Winning Hearts and Minds
The Marine Air–Ground Task Force in Nicaragua 1927–33
History Division will be moving to the Simmons Marine Corps History Center, part of the Marine Corps University. The new state-of-the-art wing will bring together all of the Marine Corps University schools into one unit. The structure will offer many new features and amenities for the student body, faculty, and staff at Marine Corps Base Quantico.


The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, January 1964–March 1965 contains more than 100 documents from the personal papers of the 23rd Commandant of the Marine Corps and is the first edited volume of personal papers to be published by the Marine Corps History Division as a monograph. Produced by a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Greene’s notes provide a firsthand account from one of the main participants in the decision-making process that led to the commitment of a large-scale American expeditionary force in Southeast Asia.

This volume begins in January 1964 and ends just before the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang on 8 March 1965, a pivotal moment that marked the official transition from the United States’ advisory mission to a more active combat mission. In doing so, it traces Greene’s growing frustration with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s equivocation and uncertainty about Southeast Asia. Along with a series of commemorative pamphlets, this book is part of the Marine Corps History Division’s effort to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War.

Reviewed by The Federalist

“...his summaries allow us greater insights into the prewar processes of decision making and the military’s role in those deliberations—a narrative that will inspire lessons to build upon.”

—Benjamin Guterman

The First Fight

U.S. Marines in Operation Starlite, August 1965

Colonel Rod Andrew Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Operation Starlite, as the Marines called it, took place on the Van Tuong Peninsula, about 10 miles south of the Marine base at Chu Lai. In the short term, the tactical victory won by the Marines validated such operational concepts as vertical envelopment, amphibious assault, and combined arms that had not been put into practice on a large scale since the Korean War. It proved that Marine ground troops and their junior officers and noncommissioned officers, as well as Marine aviators, were just as tough and reliable as their forebears who had fought in World War II and Korea. In the long term, Starlite foreshadowed the American military’s commitment to conventional warfare in Vietnam and showed how difficult it would be to defeat Communist forces in South Vietnam.

The U.S. Marine Corps in the First World War Anthology, Selected Bibliography, and Annotated Order of Battle

Annette D. Amerman

The aim of this collection of articles is to give readers the broad historical strokes to U.S. Marine Corps participation in World War I, as well as to show that the Corps’ contribution to the war effort was not limited to the 4th Marine Brigade. World War I created the modern-day Marine Corps; an adaptive force-in-readiness even when seemingly relegated to ship and barracks duty.

Hill of Angels

U.S. Marines and the Battle for Con Thien 1967 to 1968

Colonel Joseph C. Long, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

The Battle for Con Thien was not a single event. Rather, it was an amalgamation of unit actions that can arguably be said to have lasted for years, the result of the strategies and attitudes of senior leadership generally far removed from the battlefield. Hill of Angels focuses first on the planning and building of the controversial obstacle system of which Con Thien was an anchor. It then examines the period of the battle’s most intense combat—beginning in May 1967, when Marines first occupied the hill, and continuing until the early part of 1968.

The United States Marine Corps in the World War

Major Edwin N. McClellan

The United States Marine Corps in the World War provides succinct, factual, and historical information on the Marine Corps during the First World War. Published initially in 1920 as the first book from the newly created Historical Section of the Marine Corps, Major Edwin N. McClellan’s history of Marines in the first global war has stood the test of time with its statistical and concise details of the growth, activities, and combat exploits of Marines. During the 50th anniversary of the First World War, History Division provides an updated version that accounts for more accurate casualty numbers. In honor of the centennial of the First World War, this expanded version now includes short biographical sketches on key Marine Corps leaders in the war and photographs within the text. This reprint of McClellan’s seminal work is the first in a series commemorating Marines in the war.
Director’s Foreword
Charles P. Neimeyer, PhD

Winning Hearts and Minds:
The Marine Corps, the Press, and the Spanish-American War
Susan K. Brubaker

The U.S. Marines in World War I
Part II: The U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Comes to the Fore—
the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps
Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)

Rebellion, Repression, and Reform:
U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic
Breanne Robertson, PhD

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force
in Nicaragua, 1927–33:
A Campaign against Sandino’s Counterinsurgency
Lieutenant Colonel Micheal D. Russ, USMC

Development of Medical Doctrine for Amphibious
Warfare by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1930–35
Part II
Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret)

Research Note:
Organization for a Major Emergency”
Memorandum by Colonel Thomas Holcomb, USMC (1932)
Edited and with an introduction by David J. Ulbrich

Urgency Has Been the Order of the Day:
The Role of the G-1 in Operation Chromite
Edward J. Erickson and Meghan V. Ederle

Review Essay
Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary
during the Cold War
The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East:
Crucial Periods and Turning Points
Reviewed by Keith D. Dickson

Book Reviews
Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War
against East Germany
Reviewed by Thomas I. Faith

Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898–1941
Reviewed by Mark R. Folse

Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus, USA (Ret)
Annihilation Beach: A Story about the Horrific Marine Battle for Tarawa, Day One
Reviewed by Chris Blaker

120

The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action
Reviewed by G. K. Cunningham, PhD

122

Tanks in Hell: A Marine Corps Tank Company on Tarawa
Reviewed by Paul W. Westermeyer

124

Uphill Battle: Reflections on Viet Nam Counterinsurgency
Reviewed by Marilyn B. Young

126

Where Youth and Laughter Go: With “The Cutting Edge” in Afghanistan
Reviewed by R Colonel J. Matthew Lissner, USA

128

Obituary
Lieutenant General William H. Fitch, USMC (Ret)
by Fred H. Allison, PhD

130

Coming Soon. . .
Next in the Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Hill of Angels:
U.S. Marines and the Battle for Con Thien 1967 to 1968
Colonel Joseph C. Long, USMCR (Ret)

Hill of Angels, examines Marine Corps and North Vietnamese actions throughout the region that became known as "Leatherneck Square." more than a dozen Marine Operations occurred during the Battle of Con Thien. This account covers those from mid-1967 to early 1968.

Did you know . . .
All History Division publications—books and this magazine—can be sent Free of charge. Shop our full catalog of titles at https://www.history.usmc.mil and click on the publications button. Email your requests to history.division@usmc.mil.
Due to a water pipe failure this past January that caused a significant amount of damage to the still unoccupied Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center, History Division has been unavoidably delayed moving into our new facility. Fortunately, our irreplaceable archival and historical reference materials were protected and had not been moved into the building. The new relocation date is now sometime in fall 2016.

This edition of Marine Corps History is again full of interesting material on the history of our Corps. As we prepare to recognize the centennial anniversary of Marines in World War I, I hope our readers notice a partial shift in historical focus toward activities of the Corps that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century. Our first article, by Susan K. Brubaker, a former Shaw Fellow at History Division, provides an excellent launching point for a series of articles surrounding the Marine Corps following its service during the Spanish-American War. Following the Spanish-American War story, former Leatherneck editor, Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret), continues his story on the Marine Corps Reserve during World War I; the topic is pathbreaking, and I hope he continues to keep up his superb scholarship on this particular subject. Colonel Ford’s article is followed by one of History Division’s newest hires, Dr. Breanne Robertson, who is rapidly becoming the departmental expert on Marines in the Caribbean. She wrote an outstanding piece on a little-known counterinsurgency operation conducted by U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic during and after World War I. Dr. Robertson hopes to expand her work into a full-length HD monograph in a year or so.

Lieutenant Colonel Micheal D. Russ, USMC, has...
written a very timely article on the development of one of the earliest examples of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) in Nicaragua (1927–33). The deployment of Marines to Nicaragua was the largest Corps-wide operation to take place between the world wars with approximately 5,000 Marines being assigned to peacekeeping operations in Nicaragua in 1927 alone. It was here that the Marine Corps first experimented with MAGTF operations. The incorporation of organic tactical aviation revolutionized U.S. Marine Corps operations, and the valuable lessons learned were put to good use in the Pacific during World War II. In part two of his article on the development of medical doctrine during the interwar period, former Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN, continues to explore this little known but extremely important aspect of the Navy-Marine Corps team. We have nothing like his work in any of our History Division files, and Captain Oreck’s contribution is very much appreciated. Historian David Ulbrich then provides us with an excellent research note on the envisioned future role and mission of the Marine Corps by future Commandant of the Marine Corps, Colonel Thomas Holcomb. Finally, Edward J. Erickson and Meghan Ederle wrote a very interesting piece on Operation Chromite, the battle for Inchon during the Korean War. As the authors noted, the manpower difficulty the Corps found itself in during the early months of the conflict was more serious than many have previously supposed.

As usual, the magazine contains a number of excellent book reviews on the latest scholarship in military history. As director, I continue to be proud of what we have been able to accomplish with our new magazine and hope to build upon our record of excellence into the future. ♥1775♥
Winning Hearts and Minds

THE MARINE CORPS, THE PRESS, AND THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Susan K. Brubaker

“. . . the United States does not need a Marine Corps . . . the United States wants a Marine Corps.”

– Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC

The nineteenth century surged to a close on a wave of technological advances. “When we take into account the marvelous products of inventive genius with which the present century abounds . . . we can hardly find it rational to doubt the possibility of anything,” proclaims a 1 April 1898 Atlanta Constitution article discussing the possibility of a transatlantic telephone cable. The article asserts that “[s]cience within the century now drawing to a close has converted the world into one vast neighborhood.” Nowhere was this more apparent than in the press. The late nineteenth century saw the rise of popular newswire services, such as the Associated Press (AP), Reuters, and Agence France-Presse, and the advent of a “journalism of information,” which focuses on facts and a reporting style that “engages to convince readers of the authenticity of such facts.” With the expansion of the telegraph system, the relative ease and speed of steamship travel, and the laying of underwater cables, news was no longer local but global.

These technological advances along with the rise of the global press proved to be fortuitous developments for the Marine Corps. While most historians agree that the seeds of the Corps’ modern expeditionary mission were planted during the Spanish-American War, few have analyzed how press coverage of Marine exploits during the war pulled the Corps out of the shadow of the U.S. Navy and established it as an independent player on the world military stage. An examination of press coverage of three events around the turn of the century—the attempt to disband the Corps in 1894, Marine actions in the war with Spain in 1898, and President Theodore Roosevelt’s Executive Order 969 that removed Marines from ships in 1908—shows a marked change in attitude about the Marine Corps. Press coverage of the Marine Corps during the war helped America develop an appreciation for the Corps, and aided in its evolution into an independently recognized and respected institution.

To understand the Marine Corps’ precarious position in the late nineteenth century, it is necessary first to examine the dynamic changes taking place within the Navy at the time. With an unprecedented increase in funding, the Navy began rapidly replacing aged wooden ships with modern battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, and other steam-powered vessels. Having a modern, untried fleet encouraged the Navy to reexamine the business of war.

Toward that end, in October 1884, the secretary of the Navy established the Naval War College in Newport,

2 “A Trans-Marine Telephone,” Atlanta Constitution, 1 April 1898, 6.
Rhode Island, and soon a crop of energetic young officers were envisioning a brilliant future for the Navy—a vision that saw no place for the traditional role of Marines on board ships.\(^6\)

In contrast, the Marine Corps was desperately trying to survive. As historian Robert D. Heinl Jr. notes, the Marine Corps has always had “one foot in the sea, one foot on land, and its head perpetually under the sword of Damocles.”\(^7\) This was particularly true in the closing years of the nineteenth century. The Corps’ performance during the American Civil War had been lackluster. In 1864 and again in 1867, the Marine Corps faced abolishment or absorption into the Army. Both times, Navy leaders stepped in to save the Marine Corps. However, as the Navy transitioned to modern ships and ship-to-ship fighting became obsolete, Navy officials no longer saw a need for the traditional policing and boarding party duties the Marines had always performed. With increasingly specialized and skilled personnel on board its ships, the Navy found the likelihood of mutiny and general disgruntlement greatly diminished. Consequently, when the Corps’ existence was challenged again in 1894, the previously stalwart support of Navy leadership waivered.\(^8\)

On 5 February 1894, a bill to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps was referred to a joint congressional subcommittee on naval affairs.\(^9\) Though the bill called for the eventual dissolution of the Marine Corps and its partial absorption by the Army, the American press paid little attention to the possible disbanding of the Corps. On 6 February, the Washington Post reported on page six a list of proposed changes to the rank structure, organization, and size of specific corps within the Navy. Midway down the column, the Post mentioned that the rank of colonel commandant would be terminated after the incumbent officer vacated the position and no further officer commissions or enlistments into the ranks of the Marine Corps would occur.\(^10\) The New York Times, like the Post, listed the Corps’ fate in the middle of a summary of the bill that also appeared on page six. The Navy’s loss of the rank of commodore and placement of limits on its list of active officers overshadowed the demise of the Corps.\(^11\) The Sun (Baltimore) ran an article on page two highlighting what “officers found objectionable” in the bill. The article included the planned dissolution by attrition of the Marine Corps but gave little emphasis to the issue.\(^12\)

In a follow-up Post article, published 10 days later and appearing on page seven, the first hint of pushback against the Corps’ proposed demise surfaced. Senator Eugene Hale, the bill’s sponsor, noted that the proposed reorganization was “to avoid doing any injustice to any individual or corps . . . and to remove, as far as possible, all causes of contention among the several corps.”\(^13\) The New York Times reported on

---


\(^8\) Ibid., 22–33.

\(^9\) Bill To Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the Personnel of the Navy, S. 1564, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894).


\(^12\) “Naval Reorganization Plan: Features of the Bill which Officers Find Objectionable,” Sun (Baltimore), 7 February 1894, 2.

Secretary of the Navy H. A. Herbert suspected that junior officers were behind petitions demanding the removal of Marines from Navy ships. Herbert’s circular warned that any naval officers found to be involved “would be visited unhesitatingly with the severe condemnation of the Department [of the Navy].”

page four that “excitement and protest have been stirred up by the bill” and that it “antagonizes the staff corps and the Marine Corps by cutting down the former and abolishing the later.”14 The press was duly, if somewhat unenthusiastically, taking note of events taking place behind the scenes. In mid-April 1894, the Marine Corps’ first public statement ran in the papers, at which time the Post, on page 14, quoted a “prominent marine officer” as stating that the bill’s framers had forgotten that Marines were “the fighting men on board ships to-day” and that “in time of action it is the marine who can be called upon for everything.”15

Press coverage, though not blatantly supportive of the Marine Corps, still had a powerful impact on the future of the Corps. On 31 July 1894, Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert issued Navy Department Special Circular No. 16 to all U.S. naval commanders. Herbert stated he had received a petition from petty officers and men of a Navy vessel requesting Marines be removed from their ship. “This petition,” he stated, “contains an argument and is fortified by extracts from newspapers and periodicals, the circulation of which among the sailors is calculated to breed discord between them and the marines and their officers.” Herbert believed the inflammatory material was being handed around “at the instigation, or at least with the knowledge and approbation, of certain commissioned officers of the Navy.” As required, Herbert forwarded the petition to Congress but clearly was not pleased. In a firm rebuke to his troublemaking junior officers, he stated that the Navy Department, “after maturely considering the subject” and “in view of the honorable record made by the United States Marine Corps,” was convinced Marines had a place on board Navy ships.16 The press picked up the circular’s theme. On 2 August, the Sun included a lengthy article on page two under the headline, “Defends the Marines.” The article related the contents of Herbert’s circular and voiced the criticism, “For a number of years, and especially since the completion of the first ships of the new navy, there has been an attempt made to prejudice the service against the marines.” The article put the blame for the petition firmly on the shoulders of Navy officers, and quoted Herbert as stating, “The government has not anywhere in its service a more faithful or efficient body of men than the United States Marine Corps.”17 Lacking a consensus, Congress eventually tabled the matter, and the Marine Corps survived the attempt to have it evicted from warships. Unfortunately, Congress failed to address the core question of the Marines’ role in the modern fleet, but the growing influence of the press, even a relatively disinterested press, was nonetheless becoming evident.

Press coverage of a relatively insignificant incident on 14 July 1894 illustrates the growing reach of the American media. While Congress and the Department of the Navy were still debating the fate of the Corps, the U.S. military was called to arms in Sacramento, California, which was in the throes of a railroad strike. The Army attempted to clear striking rail workers from the tracks to allow a train to pass. The situation deteriorated and shots were fired. The commander of the Marines at the nearby depot sent troops to help clear the streets. Marching with fixed bayonets, the Marines swept protestors before them as the Army cavalry rushed the crowd, a U.S. marshal leading the charge. Martial law was declared, and a restive calm returned to the city. News of the incident appeared in diverse publications, including the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune, on the same day thanks to the AP.18 News of conflicts

---

16 H. A. Herbert, Special Circular No. 16 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 31 July 1894).
17 “Defends the Marines: Secretary Herbert Convinced of the Corps’ Usefulness,” Sun (Baltimore), 2 August 1894, 2.
at home and abroad was common in the years leading up to the Spanish-American War, and the Marine Corps was consistently reported in the midst of them. More frequently, Marines would also find an intrepid reporter nearby, feeding stories of danger and heroism to an eager public.

By the end of 1895, America was focused on a probable war with Spain. In *Political Science Quarterly*, an article on political events for the year noted that “the only topic of importance” was the United States’ attitude toward Spain regarding Cuban insurgents. “Many manifestations of sympathy with the insurgents,” the journal warned, “have appeared in all parts of the United States, and the so-called ‘Jingo’ press has advocated governmental action in their support.” In a 3 September 1895 speech to the Social Science Association, Commander Caspar F. Goodrich said that the Navy deprecated war but was “full of energetic officers who would quickly profit by any offered chance to distinguish themselves through valorous acts of seamanship and tactics. . . . It is our business and our duty to our country and our flag, to contrive and to study, that we may be ready when the call sounds.” The Navy had a modern fleet that had never been tried in war, and its leadership was focused on a perceived “inevitable” war with Spain. No nation, according to Admiral Stephen B. Luce, could avoid war forever. The sinking of the USS *Maine* (ACR 1) in Havana Harbor, Cuba, was the catalyst for the Spanish-American War and also caused American news correspondents to scurry to Cuba.

20 Goodrich, “Naval Education.”
In the following days, U.S. newspapers speculated on Spain's treacherous role in the disaster and demanded retribution. The U.S. military prepared for war, and the press covered every detail. Articles from across the country described men flocking to enlist, and many articles advised interested enlistees where recruiting stations could be found. The East Coast Navy yards experienced an influx of men ready to join. One recruitment story at the time illustrated the difference in relative status between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Charles B. Hobbs, who arrived at the Philadelphia Navy Yard in late April 1898, wanted to enlist in the Navy. Because he and a friend were neither seamen nor machinists, the Navy turned both away. The men then decided to “tackle the Marine Corps.” After enlisting and being sworn in, Hobbs and a fellow recruit donned their uniforms and headed into town. The local boys greeted the Marine recruits with shouts of “Halloleah” and “Amen, brother.” The Marines soon realized they were being mistaken for members of the Salvation Army. Despite articles that detailed Marines at the Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston, Massachusetts, preparing to “maintain the record of the Corps,” the public and press seemed to have a vague understanding of the Marine Corps’ relationship to the Navy. Articles about “Brave Bill Anthony” the “Hero of the Maine” exemplified the apparent confusion. Private William “Bill” Anthony was a Marine orderly on the Maine when it exploded in Havana Harbor. Meeting Captain Charles D. Sigsbee in the smoke-filled corridor outside of his quarters, Anthony calmly stated, “Excuse me, sir, but I have to smoke.”

Almost identical versions of Anthony’s heroism appeared in newspapers in Holbrook, Arizona; Shiner, Texas; and Chicago, Illinois, among others. Each article clearly identifies Anthony as a Marine but states that he spent 10 years in the Army before enlisting in the Navy, “and there he has since remained.” Before the Spanish-American War, this treatment of Marines as a mere corps in the Navy was common in the press and led to a somewhat muddled identity among the populace.

As the nation mobilized troops and massed an army of invasion in Tampa, Florida, press coverage of the war began to change. Many newspapers had correspondents in Cuba, but not all did. Those without access to overseas correspondents relied on traditional stateside sources. The “old-fashioned” articles speculated on events and couched their stories in terms of the broader concerns of their sources. Newspapers with deployed correspondents or access to AP reports filled their pages with eyewitness accounts, which relied on technology to get the story home to the states. As a result, newspapers became increasingly interested in the military’s control over the flow of information. Newspaper articles decried the lack of information available about ship and troop movements, both in the United States and Spain. Members of the press speculated that, despite being a signatory of an international convention against “interference with cables,” the United States had cut the telegraph cable from Key West, Florida, to Cuba. These were not baseless concerns or complaints. In fact, as soon as it arrived in Cuba, the U.S. Navy asked for volunteers to cut the cables in Havana Harbor. Though members of the press chafed at the military’s limitations on the flow of information, they still reported the cutting of the Havana-Santiago cable in heroic terms. The eyewitness accounts of events abroad changed the nature of newspaper articles.

Differing coverage of the landing of Marines at

24 Charles B. Hobbs biographical file, “Daily log, April 1898 to May 1900,” Historical Inquiries and Research Branch (HIRB), Marine Corps History Division (MCHD), Quantico, VA.
27 “Hero of the Maine,” Argus (Holbrook, AZ), 7 May 1898, 8; “Hero of the Maine Disaster,” Shiner Gazette (Shiner, TX), 2 March 1898, 3; and “Hero of the Maine,” Chicago Eagle, 16 April 1898, 8.
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in June 1898 is an example of this change. A front-page article in the Boston Daily Globe on 12 June declared: “Navy Wins: Guantánamo Seized by Uncle Sam’s Sea Soldiers.” The article’s subhead admonished the Army to hurry as the “Sailors Have Taken the Bloom Off the Peach.” Similar to coverage of the 1894 bill to disband the Marine Corps, the article only mentions Marines in passing and depicts the “race for glory” as one between the Army and the Navy. In contrast, the Chicago Daily Tribune ran an article the same day that gives an eyewitness account of the action and includes a sketch of Guantánamo Bay, complete with a waving U.S. flag. The correspondent describes Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington as “a handsome and soldierly man, with prominent, clear cut features” who was “considered one of the best officers in the service.” The article also notes that “Color Sergeant Silvey and Private Bill Anthony, late of the Maine, are warm friends, having been messmates for fifteen years.” The personal details and the sketch of the bay created a memorable account of events and personalized the war for readers back home. And that article was just a foreshadowing of the personalized articles on the Marines that would come out of the war.

As the war began with only the Navy and Marine Corps participating, vivid and detailed stories of the fighting filled the newspapers. An AP article in the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer described how a battalion of Marines landed from the transport ship USS Panther (AD 6) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Huntington and had “been engaged in beating off a bush attack by Spanish guerrillas and regulars since 3 o’clock Saturday afternoon.” The reporter relates the tragic death of Army surgeon John B. Gibbs in a way that makes readers feel they are personally witnessing the scene: “He was shot in the head in front of his own tent, the farthest point of the attack. He fell into the arms of Private Sullivan and both dropped. A second bullet threw dust in their faces. Surgeon Gibbs lived ten minutes, but did not regain consciousness.”

The difference between the vivid eyewitness accounts in the Tribune and Intelligencer and the traditional style used in the

On 16 June 1898, the Salt Lake Herald ran a front-page illustration of Marines landing at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. “Drawn from sketches supplied to the New York press from Cuban sources, supplemented by cable descriptions,” the illustration is an example of how modern technology and a network of sources brought the war home to everyday Americans.

Globe article is apparent, illustrating the power the war correspondent had to personalize the war for the stateside reader. The old style of citing an unnamed special correspondent to give a partisan view of events became overshadowed by the gripping personal drama depicted in the stories of the embedded reporter. In addition, on-scene reporters understood
the distinction between the Marine Corps and the Navy, and carefully reported who took part in what action, unlike the Boston Daily Globe's special correspondent who framed his story in vague terms of the "glory" of one Service over another.

Reporters such as Stephen Crane, Silvester Scovel, Charles Thrall, Alex Kenealy, and Hayden Jones took great personal risk to get their information, and were often given credit for their stories by name, which was unusual at that time. Thrall and Jones were even arrested, jailed in Cuba, and held for two weeks before U.S. troops arrived and ransomed them.34 Crane, who was part of "the first American Newspaper to open a headquarters on Cuban Soil," was a special correspondent for the New York World.35 He covered every moment of the Cuban campaign, often following troops into combat, and even served as an aide for Captain George F. Elliott during the battle for Cuzco well. The Marine Corps especially benefited from Crane's reporting. Crane was with the Marines for the landing at Guantánamo Bay, their three days of continuous fighting, and the taking of the freshwater well at Cuzco, which finally secured the bay as a safe harbor for the Navy.36 Some of Crane's most vivid stories were depictions of messengers being signaled, or wigwagged, from shore to ship. Crane—whose stories often referenced the courage a signalman needed to expose himself to the enemy in order to relay his message—had great admiration for the signalmen. One of Crane's stories tells of Huntington coming to the signalmen one night to send a message. "So the colonel and the private stood side to side and took the heavy fire without either moving a muscle," Crane wrote. According to Crane, one officer was so concerned for Huntington's safety that he asked the colonel to step down. "Why, I guess, not,' said the grey old veteran in his slow, sad, always gentle way. 'I am in no more danger than the man," Crane wrote.37 Crane's vibrant and intimate details revealed the character of the men he wrote about and personalized the war for readers back in the states.

Perhaps the most influential story Crane wrote was that of Sergeant John H. Quick during the battle for control of the well at Cuzco. The crew of the USS Dolphin (PG 24), which was providing gunfire support, was unaware that a Marine company had moved to flank the enemy. When the ship's guns unwittingly fired on the Marines' position, Captain Elliott, the ranking Marine present, called for a signalman. Crane related the events that followed:

Sergeant Quick arose and announced that he was a signalman. He produced from somewhere a blue polka-dot neckerchief as large as a quilt. He tied it on a long, crooked stick. Then he went to the top of the ridge and, turning his back to the Spanish fire, began to signal to the Dolphin. . . . To deliberately stand up and turn your back to a battle and hear immediate evidences of the boundless enthusiasm with which

36 The 1st Marine Battalion (Rein) Muster Roll, Spanish-American War of 1898, Guantánamo, Cuba, 26, Robert M. Pendleton, ed., Wars: Spanish-American (folder 2 of 5), HIRB, MCHD, Quantico, VA.
37 Stallman and Hagemann, War Dispatches of Stephen Crane, 151.
a large company of the enemy shoot at you from an adjacent thicket is, to my mind at least, a very great feat. . . . I saw Quick betray only one sign of emotion. As he swung his clumsy flag to and fro, an end of it once caught on a cactus pillar, and he looked sharply over his shoulder to see what had it. He gave the flag an impatient jerk. He looked annoyed.38

For his actions, Quick received the Medal of Honor. After the initial run, Crane’s story was reprinted in McClure’s Magazine and in a book of war stories Crane published after the war.39

While Crane was perhaps the most famous war correspondent at the time, he was not the only correspondent. First-person accounts of the war by AP reporters, for example, filled the pages of newspapers in such places as Los Angeles, California; Anaconda, Montana; Sacramento, California; Wheeling, West Virginia; and Willmar, Minnesota, and helped put a personal face on the war.40 War reporting had become big business.

In fact, after the war, McClure’s Magazine printed a five-page article titled “How the News of the War is Reported,” that discussed the high cost newspapers had incurred to get the story, including paying correspondents and insuring and supplying dispatch boats to ferry stories to Key West, Florida. According to the article, after the sinking of the Maine, “half a hundred great newspapers began to fill with news and pictures.” Reporters had nearly unlimited access. Many U.S. Navy warships, including Admiral William T. Sampson’s flagship the USS New York (ACR 2), had correspondents on board. Onshore correspondents like Crane used complex systems to meet dispatch ships and transmit news.41 This well-funded and well-organized system allowed for more intimate coverage of the war than the public had experienced during previous conflicts. While it is impossible to specifically gauge whether Crane’s vivid stories of Marines in Guantánamo influenced Americans’ attitudes toward the Corps, the Spanish-American War undoubtedly brought the Marine Corps into the national spotlight.

That spotlight did not fade with the war. Soon, Marines were on the ground in the Philippines, China, and Guam, and stories of their exploits appeared regularly in U.S. newspapers.42 But despite the coverage, trouble was stirring once again for the Corps. Even as Congress voted to improve pay for Marines and to increase their numbers, a new attempt to disband the Corps was brewing. This time, however, when the news hit the papers, the press was anything but disinterested.

On 10 December 1906, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation Rear Admiral George A. Converse testified before the House Committee on Naval Affairs that the Marine Corps belonged onshore—emphasizing that the Corps was an expeditionary force not a police force.43 Four months later, after much debate, Navy Secretary Victor H. Metcalf tabled the matter, stating that the issue of Marines serving on ships had already been decided. Unfortunately for the Marine Corps, the debate did not end there. President Theodore Roosevelt agreed with Admiral Converse that the Marine Corps should be an overseas expeditionary force and a domestic garrison. Roosevelt, a close friend of Army General Leonard Wood, also believed the Corps could better perform those duties as part of the Army.44 On 12 November 1908, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 969, which defined the duties of the United States Marine Corps.45 Metcalf

38 Ibid., 153–54.
40 For examples, see “Forty-Eight Hours of Fighting,” Heraldo (Los Angeles), 15 June 1898, 1; “The Invasion of Cuba Has Begun,” Anaconda Standard (Montana), 31 May 1898, morning edition, 1; “Spanish Attack,” Wheeling Daily Intelligencer (West Virginia), 13 June 1898, 1; and “Fight Continues,” Willmar Tribune (Minnesota), 14 June 1898, 5.
42 Bureau of Navigation—Statement of Rear-Admiral George A. Converse Before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, 59th Cong., 2d sess. 28 (10 December 1906).
President Theodore Roosevelt’s Executive Order 969 regarding the duties of Marines caused a firestorm in the press and launched congressional investigations into the status of the Marine Corps and the power of the president.

resigned due to ill health, and on 18 November, Truman H. Newberry, acting Navy secretary, on mandate from Roosevelt, ordered Marine detachments off Navy warships.46

The executive order evoked an immediate response in the newspapers. The New York Times ran a front-page article stating that the president “promulgated the order on the recommendation of a number of line officers of the navy” and that the order resulted in “deep and grievous grumbling within the Marine Corps.”47 A similar page-one article in the Sun (Baltimore) stated, “As a result of the efforts of navy officers to relegate the Marine Corps, the President today issued an executive order removing the marine detachments from all men-of-war.”48 News articles celebrating the Corps’ proud history began appearing in newspapers across the country. The Boston Daily Globe published a poem titled “Semper Fidelis” that opens with a lament about the Marine Corps being pushed out to “temper the spleen of the sailor man.” It lists past glories of the Corps and acknowledges that in peacetime the country could survive without the Marines, but warns of a time when America would “want the brawn of the ‘Leathernecks’” but “the want may be in vain.”49

An article in the Youth’s Companion explains the presidential order, gives a brief history of the Corps, and concludes that Marines “performed deeds which have made them respected by the other branches of the service, and loved by all the people.”50 Whether the other Services respected the Marines was debatable; however, no reason existed to doubt the affection the American people now felt for the Marine Corps.

Unlike previous attempts, the president’s order did not specifically threaten to abolish the Marine Corps—it merely delineated the Corps’ duties and serving on ships was no longer among those duties.51 The public was outraged. One day after the executive order was signed, an article in the Chicago Daily Tribune speculated that, since the president was “depriving” the Marines of sea duty, the Army would eventually absorb the Corps.52 By December 1908, a move was afoot in Congress to counter the order. On 12 December, the Sun reported that some congressmen wanted to overturn the president’s order; a “prominent member of the House” warned that “if the Naval Committee did not take some step to defend the Marine Corps, a provision would be offered on the floor of the House expressing disapproval of the President’s policy.”53 The Senate also took action. On 17 December, it passed a resolution questioning the president’s authority to remove Marines from ships and referred the matter to the Senate Com-

---

50 “The Marines,” Youth’s Companion 82, no. 50 (10 December 1908): 626.
51 Status of the U.S. Marine Corps, 395-96.
52 “Marines Shifted to Duty on Land: President’s Order Believed to Mean Revolution for the Whole Corps,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 November 1908, 4.
53 “Stand by Marine Corps,” Sun, 12 December 1908, 5.
The House acted first. On 7 January 1909, the House Subcommittee on Naval Academy and Marine Corps began questioning Navy officers to “elicit information as to the present and prospective status of the Marine Corps.”

A parade of Navy officers testified. The majority of those officers stated they favored the removal of Marines from ships but preferred to retain the Marines rather than lose them to the Army. Meanwhile, newspapers churned out stories. The *Washington Post* editorialized that Marines were removed from Navy ships because they “irritated” sailors. “To set against the splendid service of marines aboard ship . . . the mere fact that they irritate the sailor, which has not been proved,” the editor argued, was no reason to deny Marines their traditional role. Articles in support of Marines appeared in the *Atlanta Constitution*, *Boston Daily Globe*, *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and *Outlook* weekly magazine, among others.

The prevalent news coverage of the Marine Corps was even introduced into the Congressional Record. Testimony revealed that Commander William Fullam was behind the 1894 movement to remove Marines from Navy ships and that he had written the letter to Secretary Herbert in 1906 that instigated the situation Congress was currently investigating. Fullam was ordered to appear before the committee. When he finally took the stand, Fullam engaged in combative exchanges with the board. Confronted with testimony from the head of the Navy’s Bureau of Navigation that “bluejackets” (sailors) had never complained about Marines being on ships, Fullam contended that the Marines were untouchable and that complaining was pointless because the Corps’ “influence” was too strong to fight. Queried for details, Fullam replied that sailors saw statements “all through the newspapers” that Marines must be kept on board ships to control them. He introduced ar-

---

*Photo courtesy of the Washington Post*

A full-page article in the 29 November 1908 *Washington Post* was just one of several that appeared in newspapers across the United States in response to Executive Order 969. Unlike in 1894, the press extensively covered this threat to the Marine Corps.
articles from the *Greenville News* (North Carolina), a Dallas, Texas, paper, and the *New Orleans Picayune* to support his point. “The mere fact that such things are published abroad, broadcast over this country,” Fullam argued, “is reason enough for withdrawing the cause of it.”59 Building on those statements, he reasoned that this public attitude influenced junior officers, who, as a result, learned not to trust their men. In short, Fullam maintained that the superiority of the Marines, as perpetuated by the press, kept the Navy from reaching its full potential. Additionally, he claimed that press coverage “seriously injures the reputation of the blue jacket among the people at large, and affects the recruiting, and affects respect for his [the sailor’s] uniform.” Fullam also added that having Marines on ships “creates a privileged military class, subordinating the blue jacket to a man who is in no respect his [the sailor’s] superior and is, in many respects his inferior.”60

Predictably, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, then Brigadier General George F. Elliott (and coincidentally the officer in Crane’s wig-wag flag account at Cuzco well), took offense and interrupted the proceedings. Fullam refused to back down, asserting that Marines were “looked up to as the élite corps aboard ship . . . that they have insisted on their being the élite corps.”61 Fullam’s hostile attitude brought a series of rebuttals from the Marine Corps and from the congressmen present. The board dismissed Fullam’s arguments as unfounded. The subcommittee determined that the president had insufficient reasons for removing the Marines, and also found that the cost of removal would be more than if Marines simply returned to shipboard duty. Congress then made the Naval Appropriations Act of 1910 contingent upon Marines serving on board Navy ships.62

Heinl argues in his article “The Cat with More than Nine Lives” that practicality saved the Corps in the days between the Civil War and World War I. While true, practicality was not the Corps’ only saving grace. In “Evolution of the U.S. Marine Corps as a Military Elite,” Dennis Showalter writes, “The change of the Marine Corps’ status is inseparable from the emergence of the modern war correspondent.”63 Undeniably, the growing power of the press played a part in maintaining the status of the Corps. In fact, most historians of the Spanish-American War mention the influence of the press in some way. Piero Gleijeses focuses on the power of the press in his 2003 article, “1898: The Opposition to the Spanish-American War.”64 John A. Corry contends in 1898: Prelude to a Century that yellow journalism and the “heat of public opinion” forced America into war with Spain. In support, he quotes a Maine con-
gressman as saying, “Every Congressman had two or three newspapers in his district . . . shouting for blood.” If the press had the power to nudge a nation toward war, it certainly had the power to save a long-standing branch of the armed forces. While no evidence conclusively shows that newspapers and public sentiment swayed Congress to save the Marine Corps in 1909, it is clear that the attitudes of the press and the public toward the Corps distinctly changed between 1894 and 1909. The press, like the country, was just finding its footing and flexing its muscles at the turn of the century. Newspapers and, by extension, the American people began looking at the Marine Corps with new interest and affection. Heinl writes that the modern Marine Corps has become a “unique, vital, and colorful part of the American scene.” If that statement is accurate, that process began in Cuba with men like Sergeant Quick and his wig-wag flag and Stephen Crane and his pen.

Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)

Over the course of several parts, we are discovering the story of the Marine Corps Reserve from its evolution out of the state and naval militias into a national defense force, particularly its contribution to Marine Corps efforts in the First World War. A discussion of the Reserve’s part in this history would be incomplete without an analysis of aviation and its role in the Great War.

The Early Days

The Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps (MCRFC) did not get off the ground rapidly after Congress authorized the Naval Appropriations Act of August 1916. At that time, aviation in the Marine Corps was still in its infancy, and the early leaders in Marine Corps aviation were fighting hard to gain men, equipment, and flying fields, working closely with the U.S. Navy. Oversight of Marine aviation came through a section at Headquarters Marine Corps, and little is known of the organization and administration of the budding MCRFC.¹

In its youth at the beginning of World War I (WWI), Marine aviation can be traced back to the first Marine naval aviator, First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham. He appeared on the rolls of the Naval Aviation School, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, as the “Only Marine Officer Present” in May 1912.² By August 1912, he was the first qualified Marine naval aviator.³ Cunningham became known as the “Father of Marine Corps Aviation,” but not simply because he was the first aviator.⁴ He was a driving force in all early Marine aviation activities and particularly in readying the MCRFC for duty in the war.

Bringing on the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps for War

When the United States entered WWI, the Marine Corps had six Marine officers classified as naval aviators; although none were identified as reservists.⁵ But the surge was on, and a large segment of the buildup in aviation manpower came via Marine Corps recruiting efforts, selecting highly qualified Marine enlisted men for aviation training and the Navy Reserve flying programs.

Quick to get into the action, the first Marine
Corps Reserve officer reported for aviation duty less than a month after war was declared. Reserve Marine Second Lieutenant Edmund G. Chamberlain was listed as “on aviation duty” on the muster roll of the Aeronautic Company, Advanced Base Force, Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, from Houston, Texas, on 2 May 1917. Chamberlain earned his wings as Naval Aviator No. 96 ½ and remained in Marine Corps aviation during the war, but not as a reservist.6 He integrated into the Marine Corps on 6 September 1917, prior to earning his naval aviator designation. Chamberlain was followed by Second Lieutenant Marcus A. Jordan from Washington, DC, who was listed as “on aviation duty” on 18 May 1917.7 By early July 1917, Jordan was posted on the muster roll of the 7th Company, 5th Regiment, at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and dropped from aviation duty, but remained in the Marine Corps Reserve.8

Jordan never lost his love of aviation, and it eventually cost him his life. He deployed to France with his regiment and, on 16 October 1917, worked his way back into aviation through attachment to the Aviation Section, Signal Corps, U.S. Army, where he was ordered to the Aviation Training School in Foggia, Italy, for “instructions in flying.” Jordan took his first training flight on 28 October 1917.9 Advancing rapidly, he took his last training flight on 6 November and became an “Instructor of Cadets in Machine Gunnery.”10 While attached to the 8th Aviation Instruction Center in Foggia and still a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve, but not a designated naval aviator, he was killed on 27 March 1918 in a crash during a training flight near Foggia.11

To more effectively build and prepare a Marine Corps aviation organization for war, just three weeks after the U.S. declaration of war in April 1917, the relatively small Marine Aviation Section, U.S. Navy Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, was divided with some of the Marines forming the Marine Aeronautic Company, Advanced Base Force, Philadelphia Navy Yard, under the command of Cunningham. At Pensacola, the training had been focused on seaplanes. The new aviation unit at Philadelphia was to be a combination land and water unit with training in seaplanes, land aircraft, and observation balloons.12

On 12 October 1917, to refine aviation organization and focus flight skills, aircraft types, and missions, the Marine Aeronautic Company was split into two units: 1st Marine Aeronautic Company and 1st Aviation Squadron.13

The 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, with 10 officers, only one who—Captain Francis T. Evans—was designated a naval aviator, and 96 enlisted men, emphasized seaplane operations and relocated to Naval Coastal Air Station Cape May, New Jersey. Among those officers arriving at Cape May on 14 October

---

13 Ibid.
1917 were two MCRFC officers who were not yet designated naval aviators: Second Lieutenants Alan H. Boynton and Amor L. Smith. Also on the initial muster roll of the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company was one Fleet Marine Corps Reserve sergeant and two privates in the National Naval Volunteers (NNV).14

Although deeply involved in training its potential Reserve pilots, the company immediately became operational, flying sea patrols from Cape May with its two Curtiss R-6 seaplanes.15 It became the first Marine Corps aviation unit to deploy in an operational mode for the war when, in January 1918, it arrived at Naval Base 13, Ponta Delgada, Azores, equipped and ready for sea patrols.16

The other unit formed from the Marine Aeronautic Company was 1st Aviation Squadron, commanded by Cunningham. The new unit, with 24 officers, including one Marine gunner, and 19 enlisted men, was moved a little later in October 1917 to an Army flying field, Hazelhurst Field, Mineola, Long Island, New York. Cunningham and the second senior officer, Captain Roy S. Geiger, spent a great deal of that month away from the unit, leaving Captain William M. McIlvain as the senior officer present in the new command. While none of the officers were noted as members of the Marine Corps Reserve on the muster roll, three sergeants and five privates were, along with three NNV.17 Of the initial 24 officers, only 3 were designated naval aviators: Cunningham, McIlvain, and Geiger.18

The Army’s Hazelhurst Field focused on training pilots for landplane flying.19 The Marines of 1st Aviation Squadron remembered Hazelhurst Field because of the intense cold and poor flying conditions.20 But the icy weather was not long endured as the Marine Corps’ search for an aviation training site in a more favorable climate paid off. On New Year’s Day 1918, the 1st Aviation Squadron, including 14 Reserve second lieutenants not yet designated Marine aviators,21 left Mineola for the more aviation-friendly weather of the Army’s Gerstner Field in Lake Charles, Louisiana.22

Training and Qualifying Marine Corps Reserve Aviators

With Marine aviation training for landplanes now at Gerstner Field and seaplane operations at Cape May, another Marine aviation training site was being pursued by Geiger, who, with a small detachment including three MCRFC second lieutenants not yet designated naval aviators, moved south to Naval Air Station (NAS) Coconut Grove, Florida, in February 1918.23 Marine aviators, trained at this naval air station, earned their naval aviator designation flying seaplanes, but Geiger saw the need to get all the

---

14 Marine Aeronautic Company, Naval Coastal Air Station, Cape May, MRoll, October 1917, Roll 0130, Ancestry.com; and, names on the above muster roll were compared with the designated naval aviators in Roxanne M. Kaufmann, 1912-2012: 100 Years of Marine Corps Aviation: An Illustrated History (Quantico, VA: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2011), 314.
16 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 36.
18 Comparing the names on the October MRoll with the designated naval aviators listed by Kaufmann, 100 Years of Marine Corps Aviation, 314.
19 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 71.
21 First Aviation Squadron, MRoll, January 1918, Roll 0131, Ancestry.com; and Kaufmann, 100 Years of Marine Corps Aviation, 314.
22 Sherrod, “Marine Corps Aviation,” 55.
Corps’ early pilots, including the Marine reservists, to add the land dimension to their qualifications. He arranged for the Marines to use the old Curtiss Flying School strip near the Everglades. On 1 April 1918, the nomadic 1st Aviation Squadron arrived at its new home, the newly renamed Marine Flying Field Miami, Florida. With this move, Geiger and McIlvain’s units were combined and the 1st Marine Aviation Force (FMAF) was established. The training of pilots greatly expanded as the Navy permitted large-scale movement from its aviation units to the new Marine unit.

Three of the Marine Reserve officers, who had been with the 1st Aviation Squadron from Philadelphia to Mineola and at the Marine Flying Field Miami with the recently activated FMAF, serve as good examples of the differing routes taken to become naval aviators in the MCRFC: William H. Derbyshire, Jesse A. Nelson, and Fred S. Robillard.

Second Lieutenant Derbyshire, Naval Aviator No. 533, was the first MCRFC officer to be designated a naval aviator. He did not enter via the U.S. Naval Reserve Flying Corps (USNRFC), as did most of the early Marine Reserve aviators, and was not former enlisted. He enrolled as a second lieutenant in the MCRFC at Marine Barracks Philadelphia on 26 September 1917 after graduating from Harvard and was assigned to 1st Aviation Squadron in Philadelphia.

Second Lieutenants Boynton and Smith preceded Derbyshire’s enrollment in the MCRFC in September 1917 but were not designated naval aviators by the time Derbyshire qualified. Boynton, Naval Aviator No. 856, may well have been delayed in being designated a naval aviator because of the operational tempo of his unit, the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, which began sea patrols off the East Coast followed quickly by deployment to the Azores. The reason for Smith’s precedence as Naval Aviator No. 2761 is less evident because he transferred from 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, Naval Coastal Air Station Cape May, on 5 November 1917 to join Marine Aviation Section, NAS Pensacola, where he remained until 12 January 1918 when he was transferred to Marine Barracks New York, and discharged in January 1918. He then joined the U.S. Army, commissioned a second lieutenant, and honorably discharged after the Armistice.

Derbyshire trained at the Army flying field, Mineola, for landplane duty and qualified as a Reserve military aviator on 24 November 1917 and then moved with Geiger’s Aeronautic Detachment from Philadelphia to NAS Coconut Grove, where he was designated a naval aviator on 28 February 1918. He was injured in an aircraft accident in Miami on 12 March 1918 and remained on sick leave until September of that year. As a result of the accident, his designation as a naval aviator was revoked on 17 September 1918, and he was detached from aviation.

Nelson’s Marine Corps service and ultimate qualification as a Marine Corps Reserve aviator began when he originally enlisted as a private on 27 June 1913. He reenlisted and, because of special skills, was appointed sergeant and assigned to the Aeronautic Company, Advanced Base Force, Philadelphia, in August 1917. Continuing to excel, Nelson was appointed Marine gunner in October 1917 while at Mineola and then commissioned a second lieutenant in the MCRFC on 21 December 1917. He relocated with the squadron to Gerstner Field in January 1918 and attained designation as Naval Aviator No. 589 while with the FMAF at Marine Flying Field Miami on 17 April 1918. He sailed for France with the FMAF in July 1918 and flew with the FMAF as part of the Day Wing, Northern Bombing Group, at La Fresne, France, until the end of the war. Nelson was
The First 20 Marine Corps Reserve Naval Aviators

Naval aviator precedence numbers were used to identify the first Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps (MCRFC) aviators. The first 20 Marine Corps Reserve naval aviators are listed below by name, naval aviator precedence number, and date of designation. All Marine Corps aviators listed here came via the U.S. Naval Reserve Flying Corps (USNRFC). Only 1 of these 20, Herman A. Peterson, entered the USNRFC via the National Naval Volunteers. Peterson enrolled in the New York Naval Militia on 2 March 1917 and was mustered into federal service at Bay Shore, New York, on 7 April 1917 and ordered to Key West, Florida. He was assigned to 1st Marine Aviation Force (FMAF) at Marine Flying Field Miami, Florida, while still a lieutenant junior grade in the USNRFC. Peterson accepted an appointment as a first lieutenant in the MCRFC on 16 August 1918 while deployed with the FMAF in France.

Fractions in a naval aviator precedence number are the result of more than one aviator designated with that number. If the aviator originally enrolled as a Marine Corps Reserve officer but disenrolled from the Reserve and enrolled in the Marine Corps prior to being designated a naval aviator (e.g., Edmund G. Chamberlain), that Marine aviator is not listed.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Naval aviator number</th>
<th>Date designated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradford, Doyle**</td>
<td>111 ½</td>
<td>5 November 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webster, Clifford L.</td>
<td>112 ½</td>
<td>5 November 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright, Arthur H.</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>6 December 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterson, Herman A.</td>
<td>163 ½</td>
<td>2 November 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laughlin, George McC. III</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>12 December 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ames, Charles B.</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>21 December 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaver, John H.</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>21 January 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prichard, Alvin L.</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>21 January 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willman, George C.</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>22 January 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elvidge, Herbert D.</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>12 May 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt, Hazen C.</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>8 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark, Sidney E.</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>8 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schley, Fredrick C.***</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>8 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needham, Charles A.</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>14 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates, John B.</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>25 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talbot, Ralph</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>10 April 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comstock, Thomas C.</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>26 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarkson, Francis O.</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>28 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamson, Guy M.</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>25 March 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alder, Grover C.</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>25 March 1918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Civilian flight instructor with the U.S. Army prior to enrolling in USNRFC.

*** The spelling of his first name on muster rolls varies: Frederick, Frederic, and Fredrick. The muster roll of 4th Squadron, 1st Marine Aviation Force, Marine Flying Field Miami lists him as “disenrolled” on 17 August 1917.
among the few Reserve aviators who commissioned in the Marine Corps. He retired from the Corps because of disability in December 1935.33

Robillard took a different route and served as another example of the MCRFC and its contributions to success in the Great War. He enrolled as a sergeant in the Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4c, on 30 June 1917 in Chicago. Initially sent to the Aeronautic Company, Advanced Base Force, Philadelphia, Robillard was on the roster when the company split, and he became an enlisted mechanic in 1st Aviation Squadron.34 He trailed along with the squadron to Mineola where he was appointed a second lieutenant, MCRFC, Class 5, then on to Gerstner Field with the 1st Aviation Squadron in early January 1918.35

Robillard then accompanied the squadron to join the FMAF at Marine Flying Field Miami, designated Naval Aviator No. 602 on 17 April 1918, and became a pilot in Squadron B, FMAF. He sailed with the FMAF to be initially assigned to Field “D” near Calais, France, for duty with the Day Wing, Northern Bombing Group, where he earned the Navy Cross for his actions alongside other Allied armies during operations along the Belgian front from September 1918 to the end of the war. He was released from active duty in 1919, but reentered the Marine Corps in 1921, and went on to a very distinguished career, retiring as a major general on 1 October 1952.36

The Marine Corps Reserve officer with the lowest precedence as a naval aviator, Herman A. Peterson, Naval Aviator No. 163 ½, entered the MCRFC through the U.S. Naval Reserve Force. Peterson had been a member of the New York Naval Militia, mustered into federal service with his Navy unit as a National Naval Volunteer on 7 April 1917 and designated a naval aviator on 2 November 1917.37 He is on the June 1918 FMAF muster roll; however, Peterson was still a lieutenant (junior grade).38 He was not discharged from the Navy Reserve to accept his appointment as a first lieutenant in the MCRFC until 16 August 1918 while in France.39 Peterson earned the Navy Cross “for distinguished and heroic service . . . while serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bomb Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October and November, 1918, bombing enemy

33 Arthur, Contact!, 183.
36 Arthur, Contact!, 187-88.
37 Ibid., 77. Peterson and George McC. Laughlin, Naval Aviator No.165, are noted on page 16 of Reserve Officers Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve, as former members of the National Naval Volunteers. Contact!, notes Laughlin left Yale University after two years and enrolled as a sailor on 17 April 1917, was designated Naval Aviator No. 165, and was appointed an ensign in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps on the same day, 12 December 1917. He transferred to the MCRFC, already a qualified pilot, on 26 May 1918. According to U.S. Naval Aviation, vol. 2, Laughlin’s service listed at the time of designation as a naval aviator was National Naval Volunteer. Laughlin also earned a Navy Cross in France.
39 Arthur, Contact!, 77.
Captain Thomas R. Shearer: Texas Naval Militia Member, National Naval Volunteer, and Marine Corps Reserve Aviator

Capt. Thomas R. “Bull” Shearer was among the Marine Corps Reserve’s aviators who did not deploy to Europe during WWI but gained command stateside. Shearer began his journey to become a Reserve aviator via Company A, Texas National Naval Militia, Marine Corps Branch, in April 1917. Shearer is possibly the sole Marine aviator to gain wartime command with a career beginning in the Marine element of a state naval militia.

According to *The Recruiters’ Bulletin* of March 1917, Shearer “of Houston, Texas . . . organized and mustered into the state Service the first Marine Company in the Texas Naval Militia.” The 51-man company asked to be called “The McLemore Marines” in honor of Colonel Albert S. McLemore, the assistant adjutant and inspector of the Marine Corps, who headed Marine Corps recruiting.2

The Marine company was organized on 10 February 1917 with Shearer as its captain. On 6 April 1917, less than two months after the unit was created, the company was ordered to federal service, the day the United States declared war against Germany.3 The same day, motivated Texans and their enthusiastic commander reported to the local rendezvous site in Houston. From there, the company members traveled to the federal rendezvous site in New Orleans, Louisiana, arriving on 12 April. There they were enrolled into the National Naval Volunteers (NNV).4

By late May, Shearer and his unit were stationed at Marine Barracks NAS Pensacola, Florida. In January 1918, while still a member of the NNV, Shearer was transferred to command the Marine Aviation Section at NAS Pensacola and began flight training to become a qualified seaplane pilot.5 On 4 April 1918, he was designated Naval Aviator No. 559. Just one month later, as the commander, Shearer suspended himself from duty for five days for “flying in the fog.”6

On 1 July 1918, he transferred from the NNV, Marine Corps Branch, to the Marine Corps Reserve at the rank of captain. At that point, he became commander of the Marine Aviation Section, NAS Miami, and on 15 July 1918, he was placed in charge of all aerial patrols flying from the NAS. His unit flew the difficult air patrols in the Florida Straits until just after the Armistice.7

---

3 Arthur, *Contact!*, 175.
4 Company A, Texas National Naval Militia, Marine Corps Branch, MRol.
bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc."

The Marine Corps flew into a bit of friction with the Navy based on its rejection of a significant number, 17, of the USNRF pilots who came to the FMAF from the Navy in late May and early June 1918. Cunningham was caught in the middle. Although listed on the FMAF muster roll in June 1918, Cunningham, now a captain, remained on temporary duty at Headquarters Marine Corps, leaving Geiger at Marine Flying Field Miami to evaluate the mix of officer and enlisted pilots arriving from the Navy in June. The course of instruction at Marine Flying Field Miami was very challenging. It included basic or preliminary flying; then advanced acrobatic and formation flying; and bombing, gunnery, and reconnaissance flights. The reconnaissance training included aerial photography.

Despite being in Washington, DC, Cunningham, working for the Major General Commandant, continued his pursuit of additional aviation resources—people, aircraft, more airfields, etc.—while Geiger screened and trained would-be Marine aviators in Florida. On 11 June 1918, Cunningham wrote Geiger at Marine Flying Field Miami, "Note that the Board [run by Geiger] has turned down seventeen of the Navy pilots, and believe that they do not realize the conditions. As you know one-half of the pilots are nothing but machine gunners. The Navy have [sic] fallen down on us in the matter of giving more pilots." Positioning the highly regarded Shearer—who was known for getting things done—at NAS Miami would earn current and future benefits for the Marine Corps.

Shearer remained in the Marine Corps after the war, integrating into the regular Marine Corps in September 1919. He died on 21 April 1937 while on active duty serving as the operations and training officer at Headquarters Squadron, 1M, Aircraft One, Fleet Marine Force, Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia.

8 Letters of 26 and 29 June 1918 from 1stLt Harvey B. Mims to Capt Alfred A. Cunningham, Alfred A. Cunningham Personal Papers, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, MCU, Quantico, VA.
the Navy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Boston, Massachusetts. Enlisted Marines selected as promising flyers were appointed temporary gunnery sergeants and ordered to a 10-week ground training course at MIT. After ground school graduation, they did their actual flying at Marine Flying Field Miami and, upon qualifying, commissioned second lieutenants in the MCRFC. The first class for enlisted Marines did not enter this program until 10 July 1918, so it did not have a significant impact on the number of qualified MCRFC pilots fighting in France.46

However, the MIT program did provide pilots for the FMAF in France. One of the USNRFC officers who entered through the MIT program and later transferred to the MCRFC to serve with distinction in Europe was Ralph Talbot. In June 1917, Talbot left Yale University to join the DuPont Aviation School in Wilmington, Delaware. The war was on and he wanted to contribute. He enrolled as a seaman second class on 25 October 1917, completed the MIT ground training course, and was ordered to NAS Key West, Florida. There he was commissioned an ensign in the USNRFC on 8 April 1918 and then later designated Naval Aviator No. 456. Talbot took advantage of the Navy’s willingness to let its pilots transfer to the MCRFC at Marine Flying Field Miami and was commissioned a second lieutenant on 26 May 1918. In mid-July, Talbot deployed overseas with the FMAF and earned a unique place in Marine Corps history.47

Marine Corps Reserve Aviators Deploy to the Azores

The Germans had operated submarines in the Atlantic Ocean during the early years of the war, wreaking havoc on shipping, and there was concern that they might try to establish an advance base in Portugal’s Azores archipelago. The British had been watching the area and the U.S. Navy had used Ponta Delgada, São Miguel Island, Azores, for ship repairs. The U.S. Navy collier, USS Orion (AC 11) was in Ponta Delgada undergoing repairs when, early on the morning of 4 July 1917, German submarine U-155 began shelling the town. Orion returned fire, although her stern was out of the water, driving off the submarine.48 This helped make the decision to get Portuguese consent to establish a shore installation at Ponta Delgada.49

On 7 December 1917, the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company—with its experience flying sea patrols from Cape May—was selected to deploy to the Azores and establish shore installation (Naval Base 13) at Ponta Delgada, and the company began flying antisubmarine patrols. The company arrived with 10 Curtiss R-6, 2 Curtiss N-9 seaplanes, and 6 Curtiss HS-L flying boats on 22 January 1918.50 Among the Marines arriving at Naval Base 13 in January were one MCRFC officer, Second Lieutenant Boynton, two Marine Corps Reserve privates, and four NNV privates.51

In the Azores, the Aeronautic Company Marines

46 Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation, 20.
47 Arthur, Contact!, 148–49.
48 Josephus Daniels, Our Navy at War (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1922), 276–77.
50 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 71, provides details on the number and type of aircraft and indicates the unit arrived on 21 January; however, 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, MRoll, January 1918, Roll 0132, Ancestry.com, indicates arrival on 22 January 1918.
51 First Marine Aeronautic Company, MRoll, January 1918.
flew daily patrols out to a radius of 70 miles off the island, most often monotonous with little, if any, contact. The Marines were ordered back to the United States on 24 January 1919, arriving at Marine Flying Field Miami on 15 March 1919.

The company strength for March (7 officers and 60 enlisted men) included 2 Marine Corps Reserve officers (Class 5 and Class 1) and 3 Marine Corps Reserve enlisted.

Also deployed to Naval Base 13 in January 1918 was a Marine 7-inch naval gun unit, commanded by Captain Maurice G. Holmes. The unit, Foreign Expeditionary Detachment, Naval Base 13, and its 51-Marine detachment included six members of the Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4. Holmes commanded the detachment through the Armistice, departing on 22 November 1918. The guns were later turned over to the Portuguese rather than transported back to the United States.

Marine Reserve Aviators in the War in Europe

Involvement of Marine Corps aviation in WWI came about through the initiatives of Cunningham, although it was supported by the Major General Commandant, other officers at Headquarters Marine Corps, and U.S. Navy leadership. The German submarine menace had to be curtailed; and bombing of
the Belgian submarine shelters (or pens) in Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Bruges was a mission taken on by the U.S. Navy. The Navy dispatched a limited force to France in June 1917 to initiate the bombing but did not have enough air assets. Cunningham, during a visit to the front in late 1917, saw an opportunity for Marine aviation to get into the action by assisting the Navy. Cunningham asked for and received a Marine force of a headquarters and four squadrons in early 1918 and now, with the United States about a year into the war, Marine aviation had a combat assignment. The Marine Corps needed pilots to support the Navy’s mission, so the Navy permitted its pilots to transfer to the MCRFC in May and June 1918.

The FMAF—with its headquarters and Squadrons A, B, and C that arrived in Brest, France, on board the USS De Kalb (ID 3010) on 30 July 1918 to join the Day Wing, Northern Bombing Group—demonstrated the significance of the almost two-year-old Marine Corps Reserve. The FMAF included 272 members of the Marine Corps Reserve and six NNV out of a total of 787 men—35.3 percent were Marine Corps Reserve and NNV. The representation of the Marine Corps Reserve was dramatic among the officers: 12 of the 17 first lieutenants, or 71 percent; 71 of 77 second lieutenants, or 92 percent; and 11 of 11 Marine gunners, 100 percent.

With Cunningham commanding FMAF, the flying squadrons were commanded by Captain Geiger, Squadron A; Captain McIlvain, Squadron B; and Captain Douglas B. Roben, Squadron C. These squadron commanders, plus the future commander of Squadron D, First Lieutenant Russell A. Presley, arrived in France as an advance party, coordinating with the Navy’s Northern Bombing Group, around mid-June 1918. Squadron D did not join the Day Wing until after landing in France on 5 October 1918. This squadron added 222 Marines and Navy men to the Day Wing, of which 102 were Marine Corps Reserves—34 of 39 officers were reservists. When the FMAF became the Marine Day Wing of the U.S. Navy Northern Bombing Group, the four

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 530634

The first Marine aircraft destroyed in air battle in WWI also resulted in the pilot, 2dLt Harvey C. Norman, MCRFC, and observer, 2dLt Caleb B. Taylor, MCRFC, above, Squadron C, FMAF, being killed in action. Their aircraft was attacked by seven enemy aircraft on 22 October 1918 over the Bruges-Ghent Canal, Belgium.

Marine squadrons were redesignated the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Squadrons, respectively.

With a shortage of aircraft, Cunningham turned to the British Royal Air Force (RAF), with its numerous available aircraft and lack of fully trained pilots, for his FMAF pilots to gain flight time. Marine pilots and observers were assigned to RAF Squadrons 217 and 218 to fly combat missions over the German lines. One of these pilots, MCRFC Second Lieutenant Chapin C. Barr, flying with Squadron 218, died.

60 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 34.
63 Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation, 19.
66 Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation, 21.
on 29 September 1918 of wounds received in a combat raid over enemy territory. Barr was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions in combat and was the first Marine aviator to die as a result of enemy action. Also, while flying with Squadron 218, Marine pilots participated in the first aerial resupply on 2 and 3 October when food was dropped to a surrounded French unit. One of the three Marine pilots participating in that food drop was MCRF Second Lieutenant Frank Nelms Jr., who earned a Navy Distinguished Service Medal for his actions.

The first all-Marine air combat operation was a raid carried out on the morning of 14 October by Squadron C (9th) from La Fresne flying field. The Marines attacked the German-held railway junction and yards at Thielt, Belgium, with a composite flight of five DH-4s and three DH-9As, led by Captain Robert S. Lytle. In those eight squadron aircrews, five pilots were Marine Corps reservists and one, Ensign Elmer B. Taylor, was a member of the USNRFC assigned to the squadron. Three of the eight observers/gunners in the aircraft rear seats were Marine Corps reservists.

On the return flight, the Marine aircraft were in-
tercepted by enemy aircraft; and a group of German Fokker fighter planes attacked Second Lieutenant Talbot and his observer, Corporal Robert G. Robinson, whose aircraft had separated from the flight due to engine trouble. Robinson, firing the rear-mounted machine gun, shot down one of the attacking aircraft, but in another onslaught, his left elbow was shattered. He continued firing until again wounded, this time in the abdomen and thigh, when he collapsed. Talbot attacked the Fokker with his front guns, shooting down one additional aircraft then with continuing engine problems, he dropped low, crossed the German lines, and landed at a Belgian airfield to obtain aid for Robinson. After dropping off Robinson, Talbot again lifted into the air, despite engine issues, returning to La Fresne flying field.

Both Talbot and Robinson were awarded the Medal of Honor for “extraordinary heroism” for earlier operations and this raid, thus, earning the first two Medals of Honor awarded to members of Marine Corps aviation units, although Talbot’s was presented posthumously. Talbot was killed on 25 October 1918 when he crashed into a bomb dump at La Fresne during a maintenance test flight. He did not make it into the air, ripping off his landing gear as he tried to pass over the bomb dump embankment. He died in his burning aircraft. First Sergeant John K. McGraw, Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, Class B, earned the Navy Cross that day for “extraordinary heroism,” when he prevented a massive explosion of the bomb dump. When Talbot crashed, McGraw led the nearest men in moving burning bomb crates, rolling the bombs in mud, and extinguishing the fire. Talbot’s observer/gunner, Reserve Second Lieutenant Colgate W. Darden Jr., Class 5, flying in the rear seat was thrown clear of the aircraft and survived the accident. Darden later became a member of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Virginia, governor of Virginia, and president of the University of Virginia.

In addition to the Marine aviators of FMAF in France, six Marine officers were detached and assigned to the Army Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces. At least one of the six, Second Lieutenant Marcus A. Jordan, was a member of the Marine Corps Reserve. Another enrollee in the MCRFC in 1917 already had combat experience in France. Russell F. Stearns had been a pilot, with the rank of corporal, in the Lafayette Flying Corps prior to America entering the war. Stearns had gone to

---

77 Squadron C, FMAF, MRoll, October 1918.
80 McClellan, United States Marine Corps in the World War, 75.
81 The 7th Company, 5th Regiment, MRoll, March 1918.
France to serve in the American Ambulance Field Service in 1916, then enlisted in the Lafayette Flying Corps on 12 April 1917. He qualified as a pilot and was assigned to Escadrille Spad 150, piloting the French Spad biplane in combat during 27 December 1917–24 February 1918. He returned to the states on leave in February and, while home, applied for a discharge from the Lafayette Flying Corps and joined the Marine Corps Reserve. Unfortunately, general health issues followed him from France, and he did not qualify as a naval aviator and was disenrolled from the MCRFC on 30 July 1918.82

Examining the Marine Corps muster rolls of the FMAF, Naval Air Forces, France, American Expeditionary Forces, at the time of the Armistice in November 1918, reveals that 111 of 132 officers, or 84.1 percent were Marine Corps reservists; 15 of 15, or 100 percent of the warrant officers were reservists; and 228 of 783, or 29.2 percent of the enlisted men were Marine Corps reservists.83

The Day Wing, Northern Bombing Group, received orders to return to the United States and embarked at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 16 December 1918, arriving at Newport News, Virginia, five days later.84 Delivering supplies and the bombing raids by these early Marine aviators became routine missions in later wars and insurgencies. In its short time in existence, the MCRFC made its mark and helped ensure Marine Corps aviation continued to flourish.

*1775*

---

84 McClellan, *United States Marine Corps in the World War*, 75.
Rebellion, Repression, and Reform
U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic

Breanne Robertson, PhD

In the contest for American votes, a candidate’s bluster on the campaign trail can have unintended, yet far-reaching consequences. Franklin D. Roosevelt learned this lesson the hard way during the 1920 presidential campaign, when his remarks about the “little republics” of Central America and the Caribbean raised public furor over the U.S. intervention and Marine Corps misconduct in Santo Domingo (now Dominican Republic) and Haiti. Touting his experience as assistant secretary of the Navy, the Democratic vice presidential nominee boasted before a group of Montana voters: “You know I have had something to do with the running of a couple of little republics. The facts are that I wrote Haiti’s Constitution myself, and, if I do say it, I think it’s a pretty good Constitution.” Roosevelt further fanned the flames of opposition when he insinuated that President Woodrow Wilson’s administration could compel several Latin American republics to support U.S. initiatives in the newly formed League of Nations. “We are in the very true sense the big brother of these little republics,” he explained. “Does anyone suppose that the vote of Cuba, Haiti, San Domingo [sic], Nicaragua and of the other Central American states would be cast differently from the vote of the United States?”

Popular outcry was both swift and strong. Roosevelt’s comments elicited caustic responses from both liberal advocates for national self-determination and conservative opponents of Wilsonian internationalism. Senator Warren G. Harding, the Republican nominee for president, capitalized on the growing furor by staking his own foreign policy in Dominican soil. Speaking before an Indiana delegation of voters in late August 1920, Harding condemned current U.S. military actions in the Caribbean as “unwarranted interference” that had not only “made enemies of those who should be our friends, but have rightfully discredited our country as a trusted neighbor.” If elected president, he promised “not [to] empower an assistant secretary of the navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by the United States marines.”

In denouncing the Wilson administration’s Caribbean policy and the activities of Roosevelt, in particular, Harding effectively pledged to bring an end to the military occupation in the Dominican Republic. It would take nearly four years to fulfill this promise. Harding’s victory in the general election signaled the final phase of the American intervention, which involved intense public scrutiny, difficult treaty ne-

---

1 Although Roosevelt’s reputation in U.S.-Latin American affairs today rests largely with the Good Neighbor Policy, a foreign policy initiative that pledged nonintervention and equitable trade agreements in the 1930s and 1940s, the future president did not always espouse such progressive thinking with regard to hemispheric relations. According to biographer Frank Freidel, Roosevelt had nothing to do with the drafting of the Haitian Constitution. See Graham Cross, The Diplomatic Education of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1882–1933 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 104; and Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1952).

2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, campaign speech dated 18 August 1920, quoted in Cross, The Diplomatic Education of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 104.


4 Contemporary audiences understood that the assistant secretary of the Navy referred to in Harding’s speech was Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic vice presidential nominee.
negotiations, and sweeping internal reforms. In view of this contentious resolution, the original rationale and aims of the U.S. intervention remain essential to understanding how the military occupation in the Dominican Republic evolved from a celebrated campaign, demonstrating the tactical efficiency of the U.S. Marine Corps and producing three Medal of Honor recipients, to a misguided counterinsurgency operation and military regime embodying imperialist overreach in U.S. foreign affairs. To be sure, the 1920 presidential election reflected a pronounced shift in American public opinion since the first Marines landed in the Dominican Republic four years earlier. The campaign also demonstrated shifting political terrain—both internationally and locally within the Dominican Republic—that gave rise to increasingly harsh Marine Corps enforcement of U.S. authority against nationalist resistance. Tracking the diplomatic motivation, military invasion, and counterinsurgency efforts of Marines in the Dominican Republic elucidates the changing circumstances that not only shaped public perception of the Marine Corps throughout the occupation but also compelled reform measures in both training and operations to facilitate a peaceful and effective withdrawal.

Protecting “America’s Lake”

In the years leading up to World War I, the financial insolvency and political disorder in Central America and the Caribbean appeared dangerous to U.S. national security. Although the United States had been active in Caribbean affairs throughout the nineteenth century, the emergence of navalism, a policy which emphasized territorial and naval expansion as being indispensable to national defense, spurred U.S. officials to direct substantial attention and resources to the region in the first decades of the twentieth century.\(^5\) As naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan argued in his seminal book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660–1783* (1890), success in naval warfare required a large fleet of warships ready for rapid deployment in fighting decisive battles. The completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 endowed the U.S. Navy with a strategic advantage over other naval fleets, since the United States could quickly transfer ships between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and between the West and East Coasts. The desire to protect the isthmian canal, as well as the sea-lanes around it, renewed U.S. interest in the Monroe Doctrine and occasioned frequent and more intensive military interventions in the name of national defense.

The Venezuelan Claims Crisis of 1902–3 distilled American fears about European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Over the previous century, European investors had made substantial loans to various Latin American republics. Although the national governments receiving these loans were notoriously unstable and often borrowed funds for the explicit purpose of defeating revolution, common practice dictated that each regime must honor the debts of its predecessors. Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro, however, refused to make payments following a civil war. In retaliation, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy initiated a punitive blockade at Caracas, shelled a coastal fort, and threatened seizure of Venezuelan customs houses. Alarmed by European aggression near the Canal Zone, President Theodore Roosevelt sent about 50 ships—a large portion of the U.S. Navy at that time—to perform “training maneuvers” in the southern Caribbean. This transparent show of strength reinforced U.S. demands that the dispute be settled through international arbitration. Although The Hague would later rule in favor of the European powers, Roosevelt made clear U.S. intolerance for foreign interference in the American republics.\(^6\)

The threat of a similar crisis in the Dominican Republic prompted Roosevelt to formalize U.S. foreign policy in hemispheric affairs.\(^7\) On 6 December 1904, the president unveiled a policy that has since become

---

\(^5\) The U.S government had long expressed interest in the Dominican Republic. President Ulysses S. Grant entertained the prospect of annexing the island nation, but the U.S. Senate defeated the measure in 1871. Subsequent American victory in the Spanish-American War (1898) furnished the United States with territorial possession of Puerto Rico and Cuba, but the U.S. Navy expressed a keen interest in acquiring naval bases in Hispaniola as well.


\(^7\) In 1903, the new Dominican government under Gen Carlos F. Morales stopped paying its foreign debt with the aim of negotiating more favorable terms.
known as the “Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.” Arguing that European efforts to enforce Latin American debt repayment necessarily violated the Monroe Doctrine, he announced that the United States would need to ensure the political and financial stability of its sister republics. The president and other American policy makers believed Latin Americans were incapable of preserving law and order and that the United States, a more “civilized” power, must impose financial oversight to guarantee timely remittance and to protect foreign lives and property.\(^8\)

With transatlantic tensions hanging in the balance, the Dominican Republic served as a testing ground for the first practical application of the Roosevelt Corollary. As Roosevelt brashly proclaimed, “I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to.”\(^9\) Nevertheless, the perceived critical importance of the island to American national security necessitated U.S. involvement to preserve order and reduce foreign debts, both objectives deemed essential in preventing European military presence in the region. In 1905, the U.S. State Department worked out a series of agreements that placed the Dominican customs service under American management. Although the U.S. Senate would delay ratifying the treaty until 1907, Roosevelt implemented the customs receivership immediately by executive fiat.\(^10\)

The initial results of the U.S.-imposed customs receivership in the Dominican Republic were encouraging. Financial experts arranged for new loans with American lenders for debt consolidation and a lower interest rate, and U.S. officials took charge of customs revenues, collecting duties at Dominican ports and dividing the proceeds between foreign bondholders and the incumbent regime. Furthermore, the popularity and stability of the new Dominican president, Ramón Cáceres, permitted the administration to direct attention toward modernization and economic development in the country, which State Department officials attributed to the beneficial influence of U.S. oversight. Consequently, the Dominican customs receivership served as the cornerstone of President William H. Taft’s foreign relations policy. Known popularly as “dollar diplomacy,” Taft emphasized economic influence as a paramount consideration in diplomatic affairs and pledged to use bankers rather than battleships to influence international stability.\(^11\) Nevertheless, when such efforts failed to secure desired results, both Taft and his successor, President Woodrow Wilson, resorted to threats of military force, or as historian Max Boot has described it, “the brass knuckles hidden beneath the velvet glove.”\(^12\)

### Disorder and Diplomacy, 1911–16

The assassination of President Cáceres in November 1911 shattered the relative peace and economic prosperity of the Dominican Republic and ushered in a new era of transitory regimes and revolutionary violence. The near-constant disorder reflected a longstanding political feud between *horacistas*, followers of General Horacio Vásquez, and *jimennistas*, partisans of Juan Isidro Jiménez, as well as the growing strength of such regional leaders as General Desiderio Arias of Santiago. Without a dependable army or police force to buttress the central government, Dominican presidents remained chronically vulnerable to coups and civil wars.

Between 1911 and 1916, U.S. officials intervened in Dominican affairs with increasing frequency to compel reform measures that would ostensibly establish a stable, freely elected, and pro-American government. Employing both diplomatic pressure and military might, the United States regularly sent warships to observe or make shows of force against the Dominican government, to threaten revolutionaries, or to protect the lives and property of Ameri-

---


\(^12\) Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 129.
can citizens. Despite such heavy-handed tactics on the part of the United States, domestic political turmoil persisted in the Dominican Republic, resulting in eight separate administrations in Santo Domingo in less than five years. Rebellion flourished especially in the interior valleys, north coast, and rugged frontiers where local dictators, or caudillos, held sway. The warring political factions quickly exhausted the national treasury, and the country assumed additional debt trying to suppress rebellion, circumstances the United States considered in direct violation of its 1907 treaty with the republic. Moreover, this relapse into political volatility and financial insolvency inflamed U.S. fears of European intervention. German designs on the Americas, in particular, seemed to pose a very real threat. The German Navy, under the command of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, schemed to acquire land and establish military bases in the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico in an effort to disrupt American use of the Panama Canal and potentially stage a direct strike against the United States. Furthermore, German influence and manipulation of revolutionary unrest, especially in Mexico, aimed to divert U.S. attention and resources in a protracted and costly conflict far from Europe. These efforts culminated in the infamous Zimmerman Telegram, which outlined a plot to produce a German-Mexican-Japanese alliance and helped draw the United States into World War I.

The State Department, which had become increasingly hostile in its interactions with the Dominican government, began to consider seriously the possibility of full-scale military intervention and the imposition of U.S. demands—a solution it had already implemented in Haiti starting in the summer of 1915. In November, William W. Russell, the newly appointed American minister and longtime advocate of intervention, arrived in Santo Domingo with an ultimatum. Under the terms of this agreement, the Dominican Republic would be obligated to accept the appointment of U.S. financial advisers and the formation of U.S.-controlled constabularies. The current president, Juan Isidro Jiménez, refused the proposed treaty, which would have severely curtailed Dominican sovereignty. Even so, his political enemies pointed to American overtures to damage his prestige and bolster support for their revolutionary efforts.

Civil war again erupted in the Dominican Republic following a misguided attempt by Jiménez to disenfranchise his political rivals. In April 1916, the president ordered the arrest of several insubordinate officers, chief among them his minister of war, General Desiderio Arias. Tall, thin, and of mixed-race heritage, Arias was a powerful, charismatic caudillo with a large following in the northwestern province of Monte Cristi near the Haitian border. He represented the most infertile and impoverished region in the country but, unlike other caudillos, banned his troops from stealing food from the poor. Rising from humble origins himself, Arias attracted a devoted following among darker-skinned peasants, soldiers, and the urban poor. By early May, the popular and politically influential leader had persuaded the Dominican congress to begin impeachment proceedings against Jiménez. Arias then seized control of the capital and declared open revolt. With this action, the United States sent Marines to Santo Domingo to protect the American legation and to assist the Jiménez regime.

**Armed Intervention**

On 2 May 1916, two warships carrying a small force of Marines arrived in the Dominican Republic. In the eyes of Washington politicians, Arias had raised a rebellion against a properly elected president. In addition, U.S. policy makers viewed Arias as being pro-German and a conduit of arms to Haitian cacos, or guerrilla fighters, then resisting American military rule on the other side of the island. Humanitarian paternalism and racism further informed the State

---


14 The USS *Castine* (PG 6) brought 300 Marines and 130 sailors to Santo Domingo to guard the American legation. The USS *Prairie* (*AD 5*) transported approximately 150 Marines; the 6th Company, commanded by Capt Frederic M. Wise, was an infantry unit, and the 9th Company, under the command of Capt Eugene P. Fortson, was a field artillery unit with four 3-inch guns. Wise had overall command of the force, which was designated a provisional battalion.

15 *Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace*, 168. During October and November 1915, Marines engaged in considerable fighting with cacos in northern Haiti, where insurgents were thought to be receiving arms from Arias, then-minister of war, at Santo Domingo.
Department’s decision to intervene militarily in the Dominican Republic. Ill-informed on political and social conditions in the republic, American officials incorrectly attributed the endemic violence and debt to corrupt local leadership. The State Department thus aimed to stabilize events in the Dominican Republic by preserving the incumbent administration against attempts to usurp power by force.

The United States concluded that Jiménez could not dislodge Arias from the capital without American assistance. The rebel leader had marshaled hundreds of civilian irregulars, armed with rifles from government arsenals and around 250 Dominican soldiers who had defected to his side. Captain Frederic M. Wise, who commanded the provisional battalion of Marines in Santo Domingo, described the situation, “every male in town even boys were armed easily making over a thousand rifles, with five (5) Gatlings, unlimited ammunition . . . plenty of [artillery]” and “gunners who knew how to use it.”17 Jiménez’s small army, by contrast, numbered around 800 soldiers and had very little ammunition, fewer than 20 rounds per person. Minister Russell pressured Jiménez to request a landing of U.S. Marines. Exiled from the capital, the president first accepted but later rejected American assistance, explaining that his authority would diminish if “regained with foreign bullets.”18 As an alternative to U.S. armed intervention, Jiménez asked Russell and Wise to meet with Arias and negotiate a peaceful surrender. The Americans agreed on the condition that, if Arias refused, Jiménez would consent to a combined assault with Dominican and U.S. forces to regain the capital.

Arias and his followers rejected the deposed president’s détente. Wise returned to camp and began making preparations to disarm the rebels by force, but Jiménez balked at the attack. “I can never consent to attacking my own people,” he declared.19 Wise, incensed by this response, told the Dominican president that American prestige was on the line and that if he did not want U.S. military aid he should resign his office. After some vacillation, Jiménez agreed. A secretary drew up the paperwork, and the president resigned on the spot.

Now in the position of trying to uphold an administration that had ceased to exist, the United States was nevertheless determined to quash the revolution and reinstate a constitutional government. On 13 May, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Cruiser Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, issued an ultimatum signed by himself and Russell demanding that Arias disband the rebel army by 0600 on 15 May or face a full-scale American attack. As the U.S. officers awaited an answer, Arias defiantly hoisted Dominican flags rather than white flags as anticipated for surrender. Captain Wise and Major Newt H. Hall, commander of the 4th and 5th Companies recently arrived from Haiti and a detachment of the 24th Company from Guantánamo Bay, made plans for the forcible disarmament of the revolutionaries, while U.S. warships proceeded to San Pedro de Macorís, Sánchez, Puerto Plata, and other important Dominican ports.20 On the appointed date, the Marines marched on the rebel-held capital city. Anticipating armed resistance on every block, they instead discovered that Arias had evaded military confrontation by evacuating his troops under the cover of night.

The Marine Corps took control of Santo Domingo and made the city its base of operations ashore.21 Outside the capital, authority remained in the hands

---

16 Referring to all of Latin America, President Wilson once confided to a visiting British statesman: “I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men!” See Burton J. Hendrick, Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), I: 204.
18 Max Henríquez Ureña, Los Yanquis en Santo Domingo: La Verdad de los Hechos Comprobada por Datos y Documentos Oficiales (Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1931), 87–88.
19 Wise and Frost, A Marine Tells It to You, 143.
20 Keith B. Bickle, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 108. On 12 May, the USS Dolphin (PG 24) and the USS Culgoa (AF 3) arrived with RAdm Caperton, Maj Newt Hall, and the 4th and 5th Companies on board. The USS Hector (AR 7) brought the 24th Company to the Dominican Republic the following day.
21 Col Theodore P. Kane arrived in Santo Domingo on board the USS Panther (1889) with the headquarters of the 2d Regiment and three infantry companies on 23 May. He took command of all Marines on shore in the Dominican Republic and set up a temporary headquarters in the U.S. consulate building. The USS Sacramento (PG 19) awaited orders off shore near Puerto Plata while the Panther and USS Lamson (DD 18) patrolled the waters near Monte Cristi. By the end of the month, Marine strength in the country totaled 11 companies, drawn mostly from the 1st and 2d Regiments.
of local governors and military chieftains who operated independently of the central government. In addition, Arias claimed to still hold the legitimate power of congress. Having reestablished headquarters at Santiago, he refuted the partisan revolutionary title assigned to him by Jiménez and the United States. His flag belonged to the Dominican people, he proclaimed. Russell refused to recognize Arias as the rightful executive chief and instead elevated Jiménez’s remaining four cabinet members to the status of an interim “Council of Ministers” to carry on the business of state. Worried that Arias or one of his followers would be elected to the presidency if the Dominican congress were allowed a vote, Russell worked closely with Caperton to block congressional action while seeking a suitable alternative. While this strategy had worked in Haiti, Dominican politicians refused to give advance assurances of U.S. cooperation. “I have never seen such hatred displayed by one people for another as I notice and feel here,” Caperton confessed. “We positively have not a friend in the land.” Encountering near-universal hostility to U.S. governance, the commander feared a national uprising and called for reinforcements to secure the country’s main coastal towns and disperse Arias’s army in the Cibao Valley.

---

23 Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, 196–97.
25 On 4 June, RAdm Caperton requested the U.S. Navy to send more Marines, and MajGen Commandant George Barnett ordered the entire 4th Regiment to proceed from San Diego, CA, to the Dominican Republic. The USS Hancock (AP 3) delivered the 4th Regiment to Monte Cristi on 21 June. With 828 men, this was the largest reinforcement to date.
The March on Santiago

Arias had retreated 85 miles inland to Santiago de los Caballeros (Santiago), located in the northern agricultural valley of Cibao, where the distance to the sea precluded bombardment by a man-of-war or amphibious landing force. RAdm Caperton ordered Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, the commanding officer of the 4th Regiment affectionately known as “Uncle Joe,” to proceed against Arias’s stronghold in the northern interior. Pendleton devised a plan in which two columns of Marines would converge on Santiago from ports on the northern coast, since the country contained no roads that could accommodate large attack forces moving from the south. One column, commanded by Captain Eugene P. Fortson and subsequently Major Hiram I. Bearss, would follow a railroad inland from Puerto Plata, while the other, led by Pendleton, would march by road from Monte Cristi. The two forces would convene in Navarette, a village located 18 miles south of Santiago, for a full-scale drive on the objective.

Before the operation began, Pendleton defined the Marines’ mission in the Dominican Republic and established guidelines for appropriate troop conduct. “[O]ur work in this country is not one of invasion,” he announced to his men. Clarifying that their aim was to restore order, protect life and property, and support the constitutional government, he exhorted his fellow officers and enlisted men to “realize that we are not in an enemy’s country, though many of the inhabitants may be inimical to us.” Pendleton instructed his audience to treat the Dominican people with courtesy and dignity so as “to inspire confidence among the people in the honesty of our intentions” and to avoid generating antagonism and perceptions of an armed invasion.

In the early morning hours of 26 June 1916, Pendleton’s column embarked on its 75-mile journey inland. The Monte Cristi force, consisting of the 4th Regiment and some artillery, had a greater distance to travel and would operate as a “flying column” without communications or supplies once it passed the midpoint of its assigned route. Consequently, a two-mile-long supply train of trucks, automobiles, mule carts, pack mules, and a caterpillar tractor followed in the wake of the main column. As Sergeant Major Thomas F. Carney recalled, “no stranger array ever moved at the command of one man.” The column proceeded slowly along the main road. The Dominican insurgents had sabotaged bridges and railroad tracks on their retreat to impede the Americans’ progress toward Santiago. The column’s extensive supply included construction materials, so the Marines made repairs as necessary. At one ravine, the Dominicans had destroyed a 300-foot bridge, so the Marines crossed the ravine using an improvised trestle. Although constructed in just three hours, the makeshift bridge permitted the column to transport heavy guns and trucks across the ravine “in perfect safety.”

26 Thomas P. Carney, “Adventures of ‘San Diego’s Own’ Fighting through Santo Domingo” (unpublished manuscript, Gordon L. Pruner Papers, Collection 463, Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center [GRC], Marine Corps University [MCU], Quantico, VA).
27 Joseph H. Pendleton, “Instructions to All Officers of the Forces,” 24 June 1916, Joseph H. Pendleton Papers, Collection 402, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
28 The main column consisted of 34 officers and 803 enlisted men. Carney, “Adventures.”
29 Ibid.
fronted an array of obstacles as they trudged across the rough terrain. Forcing the Marines to walk secured tactical advantages for the insurgents by delaying the troops’ advance and leaving them vulnerable to Dominican attack.

The northern resistance began at Las Trencheras, a defensive outcropping where insurgents had built a defensive network of trenches. The widely known site had long been held by revolutionary armies; because government troops had never successfully captured the ridge, Dominicans considered it impenetrable. As Pendleton’s column approached, Marine officers watched the armed insurgents’ movements through their field glasses and judged artillery to be the best means to counterattack the entrenched position. The next morning, Captain Chandler Campbell’s 13th and 29th Companies hauled the battery into position on a ridge overlooking the road. The artillery fired 40 rounds while Captain Arthur T. Marix’s 1st Battalion, supported by Major Melville J. Shaw’s 2d Battalion, advanced slowly through the jungle foliage. The insurgents, impervious to the artillery barrage, concentrated heavy fire on the closing ranks. Sergeant Major Carney reported that “the whole hillside was enshrouded in a pall of smoke through which the flashes of rifles constantly stabbed like light[n]ing through a cloud.” Suddenly, he perceived through the smoke a long line of bayonets gleaming in the morning sun. Pendleton’s chief of staff, Major Robert H. Dunlap, sounded his whistle, and with a wild cheer the Marine infantry units charged up the slope. The supporting artillery and machine gun platoon continued to suppress enemy fire, allowing the Marines to perform quick rushes and rout the insurgents from the trenches. Within 45 minutes, they had seized the dominating ridge and driven the rebels into retreat.

On 3 July 1916, Pendleton’s column again encountered resistance at Guayacanas, where 80 Dominicans had dug defensive trenches and constructed a roadblock of felled trees. Camouflaged by the removal of excavated earth, the enemy’s position was

---

31 Ivan Musicant, *Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 255. Equipped only with shrapnel charges, the artillery dispensed no high-explosive rounds in the caissons and so caused little physical destruction to the battlefield.
32 Carney, “Adventures.”
33 Ibid. The Marines could not pursue the insurgents due to the mountainous and overgrown terrain.
so well concealed that the Marines had difficulty locating it; however, Marine patrols had earlier captured a prisoner who provided accurate information about terrain and size of the Dominican force. Artillery proved ineffective, because Marine gunners could not find an adequate position to stage their weapons. In addition, the ground in front of the defensive line had been cleared of all vegetation, providing the enemy an unobstructed line of fire.34

Without any tactical alternative, Marines of the machine-gun platoon carried their Benet-Mercier light machine guns within a few hundred yards of the trenches and opened fire. The insurgents countered the automatic weapons with single-shot rifle fire, yet the assault was so intense that several men were shot and killed at their guns within minutes.35 Pendleton, disregarding the advice of his chief of staff to remain with the artillery, advanced to the firing line. He calmly surveyed the enemy’s position and issued instructions for an enveloping movement. Although a direct frontal attack would almost certainly fail, he correctly predicted that small parties from the 1st and 2d Battalions could approach through the jungle on the right and left sides and thereby secure a protected position from which to enfilade the enemy.

Amidst the din of automatic weapons, the Marines charged from their flanked positions. In the center of the Marine advance, where action was thickest, First Sergeant Roswell Winans was working a jam-prone M1895 Colt-Browning machine gun from an exposed position. “They seemed to be just missing me,” he recalled. “I don’t know how the other men felt, but I expected to be shot any minute and just wanted to do as much damage as possible to the enemy before cashing in.”36 When the last round jammed in his weapon, Winans calmly inspected the gun, returned

34 Musicant, Banana Wars, 258.
35 Carney, “Adventures.”
it to working order, and resumed firing for the remainder of the engagement.37 Meanwhile, Corporal Joseph A. Glowin set up his Benet-Mercier behind a fallen log and began firing on the enemy. Although he was wounded twice, he continued his assault until other Marines forcibly dragged him from the front line to safety. For these exploits, Winans and Glowin became the first men in the 4th Regiment to receive Medals of Honor.

Having successfully forced the entrenched snipers to retreat, the Marines loaded their wounded into the wagon train and resumed the drive toward Navarette, where the column joined the smaller Puerto Plata contingent, consisting of the 4th and 9th Companies as well as Marine detachments from the battleships USS Rhode Island (BB 17) and USS New Jersey (BB 16).38 Under Pendleton’s orders, the force had proceeded from Puerto Plata, a town about 80 miles east of Monte Cristi on the north coast. Although the Marines had traversed a shorter distance than Pendleton’s crew, the column followed a destroyed railroad course that was inaccessible to a supply train. Tasked with securing and reopening the railroad, thereby reconnecting Santiago with the port city and establishing a line of supply for the combined attack force, the Marines traveled as far as they could in a train of four boxcars pulled by a dilapidated locomotive, which pushed a flatcar carrying a three-inch artillery piece.39 On 29 June, Bearss’s contingent encountered a Dominican force at La Cumbre, a critical position near Alta Mira where the railroad track passed through a 300-yard tunnel. The 4th Company scaled a nearby mountain trail and signaled the enemy presence approximately 3,000 yards away. Captain Fortson unloaded his 3-inch gun and began shelling a shack overlooking the rebel lines. On the ground, a combination of frontal and flank attacks forced the insurgents to retreat. When the Dominicans quit their position and ran for the tunnel, Bearss gave chase with a detachment of 60 men. The major, furiously pumping a handcar, rushed into the dark tunnel entrance despite the possibility of ambush or worse. Bearss and his men emerged safely from the railroad corridor to watch the rebels hasten toward Santiago.40

The reunion of the columns at Navarette set up the Marines for the final stage of the campaign: the capture of Santiago. Before the troops even made camp at the rendezvous point, a delegation approached and requested an audience with the American commander to negotiate peace terms. Pendleton, seated on an upturned bucket, met with the Dominicans in the shade of a mango tree.41 With the insurgents decimated and demoralized following three decisive but lopsided battles, they assured Pendleton that the revolutionaries’ desire for war was gone. The peace commission negotiated terms for surrender, including a pardon for their leader, Arias. The agreement took effect on 5 July 1916, and the 4th Regiment peacefully entered the city of Santiago the following day.

With 2,000 troops in the field, Caperton had reasonably firm control of the nation. This military success did not resolve the State Department’s desire for a pro-American successor regime, however. Russell used financial leverage and threatened further military action to dissuade the Dominican congress from electing anyone unwilling to support U.S. demands. On 25 July, the Dominicans thwarted Russell’s coercive maneuvers and elected Dr. Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal as provisional president. When Henríquez arrived in the capital, the American minister refused to recognize the election as valid until he submitted to U.S. conditions. Henríquez defended the Dominican right to manage its own affairs, so Russell impounded all government funds. The ensuing political stalemate lasted until November, when the State Department declared the establishment of a military government in the Dominican Republic.42 Over the next eight years, the Marine Corps acted as an army of occupation supporting a variable and sometimes oppressive American regime.

37 Carney, “Adventures.”
38 The detachments from the USS Rhode Island and USS New Jersey originally consisted of five officers and 128 enlisted men. Charles B. Hatch to George Barnett, 29 May 1916, Dominican Republic Subject Files, HIRB, MCHD, Quantico, VA.
39 After a skirmish at Llanos Perez, the column halted at Lajas, where Bearss arrived with a detachment from the USS New Jersey. The major assumed command, and the troops continued on foot.
40 Hiram I. Bearss to Joseph H. Pendleton, 13 July 1916, Dominican Republic Subject Files, HIRB, MCHD, Quantico, VA.
41 Carney, “Adventures.”
42 The United States justified military intervention in the Dominican Republic based on a perceived breach in the 1907 customs receivership treaty.
First Sergeant Roswell Winans and Corporal Joseph A. Glowin

Medal of Honor Citation

The Navy Department has received the report of a board of investigation convened by order of the commanding officer of the United States naval force operating ashore in Santo Domingo from which it appears that on July 3, 1916, the Twenty-eighth Company of Marines was engaged with the Dominican armed forces at the battle of Gayacanes [sic]. During a running fight of 1,200 yards, our forces reached the enemy entrenchments and Corpl. Joseph A. Glowin, United States Marine Corps, placed the machine gun, of which he had charge, behind a large log across the road and immediately opened fire on the trenches. He was struck once but continued firing his gun, but a moment later he was again struck and had to be dragged out of the position into cover. Sergt. Roswell Winans, United States Marine Corps, then arrived with a Colt’s gun which he placed in a most exposed position, coolly opened fire on the trenches and when the gun jammed, stood up and repaired it under fire. All the time Glowin and Winans were handling their guns they were exposed to a very heavy fire which was striking into the logs and around the men, seven men being wounded and one killed within 20 feet. Sergt. Winans continued firing his gun until the enemy had abandoned the trenches.

In accordance with the recommendation of the commanding officer of the expeditionary forces operating in Haiti, approved by the flag officer, the department has awarded a medal of honor and a gratuity of one hundred dollars ($100) to First Sergt. Roswell Winans, United States Marine Corps, and to Corpl. Joseph A. Glowin, United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism in the line of their profession and for their eminent and conspicuous courage in the presence of the enemy at the action at Guayacanes [sic], Dominican Republic, July 3, 1916.¹

¹ William S. Benson, General Order No. 244, 2 November 1916, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC.
The Army of Occupation, 1917–20

In the United States, press coverage of events in the Dominican Republic touted American military operations for restoring peace on the troubled island. Despite the challenges of unmapped terrain, and sabotaged roads and railroads, the Marines had demonstrated tactical skill and professional discipline. On 5 November 1916, the Washington Post announced that First Sergeant Winans and Corporal Glowin had been awarded the Medal of Honor for “extraordinary valor” shown during the battle at Guayacanas. Furthermore, the efficiency and flexibility with which the force had subdued the Dominican Republic helped to demonstrate the usefulness of the Marine Corps as an elite fighting force ready for deployment on behalf of American foreign affairs. Walker W. Vick, the former receiver general for Dominican customs, told the New York Times that he regretted only that the United States had not intervened sooner. This high regard represented a welcome change for the Marine Corps, whose very existence had come under attack in the U.S. Congress less than a decade before.

In the Dominican Republic, by contrast, public opinion of the Marine Corps deteriorated rapidly. The Marines’ mission, so clearly defined by Pendleton during the initial campaign, grew murky after the capture of Santiago and declaration of military government. Whereas U.S. Marines and sailors initially had performed brief land excursions to quell the revolution, their operations in the Dominican Republic evolved to encompass long-term occupation and the management of internal political affairs. Consequently, the rules of engagement changed as well. The initial battles in the Dominican Republic had established a tactical pattern of attack-and-response that would continue to characterize much of the fighting in the coming years; however, several factors distinguished the drive against Santiago and later counterinsurgency efforts. First, the campaign had primarily involved conventional warfare. Although the Marines encountered repeated assaults from Dominicans in entrenched positions, American commanders employed established battle tactics, such as advance reconnaissance, supporting artillery fire, frontal and flank advances, and quick rushes to rout the enemy’s defensive line. The establishment of an American military government in November 1916 effectively converted the Marine Corps to an occupying police force, directed toward the enforcement of official decrees. Tasked with maintaining order, the troops engaged in counterinsurgency operations for which they were neither prepared nor trained to handle. Second, frequent personnel changes at all command levels, particularly after U.S. entry in World War I, exacerbated the situation by introducing variable methods, interpretations, and codes of conduct. Finally, the long duration and lack of measurable progress in pacifying an increasingly hostile population resulted, for many Marines, in a breakdown in the distinctions separating civilians from enemy insurgents.

Many Dominicans opposed the American occupation from the start. On the same day that Capt Harry S. Knapp, USN, declared the U.S. military government, First Lieutenant Ernest C. Williams led an assault on the fortaleza at San Francisco de Macoris where Juan Perez, a local governor and supporter of Arias, and his followers had taken a stand and refused to surrender their weapons. As district commander, Williams initially dispatched a message to the governor demanding that he abandon the fort and release his prisoners, but the Dominican allegedly scrawled “Come and get me!” across the ultimatum in reply. In plotting a course of action, Williams conferred with other Marines who argued that the fort would require at least an infantry battalion and artillery battery to take. The district commander, however, determined an alternate course of action. Early the following evening, he led a detachment of

45 Richard Millett and G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering the Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic,” in U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898–2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, ed. Col Stephen S. Evans (Quantico, VA: MCU Press, 2008), 108. Operating without clear guidelines from Washington, Capt Harry S. Knapp, USN, repeatedly expanded administrative authority into new areas and undertook an ambitious public works program to “remake Dominican society.” His earliest legislative action included a ban on firearms and the censorship of press, mail, and telegraph messages, which he believed could be used to incite insurrection. Oppressive conditions worsened after Knapp’s departure from office in mid-1918, when subsequent military governors tightened existing regulations and pursued additional, nonessential reforms, such as a proposal to change the nation’s name to Hispaniola and the elimination of cockfighting and prostitution.
12 Marines from the 31st and 47th Companies in a surprise attack on the fort. Williams and his crew rushed the gate, and a brief but intense battle ensued. Within minutes, the detachment of 13 Marines, 8 of them wounded, had gained control of the fort as well as 100 prisoners confined therein. Williams received a Medal of Honor for his actions.

Williams’s successful operation proved the exception rather than the rule in the Dominican campaign. Under the military government, Marine officers acted as district commanders to make sure that martial law was obeyed. Initially, they focused on establishing garrisons in major cities, disarming the civilian population, and defeating known insurgent leaders, whose capture American commanders believed would curtail rebellion; however, the confiscation of weapons and ammunition proved to be a poor measure of Marine effectiveness in stemming the insurgency in a society that placed a high social value on gun ownership. Neither officers nor enlisted Marines understood Dominican culture. Few could speak Spanish, and most held then-prevailing racist views that upheld whiteness as the epitome of cultural and intellectual achievement. With a

---


47 Bickle, Mars Learning, 124-25. By October 1917, the military government had amassed nearly 30,000 pistols, 10,000 rifles, 2,000 shotguns, 200,000 cartridges, and thousands of machetes and knives.
patronizing sense of superiority, many Marines approached their service in the Dominican Republic, a country whose populations Knapp characterized as being “almost all touched with the tarbrush,” as an extended colonialist endeavor to “civilize” the natives.48 Marines habitually employed derogatory slang, referring to Dominicans as “spigs” and “niggers” both in their everyday speech and in their letters and publications.49

In April 1917, the military government established a local constabulary to assist with the counterinsurgency campaign. The Guardia Nacional Dominicana struggled due to lack of funds and a shortage of competent officers and recruits. As with cabinet positions in the military government, no members of the Dominican elite would submit to a commissioned post in the Guardia Nacional. Consequently, many recruits came from the lower classes. The brigade commander looked to Marines to organize and officer the Guardia until such time as Dominicans could be trained and found competent to fulfill leadership positions, but only 1 of the first 13 American officers was a commissioned Marine officer. Unlike in Haiti, American officers in the Guardia did not draw double pay, making it difficult to attract even noncommissioned officers to the organization. Both neglected by the military government and despised by Dominican residents, who considered Guardia members traitors to the nationalist cause, the constabulary force was neither large enough nor well enough trained to effectively assist the Marines in policing the country.50

49 See, for example, Santo Domingo Leatherneck 1, no. 1 (1919): 12, 19, 26.
50 The situation improved only slightly when U.S. entry into World War I necessitated the rapid expansion of this force. As late as 1920, more than half of the Guardia Nacional Dominicana officers were Marine officers and noncommissioned officers who had accepted Dominican commissions once dual pay had been instituted.
Early in the campaign, Marine operational reports indicated that captains or lieutenants usually led combat patrols of 40–50 men in response to collected intelligence. After the first year, operations transitioned to smaller patrols spread thinly across the countryside. In many areas, the rainforest underbrush was so thick that Marine patrols limited their searches to established trails. Commanded by noncommissioned officers, these detachments consisted of 10–15 Marines marching single file along narrow footpaths, which baited the guerrilla fighters into battle. Marines sometimes avoided ambush by conducting reconnaissance by fire. When approaching terrain ideal for an attack, the patrol point guard would shoot into the jungle, tricking guerrillas into returning fire and giving away their position before the Marines had fully entered the trap. This practice was not without its dangers, however. In August 1918, insurgents ambushed a patrol of four Marines as they were rounding the turn of a trail and crossing a stream. Only Private Thomas J. Rushforth survived the attack. Bleeding from more than six wounds, including a severed right hand by a machete blow, Rushforth managed to mount a horse and escape amid enemy gunfire. Despite being gravely wounded, the Marine returned to camp, reported the skirmish, and asked to lead a rescue party back to the scene of the attack.

As the occupation dragged on, the military forces grew increasingly edgy and frustrated. The expansion of the Marine Corps into Europe during World War I siphoned many of the best officers from the

---

51 Bickle, Mars Learning, 121.
52 “The Sole Survivor,” Log of the U.S. Marines, Dominican Republic Articles and Newspaper Clippings, HIRB, MCHD, Quantico, VA. Rushforth received ample praise from his superiors, including the secretary of the Navy; however, he was not eligible for a Medal of Honor because there were no witnesses to confirm his actions.
Caribbean, and those remaining or newly deployed to the Dominican Republic were inadequately trained and ill-prepared for the difficult task of carrying out counterinsurgency operations. In addition, many Marines resented what they perceived as a slight in their service record and a hindrance to their potential for career advancement. The enemy remained elusive, and Marines began to regard all Dominicans with suspicion. Throughout the occupation, Marine leaders asserted that their primary goal was to protect a law-abiding majority against a minority of insurgents. Marines deliberately labeled opponents “bandits” to emphasize this distinction and to uphold the righteous aims of American efforts; but, when women and children began accompanying guerrilla bands in 1918, the American troops found it extremely challenging to distinguish guerrillas from refugees and other ordinary inhabitants in rural precincts. Many Marines turned against the population they were assigned to protect, meting out gratuitous punishment regardless of an individual’s guerrilla involvement. Complaints against Marine conduct surged as it became common for patrols to burn rural homesteads and personal possessions. If the inhabitants fled, Marines often fired at them. The rationale for this practice, as Captain William C. Harlee explained, was the incorrect assumption that “People who are not bandits do not flee the approach of Marines.” Not surprisingly, such brutal treatment created more

55 William C. Harlee, Eastern District Commander, to Commanding General, 25 January 1922, quoted in Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros,” 667. Marine command tried to curtail both of these measures, since senior officers hoped that remote homesteads would serve as gathering places where patrols might easily locate guerrilla fighters in the future. Headquarters also admonished Marine patrols to exercise caution when firing on fleeing civilians, especially women and children.
insurgents and guerrilla supporters among previously uninvolved Dominicans. As one prominent Dominican explained, “When someone . . . was killed, his brothers joined the gavilleros [bandits], to get revenge on the Marines . . . Some joined the ranks inspired by patriotism, but most of them joined the ranks inspired by hate, fear or revenge.”

**Popular Protest in the United States**

U.S. entry into World War I had pushed Marine actions in the Caribbean into the background, but with the declaration of Armistice in 1918, Germany no longer represented an imminent threat to U.S. national security. Accusations of Marine atrocities, which peaked during this period, further discredited the American occupation. While most of the Marines and Guardia conducted themselves in a creditable manner, reports of abuse and cruelty reached the United States and shocked public opinion. Peasants charged the occupying forces with committing atrocities, such as rape, torture, imprisonment, and even death. Among the most egregious culprits of Marine misconduct was Captain Charles F. Merkel, who in 1918 faced a military tribunal for allegedly beating and disfiguring one Dominican prisoner and ordering four others shot during patrol operations near Hato Mayor. Reported to the authorities by his own men, Merkel committed suicide while awaiting trial in Marine custody.57 Organized opposition to the American occupation grew rapidly in response. Government representatives from Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, and Spain condemned the intervention and advised the United States to end the occupation, while Latin American newspapers launched a determined campaign against the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.58 In the United States, articles on the occupation appeared regularly in *The Nation*, *Journal of International Relations*, and *Reforma Social*, a New York-based publication distributed throughout Latin America. This groundswell of anti-imperialist agitation erupted in popular backlash against American foreign policy during the 1920 presidential campaign.

By highlighting the role of the Marine Corps in enforcing U.S. occupation in Hispaniola, Senator Warren G. Harding followed the lead of outspoken editorials in *The Nation*. As early as 1917, the leftist weekly magazine had pronounced the United States guilty of “[i]mperialism of the rankest kind” for imposing foreign rule in the West Indies by force of arms.59 The periodical devoted increasing attention to the topic after World War I, when critical essays by Oswald Garrison Villard, founder of the Anti-Imperialist League and editor of *The Nation* from 1918 to 1932; James Weldon Johnson, president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; and foreign affairs journalists Lewis S. Gannett and Kincheloe Robbins censured the U.S. military gov-

---

58 See, for example, “Asks U.S. to Quit Santo Domingo,” *Washington Post*, 11 September 1919. From his position of exile in Cuba, Dominican President Henríquez urged Dominicans to form patriotic juntas and solicited contributions to support the resistance campaign in Havana, where Dominican nationalists disseminated a steady stream of information to sympathetic journalists, press associations, and governments in Latin America and Europe. In the United States, the Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society gained support of prominent progressives, including Eugene O’Neill, H. L. Mencken, and Samuel Gompers.
ernment in Santo Domingo for its oppressive treatment of local residents. Harding thus evoked a spate of evidence when, quoting nearly verbatim from The Nation, he called his opponent’s utterances “the first official admission of the rape of Haiti and Santo Domingo by the present Administration.”

The provost counts and censorship of the press prompted the strongest outcry among citizens of the United States and the other American republics. In July 1920, Otto Schoenrich, a North American writer, reported that the provost courts, “with their arbitrary and overbearing methods, their refusal to permit accused persons to be defended by counsel, and their foreign judges, foreign language and foreign procedure, are galling to the Dominicans, who regard them with aversion and terror.” Throughout the occupation, all insurgent-related crimes funneled through the military courts, where the Marine Corps exercised wide powers of arrest as provost marshals. Many captains and lieutenants serving in this capacity did not speak Spanish and had received no special training, yet still wielded the authority to detain and sentence suspected enemies. Prisoners were occasionally shot without trial or killed while trying to escape, prompting military authorities in Santo Domingo to admonish Marines in the field to secure prisoners more carefully so as not to raise suspicion of judicial misconduct. Even with efforts to ensure due process, military records indicate that court officials did little to hide their derision for Dominican defendants and complainants, favoring instead the word of their American compatriots as a matter of course.

The case of Captain Charles R. Buckalew spurred intense criticism of the military courts in the Dominican press, inciting outrage and leading some social clubs to close in response to rising U.S.-Dominican tensions. In 1920, Dominican lawyer Pelegrín Castillo accused constabulary Captain Buckalew of murdering four Dominican prisoners and committing other atrocities, such as crushing the testicles of a suspected guerrilla with a stone. When all of the prosecution’s witnesses suddenly “voluntarily recanted and acknowledged that they falsely testified,” the provost court ruled that these circumstances made it “impossible to establish the truth of the accusations made against Charles R. Buckalew” and dismissed the charges due to unreliable evidence. For his part Castillo faced a military tribunal for apparently making false accusations. The provost court eventually exonerated him, and mounting evidence against Buckalew compelled the military court to bring the Marine officer to trial. Despite strong indications of guilt—including a partial confession—American officials again acquitted the Marine captain on technical grounds. Furthermore, as historian Bruce Calder has observed, the defendant’s statement largely corroborated Castillo’s earlier charges, suggesting that the witnesses may have recanted their testimonies under duress.

Press censorship also emerged as a flashpoint of controversy in the summer of 1920, when the trial of Dominican poet Fabio Fiallo incited indignation and criticism throughout Latin America and the United States. Under American occupation, Dominican newspapers could not legally publish commentary on military government actions or could they print evocative concepts, such as “national,” “freedom of thought,” “freedom of speech,” or “General” as a title for Dominican leaders. Infractions landed offenders in the American provost courts, which had a reputation among Dominicans of being unjustly
and cruel. In July 1920, Dominican newspapers published several stridently hostile articles and speeches that leaders had delivered during a “patriotic week,” an event held to raise funds for their oppositional movement. Several individuals, including Fiallo, landed in jail and were convicted by a military commission. Their sentences initially remained a secret, and rumors swirled that they had been condemned to death. The story spread throughout Latin America, and news of the injustice reached Washington by way of Mexico City and Uruguay. Although the verdict had been exaggerated, Fiallo’s sentence remained extreme. The poet not only began serving a three-year term of imprisonment with hard labor, but also was levied a $5,000 fine. The State Department endeavored to arrange Fiallo’s release, but he remained imprisoned for several weeks and was subsequently freed under the condition of military surveillance.67

The following month, Harding’s vehement campaign rhetoric thrust Dominican allegations of Marine brutality and oppressive military governance into the political limelight. He intended the charges to reflect poorly on the Wilson administration, especially Franklin D. Roosevelt and his superior, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. The strategy worked. Almost immediately newspapers and publications that had previously supported the occupation or failed to report on it assumed a more critical stance. Then, in the closing weeks of the national election, a private letter written by Brigadier General George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps, leaked to the press. The missive, directed to the commander of Marine forces in Haiti, seemed to corroborate the worst charges of troop misconduct. Referring to the proceedings of a recent court-martial, Barnett expressed shock and dismay over what he believed to be the “indiscriminate killing of natives” in Hispaniola.68 Journalists clamored for an official investigation and immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. Daniels responded to the negative publicity by ordering an internal investigation, but the findings failed to quell public protest. Even the New York Times, which a few months earlier had printed a front-page editorial against Harding’s nomination, issued regular updates on the Republican candidate’s charges, Roosevelt’s campaign rebuttals, and the Wilson administration’s formal inquiry into the matter.69 Harding won the presidential election in a landslide victory.70

Receiving nearly twice the popular vote as the Democratic ticket, he appealed to war-weary Americans who craved a “return to normalcy” or reorientation toward peace and domestic prosperity in the aftermath of the Great War. Exposing the failures and vulnerabilities of military occupation, the election marked a turning point in U.S. military action in Hispaniola. The persistence of armed rebellion four years after the initial intervention and reports

67 The Nation, October 1920.
68 Ibid.
69 Amid the growing furor, Roosevelt reevaluated his position with regard to other nations in the Western Hemisphere, but the damage had already been done. See Cross, The Diplomatic Education of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 85–107.
70 Democrat James M. Cox failed to earn a single electoral college vote in any of the 18 Western states and only secured 127 to Harding’s 404 in total. In the popular vote, Harding’s 16,181,750 votes dominated Cox’s 8,141,750.
of oppressive American governance spurred opposition to the military occupation, while charges of Marine atrocities further hardened popular opinion and damaged the reputation of the U.S. Marine Corps. The impact was far greater in the Dominican Republic than in Haiti, where U.S. troops would remain until 1932. Efforts toward U.S. withdrawal from the Dominican Republic began immediately; the outgoing Wilson administration submitted a proposal for U.S. departure before the end of the year. Although the initial plan was unsuccessful, Harding’s administration resumed negotiations with Dominican leaders the following spring and enacted a complete transfer of power by September 1924.

Withdrawal

Harding’s secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, entered into protracted negotiations with Dominican representatives over the terms of U.S. withdrawal. The State Department encountered resistance from both the Dominicans and from the military government until Brigadier General Henry Harry Lee, a veteran with 24 years of service in the Marine Corps, replaced the much-maligned Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden and his successor Rear Admiral Samuel S. Robison as military governor. Following the conclusion of the European conflict, the State Department endeavored to alleviate conditions in the Dominican Republic. Early in 1919, the agency had proposed transitioning from a purely military administration to a provisional government with increased civilian participation; however, this idea proved impracticable from a legal standpoint and encountered resistance from the Navy Department. Hostility to U.S. occupation increased noticeably after RAdm Thomas Snowden succeeded Capt Harry S. Knapp as military governor in February 1919. Whereas Knapp had made good service of prominent Dominicans willing to cooperate with the military government toward an eventual plan for withdrawal, Snowden showed little interest in maintaining contact with the local community. He further alienated potential allies in his public pronouncements that the occupation would need to continue for many more years. See Millett and Gaddy, “Administering the Protectorates,” 101–16.
withdrawal. He formulated a plan that would lay the groundwork for a peaceful transition of power. He reduced and concentrated the 2d Brigade garrisons of the northern and southern districts to the capital and other principal cities. He also dedicated significant resources toward improving the Guardia Nacional Dominicana as the primary peacekeeper in anticipation of U.S. withdrawal.

The centerpiece of his plan was the reorganization of policia training to reform the Guardia Nacional. Lee aimed to replace the remaining 44 American officers, sufficiently train an enlisted force of 1,200, and assign Dominican forces to all Marine outposts by the close of 1922. To this end, he planned to bring in 24 Dominican officers and all enlisted men for formal training at Haina, a new officer candidate school established in 1921. Buenaventura Cabral, a regional governor, assumed command of the constabulary, although Marine officers remained charged with the accelerated training program. Americans selected Dominican recruits carefully, preferring to train Guardia members who had previously suffered at the hands of insurgents. Under the new system, all officers and enlisted men would complete six months of training at Haina and an additional six months of supervised fieldwork before advancing from probationary status. With instruction in counterinsurgency tactics, the Dominican constabulary organized elite antiguerrilla outfits and began conducting successful patrols. In time, these paramilitary auxiliaries, renamed the Policía Nacional Dominicana, would take over Marine outposts, thereby allowing the American troops to garrison in principal cities.  

Lee announced a more benevolent policy toward the Dominican civilian population as well. He curbed the excesses of the provost courts, investigated charges of Marine misconduct, and ordered culprits to trial. He made the guards subject to civilian law. He also began an intensive indoctrination program for the troops. His primary purpose was to convince the Marines that the Dominicans were not the enemy and that their mission was to make the U.S. withdrawal a success:

The Forces of the United States did not enter this Republic to make war on the Dominican people. Far from it! . . . The object of the United States as explained in the beginning has never changed. It has been throughout the occupation to this time of returning the government to the Dominican people an unselfish object, looking only toward the betterment of the Dominican people and at great expense to the United States. . . . Now ask yourself if your conduct in

---

72 The Marines remained on call to reinforce the policia if serious outbreaks of violence occurred.
your attitude toward the Dominican people is as worthy as that of your country, and bear in mind that your conduct represents the United States in the eyes of the Dominican people.73

Lee ensured that subordinate commanders followed his rigorous training plan. Weekly reports from these years include program summaries and preliminary self-assessments for the indoctrination of enlisted Marines. Film screenings and sports, especially baseball, eased troop boredom and contributed to more harmonious Marine-civilian cooperation.74 Such measures not only worked to contain the civilian population’s disaffection but also helped to soothe the many grievances Dominicans had harbored against the occupying forces since their arrival in 1916.

In the United States, formal investigations launched in response to public outcry, one by a naval court of inquiry and one by a special committee of the U.S. Senate, could not substantiate charges of abuse. The public testimony of Dominicans before the Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo between 1921 and 1922 gave vivid detail to a litany of stories involving Marine misconduct. Public scrutiny as a result of the senatorial hearings did result in some immediate modifications to occupation policy. The 15th Regiment, for instance, ceased its practice of patrolling under junior officers. Until the end of the occupation, Marine officers sent the entire regiment into the field. The new field organization, unlike previous patrols, operated under the command of senior officers and carried previously defined objectives to be achieved. Although the senatorial committee ultimately concluded that the initial military intervention had been justified, it declared that the American administration had been ineffective. Professor Carl Kelsey, whom the American Academy of Political and Social Science sent to Hispaniola to conduct an independent study of the occupation, concurred: “The Marine Corps is intended to be a fighting body and we should not ask it to assume all sorts of civil and political responsibilities unless we develop within it a group of especially trained men.”75

The guerrilla conflict ended in the spring of 1922, after the United States and Dominican Republic signed an agreement terminating the military occupation. This definite plan for withdrawal no doubt hastened the drawdown. Equally important was the internal evaluation of the operational effectiveness and subsequent recalibration of Marine policy and tactical procedure. One notable example of this shift is the analytical writing of Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Miller, chief of staff of the 2d Brigade during the final years of occupation, who identified five separate groups within the Dominican resistance: professional highwaymen or gavilleros; discontented politicians who used crime to advance their personal ambitions; unemployed laborers driven by poverty; peasants recruited under duress; and ordinary criminals. The self-reflective impulse after 1920 generated invaluable insights into the personal motivations of guerrilla fighters, which in turn inspired novel responses and solutions on the part of the military government. Most of the insurgents Miller had identified, for example, surrendered to American forces in exchange for near-total amnesty.

The knowledge and experience gained in the Dominican Republic further permitted the Marine Corps to implement improved air-ground counterinsurgency operations in Haiti (1915–34) and Nicaragua (1926–32). Because of the novelty of aviation, airplanes in the Dominican Republic primarily performed logistical duties, such as mail delivery, aerial photographic surveying and mapping, and shuttling officers between Marine outposts and the capital; however, commanders began to perceive the utility of aviation for air-ground combat maneuvers.76 Aircraft initially supported ground operations by providing aerial reconnaissance, but communication methods hindered coordination.77 Even so, Colonel

74 Harry Lee to John A. Lejeune, Special Reports, 1923–1924, U.S. Marine Corps 2d Brigade Diary, Dominican Republic Subject Files, HIRB, MCHD, Quantico, VA.
76 Commanded by Capt Walter E. McCaughtry, the 1st Air Squadron began operations from an airstrip carved out of the jungle near Consuelo, a town 12 miles from San Pedro de Macorís. The squadron had 35 trained pilots and mechanics. In 1920, the air unit moved to an improvised airfield near Santo Domingo.
77 Since radios were too large to fit in the cockpit, field units had to recover written messages dropped from the air.
James C. Breckinridge, commander of the 15th Regiment, reported that the airplanes had been equipped with machine guns and would “play a conspicuous part in the hunting out of the bandits lurking in the jungles.”

Experimenting with aerial attacks against Dominican insurgents in the San Pedro de Macorís district, ground patrols discovered it was far more beneficial to signal insurgent locations to pilots, who would then attack guerrilla forces directly.

In the process of developing counterinsurgency tactics in the Dominican Republic, the Marine Corps also committed—and learned from—its mistakes. When it became evident in 1921 that the United States planned to dismantle the military government, the administration authorized one final campaign to eliminate guerrilla insurgency in the Eastern District. Over the course of five months, the 15th Regiment skillfully executed nine cordon operations. Assisted by biplanes spotting suspicious activity from the air, the Marines would patrol in gradually constricting circles to seal off and screen entire village populations for insurgents. Every male Dominican between the ages of 10 and 60 would be arrested, taken into a floodlit detention center, and identified by witnesses concealed behind canvas screens. Although some 600 “bandits” had been captured in the sweeps, the Marine commander abruptly dropped the method due to widespread complaints.

---

78 “Marines Use Airplanes to Fight Bandits,” Recruiters’ Bulletin, May 1919, Dominican Republic Articles and Newspaper Clippings, HIRB, MCHD, Quantico, VA.
79 Langley, Banana Wars, 154.
80 Ibid.
Conclusion

In the immediate aftermath of World War I, American society had shifted its moral orientation to a more negative opinion of imperialism, patently rejecting military invention as a justifiable course of diplomatic action. As the most visible imprint of U.S. presence in the island republics, the Marine Corps came under intense scrutiny for its apparent lack of discipline and forthright leadership. In the end, the stalemate of guerrilla warfare, oppressive policies of press censorship, and sensational reports surrounding Marine abuses overshadowed its efficiency and success in the early phase of the intervention and produced conditions in which military occupation was no longer tenable.

The process of reflecting on Marine experiences in the Dominican Republic to precipitate U.S. withdrawal laid the groundwork for the development of small wars doctrine. Before the Marine Corps departed Santo Domingo, Major Samuel M. Harrington had published “The Strategy and Tactics of the Small Wars,” an operational prescription for six steps in conducting a small war.81 This and other doctrinal writings benefited from the collection and evaluation of tactical and strategic data from the occupation in the immediate post-Dominican years. Mandatory lectures at both the field and company officers’ schools included some of the first attempts to incorporate small wars lessons into the curriculum at the new Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. Although small wars training did not expand beyond these tentative steps until the Nicaraguan intervention, the lessons of the Dominican experience—both successes and failures—contributed significantly to the formation of the Small Wars Manual more than a decade later. Today, as irregular warfare increasingly becomes the standard pattern of engagement, the military insights gained through these early counterinsurgency operations serve as a stark reminder of the need for constant evaluation and adaption in tactical procedure and of the lessons that can be gleaned thereof. ♦ 1775 ♦

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Nicaragua, 1927–33

A CAMPAIGN AGAINST SANDINO’S COUNTERINSURGENCY

Lieutenant Colonel Micheal D. Russ, USMC

United States Marines’ actions during the Nicaraguan Campaign (1927–33) underscored the significance for fighting as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) in future wars. Marines were deployed and tasked to protect national interests abroad on more than 20 occasions before the Nicaraguan Campaign, and once more, Marines and sailors would be called upon to stabilize Nicaragua and protect U.S. business interests in the Central American region.1

By training and employing the Guardia Nacional, deliberately incorporating and integrating Marine aviation, and utilizing the synergistic effects of the MAGTF concept (in a modern sense), Marines effectively countered General Augusto Sandino's insurgency and delayed a Nicaraguan civil war. Marine operations within an integrated combined-arms team ultimately proved the worth of the MAGTF concept and laid the foundation for future conflicts.

The annexation of California and subsequent discovery of gold prompted the United States to create a transisthmus supply line linking the American Pacific Coast regions and Southeast Asia to Atlantic Ocean areas. Transit across the Central American isthmus was a faster route to the West and lessened the dangers posed by moving supplies across the continental United States or around the Cape Horn of South America.2 However, increasing instability in Central America and the potential for a “European intervention” on the isthmus threatened American financial and subsequent political interests in the future construction of a transisthmus canal system.3

The security of the American population and growing U.S. financial investments, particularly in Nicaragua, seemed to rest upon “stability throughout the [Central American] isthmus.”4

Historically, Nicaragua suffered “under the lash of rebellion” due to ongoing clashes between conservative and liberal parties and localismo: a “fierce civic pride, which magnified economic jealousy and enabled petty leaders to raise armies [and] overthrow the national government.”5 The inability to align politics in Nicaragua after the disestablishment of the Federal Republic of Central America in 1839 served as the greatest destabilizing factor for Nicaragua far into the 1920s.6 However, the combination of these two phenomena was only increased by the continual battle for economic power within Nicaragua as each new leader struggled to maintain peace in the country. Over time, diplomatic and economic

3 Ibid., 4, 34.
6 Federal Republic of Central America consisted of present-day states of Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. See Nalty, United States Marines in Nicaragua, 1.
efforts of the United States produced only minimal stabilizing gains in Nicaragua, ultimately resulting in the U.S. administration's decision to declare "the supremacy of the power of the United States in Central America."7

U.S. interventions in the Central American region had produced little stability in Nicaragua by the end of 1926. President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated a peace treaty among the Central American nations in 1907, preventing the unification of Central America under a liberal Nicaraguan influence. President William H. Taft, Roosevelt's successor, implemented the Dollar Diplomacy that, one year later, extended U.S. commercial and financial interests to foreign

---

The Nicaraguan Campaign (1927–33) utilized diplomatic and military powers to disarm Nicaraguan factions, maintain regional security, and increase the legitimacy of Nicaragua, while protecting U.S. business and economic interests. Henry L. Stimson, emissary of the United States, worked with the Nicaraguan government to broker the disarmament of Nicaraguan factions. Alongside disarmament efforts, the 2d Brigade, led by Brigadier General Logan Feland, formed the basis of a MAGTF in the early part of 1928, which included six scout bomber aircraft that supported his infantry and logistics units. General Feland’s intent was not to campaign in Nicaragua but to pursue Sandino offensively using combined air and ground forces to force Sandino to flee the country.10 As Sandino’s forces resisted, U.S. Marines and sailors began occupying and patrolling the land and sky in the west and central regions of Nicaragua to bring order to the countryside and disrupt the operations of Sandino’s forces. Concomitant with offensive combat operations, Marines also set out to rebuild and legitimize an indigenous guard force capable of assuming national security responsibilities in the future.11 By the end of the campaign in January 1933, the Marines and sailors had not only disrupted Sandino’s rebels and reinvigorated a competent national guard, but also increased combat capability as “Marine aviators and infantrymen” began functioning as an air-ground team.12

Major Ross E. Rowell possessed extensive experience in Marine aviation and commanded the first squadron of de Havilland DH-4 aircraft that supported 2d Brigade. He, along with other Marine aviators, like Alfred A. Cunningham, believed that Marine aviation’s primary role was supporting the Marines on the ground. The character of aviation operations supporting the Marine maneuver elements aligned around “the functions of observation aviation, of ground attack aviation and another which may be referred to as air transport service.”13 Major Rowell worked with ground commanders and the

---

8 Nalty, United States Marines in Nicaragua, 3–5.
9 Ibid., 13–14.
11 Ibid., 14–16.
12 Ibid., 34.
Transport plane flying over the Nicaraguan coast.

Deliberate campaigning executed by Marines and sailors occurred generally from January 1927 until the spring of 1929. During these two years, the 2d Brigade “launched three major offensives against the Sandinistas” to purge the rebel forces from Nicaragua. From July 1927 to the end of 1928, Marines and sailors on the ground and from the air conducted western and eastern offensives, forcing Sandino’s rebels on the defensive. Marine aviation supported both offensives by delivering supplies and messages to and from the field, providing aerial reconnaissance, and attacking hostile ground forces (modern day close air support). Additionally, Marines provided security for the 1928 Nicaraguan elections and oversaw the training and integration of an indigenous guard force, the Guardia Nacional.

14 Ibid., 252-56.
Brigadier General Feland phased ashore more than 2,000 Marines and sailors in the initial stage and “launched a desultory campaign into Nueva Segovia to disperse Sandino’s ever-growing band” of rebels to stop the bleeding.16 The brigade’s offensives during the summer of 1927 and into the spring of 1929 concentrated the bulk of the force to defeat Sandino forces in the Nuevo Segovia and Jinotega regions and along the Coco River from the east. By the summer of 1928, more than 5,000 Marines and sailors secured population centers and established combat outposts in the northwest and north-central regions of Nicaragua, namely Quilali, Ocotal, El Chipote, and Poteca.17 Marines and sailors, once established, conducted security patrols to keep Sandino’s rebels from interfering with overlapping efforts to integrate Guardia Nacional troops and ensure security for the impending governmental elections in 1928.18

### U.S. Marines and the Guardia Nacional

The Guardia Nacional was officially reconstituted at the request of Nicaraguan President Adolfo Diaz in May 1927. The Guardia’s first director, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Y. Rhea, focused throughout much of 1927 and 1928 on recruiting, training, and retaining an all-volunteer, nonpartisan force led by Marine commissioned and noncommissioned officers. By the start of 1929, the Guardia Nacional began assuming responsibilities for much of the patrolling in the sectors of Nicaragua and was integrated into offensive operations. Three years later, the men of the Guardia Nacional manned the majority of the combat outposts and operated with Marine forces, serving primarily as the ready reserve with minimal assistance from Marine mentors.19

In 1927, the Guardia Nacional was envisioned to be a nonpartisan force, loyal to the Nicaraguan leadership and capable of defending the government against further rebellion. The responsibility for organizing, training, and employing the Guardia Nacional was initially tasked to the Marine Corps, and the Marines and sailors selected to carry out this mission did so until the end of the campaign in 1933.

Organizationally, the general headquarters of the Guardia Nacional reported directly to the president of Nicaragua and was commanded initially by Lieutenant Colonel Rhea in May 1927, succeeded in August of that same year by Brigadier General Elias R. Beadle.20 The Guardia Nacional was structured into four regional combat divisions and contained

---

16 Langley, Banana Wars, 195; and Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, January 2006), 5-4.
19 Ibid., 86–101.
separate companies that supported the headquarters, recruiting, and replacement functions. The responsibility for the training and employment of the Guardia Nacional, however, fell primarily on junior Marine and Navy commissioned and noncommissioned officers selected and assigned to lead this all-volunteer force.

Training the Guardia Nacional was not as organized or developed as the structuring of the force seemed to be. First, Marine and Navy commissioned and noncommissioned officers lacked formal training in the “social, cultural, and value systems of the native Nicaraguan.” The lack of cultural training was problematic throughout the campaign because some Nicaraguans did not respond favorably to an American-style of discipline—one that collided with Nicaraguan sensitivities and resulted in several mutinies. Second, Guardia Nacional basic and combat skill training lacked standardization, and its execution was primarily delegated to the local area commanders. Guardia Nacional enlistees, usually spending about a month in basic training, were sent to field units where they learned basic academic and soldiery skills “on the job.” As Brent Gravatt noted, “... if the recruit lived long enough ... he became a competent soldier by practice.” Third, formal military training for junior and senior native officers emerged too late in the campaign. The Guardia Nacional lacked the requisite amount of combat-experienced officers to lead the force by the departure of the Marines in 1933.

Despite perceived shortcomings in organization and training, the Guardia Nacional developed into a competent fighting force by the end of the campaign in 1933 due to the efforts of Marines and sailors. For the first couple of years of the campaign, the Guardia Nacional was employed to man outposts and conduct patrols and limited offensive operations under

---

21 Gravatt, “The Marines and the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” 60-63. The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua soldiers volunteered for three-year enlistments. During the period from October 1927 to September 1932, the Guardia Nacional enlisted on average about 1,000 Nicaraguans per year as the enlisted force level rose from 1,633 enlisted men to almost 2,300 near the end of the campaign. See table 12 in Gravatt, 109.

22 Ibid., 106.

23 Ibid., 107.

24 Ibid., 111-12.

the supervision of and alongside Marines and sailors. From 1929 to 1932, the Guardia Nacional troop counts and combat effectiveness increased, enabling them to accept all patrol duties and locally lead in many campaign operations that followed. The organization, training, and employment of the Guardia Nacional by the Marines and sailors during the course of the campaign provided Nicaragua with a legitimate, competent guard force able to fully support its developing government.

The responsibility of “Middle Stage: Inpatient Care—Recovery” rested on the shoulders of the newly elected government and the Guardia Nacional around the spring of 1929. Operationally, the Guardia Nacional, comprised of about 2,000 soldiers, integrated into the northern and western regions of Nicaragua and became the main force to occupy combat outposts and conduct security patrols alongside and in place of Marines and sailors. The strategy to establish an active defense concentrated the preponderance of the Guardia Nacional forces in the heart of insurgent country and incorporated offensive search-and-destroy missions that minimized the threats posed by Sandino’s rebels (akin to modern day operations conducted by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq). That same summer in 1929, Sandino departed Nicaragua for Mexico to request assistance for the insurgency. Unfortunately, when Sandino returned one year later, rebel forces faced a competent and experienced Guardia Nacional force that ably disrupted his operations during the next stage of the campaign.

The 2d Brigade force retrogrades and the transfer of authority of Nicaraguan regions to the Guardia Nacional in 1929 marked the overlap of the “Middle Stage: Inpatient Care—Recovery” and the “Last Stage: Outpatient Care—Movement to Self-Sufficiency.” The integration of Guardia Nacional forces

27 Counterinsurgency, 5-5.
29 Ibid., 91-92.
30 Counterinsurgency, 5-5, 5-6.
into the operations of the campaign subsequently allowed the number of Marines and sailors required in Nicaragua to be decreased. Specifically, from February to December 1929, the 2d Brigade’s total strength was reduced by almost two-thirds. The Guardia Nacional, by the summer of 1930, conducted the majority of security and stability operations as Marines and sailors provided transition assistance and served as the “ready reserve” force.

By the end of 1932, the Guardia Nacional assumed all responsibilities for maintaining security and stability in Nicaragua, and on 2 January 1933, the Nicaraguan Campaign ended as the last of the Marines and sailors departed Nicaragua for the United States. Military operations subsequently waned in attractiveness leading up to the 1932 elections that brought conservative party leader, Juan B. Sacasa, back to the head of government as the Nicaraguan Campaign ended.

Testing the MAGTF: Combined-Arms Operations and the Single Battle

Up to this point in history, the Marine Corps had not been able to leverage the full energy of the MAGTF as Marine aviation had been in its infancy. The series of operations that consumed the preponderance of the Nicaraguan Campaign demonstrated the effectiveness of the “air-ground team,” linking aviation operations to the ground scheme of maneuver and coupled with supporting logistical sustainment. The Marine air squadron, commanded by Major Rowell, combined aerial observation, ground attack, and air transport aviation operations to increase the combat power of the Marine ground elements in squashing Sandino’s insurgency.

Supporting the ground commander with infantry liaison (communications relay) and visual reconnaissance (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) missions consumed the majority of the sorties flown during the campaign. Ground commanders were enabled by Marine aviation to communicate with combat outposts and patrols that “penetrated far into the heavily forested mountains and remote jungles of [Nicaragua].” Infantry liaison missions essentially linked field commanders with the outlying patrols, providing the means for passing patrol reports and communicating routine and emergency support requests. Visual reconnaissance flights, usually conducted in conjunction with infantry liaison, augmented ground intelligence mechanisms and assisted in providing the field commanders with information beyond what was discernable from the ground. The two combined missions dramatically increased the field commander’s situational awareness beyond what he could see and his ability to command and control subordinate elements from a distance.

Aerial observation (modern day forms of close air support and armed reconnaissance) combined the “use of aircraft in organized warfare” to attack hostile ground forces and augment ground maneuver and surface fires (modern day combined-arms operations). Marine aviators routinely conducted ground attack in advance of deliberate operations (the deep fight) or when Sandino’s forces presented themselves as targets of opportunities, attacking insurgent strongholds and maneuver columns inflicting many casualties and “severely [punishing]” large enemy forces in places such as El Chipote and Murra. Marine aviators also attacked targets in close proximity and direct support of security patrols and combat outposts ably defeating and dispersing Sandino’s forces—notably, at Ocotal in 1927 and Sapotillal Ridge in 1928. Aerial observation and fires, augmenting ground maneuvers, and surface based
Marines are loading an Atlantic-Fokker C-2 transport plane with supplies for Marine ground troops. The tractor and trailer were used to carry equipment and supplies overland.

fires minimized Sandino’s ability to mass and organize his forces and provided the ground combat elements with a distinct combat advantage on the battlefield.

Transporting supplies and personnel using Marine aviation “broadened and increased” the 2d Brigade’s operating zone and efficiency. According to Major Rowell, “there is not a military situation on record where the air transport service has had such a valuable and important part.” The introduction and use of the Atlantic-Fokker C-2 transport aircraft gave the 2d Brigade a distinct logistical advantage over Sandino’s rebels in many aspects:

Entire garrisons in the most remote localities [depended] wholly on the transports for supply, an entire regimental headquarters was transported to the front, minor troop movements [were] effected, the sick and wounded [were] evacuated, casual officer and enlisted [were] carried, the mail [was] delivered and emergency articles and materials of every conceivable nature [were] delivered with the greatest speed and safety.

Additionally, in contrast with mule trains that spent 10 days to three months delivering personnel and supplies to combat outposts, Marine aviation delivered “2,000 pounds of cargo or eight fully equipped Marines per flight” in about “one hour and 40 minutes.” By the end of the campaign, Marine aviation had made contact with the enemy 300 times and transported 20,749 passengers and 6.5 million pounds of cargo in 31,296 sorties in support of the 2d Brigade and Guardia Nacional operations on the ground.

The effective use of aerial observation, ground attack, and air transport operations reinforced the 2d Brigade’s capabilities to rapidly locate and strike Sandino’s forces with a relative combat power advantage at the times and places of the Marines’ choosing. The combined effects of aviation and ground combat forces not only successfully outpaced Sandino’s insurgency and proved the worth of functioning as a capable air-ground team, but the synergy gained in this new concept, the MAGTF, proved its worth for future Marine Corps’ operating concepts.

The 2d Brigade executed a successful campaign in Nicaragua by not only employing the Guardia Nacional and conducting offensive operations to frustrate Sandino’s rebellion but also by incorporating its new air-ground team in combat operations. The operations of the six-year campaign ably displaced

---

42 Ibid.
43 Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation, 57.
Sandino’s rebels from the populated areas of Nicaragua “to achieve [a] stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development.” Historic parallels are easily made between the Nicaraguan Campaign and the campaigns conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. The lessons herein derived are enduring and necessary for similar types of campaigns to be fought in the future. First, the “foreign face,” American in this case, often present initially in an occupation can socially impair the views of the indigenous populace. Nicaraguan officials, as well as their U.S. counterparts, were eager to establish a nonpartisan, indigenous national guard force capable of providing local and regional security during government development. Rapidly placing national and regional matters back into the hands of the Nicaraguans was integral to not only assisting the United States in drawing down its forces in Nicaragua, but also to legitimizing Nicaraguan sovereignty.

Second, Marine aviation was indispensable, expanded ground-based operations, and formed a premier fight force—the MAGTF. Combining aerial reconnaissance, ground attack, and air transport operations with the ground scheme of maneuver proved that, by integrating ground and air operations, Marines were more effective in locating, disrupting, and defeating Sandino’s rebels—more effective than the conduct of each element operating separately. All in all, the functions of Marine aviation in Nicaragua were of primary importance to operations where delivering reinforcing troops, supplies, and fires more quickly than could be accomplished in movements over the land, proving the worth of not only Marine aviation but the relevance and power of the MAGTF in combat.

Though the campaign conducted in Nicaragua from 1927 to 1933 failed to bring lasting peace to Nicaragua, the Marines and sailors successfully prevented a civil war and provided a stable environment by which the Nicaraguan government grew its military and economy. For the Marine Corps, the campaign proved that “Marine aviators and infantrymen could function smoothly as a unified team.” Thus, the MAGTF was conceived and the resulting synergistic mechanisms of the new air-ground team provided the basis for how the MAGTF would fight in future wars.

---

45 Counterinsurgency, 5-3.
48 Nalty, United States Marines in Nicaragua, 34.
Development of Medical Doctrine for Amphibious Warfare by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1930–35

PART II

Captain Steven L. Oreck, USN (Ret)

The development of medical doctrine evolved during a time of great change for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. This second article covers the discussion from 1930 to 1935 and continues the story regarding the analysis of medical doctrine within the larger scope of the evolution of amphibious warfare doctrine. Beginning in the early twentieth century (1920s), individuals within the Navy and Marine Corps coalesced around the issues of medical doctrine development and how best to organize it for the Marine Corps. Though there was debate and the writing of papers regarding medicine, it was not until 1927 that the Navy published Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare that jump-started the process of how to provide medical support for amphibious operations.

1930–35

The first half of the 1930s represented a time of challenge and opportunity for the Marine Corps. The biggest obstacle for the Marines, along with every other institution in America, was how to survive the Great Depression. Under the Herbert C. Hoover administration, which had a fiscal policy of attempting to maintain a balanced budget in the face of decreasing tax revenues, Congress significantly reduced funding for and the authorized strength of the Corps. Additionally the number of Marines that could actually be funded was less than even the reduced numbers theoretically authorized. Although the U.S. Army was not interested in the issue of amphibious assault, the mission of overseas expeditionary action was a valuable bone to be fought over, especially in this fiscally constrained environment. The absorption of the Marine Corps into the Army in the name of fiscal austerity was a real possibility.

At the same time there were challenges for the Marines, doors of opportunity opened. The bulk of the Marine constabulary missions in the Caribbean, Central America, and China were terminated or downsized during this time. This freed up funds, but more important, it freed up personnel to be assigned to the dedicated amphibious forces that would be created. Reduced constabulary obligations also allowed the Marines to assign personnel to boards to work full time on all of the issues, beginning with doctrine, which needed to be developed to make the amphibious force a functioning reality. The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president in 1932 was also an opportunity for the Marines. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy with respect to Latin America accelerated the removal of Marines from the Caribbean and Central America. The fiscal policies of the Roosevelt administration and the New Deal resulted in more military spending as part of the overall economic recovery plan. Additionally, Roosevelt had been assistant secretary of the Navy and was a staunch supporter of the Navy and Marine Corps, an affinity that Marines used to their advantage.

The international environment began to change as well, and in the early 1930s as the world began to take on a less benign appearance, the military in general and the Marines in particular would be perceived by the public and Congress as more important and less

---

2 President Roosevelt’s son, James, had a great desire to be a Marine officer, and the Marines gave him a direct commission in the Marine Corps Reserve as a lieutenant colonel in 1936—an unprecedented move. James Roosevelt served on active duty in World War II, initially with Edson’s Raiders (1st Marine Raider Battalion) with distinction.
superfluous than in the past. Open Japanese aggression in China, beginning with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the increasingly hostile posture of Japan vis-à-vis the other powers with concessions and interests in China eventually resulted in “accidents,” such as the attack on the USS Panay (PR 5). These incidents ratcheted up tensions in the Pacific. Japanese departure from the League of Nations only supported those who felt that, sooner or later, the United States and Japan were going to come to violence to settle issues of Pacific and Asian spheres of influence. While Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, which included the use of poison gas, was disturbing—and even though thoughtful individuals had concerns about the ascension of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis to power in Germany—the Navy and Marine Corps were much more focused on the Pacific.

During the first half of the 1930s, the Marines’ commitment to becoming the amphibious warfare specialists intensified. During the late 1920s, the Joint Board had formally given the mission to the Marines. Colonel Ellis B. Miller had begun in the late 1920s to reorient the Marine Corps' schools toward landing operations. Not only had the intellectual re-orientation continued and expanded, but the physical structure of the Marines also changed to provide a permanent and significant amphibious force. The Marines and Navy re instituted landing exercises, and these became a significant annual event. As funding became available, and in spite of the looser purse under the Roosevelt administration, funding was by no means generous at this time, the Marines strove to obtain the tools needed to equip the amphibious force to carry out the newly developed doctrines.

In 1931, the commander of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico and the Commandant of the Marine Corps discussed the need for developing doctrine for landing operations. Subsequent correspondence elucidated the requirement that the board have Navy as well as Marine representatives as it proceeded to develop this doctrine. In October 1931, the Commandant replied, authorizing the formation of a Marine Corps board to develop a landing manual and permitting the assignment of Marine officers full time to this board and approving at least one Navy member to the board. The Marines hoped that the assignment of a Navy member to the board would provide insight into Navy thinking on such subjects as boat manning, gunfire support, and aviation. The correspondence, creating and modifying the board, made no mention of any input or discussion of medical issues associated with this new doctrine. The Marines initially established the board in June 1931, and it consisted of Majors Charles D. Barrett, Lyle H. Miller, and Pedro A. del Valle, all who would later serve in WWII. In the fall, Lieutenant Walter C. Ansell, USN, was added to the board. Lieutenant Ansell’s area of expertise was naval gunfire.

This group of officers, and by extension all of the subgroups that worked on this manual whether officially assigned or (as in the case of the medical officers) on their own, did not receive much in the way of direction from above. Major Pedro del Valle later explained that the members of the board had received little guidance, doctrine, or information on what to do and used studies of the British operation at Gallipoli, Turkey, and those studies were examples of what not to do. At one time or another, many officers were involved in shaping this document, and in January 1934, there was an extensive conference with approximately 60 officers attending to discuss progress on the manual and to make sure the document was understandable by both the Navy and the Marine Corps. Approximately six naval officers were present; however, there were no medical officers present and no discussion in the minutes of any issues relating to medical aspects of amphibious landings. Given the very specific purposes for which this

---

2 Charles F. B. Price to Board of Officers for the Development of the Text on Landing Operations, 17 April 1931, Historical Amphibious File, Gen Alfred M. Gray Research Center (GRC), Marine Corps University (MCU), Quantico, VA.
3 BGen R. C. Berkeley, memorandum, 3 June 1931, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
4 “Text for Landing Operations,” 20 October 1931, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
6 Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 279.
7 “Proceedings for Conference held at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, VA., on Tuesday, January 7, 1934, for the purpose of discussing, approving or commenting on the various headings and sub-headings of the tentative Landing Operations Manual, prepared by the Marine Corps Schools, and what it should include,” 7 January 1934, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA.
conference was held, the lack of discussion of any aspect of medical services for an amphibious landing is difficult to understand, although not surprising.

In response to a query in the 1970s from a Marine Corps archivist, Rear Admiral Ansel, who as a lieutenant had been the sole Navy representative on the original board stated that

I can recall no talk about casualties and their handling at Quantico; no one was responsible for this subject—which now seems incomprehensible. We were all on the offensive. The talk we [he and General del Valle] recalled included that returning boats (from the assault) were to be available for casualty return, and at the mother ship the boats with the casualties were to be hoisted with the wounded in them.10

The officers who made up the original board, and those who worked with them and/or attended the conference in 1934, all had the benefit of numerous detailed and critical analyses of the Gallipoli operation to study. These analyses showed that the medical component of the operation was a complete disaster, especially during the assault phase and for some time thereafter. In an impressive (or perhaps depressive) example of groupthink, all of the Navy and Marine line officers were willing to accept that the spectrum of medical care, including supply, evacuation, and treatment, would “just happen” without some sort of integrated doctrinal and planning process.

The Marines published the initial tentative manual in 1934 for internal use at the Marine Corps Schools. A year later, the Marines republished the manual for Corps-wide use. Chapter IX of the Manual for Landing Operations dealt with logistic and support issues and contained a few brief paragraphs concerning medical issues. Paragraph 53 described needs for medical planning, which included normal Fleet Marine Force (FMF) medical units and fleet units and additional hospital ships; conversion of transports for movement of the wounded, personnel, and equipment for ambulance boats and shore (beach) parties; and provisions for evacuation of severely injured and convalescence for those capable of return to duty.11 Planners based casualty estimates on the Gallipoli experience calculated by planners to be 15 percent of the force landed on the first day, 10 percent of the total force landed over the first three days, and four wounded in action for every one individual killed in action. No estimates were made to account for disease and nonbattle injuries among personnel of the landing force.12 The need for an ambulance service, collecting stations for the wounded, and eventual onshore hospital facilities were mentioned but not fully defined. Compared to the detail in most of the other aspects of an amphibious landing covered in this manual, coverage of the medical issues is both scant and incomplete. The medical paragraphs appear to have been cobbled together from other publications or informal conversations rather than as the result of detailed study and discussion by experts.

At the same time, the Marines at Quantico were beginning to put together a theoretical basis for an amphibious landing force; the Marines were also formally redefining themselves. On 17 August 1933, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) wrote to the chief of naval operations (CNO) requesting that the name of the Marine expeditionary force be changed to the Fleet Marine Force.13 The CNO concurred, and on 8 December 1933, Navy General Order 241 created the FMF.14 By emphasizing its connection to the fleet, and with the further emphasis on seizing bases for the fleet, the Marine Corps had helped to ensure Navy support in any future battles against being incorporated into the Army.

While all of these changes, both doctrinal and organizational, were occurring in the Corps, parallel changes were occurring in Navy medical support to the Marines. These medical changes were truly parallel. There is no evidence that there was ever any attempt by higher authorities in the Marines or the Navy to create a formal board to evaluate the medical needs of amphibious operations. An official plan of coordination was not created to ensure that medi-
tional input was available to the Marines landing manual group when needed or that the medical thinkers were kept abreast of the evolution of Marine doctrine. It is clear that medical officers involved with the Corps kept themselves informed about what was going on, recognized some of the problems that needed to be solved, and worked to devise solutions.

In August 1931, as the Marines were developing the tentative landing manual, Navy Captain R. Hayden, of the Medical Corps and post surgeon at Quantico, wrote two letters to the commanding general of the Quantico base. In these letters, Captain Hayden evaluated the plan of medical support for the expeditionary brigade. In essence, he found that the plan of support was inadequate in concept, personnel, and equipment. He made several recommendations, among them increasing the number of personnel, modularizing the attached base hospital set so that it could be split into two independent units, and upgrading the equipment. This was to be the first of a series of recommendations made by a succession of medical officers for changing the medical support structure to better serve the needs of an evolving Marine Corps. Captain Hayden made an important point that his proposals would need to be modified in case the brigade was engaged in major combat. This was distinctly different than the requirements for the low-level combat that had been typical for the Marines since the end of WWI.

The medical personnel supporting the Marines, and much of the medically related supplies and equipment to support the Marines, came from the Navy, therefore there was a system of dual control of medical personnel and assets. Once the Navy agreed to supply personnel or materiel to the Marines, the Corps could distribute them as it saw fit; however, the Navy, through the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), made the decisions about filling the requests for personnel and materiel. This system, which persists to the present day, has always been typical for the Marines since the end of WWI.

The fiscal constraints placed on BUMED did not mean that the Navy Medical Department was unaware that the organization of support for Marine expeditionary forces was inadequate, which had been an issue since the 1920s. It should be emphasized that Captain Chambers did not think the changes requested by Captain Hayden were excessive or inappropriate—BUMED just did not have the financial resources to buy expensive medical equipment. The surgeon general of the Navy was directly involved and, on 28 September 1931, Rear Admiral Charles E. Riggs, surgeon general of the Navy, wrote to the Major General Commandant “. . . it will be readily seen that the medical facilities provided in the Marine Corps peace strength organization tables for reinforced Infantry Brigade appears to be entirely inadequate.” The frustration behind the correspondence in the fall of 1931 between BUMED and the Marines is evident; there was a problem and it was not trivial. Both the medical staff attached to the Marines and the staff at BUMED, including the surgeon general, agreed that staffing and equipment for Marine medical support were inadequate. There was agreement that the proposed changes were reasonable and appropriate. Unfortunately, resource constraints imposed by Congress did not allow the deficiencies to be corrected.

Over and over again, a singular fact about medical

15 Currently, and for more than 30 years, there has been the position of medical officer of the Marine Corps. This doctor is on the staff of the Commandant, and one of his duties is to pass to the Commandant changes in medical force structure with his recommendations. In the 1930s, no such position existed, and at least in 1931, the post surgeon at Quantico was functionally the most senior doctor serving with the Marines and had a responsibility for forwarding such doctrinal and structural items.

16 Capt R. Hayden, (MC) USN, to Medical Department, 20 August 1931, Record Group (RG) 52, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Capt R. Hayden (MC) USN, “Letter: Tables of personnel and material allowances, medical department, to accompany U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary forces,” 21 August 1931, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.

17 Capt William Chambers, (MC) USN, to Capt R. Hayden, 28 September 1931, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.

18 RAdm C. E. Riggs, (MC) USN, to MajGen Commandant, 28 September 1931, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.
support for combat operations was made clear, and while it was the Marines in particular examined in detail, it also applied to combat medical support for the Navy itself. To have adequate materiel on hand to support combat is expensive in peacetime. Drugs and other supplies reach the end of their useful life and equipment may become obsolete before it is ever used. All medical personnel, officer and enlisted, are highly trained and valuable assets and expensive to support. Even if they are working in a normal medical capacity most of the time, the time needed to train for and to learn how to function in the field environment, which is time away from normal medical duties, represents a significant expense. Adequate training and materiel is absolutely essential to provide efficient, or even adequate, medical care from the first day of combat. While medical personnel and equipment and supplies can be expanded as a force expands, providing for day one wartime needs in the face of competing peacetime priorities is a significant problem.\(^\text{19}\)

Although Captain Chambers may have been the messenger bearing the bad news, he was well aware of the problems caused by these gaps. In 1932, he submitted a secret report to the director of the War Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Orange War Plan needs of Marine forces were analyzed by Captain Chambers, as well as the necessary hospital ships and transports (class A and B ships).\(^\text{20}\) He noted the significant number of vessels required, as well as an overage for up to 15 percent more casualties in case estimates were low, and also the possibility of losing some of the ships.\(^\text{21}\) To keep facilities available for the Marines in the land-based forward expeditionary hospital, Captain Chambers recommended that hospital ships be used to care for most Navy casualties. In early 1933, Captain Chambers prepared a report that was sent to the senior echelons of BUMED concerning the medical organizations for the Marine Corps. In addition to suggestions for reorganization of the medical battalion, Chambers’ suggestions also included increasing the number of personnel in the battalion and adding a supplementary 50-bed hospital if needed in combat against an “organized” enemy.\(^\text{22}\) He described the current plan as inadequate even in peacetime. This report, and his letter concerning hospital ship requirements for a war with Japan, made it clear that his response to Captain Hayden was not his personal view but rather an official response of BUMED.

Captain Chambers was not considering his suggested changes in a vacuum. In April and May of 1933, Captain Hayden responded to Chamber’s recommendations. Hayden agreed with most of the recommendations and specifically commented that they were adequate for peacetime activities but only if the Marines provided personnel to support the medical unit and perform nonmedical duties. He also suggested that the collecting companies be enlarged, and wanted to be clear that his approval and suggestions were provisional and subject to change upon further analysis and the result of field exercises.\(^\text{23}\) As an example of how valuable exercise experience was in the development of doctrine, Captain Hayden urged that the medical elements of the brigade and their equipment be divided among two or more ships, citing the experience of a 1932 exercise off Hawaii, where the ship carrying all of the Army medical personnel and their equipment was ruled to have been torpedoed and sunk.\(^\text{24}\)

The senior medical officer for the Marine forces

---

19 While doctors (and other medical professionals) can be added to the force when war starts, they need basic military training and then specific field training to be effective in the Marine Corps (or even afloat/Navy) environment. Enlisted (corpsman) training, both basic and field, is also time consuming. Providing adequately trained medical personnel for an expanding force will trend behind overall expansion.

20 Orange War Plans refers to a series of Joint Army-Navy plans for dealing with a potential war with Japan.

21 Collecting companies were part of the medical battalion and were the intermediate step between the aid stations and the hospital company. Here casualties were further sorted, received additional medical treatment as needed (but not surgery), and then triaged for further treatment at the hospital company, temporary holding, or return to duty. See Cdr W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, Medical Tactics in Naval Warfare.

22 Capt William Chambers, (MC) USN, memorandum, 28 May 1932, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.

23 Capt R. Hayden (MC) to Commandant, USMC, 13 April 1933, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Capt R. Hayden (MC) to Commandant, USMC, 10 May 1933, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC. The request for Marines to be not just collocated with a medical unit but to be assigned and under the command and control of the medical unit is an important issue. The number of enlisted personnel assigned to a medical unit is based on the medical tasks the unit is designed to perform. If medical personnel (corpsmen) have to be used for nonmedical tasks, such as ambulance drivers or sentries, this reduces the ability of the unit to perform its designed function. A separate Marine unit attached to a medical unit (e.g., a service company) results in a divided command where the commander of the service unit makes the decision on what tasks his Marines will or will not perform and when, rather than the commander of the medical unit; the effectiveness then depends upon individual cooperation that may not be present.
participating in the 1932 exercise in Hawaii was Navy Lieutenant Commander Walter A. Vogelsang. He had prepared two alternative plans as annexes to the field order, which dealt with both the simulated combat aspects of the exercise and the need to provide actual medical care to anyone who became sick or injured. He created a detailed plan of casualty flow, using maps of the exercise area to locate and identify collection points, beach evacuation stations, and ambulance routes. A field hospital was scheduled to be landed and set up, supplies to be on hand were defined, and a medical chain of command with specific responsibilities was established. In addition to planning for the possibility of real casualties, appropriate preventive measures (e.g., sanitation requirements and immunizations) were defined. This medical annex was remarkably similar to one that would be produced today for a similar exercise and demonstrates the expertise of Lieutenant Commander Vogelsang, as there was no file of annexes from past exercises or some standard defined format for such annexes available for reference.

With the creation of the FMF, the Navy created the post of FMF medical officer. As a specialty officer on the staff of the commanding general, the force medical officer had responsibility for the day-to-day health of the force, via the subordinate regimental and battalion physicians, but also for medical planning that included determining the staffing and equipping of the medical units attached to the FMF. The first FMF medical officer was Navy Lieutenant Commander W. J. C. Agnew. Lieutenant Commander Agnew had previously served with the Marines as a regimental surgeon. He wasted no time moving forward and, in December 1933, sent two letters up the chain of command to the commanding general, FMF, with recommendations for organizing the various medical units or detachments that would serve with the FMF. In particular, he recommended two doctors and 16 corpsmen for an infantry battalion, with half of the corpsmen to be at the battalion aid station (BAS) and the others with the companies. One of the doctors could be “temporary,” but the senior of the two was to be permanent. Noninfantry units or “special troops” were to be assigned one doctor and eight corpsmen. These recommendations were worked out in conjunction with the post surgeon, Navy Captain A. H. Allen, and the post sanitary officer, Navy Lieutenant (junior grade) R. E. Fielding.

Lieutenant Commander Agnew continued to work on a functional design of the medical support for the FMF, and the next target was the field hospital. In December 1933, Lieutenant Commander Agnew sent a memo to Major Harry K. Pickett, located at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), about logistic and support issues. The recommendation was to increase personnel and equipment so that the field hospital could be modularized and dispersed as three smaller but freestanding units if necessary. Major Pickett passed these and subsequent suggestions up the chain as well as recommending that Lieutenant Commander Agnew and others review the experience of the 3d Marine Regiment in China to devise the new system. Eventually, Pickett received the following direction on how to proceed from Major Leander A. Clapp: “Have interviewed [Brigadier] General [C. H.] Lyman [commanding general, FMF] on the matter and he doesn’t mind as to how you arrange it, but wants to assure the flexibility as outlined in Agnew’s report . . . . I frankly admit my knowledge is limited on the matter.”

The response of Brigadier General Lyman, with Major Clapp’s additional comments, typifies the Marine response to issues of medical support. The Navy provided medical personnel and supplies to

25 LCdr W. A. Vogelsang, (MC) USN, “First Marine Division/Blue Expeditionary Force, Annex No. 3 to Administrative Order No. 1: Plan of Sanitation and Medical Plan-General (Constructive),” 26 December 1931, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA; and LCdr W. A. Vogelsang, (MC) USN, “First Marine Division/Blue Expeditionary Force, Annex No. 1 to Administrative Orders No. 2: Plan of Evacuation, Hospitalization and Medical Supply,” 16 January 1932, Historical Amphibious File, GRC, MCU, Quantico, VA

26 LCdr W. J. C. Agnew, (MC) USN, to Maj Harry K. Pickett, USMC, 28 December 1933, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC; and LCdr W. J. C. Agnew, (MC) USN, to Commanding General, FMF, 18 December 1933, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC. Current staffing of a Marine infantry battalion (deployed) is two medical officers and approximately 60 enlisted corpsmen. Approximately 20-25 corpsmen would be assigned to the BAS, and the others assigned as platoon/company corpsmen. When not deployed, a battalion usually has only one doctor, the second being assigned prior to deployment.

27 LCdr W. J. C. Agnew, (MC) USN, to Maj Harry K. Pickett, 6 February 1934, 5 March 1934, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.

28 Maj H. K. Pickett, USMC, to Maj Leander Clapp, 26 February 1934, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC; and Maj Leander A. Clapp, USMC, to Maj H. K. Pickett, 7 March 1934, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.
the Marine Corps. Most Marines, like Major Clapp, felt out of their depth when dealing with matters of medical support. As a result, the Marines were more than happy to leave the details of making medical support happen up to the Navy, as long as the plans made some logical sense and did not impose what the Marines considered unrealistic demands in terms of shipping space or Marine assets, such as personnel or equipment. As long as the Marine commanders had confidence in their assigned medical officers, the doctors had the green light to create solutions to the problems with little interference. Only when plans seemed to make no sense or when support failed did line officers tend to get directly involved. This attitude was both a blessing and a curse. It gave the medical officers independence to devise solutions, yet denied them significant institutional support. The solution to the curse was to network with like-minded medical officers who faced similar problems.

Even today, in a much larger U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, the number of medical officers assigned to the Marines is not significant. Those medical officers with multiple Marine tours comprise an even smaller group. In the naval establishment of the 1930s, most medical officers who had multiple or senior assignments with the Marines knew each other by reputation at least. Given the limited geography of where medical officers assigned to the Marines were stationed, the opportunity for informal get-togethers at the officers’ club or elsewhere was important. Medical officers on a base, such as Quantico, even if not working in the same building, had many opportunities for informal networking. Almost all of those officers involved in this network had multiple tours with the Marines as well as operational experience. This combination gave them both an appreciation for the medical problems (combat and noncombat) of deployed Marines, as well as insight into the tactical realities that planners had to take into account.

An example of this sort of networking is the response to a letter sent by Major Pickett to then Commander Vogelsang. Vogelsang, who was then assigned to duty at Naval Hospital San Diego and the USS Maryland (BB 46), was asked his opinion about the proposals put forward by Lieutenant Commander Agnew for the hospital support of the FMF field hospital units. Commander Vogelsang emphasized the need to keep the larger unit on the table of organization (T/O) as it would be needed in a wartime situation, although not necessarily for peacetime operations, which included operations like Nicaragua and China. In his letter, Vogelsang cited the example of the medical disaster at Gallipoli—which was partly due to having inadequate facilities for medical care—and the lack of adequate facilities would have resulted in a failure to provide adequate care even had there been proper planning in other respects and excellent Army-Navy cooperation.

In June 1934, Navy Captain William L. Mann Jr. was once again at Quantico, now as the post surgeon. From this date until the entry of the United States into WWII, he was intimately involved with the Marines and the continuing evolution of medical doctrine for amphibious warfare. It did not take Mann long to roll up his sleeves and get to work. In August 1934, he sent a lengthy memo to Brigadier General Lyman. Captain Mann drove home the point that medical care for an amphibious assault was quite different from that for a land campaign, as a result, required specialized doctrine, personnel, and equipment. Simply copying the Army’s methods would not do.

One of the essential differences in care between the Army and Marines involved the treatment of wounded in the assault phase. Shore-to-ship movement could be problematic, and therefore, it was essential that some medical capability go ashore early. Captain Mann clarified both the problem and its potential solution: “The history of amphibious warfare . . . shows conclusively that the medical assistance of forces afloat available to the shore units is frequently UNRELIABLE and UNDEPENDABLE.”

To establish medical care ashore, Mann urged that all equipment packs for the BAS be no more than 40–50 pounds so that they would be man-portable. Like most of his fellow Marine-oriented medical officers, Mann invoked military history, most specifically Gallipoli but also the experience of the Spanish-American War, to buttress his arguments.

Captain Mann followed up on this issue of equipment. In December 1934, he wrote to HQMC con-

29 Cdr Walter A. Vogelsang, (MC) USN, to Maj H. K. Pickett, 22 May 1934, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.
30 Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, to BGen C. H. Lyman, 15 August 1934, RG 52, National Archives, Washington, DC.
cerning the proposed equipment sets for the FMF that had been recommended by Lieutenant Commander Agnew. The paperwork for these changes had been on Captain Mann's desk when he arrived to take over as post surgeon. He noted that many items issued to FMF units at present were based on the 1927 equipment tables.31

In January 1935, the Navy and Marine Corps began to test the new doctrine they were creating. The first fleet landing exercise (FLEX 1) was held from 15 January to 15 March 1935, around Culebra, Puerto Rico.32 Initially held once a year during the winter, FLEXs were held in the Caribbean and on the West Coast to create an opportunity to train sailors and Marines, to identify problems, and hopefully to test proposed solutions the following year.33 The vital role the FLEXs were to play in the refinement of doctrine, tactics, and equipment for all aspects of amphibious warfare, including medical, cannot be exaggerated. As one of the senior Marine commanders of WWII, General Holland M. Smith would later state in his postwar history of the development of amphibious warfare that “provisions for realistic, full scale joint training, which with experience is the only method for achieving that full measure of coordination necessary to success.”34 Due to constraints in ship availability, limiting the size of the assault forces and constraining personnel availability, equipment, and budgets, many aspects of FLEX 1 had to be simulated using constructive forces.35

The widespread use of constructive forces goes against General Smith's dictum for realistic full-scale training and violates the military aphorism of “train like you fight.” In spite of the many limitations built into FLEX 1 before the exercise began, it did provide valuable experience and showed a commitment to make the amphibious-oriented Marine Corps a reality. By 1935, the Marines and the medical officers who were working to solve their piece of the puzzle had the opportunity to thoroughly analyze both Gallipoli and the German assault on the Baltic Islands and hopefully could test, evaluate, and refine the cycle, avoiding most of the mistakes in those campaigns.

In March 1935, the medical officers involved in FLEX 1 submitted a confidential, classified report on the medical aspects of the exercise. The involved physicians included the battalion surgeons of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marines, the regimental surgeon of the 5th Marines, and the force surgeon. The report contained a summary of actual medical care delivered during the exercise; both preventive measures and treatment of sick or injured were considered adequate. However, the rest of the report was much less positive. One major problem was the personnel issue. There were inadequate numbers of personnel overall, and many individuals were transferred to the units shortly before the exercise, which prevented adequate training and integration, and then many were transferred out immediately following the exercise, which wasted the training effort. During the exercise, there was a lack of realistic casualty drills, limiting the training of the corpsmen and the ability to test the systems established for casualty care and transportation. Finally, there were significant problems with the equipment. The packs were too bulky to be manhandled (as noted earlier by Captain Mann), and the kits carried by the corpsmen were awkward and did not contain the right mix of supplies and equipment.36 These complaints were uniform across all levels of the medical department participating in the exercise.

Given that FLEX 1 was the first major landing exercise in 10 years, and the landing manual was still a work in progress, the Marines were not going to release it Corps wide until later in 1935. Some of the issues raised in the special reports should have been, at least in theory, relatively easy to fix. Given the

31 Capt W. L. Mann, (MC) USN, to Headquarters Marine Corps, 8 December 1934, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.
32 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 337.
33 Isley and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 46.
35 Constructive forces is the term used at the time to describe the use of a portion of a unit to represent the entire unit. This allowed an exercise to work with smaller numbers of personnel and still preserve some elements of realism, as opposed to simulated units where no personnel are used. Constructive forces represent a compromise and do not provide the experience for participants or the data for analysis that using a complete unit does.
36 “Special Reports submitted by Fleet Marine Force on U.S. Fleet Landing Exercise No. 1 Culebra, P. R., February 1935 (Confidential),” March 1935, RG 127, National Archives, Washington, DC.
overall Navy shortage of enlisted medical personnel, filling the T/O of the units may not have been possible, but the manning could have been improved by assigning more personnel on a temporary basis or with some shuffling of priorities. Also, if it was necessary to use personnel assigned on temporary duty, having them arrive in time for adequate pre-exercise training and integration should have been arranged. Medical personnel without proper field training not only limit the ability of the exercise to test doctrine and methods but can also become a hindrance. Given the importance of realistic medical drills in casualty movement and treatment, incorporating medical planners in the creation of the schedule for the next FLEX could be done easily.

Regarding equipment, the problems were at least partially identified. Redoing the packing of equipment sets into man-portable units required planning and effort but other than containers required no new purchases. Captain Mann and others had commented that the medical equipment needed to be organized so that the packs could be carried by one or two men. Overly heavy or bulky ones were difficult if not impossible to transport in an assault. Creating new kits to be carried by the corpsmen would also be a relatively easy fix.

However, to solve the equipment issue now that it had been identified, somebody had to take ownership of the problem. Given the dual nature necessary to control the medical personnel and material assets in support of the Marines discussed previously, equipment issues became orphans. The Marine Corps Equipment Board, created in 1935 by Marine Corps Order 87, had the special task of evaluating new and current equipment with regard to its suitability for use in amphibious landings. Similar to the board established to create the tentative landing manual, no Navy medical staff was represented here either, at least initially.

A good start had been made by the Marines and their Navy doctors in developing the theory for amphibious warfare, and they were beginning to test it. General Smith summed up the state of the art in 1935, “Between 1920 and 1935 a landing operations doctrine was developed and an organization established with which to test it.” The foundation for a network of Navy medical officers committed to developing medical doctrine and tactics for amphibious warfare had been established. The names of Mann, Vogelsang, and Chambers led the field in 1935, with the mantle of primus inter pares (first among equals) falling on the shoulders of Captain W. L. Mann. Some of the doctors active through the early 1930s moved on to other duties, and new men replaced them, but it always remained a fairly small group known to each other professionally if not personally.

The FMF moved from Quantico to San Diego, California. This represented the prevailing view, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps, that the Pacific was expected to be the center of any future conflict. The focus was clearly on the Orange War Plans and the Empire of Japan.

In 1930, the international scene was dominated by the Great Depression, and war was not seen to be something to be overly concerned about. By the middle of the decade, Fascist Italy was using naked military force, including gas warfare, to expand its empire, and Nazi Germany had made clear its intentions to rearm. The Versailles Treaty (1919) and the system of international relations based upon it lay in the dust. If there were issues, Hitler and Italy’s Benito Mussolini were Europe’s problems, and the United States was firmly against becoming involved yet again in the difficulties of Europe. However, in the Pacific and in Asia, Japan was on the march. Japan had not only absorbed Manchuria (now Manchuko) but was directly penetrating into China. Unlike Germany and Italy, Japan could not be written off as someone else’s problem. As you will continue to read in the third and final part of this series, there was yet much work to do, and the time in which to perform the work was shorter than anyone realized.

---

37 All boats used for landings at this time required the men to climb over the sides to debark on the beach. Anything that could not be handled by one or two men would not be usable during an assault phase but would have to wait until larger craft or barges could approach the beach.

38 Fitzpatrick, A Character that Inspired, 334.

39 Smith, The Development of Amphibious Tactics, 18.
Research Note:

“THE MARINE CORPS’ MISSION IN NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND ITS ORGANIZATION FOR A MAJOR EMERGENCY”

Memorandum by Colonel Thomas Holcomb, USMC (1932)

Edited and with an introduction by David J. Ulbrich*

Before reading the text and editorial annotations on the memorandum and its enclosure, the author—Thomas Holcomb—must be placed in his proper context.1

After receiving his commission in 1900, Holcomb served in several assignments with the North Atlantic Fleet, in the Philippines, and in China, where he eventually commanded the Marine Detachment, American Legation of Peiping (Beijing) China (1927–30). Holcomb gained notoriety on Marine Corps rifle teams, leading them to several championships between 1901 and 1911. He is thus responsible for helping create the self-identification of every Marine as a rifleman. Holcomb held several other important staff positions, including membership with then-Major Earl Ellis on an ad hoc war plans committee that advised then-Colonel John A. Lejeune in 1915–16, and on the staff of the Division of Operations and Training in 1925–27.

Next, the newly promoted Major Holcomb assumed command of the 2d Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (6th Marines), in August 1917 until August 1918. He saw combat in France with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in the First World War, where he led this unit across the wheat field in the Battle of Belleau Wood. Following his appointment to lieutenant colonel, Holcomb served as second in command of 6th Marines, taking part in the Aisne Defensive (Château Thierry), the Aisne-Marne Offensive (Soissons), the Marbache Sector, the Saint-Mihiel Offensive, the Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive, the Meuse-Argonne (Argonne Forest) Offensive, and the march to the Rhine in Germany following the Armistice.

In recognition of his distinguished service in France, Holcomb was awarded the Navy Cross, the Silver Star with three oak leaf clusters, the Meritorious Service Citation by the commander in chief, AEF, and the Purple Heart. He was also cited three times in general orders of the 2d Division, AEF. The French government conferred on him the Legion of Honor and three times awarded him the Croix de Guerre with palm. Holcomb thus ranks as one of the most decorated Marines to serve in France in the First World War.

Apart from his line and staff successes, Holcomb also excelled at every level of professional military education (PME), including what is today the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he graduated in the top 25 percent (39th in a class of 256 students) in 1925. This educational experience helped Holcomb better understand operational art and military theories, which he had already seen in practice. Holcomb counted among his classmates the likes of Courtney H. Hodges, Clarence R. Huebner, and

* David J. Ulbrich is currently assistant professor of history at Rogers State University in Claremore, OK. He is author of Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936–1943 (2011). This book won the 2012 General Wallace M. Greene Jr. Award from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. More recently, Ulbrich coauthored Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century (2014), which has since been adopted as required reading for all cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Ulbrich wishes to thank the editorial staff at Marine Corps University Press and the office staff in the History and Political Science Department at Rogers State University for assistance in laying out and transcribing Holcomb’s original memorandum and enclosure.

Jacob L. Devers, all of whom commanded divisions or larger in the Second World War. Holcomb then distinguished himself at the U.S. Naval War College and then Army War College (AWC) in 1930–32. His time at these top-tier PME institutions allowed him to broaden his understanding of war making at the strategic and grand strategic levels, as well as formulate the Marine Corps’ roles and missions in future conflicts. Among his classmates at AWC were prominent Corps and Army commanders of the Second World War: George S. Patton, Leonard T. Gerow, and Alexander M. Patch.

Following promotion to brigadier general in early 1935, Holcomb assumed the role as commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia, until November 1936. This brought his educational experience full circle. Whereas he gained a solid foundation in the principles of warfare at CGSC and the war colleges earlier in his career, Holcomb could now direct the teaching of young Marine officers regarding those principles. He directed the compilation of two of the Corps’ three seminal publications: the Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases and the 1935 edition of the Small Wars Manual. These two manuals, along with the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations of 1934, constitute the basis for the development of amphibious doctrine, the blueprint for the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific. Holcomb’s efforts in PME left long-term and indelible marks on the Corps’ doctrinal, operational, procurement, and force structure evolution for the decades after the Second World War and even today in the form of Expeditionary Force 21. This latter document builds on the proven concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, and Seabasing. The annotated footnotes in the memorandum and the enclosure flesh out these connections between Holcomb’s ideas in 1932 and more recent developments in amphibious doctrine, force structure, and equipment procurement.

On 1 December 1936, Brigadier General Thomas Holcomb received his second star and appointment as the 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps. He was promoted over several more senior general officers because he possessed the right education, experience, intellect, temperament, and leadership necessary to serve as Commandant. His appointment is a testimony to the respect Holcomb engendered in those senior generals who accepted his promotion and dutifully served under him. During the Great Depression years, Holcomb expertly guided the Corps’ preparations for war and provided his “Leathernecks” with astute direction as they participated in the first 24 months of conflict. Then, during the first two years of the Second World War, Holcomb was promoted to lieutenant general, and he directed the dramatic expansion of the Marine Corps from approximately 65,000 Marines in December 1941 to 385,000 Marines in December 1943 when he retired. Holcomb guaranteed that no decline in Marine esprit or Marine culture occurred, despite such a dramatic mobilization. He set the Marine Corps on a path to fight effectively in the Pacific war. He also contributed still further to force structure by helping to formulate policies that led to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) decades later. Holcomb measured up well in intellect, achievement, and abil-

---

2 Operational Maneuver from the Sea (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command [MCCDC], 1996); Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1997); and Seabasing (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1997).
ity when compared with such great American military managers of the Second World War as Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chester W. Nimitz, and George C. Marshall Jr. Like these unassuming yet efficient officers, he excelled in all areas of service—line, staff, command, and PME.

Within the larger context, this research note focuses on PME and especially on then-Colonel Holcomb’s yearlong stint as a student at AWC from the summer of 1931 to the summer of 1932. In addition to his studies, he also wrote and submitted an important memorandum on 20 January 1932 titled “The Marine Corps’ Mission in National Defense, and Its Organization for a Major Emergency.” The memorandum in its original format was 4 pages long, followed by a 13-page enclosure titled “A Discussion of the Marine Corps’ Mission in National Defense and Its Organization for a Major Emergency.” In the latter document, Holcomb pulls together several contemporary publications and reports as he fleshes out many of the items in the shorter memorandum. Although neither the memorandum nor the enclosure are completely original, Thomas Holcomb synthesized many existing ideas about force structure, amphibious doctrine, equipment procurement, and the future of the Marine Corps. He thus created a coherent vision for the Marine Corps as an operational force, serving the United States’ ever-changing strategic needs.

Taken together, the memorandum and its enclosure reveal not only how well read but also how truly prescient Holcomb was in early 1932. Such ideas as centralized amphibious command authority, logistical considerations, specialized weapons systems, and triangular amphibious assault and base defense force structures can be seen in their infancy forms. Most of these came to fruition in the Marine Corps during the Second World War or later in the Cold War. It is clear that Holcomb had his fingers on the pulse of the Marine Corps organization as well as on the pulse of American strategic priorities in which the Corps might fulfill missions. He also possessed the right habits of mind to leverage past lessons to better prepare the Marine Corps for the future. Holcomb recognized, for instance, that the “small war” (counterinsurgency) mission in the Caribbean slowly declined as a priority for the Corps, while the dual mission of amphibious assault and base defense grew increasingly important in the 1930s.

---

The Army War College, 
Washington, D.C., 
January 30, 1932.

Memorandum for the Assistant Commandant:

Subject: The Marine Corps’ Mission in national defense, and its organization for a major emergency. ¹

I. The study presented.

Study the mission of the Marine Corps in national defense; then, utilizing the results of this study, what should be the most suitable organization for a major emergency?

II. Facts bearing upon the study.

1. The mission of the Marine Corps in national defense is:

   To furnish detachments for combat vessels; to protect naval shore establishments; to furnish expeditionary forces for the seizure of naval advanced bases, for the defense of such bases, and for other minor operations; in order to support the Navy in the accomplishment of its mission.²

2. Arising out of this mission, the following tasks must be performed:

   a. Provision of a military headquarters for the control of the Corps.

   b. Supply.

   c. Procurement of personnel.

   d. Training of personnel.

   e. Provision of organizations to protect naval shore establishments.

   f. Provision of detachments for service on board naval vessels.

   g. Provision of expeditionary forces for

---


(1) the seizure of naval advanced bases.³
(2) the defense of naval advanced bases.⁴
(3) other minor operations.⁵

3. Military headquarters for the control of the Corps exists in the office of the Major General Commandant, who is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, in general for the efficiency of the Corps. The Major General Commandant is assisted by an adequate staff. Marine Corps headquarters, as organized, will, with an increase of personnel which is available, function adequately in war.

4. Supply is charged to the Quartermaster, Marine Corps. The organization of his department is sufficiently elastic so that it may be expanded to take care of supply needs in a major emergency.

5. Procurement of Personnel.
   a. Commissioned. War time needs will be satisfied by the promotion of regular officers, calling to active duty of reserve and selected retired officers, appointment as second lieutenants of graduates of the Naval Academy and military schools and colleges, and enlisted men.
   b. Enlisted. Increase of enlisted strength in war will be accomplished by recruiting, through expansion of existing recruiting service, and from the selective service system when effective, and by calling to duty of reserves.

6. Training of personnel.
   a. Commissioned. Existing officers’ schools will be discontinued, and schools for officer candidates organized.
   b. Enlisted.


⁴ Doctrine for this mission can be seen in the Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases, which was compiled and published in 1936 by MCS. Then-BGen Thomas Holcomb served as commandant of the MCS during this process. Based on his pattern of observing in the back of classrooms or during exercises, it is plausible to expect that he also read through drafts of the manual. See also David J. Ulbrich, “Clarifying the Origins and Strategic Mission of the U.S. Marine Corps Defense Battalion, 1898-1941,” War and Society 17, no. 2 (1999): 81-109; and David J. Ulbrich, “Document of Note: The Long-Lost Tentative Manual for the Defense of Advanced Bases (1936),” Journal of Military History 71, no. 3 (July 2007): 889-901.

⁵ Holcomb repeatedly uses the term minor operations as a euphemism for so-called “expeditionary wars” or “small wars” in the context of when Holcomb wrote his memorandum. These included Marine occupation duties in the Caribbean. Holcomb definitely downplayed the mission of so many thousands of Marines on occupation duties in the Caribbean from 1900 to the early 1930s. The Marines, especially officers, formed a clique in the Marine Corps. Because Holcomb never served in the “small wars” in the Caribbean, he could not claim membership in that clique. Instead, he clearly sided with the ascendant amphibious warfare clique. He believed that, with the return home of the Marines from the Caribbean in the 1930s, the Corps had to redirect its energies toward amphibious warfare and the future to fit into nation’s strategic needs, if not for institutional survival. See Donald F. Bittner, “Taking the Right Fork in the Road: The Transition of the U.S. Marine Corps from an ‘Expeditionary’ to an ‘Amphibious’ Corps, 1918-1941,” in Battles Near and Far: A Century of Operational Deployment, ed. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (Canberra, Australia: 2004 Chief of Army Military History Conference, Army History Unit, 2005), 116-40.
(1) Recruits will be trained at the two existing recruit depots, and at an additional one to be established.

(2) Branch training in infantry, artillery, signals, tanks, and engineers will be carried out in training centers in existence at Quantico and San Diego, and at an additional establishment to be organized. Aviation training will be carried out at existing Marine Corps and Navy activities.

(3) Organization training will be carried out in all organizations wherever stationed.

7. Organizations to guard naval shore establishments.

Existing organizations will be increased by assignment of reserves, and recruits upon graduation from depots. New detachments will be organized for new establishments.

8. Detachments for service on naval vessels. Existing detachments will be maintained by assignment of graduated of sea schools at Portsmouth, Va., and San Diego. Detachments for new vessels commissioned will be furnished from the same source. Marine detachments are available for any landing operation for which their strength qualified them.

9. Expeditionary forces.

   a. Ship-to-shore operations for the seizures of advanced bases, or for denying such bases to the enemy.

   The following considerations determine the organization of a division for this purpose: 6

   (1) General. Objectives are usually limited, and deep penetration from the beach not usually contemplated. 7 Organization and equipment must be suitable for transportation over long distances on ships, and for transporting in existing ships’ boats to the beach. Supply is simplified by the fact that movement to a great distance from the beach is not contemplated. This makes it

---

6 Holcomb made one of his most prescient predictions in this section on the Marine Corps division. He noted the need for combat arms operations that included infantry, artillery, aviation, and logistical elements. Later, when Holcomb was Commandant, he helped establish the Marine division as just such an independent fighting force. In October 1942, then-Commandant Holcomb supported revisions in the amphibious command structure that allowed a division’s commanding general more autonomy of action, relative to the naval commander. See Ulbrich, *Preparing for Victory*, 142-53, 188-89. Returning to his 1932 memorandum, Holcomb’s draft table of organization for a division also resembled a force structure that would become the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), which is most often credited as originating in the early 1960s. See Marine Corps Order 3120.3 (December 1963); *The Marine Corps in the National Defense*, MCDP 1-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2001); and Aaron B. O’Connell, *Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 241-48, 254. Nevertheless, although Holcomb did not know what exactly such an amphibious force-in-readiness would look like nor what its name would be back in 1932, his memorandum clearly pointed to the force structure and operational mission developed decades later in the Pacific War, the Cold War, and the wide-ranging operations of the twenty-first century. For one example of ongoing debate about the efficacy of the MAGTF, see Michael R. Kennedy, “MAGTF Area of Operations: Turf War or Doctrinal Necessity,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 32 (Autumn 2002): 93-97.

7 This notion of establishing a beachhead and conducting limited inland operations remained the Marines’ expectation until the first amphibious operation on Guadalcanal of the Pacific war. The eventual wartime reality of limited American military manpower and almost limitless operational objectives required the Marine Corps units to assault the beaches, expand inland, and then conduct intensive land operations. See Ulbrich, *Preparing for Victory*, 33-34; “The Idea of a Fleet Marine Force,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 23, no. 2 (June 1939): 61; and Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 227.
possible to maintain a large proportion of artillery and automatic weapons. The landing force, after attaining its objective must be prepared for a stubborn defense, with little ground for maneuver. This requires a heavy proportion of artillery and automatic weapons. The division must have much greater mobility than that of the army infantry division as now organized, and must be capable of subdivision into task groups.

(2) Infantry.

(a) The infantry platoon of four squads is best suited to landing operations, because it makes possible the transportation of an entire platoon in one boat, thus avoiding sending in a boatload without an officer.

(b) A battalion invariable requires a platoon of the howitzer company. Therefore proper organization places a howitzer platoon organically in the battalion, preferably as a platoon in the machine fun company. A machine gun company with eight guns to the battalion of the size contemplated, and one automatic rifle and one grenade discharger per squad, gives a proper proportion of automatic weapons.

(c) The triangular formation in all organization in that division, which increases maneuverability, is superior to the square formation. This indicates that the division should contain three infantry regiments of three battalions, of three rifle and one machine gun and howitzer company each, each rifle company of three platoons.8

(3) Artillery. The 75 mm gun is unsuited to ship-to-shore operations because of difficulty of transport. The 75 mm pack howitzer is so suited. A regiment of infantry of the size contemplated requires the support of a battalion of artillery of twelve guns.9

(4) Aviation. Air support of the landing, (reconnaissance, spotting gunfire, attack and bombardment missions, and screening), will be furnished by naval aviation from supporting ships and carriers. Two observation squadrons of the Marine Corps are available on the carriers. The division should be strong in pursuit and observation aviation, to be used after initial objectives have been reached and landing fields prepared.

8 The idea of a “triangular” division floated around Army officer circles in the interwar years. Although no evidence exists, it is reasonable to believe Holcomb listened and participated in these debates. He certainly did possess experience as a brigade staff officer in the First World War, and thus he worked within the large “square” division. The contemporary criticisms of this wartime division argument that the 28,000-man strong unit was too large for agile maneuver on the battlefield. Both the Army and Marine Corps eventually accepted and adopted the triangular division with approximately 16,000 men. See John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 52-56, 86-95, 125-33; and Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 34.

9 Holcomb correctly recognized the value in beach and inland operations of the lightweight yet potent 75mm pack howitzer. He doubtless recalled from personal experience in the First World War how such mobile artillery proved to be essential in ground operations, let alone amphibious operations. Contemporary Marines agreed with him as seen in Maj Harry K. Pickett, “The 75mm Pack Howitzer,” Marine Corps Gazette 15 (November 1931); and Maj Curtis W. LeGette, “Pack Howitzer Battery in Landing Attack,” Marine Corps Gazette 19 (May 1936).
(5) The proportion of engineers, signal, medical, and special troops generally, should be approximately in the same proportion as in the infantry division. While tanks will rarely be used in landing operations, a company should be included in the division, and left at home if their use is unnecessary for the operation contemplated.\textsuperscript{10}

(6) Equipment.

(a) Animals are unsuitable, and motor traction should be used.

(b) Heavy or bulky vehicles, such as escort wagons, water carts, rolling kitchens and trucks generally, because of the difficulty of landing them in boats, should not be used.

(c) The Cole cart, (a light, two-wheeled cart with steel frame and side car wheels) is suitable for the movement of ammunition, water, rations, machine guns, howitzer weapons, signal equipment, and all light equipment.

(d) Light tractors and trailers should be used for combat, field, and division trains.

(e) All equipment must be of weight and size suitable for transport in boats, man handling for short distances, movement in Cole carts, and for packing on mules when locally available.

b. Forces for the defense of a base.

After the capture of a base by the division described above, additional armament and personnel must be provided for its defense. The division is suitably organized and equipped to oppose landing operations by the enemy, but must be prepared to drive off raiding cruisers, destroyers, and aviation. For this, 155 mm guns, and antiaircraft guns and machine guns, with searchlight and sound locators are necessary.

c. Forces for other minor operations. Can be performed by the division as organized for landing operations, or a task group therefrom.

III. Action recommended.

1. That the existing organization of Marine Corps headquarters, and its system of supply, procurement of personnel, training, protecting naval shore establishments, and for providing detachments for naval vessels, undergo no organic change, but that each activity be expanded by increase of personnel, as necessary. That every effort be made to maintain a reserve of 13,000 to 15,000, principally in the “assigned” class.

\textsuperscript{10} Holcomb clearly grasped the need for logistical support forces and for combat engineering capabilities for breaching obstacles. However, despite his otherwise accurate predictions of future force structures, missions, and equipment procurement, he did not anticipate how integral tanks would be for the amphibious assault operations in the Pacific war, as well as for the defense of consolidated territory against Japanese counterattacks. See Kenneth W. Estes, Marines Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1915-2000 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 8-9, 27-104; and Maj Joseph DiDomenico, “The Progression of Tank Doctrine in the Pacific Theater of Operations, 1943-1945” (unpublished paper; Norwich University, VT, 2015).
2. That the division for ship-to-shore operations be organized as follows:

One infantry brigade of three regiments, each of three battalions, of three rifle and one machine gun and howitzer companies. Aggregate strength of battalion- 662, of regiment, 2272, of the brigade, 6904. One artillery regiment, oft three battalions of three batteries each; aggregate strength, 1611; guns, 36. Aviation group of one observation and one pursuit squadron, each of twenty five planes; aggregate strength, 735. One engineer battalion of three companies; aggregate strength, 397. Medical regiment, 483. Division headquarters and headquarters company, service company, military police company, tank company and train; aggregate strength, 955. Total strength of division, 11,085.

3. That this division be reinforced by a base defense force, when needed, organized as follows:

A headquarters, aggregate 58.

A 155 mm gun regiment, aggregate 741, consisting of a headquarters, headquarters and service batteries, and three battalions of two batteries each, in all 24 guns.

An antiaircraft regiment, aggregate strength 861, with a headquarters, headquarters and service batteries; a gun battalion of one searchlight and three gun batteries (in all 12-3“ antiaircraft guns), with sound locators; a machine gun battalion, with one searchlight and two machine gun batteries, and sound locators, in all 48 fifty caliber antiaircraft machine guns.11

4. That for other minor operations, the division, or a task group therefrom be used.

/signed/

T. HOLCOMB,
Colonel, U.S.M.C.

1 Inclosure[sic]:


---

11 Holcomb once again anticipated the need for a specialized unit to defend bases against counterattacks. This unit did have an earlier antecedent in the Marine Corps Advanced Base Force from 1900 to 1922. See Graham Cosmas and Jack Shulimson, “Continuity and Consensus: The Evolution of the Marine Advance Force, 1900-1922,” in Proceedings of the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy, ed. David H. White and John W. Gordon (Charleston, SC: Citadel Press, 1977), 31-35. Holcomb eventually saw the formation of an updated version this unit—called the defense battalion—in 1939. The defense battalion did not, however, receive the allotment of 1,600 Marines outlined in Holcomb’s memorandum. Instead, the unit included approximately 1,000 Marines. Nevertheless, its armament of artillery and machine guns roughly equaled a light cruiser in the U.S. Navy. These units would prove their mettle at Wake Island in 1941 and on Guadalcanal in 1942. See Report of the Board to Investigate and Report upon the Need, for Purposes of National Defense, for the Establishment of Additional Submarine, Destroyers, Mine, and Naval Air Bases on the Coasts of the United States, its Territories and Possessions (or Hepburn Board Report); 1 December 1938, Strategic Plans Division War Plans Division, Series III, Misc. Subject File, Box 50, RG 38, National Archives at College Park, 1-6, 62-70, 87-89; Miller, War Plan Orange; Gregory J. W. Urwin, Facing Fearful Odds: The Siege of Wake Island (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); Ulbrich, “Clarifying the Origins and Strategic Mission,” 81-107, 90-91; and Maj Charles D. Melson, Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1996).
A DISCUSSION OF THE MARINE CORPS’ MISSION IN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ITS ORGANIZATION FOR A MAJOR EMERGENCY.12

1. The mission of the Marine Corps in a major emergency was fore-shadowed in the act of the Continental Congress of 10 November, 1775, providing for the raising of two battalions of Marines, which directed that “particular care be taken, that no persons to be appointed to office, or enlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seaman, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantages sea when required.13 This provision also contemplated that the Marine Corps should have that service and that close association with the rest of the Navy which acts to qualify them for the accomplishment of that mission.

2. U.S. Naval General Policy with regard to the Marine Corps is: “To maintain a Marine Corps of such strength that it will be able adequately to support the Navy by furnishing detachments to vessels of the Fleet in full commission, guards for shore stations, garrisons for outlying possessions, and by the maintenance in readiness of expeditionary forces.”14

3. The following extract from a letter to the General Board U.S. Navy, dated May 9, 1922, and appearing in the printed hearings of the Committee on Military Affairs, held January 19 to March 9, 1926, is quoted:

“The General Board concurs in the opinion of the General Staff that the Marine Corps should not develop into a complete Army under the Navy Department, but there is no tendency on the part of the Marine Corps, both in peace and war, are definite and are distinct from the missions of the Army. In peace the Navy, including the Marine Corps, has been frequently utilized by the State Department as the instrument for carrying out the foreign policies of the government. On occasions too numerous to mention, naval landing forces have temporarily occupied foreign territory for the preservation and maintenance of order and for protection of the interests of the United States and even of the interests of other nations without creating international difficulties. Such operations by the Marine Corps acting as a part of the Navy and of the landing force of the ship or ships are regarded with less suspicion by foreign powers as to ultimate intentions. There is also room for constitutional interpretation that the President’s Executive powers abroad reach further with the Navy and with the Marines as a part of the former than with the Army. Certainly the practice of over a century confirms this view.

13 Historical sketch of the United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Historical Section, 20 May 1931.
14 “U.S. Naval Policy,” approved by Secretary of the Navy, 1 June 1931.
“In war the major mission of the Marine Corps is equally definite. The successful carrying out of the tasks assigned to the Navy on the outbreak of a war requires that the fleet be accompanied by an expeditionary force for minor shore operations, such as the seizure and defense of temporary naval bases and the clearing away of enemy forces from their temporary bases within the theatre of operations. In as much as successful conduct of these operations by the landing forces requires sea experience, it is sound military practice to make the war mission of the Marine Corps, especially in time of peace is thoroughly indoctrinated with its policy and cognizant of its plans and methods. Friction, too, will be eliminated, as the Navy and Marine Corps have by long experience become accustomed to joint operations ashore and afloat, and unity of command is automatic.\footnote{The paragraphs in this section are as relevant in the twenty-first century as they were in the Cold War, the Second World War, or in 1932 when Holcomb researched this memorandum and enclosed discussion. For example, see Expeditionary Force 21 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2014), http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/EF21/EF21_USMC_Capstone_Concept.pdf. The December 2012 issue of Marine Corps Gazette contains several articles on the current state and future prospects for the Corps’ amphibious missions. See also Raymond G. O’Connor, “Naval Strategy in the Twentieth Century,” Naval War College Review 21 (February 1961): 4–12; and Maj Trevor Howell, USMCR, “Traditional Amphibious Warfare: Wrong for Decades, Wrong for the Future,” Marine Corps Gazette 98, no. 9 (September 2014): 18-22.}

“The Navy having gained control of the sea, and thereby having opened the sea lanes for safe passage by the Army to the enemy coasts, the Marine Corps Expeditionary force, if not further required by the fleet or navy, will be available for service with the Army, as now duly provided by law.”

This explanation of these functions of the Marine Corps, seem now thoroughly understood, and do not present any controversial aspects.

4. Major General Ben E. Fuller, the present commandant of the Marine Corps, has described its mission in the following terms: “Headquarters, the Marine Corps Schools, and the other appropriate agencies of the Corps, should be continuously planning to have the Corps fully prepared for any future major war, in which the general function of the Corps would be, as an adjunct of the Navy, to provide and maintain forces for land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizures and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.”\footnote{MajGen Ben H. Fuller, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, “The Mission of the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1930): 8.}

5. Major General Lejeune, a former commandant of the Marine Corps, has stated that the Corps mission is:

“To support the United States Fleet and to aid the Navy in carrying out that part of the policy of the government which has been or may be assigned to it.”\footnote{MajGen John A. Lejeune, “The United States Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1923): 249.}

6. “Our fortified naval bases beyond American shores are insignificant in number. We cannot maintain our fleet dis-
tant from our shores, in readiness to give battle, except through the efficient operation of advanced base forces. There lies the true mission of the Marine Corps. Their sea services in first line ships with the sea habit there acquired, is essential for the fulfillment of this object.”

7. The Navy Regulations have the following to say on the subject: The following duties may be performed by the Marine Corps, when so directed by the Secretary of the Navy:

   a. To furnish organizations for duty afloat on board armed transports for service either with fleets, squadrons or divisions, or on detached service.

   b. To garrison the different Navy Yards and Naval Stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States.

   c. To furnish the first line of mobile defenses of Naval Bases and Naval Stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.

   d. To man such naval defenses and aid in manning, if necessary such other defense as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.

   e. “To furnish such garrisons and Expeditionary Forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace.”

8. It then appears that the Marine Corps is an auxiliary part of the Navy, maintained for the purpose of assisting the Navy to carry out its mission in nation defense. The Navy requires for the accomplishment of its mission, a highly mobile, military force of all arms, possessed offensive and defensive operations in amphibious warfare and in land warfare; and such a force it is the function of the Marine Corps to furnish.

9. The Mission of the Marine Corps in National defense therefore is:

   To furnish detachments for combat vessels; to protect

---

19 U.S. Navy Regulations, Article 552 (7), 1920.
20 The Marine Corps’ subordinate role within the Navy’s institutional structure was paralleled by a similar subordinate role in naval and grand strategy. The Navy and the national military leadership set the strategic objectives, and then the Marines worked to identify the proper force structure, equipment, and operational and tactical doctrine to achieve those strategic objectives. See Ulbrich, “U.S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Capabilities,” 75, 85-88, 97-100; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 319, 330-37; Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), 74-75; and D. Clayton James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986).
naval shore establishments; to furnish expeditionary forces for the seizure of naval advanced bases, for the defense of such bases, and for other minor operations; in order to support the Navy in the accomplishment of its mission.

10. Out of this mission arise the following tasks, which the Marine Corps must be organized to accomplish:
   a. Provision of a military headquarters for the control of the Corps.
   b. Supply
   C. Procurement of personnel
   d. Training of personnel
   e. Provision of organizations for guarding naval shore establishments.
   f. Provision of detachments for service on vessels of the Fleet.
   g. Provision of expeditionary forces for service with the Fleet for:
      (1) The seizure of advanced bases.
      (2) Defense of advanced bases.
      (3) Minor Operations in support of the Fleet.

   These tasks will be discussed in the following pages.

11. Discussion of the tasks involved.
   a. Headquarters for the control of the Corps.

   Such a head is found in the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, whose prescribed duties are: responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy for the efficiency of the Corps; immediate command of the officers of the staff of the Corps; issuance of orders for the movement of officers and troops; orders for their instruction and guidance; supervision and control over the recruiting service; supervision of all expenditures and supplies; the submission of estimates for the budget; distribution of the personnel; establishment and supervision of schools for officers and enlisted men; inspection of Marine Corps activities; organization and administration of the Marine Corps Reserve. The major General Commandant is therefore responsible to the secretary of the Navy for obtaining, training, organizing and equipping the personnel necessary to carry out the Marine Corps mission.

   He is assisted by a staff as follows:
   Assistant to the M.G.C. [Major General Commandant] who, under the direction of his chief, coordinates the staff at Marine Corps Headquarters.
The Adjutant and Inspector, who is the custodian of records and who carries out administrative inspections.

The Quartermaster, responsible for supplies of all kinds, including clothing, equipment, shelter, provisions, transportation, services, labor.

The Paymaster, responsible for all matters relating to pay of personnel.

An officer in charge of recruiting.

An officer in Charge of reserves.

A personnel section charged with the distribution of personnel, under established policies.

The Division of Operations and Training, which is responsible for making studies and recommendations in regard to all matters of policy or exceptions to policy, operations, and training, and for the preparation of Marine Corps war plans.\(^{21}\)

The administration of Marine Corps personnel on the west coast of the United States is decentralized to the Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, who performs his duties under instructions from and under the supervision of the Major General Commandment.

There appears to be no reason for any organic change in the organization of Marine Corps Headquarters in a major emergency. This organization is the result of many years’ experience and operates with reasonable smoothness. It stood the test of the World War satisfactorily, so far as organization is concerned. It is capable of being readily expanded to take care of the increased activities incident to war. While general staff supervision is lacking, it is perhaps less necessary in the Marine Corps than in the Army (in the case of C-4, for the reason that all matters of supply are concentrated in one staff department); the Major General Commandment has at his disposal a group of officers in the Division of Operations and Training who perform certain General Staff functions; and lastly because Marine Corps organization should parallel, as closely as may be, naval organization.\(^{22}\)

b. Supply. As states above, all matters of supply are in the hands of the Quartermaster, who procures, stores, and distributes supplies of all sorts, and provides shelter, services, and transportation. Under the detail system with its constant

\(^{21}\) The establishment of war planning functions at Headquarters resulted from First World War-era experiences, when only an ad hoc war plans committee existed (Holcomb, Ralph S. Keyser, and Ellis). With so many possible foes in different theaters, it made sense to formalize an official War Plans Committee in the Division of Operations and Training. In the mid-1920s, Holcomb also had directed this division, so he had knowledge of the planning process. See Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 14-16. For the larger context, see Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1890-1939 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 49, 80; Harry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 11-15, 35; and Miller, War Plan Orange, 36, 77-82, 202-203, 226.

\(^{22}\) In 1932, Holcomb may have embraced the Headquarters Marine Corps structure and organization put into practice by Commandant John Lejeune in the 1920s. However, during the Second World War—a true national emergency—then-Commandant Holcomb found that the existing Headquarters could not adapt quickly enough to the massive expansion of personnel: 65,000 Marines in December 1941 to 385,000 in two years hence. Consequently, in 1943, Holcomb initiated a major reform that added efficiency and reduced redundancy. See Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 154-59.
turn-over, there is a sufficient number of officers available for filling all key positions in the service of supply. The system worked moderately well in the World War, and experience gained then will be taken advantage of in the next war. No change in organization is necessary, or desirable.

c. Procurement of personnel.

(1) Officers. In time of peace, officers have been procured from three sources:

a. Graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy.

b. Promotion of meritorious enlisted men.23

c. Appointments of graduates of military schools and colleges.

In the past few years officers have been obtained from the first two sources only, these being sufficient to satisfy peace-time needs. The assignment of graduates of the Naval Academy has an important bearing on the efficient on the Corps. In addition to the fact that these officers are the result of a four years process of elimination, they are of particular value in assuring close association with the line of the Navy through their Naval Academy contacts.

In a major emergency, the expansion of the commissioned personnel will be accomplished by the promotion of regular officers in the active list; calling to duty of reserve officers and certain retired officer; promotion of noncommissioned officers from lists prepared in time of peace; and the appointment of graduates of military schools and colleges.

Based on experience in the World War, it is believed that, by the time selective service shall have become effective, there will have enlisted an abundance of material for promotion to commissioned ranks; and that vacancies occurring in forces in the field can be filled by the promotion of enlisted men. Such promotions should be in the hands of the commanders of the field forces, under such restrictions as a detailed study may indicate as desirable.

(2) Enlisted men. In time of peace enlisted personnel is obtained by the recruiting service. This service is controlled by the Major General Commandant, through an officer in charge of recruiting. It is organized into four recruiting divisions, covering the territory of continental United States, the divisions being divided into districts, the latter having in each case a prescribed number of stations.

The Marine Corps will, in a major emergency, obtain its personnel through the selective service system when operative. Prior to

23 Holcomb benefitted from this policy of promotions based on merit and skill rather than seniority as had been so often the policy for many years in the Corps. In December 1936, at the more junior brigadier general rank, Holcomb passed over eight more senior general officers to be appointed Major General Commandant. He possessed the proper talents, intellect, and temperament. See Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 38–42; and Gordon, “General Holcomb,” 260–61, 269.
such time, and adequate expansion of the recruiting service should be able to enlist 1500 men per day. The present appropriated strength of the Corps is 16,000, the authorized strength 27,400. It is assumed that the President would, when war became imminent authorize recruiting to that figure.

(3) The Reserve. The reserve consists of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve and the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve. The former has at present 241 commissioned officers, 6 warrant officers, and 6,677 enlisted men, including 391 men transferred after 16 or 20 years of service, and expensive and therefore undesirable element; and 2,805 "assigned men", who enlisted for four years' service in the reserve upon the expiration of their regular enlistment, and who receive twenty five dollars pay per annum, during their reserve enlistment; and 3,481 others. The "assigned" men are, in the opinion of the writer, the most useful type of reservists, with their background of at least four years' regular service; however it has proved difficult to obtain funds to enlarge this class, although experience has proven that from 75% to 90% of all men discharged upon expiration of enlistment and not reenlisting, are willing to enter the assigned class. If funds were available, a most useful reserve of ten to twelve thousand men could be built up and maintained by this method, and effort should be made to obtain such funds.

The volunteer Marine Corps Reserved consists of 256 officers, warrant officers, and 2,748 enlisted. This reserve is organized into regiments and separate companies, and receives approximately two weeks training in camp per year. There is no armory drill pay, but a considerable amount of instruction is carried out in armories, without pay.

d. Training of personnel.

(1) Recruit training. This is carried out, in time of peace, at two recruit depots, one at Parris Island, S.C., and one at the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif. All first enlistment recruits and men reenlisted from the Army and from the Navy are sent to one of these depots, direct from the recruiting district. There a well-organized staff puts them through a standardized course of instruction, covering a period of eight weeks. The course covers individual basic training, close and extended order drill, guard duty, marksmanship, customs of the service, etc. Upon the completion of this course the recruit is considered available for general duty, except sea service. Men selected for the latter duty, are, upon the termination of their eight weeks' course at the recruit depot, transferred to one of the sea schools, which are located at Marine Barracks, Portsmouth, Va., and Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif. There they receive the technical training and instruction to fit them for taking their places in a Marine detachment on board ship.

This system assures standardized individual basic training,
and affords opportunity to improve training methods through the control over the two depots exercised by Marine Corps Headquarters, and assures the maintenance of a standard of efficiency in this training. In marksmanship it has proved especially valuable. Assuring, as it does, the provision of instructor whose efficiency is above average, it starts the recruit off with a thorough understanding of the fundamental and prevents his being handicapped by faulty habits, which if acquired at the beginning of his service, are difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate.24

The recruit training system in use should be continued on the approach of and during a national emergency, the personnel of the depots being appropriately expanded, and one new depot being established. It should be possible to reduce the period of recruit training to six weeks.

(2) Branch training. Personnel must be trained as Infantry, Artillery, Aviation, Engineers and Signal Troops, in order to provide a force of all arms for service with the fleet.

(a) Infantry. Training in Infantry weapons is given at the Infantry Weapon Schools at Quantico and San Diego. Centers for this training should, when training for war, be organized at such other training centers as may be necessary.

(b) Artillery. Training with the 75 mm gun, the pack howitzer, and the 155 mm gun, is given in the 10th Regiment at Quantico, and in the Artillery battery at San Diego.

(c) Engineers. This training is given at Quantico and San Diego.

(d) Signals. This training is given in the signal school at Quantico, and at San Diego.

(e) Infantry, Artillery, Engineer and Signal training centers would be organized, in the event of war, at other training centers in addition to Quantico and San Diego.

(f) Aviation. Marine Corps Aviation forms a part of naval aviation. Officer candidates, after going through the elimination flight course take the course at Pensacola where they may qualify as naval aviators. A limited number of aviators. A limited number of aviators also take the courses at the various Army Aviation School. Training is continued in the various organizations. At Quantico the Aircraft Squadrons, East Coast Expeditionary Force are stationed, consisting of one fighting squadron, two observation squadrons, and one utility squadron, in addition to appropriate auxiliary organizations. A detachment from this organization is now serving in Nicaragua. The

24 Throughout his career, Holcomb placed a premium on marksmanship. From 1901 to 1911, he served on or commanded the Marine Corps Rifle Team, winning several championships. During the First World War, Holcomb also saw the value of marksmanship skills at the Battle of Belleau Wood and others engagements. He thus personally helped to establish the tradition that every Marine is a rifleman. See Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 13; and, for context, see Maj Robert E. Barde, The History of Marine Corps Marksmanship (Washington, DC: Marksmanship Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1961), 1-3, 8-17.
Aircraft Squadrons, West Coast Expeditionary Force, are stationed at the Naval Air Station, San Diego, Calif., and consist of one fighting, one observation and one utility squadron, and necessary auxiliaries. One observation squadron is on duty with the First Marine Brigade, Haiti. Two squadrons are serving on the carriers with the fleet. As many reserve pilots as funds permit are trained annually.

In a major emergency, existing facilities, suitably expanded, will take care of aviation trading.

(3) Officers. The officers’ school system consists of a basic course of nine months which all officers take upon entry into the service; a company officers’ course, a field officers’ course, and the Navy War College. In addition, a limited number of officers attend the company and field officers’ courses at Fort Benning, the battery and field officers’ courses at Fort Sill, the Cavalry, Coast Artillery, Chemical Warfare Service, Motor Transport, and Air Service Tactical schools, the Command and General Staff School, the Army War College, and the Ecole de Guerre; and officers are studying the language in China, Japan and Spain. In a major emergency the Marine Corps school would cease to function, and officer candidate school would be organized.25

e. Provision of organizations for guarding naval shore establishments.

Practically all naval shore establishments have garrisons of the Marine Corps for their protection. There are at this time fifty such garrisons in the United States, guarding navy yards and stations, radio stations, aviation stations, ammunition depots and naval hospitals. The mission of such detachments is to protect the activity of which it is a part, which it accomplishes by establishing a guard system to control the entrance and exit of persons and things at the various gates, and to prevent ingress and egress elsewhere, to protect certain buildings and activities, to furnish a fire fighting unit, and in war to prevent sabotage.

The Marine Corps also furnishes garrisons to protect naval activities beyond the seas, such as, the naval stations at Cavite, Guantanamo Bay, Olongapo [Philippines], Pearl Harbor, Coco Solo [Panama Canal Zone] and Guam.26

In time of peace the strength of these organizations in the United States is held to the minimum necessary to do the guard duty, with a small overhead.

---

25 Holcomb definitely benefitted from the PME system that allowed him to better understand the higher levels of war and the other branches of the armed forces, which explains why he supported expansion of training and educational opportunities for Marines. See Donald F. Bittner, “Foreign Military Officer Training in Reverse: U.S. Marine Corps Officers in the French Professional Military Education System in the Interwar Years,” Journal of Military History 57, no. 3 (July 1993): 481-510.

26 Looking back and with benefit of hindsight, Holcomb was correct in naming these and other advance bases on Wake and Midway, see memorandum by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to Chief of Naval Operations, 2 December 1941, appended in Ulbrich, “Clarifying the Origins,” 107-9.
In a major emergency the strength and number of these detachments must undergo a considerable increase. Thus type of service is useful in time of peace, as it accustoms the personnel to Navy methods and the Navy point of view, and affords opportunity for close association with officers of the Navy, which is necessary if proper cooperation is to be secured in war.

f. Provision of organizations for service on naval vessels.

All battleships, the 3" gun cruisers, airplane carriers, and the vessels of the Special Service Squadron carry, as an integral part of the ship’s company, a marine detachment, varying in size from a lieutenant and forty men, to a captain, a lieutenant and one hundred twenty six men. There are at present thirty four such detachments, with a total strength of about two thousand officers and men.

Field officers serve on the staff of division, squadron and force commanders.

Each marine detachment on board ship is organized as a company, and constitutes one division of the ship’s company of which it is an integral part; it is one company of the ship’s landing force. Likewise the detachments of a division, squadron or force marine officers for land operations. The detachment performs all guard duty; man’s part of the battery, fire control and communications, and enters in general into the life and activities of the ship.

This duty, which has been performed ever since the organization of the Corps, has contributed more than anything else to give to the Corps its individual character. It is on board ship and on expeditions that officers and men learn the sea habit, the Navy point of view and language, and where they learn how to work with the Navy. And it is these things that give to unity of command, which is provided by law, its real value. For unity of command alone does not assure cooperation where differences of viewpoint, habit, method, and even technical language, are all tending toward misunderstanding, jealousy, and hence dispersion of effort. And this ability to work together cannot be learned at schools or overnight; it comes from the combined experience of the whole personnel, and constitutes the tradition of the Corps, to be handed on to generations of recruits, both commissioned and enlisted.27

“The marines derive most valuable training from their service on board men-of-war, which greatly increases their efficiency for operations in connection with the fleet, in which

---

27 Holcomb recognized here that cross-training and cross-fertilization of Marine and Navy personnel was essential to effective operations. In reality, however, as seen in the Navy-Marine relations on Guadalcanal and elsewhere, the two Services did not always cooperate effectively. Still more problems could be seen when Army units were added to the mix. The need for multiple branches working in concert can be seen a few years later in 1938 in the *Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange*, Joint Board No. 325, Serial 618, Microfilm 1421, Reel 10, National Archives, College Park. More recently, such cross-training and cross-fertilization of doctrine in the U.S. Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel is known as “joint” training and operations is epitomized by *Amphibious Operations*, Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_02.pdf.
large numbers will be employed in the future. By their sea duty they acquire the sea habit, and learn to maintain themselves in the narrow confines of ship life. They acquire knowledge of naval ideas and principles, which promote harmonious action on occasions of stress, and they establish personal acquaintances and relations with the officers and men of the Navy which further tend to promote cooperation at times when acting in conjunction with the Navy. On the whole, this service of marines on board ships is of the greatest value to the naval service, and it stamps upon the Marine Corps its character as a sea-going organization.”

g. Provision if expeditionary forces for service with the fleet, to: seize advanced bases, defend advanced bases, and carry out other minor missions in support of the fleet.

(1) During the days of sail, a fleet could keep the sea almost indefinitely, subject in general only to the necessity of replenishing provisions. With the coming of steam, such freedom of action disappeared. The necessity for fuel alone limits naval operations to a definitely known distance from a base. While the adoption of oil as a fuel has materially increased the steaming radius of naval vessels, such radius of action is still relatively small, and the naval operations to be expected in a maritime war cannot be carried out entirely from bases in the continental United States. Red has by one means or another provided herself with a chain of bases which will permit her to operate with her fleet in any sea theatre, as long as she holds these bases. But the United States, whose only overseas bases are at Panama, Hawaii, and Manila will be unable to maintain her position in the Orient, if challenged by a sea power, without the seizure and defense of a number of advanced bases in the Pacific.

Fuel is not the only consideration which demands a naval base in the theatre of operations. Provisions and ammunition, both carried on board ship and in the train, but in limited quantities, must be replenished; repairs must be carried out, casualties replaced, and crews, particularly of such types as destroyers and submarines, must be rested. These things must be done in the security of a base; and in our case the base must be seized, organized and defended after the outbreak of war. While to a certain extent fuel, ammunition and provisions can be carried in the train, this method cannot replace overseas bases, because of the enormous number of ships that would be needed for an operation in a distant theatre, which in turn would

---

29 This section expanded on his memorandum because Holcomb combined an understanding of the United States’ strategy and logistical needs in the Pacific with the need for an effective logistical system. The next section lays the foundation for Holcomb to advocate for base defense units—later called defense battalions—to protect the nation’s far-flung island bases in the Pacific. See relevant chapters in Thomas M. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001); and Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/D2 Strategies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
handicap the movements of the fleet and require the expenditures of great effort in its defense. While some supplies may be obtained from neutral sources, dependence on such a source is manifestly impossible.

Landing operations are required, not only for the seizure of naval advanced bases, but also for the purpose of denying such a base to the enemy. The increasing importance of aircraft in naval warfare, and the limitation imposed by international agreements on aircraft carriers, indicates the desirability of employing shore based aircraft against naval vessels. This will make it necessary at times to seize land areas within a naval theatre as a base for our aircraft, or to deny the enemy such a base.

(2) By their mobility, by their training for amphibious operations, by their knowledge of the sea, and by the fact of unity of command, the Marine Corps is fitted to perform the naval task of seizing and defending advanced bases.

It has attained a high degree of mobility. Repeatedly it has had the experience of starting on expeditions in the shortest possible time, and has developed the technique of rapidity of movement. Such mobility is characteristic of the Navy, of which the Marine Corps is a part, and is a very essential quality for success in naval warfare. Their knowledge of the sea, their ability to live on board ship and at the same time maintain their health and efficiency, their experience of operating with naval personnel, all qualify them for this duty. The close coordination necessary in landing operations if they are to succeed, the frequent failure of combined operations in the past, all point to the importance of unity of command, which is automatic in operations in which the Marine Corps is employed.30

(3) Ship-to-shore operations.

(a) General. The seizure, from the sea, of a defended base, is probably the most difficult military operation, largely because of the inherent difficulties of moving men and impedimenta from ship to shore, in the face of even weak opposition. While in some ways resembling the passage of a river line, it differs from the latter in many respects, one being the difficulty of obtaining artillery support. It may be likened to an attack in land warfare, in which the attacking troops move in trucks to the enemy front line and there debus.

(b) Transports. While it is desirable that the transports for troops intended for ship-to-shore operations be especially designed and equipped, it is believed that considerations of economy will make it impossible to build any considerable number for this purpose, and that use will be made of

30 Holcomb convincingly articulated operational and tactical niches for the Marine Corps in the U.S. Navy's strategic plans.
available commercial shipping. So far as their defensive characteristics are concerned, these ships must be prepared for attack from the air and from submarines. They should be provided with an anti-aircraft battery, but must depend, for protection against torpedo attack on their speed and on such protection as may be available from anti-submarine vessels. They should be capable of a sustained speed of not less than fifteen knots, and of full speed not less than twenty knots, which will give reasonable protection from submarines when free to maneuver.

(c) Considerations affecting the organization and equipment of a division for ship-to-shore operations.

Ship to shore operations for the seizure of a base or denial of a base to the enemy, have limited objectives and do not, as a rule, contemplate movement to any great distance from the beach.

All equipment must be capable of being transported to the beach in the type of boat habitually found in the fleet—the motor sailor. While this boat is not by any means ideal, and while special types which would lessen the difficulties of landing operations could be designed, it is believed that such special boats will not be built in time of peace, and will not be available at the outbreak of war; and that therefore motor sailors will be used.31

All equipment must be capable of being man-handled at least for short distances, moved on hand carts, or packed on mules if locally available. Rolling kitchens, water carts, tank trucks, have no place in the equipment of the organization under discussion.

The division must have a much greater mobility than the present Infantry Division, J.S.A. [Joint Security Area], and must be capable of being broken up into task groups.

Animals should not be used in a landing force, being too difficult to handle in landing operations, and requiring too much cargo space for both animals and their forage. Motor traction and manpower must be depended on. Trucks should not be used, light tractors and trailers are recommended. The Cole (hand) cart will meet requirements of machine gun and howitzer transportation, ammunition, water and rations.

The fact that objectives are limited and deep penetration from the beach is not as a rule contemplated, simplifies supply in general. This makes it possible to maintain a relatively large proportion of artillery and automatic weapons. The fact that the organization,

31 Holcomb acknowledged that no mission-specific amphibious assault vehicle existed in 1932. He also pointed to the future development of such specialized craft. As it worked out in the late 1930s, the Marine Corps used amphibious assault craft adapted from two civilian designs—the “Alligator” amphibian and the “Higgins” boats—with very positive results. See Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 88–92, 100–2; Timothy Moy, War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military, 1920–1940 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 117–18, 150–57; and Jerry E. Strahan, Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats that Won World War II (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 24–39.
after reaching its limited objective must be prepared for a stubborn defense, with little room for maneuver, points to the desirability of having such a large proportion of these weapons.

The United States Army is organized on the triangular system in the company, battalion and regiment; in the brigade and division, on the square system. The square organization of the two latter echelons gives greater driving power because it lends itself to relief and passage of lines by regiments and brigades. It was effective in the World War, where divisions and brigades, due to the absence of flanks, were compelled to penetrate, and where the long durations of battles, due largely to this absence of flanks, required reliefs and passage of lines. The triangular system lends itself to maneuver, and the arguments which indicate it as suitable in the lower echelons, are equally applicable, at least in landing operations, to the division. While it is true that Marine Corps organizations may in the future, as in the past, be detached from service with the Army when no longer needed by the Navy, it is believed that this consideration should not be given great weight in determining organization; but that the Marine Corps division should be organized specifically for landing operations.32

The Army Infantry platoon with its two sections of three squads each, is organized with a view to employment initially in two echelons. Because of the great difficulty and great importance of control, in ship-to-shore operations, this platoon is too large. The four squad platoon in use in the Marine Corps can be transported in one boat, and insures that there shall be an officer in each boat, which is most important.

Inasmuch as in both offensive and defensive situations, the platoons of the howitzer company habitually serve, one with each battalion, and since the howitzer weapons are usually located in the same general area as the machine guns, and are similarly transported, the Marine Corps organization which does away with the howitzer company and places a howitzer platoon in each machine gun company, is believed to be sound. It is desirable that the howitzer personnel should be trained and administered by the battalion commander under whom they serve in battle.

The 75 mm. field gun is not suited for landing operations because of difficulties of transport. The same objection applies to the Navy 3 inch landing gun, which is heavier and ballistically inferior to the former. The 75 mm. pack howitzer, however, meets all the objections to the gun, and appears to be ideally suited for this type of operation.

32 Holcomb expanded here on his memorandum regarding the desirability of the “triangular” division with its three regiments over the “square” division with its two brigades subdivided into two regiments. He also recognized the need for a Marine division to be more heavily armed in artillery and automatic weapons than a typical Army division.
Aviation is the vital to success in ship-to-shore operations, for reconnaissance,

Spotting, supporting gunfire,
attacking enemy ground troops,\textsuperscript{33}
attacking enemy aviation,
laying smoke screens.

These missions must be carried out, during the landing operations, by naval aviation, as the organic aviation of the division will not normally be able to function until the operation has progressed to the point where the crated planes can be taken a shore, set-up, and landing field prepared. Prior to this time, there are available, for spotting gunfire, the observation planes of the firing ships. Reconnaissance, attacking enemy troops and aviation must be carried out by carriers will be available to assist in this work.

Observation and pursuit aviation are required in the division. The former type may carry out attack and light bombardment missions. Engineers are required in the approximate proportion founding the Infantry Division. They will be required to organize the position for defense, construct obstacles both on shore and in the water, construct and repair roads, construct wharves, and in general perform the duties of division engineers.

Division signal troops must be prepared to maintain communication from the division command post forward by telephone, radio, and visual, with airplanes by panels and radio, and with supporting ships and the next higher commander by radio. They must be familiar with naval communication procedure.

The medical regiment will be responsible for the collection, transportation and hospitalization of the sick and wounded. Casualties will be evacuated to hospital ships when possible.

Special troops.

In addition to signal already discussed, headquarters, service and military police companies are required. The necessity for tanks in the operations under discussion is problematical, and can only be determined after a study of the particular operation. A company of light tanks should be organized, and omitted when not required.

(d) From the above considerations, the following division organization appears to meet the requirements:

One infantry Brigade, of three regiments, each of three battalions, of three rifle and one machine gun and howitzer company.

Aggregated strength of battalion – 662

\textsuperscript{33} Precursor to close air support (CAS).
One artillery regiment, of three battalions, of three batteries each. Aggregate strength of artillery regiment – 1611; 56 guns.

Aviation group of observation and one pursuit squadron, each of twenty five planes.

Total personnel – 735.

Engineer battalion – 397.

Medical Regiment – 483.

Division Service Company – 135.

Signal Company – 124.

Military Police Company – 76.

Division Headquarters and headquarters Company – 280.

Division Train – 234.

Flank Company – 106 (15 light tanks).

Total for Division – 11,085.

(e) Defense of a Base.

A force defending a naval advanced base must be prepared to resist enemy landing operations and raids by cruisers, destroyers and aviation. For defense against landing operations the division as above organized, or a smaller task group there from when the whole division is not required, should be used. For defense against raids by light naval vessels---for capital ships are not likely to be risked on such missions---heavier artillery is needed. For defense against air the organic aviation is available. But antiaircraft artillery and machine guns, with searchlights and sound locators are needed. It is therefore apparent that a base defense force, organized as an artillery brigade, landed after the offensive operations for the seizure of the base are concluded of the base could then be determined. The heavy casualties to be expected where serious resistance to landing operations is offered, would probably materially reduce its strength.

(f) The suggested organization of the base defense is as follows:

A headquarters, 58 aggregate.

A 155 mm. gun regiment, aggregate 741, consisting of a headquarters, headquarters and service company, and three battalions of two batteries each, in all 24 guns.

An antiaircraft regiment, aggregate 861, with one searchlight and three gun batteries (12-3” antiaircraft guns) with sound locators; a machine gun battalion,
with one searchlight battery and two machine gun batteries, each with 24, 50 caliber antiaircraft machine guns, and sound locators.

(g) Other minor operations.

Such operations consist of occupying certain small countries, as has been done by the Marine Corps in time of peace, in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua; and of the protection of national interests abroad, as in the case of the legation guard at Peiping, and the Fourth Regiment at Shanghai. For such operations the division as recommended or a task group therefrom is suitable.  

(h) Replacements for the division and base defense force should be trained at the training centers in the United States, by branch, and forwarded on requisition from the commander-in-chief, when transportation is available.

(signed) T. Holcomb

Col. U.S.M.C.

34 Again, as in his memorandum, Col Holcomb relegated “minor operations” (i.e., “small wars”) to a lower priority than the amphibious assault and base defense units in the Corps. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, later in 1935, then-BGen Holcomb supervised the compiling of the first edition of the Small Wars Manual during his stint as the commandant of the MCS. Although mostly forgotten in the 1940s and 1950s, this seminal document would be dusted off and utilized by the Marine Corps in Vietnam. More recently, the Small Wars Manual was a significant foundation for the recent Counterinsurgency, FM 3-34/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army and Headquarters Marine Corps, 2006), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf. Under the auspices of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Army’s LtGen David H. Petraeus and the Marine Corps’ LtGen James F. Amos supervised the research and compilation of the 2006 manual. For a unique institutional study of the Corps during the early twentieth century, see Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001). Numerous books, articles, and studies devoted to counterinsurgency (COIN) have appeared since 2001.
Urgency Has Been the Order of the Day

THE ROLE OF THE G-1 IN OPERATION CHROMITE

Edward J. Erickson and Meghan V. Ederle

In high-intensity combat, in such conflicts as World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, commanders maintained unit strength by balancing casualties with incoming replacements and transferring personnel within units. Personnel management is a vital warfighting function when combat units are activated or when they are drawn down by attrition or transfer to other units. The military staff section responsible for this function is known as the G-1, which is responsible for unit strength, personnel matters, and administration. In contemporary operations, which are characterized by low-intensity combat with far fewer casualties and almost immediate individual replacements, this critical warfighting function is seldom seen or exercised. In turn, G-1s today are often left out of tactical training exercises and professional military education curriculums as more compelling staff skills, such as operations, planning, and logistics, take real-world priority. As a counterpoint, this article presents the role of the G-1 as an operationally critical warfighting component of U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur’s plan for a joint amphibious invasion at Inchon (Operation Chromite) during the Korean War. In fact, without the G-1s, the activation of the amphibious headquarters and the reconstitution of Marine and Army divisions, which provided MacArthur with the necessary force, Operation Chromite could not have been executed.

The G-1 in War

The principal duty of the G-1 in combat is to maintain the personnel strength of the force. For individual Services, G-1s manage the assignment of appropriately trained personnel, their replacements when wounded or killed, and such administrative matters as promotions, awards, and pay. In addition to these functions, G-1s manage unit activations and deactivations as well as play a key role in the reconstitution of understrength units, which have been attrited in combat. At lower echelons, S-1s perform the same functions at brigade, regiment, and battalion levels. Today, at the higher combatant command levels, J-1s monitor the overall manpower situation and seek to maintain subordinate unit strength. In the Korean War, joint headquarters (as we know the term today) at theater level did not exist, and MacArthur’s general headquarters had a G-1, rather than a J-1, as did his subordinate field army, army corps, and divisions.

Historically, there are a number of examples of the success of American combat operations hinging on the staff work of G-1s. In World War I, excessive casualties caused personnel shortages, which forced the American Expeditionary Forces to inactivate entire infantry divisions to provide infantry replacements for divisions at the front and labor troops for the lines of communications. In the fall of 1944, mistakes in Army force structure and replacement planning created a critical infantry shortage...
in General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s armies as the Germans shredded his infantry strength. Army G-1s inactivated antiaircraft and antitank battalions and hunted down excess personnel in the U.S. Army Air Forces and in the U.S. Army Communications Zone, sending the men to fill infantry slots at the front. Another innovative solution (in spite of the misgivings of most Army officers) involved integrating infantry platoons composed of blacks into all-white infantry battalions. These measures enabled Army G-1s to avert the worst of the infantry crisis and to maintain unit strength until the stateside training base increased the number of men training as infantry.

In the early days of the Korean War, MacArthur’s G-1s served an equally critical role when his Army of occupation in Japan was unexpectedly tasked to go to war. Army G-1s stripped men from units remaining behind in Japan and cross-leveled skill sets to fill empty slots on the manning rosters of units deploying to Korea. They administratively processed the personnel of departing regiments and battalions for immediate service in the combat zone. Their efforts were critical in deploying the handful of American units, which slowed the North Korean Army (or Korean People’s Army, NKPA) enough for MacArthur to establish a defensive perimeter at Pusan. Arguably, however, in the early days of the war the most critical role played by Army G-1s was the activation of the X Corps headquarters and the reconstitution of the 7th Infantry Division. Equally urgent efforts by U.S. Marine Corps G-1s ensured the availability of a provisional Marine brigade and an ad hoc amphibious planning staff. Later, Marine G-1s found and mobilized the manpower needed to reconstitute the 1st Marine Division. Having these amphibious assets in hand on 15 September 1950 enabled MacArthur to conduct the successful amphibious landing at Inchon, by which he seized the initiative, which led to the nearly complete destruction of the North Korean field armies.

An Operational Plan without Resources

War broke out in Korea on 25 June 1950 when the NKPA attacked south across the 38th parallel. By 1 August, the battered American and South Korean armies had been pushed into the Pusan Perimeter, facing defeat and withdrawal. MacArthur, serving as commander in chief Far East (CINCFE), oversaw this disaster from his headquarters in Japan. Against conventional operational logic, MacArthur decided to take the offensive by an enveloping maneuver from the sea and cut the North Korean lines of communications through a surprise amphibious landing at Inchon. From there, his forces would seize Seoul and cut off the enemy besieging the Pusan Perimeter. By 20 July, he was firm on his concept and three days later circulated his framework plan to selected members of his Far East Command (FECOM) staff. On the same day (23 July), MacArthur also informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that he intended to conduct a large-scale amphibious operation in mid-September. Although MacArthur had wide experience in amphibious operations during World War II, FECOM had no amphibious staffs and no major amphibious maneuver units available to support MacArthur’s plans.

Without waiting for formal approval from his superiors, MacArthur instructed his chief of staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, to construct a

---

plan for a landing on the east or west coast of Korea. Despite the misgivings of his own staff and the JCS, MacArthur selected a landing site at Inchon, thereby initiating Operation Plan 100-B, which was soon given the codename Chromite. Conceptually, a U.S. Marine Corps landing force would seize the urban area of Inchon and advance rapidly to seize Kimpo Air base. The Army would “land behind the Marines and advance on their right flank to seize the commanding ground south of Seoul.”¹⁴ These two forces would “form the strategic anvil as Eighth Army forces advanced from the Pusan Perimeter in the role of the hammer.”¹⁵ Although Almond was not officially assigned as the amphibious maneuver commander until 26 August, he directed the planning effort from inception through execution. Under Almond’s supervision, the FECOM G-3 formed a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to write a plan conforming to MacArthur’s ideas about the design of the campaign.

The immediate dilemma facing MacArthur was that the amphibious force itself simply did not exist. Demobilization and fiscal austerity had drawn the World War II Army and Marine Corps down to 680,000 soldiers and 74,000 Marines. Moreover, the totals belied limited capability and capacity, and rising Cold War tensions in Europe created a competing theater for scarce American military resources. At the end of June 1950, FECOM was manned at 49 percent of its authorized combat strength and 26 percent of its service support strength. All units were poorly resourced, equipped, and manned. Each of MacArthur’s four divisions was short of its authorized war strength by nearly 7,000 men. For example, “On the whole none of the four divisions was capable of laying down more than 62 percent of its normal firepower.”¹⁶ FECOM had received no new equipment since World War II and little training was conducted to achieve combat effective units at battalion level or higher. Their occupation duties in Japan left troops untrained and ill-prepared for combat operations.

On the peninsula by mid-July 1950, MacArthur’s Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) comprised three of his four infantry divisions from occupation duty in Japan (24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division). A fourth infantry division, the 7th Infantry Division, remained in Japan and was used as a replacement pool, reducing it to cadre status. As reinforcements, the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions were programmed for deployment from the continental United States. Additionally, MacArthur had a provisional Marine brigade, which was built around the Marine’s 5th Regimental Combat Team, fighting in the Pusan Perimeter.

The successful development and eventual manning for the proposed amphibious force can be tied, in part, to Almond’s first duties on assignment to Japan in May 1946—he was assigned as the G-1 in charge of personnel matters for MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo. Though Almond had not worked with MacArthur previously, he quickly earned his place within MacArthur’s inner circle after being promoted to deputy chief of staff of FECOM. In February 1949, Almond replaced Major General Paul J. Muel ler as MacArthur’s chief of staff. While MacArthur did not make his amphibious attack plan known to his chief of staff until a few days later, Almond was alongside his commander in Seoul at the very inception of the eventual assault plan. Both men saw the destruction of the capital city and the inept state of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. They shared in the understanding that swift and bold U.S. action would be required to regain control of South Korea.

Activating the Amphibious Force Headquarters

On 7 August 1950, the JSPOG met to discuss the need for a headquarters organization capable of conducting the Inchon assault plan. The JSPOG identified a major gap in the planning capability within current structures and recommended two possible courses of action to fill the gap: either obtain approval and organization through U.S. Navy Admiral Arthur W. Radford, commander Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, or establish a provisional headquarters. In keeping with his personality and against the advice of his G-3 and deputy chief of staff, MacArthur selected the latter course of action. As such, “MacArthur wanted the detailed CHROMITE planning accomplished un-

¹⁴ Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 58.
¹⁵ Ibid.
der his own close and constant supervision, and not by a group less subject to his direct view than his own GHQ [general headquarters] staff.” A Special Planning Staff (SPC) was formally organized on 15 August, exactly one month before the eventual operation. The SPC was so named to maintain anonymity and concealment to work under great secrecy.

The planning staff was comprised of hand-selected officers, primarily from the existing FECOM staff. Again, MacArthur and Almond looked to men of steadfast loyalty, who could be counted on to implement MacArthur’s unpopular plan. On 5 August, Major General Clark L. Ruffner was appointed as the chief of staff of a provisional unit headquarters.
known at the time as X Force, but which would become an Army corps headquarters. Ruffner had only arrived from the United States two days earlier, but was known as a staff genius, gaining MacArthur’s trust while serving with him in World War II. However, neither Almond nor Ruffner had personal experience in amphibious operations. In turn, Marine Colonel Edward A. Forney was appointed as the deputy chief of staff, bringing much needed amphibious operational expertise to the team. Forney was already in Japan to train Army regiments in amphibious operations, serving as the commander of Mobile Training Team Able, and was well known throughout FECOM. Importantly, Forney brought with him 10 Marine and 2 Navy officers from the mobile training team who were specialists in amphibious operations. These officers immediately augmented the SPC and five were later assigned as assistant G-2s, G-3s, and G-4s on the X Corps staff, while four others were assigned as assistants in the X Corps Fire Support Coordination Center.

Colonel Richard H. Harrison filled the soon-to-be-critical role of G-1 personnel chief. Without formally assigned tables of organization and equipment, the G-1 had to rely on existing tables for similar units to develop a corps structure capable of functioning as a “separate corps along the lines of a field Army headquarters.” G-3 operations responsibilities were assigned to Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles, a favored officer of both MacArthur and Almond, at the time serving as Almond’s secretary of the general staff. Chiles had previously served as a commander under Almond in the 2d Infantry Division. Colonel Aubrey D. Smith, who had commanded under MacArthur in World War II, served as the G-4 logistics chief and Lieutenant Colonel William W. Quinn as the G-2 intelligence chief. While Army officers filled these primary staff slots, Forney’s Marine Corps officers provided the professional depth and expertise necessary for the conduct of amphibious operations.

These men worked around the clock on detailed planning for the landing at Inchon, working in secret at an old bomb shelter in a downtown Tokyo motor pool. This cell of planners would become the core of the soon-to-be-activated operational headquarters of the X Corps. The pressure and importance of the situation at hand was captured in the X Corps War Diary, and it marked one of the most successful races against time in military history. The target date for invasion was 15 September—just one month away. Because of the unique tidal conditions in Inchon Bay, failure to meet that deadline meant almost a month’s delay before another landing attempt could be made.

The staff’s feverish and detailed work led to the recognition that X Force would be a unit of great size, leading Almond to recommend the activation of an Army corps headquarters. In a personal conversation with MacArthur about this subject, Almond casually mentioned that X Force might become X Corps (Tenth Corps), an inactivated unit, which had fought under MacArthur in the Philippines. On 12 August, MacArthur approved and issued CINCFE Operation Plan 100-B, specifically naming the Inchon-Seoul area as the target of an amphibious invasion force. With MacArthur’s eyes set on the Inchon landing, his G-1 now set out to find a way to activate the X Corps, a unit composed of both soldiers and Marines. The X Corps would be a mission-oriented unit, newly activated, without standard alignment within existing hierarchy and reporting directly to MacArthur for mission orders: “To insure independence of action, regardless of circumstances, MacArthur arranged for X Corps to serve directly under his own Far East Command. [The] Corps not only enjoyed separate status but it was lavished with extra components, being reinforced from normal corps size to the strength of a virtual field Army.”

On 30 August 1950, after approval from the Department of the Army, MacArthur formally reactivated the X Corps headquarters, with Almond in command of both Army and Marine Corps divisions. In practice, however, Almond’s ad hoc and hastily thrown together corps headquarters proved to be a “half-baked affair.”

8 Headquarters X Corps War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite: 15 August to 30 September 1950 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Headquarters, United States X Corps, Combined Arms Research Library, 1950), 1.
10 Ibid., S7–59.
11 Schnabel, “Policy and Direction,” 158.
Reconstituting the Amphibious Landing Force

In early July 1950, MacArthur sent a request to the JCS asking that a Marine regimental combat team and associated air units be dispatched to the Far East. MacArthur’s earliest vision for the landing force called for the 5th Marine Regiment (1st Marine Division) and the 2d Infantry Division to execute an amphibious assault that would “land behind North Korean lines in conjunction with a general offensive by Eighth Army from the south.”14 The eventual X Corps, however, would be a larger force comprised of 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division as the assault force and 3d Infantry Division in reserve, along with varied supporting elements and the I ROK Corps under operational control.

At the time, within the Marine Corps, the ongoing fight for relevance and existence contributed its own urgency to the mission. Consolidation of the U.S. armed forces was a highly debated political topic, and some military and political leaders were pushing strongly for dissolution of the Corps. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. Cates, was more than willing to prove the legitimacy of the Corps through the rapid and successful deployment of a large-scale amphibious assault force. Much like MacArthur, Cates did not wait for approval from the JCS in his orders to prepare the active Marine Corps and its organized and individual reserves for duty in the combat zone.

The stateside 1st Marine Division, like the rest of the military, was reduced to peacetime strength, less than two-thirds of its combat capable strength, following World War II. Moreover, since the North Korean invasion, the division had been stripped of both personnel and equipment to field a provisional brigade for the Korean fight. However, Commander of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. assured Almond that the unit could be quickly reconstituted, deployed, and prepared for the amphibious assault by mid-September.

Based on this assurance, MacArthur made a third formal request on 19 July to the Joint Chiefs for a full strength Marine division and its associated air wing.15 The need for Marines was so great that President Harry S. Truman approved a request by Cates on the same day to activate the entire ground element of the Marine Corps Organized Reserve and attached Navy medical units.16 This was possible only because Cates and his personnel officers had already given warning orders and worked out many of the details for a mass call-up. Cates then further directed that the “1st Marine Division be brought to full war strength within three weeks. This was a task that required approximately the same number of marines as existed in the entire Fleet Marine Force.”17

Major General Oliver P. Smith took command of the 1st Marine Division on 26 July, and within two weeks, he saw his outfit grow from a bare framework of 7,000 Marines to a full, war-strength division of 17,162 men. Highlighting the sense of urgency, 13,703 of those Marines joined the division in the first week of its mobilization. Both Regular and Reserve troops provided augmentation from units scattered about the globe. The 1st Marine Division’s initial planning group was aboard the USS Mount McKinley (AGC 7) (an amphibious command ship), then docked in Tokyo harbor, when it received its preliminary briefing for Operation Chromite on 19 August. This left only 20 days of planning time prior to scheduled deployment of attack forces on 9 September, making it “probably the shortest period ever allotted to a major amphibious assault.”18 The division G-1, Marine Colonel Harvey S. Walseth, and two assistants flew to Japan to join the initial planning group and began the arduous task of preparing the personnel annex to the plan.19

Once activated, most 1st Marine Division subordinate units consolidated at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, for rapid training, organization, and equipping prior to setting sail for Japan in the first days of September 1950. Personnel and equipment were gathered from bases through-
out the United States. The first regiment of the division, 1st Marines, was reactivated on 4 August by the redesignation of the 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division. This occurred barely 10 months after inactivation intended to reduce the size of the Corps following World War II. More than 9,000 Marines transferred from Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to Camp Pendleton. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, reconstitution paints a picture indicative of the accelerated buildup: “In about 10 days, the two-element, half-strength battalion expanded into a three-element, full-strength battalion. The two rifle companies in the battalion each numbering about 100 men were doubled in size with a third rifle platoon added . . . A heavy machine gun platoon was created and third sections were added to the antitank assault and 81mm mortar platoons . . . The pressure of the unknown D-Day gave almost no time for unit shake-down and training.”

To make matters worse, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which became the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, had only recently returned from a six-month deployment to the Mediterranean. The unit’s Marines traveled directly to Camp Pendleton by troop train for the hurried reorganization. The second regiment, 7th Marines, was reactivated on 17 August and sailed for Japan just two weeks later. Its reconstitution was more complex. The 6th Marines had already lost two battalions to the reactivated 1st Marines but nevertheless assembled to form the core of the newly minted 7th Marines. The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, deployed at sea and dispersed across the Mediterranean, would become the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The unit joined the regiment in Japan, and by the time the tour was complete “these military tourists would have traveled entirely around the world by various forms of land, water, and air transportation.” Additional personnel for that unit, including the reconstructed third rifle company, would come from Camp Pendleton and join the regiment in Japan. To bring the unit to full war strength, the 7th Marine Regiment filled nearly 50 percent of its personnel requirement with activated reservists, the largest proportion of any unit in the division. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was derived from the reorganization of the Sixth Fleet Landing Force, which arrived at Pusan on 9 September and was then formally redesignated. Making things all the more difficult, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed that all sergeants and below whose enlistments expired before 28 February 1951 were to be left behind.

Already engaged in battle in Korea, the provisional Marine brigade, composed of the 5th Marine Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (artillery), was pulled from direct combat action on

21 A Report of the Activities of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific from 25 June 1950 to the Amphibious Assault at Inchon, HQS, FMF Pacific, 6 December 1950, RG 127 (1120), V-2, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.
22 Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 53.
5 September and moved to Pusan for reconsolidation with the division. In defending the perimeter, the regiment was fighting at its peacetime strength of only two rifle companies per battalion. The third rifle company arrived just days before the regiment sailed for Inchon on 10 September. The brigade headquarters formally inactivated on 13 September, and unfortunately, the G-1 after action report details the period 7 July–6 September 1950, but does not cover the activities of the brigade in Pusan.24

The remainder of the 1st Marine Division converged on Kobe, Japan, and the scene there was unlike any previous operation. Units began arriving from the United States on 28 August and were required to be ready to sail for Inchon by 11 September. “They and their gear would have to be unloaded, the equipment stacked, inventoried and loaded again, about thirty thousand tons of it, all in less than two weeks. It was unheard of. But then so was almost everything about this landing plan.”25 There is no indication that the G-1 section of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in Pusan had any opportunity to transfer its plans, standard operating procedures (SOPs), or “lessons learned” to its 1st Marine Division G-1 counterpart in Kobe.26

G-1 planning in Japan began on 19 August with the arrival (by air) of Colonel Walseth, an assistant G-1, and a clerk-typist.27 In addition to managing these complex manning and personnel operations, the planners of the undermanned 1st Marine Division G-1 section produced the complete personnel annex to the operations plan, SOPs for personnel actions in combat, and the production and distribution of unit and personnel orders. A recent analysis noted that “for the entirety of the planning process, the G-1 section performed tasks usually executed by the division adjutant because the adjutant section did not embark on the McKinley until 11 September 1950.” Two significant problems arose immediately for Walseth when orders came down to exclude all 17-year-old Marines from entering combat as well as “sole surviving sons.”28 By the day of the embarkation for Inchon, the G-1 transferred 465 17-year-old Marines as well as several “sole surviving sons” to the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which remained in Japan.29

Upon the arrival of the main elements of the division by sea, the chief of staff issued Division General Order Number 14, which established a provisional division administrative center, staffed by 27 officers and 109 enlisted men, detailed from battalions across the division.30 The center assumed custody of all service records, pay records, health records, and the files of the divisional headquarters and all subordinate units. The center deployed into Korea through Inchon and established itself in Kimpo and later in Seoul as the administrative hub of the division. Additionally it was responsible for “the assembling, logging, and mailing of the division staff’s top-secret and secret operation and administrative orders” as well as Fleet Post Office (FPO) mail, the exchange, civil affairs, and prisoner of war (POW) accounting.31

**Reconstituting the Follow-on Force**

In July, MacArthur ordered the 24th Infantry, 25th Infantry, and 1st Cavalry Divisions to Korea, leaving only the cannibalized 7th Infantry Division in Japan. He also received, from elsewhere across the Army, the infantry and artillery battalions necessary to bring the EUSA up to battle strength. The EUSA resources were quickly and seriously depleted from early battles on the Korean Peninsula. The 24th Infantry Division was defeated in battles along the Kum River early in July. Elements of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions were also overwhelmed and severely weakened in engagements with the NKPA. Even with reinforcements from Okinawa, these units were quickly depleted by the continuous onslaught. The FECOM resources were running out, creating

---

27 Annex Able, 1st Marine Division Special Action Report, 29 November 1950, RG 127, File 53, 2, NARA.
28 Ibid., 4.
29 Ibid., 5.
30 Division General Order Number 14, 9 September 1950, Appendix 1, Annex Able, 1st Marine Division Special Action Report, 29 November 1950, RG 127, File 53, NARA.
31 Bonura et al., “The Importance of Professionalism.”
even greater urgency in the execution of an amphibious landing to turn the tide of the war.

The 2d Infantry Division deployed from the United States to the Far East and was originally slated to be part of the Inchon assault force. However, with the collapsing perimeter at Pusan, MacArthur was forced to push the 2d Infantry Division into the front lines, replacing the unit for the landing operation with the 7th Infantry Division, still in Japan and manned at less than half strength.32 More than 1,600 personnel had been transferred from the 7th Infantry Division to augment the remainder of EUSA units deploying to the peninsula. However, the continuing need for combat replacements continued to drain the division of able-bodied, combat-capable troops. By the end of July, the division was short more than 9,000 men, a large proportion of who were critical specialists and noncommissioned officer weapons leaders. On 26 July, MacArthur relieved the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General David G. Barr, of its occupation duties in Japan. On 4 August, MacArthur further ordered Barr to bring his unit to full strength by 15 September and prepare to move to Korea. All replacement troops arriving in the Far East, including those slated for other EUSA units in active combat, were channeled into general headquarters reserve, eventually to fill the 7th Infantry Division in preparation for the amphibious assault, now the FECH G-1’s top personnel priority. Experienced noncommissioned officers were pulled from military schools in the United States to fill field leadership positions and assist in training within the quickly expanding division.

With the primary Army assault force still severely understrengthed, MacArthur resorted to an expedient, unorthodox, and unprecedented measure, namely authorizing incorporation of more than 8,000 South Korean troops into the 7th Infantry Division. This was the inception of Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, which still exists today. Soon formalized through agreement between the ROK and U.S. Army, the KATUSA program integrated “South Korean soldiers into U.S. units, with the ROK Army retaining responsibility for their administration, pay, and discipline.”33 The KATUSA troops were not organized, trained, or even necessarily experienced military service members; most were newly conscripted Korean civilians. The ROK Army had been so decimated in the first days of the war that in order to fill American augmentation quotas in short time, it resorted to enlisting men off the streets of Korean cities. These recruits were sent directly to American units. They were not uniformed or prepared for service, but in the last week of August, 8,637 KATUSA recruits arrived at the 7th Infantry Division assembly area in Japan. The recruits were assigned primarily to infantry battalions. Preparing them for the discipline of combat service and military life was a task of great complexity in itself.

One account of the state of KATUSA recruits, upon arrival in Japan, asserted “their clothing upon arrival ranged from business suits to shirts and shorts, or shorts only. The majority wore sandals or cloth shoes. They were civilians—stunned, confused, and exhausted. Only a few could speak English. Approximately 100 of the South Korean recruits were


assigned to each rifle company and artillery battery; the buddy system was used for training and control.”\textsuperscript{34} Another account added that “the Koreans we received looked as though they had been herded together to get them off the streets of Pusan. They spent their first week in Japan in quarantine, since they had to be deloused and cleaned. Then we had to equip them completely . . . They could not speak English and we had few interpreters . . . We had a long way to go in two weeks.”\textsuperscript{35}

To establish combat readiness in these new KATUSA troops, EUSA established four training centers, but with the constrained schedule for the Inchon landing, many new Korean troops were sent directly into combat with U.S. units, receiving no training. Knowledge of the English language was not a prerequisite and in fact was practically nonexistent among KATUSA soldiers. With translators in short supply, training and integrating KATUSA troops was frustrating at best. Administrative issues abounded in many unexpected areas. Standard uniforms were hard to fit to the Korean men because most were more diminutive in size than average American troops. Feeding Koreans posed a significant change from the customary diet of primarily rice. The U.S. rations were higher in calories but lower in bulk, and this led to nearly constant complaints of hunger on the part of the KATUSA troops. In terms of technical training, it was nearly impossible to adequately train these new recruits in the proper use of weaponry, vehicles, and equipment.

Korean men also were attached to the 1st Marine Division with 2,786 assigned on 15 September, a number which grew to 4,516 by 7 October.\textsuperscript{36} The Army and the Marines used these men in artillery and service units. Language barriers still existed, but these units were more adaptable to visual means of communication. Moreover, the Korean soldiers were highly skilled at distinguishing between North and South Koreans, a skill that was particularly helpful to U.S. units during the assault at Inchon and recapture of Seoul. Perhaps equally important, particularly during the Inchon invasion and recapture of Seoul, KATUSA troops were very valuable in handling of refugees, allowing U.S. units to focus on the combat mission.

**Conclusion**

On 15 September 1950, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, landed at Green Beach on the tiny island of Wolmi-Do. With the second tide, additional elements of the 5th Marines landed at Red Beach, south of the city of Inchon, while the 1st Marines landed at Blue Beach. Three days later, the 1st Marine Division captured Kimpo Air Base, and the first elements of the 7th Infantry Division landed at Inchon with the mission of protecting the X Corps’ right flank. By 22 September, more than 53,000 personnel had landed or unloaded at Inchon. Operation Chromite was a stunning surprise and led to a spectacular victory, which restored the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea. Although the war would drag on for several more years and end inconclusively, Operation Chromite ranks as a brilliant example of “Operational Art.”

There is no question that, without the efforts of Army and Marine Corps G-1s, Operation Chromite could not have been launched or successfully executed. A self-generating sense of urgency led to the formation of a de facto Army corps headquarters, which was then activated as the X Corps. Most of this was done with men from within the FECOM headquarters itself but the integration of Colonel Forney’s Marines and Navy officers was a critical factor in the success of the operation. Incredible efforts by Marine Corps G-1s enabled the reconstitution and deployment into combat of a Marine infantry division in less than 45 days. Equally remarkable efforts by Army G-1s led to the reconstitution of a combined American-South Korean infantry division in time for deployment as the follow-on force. These unique achievements by what we might term today “human resource managers” were, in fact, a tribute to the professionalism and determination of the G-1s in the face of almost impossible circumstances. Officers currently serving might look at these harshly compressed timelines and ask whether, given similar contingent circumstances, the joint force is capable of such urgent action today. ♦ 1775 ♦

\textsuperscript{35} Stanton, America’s Tenth Legion, 53.  
\textsuperscript{36} Annex Able, 1st Marine Division Special Action Report, 5.


Raymond Garthoff is a towering figure in Cold War studies. He is the author of a number of standard works on the Cold War, including Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (1994). In Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary during the Cold War, he has made another signal contribution to our understanding of this eventful period in world history. In a short, but powerful introduction, he provides an overview of the origins of the Cold War as well as an essential correction to revisionist historians who have been all too eager to provide a simplistic one-dimensional portrayal of events.

Garthoff provides invaluable insight into the bipolar world of the Cold War by examining Soviet intelligence assessments of its declared main adversary—the United States—from the onset of the Cold War under Joseph Stalin to its conclusion under Mikhail Gorbachev.

Using Soviet archive material supported by interviews with key former Soviet intelligence and political figures, Garthoff offers an exploration of the inner workings of the Soviet leadership structure, demonstrating what role, if any, Soviet intelligence estimates of the United States had on the decision making of Soviet leaders. What emerges is that Soviet leaders in general were more influenced by their own perceptions and instincts, based on Marxist-Leninist precepts, than by intelligence products. Stalin’s complete ignorance of the West in general and the United States in particular, combined with his doctrine attachment to Communist Party ideology, blinded him to the value of intelligence information provided to him. Hikita Khrushchev moved away from the idea of inevitable war between

Keith D. Dickson is a professor of military studies and the curriculum chair for theory and history at the Joint and Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University. He is the author of Sustaining Southern Identity: Douglas Southall Freeman and Memory in the Modern South (2011).
capitalism and socialism, but never abandoned the fixation that the United States was a deadly enemy threatening the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), despite intelligence information indicating otherwise (p. 25). In fact, Garthoff points out that intelligence information had nothing to do with Khrushchev’s stridently aggressive policies (p. 21).

Leonid Brezhnev confronted the emergence of a dangerous Sino-Soviet conflict and the challenge to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe with the Prague Spring of 1968. While the USSR and United States were still adversaries, there existed areas of common concern that would contribute to an avoidance of a general war between the two superpowers. Détente with the United States had emerged, but the relationship was tinged by the Committee for State Security’s (KGB) slanted assessments that were more symmetrical with the Communist Party line than an accurate reflection of U.S. intentions. The 1972 Brezhnev-Nixon summit and agreement on nuclear arms was portrayed as a moral-political victory for the USSR that advanced Soviet power and prestige.

Events moved swiftly between 1975 and 1983, in which détente was replaced with a revitalized Cold War standoff. Brezhnev’s physical decline and his aging Politburo (policy making bureau of the Communist Party) made a series of catastrophic decisions in an attempt to advance Soviet interests. Garthoff notes that the Soviet leadership at this time used intelligence assessments that reinforced the leadership’s own opinions and perceptions, but ignored assessments that offered alternative views. The leadership viewed the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe as evidence of the United States pursuing imperialist objectives and preparing for general nuclear war. The Politburo’s most fateful decision, the military intervention in Afghanistan, was made with no intelligence input. Although Soviet intelligence officers, in fact, were strongly opposed to involvement in Afghanistan, the decision was driven largely by “enduring images” held by the leadership (p. 60).

Garthoff’s examination of the Soviet assessment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983 is one of the most valuable contributions in this book. He outlines how Soviet intelligence struggled to gain sufficient information to assess whether SDI was disinformation—a bluff intended to burden the Soviet defense economy—or valid reality and a threat to the existing nuclear balance of power (p. 65). The Ronald W. Reagan rollback of Communism and the rise of Gorbachev coincided to reshape relations after 1986. The decline in the Soviet leader’s belief in the ideological formulas that had driven so much of Soviet decision making in the past allowed Reagan and Gorbachev to move toward their mutual interest in reducing arms. Gorbachev’s apparent openness reflected a changed understanding of the world, based on contact with and some familiarity of the West; his willingness “to embrace new thinking openly and use it as a basis for state policy” was truly revolutionary (p. 77). This openness resulted in a number of new Soviet intelligence estimates and an entirely new set of collection priorities based less on identifying trigger points for global nuclear war and more on enhancing mutual security (p. 78). Nevertheless, like other Soviet leaders before him, Gorbachev relied on his own perceptions and understandings rather than intelligence provided to him; consequently, the intelligence assessments had no influence on his thinking or the development of policy (pp. 82–83). The dissolution of the Soviet Union’s power in the waning years of the Cold War brought a return of the old-line intelligence assessments, portraying the United States as fostering CIA conspiracies and subversion within the USSR as part of its overall plan for imperialist conquest.

In the end, as George F. Kennan had predicted, the internal contradictions of the Soviet system itself provided the seeds for its own destruction. Soviet intelligence, for all of its vaunted capabilities and power, Garthoff concludes, “did not play the primary role in shaping basic Soviet perceptions of the United States” (p. 99). Instead, Soviet espionage successes, and there were many, played a more ironic role. Rather than posing a direct threat to American or allied security, the access to certain secrets actually served as a confidence building measure, supporting a more stable relationship.

For every student of the Cold War, this small volume should be referred to frequently when reading any history of the Cold War. It is an indispensable resource when attempting to understand the background of Soviet actions and motivations. Teachers and scholars alike will benefit immeasurably, as it is useful both in the classroom and as an essential reference.

A different, and far more expansive approach
to the Cold War is offered by Lorenz M. Lüthi and his contributors. As the title suggests, *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East* steps away from the view of the Cold War solely as geostrategy, an ideological struggle characterized by the balance of power, proxy wars, and the search for security between the superpowers. Lüthi, in his introduction to this collection of essays, establishes an intriguing framework for examining the Cold War. He draws a difference between the systemic (or vertical) Cold War of the United States and the USSR and the subsystemic (or horizontal) Cold War that linked regional actors together in the seams that existed in the bipolar strategic environment. These seams allowed the subsystemic regional actors much more freedom of action and provided more indirect influence on events than previously recognized or appreciated. The editor has divided the Cold War into four time periods, each one serving as the focal point for a series of regionally based essays. The first period is (1953–56) establishes neutrality and non-alignment of states. The second period (1965–69) is characterized by a global perspective, détente, and the rise of the People’s Republic of China as a major influence in promoting its own brand of revolution. The third period (1978–83) covers the second Cold War, the revival of tensions between the United States and the USSR, and the reaction and shaping of a new international order as the superpowers increasingly lost authority and control over regional events, as indicated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution—all in 1979. The fourth period (1983–90) is characterized by the unravelling of the systemic Cold War structure, but leaves much of the subsystemic structure in place that arguably has served as the threshold of the security dilemmas of the twenty-first century.

Robert J. McMahon’s introductory essay explains that the thrust of this collection is to highlight the insights of the contributors, who maintain that although the superpowers limited the initiative of smaller powers, nonetheless these smaller state actors played a highly significant, and at times, pivotal role in shaping the contours of the Cold War.

Lorenz Lüthi begins the first collection of essays with an outline of how the boundaries of European state autonomy for both east and west became established, as the United States and the Soviet Union drew acceptable boundaries of action for its associated states. Jovan Čavoški in his essay observes that the Cold War system allowed smaller powers, such as Egypt, Yugoslavia, and India, to operate with great adroitness between the emerging superpower blocs and points to China developing at this time as an emerging alternative to the superpowers themselves.

The second collection includes an essay by Andrew Preston, who argues that the last half of the 1960s represented a critical reshaping of the Cold War, becoming a “more complex, more diverse, and much more of a global phenomenon” (p. 111). Geo-economic trends were overshadowing the geopolitical trends that characterized the first period. The subsystemic horizontal structures were becoming more dominant over the superpower vertical relations with aligned states. Driven by larger and more complex socioeconomic forces, political economy replaced geopolitics. Guy Laron in his essay notes that Sino-Soviet tensions, overlaid by internal tensions in the Arab world between radical and conservative leaders, characterized the second period. His examination of the influence of both East Germany and West Germany on the Arab-Israeli conflict indicates how the regional subsystemic Cold Wars created interconnections between the Middle East, Europe, and Asia as these smaller states manipulated centers of political power to their interest and advantage.

William R. Keyla’s essay examines the third period, the return of the second Cold War in Europe. Keyla argues that this new tension was fueled by escalating anxiety exhibited by both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, policymakers were becoming more concerned about an increased Soviet threat and that the United States was in danger of falling behind the USSR. The Soviets perceived the United States as pursuing an aggressive policy aimed at waging successful nuclear war against the Soviet Union. This led the Soviets to identify clear indications and warning triggers that indicated an imminent attack. The ensuing prospect of a new arms race with the United States and the growing economic crisis within the Soviet Union created unseen tensions, leaving the USSR challenged on all sides as subsystemic Cold Wars in Asia and the Middle East pressured the Soviet system. Another essay by Lüthi points to strategic shifts in Asia and the interaction between foreign policies of
the numerous subsystemic actors that influenced the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the USSR. The combination of the withdrawal from the costly war in Vietnam and the end of Communist-led liberation movements in Africa and Asia led to a rapprochement and eventual establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC, which Lüthi insightfully notes, marked the end of the subsystemic Cold War in Asia. He concludes that the United States, the USSR, and the PRC all overestimated the geostrategic effects of their adversaries’ policies and actions during this period, causing all three to make a number of poor decisions that had long-term effects on the direction of the Cold War.

The final period of the Cold War, as J. Simon Rofe indicates, was marked by the dissolving links between the systemic and subsystemic levels. Complex relationships, unknown and unappreciated at the time, helped to bring about an unexpectedly peaceful end to the Cold War. Rofe observes that “the Cold War, for all its costs and consequences, is over—although it remains a reliable source of reference” (p. 271). Serge Radchenko’s essay follows Gorbachev’s dilemma of attempting to reform the Soviet system without dismantling it altogether. He traces Gorbachev’s focus on European integration as the solution without taking Asia into account as well. His success with European leaders was not replicated in Asia. Gorbachev’s lack of a comprehensive strategic outlook doomed the USSR. Constantine Pleshakov continues this theme, stressing in his essay that Gorbachev was not the conscious agent of change that ended the Cold War; rather, he was simply an observer of what was emerging as a revolutionary crisis in Eastern Europe that he had no power to control. The subsystemic actors initiated a revolution from below, a process that had long been brewing and from the perspective of history, appeared to be inevitable. Pleshakov concludes his essay with a rueful observation that the states of Eastern Europe—during the post-Cold War period—instead of achieving autonomy and independence, have simply changed one hegemon (USSR) for another (NATO) and remained a borderland subject to the interests of stronger powers.

Lüthi deserves credit for this collection of carefully crafted essays. Each one provides an intriguing glimpse into the geopolitical trends and linkage of global events to provide the reader a cohesive understanding of the Cold War and its influence on today’s strategic environment. Indeed, the notes at the end of each essay represent a treasure trove of source material that scholars from many different disciplines will benefit from.

There are only two critiques that must be made. The first is a lack of a comprehensive bibliography. The efforts of these scholars deserve a collective list of the most important sources to assist other scholars following their lead. The second is the lack of attention to the leaders who shaped the Cold War just as much as other forces did at the systemic and subsystemic levels. Outside of Gorbachev, there are no essays that focus on those leaders. The Cold War is marked by some of the most powerful and influential men in history: Mao, Stalin, Eisenhower, and De Gaulle. Unfortunately, they appear as only minimal figures. Other significant individuals—Tito, Deng, Nasser, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Nixon—who all played powerful and pivotal roles receive little mention. The Cold War certainly proves that there is indeed a place for great men in history; a most welcome addition to this collection would be an essay on the roles great leaders played in shaping the Cold War. These two points aside, this is an exceptional collection and worth the investment in time for students of strategy, policy, and history. It opens many avenues for future study and inquiry, and provides critical insights for explaining the current state of affairs in the world. ✪ 1775 ✪
BOOK REVIEW

Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany

Reviewed by Thomas I. Faith
Historian, U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC


Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany is a well-crafted and insightful history of Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), the influential West Berlin broadcasting station. Author Nicholas J. Schlosser not only explores RIAS’s relations with East German radio stations and Radio Free Berlin but also “examines RIAS’s influence on East German political culture and analyzes how the station influenced the political worldviews and language of the German Democratic Republic’s government as well as its citizens” (p. 2). Cold War on the Airwaves weaves together several historical themes, but it is best understood in the context of propaganda and public diplomacy during the early Cold War.

Schlosser writes that RIAS was created in Berlin soon after the end of World War II and the beginning of the occupation of Germany. RIAS was instigated in spite of the existence of Radio Berlin, the Soviet broadcasting service, which operated in that sector of partitioned Berlin. U.S. officials were concerned with the ideological tone of Soviet broadcasts and feared that programming agreeable to both sides would be impossible. Thus, in 1946, before the adoption of the Deutsche mark or the formal division of Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union parted ways concerning broadcasting in the soon-to-be partitioned Germany.

Schlosser argues that critical decisions about the ideological content of RIAS broadcasts were made at the station’s inception. Instead of adopting an overt anti-Communist bias, the RIAS producers made a conscious effort to report the news objectively. This broadcasting concept was created with the German listeners’ experiences of being so recently bombarded by Nazi-sponsored propaganda. As one contemporary German said, “We hope that the American Military Government will not try to educate the Germans about the evils of Communism, inasmuch as Dr. [Joseph] Goebbels did a first-class job in that respect” (p. 40). Events made it difficult to meet this high-minded ideal. With the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin in 1948, RIAS broadcasters found objectivity impossible to maintain and fell under increasing pressure from the Office of Military Government and the United States Information Service to adopt a more anti-Communist tone. “While its reporters adhered to the principles of accuracy,” Schlosser concludes, “news broadcasts were rarely unbiased or neutral. RIAS’s reporters frankly admitted their opposition to Communism and believed that it was their moral and ethical responsibility to focus their reporting on the injustices committed by the German Democratic Republic government and to promote German reunification” (p. 5).

RIAS focused on listener preferences and public engagement far more so than their East German
counterpart did. While the station provided extensive coverage of world events that Radio Berlin simply could not match, RIAS also reported on local political and economic news in East Germany. For example, “the fate of German soldiers captured on the Eastern Front was of paramount concern for Germans after the war,” Schlosser writes, and it was a difficult story for East German radio to cover as extensively or as candidly as RIAS (p. 39). The majority of RIAS station staff and on-air personalities were German, and they enjoyed constant contact with East Germans from their station headquarters in Berlin in the years before 1961. The RIAS building had a visitor’s room where East Germans were interviewed by the staff, and the station received a steady stream of correspondence from listeners in the Soviet zone. The ironic result of these activities was that East Germans may have considered the American sponsored RIAS a more reliable source of local news than Radio Berlin.

Schlosser’s narrative centers on RIAS’s role in the June 1953 East German uprising, and he delivers a measured and well-developed account of the influence of Western propaganda on the events as they unfolded. He argues that, while RIAS broadcasts did not incite the unrest, the narrative framework and language employed by broadcasters during the event “helped transform a general strike in East Berlin into a nationwide uprising” (p. 75). The station’s ability to exacerbate tensions in the East was recognized after the uprising, and Communist leaders in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) claimed that RIAS “had in fact helped launch the uprising through the use of coded messages broadcast to agents lurking throughout the GDR” (p. 76). RIAS listeners in East Germany faced intimidation and reprisals, and the station became the target of a Stasi smear campaign. The GDR even constructed radio jamming towers in an attempt to block RIAS transmissions, and undertook clandestine operations against station personnel. The Berlin Crisis and the construction of the wall curtailed personal contacts between RIAS and its listeners, but the station continued broadcasting effectively until the end of the Cold War.

_Cold War on the Airwaves_ scrupulously resists exaggerating the influence or effectiveness of RIAS propaganda, concluding that “RIAS did not cause the collapse of the German Democratic Republic; nevertheless, it made a significant contribution to disrupting the state’s very attempts to achieve stability and legitimacy” (p. 174). It concentrates on RIAS’s relationship with other radio stations and the listening public, and how the station used its broadcasts to shape ideas, but Schlosser’s book may whet reader’s appetites for information about the history of the RIAS organization without sating it. Nonetheless, _Cold War on the Airwaves_ is an important book that imparts lessons that government institutions should heed, particularly in the age of online social media.
BOOK REVIEW

Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898–1941

Reviewed by Mark R. Folse


In Power and Restraint, Jeffrey W. Meiser argues that from 1898 to 1941 the United States, a rising power and potential international hegemon, did not expand the way other rising powers like Germany, England, and Japan did at their zeniths. Using a domestic structural theory of restraint, Meiser demonstrates that the U.S. domestic political institutions and culture kept the nation’s expansionist urges in check with only few exceptions. Federal checks and balances, public opinion, and a culture rife with anti-imperialist notions created a spectrum of restraint that Meiser uses to define U.S. overseas intervention policies and outcomes. He argues further that the character of domestic culture and political institutions are key determinants of the limits of a rising power’s expansion.

The heart of Meiser’s work covers three phases of U.S. expansion over seven chapters, but he begins with a chapter on theory and definitions. He defines expansion as “an increase in influence” of which military and territorial expansions are his main concerns (p. xix). Meiser defines the United States from 1898 to 1941 as a rising power, a nation state that is growing in power among its peers, and a potential hegemon which has “a significant effect on the hierarchy of power in the international system” (p. xviii). He labels American interventions as delayed expansion, limited expansion, or backlash all of which describe the reasons why and how the domestic structure of U.S. restrained political-military expansion. Ultimately, he contends that the United States did not become a revisionist state (states that seek to dominate the international system) the way many political scientists expect most rising powers to become because of its domestic political institutions and strategic culture.

Chapters 2–4 cover the period of 1898–1912 when the United States annexed Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines and intervened in Nicaragua and Cuba twice. Often espoused by historians and political scientists as the pinnacle of American imperial expansion, these years saw the power of domestic institutions restrain U.S. strategy significantly according to Meiser. He asserts that “anti-imperialist norms and checks and balances played the most important roles in causing restraint,” during this period (p. xvii). These norms had to do with Congress and American culture. Regarding the Teller Amendment that prohibited the annexation of Cuba, for example, Meiser contends that “a coalition of racists, bigots, humanitarians, and US sugar producers combined to oppose annexation of Cuba” (p. 31). By the time the Republicans, who tended to favor expansion dur-
ing this period, lost the White House to Woodrow Wilson and the Democrats, who tended to loathe imperialism, the imperialist drive in America had subsided significantly.

President Wilson's term (1913–21) marked a second wave of expansionism. Congressional opposition was weak during this time but other such factors as public opinion, balance of powers, and Wilson's own personal principles restrained U.S. strategy. Meiser asserts that Wilson's intervention in Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915), and the Dominican Republic (1916) and continued military presence in Nicaragua constituted the "most expansionist policies since 1898" (p. 146). Specifically, Meiser identifies Haiti and the Dominican Republic as blatant expansionist interventions that went largely unrestrained because of perceived threats from German influence in the Caribbean.

Meiser sees 1921–33 as a transition period between the Wilsonian era of limited expansion for security to the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration that completely disavowed interference in foreign affairs. Public opinion turned against costly and long interventions in Nicaragua and Hispaniola, especially after news of abuse of Haitians and Dominicans leaked to the press during the 1920s. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy" that dominated his first two terms in the White House (1933–41) continued the nation's collective disinterest in foreign interventions. Bereft of any real threat to American interests and distracted by the Great Depression, Meiser argues simply that "military intervention ceases to be an option in American foreign policy after 1933" (p. 236). Policy makers believed that by respecting the independence of the United States' neighbors then they, in turn, would respect U.S. interests. This approach did not mean that the United States lacked opportunities to intervene in foreign countries' affairs, but in each case the Roosevelt administration, with strong support from Congress and the public, chose nonintervention.

Meiser succeeds in identifying a useful and thought-provoking theory that explains American strategic restraint. But the book is largely derivative of secondary sources and makes very little use of primary evidence that would support his claims, especially regarding public opinion and culture. This book deserves more analysis than it is afforded here; however, academics and students of U.S. foreign policy and history are encouraged to make use of Meiser's work. ✥1775_HEX
BOOK REVIEW

Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus, USA (Ret)


In her book, Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations, Jennifer Morrison Taw provides a well-researched and well-written piece describing the evolution of U.S. military involvement in stability operations. She shows why the Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, released in November 2005, was a game changer that put stability operations on par with traditional operations. She demonstrates that while the United States had been performing stability operations for some time before this, the choice reflected by the directive to raise them to the same level of priority as offense and defense was, as the title suggests, a mission revolution for the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Army.

Taw begins her book with a helpful review of the literature on U.S. stability operations. This in-depth examination of U.S. stability operations spans the Seven Years’ War to today’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It demonstrates the critical importance of stability operations to larger U.S. military history.

While proving that these operations matter, the author reveals how they are perceived by military and civilian decision makers. How military and civilian strategists consider stability operations has changed as much as the operations themselves. Taw presses the question of what the second- and third-level effects will be of the adoption of stability operations as a core military responsibility under DODD 3000.05.

The progress and outcome of the Vietnam War is of critical importance to understanding stability operations today. Before the war, one of the main schools of thought held that military units can and do execute all types of stability operations successfully. During the war itself, stability operations changed as much as the population’s perception of improved security began to be realized, productivity improved. So much so that, by 1971, South Vietnam began to export part of its rice crop, which had not been done before.

CORDS worked because of two factors. First, the United States and its allies in Vietnam provided a baseline of security. Army General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., commander of all forces in Vietnam (1968–72), understood that emphasis needed to be placed on population security. He along with Robert W. Komer (head of CORDS) instituted policies and programs to do just that. Second, civilian organizations like USAID were staffed at appropriate levels to
make stability operations successful. For example, by 1968, there were 2,300 USAID personnel in Vietnam, the single largest deployment of USAID staff in history. This aspect of the success of the CORDS program supports the author’s contention that if the civilian workforce is manned at proper levels then the overall stability operation has a better chance of success.

Despite the success of the CORDS program, the larger trauma of the Vietnam War changed the trajectory of how leaders in the Army and other Services conducted stability operations. From the 1970s to the 1990s, leaders in the Army and elsewhere vowed to never get involved in another counterinsurgency. Training focused on conventional operations. At the same time the leadership set this trajectory, stability operations sprang up during the Iran hostage crisis, Beirut, and the invasion in Grenada and Panama, to name just a few. In all cases, the U.S. military relied on conventionally trained troops, along with Special Forces to take on these missions.

The tempo of stability operations skyrocketed with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the outcome of Operation Desert Storm. With the Cold War confrontation over, the United States lacked a clearcut adversary. The smashing success of U.S. and allied forces in Operation Desert Storm testified to the mighty power of U.S. military forces. In this context, stability operations of all sorts emerged across the globe. The international community looked to America, the world's sole superpower, to lead efforts to address these many and varied contingencies.

Taw also highlights the post-Cold War era as a moment of innovation for the Army. In 2003, the Army reorganized its units, guided by the capstone doctrine Operations, FM 3-0 (2001). The new units moved away from divisional teams toward brigade combat teams. These brigades (heavy infantry and Stryker armored vehicle units) could be augmented with special troops, additional signal, armor, and engineer components. This enabled the Army to better meet the particular challenges of different stability operations.

Planners aimed to augment the effectiveness of these brigades with Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs, like its CORDS predecessor, would provide a degree of normalcy and essential services to provinces in Afghanistan and Iraq torn apart by war. PRTs combined military and civilian personnel with special skill sets. But there were not enough of them. Here Taw underscores her claim that there has never been enough State Department or USAID employees to properly do the job. Lack of civilians able to be deployed to contingencies is an age-old story. For example, on the eve of the U.S. entry into World War II, the same shortage of civilians for deployment to all theaters of war existed. The military answered the call by instituting schools of military government at several universities, including the University of Virginia and 10 other locations for the Army, and Princeton and Columbia Universities for the U.S. Navy.

At the same time that these missions are challenged by civilian staffing shortages, they are also plagued by debates about whether or not stability operations are an appropriate mission for U.S. military forces. Traditionalists believe that the military has no part to play in these types of missions. Instead the military should “stay in its own lane” and focus on large-scale conflict. Progressives acknowledge that the security landscape has changed enough that the U.S. military is obligated to not only fight and win the nation’s wars, but be able to answer the call on stability operations.

Overall, Taw’s book is helpful in understanding questions related to stability operations. She explains what they are, the history of U.S. involvement, and the ways that shifting world landscapes have altered how the U.S. military participates in them. Further, she provides a comprehensive commentary on the way in which stability operations have been looked at and acted upon by leaders in the military community and the nation’s political leadership. A job well done. ✦1775✦
BOOK REVIEW

Annihilation Beach: A Story about the Horrific Marine Battle for Tarawa, Day One

Reviewed by Chris Blaker


The November 1943 Marine landing at Tarawa introduced a new era of warfare in the Pacific theater of World War II. Described by Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), in Across the Reef: The Marine Assault of Tarawa (1993) as “a tactical watershed,” Tarawa offered the “first, large scale test of American amphibious doctrine against a strongly fortified beachhead” (p. 1). For the Marines and sailors of the 2d Marine Division, it was also a particularly bloody affair.

James F. Dwyer’s Annihilation Beach: A Story About the Horrific Marine Battle for Tarawa, Day One offers a historical account of the Battle of Tarawa, the first book of a series of three on the subject. The author acknowledges that his youthful fascination with Tarawa inspired him to write an account of the battle through the eyes of the men who fought there. Narrating his story through the experiences of fictional characters and real-life Marines—such as division operations officer, Colonel David M. Shoup; former Raider commander, Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson; and scout sniper platoon leader, First Lieutenant William D. Hawkins—Dwyer presents the battle through varied perspectives. The author references a number of official military histories and combat memoirs from Tarawa, which allows him to place his fictional narrative atop a carefully researched battle study. Dwyer’s light, conversational voice tailors his work toward a popular audience, and his expert use of an omniscient point of view allows for seamless transitions between individual Marines in battle.

Annihilation Beach features fictional Marines of 1st Platoon, Echo Company, 2d Battalion, 2d Regiment, 2d Marine Division. The experiences of platoon leader, First Lieutenant Robert D. Hackett, drive the story, though chapters focusing on his runner, Private First Class Eugene Petraglia, and platoon corpsman, Navy Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Tom Fumai, are particularly engaging. Serving alongside these men in the Pacific are a dozen other Marines, all of them identified and provided with brief background information, though many are killed in combat. Dwyer’s inclusion of such a large cast of characters in the opening pages of his book risks overwhelming the reader, but the author makes a careful effort to demonstrate each Marine’s significance to the story.

An early flashback to the platoon’s experiences on the Solomon Islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal is essential to the development of these characters. On Guadalcanal, Lieutenant Hackett and his Marines are tested in combat for the first time, and though the platoon sustains casualties as a result of a Japanese
ambush, Hackett’s men are given much-needed experience that will later assist them on Tarawa. Though roughly a quarter of the book’s length is dedicated to Guadalcanal, this digression from the title subject pays off; for when the Marines finally land at Tarawa, Dwyer is able to focus his narrative on the landing itself rather than the development of his characters. Additionally, readers will enjoy following the day’s events through the eyes of characters they by now know quite well.

Dwyer ardently conveys the confusion, helplessness, and sheer terror of the Tarawa landings, where the Marines of the 2d Marine Division are separated from their units and exposed to tremendous casualties on the beach. Lieutenant Hackett realizes almost immediately after landing that only half his platoon is still with him, and he is forced to organize a composite platoon of Marines from different companies to push forward to his objective. Private First Class Petraglia and Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Fumai meet Colonel Shoup on the beach, where Shoup is desperately trying to regain the tactical integrity of his units ashore. These scenes of battle rely almost entirely on secondary sources, though Dwyer takes certain liberties to include historical accounts of both Marines and Japanese soldiers, fitting them together with the experiences of his own characters.

Ultimately, Dwyer accomplishes his goal of offering a fictional account of Tarawa while staying true to the battle’s history. This fast-paced, fervent account of the first day of battle demonstrates clearly how much the men endured and contributes further to the incredible story of how the Marines overcame overwhelming odds and mounting casualties to achieve victory over the Japanese on Tarawa.

◆ 1775 ◆
BOOK REVIEW

The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action

Reviewed by G. K. Cunningham, PhD
Instructor at the U.S. Army War College

There may have been great naval engagements before the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, but there may have been none more significant since. H. P. Willmott’s masterful rendering of this battle in, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action, accurately captures the conclusive nature of this four-day engagement. His book was selected for the Society for Military History’s Distinguished Book Award in 2006, a year after its initial publication; the award is an appropriate testament to Willmott’s thorough research, insightful interpretation, and accessible presentation.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was more of a naval campaign than a single battle, taking place over a period of four days as a series of connected actions. Willmott strongly suggests that, by the time of this naval campaign, control of the western Pacific Ocean had largely been decided, making this massive undertaking both unusual in its inception and definitive in its outcomes. Following this fleet action, Allied naval forces effectively destroyed the Japanese Imperial Navy, and thus it became unable to contest the ever-tightening encirclement of the Japanese home islands. The finality of this operation sets it apart as one of the greatest naval engagements in history, well worth the extensive detailed treatment that Willmott provides.

The author effectively addresses the operation from both the Japanese and United States perspectives, providing a balanced, full narrative of strategies, deployments, and operational developments for both sides. Willmott’s inclusion of Japanese sources greatly clarifies and enhances the existing descriptions of this naval action offered in Western histories crafted and published before 2005. Accordingly, this book makes a major contribution to understanding the antecedents to the campaign, the unfolding of the naval battles themselves, and the interpretation of subsequent developments in the Pacific theater of World War II.

Willmott makes clear from the onset that U.S. control of the Pacific Ocean had been determined before the Battle of Leyte Gulf was ever contemplated and planned. Chapter by chapter, he painstakingly explains the cultural mindset, strategic thinking, and operational planning that animated Japanese actions leading up to the sea campaign itself. Although caught somewhat off guard by earlier allied advances in eastern Indonesia, Palau, and the Mariana Islands, Japanese intelligence had, as early as 10 August 1944, correctly determined that the major U.S. offensive of this phase of the Pacific war would be made in the Philippines. Incursions by Navy Admiral William
F. Halsey’s Third Fleet carriers amply demonstrated the weaknesses of land-based air forces in the Philippines to counter any Leyte landings. Subsequently, Japanese losses in aircraft during these raids made it imperative that Japanese planning would require skillful integration of operations for the remaining Japanese naval, land, and air forces, if victory was to be obtained. Willmott points out, however, that in the latter part of 1944, no amount of cross-domain integration could compensate for the essential lack of component forces—land, sea, and air—that the Japanese had available to them at that time. Regarding the Japanese strategic assessment, he asserts, “Many senior planners and fleet officers realized that any attempt to fall upon American amphibious, support, and transport formations was likely to end in the annihilation of the Japanese forces thus committed to the offensive” (p. 49).

If such odds were expected and if the outcomes were so risk prone as to mean the end of the Japanese Imperial Navy, why did the Japanese persist in the Sho Ichi Go plan (their designation for Operation Victory One, the plan for the defense of the Philippine Islands)? In an attempt to explain this seemingly inexplicable conundrum, Willmott devotes the first one-third of his book fully to the background, planning considerations, and preliminary actions leading up to the naval operations of 24 October 1944. He points to three major delusions pervasive in Japanese planning, assumptions that went largely unchallenged and that originated in uniquely Japanese cultural patterns of thought. The first was simple unwillingness to properly account for American losses, resulting in false battle damage reports on an enormous scale: “Japanese claims were, by the least exacting of standards, fantastical” (p. 52). The second was overreliance on surprise, a belief that complexity and dispersion would so confuse American naval leaders that they would be unable to react coherently. Arguably, such reliance resulted in a complicated Japanese order of battle and disunity of assigned missions that virtually eliminated any hope of actual mutual support or reinforcement among the widely scattered Japanese forces. The third was a fundamental belief in Bushido as an inspirational force. Certainly, even to the Japanese, things looked bad. But a determined effort to die in a manner befitting Japanese warriors might somehow result in a miracle.

The remainder of Willmott’s book is a comprehensive chronicle of the events, decisions, actions, and counteractions integral to the Battle of Leyte Gulf as a campaign of naval actions. Here Willmott excels, mixing a compelling narrative style with precision in applying the right amount of detail when contrasting the actions of Japanese Admirals Kurita, Nishimura, and Ozawa to those of U.S. Admirals Halsey, Thomas C. Kinkaid, and Clifton A. F. Sprague. He does not encumber the story with excessive details, but uses them to illuminate and clarify the perceptions, decisions, and events that took place in the seas surrounding the Philippine Islands, 23–26 October 1944. That said, Willmott has done masterful scholarship; The Battle of Leyte Gulf provides a wealth of maps, charts, appendixes, notes, and sources that will prove a veritable gold mine of data for subsequent researchers (pp. 257–381). His concluding chapter, “To Pause and Consider: Blame, Responsibility, and the Verdict of History,” is so penetrating and comprehensive that it can be read with value in isolation from the rest of the book.

H. P. Willmott’s exposition of the Battle of Leyte Gulf has implications and residual worth beyond mid-twentieth-century military history. This incisive work illustrates how nations go to war and how predispositions to think and act in certain ways can influence, if not determine, outcomes of battles that reverberate for decades, perhaps even centuries, thereafter. The Battle of Leyte Gulf is not a book merely for historians; it is a book for any thoughtful person who wants to seriously consider the significance of history’s defining events and better understand their portents for the present. ✦1775✦
BOOK REVIEW

Tanks in Hell: A Marine Corps Tank Company on Tarawa

Reviewed by Paul W. Westermeyer
Historian, History Division
Marine Corps University


Operation Galvanic, the American amphibious assault on the Gilbert Islands, was the first major offensive the United States conducted in the central Pacific during World War II. The most significant portion of Galvanic was the landing at Tarawa, on Betio Island, which was the first test of the Marine Corps’ interwar contention that it could successfully conduct a major amphibious assault against a heavily fortified beach. In the end, the Marines successfully stormed Tarawa despite the difficulties of crossing the coral reef, which surrounded the atoll, and the fierce, carefully-prepared Japanese defense. During three days (20–23 November 1943) of ferocious fighting, the Marines suffered heavy casualties, and Japanese Imperial Special Naval Landing Force troops defending the island were wiped out; of the 4,500 plus defenders, fewer than 200 were captured, the rest died on the island.

The Battle of Tarawa has been extensively studied, with many scholarly works covering the battle. Oscar Gilbert and Romain Cansiere have approached this topic by burrowing down to the company level, examining in minute detail the activities of C Company, I Corps Tank Battalion (Medium), its individual M4A2 Sherman tanks, and the Marines who operated them. Arguing that Marine tank operations have been understudied generally and that the tank contribution on Tarawa specifically has been relatively ignored, the authors present a holistic unit history.

Oscar Gilbert has written a series of books describing Marine tanks in action, which includes Marine Corps Tank Battles in the Pacific, Marine Corps Tank Battles in Korea, Marine Corps Tank Battles in Vietnam, and Marine Corps Tank Battles in the Middle East. Romain Cansiere is an amateur historian whose enthusiasm and contact with Oscar Gilbert was the spark that got this book started.

In keeping with the holistic approach to the book, Gilbert and Cansiere begin with chapters on amphibious doctrine and how Marine Corps tank companies were intended to fit into it, discussing the early training and formation of the company. Then they include detailed chapters on the characteristics of the company’s Sherman tanks as well as their personal equipment and uniforms. A chapter on the Tarawa defenses and background for the assault sets up the other chapters, detailing each day, often hour by hour, that the tankers would spend in battle on Tarawa.

C Company, I Corps Tank Battalion (Medium), came ashore on Tarawa with 14 Sherman tanks; the
rest of the Marine tanks on Tarawa were M3 Stuarts, light tanks whose smaller 37mm main gun proved ineffective at dealing with enemy pillboxes and bunkers. The tanks that came ashore crossed the reef and the broad, shallow lagoon, which proved the first challenge for the tankers.

Gilbert and Cansiere depict this fight, step by bloody step, specifying the positions of each tank and corroborating oral histories with official records and photographic evidence. The authors extensively footnote the book, and provide an essay in the final appendices, explaining the methodology they used to recreate the conflict. Four additional appendices provide additional exhaustive detail on C Company, I Corps Tank Battalion (Medium), and its veterans. The book is copiously illustrated with pictures, maps, and diagrams that make it very easy to follow the action and picture the sometimes-esoteric details of tank operations. The authors have established a close personal relationship with the surviving veterans of the company, including Edward Bale, the commanding officer. They provided numerous oral history accounts of the battle.

This exhaustive look at a single company in a single battle is filled with insight into the day-to-day life of Marines, specifically tanker Marines, in the Pacific war, but does not make a compelling case that the history of Marine armor has been sidelined or unfairly ignored in the larger histories of the Pacific war. It is a very enjoyable read, the style is plain but energetic, and the battle scenes are very clear. As a battle study, the work is a great success, providing a detailed account of the company’s successes and failures on Tarawa. As a unit history, the work provides an excellent mix of personal anecdote and organizational data, but the latter portions may scare off more casual readers. The book provides a personal, beach-level view of the Marine island campaign that highlights the sacrifices made by Marines of all stripes while winning the war in the Pacific.
BOOK REVIEW

Uphill Battle: Reflections on Viet Nam Counterinsurgency

Reviewed by Marilyn B. Young
Historian, New York University Department of History


Frank Scotton arrived in South Vietnam in 1962, a 20 something officer in the United States Information Agency (USIA), excited about his new job, already half in love with the country in the abstract way Americans fall in love with foreign countries, and ready to do his best to prevent the Republic of Vietnam from losing its war with the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (SVNLF). Scotton's memoir is unusual in several ways, including what some might consider a minor matter: naming. He insists on calling things by their proper, or nonvernacular, names. Thus, the group most journalists and many historians refer to as the Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist) he uses only in connection with Americans or Saigon government officials for whom Viet Cong or VC are the common designations. Instead, he writes about the SVNLF, and in so doing, he grants the insurgency an immediate legitimacy (p. 369, n. 4). He talks about Vietnamese Communists as belonging to a “national party” whereas most Americans in Vietnam “falsely thought of the communists as an intrusion by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam” (p. 88).

Uphill Battle is full of names—of people, provinces, hamlets and villages, and organizations and agencies—helpfully listed with short descriptions in the appendix. Scotton describes the people with whom he worked, his early mistakes and gradual sophistication, and the contradictory policies he and civilian officers like him were expected to follow. An early solo field trip to a strategic village left him “exhilarated: a trip with a driver, on our own and learning—not entirely comfortable with all that was learned, but learning” (p. 12). Among the things learned on that trip was that strategic hamlets did not keep the Communists out, being often already dominated by them. Moreover, in hamlet after hamlet, people remembered the Viet Minh's government as having been fair and just; however, Mgo Dinh Diem and his government “were seen by some people as illegitimate, not the Viet Cong” (p. 32). The author's conclusion, which he maintains throughout the book, was that the real battle should have been fought at the hamlet level by highly trained mobile units of Vietnamese, advised by equally well-trained mobile units of Vietnamese, advised by equally well-trained Americans, whose goal would be to bring legitimate government back to hamlets throughout the country and to help create a positive view of the government in Saigon. Neither Washington nor Saigon proved capable or even very interested in making this effort. It was easier to carpet bomb or, as John Vann described it to Scotton, to “rampage” through the provinces of the Mekong Delta with forces like the U.S. Army's 9th Division, the “Bloody 9th” (p. 240).

Washington thought of counterinsurgency as “the
other war.” But there was only one war, Scotton insists, and it was fundamentally political in nature. Travelling in Hau Nghia Province in 1966, Scotton discovered that the Communists not only grasped this principle but consistently acted on it: “SVNLF public presence in the area was impressive, more extensive and visible than I had expected. We were witnessing political action energized from within hamlets and districts by communist cadre, rather than the typical and anemic GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam] directives from ministries and province downward” (p. 170). Instead, the Americans, sometimes accompanied by Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops, would hold “hamlet festivals” and “county fairs.” A hamlet would be cordoned off and IDs checked in hopes of trapping dozing SVNLF members. Often an American military band “played upbeat, happy tunes in the background. The rural families were penned and unhappy, but an illusion of meaningful counterinsurgent activity was established.” Scotton found the entire thing “nauseating,” but he was almost alone among his colleagues in holding this view (p. 190).

Attempting to understand why this was the case, Scotton concludes that “our general thinking about insurgency is hobbled by imperial perspective. Our emphasis is on how to organize and apply measures, inducements, and tactics to treat symptoms” (p. 325). Yet he never rejected the legitimacy of the American effort to support a government that was “endeavoring to establish an independent identity.” In a sentence that can suggest an opposite conclusion, Scotton writes that the “Geneva Accords aside” there was “nothing inherently wrong in the attempt” (p. 326; emphasis in original). Given this forgiving approach to the U.S. effort, he should perhaps have been less surprised that “one day an American administration would adopt a preemptive strike policy and deploy an army abroad with even weaker rationale than that applied to Viet Nam” (p. 327). ♦1775♦
Book Review

Where Youth and Laughter Go: With "The Cutting Edge" in Afghanistan

Reviewed by Colonel J. Matthew Lissner
Senior Army Reserve Research Advisor
United States Army War College


Lieutenant Colonel Seth W. B. Folsom takes the reader on a firsthand ride deep into the grind, humor, and agony of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, as they fight through the dreaded Sangin District in the Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Folsom recounts the journey he and his “Cutting Edge” Marines make from training at Twentynine Palms, California, and the Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) at Bridgeport, California, to the countless, frustrating, and often blood-spilled patrols in Sangin.

Folsom provides three definitions at the very outset of the book for terms describing the area of responsibility (AOR) he and his Marines must operate in: a French, sang; a Persian, sunggeen; and an English, sanguine. The French and English definitions focus on blood or bloody while the Persian definition belies something heavy, burdensome, or cumbersome—all precursors to the long road ahead for these young and dedicated Marines and sailors. This foreshadowing is further highlighted when Folsom’s regimental commander, Colonel Austin E. Renforth, fixes reality by telling Folsom, “Maybe you should focus on trying to bring back as many as possible” instead of bringing all his Marines back in one piece (p. 27).

Folsom leads the reader into his world not only as the man responsible for the lives of his Marines, sailors, and local innocent civilians but as a fighting Marine himself. Displaying the discipline and resolve of an officer and professional, Folsom constantly focuses his men on mission success, though he begins to doubt that mission even before the unit deploys. He describes with emotional gravity the burden he bears knowing his men will be maimed for life and some will indeed never make the trip back home alive.

The book describes the arduous training that 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, endures in preparation for the difficult mission of defeating Taliban fighters in a remote and hostile land. The unit trained in the cold, snow, and high altitude of the MWTC and refined its skills in the hot, dry desert of Twentynine Palms. The mission rehearsal exercise, Enhanced Mojave Viper, gave Folsom and his leaders the opportunity to master the complex skills needed to perform their mission in Afghanistan. Additionally, the predeployment site survey (PDSS) team gained invaluable experience and insight not only about the enemy, local civilians, and the terrain that 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, would be contending with but about themselves as leaders, brothers-in-arms, and Marines. Folsom and his men quickly determined from their PDSS that nothing could truly prepare these warriors for the reality they were about to face.

Folsom recounts with vivid memory his experiences participating in shuras with local tribal leaders, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), attempting to
instill responsibility and ownership in establishing peace and security within the regional communities. He further laments his frustration with the corruption and the lack of mutual trust within these Afghan circles of influence. Intertwined with his frustration, Folsom depicts the universal human qualities that many Afghans have including love for their children and respect for friendship.

In detail that compares to a high-definition, combat video game, Folsom portrays numerous patrols he and his men embarked on. These recaps make the reader feel as an actual part of the patrol, walking the ground and engaging with the enemy. Description of the scenarios and pace of action are engrossing and thrilling. From the scenery of remote villages and tiny towns to the implied sight and sound of gunfire, rockets, missiles, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Folsom captures the action and emotions with stark reality. He also is adept at bringing the reader into the combat operations center (COC) where battlefield tracking occurs. He artfully captures the tension and stress that he and the other members of the COC endured trying to discern what was happening in the AOR and making life-and-death decisions based on that analysis.

The 3d Battalion sustained seven killed in action (KIA) and innumerable severed limbs and emotional scars over the course of its deployment to Sangin. Folsom paints the horror and burden he faced with every casualty report throughout the book in fine detail. During a particular stretch of the unit’s deployment, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, suffered an average of “one Marine a week to serious injury or death” (p. 148). The burden he faced lie not only in the loss of his own men but in the death and disfigurement of the many children caught up in the destruction of this conflict. The stress of this constant burden took a continual toll on Folsom and his men as they struggled to believe in and continue their mission. However, quite possibly the best acclaim the book offers is the dedication the Marines display throughout the entire ordeal. On 8 November 2011, Sergeant Kyle Garcia inadvertently triggered an IED, leaving him partially conscious and amputated below his left knee. As the men of his squad rushed to render him aid, he reached for his own tourniquet and yelled for them to stop and sweep their way to him without rushing (p. 149). This type of leadership and dedication is what bound 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and carried the Marines and sailors through the deployment.

Where Youth and Laughter Go is by no stretch of the imagination a laughing matter. Lieutenant Colonel Folsom, commander of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, describes his unit, men, and mission with the knowledge of a seasoned coach and the respect of a loving father. He does this with the eye of a leader who takes charge and leads by example, walking numerous patrols with his men without special regard for himself or the difficult conditions 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, must live and operate in. His descriptions and recounting of what transpired during the deployment is as real as real can get—a worthwhile read that brings you into the world of this battalion and keeps you there through the epilogue. It leaves the reader with the distinct impression, as it did for many Afghan children in the Sangin District, “Marines good” (p. 348).  

**1775**
OBITUARY

Lieutenant General William H. Fitch, USMC (Ret)

Fred H. Allison, PhD

Lieutenant General William H. Fitch, former deputy chief of staff for aviation (DCS-Aviation), at Headquarters Marine Corps, passed away on 19 January 2016. Lieutenant General Fitch was a consummate aviator and visionary leader. His flying career started in Vought F4U Corsairs and ended flying modern tactical jet aircraft. He commanded Marine All-Weather Attack Squadrons (VMA(AW)) 225 and 533, Marine Aircraft Group 14, the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. As DCS-Aviation (1982–84), and despite a daunting political climate, he advanced visionary programs that resulted in a modern and professional aviation combat force.

William Fitch was born in 1929 in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He graduated from the University of Florida in June 1950. After completing naval aviation cadet training, he obtained his “wings of gold” and a Marine Corps second lieutenant commission on 1 April 1952. His first piloting assignment was with Marine Fighter Squadron 114, flying Vought F4U-5N Corsairs aboard the carriers USS Wright (CVL 49) and Tarawa (CV 40), during which time he made 100 carrier landings. One landing was on one wheel when one of his Corsair’s main landing gears refused to lower. Adroitly making an arrested landing, he saved the aircraft, albeit with unavoidable but minor damage. This was the only time he “bent” an aircraft during a career in which he flew 6,000 hours in tactical aircraft and made more than 300 carrier landings. He flew more than 120 different variants of aircraft; he attested that the F4U Corsair was the one he was “most proud to have flown operationally.”

Lieutenant General Fitch graduated from Naval Test Pilot School in 1958 and served the next two years as a test pilot in Navy Experimental Squadron 5. During this tour, he developed a prototype multiple carriage bomb rack (MCBR). From the MCBR came the multiple and triple ejector racks that allowed tactical aircraft to carry a larger bomb load and were widely used in the Vietnam War. Fitch obtained a patent in 1964 for the MCBR.

He commanded VMA(AW)-533, a Grumman A-6A Intruder all-weather attack squadron in Vietnam in 1967. During this tour he flew 310 combat missions in both the A-6A and Douglas A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, 127 of these were over North Vietnam. He earned the Silver Star medal for flying a night, single-ship, attack mission deep into North Vietnam to attack a Hanoi radio station.

Lieutenant General Fitch served in a number of positions directly involved in aircraft development. From 1963 to 1966, he was the aide/special assistant to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research and development; from 1968 to 1970, he served on the staff of the Air Weapons Systems Branch, DCS-Aviation, as weapons coordinator for A-4s, A-6s, and McDonnell Douglas AV-8 Harriers; from 1977 to 1980, then Brigadier General Fitch served at Headquarters as the deputy chief of staff, Research, Development and Studies; and in 1982 he was selected for a third star and appointed DCS-Aviation. He retired in 1984.

Lieutenant General Fitch was married to the former Margaret Marie Williams of Bartow, Florida. He attested that “the first and most important thing in my life and my career was that I had the good fortune to marry Margaret Marie on August 7, 1955.”

*1775*
Submissions

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching for contributors to *Marine Corps History* (MCH). *MCH* is a scholarly, military history periodical published twice a year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all aspects of the Corps’ history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be no less than 4,000 words and footnoted according to *Chicago Manual of Style*. For more information about submitting an article or writing a book review, please email history.division@usmc.mil with the subject line of “*Marine Corps History* Submission.”

U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

Training and Education, 2000–2010

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser

*U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare* covers a period of considerable intellectual activity for the U.S. Marine Corps. The initial fighting during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars convinced many Marine leaders that it needed to strengthen and enhance how it trained and educated Marines in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This book recounts the work of Marines and educators in the field and at home at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, and at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.
The Path to War

*U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Southeast Asia, 1961 to 1965*

Colonel George R. Hoffmann Jr. (Ret)

Book one of this commemorative series documents the activities of the U.S. Marine Corps in Southeast Asia from January 1961 to March 1965, during which time Marines saw increased involvement in the region as they served to protect American interests. While individual Marines saw duty as early as 1954 with the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, the first operational unit of 300 Marines from Marine Air Base Squadron 16 was deployed to Udorn, Thailand, in March 1961 to provide aircraft maintenance and flight-line support for Air America.


*Anthology and Annotated Bibliography*

Major David W. Kummer

This anthology and bibliography presents a collection of 37 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This History Division publication is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign can be completed. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available.


The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, January 1964–March 1965 contains more than 100 documents from the personal papers of the 23d Commandant of the Marine Corps and is the first edited volume of personal papers to be published by the Marine Corps History Division as a monograph. Produced by a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Greene’s notes provide a firsthand account from one of the main participants in the decision-making process that led to the commitment of a large-scale American expeditionary force in Southeast Asia.

This volume begins in January 1964 and ends just before the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang on 8 March 1965, a pivotal moment that marked the official transition from the United States’ advisory mission to a more active combat mission. In doing so, it traces Greene’s growing frustration with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s equivocation and uncertainty about Southeast Asia. Along with a series of commemorative pamphlets, this book is part of the Marine Corps History Division’s effort to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War.

Reviewed by The Federalist

“...his summaries allow us greater insights into the prewar processes of decision making and the military’s role in those deliberations—a narrative that will inspire lessons to build upon.”

—Benjamin Guterman

The History Division is moving!

History Division will be moving to the Simmons Marine Corps History Center, part of the Marine Corps University. The new state-of-the-art wing will bring together all of the Marine Corps University schools into one unit. The structure will offer many new features and amenities for the student body, faculty, and staff at Marine Corps Base Quantico.

The First Fight
U.S. Marines in Operation Starlite, August 1965
Colonel Rod Andrew Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Operation Starlite, as the Marines called it, took place on the Van Tuong Peninsula, about 10 miles south of the Marine base at Chu Lai. In the short term, the tactical victory won by the Marines validated such operational concepts as vertical envelopment, amphibious assault, and combined arms that had not been put into practice on a large scale since the Korean War. It proved that Marine ground troops and their junior officers and noncommissioned officers, as well as Marine aviators, were just as tough and reliable as their forebears who had fought in World War II and Korea. In the long term, Starlite foreshadowed the American military’s commitment to conventional warfare in Vietnam and showed how difficult it would be to defeat Communist forces in South Vietnam.

The U.S. Marine Corps in the First World War Anthology, Selected Bibliography, and Annotated Order of Battle
Annette D. Amerman

The aim of this collection of articles is to give readers the broad historical strokes to U.S. Marine Corps participation in World War I, as well as to show that the Corps’ contribution to the war effort was not limited to the 4th Marine Brigade. World War I created the modern-day Marine Corps; an adaptive force-in waiting that fought in World War II and Korea. In the long term, Starlite foreshadowed the American military’s commitment to conventional warfare in Vietnam and showed how difficult it would be to defeat Communist forces in South Vietnam.

The United States Marine Corps in the World War
Major Edwin N. McClellan

The United States Marine Corps in the World War provides succinct, factual, and historical information on the Marine Corps during the First World War. Published initially in 1920 as the first book from the newly created Historical Section of the Marine Corps, Major Edwin N. McClellan’s history of Marines in the first global war has stood the test of time with its statistical and concise details of the growth, activities, and combat exploits of Marines. During the 50th anniversary of the First World War, History Division provides an updated version that accounts for more accurate casualty numbers. In honor of the centennial of the First World War, this expanded version now includes short biographical sketches on key Marine Corps leaders in the war and photographs within the text. This reprint of McClellan’s seminal work is the first in a series commemorating Marines in the war.
Winning Hearts and Minds
The Marine Air–Ground Task Force in Nicaragua 1927–33

Marine Corps History
Issues of Marine Corps History can be found on the History Division website at https://www.history.usmc.mil under Publications.