MARINE CORPS HISTORY

VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 WINTER 2017

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Marine Corps History is accepting article and book review submissions for 2018.

Marine Corps History publishes twice a year, and the editors are currently looking for new articles and book reviews on all topics within the long history of the Corps: Civil War, Spanish-American War, Banana Wars, WWI, WWII, Korea, Cold War, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and women and minorities in the military. We are particularly interested in masters and PhD students who are ready to venture into scholarly publishing. Articles must be at least 4,000 words, footnoted according to *Chicago Manual of Style*, and focus on some aspect of the Corps either directly or indirectly, including foreign marines and joint operations.

For more information about submission guidelines or history books available for review, please contact the senior editor at angela.anderson@usmcu.edu.



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Approximately 50 miles north of San Diego stands the historic Rancho Santa Margarita y Las Flores. Since its founding in the early nineteenth century, this sprawling estate has sat in silent witness to notable events in Southern California history, including the birth of Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton and the modern Marine Corps on the West Coast. The Corps would go on to transform the expansive ranch lands into a permanent training installation at Camp Pendleton, and the Santa Margarita Ranch House would serve as a primary residence for Marine Corps commanders for the next 60 years. Today, the Marine Corps proudly protects these cultural resources, preserving the rich history of the base and assuring their continuing place in military history for years to come.

9 x 9 | 104 pp | 2017

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Cover art: *Last Tank Battle,* by Col H. Avery Chenoweth, oil on masonite, ca. 1991. One of the last Marine tank battles at Kuwait International Airport, which was Task Force Ripper's final objective.
Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps

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

The Legacy of Belleau Wood
100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles
AN ANTHOLOGY

The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles examines the Marine Corps during the last century, doing two things it does best: making Marines out of civilians and winning battles in defense of the United States. This anthology of articles demonstrates how Marines continue to follow in the footsteps of their Great War forebears, who fought the wars at hand while planning for the wars to come, refining and innovating tactics and organization so that the Corps remained relevant and effective in a rapidly changing technological environment.

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DIRECTOR'S FOREWORD

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
Director, History Division
Marine Corps University

These comments for *Marine Corps History* will mark my last as the director and chief historian of Marine Corps History Division and the Gray Research Center as I retire from federal service at the start of the new year (2018). I was hired by then-president of Marine Corps University, Major General Donald R. Gardner, in 2006 and have served since as the division's director. Beginning in late 2012, I also was made responsible for the Gray Research Center (GRC). During this time, History Division has experienced significant changes and improvements that are worth noting.

History Division was finally able to move into the new, state-of-the-art Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center in the fall of 2016. Delayed because of an unfortunate flood in early January 2016, the new facility is the division's home after a decade of physical moves that saw the organization relocate in 2005 from the Washington Navy Yard to temporary trailers established at Marine Corps University. In 2009, the division moved yet again into Building 3078, an ancient facility that had extensive physical plant issues but was nevertheless an improvement over old and drafty trailers. One major improvement with our final move is that, after 11 years of separation, the Archives Branch of the Marine Corps has been reunited with History Division. All the branches of the History Division formerly located in Building 3078 now occupy the entire third floor of the new center. The other two floors are dedicated to the archives and audiovisual section. Another significant improvement to the division since 2005 came with the creation of the Editing and Design Branch and the establishment of the award-winning Marine Corps University Press (MCUP) and *MCU Journal* within this branch of the division. Thanks to the hiring of Senior Editor Angela Anderson and a number of new and energetic editors and designers, History Division and MCUP publications have skyrocketed in production since the days when the division first moved to Quantico and was staffed by only an editor and a designer. The new military history journal is a quantum-leap improvement from the old *Fortitudine* newsletter. Thanks to Ms. Anderson's skill and professionalism, History Division and MCUP publications represent the division and the university on level with publication branches from our sister Services.

Since 2005, the Histories Branch also has come a long way. Now led by Senior Historian Doug Nash,

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer is responsible for the collection, production, publication, and dissemination of Marine Corps history and manages the functioning of a wide variety of Marine Corps historical programs.

USA (Ret), the branch has hired a number of new and dynamic scholars such as Dr. Breanne Robertson and McClellan Research Fellow Edward Nevgloski, USMC (Ret). Nevgloski is on the verge of earning his PhD from King's College-London. He and Nash are at work on a historical case study on Guadalcanal that will be used by the Lejeune Leadership Institute for the commander's Cornerstone Course, to be held at Marine Corps University in spring 2018. Dr. Robertson played a key role in the two "Huly Board" investigations into the identity of the Iwo Jima flag-raising participants. She is now the division's expert on the Battle of Iwo Jima and will publish a collection of papers from a conference on the Iwo Jima flag-raisings that was held at the National Museum of the Marine Corps on the 72d anniversary of the battle in February 2017. Dr. Robertson also wrote a notable architectural history of key buildings at Camp Pendleton, California. Veteran historian Paul Westermeyer has taken the lead as the editor of a potentially pathbreaking anthology to be published in late spring 2018 titled *The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles*. This anthology will be provided to Marine Corps University graduates at the 2018 ceremonies. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is writing the anthology's foreword. It is anticipated that this division publication will achieve our widest Corps readership ever.

A subset of the Histories Branch is that of the Oral History Section, ably led by Dr. Fred Allison. Allison's professional interview skills have been noted by every Commandant of the Marine Corps since General James L. Jones and other senior Marine Corps leaders for the past 15 years. Allison recently interviewed the former senator from the state of Virginia, former secretary of the Navy, and Navy Cross recipient, James H. Webb. Webb was a highly decorated Marine from the Vietnam War era. Thanks to Dr. Allison and the willingness of the senator to do these interviews, we were able to capture valuable lessons learned for our junior officers and will keep his recollections on file for generations to come. Dr. Allison is also a gifted writer of history and has established a reputation as the Corps' expert on aviation history.

One of the most consistently successful branches of the division is the Historical Reference Branch. Now led by Annette Amerman, the Historical Reference Branch not only answers thousands of requests for information, but they are the go-to source for historical accuracy on all things related to the history of the Corps. During my tenure as director, the Historical Reference Branch—which manages more than 190,000 historical working files on notable Marine Corps personalities, battles, posts, and geographic locations—has initiated an effort to digitize the most important components of our collection. Moreover, the Historical Reference Branch has digitized nearly all of the History Division publications produced since its inception in 1919. All of these books are now available for download by scholars around the world. They also have digitized the casualty lists for WWI, and the actual casualty cards for Marines killed or wounded in action in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. All of the biographical files on significant Marines have been digitized as well. Finally, Amerman and her staff are the first people most senior leadership in the Marine Corps go to for historical information. The Historical Reference Branch is one of the most valued resources in the entire Marine Corps.

The Archives Branch is led by Dr. James Ginther. Archives has accepted a number of notable document collections provided by significant Marines over the years. One recent acquisition was provided by Mrs. Janet Wilson Taylor, the daughter of Commandant General Louis H. Wilson. This collection of exceptional material will go far in filling in what we know about the difficult post–Vietnam War era of Marine Corps history. Another outstanding set of material was recently donated by Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor (Ret). General Trainor was a prolific author and scholar, and the materials covering his time as a Marine in war and peace are simply extraordinary. The Archives Branch receives similar materials from retired Marines and senior officials on a regular basis. Thanks to the archives staff, we will have this material available for researchers in perpetuity.

The GRC and the Marine Corps University Library continue to draw top honors from the faculty, staff, and students of Marine Corps University. Ably

led by Ms. Faith Kanno, the GRC's reference librarians, database management, and book collections provide outstanding service and support to the university's academic efforts every year. The GRC also is the location of choice for senior leadership conferences and seminars.

As with previous issues, this edition of *Marine Corps History* contains a number of excellent scholarly pieces on the history of the Corps and a focus on the actions of History Division and the schoolhouses, but it also includes some outstanding book reviews. Since its inception a few years ago, replacing the venerable *Fortitudine* newsletter, our intention was to raise the academic standards for this historical publication so that it was competitive with what was being produced by the Army and the Navy. Not only do I believe that we have achieved parity with these organizations in just two years, but the publication is well on its way to becoming a truly noteworthy peer-reviewed journal of the highest quality.

As I finish my last few days as director, I am very happy to report on what we accomplished during my tenure. The division's success is owed to those dedicated public servants who called the History Division home since moving to Quantico in 2005. With little to no increased support in funding or staffing, the division's facility, productivity, and professionalism has been truly a sight to behold. Much of the division's administrative burden falls upon the shoulders of the deputy director, Mr. Paul Weber. Reliable and dedicated to duty, he has been my go-to person for actions that impact every facet of the division, from hiring to finances. Weber will serve as acting director as my tenure ends and into the spring, when Brigadier General William J. Bowers selects a new director. Rest assured, the division remains in good hands.

Special thanks, as always, goes to the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation and Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman Jr. (Ret) for his long-standing support of historical research and scholarship of all things related to the Marine Corps. General Blackman's leadership at the foundation, along with that of his predecessor, Lieutenant General Ron Christmas, and his love of the history of our Corps has substantially aided the division's efforts these past 11 years. My final wish for the division is to see it continue to build upon what we have started here at Quantico. I have been honored to be the temporary "keeper of the flame" for the history of our beloved Corps. Fair winds and following seas to all.

Semper Fidelis,
Dr. C. P. Neimeyer
Director
USMC History Division/Gray Research Center

• 1775 •

FROM THE EDITORS

With the departure of History Division's director, and as the division approaches its centennial, it seems natural to look to our past to see what the future may bring. As early as September 1919, the Marine Corps recognized the need for a historical program to record and protect the history of the Service. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels directed both the Navy and Marine Corps to document the experience from the conflict taking place in Europe. As a result, on 8 September 1919, the Historical Section, Adjutant and Inspector's Department, Headquarters Marine Corps, was created by Major General Commandant George Barnett. *Marine Corps Order (MCO) 53* states that the newly created Historical Section would be required to set up and maintain an archives section to serve as a repository for historical documents; to prepare an official history of the Corps during the First World War; to revise and update the Corps' history of record; and to collaborate with current enlisted and officers to record the Service's history and events of interest. This guidance would bring to fruition one of the first official histories written by the division, supporting the defining moment of the Marine Corps' participation in the First World War.[1]

While today's *MCO 5750.1H, Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program* has been expanded significantly to cover the full scope of the History Division's mission, the basic guiding principles remain consistent: to preserve, to promote, and to publish the history of the Corps. Or, more specifically,

> to provide knowledge of the Marine Corps' past to ensure an understanding of its present and future for the Marine Corps and the American people by making its hard-earned experience and official history available for practical study and use; preserving a written, spoken, and visual record of its activities and traditions by collecting papers, articles, images, and interviews of lasting historical interest; and assisting in the Marine Corps' use of military history to aid in professional military education, training, and to provide background and precedents for decision making.[2]

In the broader scheme, military history is the study of armed forces and the conduct of war. For our purposes, military history encompasses both the descriptive and interpretive account of Marine Corps participation in war and peacetime events with a concerted effort toward objectivity and accuracy. How then do we as a division achieve that goal in the face of a society focused on social media, immediacy, and the distraction caused by calls of "fake news" and "alternative facts?"

There are those who believe that the current political situation in the nation's capital validates the work of historians, who are increasingly called upon to make sense of altered and vague perspectives. It

[1] Maj Edwin N. McClellan, *The United States Marine Corps in the World War* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1920).

[2] *MCO 5750.1H, Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 13 February 2009).

then seems critical that, as professional and scholarly historians, we do not simply draw analogies between current events and those of the past; our mission must be one in which the lessons learned from our history as a Service becomes the basis of our professional military education so that our leaders have the information required for competent decision making, free from personal bias.

To accomplish that goal, History Division must continue to:

- research and publish fact-based, unbiased, skillfully written official histories of Marine Corps events;
- be *the* source for accurate and official information relative to the history of the Corps;
- professionally preserve historically significant documents and images documenting the history of the Corps; and
- preserve the spoken word of key Marine leaders, including those who have risen to high enlisted rank, general officer, or demonstrated gallant leadership in battle.

These goals are no different than the original mission of the organization. However, in an era of instant information, the division must remain vigilant against producing materials or products that will not stand the test of time for the sake of immediate gratification. This does not mean that the division should not embrace various trends in the field of military history, such as documentary, biographical, or social histories, as well.

The division must be at the forefront of every Marine's mind when thinking of the Corps' history. To do so, the division must provide relevant and timely materials and products to the entire Marine Corps via the internet, personal lectures or speaking engagements, and publications. The division must go to where the Marines are located and provide them with presentations on topics of Marine Corps history and inform them of the division's roles and responsibilities. As the old adage goes, "If the mountain will not come to Muhammad, then Muhammad must go to the mountain."

The division also must remain firmly rooted in the sound scholarly arena of history by publishing articles and works through peer-reviewed academic journals as well as attending and participating in scholarly conferences around the globe. Attendance at conferences should not be limited to sitting through presentations; it includes discussions on the history of the Corps, but also active promotion of the division's resources that allow researchers to hone their knowledge of the Corps.

We invite you to join the division on this journey, not just as a reader of *Marine Corps History* but also as a scholar and historian who actively participates in our history by submitting an article, writing a book review, or serving on our editorial board. Learn more on the History Division website at https://usmcu.edu/historydivision or on Facebook at Marine Corps History Division.

• 1775 •

The Convolution of History

THE ARGUMENT FOR *THE PACIFIC*

by Cord A. Scott, PhD[1]

> "Classes will be conducted not at the school blackboard, but right in the family parlor."
> ~Henry Salomon, screenwriter[2]

Movies, like their television counterparts, serve not only to educate but also to inform the populace of the historical events of the past. As was noted in Robert A. Rosenstone's book *History on Film, Film on History*, historically based films can serve as a way to preserve the past; however, if the images and story are compelling enough, the history takes on its own life.[3] Often, events can be more "real" in a visual form than a history book can portray. Cable television company Home Box Office (HBO) delved into this field early on and has created several miniseries that attempt to honor the actions of World War II combatants from specific units. What started with the miniseries *Band of Brothers*, about Easy Company of the U.S. Army's 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, was continued with the series that told of the struggles endured by the U.S. Marines of the 1st Division in the Pacific theatre, entitled *The Pacific*.[4] The stories of the men in the miniseries were woven through the history of fighting in the Pacific theatre from Guadalcanal to Okinawa and finally acclimatization into the civilian world.

This second series was an attempt from executive producers Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks not merely to show the conflict that has been a part of many other programs, but also to break the myth of the war in terms often depicted in such films as *Sands of Iwo Jima* (1949).[5] *The Pacific* showed the violence and anguish that the Marines faced while on islands no one had ever heard of, fighting not only a fanatical enemy but the very terrain and elements as well. While the series attempted to break the stereotypes of an honorable and sterile war—especially in an era of drone strikes, urban enemy combatants, and two of the longest wars in American history where few understood the goals to be achieved—*The Pacific* resonated with some viewers as a way to describe the parallels to combat in the twenty-first century.

One of the biggest issues with this depiction is

[1] Cord Scott holds a PhD in American history from Loyola University, Chicago. He has taught on a variety of aspects concerning American culture. He is currently a history instructor for University of Maryland, University College-Asia in the greater Tokyo area. His previous assignments for UMUC have been on Okinawa and in South Korea.

[2] A reporter concludes that this is how a teacher of history would teach a student body, based on Salomon's comments on his series *Victory at Sea*, which served as a model for the later television miniseries *The Pacific*. Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins, eds., *Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 107.

[3] Robert A. Rosenstone, *History on Film, Film on History* (London: Longman, 2006).

[4] *Band of Brothers*, produced by Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks, various directors (New York: HBO, Time Warner, 2001), cable miniseries; and *The Pacific*, produced by Steven Spielberg, Tom Hanks, and Gary Goetzman (New York: HBO, Time Warner, 2010), cable miniseries.

[5] *Sands of Iwo Jima*, produced by Edmund Grainger, directed by Allan Dwan, starring John Wayne (Los Angeles: Republic Pictures, 1949), feature film, 100 minutes.



Adapted by History Division

U.S. Marine Corps activities in the Pacific.

how the public has come to form its popular image of the Marines, the conditions in which they fought, and the fighting itself during World War II. While many historians note that visual media, such as television shows or movies, can never truly capture the brutal realities of combat, the consensus is that some movies have clearly come closer than others in terms of the historical accuracy of equipment, tactics, and events. This concept is not without controversy however. This article addresses the public perceptions versus the documented conditions portrayed in the HBO miniseries *The Pacific*, particularly regarding how the academic community tries to rectify the public's conception of the Marine Corps' heroic persona in WWII against the historical record. For some viewers, and possibly the military Services as well, perception has often taken a form that cannot be reconciled with the record.

Timeframe of *The Pacific*

When *The Pacific* series was in development, the United States was in the middle of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. At the time of production, the "surge" was ebbing in Iraq, and II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) was in Iraq, while 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade was in Afghanistan. As if holding a mirror to the American conscience, the television series was meant to show the sacrifices of U.S. servicemen in the Pacific as well as give people a better sense of the overall brutality of the Second World War, specifically, and of war, in general. The series also made it easy to draw comparisons between events depicted by the cast and those being reported on during the time the series aired; for example, many Americans saw the Taliban or the Iraqi combatants carrying out acts of terror against U.S. servicemembers and civilians.

The budget and production values for *The Pacific* were substantial by Hollywood standards. The production companies included DreamWorks SKG Television (Spielberg's company), Playtone (Hanks and Goetzman's company), and HBO. The estimated cost of the miniseries came in at $120 million, which rivals any mainstream movie currently produced.[6] As with *Band of Brothers*, several directors were tasked with specific episodes. The directors for *The Pacific* included a mix of American and Canadian perspectives: Tim Van Patten, David Nutter, Jeremy Podeswa, Graham Yost, Carl Franklin, and Tony To.[7]

Unlike the original book written by Stephen E. Ambrose for the miniseries *Band of Brothers*, *The Pacific* miniseries was based on several sources as well as the companion book, *The Pacific: Hell Was an Ocean Away*, by Hugh Ambrose.[8] These books were quite divergent in their attitudes toward the war. Marine Private Robert Leckie's *Helmet for My Pillow* covered the early part of the war; Private Eugene B. Sledge's memoir, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa*, covered the later part of the fighting between 1944 and 1945; and Private First Class Charles W. "Chuck" Tatum's *Red Blood, Black Sand* focused on the fighting of the

[6] Alex Ben Block, "How HBO Spent $200 Million on 'The Pacific'," *Hollywood Reporter*, 26 August 2010.

[7] *The Pacific*; Van Patten directed episodes 3, 8, and 10; Nutter directed episodes 2 and 8; Podeswa directed episodes 3, 8, and 10; Yost directed episode 4; Franklin directed episode 5; and To directed episode 6.

[8] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

Marines on Iwo Jima where John Basilone was killed.[9] Another manuscript that became linked to the series was Sidney Phillip's memoirs, *You'll Be Sor-ree!: A Guadalcanal Marine Remembers the Pacific War*. Phillips was recognized as the connecting character that linked the main characters in the television miniseries during the three years the show encompasses.[10] To coincide with the miniseries, Sergeant Romus V. Burgin, who was featured in the later episodes of the series, published his memoirs, *Islands of the Damned*, to build further off of first-person accounts of the battles on Peleliu and Okinawa. Burgin served as the squad leader for Sledge's mortar team.[11]

The companion piece—*The Pacific*—was written by Hugh Ambrose, Stephen's son. While the last book was meant to be an additional work to supplement the television show, it was often compared to, and misinterpreted as, the book upon which the series was based.[12] As opposed to the companion book, the former titles by Marines were all memoirs of combat rather than a strategic overview of the Pacific theatre of war. While showing the reality of combat on the Marines, the series also looked at the racism prevalent at the time of the war and how demonizing the enemy was commonplace.

Given that the series was produced by HBO, the producers were able to budget effects and writers to make a high-budget series in a short, primetime format, and given the fact that HBO relies on subscriptions, increasing interest in the series meant they had to craft a final product that would retain audiences. To attain even more interest for residuals, the producers relied on what Jonathan Grey referred to as *overflow*; or in this case, the additional materials such as maps,



Official U.S. Marine Corps photos
Pvt Eugene B. Sledge (left) and Pvt Robert Leckie (right) wrote of their time in the Marine Corps, contributing to the public perception of the war.

statistics, personal stories, and stock footage needed to keep viewers interested in the story. However, excess information, be it in books or other media, can be vexing to story continuity, as well as viewer comprehension. This confusion seemed to occur at least occasionally for viewers of the show.[13] The creation of the series also renewed criticisms that Hollywood dramatizes the actions of the stereotypical hero—white, middle class, male—while ignoring the actions of anyone not of that type.[14] The Marines did experience breakdowns, suffer debilitating maladies, and broke the Hollywood ideal of the soldier, appearing more like combatants with a lack of basic supplies.[15]

The series also was criticized for the brutal acts of desecration to enemy troops by Marines. While viewers see this as shocking and un-American, saying as much on various comment boards on HBO, the reality was noted in several sources, particularly Sledge's memoir. Racism permeated many aspects of the war in the Pacific, as John W. Dower noted in *War without*

[9] Robert Leckie, *Helmet for My Pillow: From Parris Island to the Pacific* (New York: Bantam, 1957); E. B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981); and Chuck Tatum, *Red Blood, Black Sand: Fighting Alongside John Basilone from Boot Camp to Iwo Jima* (New York: Berkley, 2012).

[10] Sid Phillips, *You'll Be Sor-ree!: A Guadalcanal Marine Remembers the Pacific War* (New York: Berkley, 2010), ii.

[11] R. V. Burgin with Bill Marvel, *Islands of the Damned: A Marine at War in the Pacific* (New York: NAL Caliber, 2010).

[12] Hugh Ambrose, *The Pacific: Hell Was an Ocean Away* (New York: NAL Caliber, 2010).

[13] Jonathan Gray, *Television Entertainment* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 89–92.

[14] Larry May, "Making the American Consensus: The Narrative of Conversion and Subversion in World War II Films," in *The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness during World War II*, ed. Lewis A. Erenberg and Susan E. Hirsch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 76.

[15] Susan Jeffords, *Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 176.

Mercy, and the producers reiterated this aspect of the conflict in the extra features found on disc 6 of the box set.[16] This aspect of warfare made the series difficult for some Americans to watch, while others considered it an appropriate homage to those who fought.

American Attitudes toward the Pacific War

One of the most significant aspects of memory and remembrance of World War II is the difference between the two main theaters of war. While the Nazi menace was considered more dangerous and was given top priority by the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, the war with the Japanese Empire was far more brutal; its brutality could not always be understood by Americans who had not served in the military, let alone in combat. Race, among other factors, played a significant role in that confusion. The Germans had an appearance that made them "like us," or at least like white Americans. Some Americans came from a generation or two removed from Germany, so there was a connection to the old country. While the Nazis might be despicable, the Germans conducted warfare with a semblance of rules as they fought the Western Allies, while conducting a brutal war without limits against the Soviets.[17]

The Japanese, however, were depicted by the U.S. government and the popular American media as barbarians from the outset of the war.[18] During the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, the Japanese Imperial Army brutalized the population of Nanjing, China, and behaved brutally toward anyone who did not fight in the ways of a warrior, or *Bushido*, believing them not worthy of honorable treatment. The Allied troops who surrendered to the Japanese during the war were not offered any honor. Because the war in the Pacific was so markedly different from that of Europe, viewers who watched *The Pacific* were shocked to see U.S. Marines committing acts of violence that might now be seen as ghoulish or uncivilized, such as taking gold teeth from dead Japanese soldiers or the use of skulls to decorate American camps.[19] Taking war souvenirs, and to a lesser extent the desecration of bodies, occurred on both sides during the war, as was mentioned in books from the fighting in the Pacific during World War II.

National Archives
Frontline warning sign using a Japanese soldier's skull.

This behavior was not easily accepted by the average American viewer, who looked—and still looks—upon American servicemen as always doing the right thing. WWII veterans seem to be held to a higher standard than current troops by many in the media or in society, as they are part of the "good war" as described by author Studs Terkel, in which the enemies of Amer-

[16] *The Pacific*, disc 6, "Anatomy of the Pacific War," 2011.
[17] John Keegan, *The Second World War* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), 175.
[18] John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 8.
[19] See, for example, the Japanese skull and the sign reminding U.S. Marines to take their Atribine to counter malaria in the series, which was based on actual pictures. Another showed an image of a Japanese skull as decoration. Ben Cosgrove, "Portrait from the Brutal Pacific: 'Skull on a Tank,' Guadalcanal, 1942," *Time*, 19 February 2014; and Kaite Serena, "Skulls, Ears, Noses, and Other Morbid 'Trophies' Americans Took from Dead Japanese in WWII," *All that Is Interesting* (blog), 13 November 2017.

ica were readily identified.[20] Neither of these opinions is necessarily right or wrong. However, it must be acknowledged that combat is brutal and atrocities are common, but not always presented realistically in film or television. Racism occurred throughout the United States during the war, and combined with the perceptions about Japanese-Americans interned for their perceived loyalties to Japan, attitudes toward the enemy were strong, stereotypical, and often wrong.

Viewers who watched *The Pacific* expected the series to be a counterpart to *Band of Brothers*, which in some ways it was. However, the series had some distinct differences. The extremes of jungle fighting made attrition common and many Marines left the theater of combat after a time, so there was no unit cohesion. The 1st Marine Division was the focal point of *The Pacific*, which eliminated a considerable number of the battles in the Pacific, such as Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, and New Guinea. More importantly, the series did not show the contributions of the U.S. Army, Air Corps, Navy, or Coast Guard to any extent.

Creation of *The Pacific* Miniseries from Historical Documentaries

The origins of *The Pacific* miniseries go back to two specific television series from the 1950s. *Crusade in the Pacific*, a 24-part series, was done in the typical documentary fashion of the era, and covered all U.S. Services in the theater. Using newsreel footage, as well as maps, the narrator explains the specific battle or timeframe for the episode and how it influenced the overall war. *Crusade in the Pacific* focuses on strategic issues: troop movement, battle plans, fighting conditions, and the strategic outcome of the battle. The use of the maps in this original series influenced and inspired the producers of *The Pacific*, even to the point of using an Imperial Japanese battle flag to illustrate the areas of control. The other direct aspect was the diagram that showed the tunnel system on Peleliu from the episode titled "Palau," and how that was used by the producers of *The Pacific* to guide a direct scene-by-scene shot in the historical section for episode 6 on the Peleliu hills titled "Peleliu Airfield."[21]

The other influence for the series came from *Victory at Sea*, a 26-part documentary series meant to show how extensively the U.S. armed forces worked to confront enemies during World War II and how that collaboration allowed the Allied forces to defeat the Axis nations. However, *Victory at Sea* was produced more like propaganda, similar to Frank Capra's *Why We Fight*. Its top-down history did not deal with the memories of the average foot soldier or the minutiae of the battles.[22]

Even more telling was that the viewers expected *The Pacific* miniseries to be historically accurate, more akin to a documentary than an entertainment or information-based video series. The factual basis was important, but many viewers expected the stories to follow history exactly, which they did not for a variety of reasons. For example, in episode 9, "Okinawa," the action begins in May 1945, when the 1st Marine Division had already cleared the northern part of the island, but with minimal contact with the enemy as opposed to the vicious fighting farther south. The episode opens with the division shifting to the south to replace the U.S. Army units who were being taken offline, and the 1st Marine Division being put into evermore-brutal fighting near the Shuri line.[23] At times in the episode, it seems clear that certain events were merged to create a better flow for the story line, and several actions were attributed to the different characters in the show. The most apparent issue in regard to compressing time came in the last episode, "Home," when Private Sledge has seemingly gone from Okina-

[20] Studs Terkel, "*The Good War*": *An Oral History of World War Two* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

[21] *Crusade in the Pacific*, episode 7, "Guadalcanal: America's First Offensive"; episode 17, "Palau: The Fight for Bloody Nose Ridge"; and episode 25, "At Japan's Doorstep: Okinawa," directed by Arthur B. Tourtellot, written by Fred Feldkamp (New York: Time, 1951). See also the historical notes to *The Pacific*, episode 6, "Peleliu Airfield."

[22] *Victory at Sea*, directed by M. Clay Adams (New York: NBC, 1952–53); and *Why We Fight: A Prelude to War*, directed by Frank Capra (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of War, 1942).

[23] The Shuri line was the main line of Japanese resistance running from coast to coast across Okinawa and roughly in line with Shuri castle.

wa to the United States. In fact, he and his unit were sent to China for a year. This pertinent fact was overlooked for the miniseries.

The last disc of the series offers additional historical background and insight into what the directors and producers were trying to achieve. Director Tim Van Patten notes that they did a significant amount of historical research to find the proper look for the actors and the shots of the battles. The directors were quite aware that there would be some historical comparisons taking place, especially by those who were there. As with any television series, even documentaries, viewers will constantly critique what is included, excluded, and how it is edited. No matter what is presented, there will still be some human predilection toward events and historical presentation, be it their own biases, previous understanding of material, or personal recollections from friends or family.[24]

The Pacific: The Series, the "Fixes," and Its Reception

At the time of the release of the miniseries, Hugh Ambrose published the official companion piece, *The Pacific*. Ambrose wrote in the introduction that this book had been initially meant as a joint project between him and his father, historian Stephen Ambrose, who died in 2002. Later, the book was continued, but the pressure to finish the project, its massive scope, and the deadlines for additional marketing made any mistakes that much more noticeable. Ambrose made two key points in the book: first, it was not meant to be a complete overview, since there were so many stories that could not be told in the book; second, it was not meant to serve as a follow-along book, such as *Band of Brothers* or *Generation Kill*, another HBO combat miniseries based on the experiences of Marines during the first 40 days of the war in Iraq.[25] While both series followed their respective books well, *The Pacific* book was meant to tell augmented stories to tie it all together. The book focused on some of the characters from the series—Sid Phillips represents the key link, and his *You'll Be Sor-ree!* had not yet been widely distributed—but primarily focused on two officers: Navy pilot Captain Vernon L. Micheel and Marine Lieutenant Austin C. Shofner.

The speculation from many viewers was that, if the officers had been more significantly noted in the series, the show might have had greater impact with them. Understandably, the story of Shofner was compelling: stationed in the Philippines at the start of the war, a prisoner of war for a year, and then a guerrilla fighter for six months more. Shofner was in charge of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, in which Eugene Sledge fought during Peleliu. Shofner then went back to the Philippines, and later on to Okinawa. Shofner's combat record might have complemented the series well. The concept of the series, however, was to focus the story lines on the fighting man instead of the operational history that is more common in military histories.

In all, the book remains a considerable attempt to concentrate the myriad stories into one cohesive format, as well as fill in what seemed to be gaps left by the miniseries. This idea of telling individual stories rather than the big picture of the overall timeline of the war, or of the generals and admirals who make the strategic decisions, has become more prominent in recent years. Unlike *Victory at Sea*, the voices of the individual Marine, soldier, and sailor were heard in *The Pacific*, but in a more condensed role. Ambrose's book left a considerable void to fill. Many felt that Hugh Ambrose was not the historian or storyteller that his father was, while others believed the book was done

[24] The author served as a historical consultant for *Inside World War II*, produced by Jonathan Towers, aired 12 August 2012, National Geographic. One of the complaints made by viewers was that the colors were wrong for the Nazi aircraft, and that the series did not delve deep enough into the events. The producers explained to the author during review that the series was intended for younger audiences that may not be aware of the human element of the war, and that it was a starting point for further discussion.

[25] *Generation Kill*, directed by Susanna White and Simon Cellan Jones (New York: HBO, 2008). The series covers the activities of a *Rolling Stone* reporter who is embedded with 1st Reconnaissance Marines during the first wave of the American-led assault on Baghdad in 2003. It is based on the book by Evan Wright, *Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of American War* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

slapdash and edited poorly, such as the mislabeling of the Battle of Midway, which led to problems of credibility. However, the book, when taken in context of the series, did what it was supposed to do: tie in the stories presented in the miniseries to those of both Navy and Marine Corps officers who saw a different part of the war, and leave the strategic role to other more academic tomes.

The show's predecessor, *Band of Brothers*, was similarly refuted by some historians who felt that the senior Ambrose had been sloppy in his work. Some of the characters in that series who died were later noted as alive (e.g., Army Private Albert Blithe). Again, the line between documentary versus historical drama was blurred.[26] In this age of instant access and sweeping television offerings, the two concepts are often fuzzy and occasionally to the detriment of both the producer and the viewer.

Sex, Violence, and Audience Reception

Complaints about the series were often vented on HBO message boards as well as other sites. The mixed reactions stem from several issues. First, *The Pacific* was compiled from three different memoirs, as noted earlier. Second, the series was told from the point of view of a larger body of Marine combatants. For *Band of Brothers*, the series focused on a company of paratroopers from the 101st Airborne of approximately 230 soldiers, depending on units, and their replacements. The viewer watched how they trained, fought, and depended on each other throughout the war in Europe. Again, this was an entirely different aspect of the perception of the theaters of war. For the European theater, men were kept in the same unit for the duration unless wounded. Americans at home following the war in the newspapers could easily find locations in Europe noted in the articles.

For *The Pacific*, as with the actual campaign of WWII, the islands were often unknown, hard to locate on maps, and the maps did not show the terrain and weather conditions American combatants fought against. *The Pacific* series dealt with enlisted men—not readily identified officers such as *Band of Brothers*' Major Richard Winters, Captain Lewis Nixon, or Captain Ronald Spears—from the 1st Marine Division, which had a nominal strength of 16,000 Marines. Because the three main characters in *The Pacific* came from different regiments (4,000 servicemen in average regiment), there is far less continuity. Considering the physically and geographically diverse areas, intense battles, and lack of unit cohesion, the writers worked admirably to find commonalities; and the writers and producers did try to give an overview as well as an intimate look at small unit warfare in the Pacific theater. The link must be then-Private Sidney Phillips from Company H, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, who served with Private Robert Leckie at Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester and was friends with Private Eugene Sledge from Company K, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, who fought later in the same division but at Peleliu and Okinawa.

Complaints on the message boards came from different perspectives as well. In addition to the criticisms about not understanding characters, other viewers complained about the pacing, expecting the constant action found in *Band of Brothers*, or the difficulty of watching the night battle sequences. Given the terrain and conditions, it would have been less likely to see a lot of "typical war movie" battle sequences in urban or farm areas, where the enemy could be easily seen (or filmed for that matter) and engaged.

A more specific complaint generated by the series involved gratuitous sex, and to a lesser extent, gratuitously brutal violence. If one reads any Marine memoir, the desire for sex when not in combat is noted extensively. Leckie made considerable mention of this in his biography *Helmet for My Pillow,* when the Marines were in Australia, as did Phillips in his memoirs. The idea of Americans being squeamish about sex, while violence is perfectly acceptable, has also been discussed at length

[26] In this regard, a documentary is as factual as possible, while the historical drama, though based on the facts of the event, often includes fictionalized characters or merged events. This is done more for the purpose of storytelling rather than accuracy.

in psychology books as a variation of sublimation.[27]

The Marines considered the issue of sex to be of such significance that a segment on the necessity of condom usage was part of a restricted comic book published by the Marines Corps entitled *Tokyo Straight Ahead*. The desire for sex, especially young men who were virile and in harm's way, drove many.[28] The idea that a revered generation would consider thoughts attributed to a more modern generation is sometimes difficult for viewers to accept.

The series was derided for these depictions of sex, especially in episodes "Melbourne" and "Basilone."[29] The reality of the time was that Western women were not accessible to troops in the Pacific theater. There was the possibility of fraternization with local women in Europe, but any female U.S. personnel stationed in Europe during the war were under constant guard against the threat of sexual assault from male personnel. Historian Peter Schrijvers described the conditions on one particular island, where the women's quarters were surrounded by concertina wire; and further, even when out on dates, their male escorts carried a sidearm.[30] In the series, Gene Sledge made two comments on women in this regard: they did not need to be nor should they be in a combat zone. Note that one of these comments ostensibly occurred after alighting from a ship back to Pavuvu, Solomon Islands, in October 1944, and the other occurred when he was chatting with his brother about the lack of women and sex in the Pacific in which he concurred with the U.S. Army on their synopsis of the Pacific War.[31]

The concept of sex and romance is further clouded when one considers the idea of sex and military personnel. In *Band of Brothers*, a sex scene was included, but it was not necessary for character development. In *The Pacific*, the sex was part of a wider pattern showing emotional connection, both with the characters and their fears and desires as citizen soldiers, as well as combatants who wished to feel some sort of emotional connection to something other than killing and violence. While the inclusion made the episodes seem slow, the need for sex has been duly noted in several of the primary sources. For example, Leckie became more interested in what he referred to as "the chase" for willing female partners, rather than romance as was depicted in the series.[32]

Concerns about the desecration of enemy bodies and the shooting of civilians also came across in the message boards. Viewers were disturbed by a scene in which a Marine idly dropped rocks into the skull pan of a Japanese soldier, while another noted that it was gratuitous and unrealistic for Marines to pry out gold teeth from Japanese soldiers.[33] The events in question were taken directly from Sledge's book and have been noted in several other sources, including Schrijvers, Leckie, Dower, and Stephen Ambrose.[34] Even in *Band of Brothers*, a certain amount of souvenir taking among American soldiers took place. The idea of a

[27] Leckie, *Helmet for My Pillow*, 116; Phillips, *You'll Be Sor-ree!*, 120; and Steven Mintz, Randy W. Roberts, and David Welky, eds., *Hollywood's America: Understanding History through Film* (Oxford: Wiley, 2016), 83.

[28] "Don't Take a Fling, if You Ain't Got that Thing," in *Tokyo Straight Ahead: Guam, Peleliu, Saipan, Tarawa, and Guadalcanal* (Camp Pendleton, CA: Reproduction Section, Camp Pendleton, 1945).

[29] *The Pacific*, episode 3, "Melbourne," directed by Jeremy Podeswa, aired 28 March 2010, HBO; and *The Pacific*, episode 2, "Basilone," directed by David Nutter, aired 21 March 2010, HBO.

[30] Peter Schrijvers, *GI War against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific during World War II* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 150.

[31] *The Pacific*, episode 10, "Home," directed by Jeremy Podeswa, aired 16 May 2010, HBO; Emily Yellin, *Our Mothers' War: American Women at Home and at the Front during World War II* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 128; and Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps, U.S. Army in World War II*, Special Studies (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1991), 425–26, 450. Note that, in a 1939 Army staff study addressing the probability of women serving in the Army, a male officer stated: "Women's probable jobs would include those of hostess, librarians, canteen clerks, cooks and waitresses, chauffeurs, messengers, and strolling minstrels." The report failed to discuss the highly skilled office jobs that most of the women held, because many doubted women were capable of handling jobs of any significant responsibility.

[32] Leckie, *Helmet for my Pillow*, 149.

[33] *The Pacific*, episode 7, "Peleliu Airfield."

[34] Schrijvers, *GI War against Japan*, 209–10; Leckie, *Helmet for My Pillow*, 116–17; Dower, *War without Mercy*, 61–66; and Ambrose, *Band of Brothers*, 260–61.

morality in war, from Thermopylae to now, is a myth.

For today's servicemembers, the episodes contained elements that seemed familiar to modern combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In one scene in the episode during the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese use civilians as human shields and draw on American compassion. A woman tries to hand off her child to a Marine. When her jacket opens, the viewer sees she has explosives strapped to her chest, which detonates, killing or wounding all around her. The Marines later commented on the barbaric nature of their enemy to use such horrific tactics.[35] This type of combat tactic was common in Iraq and Afghanistan, where jihadists disguised as civilians walked into U.S. lines and detonated explosives. Whether they were lured, coerced, or did so voluntarily is a matter of opinion, but the results were the same. The scenario of civilians and combatants dying on the battlefield took viewers away from the Hollywood version of a "clean war" and gave people the uncomfortable perspective of seeing civilians die as they either were in the way or served a purpose against a determined enemy.

Combat, Racism, and Time Compression

Viewers of *The Pacific* also complained that the battles were often difficult to follow by the lay audience. During the first two episodes, which dealt with the battle on Guadalcanal, viewers were not given proper cues to determine what major battle they were watching. Some depictions, such as the location of Alligator Creek, were noted but not consistent; when combined with an incoherent battle sequence or the lack of location, the significance of the battle was often undercut. The book offered the viewers a way to connect the events but did not succeed, as the battles were not necessarily noted for their significance.

When one hears of veterans and the treatment of enemy soldiers in what might be considered war crimes, WWII is not invoked but Vietnam typically is. Racism was a powerful force during WWII, and when combined with the stereotypes of the Japanese (and the Japanese stereotypes of Americans), the war in the Pacific introduced depictions of the Japanese as having buckteeth, Coke-bottle glasses, and a cartoonish demeanor. The series, however, would often counter this reality. For example, one episode depicts Tatum and members of Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, commenting on their desire to "slap a Jap." Gunny Sergeant Basilone confronts them, saying that whatever the men's opinion based on Hollywood or pop culture depictions of Japanese soldiers, the real Japanese soldier deserved respect as a crafty, battle-tested soldier who was willing to die for his emperor. The Marines were told to never underestimate the enemy, nor should they be given a break; but it was also not going to be an easy battle against a caricature enemy. Tatum notes in his book that Basilone, in fact, did not utter this speech, but another sergeant did.[36]

Another criticism made by viewers, as well as those who served in support units from World War II, is that many units or groups are ignored in the story lines or that the cast is not diverse enough. Both issues are important to note, given that the U.S. Armed Services were segregated at the time. While there were important contributions by servicemen of color, the stories most often told are of the units that saw extensive combat; and the majority of those units in the segregated U.S. military of World War II were in fact white. Spike Lee further argued this point when *Flags of Our Fathers* came out, noting the fact that 900 African Americans fought during the conflict but were not depicted in the movie.[37] Since the film centered on the men who raised the flag, including everyone was not realistic, but then neither would the inclusion of specific ships, aircraft, or Army units. Hollywood still needs to sell the most appealing story, and this is why even Spielberg would be hard-pressed to make a movie that centered on his father's service in the military, flying "the Hump" with the China-India-Burma

[35] *The Pacific*, episode 9, "Okinawa," directed by Timothy Van Patten, aired 9 May 2010, HBO.

[36] Tatum, *Red Blood, Black Sand*, 86–87.

[37] Alex Altman, "Were African-Americans at Iwo Jima?," *Time*, 9 June 2008.

Dell Comics publication War Heroes *issue no. 6, October–December 1943*
Comic strips at the time featured the story of GySgt John Basilone that also was used in the series *The Pacific*.

units of the U.S. Air Corps. They did serve a vital part of the war, but it was not glamorous.

This preconceived notion that all who served in World War II were combat veterans has also been reevaluated. Many Service personnel did not serve in combat units, but were instead in some form of support. They did not see combat, but were just as responsible for the war effort by making the machinery run, arming and repairing weaponry, and keeping combatants fed. These stories, while important, often do not excite Hollywood moviemakers, nor do they resonate with viewers. So, in this regard, the films still convey what both the creators and viewers want—action. The reality is often different, and the criticisms perhaps unwarranted.

The Concept of PTSD

One of the most mistaken aspects of World War II in commemoration is that of post-traumatic stress and how it affected the combatants. Movies and documentaries from the World War II era or early Cold War often avoided such issues or illustrated them in limited form. Both *Band of Brothers* and *The Pacific* took the concept of post-traumatic stress and visually demonstrated events that may have contributed to the malady.

In *Band of Brothers*, there were issues of combat stress or some sort of mental break, especially during episode 6, "Bastogne," but on the whole there were far more cases of combat fatigue in the Pacific theatre, specifically the southwest Pacific where most of the

island fighting took place.[38] Whether it was Sergeant Basilone's lamentation for his friend Sergeant Manny Rodriguez who was killed or the guilt of not returning to fight, his emotional distress has similarly been echoed by current recipients of the Medal of Honor.

Leckie suffered combat fatigue, which led to his hospitalization on Banika, near Pavuvu. In episode 4 of *The Pacific*, Leckie notes his breakdown in detail. He also mentions in the book and the series a fellow Marine who strangled a Japanese soldier with his bare hands and later broke down.[39] Some viewers commented that Leckie was a coward for his constant disobedience to the chain of command and orders (something he readily admitted in the book), but again this was part of a wider perception of WWII veterans—that they did not suffer from mental issues—more typically seen as a Vietnam War malady. Ironically, both wars had similar situations and combat conditions, and so it is just as likely to have happened. The image of the "good war" where enemies are clearly defined and goals marked (e.g., the unconditional surrender of an enemy) is that such incidents are more of a modern creation, and not as simple as first conceived. Despite what some may see as modern weakness, other historians such as Lawrence Tritle, have noted that aspects of PTSD go back as far as ancient Greece.[40]

The stress of Marines seeing civilian casualties also was explored in episode 9, "Okinawa," where the native Okinawans were used as human shields by the Japanese against U.S. movements. Civilian losses often made coping even more difficult. Seeing a female Okinawan with a bomb strapped to her must have had some sort of impact on veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, where suicide bombers are common.

The impact of nightmares and post-traumatic stress was also noted by Sledge. And while the last episode dealt with his reacclimatization to the United States, the reality was that he did not come back to the states until almost 1947, after an additional tour in China. He still had recurring nightmares of the war, which he mentions in the book. One viewer of the series said that he "hated Sledge's emo character," as if this were an effect created by the actor or the director. Again, the events that caused him trauma in the film were noted in detail in his book.[41]

What is also prevalent in the series, as in many wartime memoirs, is gallows humor. The need for lightheartedness to break the tension was a key part of the series. For example, the scene where a Marine is chased from a cave after trying to defecate led to his near demise. The Japanese soldier is killed, but the others make fun of the Marine (who did in fact soil his pants) by saying he looked like he had won a sack race.[42]

Supplemental Information

One of the modern aspects of *The Pacific*, as compared to *Victory at Sea* or *Crusade in the Pacific*, is that the modern series offers supplemental online information through HBO's website. One section displays the battle map, which offers interactive views of the major battles shown by specific episode. The maps are detailed and show specific battles and layouts of units during the fight, where certain characters were located during the attacks, as well as animated aspects of aerial attacks and ship movements.

The second section, "Interact with History," allows the viewer to read more about the facts that no series, regardless of how extensively done, could ever cover. For example, in the first episode, a Marine lieutenant is shown with an M50 Riesling submachine gun. Many of these weapons proved to be inadequate in the jungle, but the producers made it a point of historical accuracy to show these weapons along with the M1903 Springfield rifles instead of the M1 Garand rifles, which were used by the U.S. Army by that time. The *Victory at Sea* episode on Guadalcanal did not use accurate footage of the battle and often Marines are shown with the Garand rifles.

[38] Schrijvers, *The GI War against Japan*, 197.

[39] *The Pacific*, episode 4, "Gloucester/Pavuvu/Banika," directed by Graham Yost, aired 4 April 2010, HBO; and Leckie, *Helmet for My Pillow*, 266.

[40] Lawrence A. Tritle, *From Melos to My Lai: War and Survival* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[41] "A Review of HBO's 'The Pacific'," *On Violence* (blog), accessed 1 December 2017.

[42] *The Pacific*, episode 9, "Okinawa."

The final section, "Witness the Conflict," gives access to subscribers to watch the episodes. The interactive features of the website, combined with the comment boards, the historical markers and maps, and the various stories of tribute to those who fought in the Pacific theater made, and continue to make, for a collaborative process that allows the series to morph and change with time. In testament to the efforts made, *The Pacific* was awarded two Emmys for the series, whereas *Band of Brothers* won seven, and comments on the internet, as well as the sales of the series, continue to this day.

Conclusions

While the series *The Pacific* had its detractors, it did garner considerable viewership for HBO, as well as greater recognition for the Marines who later wrote of the exploits of their units. And as with any series, especially one done primarily for entertainment purposes, and one based on memoirs as source material, the flow of scenery and historical alteration often made fodder for critique. For many viewers, *Band of Brothers* serves as a benchmark for this type of miniseries on several levels. One reason for this is the familiarity of the battles and the idea of the "good war": one in which the combatants know what they are fighting for and are fighting within the seeming grounds of respect for their enemy as fellow humans. For Marine Corps veterans of the Pacific campaigns, the war could not have been any more different from that taking place in Europe. In a scene from the last episode, "Home," Sledge discusses his war versus that of his older brother Ed, who fought with the U.S. Army in Europe. When it was revealed in the film that Eugene Sledge did not have the opportunity to fraternize with women or enjoy any of the other aspects of life in the European theater, his brother responded with a look of both shock and sadness.[43] The idea of the war in the Pacific not being familiar—geographically, climatologically, culturally, or militarily—with any preconceived expectations, or for that matter too many expectations, as Eugene had mentioned prior to his first battle, came as a surprise.[44]

For viewers of *The Pacific*, the disappointment of expectations was varied, understandable to an extent, but their complaints were not entirely accurate. Commenters on the board noted that one should watch the series a couple of times; and it becomes much stronger when the books, the supplemental information, and the series all coincide. At the same time, whenever HBO or some other large production company authorizes a series to visually tell the story of a unit from World War II, the other Services want their due, be they the Navy, the Seabees, or the Army paratroopers in the Philippines.

Preservation of history is critical, and documentaries and even historical dramas serve a role, but it must be augmented by other sources to take in the events so that one can determine what is real and what appears contrived by Hollywood. The combat memoirs from Leckie, Sledge, Phillips, and Tatum serve that purpose and were transferred, at least superficially, to the visual medium. However, in today's instant world, we focus more on the here and now and what fits in our collective ideas of what history should be. Anything else is a disappointment.

• 1775 •

[43] E. B. Sledge, *China Marine* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2002), 124–29.
[44] Sledge, *With the Old Breed*, 55–59.

"How Lucky I Am"

THE WORDS AND PHOTOGRAPHY OF CORPORAL WILLIAM T. PERKINS JR.

by Frank Blazich Jr., PhD[1]

Politics aside, the Vietnam War differed from other American conflicts through the juxtaposition and immediacy of television and communication satellites. As young men fought and died half a world away, U.S. civilians could experience scenes of this conflict within hours from the serenity of their living rooms. Through the eye of the combat photographer, the ugly visage of battle could be tempered with the beauty of nature, cultural exchange, and innocence of youth. Sharing many of the same hardships as the fighters, the combat photographer's battle is to understand the situation and their subject matter, all to better capture in still or moving images a moment of clarity, compassion, valor, or humanity.

One young American in uniform, Corporal William T. Perkins Jr., represented a typical 20-year-old Marine in Vietnam. However, whereas most carried a rifle into battle, Perkins deployed to Vietnam as a combat photographer armed with a Bell and Howell 16mm Filmo motion picture camera and his personal 35mm camera to record his fellow Marines' efforts to support and defend the South Vietnamese people against the Communist Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. His photography, though, is perhaps less notable compared with Perkins's heroic actions, which made him a posthumous recipient of the Medal of Honor; he is the only combat photographer ever so honored. Even less well known is the man himself, and the transformation he made from a spirited Southern California youth into a committed photographer and loyal Marine. Through his letters and personal photographs from the war, this article gives voice to a young

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Official portrait of Cpl William T. Perkins Jr., ca. 1966.

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Marine's actions on the 50th anniversary of his death. Perkins's own writings provide a critical opportunity to observe his transformation into a Marine and a photographer, but also to perhaps understand the reasoning behind his images and frame his ultimate act of selflessness.

Early Life and Impact of Family

The driving force behind Perkins's military service and pursuit of photography stems from the men in his life. Born in Rochester, New York, on 10 August 1947 to William and Marilane (née O'Leary) Perkins, young William, or "Butch" to his family, grew up with his younger brother Robert (19 May 1953–27 November 1978) hearing richly detailed stories of their great grandfather, grandfather, and father's military service in the Civil War and in Europe and the Pacific during World War II.[2] Their maternal great grandfather, Private John O'Leary, served with Battery L of the 1st New York Light Artillery from 31 December 1861 to 31 December 1864, participating in the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg.[3] The boys' grandfather, Captain Henry T. Perkins, commanded a U.S. Army special projects group of the Chemical Warfare Service in Guadalcanal, while their father, then-First Lieutenant William T. Perkins, flew 33 missions as a Consolidated B-24 Liberator bomber pilot with the Fifteenth Air Force stationed in Italy. During his fourth mission over Vienna, Austria, his aircraft lost two of four engines to flak and was forced down in German-occupied Yugoslavia. The young lieutenant and his crew spent the ensuing three weeks evading capture and managing to return to base.[4]

In 1960, the Perkins family crossed the country and moved to the suburb of Sepulveda (present-day North Hills) in Los Angeles, California. Although born in upstate New York, the teenage Perkins quickly acclimated to the temperate environs of Southern California. While attending James Monroe High School, he enthusiastically embraced new hobbies, such as snow skiing, swimming, skin and scuba diving, acting, and photography. He drew acclaim from fellow students for his performances in *The Mouse that Roared* and *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum*. Undoubtedly, his comedic chops grew through countless moments shared with his good friend, James R. Priddy, mimicking the routines of Groucho Marx, Jonathan Winters, Lenny Bruce, and Bob Newhart in and out of class. After expressing an interest in photography, the senior Perkins bought his son a Kodak camera that he used to learn everything about the hobby while a member of the high school photography club.[5]

Boot Camp to Film School

After graduation in June 1965, Perkins enrolled at Los Angeles Pierce College to study photography. He continued refining his acting skills, apprenticing with the Valley Music Theatre and performing at the Century City Playhouse.[6] Perhaps seeking to blend his love of acting and photography, Perkins applied to the University of California, Los Angeles, and received acceptance into its cinematography program, although, he

[2] "Born to Mr. and Mrs.," *Democrat and Chronicle* (Rochester, NY), 24 May 1953, 22.

[3] "Battery L (Reynolds), 1st New York Light Artillery, Oration of Gen. John A. Reynolds," 17 September 1889, Marilane Jacobson Collection, Division of Armed Forces History, National Museum of American History (NMAH), Smithsonian Institution, hereafter Jacobson Collection.

[4] Doyle D. Glass, *Lions of Medina* (Louisville, KY: Coleche Press, 2007), 3; "Biographical Data for Corporal William T. Perkins, Jr., USMC (Deceased)," Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA, hereafter Perkins Biographical Data; and "Flyer, Captain Father Meet at Home on Army Leave," *Democrat and Chronicle* (Rochester, NY), 28 June 1945, 12.

[5] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 3, 60; "President Awards Medal of Honor to Valley Marine," *Van Nuys (CA) News*, 22 June 1969, 18; and "Local Marine Wins Medal of Honor," news clipping, file labeled "Published Material, Perkins, William T., Jr., Cpl, USMC, MOH," hereafter Perkins published materials, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

[6] "Local Marine Wins Medal of Honor"; and "President Awards Medal of Honor to Valley Marine," 18.

was waitlisted for a year.[7] For Perkins, a year seemed like an eternity. Shortly thereafter, on 27 April 1966, Perkins and Priddy—also enrolled at Pierce College—skipped class to drive to the beach. While on their drive, they spied a recruiting billboard featuring a copy of James Montgomery Flagg's famous Uncle Sam painting pointing a finger at the men from a recruitment ad. Priddy broke the silence and said, "Let's go join the Marine Corps!" That afternoon, both Perkins and Priddy enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve, entering under the Marine Corps' "Buddy Program," whereby a recruit could enlist with a friend and attend boot camp in the same training platoon. In short order, Perkins and Priddy joined other young men from the San Fernando Valley in the Devil Dog Platoon on their way to basic recruit training with the 2d Recruit Training Battalion, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego. On 6 July, the men were sworn into the Regular Marine Corps.[8]

The following day, 7 July, Perkins wrote home to his parents and younger brother. With youthful vigor and military innocence, he remarked,

> Everything's ok and we think we're all going to make it ok. We're waiting to be issued the rest of our utility uniforms. Jim and I are in separate huts right across from each other. . . . The food's fine—always too much to eat, never not enough. You ought to see my haircut! Haven't really done much except get bedding and learn how to make our racks (beds). They taught us how to salute and march a bit.[9]

Additional letters during the course of boot camp touched on the drill instructors' mannerisms and Perkins and Priddy's disposition to crack jokes:

> Well, I guess the hardest thing yet is standing at attention for long periods of time which seem like eons sometimes—but we all get a chance to stretch our legs—march here—there—to mess etc.—runs to get in formation, to the head and back—also a lot of yelling—"aye aye, Sir," Yes Sir, No Sir, and all that good stuff. We always have to repeat all orders and then say "aye aye, Sir." We just had to stand and salute the flag. We just sat down and had to jump up and snap to for a lieutenant who roves around all the time with his .45 [pistol]—think he'd like to shoot or something—as Jim calls it "gunplay." We were issued rifles the other day and Jim said, "When are we going to have a little gun play." HA! We got out a chuckle or two and had to all shut up.[10]

Note that what was obviously missing from his letters home are any repercussions for joking around; but fun aside, Perkins remained upbeat amid the mundane details of basic training.

Photography remained on Perkins's mind as he continued training. On 13 July, Perkins and his platoon took a series of tests for intelligence and various areas

Jacobson Collection, photo courtesy of William T. Perkins Sr.
Perkins boards the bus that will take him to Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, CA, and basic training, ca. July 1966.

[7] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 10.
[8] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 10–11; Perkins Biographical Data; "President Awards Medal of Honor to Valley Marine," 18; and "Marine Buddy Program," *Cardunal Free Press* (Carpentersville, IL), 23 December 1968, 30.
[9] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 7 July 1966, Jacobson Collection.
[10] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 10 July 1966, Jacobson Collection.

of aptitude to screen the abilities of each recruit, a process changed after introduction of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) in 1968. Perkins and Priddy scored well on their tests and each received an interview by a noncommissioned officer to help determine the potential career path of each recruit within the needs of the Corps. Perkins wrote of the experience to his family:

> Then they took us for an interview, then some of us went for another interview (me). I told them I wanted to be a photographer and told them I had experience in school and on my own. A sergeant interviewed me and asked me a bunch of questions and then got specific and asked about photographic developing and printing—I answered 7 out of 8 right.
>
> Well I guess he thought that was *OK*. He *said* he *doesn't* guarantee anything but I "*probably* will get assigned as a photographer."
>
> Well, that sure made me happy. But, I'm trying not to get my hopes up about it because it's only one guy's say so and he said *probably* and didn't *guarantee* anything. Well, I hope I've got some good luck with me so I can get that job.[11]

Based on his other letters home during basic, Perkins apparently never heard any more about his desired career in the Service, but photography remained foremost on his mind. He mailed home several postcards from the post exchange to provide his family with a figurative snapshot of his training experience. In a letter on 3 August, he asked his mother if she ever developed some of his film and requested the prints "to find out if the time exposure of the moon came out, since I guessed at the exposure settings."[12]

After additional training at Camp Pendleton, Perkins and his platoon graduated in early September. After 20 days leave, he shipped out for individual combat training with the 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry Training Regiment, Camp Pendleton, and received follow-on orders as a photographer with the Headquarters Battalion, Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California.[13] As a still photographer, Perkins found the work dull and unfulfilling. "All I do is take photos of the general in parades," he told his family. At some point in the fall of 1966, Perkins requested assignment to the U.S. Army Signal Center and School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to receive training in motion picture photography. His headquarters responded favorably to his request, but with a caveat: Perkins could attend the school, however, his follow-on assignment would likely include service in the Republic of Vietnam.[14]

Undeterred, newly promoted Lance Corporal Perkins crossed the country and found himself immersed in the finer points of motion picture photography. Writing home on 26 January 1967, Perkins described the program's first weeks:

> Well, school is really pretty good. We've been awful busy. For the last 3 days, we started filming at 9:30 AM and wound it up at 3:00 PM. We shoot 300' [of film]. We just had a phase test—there are 6 phases. It's in two parts: the written and the practical. The written is self-explanatory—but I don't like the way they try to trick you and are so petty on things which really don't matter to any extent at all. This is the only thing I have against the school. The practical is where you get 100' of 16 MM B&W [black and white] and go film specific things and sequences on a script.
>
> We have whole movie scripts of acting out situations—just like a play or drama. We all have become actors. We screen the finished product—sometimes I watch my acting and forget I'm supposed to be watching the camera technique. HAH!

[11] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 13 July 1966, Jacobson Collection. Emphasis in original is underlined.

[12] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 3 August 1966, Jacobson Collection.

[13] Perkins Biographical Data.

[14] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 37.

> Although the course is very interesting and a lot of fun—It's no snap. There's so much to know about optics, camera technique, exposure, filters, framing, composition, and all the special effects, which make a motion picture look even half way realistic.
>
> It's really great to know all these techniques I've seen and now I'm using them—and on an almost, or I guess you could say professional level. I can't believe how lucky I am to be doing *exactly* what [I want] to be doing—well that's enough of my enthrallment![15]

Coupled with his film education, Perkins found time to enjoy his hobby of scuba diving. In February, he joined a scuba club at the base and became an instructor, though a bit amused by the fact that he was a lance corporal issuing commands to several officers; by March, Perkins finished instruction of a scuba course for 50 Marines.[16]

"I'm in Vietnam Now"

Upon graduation from the motion picture photography school in April, Perkins returned to Barstow before shipping out to Vietnam. Arriving in Da Nang on 17 July 1967, he finally broke the news to his family of his whereabouts:

Dear Mom, Dad, and Bob—

> I know this is going to probably be quite a shock to you, and I probably should have told you sooner, but I'm in Vietnam now. I could have told you sooner, but I just couldn't stand all the tears and everyone moping around like it was the end of the world. Everyone thinks it's such a big deal over here—like you're supposed to get shot at getting off the plane—humbug. That just shows how the papers play it up big and how ignorant the public is.
>
> I'm going to be in the 3rd Marine Division Photo Lab in Phu Bai. We'll stay here in Da Nang for the night and move out

Jacobson Collection

Perkins on 26 January 1967: "Although the course is very interesting and a lot of fun—it's no snap. There's so much to know about optics, camera technique, exposure, filters, framing, composition, and all the special effects which make a motion picture look even half way realistic." As a student in the motion picture photography school, U.S. Army Signal Center and School, Fort Monmouth, NJ, Perkins works with a Mitchell 35mm motion picture camera as he and fellow students practice making a reenlistment film.

[15] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 26 January 1967, Jacobson Collection. Emphasis in original is underlined.

[16] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 7 February 1967; William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 29 March 1967, Jacobson Collection; and "President Awards Medal of Honor to Valley Marine," 18.

Jacobson Collection

Perkins on 3 September 1967: "I caught a flight up here to Dong Ha today and wasn't here more than an hour and we caught incoming mortars and rockets. I guess you probably heard about it on the news because they blew up the ammo dump. I had my new Canon out there and got quite a few color photos, and let my buddy take a couple of me with explosions in the background and the whole bit."

tomorrow by [Lockheed] C-130 [Hercules transport] or helicopter.

You probably heard the Da Nang Air Strip got mortared Friday. We heard the same thing in Okinawa and expected to see the place demolished—humbug—you can't even see any evidence of it except for an Air Force ammo dump, which was hit on the perimeter. I don't want to make it sound *all* rosy over here because it isn't. It's just that you don't have to worry in a large compound like Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phu Bai, Hue, or Saigon because it's so well protected. Hardly anyone carries weapons around the base except for guys who are just coming off missions—so it's pretty secure. The worst thing about this place isn't the V. C. [Viet Cong] but the heat!—Wow. You sweat 24 hrs. a day—just like Okinawa. In fact, Okinawa seems more humid than here.

Speaking of Okinawa, I found Jim [Priddy] and we went out to town Friday night and had the greatest time I think I ever had. Jim really has it nice over there as far as liberty goes.

Since I haven't gotten to my unit yet, I can't tell you my address. I'll still mail this right away so you aren't wondering where I am. I guess me being here is going to take some getting used to for all of us—but don't worry about me—as long as it doesn't get over 130° I'll be fine—ha! (Well, maybe not 130°).

Well, I'd better go to chow now. I put an address on the envelope, but don't send me a letter till you get my complete address. I'm sure you all have a million questions, so write 'em down and I'll answer them.
Love,
Butch

P.S. Again, I'm sorry I didn't tell you sooner, but I really thought I'd be in Okinawa at least 2 or 3 wks.[17]

Perkins arrived in Phu Bai the following day,

[17] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 16 July 1967, Jacobson Collection; "News Release No. KTW-101-69," 20 June 1969, Perkins published materials, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. The letter is dated 16 July, as Perkins had crossed the International Date Line, ergo he arrived in Vietnam on what would be 17 July in the United States. Emphasis in original is underlined.

assigned as a photographer with Service Company, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced). Meeting up with fellow Marines from Barstow and Pendleton, he familiarized himself with the base and the surrounding areas in I Corps, documenting Marine activities.[18] Initial assignments took Perkins to Dong Ha, Cam Lo, and Hue, but also required additional duties, including working in the photography lab developing still prints. In a letter from 27 July, Perkins explained his job:

> We get a lot of work in because we have 9 still photographers whose film we develop and only 5 motion picture (including me) people. All our motion picture [film] is 16MM Ektachrome color and is sent to Washington [DC] to be developed. They send a print back so you can see your footage. All still stuff is developed here (B&W and color slides). B&W cameras are mostly 35MM and then some 2¼ x 2¼ and 4 x 5 (speed graphic). Our biggest developing and printing is aerial photography, which we rarely shoot, but is always sent to us for processing. I'm the one who prints most of it. One good thing—our print room is in a portable van and is *air conditioned*![19]

Headquarters issued Perkins a Bell and Howell 16mm Filmo motion picture camera along with a .45-caliber automatic pistol. While the latter frequently remained holstered, the Bell and Howell proved Perkins's primary weapon in the field.

In addition to his Bell and Howell motion picture camera, Perkins also carried his own personal 35mm still camera. He came to Vietnam with the Kodak his father had given him many years before. After receiving a promotion to corporal on 1 August, Perkins bought a new Canon single lens reflex camera.

Jacobson Collection

Perkins on 23 August 1967: "I'm going from Phu Bai to Dong Ha to pick up a camera and then come back. I've almost finished a roll of color slides, which I will send home to be developed. I think the slides are of the people and the countryside. A few I shot from a helicopter."

[18] Perkins Biographical Data; and William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 17 July 1967, Jacobson Collection.

[19] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 27 July 1967, Jacobson Collection. Emphasis in original is underlined.

He later purchased a second Canon, which he gave to his father as a thank you present, aided, in part, by the low prices at the post exchange.[20] With his Canon, Perkins began taking photographs of the Vietnamese people, the countryside, and his fellow Marines. He mailed his exposed film back to California, "because I don't have enough time to do my own [developing] and they frown on you using government material."[21] In his successive letters home, Perkins mailed rolls of black-and-white and color film with specific instructions on where to develop the film and to protect his slides from dust and moisture.[22]

These still photos increasingly became a focus for Perkins's letters home. These letters clearly demonstrate the growing pride in his budding identity as a professional photographer:

> 12 September 1967: P. S. I'm expecting my prints and slides in the mail (Hint! Hint!)[23]

> 15 September 1967: Excuse me, but I'd like to correct you on something. You call my photos "snaps" or "snapshots." I cringe every time I hear that. It's like calling a rifle a gun, if you know what I mean. Snapshots are taken with a little brownie box camera.[24]

> 21 September 1967: I've just been shooting still photography around the base here at Dong Ha. I'm going nuts *waiting* for you to send me my photos and slides! Please send them to me. I don't plan to keep them here because of the moisture, etc., and I will send them right back. I just want to see if they're any good. I've been waiting for weeks now—*PLEASE SEND THEM*![25]

> 2 October 1967: Make sure you're keeping my negatives in a dust free place and not getting handled. When I get home, I plan to have enlargements made of some—that's why I sound so particular.[26]

> 7 October 1967: Hate to keep talking about my photos all the time, it probably bores you all. But—I did like some of my slides and think they ought to give you a good idea of the country side [*sic*] and people. Just keep all slides and negatives dust free and out of the dampness. I don't care too much about the B&W prints because I can always print more from the negatives.[27]

Perhaps truly understanding Perkins's concern for his photography revolves around the Marine subjects within his films and still photographs. His mother, Marilane, volunteered in California as a charter member of the San Fernando Valley Chapter of the Mothers of Marines (MOMS) that mailed care packages to the Marines in Vietnam.[28] Perkins recommended that his mother's group send packages to "a group of grunts—infantrymen. You can't imagine how lousy they have it. They live and eat as well as pigs but

[20] Perkins Biographical Data; William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 30 September 1967, Jacobson Collection, hereafter Perkins 30 September letter; William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 9 September 1967, Jacobson Collection; and Glass, *Lions in Medina*, 60. In his letter on 19 August 1967, Perkins mentions that he saw his Canon "at Hopper Camera Shop for $286 and [it] cost me $94 [at the Post Exchange]—it's a real gem. Ha!" See William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 19 August 1967, Jacobson Collection, hereafter Perkins 19 August letter.

[21] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 9 August 1967; Perkins 19 August letter; and Perkins Biographical Data.

[22] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 23 August 1967, Jacobson Collection; William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 24 August 1967, Jacobson Collection; and Perkins 30 September letter.

[23] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 12 September 1967, Jacobson Collection.

[24] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 15 September 1967, Jacobson Collection, hereafter Perkins 15 September letter.

[25] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 21 September 1967, Jacobson Collection, hereafter Perkins 21 September letter. Emphasis in original is actually underlined.

[26] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 2 October 1967, Jacobson Collection.

[27] William T. Perkins Jr. to William Sr., Marilane, and Robert Perkins, 7 October 1967, Jacobson Collection.

[28] "President Awards Medal of Honor to Valley Marine," 18.

are the greatest bunch of guys over here."[29] One particularly moving assignment on 20–21 September 1967 evoked a greater request for aid:

> I was out at Con Thien yesterday and today. All it is is a slight hill about 2,500 yards from the DMZ [demilitarized zone] and *all* mud. I have never been in such a terrible place in my life. It was really a hell hole [*sic*]. We took in over 200 artillery rounds in the compound inside of 15 minutes. About every 25' there is a bomb crater. They didn't know what it was going to be like when they sent us there. It was impossible to take pictures because of the artillery and the rain, so the other photographer and I stayed in a bunker most of the time and left as soon as possible by chopper. Luckily the mud prevented the rounds from exploding as much as they should and threw more mud than anything. The artillery wasn't the bad thing though. The worst thing was the way these guys lived, covered from head to toe with mud without washing for weeks at a time. They had no tents, only holes with ammo boxes filled with mud around the holes. The lucky people had a top or roof. They had water flown in everyday, but not much. They lived only on C rations. Now, if your organization, MOMS, is going to send anything to anyone—it should be these guys. Believe me that place was unbelievable. Dong Ha is like the City Park compared to Con Thien. After that experience, they decided not to send anyone up there for a good while.[30]

How Con Thien changed or reinforced Perkins's thinking of his own mortality is unknown, but the experience undoubtedly reinforced his commitment to support his fellow Marines.

Jacobson Collection

Perkins on 12 September 1967: "I'm up at the mouth of the Cua Viet River with the Swift Boat patrol to shoot another story. We plan to shove off at 7:30 AM tomorrow and patrol south of the Cua Viet [river] on the South China Sea inspecting sampans, junks, etc. that may be carrying Communist weapons."

Operation Medina

Three weeks after visiting Con Thien, Perkins received an assignment to film Marine forces in the field. For months, the 3d Marine Division lacked sufficient forces to find, fix, and destroy enemy base areas that threatened positions at Con Thien, Khe Sanh, Dong Hai, and Phu Bai. The area of concern the enemy knew as Base Area 101, supporting the *5th* and *6th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiments*, located in the Hai Lang National Forest south of Quang Tri. In early October 1967, the 1st Marine Regiment's 1st and 2d Battalions came under the 3d Marine Division's operational control. These forces, reinforced with the 1st Battalion of the 3d Marine Regiment and two battalions of the 1st Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), would destroy any and all enemy forces in the forest. The operation would involve the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marine Regiment sweeping through the forest, pushing the enemy into a blocking force from the 1st Battalion of the 3d Marine Regiment.[31]

[29] Perkins 15 September letter.

[30] Perkins 21 September letter.

[31] Gary L. Telfer, Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming Jr., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1984), 139; and Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 123–25.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps), courtesy of Leatherneck
Perkins on 7 October 1967: "I've done a lot of medevac photography—sometime they may tell me not to shoot so much." Perkins (second from left) films a medevac on the afternoon of 12 October 1967 during Operation Medina, two hours before he is killed in battle.

On 11 October, the men of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, commenced the operation. Perkins, *Leatherneck* magazine correspondent Staff Sergeant Bruce Martin, and Marine correspondent Staff Sergeant Philip F. Hartranft Jr. accompanied the men of Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Perkins and Hartranft paired up, the former filming operations with the latter providing print coverage. While waiting for a Marine Sikorsky UH-34 Choctaw helicopter to airlift the men into the forest, Perkins asked Hartranft about life back in the United States, while in turn sharing information with the older correspondent about things to look out for in the field.[32] Early in the afternoon, the company landed at Landing Zone (LZ) Dove, secured the perimeter, regrouped, and moved out toward its first objective. Loaded with extra weapons and supplies, the men marched slowly and methodically, using machetes to hack trails through thick, razor-sharp elephant grass, tangled vines, and vegetation before entering the triple-canopy forest. After several hours, the column came to a small river and, after one Marine swam across and secured a rope, the remainder of the men moved hand over hand to complete the crossing. All during the trail and river crossings, Perkins moved around the Marine column, filming their movements from various angles.[33]

On the afternoon of 12 October, NVA forces ambushed the lead element of 3d Platoon on a jungle trail in a shower of grenades, machine-gun, and sniper fire. Enemy fire dropped several of the Marines at the front of the column. As the ambush intensified, 1st Platoon established a defensive perimeter behind 2d and 3d Platoons on the higher ground of a knoll adjacent to a trail, where they cleared fields of fire. Marines used explosives and chain saws to clear an opening in the jungle for an LZ to medevac the wounded. Perkins meanwhile took up position by a log on the edge of the new LZ perimeter with three men of 3d Platoon: Corporal Frederick A. Boxill and Lance Corporals Michael P. Cole and Dennis J. Antal. As the four Marines peered into the foreboding forest for signs of the enemy, Antal struck up a conversation with Perkins about California life, perhaps to break the tension of the moment.[34]

The UH-34 medevac helicopters arrived to fly out the 11 wounded and one killed from the initial ambush.[35] Perkins filmed the entire operation as those able loaded the wounded on stretchers and placed them aboard the helicopters. Just as the last medevac chopper departed the clearing in the dusk's fading light, all hell broke loose. Charlie Company found itself under assault by three NVA companies on two sides. Enemy concussion and fragmentation grenades rained down on the Marines from NVA soldiers who were tied high up in the trees on the perimeter's edge. Green tracers of the enemy weapons slashed across the American lines as friendly red tracers answered back, the roar of battle punctuated by screams of the wounded. Enveloped by darkness, Antal, Boxill, Cole, and Perkins returned enemy fire into the forest from their position by the log at the south side of the pe-

[32] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 127–28.

[33] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 133–35.

[34] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 152–58.

[35] Bruce Martin, " 'Let's Go Charlie!'," *Leatherneck* 51, no. 2, February 1968, 31–32.

rimeter. Incoming enemy fire flew over their heads as 3d Platoon continued to sustain casualties, holding off the brunt of the enemy attack.[36]

As the NVA pressed the attack, increasing Marine casualties opened gaps in the defensive perimeter, particularly between 2d and 3d Platoons. Captain William D. Major, Charlie Company commander, ordered First Lieutenant Jack A. Ruffer, commanding 1st Platoon, to plug the gap. Under fire from three sides, Charlie Company faced a dire situation. Ruffer, order in hand, cried out above the roar of battle, "Let's go get some!," then unleashed the Marine Hymn at the top of his lungs. Other Marines joined with Ruffer and, brandishing his pistol, the lieutenant hollered, "Let's go Charlie!," and charged down a trail separating the platoons. Marines rose up from their fighting positions and followed suit, including Perkins with his pistol. Staggered and perhaps shocked at the Marines' élan, the enemy forces pulled back as Ruffer's men regrouped and charged a second time, pushing the NVA out of the Marine lines at the LZ perimeter. With the Marine position strengthened, enemy fire dissipated, allowing a medevac helicopter to bring out several of the wounded.[37]

After Ruffer's charge, Perkins made his way back to the log on the LZ perimeter, accompanied by Boxill and Antal. Cole was located about 10 feet behind the three men, higher up the knoll's slope. Nearby in the darkness, Ruffer could clearly see the glow from the face of Perkins's Zodiac Sea Wolf dive watch. Enemy grenades began to roll from the top of the knoll down toward Cole's position. A blast from one concussion grenade threw him down the hill. Suddenly, an enemy grenade appeared in the air, silhouetted against the flash of another explosion. Antal saw the grenade falling, as did Perkins. Propping himself up on his arms, Perkins cried out, "Incoming grenade!," as the explosive landed behind the log, three feet from Antal, Boxill, and Private First Class Horace M. Roberts. Perkins dove at the grenade, kicking Antal in the process, and tucked it securely beneath his chest. In an instant, the grenade exploded, lifting Antal in the air as shrapnel wounded both him and Boxill. As a fellow Marine treated the two wounded men, a corpsman arrived to check on Perkins. When Antal asked, "Is he all right?," the corpsman shook his head.[38]

Jacobson Collection

This Bell and Howell 16mm Filmo motion picture camera was carried by Cpl Perkins when he smothered a grenade during Operation Medina on 12 October 1967. The damage from the grenade shrapnel to the camera is evident in the photo. The camera is now in the collection of the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

Charlie Company continued to hold out against fierce enemy fire for the remainder of the night. Between 2100 and 2200 hours, Delta Company pushed forward to reinforce Charlie Company, and together

[36] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 164–76; and Martin, "'Let's Go Charlie!'," 32–34.

[37] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 178–79, 185–95; and Martin, "'Let's Go Charlie!'," 34.

[38] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 198–200; and Statements of Cpl Larry J. Dalrymple, Sgt Harry W. Poole, LCpl Fredrick A. Boxill, LCpl D. J. Antal, PFC H. M. Roberts, attachments to memo from Capt W. D. Major to Commanding Officer, Service Company, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF, on "Navy Cross Medal; recommendation for; case of Corporal William T. Perkins, USMC," 27 November 1967, file labeled "Perkins, William T., Jr., Cpl USMC MOH Award Recommendation," hereafter Perkins MOH file, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA, hereafter Major memo.

the companies pushed back the NVA assault after four uninterrupted hours of combat. Under the protective glow of a quarter moon, the enemy and incoming fire faded away as the Marines secured the perimeter and the corpsmen ministered to the wounded and the dying. When dawn broke on 13 October 1967, 8 Marines—including Perkins—lay dead, 39 men were wounded, and 40 of the enemy lay dead scattered in and around the LZ perimeter. That morning, a Marine helicopter flew Perkins's body from the battlefield. A Marine also located Perkins's Bell and Howell camera, riddled with shrapnel, and handed it to Hartranft with news that the combat photographer had died. The following day, the Marines policed up the LZ and prepared to destroy any unusable equipment, piling everything into a heap and wiring it with C-4 explosives. Just prior to detonation, combat artist Major A. Michael Leahy, who arrived at the battlefield the day before, spied a green corpsman's bag on the pile that seemed out of place. Upon inspection, he found that the bag belonged to Perkins and it held his undeveloped film. Leahy returned the film to Marine headquarters back in Phu Bai, ensuring the preservation of Perkins's footage of Charlie Company's actions prior to the battle on 11–12 October.[39]

Medal of Honor

Charlie Company did not forget the selfless sacrifice made by Perkins, but having only just joined the company as a photographer, not a regular member, his identity initially remained unknown. His actions saved the lives of Antal, Boxill, Roberts, and possibly Ruffer; however, none of the men knew Perkins since he was officially assigned to Service Company, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division. As news of his death reached Perkins's hometown of Rochester, New York, Charlie Company's commander, Captain Major, was gathering evidence of Perkins's actions from survivors of the battle. Several eyewitness accounts provided convincing circumstantial evidence that Perkins was the Marine who smothered the grenade with his own body. Perhaps the key detail for a positive identification was his dive watch, whose highly illuminated face had stood out in the darkness of the LZ perimeter.[40]

On 27 November 1967, Major submitted an award recommendation for the Navy Cross on Perkins's behalf. Without eyewitness statements definitively identifying the Marine, Major could not submit Perkins for the Medal of Honor. After a review of his case at 3d Marine Division headquarters, the Navy Cross recommendation moved up the chain of command until reaching the desk of Lieutenant General Frank C. Tharin, acting commanding general, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific. General Tharin, after reviewing the recommendation, noted that "Corporal Perkins' actions may meet the eligibility requirement for the Medal of Honor."[41] He therefore requested an additional investigation into Perkins's actions. Two weeks later, Headquarters, 3d Marine Division photographic officer, First Lieutenant James E. Tyler, provided key corroborating evidence to the 3d Marine Division's awards officer, specifically that Perkins had been assigned a pistol and typically wore a Zodiac watch,

[39] Glass, *Lions of Medina*, 223–33; Martin, " 'Let's Go Charlie!'," 34–35; and Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 141. Glass's description of the cameras appears to be in error. He mentions that someone handed Perkins's still camera (most likely his Canon) to Hartranft and that Leahy found a movie camera in the bag. The Bell and Howell camera Perkins had on his person, riddled with shrapnel, is on display at the National Museum of the Marine Corps (NMMC) in Quantico, VA. Given the nature of the event, it is doubtful that someone would have known to pick up this camera and place it back inside the camera bag, while handing Hartranft Perkins's presumably undamaged still camera. Leahy kept it and Perkins's camera bag, before returning it to Perkins's father, who in turn donated it to the museum. See Michael Leahy letter to Judy and William Perkins, 19 May 2005, accession file for camera bag, Cpl William T. Perkins Jr., NMMC.

[40] Statements of Cpl Larry J. Dalrymple, LCpl D. J. Antal, PFC H. M. Roberts, attachments to Major memo; and "Marine Dies in Vietnam of Wounds," *Democrat and Chronicle* (Rochester, NY), 24 October 1967, 18.

[41] Memo from Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific to Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), "Navy Cross; posthumous recommendation for, case of Cpl William T. Perkins, USMC," 5 February 1968, Perkins MOH file, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA, hereafter CG MOH memo.

which was recovered from his body and returned to his family.[42] In light of the new information, General Robert E. Cushman Jr., commanding general, III Marine Amphibious Force, recommended to Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius that Perkins be awarded the Medal of Honor.[43]

In a private ceremony at the White House on 20 June 1969, President Richard M. Nixon presented Corporal Perkins's posthumous Medal of Honor to William and Marilane Perkins. The citation accompanying the decoration proclaimed:

> For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a combat photographer attached to Company C. During Operation Medina, a major reconnaissance-in-force southwest of Quang Tri, Company C made heavy combat contact with a numerically superior North Vietnamese Army force estimated at from two to three companies. The focal point of the intense fighting was a helicopter landing zone which was also serving as the Command Post of Company C. In the course of a strong hostile attack, an enemy grenade landed in the immediate area occupied by Corporal Perkins and three other marines. Realizing the inherent danger, he shouted the warning, "Incoming Grenade" to his fellow marines, and in a valiant act of heroism, hurled himself upon the grenade absorbing the impact of the explosion with his own body, thereby saving the lives of his comrades at the cost of his own. Through his exceptional courage and inspiring valor in the face of certain death, Corporal Perkins reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of

Jacobson Collection

The Medal of Honor presentation for Cpl William T. Perkins Jr. at the White House on 20 June 1969. From left: William T. Perkins Sr., Marilane Perkins, Senator George Murphy (R-CA), President Richard M. Nixon, and Representative Barry Goldwater Jr. (R-CA). Mrs. Perkins holds her son's Medal of Honor.

[42] Major memo; CG MOH memo; and memo from J. E. Tyler to Awards Officer, III MAF, "Information concerning Cpl William T. Perkins, USMC," 19 February 1968, Perkins MOH file, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

[43] CG MOH memo.



Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
Medina Photographer by Maj A. Micheal Leahy.

> the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.[44]

As part of the ceremonies, Major Leahy also presented the family with a painting, *Medina Photographer*, depicting Perkins fording the small stream on the way to the eventual landing zone and the actions that would mean his death.[45]

Fifty years after his heroic sacrifice, Perkins's actions continue to inspire Marine Corps combat photographers. On 11 April 1972, the Marine Corps again honored Perkins by dedicating the 2d Marine Division Photographic Laboratory at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in his honor.[46] In 1970, the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Correspondents Association created the Corporal William T. Perkins Jr. Memorial Chapter, and in 2005, established the Corporal William T. Perkins Award for Combat Cameraman of the Year, featuring a statuette of Perkins kneeling with his Bell and Howell camera.[47]

Perkins's camera, bearing the scars of an enemy grenade and dirt from the Hai Lang forest, is preserved in the collection of the National Museum of the Marine Corps. In the Medal of Honor section of the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History exhibition *The Price of Freedom: Americans at War*, visitors can view Perkins's Medal of Honor and Purple Heart. These decorations accompany Perkins's Bell and Howell camera on loan, the first time Perkins's camera and Medal of Honor have ever been presented together. Perkins's films from his time in Vietnam remain available for viewing at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. His footage captures the faces and actions of the Marines of I Corps; images preserved by a selfless young man whose love of country and photography made him a national hero.

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[44] Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Medal of Honor Citation for William T. Perkins, Jr., Corporal, USMC, Posthumously," press release, 20 June 1969, Perkins published material, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
[45] "President Awards Medal of Honor to Valley Marine," 1. Special thanks to Erik Koglin of Murfreesboro, TN, for his digital restoration of the watercolor. Exposure to ultraviolet light caused the blacks to fade. This image merges the current color artwork with a 1967 black-and-white photo of the original.
[46] Joint Public Affairs Office, Camp Lejeune, NC, "Dedication, Perkins' Memorial," press release, 21 April 1972, Perkins published material, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
[47] "Charter certificate for United States Marine Corps Combat Correspondents Association Corporal William T. Perkins, Jr. Memorial Chapter," 26 July 1970, Jacobson Collection; "Perkins Award Presented," USMCCCA.org, 7 February 2015; Thomas Brennan, "Lejeune Videographer to Receive Coveted Award," *Daily News* (Jacksonville, NC), 23 July 2013; and Jack T. Paxton, telephone intvw with author, 4 August 2017. The award is presented annually to the best combat cameraman in the Marine Corps as judged by their peers.

Shattered Amphibious Dreams

THE DECISION NOT TO MAKE AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

by Paul Westermeyer[1]

In August 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the neighboring nation of Kuwait; the large Iraqi Army quickly overwhelmed the small Kuwaiti armed forces. Under President George H. W. Bush, the United States assembled a global Coalition of concerned nations, first to defend Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi aggression, then to eject the Iraqi military from Kuwait.

The Gulf War would represent the largest deployment of U.S. Marines since the Vietnam War. It challenged the entire warfighting establishment of the Marine Corps—aviation, ground, and logistics—and forced a generation of Marines to put two decades of planning and training to the test. The Corps would see many of its tactical and operational philosophies justified under combat conditions. But the Corps' most cherished operational justification—amphibious warfare—was never put to the test. Powerful Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) remained a threat at sea; however, aside from some small raids, feints, and minor postwar landings acted as a floating reserve, a major amphibious assault on Kuwait never materialized. Despite planning for a landing, the difficulties of landing in Kuwait and the lack of any clear benefits from such a landing kept it as a feint, albeit a powerful one, which diverted significant Iraqi forces from the main lines of attack.

Gearing Up for War

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (13th MEU[SOC]) was the first amphibious task force to reach the war zone, on 7

[1] Paul Westermeyer is a historian who joined the History Division in 2005. He earned his bachelor's in history and master's in military history from The Ohio State University. He was the 2015 recipient of Marine Corps Heritage Foundation's BGen Edwin Simmons-Henry I. Shaw Award for *U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991: Liberating Kuwait*. He is the author of *U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, 28 January–1 February 1991* and the editor of *Desert Voices: Oral Histories of Marines in the Gulf War* and *U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2010–2014: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography*. He is the series historian for the Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 83d Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History (2016) and at the 2017 McMullen Naval History Symposium. This article is based on the relevant Marine command chronologies archived at the Marine Corps History Division's Archives Branch, Quantico, VA; oral histories conducted by the author and other History Division historians; Paul Westermeyer, *U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991: Liberating Kuwait* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2014), hereafter *Liberating Kuwait*; LtCol Ronald J. Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1998), hereafter *Marine Forces Afloat*; Maj Charles D. Melson, Evelyn A. Englander, and Capt David A. Dawson, comps., *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992), hereafter *Anthology and Annotated Bibliography*; and Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., *Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1998).

Marine Corps History Division
This propaganda leaflet dramatically illustrates the threat of a Marine amphibious landing to Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

September 1990. Prior to getting underway, the unit went through a training cycle designed to prepare it to conduct different types of special operations that might be encountered during its deployment.[2] These special operations included recovering lost aircraft, rescuing hostages, evacuating civilians from hostile environments, and training local forces.[3] Originally, 13th MEU(SOC) was deployed on a scheduled cruise of the western Pacific Ocean in June 1990. These "WestPac" cruises were an annual six-month deployment that rotated between West Coast Marine units; the deployed units served as the landing force of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet. The expeditionary unit was commanded by Colonel John E. Rhodes, which included Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (1st Battalion, 4th Marines), Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 164, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 13. These Marines were embarked on the ships of Amphibious Squadron 5, an amphibious ready group that included the USS *Okinawa* (LPH 3), USS *Ogden* (LPD 5), USS *Fort McHenry* (LSD 43), USS *Cayuga* (LST 1186), and USS *Durham* (LKA 114).[4] The original cruise was planned for six months, but the deployment was extended as a result of the crisis in the Gulf by nearly four months. Due to the protracted timeframe, the Marines began calling themselves the "Raiders of the Lost ARG [amphibious ready group]."[5]

The 13th MEU(SOC) began its cruise of the western Pacific with a training exercise in the Philippines in July 1990. An earthquake on the island of Luzon on 16 July led to a disaster relief operation that lasted through the end of the month. A scheduled port visit to Hong Kong followed in August, but the Raiders of the Lost ARG were then ordered to the Persian Gulf, arriving in the region on 7 September.[6]

The next Marine force afloat sent to the Persian Gulf was assembled on the East Coast. In August 1990, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (4th MEB) was commanded by Major General Harry W. Jenkins Jr., and the brigade was preparing to train with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in two exercises—Teamwork and Bold Guard 90—in northern Europe. Stationed primarily at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, the brigade was traditionally oriented toward Europe and Africa. In addition to preparing for the upcoming exercises, the brigade kept an eye on civil war–torn Liberia, where the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (22d MEU) was conducting a noncombatant evacuation and defending the U.S. embassy throughout August 1990. The focus of the brigade abruptly shifted on 10 August, when it was ordered to the Persian Gulf, forcing units that had trained for operations in Norway to turn

[2] These predeployment training programs were the Marine Corps' reaction in the 1980s to the creation of the joint U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) that included Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations forces. The Marine Corps did not join USSOCOM until 2006.

[3] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 12.

[4] Amphibious assault ships are classified as: LPH, landing platform, helicopter; LPD, landing platform, dock; LSD, landing ship, dock; LST, landing ship, tank; and LKA, cargo ship, amphibious.

[5] This moniker was a humorous play on the title of the popular 1981 movie, *Raiders of the Lost Ark*. 13th MEU(SOC) Command Chronology (ComdC), July–December 1990 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); and Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 12–16.

[6] 13th MEU(SOC) ComdC, July–December 1990; and Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 15–16.

in their cold weather gear for desert warfare garb.[7]

To be adequately prepared for the deployment, the MEB would require additional elements for full support. The ground combat element of Jenkins's brigade, Regimental Landing Team 2, was commanded by Colonel Thomas A. Hobbs. Major units of the regimental combat team included 1st Battalion, 2d Marines; 3d Battalion, 2d Marines; 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (Reinforced); Companies B and D, 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion; Company A, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion; and Company A, 2d Tank Battalion.

The logistics element came from Brigade Service Support Group 4, commanded by Colonel James J. Doyle Jr., and it included the 2d Military Police Company, 2d Medical Battalion, 2d Dental Battalion, 2d Maintenance Battalion, 2d Supply Battalion, 8th Communications Battalion, 8th Motor Transport Battalion, 8th Engineer Support Battalion, and 2d Landing Support Battalion.

The 4th MEB aviation combat element was Marine Aircraft Group 40, commanded by Colonel Glenn F. Burgess. Because the group was deploying on board amphibious warfare vessels, the only fixed-wing aircraft in the group were the McDonnell-Douglas AV-8B Harriers of Marine Attack Squadron 331. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons 263 and 365 brought Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knights; Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 was equipped with Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallions; and Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 flew Bell AH-1 Sea Cobras and Bell UH-1 Hueys.[8]

The brigade was embarked on the ships of the U.S. Navy's Amphibious Group 2, commanded by Rear Admiral John B. LaPlante. The ships were divided into three transit groups: Transit Group 1 consisted of the USS *Shreveport* (LPD 12), USS *Trenton* (LPD 14), USS *Portland* (LSD 37), and USS *Gunston Hall* (LSD 44); Transit Group 2 comprised USS *Nassau* (LHA 4), USS *Raleigh* (LPD 1), USS *Pensacola* (LSD 38), and USS *Saginaw* (LST 1188); and Transit Group 3 included USS *Iwo Jima* (LPH 2), USS *Guam* (LPH 9), USS *Manitowoc* (LST 1180), and USS *LaMoure County* (LST 1194).[9] In addition, Military Sealift Command supported the brigade with a squadron that included USNS *Wright* (T-AVB 3) and two vehicle cargo ships in the MV *Cape Domingo* (T-AKR 5053) and MV *Strong Texan* (T-AK 9670). Because there was not enough cargo tonnage for the brigade's needs, three additional vessels were leased for the duration of the deployment; these nonnaval vessels were the MV *Bassro Polar*, MV *Pheasant*, and MV *Aurora T*.[10]

The lack of amphibious shipping impacted the amphibious forces in the Gulf War from the beginning. The 4th MEB was intended to deploy on two dozen amphibious warfare vessels, but only a dozen were available in time for the brigade's deployment. As a result, some of the brigade's assault equipment and supplies were loaded on board the Military Sealift Command vessels. The brigade loaded the available ships at Morehead City and Wilmington, North Carolina. The dispersed loading sites and rushed embarkation created confusion that required the brigade's shipping to reorganize and reload in al-Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, in November 1990. Transit Group 1 departed on 17 August; Transit Group 2 departed on 20 August; and Transit Group 3 departed on 21 August, each crossing the Atlantic and Mediterranean and passing through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf.[11]

Amphibious Group 2 arrived in the Gulf in early September, with the transit groups arriving in the same order they had departed, on 3 September, 6 September, and 9 September, respectively. The brigade's Military Sealift Command vessels arrived from

[7] 4th MEB ComdC, August 1990 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 16–22. Operation Sharp Edge, the Liberian evacuations conducted in 1990–91, is described fully in Maj James G. Antal and Maj R. John Vanden Berghe, *On Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990–2003* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 2004).

[8] 4th MEB ComdC, August 1990.

[9] Most of these ships were commissioned in the 1970s and nearly all would be decommissioned in the following year or two.

[10] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 22–23, 230; and 4th MEB ComdC, August 1990.

[11] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 21–25, 28; and 4th MEB ComdC, August 1990.



Paul Westermeyer, U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991: Liberating Kuwait *(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2014), 43*

mid-September through mid-October. Because they were not present when these vessels were loaded, the brigade's logistics officers had to physically board each vessel to find and record the location of all their cargo in person.[12]

Command Relationships

Following Navy–Marine Corps amphibious doctrine, the 4th MEB and 13th MEU(SOC) fell under the control of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, rather than under Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer's Marine Forces Central Command. Through December 1990, Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz Jr. commanded Central Command's naval forces. Amphibious Group 2 and Amphibious Squadron 5 formed the Amphibious Task Force (TG 150.6), commanded by Rear Admiral LaPlante, and the two Marine expeditionary forces formed the Landing Force (TG 150.8), commanded by Major General Jenkins.[13]

The Marine expeditionary forces in the Amphibious Task Force 150.6 were intended as a theater reserve, and their employment was controlled directly by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command. During Operation Desert Shield, they were prepared to reinforce the troops defending Saudi Arabia if needed or to launch amphibious assaults or raids against the enemy's rear if the Iraqis attacked Saudi Arabia. Their presence also was intended to divert Iraqi forces toward defending the coast, thus reducing the number of troops faced inland.[14]

Admiral Mauz saw the terminal end of the Persian Gulf as particularly inhospitable for naval forces, with Iran a constant danger on the flank of any naval force passing through the Strait of Hormuz and up the Gulf to Kuwait. Admiral Mauz later declared: "I wanted to see an amphibious landing as much as anybody. . . . The trouble was, there was no good place to do a landing."[15] Mauz believed that Desert Shield would shape inter-Service competition in the post-Soviet world and that the Army and Air Force were looking to replace their NATO missions with traditional Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary missions; therefore, he wanted the naval forces to have an impact on the conflict. Despite this, he made "insistent and repeated" requests to General Schwarzkopf to halve the number of amphibious ships in the area. Mauz's belief that amphibious operations were not practical in the Gulf likely led General Jenkins to conclude that the commander of Naval Forces Central Command "displayed little interest in developing a naval campaign that went beyond the level of presence."[16]

General Schwarzkopf repeatedly denied Admiral Mauz's request to reduce the amount of amphibious shipping under his command because the Marines afloat were already being used as a reserve force as well as a threat and feint against the Iraqis, who could never rule out the possibility of an amphibious assault. General Jenkins and his staff prepared vari-

[12] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 30–33; and 4th MEB ComdC, August 1990.

[13] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 34–36, 42; and Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 84.

[14] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 41–45.

[15] Westermeyer, *Liberating Kuwait*, 43.

[16] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 42–43; Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 117–18; and LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, "Amphibious Operations in the Gulf War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 78, no. 8 (August 1994): 56.

Defense Imagery DN-ST-92-07370

During Exercise Sea Soldier III in the Persian Gulf, the bow ramp of a utility landing craft from the amphibious assault ship USS *Nassau* (LHA 4) descends as troops and vehicles prepare to hit the beach in support of Operation Desert Shield.

ous amphibious options for the 4th MEB and the 13th MEU(SOC), both separately and in tandem. These options included landings behind an Iraqi thrust into Saudi Arabia as well as reinforcement of the American and allied forces defending Saudi Arabia. Because the shoreline of the Gulf was relatively unsuited for amphibious operations, the reinforcement mission was considered most likely.[17]

The hasty departure of General Jenkins's troops and their previous training for exercises in Norway left the brigade ill-prepared for amphibious operations in a desert environment. To rectify these problems, a series of four amphibious exercises were planned in the friendly nation of Oman, each dubbed "Sea Soldier." Sea Soldiers I and II took place in October and early November, respectively. In addition to practicing amphibious landings, the exercises gave the Marines a chance to conduct maintenance that could not be completed on ship and to rearrange the loading of the amphibious vessels to better suit the staff's planning. The 13th MEU(SOC) worked with the brigade in these exercises as well, high-

[17] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 42–43; and Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 117–18.

lighting the unity of the amphibious task force.[18]

Throughout October and November, the three leased vessels—the *Bassro Polar*, *Pheasant*, and *Aurora T*—were off-loaded in al-Jubayl, and their cargos were combat loaded onto the two roll-on/roll-off prepositioning ships.[19] Major General Jenkins explained, "This was the first time that [Maritime Prepositioning] ships had ever been combat loaded to support a general landing plan for the amphibious force."[20] Three of the ships assigned to the brigade's Military Sealift Command support squadron were leased vessels with foreign flags, and thus unable to be employed in a combat zone. With the prepositioning ships now emptied of gear, two vessels from Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two—the MV *PFC William Baugh Jr.* (T-AK 3001) and the MV *1stLt Alex Bonnyman Jr.* (T-AK 3003)—were assigned to the brigade's support squadron instead.

The 13th MEU(SOC) had been deployed since June 1990, when it had departed on its scheduled cruise of the Pacific. On 4 November, the expeditionary unit departed the Persian Gulf region and sailed for Subic Bay in the Philippines, with orders to rearm and train, preparing to possibly return to the Gulf at a later date. The departure of Colonel John Rhodes's Marines left the 4th MEB as the sole amphibious landing force available in the Persian Gulf region until December.

Planning for War

Operation Imminent Thunder was conducted during 15–21 November 1990 by Central Command at General Schwarzkopf's orders. This training exercise was conducted to test the plan for defending Saudi Arabia and to determine what issues would arise from the large joint/combined force working together in the desert kingdom.[21] It was a five-phase operation that focused on air and amphibious exercises paired with tests of command, control, and communications. The exercise also served to strengthen General Boomer's I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) staff. Although Marine expeditionary forces were an established part of Marine Corps doctrine, there was little expectation that they would be employed. The Marine expeditionary units deployed annually to the Mediterranean and the Pacific, and the Marine expeditionary brigades exercised regularly, but few expected the Corps to deploy an expeditionary force outside a major war. Operation Imminent Thunder provided an opportunity for the MEF staff to practice controlling the battle in a joint/combined environment.[22]

The exercise's amphibious landings were originally planned for the port of Ras al-Mishab, but its proximity to the Kuwaiti border and the possibility of unintentional conflict with Iraqi forces led to General Schwarzkopf shifting the exercise south to the port of Ras al-Ghar. The new site was much more accessible to the media, which was eager for any new footage as the confrontation continued into its third month. Marine amphibious capabilities received a great deal of press attention as a result, and the Amphibious Task Force commander, Rear Admiral John LaPlante, later described it as "beating our chest for the press." Ironically, most of the amphibious landings were canceled because of dangerous seas, but the extensive

[18] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 46–50; 13th MEU(SOC) ComdC, October 1990 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); and 4th MEB ComdC, October 1990 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA).

[19] Roll-on/roll-off ships are designed to carry wheeled cargo, such as trucks, automobiles, or railroad cars that are driven on and off the ship.

[20] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 54–59; and MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, comments on draft of Westermeyer, *Liberating Kuwait*, 24 February 2012 (Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA).

[21] In American military parlance, *joint operations* are conducted by two or more Services (Navy-Army, Air Force–Marine Corps, etc.), while *combined operations* are conducted by American forces in conjunction with allied foreign military forces. Operation Desert Shield, conducted by forces from all U.S. Armed Services as well as the military forces of several other nations, including Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France, etc., was therefore a joint/combined operation.

[22] I MEF ComdC, November 1990 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); BGen Paul K. Van Riper, "Observations During Operation Desert Storm," *Marine Corps Gazette* 100, no. 3 (March 2016): 54–61; and Col Charles J. Quilter II, USMCR, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1993), 24–27.

air and communication operations were a success.[23]

In late November 1990, with Saudi Arabia secured, the president ordered Central Command to shift its focus of planning from defending Saudi Arabia to liberating Kuwait. Additional forces were sent to the Persian Gulf region to prepare for the required offensive. The amphibious forces were reinforced by the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (5th MEB), commanded by Brigadier General Peter J. Rowe. Brigadier General Rowe's brigade was normally the designated sea-deployment brigade of the I MEF (just as the 7th MEB was designated as the Maritime Prepositioning Force brigade), but many of the units that would normally be called on to fill out the brigade had already been reassigned to fill out the forces deploying for Desert Shield. As a result, the brigade's elements included large numbers of reservists operating alongside their active-duty Marines.[24]

On 1 December 1990, Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur took over from Admiral Mauz as commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, and commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.[25] Admiral Arthur was described as a "fighter" by General Schwarzkopf and General Boomer, both of whom he got along with very well. However, he was not eager to conduct an amphibious operation, stating after the war, "I knew that neither he [Schwarzkopf] nor the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell] wanted to have an amphibious landing. That was the last thing they wanted to have happen. And there was never going to be an occasion where an amphibious landing was going to be necessary to conduct the war the way they wanted to."[26]

Although the air campaign had already begun, most of the Marines serving on board the amphibious task force spent the end of January participating in Sea Soldier IV, the last amphibious exercise conducted for the Gulf War. Both the 4th and 5th MEBs participated in this exercise, marking it as the largest Marine amphibious exercise since 1964.[27]

The exercises had served their purpose as the two-brigade amphibious landing was a success. Three battalions of the landing force were lifted ashore by the brigade's helicopter squadrons, training to handle prisoners of war occurred, and the brigades underwent a week of desert training and equipment maintenance before conducting a tactical withdrawal exercise from the beach back to the ships. For most of the Marines in the 4th MEB, floating in the North Arabian Sea since early September, this would be the highlight of a monotonous Desert Shield and Desert Storm deployment.[28]

When the allied air attacks against Iraq began on 17 January 1991, the seaborne feint needed reinforcement in order to remain credible. Amphibious raids were one method of reinforcing that threat.[29] On 23 January 1991, Navy Captain Thomas L. McClelland, commanding Amphibious Squadron 5, and Colonel John E. Rhodes, commander of the 13th MEU(SOC), were ordered to plan for an amphibious raid on several Iraqi-held Kuwaiti islands; this raid was code named Operation Desert Sting. Before the operation began, Iraqis on one of the targeted islands, Qaruh, surrendered on 25 January to the USS *Curts* (FFG 38). On 26 January, the Iraqi garrison on another of the targeted islands, Umm al-Maradim, created a sign for U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographing the island that indicated they wished to surrender. The plan for Operation Desert Sting was modified to account for the surrender.

Heavily supported by Navy aircraft, Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (Rein), landed on the

[23] Transcript of I MEF morning brief, 19–21 November 1990 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); 4th MEB ComdC, November 1990 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 64–69; and Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 150.

[24] 5th MEB ComdC, July–December 1990, Westermeyer Collection (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); and Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 73–76.

[25] This command change had been scheduled prior to the war and the Chief of Naval Operations decided to go ahead with it despite the crisis.

[26] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 137–38, 150.

[27] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 107–9.

[28] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 107–9.

[29] Operation Desert Sting is described in greater detail in Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 139–43.



Map courtesy of U.S. Army

north end of Umm al-Maradim Island at noon on 29 January. They encountered no enemy fire or other resistance and found the island had been deserted by its garrison. The Marines captured or destroyed a large quantity of small arms, machine guns, and mortars as well as several Iraqi antiaircraft guns and missiles. After three hours on the island, the raid force departed, leaving a Kuwaiti flag raised over the island and the words "Free Kuwait" and "USMC" painted on several of the buildings.

By February, the Corps' plan for liberating Kuwait was not popular among the Marine commanders who would have to execute it. The plan called for both Marine divisions to pass in column through one breach in the Iraqi fortifications, a difficult and time-consuming operation. After the war was underway, the Marines in the amphibious task force would land at Ash Shu'aybah and seize the port to establish a logistics base for the I Marine Expeditionary Force's advance.[30]

> General Boomer later said:
>
> As we began to plan everything was on the table. In the beginning, it seemed to make sense to use our amphibious capability to come from the Gulf, attack Kuwait on the flank while forces from Saudi Arabia drove up, ultimately conducting a link

[30] Gen Walter E. Boomer, intvw with author, 27 July 2006, hereafter Boomer intvw.

> up. We explored that option carefully. Extensive planning went into that concept. There were schemes to attack up North of Kuwait City, into the Basra area. That line of thinking seemed to be favored by those at Headquarters Marine Corps. When the Navy and Stan Arthur and I really began to explore that concept, it became clear that part of the Gulf did not lend itself to an amphibious operation for a lot of reasons. Going back, there was all this criticism of Army planners working in a vacuum and devising plans and here we had planners at Headquarters Marine Corps/Quantico devising plans for us from half way around the world, none of which ultimately made any sense. Admiral Arthur and I gave them as much credence as they deserved, which was not much.[31]

An amphibious landing into Kuwait involved surmounting all of the standard difficulties of an amphibious assault, such as weather, tides, beach quality, shipping, and enemy forces, as well as the unique challenges presented by the oil industry's heavy presence in the Persian Gulf.

In addition, relatively few beaches were acceptable for a landing in Kuwait. One was available approximately 12 miles from the Saudi border—a landing so close to the front lines that it would provide no operational benefits. Farther north along the coast, the Mina al-Ahmadi oil terminal offered a more appropriate option; beyond that was a heavily urbanized beach area with many civilians and myriad buildings ideal for beach defense. Finally, the north coast of Kuwait and Bubiyan Island was surrounded by mud flats and significant tidal variations.[32]

Landing in northern Kuwait exposed the majority of the Kuwaiti civilian population to the dangers of an amphibious assault, which would have required heavy air strikes and naval shelling, combining the difficulties of an amphibious assault with those of an urban battle. If the Iraqis put up any sort of fight at all, the collateral damage and civilian death toll would have been significant.[33]

The refinery and oil terminal of Mina al-Ahmadi was the better choice, but it was one of Kuwait's prime economic resources. Moreover, the web of storage tanks, pipelines, terminals, and wellheads presented a unique tactical environment with few if any precedents. The Iraqis opened pipelines and wellheads, creating massive amounts of smoke and large oil spills. The smoke turned day into night; however, since American equipment was better suited to poor observation conditions, the smoke generally aided the liberators. The oil spills caused issues but did not hinder military activity. The result of such environmental warfare was an unknown prior to the war, as was the damage that might arise from storage tanks detonating in the refinery. Some estimates concluded that, if the natural gas facility in the Mina al-Ahmadi complex detonated, the resulting explosion could be nuclear in scale.[34]

In addition to terrain and collateral damage considerations, an amphibious assault required U.S. forces to take Iraqi military capabilities into account. The Iraqi military's greatest strengths included massed infantry, large artillery forces, and plentiful armored vehicles. Dug in behind beach defenses, even the demoralized Iraqi Army units then in Kuwait might put up a respectable resistance, though this threat applied equally to a land invasion. The Iraqi Air Force and Navy presented threats to an amphibious landing that a land offensive could safely ignore.

The threats to an amphibious assault included Exocet antiship missile-armed Dassault Mirage F1 aircraft. During the "Tanker War" portion of the Iran-Iraq conflict, an Iraqi aircraft fired two Exocet missiles into the USS *Stark* (FFG 31), severely dam-

[31] Boomer intvw.

[32] RAdm Sam Cox, USN (Ret), "Storm Season: War Clouds Form Over the Sands of Mina al-Ahmadi," *Sextant* (blog), Naval History and Heritage Command, 18 February 2016.

[33] Cox, "Storm Season."

[34] Cox, "Storm Season"; and RAdm Sam Cox, USN (Ret), "Gathering Storm: Mina al-Ahmadi in the Crosshairs–Part Two," *Sextant* (blog), Naval History and Heritage Command, 24 February 2016.

aging the frigate and killing 37 of her crew. This history left the U.S. Navy very sensitive to the dangers of the Exocet missile. On 24 January, two Mirages further illustrated this threat, when they followed Coalition strike aircraft on a course along the Saudi coast. Whether through design or good luck, these Iraqi aircraft proceeded along a "seam" in Coalition air defenses between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force. The Iraqi aircraft got far closer to Coalition shipping and port targets than they should have before a pair of Saudi McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagles successfully intercepted them.[35]

In addition to aircraft-borne Exocet missiles, the Iraqis fielded Chinese-made, shore-based HY-2 "Silkworm" antiship missiles; they had seven launchers and approximately 50 missiles. The Silkworm missile threat turned out to be somewhat hollow; only one attack occurred. Two missiles were launched on 25 February at the USS *Missouri* (BB 63); one crashed harmlessly into the sea, and the second was downed by a British Sea Dart surface-to-air missile fired by HMS *Gloucester* (D 96). The USS *Missouri* located the launcher with its drone reconnaissance craft and destroyed it with a salvo of its 16-inch, .50-caliber Mark 7 guns.[36]

The Iraqi Navy presented two threats to Coalition naval and amphibious forces with missile boats armed with surface-to-surface antiship missiles and mines. The missile boat threat was eliminated on 29 and 30 January in a series of engagements dubbed the "Bubiyan Turkey Shoot" by U.S. Navy personnel. The Iraqi Navy attempted to send the majority if its vessels to Iran, hoping they could be preserved there for postwar use. Many Iraqi vessels were destroyed by Coalition aircraft flying repeated strikes against them before they reached Iranian waters. The few Iraqi vessels that made their destination in Iranian ports were seized by Iran.[37]

The threat from naval mines was more significant to Coalition naval forces, and the U.S. Navy was ill-equipped to deal with it, despite the prevalence of mine warfare during the Tanker War, as when the USS *Samuel B. Roberts* (FFG 58) was nearly sunk by an Iranian mine on 14 April 1988. The United States deployed Sikorsky MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters for countermine operations, sweeping narrow lanes at more than twice the speed of mine countermeasure vessels. After preliminary searches, the mine sweepers would follow. The USS *Avenger* (MCM 1), USS *Impervious* (MSO 449), USS *Leader* (MSO 490), and USS *Adroit* (MSO 509) comprised the U.S. mine countermeasures force, while the Royal Navy deployed the ocean survey ship HMS *Herald* (H 138) and five *Hunt*-class minesweepers: HMS *Atherstone* (M 38), HMS *Cattistock* (M 31), HMS *Dulverton* (M 35), HMS *Hurworth* (M 39), and HMS *Ledbury* (M 30). American mine sweeping got off to a slow start; Admiral Mauz considered antimine warfare a low priority, so American minesweepers were sent to the Persian Gulf against his objections. Crewed by temporarily assigned sailors and activated reservists, the ships had not trained together prior to the crisis, and as a result the mine countermeasures forces were not ready for operations until November. British vessels and other NATO nations' mine countermeasures vessels were technologically superior to those of the United States. Admiral Arthur later remarked that "everybody in the world had better minesweepers out there than I did."[38]

As the air war moved forward, Navy and Marine planners on Admiral Arthur's staff continued evaluating amphibious landing options, especially a landing on the coast of Kuwait in support of the Marine Corps offensive across the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Rear Admiral Samuel J. Cox, who was then an assistant intelligence officer on Arthur's staff, recalled the various Iraqi antiship capabilities listed above and how they had not yet been targeted during the air campaign: "Attrition of the primary threat systems is less than 5 percent. At the present rate of attrition, it will be sometime next year before we reach 50 percent." As long as these threats remained essentially unaddressed, minesweeping operations in the northern Gulf could

[35] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 36, 206–7.
[36] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 67.
[37] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 229–32.
[38] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 74–77, 261–63.

not begin and amphibious operations would not be conducted.[39]

The postwar *Gulf War Airpower Survey*, commissioned by the Air Force, claimed that 46 percent of all carrier strike sorties were launched at maritime targets in the first two weeks of the air campaign. It also found that the Iraqi surface fleet was neutralized by 2 February, but that the shore-based Silkworm sites remained a threat until the ground campaign began. These sites were difficult to confirm destroyed, and many decoy sites were suspected. Of the 45 strikes launched against Silkworm strikes, 80 percent occurred after 7 February.[40]

On 2 February, General Boomer flew out to the USS *Blue Ridge* (LCC 19) for a conference with General Norman Schwarzkopf and Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur concerning amphibious operations, especially the planned landing at Ash Shu'aybah. At the meeting, it became clear the Navy was not ready to conduct any large amphibious operations, primarily because of the large number of mines the Iraqis had deployed in Kuwaiti waters. General Schwarzkopf was not enthusiastic either, since he was informed during the meeting that the amphibious operation and subsequent coastal fighting would likely involve massive destruction to Kuwait's most densely populated areas. He remarked that he was "not going to destroy Kuwait in order to save it." When asked if the landing was required for success, General Boomer replied no, with the caveat that the amphibious deception and mine-clearing operations move forward and that the amphibious forces continue planning so the option would remain available if needed.[41]

Although General Schwarzkopf had vetoed a major amphibious invasion, an amphibious feint remained an important part of the Coalition's plan to draw attention away from both the Marine thrust into central Kuwait and the Army's wide, sweeping flanking movement to the west. The American battleships conducted naval gunfire support missions along the coast throughout February, and Coalition minelayers cleared lanes through the Iraqi minefields on 16 February.[42]

The U.S. Navy's fear of Iraqi mines and lack of confidence in its ability to fully clear the minefields proved well founded. On 17 February, the USS *Tripoli* (LPH 10) was disabled after it hit a mine. *Tripoli* had been pressed into service as the platform for the Sikorsky MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters of the Na-



Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War *(Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), 248*

[39] RAdm Sam Cox, USN (Ret), "Storm Front: The Threat of Mina al-Ahmadi–Part Four," *Sextant* (blog), Naval History and Heritage Command, 1 March 2016.

[40] Eliot A. Cohen, "Effects and Effectiveness," in *The Gulf War Air Power Survey*, vol. II, *Operations and Effects and Effectiveness* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 226–29.

[41] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 130–33; and Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 254.

[42] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 247–68; and Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 149–54.

Defense Imagery DN-SC-92-08659

The battleship USS *Wisconsin* (BB 64) fires a round from one of its 16-inch guns at Iraqi targets in Kuwait. In the first days of the ground war, the battleships—directed by Marine ANGLICO teams—often fired in support of the Saudi troops advancing along the coastal highway.

vy's Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 during minesweeping operations and was, ironically, engaged in this task when it struck a mine. Later the same day, the USS *Princeton* (CG 59) also was struck by a mine. Fortunately, and surprisingly, neither vessel suffered fatalities from the mine attacks.[43]

The Amphibious Feint

In the days leading up to the liberation of Kuwait, and during the ground assault itself, the U.S. battleships fired effectively on Iraqi forces along the coast. Admiral Arthur used the battleships to continue the amphibious feint because they were strongly tied to an amphibious assault. After the war, he remarked, "All I had to do was start moving the battleships . . . and then line General Jenkins and his fine Marines and our amphibs [amphibious ships] up behind them, and there was no doubt in anybody's mind that we were coming."[44]

Most of the battleships' 16-inch naval gunfire was directed at preplanned targets, but some spectacular direct support was also provided. On 24 February 1991, this came to the aid of the Joint Forces Command–East troops and Captain Douglas R. Kleinsmith of the 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (1st ANGLICO):

> The Saudi battalion commander, a colonel, looked at him [Kleinsmith] incredulously.

[43] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 149–54.

[44] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 279, 288–89.

> "You can call in the battleships?" he asked. "Yea[h]," answered Captain Kleinsmith, "That's why we're here." Kleinsmith contacted [the USS] *Wisconsin* [BB 64] and the battleship opened fire. The captain heard the muted roar of her 16-inch guns through his radio. The 43 seconds required for the first shell to reach its target seemed an eternity. Kleinsmith was beginning to wonder if he had transmitted the wrong coordinates when projectiles began to fall precisely where he wanted them. The Saudi marines stared in amazement as the 2,700 pound shells lifted whole houses into the air. "You can do this anytime?" asked the Saudi battalion commander. Kleinsmith replied in the affirmative. "Ah," exclaimed the colonel, "We can win now."[45]

The battleship support was somewhat irrelevant, however, because the Saudi advance encountered almost no resistance on the first day as it advanced into Kuwait and captured thousands of Iraqi prisoners.

In the predawn hours of 25 February, 13th MEU(SOC) conducted a helicopter feint into the Ash Shu'aybah area, attempting to convince the Iraqis that an amphibious landing was pending. The flight included six CH-46E Sea Knights, two Bell AH-1W Super Cobras, one CH-53E Super Stallion, and one Bell UH-1N Twin Huey. The helicopters flew in low and deliberately popped up to be detected by Iraqi radar at 0449 before returning safely to USS *Okinawa*. Combined with the battleships' naval gunfire, the operation appeared to be a success.[46]

Conclusion

Two relatively large landings by the Marines of the landing force deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm, although neither involved an amphibious assault. On 24 February, the 5th MEB's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, landed by helicopter south of the al-



Marine Corps History Division
This sketch depicts the extensive beach defenses the Iraqis placed along the Kuwaiti coastline in anticipation of an amphibious landing.

Wafrah oil field on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, where it established a blocking position and filled the gap between the I MEF and the Saudi-led Joint Forces Command–East along the coast. After the Iraqi surrender on 28 February 1991, the battalion cleared the forest of Iraqi stragglers.[47]

On 3 March, the 13th MEU(SOC) landed on the island of Jazirat Faylaka, which was held by the Iraqi *440th Naval Infantry Brigade*. Aerial reconnaissance observed white flags as the Iraqis gathered in a communications compound. The Marines conducted a helicopter assault on the island, accepted the Iraqi troops' surrender, and supervised their evacuation to the USS *Ogden*.[48]

The amphibious threat remained a constant concern for the Iraqis throughout the conflict, given the extensive defenses built along the coast manned by five infantry divisions. The Iraqi Navy devoted itself to extensively mining the Kuwait coast and the northern waters of the Persian Gulf. Although some Iraqi offi-

[45] Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 288.
[46] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 155–56.
[47] Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 173–80.
[48] 13th MEU(SOC) ComdC, March 1991 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); MEU Service Support Group 13 ComdC, February–March 1991 (Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA); and Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 157–62.

Defense Imagery DM-SC-93-05230, courtesy of SSgt J. R. Ruark

This Iraqi sand table was found in a school gymnasium in Kuwait City. The marked Iraqi positions corresponded to their defense plans and indicated how successful the Marines' amphibious deception was at distracting Iraqi attention from the Saudi-Kuwaiti frontier.

Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-08410

Barbed wire, mines, and other obstacles were erected along the shoreline during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait to prevent or slow attacks by sea.

cers expressed doubts about an American amphibious assault, it appears to have dominated Saddam Hussein's thinking as late as 24 February 1991, hours after the Coalition's offensive was well underway. Postwar examination of Iraqi coastal defenses and a captured sand table depicting Iraqi shore defenses in a Kuwaiti school amply illustrated how seriously the Iraqis took the amphibious threat.[49]

After the war, the commander of the Iraqi Navy declared that "these [Iraqi] mines proved [their] lethality and effectiveness. . . . They caused havoc within the enemy force." He continued, "During the epic Mother of All Battles, this weapon [mines] was utilized effectively and successfully to disrupt the allies' plans in launching any operation from the sea." His view was shared by the U.S. Navy Central Command commander, Vice Admiral Arthur, who later stated that "Iraq successfully delayed and might have prevented an amphibious assault on Kuwait's assailable flank, protected a large part of its force from the effects of naval gunfire, and severely hampered surface operations in the northern Arabian Gulf, all through the use of naval mines."[50]

Looking back at the conflict, the Marine commanders felt the role of the amphibious deception needed to be emphasized. Major General James M. Myatt, commander of the 1st Marine Division, recalled: "I think what we can't dismiss is the level of effort put into the defenses along the beaches by the Iraqis. . . . probably 40% to 50% of the Iraqi artillery pieces were pointed to the east in defense of this perceived real threat—an attack from the Gulf. There were literally hundreds of antiaircraft weapon systems laid in a direct-fire mode from Saudi Arabia all the way up way above Kuwait City to defend against the amphibious threat. . . . I think it [the amphibious feint] saved a lot of Marine lives."[51]

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[49] Kevin M. Woods, *The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 199, 223.

[50] Woods, *The Mother of All Battles*, 134; Marolda and Schneller, *Shield and Sword*, 247–68; and Brown, *Marine Forces Afloat*, 149–54.

[51] "The 1st Marine Division in the Attack: Interview with Major General J. M. Myatt, USMC," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 117, no. 11 (November 1991), as quoted in Maj Charles D. Melson (Ret), Evelyn A. Englander, and Capt David A. Dawson, comps., *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992), 145.

Marine Corps Art Spotlight

COMBAT ART GALLERY

by Breanne Robertson, PhD[1]

Marine Corps art is having a moment. Even if the average Marine has not noticed, recruiters have. The current advertising campaign from J. Walter Thompson, the Service's longtime agency for recruitment, depicts the illustrious history of the U.S. Marine Corps in the form of an extended sculptural tableau. Rendered entirely in CGI, miniature diecast figurines populate an immense, battle-strewn diorama. The camera pans from scene to scene, highlighting significant junctures in Marine history from Tripoli to Belleau Wood to Baghdad and beyond. In the background, metallic sounds of sword-fight, rapid machine-gun fire, and periodic whistling of mortar shells provide an acoustic backdrop that animates the posed action figures and evokes the cacophony of battle. The diminutive scale, green-hued patina, and dynamic posture of the Marines call to mind the myriad toy soldiers and military miniatures that ignited childhood imaginations and inspired hobbyist wargames. At the same time, the commercial makes explicit reference to public monuments erected in honor of American heroism and military triumph, a theme underscored in the voiceover announcement that "in the heart of every Marine, you'll find a promise . . . of battles won." While the deliberate conflation of diecast figurines with modern military monuments first emerges in the advertisement's recreation of the Iwo Jima flag-raising, famously commemorated in bronze at the Marine Corps War Memorial, the prospect of cultural reverence becomes fully apparent in a slow reveal at the end; the camera zooms out to disclose a larger-than-life statue, a modern Marine cast in the tradition of "common soldier" monuments, yet derived from a mosaic of historical vignettes and enshrined in a museum setting.[2]

What recruiters have long recognized, and what this commercial makes clear, is that art plays an essential role in shaping cultural memory and understanding of war.[3] Historically, Marine Corps leadership has appreciated the ability of artists and photographers to document military action for educational and promotional purposes. Prompted by the success of the combat correspondents program, the U.S. Marine Corps initiated a corollary mission for combat artists to keep Americans informed about Marine activities

[1] Breanne Robertson joined Marine Corps History Division in 2015. She is the author of *Camp Pendleton: The Historic Rancho Santa Margarita y Las Flores and the Marine Corps in Southern California, A Shared History*, which commemorated the 75th anniversary of that military base. She is currently preparing a monograph on Marine Corps activities in the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924 and an edited volume examining the history and cultural meaning of the Iwo Jima flag-raisings, entitled *Investigating Iwo: The Flag-Raisings in Myth, Memory and Esprit de Corps* (2018).

[2] The museum unveiled three of the bronzes donated by Marine Corps Recruiting Command to the National Museum of the Marine Corps on 13 December 2017, where they will be on display for the foreseeable future. See LCpl Naomi Marcom, "MCRC Unveils Three Iconic Battles Won Sculptures," Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 13 December 2017.

[3] This is particularly true in the advertisement's inclusion of the U.S. military's toppling of the statue honoring Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

Official U.S. Marine Corps video, courtesy of J. Walter Thompson
"Battles Won: Anthem," advertisement created by J. Walter Thompson Atlanta for the U.S. Marine Corps, 2017.

on the home front and overseas during World War II.[4] Their mission was twofold: to reconstruct accounts of the battlefront that had not been photographed and to convey the essence of warfare using the emotive capabilities of fine art. Under the direction of Brigadier General Robert L. Denig, Marine combat art attained national exposure and critical acclaim through magazines, newspapers, and exhibitions at prestigious museums, including the Museum of Modern Art in New York City and the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC. Despite its apparent utility to Marine Corps public relations, the combat art program ceased operations at the end of the war. It was resurrected briefly during the Korean War, but did not become a fixed element again until the United States entered the Vietnam War. General Wallace M. Greene Jr., 23d Commandant of the Marine Corps, mandated the reestablishment of the combat art program as a permanent component of daily Marine operations and training in the fall of 1966. Since that time, Marine artists have performed an array of standard military occupational specialties, while also embracing the additional duties of crafting a visual record of U.S. military action and experience.

Honor, Courage, Commitment

While a sculpture-themed recruitment campaign would generally have broad appeal, its current distribution is well timed to coincide with the opening of the Combat Art Gallery at the National Museum of the Marine Corps (NMMC) in Triangle, Virginia. In July 2017, the museum invited the public into its new second-floor gallery space, constructed as part of the ongoing building expansion, with the inaugural exhibition *Honor, Courage, Commitment: Marine Corps Art, 1975–2015*.[5] As custodian of art produced under the Marine Corps combat art program, as well as works created before and since, the museum's collection consists of more than 9,000 paintings, sculptures, drawings, and prints by 350 artists.[6] Curator Joan Thomas

[4] The combat art program originally operated as a branch of the combat correspondents program, through which artists served alongside writers and photographers to bring the impact of war to the American public.

[5] Construction on the museum building concluded in March 2017. The installation of galleries and exhibits in the new space is scheduled for completion in 2021, with new pieces being added each year from now until then.

[6] In addition to officially sanctioned combat art, the NMMC maintains in its holdings art that capture significant moments in the history of the Corps, field sketches, early twentieth-century recruiting poster designs, and portraits of notable Marines, such as Medal of Honor recipients and the Commandants.

Photo courtesy of the author

Installation view of *Honor, Courage, Commitment: Marine Corps Art, 1975–2015*, combat art exhibition at the NMMC, 2017.

envisioned the exhibition as "a reflection of what Marines would have seen and experienced." Selecting works that were honest interpretations of combat zones and that would potentially evoke memories in museum visitors, Thomas strove to present "visual touchstones of the past 40+ years of Marine Corps history and our Nation's history."[7] It showcases 100 works of art produced by 22 military artists, many of whom served as official combat artists during their service with the Marine Corps. Ranging in rank from lance corporals to colonels, these men and women devoted their artistic talents to recording the story of their fellow Marines in visual form.

The title of the exhibition—*Honor, Courage, Commitment*—evokes the triad principles embraced by Marines and supplies the organizational impetus behind the gallery space. The first section, "Every Clime and Place," illustrates Marines as they conduct training exercises and as they engage the enemy around the globe. *Return from UNITAS*, for example, depicts the 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion returning to Onslow Beach at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, after partici-

[7] Joan Thomas, personal correspondence with the author, October 2017. Thomas and her colleagues at the NMMC chose to focus on the post–Vietnam history of combat art because it foreshadows the exhibition themes that will be covered in the forthcoming galleries created during the building expansion. They also felt it was appropriate that the first-ever combat art exhibition should highlight Marine artists, with special attention given to the influential role Maj Jack Dyer and Col Charles Waterhouse each played in the development of the program. Charles Grow, personal correspondence with the author, October 2017.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps

Capt Charles Grow, *Return from UNITAS*, oil on canvas.

pating in the Unitas exercises on 8 December 1988.[8] Completed by then-Captain Charles Grow as part of a series on military vehicles, the painting shows tracked vehicles gleaming in the predawn light. Golden-violet clouds and a tangerine horizon melt into a lavender sea, while tufts of orange-tinged sea grass dapple the sandy slopes. The Marine infantry and equipment, recently returned from South American deployment and silhouetted against the sky, exude a quiet stillness that suggests a successful training mission and highlights the natural drama unfolding around them.

"No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy," a phrase taken from then-Major General James N. Mattis's 2003 command to the 1st Marine Division, exemplifies the dual nature of the Marine Corps mission; whereas each Marine is a skilled combatant, professionally trained in the art of warfare, they must also display compassion and commitment to assist those in need. Veteran combat artist P. Michael Gish exemplified this tenet when deployed to Somalia in support of Operation Restore Hope. Having served as a Marine Corps aviator against the backdrop of World War II and the Korean War, Gish voluntarily embarked for the frontlines as a combat artist during the Vietnam conflict and in several aid missions thereafter. *Grain Queue, Somalia* documents the 1992–93 relief efforts of Marines and nongovernmental organizations to protect and feed a starving population. Since 1975, the Marine Corps has provided humanitarian aid to ci-

[8] Previously known as Partnership of the Americas, the U.S. Marine Corps' Unitas amphibious exercise is a multinational maritime exercise conducted to enhance security cooperation and improve Coalition operations in the Western Hemisphere.

vilians in Somalia, Haiti, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and other locales around the globe.[9]

During this same period, the Service has been called upon to defend U.S. interests and so engaged the enemy with unparalleled ferocity on the battlefield. In January 2003, Sergeant John M. Carrillo deployed to Iraq to serve as a combat artist for the Marine Corps History Division. As the first enlisted Marine assigned to the region with the explicit mission of creating combat art, he used a sketch pad, pencils, and charcoal to tell the Marine Corps story during Operation Iraqi Freedom.[10] Carrillo's mixed media piece, *155 Artillery South of Baghdad*, foregrounds the activities of Coalition forces through a vivid nocturne of British artillery in Iraq. The rhythmic composition and swirling plumes of smoke evoke Vincent Van Gogh's *Starry Night*. Yet, the inscription below the artist's signature belies the beauty of the scene by calling attention to the realities of war; in a fluid white script, Carrillo notes that the artillery barrage "softened Baghdad all night long."

The final segment within the exhibition, aptly titled "The Price," acknowledges the physical and emotional toll of military service. In their depictions of memorial services, wounded warriors, and loved ones supporting Marines from afar, the works in this section remind viewers that Marines willingly accept the risks associated with their missions and that families carry the weight of uncertainty, loss, and grief. Sergeant Sarah Rothschild bears her personal struggle with post-traumatic stress in a heartrending self-portrait whose title, *What Happens There Doesn't Stay There*, conjures the carefree tourism slogan of Las Vegas to underscore the psychological toll of warfighting and the challenges of returning to civilian life. The combat art collection thus exhibits Corps values, albeit occasionally with a dose of gritty realism.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
Col Peter Michael Gish, *Grain Queue, Somalia*, oil on canvas.

The exhibition encompasses an impressive range of military involvement and, in doing so, honors Marines who have served in the Corps during the past 40 years. Active-duty Marines, reservists, and civilian artists capture all aspects of Marine Corps experience: training for battle, daily life on the battlefront and during humanitarian missions, and personal reflections on home and family. As Marine Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael D. Fay (Ret) explains:

> Through our eyes, we want to get as close as possible to the realness of what is happening—the sweat, suffering, boredom and adrenaline. In an era of digital imagery, our art is slowed vision. There is depth to it. The

[9] Annette D. Amerman, *The Marines Have Landed: Eighty Years of Marine Corps Landings, 1935–2015* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2015).

[10] Sgt John M. "Jack" Carrillo began his military career at the age of 19, when he became a Navy hospital corpsman. He served in that capacity until 1996. Upon learning that the Marine Corps had a combat illustrator program, he immediately enlisted and trained in this occupational specialty. In 2002, Carrillo became the first enlisted artist to be selected as a uniform plate artist. He deployed to Iraq in 2003 as an official combat artist.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
Sgt John Carrillo, *155 Artillery South of Baghdad*, mixed media on paper.

Gift of the artist, Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
Sgt Sarah Rothschild, *What Happens There Doesn't Stay There*, mixed media on watercolor paper.

> viewer can see that the artist was there and get an idea of how the subjects were feeling.[11]

Rendered with sensitivity and clear-eyed vision, the collection imparts the tremendous courage and selflessness Marines display in service to their country, even under the most trying of circumstances.

Today, the National Museum of the Marine Corps is working to revitalize an official Marine Corps Combat Art Program. With a newly designated studio and exhibition space, the museum promises to be a locus of opportunity for aspiring artists as well as a site for civilian and military audiences to forge deeper understandings of what it means to serve. Thomas has already commenced planning the next exhibition, which will introduce visitors to combat art from the First World War, while Grow continues to contribute knowledge and insights from his experience as a Marine Corps combat artist in his current position as deputy director at the museum, where he oversees and encourages younger talent through the modern combat art program, among other duties.[12] Through their efforts, current servicemembers and aspiring recruits may yet recognize themselves in the hallowed halls of the National Museum of the Marine Corps—not in the glorified guise of the recruiter's statue, but rather in the sensitive painting or rough pencil sketch of the combat artist.

• 1775 •

[11] Capt Paul L. Greenberg, "Combat Artists Sketch 2/25 Reservists in Action," *Leatherneck*, November 2008, 66.

[12] Capt Charles Grow (Ret), "The National Museum of the Marine Corps Is Looking for a Few Good Artists," *Leatherneck*, March 2017, 46.

The Historical Reference Branch

YEAR IN REVIEW, 2017

by Annette D. Amerman[1]

Under the banner of *Marine Corps Order 5750.1H*, History Division is mission driven to provide knowledge of the Corps to ensure an understanding of its history, to provide an explanation of the present, and to offer guidance for the future of the Service and the American people. The Historical Reference Branch provides historical research and reference services for Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps units, other military organizations and government agencies, active duty Marines, and the general public. The branch is also responsible for several key programs and projects, including the Unit Lineage and Honors Program and the Commemorative Naming Program.[2]

In September 2017, the Historical Reference Branch celebrated its first year in the new Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center. The past year has been one fraught with many challenges, but the core mission of the branch never wavered: answer all the questions posed by everyone and anyone. With the first year in the books, it seemed appropriate to recount the work accomplished by the members of the branch and provide a little background on this unique office within the History Division.

While the exact date of the establishment of the Historical Reference Branch is unknown, it has long been accepted that the father of the branch is Joel Davis Thacker, a World War I veteran and researcher extraordinaire, who joined the Marine Corps civilian workforce in 1931. Thacker was hired in the Muster Roll Section of Headquarters Marine Corps to review, proof, and sometimes recreate World War I muster rolls. It was this work that brought him into contact with the History Division (HD).[3] Thacker aided the

[1] Annette D. Amerman is the branch head of the Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division. She also serves as the series historian for the U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Series, for which she has published an updated and revised 2015 reprint of McClellan's *The United States Marine Corps in the World War* and authored the *United States Marine Corps in the First World War: Anthology, Selected Bibliography, and Annotated Order of Battle* in 2016. Also in 2016, Amerman compiled new data to publish *The Marines Have Landed: Eighty Years of Marine Corps Landings, 1935–2015*. She joined the division in 1995 as a student intern from Shenandoah University; in 1996, she was hired as a civilian clerk, and served as the branch research assistant for a year and a half. Amerman returned to the branch in 2003, where she managed the Lineage and Honors Program for the next 10 years, before being reassigned to duties dealing with requests from Headquarters Marine Corps, Congress, and other prominent government offices. She became acting branch head in October 2015 and was promoted to permanent branch head in November 2017. Ms. Amerman earned her master's from George Mason University.

[2] *MCO 5750.1H, Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 13 February 2009).

[3] Over the years, the History Division has been a section, division, branch, and more. For our purposes, it will be referred to as History Division in this article and not what would have been accurate for the particular period under discussion.



Marine Corps History Division
Joel D. Thacker, ca. 1944, during his tenure as a historian with History Division.

few historians and staff of the division during the 1930s; in 1942, he joined HD as assistant historian and special research assistant. It was during his tenure that the foundations of the Historical Reference Branch were laid. Thacker collected copies of documents—articles, reports, manuals, and more—to create a filing system that would allow him to answer a multitude of questions. While Thacker was prolific in writing about the Corps, his primary responsibility was to answer the requests for information posed by the general public, academics, veterans, and Marines of all ranks. While Thacker focused on answering the questions, he also helped evolve the War Diary and Special Action Report. When HD took custody of World War II operational records in 1944, Thacker devised an intricate filing system used for the several million records received in the following years. Joel Thacker retired in 1957 due to ill health, but his legacy remains.

Today, the Historical Reference Branch's working files are the direct result of Thacker's collection efforts; more than 1,200 linear feet of paper and photographic prints are maintained by the staff and historians of the branch. Unlike an archive, the materials are not originals. The collection is mostly copies of articles, reports, and other documents that the branch historians think will aid in future requests or research. Like an archive, however, the materials do not leave the office—at any moment they may be needed to answer an important request.

The relocation of HD to the Simmons Center in September 2016 posed a challenge for the branch: how to make the move without losing anything while still answering questions. Thankfully, two members of the branch had already made moves with HD in 2005 and 2009, so all went smoothly and not one folder was lost when the division crossed the road from Building 3078. Despite the relocation efforts, branch historians continued serving patrons even while the files were in transit from the old building.

While the branch's main function is to answer requests for information, it has taken on several other responsibilities during the passing decades. In 1968, HD started the Lineage and Honors Program to track the history and cumulative battle honors of eligible Marine Corps units.[4] To date, more than 430 units are eligible for lineage and honors certificates that have been signed by the Commandant. The certificates, which are suitable for framing, are thoroughly researched (using command chronologies submitted by the units), drafted, edited, and printed by the Historical Reference Branch. In conjunction with the Lineage and Honors Program, the branch also certifies all requisitions for streamers submitted by units—a check/balance to ensure units are displaying the proper streamers. In 1976, the branch took over responsibility for the Commemorative Naming Program to

[4] "Lineage and Honors," Unit Information, Marine Corps History Division, May 2017.

U.S. Marine Corps Lineage and Honors Certificate Schedule

To better communicate with the units and to encourage better understanding of the process for updating lineage and honors certificates, the Historical Reference Branch will issue periodic updated schedules with accompanying notes. This schedule is subject to change due to deployments, lack of command chronologies, or other unforeseeable technological issues. For the most up-to-date information on the schedule, email the branch at history.division@usmcu.edu. If you wish to submit command chronologies or inquire as to the gaps reported herein, please email the Archives Branch at mcu_archives@usmcu.edu.

Certificates are issued in "batches" or groups of 20–30 units at a time. Historical Reference Branch tries to issue at least three groups of certificates in a calendar year, but also is at the mercy of branch staffing levels and workload, workflow of Headquarters Marine Corps, responsiveness of units, and availability of command chronologies.

The *Sin Bin* represents the list of units with significant gaps in command chronologies or those we have not heard from when requesting additional support while working on their lineage and honors.

BATCH ALPHA

(mailed out December 2017)

Marine Air Support Squadron 2
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3
Marine Air Control Squadron 4
Marine Aircraft Group 24
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 24
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31
Marine Aircraft Group 36
Marine Air Control Group 48
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204
Marine Wing Support Squadron 272
Marine Wing Support Squadron 371
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466

streamline the vetting of candidates and ensure only appropriate candidates are honored. To ensure named candidates are suitable, vetting includes a thorough review of the individual's military service record, which in some cases can be tens of thousands of pages.

As HD made the move from Washington, DC, to Quantico, Virginia, in 2005, maintaining the HD website became the latest addition to the Historical Reference Branch's duties. To date, there have been at least three major website migrations to different web platforms and major redesigns. These added responsibilities did not diminish the branch's primary mission of answering questions.

Shortly after the relocation in 2016, the branch lost its third historian, leaving just two historians and an administrative assistant to continue the work. While the shortage of staff limited the branch's ability to issue lineage and honors certificates to units and to respond as quickly to requests, the branch was able to achieve a significant amount of work. For the period of September 2016–September 2017, the branch answered more than 2,700 requests for information. Additionally, thanks to supplemental help from fellows and interns, 23 sets of lineage and honors certificates were updated and issued, with another 70 researched and readied for drafting. Several commemorative naming actions were initiated and more than 70 requisitions for streamers were approved. The branch saw an uptick in requests from units, indicating that our efforts to remind the operating forces that we are a resource has been successful.

Further, 2017 and 2018 represent significant anniversaries for several units, including 5th and 6th Marines, Marine Corps Base Quantico, and 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB), just to name a few. In July, the entirety of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, was on site to recreate their 1917 battalion photograph. The branch provided 600 Marines of the battalion with a presentation on the history of Quantico and the battalion in World War I, before they formed up outside to have their photograph taken 100 years after their first. In addition, we helped identify the location where the original battalion photograph was taken here at Quantico—ironically, the Simmons His-

Marine Corps History Division

Top: files from the Historical Reference Branch packed on carts and wrapped in shrink-wrap in order to be moved to the new office space. Bottom: unpacking boxes in the new office in the Simmons History Center. The shelving unit is 11 feet tall and 19 feet long; certainly an increase from the old system.

tory Center and Warner Hall now occupy that exact location. Both 3d MEB and III Marine Expeditionary Force sent Marines to conduct extensive research with the division to capture the history of their respective units in Okinawa.

With the new fiscal year, the branch remains focused on filling the three historian vacancies, reinvigorating the Lineage and Honors Program, adding materials to the website, and continuing first-rate service to our patrons. To that end, we frequently add materials to the website to assist patrons with their historical needs. Visit the History Division website for more on our programs, but also for a comprehensive list of HD's publications, including official histories, occasional papers, and military history journal.

U.S. Marine Corps Lineage and Honors Certificate Schedule

BATCH ALPHA (continued)

2d Reconnaissance Battalion
10th Marines
Combat Logistics Battalion 5
Combat Logistics Battalion 11
Combat Logistics Battalion 13
Combat Logistics Battalion 22
7th Communication Battalion
9th Communication Battalion
3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade
II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
22d Marine Expeditionary Unit
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group

BATCH BRAVO

1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade
I Marine Expeditionary Force
I Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group
III Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 1
Marine Air Control Squadron 2
3d Marine Aircraft Wing
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167
Marine Attack Training Squadron 203
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 266
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 363
Marine Wing Support Squadron 374
1st Intelligence Battalion
2d Medical Battalion
Combat Logistics Regiment 3
6th Communication Battalion
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity
Marine Corps Logistics Command
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA

(continued next page)

U.S. Marine Corps
Lineage and Honors Certificate Schedule

BATCH BRAVO (continued)
2d Battalion, 3d Marines
3d Force Reconnaissance Company
2d Battalion, 7th Marines

BATCH CHARLIE
Marine Air Control Squadron 1
Marine Aircraft Group 12
Marine Aviation Logistics Group 12
Marine Aircraft Group 13
Marine Air Control Group 28
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 366
1st Battalion, 8th Marines
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
7th Marines
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit
Combat Logistics Battalion 31
Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company Central (Bahrain)
Marine Corps Security Force Regiment
Marine Corps Security Force Battalion Kings Bay, GA
Marine Corps Security Force Company Guantánamo, Cuba
Recruit Training Regiment Parris Island, SC
Marine Corps Systems Command
Marine Corps Combat Development Command

BATCH DELTA
Marine Air Support Squadron 1
2d Marine Aircraft Wing
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2
Marine Air Support Squadron 6
Marine Air Control Group 18
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 18
Marine Air Control Squadron 24
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 112
Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 225
Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Training Squadron 303
Marine Attack Squadron 311
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 467
2d Battalion, 1st Marines
4th Marine Division
4th Assault Amphibian Battalion
3d Dental Battalion
Marine Corps Installations Command

BATCH ECHO
4th Force Reconnaissance Company
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369
Combat Logistics Battalion 23
Combat Logistics Regiment 45
Combat Logistics Battalion 453
Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, CA
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group
Deployment Processing Command East
Deployment Processing Command West
3d Battalion, 6th Marines

SIN BIN
2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Marine Transport Squadron
Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 764
No command chronologies received since September 2015
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 4
1st Battalion, 4th Marines
No command chronologies received for July–December 2002, January–June 2003, July–December 2003, July–December 2005, July–November 2007, April–September 2016, October 2016–March 2017
3d Marine Division
No command chronologies received after March 2015

Historical Reference Branch

PHOTOGRAPH FILES

by Kara R. Newcomer[1]

Under the banner of *Marine Corps Order 5750.1H*, History Division is mission driven to provide knowledge of the Corps to ensure an understanding of its history, to provide an explanation of the present, and to offer guidance for the future of the Service and the American people.

The Marine Corps History Division's Historical Reference Branch maintains working files in four main categories: biographical, subject, unit, and photographs. While the official repositories for U.S. Marine Corps photographs taken prior to about 1980 are with the National Archives and Records Administration's Still Picture Branch in College Park, Maryland, and for photographs taken after that time with Defense Visual Information Directorate, the Reference Branch has collected select, duplicate official images for various in-house projects. Not all topics are represented equally, however, as what was collected depended on who recalled the images and what projects the photographs were intended for initially.

Just as with the other working files, the images are divided into categories, mainly people, subjects, and posts and stations. Approximately 75 to 85 percent of the collection is currently in print form only, and, due to website restrictions, only about 4,500 of the images that are digitized are publicly accessible on History Division's website at www.history.usmc.mil.



Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Marines at Portsmouth, NH, ca. 1898.

A few samples follow of the photos held by the Historical Reference Branch.

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[1] Kara R. Newcomer received her BA in history from the University of Evansville, IN, and her MA in museum studies from George Washington University in Washington, DC, before being hired as a historian with the Historical Reference Branch in 2003.



Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

The largest gun mounted, manned, and operated by Marines during the First World War was a 7-inch gun on the island of São Miguel, near Ponta Delgada, Azores. Capt Maurice G. Holmes commanded 1st Aeronautic Company of Marines, the first company to land overseas fully equipped. Another 7-inch gun was installed by this company at Feteiras on the same island.



Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 516308

President-elect William H. Taft went to Panama on the USS *North Carolina* (ACR 12) in January 1909 with a party of engineers to inspect the Panama Canal. The ship landed at Colón, and from there, the group went by train to Camp Elliott, Isthmian Canal Zone, where they were greeted by Maj Smedley D. Butler and the Marines of the 1st Regiment.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

A Lewis light machine gun captured by the 52d Company, 11th Regiment, on 19 October 1928 in Nicaragua. The Marine holding the weapon is Cpl Martin F. O'Donnell, who found it at El Chufon.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo PB7321

U.S. Marines, Mounted Detachment, in Peiping (now Beijing), China.

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching for contributors to *Marine Corps History* (*MCH*). *MCH* is a scholarly, military history journal published twice a year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all aspects of the Corps' history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be between 4,000 and 10,000 words and footnoted according to *Chicago Manual of Style*.

For more information about submitting an article or writing a book review, please email history.division@usmcu.edu with the subject line of "Marine Corps History Submission."

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 112921

On 28 February 1945, women Marines who recently reported for duty in the Hawaiian Islands are shown here as they marched down the gangplank of their transport, wearing winter uniforms and carrying field packs. From left: Sgt Ada Schuelke from Fort Wayne, IN, and Sgt Martha M. H. Schmidt from Wheeling, WV.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 122274

On Okinawa, Japan, May 1945, Marine Col Francis I. Fenton prays at the foot of his son's grave. PFC Michael J. Fenton was killed in a Japanese counterattack on the road to Shuri.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo A134978

In Pohang, Korea, orphans received clothing, shoes, and chinaware donated by Marines of the 1st Marine Division. At extreme left is Chaplain Joseph F. Parker of Portsmouth, VA, who used Marine donations to make the orphanage largely self-sustaining. Also pictured: MSgt Charles A. Orr, of Norwalk, CA, and Kwong Sun An, manager of the orphanage, examine chinaware; TSgt Oscar W. Nelson Jr., combat correspondent, holds a belt for the scrutiny of the smallest orphan; and far right, Kim Kong Sun, assistant manager and interpreter.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

The teamsters transporting sections depicting the Iwo Jima flag-raising converse with U.S. Park Police on the southern end of the Baltimore-Washington Parkway. They are discussing the change of route through Washington, DC, on the way to the Marine Corps War Memorial site in Arlington, VA.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo A454019

2dLt Gayle W. Hanley prepares to reload a magazine with ammunition during a lull in action while participating in The Basic School Exercise on 20 April 1977.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo A188606

On 9 April 1967, PFC Edward R. Stanley searches a Vietnamese hut during an operation near Dong Ha. Stanley's unit, Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, combed each village in their route during Operation Big Horn.

Official U.S. Navy photo DN-SN-84-05181
In Beirut, Lebanon, on 10 December 1983, a Marine M60 machine gun crew stands guard in a bunker at Beirut International Airport.

Official U.S. Navy photo DN-ST-92-03124
Left: in Zakhu, Iraq, ca. 1992, a Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter hovers above a Marine command post as a Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight is parked in the background. Marines were in the region as part of Operation Provide Comfort, an allied effort to aid Kurdish refugees who fled Saddam Hussein's forces in northern Iraq.

Oral History Program

by Fred H. Allison, PhD[1]

Under the banner of *Marine Corps Order 5750.1H*, History Division is mission driven to provide knowledge of the Corps to ensure an understanding of its history, to provide an explanation of the present, and to offer guidance for the future of the Service and the American people. The Oral History Section supports that endeavor in its efforts to document the Marine Corps' current operations, historical events, and developments through the spoken word and to collect career-length interviews of ranking Marine leaders and other distinguished Marines.[2]

The 23d Commandant, General Wallace M. Greene Jr., defined oral history as *living history*, or the recorded voices of U.S. Marines in Vietnam. He believed that historical interviews would help fill the gap of historical information between the event and what was recorded in official documents, such as command chronologies and after action reports. His original order implored Marines to "acquire a consciousness about the significance of individual experiences." The order continued, "Tape-recorded voices of Marines who had seen service in Vietnam could result in a vast collection of lessons learned to be employed in the development of new doctrine, or the refinement of old."[3]

This command came down in 1965, and the Marine Corps had just gone to war in Vietnam. It also marked the beginning of the Marine Corps' oral history program. Under General Greene's order, 11 interview stations were set up at bases in the continental United States. The interviewers at these stations were Marines from various office staffs. The following year, the commanding general at Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, upped the ante by recommending that interviews be conducted in-country, close to the event in both time and place.

Oral history was just coming into vogue at the time. The validity of oral history as a means to document events came as a result of Columbia University's Oral History Research Office, which had been set up in 1948 by Professor Allan Nevins (1890–1971), considered a pioneer of oral history. Benis M. Frank established the Marine Corps' program using Nevins's program as a model.

Another driving factor in the creation of an oral history program was the explosion of technology at the time, including the development of lighter-weight tape recorders using magnetic tape. In 1965, the machines used for the Vietnam interviews were reel-to-reel recorders, weighing about 50 pounds. These were considered expeditionary for the time, certainly more mobile than what had been used before.

The Vietnam interviews were sent to the Historical Branch's archives for processing, which at the

[1] Fred H. Allison has managed the Marine Corps' Oral History Section since 2000. He is a retired Marine major, a native of Texas, and earned his PhD in history from Texas Tech University in 2003.

[2] *MCO 5750.1H, Manual for the Marine Corps Historical Program* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 13 February 2009).

[3] *MCO 5750.3, Historical Interview Program* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1965).

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A415506

Gen Wallace M. Greene Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, presents a commendation for meritorious civilian service to Richard A. Long, as Col John H. Magruder looks on.

time was part of Headquarters Marine Corps and commanded by Colonel Frank C. Caldwell. The interview program continued throughout the war, with more than 10,000 historical interviews collected and accessioned into the archives. Initially, they were held classified as secret; however, in later years, they were declassified. These Vietnam interviews are now available in the History Division's oral history collection at Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. The vast majority is digitized, thanks to a collaborative effort between the Oral History Section and the Naval Historical Foundation. The foundation purchased high-speed digitization equipment in 2002–3 on which the original reel-to-reel tapes were copied. The Vietnam interviews cover the gamut of military occupational specialties, ranks, and time periods. They represent a solid collection of information and captured personal experiences. The Vietnam interviews in many cases, however, lack detailed descriptions of people, places, and events; so in a sense, they represent unexplored territory. Nevertheless, these interviews, as General Greene wished, fill the information gap between what happened and what was written or will be written in official reports.

Although the Oral History Section officially began its work in 1966, the collection contains combat recordings that preceded Vietnam. Approximately 1,700 recordings were collected in World War II at prominent Pacific battlefields as a result of a collaborative project between Marine Corps public affairs and the Library of Congress. The library's American Folklife Center saw the Marine presence in the South Pacific as an opportunity to record the indigenous songs, chants, and ceremonies of Pacific islanders. The Corps' director of public information, Brigadier General Robert L. Denig, saw another use for the equipment. He believed that recording the voices of Marines from Pacific battlefields would be valuable for public information on Marine Corps activities. A large collection of interviews resulted. Marines were interviewed where they were in the field, often in combat, on Amertape filmstrip or Armour wire recorders.[4] These recorders were so heavy and bulky they had to be transported by jeep or in specially made carts and brought ashore in amphibious tractors. Later, the interviews were dubbed onto acetate discs, recorded at 33 1/3 revolutions per minute (rpm). The History Division's Oral History Section discovered these interviews in 2003 and established a collaborative plan to digitize the recordings. History Division provided the labor to the Library of Congress in the form of an intern, Camille Lorei, who digitized each recording and organized the collection.

The World War II combat recordings, even more so than the Vietnam interviews, lack good descriptions of their contents, although a brief description of each was done by Marine personnel after the war while working with the library. Some of the interviews were recorded in real combat situations, where the action was described by a narrator. Other recordings contain short interviews of Marines, most of which then conclude with the Marine saying hello to their family back in the states. The recordings, therefore, have a radio-show quality and lack of depth regarding operations. Regardless, their historical value cannot be questioned, as they were conducted on the scene of iconic Pacific battles. An additional value of these interviews, and the Vietnam interviews for that matter, comes from the glimpse of the language and slang of the day. Without good descriptions, we are just not sure what are in the recordings.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Founder and chief oral historian, Benis M. Frank, ca. 1995.

Another set of interviews that predate the Oral History Section's official beginning came from the Korean War. Colonel Robert D. Heinl Jr., who led

[4] Amertapes were a film-type format with sprocket holes and a series of sound grooves running down the center of the film. Karen Fishman, "Earwitness to History: The Marine Corps Combat Recordings," *Now See Hear* (blog), Library of Congress, 13 November 2014. Wire recording medium resulted when Armour Research Foundation received a contract from the U.S. Navy to develop a portable sound recorder. The original recorder was modified to make it more rugged. Between 1942 and the end of the war, Armour and a licensed manufacturer, General Electric, made perhaps a few thousand of these recorders. They were used for many purposes throughout the war, most notably as a portable field recorder for journalists. "Wire Recorders," Museum of Magnetic Sound Recording.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Combat correspondent Alvin M. Josephy, speaking into the microphone, narrates combat action at the battle of Guam in 1944. Josephy collected numerous oral history interviews in World War II in battle scenarios for the Library of Congress's Marine Corps Combat Recordings project. He was awarded the Bronze Star for "heroic achievement in action" during the Battle of Guam.

the Historical Section in 1946–49, initiated efforts to organize a historical unit, modeled on the Army's World War II example. The Army used professional historians to work in-theater to document operations, including collecting interviews. Heinl did not realize how timely his initiative would be. By the time the Korean War broke, professional historians among the Marine Corps Reserve had been identified and were indeed mobilized, forming the 1st Provisional History Platoon on 7 August 1950.

Although the provisional history platoons (one each for the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing) met with logistical difficulties, such as being labeled "spies" from Headquarters and even disbandment before the war ended, they did make a valuable contribution to the documentation of the Korean War. The 75 interviews acquired represent the first Marine Corps attempts at a systematic oral history project. They aptly captured what only a few other collection techniques can capture: the personal experience. Since the interviews were done in the field with combat Marines, both air and ground, they captured information while it was still fresh in the minds of interviewees. Again, the interviews helped fill the gap between the event itself and written reports.

The Korean War historians did not have tape recorders; therefore, their interviews were recorded via handwritten notes. Often these were just summaries, but some are full transcripts and can provide important information. For instance, the following excerpt from a Marine with 7th Marines, who was in charge of grave registration or handling Marines killed, describes burying the dead at Koto-ri, North Korea, as the Marines began their withdrawal to the sea:

> We got into Koto-ri and we didn't stop work, we just started burying and we buried all day. We had General [Edward M.] Almond [USA] up . . . and General [Frank E.] Lowe [USA]—and they was all there; and it was a sight. It was sad, I had never in my life seen Colonel [Homer L.] Litzenberg cry. I actually seen him crying because he had lost a bunch of good fellows—good men who was fit to bring back and probably he would have brought more of them back. But it was one of the saddest days in the Marine Corps history at Koto-ri. There was a wonderful turnout for the mass burials.[5]

Another transcript that gives a compelling account of combat comes from an interview with Captain Edward P. Stamford, a forward air controller with an air, naval gunfire, liaison company (ANGLICO) attached to the Army's 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment. This battalion was eliminated as a fighting force when a couple of Chinese divisions overran the Army's positions east of the Chosin Reservoir. Stamford was interviewed in March 1951 by one of the provisional history platoon's historians. In this passage, Stamford describes the onset of the Chinese onslaught:

> About midnight or soon after, I heard some shots and Captain [Edward B.] Scullion

[5] SSgt Robert B. Gault, intvw by field historian, 10 July 1951 (Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA).

> yelling in our direction. Just after this and before we could get up to see what was happening, we heard some chattering outside of our bunker. The poncho was pulled aside; I saw a fur-rimmed face in the moonlight and fired at it from a sitting position, but he had already dropped a grenade inside which blew up between my feet on the sleeping bag. One man was wounded. We continued to fire back, and upon receiving rifle fire, moved back into the slit trench where we remained for about three minutes. Our own MG [machine gun] fire cleaned off the top of the bunker and we were able to get out. I immediately organized my men and others in the vicinity in defense of this position. The company CO [commanding officer] exposed himself initially and was killed during the first exchange of shots.[6]

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
LtGen Herman Nickerson (center), commanding general of III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam, prepares to be interviewed in support of the Vietnam Oral History Project, ca. 1969–70.

As these two samples indicate, although limited in number, the Korean War interviews give valuable insight to the fighting and conditions in Korea.

This idea that oral histories may supplement official reports is why operational interviews are still the primary function of today's oral history program. Interviews have been collected from all major combat operations since Vietnam, including Grenada, Lebanon, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq (1990–present), and Afghanistan. Operational interviews also have been collected regarding humanitarian operations, training exercises, and other events of historical importance. What makes the operational interview especially valuable is the immediacy and candid perspectives captured before memory fades or is influenced by outside factors. These interviews offer up the human experience—the sensory perceptions of a time, place, sight, smell, sounds, thoughts, and emotions—all those things that pepper into a historical narrative and make it engaging. This points out the primary reason we collect oral history: to support History Division's writing program. Today in the oral history collection, we have approximately 25,000 interviews or operational interviews with active duty Marines.

The vast majority of operational interviews done since the early 1990s have been conducted by Marine reservists. Originally founded as a Mobile Training Unit (MTU) in 1978, its mission was to deploy trained field historians and combat artists with all Fleet Marine Forces commands. The MTU's first full deployment as a unit was in 1983 to Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada). Subsequent deployments in the early 1990s included Operation Desert Storm (Kuwait), Operation Provide Comfort (Kurdistan), Operation Safe Harbor (Guantánamo Bay), Operation Able Manner (Haiti), and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia). In 1994, the MTU transformed into an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Detachment and deployed field historians to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. By the decade's end, nearly 2,000 oral history interviews had been collected. With the advent of the Global War on Terrorism, IMA Marine reservists conducted more than 7,000 oral history interviews during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Unlike the

[6] Capt Edward P. Stamford, intvw by field historian, 16 March 1951 (Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA).

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
By 1994, IMA Detachment field historians were deploying overseas to capture interviews and data with Marines in the field. LtCol Carroll N. Harris conducts an interview in the field.

staff appointees who collected interviews during Vietnam or the historians in the Korean War who were perceived as spies and had difficulty getting support from units they were visiting, the IMA field historians are successful Marines in their primary military occupational specialty (MOS) and most have extensive deployment histories, so they are able to gain the trust and confidence of unit commanders and their Marines. Many of the Marine reservists are history professors and authors in their civilian careers, and most possess a master's degree or PhD. Presently, this small group of field historians (around 12 in total) visit forward deployed units in combat zones, during major field exercises and, at times, even catch rides aboard amphibious ships returning home to collect interviews. The field historians then draft insightful summaries for digitization and storage in the History Division's oral history collection in Quantico.

The other major thrust of the oral history program is career interviews with distinguished Marines. These include mostly general officers, especially former Commandants and Assistant Commandants, but also former Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps, Medal of Honor recipients, and Marines who have been involved in important historical events or developments. Former Marines who went on to have prominent careers after their service in the Corps are also interviewed, such as Senators John Glenn, John Warner, and James Webb. Career interviews are extensive and thorough. The value of this approach is that, by discussing their entire careers, we can learn about earlier times and then note the changes in the Corps during a span of 20–30 years. Also, because these officers were in significant billets, we capture information on momentous decisions, headquarters-level initiatives, and background information on critical events. We also learn of interpersonal relationships, leadership challenges, and successes. A prime example of the value of these type of interviews is the unification crisis.[7]

There is very little official documentation on what the Marine Corps did to protect itself during this time, because a large part of the actions were accomplished surreptitiously. The oral history interviews done by Ben Frank with Generals Victor Krulak, Merrill B. Twining, and many more, however, give us insight into what went on regarding this critical aspect of Marine Corps history. Similarly, the career interviews give excellent information on how important developments occurred, such as the writing of the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* (1935), and nuances in the development of important doctrine, for instance close air support or vertical envelopment. More recently, the 32d Commandant, General James

[7] The unification crisis was a series of actions occurring in the Department of Defense and the executive branch shortly after World War II that aimed to unify the military Services under a single leader. The Marine Corps perceived this as a threat to its position in the national defense establishment, believing that unification would result in a greatly reduced force structure and loss of roles and missions, especially amphibious warfare and combined arms.

U.S. Marine Corps Centennial Anniversaries

With the United States' entry into World War I on 6 April 1917, the Marine Corps saw rapid expansion to meet the demand for more manpower. In 2017 and 2018, several units are celebrating their centennials and are direct lineal descendants of those units created for the war expansion. Because of the force structure at the time, not all regiments had battalions formed. Often, a regiment was simply a collection of companies reporting directly to the regimental commanding officer, so not all battalions existed at the time of the regiment's activation.

2017 Anniversaries

Original designation	Date of activation	Current designation
5th Regiment	8 June 1917	5th Marines
1st Battalion	25 May 1917	1st Battalion
2d Battalion	1 June 1917	2d Battalion
3d Battalion	1 June 1917	3d Battalion
6th Regiment	11 July 1917	6th Marines
1st Battalion	11 July 1917	1st Battalion
2d Battalion	11 July 1917	2d Battalion
3d Battalion	14 August 1917	3d Battalion
7th Regiment	14 August 1917	7th Marines
8th Regiment	9 October 1917	8th Marines
9th Regiment	20 November 1917	9th Marines*
3d Provisional Brigade	14 December 1917	3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Marine Barracks Quantico	14 May 1917	Marine Corps Combat Development Command

2018 Anniversaries

Original designation	Date of activation	Current designation
11th Regiment	3 January 1918	11th Marines
2d Battalion	5 November 1918	2d Battalion
13th Regiment	3 July 1918	13th Marines*
14th Regiment	26 November 1918	14th Marines
15th Regiment	26 November 1918	15th Marines*

** Indicates units currently deactivated*

L. Jones, shared his top priorities and accomplishments, including restarting ANGLICO, resurrecting Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), commitment to the V-22 airframe, development of the Marine pattern (MARPAT) camouflage uniform, adoption of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP), and—his proudest accomplishment—building new base housing for Marine families.

Another value of the career interview transcripts is that the officer can provide firsthand information on events that predated the onset of the oral history program. The career interviews with general officers in the 1960s and 1970s provide an eyewitness account of actions in the Banana Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. The first career interview was conducted in 1965 with Major General Ford O. Rogers, a World War I aviator. The oldest Marine interviewed based on date of commissioning was Lieutenant General Julian C. Smith, commissioned in 1909, who met with Benis Frank in 1967.

Career interviews can be fairly long. For instance, the career interview with General Carl E. Mundy Jr. took 30 sessions of 60–90 minutes in length that, once transcribed, produced a transcript of 745 double-column pages. The transcripts are edited by History Division personnel and then the interviewees. Pictures and an index are added and the final transcript is digitized. Paper copies are bound and distributed to various research libraries. As a result, the career interview is a highly useable, useful, and information-packed product. The oral history collection now contains approximately 400 career interviews.

Veteran interviews, those commonly thought of as "oral history," are not given the same priority as operational and career interviews because the Oral History Section is not resourced for this activity. We do, however, manage to acquire a good many veteran interviews as the opportunity arises. Many veteran interviews are donated by outside parties. We ask that they be quality interviews and adhere to established

standards.[8] In some instances, organizations have undertaken oral history projects to interview their members that have resulted in the donation of several quality interviews. For example, the Women Marines Association donated more than 200 interviews of female Marines extending back to World War II. The Witness to War Foundation, which does high-quality video interviews describing combat, also has provided a number of interviews. California State University-Fullerton conducted a social archaeology project on Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California, because the base had been closed and was being converted to green space. Marines who had served at El Toro were interviewed, resulting in the donation of almost 400 digitized interviews and bound transcripts to the History Division.

In conclusion, the oral history collection today holds approximately 30,000 items, including recordings and transcripts. Approximately 85 percent of these are digitized. Unfortunately, the high cost of transcribing has delayed the balance from being transcribed. All interviews, however, have at least a database entry that provides basic information on the interview. The oral history collection sees considerable use, providing about 1,500 items per year to researchers. Most of these customers are conducting serious academic research in their efforts to write articles, books, and papers, especially students in the various schools at Marine Corps Base Quantico. Because our clientele is conducting serious research, we rarely conduct video interviews; they seek information, not entertainment.

Sometimes, we encounter resistance to a request for an interview because Marines humbly do not want to take credit for something that many others had a part in. However, the purpose of oral history interviews is not to elevate one Marine above another, but rather simply to capture the experience of that Marine for posterity. As Marine Corps historians, we emphasize that an oral history interview is dissimilar to an after action or lessons learned report. Our intent is to capture the subject's personal experience—the sights, sounds, smells, feelings, and notable memories of time spent in combat or in the Corps. Such raw descriptions hold tremendous value to researchers and authors who write each new chapter of Marine Corps history. It has been said that every "generation of Marines leaves a heritage to the next." The History Division and the Oral History Section accepts the charge to record that heritage and make it available to future generations of Marines.

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[8] For more on the specific requirements for oral histories, see "A 'Do-It-Yourself' Oral History Primer," Oral History Section, History Division; and Donald A. Ritchie, *Doing Oral History* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995).

Expeditionary Warfare School

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

by Robert J. Fawcett[1]

> Read about history, and you become aware that nothing starts with us. It started long ago. If you read enough biography and history, you learn how people have dealt successfully or unsuccessfully with similar situations or patterns in the past. It doesn't give you a template of answers, but it does help you refine the questions you have to ask yourself. Further, you recognize there is nothing so unique that you've got to go to extraordinary lengths to deal with it.[2]
>
> ~General James N. Mattis,
> Secretary of Defense

We are the U.S. Marines, and we love our history. Perhaps more than any other military organization, we teach our history to recruits and reemphasize it to all our Marines at every opportunity. One reason to teach history is to inculcate Marines with our ethos and values and to instill pride in our heritage, but also—taking to heart the ideas of Secretary Mattis—to use the study of history as a means of learning from the past, attempting to find the lessons from those who have gone before us, and to apply them to the challenges we will face in the future.

At the Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS), which is part of the Marine Corps University at Quantico, we teach a course for approximately 250 captains each year. Our mission is to "educate and train company grade officers in order to prepare them mentally, morally, and physically for billets of increased leadership responsibility across the Marine Corps and the Joint Force."[3] Part of how EWS does that is by including history in its curriculum. History permeates the entire curriculum at EWS, and it is presented in several different formats: readings, lectures, decision-forcing cases, tactical decision exercises, battle studies, and staff rides.

EWS's attention to history starts before the students arrive with a precourse requirement to read and be prepared to discuss *First to Fight* by Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak. His story details the unique relationship between the Marine Corps and the American people, which he describes as "almost spiritual."[4] Krulak focuses on how historical events and innovations of his era and earlier have shaped the Corps and talks about Marines as thinkers, innova-

[1] Robert J. Fawcett is chief academic officer of Marine Corps University's Expeditionary Warfare School, Quantico, VA.

[2] David Lauterborn, "Secretary of Defense James Mattis," HistoryNet, 1 December 2016.

[3] "Mission Statement," Expeditionary Warfare School, Marine Corps University.

[4] LtGen Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), xv.

tors, improvisers, penny pinchers, brothers, and fighters. For each characteristic of the Corps, he provides personal and historical examples. Upon arrival at EWS, students are assigned a diagnostic essay requirement to provide their impressions of *First to Fight* and how these impressions will inform their year of education at resident EWS. The survey of history provided by General Krulak's book serves as a foundation for many other discussions throughout the course. It also reaffirms students' commitment to the Marine Corps' ethos and values that underpin this special relationship with the American people.

To set the stage, the academic year opens with three lectures on Marine Corps history by the director of Marine Corps History Division. In Marine Corps History (1775 to Guantánamo Bay 1898), students learn about the evolution of the Corps from small ships' detachments to the beginning of an era of expeditionary operations, which provided the foundation for the expeditionary mission of the Corps today. Marine Corps History (1914–1945) starts with World War I and Belleau Wood and how the heroism of the 4th Brigade created in the minds of the American people the image of Marines as ferocious warriors. This lesson also addresses the counterinsurgency legacy forged during the Banana Wars and covers the development of amphibious doctrine and its successful application in the island-hopping campaign of World War II—all lessons that carry through to modern times. Marine Corps History (1946–present) lays out the post-war fight for survival of the Corps, the success of the Marine Corps in Korea, and the birth of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept.

These lessons in history are not the typical History 101 survey course found on any American campus—a simple rehash of the events; rather, they constitute a History 201 course, an advance-level course where the focus shifts from just a description of heroic events to how those events shaped the Corps. Extending beyond just the history of the Corps, Dr. James Lacey of Marine Corps War College presents a view of warfare across time in A Historical Look at the Future, which starts with Cain versus Abel and walks the students through the history of warfare to the current and future multidomain battlefield.

While EWS faculty usually do not think of it as history, the doctrine course includes several lessons on military theorists—Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, and John R. Boyd. The theories of war espoused by these writers were based on their own personal experience and the historical study of wars, battles, and engagements.

EWS also uses various forms of case studies in its curriculum. In one example, described as a decision-forcing case, the students are provided background readings or a short presentation about a historical battle. The scenario is presented up to a certain decision point. The students are then directed to put themselves in the shoes of the commander, to make a decision, and then to describe their reasons for that decision. After students present their decisions, the case concludes with what we term *the rest of the story*, where they are informed of what the battle commander actually decided and how the battle turned out. Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, formerly of the Case Method Project, presents a series of historical decision-forcing cases at EWS. While the Case Method Project has been discontinued, a similar program—The Decision Game Club—is offered on Thursday afternoons after class for MCU students and others who are interested.

Within the EWS curriculum, the opening salvo to the Warfighting Course is a historical decision-forcing case on Operation Iraqi Freedom I, the march on Baghdad, presented by Dr. Gudmundsson and former members of the Case Method Project. We also use an Operation Desert Storm case study to introduce the MAGTF Operations Ashore Course and a case study of the 1982 United Kingdom amphibious assault on the Falklands to introduce the MAGTF Operations Afloat Course. For several years, EWS was privileged to have Royal Marines Major General Julian Thompson and Royal Navy Commodore Michael Clapp, the commander of the landing force and the commander of the amphibious task force, respectively, for the Falklands operation, visit EWS to present the rest of the story of the Falklands campaign in person. On their last visit to the United States in 2017, History Division conducted an oral history interview with

Major General Thompson and Commodore Clapp to ensure their stories will be available to future amphibious warriors.

The EWS course also makes liberal use of tactical decision exercises. These tactical problem scenarios are laid out on a map or sand table and the students are given a short period of time to analyze the situation, make a decision, and prepare a brief verbal order. Many officers will remember the "What now, Lieutenant?" tactical decision exercises from The Basic School. Some of the scenarios are fictional, but many are based on historical events. Like other historical case studies, these decision exercises have the benefit of being able to relate the orders and actions of the actual leader on scene and the final effect of their decisions.

Another form of history in the EWS curriculum is a series of eight student-led battle studies spread out across the course. In teams of two, the students develop and present to their 16-person conference group with a one-hour interactive presentation on an operation that has particular relevance to the curriculum. During the MAGTF Operations Ashore Course in the fall semester, the battle studies include the Russia-Ukraine conflict (2014–present), Task Force 58 in Afghanistan (2001–2), Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Battle of Chancellorsville during the Civil War. The battle studies in support of the MAGTF Operations Afloat Course in the spring semester include Operation Corporate (Falklands, 1982), Operation Watchtower (Guadalcanal, 1942–43), Operation Eastern Exit (Somalia, 1991), and Operation Chromite (Inchon Landing, 1950).

The final history-related method used by EWS is the staff ride. We conduct two every year: one for the Battle of Antietam at Sharpsburg, Maryland, in the fall, and the other for the Battle of Gettysburg in Pennsylvania near the end of the academic year. The staff ride preparation begins well before the event with readings on the battle and the key participants. The staff ride usually begins at each national battlefield visitor center for an overview of the battle. Then conference groups travel the battlefield, making stops at key points along the way. At each stop, a student gives a short orientation to the terrain and the forces that fought there. Other students are assigned to play the role of the opposing commanders whose forces met at that point on the battlefield, describing the decisions and actions of each commander. These staff rides further the professional development of each student by illuminating key aspects and themes of the Warfighting and Profession of Arms curricula. These staff rides expose the students to the dynamics of the battle, offer them a historical look at the human dimension of the military profession, and showcase the enduring nature of war. They also provide valuable studies in leadership, reinforce the physical effects of terrain, and highlight the importance of military history in the development of the professional officer.

While the EWS curriculum focuses on the study and application of Marine Corps doctrine to the current and future battlefield, that study is built on a strong historical foundation that highlights our ethos, values, innovation, and battlefield prowess and is reinforced by a variety of methods throughout the academic year. We are the Marine Corps, we love our history, and we will learn from it.

• 1775 •

School of Advanced Warfighting

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

by Wray R. Johnson, PhD[1]

> Learning is first and foremost a process of discovering what it is we wrongly thought we knew, of first exposing ignorance, before going on to knowledge. Merely adding bits of wisdom to a mass of foolishness will not make people wiser. It will only increase the danger of their ignorance.
>
> ~Socrates

History is an assessment of something that happened long ago, retold in the present as a factual recounting of what has passed before. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most historians were content to simply collect interesting vignettes they thought would appeal to a wide readership. For modern historians, however, and certainly for the faculty of the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), this is not enough. SAW employs the systematic study of history to help our graduates become first-rate planners and commanders, today and tomorrow.

As Frederick the Great wrote, "Past facts are good to store away in the imagination and the memory: they furnish a repository of ideas whence a supply of materials may be obtained, but one which ought to be purified by passing through the strainer of the judgment."[2] B. H. Liddell Hart later noted, "History can show us what to *avoid*, even if it does not teach us what to do, by showing the most common mistakes that mankind is apt to make and to repeat," a sentiment anticipated by Thucydides.[3] And it was Winston S. Churchill who acknowledged that, although "we cannot undo the past, we are bound to pass it in review, in order to draw such lessons as may be applicable to the future."[4] Thus, developing good judgment in our students to enable them to avoid repeating past mistakes is another goal facilitated by the systematic study of military history.

The idea that war can be studied systematically is an old one. During the classical era, writers mostly referred to the best-known extant models of warfare.[5] Little changed until the Renaissance, when Niccolò Machiavelli attempted to synthesize the whole experience of war from antiquity to the late Middle Ages. His fundamental proposition was that, despite technological and other changes, human nature remains immutable, and the study of history can

[1] Wray R. Johnson is professor of military history at Marine Corps University's School of Advanced Warfighting.

[2] Jay Luvaas, ed., *Frederick the Great on the Art of War* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1999), 49.

[3] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Why Don't We Learn from History?* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), 19, emphasis in original.

[4] Winston S. Churchill, *Speeches on Foreign Affairs and National Defense* (London: Estate of Winston S. Churchill, 1938).

[5] Flavius Vegetius, *De Re Militari* [Concerning Military Affairs]: *The Classic Treatise on Warfare at the Pinnacle of the Roman Empire's Power* (Driffield, UK: Leonaur, 2012).

therefore teach lessons that are valid at any time. The late military historian John Keegan was of the same mind, writing that "continuities, particularly hidden continuities, form the principal subject of historical inquiry."[6] Indeed, it is the identification of links between the past and present that most readily helps us to put our own decisions and actions in context. Our aim at SAW, then, is primarily practical rather than theoretical or even historical. SAW is not now—and never has been—a historical survey course; although to the outsider and untrained eye, the curriculum might appear as such. Rather, we seek to encourage our students to interpret the past with an eye to the present and future in a manner that enables them to develop problem-solving skills and, as noted earlier, improve their judgment.

Thus, SAW uses an approach to leverage history that began with Machiavelli but accelerated in the late eighteenth century during the intellectual movement known as the Enlightenment. Starting in France and spreading across Europe, the Enlightenment emphasized scientific, rational, and logical methods as opposed to received wisdom. The animating spirit of the age, then as now, is that man, guided by reason, can understand any challenge. In that respect, Newtonian mechanics was the exemplar and remains an inspiration today for humanity's ability to master reality. It was this scientific approach that became a generalized method to explore any subject on the basis of critical reflection, logic, and reason. And this approach is applied to the study of war at SAW.

Although in agreement with the basic thrust of the leading thinkers in France, for those in the German-speaking states, the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) took a different course in terms of military thinking. Whereas abstraction and mathematical certainty were at the heart of French military writing, as was the case with Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte (Comte de Guibert) and Antoine-Henri Jomini, German-speaking military intellectuals were motivated by a more humanistic vision with a strong educational emphasis. Indeed, German-speaking reformers advanced the idea that a proper education rooted in a variety of modes of inquiry should form the basis of a professional officer's intellectual and practical development. At its core was the idea of *bildung*, a term that has multiple meanings but perhaps can best be translated as one's developed character and intellectual acumen; this underwrites SAW's motto, *Sapere Aude*, or "dare to know." The military *Aufklärers* (philosophers of the Enlightenment) stressed that proper *bildung* is necessary to develop an officer's critical thinking faculties. Technical expertise alone is not sufficient. In other words, "manning the equipment" is not enough; we must also "equip the man." Nor is personal experience in the field sufficient. As Frederick the Great noted, "What good is experience if it is not directed by reflection. . . . A mule who has carried a pack for ten campaigns . . . will be no better a tactician for it."[7]

SAW was founded on the precepts of the *Aufklärers*, and in particular the ideas of Gerhard von Scharnhorst and the *Militärische Gesellshaft* (Military Society). Scharnhorst emphasized that military theory provides *richtige begriffe* (correct concepts), grounded in historical inquiry and reenactment. He believed that an inherent interdependence exists between theory and reality, and the latter is revealed in a detailed treatment of the historical record. History, especially military history, provides "vicarious experience." As Navy Admiral Alfred T. Mahan wrote, "history supplies the raw material from which they [military professionals] are to draw their lessons, and reach their working conclusions."[8] In a similar vein, Army General Douglas MacArthur wrote: "More than most professions, the military [depends] on intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting the future." The soldier, he continued, "makes maximum use of historical record in assuring the readiness of himself and his command to function efficiently in emergency. The facts derived from historical analysis he applies to conditions of the

[6] John Keegan, "Introduction," in Alan Wykes, *Hitler's Bodyguards: SS Leibstandarte* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), 6. For more on his approach to history, see John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

[7] Luvaas, *Frederick the Great on the Art of War*, 47.

[8] As quoted in *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), v.

present and the proximate future, thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization, and doctrine."[9]

At SAW, the systematic study of history enables our students to get inside the mind of a commander from the past in terms of reenacting that commander's decision making. As R. G. Collingwood has pointed out, "Reality is not only experience, it is immediate experience."[10] Reenactment provides a form of immediate experience. But knowing what happened at Jena or Normandy or Fallujah is only the first step. For the second and more important step, we encourage our students to make their way out of the past to synthesize the lessons learned and, as General MacArthur suggested, evaluate the value of those lessons with respect to the present and near future. At SAW, to reenact the past is to construct an accessible present and future.

For SAW students, history reveals more than simply *what* happened. It sheds light on *how* Marines, soldiers, airmen, sailors, and others think and decide. Reading history enables our students to get at the factors that inform command decisions. While most readers of history analyze events *ex post*, we encourage our students to analyze events *ex ante*, to appreciate why commanders chose a particular course of action when multiple paths were available. History, unlike a court of law, can be retried many times, and this permits our students to reenact command decisions in the context of contingent complexity. And doing so develops our students' innate critical thinking skills and encourages creative problem solving.

It is often said that, to arrive at a *new* idea, one should read an *old* book. This is not a modern insight. During the Seven Years War between Great Britain and France, British Army Major General James Wolfe, chiefly remembered for his victory at Quebec in 1759, had won a battle at Louisburg the year prior. After that battle ended, he was asked how he had come up with his novel employment of light infantry. He replied: "I had it from Xenophon, but [my] friends here are astonished at what I have done because they have read nothing."[11] Wolfe was a self-taught military intellectual, but like Wolfe, we seek pattern recognition with the goal of adaptation and innovation. And by analyzing the past but remaining in the present, we retain the initiative. The present is where the thought experiments take place. Thus, like Socrates, we urge our students to think differently about things they believe they already know.

In its own way, thinking differently about things already known is a kind of remote sensing. Logic and imagination help. To borrow from Jane Azevedo, a prominent theorist of map making, we try to develop in our students a kind of "reiteration loop," making use of both deductive and inductive reasoning, that is, an ability to deduce the process that led to a decision and subsequent action.[12] As John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, one "can hardly perform that task, though, without repeated acts of induction: you have to survey the evidence, sense what's there, and find ways to represent it. Finding those ways, though, gets you back to the deductive level." According to Gaddis, "What's required . . . is to apply both techniques to the objects of your inquiry, fitting each to the other as seems appropriate to the task at hand."[13] At SAW, we use history to develop the skills of deduction and induction in each student in the manner of the reiteration loop described by Azevedo.

SAW asks its students to see like a historian. To do this, as Gaddis posited, is to "get inside the mind of another person, or another age, but then to find your way out again."[14] The SAW student's pathway, guided by the faculty, is to make use of vicarious experience to enhance judgment, improve decision-making skills,

[9] Col Edward T. Imparato, USAF (Ret), comp., *General MacArthur: Speeches and Reports, 1908–1964* (Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing, 2000), 107.

[10] R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 141.

[11] Hugh Boscawen, *The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 141.

[12] Jane Azevedo, *Mapping Reality: An Evolutionary Realist Methodology for the Natural and Social Sciences* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

[13] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 47.

[14] Gaddis, *The Landscape of History*, 129–30.

and imagine alternative futures and courses of action to increase their wisdom as a planner and commander. The objective is ultimately the same as it was for French mathematician Henri Poincaré: "We should discover the simple under the complex; then the complex under the simple; then anew the simple under the complex; and so on without ever being able to foresee the last term."[15] Hence, we want our students to embrace the reality that war is a dynamic system wherein predictable and unpredictable phenomena occur within the same system. Poincaré's great insight is that linear and nonliner relationships can coexist, that a system (such as war) can be simple and complex at the same time. When SAW students obtain this insight, they have achieved a measure of wisdom they probably did not have prior.

In conclusion, when SAW students embrace Poincaré's insight, they are ready to graduate. They realize that history is not to be read as a desk calendar, but it is to be understood as simultaneously a deductive and an inductive enterprise that enables planners and commanders to employ the higher-order cognitive skills of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Thinking about what decision makers have done in the past—the unsuccessful as well as the successful—provides our graduates with Frederick's repository of ideas as well as a lens through which they may see multiple courses of action and then, by their enhanced judgment, choose the right one. Studying history, as we do at SAW, necessarily involves taking oneself out of the present to explore an alternative world, to become more aware of continuities as well as novelties and anomalies. Thus, to reenact the past presents an opportunity for SAW students to think about thinking; that is, why we think, decide, and act the way we do. In the end, to study history is to study ourselves and to be made aware of the possibility of doing things differently.

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[15] Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 380.

Engaging Students of History

by J. N. Campbell and William C. Mayborn, PhD[1]

Campbell and Mayborn offer the following review and classroom exercise for the use of university faculty and staff in their efforts to bring history into the classroom. The review offers a comprehensive view of America's strategic interactions in East Asia since the founding of the republic. It touches on Michael Green's mastery of tracing the large movements and the many critical junctures of American grand strategy. One such critical juncture serves as the springboard for the classroom exercise—an analysis of Japanese strategic intentions during the 1930s.

By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783. By Michael J. Green. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. Pp. 760. $45.00 cloth; $44.99 e-book.)

Do not let the subtitle and page count of this tome scare you away. Michael Green is superb at compressing 233 years of diplomatic history of the strategic foundations of the United States in East Asia into an understandable and thought-provoking read. To accomplish this task, Green takes a disciplined approach to exclude all of the historical minutiae that would fill multiple volumes on diplomatic history. The book retains its strategic overview and does not include the tactical missteps or errors of American counterinsurgencies in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Green includes numerous primary sources that demonstrate how senior officials attempted for more than two centuries to engage the United States in the commercial and political affairs of East Asia.

With his focus on grand strategy, the monograph largely focuses on U.S. policy toward the most powerful actors in East Asia—China and Japan. Thus, Green provides limited details on India, Indonesia, North Korea, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Moreover, he treats Southeast Asia as a region, rather than focusing on nation-specific American policies as he works through French decolonization, the Vietnam War, and the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Green does well to show that the actual construction and implementation of grand strategy takes concerted efforts to achieve the long-term objective of blocking any other power from establishing hegemonic control over Asia or the Pacific Ocean. In this regard, he organizes U.S. grand strategy toward East Asia chronologically into three parts: confronting the rise of Imperial Japan, containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the current-day challenge of a rising China. This chronology repeatedly illustrates

[1] J. N. Campbell is an independent scholar living in Houston, TX. He is the coauthor with Steven M. Rooney of *How Aspirin Entered Our Medicine Cabinet* (2017). Currently, Campbell is working on another book, *A Time-Release History of the Opioid Epidemic*, due out summer 2018. William C. Mayborn, PhD, is an adjunct professor at Boston College, Woods College of Advancing Studies, in Chestnut Hill, MA. He teaches courses in Asian politics and international relations.

how other vital priorities, such as the U.S. Civil War, the Great Depression, crises in the Middle East, and the 2008 recession, have distracted numerous U.S. administrations from dedicating resources toward American engagement in Asia.

Educators will appreciate Green's short vignettes that highlight the strategic debates between previous presidents and their national security advisors, beginning with the essential question: Is East Asia a *vital* interest for the United States? A personal favorite came from Lyndon B. Johnson's March 1968 meeting with his counselors to decide a successful Vietnam policy. His vivid descriptions could be useful for setting up classroom debates, presentations, or writing exercises. Green served as a national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration and offers insights into the formulation of strategy toward Asia. This proximity to the policy debates in the White House gives him a deeper understanding of the personalities and policy debates that took place during the William J. "Bill" Clinton and Barack H. Obama administrations.

By More Than Providence does a superb job introducing the backgrounds and personal histories of the people who constructed American strategy toward the Asia-Pacific. The work introduces little-known academics, political visionaries, and strategists who greatly influenced historical outcomes. For example, Peter Parker was instrumental in the 1850s to expanding U.S. naval power toward China and Japan. Later, Green spends a considerable number of pages describing Thomas W. Lamont's work in the early 1920s to bind Japan and the United States economically in hopes that economic interdependence would result in peace. These biographical descriptions are more prevalent at the beginning stages of the book, but trail off as the author switches the focus predominantly to presidential decision making after World War II. He does not fixate on this point, but we might consider that the role of the modern diplomatic corps has shifted in the current era of "shuttle diplomacy" performed by the modern president.

One criticism the reader should consider is that, as diplomatic history, the book inserts a number of political science terms that may leave the history student perplexed by what Green is emphasizing. For example, terms such as *horizontal escalation*, *neorealist* and *structural realism*, *bipolarity*, and *external balancing* remain undefined. At times, Green declares true statements without offering a full explanation. The most blatant example was calling Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama "loopy" without listing all of the reasons he damaged the U.S.-Japan alliance. Indeed, Hatoyama's short nine-month tenure gave President Obama headaches for revealing nuclear secrets dating back to the Richard M. Nixon-Eisako Sato summits, suspending the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma relocation plan, interrupting fresh water and oil supplies to the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean, and repeatedly calling for the construction of an "East Asian Community."[2]

Green's work highlights the contemporary challenges that the United States faces in managing the often-antagonistic relations between China and Japan. He does well to show how the alliance with Japan has shifted from Marine Corps General Henry C. Stackpole's description of the alliance as "a cap in the bottle" containing Japanese militarism in 1990.[3] While Japan aided American interests during the Cold War by tracking Russian submarines and enlarging its military expenditures throughout the 1980s, Tokyo and Washington's actions after the Cold War pushed the alliance toward joint operability in the wake of the 1995–96 Taiwan Crisis.[4] Yet, a strengthened alliance heightens China's sense of insecurity. Additionally, as a respected Japan scholar, Michael Green excels in highlighting modern U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations. He offers new insights into how Nixon damaged re-

[2] Tanaka Akihiko, "Japan-U.S. Summit Meetings," World and Japan Database, 29 June 2017; Mina Pollmann, "Tokyo, Okinawa Avoid Court Battle over Futenma Base Issue," *Diplomat*, 11 March 2016; and Yeo Lay Hwee, "Japan, ASEAN, and Construction of an East Asian Community," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 28, no. 2 (August 2006): 258–75.

[3] Kenneth B. Pyle, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century," *National Bureau of Asian Research*, 13 November 2012, endnote 1.

[4] "The 1995–96 Taiwan Crisis," *Adelphi Papers* 39, no. 331 (1999): 43–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/05679329908449618.

lations with the Japanese by his secret diplomacy to reach rapprochement with the Chinese in the early 1970s and the current feud over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

Green repeatedly visits the policy prescription of Robert H. Dorff, from the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, that senior decision makers should adjust ways, ends, and means with the advent of new technologies in warfighting, communication, and commerce—the exercise of "contextual intelligence." One possibility in revisiting Dorff's policy prescription is to draw back the curtain on policy makers within previous administrations failing or succeeding in thinking critically about the current situation.[5] It is our hope that the classroom exercise below will illustrate the difficulties of constructing strategy toward Asia.

Classroom Exercise

Below is a role-play lesson that employs topics and considerations from Michael J. Green's *By More Than Providence*. It can be adapted for both World and U.S. History secondary school classrooms or for college-level coursework. Instructors can request the book for their library or contact Columbia University Press for a desk copy.

With a broad-sweeping narrative, Green provides readers with much interpretive food for thought. A lesson such as this is adaptable to comparing viewpoints during the Opium War from the mid-nineteenth century (p. 139), or the grand strategy of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon during the Vietnam War (p. 324). Below is a single example of the important topic of Japanese expansion in the Pacific during the interwar years prior to 1941 and the American debate concerning response. Themes accentuated include how Asian specialists in the 1930s expressed their contextual intelligence and how the role of the historian, both then and now, might weigh evidence and provide consultation in the political arena.

History Exercise

Reassessing Grand Strategy: The Problem of Japanese Aggression in the 1930s

Agenda

Part I: Prelecture/discussion (30–45 minutes to discuss grand strategy and to assign groups)

Part II: Class time (45–60 minutes total class time: 10 minutes for planning; 25–30 minutes for 5–7-minute presentations; 5–7 minutes for the Roosevelt response)

Part III: Class time summary/reflection (10–15-minute wrap-up)

Part IV: Essay assignment options (due in class 2–3 days later)

Scenario

It is early 1937. The empire of Japan has prosecuted a series of strategic movements both diplomatically and militarily, including withdrawal from the League of Nations, blowing up a railroad at Mukden, China, and the subsequent invasion of Manchuria. Little did the Americans know that Japan had designs on expansion into the South Pacific, and were preparing for further invasion of China by midsummer. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) has gathered members of his closest East Asia advisors to prosecute a new grand strategy.

The Players

Divide students into groups during the class prior; you could also delegate a leadership role to one of the students serving as FDR.

Group 1: President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Secretary of State Cordell Hull; Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (individually assigned depending on class size)

Group 2: Director Stanley K. Hornbeck, Far East Division

[5] Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff, eds., *Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2013).

Group 3: Joseph C. Grew, U.S. ambassador to Japan
Group 4: John Van Antwerp MacMurray, former director, Far East Division
Group 5: Professor Tyler Dennett, historian, Princeton University

Supplies

Make copies of relevant pages for student access from Green's *By More Than Providence*, chapter 5. Each player needs to examine their section as well as the other groups so they may apprise themselves of all the arguments available. Also, for Joseph Grew, since his section is the shortest, you might add the following primary source: *A More Forceful Response to Japan is Needed* (1937).

PART I
Short Lecture: What Is Grand Strategy?

Prior to the role-play, help the students understand that Asia was a challenging place to affect a grand strategy well before the 1930s (pp. 2–4). Nations, especially the United States, were attempting to adapt flexibly to changing conditions and push any rising hegemonic power out. As both the Americans and Japanese strategies evolved, the governments were thinking about "inflection points" (p. 157), which included weighing ideas and factors, including those old but still relevant; old and no longer relevant; new and relevant; new but not relevant. The overarching point is that ideas must be malleable; if you throw out tried-and-true methods, then you might be turning your back on what has worked for generations. However, stick to the same plans and you might be blind to innovations that could help secure power in the Pacific. As Green adeptly points out: "The emerging system of international relations in Asia had visibly begun to implode, yet there was no new system or concept to replace it other than Japan's bid for domination" (pp. 157–58).

PART II
Role-Play

On this day, allow 10 minutes for groups to formulate their own grand strategy recommendations to President Roosevelt. The president's group should meet during this time as well, and you might ask the Hull and Stimson players to do their own research on their perspectives on Japan. Each group should then be prepared to discuss in a timed 5–7-minute presentation that can be given in writing or through PowerPoint.

Questions

1. What is the main argument that your player believes is the best response to Japan?
2. Give multiple examples from the reading of what you think are factors and forces that make up this new strategy and what past thinking needs to be incorporated or jettisoned moving forward.
3. Summarize what you believe the president should do moving forward in the Pacific.

Once Groups 2–5 present, the president (and/or his advisors) can give their own appraisal of the situation (5–7-minute discussion). Roosevelt should make remarks to the groups concerning a grand strategy moving forward, and if time permits, questions can be directed to the president.

PART III
Summary and Reflections

Make sure you leave enough time (10–15 minutes) at the end for a summary and an open discussion of ideas.

Questions

1. How did old and new ideas influence the decision that the Roosevelt administration faced in 1937?
2. How different was the discussion without the knowledge of what the Japanese did from 1937 to 1941?
3. How do discussions of grand strategic decision making affect our own lives when it comes to choosing when to incorporate new ideas?

PART IV
Essay Writing Assignments

1. Based on evidence provided in the role-play,

write a 2–3-page essay examining each of the perspectives of the players involved. Which did you find most convincing and why?

2. Play the role of one of the participants in the debate and write a 2–3-page memorandum to President Roosevelt on why he is making a strategic mistake by following a certain course of action.

Conclusions

History is replete with examples of strategists and senior decision makers missing opportunities to avert war, contain adversaries, or deter future aggression. Historians hold fast to the precept that every occurrence is unique and major events cannot be generalized by a parsimonious theory; however, they also contend that there are great lessons to be learned from the past. In that end, Michael J. Green's book offers educators numerous moments in American history where the country's strategic course was hampered by the wrong assumptions, blinded by ideological misgivings, and handicapped by a lack of empathy. Green also does well to show how previous policies can create a path of dependence toward future missteps and unintended successes. Thus, the lessons of history need to be acted out, literally, to challenge students to think retrospectively about not only the past but also their own futures.

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CORE OF THE CORPS

The MAGTF Marine

COLONEL MICHAEL WODARCZYK

A native of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Michael Wodarczyk immigrated to the United States in 1910 and enlisted in the Marine Corps just two years later. His service in the Marine Corps spanned more than three decades, enlisted to officer and infantry to air. One of the most venerated aviators of the 1920s, Wodarczyk is the epitome of "Core of the Corps."

From 1912 to 1914, Wodarczyk was busy with expeditionary duty in the Dominican Republic and Vera Cruz. While serving at Marine Barracks Norfolk, Virginia, in October 1915, he and Private W. S. Parker came upon a fire in Number 4 Filling House; they proceeded to extinguish the fire, despite the fact the building contained explosives. For their prompt action, both Marines received letters of commendation from Major General Commandant George Barnett.

In 1916, Wodarczyk reenlisted and found himself again performing barracks duty, though this time at the New York Navy Yard, until he was transferred to the 43d Company, which was heading to Cuba for service. When the Marine Corps formed up the 5th Regiment for service in France, the 43d Company was recalled from Cuba. On 10 June 1918, while in the midst of the Battle for Belleau Wood, now-Gunnery Sergeant Wodarczyk was in command of a platoon when they spotted 200 Germans manning machine guns in a ravine. Outnumbered 4 to 1, Wodarczyk led his men in an attack against the Germans, driving them out of their positions and capturing 50. For this action, he was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross; however, it was not approved by the U.S. Army. By the end of the war, Wodarczyk had an enviable record of achievement: two Silver Star citations (later converted to Silver Star medals), the Croix de Guerre with palm, the Croix de Guerre with gilt star, the French Médaille Militaire, and two wound

Historical Reference Branch, History Division
Then-gunner Michael Wodarczyk saw service in World War I with the 5th Regiment and in the air while in Nicaragua.

Historical Reference Branch, History Division
Wodarczyk standing in front of one of his airplanes. During his service in Nicaragua, he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Nicaraguan Cross of Valor.

stripes (later converted to Purple Heart medals).[1]

Due to his wounds, Wodarczyk left the Corps in May 1919; however, he reenlisted at Philadelphia in November 1920. Less than a year later, in August 1921, Wodarczyk was appointed a Marine gunner while serving at Marine Barracks Quantico. In November 1922, he was transferred to the 2d Brigade in the Dominican Republic and began his career flying with Marine Aviation. He returned to the United States in the summer of 1924 and continued flying—sometimes ferrying aircraft from one coast to the other and back.

In February 1927, Wodarczyk was transferred to Nicaragua as part of Marine Observation Squadron 1 (VO-1M). During his tenure in Nicaragua, he accumulated another valiant record of achievement, this time in the air. During those 16 months, Wodarczyk was recommended for the Distinguished Flying Cross for three separate occasions; regrettably only one yielded the award. He was awarded the Nicaraguan Cross of Valor for his actions on 16 July 1927 in which his flight as one of five aircraft aided the garrison of Marines and Nicaraguans at Ocotal. His citation cited his "skillful and daring ground attack [that] accomplished the rescue of the besieged garrison of Marines and native troops at Ocotal, Nicaragua. He displayed great heroism in the face of hostile fire and repeatedly made brilliant attacks that dealt the enemy telling blows." Upon his return to the United States in June 1928, Wodarczyk had earned a Secretary of Navy Letter of Commendation, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Nicaraguan Cross of Valor.

In February 1928, Wodarczyk was promoted to chief Marine gunner and continued his flying duties in San Diego, Quantico, Guantánamo Bay, and other locations through the 1930s and 1940s. In February 1942, he was promoted to captain (temporary), to major in February 1943, and to lieutenant colonel in January 1944. Due to several aircraft crashes and waning health, he retired in June 1946. He was later promoted to colonel on the retired list and died in 1957. Wodarczyk remains one of the very few Marines to be decorated for actions while serving in both ground and aviation units, thus being a true MAGTF Marine.

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[1] Authorized on 6 July 1916 by Army Order 249, the stripe award allowed those who appeared on casualty lists to wear a two-inch gold braid on the left sleeve of their uniform jacket. Later, it would be converted to a brass version for ease of care. The servicemen could add additional stripes for each subsequent inclusion on a casualty list, though accidental or self-inflicted injuries did not qualify.

IN MEMORIAM

Colonel Edward L. Bale Jr., USMC (Ret)

19 March 1920–21 December 2017

by Kenneth W. Estes, Oscar E. Gilbert, and Romain Cansiere

Edward Bale Jr. was born in Dallas, Texas, to Edward Bale Sr. and Margaret Loughlin Bale. His father was in the real estate business in Dallas; Bale once recalled collecting rent on his father's properties during the last stages of the Great Depression, when tenants paid in cash. Bale Jr. became interested in Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) while in high school and enrolled at the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas (now Texas A&M University) in College Station in 1938. He entered the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Platoon Leader's Course on 14 June 1940. Upon leaving the degree program that he finished later in 1947, Bale was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Reserve on 21 March 1942 and attended The Basic School at Philadelphia Navy Yard until 15 June 1942, with field training near the old Gettysburg battlefield.

In June 1942, Bale reported to Marine Barracks New River, North Carolina (now Camp Lejeune), for assignment at its training center, and became the tank platoon leader of the new 51st Composite Defense Battalion, while also attending the U.S. Army Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Defense battalions received tank platoons in May 1942 as part of defense battalion reorganization after the Corps' experiences at Wake Island. Bale would later recount that, in those days of racial segregation, officers from the southern United States were often assigned to lead black Marines, which he considered another form of discrimination.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Then-Capt Bale after World War II.

As a first lieutenant, Bale transferred in May 1943 to command Company C, 1st Corps Tank Battalion (Medium), forming at Camp Pendleton, California. The Marine Corps had received sufficient tanks so



Courtesy of the Bale estate
Then-1stLt Edward Bale at the training center at Jacques Farm, now part of Camp Pendleton, CA, ca. 1943.

Courtesy of the Bale estate
Bale (back to camera) takes over *China Gal* after his own tank, *Cecilia*, was damaged on Tarawa.

that it could implement its untested tank doctrine for amphibious operations, calling for the light tanks of the divisions to land first and eliminate the beach defenses after which medium tanks would land to counter enemy tanks and spearhead movement inland.

Bale's baptism of fire came at Tarawa, where he led his 14 M4A2 Sherman medium tanks ashore on D-day, 20 November 1943, which was the first use of these tanks by the Marine Corps. Bale and his crew were the first Marine tankers to engage an enemy tank, and he often complained about the fanciful reporting of that battle, particularly the account that his command tank destroyed a Japanese tank by ramming it. In actuality, "the gunner was excited and fired, missing the Japanese tank. Before the loader could reload, the Japanese tank fired."[1] By a million-to-one shot, the enemy shell went into the gun barrel, spraying the turret interior with fragments through the open breech. Bale took over another tank and teamed up with Major Michael P. Ryan's infantry to attack enemy positions along Green Beach from the rear, clearing the way for reinforcements to come ashore as organized units.

Although only two medium tanks remained fully operational at the end, the M4A2s had greatly assisted in turning the tide in that horrific battle. Bale later criticized the tank tactics taught at the Army tank school, particularly *cruising on the objective*: "That was the term that was used for running around on the objective. That was a tactic that the Army taught. I don't know whether it came from the horse cavalry running over a hill and riding around on the hilltop, or what the hell it came from."[2] Bale contributed to the assessment that followed the battle, particularly whether the Tarawa experience would lead to more realistic tank doctrine and tank-infantry coordination.

His company remained with 2d Tank Battalion as its Company A. Now a captain, Bale led it through

[1] Oscar E. Gilbert, *Marine Tank Battles in the Pacific* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001), 90.
[2] Oscar E. Gilbert and Romain Cansière, *Tanks: A Century of Tank Warfare* (Oxford, UK: Casemate, 2017), 66.



Gilbert and Cansière, Tanks in Hell, *courtesy Casemate Publishing*

Map of Tarawa on D+1: (1) *Cecilia* moves east to attack "The Pocket" from the water; (2) while firing with her machine guns, *Cecilia* falls into a submerged shell hole and is abandoned; (3) Bale takes over the repaired *China Gal* and moves west to find the infantry and push south along Green Beach; (4) with Maj Michael Ryan's scratch force of surviving infantrymen, or "Ryan's Orphans," *China Gal* clears Green Beach, attacking enemy positions from behind; and (5) at nightfall, *China Gal* falls back to spend the night in a safer area.

the Battles of Saipan, Tinian, and Okinawa. When his company was transferred to southern Okinawa in the final stages of the battle, "LtCol Jeb Stuart [commanding officer (CO), 1st Tank Battalion] was impressed with our movement and attack with the 8th Marines. Was truly nothing special given the fact that the troops were fresh, the equipment in good shape and we had trained together for months. Every platoon leader and platoon sergeant had trained hard with designated infantry battalions. People knew each other; right down to squad leaders and tank commanders. Infantry Bn [battalion] Commanders knew that I ran tank side of

Courtesy of the Bale estate
Then-Capt Bale, commander of Company A, 2d Tank Battalion, on Saipan.

operations and that Regimental CO would back me if dispute/problems arose. They also knew that if there were problems, I would take care of them. I proved this on Tinian when I fired a platoon leader and sent him back to LtCol [Charles Worth] McCoy because of his uncooperative attitude and being overly cautious as reported to me by a Bn Cmdr. Confirmed to my satisfaction before acting. There was tremendous rapport and confidence throughout."[3]

On southern Okinawa, Army Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. was hit by an antitank round while observing Bale's tanks in action, becoming the highest-ranking American officer killed in the war. By 1945, Bale was clearly one of the most combat experienced tank company commanders in the Marine Corps.

Postwar, Captain Bale was made a regular officer and became the first Marine Corps officer to attend the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Fort Knox, before returning to 2d Tank Battalion in July 1947 as battalion operations officer and executive officer, where he was later promoted to major in April 1948. After three years commanding the recruiting station in Dallas, Texas, he attended Senior School (redesignated Marine Corps Command and Staff College) at Quantico from September 1952 to May 1953. That November, he married Sybil Gilliland and was promoted to lieutenant colonel. Reporting to the Recruit Training Depot San Diego, California, he became the depot inspector and later took command of its headquarters battalion.

Bale returned to the Pacific theater as commanding officer, 1st Tank Battalion, from 1 April 1954 to 19 December 1954, then took command of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, bringing it back to the United States in May 1955.

One last assignment at the Army Armor School at Fort Knox as the Marine Corps representative (June 1955–July 1958) was followed by his assignment as inspector-instructor of the 1st Tank Battalion, Marine Corps Reserve (August 1958–July 1960). Attending the Naval War College the following year led to his assignment to the G-4 Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, as the head of its Ordnance Branch (July 1961–May 1964). During this tour, he successfully shepherded the modernization and dieselization of the Marine Corps tank fleet among myriad other activities.[4]

Promoted to colonel on 3 July 1962, Bale took command of Marine Barracks Guam in July 1964, 20 years after the tough fighting there and on nearby Saipan and Tinian islands. Once more war beckoned, however, and he reported to the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam for duty as the G-4 officer in September 1966 and later served as deputy chief of staff. It was in this second assignment that his Legion of Merit citation noted he was "charged with many complex and sensitive projects as special representative of the Commanding General, he was responsible for collecting factual information regarding the combat performance of the new M-16 rifle. Personally supervising a team composed of ordnance experts, he ensured that special instructions regarding care, cleaning, safety and maintenance procedures for the M-16 were provided [to] all echelons, including small unit leaders who were charged with presenting classes to their own personnel. As a direct result of his efforts, significant

[3] Edward Bale, email to Kenneth Estes, 2 June 1999.

[4] Kenneth W. Estes, *Marines under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916–2000* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 160–61.

improvements in the effective use of the rifle were made within the division."[5]

Colonel Bale returned to the United States and assumed his final duty assignment on 2 November 1967 as deputy chief of staff and inspector for force troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. He retired on 1 August 1969 after serving 30 years, 1 month, and 16 days in the Corps. Besides the Legion of Merit, he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with "V," the Navy Commendation Medal, two Presidential Unit Citations, the American Defense Service Medal, the American Campaign Medal, the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with four stars, the World War II Victory Medal, the Navy Occupation Service Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Korean Service Medal, and the United Nations Service Medal (Korea).

After retirement, Bale served as the vice president at First National Bank of Dallas for 10 years. While history often ignores the softer side of warriors, Bale also served the community through the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of America. Bale was known as a very compassionate person, though some of his community service was done anonymously. One Christmas in Dallas, his family packaged a tree, decorations, gifts, and food and delivered them in secret to the home of a struggling single mother.

Following his second retirement, he became the administrator of the Episcopal Diocese of the Rio Grande for another five years. Well into his 70s, Bale remained involved in the sanctuary movement, providing supplies for Central American refugees in Mexico. Because of his extensive service in war and peace, he was a frequent contributor to historical research in both print and film media. His key roles in the evolution of Marine Corps armored fighting vehicles and other ordnance matters, plus his considerable knowledge of three decades of Marine Corps leaders, made him a highly valued contact and contributor for scholars and filmmakers. He will be sorely missed, but his records and reminiscences remain in books and archives, including the Library of Congress.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy 2d Tank Battalion
Col Bale as commanding officer, Marine Barracks Guam.

Edward Lewis Bale Jr. passed away on 21 December 2017 during a visit to family in Winnsboro, Texas. He was interred on 9 January 2018 at the Houston National Cemetery.

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[5] Col Edward L. Bale, "Information Services Office" press release, Biographical Data Folder, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

IN MEMORIAM

Colonel Wesley L. Fox, USMC (Ret)

30 September 1931–24 November 2017

> "Every now and then in my life, I have met someone who I think cannot be killed or who will never die for any reason. Wes Fox is one of them."
>
> ~Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Cody, USMC (Ret)

Born 30 September 1931, in Herndon, Virginia, Wesley Lee Fox attended Warren County High School in Front Royal, Virginia, until 1948. Enlisting in the Marine Corps on 4 August 1950, he was ordered to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, South Carolina, for recruit training, which he completed in October 1950.

After a brief tour as a rifleman with the 2d Marine Division at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Fox served his initial tour during the Korean conflict as a rifleman with Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division. Wounded in action on 8 September 1951, he was evacuated to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Maryland. Upon his release from Bethesda in March 1952, he served as a patrolman with the Armed Forces Police in Washington, DC, until September 1953, when he was reassigned to Marine Aircraft Group 11 in Japan.

Returning to Korea for his second tour, now-Sergeant Fox served as a platoon sergeant with Company G, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Upon returning to the United States, he served briefly at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, prior to being assigned to Drill Instructors School at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps)
Then-Capt Wesley L. Fox pictured here after being awarded the Medal of Honor.

Completing the school in August 1955, he remained in San Diego, serving as a drill instructor

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy LCpl E. E. Hildreth
Then-1stLt Fox, commander of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, takes a break to catch up on the news. Fox led his company during Operation Dewey Canyon against an enemy bunker complex.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
Then-1stLt Fox rests at Company A's position overlooking the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a week after the action for which he would be awarded the Medal of Honor.

until August 1957 before returning to the East Coast to attend Recruiter's School at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island. After completing his tour as a recruiter in December 1960, he was ordered back to the West Coast and served as a platoon sergeant with the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company both at Camp Pendleton and on Okinawa through November 1962. In December that year, Fox was assigned as a troop handler at the Marine Air Detachment Jacksonville, Florida, and served in this capacity until September 1965.

Gunnery Sergeant Fox next saw duty in the Office of the Provost Marshal, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Paris, France. In May 1966, he was promoted to first sergeant and also commissioned as a second lieutenant. Returning to the United States in August that year, he became a platoon commander with the 2d Force Reconnaissance Company at Camp Lejeune.

Lieutenant Fox was then ordered to the Republic of Vietnam, where he served as a battalion advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps for 13 months. In November 1968, he became the commanding officer of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, serving in this capacity until May 1969. It was during this assignment that he would be awarded the nation's highest decoration for bravery. He was promoted to captain on 1 April 1969.

Upon his return to the United States, he completed the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy SSgt David Pafford

Medal of Honor recipients, ca. 1985. From left: Howard V. Lee, William Barber, Mitchell Paige, Joseph Foss, Gen Louis Wilson, Jacklyn Lucas, Col Harvey Barnum, and LtCol Fox pose after attending events at The Basic School.

Base Quantico, Virginia, in January 1970, at which time he assumed his assignment as a tactics instructor at The Basic School, Quantico. After 43 years of Marine Corps service, Fox retired as a colonel in September 1993. He would then go on to serve eight years as the deputy commandant for Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University's Corps of Cadets.

Colonel Wesley L. Fox was the 48th Marine to be awarded the Medal of Honor for outstanding heroism. The medal was presented to then-Captain Fox by President Richard M. Nixon during a Joint Service ceremony held at the White House on 2 March 1971. In addition to the Medal of Honor, his other medals and decorations include: the Bronze Star Medal with combat "V," the Navy Commendation Medal with one gold star, the Purple Heart with three gold stars in lieu of second through fourth awards, the Combat Action Ribbon, the Presidential Unit Citation, the Good Conduct Medal with four gold stars in lieu of subsequent awards, the National Defense Service Medal with one bronze star, the Korean Service Medal with three bronze stars, the United Nations Service Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal with one silver star and one bronze star in lieu of subsequent awards, two Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry, the Vietnamese Honor Medal First Class, the Vietnamese Unit Cross of Gallantry with palm, the Korean Presidential Unit Citation, and the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal.

Medal of Honor Citation

> The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to Captain [then 1st Lieutenant] Wesley Lee Fox, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty on 22 February 1969, while serving as Commanding Officer of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in action

against the enemy in the northern A Shau Valley. Captain Fox's company came under intense fire from a large well concealed enemy force. Captain Fox maneuvered to a position from which he could assess the situation and confer with his platoon leaders. As they departed to execute the plan he had devised, the enemy attacked and Captain Fox was wounded along with all of the other members of the command group, except the executive officer. Captain Fox continued to direct the activity of his company. Advancing through heavy enemy fire, he personally neutralized one enemy position and calmly ordered an assault against the hostile emplacements. He then moved through the hazardous area coordinating aircraft support with the activities of his men. When his executive officer was mortally wounded, Captain Fox reorganized the company and directed the fire of his men as they hurled grenades against the enemy and drove the hostile forces into retreat. Wounded again in the final assault, Captain Fox refused medical attention, established a defensive posture, and supervised the preparation of casualties for medical evacuation. His indomitable courage, inspiring initiative, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of grave personal danger inspired his Marines to such aggressive action that they overcame all enemy resistance and destroyed a large bunker complex. Captain Fox's heroic actions reflect great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps, and uphold the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.



Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Nischalke
LtCol Fox on Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, ca. 1993.

Colonel Fox passed away on 24 November 2017 at the age of 86 in Blacksburg, Virginia.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

Air Power Doctrine

by Viktoriya Fedorchak, PhD[1]

Introduction

The contemporary field of air power studies is characterized by multifaceted exploration of operational, technological, and conceptual aspects of using air power. The logic of systematic analysis would dictate the necessity of covering all of these aspects in understanding air power and its development in each national strategic culture. However, the amount of research on air power doctrine as the primary vessel of a conceptual component remains scarce, particularly in the case of British air power doctrine for the Royal Air Force (RAF) as compared with those of the American Services.[2] The primary purpose of this article is to provide a literature review of the few existing works on RAF air power doctrine, intersecting fields that can provide some insights into operational considerations of air power conceptualization in its connection to other British military doctrines, but also to illustrate some trends in academic coverage of U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Marine Corps Aviation doctrine.

The field of RAF air power doctrine is not widely covered in the academic literature. The majority of research is devoted to doctrine development in the twentieth century, with fewer works on its post–Cold War revival. Compared to the amount of research on the two other Services in the post–Cold War era, this article draws readers' attention to the existing gap in the literature and the necessity to explore this question in greater depth. Regarding the structure, first, this article explores academic works that investigated RAF doctrine, per se, followed by intersecting fields of British air power and U.S. military doctrine that can be insightful for investigating certain features of RAF air power doctrine. However, these works do not explore in depth the processes of institutionalization of jointery and the most recent editions of air power doctrine from 2013, *UK Air and Space Doctrine*, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-30, and the 2017 edition.[3]

History of RAF Doctrine Development

James Neil Pugh's 2012 PhD thesis, followed by his most recent book, places the emphasis on the conceptual origins of the control of air in terms of divided British military and naval aviation of 1911–18.[4] It also provides background on how the first doctrinal manual was created and which concepts were predomi-

[1] Viktoriya Fedorchak received her PhD from the University of Hull in Yorkshire, England, exploring the subject of "The Development of RAF Air Power Doctrine, 1999–2013." She is a lecturer in military history at Maynooth University, Ireland. Previously, she has taught multiple courses at the University of Nottingham, the University of Hull, and Kyiv International University, Ukraine. Her research interests include defense studies, air power, and military doctrine. Her upcoming monograph, *British Air Power: The Doctrinal Path to Jointery* (2018), explores the shift from single-Service to joint authorship of environmental doctrine.

[2] Due to the nature of this discussion and to reduce confusion, Service will be used interchangeably throughout to represent a country's military, regardless of whether American or foreign.

[3] *UK Air and Space Doctrine*, JDP 0-30 (Swindon, UK: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, 2013, 2017).

[4] James Pugh, *The Royal Flying Corps, the Western Front, and the Control of the Air, 1914–1918* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017).

nant. Although the research concentrates mainly on concepts, and doctrine is viewed as one of "various facets affecting the conceptual origins of the control of the air" in terms of the history of the studied question, it still provides some insights into the beginning of the process of doctrine writing within the RAF.[5]

The next stage of doctrine development is covered in the research of Air Commodore Neville Parton, who concentrates on air power doctrine and its development in the interwar period.[6] Parton explains the influential factors in the preparation of doctrine, which affected its final form and classified status.[7] These factors include the dominance of concepts of strategic bombing and air offensive, the inter-Service rivalry, and the desire of the RAF to preserve its independent status under the conditions of constant budgetary restraints.[8] He also examines both strategic and tactical doctrines. Parton conducted a comparative analysis of *Operations Manual RAF* from 1922 with the first two editions of the *RAF War Manual*.

John Buckley also explores air power doctrine in the interwar period.[9] Although, like Neville Parton, he looks into conceptual changes in air power doctrines of the time and examines inter-Service pressure on doctrinal development, he places emphasis on the subject from the perspective of maritime air power rather than the RAF.[10] He also analyzes RAF performance in World War II, paying particular attention to RAF Coastal Command and Trade Defence.[11] Although John Buckley examines the development of RAF doctrine in the interwar period, doctrine per se was not the subject of his research, but it serves as a tool for exploring air power performance in the chosen time.

On the other hand, Scot Robertson devotes his book entirely to the establishment of RAF strategic bombing doctrine in the interwar years.[12] He explores the complexity of the internal political environment, "debates on spending money on untried weapons," and attempts to conceptualize airpower according to narrow needs of diplomacy and imperial interests of the time.[13] Robertson argues that the theory and strategy of air power are in disjunction and the two interwar decades were driven by theory rather than the doctrine of strategic bombing. Thus, he concludes doctrine is virtually nonexistent. This book is an excellent source to explore the factors influencing doctrine writing and its place in inter-Service politics of the interwar years.

Further chronological research was conducted by Andrew Vallance, covering the period 1957–87.[14] The main emphasis of his work is described thus: "While seeking to identify the principal elements of the Royal Air Force's air power doctrine in the past—and the factors that have shaped it—this study is aimed very much at the Service's doctrinal development in the future."[15] Attention is paid to the reasons for the Service's existence without a conceptual framework of its actions, its diverse functionality, and the potential ways of its shaping against growing inter-Service and international integrations.

In an article published the same year in *Air Clues*, Vallance explains the results of his research in a discussion between senior officers and the practical ne-

[5] James Neil Pugh, "The Conceptual Origins of the Control of Air: British Military and Naval Aviation, 1911–1918" (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012), abstract.

[6] Neville Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919–1939" (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2009).

[7] Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine."

[8] Neville Parton, "The Development of Early RAF Doctrine," *Journal of Military History* 72, no. 4 (October 2008): 1155–78, https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.0.0104.

[9] John Buckley, *Air Power in the Age of Total War* (London: Routledge, 1998).

[10] Buckley, *Air Power in the Age of Total War*.

[11] John Buckley, *The RAF and Trade Defence, 1919–1945: Constant Endeavour* (Keele, UK: Keele University Press, 1995).

[12] Scot Robertson, *The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919–1939* (Westport: Praeger, 1995).

[13] Robertson, *The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine*, xi.

[14] Andrew Vallance, "The Evolution of Air Power Doctrine within the RAF, 1957–1987" (master's thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988).

[15] Vallance, "The Evolution of Air Power Doctrine within the RAF," 5.

cessity of the doctrine for the RAF.[16] He traces the history of doctrine development and functionality and comes to a conclusion that "in comparison with USAF's well organized 'Big Business' approach to doctrinal development, that of RAF's was more akin to a cottage industry."[17] Vallance continues his professional activity, encouraging strategic thinking on air power and potential doctrinal publications. The next step is a collection of essays on air power, which is an attempt to systematize the existing concepts and create a certain unofficial framework of air power use.[18] In his book, *The Air Power Weapon*, Vallance concentrates on the implications of new technological advancement for the role of air power in the post–Cold War and post–Gulf War strategic environments.[19]

The contemporary period of RAF doctrine development is covered in an article by Chris Finn. In his earlier works, he concentrates on operational lessons that could be adopted in the new practice, potential doctrinal implications of new operations, and technological changes.[20] Later, he traces the development of air power doctrine from 1977 to 2009, when the fourth edition of *British Air and Space Power Doctrine* (AP 3000) was about to be published.[21] Hence, Finn's account does not include an analysis of the last publication on air power doctrine, *UK Air and Space Doctrine*. The main argument he poses is that irrespective of temporal changes, the intellectual tendencies in air power thinking remain the same. He is quite critical about doctrinal functionality and the impact of diverse operational experience on the application of doctrine. He also explains certain unknown forces behind the writing of the fourth edition of *British Air and Space Power Doctrine*. The relevance of this article for the studied field is that it provides a roadmap to the evaluation of the processes of doctrine writing of the two studied editions of air power doctrine. However, this article neither covers more contemporary trends in doctrine development after 2009 nor concentrates on the systematic approach to doctrine writing.

Intersecting Fields

Except for the previously mentioned works directly related to the studied research question, there are fields of literature on the studied period that intersect with this topic. The literature can be divided into two groups. The first group concentrates on the general topic of British air power and the RAF. The second group is devoted to the exploration of the British military doctrine in general.

British Air Power and the RAF

The field of air power studies is characterized by a very small number of specialists. Military specialists of air power often work on its practical aspect and disseminate their findings through conferences and workshops, while academics publish a few articles and books on the topic. However, they primarily concentrate on the theoretical aspect of research. Therefore, when there is an opportunity to bring together both military practitioners and academics, it results in a systematic evaluation of the topic and its dissemination to a wider audience. Thus, new ideas and concepts presented only at conferences and workshops to academics and practitioners become available to the public. Often, such symbiosis is achieved in the form of monographs and collections of essays on a target topic. This explanation is aimed to demonstrate the

[16] Andrew Vallance, "Air Power Doctrine," *Air Clues* 42, no 5 (May 1988): 163–69.
[17] Vallance, "Air Power Doctrine," 167.
[18] Andrew Vallance, ed., *Air Power: Collected Essays on Doctrine* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1990).
[19] Andrew G. B. Vallance, *The Air Weapon: Doctrines of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
[20] Chris Finn, "Air Aspects of Operation Iraqi Freedom," *Air Power Review* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 1–23; Chris Finn, "Air Power in Afghanistan," *Air Power Review* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 1–16; Chris Finn, "The Broader Implications of the Increasing Use of Precision Weapons," *Air Power Review* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 35–59; Chris Finn, "Network Centric Warfare—Doctrinal Issues," in *Network Centric Warfare and the Future of Air Power: Proceedings of a Conference Held in Canberra by the Royal Australian Air Force*, ed. WgCdr Keith Brent, RAAF (Tuggeranong, Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2004); and Chris Finn, "Air Power Post Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Doctrinal Implications" (unpublished paper, RAF 2004 Air Power Conference, London).
[21] Chris Finn, "British Thinking on Air Power—The Evolution of AP3000," *Air Power Review* 12, no. 1, (Spring 2009): 56–67.

importance of monographs in the field of air power studies and their scarcity.

Stuart Peach, as an author of the third edition of *British Air and Space Power Doctrine*, edited a couple of books on the new capabilities of air power conditioned by technological changes and how they fit into the post-Kosovo realities.[22] Although the ideas embodied in these works reflect the concepts of the written doctrine, doctrinal issues per se are not discussed in these books.

Peter Gray also has edited collections of essays on air power: *Air Power 21* and *British Air Power*.[23] The main emphasis of both collections is on the transition of air power from the experience of the Cold War toward the new realities of the twenty-first century. Such topics as asymmetric warfare, counterinsurgency, the new technologies of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the politico-strategic implication of the improved precision are included. The first monograph concentrates on the lessons of Kosovo and allied operations, while the second pays attention to Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism.

The series of books edited by Andreas Olsen concentrates on air power on the global scale, but also includes several chapters on British air power. In *A History of Air Warfare*, more attention is paid to the evaluation of the performance of air power in major operations through the history of the existence of the RAF.[24] In terms of British air power of the period relevant to this thesis, Robert Owen analyzes the correlation between the decision-making apparatus and air power efficiency in Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995). The British contribution to the recent campaigns in Operations Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001–14), and Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003–10) are analyzed by Tony Mason, Benjamin S. Lambeth, and Williamson Murray. The potential of air and space powers' use in effects-based operations and the place of both in contemporary warfare are explained in the case study by Richard P. Hallion.[25]

John Andreas Olsen's book *Global Air Power* includes a chapter by Tony Mason in which he follows the history of the RAF and explains the complexity of its independence as a single Service under the constant threat of being absorbed by two other Services.[26] In terms of the studied timeframe, the chapter provides analysis of the RAF's performance in the last operations under substantial budgetary cuts. In this regard, it emphasizes that "sometimes air power could achieve the desired political or strategic effects on its own, but its primary focus was joint service operations."[27]

While the previous works concentrate on air power development and its incorporation into the changing strategic environment, other academics devote their works to the exploration of air power's role in particular operations. David F. Haines argues that contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) operations require a more profound COIN education, which should be based on a better analysis of the previous experience of COIN use of air power in Malaya and Aden.[28]

Benjamin Lambeth, an American specialist in air power, devotes his books to various operations and their results for air power. He analyzes the political and strategic implications of air power use and frictions in air war in Kosovo, the role of air power in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and other as-

[22] Stuart Peach, ed., *Perspectives on Air Power: Air Power in Its Wider Context* (London: HMSO, 1998); and Stuart Peach and David Gates, eds., *Air Power for the New Millennium* (Lancaster: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1999).

[23] Peter Gray, ed., *Air Power 21: Challenges for the New Century* (London: HMSO, 2000); and Peter W. Gray, ed., *British Air Power* (London: HMSO, 2003).

[24] John Andreas Olsen, ed., *A History of Air Warfare* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010).

[25] Richard P. Hallion, "Air and Space Power: Climbing and Accelerating," in *A History of Air Warfare*, 379–80.

[26] John Andreas Olsen, ed., *Global Air Power* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011).

[27] Tony Mason, "British Air Power," in *Global Air Power*, 62.

[28] David F. Haines, *British Airpower and Counterinsurgency: Learning from the Past, Fighting Today and Preparing for Tomorrow* (BiblioScholar, 2012).

pects of the development of air power.[29] The general relevance of his works to the topic is in the creation of background knowledge for the understanding of global tendencies in the roles of air power. He also refers to the RAF's performance in recent operations. His last book, *The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein*, is of particular significance, because he devotes an entire chapter to the allied contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom, where he compares the RAF and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) performance.[30] Moreover, he addresses the issue of doctrine in terms of the harmonization of Coalition cooperation at the operational and tactical levels.[31]

Tim Ripley analyzes Coalition performance in each stage of the air war in Iraq and traces the evolution of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations after Afghanistan.[32] His most recent book pays particular attention to British Army aviation in operations from Kosovo to Libya.[33] The author looks into the technological equipment of the British Army Air Corps and Royal Artillery. Thus, he concentrates on British Army aviation rather than the RAF. On the other hand, Anthony Loveless adopts a different perspective in *Blue Sky Warriors: The RAF in Afghanistan in Their Own Words*, focusing on the RAF experience in a particular operation. He collected interviews with RAF personnel serving in Afghanistan.[34] Unlike the aforementioned literature, this work addresses his personal perception of the operation and the day-to-day challenges of its accomplishment.

The relationship of Colin Gray's research to the subject is dual. First, Gray writes about doctrine from a theoretical perspective as one of the dimensions of strategy.[35] He also explores doctrinal functionality as an institutional means of creating commonality in thinking and the synchronization of actions.[36] Second, in his book *Air Power for Strategic Effect*, Gray concentrates on the historical and contemporary reevaluation of air power in a strategic context, discussing air power per se, and not just the RAF or the USAF.[37] Since the intent of the book is to link operational experience to the strategic reevaluation of air power for the contemporary strategic understanding and its effective use, it does not look into doctrinal issues. However, the book is an immense source for the historical development of air power examined from the point of view of strategic thinking.

From the literature analyzed above, we can conclude that air power was evaluated mainly in terms of new operational experiences and requirements of a strategic environment. British air power is less emphasized than American. Conversely, the analysis of Coalition operations can be applied to both air forces, taking into account obvious differences in size, the division of roles, and the achievement of objectives. In terms of doctrine, the general air power discourse pays little attention to it since the main approach to air power research is aimed at outcome analysis instead of means such as doctrine. Therefore, with the

[29] Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Washington, DC: Rand, 2001); Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2005); Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003); Benjamin S. Lambeth, *American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2005); Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Combat Pair: The Evolution of Air Force-Navy Integration in Strike Warfare* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007); and Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2011).

[30] Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

[31] Lambeth, *The Unseen War*.

[32] Tim Ripley, *Air War Iraq* (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2004); and Tim Ripley, A*ir War Afghanistan: US and NATO Air Operations from 2001* (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2011).

[33] Tim Ripley, *British Army Aviation in Action: Kosovo to Libya* (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2011).

[34] Anthony Loveless, *Blue Sky Warriors: The RAF in Afghanistan in Their Own Words* (Somerset, UK: Haynes Publishing, 2011).

[35] Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[36] Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[37] Colin S. Gray, *Air Power for Strategic Effect* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2012).

exception of a few works, the general air power literature does not pay sufficient attention to doctrine.

The Field of British Military Doctrine

After the end of the Cold War, doctrine writers who had no previous experience of systematic doctrine writing had to face several challenges.[38] First, it was essential to come to a common understanding of what was meant by the term *doctrine* and its role in the national strategic culture. Second, the place of doctrine in the timeline of events required emphasis. Although the first post–Cold War decade was meant to address these issues and provide a precise conclusion, the transitional nature of the period and the unstable role of doctrine resulted in a diversity of inquiries on doctrinal matters. Since the field of doctrinal studies is still evolving, most of the literature analyzed below consists of academic and professional articles on the subject. It can be divided into several groups: historical, conceptual, and Services' perspectives.

In terms of the historical approach, academics paid attention to the exploration of the historical development of doctrine and the meaning of historical experience in doctrine. The first aspect is reflected in Oliver Daddow's historiographic toolkit. He argues that doctrine is a historical document reflecting the combination of four diverse factors influencing its preparation: international context, domestic politics, networks, and writers.[39] The history in terms of the development of military skills is presented by Charles Grant, Eliot A. Cohen, and Douglas Porch. Grant argues that the lessons of history are crucial for understanding what can be achieved.[40] Eliot Cohen argues for the necessity of "a historical mind," suggesting that an individual is not supposed to rely heavily on the meaning of lessons learned but to "appreciate the variability of people and places, conditions and problems."[41] Douglas Porch emphasizes the role of history in debates of the connection between strategy and policy making, with reference to the example of the GWOT.[42]

In terms of a conceptual approach, articles can be divided into the following categories of inquiry: the nature of doctrine and its meaning; the influence of doctrine on the military environment; and doctrinal development. An article by Andrew Methven is an example of the first category, examining the nature of doctrine, purposes, factors influencing the evolution of doctrine, and its problems.[43] One of the focal points of the article is the continuation of the discourse introduced in I. B. Holly's 1989 article, "Concepts, Doctrines and Principles." Holly emphasizes that doctrine is about fighting wars today, while concepts are about fighting wars tomorrow.[44]

The best example of the doctrinal debate is represented in an article by Colin McInnes and the following response by Neville Parton.[45] McInnes is skeptical about the very functionality and productivity of doctrine, suggesting that its retrospective nature does not prepare personnel for future wars. Parton justifies doctrine, considering it productive in the delivery of best practice as a formal teaching. Thus, it trains personnel for future wars.

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[38] This is particularly the case of Charles Dobbie and Philip Wilkinson's work on the British Army's Field Manual, *Wider Peacekeeping* (London: HMSO, 1995).

[39] Oliver J. Daddow, "Facing the Future: History in the Writing of British Military Doctrine," *Defence Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 163.

[40] Charles Grant, "The Use of History in the Development of Contemporary Doctrine," in *The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*, ed. J. Gooch, Occasional Paper No. 30 (Camberley, UK: Strategic Combat Studies Institute, 1997): 7–17.

[41] Eliot A. Cohen, "The Historical Mind and Military Strategy," *Orbis* 49, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 575.

[42] Douglas Porch, "Writing History in the 'End of History' Era—Reflections on Historians and the GWOT," *Journal of Military History* 70, no. 4 (October 2006): 1065–79, https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2006.0270.

[43] Maj Andrew Methven, "Is It Not High Time the Doctrine Industry Published Its Doctrine on the Limits of the Utility of Written Doctrine?," *Defence Studies* 3, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 133, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430308405082.

[44] MajGen I. B. Holly Jr., USAFR (Ret), "Concepts, Doctrines and Principles—Are You Sure You Understand These Terms?," *Air University Review* 35, no. 5 (July/August 1984): 90–93.

[45] Colin McInnes, "The British Army's New Way in Warfare: A Doctrinal Misstep?," *Defense & Security Analysis* 23, no. 2 (June 2007): 127–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790701424697; and GpCapt Neville Parton, "In Defence of Doctrine . . . But Not Dogma," *Defense & Security Analysis* 24, no. 1 (March 2008): 81–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790801903335.

In his works on strategy, Colin Gray pays attention to military doctrine as a tool of the military institution's unification of personnel and the development of common principles. It might be both useful and harmful in terms of creativity and adaptability to changing circumstances. In this regard, he starts from the perception of doctrine as a dogma and a rather counterproductive phenomenon in terms of strategy.[46]

One of the most systematic examples of research done on British doctrine was conducted by Markus Mäder. The main emphasis of his PhD thesis and the subsequent book is the study of reasons for doctrine writing after 1989. In this context, he explores such questions as: "What caused this change of attitude towards doctrine? Which events and perceptions, which debates and schools of thought drove the evolution of Britain's military-strategic doctrine?"[47] Consequently, doctrine is studied in the framework of strategic, political, and societal changes in the period 1989–2001. The distinctive feature of the book is that it does not study doctrine as an abstract subject, but pays attention to its conceptual development and subsequent textual embodiment.

The empirical perspective on the topic includes an article based on an interview with Major General Tony Milton, the first director general of Joint Doctrine and Concepts for the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, who suggests that doctrine is about using historical experience in training people for fighting current wars, while concepts are hypotheses on fighting wars of tomorrow. He states that the development of joint publications does not aim at the crucial modification of single-Service doctrines but at the harmonization of tri-Service cooperation under the conditions of different environments.[48] Julian Lindley-French analyzes doctrine in the framework of the political struggle between France and the United Kingdom for the leadership in Europe. However, this time doctrine is addressed in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 and in terms of the European Common Security and Defence Policy.[49] J. J. Widen devotes his research to tracing a connection between Corbett's ideas and their actual implementation in the text of the British maritime doctrine.[50]

In terms of the verification of doctrine efficiency, an article by Claudia Harvey and Mark Wilkinson is of particular interest. It assesses the value of doctrine for British officers in the case study of Afghanistan.[51] An entirely different perspective of doctrinal research is presented by British Army Colonel Alexander Alderson. In his article, Alderson aims to show a connection between the successful development of a single-Service Army doctrine and the structure of the British Army.[52]

The Perspectives of the Services

The relevance of the British Navy and Army works on doctrine for this thesis is due to the following considerations. First, the tendencies in doctrine development within the other two Services reflect the general doctrinal environment within the British armed forces of the time. Realization of doctrinal tendencies and the general attitude toward doctrine within the other two Services provides a systematic understanding of how jointery was further implemented both in terms of doctrinal and operational aspects. Second, even before the advancement of jointery, the three Services had to cooperate in the actual warfighting environment, reflecting certain lessons learned regarding such

[46] Gray, *Modern Strategy*.

[47] Markus Mäder, *In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post–Cold War Era, 1989–2002* (Germany: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004), 23.

[48] MajGen Tony Milton, OBE, RM, "My Job: Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts," *RUSI Journal* 145, no. 2 (April 2000): 15–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840008446502.

[49] Julian Lindley-French, "Fighting Europe's Wars the British Way: The European Politics of British Defence Doctrine," *RUSI Journal* 147, no. 2 (April 2002): 74–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840208446759.

[50] J. J. Widen, "Julian Corbett and the Current British Maritime Doctrine," *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 2 (April–June 2009): 170–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930902799764.

[51] Claudia Harvey and Mark Wilkinson, "The Value of Doctrine: Assessing British Officers' Perspectives," *RUSI Journal* 154, no. 6 (December 2009): 26–31, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840903532858.

[52] Col Alexander Alderson, "The Army Brain: A Historical Perspective on Doctrine, Development and the Challenges of Future Conflict," *RUSI Journal* 155, no. 3 (June 2010): 10–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2010.499618.

cooperation in doctrinal documents. Thus, looking into the analysis of doctrines by the other two Services provides this article with a more systematic overview of the operational performance of the British armed forces, tendencies in perceptions of doctrine within each Service, and a subsequent correlation between the three Services in the doctrine writing of each. In other words, it should be understood that just as the doctrines of the three Services are related, so is their analysis in professional and academic literature.

The Royal Navy

The main source of professional discourse in the Royal Navy is *The Naval Review*.[53] Irrespective of the relevance of this journal for understanding professionals' critical thought on the doctrinal subject, it is limited by the timeframe of 1990–2003. The first article of 1995 was written by Simon Hollington, who concentrates on explaining what doctrine itself is and its meaning under the conditions of the changing post–Cold War military environment.[54] James J. Tritten follows the general explanatory pattern of Hollington, but also places emphasis on the historical dimension of doctrinal development and the lessons relevant for today. The main lessons to consider include the need, irrespective of the joint approach, for each Service to keep its own way of accomplishing tasks; the development of different doctrines for various circumstances and the levels of warfare; attention to the role of individual commanders; and the involvement of nonmilitary participants in the reviewing stage.[55] In the final article, an anonymous author addresses doctrinal functionality in the environment of scarce funding of national defense.[56]

The RAF Perspective

In the case of the RAF, too, the availability of resources on doctrine is constrained by time. The only difference is that, while more data on the Royal Navy is available for the first post–Cold War decade, the RAF *Air Power Review* covers the second post–Cold War decade.

The first article was written by Professor Richard Overy in 2000. He analyzes the dogmatic context of doctrine through its historical nature. Although he does not suggest that doctrine is useless, he argues that "doctrine tends to solidify like a slowly moving lava flow."[57] Overy's historical analysis of doctrine shows that the development and application of doctrine is influenced by five factors: wider politics, technological changes, lessons of experience, the requirement that doctrine be modified and reviewed when a need arises, and the "eccentricity factor."[58]

The most remarkable researcher in the field of air power doctrine is Group Captain Peter W. Gray, RAF (Ret). In his first article, he aims to stimulate debate on how the future aerospace doctrine of 2010 might look. He concludes that, although government might decide not to finance and develop certain technologies, future doctrine will be characterized by joint inter-Service and allied operations.[59] In another article, Gray suggests that "we cannot expect to be able to apply doctrine to every military situation with the precision and utility of a Delia Smith recipe. But it should always be there as a guide to our actions."[60] In a third article, Gray pays particular attention to a correlation between air power and joint

[53] *The Naval Review* originated as a quarterly journal for a naval society formed in 1912, which served for "correspondence on professional matters." Today, it remains a forum for discussion of the recent professional matters by serving staff of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. The main feature of the journal is that publication of articles and memos do not require preliminary approval from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Due to this, *The Naval Review* is a valuable source of professional opinions on contemporary subjects, which might be different from an official position of MOD.

[54] Simon Hollington, "The Royal Navy Needs Doctrine," *Naval Review* 83, no. 1 (January 1995): 12–16.

[55] James J. Tritten, "Navy Doctrine: Lessons for Today," *Naval Review* 84, no. 1 (January 1996): 18.

[56] GoCo, "A New Doctrine For A New Century," *Naval Review* 88, no. 1 (January 2000): 23–26. Note that GoCo refers to staff, or government owned-contractor operated, authors.

[57] Richard Overy, "Doctrine Not Dogma: Lessons from the Past," *Air Power Review* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 33.

[58] Overy, "Doctrine Not Dogma."

[59] GpCapt Peter Gray, RAF, "Air Power or Aerospace Doctrine 2010?," *Air Power Review* 3, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 7–21.

[60] GpCapt Peter Gray, RAF, "Air Power in the Modern World," *Air Power Review* 3, no. 3, (Autumn 2000): 11.

doctrine from the RAF's point of view. His main conclusion is that, despite the benefits of relatively easy cooperation of air power doctrine with the other two Services, it is incapable of overcoming one crucial obstacle: the institutional baggage of their own Service. This obstacle can only be dealt with on the common/joint level.

Irrespective of the contributions the representatives of the various Services bring to the table of common decision making and operational planning, they also bring the baggage of their own Services, "whether this be differing interpretations of history or unhealthy doses of dogma."[61] The best way to develop "dogma-free thinking" is the establishment of "inherently joint and consistent" training and programs under the authority of the Joint Services Command and Staff College.[62] Following Gray's works, the Air Force emphasis in doctrinal study shifts toward specific and conceptual dimensions. While Wing Commander Alistair Monkman, RAF, concentrates on the maneuverist approach and coalition warfare, Richard Lock-Pullan pays attention to the concepts of strategic effect and centers of gravity.[63]

Overall, the RAF writing on the matter of doctrine can be characterized as evaluative rather than developmental, as is the case with the Royal Navy. In this regard, the relevance of doctrine is not doubted. Attention is paid to the problematic areas of its application, such as a need for constant revision and modification, differences in the interpretation of doctrine by various Services, and a subsequent need for a reevaluation of the conceptual framework of its application. In other words, RAF writers concentrate on the current requirements of the doctrine rather than phenomenological matters of its origin. Therefore, they explore doctrine as a tool, which might contribute to the resolution of existing problems in the single-Service and joint environments.

The Army Perspective

In terms of the British Army perspective, it can be argued that, unlike the two other Services, the doctrinal aspects of the previous operations are covered in more detail in academic and professional literature. The most popular topics refer to two types of doctrines: counterinsurgency (COIN) and peace support operations (PSO).

COIN doctrine was a hot topic in the second post–Cold War decade. The attention to it was triggered by events in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Christopher Tuck, the historical perspective of analyzing the British approach to COIN can give a clear comprehension of the strengths and weaknesses of any counterinsurgency doctrine, including the current one.[64] The problems of the theory/practice dichotomy and the case-oriented nature of COIN doctrine are discussed in an article by Thomas Mahnken.[65] The previously mentioned Colonel Alderson devotes various aspects of his research to the relevance of British COIN doctrine to the requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan and future warfare.[66] The position of Warren Chin is quite similar to Alderson's. He does not consider that British COIN doctrine is initially wrong and failed in Iraq. He argues that the traditional British approach of 80 percent political means and 20 percent military support of COIN simply did not correspond to the reality of either Afghanistan or Iraq.[67]

Another way to address COIN doctrine in the framework of recent conflicts is through its applica-

[61] GpCapt Peter Gray, RAF, "Air Power and Joint Doctrine: An RAF Perspective," *Air Power Review* 3, no. 4, (Autumn 2000): 7.
[62] Gray, "Air Power and Joint Doctrine," 10.
[63] WgCdr Alistair Monkman, RAF, "The Manoeuvrist Approach and Coalition Warfare: A Re-examination," *Air Power Review* 5, no. 2, (Summer 2002): 12–42; and Richard Lock-Pullan, "Redefining 'Strategic Effect' in British Air Power Doctrine," *Air Power Review* 5, no. 3, (Autumn 2002): 59–69.

[64] Christopher Tuck, "Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency," *Defense & Security Analysis* 23, no. 2 (June 2007): 165, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790701424721.
[65] Thomas G. Mahnken, "The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: An American View," *Defense & Security Analysis* 23, no. 2 (June 2007): 227–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790701424770.
[66] Col Alexander Alderson, "The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq, 2003–2009" (PhD thesis, Cranfield University, 2009).
[67] Warren Chin, "British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan," *Defense & Security Analysis* 23, no. 2 (June 2007): 212, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790701424762.

tion in the Long War on Terror (WOT) or, as it is often called, the Global Insurgency. Scholars who consider terrorism an example of the global insurgency include David J. Kilcullen, Thomas R. Mockaitis, David W. Barno, and John Mackinlay.[68] On the other hand, Michael Howard, James Kiras, and Matthew Kowalski argue that terrorism is an abstract phenomenon and cannot be identified as an insurgency.[69] Bard E. O'Neill discusses the development of insurgency and terrorism in terms of revolutionary warfare, while a vivid example of a comparative analysis of the two doctrines comes from an article by Karsten Friis.[70] In contrast, he places the main emphasis upon a comparative analysis of UN peacekeeping "capstone" doctrine and COIN doctrine of the U.S. Army.

Concerning PSO doctrine, the main discussion of doctrine modification takes place before, during, and immediately after the publication of *Wider Peacekeeping* in 1994. Charles Dobbie argues that a new doctrine is needed to accommodate the Army and the new realities of the post–Cold War era. This could be achieved by drawing a broad line between the first two categories of peacekeeping operations and the third one: peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.[71] On the other hand, peace enforcement cannot be simply equated to warfighting, and a distinction has to be made. The vague notion of consent can be interpreted in various ways depending on the *inter*state or *intra*state context. As a protagonist of *Wider Peacekeeping*, Allan Mallinson suggests that expectations from this interim and tactical level doctrine are pushed to the level of an operational one. He argues that consent at the tactical and operational levels has a different meaning; while on the field consent might be lost for various reasons, it should not be dismissed at the operational level.[72]

An article by Rod Thornton outlines the development of a debate and the shift of attention from the need for PSO doctrine and clarification of the status of peace enforcement to the importance of cooperation with nongovernmental organizations in the framework of complex emergencies.[73] The connection between two types of operations and the subsequent doctrines also is explored by Philip Wilkinson. This time, he analyzes the international dimension with reference to British PSO doctrine and traditional UN peacekeeping methods.[74] John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent published several articles on the British complex emergencies doctrine in the context of the changing international and strategic environments.[75] The discourse of Wilkinson, Mackinlay, and Kent was continued by a Danish scholar, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, who also refers to the doctrine of grey area operations. However, he emphasizes the abstract modification of military doctrine in respect to the national specif-

[68] For further information, see David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005): 181–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500300956; Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-imperial Era* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995); David W. Barno, "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency," *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 15–29; and John Mackinlay, "Is UK Doctrine Relevant to Global Insurgency?," *RUSI Journal* 152, no. 2 (May 2007): 34–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840701349950.

[69] For further information, see Michael Howard, "A Long War," *Survival* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 7–8, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330601062675; James Kiras, "Terrorism and Globalisation," in *The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 479–99; Matthew Kowalski, "Global Insurgency or Global Confrontation? Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and the 'Long War' on Terrorism," *Defence & Security Analysis* 24, no. 1 (March 2008): 65–71, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790801903251.

[70] Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2001); and Karsten Friis, "Peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency—Two of a Kind," *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 1 (February 2010): 51, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533311003589199..

[71] Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post–Cold War Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 121–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339408442753.

[72] Allan Mallinson, "Wider Peacekeeping: An Option of Difficulties," *British Army Review* 112 (April 1996): 5.

[73] Rod Thornton, "The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 45, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310008413834.

[74] Philip Wilkinson, *Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: The Development of a Common Military Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*, International Security Information Service briefing paper (London: University of Essex Human Rights Centre, 1998), 18.

[75] John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent, "Complex Emergencies Doctrine: The British Are Still the Best," *RUSI Journal* 142, no. 2 (April 1997): 39, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849708446128.

ics of the Western tradition.[76] Another way to view PSO is from the perspective of a single Service. In this context, Rob McLaughlin's article on the meaning of the Navy in PSO is of particular relevance.[77] The most prominent scholar who refers to relatively recent events is Stuart Griffin of King's College, London. In terms of British PSO doctrine, he states that the 2004 revision of PSO and the addition of COIN and counterterrorism to the common umbrella of PSO may be counterproductive.[78]

USAF Air Power Doctrine

The partial coverage of RAF doctrine in the academic literature could suggest a similar situation for USAF doctrine. However, the situation is quite the opposite. The development of the USAF's conceptual component and its doctrinal reflection is well explored by Robert Frank Futrell. His two volumes are devoted to the strategic thinking of USAF and the evolution of American air power doctrine. The first book explores the period from 1907 to the 1960s.[79] In this regard, he looks into the preliminary ideas for applying air power, establishment of an independent Air Force, and inter-Service frictions in defining the role of air power in the national way of warfare. Moreover, he looks into the complexities of the establishment of Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and the struggle between tactics-oriented and intellectual schools of thought within the USAF and the American armed forces, in general.

His second volume covers 1961–84, in which he explores the nuclear potential of air power, the volatile political environment of the Cold War, and its impact on the conceptualization of air power and its strategic effect.[80] Also, he further investigates the institutional evolution of Air University. The academic value of Futrell's work is not only in covering a vast part of USAF history, but also in applying a systematic approach to its investigation. He explores the evolution of the conceptual component and also multiple situational factors that affect each concept and each edition of USAF doctrine. He illustrates in detail the time and rationale for various debates and political decision making influencing USAF thinking and consequent implementation of air power. These works are crucial in understanding the American strategic culture of conceptualization and implementation of air power.

On the other hand, the post–Cold War period of USAF conceptual development is not covered in-depth within a single monograph or new research entirely devoted to a conceptual component. However, there is an abundance of books on operational analysis and evaluation of American air power in the new strategic environment. Often, these books briefly touch upon doctrines and concepts in an attempt to evaluate the efficiency of air power in various operational settings and to test the quality of training courses. There is also a substantial number of works by Phillip S. Meilinger, who is recognized as a specialist in American and global air power.[81] His work on the theory of air power is crucial for understanding the main debates in the establishment of specific concepts and their application.[82] Considering the most recent American overseas operation, there are also many

[76] Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Emerging Consensus on Grey Area Peace Operations Doctrine: Will It Last and Enhance Operational Effectiveness?," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 36–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310008413848.

[77] Rob McLaughlin, "Naval Force and the Conduct of Peace Support Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 114, https://doi.org/10.1080/714002783.

[78] Stuart Griffin, "British Peace Support Doctrine and Iraq: Implications for the Future" (conference paper, International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 22 March 2006), 1.

[79] Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1960*, vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989).

[80] Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1961–1984*, vol. 2 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1989).

[81] Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, *10 Propositions Regarding Air Power* (London: Air Power Studies Centre, 1995); Phillip S. Meilinger, *Airwar: Essays on Its Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Frank Cass, 2003); and Phillip S. Meilinger, *Limiting Risk in America's Wars: Airpower, Asymmetrics, and a New Strategic Paradigm* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017).

[82] Col Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997).

works on the role of air power in counterinsurgencies.[83]

Overall, it can be argued that USAF air power doctrine is well covered both in its historical and contemporary accounts. However, the historical aspect offers more detail, and the contemporary conceptual component is primarily analyzed in terms of operational investigation and the predominant environment of COIN operations. On the other hand, a systematic exploration of USAF air power doctrine in the post-Cold War period will still be a relevant and original contribution to the field of air power studies.

Marine Corps Aviation Doctrine

Another field of air power doctrine points us back to the history of Marine Corps Aviation. Just as the development of RAF doctrine was sporadically covered, some periods of Marine Corps Aviation doctrine are covered better than the others. One of the most prominent works on the history of Marine Corps Aviation includes *Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912–1940* by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edward Johnson with editor Graham A. Cosmas.[84] This work investigates the difficulties the Marine Corps faced to secure their own air arm and the daily technical, political, and training challenges of the Marine air-ground team. This is an exceptional source for an early history of this Service, especially since Johnson's original research is based on analysis of official statements, reports, documents, personal correspondence, and transcripts of aviators' oral testimonies on operational and organizational trends. Besides providing an organizational history of Marine Corps Aviation, the book also addresses the development of early Marine Corps doctrine, outlining that the first concept of the air mission was established in the 1920s. There are three tactical roles Marine aircraft could fulfill: observation, which includes artillery spotting and aerial photography; light bombardment; and fighting aviation (air-to-air combat to control the skies over Marine areas of operation).[85] Marine Corps Major John M. Elliott also explores the same timeframe. He complements Johnson's work with more recent details and perspectives on Marine Corps Aviation.[86] Wayne Heiser devotes his research to the history of U.S. Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Aviation, exploring its gradual establishment from 1912 until the Second World War.[87] William Larkins, who investigates the evolution of U.S. Navy aircraft during 1921–41 and Marine Corps aircraft during 1914–59, takes a technological approach.[88] The Service is also explored in terms of early COIN operations.[89] However, Leo J. Daugherty III does not pay too much attention to aviation for that period.

The Second World War

Regarding the Second World War history of Marine Corps Aviation, Robert Sherrod delivers the most prominent account of the events and the roles of Marine Aviation.[90] In his monograph, he outlines not only the course of events and maneuver but also detailed squadron history and their impact on accom-

[83] Alan Vick et al., *Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006); Robert C. Owen and Karl P. Mueller, *Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007); LtCol Paul J. Kasuda, USAF, "United States Air Force Counterinsurgency Operations Capabilities, the Ground Dimension: Are We on the Right Glide Slope?" (unpublished paper, Air War College, Air University, 2011); Maj Eric L. Westby, USAF, "Tactical Airlift and Direct Support: The Keys to USAF Relevance in Modern Counterinsurgency and Their Struggle Against Air Force Culture" (unpublished paper, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2011); and Jeffrey J. Smith, *Tomorrow's Air Force: Tracing the Past, Shaping the Future* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

[84] LtCol Edward C. Johnson, *Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912–1940*, ed. Graham A. Cosmas (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1977).

[85] Johnson, *Marine Corps Aviation*, 35.

[86] Maj John M. Elliott (Ret), *Marine Aviation at Quantico, 1918–1941* (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2012).

[87] Wayne H. Heiser, *U.S. Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Aviation*, vol. I, *1916–1942, Chronology*, 2d ed. (McHenry, IL: Dihedral Press, 2006).

[88] William T. Larkins, *U.S. Navy Aircraft, 1921–1941/U.S. Marine Corps Aircraft, 1914–1959* (London: Crown, 1988).

[89] Leo J. Daugherty III, *Counterinsurgency and the United States Marine Corps*, vol. 1, *The First Counterinsurgency Era, 1899–1945* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015).

[90] Robert Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1952).

plishing both operational and tactical tasks. Barrett Tillman adopts a similar approach to the exploration of this timeframe.[91] Conversely, David Donald evaluates the operational performance of American warplanes across three Services, including Marine Corps.[92] This book is particularly interesting as it provides a comparative perspective on air power within different organizational cultures and approaches to its application. All of these books offer mainly narratives of warfare, operational analysis, and factual squadron history. Since these academic works concentrate on warfare itself, little room is left for evaluating the conceptual component or distinguishing the role of air power in a particular operational setting. This account of the military history of Marine Corps Aviation is far from exhaustive.

The Post–Cold War Period

Ronald Brown's work explores the role of U.S. Marines in the First Gulf War.[93] Brown pays significant attention to the operational analysis of planning, execution, and practical considerations of tasks Marines performed in Iraq. Although this source is an excellent piece of academic work on the Marine Corps and its aviation role in the First Gulf War, it also briefly addresses the role of doctrine in this conflict. Brown explores the concept of "compositing, whereby the command elements of two or more units merged to create a single headquarters when more than one unit deployed into a single combat arena."[94] Unlike some other works, this one explores the First Gulf War alone with only a few references to similar operational settings from the previous years.

One of the better post–Gulf War books on Marine Corps Aviation comes from Air Force Major James Holmes.[95] Although Holmes provides a short guide to air superiority for Joint Force commanders, he also addresses the role of a conceptual component in achieving air superiority. Thus, he compares doctrinal differences of various Services using air power in their tool kits, including the Marine Corps outlook on air power from the perspective of amphibious warfare.[96] This is a useful source to base an evaluation of post–Cold War changes in thinking on the role of air power and the Service's self-perception in the changing strategic environment.

In the contemporary period, Marine Corps Aviation and its doctrinal reflection are discussed in the framework of air-land integration and transformation of a conceptual framework.[97] The authors argue that *Marine Corps Operations*, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-0, resolves an ongoing debate about the supportive or independent role of air power. It is suggested that the flexibility to adjust to situational requirements and the ability to switch between independent and supportive roles provides greater strategic outcomes. Moreover, the authors argue that this flexibility is one of the primary advantages of contemporary U.S. warfare: "It is precisely this flexibility and relative ease of shifting the supported/supporting relationship between air and ground forces that makes the concept of air as a maneuver for such a viable option in Twenty-first [*sic*] century U.S. warfare."[98] This book is a useful source to understand the history and contemporary narratives in the air-land integration debate.

Analyzing the academic works on Marine Corps Aviation, it can be argued that just as in the case of RAF air power doctrine, the majority of works are devoted to the history of the Services and the factors

[91] Barrett Tillman, *U.S. Marine Corps Fighter Squadrons of World War II* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2014).

[92] David Donald, *American Warplanes of World War II: Combat Aircraft of the United States Army Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, 1941–1945* (London: Grange Books, 2001).

[93] Ronald Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990–1991: With Marine Forces Afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1998).

[94] Brown, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf*, 10.

[95] Maj James M. Holmes, USAF, "The Counterair Companion: A Short Guide to Air Superiority for Joint Force Commanders" (masters thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 1995).

[96] Holmes, "The Counterair Companion," 12–15.

[97] Ellwood P. Hinman IV, Thomas E. Jahn, and James G. Jinnette, *AirLandBattle21: Transformational Concepts for Integrating Twenty-first Century Air and Ground Forces* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 65–66.

[98] Hinman, Jahn, and Jinnette, *AirLandBattle21*, 65.

shaping their institutional features and organizational culture. However, very few works evaluate their doctrine. During 1912–90, the most attention is paid to institutional development and evaluation of operational experience. Doctrine is addressed on a few occasions in the context of those two trends. However, in the case of RAF doctrine, the early stages of doctrine development are covered in full. The same cannot be said for the doctrine of Marine Corps Aviation.

Although, as a rule, a conceptual component and its doctrinal embodiment are paid less attention than operational analysis, that does not mean that interest in its conceptual component has ceased completely. The revival of practical interest to a certain theme and confirmation of its originality are often evident in the topics chosen by military practitioners in their pursuit of advanced and terminal degrees. One such work by Marine Corps Major Joseph F. Freshour covers the role of air intelligence in the success of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).[99] Although this might not be the most exhaustive analysis, the author applies a rather systematic approach to the task, addressing not only organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policies related to the performance of Marine Corps aviation intelligence, but also the question of doctrine and the conceptual component. Consequently, this subject offers multiple opportunities for additional research.

U.S. Naval Aviation

An accounting of air power development would not be complete if at least some of the most prominent works on naval air power are not mentioned. Geoffrey Rossano conducts one of the first systematic and detailed studies on the operational role of U.S. naval aviation during World War I.[100] The author explores the establishment of American naval aviation from its inception, paying close attention to the role of personnel and their vision of naval aviation. This book is an excellent source for exploring the way organizational culture was shaped and how naval aviation ethos evolved in a bottom-up way. This source is also relevant for identifying differences in organizational cultures and the consequent perception of air power within the U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and the Marine Corps. Another excellent source on the early history of naval aviation can be found in a book by Navy Captain Archibald D. Turnbull and Lieutenant Commander Clifford L. Lord.[101] The authors explore the administrative and political complexity of establishing an aviation branch within the U.S. Navy. They also pay particular attention to the internal and external political environments that shaped naval aviation during World War I and the interwar period. This book and Rossano's monograph are excellent sources for understanding the endurance of organizational ethos of naval aviation.

A more niche work worth exploring is Geoffrey Rossano's and Thomas Wildenberg's book on the Northern Bombing Group (NBG) during WWI.[102] This book is particularly unique because it provides the first in-depth analysis of NBG, meaning the cooperation between U.S. naval aviation and the Marine Corps in the strategic bombing of German U-boat bases in Belgium. This book should be considered essential reading for Marine Corps personnel and anyone exploring the field of air power, because it provides insights into the practical implementation of air power by different Services. This distinctive operational experience results in the unique conceptualization of air power within each Service. However, it is essential to look into the initial operational experience that shaped that culture to understand the current distinctiveness of conceptual framework and organizational trends. Although these books do not explore air power doctrine per se, they provide anoth-

[99] Maj Joseph F. Freshour, "Marine Corps Aviation Intelligence: A DOTMLPF-P Analysis" (masters thesis, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2015).

[100] Geoffrey L. Rossano, *Stalking the U-boat: U.S. Naval Aviation in Europe during World War I* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010).

[101] Capt Archibald D. Turnbull, USNR, and LtCdr Clifford L. Lord, USNR, *History of United States Naval Aviation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1949).

[102] Geoffrey L. Rossano and Thomas Wildenberg, *Striking The Hornets' Nest: Naval Aviation and the Origins of Strategic Bombing in World War I* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015).

er layer to understanding its origins and diversity of perspectives to conceptualization of air power.

Conclusion

Overall, this literature review illustrates that air power doctrine of the above Services is covered sporadically and with varying degrees of depth. The topic of air power doctrine exists on the interface of two fields of study: British and American air power, in its wider and more specific aspects, and military doctrine, in its inter-Service characteristics. Although there are many materials on various aspects of each field, the volume of literature referring particularly to the topic remains quite small. Though significant attention is paid to the reflection on operational experience of different British Services, the driving forces behind the development of air power doctrine during the past two decades are not reflected in detail and the material does not cover the most recent period. In the case of USAF doctrine, the majority of doctrinal history is well covered, while the contemporary conceptual framework and its doctrinal reflection can be found in various books on operational analysis. Conversely, no period of Marine Corps Aviation doctrine is covered systematically and in-depth. Such conclusions again suggest the necessity of more profound and systematic research to cover the existing gap in the literature.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Diana Clark Gill, PhD[1]

This Brave New World: India, China, and the United States. By Anja Manuel. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016. Pp. 368. $27.00 cloth; $17.00 paperback.)

Transitions can be thought of as points of vulnerability. Those that Anja Manuel writes of in *This Brave New World: India, China, and the United States* are the rapid shifts currently underway moving world power from West to East. By 2030, India will top the population chart by a clear margin of at least 100 million people more than that of China's population. This is impressive considering that China is already (by purchasing power alone) the world's largest economy, with the number of its megacities dwarfing those of other countries and its pension obligations covering more retirees than the United States has citizens. By sheer size alone, both China and India already outrank the United States.

Anja Manuel, formerly an official with the U.S. Department of State, argues how these numbers are creating a pivotal point in history; that China and India are emerging as superpowers is undeniable. But what is questionable is how they will conduct themselves and whether the existing international political players will accommodate them at the diplomatic trough. In other words, will the transition be smooth? Or will it devolve into highly militarized chaos among the superpowers?

Intensifying these questions is the fact that both China and India are uncertain of their allies. Military spending is up in both countries, mainly in response to real or imagined aggressions on the part of each other or by the United States. China, for example, is tactically surrounding India by aggressively courting its neighbors. This has led India to suspect China of a "hidden agenda to use its influence . . . to gain a military foothold in the Indian Ocean" (p. 228).

Meanwhile China's own concerns have been triggered by American "shoring up [of] Asian military alliances and adding troops in Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines" (p. 248). This, combined with India's sharp increase in military spending and deepening defense ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia, is sparking China's own fears of "encirclement" (p. 248). Maritime freedom is paramount with China. Territorial encirclement endangers their "commercial sea-lanes of communication" by which "massive energy and raw materials" are moved in-country and then exported out of China in the form of manufactured goods (p. 254).

This jostling for power and the growing suspicions between the three countries is, according to Manuel, resulting in a "gradual, great power military escalation that no one really wants" (p. 248). She explains that, aside from trying to abate such escalation, there are practical reasons for the United States to help rather than hinder the emerging powers. Economically, a "prosperous China and India are good for the United States. Like it or not, their economies are the engines of world growth. . . . To keep our own economy strong, we will need to trade with and invest in them" (p. 277). She adds that "American companies' exports to China and India support many jobs here at home. Boeing, for example . . . sells more than a quarter of its commercial planes to China and India. If those markets were closed to us, the result would likely be tens of thousands of layoffs here" (p. 286).

[1] Diana Clark Gill is author of *How We Are Changed by War: A Study of Letters and Diaries from Colonial Conflicts to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (2010). She is an independent scholar with a PhD in English from the University of Mississippi in Oxford.

And while some American politicians push for restricting imports, Manuel points out pragmatically that, "even if American manufacturing jobs don't go to China or India, they still won't come back here. They will go to other inexpensive countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh, so we must help our workers adjust" (p. 275). The big picture, she points out, is that "China is America's fastest-growing export market, so problems in China will hurt our companies, and cost us jobs. . . . A growing Indian economy also helps the United States. As India grows, its wealthier, fast-growing population means that U.S. companies will be selling to hundreds of millions of additional consumers" (pp. 84–85).

How, though, can the United States smooth the path of two Asian giants just now finding their footing on a new stage? The answer may be found in a shared past. The United Kingdom went from having political feet on the ground across a quarter of the planet before World War I to currently possessing only a few far-flung islands with its own landmass barely comparable to that of Michigan. But what it taught by example is how to adapt to a new reality.

The United Kingdom retooled itself into a diplomatic powerhouse by adopting the kind of soft power tactics that Manuel is now proposing not only at a governmental level for the United States but also for American companies and nonprofits. Collaboration, she sees, is the key. Both India and China have internal problems that need to be addressed before they can be seen as true global leaders. These issues include everything from "income disparity and corruption to massive demographic upheavals, environmental degradation and the treatment of women . . . [to] how each copes with internal dissent" (p. 8).

Collaborating on such issues benefits everyone involved. "If we want a growing world economy," Manuel states, "[then] we need its two largest, most dynamic engines to prosper" (p. 84). Here, she stresses the need to engage both countries equally to reduce rivalry. In the late nineteenth century, the United Kingdom also was faced with two emerging powers: Germany and the United States. One power was nurtured by the United Kingdom, even as it stumbled with its new role upon the global stage, while the other power was treated as a rival of which to be wary. "If," Manuel argues, "we treat China like the 'other,' including by allying more closely with India, China is more likely to feel insecure and friendless and to act like an opponent—just as Germany did" (p. 274).

Along with collaboration, Manuel suggests that the United States also lead a reform movement of such "outdated" world institutions as the World Bank and the United Nations, as "they have been terrible at accommodating ascending powers, especially the largest ones: China and India" (p. 244). She adds that both Asian countries "are rightfully pushing us to rethink the outdated, post-World War II global order. They will not agree with the United States on all issues. [But as] both show an increasing willingness to shoulder global burdens . . . we should welcome them as partners rather than obstinately refuse to acknowledge that the world is changing" (p. 245).

This Brave New World is an exhaustive sociohistorical overview of a critical part of the globe. Its author manages, though, to center it on our own internal security. A secure and prosperous United States is one, she stresses, that facilitates the security of other nations by promoting dialog, exemplifying transparent governance, and sharing with them the burden of global responsibilities. Succinctly, Manuel sums up her premise: "The rise of China and India does not spell our demise. In fact, many problems can only be solved if we work on them together" (p. 286).

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Breanne Robertson, PhD[1]

Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic. By Ellen D. Tillman. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016. Pp. 288. $29.95 paperback; $19.99 e-book.)

The expeditionary history of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps has long been steeped in the romance of foreign travel and adventure. From recruitment posters promising a chance to "See the World!" to nostalgic accounts relating the tropical exploits of the "Old Corps," the U.S. government's numerous military interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean have been understood primarily as admirable, if flawed, experiments in exporting social order and democracy to less stable countries. Historian Bruce J. Calder challenged such triumphalist interpretations in his seminal study of military governance in Santo Domingo as early as 1984, as did several revisionist publications by Dominican authors; nevertheless, the American occupation of the Dominican Republic has remained a relatively neglected area of historical study—until now.[2] A resurgence of scholarly interest, evident in a plethora of dissertations-in-progress and in such publications as Alan McPherson's *The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations* (2014), indicates that a critical reevaluation of the history of occupation and resistance is currently underway.

Ellen D. Tillman's *Dollar Diplomacy by Force: Nation-Building and Resistance in the Dominican Republic* is a welcome addition to this burgeoning literature. A professor of history at Texas State University in San Marcos, Tillman examines U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924 to elucidate the motivations, limitations, and consequences of U.S. military intervention. Her primary argument posits that American occupation officials aspired to reform the Caribbean nation in the model of U.S. governmental and military structures, but also that Dominican resistance to foreign rule combined with military centralization and infrastructure improvements produced a political landscape that not only failed to restore social order under U.S. military rule but also primed the nation for Rafael L. Trujillo's subsequent rise to dictatorship.

Seven chapters chronicle the efforts and challenges U.S. occupation officials faced in trying to remake the Dominican Republic in their own image. The first part of the book provides a detailed overview of the history of U.S.-Dominican foreign relations and domestic regionalism to reveal how the U.S. government's trial grounds for "dollar diplomacy" became a military experiment in the exportation of U.S. political and social institutions instead. Chapters 1 and 2 present a historical synthesis of growing tensions between rural Dominicans desirous of maintaining regional traditions and U.S. investors seeking to "modernize" the sugar industry, which propelled frequent U.S. interventions and spurred anti-American sentiment in the years leading up to the occupation. Chapter 3 delves more deeply into the dualistic political and economic structure of Dominican regionalism, which flouted centralization and fostered widespread distrust of foreigners, to explain the frequency of Dominican civil war as a popular struggle against external control and military violence, whether imposed by American occupation forces or Dominican politicians.

After more than a decade of uncoordinated U.S.

[1] Dr. Breanne Robertson is a historian with the Marine Corps History Division at Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. Her research interests focus on U.S.-Latin American foreign relations and cross-cultural exchange. Her current projects include an edited volume on the famous flag-raising on Iwo Jima and an official monograph on Marine activities in the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 1924.

[2] Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984).

interventions and near-continuous civil war, U.S. Navy officials decreed a military government in the Dominican Republic on 29 November 1916. Steeped in Progressive ideology and early twentieth-century notions of scientific racism, U.S. occupation administrators intended for the country to become a showcase for the beneficial influence of U.S. society and military professionalization. In the second half of the book, Tillman traces the development of the Dominican constabulary, a U.S.-established native peacekeeping force, as a primary indicator of the U.S. government's success in these reform efforts. Although such a force was considered crucial to a successful occupation, American officials scarcely invested in the military force, and Dominicans disparaged it as an armed legion of traitors and social outcasts. Chapter 4 describes how this lack of resources, training, and respect—either from occupation forces or local populations—generated a constabulary that often resorted to theft and violence in its interactions with locals, further discrediting its esteem among the general population.

The military government's stubborn adherence to paternalistic goals of modernization and education is the subject of chapter 5. During the middle years of the occupation, U.S. officials responded to local opposition with increasingly oppressive tactics. Press censorship, provost courts, and physical abuse catalyzed Dominican insurgency and spawned international condemnation. Fortunately, not all occupation administrators resorted to oppression and violence; as Tillman's nuanced study makes clear, regional solutions forged between local occupation officials and Dominican constituents bypassed centralized state authority during this period to remain operational. Such negotiated systems of governance were only a temporary fix, however. As chapter 6 reveals, developments in the 1920s—namely, the failing economy, international protest movements, and military centralization efforts—permitted the widespread unification of previously shared, but isolated, complaints against occupation and constabulary forces.

The final chapter tracks the transformation of the Dominican constabulary from a weak, untrained, and despised force of the occupation to an entrenched fixture of Dominican society supported by a constitutionally elected government. With the U.S. State Department assuming a larger role in negotiating a withdrawal plan and the American public calling for an immediate end to the occupation, military officers abandoned plans of social reform and concentrated their efforts on empowering the constabulary to maintain order after their departure. The exigency of withdrawal spurred a refocus of resources and structure that improved military centralization and domestic infrastructure and provided a path of social advancement for the Dominican *gente de segunda* (second class) to the highest officer positions in the Dominican military. Moreover, the partnerships and alliances formed during these years ensured the constabulary's continuing rise to dominance after U.S. military withdrawal and laid the groundwork for Rafael Trujillo's political coup less than a decade later.

Tillman offers a clearly structured and balanced account of the American occupation that will be useful to nonspecialists and historians alike. Her insightful analysis elucidates a complex political landscape formed through regionalist economic and social concerns, U.S. imperial ambitions, and global competition spurred by World War I. She unpacks domestic factionalism between ardent nationalists, political party leaders, rural peasants, foreign investors, and guerrilla fighters, and she appropriately highlights the failure of U.S. administrators to revise their paternalistic belief that military control could reform another society.

Impressively researched and incisively argued, *Dollar Diplomacy by Force* is a significant reappraisal of the Dominican Republic's complicated history. It sheds light on the origins and processes of military and state power centralization, which emerged through U.S. occupation and which facilitated Trujillo's political ascent and lengthy rule, and will hopefully inspire equally nuanced, archive-based studies that elaborate her insights and further explore the history of occupation and resistance.

Major Kenneth M. Koyle, USA (Ret)[1]

Paying With Their Bodies: American War and the Problem of the Disabled Veteran. By John M. Kinder. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. Pp. 368. $30.00 cloth; $20 paperback; $18 e-book.)

The best histories are those that make you consider a problem from a different perspective, to see a familiar issue differently than you did before. In *Paying with Their Bodies*, historian John M. Kinder takes a deep, analytical look at an issue that most Americans probably think they understand from what they have seen in the media; but as he demonstrates, that common understanding may be quite superficial.

Kinder's book, 10 years in the making according to his acknowledgments, began to take shape in 2004 when he was doing research at the National Museum of Health and Medicine, which at that time was collocated with Walter Reed Army Medical Center (both institutions have since moved to new sites). Surrounded by wounded warriors returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Kinder realized that he knew little about them or what lay ahead as they embarked on their lives as disabled veterans. Determined to learn more about the issue, he set out to answer three critical questions: "What are the nation's obligations to those who fight in its name? Who is ultimately responsible for veterans' disabilities—the enemy combatants they faced abroad or the public officials whose policies put them in harm's way? And at what point does war's legacy of disability outweigh the nation's interests at home and abroad?" (p. 3). These are, of course, questions without definitive answers. Undaunted, Kinder ventures deep into his inquiry, examining these questions and many others from all sides.

Kinder's analysis of the "problem of the disabled veteran" begins with the American Civil War—an obvious launching point for such an investigation. As Kinder points out, the Civil War produced "both the largest cohort of disabled veterans in American history and the first 'system of national public care' for a single population of US citizens" (p. 17). From this introduction to the root of the problem, Kinder quickly moves on to the years surrounding World War I, the period at the heart of the book. Nearly a million American Great War veterans applied for disability benefits by 1923, prompting a crisis of care as the government lacked administrative, medical, and bureaucratic capacity to manage such an overwhelming volume of cases. Governmental shortfalls, in turn, fueled the creation of well-organized veteran advocacy groups like the American Legion and the Disabled American Veterans. These groups, though sometimes competing against each other for the resources and favor of their shared constituencies, quickly became powerful influencers in government affairs.

The early twentieth century was a crucial time for warfare, medicine, and the sociological constructs of both. Historians point to World War I as the proving ground for "revolutions in military affairs" that included mechanized warfare, chemical weapons, and aviation; at the same time, revolutions in military medicine, such as aseptic surgical techniques and motorized battlefield evacuation, made it seem possible to medically counteract the destructive new forms of combat. Sociologically, many Americans "adopted an idealized view of disabled veterans" as chivalrous and noble heroes who had courageously sacrificed their own well-being for the good of the republic (p. 28). This view was not universal, and there was no shortage of critics complaining about the cost of government support to disabled veterans and the propensity for fraud in the system. But by and large, those veterans with visible signs of their sacrifice—empty sleeves, prosthetic legs, and other battle scars—were treated with deference and respect, in sharp contrast to the

[1] Maj Kenneth M. Koyle serves as the deputy chief for the History of Medicine Division at the U.S. National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD.

way those who were disabled by birth defects or accidents were often shunted aside and stigmatized.

Young men eager for martial adventure and anxious to prove their masculinity volunteered in droves when the United States entered the Great War. When many of them came back physically and psychologically broken, the problem of the disabled veteran began to take on new contours in American policies and attitudes. Kinder probes these concepts with laudable depth and reflection, giving readers a balanced view of the issues from the perspectives of the disabled veterans themselves, the government agencies struggling to provide appropriate care for them, the veterans' organizations lobbying to improve that care, and the peace activists hoping to prevent such carnage in the future. Five of the book's eight chapters are dedicated to building this framework around the issues affecting disabled veterans in the interwar period. Sometimes the veterans are characterized as pawns to the rival factions pushing their agendas, other times the veterans wield varying degrees of power in their own advocacy. Throughout it all, we see important dichotomies play out between groups who generally have the best interests of the veterans at heart, but who often have opposite views of how to help. For example, some groups touted rehabilitation as a logical way to help veterans return to normalcy and become productive members of society, while others viewed that effort as a way to erase the memory of the veterans' sacrifice, "deveteranize" them, and shirk responsibility for their continued care (pp. 197, 267). Kinder tracks these polarizing arguments through the experiences of disabled veterans from World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Kinder's research and documentation in this book is exceptional, making it a valuable resource for historians of disability, government policy, and rehabilitation, but a critical reviewer can find minor faults in any work of this extent. There are occasional points raised that could benefit from further exploration, or at least a footnote, such as reference to "scandals at Walter Reed Medical Center and other medical facilities" in the aftermath of World War I (p. 6). Some of his notes cite only secondary sources when it seems that primary sources should be readily available, and occasional slips of hyperbole make their way into the text. But these are very minor criticisms of a generally excellent book.

While Kinder's book might not change your overall view about the status and treatment of disabled veterans, recognizing that there is a multifaceted dichotomy to this problem will encourage you to give it a fuller measure of consideration. Though he built the scaffold of his inquiry around specific questions of obligations regarding disabled veterans, the real value of the book lies in its more abstract aims to "provide historical context for today's Disabled Veteran Problem" and to demonstrate that the field of disability studies can yield valuable and unexpected insights about foreign and domestic policies, government bureaucracies, race disparities, and public activism (p. 11).

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Lawrence Provost[1]

Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I. By Richard S. Faulkner. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. Pp. 772. $39.95 cloth.)

Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I is a magnificent work that should be required reading for every commander of soldiers and Marines. *Pershing's Crusaders* follows the American fighting men from the time of their enlistment to their demobilization or their demise. Very little is said at all about General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF); rather, *Pershing's Crusaders* primarily focuses on the accounts of the servicemen of the AEF, especially the enlisted soldiers.

America's fighting men in World War I and their leaders faced monumental challenges, but they did the job. Nearly every chapter of *Pershing's Crusaders* is a chronicle of the ingenuity and triumphs of the nation—an America that was not ready for the war it entered in 1917. The soldiers being trained in the United States often lacked weaponry, experienced noncommissioned officers, and even experienced Allied trainers from the warring nations of Britain and France. Yet, in a little more than a year, the United States went from having a small army to a large professional fighting force that was sending nearly 10,000 soldiers a day to France by late 1918.

Pershing's Crusaders is written from the viewpoint of the lower-ranking fighting man, from the company-level officers to, especially, the enlisted troops. This feels right and proper to this reviewer, as soldiers and Marines felt squad, platoon and, at most, company loyalty; very few would feel the loyalty that was seen, albeit rarely, in World War II to General George S. Patton's Third Army.

Diaries, letters, and other documents attest to the hard life that the AEF faced in the trenches, though the trials and tribulations faced by the ordinary soldier are plainly evident from the hurry-up-and-wait mentality to complaints about the food (though American soldiers had the best food in the war), the rear echelon, and the uselessness of certain training and leaders. Still, the text is one of triumph despite hardships.

A theme that is echoed throughout *Pershing's Crusaders*, and is universal in every war, is the sheer disdain those on the front lines have toward those serving in the rear. Even at the front there were, and remain, different levels in the hierarchy of hardship between the infantry and the rest of the force, such as artillery.

Another theme that stands out in *Pershing's Crusaders* is a sense of American superiority that manifested itself in terms of hate for the Germans (at least until after the Armistice), as well as general disdain for the British and the French. Further, despite often-poor training, the American fighters demonstrated uncanny ability in the summer and latter days of 1918. The effects of the American contribution in World War I cannot be overstated.

The Spanish-American War is often considered America's first international war and the one that set it on the stage as a world power. However, World War I was really the conflict that set the twentieth century in motion as the "American century." Further, while the Spanish-American War did play a role in improving relations between the North and the South after the Civil War, World War I was the first large-scale conflict to bring together men from every part of the country in a common cause.

Aside from general themes, *Pershing's Crusaders* is meticulously detailed, from counting the number of calories troops consumed, measuring how many

[1] Lawrence Provost is a master's candidate in legislative affairs at George Washington University.

pounds they had on their backs in battle, and reporting how many miles they carried it to estimating how many hospital beds would be available if they were wounded.

Though the author states that the term *soldiers* is meant to encompass soldiers and Marines, very little of the book is devoted to the hardships and exploits faced by the U.S. Marine Corps. Still, where Marines are chronicled, their tenacity, steadfastness, and fighting spirit are plainly evident.

Pershing's Crusaders, though written about events that took place 100 years ago, is a timely read. While the Civil War is often called the first modern American war, World War I was significantly different from all others that came before it in its political and logistical scope. *Pershing's Crusaders* captures this concept through an account that is well researched and maintains an interesting read through almost 800 pages. Further, it is one of those books that will maintain relevance in successive generations.

World War I saw almost as many American deaths per day as did World War II; it simply lasted three fewer years. The war was so deadly in scope and so large in its impact that it is no surprise that it was called the Great War or, simply, the World War. The relevance of this conflict cannot be overstated, and books written about it should be held to a high standard. *Pershing's Crusaders* meets that standard, and the serious historian, interested reader, and fighting trooper of all ranks would do well to read this essential volume.

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Major Gary J. Sampson, USMC[1]

Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military. By George E. Reed. (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, University of Nebraska Press, 2015. Pp. 216. $26.50 cloth.)

Retired U.S. Army colonel George Reed, now dean of the School of Public Affairs at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, has penned an important book shedding light on a not-so-well-kept secret about the U.S. military. Despite the best efforts, it continues to promote and advance a not-insignificant percentage of leaders whose consideration for the well-being of their subordinates in their decision-making processes and leadership styles is lacking. Reed dubs these leaders *toxic* and spends a good part of the first chapter of the book getting at the definition of his subject. With a nod toward the difficulty in establishing even a commonly accepted definition of *leadership*, he boils toxic leaders down to those being interpersonally challenged and lacking self-awareness, and states that they treat others in ways that are not in the long-term best interest of organizations that aspire to enlightened core values, such as honor, courage, or commitment, just to name a few. Acknowledging that everyone has a bad day now and then, Reed indicates that problematic toxic leaders display such behaviors over a sustained period of time (pp. 14–15).

A major factor in Reed's writing the book stems from the perception that, while many people understand that toxic leadership in uniform is a real thing, there is no clear understanding of what those who work with, and especially for, such a leader can do about their lot in life. Those serving in uniform cannot simply quit their jobs, after all. The power differential in uniform created by the chain of command has no direct analogue in the civilian world and is one of the primary factors that makes leadership toxicity in the military such an intractable issue. According to survey data cited by Reed, between 10 percent and 30 percent of leaders in the military may be suffering from this leadership deficit (pp. 23–25).

To explore why there could be so much toxicity in the ranks, *Tarnished* delves into factors related to the phenomenon of toxic leadership that might be seen as additive or possibly even causal, including ethical factors. Reed notes that the post–11 September 2001 wars and fixation on a common cause or enemy may have contributed to an "ends justify the means" mentality in the military. As long as the mission was being accomplished, superiors were more inclined to look the other way than to question the manner in which a subordinate leader was leading their organization to accomplish the desired results. Reed indicates that this mind-set might be seen as appropriate only for those with a dangerously shortsighted view of their role in the stewardship of an organization's capabilities, one of the hallmarks of a toxic leader. Instead, he maintains, commanders and those in positions of authority should take a longer view, acknowledging that the tasks the unit accomplishes today must be done, while also taking into account the effect that doing so in a given fashion will have an impact on the organization's ability to accomplish future missions.

Numerous organizations have attempted to provide a corrective action to this ethical deficit, revealed during more than a decade of conflict in the post–9/11 wars. In one example taken from this reviewer's profession, in 2012, the officers and staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of a North Carolina-based intelligence battalion developed and published an internally generated set of ethics for intelligence operations and analysis that would guide unit members

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as they conducted their organizational mission. This set of guidelines, later published for wider consumption in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, was created with an acknowledgment that the baseline ethics for Marine recruits drawn from across the American populace was not a common, shared set and that modern enemies intentionally choose their weapons and tactics to place our personnel in ethically challenging situations with a high probability of generating an incident exploitable for adversary information operations purposes.[2] This code also was specifically designed to combat negative perceptions of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which is haunted by the fallout of the faulty intelligence case for the Iraq War, extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists from third countries, CIA "black sites," Guantánamo Bay, and more.[3] Reed's discussion of a code of ethics for military professionals as combative against toxicity would have been bolstered by small-unit level examples, such as when the unit's leadership took it upon themselves to address in advance a blind spot they forecasted that could have major, strategic-level ramifications if not handled appropriately. Certainly, this example is but one of many known to the reviewer from the post–9/11 period.

Sexual misconduct is another contributing factor or symptom of toxic leadership that rightly receives a separate chapter in the book. Reed notes that there seems to be a connection between the excessive narcissism that stands as one of the hallmarks of toxic leaders "and those with a propensity to engage in risky sexual relationships" (p. 101). Further, military officers and leaders often "have access to funds, perquisites, power to reward and punish, personnel who want to please them, information, and other resources that those of lesser status in the organization do not have" (p. 102). The inflated sense of self-worth and ego can lead flawed leaders to believe they are "entitled to sexual escapades, believe they are clever enough to get away with it, and [that they] have sufficient power to cover it up if discovered" (p. 103). The bottom line, according to Reed, is that the use of a subordinate for sexual gratification in this way is tremendously harmful to unit cohesion, esprit de corps, and unity of purpose, but also results in potentially lifelong physical and psychological consequences for the victim (pp. 88–89).

Part of the toxic leadership issue in the military comes from a promotion and advancement system that is not intended to screen out those leaders whose track record may indicate potential toxicity problems. Reed notes that "the promotion and command selection processes that exclusively rely on top-down assessments are as likely to promote a toxic leader as one who is not toxic" (p. 148). Only in rare instances does the system "work" in this respect if the reputation of a particular officer precedes them into the command screening or promotion selection board room and happens to be taken into account by the members. Reed calls for the development of a better system to screen and filter for advance warning signs of toxicity. While details of how this might work are scarce in the book, the discussion evokes a concept not unlike medical surveillance for infectious disease. Perhaps developing a list of key indicators would be a starting point to sensitize senior leaders to the presence of a potential future toxic servicemember from among their subordinates.

However, even if such a list existed and it was in the hands of the Services, such as regimental and brigade commanders or their equivalent and above, it is not clear that these commanders would use it. From the top looking down, oftentimes toxic leaders appear just like some of the most effective subordinates, so these commanders might not even realize that their top-ranked lieutenant colonel battalion commander was in fact toxic; in this instance, the leadership sees only that they are dedicated, demanding, and driven to accomplish the mission (much to the chagrin of subordinates who are trampled underfoot). The view from inside the battalion itself could be much differ-

[2] Officers and SNCOs, 2d Radio Battalion, "Ethical Intelligence: Enabling the Application of Force," *Marine Corps Gazette* 97, no. 12 (December 2013): 69–71.

[3] The best single-volume work covering the macroview of the slippery moral slope tread by the United States after 9/11 remains Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals* (New York: Anchor Books, 2008).

ent from that of the regimental staff looking down. And because of the short tenure of most commanders (1–2 years plus time required for another officer to "get a look" in command), their focus necessarily shifts to relatively short-term goals and objectives. These units and their commanders need to accomplish the mission today, now, or their bosses will find someone else who can.

In *Tarnished*, Reed demonstrates that there may be value in pointing out to young officers and NCOs during initial training not just the glowing, aspirational examples of enlightened leadership to be emulated, but also some negative examples as cautionary lessons. "The emphasis on leadership in professional military schools and courses," Reed writes, "provides a common understanding of what leadership should look like" (p. 22). He goes on to note that "early socialization [about toxic leaders] is important, and for that reason discussions of leadership style and destructive leadership should be incorporated into the early stages of professional military education" (p. 151). Books such as the Department of Defense's *The Armed Forces Officer* (2007), the Marine Corps' *Leading Marines* (2014), and literally hundreds of other manuals, memoirs, and biographies overflow with fundamental elements of good leadership and examples of how a given officer or NCO did the right thing or made the right choices and won the day; however, comparatively few titles offer warnings about or indicators of forks in the road that should not be taken. *Tarnished* offers many examples that are difficult to find in such coherence and volume in other places, and for this reason, it should be read by all junior officers in all Services. Pairing it with a lively account of the effects of toxic leadership in a deployed combat environment taken from post–9/11 wars, such as Jim Frederick's *Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death* (2010), would be ideal and would give new officers clear examples of the perils and pitfalls attendant to toxic leadership. For those NCOs and enlisted soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who would serve under these officers in the future, *Tarnished* can serve as the basis for an early warning system for officers and leaders who might be exhibiting toxic tendencies.

Some of Reed's recommendations for improving the system to combat toxic leaders in the ranks rang hollow to this reviewer. For instance, he writes that more surveys and command climate assessments are a key part of the way forward (p. 165). As an active-duty officer currently subject to innumerate climate surveys and safety assessments, it is clear that today's force suffers from what could be termed *survey fatigue*. While ultimately well-meaning, these surveys are layered on top of all the myriad training and other requirements, and honestly, they get a bare minimum look despite whatever level of importance is assigned to them or pledges by senior officers that the feedback provided will be taken seriously. Follow-through is another issue with this process. Too often, the results are never shared with the troops; and as Reed says, "If [command] climate [survey] data are only provided to a commander who is a large part of the problem, little is accomplished" (p. 152). If the information is shared, oftentimes little action or remediation comes afterward (at least on a level apparent to the troops). Because of these dynamics, barring other changes resulting in greater visibility of follow-through on issues uncovered, it is not clear how additional surveys about toxic leadership in military organizations would be a significant improvement. This reviewer would like to have seen a more innovative approach offered on this matter that goes beyond the shopworn recommendation for more surveys.

Of all the book's chapters, chapter 7, "Toxic Coworkers," seems the one with the least to offer readers. Weighing in at only 10 pages (the shortest in the book), the reviewer would have liked to see more depth here, perhaps incorporating some of the ideas popularized in the Marine Corps by Matthew W. Tracy in a 2005 article, "Co-Opting the Charismatic Malcontent." Instead of trying to get away from and minimize interactions with problem colleagues as Reed advocates, Tracy argues that instead their influence should be skillfully repurposed and harnessed in support of organizational objectives by bringing them into the fold with collateral assignments that lend a patina of orga-

nizational legitimacy to their charisma.[4] Instead, what we get is a series of unfulfilling platitudes urging us to put as much distance as possible between us and the toxic colleague. Unlike in the civilian world, military subordinates of toxic leaders often have a very circumscribed set of tools with which they can deal with the problem. With the centrally managed manpower assignment process each of the Services continues to use, individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines extracting themselves from the situation at the unit level is typically not an option, unless in the case of substantiated sexual assault or a similarly egregious transgression.

In summary, while not flawless, *Tarnished* fills a gap in the current literature by tying together some of the loose ends associated with this subtopic of military leadership and personnel policy. Based on his time in uniform and extensive scholarship in this field since his transition to academia, Reed is the right person to offer this treatise. In addition to adding *Tarnished* to the required reading list for all new officers, this reviewer recommends the book to all analysts and scholars interested in military personnel policy and leadership development and hopes that Reed will continue to research and publish as a leader in this field.

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[4] Matthew W. Tracy, "Co-opting the Charismatic Malcontent," *Marine Corps Gazette* 89, no. 10 (October 2005): 44–45.

Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret)[1]

Tattooed on My Soul: Texas Veterans Remember World War II. Edited by Stephen M. Sloan, Lois E. Myers, and Michelle Holland. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2015. Pp. 304. $29.95 cloth.)

The Baylor University Institute for Oral History (BUIOH) in Waco, Texas, began interviewing and archiving World War II veterans' oral histories in 1970, just 25 years after the end of the war. The center of attention was Texas veterans—veterans born in Texas or living in Texas after active duty. Now, with age rapidly dwindling the WWII veteran population, Stephen M. Sloan, director of the institute, and his team are focusing on expanding awareness of the extensive collection of oral histories; thus, *Tattooed on My Soul* was produced. The book debuts in print 17 carefully selected oral histories from more than 6,000 interviews that have been conducted, recorded, and archived at BUIOH.

These are not stories that necessarily tell the history, the strategy, or the great victories of the war. They are personal tales of life, the hardship of war, and how these veterans moved on, imprinted by their experiences, but continuing to grow and contribute to society.

Sifting through the extensive interview collection to present 17 oral histories clearly was a monumental and unenviable task. The selected histories provide a representational sample of the state's demographics and cover the field of military assignments. When reading the gripping stories in *Tattooed on My Soul*, it becomes clear why these oral histories made the cut for publication. The published interviews include those of eight men who served in the U.S. Army; four men who served in the Navy; two who flew with the Army Air Corps; a U.S. Marine who fought in the Battle of Okinawa; a member of the Women's Army Corps; and a woman who served with the Army Nurse Corps. The interviews are thoughtfully grouped into three sections: "There at the Start: 1941–1942"; "There in the Thick of It: 1943–1944"; and "There at the End: 1944–1945."

The title leads one to anticipate the selected oral histories are stories of Texans, born and bred. While that is not the case, each WWII veteran whose history is included lived in Texas or resided there when the oral history interview was conducted. Two of the impressive histories, those of Herbert U. Stern and Hannibal Jaworski, recall the service of men born in Germany but going to war fighting for their adopted country. Richard E. Cole is another veteran who elected to become a Texan. He completed some of his pilot training in Texas and met the woman he would eventually marry, a member of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP), in Texas during the war. His name may be familiar as one of the famous Doolittle Raiders who parachuted into China after bombing Tokyo in 1942. His revelations on training for the raid, the conduct of the raid, and his escape from capture by the Japanese is beyond gripping. Readers will understand why he was awarded the Medal of Honor in 2014 at age 98. Cole retired to Comfort, Texas, where he was interviewed in 2009.

The oral history of Oscar Norbert DuCongé prompts more understanding of the attention to detail in the selection of oral histories for this book. DuCongé was born in Mississippi, one of 14 children. He grew up in New Orleans, attended college in New York, and earned a degree at Xavier University in New Orleans. While teaching in Louisiana, he became a Selective Service registrar, registered himself, and at age

[1] Col Walter G. Ford is the former editor of *Leatherneck* magazine and publisher for the Marine Corps Association. He is the author of *Marine Corps History* articles on the Marine Corps Reserve in WWI and a pending commemorative on the Marine Corps in the WWI Battle of Saint-Mihiel, one of the History Division's Marines in WWI Centennial Series.

32, was drafted as a soldier in the U.S. Army. His story of training and going to war as an educated black man in a racially segregated Army provides exceptional insight. DuCongé returned from the war, continued his education, and settled in Waco, Texas, where he served three terms on the city council and became the first black mayor of Waco. His penetrating interview was recorded in 1975.

Ruth St. Claire Murphy moved to Texas in 1972 after retiring. An Army brat, her father had a wide range of assignments across the United States and overseas, giving her a strong respect for America and American values. After graduating from college, she worked as a freelance artist until a desire to serve others drove her to enroll in nursing school. Her father, still on active duty, swore her into the Army Nurse Corps. A female in what was an all-male Army early in the war, her insights on uniforms, training, pay, and going to war in Europe speak to the unpreparedness of the U.S. military for females in war. Murphy landed on Omaha Beach and moved inland, treating casualties under tentage, in blown-out buildings, in a tuberculosis sanatorium, and in a local school. She shifted to service in evacuation hospitals, receiving and preparing wounded for movement back to a hospital. She was there for the Battle of the Bulge and as chief nurse for the 58th Field Hospital, where she treated Americans freed from POW camps, Russians, and other Allies. She was at Dachau, Germany, and tells of bodies hanging from hooks and piled high ready for the crematoriums, which smelled of burning flesh. Murphy's interview was conducted in 1994 in Waco, Texas.

These three examples from those 17 superb oral histories selected for *Tattooed on My Soul* will whet your appetite for more—and there are more available. In addition to this book, through the vision, energy, and productive efforts of the BOIUH archivists and the support of Baylor University, there are more than 4,000 first-person Texas WWII veteran interview transcripts and audio files available online at www.baylor.edu/oralhistory. When many are calling into question what America is all about, and what service to one's country can achieve, these stories provide the answers.

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



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



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Death in the Imperial City
U.S. Marines in the Battle for Hue
31 January to 2 March 1968

Colonel Richard D. Camp



Death in the Imperial City begins with an overview of the city and its geographical, political, and cultural importance to the region. Hue was an important religious and intellectual center for the Vietnamese people. Its residents enjoyed a tradition of civic independence that dated back several hundred years. Nevertheless, regardless of the city's cultural and intellectual importance to the Vietnamese people, it was only a matter of time before the Communists tried to make it their prize.

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



Reducing the Saint-Mihiel Salient
SEPTEMBER 1918

Colonel Walter G. Ford



When Marines of the 5th Regiment arrived in France in June 1917 as leading elements of what would become the 4th Brigade, they found the French and British faced off against the German Army in a gory line of trenches. After more than two years of furious fighting along a 468-mile strongly fortified line, the German armies still retained the initiative and Allied morale was low. Here sat a longstanding German-held "hernia" on the French side that French forces had repeatedly attempted to reduce—the Saint-Mihiel salient. In September 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces, with its one Marine brigade, would win the first large-scale American-led victory of World War I.

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



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