Story to tell?

*Marine Corps History* is accepting article and book review submissions for 2017–18.

The editors are currently looking for articles on all topics within the long history of the Corps: Civil War, Spanish-American War, Banana Wars, WWI, WWII, Korea, Cold War, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and women and minorities in the military. We are particularly interested in masters and PhD students who are ready to venture into scholarly publishing. Articles must be at least 4,000 words, footnoted according to *Chicago Manual of Style*, and focus on some aspect of the Corps either directly or indirectly, including foreign marines and joint operations.

For more information about submission guidelines or history books available for review, please contact the senior editor at angela.anderson@usmcu.edu.

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**U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2010–2014**

*Anthology and Bibliography*


This anthology is organized into six parts: one section for each year and a final section devoted to a broader overview of Marine participation in the Afghanistan conflict. This work is not meant to be an authoritative history but rather a selected record of Marine contributions to the Afghan war effort as captured by the media and other sources. It is intended to be used as a starting point for the general public and academic researchers.

Visit www.usmcu.edu/historydivision for a digital copy or email history.division@usmcu.edu for a print edition.
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Charles P. Neimeyer, PhD

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The Last to Fall:
The 1922 March, Battles, and Deaths of the U.S. Marines at Gettysburg
Richard D. L. Fulton and James Rada Jr.

The Legend of Suicide Charley:
Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Ret)

Royal Marines Commandos at Limbang, 1962
Captain Derek Oakley, MBE, RM

The “Afloat-Ready Battalion”:
The Development of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit, 1898–1978
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Storming the City: U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam
Reviewed by Douglas E. Nash

Reviewed by Charles D. Melson

Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era
Reviewed by Mark R. Folse

Originals: How Non-Conformists Move the World
Reviewed by Richard A. McConnell, PhD

A Companion to the Meuse-Argonne Campaign
Reviewed by Douglas V. Johnson, PhD
Did you know . . .

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The Marine Corps History Division has been running smoothly since we occupied the new Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center in the fall of 2016. Since then, we have had several classes of future commanding officers and sergeants major complete the Cornerstone Course at Marine Corps University. Consequently, we have received renewed interest in our historical unit archives and reference files from an increasingly large number of active duty Marines. In July 2017, for example, the entire 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, visited Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, as part of their centennial founding celebration (1917–2017). The History Division Reference Branch Head, Ms. Annette Amerman, presented a lecture on the 1917 establishment of Quantico and the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, World War I history.

This edition of Marine Corps History is again full of interesting material on the history of our Corps and is perhaps more eclectic than past editions. The first article, “The Last to Fall,” by Richard D. L. Fulton and James Rada Jr. deals with a little-known aspect of Marine Corps history. During the 1920s, largely at the behest of double Medal of Honor recipient and Marine Corps Base Quantico commanding general, Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, the Marine Corps sponsored a series of Civil War battlefield reenactments with the Quantico Marines playing the role of both Union and Confederate forces. This article discusses the 1922 reenactment at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where the authors show that even “staged” battles are not without their cost. Next, a very timely article by Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Ret), titled “The Legend of Suicide Charley,” Written just in time for the 75th anniversary of the Marine Corps battle for Guadalcanal, and using never-before-published material from actual participants, Cozzens recounts the legendary stand of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in the epic struggle for Henderson Field during the bloody evening of 24–25 October 1942. The author focuses on the infantry company that held the center of Puller’s line, “Suicide Charley,” and helped repel six major Japanese assaults in a single night. The article that follows offers an interesting personal account written by Royal Marine Captain Derek Oakley, MBE. Captain Oakley’s article nicely covers a major counterinsurgency operation conducted by the Royal Marines in Brunei in 1962 and includes a daring and successful rescue of hostages temporarily incarcerated by rebels in the town of Limbang. Oakley’s story also
features the activities of then-Captain Jeremy Moore, RM, who would later play a major role during the 1982 Falklands crisis as a major general. Our final article comes from Colonel Douglas Nash Sr., USA (Ret), and senior historian for the Histories Branch of the Marine Corps History Division. Nash’s piece is focused on the formation and evolution of the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group. This is a timely article as today’s Marine Corps is once again emphasizing its amphibious roots.

At the urging of our readers, we have included the obituaries of some extraordinary Marines. First and foremost was the passing of Marine colonel, astronaut, and former U.S. senator from Ohio, John H. Glenn Jr. A legend in the field of aviation and space exploration, Senator Glenn treasured his time as an officer of Marines and flew numerous combat missions as a USMC aviator. History Division also honors Colonel Julia Hamblet, who passed away this year just short of her 101st birthday. Colonel Hamblet was one of the first women to enroll in the Women’s Reserve Officer Training Program at Mount Holyoke College during World War II. She was retained as one of the few women Marine Corps officers (at that time) to remain on active duty after the war and did not retire until the mid-1960s. Her pathbreaking service to the Corps as one of its top women leaders was simply incredible.

Finally, we note the passing of two giants in the field of Marine Corps history with the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Merrill Bartlett and Major Norman T. Hatch. Both of these gentlemen made incredible, award-winning contributions to the history of the Corps. Few people are aware, for example, that Major Hatch was the only serving Marine to win an Academy Award for his documentary on the Marine Corps at Tarawa in 1943, and many of our Marine Corps schools today still use elements of Bartlett’s seminal Assault from the Sea as required reading.

As in previous issues, MCH contains a number of excellent book reviews on the latest scholarship in military history. The Marine Corps History Division is looking forward to the publication of the fourth volume of Marine Corps History. Each edition seems to get slightly better than the preceding one. We would love to hear what our readers think. Feedback on the current issue or submissions for future issues can be sent to history.division@usmcu.edu.
The U.S. Marines are known for having fought valiantly in World War I (WWI) in such situations as the Battles of Belleau Wood and Blanc Mont in France, where they earned a reputation for being tenacious and skillful warfighters. After the deadly skirmishes to drive out the entrenched German troops, Army General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, said, “The dead-liest weapon in the world is a Marine and his rifle.” However, that belief didn’t stop Pershing, President Woodrow Wilson, and others from wanting to disband the Marine Corps after the war had been won and to absorb the Marines into the Army. Additionally, the Corps had to deal with the drawdown in numbers following WWI.

Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune understood that his Service needed to fight for survival in the political arena just as hard as it fought on the battlefield. Lejeune formulated a campaign to raise public awareness and increase support for the Marine Corps. The birthday of the Marine Corps, celebrated each year on 10 November, would easily serve as part of the public relations push by the Marine Corps to focus on its traditions, as could the major Marine elements tied to iconic battles or moments of Marine Corps history. This article highlights General Lejeune’s two-pronged plan to improve the skills and abilities of the Corps by applying lessons learned to introduce new tactical doctrines and also to prevent the Service from being dissolved by raising public awareness about the Marine Corps.

“Instead of going to obscure places to conduct war games and learning lessons learned and learning how to integrate armor, artillery, and aviation into war fighting, he would do it at iconic places and put the Marines out in front of the public,” Gunnery Sergeant Thomas E. Williams said. At the time, the national parks and battlefields, such as Gettysburg, were still under control of the U.S. War Department, which meant the Marines could use them as a training ground.

General Smedley D. Butler assumed command of Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia, at the end of June 1920 and is credited with the idea to stage exercises at these landmarks. He saw the reenactments as a hands-on way to teach Civil War tactical decisions and to focus positive public opinion on the Marine Corps.

The Marines conducted four Civil War training exercises between 1921 and 1924. They reenacted the Battles of the Wilderness (1921), Gettysburg (1922), New Market (1923), and Antietam (1924). Of these, the event at Gettysburg drew the largest crowds and was the one that the Marines traveled the farthest to conduct. These events attracted attention across

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2 GySgt Thomas E. Williams (Ret), intvw with author, 12 December 2014, hereafter Williams December intvw.
3 Ibid.
the nation, in part, because of the size of the group marching through towns and across the countryside. The Gettysburg Star and Sentinel called it the greatest military maneuver under the flag in a time of peace.5

President Warren G. Harding was invited to the 1921 exercises in Virginia. He witnessed the reenactment first-hand and walked along behind the Marines during the fighting. He told the Marines after a Sunday morning worship service:

It was suggested that I stand here before you mainly that we might be better acquainted. After all it is ours to serve together. I cannot tell you how inspiring it had been to sit in worship with you and how greatly I have enjoyed being in camp with you. I shall not exaggerate a single word when I tell you that from my boyhood to the present hour I have always had a very profound regard for the United States Marines, and I am leaving camp today with that regard strengthened and genuine affection added.6

General Lejeune’s efforts were already bearing fruit.

**Marching to Gettysburg**

Early in the morning of 19 June 1922, 5,500 Marines—roughly one-quarter of the Corps—left Marine Barracks Quantico. Four Navy tug boats towed eight large barges full of Marines up the Potomac River toward Washington, DC.7 Meanwhile, tanks and artillery pieces towed by trucks rolled out along the Richmond Road headed for the same destination.8

The march involved the entire 5th and 6th Regiments, a squadron of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and elements of the 10th Marine Regiment Artillery.9

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5 “Marines Begin Big Sham Battle,” Star and Sentinel (Gettysburg, PA), 1 October 1921, 3.
6 “President Sees Army Camp Life,” Boston (MA) Post, 3 October 1921, 8.
7 “Marines Are on the March Here,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 20 June 1922, 1.
8 “President Saluted by 5,000 Marines,” Washington Post, 20 June 1922, 3.
9 Williams December intvw.
The Sun noted that these Marines were ready for anything and had cleared Quantico of everything that could be moved.\textsuperscript{10} Raymond Tompkins noted how “the 5,000 men are carrying the equipment of a complete division of nearly 20,000. In the machine-gun outfits especially the personnel is skeletonized, while the material is complete. Companies of 88 men are carrying ammunition, range finders and other technical gear for companies of about 140.”\textsuperscript{11}

The Marines erected their first night’s camp in East Potomac Park, south of the Washington Monument. It was named Camp Lejeune, following General Butler’s practice of naming camps after prominent Marine Corps generals.

Once the camp was organized and the men fed, the Marines fell into formation and marched from the camp and through the East Gate of the White House around 1830. At the South Portico, President Harding, the first lady, General Lejeune, and other distinguished guests watched the Marines pass by as Harding returned the salute the marching Marines gave him. General Butler led the Marines in the review, but as he reached the portico, he left them and took his place with the other observers. It was the first time that troops had passed in review through the White House grounds since the Civil War.\textsuperscript{12}

This event marked initial success in the Marine Corps’ efforts to influence the decision makers who held its future in their hands. President Harding, who had two planned meetings with the Marines on this march, would actually meet with them three times.\textsuperscript{13} Even after a long and arduous day, the Marines were still on the road by 0600 the next morning. “Although the hour was early as the force swung out of the Capital, a considerable crowd cheered the marchers as they passed from East Potomac Park to the route leading to Wisconsin Ave., and out,” the Washington Post reported.\textsuperscript{14}

The thousands of infantrymen marched along at roughly three miles per hour, while the artillery pieces and tanks traveled about twice that speed. Captain W. S. Shelby, an administrative aid to the District Police,

\textsuperscript{10} “Marines Complete Hike Preparations,” The Sun (Baltimore), 19 June 1921, 3.
\textsuperscript{11} Raymond S. Tompkins, “Marines Are Marching on to Gettysburg,” The Sun (Baltimore), 25 June 1922, part 5, 4.
\textsuperscript{12} Capt John H. Craige, “The Marines at Gettysburg,” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 3 (September 1922): 250.
\textsuperscript{13} The third opportunity came with an unplanned visit while the Marines were camped in Frederick, MD, headed back to Quantico in July.
\textsuperscript{14} “Marine Army Sees Movies of Itself on Eve of ‘War,’” Washington Post, 21 June 1921, 7.
estimated that walking eight abreast, it would take three hours for the Marine line to pass.\footnote{Tompkins, “Marines Are Marching on to Gettysburg.”}

The second day’s march was 12.5 miles and the Marine line stretched out for more than a mile along Rockville Pike in Maryland. At one point, the line of more than 5,000 Marines, 24 guns, and more than 200 trucks was reported to be two miles long.\footnote{“Marine Army Sees Movies of Itself on Eve of ‘War’.”}

Each company had four Cole carts, which were piled high with the lower rolls of their packs. A pair of Marines pulled each cart for a distance before they switched with another pair. It was a rough time for Marines pulling the cart, but it lasted for only a short stretch of the march. “But by the time the fourth or fifth pair of men take their turn, they are normally tired with marching, and the pulling comes hard. And they say ‘The hills are hell,’” The Sun reported.\footnote{“Marines Rest in the Hills on Their Way to Gettysburg,” The Sun (Baltimore), 23 June 1922, 2.}

General Lejeune reviewed the line along the march. The Marines stopped at the Charles Corby estate just outside of Bethesda at 1100 and set up Camp Neville in honor of Major General Wendell C. Neville. Once the setup was complete, local officials and some curious residents toured the camp. That evening, the Marines marched to the east end of the estate, which formed a natural amphitheater. There, the troops enjoyed a cartoon on the screen set up for their entertainment and then watched themselves in the Washington, DC, march from the day before. The Marine Photographic Section had filmed the Marines, and the Navy Aviation Photographic Unit then developed and rushed the film to the Corby estate to be viewed. “It is the first time on record when a force on the march has taken its own moving pictures and seen them exhibited within 24 hours. The show greatly pleased the men and was also viewed by members of the Corby family and several nearby residents,” the \textit{Washington Post} reported.\footnote{“Marine Army Sees Movies of Itself on Eve of ‘War’.”}

The Marines invited the public into their encampments to meet the men and see their equipment. It was one more way the Corps began garnering public support. The march was not specifically described to the public as an effort to save the Service, but that was the effect. And the public did turn out. Hundreds of people visited the encampments and thousands lined the route along which the Marines traveled.

The following day, 22 June, the East Coast Expeditionary Force once again broke camp and headed north toward Gaithersburg, Maryland. This day’s march was 12 miles long. As in many towns along the route, residents turned out to watch the largest military procession seen in their lives pass by their homes and businesses. The Marines tried to give them a good show, singing as they marched along the roads.

“It seemed that every one was out to see the troops in Rockville. Front porches were filled with people, clerks watched from stores, and business was suspended excepting what was done to serve the men as they took the opportunity to quench their thirst or replenish the supply of tobacco or cigarettes. Water bottles were filled and many kinds of residents delighted in throwing fruit to the men who rested along the curb,” the \textit{Washington Post} reported.\footnote{“Mimic War Serious Play, Marines Find on the March,” Washington Post, 3 July 1922, 3.}

While the first two days of the expedition had been easy marching, the third day marked the start of the Marines’ training exercises. They sent out scouts and proceeded as if they were in a hostile environment. The exercise was to assume that a hostile force had captured Gaithersburg and the railhead. It was the Marines’ job to free the town and its residents. “Warily and in scattered detachment, preceded by skirmishers and advance guards who would ‘clean out the enemy’ in the roadside woods. The ‘enemy’ had their American flags hanging out and ‘sniped’ the [M]arines with apples, oranges, drinks of water and bottles of milk,” the \textit{Washington Post} reported.\footnote{“Marines Stage Big Battle, then Lose at Baseball,” Washington Post, 23 June 1922, 1.}

Around noon, the scouts made contact with a supposedly hostile army advancing toward the Marine column. Airplanes dropped messages to Marines on
the ground and they reacted as if they were in an actual hostile situation. “Fighting imaginary foes is the ‘Gyrenes’ idea of something to do on a quiet evening at home when one is tired of bridge and knitting. The United States Marine is not an enthusiastic shadow boxer. He likes to feel a wallop land,” according to The Sun.

The exercise lasted for about two hours and the Marines finished their march to erect Camp Richards, named for Brigadier General George Richards, about two miles north of Gaithersburg. Once the camp was set up, the Marines spent the afternoon and next day playing baseball games against American Legion teams from Gaithersburg and Ridgeville, Maryland. News of the games spurred Corps pride as odds were offered on the outcomes.

The first casualty of the trip occurred Thursday, 22 June, when a truck ran over a Marine’s foot. Another potential casualty was avoided when Marine pilot Captain George W. Hamilton made a rough but safe landing in his plane upon returning from Quantico.

On Friday, 23 June, the Marines marched 15 miles to Ridgeville. They left the next morning, marching east along the National Pike. The first Marines began arriving in Frederick at 0900, but the bulk of the group arrived around noon. By then, streetcars were carrying signs throughout the city announcing that the Marines had arrived at the fairgrounds. The Marines were greeted with flags hanging from windows and thousands of people lining the road into the city.

Once the Marines were encamped at Camp Feeland, Frederick Mayor Lloyd C. Culler led a delegation out to the fairgrounds to greet them. Culler urged General Butler to stay through Sunday, but the general insisted the schedule had to be kept. However, he did invite any Civil War veterans in Frederick to be special guests of the Marine Corps at Gettysburg. Butler attended a chamber of commerce dinner in nearby Braddock Heights, Maryland, as their guest of honor.

That evening, the public enjoyed concerts from

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21 Around 1900, Navy sailors began using the term Gyrene as a derogatory reference to a Marine. “Marines Complete Hike Preparations,” The Sun (Baltimore), 19 June 1921.
22 “Marines Rest in the Hills.”
23 Ibid.
24 “5,000 Marines Camp at Ridgeville: Corps Reach Frederick at Noon Today,” Frederick (MD) Post, 24 June 1922, 1.
25 “Road-Weary Marines Find Frederick’s Gates Wide Open,” The Sun (Baltimore), 25 June 1922, 4.
26 “Frederick Welcomes 5,000 Marines Arriving at Noon for Day’s Stay while Enroute to Gettysburg,” Frederick (MD) News, 24 June 1922, 1.
the expeditionary Marine Corps Band, and then later the Marines settled down to watch movies before turning in for the evening. All of these events served as increased public relations for the Marines. They made friends, and in doing so, drew positive press, not only from the newspapers along their travel route, but newspapers all over the country.

The Sabbath saw no rest for the Marines. In fact, it would be the longest day of marching for the entire journey. They marched 18 miles north to reach Thurmont, Maryland. It also turned out to be the hottest day of the event. The Marines had been singing when they left Frederick, and they were singing as they entered Thurmont and the last mile of the hike around 1345.28

“Everyone from the small boy to the aged veteran was up and out to await and see the soldiers. Sunday School and church attendance suffered severely, and no doubt the few who did attend wished they were out on the street. Many persons remained in town preferring to miss their dinners rather than miss seeing this great military outfit arrive. Every porch along the State Road was crowded with people watching the passing trucks,” the Catoctin Clarion reported.29 By 1430, the Marines marched into a clover field about a mile north of Thurmont and sat down. Camp Haines, named in honor of Brigadier General Henry C. Haines, had been erected on the Hooker Lewis Farm for them.

The next morning, 26 June, the Marines made their final 15-mile march to Gettysburg, settling in at Camp Harding, near the base of the Virginia Memorial on the Gettysburg battlefield.

28 “Modern ‘Barbara Frietchies’ Greet Marines in Frederick,” The Sun (Baltimore), 26 June 1922, 2.

29 “Marines Camp Here,” Catoctin Clarion (Mechanicstown, MD), 29 June 1922, 3.
Camp Harding
An area between Emmitsburg Road and West Confederate Avenue, adjacent to Seminary Ridge, was designated for Camp Harding, named in honor of President Warren G. Harding. By naming the camp after the president, it not only showed respect for the commander in chief, but it also curried favor from a man whose support was needed to keep the Marine Corps strong. Even before units of the Marine East Coast Expeditionary Force left their base of operations at Quantico, along with approximately 1,000 pieces of motorized equipment, work had commenced on Camp Harding. As early as 19 June, local plumber A. B. Plank, who had been awarded the encampment water and sewer contract, began working on water supplies to ensure that the 300 showers being installed
The Marines pass through the Emmitsburg Town Square, MD, on their way to Gettysburg on 26 June.

in two bathhouses, also under construction, received an adequate supply of water.³⁰

On 27 June, the Signal Corps established radio contact with Washington, New York, Philadelphia, and the Marine Corps barracks at Quantico and set up a radio network throughout the encampment to allow officers and staff to communicate with each other on-site, as well as to communicate with various aircraft being used.³¹

The Gettysburg Times noted that the connections with Quantico did more than allow radio communications between the Gettysburg battlefield camp and the Virginia headquarters. “The feat established a new record for speed in long distance radio communica-

tion, as the points were reached within a half hour after the work of establishing the large system . . . had been started.”32

The Marines on-site also provided the encampment with its own phone service setup for the troops and their command, with lines also being connected to those of the Bell Telephone Company to enable “outside” calls. The phone system as installed conceivably made it possible for the encampment to have its own unique telephone exchange.33 The final size of the encampment was reported by various newspapers to have been from 65 to 100 acres.34

The Canvas White House

Due to the planned stay of President Harding and his wife, Florence, in the Marine encampment for a portion of the military demonstrations and reenactments at Gettysburg, a structure was erected for the couple, as well as for use by members of the presidential entourage.

The so-called Canvas White House (or Gettysburg White House) was not merely to provide a showpiece for the event or to serve solely as convenient quarters for the president and dignitaries at the maneuvers, though it certainly was all those things as well. The Baltimore Sun reported, “It will house the President and Mrs. Harding . . . [and] the office force he brings along to keep the executive department of the Government going . . . so that the country may progress as rapidly, while ‘Pickett’s Marines’ are charging as it does in Washington.”35

The Gettysburg Times described the presidential compound as “one of the most elaborate quarters ever provided the President of the United States in any camp.” The Sun compared the appearance of the canvas presidential complex at the encampment site to “a magic castle in the wilderness.”36

The entire tent complex of the presidential compound formed a semicircle, fronting a semicircular drive. The completed nine-structure complex of canvas and wood was 400 feet in length and 175 feet in width and comprised 16 rooms. Initially, the finished compound was to have been painted white, but that plan was amended sometime around 29 June.37

Three buildings flanked each side of the main presidential structure, each a combination of reception area and bedroom, and were intended for the men in the presidential entourage. At the end of each row of three sat a larger structure, each with living rooms and bedrooms, which were intended for the women in the presidential group.38

The interior walls and ceilings of the Canvas White House were covered with plasterboard and other materials, mainly to conceal such structural elements as bare studs and rafters.39 The presidential

32 Ibid.
34 GySgt Thomas E. Williams (Ret), intvw with author, 29 January 2015.
35 R. S. T., “Marines to Begin Rehearsals of Pickett’s Charge Today.”
36 “White House Is Being Erected,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 28 June 1922, 3; and R. S. T., “Marines to Begin Rehearsals of Pickett’s Charge Today.”
37 “White House Is Being Erected.”
38 Ibid.
compound was well lit, with the electricity provided by on-site generators. The generators not only provided enough power for the interior lighting that had been installed in the two-dozen rooms of the complex, but also for “long lines of incandescent bulbs” outside along the frontage of the compound tents.40

The Canvas White House was “officially” completed on 29 June with the installation of six porcelain bathtubs, which had been flown in “strapped to” Martin MBT twin-engine bomber/torpedo planes and “flown over the mountains to Gettysburg,” The Sun reported; the article further noted the concern that the heavy porcelain bathtubs could be damaged during overland transport, that “these are the first bathtubs ever carried by airplane, it is believed.”41

A Tragic Beginning

On 26 June, the celebratory arrival of the Corps was marred by the deaths of Marine aviator Captain George Wallis Hamilton and Gunnery Sergeant George Russell Martin.42

Captain Hamilton was in command of a squadron of fighters providing simulated “scout duty” while escorting the Marine infantry. Captain Hamilton, along with Gunnery Sergeant Martin, were flying a De Havilland DH-4B biplane fighter at the rear of the squadron of four planes as they left their encampment at Thurmont, Maryland, shortly after noon on 26 July and proceeded north.43

Nothing amiss among the planes was noticed until the squadron approached the landing field at Camp Harding. Two of the planes landed safely in the fields near the intersection of Long Lane and Emmitsburg Road.44 Eyewitnesses then saw Captain Hamilton’s plane go into a nosedive that developed into a tailspin that brought the plane crashing into the ground.45

Aviation magazine reported,

40 “Camp Made Ready for President,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 29 June 1922, 1.
41 Raymond S. Tompkins, “Marines Plan to Reenact Famous Battle Every Year,” The Sun (Baltimore), 3 July 1922, 3.
42 For his service during World War I, Hamilton was awarded two Distinguished Service Crosses, the Navy Cross, and four Silver Stars.
43 Discrepancies exist in the recorded history for this event. “Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Killed When Plane Fell,” Star and Sentinel (Gettysburg, PA), 1 July 1922, 1; and R. S. T., “Marine Aviators Crash to Death on Battlefield of Gettysburg,” The Sun (Baltimore), 27 June 1922, 1.
44 “Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Killed When Plane Fell.”
45 Ibid.
According to Capt. John Craige, Aide to General LeJeune, who had just stepped out of a Marine Corps plane when he heard a formation of five planes overhead, Captain Hamilton, the leader in a DH4 signaled that he was about to land and cut his engine. From a height of about 500 ft. the plane went into a slow spin from which the pilot was seen to partially regain control, apparently about 100 feet from the ground.46

*Leatherneck* reported, “As the crippled plane descended, at a rate of approximately 200 miles an hour . . . [it impacted the crash site,] striking the ground at an angle of 45 degrees. Several hundred persons witnessed the fatal plunge.”47 The plane crashed on the William Johns farm at approximately 1305 in the afternoon and within 50 feet of tents and equestrian equipment belonging to Lew Dufour’s Exposition, which had set up along Steinwehr Avenue.48

The *Star and Sentinel* reported that Martin was pulled from the wreckage, alive but bleeding heavily from a head wound. Hamilton was found deceased within the wreckage. Both men were rushed to Warner Hospital in Gettysburg, though Martin died shortly after reaching the hospital.49

*Leatherneck* stated in its report of the event, “In the opinion of the accompanying aviators, the accident was due to the difference in the reading of the altimeter, by which fliers estimate their distance from the ground, at Quantico and Gettysburg. Quantico is on sea level, while Gettysburg is 600 feet above sea level. Consequently, when the altimeter reads 1,000 feet at the latter place, the actual distance is only 400 feet.”50

Hamilton and Martin were listed as killed in the line of duty in the service of their country, and the deaths of the two Marines may be the only military deaths that have occurred on the Gettysburg battlefield since 1863.51 Marine officers believed Hamilton tried his best to avoid the crowds at the carnival, knowing his plane was in trouble. According to the *Gettysburg Times*, the aircraft could have struck the carnival if Hamilton had continued to maneuver the plane out of its plunge toward the earth, and that could have led to many more deaths.52

### An Educational Process

To properly portray Pickett’s Charge, the commanders of the expedition felt that it would be necessary for the soldiers to know the particulars concerning the events that had occurred on the grounds 59 years earlier.

*The Sun* reported that “Brig.-Gen. Smedley D. Butler is determined that his men shall know the real history of the battle of Gettysburg before they fight it again. They will be handicapped . . . by an official guide battalion that has found the battle of Gettysburg commonplace and has trimmed it up to suit modern tourists.”53 On 28 June, two battalions of Marines toured the battlefield aboard 20 trucks, with an “official guide” in each. These educational tours were conducted leading up to 1 July.54

Since most of the Marines would be portraying Confederate forces in the upcoming reenactments of Pickett’s Charge, the color of their brown uniforms could readily pass as butternut, the same color of the uniforms worn by some Confederate units, which had been achieved by dyeing cloth with oil from the bark of the butternut tree.55 With that, half of the clothing battle was essentially won by default. However,

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48 “Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Killed When Plane Fell.”
49 Ibid.
50 “Death of Captain Hamilton and Sergeant Martin Saddens Troops.”
51 “Attend Funeral of Dead Aviator,” *Gettysburg (PA) Times*, 29 June 1922, 1.
52 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
half was not enough for the U.S. Marine Corps. The Marines were already accustomed to carrying blanket rolls on campaign marches, so they merely used these rolls for Confederate reenactment purposes as well.

Field officers also spent time studying the *Battle of Gettysburg Cyclorama* to get an overview of how the grand spectacle of Pickett’s Charge may have looked. The immense, panoramic painting was executed by artist Paul Dominique Philippoteaux and his assistants, with the finished product first exhibited in Chicago in 1883.56

**Battle for Herr’s Ridge**

The Marines scrambled sometime before 1100 on the morning of 29 July for an impromptu call to arms. Orders were passed down indicating that “flank and advance guard [of the enemy] had seized Seminary Ridge from the Chambersburg road to the sharp bend in West Confederate avenue.” Units from the 6th and 10th Regiments attacked and seized McPherson’s Ridge at 1100.57

The enemy consisted of a regiment of infantry and a battery of 75mm cannons that represented the defensive position on Herr’s Ridge. As they were driven off McPherson’s Ridge, the men fell back west of Willoughby Run and established a defensive position along Herr’s Ridge. Aircraft were deployed to conduct reconnaissance, patrolling the enemy-occupied territory between Herr’s Ridge and Cashtown northwest of Gettysburg.58

This was a no-holds-barred exercise, as reflected in the details of the unfolding engagement in the newspaper:

> The attacking forces are accompanied with all auxiliary arms, field rations for one day, being maintained at all rail heads. The Marine Quartermaster Corps have been ordered out as a salvage squad, assisted by the Engineers. The Sanitary Inspector will attend to the proper burial of all “casualties” while two Chaplains are detailed to look after the burial and keep records of the men killed.59

A battalion of Marines from the 5th Regiment was posted in the area of Lincoln Square to serve as reinforcements. Radios were deployed and telephone lines laid by the Signal Corps to allow all of the units to stay in touch with the command, the other units involved, and even the airplanes overhead. Even the “big ears” were set up to monitor the sky for any sign of enemy aircraft.60

Aside from concluding the fight for Herr’s Ridge, the commanders at the encampment managed to inject a few more rehearsals of the charge into an otherwise busy schedule of finishing final touches to the camp and preparing for the presidential visit, along with dozens of federal and state dignitaries, foreign dignitaries and emissaries, and tens of thousands of spectators.

**The President Arrives**

President Harding and his entourage of more than 40 members of his staff, Secret Service, and select reporters left Washington shortly after noon on Saturday, 1 July.60 For the Hardings, it was the beginning of a weeklong vacation. The presidential party also included the first lady, General Pershing, retiring budget director Charles G. Dawes, Army Medical Corps Brigadier General Charles E. Sawyer (who served as the president’s personal physician), and the president’s personal secretary, George B. Christian Jr.

As the president and his entourage arrived in front of the Canvas White House, artillery provided a 21-gun salute.61 The president inspected the camp

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57 “Attack Made on Seminary Ridge,” *Star and Sentinel* (Gettysburg, PA), 1 July 1922, 3.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 “City Prepares to Welcome the President Here,” *The News* (Frederick, MD), 1 July 1922, 1.

61 “Harding Made Brief Visit Here,” *Gettysburg (PA) Times*, 3 July 1922, 1.
with General Butler and then returned to the Canvas White House to prepare to watch the Pickett’s Charge reenactment, which began at 1700 that evening. The group watched from a vantage point in an observation tower on Cemetery Ridge to get the full sweep of the historical reenactment that lasted less than an hour. Following the excitement of the afternoon, the president and his party were guests at a dinner in their honor in the Marine camp.

The Battle Is Joined

An estimated 100,000 spectators turned out to watch the reenactment. The Star and Sentinel reported, “For miles on the front and either flank of the territory over which the charge was made, as well as from other points of vantage, including the Round Tops, a great throng of people, who motored here from nearby sections of the country, witnessed the pageant.”

At approximately 1700, “candles” were set off to provide a smoke screen signal for the Confederate artillery barrage to begin. Two of the Confederate 75mm guns fired, representing the opening barrage of the artillery “concealed” in an artillery park on Seminary Ridge. A number of the 75mm guns also were placed along Cemetery Ridge and around Little Round Top to represent the federal artillery.

“At 5 o’clock little clouds of white smoke jetted up from the ground under the far off trees,” The Sun reported. “Off to the left they started first, then spread out toward the west in a solid white line, until the line seemed lost in the distance. It grew thicker and thicker, rising until it hid the trees. Suddenly red flashes split through the white wall, and next second the boom of a gun rolled across the mountain.”

The guns were then rolled forward by hand from the artillery park behind Seminary Ridge until they were standing hub-to-hub along the period smooth-bore guns of the Confederate Army on West Confederate Avenue. This placed them approximately 1,400 yards from their intended targets on Cemetery Ridge. When the artillery commenced firing, “the recoil of the 75mm guns shook the earth.” George Chandler wrote that the 75mm howitzers also used black powder rounds to add to the effect of the “fog of war” on the field and to provide an authentic appearance to the battle reenactment.

The opening barrage represented a 30-minute version of the 1863 duel in which Confederate Colonel Edward P. Alexander, commanding General James Longstreet’s reserve artillery, was ordered to direct the opening of a two-hour barrage of 140 Confederate cannon aimed primarily at the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, as a prelude to Pickett’s Charge. Witnesses claimed, “Faster and faster the flashes of red came through and quicker and quicker the artillery thunder rolled over the fields, until it sounded like the beating of drums. . . . Guns roared both ways across the field now. Puffs of smoke leaped out from the Round Tops on the left of the Union Line and

63 “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s Charge,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 3 July 1922, 1.
from Cemetery Hill on the right. The flashes along Seminary Ridge persisted.  

When the half-hour barrage subsided, the Marines representing the Southern advance began, preceded by a skirmish line of sharpshooters that was deployed about 20 paces in front of the battle line. To aid spectators in keeping track of the units on the field, the Confederate regiments carried white and red Army signal flags as their respective battle flags, while the names of the generals who were represented in the charge were written in white on blue cloth.  

At first, there was so much smoke on the field from the smoke candles and the artillery rapidly firing black powder-filled rounds into the air that the advancing Confederate battle line was not easily discerned. When they were spotted in the haze, spectators said it appeared the ghosts of soldiers past had returned out of time itself and onto the battlefield. “Then they began to move forward . . . and for the watchers there was a thrill as though the ghosts of Pickett’s men were massed once more for another try for victory. . . .” one reporter wrote. The Gettysburg Times noted, “In spectre [sic] like form, it seemed, as the figures were dimly outlined through the dense smoke of battle, that the soldiers of the Confederacy had actually come back and were reenacting that charge which proved fatal to the cause of the Southern States.”  

The Confederate Marines advanced shoulder-to-shoulder, nineteenth-century style, until they reached the Emmitsburg Road, where they must then address surmounting the fencing that represented the last obstacle in their path to the High Water Mark. The Sun reported that

> Now the crackling of rifles was a steady chorus, and the men were plainly living figures. They fell upon the fence in clouds, like mobs of insects alighting, firing furiously. Some toppled over the fence, fell headlong in the road and lay there. Some went suddenly limp across the top rail and hung like clothes drying in the sun. But the mass of them went over, crossed the road, climbed the next fence and were at the foot of the knoll.  

Some of the advancing troops also had been provided with shotguns loaded with black powder rounds that they would fire toward the ground as the troops progressed to simulate artillery shell explosions. The Marines in the vicinity of the “explosions” would then

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67 R. S. T., “Pickett’s Gettysburg Charge Dramatized in Marine Attack.”  
68 Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.”  
70 “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s Charge.”  
71 This spot on the Gettysburg battlefield is called the “High Water Mark of the Confederacy” because it represents both the farthest point of advance for Confederate troops but also the Confederacy’s most significant push into Union territory and thus their failed, best chance at routing the Union army.  
72 R. S. T., “Pickett’s Gettysburg Charge Dramatized in Marine Attack.”
fall “dead” or “wounded” around the detonation produced.\textsuperscript{73}

After crossing the Emmitsburg Road, the Marines continued on toward the stone wall that comprised the High Water Mark of the Battle of Gettysburg at the crest of Cemetery Ridge. However, before the advance continued, a portion of the Marines charged the Codori homestead on the east side of the road, routing an army of chickens. “Chickens on the farm, terrified by the sudden appearance of these khaki-clad figures and heavy rifle fire, flew in all directions for safety,” the \textit{Star and Sentinel} reported.\textsuperscript{74}

At 1720, the climactic storming of “The Angle” began, led by Major William P. Upshur, portraying Confederate General Lewis A. Armistead.\textsuperscript{75} As the final moments played out, The Sun reported that “the din of firing was fearful. From the far-off woods on Seminary ridge the cannonade had almost ceased, but from all around . . . the Union guns now roared a thunderous chorus. Then came the ‘rebel yell’ and the last rush. They were at the stone fence, in a yelling, shooting mass. The Confederates were at the Bloody Angle again.”\textsuperscript{76}

Upshur placed his hat on his sword, led his Marines over the wall, and was subsequently “mortally wounded,” falling beside one of the Union guns in the battery at a crucial angle in the Union defense. The collision of the Confederate Marines with those representing the Union seemed so realistic that those observing the attack from immediately behind the Union line began to retreat as well. “As the attackers crossed the wall with all the enthusiasm and fury of real battle, the crowds of people who lined Hancock Avenue, to view the event, instinctively fell back as before a real foe,” the \textit{Star and Sentinel} reported.\textsuperscript{77}

The charge, having reached the maximum point of penetration of the Union line, had ended, and the hundreds of “wounded” Confederates made their way across the fields they had previously charged across to assail the enemy position on Cemetery Ridge. “A shivering yellow pup, with tail tucked into its dragging belly, crept to the side of one of the fallen [M]arines who lay sprawled [sic] out with his closed eyes to the sun,” the \textit{New York Tribune} reported. “The pup licked his face sympathetically once, twice, then the stricken ‘Confederate’ leaped to his feet and rejoined his fighting but now retreating comrades.”\textsuperscript{78}

Then the fields suddenly fell silent as “a bugle was sounded from the High Water Mark, which called the ‘dead’ and ‘wounded’ to arise . . . [followed by] loud applause, from all sections of the large fields, greeted this ‘awakening’ of the dead.”\textsuperscript{79}

By 0930 on the morning of 2 July, the president and his party left Gettysburg for Marion, Ohio, the president’s hometown. He would spend the next few days there celebrating the town’s centennial anniversary.

\textbf{The Grand Finale}

The Fourth of July represented the grand finale, for all intents and purposes, to the more-than-week-long training and battle demonstration campaign around Gettysburg. The focus of the day’s warfare was a presentation of Pickett’s Charge as if it had been fought in 1922 and, for a welcome change, the weather seemed to be predominantly on the Marines’ side.

The Marines held nothing back regarding the equipment they had hauled up to the Gettysburg battlefield, including the airplanes and howitzers previously used, as well as hydrogen-filled observation balloons, tanks, machine guns, antiaircraft guns, monitoring devices, radio communications, and mortars.

The fury began around 0900, when spectators

\begin{footnotes}
\item[73] Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.”
\item[74] “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s Charge.”
\item[75] The Angle (or Bloody Angle) within the Gettysburg battlefield represents the site along Cemetery Ridge where approximately 150 Confederates broke through the Union line on 3 July 1863. Upshur’s father had been wounded in the service of the Confederate States during the actual war, while Upshur was a Medal of Honor recipient for his actions in Haiti in 1915.
\item[76] R. S. T., “Pickett’s Gettysburg Charge Dramatized in Marine Attack.”
\item[77] “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s Charge.”
\item[78] “General Pickett’s Charge Staged for Harding.”
\item[79] “Harding and Pershing View Re-enactment of Pickett’s Charge.”
\end{footnotes}
Gettysburg battlefield map for 1–3 July 1863.

Courtesy Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association
saw an observation balloon ascend to approximately 2,000 feet. The balloon hovered above the Marine camp to represent a Confederate observation craft. As soon as all the balloons were aloft, artillery posted on Seminary Ridge fired. The purpose of the balloons was to ascertain the effect of the rounds being aimed at the enemy positions. A squadron of four enemy planes, representing Union aircraft, suddenly appeared above Cemetery Ridge to defend the forces located there. And just as quickly, two squadrons of fighters representing Southern forces rushed up and toward the enemy planes, which were soon engaged in a dogfight, “in which nose dives, spins, loops, Immelmann turns and other war maneuvers of fighting aircraft succeeded each other in rapid succession, while bursts of machine gun fire from aloft told when a pilot has succeeded in securing a deadly position on the tail of some other craft,” the New York Tribune reported.81

One of the enemy Union planes suddenly broke off and dove at the targeted observation balloon: “Speeding like an angry wasp straight at the big ‘sausage,’ it veered away and circled the balloon with a ‘tat-tat-tat’ of machine gun fire. Then it headed back to join its fellows.” The assault on the balloon was brief but fatal. Flames appeared and then spread rapidly throughout the craft, which had been inflated with a “half-million cubic feet of hydrogen gas.” A dummy, it was generally reported, wearing a parachute was cast forth from the observation basket attached to the underside of the balloon, while a second figure fell to the earth without a chute. As the burning balloon fell somewhere on the west side of Seminary Ridge, along with the slowly descending “parachutist,” the crowd stood stunned, some believing that the figures were

81 Named for Max Immelmann, a German World War I ace, the Immelmann turn is a maneuver in which the aircraft accelerates to execute an upward half loop and then inverts with a half roll to level flight in the opposite direction at a higher altitude.
82 R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Captulates to Marine Attack,” The Sun (Baltimore), 5 July 1922, 1.
actually people, and that one of them had fallen to
certain death.83

_The Sun_ reported that, unbeknownst to the many
spectators, the fire and discharge of the occupants of
the basket had been controlled from the ground via
wires, one of which was electrified to ignite the bal-
loon. _The Sun_ also reported that there were two obser-
vation balloons aloft, only one of which was sent up to
serve as the one slated for destruction.84

The _New York Tribune_ wrote that the balloon was
ignited by “the use of composition bullets, of the kind
used in signal pistols, which were burned in the air,
being totally consumed in about five hundred feet, yet
having hardness enough to penetrate the skin of the
balloon at short range.”85 Yet another report places a
living, and rather daring, Marine in the balloon to ig-
nite the balloon, throw out the dummy without the
parachute, then parachute to escape. In a poorly writ-
ten account, the _Democrat and Chronicle_ wrote that “a
thrill was provided when one of the large observation
balloons was fired by an attacking airplane and [sent]
flaming to the ground several hundred feet below,
after the observer had leaped to safety with a great
parachute.”86

There was no opening artillery barrage as there
had been during the beginning of the reenactments on
1 and 3 July. This time, the artillery were staged farther
away in the woods, 3,000–3,500 feet behind the ridge,
and they fired during the whole charge, with airplanes
acting as their spotters.87

Following the initial air action, at around 1030,
a smokescreen was laid down on the field in advance
of the Confederate troops, until approximately 1040
when the Marines began their assault. Unlike the
reenactments of 1 and 3 July, the Confederates at-
tacked the Union position as they would have done
rather than in long shoulder-to-shoulder firing lines.88

The Marines crossed the Codori fields toward the
enemy position on Cemetery Ridge in several waves.
The idea was to deprive the enemy of a target-rich en-
vironment.89 Each wave of squads would advance 20–
30 feet and then lay prone as a second group advanced
to reinforce them. In this manner, the waves of men
leapfrogged each other toward their objective.90

“The machine guns were really there yesterday
[4 July]. They were firing real bullets. Machine guns
can’t fire blank ammunition. So were all the other ma-
chine guns in the woods on Seminary Ridge. But pits
had been dug all around them and the bullets were
diving harmlessly into the earth,” _The Sun_ reported.
Further confirming this, the _Washington Post_ noted
that “the machine guns used ball ammunition, for ma-
chine guns will not function with blank ammunition.
The guns were emplaced in previously prepared pits,
and the stream of steel-jacketed lead was pumped into
the soggy earth.”91

At some point during the advance, machine gun
crews made their way toward Emmitsburg Road, es-
tablishing positions along the west side and eventu-
ally the east side, when help arrived to get them there.
“The audience heard only the thunder of artillery, the
ceaseless tat-tat-tat of machine guns and the crack of
rifles,” _The Sun_ reported. “They saw little but puffs of
smoke and now and then a few men running, only to
disappear suddenly as though the ground had swal-
lowed them . . . because that is the way men fight in
these days.”92

The _Washington Post_ wrote that the engagement
readily established that “a squad of eight men can
approximate the fire power of a battalion of the last
century.” The reporter further noted that “it became

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83 Ibid.
84 Accounts of this event vary. R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitu-
lates to Marine Attack.”
85 “ ‘Modern Gettysburg’ Fought by Marines in Air Thrillers.”
86 “50,000 See Marines Re-enact ‘Pickett’s Charge’ of July, ’63,”
_Democrat and Chronicle_ (Rochester, NY), 5 July 1922.
87 Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.”
Four M1917 light tanks rolled into action, two on the right of the Marine attack and two on the left, and then charged the enemy lines. “The tanks appeared and went after a machine gun nest with machine gun fire and then contemptuously ignored the small arms fire and ironed out some barb wire entanglements,” Chandler wrote.

The pair of tanks on the right of the Marine assault immediately made for the Codori house and outbuildings. “The tanks went sneeringly up to the Codori house, around the barn, around to the back door, through the chicken yards, up the front porch, firing explosive shells [supposedly] through the windows,” The Sun stated. “In a few moments they waddled away, and you could almost imagine them chuckling horrifyingly, heading again toward the rear to sleep and snore until there was no more killing to do. The enemy in the Codori House was silenced forever.” One of the tanks at the Codori house became a “casualty” in the attack and was taken out of action by enemy fire.

Once the Marines had seized both sides of the road and had driven off the Union defenders, creating a clear path to the High Water Mark, the charge was declared over by the officers on the determination that, at this point, “the defenders in consequence would be so shaken in morale that their retreat would be inevitable and the position, Cemetery ridge, won [by the Marines portraying the Southern forces].”

With the Battle of Gettysburg refought and rewon, the Marines began breaking down Camp Harding on 5 July. After a week on the Gettysburg battlefield, it was time to retrace their steps back to Quantico. A company of engineers left for Thurmont on 5 July to begin setting up the camp there. Some planes returned to Quantico since they would only be needed for mail service and not maneuvers. The Canvas White House

quite apparent to the spectators that modern warfare resolves into movements wherein men fight desperately to kill men they can barely see and are sent to their death by men to whom they are not visible. The inspiring clash of contact combat is a thing of the past.”

Little by little, the squads of Marine infantry and machine gunners made their way toward a key position—the occupation of Emmitsburg Road—preliminary to the charge upon the High Water Mark, as fighters strafed the Union stronghold, and simulated artillery and mortar strikes detonated over both sides of Emmitsburg Road. Not only had the Union Marines posted the entanglements to obstruct the progress of their Southern counterparts, but also established fortified machine gun positions.

As the battle approached a climactic conclusion, the Confederates seemed to run into stiff opposition in and around the Codori house and farm buildings, which neither small-arms, machine-gun, nor light artillery fire could clear, resulting in the troops who were attempting to capture that position calling for armor support to help.

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93 “Marines Thrill 125,000 with Modern Maneuvers.”
95 “Marines Thrill 125,000 with Modern Maneuvers.”
96 Mallen, “Battle of Gettysburg Re-Fought by Marines During Downpour of Rain”; and Chandler, “Gettysburg, 1922.”
97 R. S. T., “Cemetery Hill Capitulates to Marine Attack.”
98 “Marines Thrill 125,000 with Modern Maneuvers.”
99 Ibid.
100 F. A. Mallen, “Marines Anxious to Get Back to Fred’k,” Daily News (Frederick, MD), 6 July 1922, 9.
was disassembled and shipped back to Quantico.101

Although the Marines had felt snubbed by the
town of Gettysburg, the town finally realized what it
had too late: “This town has found them a different
body of troops than they thought, and now every-
one seems to regret that the Marines were not given
a more cordial reception on their arrival.”102 Part of
the softening attitude may have been that residents
saw how anxious other towns were for the Marines to
visit them for maneuvers. Other cities were already
making requests to host the 1923 maneuvers: “Scores
of places throughout the country have asked for the
camp next year, but it is the idea to have scenes of his-
torical interest used regularly because of the peculiar
adaptability for movements of troops and the lessons
of patriotism they teach.”103

Results
The multipronged mission to save the Marine Corps
was advancing successfully. Public opinion would
serve as a strong motivating factor for the Service,
Congress, and the president. In the end, General
Lejeune achieved what he had set out to do. The Ma-
rines received positive publicity from the reenact-
ments. Repeated over a number of years, it kept the
Marine Corps in the public eye in an encouraging
manner. “All along their line of march from Quantico
to Emmitsburg, the Marines received tremendous ov-
tations,” one newspaper noted.104

The reenactments won over the public and the
decision makers, though the Marine Corps’ numbers
continued to drop for a few more years. From a high
of 75,000 in the last year of WWI, enlistment fell to
18,000 in 1925 before ticking up again.105 While disap-
pointing for Marine leaders, at least talk of disbanding
the Marine Corps ended, and the Corps won another
fight until the fury of battle eventually receded from
the public memory. Other elements of the public
awareness campaign, such as the birthday celebration
and the history behind uniform elements, took hold
and are still part of the Marine Corps tradition today.

101 “Marines Are Ready to Break Camp,” The Sun (Baltimore), 6
July 1922, 7.
102 Mallen, “Marines Anxious to Get Back to Fred’k.”
103 “Marines Are Ready to Break Camp.”
104 “Sea Soldiers Not Impressed,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 7 July
1922; and “Sea Soldiers Not Impressed,” Gettysburg (PA) Times, 8
July 1922.
105 “The Presidents and the Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette 17, no.
4 (February 1933): 20–21.
The Legend of Suicide Charley

COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 7TH MARINES, AND THE BATTLE FOR HENDERSON FIELD, 24–25 OCTOBER 1942

by Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Ret)*

The 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) landed on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on 7 August 1942, and during the next four months, the division participated in an ongoing fight to prevent the Japanese from recapturing the island and Henderson Field. Yet, the official historian of the 1st MarDiv wrote, “There are two Guadalcanals: the battle and the legend.”

One of those legends was born on the night of 24 October when the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, occupied defensive positions south of Henderson Field in a sector normally held by two infantry battalions. The understrength Company C anchored the center of the line and bore the brunt of at least six separate attacks by the Japanese that night. Although the fighting was desperate, Company C Marines held the line. Later, on the morning of 25 October, a handmade flag appeared over the Company C line that had been made from white Japanese parachute material and showed a skull-and-crossbones crudely inscribed with “Suicide Charley, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.”

Since that night 75 years ago, Company C has been known as Suicide Charley, though the origin of the nickname and the guidon are not widely known outside the company. While only a vignette, the lore surrounding Suicide Charley is the type of legend that exemplifies Marine Corps history. This article documents the fight on the night of 24 October and the origin of the Suicide Charley legacy.

Formed in Cuba on 1 January 1941, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was commanded by the legendary Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the 7th Marines became the nucleus of the 3d Marine Brigade and deployed to protect American Samoa in April 1942. While the 1st MarDiv landed on Guadalcanal on 7 Au-

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2 Stanley Coleman Jersey, Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 291.
3 7th Marines History: Traditions and Customs, 7th Marines Order 15750.1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1963). Note that the spelling on the original guidon (Charley) is used in this article rather than the traditional spelling (Charlie).
4 The term guidon refers to a small flag, particularly one carried by a military unit as a unit marker.
Charley Company

This company photograph is widely used in books and publications on Guadalcanal. No publication identifies the unit pictured except in Major John L. Zimmerman’s official monograph, which captioned the photograph as “Fresh troops of the 2d Marine Division during a halt.”1 The troops are obviously fresh and free of disease, their equipment clean and uniforms in good shape. Most of these Marines are armed with M1903 bolt-action Springfield rifles and carry M1905 bayonets and M1941 packs. Two men high on the hill at left wear mortar vests, and one standing in the center has on a World War I-type grenade vest. The Marine seated at far left holds a Browning Automatic Rifle.

In December 1990, the author interviewed Charles Ramsey, a member of Company C on Guadalcanal, who affirmed that this photograph was Company C and was taken sometime between the time the company arrived on Guadalcanal on 14 September 1942 and their first fight along the Matanikau River on 23 September. Ramsey sits high in the center of the picture with his chin resting on his left hand.2

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2 Charles Ramsey, intvw with Gary Cozzens, December 1990, Woodland Hills, CA.
The battalion's table of organization included three infantry companies, one machine gun company, and a headquarters company. Headquarters Company included a platoon of 81mm mortarmen. A machine gun platoon was attached to each rifle company during combat. It was not unusual to have a machine gun platoon attached to a rifle company for months at a time. Each infantry company consisted of four platoons—three infantry platoons and one platoon of .30-caliber air-cooled light machine guns and 60mm mortars. A 37mm gun platoon also was attached to each battalion from the regimental weapons company. At this time, the Marines were using old equipment and did not have radios. Communication took place either by telephone or runner. The total strength of the company was 171 Marines.6

Soon after arrival on Guadalcanal, Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s Marines participated in two major actions. The first occurred along the Matanikau River on 23 September along the northern portion of the Marines’ perimeter. After moving down the river, Companies A and B landed west of Point Cruz, near Honiara, an action in which the battalion executive officer, Major Otho Rogers, was killed.7 Captain Charles W. Kelly Jr., commanding officer of Company C, assumed Roger’s billet, and Captain Marshall W. Moore became the commanding officer of Charley Company. In a second action on 7–9 October, Charley Company acted as the main effort in a regimental-size attack, catching the Japanese 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, in a draw inflicting 700 casualties.8

Defense of Sector Three

After fighting along the Matanikau River, Puller’s Marines were assigned to defend the eastern half of Sector Three south of Henderson Field. Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, had been to the 1st Battalion’s right flank of Sector Three on the forward slope of Edson’s Ridge, but had redeployed on 23 October to the Matanikau

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7 In an ill-conceived plan, Companies A and B were sent to the area near Koli Point via landing craft with Rogers in command. They walked into an ambush, and if Puller had not gotten them out, they would have been decimated. As a result of the action, Rogers was killed, Kelly became battalion executive officer, and Moore became Company C commander.

8 Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, MRoll, 314-21; and Jersey, Hell’s Islands, 252.
Captain Marshall W. Moore

Marshall W. Moore was born in Geneva, New York, on 17 September 1917. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in Buffalo and reported to Quantico, Virginia, on 18 October 1940 as a private first class. Following Officer Candidate School, he attended Officers Class and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1941. Moore joined 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, at New River, North Carolina, and was initially assigned to Company A as 3d Platoon commander.

He was promoted to first lieutenant on 28 February 1942. He then became commanding officer of Company C on Guadalcanal on 27 September, participating in all of Company C’s battles, until immediately after the action at Koli Point when, on 3 December 1942, he was evacuated as suffering from malaria, yellow jaundice, amoebic dysentery, and excessive weight loss (40 pounds).

For his actions in the defense of Henderson Field on the night of 24 October, Moore was awarded the Silver Star. After recovering his health, he assumed command of Company A and led that unit in the battle on New Britain. Following World War II, Moore remained in the Marine Corps Reserve and retired as a colonel in 1958. His son, John, also a Marine infantry officer, was killed in Vietnam in December 1968.

Marshall Moore died on 22 February 2004 and is buried in the Glenwood Cemetery in Geneva, New York.¹

Moore’s Silver Star citation reads:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Captain Marshall W. Moore, United States Marine Corps Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity as Commanding Officer of Company C, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on the night of October 24, 1942. Despite continuous and dangerous assaults by a numerically superior Japanese force which was attempting to smash the Lunga defense lines, Captain Moore daringly commanded his men in maintaining our positions and repulsing the enemy. With utter disregard for his own personal safety, he led his company in brilliant and devastating counterattacks and contributed to the rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese regiment. His indomitable fighting spirit and grim determination served as an inspiration to the men under his command and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.²

¹ Marshall Moore to Gary Cozzens, Cozzens Personal Papers.
River in anticipation of the next Japanese attack. As a result, Puller’s Marines assumed the defense for all of Sector Three in the 1st MarDiv’s perimeter, approximately 2,500 meters normally assigned to two infantry battalions.

Leadership within the Marine ranks demonstrated the confidence the Marines brought to the situation. In addition to Moore, other leaders in Company C included First Sergeant Lewis C. Oleksiak; Gunnery Sergeant Charles Livelsberger; platoon commanders First Lieutenants Karl H. Schmidt Jr., Arthur H. Wyman, and Marine Gunner William Fleming (2d Platoon); and platoon Sergeants Robert L. Domokus (1st Platoon), London L. Traw (2d Platoon), and Simon Viger (3d Platoon).

Puller and Kelly discussed the employment of the battalion and decided Kelly would take one platoon from each rifle company with attached machine guns, and occupy the position vacated by Hanneken. The terrain was much more favorable for defense, and Puller and Kelly thought it could be held with fewer men. This method of filling in the gap proved to be fortuitous. Kelly was accompanied by Captain William Watson, the battalion S2 (intelligence), communicators, and a couple corpsmen. The composite company spent its time bringing in ammunition and

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9 Edson’s Ridge, better known for the Battle of Bloody Ridge, was named for LtCol Merritt A. Edson, commander of the 1st Raider Battalion.

11 Platoon sergeant was a rank at this time equivalent to the modern rank of staff sergeant. Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, MRoll.
supplies and familiarizing themselves with the defensive features of the area.\(^\text{12}\)

It was obvious to the Marines that a large-scale Japanese attack would be a real threat in the near future. Accordingly, Puller’s Marines improved the defensive line and registered the final protective line in the perimeter defense. Barbed wire was woven into double apron fences and hung with empty ration cans and items that would make a racket and expose attempts to breach the wire. Fields of fire were cleared for the automatic weapons and mortar and artillery targets were preregistered. The Marines also removed the machine guns from disabled airplanes at Henderson Field and incorporated them into the defensive fires.\(^\text{13}\)

All during the day of 24 October, Puller drove his men to complete their defensive positions. From left to right facing south, Puller’s defense consisted of Company A (Captain Regan Fuller), Company C (Captain Moore), Company B (Captain Robert H. Haggerty), and the composite company (Captain Kelly). The battalion’s weapons company, Company D (Captain Robert J. Rodgers), had machine guns attached to each line company. Master Gunnery Sergeant Ray Fowel’s 81mm mortars provided indirect fire support. A platoon of four 37mm antitank guns (used in an antipersonnel role) from Captain Joseph E. Buckley’s regimental weapons company also inter-


\[^{13}\] Ibid.
spersed in the line. 14 Several hundred yards in front of Company A’s position sat a combat outpost manned by platoon Sergeant Ralph Briggs’ platoon. To Company A’s left (east) was 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, an Army National Guard battalion from North Dakota and Minnesota. The point where Company A’s line joined the Army National guardsmen had been coined “Coffin Corner,” while the open area in front of the lines was called the “Bowling Alley.” 15

A trail ran through the center of Company C’s position that was protected by a cheval-de-frise, which in turn was set into a double apron of barbed wire. 16 The Marines opened and closed this cheval-de-frise to allow patrols in and out through the perimeter. Sergeant


15 Company A’s line was held by one platoon. Sgt Briggs’ platoon was placed at the combat outpost in front of the battalion lines, and one platoon was detached to Captain Kelly’s composite company. Burke Davis, Marine!: The Life of Chesty Puller (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), 153; Col Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR, Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC (New York: Random House, 2001), 184; and Frank, Guadalcanal, 352–54.

16 The cheval-de-frise is a defensive obstacle consisting of a frame covered with many projecting spikes or spears.
John Basilone and his section of heavy water-cooled .30-caliber Browning machine guns from Company D were attached to Company C and emplaced in the company’s line. It was at this point that the major Japanese attack occurred on the night of 24 October.17

After only a month as company commander, Moore was now faced with establishing a defensive position with one-third of his company detached. On the afternoon of the attack, Moore sat in the company command post, feeling uneasy about the situation. He suggested that his Marines string another double apron of barbed wire behind the cheval-de-frise. At approximately 1600, they put on heavy gloves and strung more barbed wire, paying particular attention to the area behind the cheval-de-frise. The wire was strung in such a way as to make it very difficult to get through in the dark; so difficult, in fact, that a person would have to weave through. This tactic proved a great asset, as the Japanese apparently did not know it was there. Moore’s men also installed trip flares in the wire.18

Throughout the line, foxholes were deepened, crew-served weapons positions prepared, targets registered, and tactical wire emplaced. Some fighting positions were large enough for three men and surrounded with sandbags, leaving only a window to shoot through and a crawl space in the rear through which to enter and exit. The fighting holes were then covered by laying coconut logs on the sandbags, with another tier of sandbags atop the logs.19

Runners took messages from the battalion commander to the front lines where Company C was on the edge of the jungle. The company had cleared foliage in front of its positions about 100 yards into the jungle. In this stage of the war, Marines were using the M1903 Springfield .30-caliber rifles left over from World War I.20

Meanwhile, the Japanese were not idle. A Marine on patrol saw a Japanese officer observing Henderson Field through field glasses.21 Another Marine observed a large amount of smoke, apparently from cooking fires, rising from the jungle floor in Lunga Valley, two miles south of Puller’s position.22 Unfortunately, those two pieces of information never reached Puller.

These Japanese soldiers of the 17th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake, were some of Japan’s finest, particularly the regiments of Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama’s 2d (Sendai) Division whose motto was “Duty is heavier than a mountain, but death is lighter than a feather.”23 Colonel Masajiro Furumiya’s 29th Infantry Regiment, followed by Colonel Toshio Hiryasui’s 16th Infantry Regiment, would spearhead the attack by the Japanese left flank under the command of Major General Yumio Nasu. The right flank attack, under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, would consist of Colonel Akinosuka Oka’s 124th Infantry Regiment supported by Colonel Toshinari Shoji’s 230th Infantry Regiment. Kawaguchi balked at his orders to attack the right side of the Marines’ line and was relieved as the commander of the right wing by Colonel Shoji. According to General Hyakutake’s original plan, the attack was to occur on 18 October, but the intense jungle terrain and the uncooperative weather caused a postponement until the 22d that was later pushed back to the evening of 24 October.24

As the Sendai Division approached from the south, it reached a point it believed to be about a mile south of Henderson Field by about 1400. With the attack set for 1900, the two wings of the division opened four trails through the jungle to the American lines. Rain began to fall about 1600 and intensified an hour later, causing

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17 Moore to Hammel; and Bill Sanford to Gary Cozzens, 17 May 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.
18 Moore to Hammel.
19 Charles Ramsey to Gary Cozzens, 24 June 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.
20 Sanford to Cozzens.
21 Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, 118.
chaos among the Japanese. Darkness further obscured their ability to navigate. Due to these difficulties, the Sendai Division missed its assigned attack time and was still moving north when the rain ended and the clouds opened up to reveal a brilliant full moon.25

After the battle, a diary written by First Lieutenant Kozaburo Miyazawa, commanding officer of 2d Machine Gun Company, 2d Battalion, 29th Regiment, was discovered that detailed the devastation to the Japanese soldiers. The 29th Regiment was to assault Mukade (Bloody Ridge) with one blow and sweep all the artillery positions west of the airfield.26 As the regiment advanced to complete the mission, an officer patrol was dispatched to observe Marine lines due to extremely difficult terrain as a heavy rain fell, delaying the unit’s advance. Miyazawa wrote on 24 October that the Japanese finally encountered the Marines. The Japanese regiment was advancing with 3d Battalion in the lead and 1st Battalion on the right front. However, as no movement could be seen, contact could not be maintained. The 2d Battalion was to have been the reserve for the infantry group, but it followed directly behind the regiment.27 On the east flank of the Japanese attack, Shoji’s force turned right to run parallel to the Marines’ lines. All but one battalion—1st Battalion, 230th Infantry—failed to make contact with the Americans and drifted out of the action.28

The Japanese Attack

With darkness fast approaching, the Marines prepared for the coming onslaught. Lieutenant Colonel Puller ordered the lines on the field telephones to be left open for instant communications with subordinates. At approximately 2100, rain began to fall again, making the night even darker under the thick jungle canopy.

At 2130, the combat outpost from Company A reported to the battalion that it was surrounded by the Japanese. Puller directed them to push to their left (east) and return through 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, to Company A’s position if possible. A short time later, the Japanese taunted the Marines by yelling, “Blood for the Emperor!” and “Marine you die!,” in an attempt to entice them to give away their position. After more than a month on the island, Puller’s men were too wise to fire at the voices. Instead, they replied with their own taunt, “Blood for Franklin and Eleanor [Roosevelt].”29 Suddenly, at 2200 on 24 October, the

25 Frank, Guadalcanal, 352-35; and Hoffman, Chesty, 185.
26 In Japanese, the term mukade refers to the centipede, which is what the Japanese soldiers called the ridge because of its shape.
29 Davis, Marine!, 155; and Leckie, Challenge for the Pacific, 265.
Japanese came toward the Marines’ lines in a rush.³⁹ Luckily for Captain Moore’s men, the cheval-de-frise in front of Company C’s position caught the Japanese by surprise and they were momentarily halted.³¹

Japanese records indicate that it was Colonel Shoji’s 1st Battalion, 230th Infantry, that hit Puller’s lines first on the right at 2200, running into Company A. They were followed by the whole of Major General Yumio Nasu’s left wing, attacking in a column of battalions. The 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, rapidly moved straight into the cheval-de-frise in front of Company C and was decimated.³²

Marine artillery and mortars were firing supporting missions in such volleys that the powder bags heated in the weapons and “cooked off” from hot barrels, causing “short rounds narrowly missing the Ma-

³⁹ There is controversy over the exact time and date of the Japanese attack. The following references reflect the differences: official records put the initial attack at 2200 on 24 October 1942 in “Summary of Operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 24–25 October 1942,” Reference Branch, History Division, MCU, Quantico, VA; shortly after midnight on 25 October in James S. Santelli, A Brief History of the 7th Marines (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1980), 11; at about 2200 on 24 October in Hammel, Guadalcanal, 348–51; at about 2130 on 24 October in Davis, Marine!, 152–55; at about 2200 on 24 October in Hoffman, Chesty, 186–87; at about 0030 on 25 October in McMillian, The Old Breed, 105–6; at about 0030 on 25 October 1942 in Zimmerman, Guadalcanal, 118; at about 0030 on 25 October in Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 373; and at about 0300 on 25 October in Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, 368–69. These times may all be correct and may account for the different waves of the Japanese attack.

³¹ Hammel, Guadalcanal, 346–57, 361–63; and Davis, Marine!, 155.
³² Frank, Guadalcanal, 351–54; Hoffman, Chesty, 188–89; and Moore to Hammel.
Moore’s men had emplaced their barbed wire entanglements so securely that wave after wave of Japanese assault troops were hung up and died on it. The company eventually was infiltrated, but afterward, the Japanese seemed confused and made little effort to take advantage of the penetration.  

**Sergeant John Basilone**

At 0015 and again at 0300, General Marayama’s Sendai Division attacked in the most concentrated effort of the night. When the first wave came, the Marines kept firing and drove the Japanese back. Ammunition supplies were getting low, so Basilone left the guns and ran to his next gun position to get more. Upon his return, a runner arrived and told Basilone that the Japanese had broken through the emplacements on the right, killing two of the crew and wounding three, and the guns were jammed. Basilone moved up the trail and found 18-year-old Private Cecil H. Evans screaming at the Japanese to “come on.” Basilone returned to his own guns, grabbed one machine gun, and told the crew to follow him up the trail. While he cleared the jams on the other two guns, the Marines set up their weapons. The Japanese still coming at the lines pinned the Marines down at their positions. Basilone rolled over from one gun to another, firing as fast as they could be loaded. The ammunition belts were in bad shape because they had been dragged on the ground, forcing the gunners to scrape the mud out of the receiver. Still, some Japanese soldiers infiltrated behind the lines, so the Marines would have to stop firing and shoot at infiltrators with small arms. At dawn, the gun barrels were burnt out after Basilone’s machine gun section fired 26,000 rounds.  

Company C was stretched out over a wide area in a very thin line that had been decimated by heavy casualties and illness. Sergeant Louis S. Maravelas of 2d Platoon and his squad were in position to the right of Basilone’s section protecting the guns, and in the confusion of the fight, they could not see to the right of the line. Firing was heavy and contact between platoons was very poor. Maravelas and his Marines fixed bayonets and returned fire. Basilone had the bodies of the dead Japanese piled two, three, and four high in front of his emplacement.

**Reserves Committed**

The Marines poured their fire into the Japanese attack, which was centered on Company C’s line. Puller telephoned Brigadier General Pedro A. Del Valle, commanding officer of the 11th Marines, requesting artillery support. The battalion’s operations officer, Captain Charles J. Beasley, called Colonel Gerald C. Thomas, the division chief of staff, requesting reinforcements.  

As the situation became more serious, Lieutenant Colonel Julian N. Frisbie, the 7th Marines regimental executive officer, called Captain Kelly from the regimental command post 600 yards directly behind Kelly’s position and told the captain he was sending up a battalion of the U.S. Army’s 164th Infantry. He asked if Kelly could guide them into position in Puller’s area. Kelly told Frisbie he would have runners there by the time the Army troops got up to the lines. The fortunate result of Puller’s method of filling in the area Hanneken’s battalion had vacated with a platoon from each company position in Kelly’s area was that it was a simple matter for each platoon to send a man to Kelly, since they were thoroughly familiar with the location of their parent units and the access routes. The runners arrived at Kelly’s command post, where he briefed them on their task. Kelly then ordered Captain William Watson to take the guides to Frisbie’s position and to be sure that they each picked up an Army company to lead to their own company area. The 7th Marines chaplain, Father Matthew F. Keough, led the Army battalion into position with Marines from Captain Kelly’s position acting as guides to their parent

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34 Ramsey to Cozzens.
36 Louis Maravelas to Gary Cozzens, 29 May 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.
**Sergeant John Basilone**

**MEDAL OF HONOR CITATION**

For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action against enemy Japanese forces, while serving with First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division, in the Lunga Area, Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on October 24 and 25, 1942. While the enemy was hammering at the Marines’ defensive positions, Sergeant Basilone, in charge of two heavy machine guns, fought valiantly to check the savage and determined advance. In a fierce frontal assault with the Japanese blasting his guns with grenades and mortar fire, one of Sergeant Basilone’s sections, with its gun crews, was put out of action, leaving only two men to carry on. Moving an extra gun into position, he placed it into action, then, under continual fire, repaired another and personally managed it, gallantly holding his line, until replacements arrived. A little later, with ammunition critically low and the supply lines cut off, Sergeant Basilone, at great risk of his life and in the face of continued enemy attack, battled his way through hostile lines with urgently needed shells for his gunners, thereby contributing in a large measure to the virtual annihilation of a Japanese regiment. His great personal valor and courageous initiative were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval service.¹

¹ Blakeney, *Heroes*, 16.

companies.³⁸ While the Army units moved forward, Company L, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, reinforced Company A; Company I, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, reinforced Company B; and Company K, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, reinforced Charley Company. All the Army companies were in position by 0345. The movement went smoothly and the reinforcements were fed in from behind the Marine company positions. The soldiers were fed into the line piecemeal rather than as tactical units.³⁹

From Kelly’s position on the ridge, it was readily apparent when the new troops were in position, as the sound and tempo of firing picked up significantly. The Army units were armed with M1 Garand .30-caliber rifles, which had a much higher rate of fire than the old Springfields used by the Marines. The sounds of the battle were deafening at times, only to diminish and then pick up again as the Japanese rolled back in. Up on the ridge, Captain Kelly felt he had a grandstand seat—he could see the action laid out in front of him, though off to the left on the low ground, he could only guess at the progress of the battle. Puller called in all the available artillery, and Kelly heard it firing at such reduced range that its rounds were coming in close overhead—so close that a few short rounds landed behind Marine lines. Fortunately, no casualties resulted from friendly fire.⁴⁰

The next assault by the Japanese at about 0400 was somewhat unexpected in its execution. Marine

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⁴⁰ Kelly to Hammel; and Maravelas to Cozzens.
and Army units were mixed into the line piecemeal. At daylight, although the American line had held, a small Japanese salient existed between Companies C and B, plus the infiltrators who had penetrated the lines.

One of the Marines leading reinforcements into the lines that night was Private Theodore G. West. Though wounded and unable to fight, West continued to maintain his position on the line and directed reinforcements into position and into the fight. His actions “contributed materially to restoring our line and to the eventual rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese regiment.” For his actions, Private West was awarded the Navy Cross.41 In his official report of the battle, Puller stated that “the conduct of [A]rmy reinforcements on the night of 24–25 October were exemplary and they arrived just in time.”42

Captain Kelly and his composite company also saw action on the night of 24 October, but not to the extent of the rest of the battalion. Kelly kept his phone handle a rifle, remained in his position until reinforcements arrived, then rendered invaluable assistance by placing two rifle squads and directing their fire. His gallant action thereafter contributed materially to restoring our line and to the eventual rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese regiment. His courageous devotion to duty, maintained for nearly seven hours after he was severely injured, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.43

Miyazawa’s diary recorded that, when Japanese encountered the Marines, it was necessary to advance along a trail made by the Americans. The Marines had excellent detectors set up to announce Japanese movement, resulting in intense machine-gun and mortar fire. Even though it was night, the Marines had effective plots that inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. However, the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, commander strove to break through. Each company began its ordered assault, but because of the heavy concentration of mortar and machine-gun fire, the attempt was de-

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41 “Theodore Gerard West”; and Blakeney, Heroes, 115.
43 Kelly to Hammel.
layed. About this time, the regimental commander, Colonel Masajiro Furumiya with 7th Company, penetrated the Marines’ position, but made no progress. Finally, dawn broke and American fire became more intense, almost annihilating 3d Battalion. According to Miyazawa, Japanese battle losses at the mukade were estimated at 350 killed, 500 wounded, and 200 missing for a total of 1,050.44

All night on 24 October, the Japanese hit Company C with a regiment of troops in waves of suicidal attacks. They threw their bodies into the machine gun emplacements, forcing the gunners to evacuate the bunkers and fire from the top. During the night, Marines transported ammunition to the frontlines.45

One Company C machine gun emplacement on the right side burned out the lands and grooves of two air-cooled .30-caliber barrels for their machine gun.46 The 2d Platoon sergeant, London Traw, was on the right with a water-cooled .30-caliber machine gun. He was blown up with Japanese dynamite and killed that night.47 The medical personnel in the battalion aid station cared for the wounded under exceedingly adverse conditions. They worked in virtual darkness and heavy rain amid tremendous battle noises to save the most severely wounded.48

At approximately 0500, a small group of Japanese from the 7th Company, 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, broke through the Marine lines and drove a salient between Companies B and C. The penetration was quickly sealed, and Company C held the line throughout the night despite multiple Japanese attacks. Thirty-seven Japanese were killed, reducing the salient, and 41 more died in the rear of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, line the following day during the mopping-up effort led by First Lieutenants Arthur H. Wyman and Karl Schmidt and Sergeant Robert L. Domokos.49 After sunrise, the Japanese mounted one more serious attack, but were easily beaten back.50

Private Ralph Tulloch of the regimental weapons company had gone to sleep in the back of an open truck. Upon being awakened, he was ordered to the ammo dump and picked up a load to take to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Tulloch had not been to 1st Battalion’s position and asked if someone at the ammo dump would ride shotgun to guide the way. The normal route was under enemy attack.

With as much ammo as he could stow in the truck, Tulloch slowly left the ammo dump. He turned left on a trail at the foot of Bloody Ridge and headed into the jungle east toward 1st Battalion’s lines. Heavy rain continued, though an occasional sliver of moonlight helped guide the driver. At the base of Bloody Ridge, the ground was slippery with mud, and water stood a foot deep.

It was now 0300 on 25 October, and the main attack of the Japanese focused on Company C’s position. With tracers and the sound of rounds from Japanese machine guns overhead and debris from the trees falling, Tulloch struggled against his instinct to stop and find cover. After some time driving in blackness, Tulloch turned on the blackout lights, but they did not help. He stopped the truck and picked up a piece of wood that gave off what he called foxfire. He asked the guide to walk on the left side of the trail holding the foxfire where he could see it along the trail.51 Tulloch passed what he later learned was 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, moving along the trail to reinforce Puller’s battalion. He was stopped by someone from the battalion command post, who asked him to unload part of the machine gun and rifle ammo there. Tulloch and the guide carried some to the front lines a short distance away to supply the machine guns for

44 Miyazawa, “Diary.”
45 Ramsey to Cozzens.
47 The USS Traw (DE 350), a destroyer escort, was laid down on 19 December 1943 and launched on 12 February 1944. It saw action in both the European and Pacific theaters.
48 Kelly to Hammel.
49 Wyman, Schmidt, and Domokos were awarded commendations for this action. George MacGillivray to Gary Cozzens, 8 September 1993, Cozzens Personal Papers.
51 Foxfire is a naturally occurring phosphorescent glow created by a species of fungi as wood decays.
Sergeant Basilone, while the rifle ammo was placed under a poncho at the Company C command post. The truck slid off the trail at the base of the ridge, leaving Tulloch’s vehicle mired in mud, with all four wheels spinning. Trapped inside the vehicle, he could not get out and a sniper started firing at him. Three or four rounds hit the truck bed and ricocheted. One round hit the lower left corner of the windshield, forcing Tulloch to take cover in front of the truck and return fire blindly in the general direction of the sniper. After about 30 minutes of quiet, Tulloch managed to get the truck out and go after another load of mortar, 37mm, rifle, and machine gun ammo, water, and rations, which he delivered at daylight.

The Morning After
The Marines exacted a heavy toll in the Battle for Henderson Field. Major General Yumino Nasu (commander of the left wing), Colonel Yoshi Hiroyasu (16th Infantry), and Colonel Masajiro Furumiya (29th Infantry) were killed in action. Japanese reports account for more than 1,050 killed, missing, or wounded from the 29th Infantry alone. American figures showed 250 dead Japanese were found within the 1st Battalion’s lines, 25 of whom were officers. A total of 1,462 dead Japanese were counted in front of the battalion’s position. Another account states that after the night of attacks, more than 400 Japanese were counted in the cone of machine gun fire in front of Company C’s position; they were buried in a common grave.

Kamekichi Kusano, a 23-year-old private in 7th Company, 2d Battalion, 29th Regiment, wrote: “The 29th [Infantry] attacked the first day and was led into a trap and the majority of the regiment was killed. The dead were piled three and four deep. Only two or three hundred survived the attack.”

52 Ralph Tulloch, “Guadalcanal Echoes,” Guadalcanal Campaign Veterans, January 1993, 7. Tulloch was meritoriously promoted to corporal for his actions this night.
53 Hammel, Guadalcanal, 350; Davis, Marine!, 161-62; and Ramsey to Cozzens.

John Stannard, then a sergeant in Company E, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment, recalled that “the carnage of the battlefield was a sight that perhaps only the combat infantryman, who has fought at close quarters, could fully comprehend and look upon without a feeling of horror.”

At daylight the next morning, the front lines revealed a stack of dead Japanese piled up in front of Company C’s position. The U.S. Army was left to clean up and quickly bury the dead to prevent diseases. Korean prisoners, whom the Japanese had brought onto the island as forced labor, were assigned to bury the Japanese dead. Marine engineers blew three holes in front of Company A’s old position, and in three days, the Koreans buried more than 700 dead Japanese.

Casualties for Puller’s battalion were 19 dead, 30 wounded, and 12 missing. Company C’s casualties were 9 dead and 9 wounded. To date, the battalion had suffered 24 percent casualties and 37 percent officer casualties on Guadalcanal.

56 Arthur Miller to Gary Cozzens, 26 November 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers; George MacGillivray to Gary Cozzens, 26 June 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers; and Richard Fisher to Gary Cozzens, 10 November 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.
58 “Summary of Operations, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 24-25 October 1942.”
backing us up, and there was plenty of barbed wire.”

When the Marines were relieved by the soldiers and sent to new positions farther up on Bloody Ridge, they all were equipped with the new M1 Garand rifles instead of their issued Springfield bolt-action rifles. Soon after, however, a directive ordered the return of the M1 rifles to the Army and the Marines got their old Springfields back.60

The 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, relieved Puller from perimeter defense and he shifted his battalion on the ridge, so what was left of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, now occupied the position previously held by 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The rain stopped and sunlight hit the ridge, giving the Marines a chance to dry out and rest. That night, the Japanese tried a repeat performance, with their main effort coming at the same area as before, though now occupied by 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry. They made desultory attempts on 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ new position on the ridge, a few straggled down the bank of the Lunga River, and some were simply laggards who were lost. At 0800 on 26 October, General Hyakutake ordered his forces to retreat.61

Usually conservative when awarding personal decorations, the Marine Corps recognized Company C’s stubborn defense the night of 24–25 October. Charley Company Marines received one Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, one Bronze Star, and nine commendations for their actions that night. In addition to Basilone’s Congressional Medal of Honor, attachments to Company C were awarded two Navy Crosses, two Silver Stars, and one commendation.62

The Suicide Charley Guidon
The morning of 25 October saw the collapse of the Japanese attack and the defensive line of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, still intact. Later that morning, a flag appeared over Charley Company’s position. It had been fashioned from white Japanese parachute material and crudely painted with a skull and crossbones and the inscription “Suicide Charley, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.” The flag would continue to appear throughout the hard-fought battle for Guadalcanal.63

No picture of the original guidon is known to exist, however, the best evidence comes from oral history interviews conducted with the U.S. Marines who saw the original guidon on the morning of 25 October. Private First Class Richard L. Fisher remembers:

> The guidon was sticking in the ground near the foxhole of PFC William Wentz during the day between the Japanese attacks of October 24th and 25th. I asked PFC Paul Hatfield who made it. Paul just shook his head. . . . I was with a small group that rotated back behind the lines for chow and the guidon was near one of Basilone’s machine gun emplacements when I returned. I tried to sleep for a while. Later Puller, Capt. Kelly and our quartermaster sergeant came by and I woke up. [Corporal Edward] Kleason, quartermaster sergeant, was carrying the flag. Puller was smoking a pipe. He grinned out of the corner of his mouth. “Go back to sleep old man, we may not get any tonight.” Kleason kept the guidon in a box in his tent. I only saw it that one morning.64

Private Ralph Tulloch of the regimental weapons company also remembers seeing the Suicide Charley guidon that same morning:

> [T]he only time I remember seeing it [the flag] was after the 1st Battalion moved to the right on Bloody Ridge, taking over the

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60 Marshall W. Moore to Gary Cozzens, 9 May 1990; and Billy R. Sanford to Gary Cozzens, 18 May 1991, Cozzens Personal Papers.
61 Kelly to Hammel, 25 August 1980, Hammel Papers; Frank, Guadalcanal, 364; and Jersey, Hell’s Islands, 292.
62 Award records are scattered and not well documented. Fleming was later killed in action on Cape Gloucester. See MacGillivray to Cozzens; and Blakeney, Heroes, 113, 98, 191, 180.
63 7th Marines History, 10.
64 Richard Fisher to Gary Cozzens, 10 November 1990, Cozzens Personal Papers.
positions where the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines had been three or four days before, they [2d Battalion, 7th Marines] moved to the Matanikau River area. This would have been 25 or 26 October 1942. A few days later the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines moved to the Koli Point area, which Weapons Company, 7th Marines supported. However, I don’t recall seeing the flag at that time, 4–10 November 1942, nor do I recall seeing it again. . . . It is my theory that the flag was made to signify that any enemy attacking Charley Company was committing suicide.65

Private First Class Gilbert Lozier adds: A few months after I was wounded [8 October], I ran into a C Company Marine at New Caledonia. He told me what had happened after I had left. That line we were holding was hit by a very large number of Japanese. Our Marines held on for a while, but the Japanese broke through. There was some hand-to-hand fighting in which several members of my squad were killed, but we were able to close the Japanese gain, and kill those who had gone through the gap. Sergeant Basilone was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. This is where the term “Suicide Charley” started.66

Private First Class Clarence E. Angevine recalls seeing the guidon and gives a clue as to who might have painted it:

The man you are trying to find who made that flag is probably Phil South [Private Phillip South]. He was from Manhattan, Montana. One of the guys that was in on that flag deal name was Pokana. These guys were from the third platoon of the compa-

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65 Ralph L. Tulloch to Gary Cozzens, 29 November 1993, Cozzens Personal Papers.
of the campaign on [Cape] Gloucester. He was evacuated and I never heard from him since.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{The Tradition Continues}

The battalion next conducted offensive operations at Koli Point in November before withdrawing from Guadalcanal in December 1942 and deploying to Australia for recovery. The battalion fought next on New Britain, but the Suicide Charley guidon was not seen again until the bloody Battle of Peleliu (Operation Stalemate). During that time, a replica of the original guidon appeared briefly to inspire the tired Marines to victory.\textsuperscript{68}

The symbol next appeared in Korea. While on rest and recuperation in Seoul, some members of Company C had a new Suicide Charley guidon made and proudly bore it back to the company. The guidon was carried throughout the conflict in Vietnam, and it then crossed the minefields into Kuwait in 1990–91, when Lieutenant Colonel James N. Mattis led 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, during Operation Desert Storm (First Gulf War). Company C bore the standard before them when they participated in humanitarian aid efforts in Somalia during Operation Provide Comfort.

\textsuperscript{67} No Marine named Pokana has been found on the October 1942 Company C muster rolls. Clarence Angevine to Gary Cozzens, 15 July 1996, Cozzens Personal Papers. Angevine was awarded the Navy Cross for actions on Cape Gloucester on 10 January 1944.

\textsuperscript{68} 7th Marines History, 10.
(1991), and it was present in both Afghanistan and Iraq during Operations Enduring Freedom (2001–3) and Iraqi Freedom (2003).

The white Suicide Charley guidon has traveled the world with the company. The National Museum of the Marine Corps holds two versions in its collection, and replicas abound among the company’s former members.°9 Today, the Suicide Charley guidon is carried in all formations, and Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, is better known to its Marines and those who know its history as Suicide Charley.

(article continues with award citations next page)

69 Henry I. Shaw Jr. to Capt Gary Cozzens, 4 March 1986, Cozzens Personal Papers.
70 7th Marines History, 10.
AWARDS FOR BATTLE OF HENDERSON FIELD

**Company C**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Award</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sgt Archie D. Armstead</td>
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<td>Navy Commendation Medal</td>
<td>24 October</td>
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<tr>
<td>PltSgt Robert L. Domokos</td>
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<td>Navy Commendation Medal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG William McK. Fleming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sgt John M. Kozak</td>
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<td>Sgt Edward Lewis</td>
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<td>GySgt Charles K. Livelsberger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt Marshall W. Moore</td>
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<td>1stLt Karl H. Schmidt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pvt Theodore G. West</td>
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<td>1stLt Arthur H. Wyman</td>
<td>1st Battalion, 7th Marines</td>
<td>Navy Commendation Medal</td>
<td>24 October</td>
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**Attached to Company C**

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<tr>
<td>PltSgt John Basilone</td>
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<td>Medal of Honor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pvt Billie J. Crumpton</td>
<td>Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines</td>
<td>Navy Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pvt Cecil H. Evans</td>
<td>Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pvt Sam Hirsch</td>
<td>Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines</td>
<td>Silver Star</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cpl Noel L. Sharpton</td>
<td>Weapons Company, 7th Marines</td>
<td>Navy Commendation Medal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC Jack Sugarman</td>
<td>Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines</td>
<td>Navy Cross</td>
<td>24-25 October</td>
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**Sergeant Archie D. Armstead**  

Navy Commendation Medal  

For devotion to duty during adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy from September to early December 1942. Throughout this entire period, Sergeant Armstead served with honor and distinction. On October 24th, he served as acting Platoon Sergeant in an especially commendable manner, with a platoon defense of the Lunga Area on Guadalcanal Island against an enemy force of superior numbers. The platoon was subjected to enemy fire from all enemy weapons and helped to repulse repeated enemy assaults. In his position of leadership, Sergeant Armstead, coolly and deliberately, without regard for his safety, assisted in directing the fire of his platoon, until his platoon leader was killed. Immediately he assumed the duties of his leader, serving with courage and skill, in addition to performing his own. By his intelligent action, he contributed greatly to the rout and virtual annihilation of a Japanese Regiment, which resulted in the Marine victory.
PLATOON SERGEANT
JOHN BASILONE
Medal of Honor
The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to Sergeant John “Manila John” Basilone, United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action against enemy Japanese forces, above and beyond the call of duty, while serving with the First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, during the action against enemy Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on the night of 24–25 October 1942. When his squad leader and the remainder of his crew were killed or wounded during a mass frontal attack by hostile forces, Private Crumpton, although he, himself, was severely injured, gallantly stood by his gun and by maintaining effective fire, kept the enemy from penetrating the sector. Later, after his gun had been put out of action, he remained in an exposed position beside the disabled weapon and resumed fire with his rifle until wounds from exploding hand grenades forced him out of the fight. By his courageous devotion to duty and grim determination in the face of great danger, he contributed materially to the defeat and virtual annihilation of a Japanese regiment.

Note: Platoon Sergeant Basilone was a member of Company D and was attached to Company C when he was awarded the Medal of Honor during the second Battle of Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal.

PRIVATE BILLIE J. CRUMPTON
Navy Cross
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private Billie Joe Crumpton, United States Marine Corps Reserve, for extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty while serving with a heavy machine-gun crew in Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, during the action against enemy Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on the night of 24–25 October 1942. When his squad leader and the remainder of his crew were killed or wounded during a mass frontal attack by hostile forces, Private Crumpton, although he, himself, was severely injured, gallantly stood by his gun and by maintaining effective fire, kept the enemy from penetrating the sector. Later, after his gun had been put out of action, he remained in an exposed position beside the disabled weapon and resumed fire with his rifle until wounds from exploding hand grenades forced him out of the fight. By his courageous devotion to duty and grim determination in the face of great danger, he contributed materially to the defeat and virtual annihilation of a Japanese regiment.

PLATOON SERGEANT
ROBERT L. DOMOKOS
Navy Commendation Medal
For bravery and devotion to duty in an engagement with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands on October 24, 1942. The Company in which Platoon Sergeant Domokos was attached was assigned to the defense of a sector of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal. The enemy had forced a salient in the line. Sergeant Domokos took command of a small force of Marines and by his skill and courageous leadership succeeded in the line and annihilating the enemy forces which had penetrated it.

PRIVATE CECIL H. EVANS
Silver Star
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Private Cecil H. Evans, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving with a
heavy machine-gun crew in Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, 24 and 25 October 1942. When his squad leader and the remainder of his crew were killed or wounded during a mass frontal attack by hostile forces, Private Evans, manning his rifle from a dangerously exposed position, prevented hostile troops from overrunning the gun position until the disabled weapon could be replaced. His heroic conduct, maintained at great personal risk in the face of grave danger, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

MARINE GUNNER
WILLIAM McK. FLEMING
Navy Commendation Medal
For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. Throughout this entire period, Marine Gunner Fleming served with honor and distinction. He was serving as platoon leader on October 24 and 25 with the Marines in defense of the Lunga area on Guadalcanal Island when the enemy attacked with superior numbers. Without regard for his own safety, under severe enemy fire, and in the face of repeated enemy assaults, he displayed great courage and leadership. During the long hours of the attack, in rain and under darkness, he so skillfully lead his men that he contributed greatly to the rout and virtual annihilation of a Japanese Regiment, which resulted in a Marine victory.

Note: William Fleming received a field commission to second lieutenant and was later killed in action on New Britain.

PRIVATE SAM HIRSCH
Silver Star
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Private Sam Hirsch, United States Marine Corps Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving with Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division in action against enemy Japanese forces at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands on October 24, 1942. During dangerous assaults against the main Lunga Defense line by a numerically superior Japanese force, Private Hirsch, despite the intense fire of enemy machine guns, mortars and rifles proceeded with courageous initiative to carry ammunition and spare parts from his company dump to machine gun positions in the forward area where such supplies were critically low. In addition, he fearlessly continued to load ammunition belts at the company dump, although exposed to the fire of infiltrating enemy groups. His heroic and intrepid conduct, maintained without regard for his own personal safety, contributed immeasurably to the ultimate success of our forces in this engagement and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

SERGEANT JOHN M. KOZAK
Navy Commendation Medal
For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. On October 24 while serving as a platoon leader of a weapons platoon in defense of the Lunga area on Guadalcanal Island, Sergeant Kozak and his comrades were heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly superior in numbers. Under severe enemy fire and in the face of repeated assault waves he coolly and deliberately, without regard for his own personal safety, directed and controlled fire of the machine guns of his platoon upon the enemy until the devastating fire of the Marines turned the battle into utter defeat and the virtual annihilation of an enemy regiment. By his skill and determination and his extraordinary heroism under enemy fire, Sergeant Kozak distinguished himself in the line of his profession and contributed greatly to the Marine victory.
SERGEANT EDWARD LEWIS  
Navy Commendation Medal
For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. While serving as a section leader of a weapons platoon in the defense of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal, the platoon was heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly superior in numbers. The enemy was placing heavy fire from all of their weapons. Sergeant Lewis coolly and deliberately, without regard for his own personal safety, directed and controlled the fire of the machine guns of his section upon repeated assaulting waves of the enemy until the devastating fire of the Marines turned the battle into utter defeat and the virtual annihilation of an enemy regiment. By his skill and determination and his extraordinary heroism under enemy fire, Sergeant Lewis distinguished himself, in the line of his profession and contributed greatly to the Marine victory.

GUNNER CHARLES K. LIVELSBERGER  
Navy Commendation Medal
For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early December 1942. While serving as a platoon leader of a weapons platoon in the absence of a commissioned officer, in defense of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal Island, the platoon was heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly superior in numbers. The enemy was placing heavy fire with all of their weapons. Gunner Livelsberger coolly and deliberately, without regard for his own personal safety, directed and controlled the fire of the machine guns of his section upon repeated assaulting waves of the enemy until the devastating fire of the Marines turned the battle into utter defeat and the virtual annihilation of an enemy regiment. By his skill and determination and his extraordinary heroism under enemy fire, Sergeant Livelsberger distinguished himself, in the line of his profession and contributed greatly to the Marine victory.

CAPTAIN MARSHALL W. MOORE  
Silver Star
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Captain Marshall W. Moore, United States Marine Corps Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity as Commanding Officer of Company C, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, on the night of October 24, 1942. Despite continuous and dangerous assaults by a numerically superior Japanese force which was attempting to smash the Lunga defense lines, Captain Moore daringly commanded his men in maintaining our positions and repulsing the enemy. With utter disregard for his own personal safety, he led his company in brilliant and devastating counterattacks and contributed to the rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese regiment. His indomitable fighting spirit and grim determination served as an inspiration to the men under his command and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

FIRST LIEUTENANT KARL H. SCHMIDT  
Navy Commendation Medal
For bravery and devotion to duty in an engagement with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands on October 24, 1942. The company to which Lieutenant Schmidt was attached was assigned to the defense of a sector of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal. The enemy had forced a salient in the line. Lieutenant Schmidt took command of a small force of Marines and by his skill and courageous leadership succeeded in reestablishing the line and annihilating the enemy force which had penetrated it.

CORPORAL NOEL L. SHARPTON  
Navy Commendation Medal
For bravery and devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands from September to early De-
cember 1942. Throughout this period Corporal Sharp-ton served with honor and distinction. During the engagement on October 24, the enemy attacked with a force of greatly superior numbers placing severe fire and making repeated assaults. Without regard for his own safety under these extreme conditions he continued to direct the fire of his gun and contributed greatly to devastating the enemy who were utterly defeated and virtually annihilated. By his courage and skill, he enhanced the Marine victory.

Note: Corporal Sharpton was a member of the 7th Marines Regimental Weapons Company. His 37mm gun was attached to Company C during the second Battle for Bloody Ridge.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS
JACK SUGARMAN
Navy Cross
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Private First Class Jack Sugarman, United States Marine Corps Reserve, for extraordinary heroism and conspicuous devotion to duty while serving with Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area on the night of October 24–25, 1942. During a mass frontal attack by a numerically superior enemy force, Private First Class Sugarman, with his gun temporarily out of action and his position threatened by hostile troops, removed the weapon and, with the aid of a comrade, repaired and place it back in action under heavy fire. On four separate occasions he saved the gun from capture, repaired it under fire and continued to maintain effective resistance against masses of attacking Japanese. By his skill and determination, he inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy and helped prevent a break-through in our lines, which at that time, was weakly held by a small group of riflemen. His actions throughout were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

PLATOON SERGEANT
LONDON L. TRAW
Silver Star
The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Silver Star (Posthumously) to Platoon Sergeant London Lewis Traw, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving with the First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division during action against enemy Japanese forces in the Lunga Area, Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands on October 24 and 25, 1942. Undeterred by terrific enemy fire, Platoon Sergeant Traw coolly directed and controlled the fire of the machine guns of his section against repeated assaults of enemy forces greatly superior in numbers. The combat achievements of his platoon under his inspiring and courageous leadership contributed greatly to the rout and virtual annihilation of a Japanese regiment. He gallantly gave up his life in the service of his country.

PLATOON SERGEANT
SIMON VIGOR
Navy Commendation Medal
For devotion to duty under adverse conditions during engagements with the enemy in the British Solomon Island from September to early December 1942. On October 24 while serving as a platoon sergeant of a platoon in defense of the Lunga area on Guadalcanal Island, Platoon Sergeant Vigor and his comrades were heavily engaged with an enemy force, vastly superior in numbers. While under heavy fire from all enemy weapons he coolly and deliberately, without regard for his own personal safety, directed and controlled the fire of his platoon upon repeated assaulting waves of the enemy until the devastating fire of the Marines turned the battle into utter defeat and the virtual annihilation of a Japanese Regiment. By his skill and determination and his heroism under enemy fire, he distinguished himself in the line of his profession and contributed greatly to the Marine victory.
PRIVATE THEODORE G. WEST
Navy Cross
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Theodore Gerard West, Private, U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism and conspicuous devotion to duty while serving with Company C, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine Division, during action against enemy Japanese forces in the Lunga Area of Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands on 25 October 1942. During a heavy attack by a numerically superior enemy force, Private West, although wounded to such an extent that he was unable to handle a rifle, remained in his position until reinforcements arrived, then rendered invaluable assistance by placing two rifle squads and directing their fire. His gallant action thereafter contributed materially to restoring our line and to the eventual rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese regiment. His courageous devotion to duty, maintained for nearly seven hours after he was severely injured, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

FIRST LIEUTENANT
ARTHUR H. WYMAN
Navy Commendation Medal
For bravery and devotion to duty in an engagement with the enemy in the British Solomon Islands on October 24, 1942. The company to which Lieutenant Wyman was attached was assigned to the defense of a sector of the Lunga area, Guadalcanal. The enemy had forced a salient in the line. Lieutenant Wyman took command of a small force of Marines and by his skill and courageous leadership succeeded in reestablishing the line and annihilating the enemy force which had penetrated it.
Royal Marines
Commandos at Limbang, 1962

by Captain Derek Oakley, MBE, RM*

Until 1962, the island of Borneo, the third largest island in the world, was divided into a vast southern area under Indonesian rule and three British dependencies—Sarawak (the largest), North Borneo and, sandwiched between them, the tiny but very rich protectorate of Brunei. With British interests gradually declining in this part of the Far East, a federation of these three Borneo states along the north coast was emerging. Although the indigenous tribes of the Borneo jungle were basically hard working and distant from political and territorial ideals, many, including the Kedayans, were of Indonesian origin. Through such tribes, the Indonesian Army had infiltrated and trained some in the use of arms so that, when the time was right, they could rebel against the Sultan of Brunei, Omar Ali Saifuddin. The Federation of Malaya had achieved independence in 1957 and its prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed in 1961 that a larger federated state of Malaysia be formed embracing Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo. There was considerable dissension and unrest in Brunei and...
Sarawak over the proposal, while Indonesia immediately opposed it.¹

Such was the background to a revolt that was sparked off in the first few days of December 1962, when several towns, including Brunei Town and Limbang, a small community 12 miles upriver and across the border into Sarawak, were occupied by Indonesian rebels. This article highlights the courageous civilians already present on the island and the Royal Marines who would later come to their rescue on this far-flung shore.

Richard Morris, the British resident of the 5th Division of Sarawak, lived here.² Although intelligence had revealed that the revolt was planned for 5 December, the seizure of hostages at Limbang, Seria, Miri, and other towns in Brunei did not take place until the morning of the 8th. Morris, an Australian, had served 17 years in the Sarawak administration, first going to the country with the Australian Army during World War II. He had spent two years (1954–56) as assistant resident in Brunei, knew the country well, and was happiest with the natives deep in the ulu, the Malayan word for jungle.³ In 1961, Morris was appointed resident of the 5th Division at Limbang and soon heard warnings of unrest.

Now in late 1962, Morris and his wife had been looking forward to the arrival of their two children—Geraldine (age 15) and Adrian (age 13)—from Australia for Christmas.⁴ However, in late November, when Morris heard whispers that an insurrection was planned for Brunei, he cancelled the children’s visit. He also reported his concerns to higher authority, but a visit from the inspector general of the Malayan Police found insufficient evidence to be alarmed.⁵

In the first days of December 1962, Richard Morris realized that trouble was imminent, and indeed signalled to the Sarawak capital of Kuching that there was a possibility of a revolt in his northern area the week before revolt broke out. This information appears never to have reached the military intelligence services in Singapore. He met Lord George Nigel Douglas-Hamilton, 10th Earl of Selkirk, the commissioner general for South East Asia, in Brunei on 6 December, and gave his staff the probable “enemy” order of battle and warned that a rebellion would likely erupt in a couple of days’ time. His wife Dorothy, who was with him at the time, had recently been appointed president of the Limbang group of the Red Cross.⁶

The Hostages’ View

The night the revolt broke out, the Morrices and a dozen other hostages, including two European women

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² A resident, or in full, resident minister, is a government official required to take up permanent residence in another country. As a representative of their government, the resident officially has diplomatic functions that are often seen as a form of indirect rule.
³ Chanin, Limbang Rebellion, 16.
⁴ Ibid., 35.
⁵ Ibid., 41.
⁶ Ibid., 35.
and a Peace Corps officer, were captured and incarcerated in Limbang, while four Sarawak constabulary officers were killed during the attack. Dorothy Morris provides a vivid description of events from the hostages’ point of view. She wrote that, even though they had some warning, the revolt came as a complete surprise when they were suddenly ambushed in their own compound on the night of 8 December and led down in the dark to the dense jungle just above a small stream with very steep banks. The hostages sat there with every form of biting nightlife assailing them, Morris clad only in his underpants without much seat in them and the inevitable perished elastic band at the top and no safety pins. In the short time available, he had not been able to locate any more dignified clothing, though his wife had been able to dress more adequately, including a pair of heavy shoes. Morris was savagely bound with nylon fishing cord, but his wife’s hands were left free. Two decidedly questionable bandits sat on either side of her clutching an arm, while another pointed a kris (a Malay dagger with a wavy blade) unpleasantly close to Morris’ back. After an hour, they were ordered up the slope to a clearing above the residency, when Dorothy Morris lost her footing and slid down to the bottom, earning bruises from hip to shin. Suddenly, large numbers of rebels, all looking scruffy and intent despite a mix of uniforms and weapons, filed past them. Some stopped and stared with no noticeable reaction to the scene, and

one, whose aim was fortunately very poor, attempted to spit in her face.\(^9\)

Shortly afterward, the Morrises were moved to the jail, where they found Police Inspectors Abang Zain bin Abang Latif and Latif bin Basah, with King Shih Fan, a Public Works Department engineer, and three other policemen. Inspector Latif had been wounded at some point. Morris, still clad only in his underpants, was used as a human shield on the way up to the police station. Later that day, the Morrises were allowed back to the residency to collect some clothes and belongings.

The following afternoon, their spirits rose considerably when the hastily reconstituted Limbang Red Cross led by Inche Omar bin Sanauddin, a retired postmaster, and the wife of the Public Works Department superintendent, appeared with coffee, rice, towels, codeine, bandages, and ointment for the wounded police inspector in the next cell. Dorothy Morris recalls that these tireless, brave, and devoted few did more than they will ever know for the comfort of those behind bars. She recalled that one of the most unsettling aspects of their incarceration was the distasteful business of being glared at by their guards through the bars of their only window. In the meantime, three Catholic priests and a member of the United States Peace Corps—18 year-old Fritz Klattenhoff—were detained in the police station along with another member of the Public Works Department.\(^10\)

By 10 December, the tougher, more dedicated rebel elements had been dispatched to the outskirts upriver as rumors spread that the Dyaks (loyal aboriginal Sarawak headhunters) were coming down to “do over” the rebels. That night, Dorothy heard whispered discussions in Malay between the guards sitting at the top of the steps just outside the cell door. Although she only heard snatches, there was frequent mention of “prisoners,” “sunrise,” and “shooting.”

Dorothy Morris would later state that she will never know, nor does she want to know now, whether it was her over-taxed imagination or wishful thinking on behalf of the guards, but she prayed she and her husband would be given courage to face whatever lay ahead, and then prayed again for her children so many hundreds of miles away in Australia.\(^11\)

On 11 December, there was a change in the attitude of their guards, who took every opportunity to whisper to them that their hearts were not really in the enterprise and they hoped the “Tuan” resident would deal gently with them when it was all over. Though the Morrises were not aware of it at the time, the military chief of the rebels, Yassin Affandy, had passed through Limbang on his way to Temburoung District and realized quickly that his cause was lost in the shadow of coming British forces.\(^12\) The feeling that something was about to happen was further strengthened when friendly visitors conveyed news of British military successes in Brunei Town, Kuala Belait, Seria, and Miri. That day, most of the hostages were moved to the hospital. In spite of the change in conditions, the hostages did not get much sleep that night, with the significant increase in guards and noise. They must have sensed something was about to happen. At first light the next morning, Dorothy Morris writes,

> We didn't enjoy the bangs and the flying glass one bit, but I do well remember the glorious sound . . . calling on the rebels to surrender . . . during which we sang our little ditty about “Green Bonnets.”\(^13\)

The hostages’ identities were quickly established, and then they heard Sergeant Dennis Smith’s reassuring voice saying, “Come on out, old girl.” When the Morrises emerged through the rather jagged aperture of the broken window, Richard Morris recalls,

> It was 0620 when we climbed out of the window. The last eighteen minutes were now part of history, minor history maybe, but terribly important to all those who had played a part in its making. The fire-fight was over, but there was still quite a lot of

\(^9\) Morris, “Etiquette and Alka Seltzers.”
\(^10\) Ibid.
\(^11\) Chanin, Limbang Rebellion, 72–73.
\(^12\) Ibid., 78.
\(^13\) Ibid., 139.
shooting and the occasional crump of a grenade at the beach-head was extended.¹⁴

The hostages did not waste time with pleasant-ries but quickly moved into the hospital ward where the other hostages had been held. They were all present and correct, if a trifle dazed. With plenty to do in preparing beds and bandages for the wounded, Dorothy found it difficult to believe that the worst was over. She later wrote, “Any sense of joy was tempered for all of us to one of quiet thankfulness mixed with great sadness and the consciousness of a debt we could never repay, by the presence of the dead and wounded around us.”¹⁵

The Military Response

As news of these events filtered through to Singapore, two companies from the Royal Gurkha Rifles on standby were moved to the Royal Air Force (RAF) stations in Singapore at RAF Changi and RAF Sele-tar to fly to Labuan, a small island off the coast of Brunei.¹⁶ Some flights were diverted to Brunei Town airfield when it became clear the North Kalimantan National Army (TNKU) rebels had failed to seize control of the capital. This TNKU militia had been supplied by Indonesia and was linked to the Brunei People’s Party, which favored a North Borneo Federation. Landing late in the evening of 8 December, the Gurkhas advanced immediately toward Brunei Town airfield when it became clear the North Kalimantan National Army (TNKU) rebels had failed to seize control of the capital. This TNKU militia had been supplied by Indonesia and was linked to the Brunei People’s Party, which favored a North Borneo Federation. Landing late in the evening of 8 December, the Gurkhas advanced immediately toward Brunei Town and engaged in a series of actions that resulted in six casualties, including two dead. The Gurkhas met such fierce resistance when they moved toward Seria that they were forced to return to Brunei Town to counter the ongoing rebel threat there and near the airfield until reinforcement arrived.⁷

Additional British forces available to react to the rebellion were stationed in Singapore. Those selected to offer further support to the situation confronting the Gurkha Infantry Brigade, who had already re-stored order in Brunei, were the Royal Marines of 42 Commando.¹⁸ The 3d Commando Brigade, Royal Ma-rines, at this time consisted of 42 Commando, who had been looking forward to Christmas in Singapore after an extremely busy year of exercises, and 40 Commando, who were embarked on HMS Albion (R 07) off Mombasa, Kenya. Brigade headquarters had only recently returned from controlling exercises in the Aden Protectorate in southern Arabia, while 45 Commando were under independent operational command and on active service in Aden. On 8 December, 42 Commando was put at short notice to move to Brunei, and two days later they were on their way. Their Commando Headquarters and Company L flew first into Labuan and then into Brunei Town, where the Gurkha Rifles had already restored order.

At 0600 on 11 December 1962, Brigadier A. G. Patterson, OBE, MC, commander of 99 Gurkha In-fantry Brigade and now in command of operations against the Indonesian terrorists, greeted the newly arrived company commander of Company L, 42 Commando Royal Marines, Captain Jeremy Moore, who had earned a Military Cross in the Malayan jungle 10 years earlier. Perched on the hood of his vehicle, the brigadier made his directive quite clear: “Your Company will rescue the hostages at Limbang.”

During the next 24 hours, one of the most auda-cious amphibious raids in post-war Commando his-tory was planned and executed, turning the whole course of the Borneo campaign. At that time, only 56 men of Company L had reached Brunei, plus a section of Vickers .303-inch medium machine gunners; however, with a few other additions, the final num-ber on the raid totaled 89. Intelligence was scarce but

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¹⁴ Ibid., 140.
¹⁵ Morris, “Etiquette and Alka Seltzers.”
¹⁶ The Royal Gurkha Rifles is a two-battalion light infantry regiment serving in the British Army and entirely composed of Nepalese soldiers recruited from within Nepal since the days of the British East India Company. Gurkhas are known as brutal fighters and fiercely loyal to the British Crown. Gurkhas have fought on nearly all of Great Britain’s battlefields since they were formed 200 years ago, including Burma in World War II, Malaya, the Falklands, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition to their warrior spirit, they also are known for their Kukri knife, a distinctively shaped weapon they wield in hand-to-hand combat. Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990).
¹⁷ Francis, “The Raid on Limbang.”
¹⁸ Ibid.
they believed that about a dozen hostages were being held in Limbang, including Resident Richard Morris and his wife, Dorothy, another woman, and U.S. Peace Corps Officer Fritz Klattenhoff.

As Captain Moore, his second in command, Lieutenant Peter Waters, and his company sergeant major, Quartermaster Sergeant Cyril Scoins, took stock of the situation, the Marines prepared for the ordeal to come. Approximately three hours later, the commanding officer of 42 Commando, Lieutenant Colonel Robin Bridges, and his intelligence officer, Lieutenant Ian Walden, arrived to take over the difficult responsibility of obtaining information and intelligence for the operation. They managed to fly over Limbang, but their view was obscured by low cloud cover and they achieved little toward the situation on the ground. It was clear in everyone's mind that speed and surprise were essential. The decision was soon made that the raid would have to take place at dawn the following morning.

Of prime importance was the need to find some river craft in which to mount the operation. Lieutenant J. P. Davis, some newly arrived naval ranks, and the author set about this task, inspecting the myriad small boats along the Brunei waterfront. There were hundreds of them, but none were particularly suitable for transporting 100 men upriver for 12 miles and then carrying out a possible frontal assault against an unknown enemy. Just as they reached the north end of the extensive waterfront, they came across two old Z-craft belonging to the Brunei government that appeared to be in working order. While there were no signs of any crew, one of them had on board two yellow bulldozers, which apparently were used to push the craft off the mud when they got stuck. Nevertheless, the two craft suited the Commando purpose admirably and the bulldozers went on the raid.

Just after midday, two coastal minesweepers, the HMS *Fiskerton* and HMS *Chawton*, sailed into the harbor, subsequently providing the only reliable communications between Brunei and Singapore. They had been piloted downriver by Captain Erskine Muton, the local director of the Brunei State Marine Department. The Royal Navy immediately took command of the situation, providing their two first lieutenants to command the Z-craft and engine room staff to ensure they were both in working order.

The minesweeper captains, Lieutenant Harry Mucklow, RN, and Lieutenant Jeremy Black, RN, came ashore and, with Captain Moore, helped in the detailed planning. This was the first meeting between Moore and Black who, 20 years later, would find themselves in action together again in the South Atlantic when Moore was the force commander and Black was the captain of the aircraft carrier HMS *Invincible* (R 05) during the Falklands campaign. By late afternoon, the engines and maneuvering ability of both

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19 Z-craft are basically a pontoon landing craft with an engine room at the back for the propulsion and a bridge over the top for navigating. The deck is flat and open, sitting only about two feet above the water, with a ramp at the front from which tanks can be loaded and unloaded.
craft had been thoroughly checked by the seamen and engineers, and were pronounced fit for their task. The only protection for those embarked were large backpacks acting as sandbags, a few earth-filled oil drums and the crafts’ own 1.5-inch wooden planking.

Meanwhile, Moore was collecting as much intelligence as possible, but he found that he had no more than small-scale maps and one out-of-date aerial photograph to help him. He knew that a small police launch that had approached Limbang two days earlier had been driven off by heavy small-arms fire. The strength of the enemy and his dispositions were virtually unknown, as estimates varied from 30 to more than 100, but it was obvious that the rebels were there in some numbers and that they had captured police weapons to add to their own. However, Moore assessed that their firepower would be fairly ineffective beyond 100 yards, and at close quarters, the two sides would be about equal. He knew that his highly trained Marines would therefore be more than a match against what appeared to be a poorly led enemy.

Moore anticipated that he might be able, by a show of force, to bluff the rebels into surrendering. If that failed, or if the operation was prolonged, the rebels would either shoot the hostages out of hand or threaten to do so to force him to withdraw. His prime concern was the safety of the hostages, but he did not know where they were being held. Several possible locations presented themselves—the police station, the jail, the hospital, and the British residency—which were all separated by about 300 yards. Moore decided that the police station, almost in the center, was the most likely place for the rebels to set up their headquarters. He planned to eliminate this location before they had a chance to harm the hostages. His simple plan was to overwhelm their positions as fast as possible, each Marine withholding fire until the rebels opened up. He intended to call on the enemy to surrender in the hope that, by a brave show of force, he could bluff his way in.

That afternoon, ammunition and equipment were checked, the Vickers .303-inch medium machine guns were mounted forward on the Z-craft where they would be most effective, while food and rest were
hastily taken during what was left of the day. To arrive off Limbang at dawn, they set sail about midnight, guided by Captain Muton, who had earlier led the minesweepers down the river to Brunei Town. Muton admitted that he had never sailed that part of the Limbang River before. HMS *Chawton*’s Lieutenant David Willis, RN, cast off the leading craft at 1203 on 12 December. He was aided considerably by a clear night and a nearly full moon. The Commandos’ route lay along a series of complicated winding channels between 30 and 100 yards wide flanked by the dangerous nipa swamp. The Royal Marines on board, already exhausted from nearly two days without proper sleep since leaving Singapore, snatched whatever rest they could, but the excitement and anticipation allowed them little rest.

The two craft, keeping just within visual distance, slowly edged their way down the narrow channels as silently as they could, no lights or noise emanating from those on deck, leaving only the grinding engines to announce their presence to any waiting ambushers. After half an hour, the leading craft slewed across the river as one of its engines failed, but was soon fixed. Occasionally, in the narrower passages, the craft bumped perilously against the mangrove roots. By 0200, both craft reached the main Limbang River, approximately five miles from the town, where they remained hidden in the shadows of the jungle edges until 0430. This was a frustratingly anxious time for the Marine Commandos. Some lay awake contemplating the inevitable battle ahead, wondering what their first taste of action would be like; others fitfully slept with their weapons in their hands. The mangrove branches hid the bright moon casting shadows above them, allowing imaginations to conjure up alarming configurations.

Many of the dozing Marines were nudged awake as the engines started up again at 0430, and the two craft nosed their way into the much wider Limbang River, leaving the passengers feeling naked and exposed in the fading moonlight. Last minute checks were made as the craft rounded the final bend toward the small town. They saw the dim lights of the town in the distance. Ever more slowly, the two craft drew nearer, and then to the surprise of everyone on board, the lights in the town suddenly went out. They would later learn that it was the routine as dawn approached. As silently as their engines allowed, and with about 50 yards between them, the leading craft came level with the northern edge of the town. Captain Moore, with his Malay-speaking intelligence sergeant, David Smith, alongside peered into the ever-lightening distance. At 300 yards, they saw movement everywhere as Limbang grew nearer. The bazaar area seemed alive, and they could just make out the police station. “Full ahead” was ordered, and the leading craft surged toward the bank. Moore turned to Sergeant Smith, who through his loudspeaker informed the enemy that the rebellion was over and that they should lay down their arms and surrender. At this, a hail of bullets greeted the approaching Royal Marines. The response from each craft was instantaneous, and by the time the leading craft had beached about 30 yards from the police station about 20 seconds later, it was clear that Company L had the fire initiative thanks largely to the heavy weight of lead pouring from the Vickers medium machine guns.

Moore recalled,

*We drove our landing craft straight at the bank, opposite the police station, with the second craft with the Vickers in support. . . . The enemy had light machine guns, lots of rifles and shotguns, so the fire was heavy and a number of people were hit.*

Two Marines of the leading troop were killed even before they got to the bank, and Lieutenant Peter Waters was hit in the leg as he jumped ashore. The coxswain of the leading craft also was hit, as were Lieutenant Davis and a seaman in the second craft still standing off and giving covering fire. The term *coxswain* refers to the sailor who has the charge of the boat and its crew and who usually steers.

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20 Nipa is a monotypic genus of palm found in Australasia. These palms integrate with mangroves in transition zones between salt and fresh water.

21 The term *coxswain* refers to the sailor who has the charge of the boat and its crew and who usually steers.
stormed ashore, clearing the police station in its stride, with Corporal Bill Lester taking his section across the road, mopping up, and providing a cut off to the rear. Sergeant John Bickford, a Corps footballer and physical training instructor, and his section commander, Corporal Bob Rawlinson, pressed home the attack, though Rawlinson had been wounded in the back.

Meanwhile, with the coxswain wounded, the leading craft had drifted off the bank, but Lieutenant David Willis immediately took the wheel and drove the craft back into the bank. Being very unwieldy, he beached it halfway between the residency and the hospital, approximately 150 yards from the initial landing. Captain Moore reassessed the situation and ordered his troop sergeant, Sergeant Wally Macfarlane, ashore with the reserve section. Sergeant Smith, having decided that his loudspeaker was no longer a suitable weapon, accompanied them. By this time, only sporadic fire could be heard, and Sergeant Macfarlane moved stealthily north, clearing the enemy from the jungle edges that came right down to the bank in places. They reached the hospital without incident, where Macfarlane decided to press on to join up with the initial landing force near the police station. Suddenly, a group of determined enemy opened fire, killing the troop sergeant and two Marines.

Through the sounds of battle, Sergeant Smith heard inharmonious singing coming from within the
hospital. Recognizing the tune as a version of “Coming Round the Mountain,” he called out to them in English and was able to identify the Morrises, along with several other hostages, who were unharmed but severely shocked. Their guards had fled. Captain Moore, his main task of freeing this group of hostages achieved, checked with Richard Morris to ensure that there were no more held in other locations. As he did so, one remaining rebel loosed a round from his shotgun, fortunately quite inaccurately, before disappearing into the close jungle.

During this time, the second craft had been maneuvering in the fast-flowing river to give the best supporting fire possible. The company sergeant major had taken command of the situation when Lieutenant Davis was severely wounded. At this juncture, the reserve sections on the second craft came ashore before the craft once again took up a position midstream, covering any eventuality with its medium machine guns.

A number of the rebels were soon routed by Number 5 Troop in the area of an attap house, while Number 6 Troop cleared the police station and Number 4 Troop moved north past the mosque to the back of the bazaar, where one of the rebels engaged them from a room full of women and children. He was soon dislodged with no further casualties. From this time onward, most of the enemy resistance had collapsed, although a number of dissidents held out in town and the surrounding jungle. As a result, considerable movement and sniping continued during the next 24 hours.

As soon as the second craft beached, Royal Navy Sick Berth Attendant Terry Clarke made his way to the hospital and set up a dressing station, treating the casualties while the released hostages helped him to prepare dressings. Ironically, four of the six cases of gunshot wounds were in the legs, though additional casualties would come in later as a result of men falling through the roofs of buildings during searches. Sergeant Smith set about interrogating the hostages and other prisoners, discovering that others were still being held in the jail and the southern area of Limbang. By late afternoon, this area also had been systematically cleared and a total of 14 hostages had been rescued unharmed.

Later in the morning, the Z-craft returned to Brunei, this time rather more quickly and triumphantly, bringing the hostages and the casualties with them. Company L had lost five dead and five wounded, plus one sailor wounded. The police had lost six men. The wounded were quickly flown to Labuan, Malaysia, and then evacuated to Singapore. As Dorothy Morris came ashore, relief showing in her taut face, she handed the author two letters for her children—Geraldine and Adrian—safe at school in Australia. Originally, they were due to arrive in Limbang any day that week for the Christmas holidays.

That afternoon, the author accompanied Brigadier A. G. Patterson, the commander of 99th Gurkha Infantry Brigade, down to Limbang by boat to assess the situation. They met Richard Morris for the first time, along with Jeremy Moore, who gave them a first-hand account of the action. It was clear that the training, professionalism, and bravery of the Royal Marines had won the day.

As Company L consolidated during the next few days, 15 rebel bodies were found and approximately 50 prisoners were taken. It was later learned that many others died of wounds in the jungle. Of the nearly 350 rebels who had held Limbang initially, many later simply discarded their uniforms and melted anonymously into the bazaar areas of the town. Much later, Captain Jeremy Moore made the following observations:

It is perhaps interesting to note that, though my assessment of where the enemy headquarters might be was right, I was quite wrong about the hostages. Furthermore, it

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22 “Brunei Revolt: The Assault on Limbang 42 Commando,” Arcre.com, transcribed from original at TNA WO 305/2519.
23 An attap house is a traditional dwelling found in Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It was named for the attap palm, which provides materials for both the wattle in the walls and the thatching for the roofs.
24 “Brunei Revolt.”
25 Chanin, Limbang Rebellion, 145.
was chance that the second beaching hap-
pended where it did, that resulted in us tak-
ing the hospital from the direction we did. It could be that this saved us heavier casu-
alties, though I assess the most important factor in the success of the operation was first class leadership by junior NCOs. Their section battle craft was a joy to watch, and the credit for this belongs to the Troop and Section commanders.26

Aftermath
Though the actions in Brunei lasted only a few days, there is no doubt that they acted as a catalyst for what followed.27 They kick-started a four-year jungle campaig

26 Francis, “The Raid on Limbang.”
A Royal Marines Commando is the equivalent of a U.S. Army battalion, with a total of approximately 680 men. The 42 Commando had been reformed from a very different wartime organization just two months before the Limbang operation. A Commando contains three rifle companies, a headquarters company, and a support company with reconnaissance (or recce), mortar, antitank, and assault engineer troops. The new organization retained the wartime name of troops rather than platoons for the subunits within each company, and each troop had sections.

Lieutenant David Willis, RN, received a Distinguished Service Cross; and Sick Berth Attendant Terry Clarke received a commendation. Richard Morris would later receive the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE).

than one occasion, both were present. This was indeed a case of the Royal Marines being “first in, last out.”

For the action at Limbang, Captain Moore was awarded a bar to his Military Cross; Corporals Rawlinson and Lester were awarded Military Medals;
As any student of naval and maritime history knows, sea power is the ability of a nation to use and control the sea and to prevent an opponent from using it. Merely having a fleet is not enough; any nation that wishes to control the sea must be able to project its power in real or concrete form. According to current U.S. Navy doctrine, power projection in and from the sea includes a broad spectrum of offensive operations to destroy enemy forces or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within range of friendly forces. History shows that there are generally three ways to accomplish this goal: amphibious assault, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations. The United States, of course, the world's leading maritime power; a key component of its maritime power projection capability is the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' Amphibious Ready Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU), a force that is increasingly relevant in today's complex operating environment. The way in which the ARG/MEU concept evolved is an excellent example of how the Marine Corps has successfully adapted throughout its history in response to changing political and military circumstances.

Whenever a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) consisting of a battalion landing team, composite air squadron, and combat logistics battalion is embarked aboard a Navy Amphibious Squadron (PhibRon), an ARG/MEU is created. Up to three can operate continuously in the areas of responsibility assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), including the Pacific, Central, African, and European commands. These versatile units provide the president of the United States, acting in his capacity as the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Services, and the GCC commanders with credible deterrence and response capability across the range of military operations. ARG/MEUs serve as forward-deployed, flexible sea-based MAGTFs—an afloat-ready force—a force capable of conducting amphibious operations to respond to a crisis, conduct limited contingency operations, introduce follow-on forces, or support designated special operations forces at a moment's notice. ARG/MEUs are characterized by their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary nature, ability to plan for and respond to crises, combined arms integration,
and interoperability with joint, combined, and special operations forces in support of theater requirements. However, the ARG/MEU concept did not simply spring into existence overnight. Its inception as an afloat-ready force dates back to the late 1800s and reflects a confluence of three factors: policy (i.e., the political-military need for afloat-ready forces by the U.S. government, and by extension, the U.S. Navy); the maturation of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary doctrine that featured the ARG/MEU as its centerpiece; and the technological development of aircraft and amphibious assault shipping that enabled the MAGTF to operate in its maritime environment. This article will lay out the historical milestones of this concept, including its early origins, and show how policy, doctrine, and technology have contributed to the evolution over the past 118 years of the force deployed around the globe today.

**Historical Origins of the Afloat-Ready Force**

Since its inception in 1775, the U.S. Marine Corps has contributed a detachment of Marines, numbering anywhere from 6 to 60 Marines, to nearly every major warship’s complement, from sloop to frigate, until the turn of the twentieth century. Serving as “naval infantry” when needed, as marksmen in the “fighting tops” of sailing ships during sea battles, and as the ship’s guard, they also were ready to enforce shipboard discipline when necessary. Should a landing party be ordered to go ashore to fight or land for less warlike purposes as part of a naval expedition, Marines would make up a portion of the party, but would usually be outnumbered by Navy bluejackets, who were part of the ship’s normal complement.

As a rule, large numbers of Marines would not normally be embarked on a Navy ship, especially in cases where a fleet or flotilla might sail on missions lasting weeks or even months. There was simply no reason for them to do so, unless embarked on a troopship where they would be landed as part of a land campaign led by the U.S. Army. Exceptions were made should a large-scale amphibious landing be contemplated, such as at Veracruz, Mexico, in 1847, or Fort Fisher, North Carolina, in 1864, but Marines did not ordinarily embark to serve as a fleet’s contingency landing force to be landed if and when a commodore saw fit. There was simply no room aboard contemporary warships for anything larger than a detachment of up to 60 men.

Despite this record, at least one naval officer during this period advanced the idea of having an embarked landing force sailing with the fleet at all times. The officer, Navy Commander Bowman H. McCalla, had recorded his suggestion in an after action report about the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps expedition of April 1885 to the Isthmus of Panama, then still part of Columbia. Noting how readily the brigade of Marines restored peace and prevented an insurrection once ashore, McCalla wrote that “in future naval operations an additional number of seamen and marines, organized in naval brigades, will be carried in transports accompanying the battle ships.” Though the seeds of an idea had been sown, the Navy Department did not concur and would continue to adhere to existing practice of forming ad hoc landing forces when needed.3

That policy changed in 1898, when the United States declared war on Spain. Confronted by a maritime enemy with naval and land forces stationed around the globe defending various overseas colonies, such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the U.S. Navy was challenged by the enormous distances involved in simply closing the distance to do battle. Another aspect of naval warfare that had changed since the Marine Corps’ inception was the introduction of steam-powered warships, which had completely replaced wooden sailing ships by the end of the nineteenth century. Instead of being driven by inexhaustible wind power, ships were now dependent upon coal to fire their steam plants, which enabled them to travel faster and at a steadier pace than with

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3 Bowman H. McCalla, Report of Commander McCalla upon the Naval Expedition to the Isthmus of Panama, April 1885 (Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1885), 43-81.
sail power. However, steel-hulled steam-powered warships could not carry enough coal, the fuel of choice, to travel 8,000 miles or more to reach some of Spain’s far-flung possessions, where they presumably would do battle with the Spanish fleet once they arrived. Therefore, coaling stations and advanced bases located along the way were necessary and in fact became of strategic importance to the Navy.

While ships could and often did take on coal at sea, this was a slow and hazardous process that exposed a warship to danger while it had come to a complete stop and “hove to” alongside a fleet collier, unlike in today’s Navy, where underway replenishment is a common procedure. A coaling station in a protected harbor or port was thought to be far more preferable. However, a protected harbor would most likely have to be taken from the enemy, who might be using it for the same purpose. While, in theory, sailors could (and occasionally did) fight as part of a landing party, the only infantry the Navy had of any strength was the fleet’s few embarked Marines who actually had trained for ground combat as their stock-in-trade. To be effective, such an expeditionary landing force would have to be at least of battalion size (several hundred men), including artillery, which could embark and remain on board as an afloat-ready battalion and land whenever the naval commander deemed the situation required boots on the ground (in modern parlance) or when U.S. foreign policy dictated that they land. And therein lies the true genesis of the fleet’s “ready reserve” force, the forerunner of today’s Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Huntington’s Battalion

The Marine Corps’ first ready reserve force or afloat battalion was “Huntington’s Battalion,” which was activated for expeditionary service during the Spanish-American War on 16 April 1898. Composed of Marines recruited from nearly every shipyard and naval installation detachment on the East Coast of the United States, it was created by the Colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps, Colonel Charles C. Heywood, in anticipation that the Navy would ask for such a force, but without knowing exactly how, when, or where it would be employed. This ad hoc organization, known officially as the 1st Marine Battalion (Reinforced), consisted of 654 Marines and one Navy surgeon.

It was organized into five infantry companies and one artillery battery equipped with four 3-inch rapid-fire guns and a battery of four Colt-Browning M1895 machine guns. There was, of course, no aircraft to support this modest force, since the Wright brothers’ pioneering flight was still five years out. Having received no definite mission from the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington, was ordered to have his men board the converted transport USS Panther (1889) in New York City on 22 April 1898. While underway, they learned that they were bound for the naval blockade of Cuba.

The Panther was hardly suited as an attack transport. It was old and crowded, having been purchased with the intent of carrying only half the number of Marines that were actually embarked. A former South American banana freighter, its hasty conversion to a troopship failed to address many of the amenities taken for granted today, such as adequate ventilation and heads (toilets) and galley (kitchen) spaces. Given the time constraints, it was the best the Navy could do. After nearly two months in limbo, half of the time being spent ashore at Key West, Florida, and the other half afloat, Huntington and his battalion were finally landed at Guantánamo Bay.

Marine officers who landed with 1st Marine Battalion (Reinforced) at Guantánamo, Cuba, on 10 June 1898 (from left): 1stLt Herbert L. Draper, adjutant; Col Robert W. Huntington, battalion commander; and Capt Charles L. McCawley, assistant quartermaster.

Marching off to war in the late afternoon on Friday, 22 April 1898, the battalion, preceded by the New York Navy Yard band playing the popular “The Girl I Left behind Me,” is led down Navy Street in Brooklyn, NY, under the command of LtCol Huntington astride Old Tom (Capt George F. Elliot’s charger).

For Huntington and his Marines, the landing could not have come soon enough. Besides having to cope with crowded and uncomfortably hot living conditions aboard the Panther, a variety of command-related issues had arisen between Huntington and the ship’s captain, Commander George C. Ritter, since embarking in April. One well-known example involved Ritter’s order forbidding his crew to assist the Marines in landing their supplies and equipment, forcing the Marines to do it by themselves, thus prolonging the landing operation. Additionally, the Marines were not allowed to land all of their rifle ammunition, since Commander Ritter claimed he needed it kept aboard to serve as ship’s ballast.

Cuba, on 10 June 1898 at the site the Atlantic Fleet had selected for a protected coaling station.5

Incidentally, the same bay is still in use by the U.S. Navy 118 years later.
Moreover, Ritter, following Navy custom, insisted on establishing his authority over the Marines on every matter, large or small. While this certainly was his prerogative in regard to a normal Marine Corps ship’s detachment, Huntington believed that this authority was overstated in regard to an embarked Marine battalion, which was under the command of its duly appointed commander. Timely intervention at one point by the overall flotilla commander, Commander McCalla of the warship USS *Marblehead* (CL 12), ensured the cooperation of both the ship’s captain and commander of the landing force for the duration of the operation.

Nevertheless, Huntington’s Battalion was successfully landed on 10 June with all of his men, guns, tents, and equipage and they immediately went about securing the heights surrounding the bay. The Spanish defending force was resoundingly defeated at the Battle of Cuzco Wells on 14 June, leaving the battlefield to the Marines. Not only did the Marines fight ashore as an independent, all-arms force for the first time, new techniques in ship-to-shore communication, fire support, and inter-Service cooperation also were established, if not perfected. With the heights secure and the Spanish bottled up safely in the town of Caimanera, McCalla’s flotilla sailed into the excellent harbor and used it continuously for the next several months, which was finally established as a permanent U.S. naval base by treaty when the war was over. Following the war’s conclusion, Huntington and his Marines sailed back to the United States, arriving at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 26 August 1898.⁶

Back on American soil on 19 September 1898, Colonel Commandant Heywood ordered the battalion paraded and then had it disbanded, with its Marines being sent back to the various East Coast barracks and naval installations from whence they had come.⁷ Although Huntington’s Battalion had successfully accomplished its mission, Heywood did not contemplate this expeditionary adventure becoming a standing requirement. Instead, the Colonel Commandant saw it as a distraction from the Marine Corps’ traditional role, which he felt was continuing to serve as ship’s detachments and guarding the various naval installations throughout the United States. Whether he or the Marine Corps cared for the concept or not, had come.⁷ Although Huntington’s Battalion had successfully accomplished its mission, Heywood did not contemplate this expeditionary adventure becoming a standing requirement. Instead, the Colonel Commandant saw it as a distraction from the Marine Corps’ traditional role, which he felt was continuing to serve as ship’s detachments and guarding the various naval installations throughout the United States. Whether he or the Marine Corps cared for the concept or not,

⁶ Surprisingly, 98 percent of the men had been unaffected by any tropical disease, compared to the Army contingent in the Cuban campaign, which suffered inordinately from such diseases as yellow fever. Their good fortune was attributed to the fact that, for most of the campaign, the Marines had been embarked aboard a ship away from the swampy lowlands, and while they were ashore had practiced rigorous field sanitation procedures.

⁷ The origination of military parades harkens back to military formations during close-order maneuvers. More recently, the actions became strictly ceremonial in nature, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when military units were returning from deployments or as a means to demonstrate the military might of a nation.
The first bloody engagement of U.S. troops on Cuban soil. U.S. Marines going ashore at Guantánamo with their Kråg-Jørgensen rifles in June 1898.

The afloat-ready battalion had proven itself in practice, and the U.S. Navy took notice.

The Afloat-Ready Battalion Concept Revived by the Navy

The next incarnation of the afloat-ready battalion came four years later in the form of Russell’s, Haines’, Pope’s, and Lejeune’s Battalions. At the beginning of September 1902, the USS Panther once again embarked a Marine battalion (16 officers and 325 enlisted men) at the request of Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody, who had stated his desire the previous July to have such a battalion ready for training with the fleet, as well as to be on hand to serve in an expeditionary capacity and ready to land anywhere the fleet deemed it desirable to do so.8

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Russell, this first afloat-ready battalion was composed of men from the Marine Barracks Brooklyn Navy Yard and Philadelphia Navy Yard. Hastily formed for service in what they were told would be Western Caribbean waters, the battalion sailed on 14 September 1902. Upon arrival off the coast of Columbia, the Panther would serve as a station ship, able to launch an expeditionary battalion-size landing force anywhere in the region at a moment’s notice. It and its three successor battalions would protect American interests during ongoing unrest in Honduras and Panama for the next 16 months, serving as an important tool of U.S. national policy in the region.

The Marines did not have to wait long. On 23 September, on orders from Rear Admiral Silas Casey III, commander of naval forces in the Caribbean, Russell and his Marines landed at Colón in what is now modern-day Panama, to protect U.S. interests during

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a period of civil unrest between Colombia and the United States, which exercised governmental authority over the region where the Panama Canal was being built. The landing of a disciplined battalion of well-armed and -equipped Marines, and its visible presence throughout the city, was enough to convince the warring parties—loyalists and separatists—to stand down and cease their violent acts against the local government in Colón and American businesses.

After two uneventful months of patrolling and supporting the local police, the battalion once again embarked on board the Panther on 18 November and sailed for the advanced naval base at Culebra, an island off the coast of Puerto Rico, where the Marines disembarked and conducted training ashore.9 By 30 November 1902, most of Russell’s men had become sick from various tropical diseases incurred after two and a half months of service in the Caribbean, forcing the weakened battalion to return to the United States, where it was immediately disbanded. Despite the lingering effects of the various tropical illnesses, the presence of an armed and well-trained battalion of Marines embarked aboard a station ship had proved its worth.

Meanwhile, once again at the behest of the Navy, another Marine battalion was formed on 5 November that same year in Norfolk, also for service in the Caribbean. This battalion, commanded by Colonel Percival C. Pope, was sent directly to Culebra aboard the transport USS Prairie (AD 5) to train with Russell’s Battalion, since the immediate need for troops in Panama had seemingly passed. Discovering that Russell’s Battalion had been forced to return to the United States for health reasons, the flotilla commander decided to keep Pope’s Battalion on station aboard the Prairie instead.

Pope was no stranger to service afloat. He had served on the staff of Huntington’s Battalion at Guantánamo Bay and was a good choice to lead the new battalion, which was nearly twice as large as Russell’s. It was a balanced force, consisting of 600 men organized

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9 Ibid.
into six companies, along with artillery, machine guns, and rudimentary signal equipment. However, in fleshing out this battalion, the East Coast was effectively denuded of nearly every able-bodied Marine who had not deployed with Russell five months earlier. It also forced the Colonel Commandant to delay his plans to create an advanced base defense force, which had become the Marine Corps’ primary focus since the Spanish-American War.

**Emphasis Shifts to Advanced Base Force**

With its traditional role of serving as ship’s detachments threatened by the increasing modernization of the Navy, which felt that it no longer needed such a seemingly anachronistic body of troops on board its ships, Marine Corps leaders belatedly realized that the advanced base force was where its future lay. After its victory in 1898, the United States had acquired a far-flung overseas empire with coaling stations located all around the globe that needed to be defended or seized if the president deemed it necessary. The ensuing deployments of not only Pope’s Battalion in an expeditionary capacity, but of two subsequent ones, forced Heywood to delay his plans for creating such a force for at least two more years, since it was patently obvious that nothing could be done until the Navy overcame its desire to keep large numbers of Marines embarked on station ships or until it became impractical to continue doing so.

Nevertheless, Admiral George Dewey, commander of the Atlantic Fleet and hero of the Battle of Manila Bay, remained enthusiastic about the utility of an embarked ready battalion. Shortly after the Spanish-American War had concluded, he commented that “If there had been 5,000 Marines under my command at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me on May 1, 1898, and could have been properly garrisoned.”

The further utility of the Marines for service in the Caribbean was evinced by Dewey’s deputy, Rear Admiral H. C. Taylor, in a letter to the secretary of the Navy, in which he asserted that the Marines served two

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10 At the time, an advanced base force was understood to be a coastal or naval base defense force designed to establish mobile and fixed bases in the event major landing operations would be necessary beyond U.S. shores.

purposes: one of “being ready for service anywhere,” and the other “that of improving the base and harbor” of Culebra as “a most valuable adjunct.” It was not an entirely negative development for Pope’s Marines, who gained valuable experience in constructing and defending an advanced base during a lengthy exercise carried out by the Navy that ended on 3 January 1903.

That same month, Colonel Pope handed over command of his battalion in Culebra to Major Henry C. Haines, who then was ordered to transfer his Marines back aboard the creaking Panther later that month. They would serve aboard this station ship as part of the Atlantic Fleet’s newly activated “Caribbean Squadron” until late July 1903. Finally landed in Maine to take part in Army-Navy joint maneuvers at the end of that month, Haines and his battalion sailed to the Philadelphia Navy Yard in August 1903, where he was relieved of command by Major John A. Lejeune in October.

The Floating Battalion of the Atlantic Fleet

Lejeune’s Battalion, now known by the Navy as the “Floating Battalion of the Atlantic Fleet,” then embarked aboard the transport USS Dixie (1893) and sailed once more to the Caribbean to take part in the upcoming 1903-4 winter maneuvers. That exercise never came to pass because Lejeune and his men were diverted from Culebra to Panama instead, where they went ashore at Colón on 5 November to discourage Colombian forces from invading. Joined two months later by Brigadier General George F. Elliott’s provisional Marine brigade, Lejeune and his men participated in the Panama Canal crisis of 1903-4, but did not see combat.

After Colombia backed down from its threats to invade Panama, mainly due to the presence of Elliott’s Brigade, peace was restored and Panamanian independence was formally recognized. No longer needed, Lejeune’s Battalion returned to the United States in February 1904, where it was finally disbanded.

Though Pope’s, Russel’s, Haines’, and Lejeune’s Battalions had satisfactorily served as precursors for the Navy’s forces afloat-ready concept, the Marine Corps recorded its objections to the overall concept, feeling that it was a diversion from what it saw as its evolving primary mission of serving as the fleet’s nascent base defense force. In addition to this objection, Colonel Commandant Heywood complained in 1903 that this unfunded program came out of the Marine Corps’ thinly stretched budget and was not compensated for by the Navy, that it used “borrowed” manpower needed elsewhere, and that the proper onboard equipment and small boats needed to receive, store, and land supplies were lacking on the ships used to

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12 Millett and Shulimson, Commandants of the Marine Corps, 141.
14 Ibid., 1213.
carry the Marines. There was also the issue of the ships themselves—the USS *Panther*, *Prairie*, and *Dixie*—which were never intended to serve as troopships and had undergone inadequate conversion to prepare them for that role. They were cramped, poorly ventilated, and lacked adequate space for the embarked Marines to exercise or perform any sort of drills.

Another issue that continually raised its head was the never-ending conflict of authority between the successive Marine battalion commanders and each ship’s captain. In many cases, not only did the ship’s captain insist on enforcing his writ upon every Marine on board, circumventing the Marine Corps chain of command, but some ship’s captains also attempted to give precise instructions on the employment of the Marines once they had gone ashore. However it might vex Colonel Commandant Heywood and his successor Brigadier General Commandant Elliott, there was little either of them could do about it, since they had no authority over their Marines from Washington, DC, once they were sailing as part of the fleet, unless, like Elliott, he sailed with his Marines to command them in person as commander of the provisional brigade sent to Panama.

While Heywood or Elliott could complain to the Navy about this practice, both had to confront the admiral’s belief, deeply rooted in tradition, that anyone embarked on a U.S. Navy warship was subject to the captain’s authority. Heywood, when he first confronted this assertion, countered that this was nonsense, given that the *Panther*, *Prairie*, and *Dixie* were mere troopships, which by naval custom gave the commander of the landing force authority over his own men. Unfortunately for Heywood, the Navy’s counterargument that the presence of a few small-caliber cannon on board these converted freighters buttressed its contention that these were indeed warships, which practically ended all discussion of the matter during the rest of his and Elliott’s tenure.

Despite the ineffective resistance of the Marine Corps, which was in any case subordinate to the Navy, the latter Service still wanted to continue the practice. After the success in Panama and elsewhere, the Navy believed that an embarked battalion of Marines enhanced the Navy’s expeditionary capability. However, events conspired to end the practice altogether for nearly 43 years. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the United States quickly discovered that its new overseas empire needed to be policed and that the numbers of troops on hand, both Army and Marine Corps, were insufficient for the purpose. The Marine Corps especially found itself pulled in every direction, having to send detachments to protect new naval bases in the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, as well as the American legation in China. While the authorized size of the Marine Corps had increased, it still had not attained the minimum number of Marines that Colonel Commandant Heywood felt adequate—a total of 10,000 men—to meet all of the Corps’ commitments, most especially when it was focused on the evolving advanced base defense force concept.

The dichotomy between the desires of the Navy, which wanted an expeditionary afloat-ready battalion, and the Marines Corps, which wanted an advanced base defense force, would continue unresolved until 1947. During the interval, both Services were consumed by a variety of challenges, including modernizing the fleet, fighting World War I, participating in a series of protracted counterguerrilla and nation-building operations in the Caribbean during the 1920s and ’30s (the Banana Wars), experimenting with air-ground cooperation, and—most important from the Marine Corps perspective—developing and maturing the advanced base force concept that included the concept of amphibious assault against a defended beachhead. These and other events, including successfully waging World War II, required the complete dedication and cooperation of both sea Services to achieve their goals.

**Afloat-Ready Battalion Concept Rediscovered by State Department**

This is where things stood until December 1947, when the concept was resurrected at the beginning of the Cold War. On this occasion, it was not the Navy that called for an afloat-ready force, but the U.S. Department of State, which felt that the United States needed a variety of policy options to employ as a counter
to what had become an increasingly belligerent and assertive Soviet Union. In April and again in December of that year, Ambassador George F. Kennan called for a scalable, highly mobile amphibious reaction force that could be based at sea and prepared to conduct a landing operation anywhere in the Mediterranean Sea to assist U.S. allies threatened by Communist expansion. Instead of seeking a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, which was engaged in destabilizing several Western European nations and consolidating its control over Eastern Europe, Kennan believed that U.S. goals would best be achieved by containing the Soviet threat over a long period by using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) levers of power.

Kennan was serving at the time as Secretary of State George C. Marshall Jr.’s influential director of policy planning and was highly respected throughout the U.S. government for his depth of understanding of the growing Soviet menace. When the Soviet Union began to exert diplomatic and military pressure upon Greece and Italy throughout the summer and fall of 1947, the State Department was able to convince President Harry S. Truman that to assist these democratic governments, both threatened by Communist agitation, the Navy could help further the nascent “containment policy” and Truman Doctrine against the Soviet Union by conducting a variety of fleet exercises and amphibious demonstrations that would send a signal to Josef Stalin of the inadvisability of continuing his destabilizing actions.

Consequently, in addition to sending additional ships of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean as ordered by the president, the commander of U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri, also requested that a battalion-size Marine Corps landing force be deployed to bolster the fleet’s striking power, which up to that point did not include any battalion landing teams. The request was duly approved and an order by the chief of naval operations dated 20 December 1947 directed the temporary assignment of a reinforced Marine battalion to augment existing Marine detachments on Sixth Fleet warships and to provide a ready landing force. This order brought about the actual resurrection and implementation of the afloat-ready battalion concept, the first time since Pope’s, Haines’, Russel’s, and Lejeune’s Battalions of 1902–4 that an amphibious expeditionary force would embark aboard Navy ships

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and remain on station, awaiting a possible contingency order that could result in their landing on a foreign shore at a moment’s notice.

Within days of receiving this order, a battalion landing team of 1,000 Marines from the 2d Marine Regiment (Reinforced), along with vehicles, tanks, artillery, and supplies, formed up and began loading on board the World War II-vintage U.S. Navy attack transports USS Bexar (APA 237) and USS Montague (AKA 98) in Morehead City, North Carolina. Sailing from the East Coast on 5 January 1948, this force remained afloat with the Sixth Fleet for three months in the eastern Mediterranean, returning on 12 March 1948 after being replaced by a similar battalion from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, a move that initiated a series of cruises that would normally last six months.

Unlike its lukewarm acceptance of the concept in 1903, the Marine Corps embraced this new mission enthusiastically. Embroiled as it was in the 1947–48 military roles and missions debate, which involved nothing less than the continuing survival of the Marine Corps as a Service, this type of mission was tailor-made for what it specialized in—expeditionary operations and amphibious assault—as part of the Navy’s “balanced fleet.”

Having proven its ability to carry out these kinds of assignments in the Pacific during World War II, the Marine Corps felt that it was uniquely suited for the afloat-ready battalion mission in the Mediterranean, as compared to the U.S. Army, which was almost fully committed to occupation duties in Germany, Japan, China, and Italy. The greatest obstacle to filling the Navy’s requirement was that the number of existing battalion landing teams had been reduced to six, of which only half were considered to be available for service with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and elsewhere.

Though it was never committed to battle, the first afloat-ready battalion to deploy to the Mediterranean participated in several amphibious exercises within close proximity of Greece and Italy, a move

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18 Ibid.
20 Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 150.
that the Soviets could not fail to notice. Combined with other political and military signals being sent by the U.S. government at the time, the presence of the amphibious force and the national resolve that it signified were enough to influence the Soviet Union to decrease its support to the Communist rebel movements in Greece, Italy, and Turkey, granting the governments of these countries the breathing space they needed to renew efforts to bolster their defenses against their respective insurgencies.21

Evolution of the Mediterranean Afloat Battalion 1948–60
This first afloat-ready battalion, though still a powerful unit by today’s standards, was not a true combined Marine air-ground organization in the modern sense. The battalion landing team was not paired with an aviation component and lacked a commander and staff to exercise command and control of any Marine Corps air and ground units that might operate together. It was completely dependent on its troop transports for logistical support, having none of its own, rendering it unable to operate independently ashore for more than a few days. To compound command and control issues, neither the Bexar nor the Montague was equipped with the communications gear that would have allowed the battalion commander to exercise control over his forces while afloat. It was a stopgap, expedient solution but it was enough to send the right message of political will.

Though Marine fixed-wing aircraft were operating aboard aircraft carriers of the Sixth Fleet at the time, they fell under the Navy’s control and were not considered to be part of the afloat-ready battalion’s “force package” or authorized temporary organizational structure. The battalion and its equipment were not configured for an amphibious assault either, since neither of the two attack transports were accompanied by the necessary landing ships, tank (LSTs) nor did they carry any landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs) like those recently used during the war with Japan with such great effect. It also had no helicopters of its own, a newly introduced aerial system that had not yet gone far beyond the experimental stage but one that showed great future promise as a means of landing troops in support of an amphibious assault.

Nevertheless, this move initiated the Marine Corps’ practice of maintaining an air and landing force with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on a recurring basis, a practice which, except for short-term breaks in continuity due to overwhelming requirements for troops elsewhere (e.g., the Korean and Vietnam Wars), has continued from 1948 to the present day. That same year, this afloat-ready battalion also was given its first name—the Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Battalion, or NELM Battalion.22 In 1960, the Sixth Fleet redesignated it as the Landing Force, Mediterranean, or LanForMed, but little else changed.

The Doctrinal Revolution of the 1950s
Except for the existing battalion landing team doctrine dating back to the late 1940s, the Marine Corps had yet to devise a tactical system or a way of thinking about how to incorporate all of the disparate elements needed to make such an air-ground force capable of operating in a nuclear environment complete. Even had there been doctrine, or helicopters advanced enough to carry troops and cargo, in 1948 there was as yet no ship suitable enough to serve as a floating base, though aircraft carriers did hold promise. Unfortunately, the Navy was reluctant to allocate its large fleet carriers or the funding for such a project, not convinced yet that the helicopter would prove itself as the panacea that the Marine Corps thought it was. Fixed-wing aviation continued to operate from aircraft carriers assigned to the various fleets.

Between January 1948 and early 1960, a succession of NELM Battalions continued sailing with the Sixth Fleet throughout the Mediterranean. However, a portent of the future gradually began to take shape

22 “Marines Are on Their Way,” Sunday Star-News (Wilmington, NC), 13 January 1957, 8-A.
upon the publication of a bulletin on 9 November 1954 written by General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps. Weighing the increasing capability of the Marine Corps’ rotary- and fixed-wing aviation elements, and foreseeing how they might work in concert with ground combat elements, Shepherd decreed that a new organizational structure—what he termed a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, or MAGTF—would be needed in the future to enable the Marine Corps to continue its amphibious

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warfare mission while at the same time leveraging new technology to make it a more lethal and agile force.

Shepherd stated that the “future employment of Fleet Marine Force elements will normally involve organization as air-ground task forces in which air and ground units will habitually operate as a single operational command” and that this Marine Air-Ground Task Force should consist of a balanced all-arms team. Shepher was not prescriptive in the bulletin as to the actual makeup of the force, but he was clearly influenced by the all-helicopter amphibious assault concept, commonly referred to as vertical envelopment, which foresaw an even greater employment of the helicopter than was possible at the time. More importantly, Shepherd stressed the importance of all arms—air, ground, and logistics—being placed under the command of a single Marine commander not tasked with the additional duty of commanding one of the MAGTF’s components.

While Shepherd’s bulletin was important, it was not yet settled as doctrine and commanders of Marine Corps units in service with the various fleets were not bound to follow it. A year later, however, Shepherd’s thoughts were reinforced by Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, Landing Force Bulletin 17 (LFB-17), which did have the force of doctrine behind it. This bulletin stressed that the MAGTF concept was uniquely suited toward the conduct of vertical envelopment as part of amphibious operations in a nuclear environment and that MAGTFs must leverage all of its elements to achieve success. However, the bulletin did not actually provide much guidance concerning how the doctrine was to be put into practice, leaving it up to the commanders to decide what a MAGTF actually was and what it would look like. Additionally, the Marine Corps was still without a suitable seagoing platform to carry such a force, even had there been a consensus with the Navy as to what it was to be. Though smaller escort carriers had been made temporarily available to the Marine Corps for training exercises and experimental purposes since 1948, no dedicated or purpose-built Navy ships yet existed that could transport and support the kind of MAGTF that Shepherd envisioned.

Impact of New Doctrine on the Fleet Marine Force

Armed with the knowledge that incorporating helicopters into the afloat-ready battalion concept was now expected to become standard practice, beginning in 1956, all three Marine Expeditionary Forces, or MEFs (I MEF, II MEF, and III MEF), began to experiment using the forces assigned to them; but each MEF headquarters, faced with different challenges posed by
its area of operations and the availability of amphibious shipping, approached the matter differently. One of the first prototype MAGTFs that deployed consisted of 6th Marine Regiment Headquarters, with one battalion landing team, joined by two Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrons (HMM)—HMM-261 and HMM-262. This force left Morehead City for NELM Battalion duty with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on 20 August 1957, making it the first standing MAGTF to serve in that capacity on a rotating basis. The regimental headquarters served as the overall command and control element of the MAGTF, but the limitations of existing amphibious shipping meant that its helicopters had to embark aboard fleet carriers, leaving the MAGTF commander with little authority over their employment until they could be landed and joined with the rest of the MAGTF ashore, the same procedure that governed employment of fixed-wing aircraft.

Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were many examples of the NELM Battalion/LanForMed being used to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations and to support humanitarian assistance operations, such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, and the Cyprus Crisis of 1965, among others. On 14 July 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the NELM Battalion, along with two additional battalion landing teams, to land in Lebanon to evacuate American citizens and to forestall a coup of the democratically elected government. Joined by elements from the 2d Marine Division that were already afloat in the Mediterranean with the Sixth Fleet for an exercise, the NELM Battalion was quickly landed and began conducting operations nearly a week before the U.S. Army’s airborne task force, entirely dependent on airlift, arrived from Germany. The ability of the afloat-ready battalion with its associated aviation element to land and begin conducting operations within 48 hours of notification was a powerful testament to the utility of the concept, once again proving the usefulness it first demonstrated in 1898.

New and Modified Ships Make Their Appearance

Meanwhile, a new class of Navy ships pointed toward the possibilities of the modern MAGTF. On 20 July 1956, the USS *Thetis Bay* (CVE 90), a converted World War II escort carrier, was recommissioned by the Navy as a landing platform, helicopter (LPH) ship, which was the Marine Corps’ first amphibious assault ship able to embark both the troops from the battalion landing team and 12 aircraft from a composite helicopter squadron, combining the functions of both an aircraft carrier and attack transport, changing the way afloat-ready battalions would operate forever. Though the *Thetis Bay* primarily served as a training platform, it saw many operational deployments as the Marine Corps worked out the technical details of the vertical envelopment concept. On 10 November 1958, the first permanent Marine aviation detachment afloat was activated for service and would ultimately serve on board the USS *Boxer* (LPH 4), a converted World War II Essex-class fleet carrier, then undergoing conversion at Norfolk, Virginia. The unit was activated to provide supply, maintenance, and flight deck control to Marine helicopter squadrons and troops assigned to the *Boxer* once the ship was placed back into service.

This trend accelerated in 1959, when the USS *Boxer* was finally recommissioned on 30 January. Twice as large as the *Thetis Bay*, the *Boxer* carried up to 30 helicopters (21 on deck and 9 in the hangar deck) as well as nearly 2,000 Marines of an embarked battalion.
Two other converted Essex-class carriers, the USS Princeton (LPH 5) and USS Valley Forge (LPH 8), soon followed, joining the Boxer and the USS Thetis Bay. Finally, the Marine Corps had the major pieces of what would constitute the future amphibious force, but these converted carriers had their limitations. For example, while they could embark troops via helicopters, they had no surface landing craft of their own, forcing the Navy and Marine Corps to continue to rely on LSTs and landing ship, docks (LSDs) to carry the ship-to-shore craft that would transport the bulk of the battalion landing team and the logistics elements ashore. These vessels were much slower than the Essex-class ships, often requiring the LPHs to sail separately.

With four LPHs on hand between 1959 and 1964, the Marine Corps focused on merging the MAGTF concept with the afloat-ready battalion concept. The half-formed doctrine still lagged behind the evolution of landing craft and helicopters. Realizing this, the Navy and the Marine Corps began working closely together in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets as their experimentation progressed, though again each fleet approached the challenge differently. For example, in 1960, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea announced the initiation of the Fast Amphibious Force (FAF) concept.

According to an article in the Marine Corps Gazette, which represented the unofficial voice of the Marine Corps’ leadership, the FAF consisted of an
affloat-ready battalion, a composite helicopter squadron, and a small logistics element embarked aboard the ships of a Navy amphibious squadron, consisting of fast amphibious ships (including an LPH) capable of steaming at 20 knots that would allow them to avoid slower Soviet submarines. The concept stressed that both the Marine and Navy elements of the FAF must train and operate in concert with one another to boost proficiency and overall effectiveness. Although the FAF concept was intended to be implemented in both Pacific (with the Seventh) and Atlantic (with the Sixth) Fleets, it only seems to have been put into effect under that title in the Atlantic.32

The Fleets Experiment with New Concepts

As the outlines of future amphibious doctrine began to take hold, the concepts for Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and Marine Expeditionary Corps (MEC) had become common usage within the Marine Corps by 1960, though they had not yet been encapsulated in doctrine.33 This led to misunderstandings throughout the Marine Corps regarding their exact usage and composition, whether it applied to the NELM Battalion (redesignated in 1960 as the Landing Force, Mediterranean, or LanForMed) or the FAF.

For example, the 24th MEU (the first recorded use of that designation) was activated at Cherry Point, North Carolina, on 15 November 1960. It consisted of a brigade headquarters, a battalion landing team from the 2d Marine Division, and a provisional Marine aviation group consisting of a light helicopter transport squadron and an ordnance-laden attack or jet fighter squadron embarked separately on an aircraft carrier with the Sixth Fleet.34 Technically speaking, it was a MAGTF, but not quite like the MEU as they are known today, and it did not deploy to the Mediterranean for LanForMed Battalion duty, but deployed only for a series of training exercises. One possible reason is that the Sixth Fleet did not perceive the FAF as a permanent organization; its primary purpose ap-

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34 Donnelly, Neufeld, and Tyson, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 43.
pears to have been to serve as a means to train and familiarize Marines with the emerging doctrinal concepts.

The Sixth Fleet’s FAF went through a number of permutations over the next several years, as different units rotated in and out within its structure, but the FAF itself, which at one point included the provisional 16th MEB, never existed for more than three months at a time. By the time the Vietnam War began in 1965, it appears to have disappeared altogether, as the demands for ships and battalion landing teams outweighed all other considerations, though the LanForMed Battalion deployments appear to have continued unabated throughout the 1960s.

The introduction of the FAF concept evolved along similar lines with the Seventh Fleet during the early 1960s, but with some typical differences in the operational style between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. In 1961, the Seventh Fleet, under the guidance of its commander, Admiral Harry D. Felt, designated its FAF equivalent as the Amphibious Ready Group or ARG. Felt, with Marine Corps support, first proposed the organization of such task forces to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who concurred. This force, the Navy and Marine Corps’ first ARG, was designated Task Force 76.5 and based out of the U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay in the Philippines.

The prototype ARG consisted of an amphibious squadron with three to four “fast” ships (one LPH, one LSD, and/or an attack cargo ship or AKA) and a Special Landing Force (SLF) instead of a MEU, consisting of a battalion landing team from the 3d Marine Division based in Okinawa and a composite helicopter squadron that included both utility and heavy-lift aircraft. Thus combined, the ARG/SLF would rotate its embarked Marine units every six months, remaining at sea “on station” in support of various Southeast Asia contingencies involving Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam between 1960 and 1964, but was not deployed ashore. That would change during the summer of 1965, when the United States stepped up its involvement in South Vietnam.

The first MAGTF to sail the Atlantic with its own aviation element was built around battalion landing teams from 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, in February 1961 and included aviation elements from the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. With an 83-man headquarters element provided by 2d Marine Division, this force was designated as 4th MEB. It was joined shortly thereafter by the 24th MEU, which was already at sea sailing as part of the aforementioned FAF. Combined, the 4th MEB included the USS Boxer and the fast attack transports from the Navy’s Amphibious Squadrons 2 and 8.

This was the first time that a balanced, self-contained, brigade-size MAGTF had participated in a routine afloat mission in the Atlantic and Caribbean. It had not been activated for any specifically designated contingency, such as those brigade-size task forces that had been quickly created or stood up for the Lebanon or Cyprus crises. Instead, like the FAF before it, the MEB served as an enormous sea-going laboratory for amphibious warfare. Though much larger than a MEU, the 4th MEB allowed the Marine Corps to experiment with both its new ships and doctrinal concepts during Exercise LantPhibEx 1-61 before the brigade was deactivated after three months at sea.

A cursory examination reveals that both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets composited or assembled their afloat-ready forces differently. Those activated for service in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, or in the Mediterranean as LanForMed, tended to be somewhat larger than the special landing force in the Pacific, usually approaching a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (as shown above in the case of the 4th MEB) in size versus that of a battalion landing team-size Marine Expeditionary Unit. Thus, even as late as 1962, it appears that the Marine Corps had still not completely

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37 Ibid., 474, 529.
settled the argument about what exactly a MAGTF or a MEU was and what were its constituent elements.

**Marine Corps Order Settles the Doctrine Debate**

While the evidence indicates that nearly every senior-level Marine (e.g., lieutenant colonel and above) were in general agreement about the overall MAGTF concept, opinions differed widely as to their size, mission, composition, and other important topics. On 27 December 1962, the MAGTF debate was settled once and for all when Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.3 was issued by Headquarters Marine Corps after extensive consultation with the Navy, which, after all, would be providing the amphibious warfare ships to carry them. This order, signed by Commandant of the Marine Corps General David M. Shoup, formally codified a MAGTF’s composition in doctrine and specifically enumerated the four types of MAGTFs based on the size of the command.39

The order stated that a MAGTF, regardless of size, would henceforth consist of a ground combat element (GCE), a command element (CE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a combat service support element or CSSE (now called logistics combat element, or LCE). Additionally, the order specified that a MEU would be based on a battalion landing team, just as the first battalion landing team had been in 1898, and would be augmented by a composite helicopter squadron and a dedicated logistics battalion. Though the doctrine was quickly accepted and the terminology agreed upon, the Seventh Fleet, demonstrating its independent streak, continued to use the term special landing force for the MEU sailing with the ARG in the Pacific.40

In line with the declaration laying out the composition of a MEU, the order further stated that a MEB was to be based on a reinforced regimental combat team, a composite air group, and a logistics regiment. The MEF would be based on a Marine division, air wing, and appropriately sized logistics elements.

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40 Ibid., enclosures 1-2.
The MEC, though the term was never used in practice due to the U.S. Army’s objections, was to be based on two or more Marine divisions, with an appropriately sized air wing and logistics element. In practice, however, the MEF has effectively functioned as a corps-size headquarters, demonstrated by the performance of I MEF during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

The Marine Corps Internalizes the Concept
Simply stating “Let there be MEUs, MEBs, MEFs, and MECs” was not the same as creating these organizations. A great deal of learning had to be accomplished and many different subordinate doctrinal publications, tables of organization, tables of equipment, and reams of Service regulations had to be written. The best way to try out new doctrine was through actual practice using real Marines and real ships, where lessons could be learned and modifications made. New organizations had to be created out of thin air, so to speak, since they may not have existed before or even been contemplated in the original 1961 order.

For instance, MEU headquarters generally did not exist in the early 1960s. The usual practice was to take a Marine division or regimental headquarters and either increase its capability with more staff and equipment to make a MEU headquarters or strip down a division headquarters to the bare essentials to create a MEB headquarters. For a more permanent solution, MEU headquarters had to be designed and built into future budgets so the manpower spaces could be allocated, equipment purchased, and funding for training programmed.

An excellent example of how each MEF worked through the task of incorporating the new doctrine can be seen in how the Pacific Fleet’s SLF evolved. The first SLF created in 1960 lacked a separate command element. Instead, the commander of the battalion landing team or the commander of the helicopter squadron, depending on which was senior, served in a dual capacity as both battalion commander and SLF commander. With the addition of an aviation element consisting of a mixed rotary-wing squadron, this quickly proved to be an unworkable arrangement, since the battalion landing team commander lacked the expertise and communications means to command and control it. Consequently, III MEF in Okinawa authorized the activation of a small permanent SLF command element in 1965. A year later, this staff had evolved into a true MAGTF headquarters approximately the size and capability of an infantry regiment’s staff.

As the demand for more troops to support the Marines in Vietnam increased, the ARG/SLF was in-
increasingly employed ashore, where it took part in numerous ground combat operations, so much so that the Navy decided it needed another ARG/SLF activated just to ensure that the Seventh Fleet still had a reserve landing capability should other emergencies arise in the Pacific Rim not involving Vietnam. Accordingly, a second ARG/SLF, or ARG-B, was created to complement the original ARG, now designated ARG-A. From 1965 to 1969, both ARGs rotated between service with the fleet and ashore in support of III MAF in South Vietnam. During this period, both ARGs carried out 62 amphibious landing operations in Vietnam while taking part in dozens of cruises with Seventh Fleet. The only change that occurred during this period worth noting involved the renaming of Marine Expeditionary Units, which, due to perceived South Vietnamese sensitivity to the term expeditionary (with the attendant negative connotations of French Colonial rule), were redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units or MAUs in 1965. Between 1965 and 1990, a variety of former MEUs carried over this term until all existing MAUs reverted to their former naming convention of MEU. Except for the name change, everything else remained the same. Finally, even the Seventh Fleet’s special landing force was redesignated as a MAU in 1969, then once again as a MEU by 1988.

**U.S. Navy Support to the ARG/MEU Concept**

The final piece of the afloat-ready battalion concept

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involved related activities of the U.S. Navy, which had continuously coordinated its ship design initiative with the Marine Corps. While the ARG/MEU concept had become embedded in Navy practice, if not in doctrine, purpose-built ships to replace the World War II-vintage ships did not arrive in the fleet until 26 August 1961, when the first LPH was built as such from the keel up, and the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) was commissioned. Six others of its class soon followed. These ships were capable of carrying 26 helicopters and nearly 2,000 Marines of a reinforced battalion landing team, equating to 193 officers and 1,806 men.45

However, as impressive as these vessels were in terms of their vertical envelopment capability, they lacked a well deck, thus forcing the ARG/MEU to rely on older LSTs and LSDs to carry the ship-to-shore “connectors” (LVTs, LCVPs, LCU; etc.) for over-the-beach amphibious capability. Fortunately, by 1962, a new type of amphibious warship, the landing platform, dock or LPD (known today as amphibious transport docks), entered service, easing the reliance on the World War II-era vessels. It had both a well deck and purpose-built helicopter landing platforms, giving it a versatility that the older ships lacked.

By 1970, composition of ARGs, at least as far as the Navy was concerned, had become a settled issue due to the retirement of the rest of the few remaining World War II-era amphibious ships and the con-

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struction of enough new ones to replace them. The “standardized” ARG/MEU was now composed of an amphibious squadron (PhibRon) consisting of one LPH (later replaced by the amphibious assault ship, general purpose, or LHA), one LPD, and one LSD combined with a MEU of 2,200 Marines. However, fixed-wing aircraft were still embarked aboard Navy fleet carriers, which were not part of the ARG/MEU combination. War plans directed that, once a beachhead had been taken, airstrips would then be seized or constructed, allowing fixed-wing aircraft to land, where they would then revert to ARG/MEU control. This unsatisfactory situation would not change until 1979.

The slower Newport-class LSTs and attack cargo ships, or AKAs, were relegated to other amphibious squadrons before they were phased out entirely by 2000, being superseded by the new classes of ships being commissioned. Attack transports (APAs), the last vestige of the World War II-type attack transport, also were completely phased out by 1980. Though the ARG/MEU composition had been settled for nearly 40 years, it was not until 2010 that it was finally codified in the U.S. Navy’s Operational Instruction OPNAV 3501.316B on 21 October.46

Evolution into Today’s ARG/MEU

The last significant development occurred on 29 May 1976, when the first Tarawa-class LHA was commis-

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46 OPNAV 3501.316B, Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 21 October 2010).
sioned. The USS *Tarawa* (LHA 1) was the first LHA with a well deck for carrying and launching landing craft, utility (LCU), amphibious assault vehicles-personnel 7 (AAV-P7), and landing craft, air cushion (LCAC). There were five of these enormous ships built, each capable of carrying as many as 41 helicopters or a balanced mix of Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knights, Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallions, Bell AH-1W Super Cobras, and Bell UH-1 Iroquois, as well as 1,903 troops.47 The USS *Tarawa* deployed on its first Western Pacific cruise in March 1979 and, for the first time, operated with a McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier vertical short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) jet squadron, in addition to an embarked helicopter squadron in a successful experiment to determine the feasibility of VSTOL aircraft operating from an LHA.

With the addition of the AV-8B Harrier, the ARG/MEU combination finally had its own organic fixed-wing aircraft squadron, capable of providing combat air patrol coverage as well as close air support to the MEU. Today, ARG/MEUs often deploy as part of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) consisting of an aircraft carrier or other surface warfare combatants. Since 2015, the more-capable USS *Wasp*-class LHDs

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and the new USS America-class LHAs have completely replaced the Tarawa-class LHAs. Both classes of ships now operate with the new Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey and will soon host the newly introduced Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II VSTOL aircraft, which is replacing the AV-8B. One thing has not changed, however. Conventional Marine fixed-wing aviation assets, such as the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, still operate from the decks of Navy fleet carriers. Once suitable airfields are constructed ashore, they will deploy as part of the ARG/MEU, though the Naval Task Group commander still retains the option of having them operate under his control.

Introduction of the MEU (Special Operations Capable) Concept

Another change to the ARG/MEU concept occurred in December 1985, when the 26th MAU (redesignated as a MEU in 1988) received the special operations capable, or SOC, designation, becoming the 26th MAU (SOC). Though the actual organization of the MAU itself did not change, its mission profile did, based upon an increasing awareness within the Department of Defense that the growth of terrorism around the world required an effective military response that went beyond traditional capabilities, bordering on those ordinarily possessed by special operations forces (SOF). The addition of a SOC designation to
its title signified that a MAU had been issued certain equipment “enhancements” and had trained to a rigid standard prior to deploying. Once it had arrived on station, a MAU (SOC) might be called upon to accomplish special operations-like missions, such as in extremis hostage rescue or noncombatant rescue operations and antiterrorist operations. By 1987, all deploying MAUs were required to train to MAU (SOC) status.

Marine Amphibious Units from that point onward would only receive the MAU (SOC) designation prior to deployment after they had met special operations certification requirements; otherwise, when not deployed, they would retain the normal MAU title (in 1988, they were once again redesignated MEUs and became MEU [SOCs]). This concept remained in effect from 1985 until 2005, when the newly activated special operations companies of Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) began to assume the mission and MEUs finally dropped the SOC appellation. Currently, MEUs can only use the SOC designation if a Marine Corps special operations component is attached to carry out specific special operations-related missions, though in practice this rarely occurs due to the high demand for their services within the U.S. Special Operations Command.

Conclusion
While current operational concepts, such as a disaggregated or split-based ARG/MEU, have recently been put into practice, the core concept of the ARG/MEU remains unchanged and will probably stay that way for the foreseeable future. As this article has shown, during the past 118 years, a progression of changes in national security policy, Service doctrine, and technology have combined to provide today’s afloat-ready force the capability that Lieutenant Colonel Huntington could only dream about. Though the modern expeditionary amphibious force, with its warships, aircraft, and landing craft, is far removed from the afloat-ready battalion that saw its debut during the Spanish-American War, the concept itself—that of having an embarked self-sustaining battalion-size force ready to be landed anytime, anywhere at the order of the U.S. government—has hardly changed at all. Though debate may swirl around the notion that amphibious warfare has become obsolete, one thing is certain—as long as there is a U.S. Marine Corps, there will be an ARG/MEU at sea somewhere, ready for the call to carry out the nation’s bidding.
The original concept for the National Museum of the Marine Corps (NMMC) was to honor the courage and sacrifice of all Marines. That concept drove a master plan, which subdivided this major undertaking into phases: first and final. The first phase opened in two subphases. The first three historical galleries opened in 2006 and covered World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The next three opened in 2010, adding the years 1775 through 1918, which significantly completed the first phase.

The final phase is a 10-year project, which is half complete. NMMC started artifact preparation in 2010, exhibit design spanned 2013 to 2016, and exhibits fabrication has started. The final phase project adds several new galleries that will open between 2017 and 2021. The Combat Art Gallery was the first to open to the public on 9 July 2017.

Honor, Courage, Commitment: Marine Corps Combat Art, 1975–2015 is the inaugural exhibit in the new Combat Art Gallery. NMMC chose that 40-year period because it foreshadows the large historical galleries that open in 2018 and 2019. The exhibit consists of 100 works by 22 artists, all of whom wore the eagle, globe, and anchor. This first exhibit will be up through April 2018, when it will be replaced by an exhibit that celebrates the centennial of the end of World War I. Looking forward, NMMC also reached out to the George W. Bush Presidential Library to get into the queue to exhibit the former president’s recently painted col-
lection titled “Portraits of Courage.” NMMC hopes to pair the president’s paintings with similar exhibits for an emotive offering that includes the Joe Bonham Project, Lima Company Memorial, and Semper Fi: How I Met My Father. The Joe Bonham Project is a collection of portraits of wounded warriors drawn from life by several artists.1 Lima Company exhibit titled The Eyes of Freedom is a collection of life-size portraits of 23 Marines and corpsmen from Ohio who lost their lives in Iraq while serving with Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment.2 Tom Hubbard’s Semper Fi is a collection of ceramics, mixed media, and photography documenting his journey to learn about his father, a U.S. Marine killed in Vietnam in 1966.3

An artist’s studio sets beside the art gallery. Visitors will be able to see new studio art created by Marines and visiting artists. Comfortably sized for two artists, the studio can be used for drawing, painting, and sculpture. NMMC is also looking for collaborative opportunities with wounded warriors and the art therapists who support them.

The Marine Corps Heritage Foundation is scheduled to open a new giant-screen theater with a signature film in July 2017. We, the Marines, narrated by Gene Hackman, wows visitors with a high-tempo, heart-pumping, 40-minute experience of today’s Corps in action.

Immediately downstairs from the Combat Art Gallery, exhibit fabricators have already begun work on the Children’s Gallery, which is on schedule to open in November 2017. Our first decade taught us that Marine families love to visit the museum, so the Children’s Gallery incorporates those lessons and focuses on the needs of young learners. The space is kid friendly, with a stroller parking lot outside the engraved glass front that will help to mitigate the noise generated by little ones. This gallery is adjacent to two new 40-student classrooms and a new student lunchroom. When complete, this suite of spaces will help to meet the needs of NMMC’s younger visitors.

The next two years—2018 and 2019—mark a significant milestone as NMMC opens the historical galleries that present the Corps’ history from right after Vietnam through today. The museum, being a learning organization like the Marine Corps, incorporated a series of lessons learned into the design of these new spaces. For instance, before we thought about design, we spoke to key stakeholders, including the formal professional military education schools aboard Quantico at Marine Corps University, teachers in Prince William County, and the specialists who manage every occupational field in the Marine Corps. They helped shape the story and prioritize the messages. Then we approached USMC Manpower and Reserve Affairs, who helped us identify a number of individuals with interesting stories; their former sergeant major, Thomas G. Eggerling, was immensely helpful. NMMC also received dedicated support from History Division, who assigned a full-time historian, Douglas Nash, to assist with the research and writing. We established and relied upon a diverse group of senior advisors who represented a broad swath of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, officers, enlisted, men, women, and a non-Marine academic. NMMC also adjusted the design to accommodate four large overlooks that allow visitors to: a) interact with the new galleries in a different way, and b) watch the progress being made over the next two years. Visitors can already see the McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18A Hornet resting on its mount and an M60 Patton main battle tank mounted in the corner of the Operation Desert Storm exhibit. The Hornet is mounted on a post, low to the ground, with its port wing nearly touching the deck and its starboard wing pointing toward the roof. This aircraft was stationed with a Reserve squadron at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, and responded to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon. The tank was the first vehicle in its unit to breech the berm between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1991.

The NMMC exhibits team has already started casting figures from real Marines, which will be used

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in the tableaus around the LAV-25 light armored vehicle and the MRAP all-terrain vehicle (MATV). Exhibits specialist Alice Webb reached out to Marines who performed those missions to ensure that all of the uniforms, props, poses, and story points were correct. The museum owes a debt of gratitude to Major General H. Stacy Clardy III for support in this area; he helped us obtain the LAV-25 and locate crewmen who knew exactly how to dress and act while recreating the march to Baghdad.

The curators have written all of the exhibit text, photo captions, and object labels, and our director is steadily editing every word. They also have gathered and prepared more than 400 objects, almost all of which have a rich personal history. An abbreviated list includes the blood-caked ribbons and pilots wings worn by Captain Michael R. Norfleet when he was seriously wounded in the federal building bombed by Timothy McVeigh; the police uniform and dress blues of Reserve Marine Sergeant Major Michael S. Curtin, who earned a posthumous Medal of Honor from the New York Police Department; the helmet of Lieutenant Colonel Ben Edwards, who was an advisor with an
Afghan unit that came under attack, with the bullet that hit his forehead still lodged in the helmet; Sergeant Rafael Peralta’s rifle that was battle damaged when he fell on a grenade to save the lives of other Marines; and so many more. Contracts are pending for the hardware and media productions that will make the galleries come alive. Exhibit lighting has been installed through approximately half of the new gallery spaces. Every day, signs show that progress continues at a steady pace.

During 2020, NMMC will open the Sports Gallery and the Hall of Valor. The Sports Gallery addresses that small cadre of Marine athletes who were elected into the Marine Corps Sports Hall of Fame or were professional athletes. Curators have been collecting artifacts that speak to football, baseball, basketball, track, boxing, track, and golf. The Sports Gallery also will explore the value of sports in helping wounded warriors recover and rehabilitate. The physical space into which the Sports Gallery will be built is complete. The Hall of Valor will be a stand-alone gallery just off of Leatherneck Gallery and next to the Medal of Honor Theater. The Hall of Valor will include a space to recognize Marines and sailors.

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who, while serving with Marines, earned the Medal of Honor. The space will feature a circular room inspired by the Lincoln Tomb, including a coffered dome ceiling with an oculus through which visitors can gaze at an infinite star field. Abraham Lincoln was president when Corporal John F. Mackie became the first Marine to be awarded the Medal of Honor.5

Finally, in 2021, NMMC will open a large Changing Gallery and small Inter-War Gallery, which completes the final phase. The Changing Gallery is sufficiently sized to roll in a number of wheeled or tracked vehicles and small aircraft. It provides the space and flexibility to keep the story updated and current well beyond the final phase. The Inter-War Gallery will fit into a space temporarily used as offices, a classroom, and docent lounge. It will explore the creative period when Marines like Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. “Pete” Ellis and Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak developed strategies for countering the coming war with Japan and worked with industry to develop the hardware necessary for an island hopping campaign. Visitors will walk around the original Roebling Alligator, or landing vehicle, tracked (LVT), which is the predecessor of the amphibious assault vehicles that eventually become the amphibious assault vehicle AAV-P7. Overhead, visitors will be reminded of the development of Marine air by a fully restored Vickers FB-5 biplane that will be installed inverted, as if it is tipping over the top of a loop and beginning to fall toward the earth.

Some visitors have asked what the museum has planned for after the final phase is complete. Our response is that good museums are never done. We will start updating existing galleries, which will be 15 years old by then. However, the long-range vision is to break outside the walls of the NMMC and extend the museum’s influence to those who cannot visit Quantico.

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IN MEMORIAM

Colonel John H. Glenn Jr., USMC (Ret)
18 July 1921–8 December 2016

by Fred H. Allison

Marine Colonel John Glenn, aviator, astronaut, and Ohio senator, passed away on 8 December 2016. Glenn served 21 years, 9 months, and 4 days in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is best remembered as the first American to orbit the Earth.

Glenn was born in Cambridge, Ohio, on 18 July 1921. His father was a plumber, and his mother taught school. He grew up in New Concord, Ohio, the quintessential American town—small, religious, and patriotic. It was home of the Presbyterian-based Muskingum College, where Glenn attended until World War II drew him into active service.

He went into naval flight training as a Naval Aviation Cadet. As he approached the end of flight training in 1943, he and fellow cadet, Thomas H. Miller, who would become a three-star Marine general and life-long friend, were notified that they had the qualifications to become Marines, though they had not given it serious thought. They had always envisioned flying from carriers. They attended a brief on Marine aviation. Two Marine veterans of Guadalcanal gave the presentation—one an aviator and the other a ground officer. They spoke about the recently concluded Guadalcanal battle and how aviation played a key role in the Marines’ success in that desperate fight. Glenn wanted to get into combat, and Marine aviation seemed to promise combat soon. He also was
inspired by the idea of assisting ground troops to accomplish their objectives and stay alive. He and Miller enthusiastically opted for the Marine Corps.1

Glenn and Miller ended up in the same squadron, Marine Fighting Squadron 155 (VMF-155, initially Marine Observation Squadron 155), flying Vought F4U Corsairs in the Marshall Islands. Arriving in July 1944, the squadron flew interdiction strikes, hitting bypassed Japanese-occupied islands. At that time, the Marshalls were the backwaters of the Pacific War. The strikes, or “milk runs,” were plenty dangerous. On his first mission, Glenn's wingman was hit by antiaircraft fire. Miller recalled, “He just flew into the water. It wasn’t because we were making a dangerously low pull-out or anything. He just never, ever, pulled out of his dive . . . it really shook John up.”2 Glenn flew 59 combat missions with VMF-155. He was awarded two Distinguished Flying Crosses (DFC).

Before going to the Pacific, Glenn married his beloved Annie; “the wind beneath my wings,” he called her.3 Annie was afflicted with a severe stuttering impediment, and Glenn remained intensely loyal and protective of her throughout their life together. Glenn’s public life, however, was an extreme challenge for her. She underwent an effective treatment in 1978 that cured her stuttering. They had two children, David and Lyn.

In 1953, Glenn, now a major, asked for and was assigned to Korea, where the Korean War continued. He joined VMF-311, flying interdiction and close air support missions in the Grumman F9F-5 Panther jet aircraft. Intense enemy fire along the front lines, where Marine pilots laid down ordnance for Marine infantry, made for exciting flying. On one mission, Glenn’s F9 was pierced by more than 200 shell fragments from antiaircraft artillery fire. On another mission, 300 fragments hit his Panther; one hole measured approximately two feet across. Another pilot in the squadron, famed baseball player Ted Williams, was a reservist who had been called to active duty. They often flew together. Glenn remarked, “He was a fine pilot and I liked to fly with him.”4 Glenn flew 63 missions with VMF-311 and earned another DFC.

In July 1953, Glenn served as an exchange pilot with the U.S. Air Force’s 25th Fighter Squadron. Flying North American F-86 Sabre jet fighters along the North Korea-China border, the 25th Fighter Squadron’s mission was keeping Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15s from coming south from sanctuary bases in China. Within days of the end of fighting, Glenn scored three

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1 LtGen Thomas H. Miller, intvw with Benis Frank and Maj Frank Batha, 16 December 1982, 1–2. Miller also commented that, for a Naval Cadet to be considered for the Marine Corps, he had to be in the top 10 percent of his class in flying and academic grades. See also John Glenn, “Glenn: An American Life,” Reader’s Digest, May 2000, 95, 98.

2 This was Miles F. Goodman, killed in action on 10 July 1944. Tom Miller continued: “His folks ran a furniture store in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. We kept in contact with them for years.” Miller intvw, 78.


4 Ibid., 135.
MiG kills. In one engagement, a flight of 16 MiG-15s attacked. Glenn's wingman was hit and he struggled to keep his F-86 in the air. Glenn turned into the enemy fighters with guns blazing. His attack struck one of the MiGs and the others broke off their attack. This allowed his wingman to return safely to home base. For this action, Glenn was awarded his fourth DFC. Glenn commented on combat flying: “If you're going to be a fighter pilot, you don't hold back. . . . You go all out. If you're not going to go all out, then you ought to get out of the business and do something else.”5 Glenn flew so aggressively that the Air Force pilots painted “MIG-Mad Marine” in big bold letters on his F-86. He flew 27 combat missions with the Air Force.

After the Korean War, Glenn, now a test pilot, was assigned as the project officer for the Marine Corps and Navy’s new fighter, the Vought F-8U Crusader. On 16 July 1957, Glenn flew an F8U-1P nonstop from Los Alamitos Naval Air Station, California, to Floyd Bennett Field, New York, at supersonic speeds.6 This was the first supersonic transcontinental flight, with a cruising altitude of about 50,000 feet. During the flight, he had to aerial refuel three times, which required descending to 25,000 feet, slowing down to about 300 knots, and adroitly plugging into the tanker’s hose. He still broke the old record by more than 20 minutes, clocking in at 3 hours, 23 minutes, and 8 seconds. He was awarded his fifth DFC for this achievement.

With the onset of the space race, Glenn was among the first American astronauts for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Mercury program.7 Seven men—three from the Air Force, three from the Navy, and one Marine—were selected out of a field of 80 candidates.8 He was the oldest of the seven at 37 years, and he did not have a college degree. Glenn was highly regarded by his fellow astronauts and the public. His enthusiasm and all-American persona made him attractive to the press and a U.S. public that sought good role models. When a couple of his fellow astronauts’ off-duty shenanigans threatened that image, Glenn scolded them. His well-placed concern was that these activities threatened the loss of public support for the space program.

He was not the first of the seven to go into space. Two previous flights had put U.S. astronauts in suborbital space.9 He was, however, the first American to orbit the Earth. The significance of this flight went beyond a technological achievement. Glenn’s flight represented an American beachhead in space, a springboard upon which was built further space exploration that allowed the United States to eventually overtake and surpass the Soviet Union.

It could not have come at a better time. The U.S. space program had been humiliated by the Soviets’ success. They were first to put a satellite in orbit, the notorious Sputnik I in 1957, and a Soviet astronaut, Yuri A. Gagarin, was the first man to go into space and orbit the Earth one time during his April 1961 flight. Another Soviet astronaut had orbited the Earth 17 times in August 1961. In the meantime, the U.S. program had seen a disheartening number of spectacular and public failures.

The space race was more than just scientific competition. The Cold War was a harsh reality and the race for space represented an important front, if not the main front of the war. Technology was the strategic pivot in this war. The nation with technological superiority could dominate its adversary. Glenn's planned flight was delayed 10 times for weather or technical dif-

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6 The F8U-1P version of the Crusader was an unarmed photographic reconnaissance aircraft.
7 Project Mercury was NASA’s program to put the first American astronauts into space and orbit the planet.
8 Glenn's good friend, LtGen Thomas Miller, asserted that the Commandant, Gen Randolph M. Pate, “raised hell” when the initial list came out without a Marine. Sgt Kurt Sutton, “Do It Again, and It Got One, Again,” Marines, January 1998, 24.
9 The first American in space was Alan B. Shepard Jr. on 5 May 1961, followed by Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom on 21 July 1961. Both flights lasted approximately 15 minutes.
It was not perfect, however; far from it. During the flight, the automatic flight controls failed, which required that Glenn fly the capsule manually the last two of the three planned orbits. Then a faulty sensor indicated that the heat shield, necessary to keep the capsule and Glenn from incinerating on reentry, was loose. This caused a great stir—on the ground—Glenn’s heartbeat remained basically the same. He was, however, acutely aware of the heat building during reentry. He radioed NASA: “A real fireball outside.” Fortunately, the shield was not loose. Glenn brought Friendship 7 in close to the targeted landing place about 800 miles southeast of Florida and within 6 miles of the destroyer USS Noa (DD 841).

Glenn was the nation’s hero. Like Charles A. Lindbergh’s 1927 flight across the Atlantic, Glenn’s flight boosted American pride and confidence in its ability to prevail on the technological frontier. The United States went on to win not only the race to the moon, but also the Cold War. The tickertape parade in New York City that celebrated Glenn’s flight saw 3,500 tons of celebratory paper tossed along the parade route. Muskingum College awarded him the bachelor of science degree he had started but never finished during World War II, and the Marine Corps Aviation Association named him as the first Marine pilot of the year.

He felt comfortable in the spotlight and was befriended by President John F. Kennedy and his
younger brother Robert F. It was perhaps due to the latter’s influence that Glenn opted for a political life. He submitted his resignation from the Marine Corps in 1964.\textsuperscript{10} In so doing, he deferred on a pending promotion to colonel, believing that the Corps would be best served by an officer who planned to remain on active duty. President Lyndon B. Johnson ensured that he was promoted anyway by giving the Marines an additional colonel slot. He received his silver eagles in a White House ceremony.

His first two attempts to become a U.S. senator representing Ohio failed.\textsuperscript{11} In his third attempt in 1974, his opponent, a well-financed former labor lawyer and opponent of the Vietnam War, regularly characterized Glenn as a man who had never held a job. Glenn turned the tables in a debate in Cleveland. Glenn responded to his opponent:

I ask you to go with me, as I went the other day, to a Veterans Hospital and look those men, with their mangled bodies, in the eye and tell them they didn’t hold a job. You go with me to any gold-star mother and you look her in the eye and tell her that her son did not hold a job. . . . You go with me on Memorial Day coming up, and you stand on Arlington National Cemetery—where I have more friends than I like to remember—and you watch those waving flags, and you stand there, and you think about this nation, and you tell me that those people didn’t have a job.

I tell you, Howard Metzenbaum: you should be on your knees every day of your life thanking God that there were some men . . . who held a job. And they required a dedication to purpose and a love of country and a dedication to duty that was more important than life itself. And their self-sacrifice is what made this country possible.\textsuperscript{12}

An extended standing ovation followed. Glenn won the election by more than 90,000 votes.

Democratic U.S. Senator John Glenn was a solid ally of the Marine Corps. The Vietnam War had taken a serious toll on the Services. Equipment, weaponry, rolling stock, and aircraft were worn out and outdated. Personnel issues—drugs, racial conflict, and poor discipline—plagued the ranks. The military’s esteem in the public eye had hit rock bottom. America’s Cold War adversaries took note of the Vietnam debacle and assumed a more aggressive posture. Global terrorism became a threat to stability and national security. Marine leaders stepped forward, vowing “never again,” and began rebuilding and resetting the Marine Corps. The important acquisitions, programs, policies, and developments undertaken during the late 1970s and 80s built the modern Marine Corps, a combat-ready force unsurpassed in readiness and capability. Glenn remained a trusted politician and a faithful proponent at a critical node within the U.S. Congress during his tenure spanning 25 years.

Glenn served in the Senate until 1999. A year before he retired at 77 years old, he went back to space as a crewmember on the space shuttle \textit{Discovery}. Glenn continued to fly until age 90, saying that “old people, he insisted, should not let the calendar dictate their lives.”\textsuperscript{13}

Glenn credited the Marine Corps with his success. He wrote:

I had learned a set of virtues from the time I was a child. . . . Those convictions are reflected in the Marine Corps’ simple but far-reaching motto, \textit{Semper Fidelis}—Always Faithful. That was what Pete Haines, the skipper of my Corsair squadron back in World War II, had meant when he said the Marines were different, that you

\textsuperscript{10} Glenn was in line for promotion to colonel. He asked to be retired before the promotion, believing that a Marine was promoted not only for past performance but also future promise, saying, “I didn’t think it was fair to make somebody else wait another year when I was going to retire anyway.” Glenn and Taylor, \textit{John Glenn}, 310.

\textsuperscript{11} These were political races in 1964 and 1970.


\textsuperscript{13} “Obituary: John Glenn Died on December 8th,” \textit{Economist}, 17 December 2016, 82.
would trust your life to another Marine. You’d risk getting hurt yourself before you’d let your buddy down. When you had that kind of faith and loyalty and discipline, the next steps were that much easier. You’d do anything before you let your loved ones, or your country, down.¹⁴ John Glenn did not let his country or his Corps down.

¹⁴ Glenn and Taylor, John Glenn, 312.
IN MEMORIAM

Colonel Julia E. Hamblet, USMC (Ret)
12 May 1916–17 April 2017

Julia Estelle Hamblet was born in Winchester, Massachusetts, on 12 May 1916. After attending the Hartridge School in Plainfield, New Jersey, she entered Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York. She graduated in 1937 with a bachelor of arts degree. She obtained her master’s degree in public administration at Ohio State University in 1951.

From 1937 to 1943, she served with the U.S. Information Service in Washington, DC. In April 1943, she entered the Marine Corps and was assigned to the first Marine Corps Women’s Reserve Officer Training Class at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts. After completing the course, she was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Women’s Reserve on 4 May 1943. Hamblet was then selected as adjutant to then-Captain Katherine A. Towle at the Women’s Recruit Training Center at Hunter College in New York. She was promoted to captain on 7 February 1944 and to major on 31 August 1944.

During subsequent tours of duty, Major Hamblet served at Marine bases in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California; and Quantico, Virginia. Before the end of World War II, she was commanding Aviation Women’s Reserve Group I, numbering approximately 2,600 women, at the Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. For her service during this period, she was awarded a Commandant’s Letter of Commendation with commendation ribbon.

Major Hamblet was released from active duty in July 1946, but after two months was recalled to Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, to serve as the third director of the Women’s Reserve from September 1946 to November 1948—succeeding Colonel Towle.

Following demobilization, the ranks of the
Col Hamblett boards a Douglas F3D Skyknight at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, for her first jet flight. The ranking officer of Women Marines received special permission to return to Washington, DC, by jet following a brief inspection.
Women’s Reserve dwindled to 8 officers and 159 enlisted. With the passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act in 1948, a transfer of personnel into the regular components of the Marine Corps with the title of Women Marines was effected. Major Hamblet thus accepted a regular commission in the Women Marines on 4 November 1948. On 24 August 1949, she was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In 1951, after completing graduate work at Ohio State University, she was assigned to the staff of the commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, with headquarters in Hawaii. The following year, she was named officer in charge of the Women Officers Training Detachment, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

On 1 May 1953, she assumed duty as the director of Women Marines, again succeeding Colonel Towle who was retiring. The post carried with it the rank of colonel, and Colonel Hamblet continued to serve in that capacity when her four year tour of duty was extended to 1 March 1959. Later in that same month, she was assigned duty in Naples, Italy, as military secretary to the commander in chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

In May 1962, on her return from Italy, Colonel
Hamblet reported to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, as commanding officer, Women’s Recruit Training Battalion, and served in this capacity until her retirement three years later on 1 May 1965. She was awarded the Legion of Merit upon retirement for “outstanding service as planner, administrator and leader of Women Marines throughout a distinguished career which encompassed every major assignment in the women’s program.”

Colonel Hamblet went on to work for the U.S. Office of Education (later the Education Department) from 1965 to 1978, working in elementary and secondary education programs. For several years, she was based in Seattle, Washington, before she returned to Alexandria, Virginia. She moved to Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1986.

Colonel Hamblet passed away on 17 April 2017 in Williamsburg at the age of 100. She was laid to rest in Harmony Grove Cemetery in Salem, Massachusetts.
It was with great sadness that Marine Corps History Division was informed of the passing of Merrill Bartlett on 5 February 2017. Born on 8 April 1939, Bartlett grew up in Colfax, Washington. After graduating high school in 1957, he attended Washington State University and graduated with a Pharmacy degree in 1963.

Bartlett enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve and rose to the rank of corporal before being commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps on 5 June 1963. He trained as an artillery officer and served in the 11th, 12th, and 13th Marines during his career. From 1968 to 1969, he served with the 13th Interrogation Translation Team in Vietnam, and for his service was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal. Bartlett’s final assignment was with the U.S. Naval Academy, where he taught history to the midshipmen from 1977 to his retirement in 1983. For his dedicated service during those years, he received the Navy Achievement Medal and the Legion of Merit.

After retiring from the Corps, Bartlett became a prolific researcher, historian, and writer. He authored more than 125 articles for various publications, including *Leatherneck*, *Marine Corps Gazette*, *Fortitudine*, and *Naval History*. He published numerous books, including *Assault from the Sea, Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare* (1983); *Lejeune: A Marine’s Life, 1867–1942* (1991); *Leathernecks: An Illustrated History of the United States Marine Corps* (2008); and *The U.S. Marine Corps:
An Illustrated History (1984). In the past few years, Bartlett had been researching early Medal of Honor recipients at the National Archives, History Division, and other repositories across the country. His contributions to Marine Corps historical scholarship will continue to shape the narrative for years to come, and those who knew him will miss the self-described curmudgeon.

• 1775 •
Major Norman T. Hatch, USMCR (Ret)

2 March 1921–22 April 2017

It was with deep sympathy that the History Division learned of the passing of retired Major Norman T. Hatch on 22 April 2017 at the age of 96.

Hatch was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 2 March 1921, and enlisted in the Marine Corps in July 1939 at the age of 18. Graduating from Gloucester High School in the midst of the Great Depression, jobs were scarce. According to a 2005 interview, Hatch enlisted in the Marine Corps because he “needed a place to live and someplace where I could get three meals a day.” After recruit training, he was sent to Washington, DC, and became part of Marine Corps Institute as an instructor and later as a member of Leatherneck magazine before being assigned to the U.S. Navy’s public relations office. The March of Times School of Pictorial Journalism in New York City advertised a course in newsreel technique, and Hatch, with his staff photographers, took the course.

Two years later, he found himself carrying 90 pounds of camera equipment through waist-deep water across the reef at Tarawa. Covering the battle as it raged on and as bullets whizzed by was part of the job, and Hatch did it without giving a second thought to his own safety. “I’ve got to be here . . . I’ve got to document what [they] were doing,” he told reporters in 2005. The footage he and his fellow combat correspondents captured was turned into a documentary called With the Marines at Tarawa, which won the best documentary award by the National Board of Review in 1944 and an Academy Award for best documentary (short subjects) in 1945.

Rising to technical sergeant, Hatch was appointed a warrant officer and assigned to San Diego, California, for duty with the 5th Marine Division in June 1944. On 19 February 1945, along with the rest of the division, he and his fellow combat correspon-
Top: U.S. Marines photographed during the Battle of Tarawa in November 1943, including then-SSgt Hatch (back row on right). Bottom: in the shadow of a wrecked tank, Hatch makes friends with a kitten caught in the battle.
dents landed on Iwo Jima, Japan. For his service on Iwo, he was awarded a Letter of Commendation from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz for his “cool-headedness under fire, and devotion to duty in combat.” Later, the Bronze Star with “V” also was awarded to Hatch for Iwo Jima.

Hatch returned to the United States in late 1945, and in late 1946, he returned to inactive status in the Marine Corps Reserve. Remaining in the Reserves, he was able to receive a commission in 1950 and continued to serve the Corps while living in the Washington, DC area. Promoted to captain in 1952 and then to major in 1960, Hatch retired from the Reserves in 1967.

His service to the Corps continued for many decades, providing vital details to the Corps’ historians, archivists, and curators on the earliest days of the combat correspondents and other aspects of World War II. Hatch remained engaged in the history of the Corps to the end. His service will not soon be forgotten. He is survived by his loving wife, Lois, his son, N. Thomas, and daughter, Colby.

• 1775 •
World War I was marked by changes and developments in tactics, fortifications, and weapons. Sometimes weapons development drove changes in tactics; sometimes manpower and tactical considerations drove changes in fortifications. The two fine books reviewed here show how these situations developed.

It is said British soldiers would theorize about walking from the North Sea to Switzerland entirely within the extensive Allied trench system—a seemingly impossible feat for the reader to comprehend. The Germans, of course, had their own extensive trench system. The Hindenburg Line, which some of those British soldiers attacked in 1917 and 1918, was an imposing and formidable obstacle.

Authors Patrick Osborn and Marc Romanych have joined with illustrator Adam Hook to produce this fine treatise on the Hindenburg Line. According to the authors, “the origin of the Hindenburg, or Siegfried, fortifications lay in two major German defeats of 1916” (p. 7). Fighting at Verdun and the Somme resulted in 700,000 casualties in the German Army, in addition to the loss and expenditure of large amounts of supplies and ammunition. These losses resulted in the adoption of defensive tactics and the idea to create a new defensive line that would shorten the existing line and provide savings in men and material. The new positions consisted of a series of five lines, or systems, that “formed a continuous fortified front from the Belgian coast to the Moselle River” (p. 12).

After covering the construction of these positions, the authors review changes in German tactics that culminated in deeper defensive zones by 1917. They provide a description of the organization of a defensive zone, complete with interesting data on barbed wire obstacles and antitank mines. Text and illustrations depict the emplacement of concrete bunkers, artillery positions, and tank barricades. The authors’ operational history of the system covers French locations in Cambrai, Amiens, St. Quentin Canal, Meuse-Argonne, and others.

In short, the authors point out that Germany could afford no more battles with heavy losses, yet, with the Americans coming on the scene, they could not win the war by remaining in defensive positions, no matter how strong. In the end, “the Allies, employing new combined-arms tactics and weapons, especially tanks, were able to nullify any advantages the fortifications provided to the German army. Germany’s last line of defense was a forlorn hope” (p. 60).

The text is enhanced by many photographs depicting examples of trenches, shelters, strongpoints, and construction activity. Hook’s illustrations, cross-sections of shelters, and other visual aids help the
reader understand some of the detail of the fortifications. Several maps orient the reader to the trench system along the entire western front. The book does not contain footnotes; however, the bibliography, while only one page, seems adequate.

At 64 pages, this is an easy read that is packed with a lot of good information. People who are just beginning to read about World War I, especially the climactic year, 1918, should consider reading this book first. It will give them a good idea of what the Allies faced in their final offensive to end the war. More experienced readers will enjoy this concise treatise too.

In defense of such trench and fortification systems as the Hindenburg Line, or in preparation to attack them, artillery proved to be the king of battle in World War I. The new book, King of Battle: Artillery in World War I, is an excellent international study of artillery during the war. Whether comparatively smaller cannon or mortars manned by infantrymen or huge railroad guns served by sailors, these pieces made themselves known on the battlefield, causing death and destruction and driving changes in fortifications and tactics. World War I artillery even “holds the dubious distinction of causing a new diagnosis, shellshock” (p. vii). While acknowledging that scholars have written about artillery since the war, editor Dr. Sanders Marble then states: “Overall, there are only a few books examining artillery in World War I on a comparative, international basis” (p. vii). Marble and his contributors seek to address the gap with this book.

The international team of scholars covers the following countries: Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, Serbia, Russia, United States, India, and Romania. The fact that each contributor used native sources makes this book particularly valuable to many English-speaking readers who would find such sources inaccessible. Each of the contributors focused on different aspects of their topic, and each used a varied scheme of arrangement to present their information. Not surprisingly, certain patterns emerge; in particular, areas of common concern among all nations become apparent. For example, all nations seem to have suffered from material and ammunition shortages, some severely so. Most nations struggled with the need to integrate field guns with heavy howitzers and mortars and to incorporate all within a coherent, effective tactical framework.

Setting the stage for the national histories, Bruce Gudmundsson (Marine Corps University) provides an interesting introduction, citing two pre-World War I inventions that prompted what he calls a technological revolution in artillery. The integrated recoil system, which allowed the carriage of an artillery piece to remain still during firing, produced a significantly faster rate of fire. Before this, improvements in gunpowder, explosives, and steel technology resulted in artillery projectiles that carried larger and more effective payloads farther than pre-1880s pieces. Next, Gudmundsson presents an overview of the myriad types of artillery pieces and projectiles of the era. This is followed up with brief discussions of artillery unit organization and techniques of employment.

Sanders Marble starts the national histories with a review of British artillery. After a brief introduction, Marble covers British artillery chronologically. For each year, Marble examines how tactics evolved against a backdrop of munitions shortages, weapons development, and organizational changes. For example, 1914 found British commanders adjusting to the importance of heavy artillery. Marble gives an example of tactical adaptation and resulting problems in 1915: “Due to munitions shortages . . . a decent bombardment meant a narrow attack, which meant punishing flanking fire” (pp. 38–39). Heavier bombardments and improved indirect fire techniques marked later years. Marble also includes “Behind the Lines” and “Beyond the Western Front” sections for each year. In his conclusion, Marble states that, in the end, despite evolving tactics and techniques, “the British did not embrace the idea of artillery conquers/infantry occupies” (p. 61).

Gudmundsson follows with his analysis of French artillery. According to him, “the history of the artillery of the French Army of the First World War is a tale of extremes” (p. 62). They had the best specimens of some artillery pieces and the worst of others. Gudmundsson organizes his chapter mostly by an examination of the
various classes of guns, howitzers, and mortars. Numerous charts throughout reflect the characteristics of the pieces. He addresses the French shell shortage, industrial mobilization, changes in tactics, motorization, naval pieces, and artillery unit organization. This chapter offers a thorough analysis of the topic.

Major General David T. Zabecki (USA, Ret; University of Birmingham, UK) covers German artillery in the next chapter. Zabecki provides a wonderful analysis of German views on mobility and fire and maneuver. His discussion of high explosive, shrapnel, and gas shells is clear and edifying. Zabecki discusses field artillery, foot artillery, trench mortars, command and control, and fire control. Rounded out with an analysis of German fire support doctrine and tactics, this chapter serves as a fine examination of German artillery.

Independent scholar John R. Schindler adopts a chronological approach to Austria-Hungary’s artillery. Their army was hamstrung by internal politics before the war, and adequate funding was slow to materialize. Schindler concludes: “The tragedy of the Austro-Hungarian artillery was that it had mastered the art of 20th century combat just when the Dual Monarchy lost the ability to materially sustain such efforts” (p. 156).

Colonel Dmitri Minchev (Ret; president of the Bulgarian Commission for Military History) covers Bulgarian artillery chronologically against the background of their three major campaigns: Serbia in 1915, Romania in 1916, and Salonika, Greece, in 1915–18. Minchev also covers fire control, sound ranging, and the different types of fire support.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Erickson (USA, Ret; Marine Corps University) provides a chronological review of artillery operations of the Ottoman Army. In common with other countries, the Ottomans were plagued by munitions shortages and, in the end, “failed to provide the weapons and munitions necessary for the fielding of a 20th century artillery arm” (p. 195).

Colonel Filippo Cappellano (Archivio dell’ Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito) covers Italian artillery. As with other nations’ artillery, the Italians suffered from a dearth of munitions. Their tactics, too, changed as the war progressed, developing, for example, the idea that artillery should be used to pave the way for one’s own infantry attack, instead of waiting until the attack is underway. Cappellano also discusses the changes in manning and organization during the war.

James Lyon (Centre for Southeast European Studies of the University of Graz) next discusses Serbia’s artillery, which benefited from experience in the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913). Serbia had to contend with exhaustion (physical and economic) from these previous wars, as well as shortages of munitions during the World War. So acute was the shortage that, at one point, division commanders “demanded a strict account of each shell fired” (p. 238). Lyon covers Serbia’s battles chronologically, and this chapter is an excellent account of Serbia’s heroic efforts.

Andrey Pavlov (School of International Relations, Saint Petersburg State University) reports on Russia’s artillery. Pavlov describes the efforts to upgrade the Russian Army following the Russo-Japanese War. Despite these efforts, “the munitions famine became one of the most important reasons behind the heavy defeats which the Russian army suffered in the campaign of 1915” (p. 260). Indeed, at one point, artillery units were restricted to firing only one shell per gun per day. Pavlov also covers developing tactics, foreign aid, heavy artillery, and trench artillery. Just when Russian artillery was strongest, revolution halted Russian participation in the war.

Janice E. McKenney, an independent scholar, provides a fine chapter on the United States’ artillery. Her thorough essay covers personnel, equipment and organization, training, and the need to acquire artillery pieces from foreign suppliers. McKenney reviews railway artillery, coast artillery, and trench mortars; each of these types of units served in action in France. Her “Operations” section covers changing tactics, infantry and artillery coordination, intelligence, supply, fire support, and aerial observation.

Kaushik Roy (Jadavpur University, Kolkata; and Peace Research Institute, Oslo) discusses many inter-
esting facts about India’s artillery during the war. After discussing the prewar state of Indian artillery, Roy addresses wartime organization and manning. British officials, fearful of the presence of large numbers of trained Indians in the country, kept recruitment low. According to Roy, “due to the Martial Race theory regarding recruitment, Indian artillery personnel were recruited only from the Jat Sikhs and Muslims from Punjab” (p. 304). Roy addresses Indian performance in East Africa, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Gallipoli. Indian artillery tactics and training improved during the war despite a limited industrial base and governmental financial constraints.

Cornel I. Scafes (independent scholar) and Ioan Scafes (department head, King Ferdinand I National Military Museum, Bucharest) conclude the national surveys with their essay on Romanian artillery. The authors discuss the period of initial Romanian neutrality, followed by the campaigns of 1916, 1917, and 1918. Romania, too, struggled with shortages and a lack of trained personnel. In common with other nations, Romania improved its equipment, tactics, and training as the war went on. This chapter is augmented by a fine map and 13 interesting photographs.

Boyd L. Dastrup (U.S. Army Field Artillery School) provides a conclusion and summary. Dastrup reviews changes in munitions, motorization, tactics, and methods of firing to support his general conclusion that “the challenges of the war forced armies to modernize their artillery” (p. 360). This was evident in the shift to indirect fire, an increase in the use of heavy artillery and high explosives, and a move toward improved traction and motorization.

Although *King of Battle* is easy to read, some of the writing and tables are fairly technical. Each chapter can, of course, be read independently. This book will appeal mainly to artillery aficionados and scholars, although the generalist reader will certainly learn a lot about changing tactics and the adaptability of artillery to counter those tactics. The reported high retail cost of this book probably puts it beyond the reach of the average reader. Scholars and serious artillery enthusiasts would be well advised to seek out a copy at Service academy libraries or other institutions of higher learning. More casual readers might want to wait until used copies appear for sale at a lower cost.
As historical topics of research go, writing about the Holocaust presents something of a paradox. At first glance, the field might seem full. Books, articles, and documentaries have covered many aspects of it. At the same time, Holocaust denial, claims of Holocaust exaggeration, and the trivialization of the Holocaust abound and perhaps are growing. In *Hell Before Their Very Eyes*, John C. McManus attempts to step into the center of this paradox. In one sense, the book covers little new ground, but in another, by reframing the Holocaust through the eyes of the American soldiers who liberated concentration camps, it offers an important contribution in combating the tendency to trivialize the horrors to which these Americans bore witness. In doing so, it also raises some intriguing questions about the U.S. military during liberation that merit further consideration and serious study.

Starting with the preface, McManus identifies the nature of the problems that *Hell Before Their Very Eyes* seeks to address, namely Holocaust denial and claims of Holocaust exaggeration. To counter these problems, he focuses on presenting the experiences of American forces involved in the liberation of three major concentration camps in Germany: Ohrdruf, Buchenwald, and Dachau. The cases build upon each other, with the majority of the book spent on Dachau. In each instance, McManus provides a thorough account of liberation and the horrors the liberators witnessed. In some cases, he goes into more depth, explaining and settling controversies, such as which unit liberated Dachau and questions about U.S. soldiers taking part in reprisal killings of Nazi personnel. The graphic and detailed nature of the considerations of the three liberations, which are largely drawn from eyewitness accounts, fulfills the purpose of the book, leaving the reader without any doubt about the nearly unparalleled barbarity of the Holocaust.

Throughout the book, McManus presents several intriguing and repeating patterns that are worthy of further examination. In each case of liberation, McManus notes that the American soldiers had no idea what they were going to encounter, or even that there were camps in the area. By the liberation of Dachau, U.S. soldiers encountering escaped victims of that camp had so little knowledge of what was happening that they did not believe the inmates’ assertions that such a place existed. This is particularly hard to understand because the divisions involved in camp liberation had received orders to secure the camp at Dachau, and the Americans had already liberated several camps, including Buchenwald and Ohrdruf. Additionally, the locations and some realities of both Buchenwald and Dachau were certainly known, as both were in op-

* Jacob Stoil holds a doctorate in history from the University of Oxford and a master’s in the history of warfare and a bachelor’s degree from King’s College London.
eration prior to the outbreak of the war and, in the case of Buchenwald, the Allies had aerial photos taken in 1944 in which the camp was labeled. There was also intelligence from Special Operations Executive agents who had escaped the camps. All of this begs the question of why the units operating in the area of the camps were not informed. Why were soldiers not told what to expect? Unfortunately, having repeatedly narrated this pattern, McManus digs no deeper. *Hell Before Their Very Eyes* implies that, because of their lack of prior knowledge, the liberators had to make do with the supplies on hand, and no special instructions or preparations were made. It seems more than possible that, as precious time went by before medical teams and nutritionists could arrive, lives were lost. These questions may be beyond the scope of McManus's work, but having raised the issue, the author leaves the reader wanting answers.

In a similar vein, the witnesses themselves are somewhat absent from the book. From the title and the prologue, it appears that *Hell Before Their Very Eyes* will cut interesting new ground in focusing on the experiences and perspectives of those Americans who liberated the concentration camps. The book is peppered with vignettes and quotes from these witnesses. At times, it notes the ethnicity of the liberators, mentioning Jewish or German heritage. It would be interesting and worthwhile to see how ethnic, religious, and other identities affected the experience of taking part in the liberation. Conspicuous in their absence are the voices of the African American personnel who encountered the camps. This is particularly surprising given the wealth of material on the subject. The long-term effects of the liberation on soldiers provides another fertile ground for further inquiry. Although there are subchapters in the epilogue that present some exploration, the work leaves room for a more robust investigation.

Overall, John McManus’s *Hell Before Their Very Eyes* provides a good and important introductory resource for those unfamiliar with the true horrors of the Holocaust and a good reminder for those who may have forgotten. For those looking for a more scholarly discussion, *Hell Before Their Very Eyes* raises more questions than it answers, but this is not necessarily a negative. In a field full of excellent histories, McManus points toward some new directions for further research.
As any Marine or soldier who took part in the Second Battle of Fallujah will tell you, urban warfare is difficult. House-to-house fighting, with its close-range engagement distances, extensive use of firepower, and potential for massive collateral damage, is the kind of mission that most troops would rather avoid if given the choice. But all too often, they do not get that choice, and when directed to do so, usually go about this most challenging of assignments with little time to prepare and even less time to train.

Although urban warfare is becoming increasingly likely in the expanding megacities proliferating along the world’s littorals at a rapid pace, American military planners apparently would rather avoid discussing the topic altogether, preferring to conduct operations in the wide open spaces of the desert or countryside rather than being sucked into city fighting—and for good reason. This reluctance is altogether understandable, given the high cost in casualties suffered and massive expenditures of ammunition, but it does little to prepare our armed forces for the kinds of battles in which they will increasingly find themselves involved.

To illustrate how effectively American troops have tackled this challenging mission during World War II and afterward, the author selected four examples of urban warfare ranging over a 24-year period (1944–68) involving three different wars: the Battles of Manila and Aachen in World War II, the 1950 battle for Seoul during the Korean War, and the 1968 Battle of Hue during the Vietnam conflict. All of these battles involved U.S. Army and/or Marine Corps forces, ranging in size from an infantry regiment with two battalions (Aachen) up to and including multidivision operations (Seoul and Manila).

While Wahlman provides good thumbnail histories of each of these urban battles that are worth studying in their own right, the true value of his book lies in the analytical model he created to determine how each of these fights differed and what elements common to all four contributed to ultimate American success. Understanding and applying this model to recent battles fought in Iraq and Afghanistan would not only aid historians, but would prove useful for current or future planning efforts, supporting increased command and staff effectiveness during the run-up to urban fighting and possibly resulting in fewer military and civilian casualties and with less collateral damage to urban area infrastructure.
Wahlman’s main thesis is that American ground combat forces have been successful in conducting military operations in urban terrain primarily due to two factors: transferable competence and battlefield adaptation. The first term, **transferable competence**, simply means that the skills that make U.S. forces successful in conducting high-intensity ground combat operations in open or wooded terrain are readily transferable to the urban environment, such as the quality of small unit leadership, the emphasis on firepower and the logistical support that makes this possible, the coordination and orchestration of combined arms, the experience gained in previous combat situations, and the design of armored vehicles that makes the infantry’s firepower employment more effective.

The second term, **battlefield adaptation**, concerns how units, with little or no knowledge and experience of urban combat, rapidly learn and adjust their tactics—how they fight—to succeed in the strange and challenging world of the urban jungle. Historically, American troops, both Marines and soldiers, frequently have exhibited the ability to change and adapt to various challenges using tactics, techniques, and procedures described in their doctrinal manuals, which serve as points of departure, relying on a “spirit of innovation and flexibility” that is almost unique to American military culture and deviates from doctrine if and when the situation calls for it (p. 6).

Wahlman believes that this uniqueness is no accident; he believes that it is imbedded in the American character, as well. Just as important, according to the author, is the historical tendency displayed by American commanders, who push decision-making authority down to the lowest level of leadership possible to allow the commander to make the right decisions as well as to provide him the firepower he needs to get the job done. This favorable trend began to accelerate during World War II and has continued to the present day. While history shows that commanders have not always followed this dictum, the success achieved in the battles for Manila, Aachen, Seoul, and Hue were made possible because the local commanders at the point of the spear were given nearly everything they asked for (with the exception of the Battle of Manila, when General Douglas MacArthur denied requests for close-air support) to overcome their opponent. Even in 1944, fear of excessive collateral damage influenced decision makers.

To assess how these two factors allow the observer to quantify battlefield performance in urban conditions, Wahlman selected five metrics. These measurement tools—command, control, and communications; firepower and survivability; mobility and counter-mobility; logistics; and dealing with the local population—are ideally suited to evaluating combat in urban environments because they are readily observable and quantifiable. That is, you can examine the evidence from these battles using situation reports, oral interviews, and after action reports to compare one battle against another to determine whether certain trends can be identified, such as whether advancements in urban combat tactics, techniques, and procedures are taking place. It also allows the observer to determine how much ammunition was used, how many civilians were evacuated or treated in hospitals, and what means were used to effectively communicate with troops engaged in combat. Using this methodology, the author came to the conclusion that, while the United States has been uniformly successful in city fighting, its efficiency has been declining in relative terms since 1944.

Finally, the author exposes two myths that have been used, in his opinion, as excuses by commanders or staffs (and even strategic leaders) to avoid urban fighting. The first is the myth that any attacker in an urban setting must enjoy 3 to 1 superiority in numbers when going against prepared defenses. After a careful analysis, Wahlman demonstrates that in none of the cases cited did U.S. forces enjoy anything greater than a 1.5 to 1 advantage (as in Manila), and in the other cases, were either on par with the enemy in numbers or (as in Aachen) were outnumbered. In all four cases studied, American forces prevailed despite the overall lack of numerical advantage. The difference, according to the author’s model and borne out by his analysis, was that U.S. forces were simply better trained, led, and equipped than their opponents; were backed up by overwhelming firepower; and were sustained by a seemingly inexhaustible logistics pipeline.

The other myth is that urban combat is a propo-
sition best left to the infantry, who are better suited for house-to-house fighting. Time and again, the author demonstrates that the key to success in an urban fight is the integration of all arms—infantry, combat engineer, artillery, air, and most of all, armor. While tanks are admittedly at a greater disadvantage when operating in cities, if backed by infantry providing close-in protection, they can be devastatingly effective against fortified enemy positions. Artillery and close air support are also combat multipliers, but a correspondingly robust logistics system must be in place to feed the voracious ammunition appetites typical of modern city fighting.

The effectiveness of the all-arms approach was tellingly demonstrated (again) in the battles of Fallujah, where M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks in support of individual infantry platoons blasted enemy positions with their powerful 120mm guns, firing high-explosive antitank ammunition. In fact, any attacking force that decides to go into a city without armor is likely to suffer heavy casualties, as witnessed by the Wehrmacht’s failed attempt to take Stalingrad in 1942 with only token armored support. Even in Hue, when teamed with infantry and tanks, the lightly armored 106mm recoilless rifle-equipped M50 Ontos antitank vehicle was strikingly successful against enemy positions located in buildings and street-level bunkers. Of course, the opposite can be true as well—the overreliance on armor to the detriment of infantry led to the Russian Army’s disastrous performance during the first battle of Grozny, Chechnya, in 1996, when on several occasions armor-heavy battle groups were completely wiped out by light infantry operating in the city. Maintaining balance between all arms is therefore essential.

The author chose not to apply his analytical model to more recent urban fights, such as the two battles for Fallujah or Marjah. In an email to the reviewer, he stated that he believes that these battles are still too recent for a detailed analysis. Wahlman does make the case, however, that even though U.S. forces were uniformly successful during the 24-year period in question, he noticed a slow, almost imperceptible decrease in overall competency. He explains this phenomenon by stating that commanders and staffs were being taught increasingly less about urban operations during their professional military education and conducted little or no training in built-up areas despite a rapidly evolving doctrine that provided an adequate intellectual foundation for addressing this type of combat.

Whether this tendency has gotten worse can be argued, but additional causes for professional concern are the ever-growing population densities of modern megacities, fear of collateral damage resulting from overuse of firepower, the ever-increasing complexity of rules of engagement, and the intrusion of modern media on the battlefield, beaming images of alleged atrocities into the world’s living rooms. All of these can combine to discourage serious thinking about urban warfare, but combat in cities is not going away—if anything, it is becoming more prevalent, as demonstrated in the ongoing Syrian civil war.

Fortunately, many of these concerns are adequately covered in the current doctrinal publications, the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations (2006), and the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (1998). Though these manuals have been revised and updated and are considered to be the last word on the subject, Wahlman feels that commanders and leaders in both Services must continue to stress the basics in their craft to ensure that the two factors discussed in the beginning of the book are still emphasized: competence in their warfighting craft that can be transferred from battlefield to battlefield, and the continuing ability to adapt existing weapons and tactics toward the unique challenges posed by the urban environment. Their continuing ability to do so is borne out by the marked success enjoyed by Marine and Army forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, though as the author might caution, they should not take their innate tendency of transferable competence and battlefield adaptation for granted—they must be fostered and encouraged, not assumed to be ever-present.
Alexandre Binda’s intimate knowledge of the Grey’s Scouts, a mounted infantry unit created in 1975, comes from being a member of the United Kingdom’s colonial Rhodesian Army for 15 years and of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and from writing regimental histories of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Rhodesian African Rifles, and Rhodesia Regiment. As a participant and observer, Binda narrates his story with immediacy and context. Based on a conglomeration of formal and informal sources, he tells a story “before the colors fade” from the viewpoint of those who were there. As such, the book crosses the space between memoir and history. This is popular history as seen by the organization and its members without the benefit of documentation, and while intense, it cannot be authenticated or exact in the details.

Binda begins his account of the Grey’s Scouts with approximately 40 pages on the origin of the unit’s name during the 1896 Matabeleland Rebellion (Second Matabele War) between indigenous tribes. The subsequent chapters are arranged chronologically, covering the period 1975–1980, during the bitter conflict that witnessed Rhodesia’s transformation into Zimbabwe. Appendices provide a reconstructed nominal roll, awards, unit songs, and verses, with maps and abundant photographs added. One important fact about the Grey’s Scouts was its multiracial composition, which allowed it to continue after independence, while other racially exclusive organizations (Special Air Service, Rhodesian Light Infantry) were disbanded.

In July 1975, an experimental mounted infantry unit under Major Alexander Fraser-Kirk was formed by the Rhodesia Army. It was manned by regulars, territorials, and national servicemen. They fought on horseback and were most active in the Rhodesian border areas. On 26 March 1976, the unit was named after a historical predecessor: Captain George Grey. Frederick C. Selous commented in 1896 that “Mr. Grey got together 23 good men and rode back to Tokwe the same evening. These men formed the nucleus of the force which had done splendid service in the suppression of the present rebellion under the name of Grey’s Scouts” to put down the Matabele and Mashona. A regimental song, “The Grey’s Scouts Ride Again,” characterized Rhodesia’s foremost mounted unit, although the police force and internal affairs also had horse-mounted elements.

Based at Inkomo Barracks, the regiment began as a single squadron, expanding to a battalion-size unit of 800 men organized into a headquarters, support, and three combat squadrons (A, B, and C) with approximately 450 men and 400 horses at full strength. Each squadron had three troops consisting of four eight-man sections (the basic four-man patrol or half section). A support squadron included reconnaissance, mortar (60mm and 81mm), and tracker dog (fox hounds) sections. Normal headquarters and support elements were provided, including motor transports of hard mine-and-ambush proof and soft horse carrying vehicles.

Starting with a four-and-one-half month selection and training course, horse and rider were kept together to develop and keep affinity and trust, in-
cluding gun proofing. The basic requirements for a Grey's Scout recruit included weighing 160 pounds or less, and having experience as a soldier; in this instance, military experience was more desired than riding skills. Mounts came from various sources, with the majority being small, mature horses from South Africa (cross breeds of *bossiekops* [farm ponies] and Basuto ponies were preferred). Packhorses carried stores, ammunition, and crew-served weapons that could weigh more than 300 pounds. For example, a mortar tube was strapped to a pack frame, balanced on the other side by ammunition, with the baseplate mounted on the pommel. Tack came from local manufacturers, including a McClellan-style cavalry saddle and pack frame.

The roles of the Grey's Scouts encompassed long-range reconnaissance patrolling of rural areas, tracking, and follow-up on horseback; deep penetration in support of armored cars; and serving as dismounted infantry when needed. The unit operated in areas where the terrain limited vehicle and foot mobility, such as along the eastern and southeastern border, often in conjunction with the border minefield cordon. Much of its deployments supported the engineers and patrolled the border, although occasionally it provided support to the units engaged in external operations. One American participant remarked that it was used “on border control and sweeps that resulted in successful contact situations for the Selous Scouts.”

Patrols lasted up to 10 days with self-supply of local fodder and concentrated horse pellets. Two sections would work together and cover up to 40 kilometers in a day. A horse and rider could alternate a 7-kilometer-per-hour (kmh) walk with a 12-kmh trot (the trot was found to be uncomfortable and dislodged equipment), and a canter at 18 kmh could be attained. Various horse camouflage techniques were tried with sometimes visually astonishing results. Commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Mick McKenna believed vehicle-drawn horse boxes allowed the Grey's Scouts to be quickly inserted into areas, to follow up on tracks, and to pursue retreating groups. The horses placed the rider well above the high savannah grass and meant that the section, equipped with radios, could spread out to cover a wide front, making ambush difficult—a startled horse would simply burst out from the ambush. Horses, unlike vehicles, moved silently through the bush. The speed of the horse allowed running men to be overtaken easily. Like Rhodesia's Special Air Service and Selous Scouts, the unit suffered a degree of notoriety during the war, but this did not stop them from continuing to operate after Zimbabwe's independence as a mounted infantry unit for border control and antipoaching operations.

The Rhodesian Combined Operations headquarters regarded the Grey's Scouts in the same way it did the Special Air Service, Selous Scouts, Fire Forces, and the border cordon, which were under its direct control. There may be some question as to this status, as the unit's standards were not comparable to either the more exclusive Special Air Service or Selous Scouts. Still, the group was a unique response to a specific situation and often operated where other special forces were not as successful.

For those interested in counterinsurgency in Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s, this book offers insight into an innovative response to cross-border terrorist incursions. Instead of technology, biology was used to provide mobility. If they could not run the terrorists down with personnel and helicopters, then adding horses to the mix might solve the problem of chasing men on foot in broken terrain. This resulted in the formation of a mounted infantry unit that was employed throughout the country to augment more conventional counterguerrilla forces spread thin over “MMBA” (miles and miles of bloody Africa). The narrative provides a unit history, including its ups and downs in morale and discipline. Once the regiment was established, the narrative weaves through a series of internal deployments and contacts with the various terrorists and guerrillas who were the face of enemy forces in the rural area. Also included in the book are descriptions of a number of external operations into neighboring countries that provided the guerrillas sanctuary. These detailed impressions of small unit combat are the book's main strengths.
Haynes concludes that *A Cooperative Strategy*, with its global and systemic view of world affairs, was a step in the right direction strategically for the Navy, but more changes were necessary to make the approach permanent. He recommends that the Navy employ strategists with advanced degrees in political economics, international finance, security, history, and strategic studies to become more adept at thinking strategically, and “explain in clearer and more compelling terms the merits of a maritime-systemic strategic approach” to both naval and civilian audiences (p. 252).

One criticism of Haynes’ book is his assumption that a maritime strategy is best for the United States and its Navy. This book is persuasive if one agrees with that basic premise. However, readers who believe that the Navy and other military institutions should focus on warfighting first and foremost may be a tough audience. Some believe that the Navy’s elevation of humanitarian and disaster relief missions to the same level of concern as nuclear and conventional military threat deterrence means a reduction in warfighting capabilities. Funding and training time would have to shift from one to the other. Whether students and teachers of history, strategic studies, and military thought agree with Haynes’ underlying assumptions or not, all are encouraged to read this book and consider its implications.
Richard A. McConnell, PhD*


The Declaration of Independence promises Americans the unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In the quest for happiness, many of us choose to enjoy the world as it is. Originals embrace the uphill battle, striving to make the world as it could be.

-Adam Grant

In Originals, Adam Grant provides an engaging description of how divergent thinkers pursue novel ideas, driving progress in disciplines ranging from selling eyeglasses online, writing historical speeches that change the world, analyzing intelligence, and distributing computers. As the above excerpt implies, original thinkers seek to break out of the status quo, reaching out to that which accepted convention might maintain is impossible and establishing a new standard for their disciplines. This book is for anyone curious about how creative trendsetters develop new ideas, challenge assumptions, speak truth to power, and avoid groupthink while carefully fostering the waver ing flame of innovative ideas. Originals may especially interest military professionals as they challenge accepted conventional thinking in the ongoing effort to anticipate the unexpected in an ever more complex world. Readers beware: Grant presents case studies and research that fly in the face of conventional wisdom regarding how to inaugurate groundbreaking endeavors with a hope of success.

Early in Originals, Grant describes a unique groundbreaking effort by an American prescription glasses company, Warby Parker, to change the industry by selling prescription glasses completely online. Five years ago, most glasses-wearing customers would not have considered buying glasses online because of the accepted convention of going to a shop and trying on frames. Warby Parker’s founders challenged this accepted paradigm, resulting in a company valued at more than $1 billion. This case study might challenge reader perceptions of how innovative thinkers behave. Instead of going all in on Warby Parker and pursuing this endeavor full time, company founders balanced risk while questioning established paradigms by splitting their time between Warby Parker and their day jobs. This account of innovators hedging their bets seems as counterintuitive as Grant’s explanation of how nonconformist originals employ strategic procrastination to ensure the best innovative outcomes.

Grant relates the story of how Martin Luther King Jr. procrastinated during his preparation for his monumental “I Have a Dream” speech that defined a generation of civil rights activists. This account tells an interesting story of how originals forge the unique and groundbreaking by putting off completion of a project until it has a chance to mature. Martin Luther King agonized over his pending oration in front of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963, constantly revising and reimagining it. In none of the drafts did he mention the notion of his dream. Yet, during the address, when Mahalia Jackson shouted, “Tell ’em about the dream, Martin,” King improvised what has become iconic for a movement that reshaped America. Grant describes suspending the completion of an idea as strategic procrastination. Divergent original thinkers allow novel

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ideas to incubate in their minds by refusing to rush to completion because, once they are complete, they stop thinking about that idea. Such procrastination may seem nonsensical to some readers, as many learn to work proactively to complete a project ahead of schedule, while Grant advocates postponement to achieve higher-quality ideas. Such approaches could put originals at odds with superiors who may expect results based on probable outcomes.

One of the biggest challenges to original thinkers is how to present their novel ideas to organizational leaders. Many innovators have great ideas that are never heard because they have not obtained the credibility to present those notions and have them successfully adopted. Grant calls this credibility idiosyncrasy credits and applies this term to two cases: one at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and another at Apple. In one case, a CIA analyst wanted to improve information sharing through a wiki-like system but initially failed due to a lack of idiosyncrasy credits that she gained some years later. In another case, a distribution executive at Apple succeeded in getting her perspective heard because of her level of credibility with organizational leaders. This section of *Originals* might be the most useful to readers who find themselves in possession of an innovative idea and faced with advocating adoption of that idea to organizational leaders.

*Originals* provides a paradigm-breaking view of nonconformist innovation that is well supported with case studies, anecdotes, and research. Although Grant draws from scholarly research, this book is not written only for that community. *Originals* is for any audience interested in how revolutionary thinkers successfully develop ideas, present visions for the way ahead, and avoid the perils of groupthink. This book would definitely be a great selection for military professionals who wish to hone their critical and creative thinking skills. An outstanding selection for civilian and military readers alike, *Originals* engagingly points the way to innovative trailblazing.

"• 1775 •"

**CORE OF THE CORPS**

**Captain Robert S. Hunter**  
**Navy Cross recipient**

On 13 May 1928, Captain S. Hunter and 26 Marines and 8 Nicaraguan Guardia were conducting a patrol 15 miles north of Peña Blanca in Nicaragua, when they were ambushed by more than 100 members of General César Augusto Sandino's forces. In the ensuing gunfight, Hunter was shot through the neck, one of his Marines was killed, and another wounded. Despite the devastating wound that made him unable to speak, Hunter began scribbling notes to direct his second in command, Second Lieutenant Earl S. Piper, to get to the nearest airfield at Quilali—several days march through narrow jungle trails. Pursued by Sandino's forces, and carrying their wounded captain on a litter, the Marines and Guardia fought for five days under Hunter's direction until he died in the early morning hours of 18 May. For their actions, Captain Hunter was awarded the Navy Cross as was Second Lieutenant Piper.
In 29 chapters, editor Edward G. Lengel provides a comprehensive account of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. This book represents an ambitious effort that mostly succeeds. Several chapters are among the best accounts of aspects of this campaign the reviewer has ever read.

As a compendium, the coverage is broader than any published work on the campaign published thus far, dealing with most aspects of the American Expeditionary Forces’ organizational and functional elements. Here the reader will find accounts covering medical, signal, air, artillery, logistical, command and control, equipping, and doctrine in brief but enlightening essays. The long-overdue addition to existing literature covering elements of the French contribution, particularly that of French armored employment, is among the very best written and supported in the collection. The inclusion of German action at the mid-command level, illustrated by a simple, but nicely illustrative map (chapter 16, by Markus Klauer) helps round it out.

As with any multiauthor effort, some chapters are better than others, and almost all rely upon the American Battle Monuments Commission’s maps for support. Those illustrations supported different narratives, and thus, readers are occasionally left to their imagination as to the exact location of some places, though in no case is the omission a serious matter.

Lengel rightly calls our attention to a theme he has pursued in his previous writings: that not all who won glory for their actions deserve the accolades, and that many others deserve equal or greater notice. The worship of William L. “Billy” Mitchel, for example, has been in decline for several years; but chapter 18 on “Airpower during the Meuse-Argonne Campaign” by Thomas Withington provides a nicely balanced analysis of the evidence, with which American soldiers being strafed regularly by German aircraft would be more likely to agree.

Chapter 19 by Patrick R. Osborn, “French Armored Support during the First Phase of the Campaign,” relies on original French sources seldom seen or exploited by American authors. We must make special mention of this chapter because American accounts that include the actions of supporting French tanks will need to be very carefully reexamined. Lest the reader suspect the French of writing with later history in mind, it should be noted that most French accounts are immediate battle reports by junior to midgrade officers.

Chapter 26 by Douglas Mastriano might have made a better second or third chapter, and this reviewer would suggest the book be read in that order. The argument Mastriano analyzes is one that was set in motion by flamboyantly partisan materials published by Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly in 1928, claiming the Americans won the war and wildly upsetting the British in particular. Read this section early, as it will give even deeper context to the several chapters dealing with specific tactical actions. Who won the war is hardly worth two minutes debate these days, but to make such a claim in light of the horrible cost of
unpreparedness, stupidity, inflexibility, and pride, so well illuminated in those other chapters, is enough to cause one to think more deeply about it all. Readers should consider following Mastriano’s chapter with Klauer’s on the German High Command.

The evolution of infantry tactics as embodied in doctrine, training, and practice—each a very different set of circumstances and seldom in full harmony—remains a point of major disagreement among authors of the subject and understandably depends largely upon which units were studied and when. Those wishing to pursue this question ought to avail themselves of several very good doctoral dissertations on the subjects. Whatever conclusions one may reach based on particular unit performance, the Report of the Superior Board on Organization and Tactics (1919) leads simply to more head scratching. Jeffrey LaMonica’s chapter 21 discusses infantry tactics during the campaign and is a good place to begin the study.

This unique compilation is worth the time to read and study, providing a solid point of reference from which to appreciate those events of a century ago.

• 1775 •

Submissions

Marine Corps History Division is actively searching for contributors to Marine Corps History (MCH). MCH is a scholarly, military history periodical published twice a year (summer and winter). Our focus is on all aspects of the Corps’ history, culture, and doctrine. Articles should be no less than 4,000 words and footnoted according to Chicago Manual of Style. For more information about submitting an article or writing a book review, please email history.division@usmcu.edu with the subject line of “Marine Corps History Submission.”

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In Persistent Battle
U.S. Marines in Operation Harvest Moon
8 December to 20 December 1965
Nicholas J. Schlosser, PhD
Operation Harvest Moon revealed a number of problems in how Marines coordinated counterguerrilla operations and used helicopters to lift formations into combat zones. In the course of the operation, the commanding general was relieved due to his inability to provide clear direction to his units. Although the Marine forces were able to exact a heavy price from their Viet Cong adversaries, the main enemy units were able to retreat and regroup, leaving the valley far from secure. Although the engagement did not produce the seemingly decisive result of Starlite or later battles like Hue City, Harvest Moon was arguably more representative of the American experience in Vietnam as a whole.

Hill of Angels
U.S. Marines and the Battle for Con Thien 1967 to 1968
Colonel Joseph C. Long, USMCR
The Battle for Con Thien was not a single event. Rather, it was an amalgamation of unit actions that can arguably be said to have lasted for years, the result of the strategies and attitudes of senior leadership generally far removed from the battlefield. Hill of Angels focuses first on the planning and building of the controversial obstacle system of which Con Thien was an anchor. It then examines the period of the battle’s most intense combat—beginning in May 1967, when Marines first occupied the hill, and continuing until the early part of 1968.

United States Marine Corps in the First World War
Anthology, Selected Bibliography, and Annotated Order of Battle
Annette D. Amerman
The aim of this collection of articles is to give readers the broad historical strokes to U.S. Marine Corps participation in World War I, as well as to show that the Corps’ contribution to the war effort was not limited to the 4th Marine Brigade. World War I created the modern-day Marine Corps; an adaptive force-in-readiness even when seemingly relegated to ship and barracks duty.

The United States Marine Corps in the World War
Major Edwin N. McClellan
The United States Marine Corps in the World War provides succinct, factual, and historical information on the Marine Corps during the First World War. Published initially in 1920 as the first book from the newly created Historical Section of the Marine Corps, McClellan’s history of Marines in the first global war has stood the test of time with its statistical and concise details of the growth, activities, and combat exploits of Marines.

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Marine Corps History

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