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*Bitskrieg: The New Challenge of Cyberwarfare.* By John Arquilla. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2021. Pp. 212. \$ 64.95 (hardcover); \$ 22.95 (paperback); \$14.00 (ebook).

In this book, John Arquilla tackles the new challenges posed by information operations under the bitskrieg doctrine as “a subsector of Cyberwar” (p. 143). The book links military history and doctrine—*blitzkrieg*—with the author’s expertise on cybersecurity and cyberdefense, providing valuable insights into networked warfare and its current challenges to the militaries, state, and society.

The book presents a compelling dialogue between the past, present, and future grounded on accurate sources. Therefore, it links both military doctrine—*blitzkrieg*—and history, with the author’s advisory experience, mainly in Operation Desert Storm (1990–91), trying to set the scene for the future of cyber warfare. Indeed, the book’s title, *Bitskrieg*, owes its wording to its predecessor *blitzkrieg*, which is achieved through an analogy between both.

The author enhances the profound impact that *blitzkrieg* has introduced since World War II in the military strategic and operational domain. Its velocity and related tactical maneuvers operated in battle have shown that an armed conflict can be everywhere involving many known and unknown actors, which, in turn, challenges Carl von Clausewitz’s military paradigm of “defence dominance” (p. 6).

These ideas may apply to information operations and networked cyber warfare where “then the defence dominance must be replaced by ‘offence rules’” (pp. 6–7). The author accurately portrays its title and the analogy, which serves as guidance: “Just as the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) foreshadowed the kinds of actions—from tank manoeuvres in the field to the aerial bombardment of cities—that was to characterize much of the fighting in World War II under the rubric of *Blitzkrieg*, so too have recent Russian uses of the various modes of cyberwar in Georgia and Ukraine provided a glimpse of the next ‘face of battle’: *Bitskrieg*” (p. 7).

Next, the author explains the challenges posed by cyber operations, which are below the threshold of violence; although disruptive, “they destroy little,” which minimizes “the escalation to a wider war,” delving into issues of cyber security (pp. 13–14).

Also, the author considers the profound impact of technology on warfare, its battle doctrine, and military domain. Smaller units highly networked on land, sea, and air will defeat larger forces (p. 14). The military doctrine of information superiority lies at the heart of cyberwarfare and *Bitskrieg*. The side with better information will pursue decisive military operations with possibly fewer losses (pp. 14–15).

One of the book’s central and appreciated features relies on its structure and selected topics for discussion. Indeed, it presents the main ideas of the most critical subjects

in cyber warfare to the broad audience at a glance, in a concise, coherent, and perceptible manner.

The book is divided into five parts, covering various topics related to cyber warfare. The first part outlines the main issues and explains the new trends in cyber warfare (pp. 13–24). The second part discusses the importance and impact of market-driven forces on solutions to cyber threats and the vulnerability of liberal societies compared to authoritarian regimes (pp. 32–34). The third part explores the combination of virtual and nonvirtual battlefields, including the role of robotics and artificial intelligence in the revolution in military affairs (pp. 46–51, 67–96). The fourth part examines the challenges of conceiving and controlling cyberweapons, including their dual use, and presents the author's perspective on the feasibility of a cyber arms control agreement (pp. 98–30). Finally, the last part offers solutions related to encryption and cloud computing, which are coherent with the book content and address the main topics already covered.

It is, therefore, a book that brings awareness and invites the readers to rethink cybersecurity, cyberdefense, cyberwarfare, and the future of the military, focused on the U.S. environment (pp. 132–55). The same military has also shown reluctance to detach from old paradigms and invest in new ones with smaller units, precision-guided weapons, and information superiority on “their weapons and the interconnectedness of all forces in the field at sea, and in the aerospace environment” (pp. 89–90).

The author explores the adaptation of the blitzkrieg doctrine from World War II to the cyber domain, which has unique features. However, the author could delve deeper into this analogy to understand its impact on individuals, society, and the state, particularly in balancing cybersecurity, cyberdefense, and fundamental freedoms. Further explanation of this doctrine could also clarify the military's reluctance to adopt *Bitskrieg* and enhance its added value, impact on the conduct of hostilities, and compliance with legal frameworks and rules of engagement. Finally, the book could also address the disagreement on the definition of cyberweapons and its impact on the legal regime of cyber weapons review and the cyber arms control agreement. This would provide further insight into the challenges of regulating cyber warfare and the need for a common understanding of key concepts in this domain.

Notwithstanding, the book significantly contributes to understanding networked cyber warfare, cybersecurity, and defense issues. Undeniably, the book will contribute to readers' understanding, rethinking, and willingness to deepen their knowledge of these critical subjects. This will undoubtedly enhance readers' ability to address the challenges of regulating cyber warfare and promoting cybersecurity.

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*The Culture of Military Organizations*. Edited by Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 482. \$111.00 (hardcover); \$36.99 (paperback); \$36.99 (ebook). <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108622752>.

The study of culture within military contexts is a welcome trend gathering momentum with the publication of several excellent monographs in recent years, including the exploration of important subcultures as well as the development of an overall Service culture.<sup>1</sup> With *The Culture of Military Organizations*, editors Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray assembled an impressive array of scholars with the dual aim of focusing attention on the role of both organizational and strategic culture in military effectiveness and of providing current military leaders and policy makers a better understanding of how culture within their respective organizations develops, is shaped, and can influence the choices—and the future—of military Services. The contributors then proceed to examine how various aspects of culture and cultural tendencies manifest in a variety of different military, political, and temporal settings, broadly categorized by land-based military forces, maritime forces, and air forces. The resulting work, then, is one with a wide scope but a narrow focus, and one that succeeds in drawing out the “insights of history” in a compelling, convincing, and constructive way (pp. 3–14).

The authors examine two different kinds of culture throughout—organizational culture, as conveyed by artifacts, beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions—and strategic culture, which the editors describe as being nationally or ethnically defined, rather than by specific institutions. Strategic culture precedes organizational culture, they claim, and this is certainly understandable—military personnel are slowly imbued with various aspects of strategic culture throughout their lives as members of a given national, cultural, or ethnic entity, as if by osmosis. Along with these categories, the editors identify geography, history, and environment as three significant contributing factors that shape the cultures of military organizations. Culture, then, establishes “organizational identity” and expected group behavior in various situations (pp. 2–36).

The book's individual chapters examine how these concepts can be observed in practice, including the influence of strong personalities, the impact of the cultural background of personnel, the role of disappointing performance as a motivator for change, and the importance of past experience in determining both organizational purpose and operational decision-making. There is a disproportionate focus on land-based forces (11 chapters on armies compared to 3 on maritime forces and only 2 examining air forces) and the editors do not offer specific justification for this choice, beyond pointing out that sea and air forces are by nature more reliant on technology, while land forces are shaped by both the populations and urban environments in which they operate. This does not detract from applicable insights that each chapter is able to provide, however. Each contributor, in turn, supports the editors' claim that “having an organizational culture aligned with the challenges of the organization's mission and environment may be the most underrated variable in war and strategy” (pp. 32, 55–78, 121–54, 300–307, 321–22, 426–48).

The editors conclude by contemplating a variety of lessons illuminated by the preceding chapters, including learning and innovation, the role of professional military education in “sustaining” organizational culture, and the dangers that come with the widening disconnect between the U.S. military and American society at large. These are broad topics, with far-ranging implications beyond the scope examined by this volume and its contributors. With *The Culture of Military Organizations*, the authors provide a valuable framework that succeeds in not only demonstrating the crucial importance of culture in understanding military organizations and how they operate, but also supports further work by other scholars who will continue exploring these themes (pp. 449–62).

## Note

1. See Melvin Deaile, *Always at War: Organizational Culture in Strategic Air Command, 1946–62* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018); Heather P. Venable, *How the Few Became the Proud: Crafting the Marine Corps Mystique, 1874–1918* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019); David W. Bath, *Assured Destruction: Building the Ballistic Missile Culture of the U.S. Air Force* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2020); and Michael W. Hankins, *Flying Camelot: The F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021).

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*Capturing Aguinaldo: The Daring Raid to Seize the Philippine President at the Dawn of the American Century.* By Dwight Sullivan. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2022. Pp. 422. \$34.95 (hardcover); \$33.00 (ebook).

It is not every day that a valuable work of military history is written by one of our own. And I am not only claiming Dwight Sullivan as one of “our” own because he is a 30-year veteran of our the Service’s JAG Corps, the cofounder of the CAAFlog website (the premier blog for military justice law and policy), and for the last decade a member of the senior executive services in the Department of Defense’s Office of General Counsel with the military justice portfolio. Yes, he is a veteran military lawyer, but he is more than that. Lest the brief biographical details on the dust jacket deceive you, I am claiming him as one of our own in a more proximate sense. In fact, his consanguinity to the Air Force JAG Corps is closer than perhaps this Marine may want to admit. But for five years, Sullivan worked as the Air Force Appellate Defense Division as learned counsel in the capital appeal of *U.S. v. Witt* before assuming his current position at Department of Defense General Counsel. Full disclosure, that is where we met and worked together for three years, and then we both continued moonlighting on the *Witt* appeal for another three years until it was ultimately decided in 2016.<sup>1</sup> Sullivan remains a mentor and a friend, so it is with great pleasure that I read his book. And there is much to recommend in this fascinating volume.

I will also offer my review from the perspective of what I know best, that of a judge advocate. And *Capturing Aguinaldo* will certainly be of value to legal professionals, but I suspect that it will be read with great interest by all in the profession of arms for at least three reasons. First, because the context of this story is of value for one’s professional readings—namely, a half-forgotten guerrilla war fought seven decades before Vietnam and a century before Iraq and Afghanistan is something that we should know more about. Second, because a number of practical questions are raised in these pages that seem eerily familiar 124 years later—about military justice, the law of armed conflict, and political-military relations. Third, because the story of how the protagonist and his motley crew, which included not only U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Marines but also Filipinos and Spanish turncoats (spoiler alert!) captured the president of the fledgling Philippine Republic is a ripping good yarn. You will not be able to put it down.

## A Forgotten Guerrilla War

Nineteen years ago, I found myself sitting at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) in Omaha, Nebraska, awaiting my medical examination. While most of the recruits were a decade younger, sitting next to me was a Marine Corps veteran closer to my age reenlisting after a break in service. I was reading Max Boot's *The Savage Wars of Peace*.<sup>2</sup> The Marine asked what my book was about, and I told him that many people say that America has no history with and does not know how to fight small wars (*guerrilla* is, of course, Spanish for "little war" from which we derive the term "guerrilla war" in English) and that this book was written to refute that idea. If memory serves, I brought up the example of the Philippine-American War (1899–1902), which is a fascinating counterexample to the post-Vietnam narrative about our supposed ineptitude and inexperience with counterinsurgencies. To his credit, my interlocutor was well aware of such wars. I suggested that was because of his prior service and that the average American probably did not know about such things. As I remember, our conversation ended there. But I stand by my opinion: most of us know about America's "big" wars from high school history classes, but many of us do not know much about the "savage wars of peace" in between.<sup>3</sup>

There is much to learn from them, and this book helps to fill that gap. Part biography, part action-adventure story, part political drama, this is a painless way to absorb some useful history. And members of the JAG Corps should know about this forgotten war—not least because, for the first time in three decades, Americans are reoccupying bases in Philippines as a part of our strategy to encircle China with a network of alliances. This archipelagic nation lies at the crossroads of one of the most important regions in the world, both economically and strategically, and our fates are inextricably bound together.<sup>4</sup> So it would behoove us to know more about our shared history.

## Lessons about Military Law

Refreshing our memory about the war in the Philippines serves another valuable purpose already hinted at—that there are clear parallels to more recent history, which, arguably, "is not even past."<sup>5</sup> Discussing more recent wars, whether as to their inception or execution, is of course more fraught. Try asking a room full of veterans if the Iraq War was a mistake or if waterboarding was justified, and you may find yourself embroiled in a heated conversation with opinions dividing along familiar partisan lines. Perhaps examples further removed from present debates and political rancor may provide less controversial case studies and thereby enable clinical detachment and clearer thinking. This volume provides several such examples useful to thinking about military law. Consider three.

Early in the campaign, following a brutal series of battles, there were allegations of serious misconduct and even war crimes committed by the Kansas regiment under Brigadier General Frederick Funston's command. Allegedly, these Kansans were ordered to take no prisoners, shot some enemy soldiers attempting to surrender, and even murdered a few after they were taken as prisoners (pp. 42–43n2). An inspector general investigation concluded that some of these allegations were true (p. 43). Funston's commanding officer, Major General Elwell S. Otis, nonetheless decided against convening a courts-martial because, he said, doing so would endanger American soldiers should the enemy learn about these atrocities. This reflects poorly on the military justice system of the era, which was apparently willing to sacrifice accountability in favor of exigency.

Perhaps lessons can be learned from the mishandling of these crimes that may inform the work of contemporary convening authorities or judge advocates.

The next example concerns the book's marquee story, the Palanan expedition, by which an intrepid band of U.S. soldiers along with allied Spanish expatriates and Filipinos marched across enemy territory and captured the president by pretending to be compatriots who had captured American prisoners (pp. 68–79, 131–57). Novel as this strategy was, the lawfulness of capturing a foreign head of state by treachery was questioned, and Funston was lambasted on these grounds by Massachusetts senator Thomas Patterson (p. 173).<sup>6</sup> This account also merits closer study by modern legal professionals.

A third example concerns Brigadier General Funston's postwar conduct, especially his difficult relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Despite repeated warnings, during speaking tours about his experience in the Philippines, Funston continued offering political commentary—for example, suggesting that critics of the war should be prosecuted for treason (pp. 171–73, 175–80). Roosevelt was furious (p. 174). Surely every seasoned staff judge advocate has counseled at least one senior officer inclined to say more than they should about controversial or political questions. Funston's behavior is, therefore, strikingly familiar—seemingly ripped from the pages of the Department of Defense Standards of Conduct Office's *Encyclopedia of Ethical Failure*.<sup>7</sup> This is another example of the *timelessness* of the sorts of legal issues that judge advocates wrestle with. Circumstances and technology may change, but human nature does not.

It is worth noting that with each of these three examples, the author stops short of providing a thoroughgoing legal analysis and rarely even expresses his opinion. Like Sergeant Joe Friday, the approach here is limited to “[j]ust the facts, ma'am.”<sup>8</sup> Knowing Mr. Sullivan as I do, I have little doubt that he has opinions on these subjects that are strongly held and well reasoned, and I cannot help wondering what conclusions he would reach. Yet, here lies one of the book's virtues: the author leaves it to the reader to reflect on the historical record and to reach their own conclusions. One does not find here didactic finger-wagging; unfiltered history is presented on its own terms.<sup>9</sup>

## A Good Story, Well Told

There is an apocryphal quotation attributed to Abraham Lincoln, complaining about a man who could compress the smallest ideas into many words.<sup>10</sup> To its credit, this book does not suffer from that defect. On the contrary, in the hands of a less skilled author, this could have been a much longer book. It spans a full century, tracing the protagonist's parents' migration from Ohio to Kansas; tells about Frederick Funston's early life and career; slows down for the featured events of the Philippine-American War; and speeds up again to recount the aftermath of the raid and Funston's career. Although this book covers much ground, it never feels tedious. This is how history should be written. Even the most patient reader will welcome this book's lively prose and spritely pace.

## Conclusion

The conclusion of the remarkable book quotes General Douglas MacArthur, “the son of Funston's mentor and idol,” who famously said, “Old soldiers never die; they just fade away” (p. 258n2). The author ends with this observation: “Funston didn't live long enough to become an old soldier. But he has certainly faded away.” Would that every old soldier were so fortunate as to have such an author unearth their story and retell it

for a new generation. With this outstanding biography and historical work, teeming with insights on every page, Mr. Sullivan has proven himself Funston's Boswell.<sup>11</sup>

## Notes

1. United States v. Witt, 75 M.J. 380 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
2. See generally Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
3. Rudyard Kipling coined this term to describe the smaller wars during periods of supposed peace between the major wars in his poem about the Philippine-American War. "The White Man's Burden," *McClures*, no. 12 (February 1899).
4. "The Philippines' Proximity to Taiwan Makes It Central to Western Strategy," *Economist*, 21 February 2023.
5. See William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun* (New York: Random House, 1952). Consider the numerous articles reconsidering the decision to invade Iraq on the 20th anniversary of the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom on 20 March 2003, and it soon becomes clear that these debates are still ongoing.
6. The author cites H. W. Halleck, *International Law; or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War* (San Francisco, CA: H. H. Bancroft, 1861), 400–1.
7. *Encyclopedia of Ethical Failure* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2021), 174–87.
8. Although this quotation is attributed the fictional detective of the *Dragnet* television series, apparently Sgt Friday never actually used this turn of phrase. See Daniel Moyer and Eugene Alvarez, *Just the Facts, Ma'am: The Authorized Biography of Jack Webb* (Santa Ana, CA: Seven Locks Press, 2001), 45, 55, 61.
9. This approach is, arguably, the right one for works of history. See Jill Lepore, "Just the Facts, Ma'am," *New Yorker*, 17 March 2008.
10. There are various versions of this quotation, and this is one of the most common: "He can compress the most words in the fewest ideas of anyone I ever knew." Anthony Gross, ed., *Lincoln's Own Stories* (New York: Harper, 1912).
11. James Boswell wrote what is perhaps the most famous biography in the English language based on his account of his friendship with Samuel Johnson, thereby granting his subject an enduring fame that outlasted his own literary achievements. See James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (London: Henry Baldwin, 1791).

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*Women, Peace, & Security in Professional Military Education.* Edited by Lauren Mackenzie, PhD; and LtCol Dana Perkins, PhD. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2022. Pp. 288. Paperback and ebook (free). <https://doi.org/10.56686/9798985340365>.

This book stands as a first step to preserve the rich history of women, peace, and security (WPS) works by military and civilian authors who have entered WPS writing competitions. In this book, the two editors, Dr. Lauren Mackenzie, the leader of the Marine Corps University (MCU) WPS Scholars Program, and Lieutenant Colonel Dana Perkins, PhD, the director of WPS Studies at the U.S. Army War College, showcase the



2021 WPS papers submitted for the Joint PME “best of” WPS Writing Competition. These papers represent the top papers of various WPS schoolhouses, to include the MCU WPS Writing Award. The contributors range in rank from second lieutenant to colonel to civilian. They serve in the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Marines. Missing is a contribution from the Coast Guard, which I trust the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Linda L. Fagan, will remedy in the future. As I read the contributions, what is missing too are the insights from authors who contributed works for past WPS writing competitions, such as the 2013 National Defense University WPS Writing Award competition winning paper, “Marine Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan,” as well as past Naval War College WPS writing competitions. To ensure we are not deprived of the insights of past winners, but instead have the opportunity to build on their experiences and insights, I recommend MCU create an anthology of past winning papers. I ask MCU to continue publishing the winning papers of future competitions, and that such competitions not exclude the backbone of our military, the enlisted.

While the works address topics as diverse as gender perspective, gender neutrality, gender and violence, mainstreaming WPS in PME, the nexus of climate change, migration, human trafficking, hegemonic masculinity, and operationalizing WPS, a dominant theme is the lacuna of leadership. Fursova highlights General Robert H. Barrow’s testimony before Congress (and the many Marines who viewed videos of his testimony) that not excluding women from the combat arms branches “would destroy the Marine Corps” (p. 78). Coddington calls for leadership, stating that “senior leaders must take the lead,” to include “leading by example” (pp. 22–23). But, as Vallanueva discloses, “leadership did not observe training unless there were dignitaries or political personnel visiting” (p. 226). Vechinski reveals that the commander-in-chief’s 2021 *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* “does not call out the WPS agenda specifically” (p. 37). Winton decries the lack of executive agent for WPS and sponsor at the Army War College (pp. 55, 57). Garza-Guidara tackles the tough issue of the highest femicide rate in Latin America, arguably exacerbated by the “US-funded Salvadoran military strategy against the [Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front] FMLN” (p. 85). And Patel points out that “government and nongovernmental organizations should raise awareness about trafficking within communities of higher risk of experiencing climate change . . . to help ensure migrants do not fall victim to traffickers’ false promises” (p. 112).

The solution: lead. Siemonsma, in explaining Kotter’s Leading Change framework, asserts “change can be attributed to leadership in 70 to 90 percent of the time” (p. 43). Salvo highlights the findings of the 2014 *Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee* that “commanders who strive to implement the core elements of the [SHARP] program to the lowest levels and take personal ownership of promoting climates of dignity and respect on a daily basis have consistently demonstrated success in reducing—even eliminating—sexual harassment and assault” (p. 156). But Army leaders fail to examine aspects of Army culture that enable sexual harassment and battery (and neither “acknowledge their responsibility” nor “their power to change” such as the senior installation commander at Fort Hood who responded, “What can I do about it?” (pp. 123, 154, 157). As the secretary of the Army said in 2020, “[W]ithout leadership, systems don’t matter. This is not about metrics but about possessing the ability to . . . look out for the best interests of our soldiers” (p. 164). Yet, as Grider points out, the

17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff admits, “Every time we open new doors in women’s professional lives . . . we end up wondering why it took us so long” (p. 99). Trogus provides the 2018 tweet of Afghan major Abdul Rahman Rahmani about U.S. major Brent R. Taylor to demonstrate the transformational power of example. Rahmani tweets, “Let me admit, before I met Brent [Taylor], even I did not think that a woman and men should be treated equally. Your husband taught me to love my wife Hamida as an equal and treat my children as treasured gifts, to be a better father, to be a better Husban[d], and to be a better man” (p. 169).

What writing is awarded by whom and how provides insight as to what military leadership values and what it does not. While the chief of staff of the Army leads an annual ritual in awarding the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award for company grade officers who demonstrate the ideals of duty, honor, and country, there is no annual ritual for awarding the Best of WPS Writing Award, and the chief of staff of the Army does not present the WPS Award (p. 143). Instead the 2021 WPS Award winner received a Joint Staff J-5 certificate and a personalized note from the U.S. Army War College director of WPS Studies (p. xiii). Given that General MacArthur’s first demand for reform to the government of Japan in post-WWII occupied Japan was the “emancipation of women,” the chief of staff of the Army should award subsequent General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Awards to company grade officers who embody MacArthur’s first demand, a demand that occurred over a half-century before UN Security Council Resolution 1325. In selecting awardees, I urge the chief of staff of the Army to consider a contributor to this book, the 2021 West Point graduate Second Lieutenant Elizavetta Fursova.

Fursova provides insights I did not already know. Her work highlights arenas in which women’s physical performance “surpasses men,” to include “aerobic capacity,” “resistance to muscular fatigue,” and “recovery following exercise” (p. 62). I should have known. During WWII, Soviet Aleksandr V. Gridnev observed “our experience showed that women fighter pilots in the majority of circumstances, much better than men, endured G-loads to the body which arose during abrupt and sharp changes of aircraft altitude—in steep banking turns, combat turns [chandelles], and during abrupt exits from a dive. Also women pilots had greater endurance than men during high-altitude flights without oxygen.” When Fursova explained that the leg tuck was an area in which women did not surpass men, I wondered about the implicit determination by the Army that there is a higher correlation between being successful in combat and the leg tuck, rather than aerobic capacity and resistance to muscular fatigue (p. 75). About a recent visit to the U.S. Naval War College, Irish major general Maureen O’Brien reflected, “They are hung up with the physical standards. They don’t include flexibility in these physical standards. If they did, half of the men wouldn’t pass it.”

For subsequent editions, I recommend inserting the biographies of all contributors. I appreciated the glossary of key WPS concepts and terms. For subsequent editions of the glossary, I also urge incorporating language used in the 2021 winning entries: “Charter on WPS,” “gender blindness,” “gender performance,” “gender awareness,” “gender lens,” “gender injects,” “gender sensitive,” “gender institutionalization,” “Gender Advisor (GENAD),” “Gender Focal Point (GFP),” “meaningful participation,” “structural barriers,” “femininity,” “masculinity,” “toxic masculinity,” “military masculinity,” “hypermasculine,” “hegemonic masculinities,” “machista,” and “machismo.”

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*Special Reconnaissance and Advanced Small Unit Patrolling: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Operations Forces.* By LtCol Ed Wolcuff (Ret). Havertown, PA: Pen and Sword Books, 2021. Pp. 400. \$39.95 (hardcover); \$24.95 (paperback); \$21.95 (ebook).

Lieutenant Colonel Ed Wolcuff's *Special Reconnaissance and Advanced Small Unit Patrolling: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Operations Forces* is a full-throated effort to take a special operations soldier and simply make them better, thereby rendering his efforts in the battlespace more effective while simultaneously maximizing their chances of survival.

Before reading Wolcuff's book, it would have been difficult to imagine that one solitary individual could be a walking repository of virtually limitless knowledge and experience. Until now, that is. This comprehensive "how-to" manual covers a broad spectrum of techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) that a modern special operations warrior must know and practice to thrive in an unconventional/irregular warfare environment, skills that are today every bit as crucial to mission success as ever.

The text of the manual is sanitized and flawless, perhaps a reflection of Wolcuff's tendency as a career U.S. Army Special Forces officer to construct written communication in succinct, direct thoughts that get to the point as quickly as possible. It is bereft of superfluous adjectives and other modifiers that would serve only to distract the reader from the wisdom that Wolcuff is attempting to impart.

If you are looking for a "So no kidding, there I was in the enemy trench, ankle-deep in grenade pins . . ." type of story, then this book is not for you, although Wolcuff does devote recollections from his personal experiences in the art of soldiering to demonstrate how his TTPs worked so well time and again during USMACV-SOG's heyday. More importantly, these are the TTPs that will be successful when our contemporary special operations warriors venture downrange into harm's way all over the world in fulfillment of their role as instruments of national policy.

Wolcuff's practically boundless knowledge in unconventional warfare is without peer and a great resource for special operations forces warriors who espouse a burning desire to become even more efficient and lethal in the application of their craft. Acquiring this resource and implementing the TTPs described therein is an essential task for today's special operations warrior.

In the world of special operations, practitioners often learn from personal experience, far too often gained through the proverbial school of hard knocks. Furthermore, there are multiple instances in the history of armed conflict when great TTPs are developed by one army or another, ones that work well and see widespread usage, but at times have to be improved and perfected at the cost of soldiers' lives. To add insult to injury, these same TTPs are often quickly forgotten by the time the next war or crisis rears its ominous head. As a result, subsequent generations of soldiers are doomed to

reinvent the wheel as the painful and costly process of TTP development begins anew. Wolcott's opus enables the reader to learn from his years of accumulated knowledge and honed expertise, thus breaking the "wheel reinvention" cycle and allowing them to improve their soldiering skills in ways that are far less costly than trial and error.

This book should by no means be limited exclusively to those serving in special operations forces units. Any soldier who works in a combat arms military occupational specialty will benefit from the lessons Wolcott teaches in this amazing tome. Historians, scholars, researchers, and frankly anyone who holds an interest in the topic also will benefit from reading this book and learning about the lessons contained therein. If the book's language appears esoteric to the uninitiated, have no fear. Wolcott includes an extensive glossary of the vast array of acronyms and expressions used, what they mean, and how they fit into the implementation of a particular TTP. Thus, one does not necessarily have to possess a special operations background to understand and appreciate this masterpiece. In addition to the glossary, there are four appendices that supplement the book well. Wolcott also uses footnotes extensively and includes a comprehensive bibliography divided into periodicals, military technical manuals, books, and of course, web-based sources.

Today's components that form the core of U.S. Special Operations Command would do well to embrace, teach, and practice the TTPs and lessons learned found in this book.

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*Right and Wronged in International Relations: Evolutionary Ethics, Moral Revolutions, and the Nature of Power Politics.* By Brian C. Rathbun. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2023. \$105.00 (hardcover); \$33.24 (ebook). <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009344722>.

The study of ethics is good for you, like granola, but can be awful in the way granola always is. In *Right and Wronged*, author Brian C. Rathbun draws an arc from theories of social psychology through a series of surveys across Western and non-Western political cultures, before presenting the reader with a detailed analysis of German machinations in the early twentieth century. Unlike granola, Rathbun delivers something close to emotionally fulfilling.

For Rathbun, Western conceptions of morality are too limited to effectively explain the complexity of modern international relations. The idea that ethical action "demonstrates a universal concern for individuals" is far too simple and positively WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic) (p. 3). Morality is a human-oriented activity, from *ante facto* instinct to *post facto* judgment, thus cannot be separated from the politics of international relations. The problem with ethics is that liberal normative concepts of morality rely on a sense of *impartiality inexpeditus*. However, Rathbun tells us impartiality cannot exist because it dismisses the importance of instinctual in-group/out-group commitments, which are born through humankind's

long evolution. He argues that groups exist because *binding morality* brings individuals together to meet challenges to a community's welfare. Defense of the group is moral. Threats to the group are immoral. The ensuing condemnation is a necessary adjunct to the very concept of community. Loyalty to the group, deference to authority in times of crises, and respect for the group is moral. These are some of what the author calls binding foundations of morality.

It was the constant prehistorical conflict that sparked the promotion of material well-being. Forming groups was a response to anarchy and violence; it was a survival mechanism. Credible threats of defensive violence allowed the group to advertise its intentions and the potential cost of interaction. Groups displayed their morality with physical violence. This reveals that morality has an ordering principle: Survival of the group is the highest good and evolutionary morality requires contribution to the defense of the group, with potential costs of death weighed against real costs in perception of shirking duty, loyalty, and deference. Morality's ordering principle limited excessive self-interest and encouraged behaviors based on a sense of right and wrong that then become social norms.

From this beginning, Rathbun develops a taxonomy of ethics around political groupings that drives decision making in international relations. Drawing on John Duckitt's "dual process model" of ideology, the author demonstrates that conflict is motivated by either a humanitarian impulse to provide for others, or a desire to protect oneself and one's group. The political right goes one way with militant internationalism while the political left goes another with cooperative internationalism. Both concepts can be operationalized as foreign policies and both present war as a kind of "virtuous violence" with both couching conflict in terms of self-defense. Both foreign policies seek to redress a sense of imbalance and unfairness (i.e., a system that is selfish and unjust). States may feel left out or unfairly treated and use war to gain a larger share of the spoils. Other states would see the protagonist as overly self-interested and potentially creating an injustice and seek balancing defense mechanisms, which are deeply rooted in evolution. This would trigger moral condemnation and possibly retaliation through many tools, but the most well-known is state sanctioned violence. Violence, and we are talking of organized warfare here, becomes a path to retribution and reestablishing equity, that is, justice.

Rathbun demonstrates these phenomena using well-developed case studies on Wilhemine and Nazi Germany. Germany sought to increase their status, moves seen by England, France, and the United States as a grab for an undeserved share of the international system. Germany attempted to coerce France into concessions in Morocco in 1905 but failed. Believing the other great powers were not treating Germany as an equal led to military buildups and a web of alliances in the early twentieth century as each side sought to balance against the other. German nationalists were ashamed that Germany was not being acknowledged as a great power with equal access to colonial resources. Germany felt unjustly immobilized and lashed out. The system sought balance through war, with both sides justifying the conflicts as self-defense. Defeat in World War I was seen as further proof that the Prussian elites had betrayed the German *volk* to save their own political and economic interests, a line of reasoning fully exploited by Adolf Hitler's Nazi campaigns in the early 1930s. And so, the author comes back full circle: fairness is equity, equity is justice, thus what is fair is just. When leaders make the decision to go to war, they are motivated by

moral judgments, just as they are at the interpersonal level. Just like people, states are offended by excessive self-seeking and self-interested behavior in other states. It upsets the instinctual feeling for fairness. States that invade other states are regarded as excessive and must be brought back into line.

*Right and Wronged* is not a book for the casual reader, and the publisher's inclusion of Russian survey data and statistical methodology drags the reader back toward something necessary, but unappreciated, like granola. Doggedly grinding through the pages, one cannot escape the suspicion that *Right and Wronged* is a quickly assembled tome of Rathbun's previous journal articles and writings. Too often, issues that appear settled early in the book are rehashed later and in a slightly different way, leading the reader to wonder just what the point really is. However, with the German case study detailing the binding morality of that nation in the twentieth century, Rathbun certainly can claim to have established solid evidence to support evolutionary ethics. This reader would be interested in learning more from Rathbun on his humanitarian morality and consequentialist morality. Perhaps more will be forthcoming.

For all that, in writing a book about ethics, Rathbun has provided what is needed by students of international relations: perspective. The stunted humanitarian morality espoused by the rich world has been corrupted and twisted into never-ending arguments about self-defense and just war theory, inevitably used by both sides to justify today's wars. By conceptualizing evolutionary ethics, the author brings back our sense of right and wrong and implores us to tame our animal reactions.

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*Intelligence and the State: Analysts and Decision Makers.* By Jonathan M. House. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Pp. 248. \$40.00 (hardcover).

Sherman Kent, the founding figure of U.S. intelligence analysis, strongly held in *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (1949) that the practice of analysis should guard against too close an association with the business of policymaking to ensure its objectivity. This view was subject to criticism nearly from the outset, with Wilmoore Kendall in his review of Kent's book ("The Functions of Intelligence," *World Politics* 1, no. 4 [1949]: 542–52) arguing that the purpose of intelligence analysis should be to directly help "politically responsible" leaders achieve their objectives. Judging from the subtitle of Jonathan House's latest book, *Intelligence and the State: Analysts and Decision Makers*, the reader might understandably anticipate that House intends to make a contribution to this conversation. Unfortunately, the reader will be disappointed.

In his preface, House invokes Samuel Huntington's concerns over the potentially detrimental impact of Cold War strains on the principle of civilian control of the military in America to assert a parallel stress on U.S. "civil-intelligence relations" stemming from "the Cold War and the subsequent era of insurgency and terrorism" (p. ix). He then indicates that his objective in the book is to "address a civil-intelligence interface that has become just as fraught with misunderstanding and error as civil-military relations have ever been" (p. x). Along the way, House avers that post-1945 U.S. policy

makers “had to rely constantly on the expertise of intelligence officers” (p. ix) and that “analysts . . . suspect that the decision-makers are unable to overcome their own biases and partisan politics in order to understand foreign cultures and interests” (p. x).

These are all contentious positions that should offer rich opportunity for development and argumentation. The extent to which intelligence analysis influences policy decisions varies by era and presidential administration, with a number of scholar practitioners, such as Stephen Marrin (“Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 32, no. 6 [2017]: 725–42) and Paul Pillar (*Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform*, 2011), arguing that influence is very slender indeed. The assertion that intelligence analysts view their policy customers as mired in bias and partisanship, unable to rise to the serene understanding of “foreign cultures and interests” enjoyed by analysts, hints that the author may have a bias toward Kent’s views on the proper separation of the two communities but requires substantiation to be credible (p. x).

Similarly, the existence of a “civil-intelligence interface . . . fraught with misunderstanding and error” is not self-evident (p. x). The public use of intelligence analysis by the Joseph R. Biden administration in building consensus for international action in the lead up to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine would seem to be one very visible point suggesting the opposite. The two communities do differ in their outlook and objectives, and the proper relationship between them is a legitimate question that requires nuanced examination taking into account previous attention to the question from scholars and others.

Having stated that his objective is to address the “civil-intelligence interface” and its problems, House begins with a discussion of the extent to which intelligence is a profession without clearly indicating its bearing on the issue (p. x). This is an enduring question that received a burst of attention in the years following the 9/11 attacks by scholar practitioners such as James Bruce (James B. Bruce and Roger George, “Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 8, no. 3 [2015]: 1–23), among others. Much of the chapter House devotes to this topic, however, concerns civil-military relations and does not engage with the intelligence studies literature on intelligence analysis as a profession.

This chapter is followed by one on “the intelligence process,” which provides a largely conventional description of the canonical intelligence cycle, along with commentary on some of the points at which that cycle can break down (p. 14). Next is a discussion of “the operator-analyst interface” (p. 29). It is in this chapter that House most closely approaches the ostensible topic of the book, asserting that the relationship between analysts and decisionmakers is “at the heart of most intelligence successes and failures” (p. 29). An account of tensions inherent in the differing motivations of analysts and decision-makers, cognitive biases, and political misuse of intelligence using Vietnam War and Iraqi WMD examples is provided, but no new ground is broken or direct engagement with the questions raised in the preface offered.

The bulk of the book follows these three introductory chapters and consists of a summary history of the development of European and U.S. intelligence services in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, along with an overview of warning intelligence that provides standard examples of intelligence surprise, such as Pearl Harbor and the Yom Kippur War.

House's final chapter, "conclusions," begins by stating that "the vast majority of interactions between intelligence and policy makers experience no more friction and misunderstandings than are typical of any group endeavor," a conclusion that seems at odds with the "fraught" relations between intelligence and policy communities that the author claims at the outset it is his intention to examine (p. 162). This short chapter reads mainly like an opinion piece rather than the culmination of a sustained argument, likely due to no argument or sustained examination of the nominal question having been developed in preceding chapters. A number of points not developed in the text are packaged together here, including the presumed challenges for newly elected officials in overseeing executive branch organizations, the "deep state," subversion and special operations, and politicization and professionalism, the last of which returns to the question presented in the first chapter (p. 163). House asserts that "for decades, the US intelligence community has been ready to function as a profession" according to Huntington's criteria for a profession, but to realize this potential "the civilian leaders of the government should recognize intelligence work as a profession" (p. 166). There is a good deal more to the decades-long examination of the status of intelligence analysis as a profession than House reveals here, but surely depending on nonpractitioners to confer that status is not a convincing argument in its favor.

In his conclusion, House also claims that intelligence surprise following the inability of an analyst to persuade a policymaker to accept an analytic judgment is a type of intelligence failure. Yet, it is very difficult to understand why this should be so. Professional ethics and custom preclude advocacy among intelligence analysts, and decision-makers are exactly that—those who decide. The power differential in these relationships is decidedly in favor of the policy community. House does not offer insight into the reasoning that leads to this assertion.

The book is marred in a few places by what appear to be minor errors. With the discussion of Nazi Germany's intelligence services, *Geheime Staatspolizei* (Gestapo) is given as "General State Police," rather than the correct "Secret State Police." When discussing post-Church Committee reforms of the intelligence community, House states that the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 "requires the President to determine an intelligence collection effort is important to national security and to inform Congress" (p. 121). The act requires notice to the congressional intelligence committees of covert activities, not routine intelligence collection.

*Intelligence and the State* occupies a curious place in the intelligence studies literature, neither an academic monograph, nor a memoir, or a conventional history. House, in both his title and preface, leads the reader to expect an examination and assessment of the policymaker-analyst relationship, yet does not provide either. Each chapter is capably written but essentially stands on its own, covering standard intelligence-related topics inflected in places with personal viewpoint. Collectively, these chapters do not form an argument or a sustained narrative. The book is perhaps best positioned as a primer for those new to intelligence studies who have an interest in a former practitioner's view of the business but does not improve over more established such works and has little to offer a more experienced audience.

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*Maoism: A Global History*. By Julia Lovell (New York: Penguin Random House, 2019). Pp. 624. \$22.00 (paperback).

A thorough understanding of Maoism's philosophical underpinnings and legacy has become increasingly salient to the American military professional in a world where the People's Republic of China desires to supplant the United States as the global hegemon. Although the destructive effects of Mao's regime are comparable to those of Joseph Stalin's and Adolf Hitler's, there is a paucity of literature on Maoism's impact on a global scale. *Maoism: A Global History* by Julia Lovell helps to fill that void by providing a well-researched account of Mao Zedong, whose ideological reverberations cut across a swath of cultural and sociopolitical contexts; in writing the book, Lovell aims to "suggest the chronological and geographic scope of Maoism, one of the most significant and complicated political forces of the modern world" (p. 7).

Lovell begins her book by defining the tenets of Mao Zedong and exploring the ideology's early effects on China. She then details China's efforts to supersede the USSR as the leader of the world Communist revolution through the 1950s and how this escalation schisms Sino-Soviet relations, shaping the rest of the Cold War.

Lovell then shifts focus to Maoism's effects outside of China, walking through a chronology of case studies. Each of these case studies covers a different country or region, highlighting Maoism's ability to adapt to disparate contexts. By structuring her book this way, Lovell also depicts the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) foreign policy over time. Lovell pulls from a myriad of firsthand and secondhand sources, acknowledging a wide array of perspectives and highlighting where there is division in academia (e.g., the discourse in Vietnam over the consequences of land reform and debates between historians about the degree of Chinese involvement in Indonesia's September 30th Movement). Furthermore, in a book that does not shy away from emphasizing the cruelty and suffering caused by Communism, Lovell also highlights instances where Maoism had a positive effect such as its use by civil rights groups and its influence on figures such as Nelson Mandela.

Lovell's international coverage starts in Indonesia, where an unsuccessful Communist coup in 1965 prompted the government to retaliate with a violent series of purges. The resulting massacres killed half a million Indonesians and allowed power to be centralized under a long-lasting military dictatorship. In Africa, Chinese investment into insurgency training and architecture was welcomed with open arms in some places and decried as imperialism in others. In Southeast Asia, CCP backing was integral to Vietnam's victory in the Anti-French Resistance War (a.k.a. First Indochina War) and the Khmer Rouge's ascension to power after the Cambodian Civil War. However, the alliances between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia eventually disintegrated into nationalist wars, disproving Domino Theory and straining relations between all three countries.

In the West, Lovell explains how Maoism's influence in the United States and Europe shaped civil-rights activism but also fueled militant groups and acts of terrorism. Activists were unaware or willfully ignorant of Communism's ruinous effects on the Chinese economy; Lovell writes that "the Cultural Revolution fever of the 1960s and beyond once more showcased the ability of Westerners to create an imaginary China largely divorced from empirical reality" (p. 291). In Peru, Maoism proved malleable enough to be adapted to an urban, literate, democratic context that was free from im-

perialist control. Peru's Shining Path Communist revolution saw the general populace caught in the crossfire between Communist guerrilla terrorism and the military's indiscriminate retaliation; during two decades, this conflict killed 69,000 people and created at least 600,000 refugees.

In India, social inequity and dismal economic conditions have fomented a Maoist movement that the government considers to be a significant internal security threat. Lovell comments that, in the ilk of other Maoist insurgencies, the movement lacks substantive ideas for governance. When commenting on Nepal, Lovell writes that "the intensity of Maoists' ardour for literary and ideological texts has created a relationship with Maoism that fixates on abstractions and ideals, rather than on lived experience under Mao's policies" (p. 393). Maoists have attained power in Nepal, but the government still fails to reflect the politically diverse, economically advanced state that Maoists hoped to bring forth.

Finally, Lovell draws a close to her book by circling back to China, where Deng Xiaoping's leadership saw China discard socialist economic policies while preserving party rule for the CCP. Today, Xi Jinping's model of authoritarian governance evokes aspects of Mao's regime (such as a strong cult of personality) while aggressively downplaying the great loss of human life during the Cultural Revolution as a regrettable but temporally distant occurrence.

It is incumbent on American leaders to understand how Maoism will continue to be a vehicle for the CCP to expand its influence. Maoism's continued impact is predicated on its enduring prevalence. But what accounts for Mao Zedong's international popularity despite its repeated failures outside of China? Lovell explains that Chinese Communism was seen as a non-Western alternative to the Soviet model; Maoism's heavily anticolonial, anti-imperialist rhetoric resonated with those in developing countries actively fighting for independence from Western powers. Maoism's ubiquity can be traced to its cross-sectional appeal and accessibility; Maoist principles are ambiguous and rife with contradictions, making its tenets easily adaptable to various local conditions.

The enigmatic nature of Maoist doctrine highlights the CCP's disinterest in conforming to their rhetoric. China embraces capitalism despite claiming to be the true successor to the Marxist-Leninist movement, and their state-run opium industry was responsible for a sizable portion of the state's income in its early years despite the party publicly denouncing opium as an instrument of Western imperialism. Maoist thought was used to champion minority rights around the world while the CCP was persecuting ethnic and religious minorities at home. Maoist principles were meant to champion the poor; ironically, lower classes were hurt the most by Maoism in China, India, Nepal, and Peru. Maoism's modern adherents engage in hagiography, fixated on ideology while ignoring its actual effects on the lives of millions of people.

Today, China propagates a narrative of historical victimization under the weight of Western imperialism while underplaying China's global activities during the Cold War. During the twentieth century, a period commonly thought of as a time when China quietly rose to power through economic reforms, the CCP funded, trained, and armed global insurgencies while exporting hundreds of millions of copies of Mao's *Little Red Book*. Maoism will undoubtedly continue to shape world affairs in the coming years, given its penchant for inciting social unrest and its resurgence in modern China. The

danger this poses makes Maoism's global history an important topic of study for political and military leaders.

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