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REVIEW ESSAY

BOOK REVIEWS

From the Editor

I am honored to serve as the guest editor for the fall edition of the *Journal of Advanced Military Studies* (JAMS), dedicated to the topic of "Conflict on the Seas." At the time of my commissioning while at the U.S. Naval Academy 42 years ago and embarking on my Navy career in the submarine force, conflict on the seas looked much different than it does today. This change is the prime reason that the theme conflict on the seas is the focus of the fall edition of JAMS.

After being commissioned in 1981, I entered the U.S. Submarine Force during the Third Battle of the Atlantic, otherwise known as the Cold War. At the time, the U.S. mission seemed a daunting task—prevent World War III by deterring the Soviet Union from attacking the United States or its allies. On one side of this conflict, there was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) composed of the United States and like-minded allies in Western and Northern Europe. On the other side was the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, made up of Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe. As leader of the free world, the United States jockeyed for position against its Soviet counterpart as each side attempted to win more allies and territory under the rubric of its respective ideology and the guarantee of a nuclear umbrella. Superpower competition was truly global, spanning every ocean and every continent.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and its allied forces engaged in a constant, high-risk cat and mouse game with Soviet air, ground, and naval assets. With the battle lines drawn along contiguous borders between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the ground campaign was generally static. In the maritime domain, however, the interactions between the much larger Soviet Navy and the U.S. Navy was frequent and common place. Although such interactions in the Pacific were notable, they were secondary to more frequent and dangerous encounters between them in the waters surrounding Europe and in the Atlantic. John Kuehn provides an excellent summary of the challenges the U.S. Navy faced during this era in his article, "Zumwalt, Holloway, and the Soviet Navy Threat: Leadership in a Time of Strategic, Social, and Cultural Change." One of the tipping points that occurred came after the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. America had effectively lost the Vietnam War and sued for "peace with honor" as President Richard M. Nixon called it. The Navy, as did the other Services,

had become a hollow force. Facing new threats on the horizon, in the form of growing Soviet naval power and continued challenges of dealing with the People's Republic of China (PRC), Nixon chose one of the youngest chiefs of naval operations (CNO) in history, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt. With the support of Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee, Zumwalt jumped over 33 more senior officers and took the mantle of leadership at the age of 49.

Admiral Zumwalt addressed the atrophy of the surface navy head-on by challenging the three "tribes" in the Navy represented by aviation, surface, and submarine admirals. He commissioned Admiral Stansfield Turner, president of the Naval War College, to come up with a maritime strategy in the form of "Project Sixty." Zumwalt gave Turner little guidance and what followed was the prioritization of sea-borne nuclear deterrence as the Navy's primary role, followed by sea control, and then projection of power ashore. Zumwalt understood the ramifications of escalating costs of sophisticated warships, so he embraced a controversial "high-low" mix of warships, which put him at odds with Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who believed that the Navy should contain a preponderance of expensive, nuclear-powered warships. Ironically, this matter is still debated in the Navy today.

After his retirement, Zumwalt addressed the Naval Academy class of 1981 in historic Mahan Hall on a hot summer night in 1977. Standing alongside the academy's superintendent, Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, who was a prisoner of war in the infamous Hanoi Hilton for seven years, Zumwalt lit up the crowd with his telling and compelling commentary on leadership in the Navy. Kuehn accurately articulates Zumwalt's challenges as CNO, from the dwindling size of an aging fleet to regulating drug abuse and racial unrest in the ranks. His personnel reforms delivered in the form of his infamous "Z-grams" became the foundation for the integration of people of color and women in all warfare specialties that exist today. He was a visionary but controversial leader.

Zumwalt was succeeded by Admiral James L. Holloway III, another decorated combat veteran from World War II. Holloway inherited the same concerns of a declining fleet size that plagued Zumwalt. Despite the push to generate more naval capacity in Project Sixty, Zumwalt could not arrest the Navy's declining size. Holloway launched Sea Plan 2000, a slight variation on Zumwalt's priorities of nuclear deterrence, sea control, and power projection. To do so, Holloway prioritized the aircraft carrier as the crown jewel of the fleet, capable of contributing to success in all mission areas. He included allies and partners in the mix, ensuring the continued freedom of the sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic through strong support for NATO. In the final analysis however, Admiral Holloway watched as the Navy declined to its lowest level since 1939.

At the time I joined the Navy as a newly commissioned ensign, John F. Lehman, a 38-year-old naval reservist, was appointed as the 65th secretary of the Navy by President Ronald W. Reagan in 1981. Lehman, one of the youngest Service secretaries in U.S. history, was a naval visionary and the architect of the

600-ship Navy. At the time, the CNO, Admiral James D. Watkins, teamed up with Lehman and a brilliant young captain named Peter M. Swartz—an intel officer in Vietnam who sailed in the Swift Boats with Zumwalt's son—to write and publish "The Maritime Strategy" in the U.S. Naval Institute's *Proceedings* in 1986. As the unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy made clear, the Navy was prepared to take the fight to the enemy with its carrier strike groups over the top of the Kola Peninsula. This concept made the Soviet leadership, particularly the Russian CNO, extremely nervous.[1]

As a junior officer on a submarine crew, we were trained that when the vessel left the pier and reached the dive point, we were in a wartime posture. Sonar up, tubes loaded, and ready to fight—very motivational. That said, the maritime strategy was intended to be a cost-imposing strategy. The United States found itself in both a nuclear and naval armaments race. Under this economic and martial strain, the flaws in the Communist Party's rule of the Soviet Union and its satellites began to emerge. Neither the Soviet Union nor the Warsaw Pact could keep up with the West. Eventually, the Berlin Wall came down and the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1989 and the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. Victory for the United States and NATO had been achieved in a nonkinetic manner. Lehman articulated the overall effect of such a well thought out maritime strategy many years later:

> At first, the Soviets were aghast at the Maritime Strategy and then soon tried to react with increasing vigor. But as more and more ships, aircraft and technology joined the fleet, it became clear to the Soviet Navy that it could not cope. . . . After beggaring their economy to achieve the dream of military superiority, the Soviet Union now found itself worse off than ever. The forward strategy and maritime supremacy that had been asserted and built since 1981, led by the president and supported by a bipartisan Congress had been vindicated. . . . We had won the Cold War at sea: the world's oceans had been ventured, and the world's oceans had been gained.[2]

In his analysis of this period, Jon-Wyatt Matlack underscores the importance of the 1986 maritime strategy as something well beyond a robust naval plan for winning wars in his article, "Allies through Thick and Thin: U.S. Navy Strategic Communication, 1986–1994, in Transatlantic Context." In addition to being a thoroughly vetted naval strategy with ways and means to an end, it was written with a blind eye to budgetary restraints. In other words, Lehman wanted to build a navy the United States needed to win and was unconstrained by resources. Although the U.S. Navy never quite made it to 600 ships, the maritime strategy was as much a masterful strategic communication plan as it was a naval strategy. The U.S. allies and the Soviet Union received a clear message—the USSR could no longer compete with the West. As Matlack contends quite frankly, successive maritime strategy documents, such as " . . . From the Sea"

and "Forward . . . From the Sea," have not been as successful as the maritime strategy written in the 1980s because they are linked to limited resources, and they adopted a regional rather than global approach to the maritime domain.

In a landmark essay from 1989, Francis Fukuyama, a scholar and foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State, opined that with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact that year and the imminent collapse of the Soviet empire, the United States and its Western allies were at a crossroads he called "the End of History":

> What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.[3]

Despite the euphoria in the West of the triumph of democracy over Communism, the so-called peace dividend was short-lived. Nobody at that time could have predicted how explosive the level of discontent, attributed to NATO expansion in the 1990s, would manifest itself in the evolving Russian Federation at the turn of the twenty-first century. A discussion will come later in this introduction.

In the meantime, the alternatives to Communism were limited and few—liberalism or fundamentalism. As markets thrived, the accumulation of wealth became lopsided. With the West ignoring the growing lack of governance in developing nations and remote regions of the world, such as Afghanistan, fundamentalism took root and served as a cauldron that fomented violent extremism. Fukuyama also alluded to this in his essay:

> The rise of religious fundamentalism in recent years within the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim traditions has been widely noted. One is inclined to say that the revival of religion in some way attests to a broad unhappiness with the impersonality and spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies. Yet while the emptiness at the core of liberalism is most certainly a defect in the ideology—indeed, a flaw that one does not need the perspective of religion to recognize—it is not at all clear that it is remediable through politics. Modern liberalism itself was historically a consequence of the weakness of religiously-based societies which, failing to agree on the nature of the good life, could not provide even the minimal preconditions of peace and stability. In the contemporary world only Islam has offered a theocratic state as a political alternative to both liberalism and communism. But the doctrine has little appeal for non-Muslims, and it is hard to believe that the movement will take on any universal significance.[4]

Accordingly, the West seemed oblivious to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which culminated with the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. In response, the United States launched operations that became known as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which cost the United States trillions of dollars during the course of a 20-year campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan.[5]

With America firmly engaged in the GWOT, China, or the People's Republic of China (PRC), took the opportunity to strengthen its position economically, technologically, and militarily during those two decades. China's growth enabled it to emerge from its former undeveloped and agrarian state to become a major player on the world stage. Meanwhile, the West hoped for a peaceful rise of the PRC. There were some positive indicators that this might be the case. For example, China hosted the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao in 2013, where it facilitated the signing of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to provide for multiple methods of communication between warships to avoid potential mistakes or miscalculations that could create a crisis.[6] In response, the United States invited the PRC to participate in the annual Pacific Rim Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2014.[7] China took full advantage of the offer by sending four warships and one uninvited spy ship (auxiliary general intelligence, or AGI). Accordingly, this was the last year that China was invited to participate. Finally, in pursuit of its charm offensive, China signed the *Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters* with the U.S. Navy at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Conference in November 2014.[8]

As the senior representative of the U.S. Navy staff, I participated in these talks with the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Frankly, at the time, it seemed as though China wanted to engage the West positively and avoid the potential for confrontation. The sentiment did not last long, however. Shortly after signing the *Rules of Behavior in the Air and Maritime Domain*, the PRC resumed its overt campaign to assimilate contested areas of the South China Sea. Furthermore, it embarked on a naval arms race of epic proportions. By 2015, Chinese shipyards had produced 255 warships, including nuclear powered attack submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. By 2020, this number rose to 360 ships, in contrast to the U.S. Navy's 297 ships. The PLAN is projected to have 425 ships total by the end of the next decade.[9]

The PLAN build-up indicates that the United States is locked in a great power competition with the PRC. The *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (NDS) made this quite clear in an effort to support its allies and partners in the region. "China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea," it notes.[10]

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), combined with its massive commercial and naval shipbuilding program—including the construction of modern big-deck aircraft carriers, provides a sense of foreboding for U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region, but the United States can do a lot to ensure its partners,

however. In his piece, "Neglected Maritime Terrain in the Bay of Bengal: An Examination of the Future of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands," Major Evan Phillips underscores great power competition in the Bay of Bengal and around the Straits of Malacca, demanding a greater U.S. naval presence in the region. In light of the recent reinvigoration of the Quad, a partnership between Japan, Australia, India, and the United States, Phillips suggests that the group could partner with India and provide a blockade of the Straits of Malacca, but only in the event of a potential conflict.[11] This action would greatly affect China's commerce on the sea and inhibit its BRI based supply chain that is so essential to its economy. Accordingly, Phillips envisions a nonkinetic form of Alfred Thayer Mahan's concept of *guerre de course*.

Consistent with other authors, Phillips is aligned with the NDS of 2018, identifying China as a rising threat and signaling to U.S. allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa that the United States is preparing for yet another pivot to the Indo-Pacific theater of operations. By 2015, the U.S. Navy had repositioned approximately 60 percent of its battle force to the Pacific theater to address China's aggressive tendencies. The NDS clearly stated:

> As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.[12]

There is no doubt that China has embarked on a naval arms race with the express purpose of challenging U.S. hegemony on the high seas. China's broader BRI strategy enables economic prosperity for the PRC while enabling a robust supply chain for Chinese commercial and military warships worldwide. For this reason, the United States has identified China as the pacing threat in its national security strategy and is about to execute another pivot to the Pacific.

The importance of the Pacific region is underscored by both historical and current examples in this issue of JAMS. Thomas Jamison examines the historical perspective in "The Port Hopping War: Littoral and Amphibious Operations in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884." In this conflict, Chile exploited new technology, especially the machine gun, armored warships, electrically detonated mines, and locomotive torpedoes to defeat the allied forces of Peru and Bolivia. Jamison's article is relevant to the changes that the current Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger, is trying to achieve in *Force Design 2030*:

> The 2018 National Defense Strategy redirected the Marine Corps' mission focus from countering violent extremists in the Middle East to great power/peer-level competition, with

special emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral, and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily requires substantial adjustments in how we organize, train, and equip our Corps.[13]

General Berger concludes that today's Marine Corps is equipped to fight the last war of the twentieth century, not the next war of the twenty-first century. He identifies the current gaps and shortfalls in *Force Design 2030*:

We have shortfalls in expeditionary long-range precision fires; medium- to long-range air defense systems; short-range (point defense) air defense systems; high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal strike capabilities; and disruptive and less-lethal capabilities appropriate for countering malign activity by actors pursuing maritime "gray zone" strategies.[14]

As a result, Berger has taken bold steps to "divest to invest," meaning the Service should get rid of onerous legacy systems in favor of lethal and more agile modern systems:

Similarly—and understandably, in a force that was designed with different assumptions regarding threat and environment—there are some capabilities that I assess we are over-invested in. A partial list includes heavily armored ground combat systems (tanks), towed cannon artillery, and short-range, low endurance unmanned aerial systems (UAS) incapable of employing lethal effects. Finally, as an element of the integrated naval force, we have capability and capacity excesses and shortfalls in areas not organic to the Marine Corps, but which are essential to our ability to contribute to sea control and sea denial in a contested littoral environment. These include a requirement for smaller, lower signature, and more affordable amphibious ships and a shortfall in affordable, distributable platforms that will enable littoral maneuver and provide logistical support in a very challenging theater for the kind of operations envisioned in our current concepts.[15]

Berger has come under withering fire from a community of retired Marine generals, but he has held his ground and is pursuing his vision. This is not without risk, but, similarly, neither was the Chilean strategy in 1879.

With China as the pacing threat, Major Lindsey Madero shifts the focus in his essay, "The Maritime Silk Road: Concerns for U.S. National Security." This article examines the threat from China's twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road strategy and its impact on U.S. national security. China's program for

expansion creates operational security risks, alters U.S. military force projection, and does not adhere to the accepted norms, standards, and institutions of behavior for investment in developing nations worldwide. I saw this firsthand while serving as commander of U.S. Naval Forces Africa when China built its new base in Doraleh, Djibouti, not far from the U.S. base at Camp Lemonier. In three short years, China poured millions of tons of concrete to construct its naval facility in the Horn of Africa right under the view of the U.S. Navy. Now at full operational capability, the facility and its pier are capable of supporting a Chinese aircraft carrier with the option of extended operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Despite the new focus on the rise of the PRC, the NDS still called out the Russian Federation for its meddling:

> Concurrently, Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor.[16]

While serving in Europe as the commander of Naval Forces Europe and Africa, I was concerned that many in the United States had written Russia off as a superpower in decline. They also seemed to ignore the idea that the Russian Federation could be dealt with by offering former Soviet satellites a pathway to Euro-Atlantic integration by joining the European Union and NATO. After Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Dr. Alarik Fritz and I warned against complacency in regard to Russia's intentions in the "Fourth Battle of the Atlantic" in *Proceedings* in June 2016:

> It is now clear that a fourth battle is not looming, but is being waged now, across and underneath the oceans and seas that border Europe. This is not a kinetic fight. It is a struggle between Russian forces that probe for weakness, and U.S. and NATO ASW forces that protect and deter. Just like in the Cold War, the stakes are high.[17]

Russian aggression in the Black Sea region has been an overlooked but slowly intensifying situation—what could be referred to as a boiling frog scenario—from well before 2014. Six years earlier, Russia surprised the West when it attacked the nation of Georgia after a long-standing dispute over the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia—now de facto Russian territories—in August 2008.

The West viewed Russian aggression in Georgia as extremely dangerous and attempted a rapprochement, widely known as the Reset with Russia. The Reset did not last for long. On the tails of what would have been an otherwise successful Winter Olympic Games hosted in Sochi, Russia, in 2014, President Vladimir Putin became incensed about the Maidan Revolution in Kyiv,

Ukraine, which ousted the puppet government of Victor Yanukovych. Accordingly, Putin directed the invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014. To Western nations, Russian forces, which took the territory without firing a shot, made it look easy and did not inspire confidence in Ukrainian armed forces.

Russian naval forces then carried out a campaign of economic strangulation on the rest of Ukraine with the rapid construction of the Kerch Bridge and restricting access to the Sea of Azov. Because this protocol yielded big dividends for the Russian economy, Putin made the decision to conduct a "special military operation" to invade Ukraine from three different axes on 24 February 2020. His goal was to assimilate the entire territory of Ukraine as he had Crimea.

The performance of Russian armed forces did not mirror the bloodless annexation of Crimea, as this time, Ukrainian forces had eight years to prepare. Russia has since regrouped and refined its tactics and procedures, resulting in the consolidation of their gains in Eastern Ukraine around the Donbas region. The bloody conflict continues up to the publication of this journal.

To better understand how the situation got to this point, Adam Nettles examines short- and long-term objectives of Putin and Russia in the Black Sea. He takes the reader on an important historical journey through centuries of Russian aggression in the region that validates the existence of the boiling frog scenario.

Although he does not have a crystal ball, Nettles examines potential alternative futures and acknowledges issues that have been alluded to in previous paragraphs. He recognizes that the United States does not have a powerful NATO-style alliance in the Indo-Pacific region, which requires more U.S. engagement there. Meanwhile, Europe may have to operationalize "strategic autonomy" in support of long-term deterrence of Russia. While Nettles makes a significant point that the United States does not have enough force structure to defend two theaters—the Indo-Pacific and Europe—at the same time and that alliances and partners, particularly in Europe, are valuable force multipliers, the United States in its role as a superpower has a deterrent role in both theaters of operation.

Today, the Biden administration has devised a new NDS that will advance the goals of the United States through three primary ways: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages. The three pillars of NDS 2022 are discussed in an unclassified fact sheet. Integrated deterrence consists of "developing and combining" the assets of the United States to "maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships." The concept is "enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent." Campaigning strengthens deterrence and enables U.S. forces to "gain advantages against the full range of competitors' coercive actions." To accomplish this goal, U.S. Services should "operate forces, synchronize broader

Department efforts, and align Department activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors' military preparations, and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with Allies and partners." Building enduring advantages would include "undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource."[18]

In support of the new NDS 2022, the current CNO, Admiral Michael Gilday, released a new capstone document, *Navigation Plan 2022*, with supporting fires. Having received a sneak peak of the publication, I commented on it for the Center for Maritime Strategy. Most significantly, Gilday's plan establishes that "building the Navy . . . for peacetime competition and, if necessary, combat operations is a continuum and beyond the tenure of the one CNO." China's advances in technology related to the maritime, cyber, and space domains has and continues to erode the Navy's "credible conventional deterrence." The relationship between China, Russia, and Iran has grown stronger as "recent events" have led to the three nations collaborating to "overturn the norms, standards, and institutions of the current international order." With the "unprovoked attack on Ukraine and blockade of seaborne ports of departure in the Black Sea" being the start of these actions, it will be important for the "next CNO's NAVPLAN . . . to continue to build on Admiral Gilday's framework for the fleet to meet these challenges," especially because "restoring fleet readiness, introducing new capabilities, rebuilding capacity for deployment and operations as well as training current and future sailors is a decade-long process." To ensure the success of these elements, the Navy "needs greater financial support in terms of 3 to 5 percent budget growth above inflation per year" as well as strong support from Congress and the Department of Defense. With this new plan, which includes a plan for a *Force Design 2045*, "CNO Gilday has set the Navy on course for success but maintaining that direction and speed over time will be a challenge.[19]

As the Navy looks to new domains and new ways of warfighting, similar to Berger's *Force Design 2030*, Gilday has identified six pillars of his *Force Design 2045*, easily remembered as the six Ds: distance, deception, defense, distribution, delivery, and decision advantage. In the last D, cyber-resilient networks play a significant role as an enabler of a distributed force across all domains. To produce a decision advantage, according to Gilday, the Navy must be able to "out-sense, out-decide, and out-fight" its adversaries by speeding up the Service's "decision cycles with secure, survivable, and cyber-resilient networks, accurate data, and artificial intelligence." Being able to connect "sensors, weapons, and decision-makers across all domains" allows the Navy's units "to mass firepower and influence without massing forces."[20]

The next three articles of this issue dive into the newest domain of warfare—cyberspace. Retired Navy lieutenant commander Travis Howard and Jose de Arimateia da Cruz set the table for a discussion of the complexities of cyberspace in their article, "Like the Sea, So Cyberspace: A Brief Exploration

of Establishing Cyberspace Norms through a Maritime Lens." Howard and da Cruz effectively use the metaphor of a digital sea in examining the complexities of establishing maritime laws, norms, customs, and standards of conduct in cyberspace. In examining the threats and policy issues that the United States faces within the maritime framework, there is no doubt that the digital warriors of today have their work cut out for them.

Next, Army major Kevin Doherty traces the history of great powers controlling the seas starting from the heyday of the British Royal Navy and the British Empire to the post–World War II era, when the United States assumed the position as the dominant global power. This transition resulted in the United States taking on the responsibility of maintaining peace and security in the global commons. Today, however, it is insufficient to simply maintain the sea lines of communication (SLOC) free and open to ensure the sanctity of the global economy. The United States must also secure the electromagnetic spectrum, which requires an understanding and strategy to master the complexities of cyberspace.

Likewise, Matthew J. Flynn makes similar observations on the essential role of cyberspace in naval power. In other words, naval power cannot exist without embracing cyberspace. Cyberspace has leveled the playing field among rising and resurgent powers, such as China and Russia. Flynn raises the issue of sovereignty in cyberspace, a noble but likely impossible goal to achieve in the face of authoritarian nations that do not subscribe to a rules-based order. As the CNO has identified in *Navigation Plan 2020*, it will be necessary to wield distributed naval power in a contested environment with cyber-resilient networks to ensure victory.

The final article in this issue is "The Army and Sea Control: Reconsidering Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-first Century," written by Nathan A. Jennings. Jennings argues that the United States cannot achieve victory over its adversaries in a contested maritime domain with a single Service alone. The Navy and Marine Corps welcome the Joint contribution of the U.S. Army to the fight. In the last few years, it is not just the Navy that has pivoted to the Pacific. The Army promoted the commander of Army Forces Pacific from three to four stars. Likewise, it has increased the number of personnel in the Pacific from 25,000 to more than 100,000. The Army brings a lot to the fight in terms of numerical advantage in troops, long-range fires, and missile defense capabilities. Jennings cites the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark A. Milley, a four-star general in the Army, as saying that it is time to "shift from battles of attrition to battles of cognition." In other words, think out of the box. Certainly, Navy and Marine Corps commanders, who have grown up in the environment of Goldwater-Nichols, would welcome the Army to the fight.

Admiral James G. Foggo, USN (Ret)
Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy

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Zumwalt, Holloway, and the Soviet Navy Threat
Leadership in a Time of Strategic, Social, and Cultural Change

John T. Kuehn, PhD

Abstract: This article examines the strategic challenges faced by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and James Holloway as chiefs of naval operations in the 1970s. Zumwalt's charter was to reform the U.S. Navy, but it included a charge to address Navy strategy in the face of a growing Soviet maritime threat. He succeeded, but his successor, Admiral Holloway, who is less known, provided much needed stability for the fleet in the wake of Zumwalt's reforms. Holloway continued to refine the ideas of Zumwalt and Admiral Stansfield Turner that eventually became the maritime strategy of the 1980s. The challenges they overcame provide insights for similar challenges today.

Keywords: Elmo Zumwalt, Soviet Red Banner Fleet, James Holloway, maritime strategy

All of this suggests that we are entering a period of significantly changed relationships in the world, and that many of the comfortable assumptions concerning the ability of American military power to maintain peace and stability, and to assure the protection of our own vital interests around the world may be challenged in the years ahead.

~ Admiral James L. Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations[1]

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Admiral James Holloway's words ring as true today as they did when he first penned them for an audience that read the U.S. Navy's unofficial journal of seapower, U.S. Naval Institute's *Proceedings*. Other than technology, the United States faces a similar challenge, except instead of being challenged by the growing fleet of the Soviet Union, today that fleet is the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China. His observation about "comfortable assumptions" must strike a resonant chord with those informed about the maritime and security challenges facing the United States today. It seems as if a new "comfortable" assumption, and some not-so-comfortable assumptions, are being revised on almost a daily basis in these troubled 2020s.[2] Different leaders handle these challenges in different ways, but one key to moving forward is senior leadership. Today's defense and security leaders could learn much from how two CNOs—Elmo Zumwalt and James Holloway—led their Service through a period of naval decline and security malaise much like today. Zumwalt was the innovator, reforming the Navy from the inside out, while serving the function of a minuteman, alerting his nation to the security and technological dangers of a seemingly new age. Holloway followed in support, the man who continued to echo Zumwalt's warnings about the growing danger of the Soviet fleet while bringing stability to the Navy in an attempt to address the "hollow" and somewhat dispirited Service he inherited.

Three Tipping Points

Three tipping points—points in time where the security environment clearly could have been have changed—provide the context to understand the challenges these two admirals faced. The first occurred in October 1962 and represents a tipping point for the Soviet Union and in maritime history.[3] That month, the Soviet Union was forced to back down during the Cuban Missile Crisis—in part due to a U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba. The emerging leader of a new generation of Soviet navalists, Admiral Sergey G. Gorchakov, spurred on first by Nikita Khrushchev and then Leonid Brezhnev, now had the political support to build a blue water fleet to challenge the "imperialists" of the U.S. Navy.[4] Similarly, in 1996, the PLAN had such a moment when the People's Republic of China was forced to tone down its anti-Taiwan rhetoric and military posturing with the election of a more independent-minded government on that island. This was in no small part due to another U.S. Navy fait accompli involving the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG) by the United States in support of Taiwan.[5]

A third, lesser known, tipping point occurred just after the United States withdrew from Vietnam in accordance with the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. The Yom Kippur War of October 1973, 11 years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, emphasized for all the Services, including the U.S. Navy, that continuing the status quo with a worn-out and "hollow" legacy fleet was not a sustainable strategy in the face of the new precision guided munitions on display in that conflict: radar-guided surface to air missiles (SAMS), antitank guided munitions

(ATGMs), and antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs).[6] A young LTV A-7 Corsair II pilot deployed during that crisis remembered it vividly, "When the Soviet destroyer turned and opened the missile doors and pointed them at the carrier, we had nothing to counter it."[7] It was this tipping point that served as the strategic background as Admiral Elmo Zumwalt turned over the reins of the office of chief of naval operations to his successor the next year, Admiral James Holloway III. The Navy reacted much as the U.S. Army under the leadership of General William E. DePuy did in reaction to the results of the Yom Kippur War. The Army implemented a sustained program of doctrinal reforms to account for the unexpectedly good performance of the Egyptian Army against the Israeli military. This reaction was later reflected in Holloway's strategy, naval construction, and weapons programs, but the wake-up call occurred on Zumwalt's watch.[8] These events also drove the United States Navy to be more inclusive in its strategic planning for localized conflicts in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era, which did much to move that planning into the area of the geographic combatant commanders.[9]

Given the challenges of the present day—with the similar rise of the People's Liberation Army Navy of China—reexamining Zumwalt's and Holloway's efforts to meet the rising challenge of a large, blue-water Soviet Red Banner Fleet makes sense. The challenges to both CNOs' leadership skills should be emphasized because both were also dealing with defeat in Vietnam, which both had fought in, as well as massive social changes inside the Navy reflecting those that were rocking larger American society in the turbulent 1960s and 1970s. Zumwalt led change during this transformative period, while Holloway inherited that change, to some degree in an even more challenging period just after the Vietnam War ended.

Zumwalt: Leading Transformation in Changing Times

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt had been in the Navy since before the beginning of the Cold War, serving on destroyers in World War II. He had been mentored by diplomat George F. Kennan, was extremely talented, and considered a "political admiral" by contemporaries such as Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. His familiarity with strategy was of the up close and personal kind, having served as aide to the secretary of the Navy, one of the fathers of Cold War strategy, Paul H. Nitze. Zumwalt's rising star led him to be appointed to what today would be called a "component command" in Vietnam from 1968 to 1970 of all the naval forces there. His surge in the Mekong Delta—Operation Sealords—had led to operational victory and pacification of the delta region of that nation.[10]

Zumwalt's selection as chief of naval operations by President Richard M. Nixon in consultation with Secretary of the Navy John L. H. Chaffee was based on his reputation for being someone who could make things happen. It was an unprecedented choice, skipping 33 more senior admirals and making Zumwalt the youngest ever CNO at the age of 49. Zumwalt is best remembered for his programs for social change in the Navy and his famous Z-grams, but

equally important, at least to those who appointed him, was his strategic charter.[11] Zumwalt gave himself 60 days to report on his proposals and reforms to Chaffee. This included an assessment of the future fleet architecture of the Navy in the increasingly constrained budget environment as Vietnam wound down. Zumwalt formed a study group, and although he wanted Captain Worth Bagley to lead the effort, he was still on sea duty. Zumwalt decided to use his fellow "destroyer-man" Captain Stansfield Turner, who was Chaffee's executive assistant, to lead the strategic study until Bagley became available. He named this effort Project Sixty. Zumwalt told Turner to "write a strategy for the Navy." When asked by Turner for more "guidance," Zumwalt said, "You write it, then let me see it." In Turner's words, "It was a wonderful opportunity for a young rear admiral [Turner had just been selected to write a strategy with virtually no guidance]."[12]

Turner led the study group and completed it enough to brief it in the CNO conference room to Zumwalt and a number of other flag officers on 26 August 1970. Turner, assigned as president of the Naval War College, then turned the report over to Bagley, who briefed the final report to Chaffee.[13] Project Sixty's primary recommendations, however, did not encompass a social revolution. Instead, they dealt with what Admiral John M. Richardson (a former CNO) refers to as "fleet design"—that is the roles and missions for a Navy in the near and long term to address threats to national security.[14] The final report signed by Zumwalt and dated 16 September 1970 indicated that the Navy saw its number one priority in terms of national security as its ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet and its ability to deliver "assured second [nuclear] strike." It listed the drivers for the new doctrine as "significant changes in the Soviet Threat" with "the Nixon Doctrine [having] effectively raised the threshold at which we [the United States] would commit land forces overseas."[15]

Zumwalt was greatly concerned by what has become known—and is very familiar in our own day—as the "shrinking fleet." In 1968, the U.S. fleet numbered 1,122 commissioned warships and by 1973 had dropped to 932 ships.[16] Zumwalt blamed dynamics inside and outside the Navy. Some of his blame included the other Services for preventing real growth in the Navy during Korea and Vietnam. They had caused the Navy "to put a disproportionate share of the money [the Navy] did receive into maintaining its capability for [power] projection—its carriers and attack planes, its amphibious vessels, and its ships with weapons for bombardment.[17] Zumwalt also laid some of the blame on the three "air CNOs" who had preceded him, especially for the degradation in the surface fleet. His studies had found that of the three major tribes in the U.S. Navy, it was the surface fleet that had suffered most since the air CNOs were taking care of carriers and aviation while Hyman Rickover maintained strong support for the most advanced nuclear submarine force in the world.[18]

The real sea change in the document, though, had to do with the second priority. Zumwalt, Turner, and Bagley had moved "Projection of Power Ashore" behind "Control of Sea Lines [of communication, SLOC] and Area,"

which now became the second priority. This change was clearly driven by the articulation of the Nixon Doctrine's focus on forward maritime, air, and revitalized nuclear presence instead of "land forces overseas." Especially important was sea control and the assurance of the free flow of trade and positioning of the Navy and Marine Corps conventional forces for emergent crises.[19] Sea control is a subset of command of the sea and allows a nation, through use of naval forces, to control the sea for use by its forces and friendly maritime commerce. He stressed that the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission that made up the bulk of the sea control mission had suffered due to the neglect of the surface fleet.

Zumwalt's movement of sea control to second priority reflected his attitude that one must fight wars with the Navy one has, and he strongly felt that the U.S. fleet was not in a position to protect the SLOCs to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies across the North Atlantic. He first focused on the design and structure of the Navy to fight the type of war he thought most likely with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) if deterrence through assured second strike failed, which was a conventional war to protect SLOCs between North America and Europe.[20]

Zumwalt's proposed solution for the design of the fleet became known as the "high-low" mix. He stated this methodology as follows:

> In sum, an all-high Navy would be so expensive that it would not have enough ships to control the seas. An all-low Navy would not have the capability to meet certain kinds of threats or perform certain kinds of missions. In order to have enough ships and good enough ships there had to be a mix of high and low.[21]

Interestingly, this methodology served as the basis for three congressionally mandated studies in 2016 on fleet architecture.[22] Zumwalt's approach gave birth to the *Perry* frigate and *Spruance* destroyer classes that became mainstays for the sea control fleets of the late Cold War and for long after. But these new ships were still years out from joining the fleet in significant numbers. Another key initiative accelerated the shrinking of the fleet because Zumwalt, due to budget realities, also decommissioned older, expensive-to-maintain surface ships as bill payers for his programs. The Navy had to shrink to get better—something that seems counterintuitive. In this, his actions reflected those of Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher 70 years earlier—except Zumwalt had no dreadnoughts for the high-end balance.[23] These decommissionings further cut into the forces he felt he needed for the sea control mission. His other initiative to try to update the old concept of the ASW aircraft carrier (CVS) that never got off the ground other than a proof of concept using an older amphibious ship. The ships were initially designed to be large sea control ships with aviation, eventually becoming the fleet command and control ships USS *Blue Ridge* (LCC 19) and *Mount Whitney* (LCC 20).[24]

All Zumwalt's efforts, complicated enough in peacetime, occurred in an environment bordering on cultural revolution, during a time of war for his first two years, and in a period of declining budgets and a shrinking fleet. This revolution was the more famous (or infamous) element of Zumwalt's tenure and involved personnel policy reforms that he instituted with his "Z-Grams." These involved women attending the Naval Academy and the opening up of previously restricted jobs in the fleet for minorities and women.[25] The occurrence of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (the Yom Kippur War) affected Americans' daily lives more than Vietnam due to the oil embargo, which caused massive fuel shortages. It came in Zumwalt's last 18 months as CNO and added a level of uncertainty to all these other factors, challenging his leadership and that of his successors and contemporaries. However, the shock of that war was the performance by the Egyptian Army against the vaunted Israeli military, which initially was savaged by precision-guided munitions in the Sinai and along the Suez Canal. Additionally, the crisis led the United States to go to its highest level of alert for nuclear war since 1962 and led to frightening confrontations by the energetic Soviet Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean as relayed in the vignette discussed earlier.[26]

In 1971, prior to the 1973 war, Zumwalt had already assessed the Navy's chances of winning a conventional war at sea at 45 percent. By the time of the drafting of the fiscal year (FY) 1973 budget (in 1972), it was down another 10 percent. During the period from 1966 to 1970 the Soviets had built twice the number of ships as the United States had, and Zumwalt assessed that fleet as being larger (although most of the warships were smaller vessels) as early as 1971. Zumwalt later said in an interview in 1987 that the United States would have lost a war at sea with the Soviets on his watch and during that of the next two CNOs, James Holloway and Thomas Hayward.[27] Analysis of the actions of antiship cruise missile (ASCM) equipped craft in both the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and the 1973 war caused Zumwalt to accelerate the acquisition of ASCMs for the Navy for the Harpoon program, which had begun in 1969. The Navy bought its first 150 Harpoon missiles the year Zumwalt retired in 1974.[28]

Zumwalt's concerns vis-à-vis the Soviets were also shared by General William DePuy, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander. The 1973 Arab-Israel War seemed to confirm both men's belief that warfare had changed—on land and at sea. The weapons and doctrine that the Soviets provided Egypt shocked Israel and the world.[29] When Zumwalt left the position of CNO in 1974, he was remembered for his sweeping social and cultural changes to the Navy, not for his efforts to refocus the U.S. Navy for Cold War conflict with a growing and dangerous Soviet Red Banner Fleet. He should have been. Zumwalt's efforts in this regard have been lost to history, even though Project Sixty and his ideas about sea control in the Atlantic were the first items on his agenda when he took over as CNO.[30]

James Holloway:
Inheriting Transformation in Changing Times

James Holloway III, the son of an admiral, was Zumwalt's classmate at the Naval Academy and also served in combat in World War II, receiving a bronze star for action during the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf aboard surface ships. He went on to become a naval aviator and earned a Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) and three air medals in combat during the Korean War. He commanded the United States' first nuclear powered aircraft carrier, USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65), nicknamed "Big E," on its combat deployment to Vietnam, where it supported the Operation Rolling Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam. Holloway later commanded the U.S. Seventh Fleet, stationed in Japan, during the so-called Easter Offensive by North Vietnam in 1972 that resulted in the air campaigns known as Linebacker I and II. Linebacker I—which saw the use of precision-guided weapons by U.S. air forces on a large scale for the first time as well as the first American suppression of enemy air defense campaign against a sophisticated air defense system—was a critical factor in preventing the collapse and conquest of South Vietnam by the mechanized armies of North Vietnam that year.[31]

The challenges Holloway faced were equally as daunting as those faced by Zumwalt. True, the Vietnam War was over, but all the factors that had made Zumwalt's job so difficult were still in play: a declining budget, a shrinking fleet, a growing Soviet naval threat, and what has become known to American history as the post-Vietnam "hollow force," including the Navy. Some of this had to do with Zumwalt's sweeping personnel changes that many naval officers viewed as having undermined the morale and good order and discipline of the fleet.[32] At the same time, the American public was decidedly ambivalent about the Navy, and with the elimination of the draft the Navy now had a harder time than ever recruiting the highly skilled people it needed for its high-tech ships, aircraft, and systems.

Holloway was a reliable steward for the Navy, however his leadership provided much-needed stability during a period when détente with the Soviet Union seemed an established fact. Nonetheless, as the U.S. fleet shrank and the Soviet fleet grew, Zumwalt pointed out the growth in the Soviet Navy as he took over, emphasizing its ability to provide presence at greater levels than the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, while tripling its number of missile launch platforms from 227 in 1960 to 723 in 1970. Particularly troubling was the growth in the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine fleet.[33] When Holloway took over as CNO, the Soviet fleet had grown further still, surpassing the U.S. Navy in numbers of ships by 1976. Zumwalt's gloomy forecasts had come to pass. Holloway later referenced the danger that Soviet missile platforms had posed in 1973 to U.S. Navy warships on patrol in the Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli War.[34]

Meanwhile, the size of the American fleet had dropped to 512 active warships, and by the time Holloway put his FY 1977 budget together for Congress

in 1976, the fleet had dropped to its lowest point since prior to World War II, 477 ships. As discussed, there was still no real maritime strategy beyond the ideas of power projection and a commitment to protect the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic should the Cold War go hot.[35] Turner, in his perch at the Naval War College, had described the closest thing to the American maritime strategy in 1974, emphasizing the same elements as Project Sixty with nuclear deterrence through assured second strike, sea control, power projection, and presence. The last three elements, Turner made clear, addressed the track record of the Navy in providing ready forward forces for emergent crises and thus overlapped and supported each other.[36] The election of James E. "Jimmy" Carter as president—a naval academy graduate—in 1976 did nothing to change this situation. Carter, a liberal democrat, wanted to continue to cash in a peace dividend from the Vietnam War given the United States' continuing economic woes with inflation, high interest rates, and the slow growth in income and jobs. Carter would eventually free up funds for the military, but mostly to redress the horrible pay scales that existed for junior officers and the enlisted ranks.[37]

It was not just the size of the Soviet Navy, but its activities, as 1973 had shown, that caused concern for Holloway and the Navy. Just after the Cuban Missile Crisis the Soviet Navy started conducting regular annual exercises. In 1965, the Soviets conducted a large naval exercise that foreshadowed the later Okean exercises of the 1970s. Okean 1970 and 1975 get more press, but the actual cycle of these large Soviet blue water exercises began in 1965. As the Soviet fleet increased in size to more than 1,000 warships, so too did the size and scale of these exercises. By the 1970s, the numbers of participating ships were in the hundreds. Tactically, the exercises focused on anticarrier warfare as well as on the more traditional areas of submarine and antisubmarine warfare. An off-cycle ASW exercise took place in 1973 and included the forward deployment of submarines beyond Iceland.[38]

Against this backdrop, the dire situation of the post-Vietnam U.S. military was demonstrated for all to see in the 1975 *Mayaguez* incident, the botched recuse attempt for a ship seized by the Khmer Rouge shortly after Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese Army. This episode highlights how poorly the Services worked with each other and how unsuited they were a bare two years after Vietnam to engage in violent contingency operations.[39] Nonetheless, Holloway provided a steady hand at the tiller during this turbulent period. In the words of one author, "He did more than provide stability."[40] That "more" included his impact on naval strategy. One can also go to the pages of the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* of that period to find the key elements of Soviet and U.S./NATO strategy. The U.S. strategy might best be termed as a reactive sea control strategy. Its focus was to protect the sea lanes to Europe, thus Zumwalt's emphasis on sea control. To that end, in the January 1975 issue of *Proceedings*, one can glean more resolution on the strategy from an article by Admiral Hyman Rickover entitled "Nuclear Warships and the Navy's Future." Rickover saw that with

Zumwalt's departure and the arrival of Holloway, the time was right to make his case for a predominately nuclear-powered fleet. He emphasized that the growth in the Soviet Navy, the threat to Middle East oil, and the recent Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargoes underlined the tenuousness of the oil supply and mandated that the United States free itself from fossil fuels with a mostly nuclear fleet and that any new major surface combatant be nuclear powered. He compared the advent of nuclear propulsion with the naval revolution caused by the commissioning of the Royal Navy's dreadnought battleship 70 years earlier. He made a compelling case, in spite of the continuing budget crunch.[41]

Holloway, like Rickover, realized that the real battle to support a maritime strategy that saw conflict with the Soviet Fleet in the North Atlantic, if not elsewhere across the oceans of the globe, would involve a public relations campaign to gain congressional support for a more robust Navy budget. To that end, he leveraged the readers of *Proceedings* the following June 1975 in the section known as "The President's Page" (the CNO at that time was president of the Naval Institute), laying out his thoughts as well as his interpretation of the maritime strategy needed to address the Soviet threat. He specifically asked the readership of the Naval Institute to serve as "spokesmen" to the "public . . . about public awareness of a defense budget approaching one hundred billion dollars."[42] This was more than a just a publicity stunt or the pro forma business as usual comments of an incoming Service chief that it might appear to today's more jaded readers. Holloway outlined the major points of the maritime strategy of the mid-1970s for *Proceedings'* readership. He first addressed the budget context, emphasizing how much the budget had been reduced, the plans to reduce it further, and how that negatively impacted the Navy. In other words, the "shrinking fleet" would probably continue to shrink.

His second point was to emphasize that as the United States cut its fleet, the Soviets were building theirs, a situation analogous to that of the United States and China today. He cited (in 1975) that the Soviets spent 50 percent more on their fleet for new ship construction.[43] Holloway's third point emphasized that the "U.S. and Soviet trends . . . occurred against a backdrop of shifting power relationships in the world—to which the changing U.S.-Soviet military balance has itself contributed significantly."[44] In other words, the Soviet increase in military (and maritime) power was changing the geopolitical balance in favor of the Soviet Union. Recall, these words occurred during a period of official détente with the Soviet Union, when U.S. and Soviet ships were visiting each other's ports.

Holloway then turned his readers' attention to the "role of the Navy." He first emphasized that it was the "age of nuclear weapons." This meant that for the Navy maintaining the sea-based leg of the strategic nuclear deterrent was nonnegotiable and that "sea-based missile systems will continue to *increase in importance*."[45] Second, and presumably second in priority for the Navy, was "to keep our sea lines of communication open." These first two points reflected the

Zumwalt/Turner maritime strategy at the time, which meant a one-ocean Navy focused on the SLOC in the Atlantic. Holloway was having none of it. His third point encompassed the ability to "project U.S. power ashore to protect our vital interests." Because he had argued in the final of his first three points about "background" and how the changing global "balance" affected those very interests, his point about power projection emphasized the critical role of the fleet beyond the North Atlantic and sea control there; that vital interests encompassed crises that could be met with what he later called "hedges." Holloway specifically identified aircraft carriers and afloat Marines on amphibious ships as the principal components for this maritime role.[46] In sum, Holloway argued that nuclear deterrence, sea control, and power projection should be the basis of the fleet. To some degree he was downplaying Zumwalt's elevation of sea control to second priority, although it was still a very critical role.

Holloway's fourth point about the role of the Navy emphasized again his previous discussion of crisis-response type forces for other vital interests beyond Western Europe. "Fourth, perhaps the most important mission of the navy for the era of peace we seek is . . . overseas presence. The existence of our Navy demonstrates to those who would deny us free use of the seas that hostile challenges to our interests, or those of our allies, may result in a confrontation with U.S. armed forces."[47] The headlines had only just emphasized this point with the recent *Mayaguez* incident, although Holloway did not mention it specifically. He went on to expand on this theme and specifically mentioned the Mediterranean—where World War III almost started in October 1973—as well as the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans (where an Indo-Pakistani War had recently concluded). He closed this section of his discussion by returning to the global nature of the Soviet Fleet, and the fact that even the Caribbean, seemingly safe since the Cuban Missile Crisis, was now host to Soviet naval deployments to Cuba and that Soviet ships circled Hawaii and cruised home along the Alaskan littoral. All of this went to his emphasis that "it is essential to reverse the declining trend of our naval force levels." He specifically cited the current level of 490 warships for the coming fiscal year as "an historic low which takes us below the figure of 1939, two years before Pearl Harbor."[48]

Holloway then emphasized the need to focus on two major issues. First, a strategy needed to be devised and explained to Congress. He expected his readers to do so, using his talking points. Second, fleet readiness was the "primary objective" in the near term, reflecting how the "hollow fleet" undermined making the case to the American public. To hammer this point home, his last sentence laid "the responsibility for securing that the public is informed lies in a great measure to the professionals who comprise the membership of the Naval Institute. . . . Press on!" These pages of *Proceedings* read as talking points and commander's guidance from the top, mustering "all hands on deck" to mobilize Americans to care once again about the value of the fleet to their own security.[49]

In the very same issue of *Proceedings*, the clever editors included a translated open source article by Holloway's counterpart in the Soviet Fleet, Admiral of

the Fleet Sergey F. Gorshkov, from the Soviet analogue to *Proceedings*, *Morskoy Sbornik*. Gorshkov's translated article from 1974 hammered home Holloway's points about the Soviets, especially the geopolitical ones. It explained clearly why the Soviets were building and challenging the United States outside their traditional near-shore operating areas.[50] Holloway did not shy away from his own participation in the information campaign to protect the Navy budget. He was quoted in *U.S. News and World Report* as saying, "With declining carrier-force levels, the reappearance of a strong naval adversary, the same overall global commitments, and no forecast diminution in potential trouble spots, the Navy needs a balanced and effective force of surface combatants."[51] All the elements of this 1975 call to arms can be found in Holloway's formal effort to codify a strategy in the "SEA PLAN 2000" study, promulgated by the CNO in 1978.[52] It identified the aircraft carrier as the centerpiece of his "hedging" strategy for the panoply of vital interests across the globe as well as making clear the value of smaller surface combatants to the presence mission he articulated in June of 1975. Holloway termed this use of naval forces in SEA PLAN 2000 as "the calibrated use of Force against the Shore." The strategy also included discussions of support to allies, especially the protection of NATO allies' SLOCs. Accordingly, Holloway supported the acquisition of more nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships like the USS *Tarawa* (LHA 1).[53]

However, Holloway did not succeed as much as he would have liked. His plan hinged on a healthy building plan for the Navy beyond nuclear submarines. Things went from bad to worse as the Navy shrank, its readiness continued to plummet, and the Carter administration came close to canceling the construction of the new large nuclear carriers on his watch. These last were central to his hedging strategy approach. Only the deterioration of the world situation with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980) and the Iran hostage crisis (1979) caused President Carter and Congress to reverse course and belatedly implement many of Holloway's ideas after he had been replaced by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward.[54]

Fair Winds and Following Seas?

The United States, it is now clear, expected a "peace dividend" from Vietnam, even though the Cold War was still underway. Détente had contributed to a certain smugness about the Soviets, but both Elmo Zumwalt and James Holloway pushed back against these attitudes as CNOs of the U.S. Navy. They both understood that "national emergencies cannot be foreseen and must be met by existing forces."[55] They required warships to do as they were asked. Holloway had presented clear evidence in "SEA PLAN 2000" of the utility and use of naval forces during the 1970s in crisis after crisis.[56] But warship construction for surface ships remained anemic as the Soviet Navy grew. The similarities of the situation of the U.S. Navy today with those in the period discussed here are eerily familiar. American naval officers today, sailors and Marines, know how Zumwalt, and especially Holloway, might have felt in the 1970s as they faced

the growing might of the People's Liberation Army Navy and its attendant coast guard and naval militias as the U.S. Navy has seen zero real growth for more than a decade.

In the Marine Corps, it is clear the current Commandant, General David H. Berger, is trying to address these concerns, especially regarding the challenges in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) region. One sign that he is succeeding is the pushback he is receiving from the old guard of the Marine Corps. The threat to sacred cows, and the response of those stakeholders, is one sign that real reform is being considered.[57] However, David H. Berger still needs maritime lift for his Marines and this will come from the Marines' bigger "blue brother"—the U.S. Navy. The recent submission of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan offers little reason for optimism; it does not include anything approaching Holloway's articulate description of the Soviet naval threat faced in the earlier era. Worse, it lacks any of the sort of clarion calls that Zumwalt and Holloway made in trying to get the nation to reverse course and build up its seapower, instead dressing up its proposals in nearly impenetrable bureaucratic language.[58]

Time may be running out for clarion calls to be of much use. Zumwalt and Holloway stood the watch in lean times, but they did not shy away from clearly outlining the threats, challenges, and shortcomings of the fleet. Instead, they provided pivotal leadership and vision in producing the strategy documents that later became the highly touted maritime strategy of the 1980s while at the same time correcting the course of the fleet toward the future.[59]

Endnotes

1. Adm James L. Holloway III, USN, "The President's Page," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 101, no. 6 (June 1975): 3.
2. For an example of the latter type of assumption, see the podcast with Michael Kofman et al., "What the Experts Got Wrong (and Right) about Russian Military Power," *War on the Rocks* (podcast), 30 May 2022, 1:00:15.
3. See Peter Swartz et al., *The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?* (Arlington, VA: CAN, 2010), 40–42, for a discussion of this term and its definition within the context of naval affairs and maritime dominance.
4. Lise A Rose, *Power at Sea: A Violent Peace, 1946–2006* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 168–69, 183–84; and Kevin Rowlands, ed., *21st Century Gorshkov: The Challenge of Sea power in the Modern Era* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 132–33, 135.
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Allies through Thick and Thin
U.S. Navy Strategic Communication, 1986–1994, in Transatlantic Context

Jon-Wyatt Matlack

Abstract: From 1986 to 1994, U.S. Navy declassified strategy documents necessarily shifted in both form and function as the Cold War ended. However, this transition also evidenced a diminished inclusion of allied navies in the Navy's strategic conceptions. Departing from the global deterrence in the maritime strategy and pivoting toward the power projection in ". . . From the Sea," an aloofness to alliances emerged. Reflecting on this period through the example of Germany, U.S. naval strategy will be shown to be made more "whole" when it more overtly accounts for allied naval partnership.

Keywords: allied navies, U.S. Navy, naval strategy, German Navy, maritime strategy, white papers, NATO, transatlantic alliance, deterrence

How do you allocate the cost of the Navy in terms of the global presence, the capacity to operate on all the world's oceans?," Secretary of Defense Richard B. "Dick" Cheney posed on 31 July 1991 while testifying to the House Budget Committee. He added, "Obviously they defend all of it, the entire world, in a sense."[1] While the U.S. Navy has played a crucial role in the security of the United States throughout its history, the Cold War thrust on the naval Service the responsibility of operating on a global scale while maintaining a near wartime level of readiness. These conditions necessitated prodigious cooperation with the fleets of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners akin to the two World Wars. From the first announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the middle Cold War in the 1970s, the U.S. Navy and its allies in the

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Atlantic and Pacific enjoyed numerical and qualitative superiority compared to their Soviet adversary. Though such events as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963 are traditionally viewed as the main flashpoints of the Cold War, the United States Navy and its allies received their most onerous challenge in the 1980s, as the Soviet Union's efforts to massively expand their naval forces culminated.

Within this historic context, the U.S. Navy published the maritime strategy in 1986.[2] In substantive detail, the Navy publicly prescribed a strategy that illustrated how national naval power, aided by allied fleets, would project power into all Soviet coastal regions in the event of war. Initially produced as a classified draft in 1982, the maritime strategy proved to be a resounding success in demonstrating the utility of the Navy in deterring foreign threats to the United States and its allies. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the catalysts for the Navy's more robust strategic posture, left the Service as the last one standing as the Cold War abruptly ended. Lacking a peer opponent and facing mounting calls for budget cuts, the Navy entered the 1990s in the undeniably unenviable position of continuing to effectively advocate to Congress and the public for a capable naval service budget. Out of this context, the Navy published the article "The War Ahead" (1991), followed by the white papers ". . . From the Sea" (1992) and ". . . Forward from the Sea" (1994).[3]

The shift from the maritime strategy to the immediate post–Cold War white papers has received extensive study in recent years. However, more narrowly, this article contends that this series of Navy strategy documents evidence a devolved standard of political communicative clarity regarding the Navy as an intrinsically allied armed Service. To borrow William Cockell's characterization, naval strategy should be "simple, not simplistic."[4] These documents' shift in audience, from that of a broadly international to a national one, similarly evidence a commensurate pivot away from a codified role for allied navies to U.S. security. The maritime strategy pointedly targeted the Soviet audience, outlined critical roles for allied observers, and illustrated the Navy's unique capability to combine these aspects to advance national goals. After the Cold War, though, and in response to pressing budget crises of the early 1990s, the Navy's capstone publications were understandably intended to justify its force structure to Congress. As such, strategy certainly needed to be easily digestible for the congressional and taxpayer audience. However, the post–Cold War strategic documents omit any conception of allied partnership with the Navy, thereby unnecessarily forgoing the Navy's particular strength to operate with friendly nations more easily, for both the domestic U.S. and international audience alike. Where the maritime strategy outlined the Navy combating enemy fleets, " . . . From the Sea" foresaw the Navy fighting for supremacy on both land and littorals. The post–Cold War deemphasis of the Navy fighting *alongside* allied navies was an error that need not be repeated in future strategy documents, avoiding "strategic shallowness," to borrow another phrase from Roger Barnett.[5]

To provide an illustrative example, this analysis features the allied perspective of the Federal Republic of Germany and its maritime service, the German Navy.[6] This comparison is intended to exemplify how consequential Navy strategy can be in one specific national context of an American ally. While far from the largest or most powerful allied navy to the United States, Germany does provide a unique lens to frame this discussion. By the 1980s, the German Navy was growing and expanding its mission within the NATO Northern Flank due to its status as a military logistics hub for NATO forces.[7] Owing to the experience of the two World Wars, the German Navy was also specifically established to perform exclusively "in close cooperation with the great maritime powers," the United States being chief among them.[8] With its raison d'être as an allied-centric fleet, the German Navy implemented the NATO defensive mission within its force structure, forsaking any broader claim toward seapower beyond its immediate borders. Moreover, the Germans, politically speaking, were astute observers of wider U.S. military strategy. As host of 96 percent of U.S. Army assets in Europe, German military strategists were on the forefront of advocates for the NATO strategy of flexible response in the 1960s.[9] This enthusiasm for ground combat doctrine would be shared by German naval officers regarding U.S. Navy strategy. While other allied nations provide their own impact imprint for U.S. maritime security, few nations of the economic size of Germany were so wholly proactive in aligning their security structures in partnership with the United States.

Table 1. U.S. Navy active ship force levels, 1986 and 1998

	30 September 1986	20 September 1998
Battleships	3	-
Carriers	14	12
Cruisers	32	29
Destroyers	69	50
Frigates	113	38
Submarines	101	65
Ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN)	39	18
Command ships	4	4
Mine warfare	21	18
Patrol	6	13
Amphibious	58	40
Auxiliary	123	57
Surface warships	217	109
Total active	583	344

Source: courtesy of author, based on "U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1986–1999," Naval History and Heritage Command, last updated 17 November 2017.

Table 2. German Navy active ship force levels, 1986 and 1998

	1986	1998
Frigates, destroyers	16	15
Submarines	24	16
Fast patrol boats	40	34
Mine countermeasure units	59	41
Maritime patrol aircraft/antisubmarine warfare aircraft	14	14
Naval fighter-bombers	112	53
Helicopters	41	39
Support ships	36	18
Transport/oil pollution control aircraft	0	4
Amphibious vessels	19	0

Source: Jürgen Ehle, "The German Navy after the Cold War and Reunification," Naval War College Review *51, no. 4 (1998): 80.*

Strategic Discourse: The Maritime Strategy

The Soviet Union's aberrant buildup of their naval forces prompted a response from the United States Navy. Already in 1981, Under Secretary of the Navy Robert J. Murray tasked then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward with establishing a Strategic Studies Group for the express purpose of " 'reinforc[ing] in the Soviet mind the perception that it could not win a war with the United States'."[10] Directly naming "the need for a sound strategy" in the face of "a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge U.S. interests," the public version of the maritime strategy in 1986 exhibited to an international audience the Navy's operational capability to prosecute counteroffensive thrusts toward the vulnerable Soviet maritime flanks.[11] Concretely, this entailed a comprehensive plan to exert pressure on the relatively hemmed in Soviet fleets in the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean, and North Seas, as well as the Pacific Ocean. By advertising the destruction of Soviet naval assets in these seas on a global scale, the maritime strategy boasts "alliance solidarity" while also demonstrating resolve to a Soviet audience.[12]

As in previous iterations, the American strategies of massive retaliation under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and flexible response spearheaded by President John F. Kennedy, the premise that "the probable centerpiece of Soviet strategy in global war would be a combined-arms assault against Europe" remained the basis for the Navy strategy.[13] Much in line with the logic purported by Lieutenant Commander Stanley B. Weeks—"to deter is to threaten"—the maritime strategy was meant to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the full capability of the Navy would bear down on the Soviet homeland should war break out.[14] The strategy in effect recommended that naval forces carry out

aggressive seek and destroy operations "to complete the destruction of all Soviet fleets," thereby allowing "us to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy in all theaters."[15]

The effectiveness of this strategy was immediate. "Soviet awareness of the challenge was heightened in the 1980s by the U.S. Navy's . . . assertive application of naval power posited by the publicly announced U.S. 'Maritime Strategy'," prompting the Soviets to question whether the expenditure dedicated to their naval forces was justified in the wake of the American counter.[16] John Lehman argues that already in the beginning of 1986, a "remarkable shift" was tangible, as Soviet naval operations adopted an overtly defensive character and retreated closer to home.[17] The Institute for US and Canadian Studies, a Soviet and now Russian Federation-based think tank in Moscow, reported to the Soviet government in a public report that they had fallen into a trap laid by the United States. By massively investing into maritime power as a means to challenge perceived U.S. and NATO dominance of the seas, the Soviets have entered into "a race which would play to U.S. strengths in 'existing shipbuilding capabilities'," resulting, in the opinion of General Makhmut Gareev of the Soviet Army, that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was diverting "resources from important tasks to goals that are unachievable."[18] These inner-Soviet insights coincide with Lehman's stipulation that Soviet propaganda began portraying the Navy as a dangerous offensive threat, demonstrating the systematic impact of the maritime strategy.[19]

Toward the end of the decade in 1989, an opportunity arose for predominantly retired Soviet and American officers to gather in Washington, DC, for a roundtable discussion in hopes of openly discussing traditionally taboo topics. Among the agitation expressed by Soviet mariners, retired rear admiral Boris Yashin of the Soviet Navy opined that "the quality of Soviet ships and their quantity" were "being exaggerated by officials of the United States."[20] Yashin further accused his American colleagues, with regard to the comparative quality of U.S. and Soviet warships, that they "conceal the fact . . . that in regard to their firepower . . . the U.S. has almost twice their capacity."[21] While "Phase III: Carrying the Fight to the Enemy" of the maritime strategy only indirectly threatens the direct application of conventional naval weaponry onto Soviet civilian targets in the motherland, the alarm of Soviet naval officers at this meeting illustrate the strategy's wide readership.[22] Retired Soviet rear admiral Alex Astrafiev indignantly questioned: "How can we understand the fact that you have recently adopted a new naval strategy? According to which [Secretary] Lehman and the U.S. should approach the Soviet Union, occupy positions on the shores, so as to act in the depth of Soviet territory."[23] Astrafiev was further perplexed that, as he understood the broader implications of the maritime strategy, the U.S. Navy would in effect hail Mary its forces in an all-out assault, leaving critical oil supply traffic under guarded. Despite attempts to assuage the Soviet guests by the host speaker, retired U.S. Navy rear admiral Gene La Rocque, the Soviet panel stood steadfast in their position that the maritime

strategy represented a dangerous and provocative strategic stance. Regardless of whether La Rocque was speaking sincerely, Eric Grove argues that American-led NATO antagonism in the Norwegian Sea and other global positions heavily contributed to implementing "pressure that stretched the Soviet Union to the breaking point."[24]

Returning to the German audience, the maritime strategy demonstrated American resolve to combat the Soviet threat to NATO access to the seas. As early in the drafting process as 1982, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins insisted that the Navy's strategy should be "focused on coopera-tion with allies."[25] The maritime strategy rather conveniently built on a pre-viously established effort of the Germans in their invoking alliance needs to justify broader operational capacity. Having only as of 1980 been unburdened by self-imposed German government restrictions on their force structure, this decade was the first in which the German Navy's operational zone of activity ex-tended into the North Sea.[26] Even before the onset of the maritime strategy, the German Navy sought to integrate themselves into larger NATO maritime strat-egies to further their own domestic aspirations. For example, during the draft-ing process of the NATO *Concept of Maritime Operations* (CONMAROPS) in 1984, the German Navy was, along with Canada, the most influential actor in the conceptual process, as the Germans perceived CONMAROPS as "an opportunity to enshrine their national concepts in a broader NATO policy document."[27] With the imposed restrictions on ship sizes lifted in 1980, along with an expanded zone of operation, the German Navy seized the chance to use CONMAROPS as the substantiating proof of a further need for "the acquisi-tion of modern frigates and destroyers designed to operate in rough waters at long distances" away from their home bases.[28]

One particularly relevant role seized on by the German Navy outlined in the maritime strategy concerned antisubmarine warfare, as NATO's Northern Flank was an area vulnerable to any Soviet naval offensive aiming to sever the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The authors of the strategy document highlight that "Germany will bear the brunt of the campaign in the Baltic," along with Denmark, to prevent a Soviet breakthrough into the North Sea.[29] In the 1989 *Maritime Component*, an addendum to the maritime strategy, Ad-miral Carlisle A. H. Trost articulated that "ultimate control of the transatlantic SLOCs, for instance, will be determined in the Norwegian Sea," another area of operation for the German Navy, concluding that "if we fight the next 'Battle of the Atlantic' in the Atlantic . . . we will ultimately lose the land war in Europe."[30] The contemporary debate on submarine warfare in these regions was persistent. In 1989, Richard Hooker maintained that the 119 attack submarines of just the Soviet Northern Fleet outnumbered the entire U.S. Navy's submarine force, of which perhaps 30 would engage the Soviets in the Norwegian Sea.[31] Analysts in 1985 similarly concurred that the Soviet Navy could not eliminate threats in its Northern Flank without breaking through the "bulk of the German Navy" in the Baltic.[32] So as to prevent the Soviets from achieving a breakthrough into

the Atlantic with their submarine forces, John Hanley argues that the Navy's Strategic Studies Group (SSG) in 1981 identified this region and its potential for trouble, and ultimately concluded that future maritime strategy should seek to reorient the "correlation of forces" in the region.[33]

Commander Viktor Toyka of the German Navy pointed to his service's focused deployment of submarines in the Baltic to tie up significant Soviet antisubmarine warfare vessels, therefore complementing the U.S. Navy's ability to operate with an unchallenged southern flank during their operations in the Norwegian Sea.[34] The allied use of submarines in the northern Atlantic was also deemed high priority. According to the maritime strategy, "the Soviets would particularly like to be able to destroy our ballistic missile submarines," with the document concluding that it is crucial that the Soviets "lack antisubmarine warfare capability."[35] This rather microsomal tactical element demonstrated the unique impact the German Navy was able to contribute to the overall U.S. Navy outlook on a potential war. With the Soviet's existing contingent of antisubmarine warfare vessels heavily and aggressively engaged by German U-boats, American vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea would have been granted a freer hand. Toyka's analysis also featured other supporters. Vice Admiral Helmut Kampe of the German Navy similarly articulated in 1986 his vision that German efforts to bottleneck the Soviet fleet in the Baltic approaches provided NATO forces a safe flank as they operated elsewhere in the Atlantic.[36] Both Commander Toyka and Vice Admiral Kampe published their positions while working in the Ministry of Defense and while serving as the commander, Allied Forces Baltic Approaches, respectively. As such, their publications bear the weight of institutional approval and demonstrate an engaged level of political awareness on the part of the German Navy's leadership. Furthermore, these publications, written in English, indicate a perceived necessity to explain the German contribution to NATO security directly to a U.S. Navy audience.

This linkage between German Navy and U.S. Navy officers evidences a level of improvisation to calibrating and fine-tuning the relationship between the two Services. Unlike the Soviet audience's direct response to the applied strategic stimuli of the maritime strategy, the German Navy and U.S. Navy's operational confluence is not so clearly horizontally linked. Within this cooperative and symbiotic dynamic, one of the true strengths of the maritime strategy radiates brightest. By specifying a role for allied navies, but not going as far as dictating strict and truncating functions, the Navy's strategy naturally benefited from advances made concurrently by their allied forces, thus heightening the overall success of the strategy. As Secretary of the Navy John Lehman commented in 1985, "if we could not count on our allies, we would require a U.S. fleet much larger than 600 ships to deal with the 1,700 ships and submarines that the Soviets can deploy against us."[37] Roald Gjetsten reiterates that after the maritime strategy was publicly released, "the U.S. Navy had regained the overall initiative" on the seas in conjunction with allied forces.[38]

New Frictions Emerge

Before the discussion can turn to " . . . From the Sea" and the post-1990 U.S. Navy strategy documents, the overall political environment by the end of the Cold War necessitates mentioning. Coinciding with the strategic discussions surrounding the maritime strategy in the late 1980s was a parallel change in the fundamental culture surrounding the formulation of strategy. The very infrastructure within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations that carefully nurtured the maritime strategy was fundamentally uprooted by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which passed in an overwhelming 95-0 vote in the Senate, and a 383-27 vote in the House of Representatives.[39] Steven Wills identifies that the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), alongside the chief of naval operation's Plans, Policy, and Operations Office, had a deep bench of dedicated naval strategists. Despite resistance from Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, the legislature elevated the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal advisors to the president and granted regional combatant commanders with broader authority over strategy "at the expense of the service chiefs."[40] One scholar even speculates that congressional leaders drafted the legislation with the Middle East in mind as an area of geostrategic concern, believing that strengthening regional commanders would mitigate further setbacks in the region.[41] Wills concludes disenfranchising the Service secretaries from overall strategy formulation "significantly weakened the Navy's strategic enterprise shaped in the 1980s, leaving it divided and disorganized" by the end of the Cold War.[42] Even in such instances as President Ronald W. Reagan's statement to Congress in 1987, where language from the maritime strategy was clearly adopted and refashioned at the level of high policy, the Navy was unable to maintain strict control over its strategy formulation going into the 1990s.[43]

Budgetary constraints even before 1990 arose concurrently with the new legislation, forcing the Navy to conceive of its place within the national security infrastructure with dwindling resources, further compounding the challenges presented by Goldwater-Nichols. Wills points Samuel Huntington's analysis that naval officers are tasked with "telling civilian leaders how they intend to defend the nation."[44] By this logic, the Navy's mission is more self-guided in peacetime postures than that of the Army, which relies more heavily on civilian leadership's guidance for its mission. This, however, places the Navy in the unduly existentially threatening conundrum of having to rejustify its allocated resources in times of political rupture. In his testimony before the House Budget Committee in 1991, Secretary of Defense Richard B. "Dick" Cheney was asked by Representative Thomas J. "Jerry" Huckaby (D-LA) whether the military needed to maintain such a strong force structure going forward. Huckaby pressed, "we were hearing comments from the Defense Department about this 'window of vulnerability' we were going to encounter in the mid to late 1980s . . . I think we can look back and say that this arms race truly left us with a significantly bigger deficit."[45] The congressman was not wholly unjustified in his

vantage point, since the U.S. defense budget had drastically risen from $155.2 billion in 1980 to $319.8 billion in 1988—a marked increase of 50 percent.[46] Along the lines of the development of the so-called Base Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell responded in 1989 to President George H. W. Bush's ordered national security review, concluding that in concert with broad budget cuts, the Navy would be reduced to a maximum of 400 ships from the 1989 level of 592 vessels.[47]

A sudden wave of budgetary consciousness within Congress is highly unlikely as the sole reason that the Navy's budget was dramatically cut after 1990. U.S. Navy spending remained high despite fraught economic circumstances throughout Reagan's administration, in part due to the gifted lobbying skills of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman throughout the halls of Congress.[48] This congressional support, despite Lehman's departure in 1987, remained durable even in the face of economic downturns in both 1982 and 1987 in the American economy.[49] Even the criticism that the maritime strategy was "no more than a cynical rationalization for larger navy budgets" does not prove valid, considering President Reagan incrementally increased the military budget in 1985 before the strategy's publication.[50] Only with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the apparent end of the Soviet Union in 1991 were budget concerns placed beyond security concerns. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney rebuked congressional accusations that the military budget was the primary catalyst for the budgetary woes of the U.S. government. While displaying a chart of defense spending proportional to the congressionally approved budgets from 1962 to 1992, Cheney purported that defense spending only increased cumulatively by 12 percent in the past 30 years, whereas mandatory spending increased 448 percent and domestic discretionary spending increased 187 percent, adding, "I don't believe that the Department of Defense is responsible for our nation's deficit problem."[51]

Congressional leaders such as Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) reached across both the aisle and the Atlantic in fervent attempts to reduce the military budget. Already in 1984, Senator Nunn had fired the first salvo by attempting to pass an amendment to the budget wherein NATO allies would be penalized by a systematic withdrawal of U.S. forces in Europe unless the Europeans increased their own defense spending.[52] Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee John Tower (R-TX)—still serving in the U.S. Navy—retorted that "when the President of the United States says 'we must not do this,' when the Sec. of Def. says 'we must not do this'," then the amendment should not be tabled.[53] In opposition, the Reagan administration lobbied vehemently and ultimately successfully to declaw the so-called Nunn Amendment, though the German defense minister Manfred Wörner commented that he resented being handled with "the stick"; "neither the Reagan administration or the European Allies had anticipated that the Senate would involve itself in a major debate on NATO."[54] Years later, in 1990, while awaiting testimony on the Navy's budget from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Trost, Senator Nunn taunted that it was high time

to "come up with a different story this year, it's time to reduce."[55] Primed for austerity, Senator Nunn independently advanced his own budgetary conception of the U.S. military in the same year. Reductions to U.S. forces above all in Europe were deemed sensible, as allied forces would assume larger responsibilities for their own regions, he reasoned. Nunn's move prompted John T. Correll to posit the counterpoint: "What if our allies refuse the roles assigned them in the strategy?," adding that "we defend allied interests because doing so is in our own interest. Our global presence may shrink, but our global interests will not."[56] Simultaneously, Senator Nunn forcefully advocated that the defense budget be reduced to reinvest in environmentally focused programs, an initiative supported by multiple senators, notably including Al Gore (D-TN).[57] This rather lengthy sketch of one senator's dedicated crusade to shrink the defense budget does demonstrate the new political waters that the Navy's strategy would be forced to operate in going forward. Arduous budgetary drawbacks were unavoidable. In his testimony before Congress, Secretary of Defense Cheney reiterated "that historically if you look at precedents you can't find a time when we ever got it right. Every single time when we've been through one of these cycles of significantly downsizing the force, we've blown it."[58] Representative Huckaby countered that while the United States is "spending our lowest level in 50 years on defense . . . the world is probably safer by far than it has been in the last 50 years."[59] Very often, senators such as Sam Nunn maintained a long record of unwavering political support for NATO in his rhetoric, while later launching razor sharp legislative cuts to American NATO forces in Europe.

Consternations about the flow from the congressional purse in the United States diverged with threat assessments from multiple NATO naval officers. Indeed, the triangulation between discrepancies of rhetoric and capabilities was a common theme. Even two years after the collapse of the USSR, Commander Kurt Jensen of the Royal Danish Navy pointed out that though the Soviets/Russians were demonstrating a change in "will," there was nonetheless no such change in "capability" in terms of their ability to wage a war against the West on the sea.[60] Alongside similar lines, Captain Torstein Siem of the Royal Norwegian Navy, also publishing in the *Naval War College Review*, presented the case that the United States' budget discussions gave the impression that the U.S. Navy may no longer be able to provide security in the North Sea. While meekly proposing that the German Navy, with support from the French, could perhaps provide the security relationship the Norwegians deemed necessary, he ultimately insisted that Norway continue to lobby the United States for a renewal in their commitments to the NATO Northern Flank.[61] American naval officers shared in this consensus. In "The Maritime Strategy for the 1990s" (published in May 1990), Admiral Trost declared in this article in *Proceedings* that however welcoming "the possibilities presented by Gen. Sec. Mikhail Gorbachev's restructuring and openness might be," they nevertheless advocated that the United States "continue to gauge our strategy and war fighting capabilities against this least likely, but ultimately most potent threat."[62] Writing in 1990

before this hearing took place, Admiral Charles R. Larson skeptically judged the Soviet policy of *perestroika* to be disingenuous, as its success would mean an enhanced Soviet economy, which would in turn strengthen their underfunded military forces.[63]

Former Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb engaged in a dialogue with West German journalist Ulrich Schiller concerning NATO's future in early 1989. Webb acknowledged that with regard to the Soviet threat, "we are in a sense in a period where we are reading tea leaves. You're hearing one thing, and yet in terms of military capabilities there has not been an adjustment."[64] Despite his judgment of the potential for future hostilities with the Soviet Union, Webb flatly reported that "unfortunately, in our system the budget drives the strategy instead of the other way around."[65] Webb was not alone in assessing congressional efforts to lessen military spending as being more of a sterile accounting project than a result of a prolonged meditation of U.S. military strategic needs. During the aforementioned roundtable discussion between U.S. and Soviet military officers, an exchange between Major General Evgeny Nozhin of the Soviet Army and Air Force General John B. "Jack" Kidd provides a key understanding. Nozhin submitted the suggestion of a military-led effort to reduce troops and force sizes on a quid pro quo basis, to which General Kidd responded: "I think it may not be necessary to look for a rationale for action. . . . The force deployments overseas are going to be dictated by the U.S. economy," concluding ultimately that "strategists will be relieved of the responsibilities of coming up with a strategy or name for the process. It will simply happen."[66]

No matter the litany of nuanced articulations by naval officers, the potential savings of the peace dividend were far too enticing for congressional representatives to passively forego. The rapid disappearance of a compelling peer adversary released Washington policy makers from the decades-long vice grip of the Soviet threat. Within the swirling constellation of this debate, the international audience of the maritime strategy is all the more striking. From opponents to staunch military funding, like Senator Nunn, to allied naval officers, the global scope of the Navy's mission is consistently paid its due attention. As it will be evidenced later, U.S. Navy white papers in the early 1990s withdraw from this position by overly committing to a political, domestic audience.

One final point of friction to address is how Operation Desert Storm might have influenced Navy strategy in early 1990s, especially regarding Germany. Skepticism on NATO's efficacy in confronting American security needs is certainly detectable in the 1991 article "The Way Ahead" by the secretary of the Navy, postulating how "the Gulf War's allied coalition may be a harbinger of future security arrangements."[67] This prescient point would be confirmed a scant two years later in 1993, when Operation Restore Hope in Somalia again instigated the creation of a coalition force.[68] Moreover, the 1992 Navy white paper " . . . From the Sea" clearly was heavily influenced by Desert Storm, as expeditionary-style wars were "seen as a template for future operations" in the document.[69] German naval historians frequently point to the participation of

five units of German mine countermeasure vessels in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm.[70] Jürgen Ehle does provide a key insight. Because of unification, the German Navy in 1990 was charged with simultaneously drawing back its 47,4000 personnel to 27,200 by 1994, while also absorbing the 8,300 personnel of the *Volksmarine*, the former enemy navy of East Germany.[71] Despite Germany's understandable preoccupation, German minor participation certainly fell short of American expectations that the Germans would transition more steadfastly into an international actor in line with their economic prowess.

Naval Strategy Post–Cold War

The seismic geopolitical collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR resulted not only in the erosion of the United States' most obvious adversary, but in the U.S. Navy's character as a coalition-augmented Service oriented toward conflict with peer adversaries. After 1991, when the collapse of the Soviet Union had become a matter of fact rather than contemplation, the Navy pivoted toward a more domestic, political audience with its 1992 strategic documents " . . . From the Sea" and the 1994 "Forward . . . From the Sea." As the audience narrowed to a more domestic audience, the Navy's hard-won credibility as a coalition-oriented Service in conjunction with allied navies was unnecessarily put at risk. Whereas declarations such as the maritime strategy outlined specific strategic goals, while also outlining the approximate operational means of fulfilling their objectives, post-1991 strategic documents advanced truncated argumentations that prompted more questions than they provided answers. Furthermore, the previously vaunted centrality of alliance partners was crucially deemphasized in the early 1990s. One unique feature of maritime strategy was the awareness of an audience well-versed in military affairs built into the framework of the documents, as evidenced by its overt conceptions that were dually inclusionary to alliance partners and resolutely targeted toward the Soviet Union. The 1980s featured one overarching strategy document, albeit in various, edited forms, while the 1990s bore witness to nine total attempts by the Navy to formulate its strategy in either a white paper or an article.[72]

First disseminated in April 1991, Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garret III published "The Way Ahead" in *Proceedings* as a burgeoning step toward replacing the previous strategy of the 1980s.[73] The paper pinpoints what will become an enduring focal point through the early 1990s: emerging threats from less developed countries to U.S. sea dominance and sea access, effectively boiling down to a shift "from global commitment against a single threat to global commitment against a number of regional threats."[74] In this document, the trend toward unilateral military action sans foreseeable allied naval inclusion is already observable. "The Way Ahead" refers to allied "reluctance" to "subordinate national interests to a broader common purpose."[75] " . . . From the Sea" will in more explicit terms contend that this purpose takes the form of expeditionary-style forces, capable of global interventions in littoral spaces. This concession that allied observers may find the Navy's "common purpose"

dubiously convincing does cast some measure of doubt in the Navy's own confidence in this approach.

The language employed in " . . . From the Sea" further confines itself to a layman audience. Naval operational capabilities are framed as a "potential force from the sea" that is "a critical tool for diplomacy and influence."[76] In lieu of more exacting articulations of the Navy's place in a global security infrastructure, this document's descriptive energy focused more on broader characteristics of naval forces. Vitality and the irreplaceable nature of the Navy is stressed throughout the document: "our Navy and Marine Corps will provide unique capabilities of indispensable value in meeting our future security challenges."[77] Regarding spatiality, the document is imprecise. The *battlespace* is defined as "the sea, air, and land environment where we will conduct our operations."[78] Later, the "shift in the strategic landscape" required the Navy to "concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the Sea."[79] But then, the document calls for the Navy's supremacy in "space-based assets" to "achieve dominance in space as well."[80] While naval forces indisputably have generous war-waging versatility, the lack of specified war scenarios or potential adversaries leaves a muddled impression. What sort of enemy located in the less developed regions could contest the Navy on so many fronts simultaneously?

This article describes what both documents refrain from addressing. " . . . From the Sea" and its successor "Forward . . . From the Sea" are by no means devoid of meaningful information concerning the strategic and operational goals of the U.S. Navy. However, a confluence of factors lends these documents to scrutiny from a transatlantic perspective. In both publications, neither NATO, nor any codified alliance structure receives a single mention. In " . . . From the Sea," the nebulous term "allies" appears only in conjunction with so-called "force packages."[81] Such rhetoric of an expeditionary force package effectively constrained integration of allied fleets by consigning them to last on the list of assets for possible deployment.[82] In "Forward . . . From the Sea," allies as actors are addressed in a cursory manner, referring on a few occasions to the need to "extend our protective shield" over allies, for example.[83] The term *potential coalition partner* is similarly paired with one mention of allies.[84] Both instances grant the impression that ad hoc coalitions akin to the Gulf War were anticipated, as NATO members already benefit from the U.S. nuclear shield beyond just the nuclear assets of the Navy, perhaps denoting a hesitancy to not overly commit the Navy conceptually to alliances like NATO. It is notable, as well, that " . . . From the Sea" contains strong assertions of interoperability with the Army and Air Force, illustrating the influence of Joint-Services capabilities that emerged after Goldwater-Nichols.

A specific enemy, or even an invocation of a spectrum of opponents, reminiscent of President George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil" is similarly absent. Swartz contended that the "Maritime Strategy, 1984" was a "self-consciously allied" document, given that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Watkins consulted NATO allies throughout the drawn-out drafting process of the strategy.[85]

" . . . From the Sea" and its 1994 successor do not themselves advocate Europe as a focal point and thus leave NATO allies in the position of determining for themselves exactly what their role within U.S. Navy strategy might be. " . . . From the Sea" indeed invoked the Navy's role in "helping to preserve the strategic position we won with the end of the Cold War."[86] Despite the promise in "The Way Ahead" that the maritime strategy's "enduring principles" would be integrated in future strategy, by refraining from articulating a role within the "won" strategic spaces surrounding the European continent, the Navy tacitly conceded a significant measure of utility as the armed Service best positioned for Joint operations with American allies.[87]

Critiquing these two somewhat cumbersomely entitled documents, Captain Edward Smith contended that the Navy swiftly attempted to reposition itself within a political context of acute budgetary stress. Smith claimed that Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe's "instructions were to go beyond simply reacting to the immediate effects of the Soviet collapse" so as "to create a 'new zero-based plan for naval forces spanning the next fifteen to twenty years'."[88] The result of O'Keefe's endeavors were strategic documents that espoused an overarching operating ethos by advertising a statement of skills. As such, " . . . From the Sea" "has shifted from a focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges," ultimately placing emphasis on the flexibility of naval forces to operate in littoral regions where the United States was conceived as fighting wars similar to Desert Storm.[89] Therefore, the language of " . . . From the Sea" was at once quite broad to leave room for imagination from policy makers, but also seemingly reduced the spectrum of potential naval capabilities to littoral-located warfare, without much conception of allied cooperation. The focus on the littoral battlespace can be interpreted as a euphemism as warfare beyond the European continent, given the strategy's overall focus on threats in undeveloped nations. This readjustment beyond European territory for imagined conflicts of the future is not so much the error of focus, but rather the Navy's abstention of considering roles for allied forces to integrate within task forces, thereby providing a common green for U.S. alliance partners to revitalize and retool for the next century.

Captain Smith explains that "it was clear that the final white paper [' . . . From the Sea'] needed to be simple, direct, and concise if it were to have any value."[90] This newer form of lowest common denominator expression lent itself well to a congressional and civilian audience that were laymen regarding naval warfare. According to Vice Admiral Leighton W. Smith and then deputy chief of naval operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, " . . . From the Sea" was written in such a way "to make sure that people on the Hill understood it."[91] Ironically enough, while the maritime strategy was being drafted by the chief of naval operations, the emerging paper was often criticized by several fleet flag officers for the document's apparent "brochuremanship" character, claiming that it was at best a "PR job—not a strategy."[92] Wills also remarks that many naval officers demonstrated dissatisfaction with " . . . From the Sea" and its direct

publication as an unclassified document, as opposed to the years of internal vetting that occurring with the maritime strategy.[93] This disunity among the officer corps, regardless of knowledge production method, showcases the challenges of crafting strategy for any armed Service.

Perhaps due to the lack of operationally specific language, " . . . From the Sea" prompted perplexed responses by German observers. In 1992, immediately after " . . . From the Sea" was published for the first time, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) contextualized the beleaguered strategic concept at a maritime symposium in Annapolis, Maryland. Erhard Rosenkranz, editor-in-chief of the German journal *Marine Forum,* praised McCain's interpretation as especially enlightening. In Rosenkranz's view, Senator McCain was able to "present the new maritime strategy with clarity like no admiral could have," believing that this skill was the unique result of working in politics.[94] The finer implications of " . . . From the Sea" for an international military audience were therefore left overly vague, as Sebastian Bruns concluded: "admittedly, the document displayed a much broader focus on political viability in Washington than on operational salience."[95] The shift in Navy documents toward a domestic, political audience is consistently accompanied by a diminished, if at all existing, compelling inclusion for allied navies in American maritime strategy. Even as Senator McCain's previously mentioned speech presented a more nuanced understanding of " . . . From the Sea" and its principles, Erhard Rosenkranz commented that during the senator's speech, not a single mention of the United Nations or other global organizations was given, despite the fact that the event was well attended by a variety of foreign officers and was officially observed by a United Nations delegation.[96] The clear danger in such instances is instilling the impression that the United States would in the future seek to rely on unilateral operations to advance its security.

Strategy Adherence

An analytical glance of the respective force structures (see tables 1 and 2) of the U.S. Navy and Germany Navy during the Cold War and post–Cold War period provides illumination. Despite the littoral strategy advocated by " . . . From the Sea" and "Forward . . . From the Sea," the general trend of the U.S. Navy force structure clearly demonstrated a measured drawback of all types of vessels. Proportionally speaking, blue-water assets such as destroyers even gained in relative significance by 1999 compared with their contribution to the fleet in 1986, with amphibious and auxiliary vessels actually receiving some of the most considerable cuts. From this force structure, the U.S. Navy appears to have equally valued all its assets, notably maintaining its carrier force in strong numbers. The ostensible reasoning for maintaining a primarily blue-water fleet structure is often bolstered by the commitment to forward presence that was advocated in " . . . From the Sea." By contrast, Tim Rexrode posits that "debates over forward presence were reduced to surrogates for debates over force structure rather than strategy," as the warfare approach advanced in " . . . From the Sea" and "Forward

. . . From the Sea" failed to consequentially imprint on the force structure.[97] In the 1980s, the maritime strategy presented a convincing justification for an overarching naval strategic vision, allowing for Lehman's 600-ship navy to become a natural conclusion. The "fatal flaw" of " . . . From the Sea" was the failure to establish a link between the Navy's budget requests from Congress vis-à-vis the fleet structure and Navy strategy.[98] The budget crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s certainly did not offer naval planners luxurious time horizons to align more cohesive adherence to their strategy. The missed opportunity for the U.S. Navy in this regard lies in viewing the implications of the political environment on the German Navy in the 1990s.

For the German Navy, the force structure is more flexible. *Flugkörperschnellboote* (fast missile Boats), a non-blue-water asset, were dramatically reduced by the 2000s, while, despite an overall drawback of naval units, blue-water assets such as frigates were produced in greater numbers and thus represented the most significant portion of the fleet. In the 1994 whitebook of the German Department of Defense, the German Navy is assigned with the task of contributing to "the freedom of the seas" by working together with U.S. Navy power.[99] Along with the designated role of the Navy, the German force structure was meant to "instead have the characteristics and capabilities of blue water units" for the purpose of joining NATO Standing Forces during crisis management situations.[100] Christian Jentzsch considers the Cold War German Navy as not merely having been an escort fleet, but rather an offensively equipped naval force specialized in littoral warfare.[101] Accepting this premise, the German Navy's subsequent post–Cold War pursuit of retention and even increase in the relative importance of blue-water assets demonstrates their determination to integrate into future international task forces.[102] Jürgen Ehle argued in 1998 that the German Navy's force structure may have limited capacity to carry out independent littoral operations into the depth of enemy territory, but its forces were adjusted to "significantly augment" existing alliance and USN force structures.[103] These insights are further supported by William Collins in 1996, who argued that although the German Navy's size prevents it from independently implementing the principles of Navy strategy, it is "able to fulfill its commitments not only to the defense of Germany but also to combined or coalition operations anywhere a crisis develops."[104] Beyond expressions of political will or statements of strategy, German Navy Captain Lutz-Uwe Gloeckner, while reflecting on "Forward . . . From the Sea," advanced the notion that his country's procurement policies in their force structure should continue to complement that of the U.S. Navy.[105] Despite the narrative deficit of post-1991 Navy strategy concerning allied navies, the example of Germany showcases the continued will of one U.S. ally to couple the security infrastructures of both countries, even as a clear enemy was lacking.

Table 1's illustration of the Navy's force structure makes a particular trend clear: as judged by comparing the allocation of vessels in 1986 and 1998, the U.S. Navy maintained a "less of the same" of the Cold War structure, despite

the call of ". . . From the Sea" for a "fundamentally different force'."[106] Therefore the littoral strategy presented to the domestic, political audience lacked a certain measure of follow through, as the forward presence in littoral regions was nevertheless executed with the blue-water assets of the Cold War.[107] Owing the Navy's prestige as the sole superpower fleet of the Western world, allied navies, through the example of Germany, demonstrate how keenly they observed the finer details of U.S. fleet structure, strategy, and budget. Instances such as German Navy commander Peter Gladziejewski's praise of Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda to the position of chief of naval officer, believing that his experience in previous posts in NATO and his "personal strengths fit well with the new political atmosphere in Washington" supplements this reasoning.[108] Author Stefan Terzibaschitsch evidenced this trend as well through a yearly update in the German Navy's *Marine Forum* informing readers on the latest changes in the U.S. Navy budget from 1993 to 1994.[109] This deep-rooted devotion to future cooperation and operational compatibility with the Navy further illustrates the error in the Service's strategic documents in undervaluing the contribution of allied navies in future deployments.

Reinforcing the Links

Not unlike the sharp reductions of the Navy after the Second World War, an exacting peace dividend was inevitable after nearly 50 years of military strain on the U.S. economy.[110] The enormous threats of the 1980s buttressed the excellence of the maritime strategy. Any strategy's pertinence is commensurate with how extraordinary the times allow for it to be. The Navy's commitment to battlespace dominance, power projection, or forward presence codified in post-1991 strategic documents is not this author's subject of criticism. As controllers of the purse, orienting such documents' message toward Congress was similarly no error, at least in principle. Military forces are extensions of the national will. More than any other armed Service, the Navy as a political tool is unique in its operability in peacetime and capability in formulating credible deterrence of future threats. For this reason, the inclusion of allied navies in strategic documents is an opportunity to promote alliance solidarity through naval partnership. In practice, its exclusion is a critical oversight. Placing emphasis on alliances also serves to remind a domestic, political audience of the Navy's particular utility to reinvigorate previous partnerships and engage in ad hoc coalitions. The alliance aloofness of post-1991 Navy strategy documents therefore juxtaposes poorly with the ironclad commitment to foreign partners in the maritime strategy.

The political upheaval accompanying the end of the Cold War as a watershed moment in U.S. history now holds special significance today with the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. No U.S. Navy strategy can be formulated in anticipation of all eventualities. That the maritime strategy did not fully account for operations akin to Desert Storm did not invalidate the document's relevance, nor do today's events retroactively cast the strategic assumptions outlined post-1991 in a negative light. Rather, the current need

to revitalize the political basis of cooperation with allies such as Germany does provide an impetus for the United States' interest in alliance cooperation.

In an era of hyperglobalization, George W. Baer counsels that coordination with allied navies is an intrinsic element to making U.S. maritime strategy "whole."[111] Navy strategies such as the 2008 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* have even gone further in attempts to court allied navies to expand their capabilities than the strategic documents of the early 1990s.[112] As it concerns the European context, and is certainly the case for Germany, alliance structures allow smaller naval services to tailor their forces and strategic outlooks toward supporting NATO and U.S. forces by extension. NATO structures have a time-tested political durability that permit the United States, with its military forces, to continue to exercise influence in Europe.[113] The legitimacy of NATO as a security guarantor has proven to temper the classic post-1945 German skepticism of unilateral military action, as the German public tends to more easily support military missions that are legitimized by NATO or the UN.[114] As was the case in the Cold War and in the maritime strategy, Germany's Navy can be again engaged as an ally to bolster a global U.S. Navy strategic approach. The 2018 reactivation of the U.S. Second Fleet in the Atlantic occurred despite a broader pivot to the Pacific. Where German naval forces once were instrumental in tying down the Soviet Baltic fleet, calls are now being made for the German Navy to strengthen its forces in the High North to free up U.S. Navy forces to deter China.[115] The basis for this manner of cooperation already exists through U.S. Navy-German Navy Joint efforts in previous years. German frigates are today well-trained to integrate into U.S. carrier strike groups for air-defense purposes.[116] Prompted by German chancellor Olaf Scholz's decision to dispense a one-time investiture of 100 billion euros in the armed forces for modernization efforts, the Inspector of the German Navy vice admiral Jan Christian Kaack specifically identifies his service's vital role in protecting NATO carrier strike groups as a critical interest.[117]

At this decisive junction, the U.S. Navy should seek to replicate their successes in the 1980s, with the force multiplicative potential of allied fleets being similarly maintained in responding to the threats of the twenty-first century. As Thomas-Durell Young reflected on the experience of Western naval forces in the Persian Gulf in the late 80s, "it is not the operational doctrine but the *political* basis for cooperation that requires reform."[118] This political basis should include a broader scope to include international partners of the United States and similarly embed this notion within Navy strategic conceptions.

Endnotes

1. Dick Cheney, "Defense Policy in the Post–Cold War Era," C-SPAN, 31 July 1991, video, 1:17:08.
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4. John B. Hattendorf, "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to 1987," *Naval War College Review* 41, no. 3 (1988): 13.

5. Roger W. Barnett, "Naval Power for a New American Century," *Naval War College Review* 55, no. 1 (2002): 45. It is worth pointing out that Barnett was referring to the approach of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in *Joint Vision 2010.*

6. For the sake of readability, this article uses the term German Navy, in spite of a healthy complexity to this period. The naval service within Germany's *Bundeswehr*, the Armed Forces, was unofficially called the *Bundesmarine* (Federal Navy) to differentiate it from the naval forces of the Communist-aligned German Democratic Republic, or *Volksmarine* (People's Navy). After 1990, Germany's naval service was simply called the *Deutsche Marine*, or the German Navy.

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10. John Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's* Maritime strategy*, 1977–1986,* Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 54. Found in Steven Wills, "The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994," *Naval War College Review* 69, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 33.

11. John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., "The Maritime Strategy, 1986," in *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents,* Newport Papers 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008), 203, 206.

12. Hattendorf and Swartz, eds., "The Maritime Strategy, 1986," 217.

13. Hattendorf and Swartz, eds., "The Maritime Strategy, 1986," 211.

14. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's* Maritime strategy*, 1977–1986*, 70.

15. Hattendorf and Swartz, eds., "The Maritime Strategy, 1986," 221.

16. Norman Cigar, "The Navy's Battle of the Budget: Soviet Style," *Naval War College Review* 43, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 9.

17. John F. Lehman, *Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018), 155.

18. Cigar, "The Navy's Battle of the Budget: Soviet Style," 11.

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24. Eric J. Grove, "The Superpowers and Secondary Navies in Northern Waters during the Cold War," in *Navies in Northern Waters*, ed. Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 220.

25.   Hattendorf, "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy," 19.
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27.   Peter Swartz, "Preventing the Bear's Last Swim: The NATO concept of Maritime Operations (ConMarOps) of the Last Cold War Decade," in *NATO's Maritime Power 1949–1990*, ed. I. Loucas and G. Maroyanni (Piraeus, Greece: European Institute of Maritime Studies and Research, Inmer Publications, 2003), 50.
28.   Swartz, "Preventing the Bear's Last Swim," 51.
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Neglected Maritime Terrain in the Bay of Bengal
An Examination of the Future of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands

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Abstract: The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) are some of the most neglected maritime terrain in the world despite their proximity to one of the busiest maritime chokepoints on Earth. Strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal and around the Strait of Malacca necessitates that U.S. strategy carefully considers the implications of having a U.S. presence on the ANI. The United States has the capacity to assist in international law enforcement of illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing and piracy as well as ensure the security of international shipping through the Strait of Malacca. The possibility of bilateral exercises that introduce concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and the use of the U.S. Coast Guard in multiple capacities are real possibilities as well. Perhaps most importantly, the United States can partner with India to leverage China's Malacca Dilemma and constantly threaten a blockade of Chinese shipping through the Strait of Malacca in a potential conflict. China also aspires to alleviate its Malacca Dilemma.

Keywords: Andaman and Nicobar Islands, ANI, Andaman and Nicobar Islands Command, strategic competition, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, QSD, Quad, Quad plus, ASEAN, Hindu nationalism, Strait of Malacca

Historical Context and Introduction

Understanding the complexities of the ANI begins with their history. The ANI had been home to indigenous people called the Andamese, which inhabited the islands as much as 30,000 years ago.[1] There are

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still tribes on the island that are considered isolated, including the Shompen People who may be one of the last purely isolated tribes in the world.[2] The islands lie in close maritime proximity to Myanmar, Thailand, and the mouth of the Strait of Malacca. Of the 573 islands that make up the territory, only 38 are inhabited. Besides fishing, the islands have abundant natural resources, with some of the most lucrative being rubber and red oil as well as a wide variety of crops. Forest covers the majority of the islands, and the central administrative center is Port Blair. Advancements in naval technology and navigation have yet to fully take advantage of the ANI maritime strategic potential. However, once the islands were populated with nonindigenous peoples from aspiring empires, the importance of the islands as essential regional maritime terrain would not be forgotten.[3]

The first significant ruling authority over the islands was the Chola Empire, which existed from 300 BCE to 1279 ACE, making it one of the world's longest surviving empires.[4] One of the most significant rulers of the Chola Empire was Rajendra Chola I or Rajendra the Great, who reigned from 1014 to 1044 ACE.[5] Rajendra Chola I may have been the first to understand the ANI maritime importance. Due to the advancements in naval shipping and navigation and the emerging concept of globalization and internationalization, an advanced naval base was established on the ANI by the Chola Empire. This base's primary purpose was to serve as a strategic launch point for further expeditions. However, this also set the stage for future military uses of the islands and the prospect that the islands could be of great benefit in controlling major trade routes near the region's significant chokepoints and essential trade routes in the Indian and Pacific oceans. While the Chola Empire may have been the first to use the islands to expand their empire, they would not be the last. The Maratha Empire established an advanced naval base on the islands within the next hundred years before European colonial powers would overthrow them.[6]

The importance of global trade routes would be of significant concern to future empires as the art of empire building became perfected. Several empires attempted to maximize the use of the ANI. The British and the Dutch recognized the importance of the ANI as they colonized around the world. The Dutch were the first European nation to establish a colony on the ANI. In 1755, the Dutch East India Company officially made the ANI a settlement and renamed it New Denmark.[7] However, the Danes would abandon the islands due to disease several years later. The problem of malaria pandemics would be a common theme for European colonists during the early European colonialization period. Austria would claim the islands that were thought to be abandoned by the Dutch and rename them the Theresa Islands. However, after a minor colony was established, like the Dutch, the Austrians would leave the islands in 1784.[8]

The next empire to establish a colony on the islands were the British who would initially establish a penal colony in 1789, but the British abandoned the colony in 1796 due to an outbreak of disease; they returned nearly 60 years later

to establish a penal colony on the islands again and make a permanent settlement at what is now present-day Port Blair. During European colonial powers' continuous reclaiming of the ANI, the Dutch still had a sovereign claim. The rights to the islands were initially sold in 1868, and the ANI officially became part of the British Empire belonging to British India.[9] The British would retain the islands for the better part of the next century. However, as the British Empire declined, so did its holdings worldwide.

World War II (WWII) would have powerful influences on the ANI. The rapid decline of the once-mighty British Empire, along with the swift rise and fall of the Japanese Empire during the early 1940s, left the future of the ANI in question. However, India's independence from British rule in 1947 determined that the ANI were formally part of India instead of the British Empire. The British recognized how vital the islands were and attempted to establish a sovereign puppet state made of Anglo Indians and Anglo Myanmar peoples before their departure from the Indian subcontinent. This last-ditch effort to colonize was fruitless, and the islands remained a part of India until the present day.[10]

The Strait of Malacca looms large in a discussion of global geopolitics and commerce. All observers recognize the importance of the three littoral states: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Far too few have noticed that India is effectively a fourth littoral state because it controls the ANI. Located some 1,078 kilometers northwest of the western exit from the strait, the ANI gives India the capability to control Strait of Malacca traffic. If the United States can take advantage of its developing strategic partnership with India and the use of the ANI, it would gain significant leverage in the continuing strategic competition with China. Surprisingly, no state in the modern era has taken advantage of the ANI's geopolitical position. The islands are part of Indian sovereign territory but would be most valuable in the context of a broad coalition in defense of the maritime commons. The intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific will draw the attention of all parties to the archipelagoes. Whoever holds the ANI can effectively control access to the Strait of Malacca and gain a significant advantage in any future maritime conflict. To that end, the United States must find a way to leverage the strategic benefits of the islands to counter a rising Chinese maritime threat. Leveraging strategic benefits can be accomplished by engaging in bilateral security and diplomatic efforts that also foster increased U.S. and Indian military cooperation. The mere perception of cooperation between India and the United States can itself be a powerful strategic deterrent to potential adversaries such as China. The world may never know a purely regional conflict again due to advancements in technology, global mutual economic dependence, and ultra-globalization. These concepts have created constantly changing diplomatic, informational, military, and economic variables. Strategic competitors have begun to develop and institute revolutionary new ideas to adapt to these changes, such as EABO, sea basing, as well as ways and means to project power and influence the global maritime commons while using new domains of war including cyber and space. These

perceived adaptations are a result of a changed character of war necessitating changes in the way nations conduct future warfare and highlight the continued importance of strategic maritime terrain such as the ANI, regardless of its location on the globe.

The strategic weight of the ANI adds significantly to the importance of the U.S. strategic partnership with India. The United States must overcome political obstacles that hinder its relations with India. Despite considerable improvement since the Cold War era, the relationship between the United States and India remains complex and challenging. The Hindu nationalist ideology of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which has dominated Indian politics since 2014, clashes with the U.S. concept of democracy. Such a division might hinder security cooperation, especially if the U.S. public becomes strongly opposed to Hindu nationalism, although there have never been any indications of that occurring. A more significant obstacle is India's firm stance on not becoming part of an alliance system, which it has recently reaffirmed.[11] India's strategic weight may be too great for the United States to permit any significant division whatever the circumstance. The United States must understand and manage challenges including India's ideology and diplomatic positions to achieve an enduring partnership in the region. There may be other disputes among states with vital interests in the region. The United States must build further relationships with countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, to name a few. These countries already have internal agreements and possibly some lingering distrust of Western powers and past colonialist nations, making building and maintaining relationships potentially sensitive for Western powers.

Improving U.S. relations with India enough to permit U.S. forces to operate in the ANI will be challenging but possible. The growing Chinese presence in the region and the threat the ANI poses to Chinese maritime commerce through the Strait of Malacca make the ANI and the Bay of Bengal of increasing interest to strategic competitors. In addition to the potential difficulty in managing an enhanced U.S. and Indian partnership, the United States must be prepared to cope with a possible Chinese response. The possibility of conflict with China would vary depending on if the United States could interfere with traffic through the Strait of Malacca. These are just a few possible implications that could arise due to the United States gaining access to the ANI and advancing its relationship with India and others in the region. The ANI will have a crucial role in future maritime security, so the United States needs military access. The reality of this occurring in the next decade may depend on variables that have not yet been decided. The value of understanding the historical context of how the ANI was used over the last several centuries is of vital importance to any future endeavors of the United States to establish a presence on the islands. Whatever the history of the islands themselves, the overall legacy of colonialism and India's hesitation for a superpower like the United States to be on its most strategically important islands may continue to make an outside presence on the ANI unwelcome. However, if there were multiple variables at play, such as

a significant conflict in which the United States was deemed essential for the survival of Indian interests in the region, or a robust diplomatic effort was put forth to negotiate mutually beneficial terms in which the United States could work with India, then perhaps the situation would change. The United States has entered many partnerships, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, a.k.a. the Quad) and Quad plus, to show that it desires to work with countries in the region and is not another colonial power with aspirations of domination. Assisting and partnering with nations in a wide range of security cooperation efforts such as disaster relief and foreign aid ensure that the United States is headed in the right direction. The importance of these efforts is further intensified by China's encroachment on the ANI in recent years, particularly Chinese submarine and survey vessels executing reconnaissance and survey operations within India's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).[12]

Geography and Strategic Importance

The geographic understanding and analysis of the ANI are essential to any discussion regarding maritime strategy in the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca. There is a need for a reassessment of the habitable islands within the ANI chain and their suitability for major infrastructure on land and sea. In addition, the location of the ANI in proximity to other countries and, most importantly, the Strait of Malacca are essential for any nation to understand if they want to exploit the ANI for strategic maritime purposes.[13] The ANI are 573 islands, with the Andaman group having 325 islands while the Nicobar group has 247 islands. The northern islands are approximately 274 kilometers from Myanmar, the southern islands are about 193 kilometers away from Indonesia, and around 1,078 kilometers from the Strait of Malacca (map 1).[14] Another aspect of the islands' geography is the *Ten Degree Channel* between the ANI chain (map 2). The channel derives its name from the 10 degrees latitudinal it overlays. The Ten Degree Channel is approximately 150 kilometers wide and 10 kilometers long.[15] This channel has significant military and economic importance as control of the channel would isolate the islands from each other and restrict movement. An enemy maritime seizure of the Ten Degree Channel would be devastating for lines of communication and freedom of navigation and would be essential to retain in any conflict.

Another consideration of the island's geography is the significant difference between the ANI people and the people of mainland India. The island's isolation from the mainland and millennia's worth of different empires intermingling has created a mixed population descended from former empires' convicts, settlers, and indigenous people. The island's people have been traditionally slow to accept and implement mainland Indian policies. This has been evident in the past decade as Hindu nationalism has not spread as it did on the mainland. A potential fear that may arise in India is that rival nations may easily influence the islands and, in a worst-case scenario, the ANI would rebel or declare inde-

Map 1. The proximity of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Strait of Malacca

Source: OpIndia, 2022.

pendence if another world power like China backed the ANI inhabitants. A loss of the islands would be a strategic disaster if a scenario such as this were realized.

The Indian government has seen fit to deploy a brigade command with two and a half battalions, an airfield capable of operating heavy transport and bomber aircraft, and robust logistics and maintenance facilities on the south ANI. In addition, forward naval and coast guard bases with protected harbors complement the naval and air defenses.[16] Establishing deepwater ports on the Great Nicobar Island is also possible. These interests fall under an Indian joint unified command called the ANI Command.[17] The significance of this command is that it shows India's assertion in the region and the willingness and ability to act in ensuring the safety of commerce flowing in and out of the Strait of Malacca. Furthermore, the command shows the ability of India and its allies to project power to directly influence or even to blockade the Strait of Malacca. The United States could make the case that strategic position, the need for cooperation to deal with nontraditional security issues, the wide variety of small islands, narrow and shallow waters, and the sheer size of the territory necessitates a joint forces approach.[18] Perhaps most important is the need for the United States to have regional support, not just from India, for a presence in the region in any sizable capacity.

Regional Relationships

One of the most critical recent partnerships in the INDOPACOM may be the Quad. The Quad was loosely formed in 2004 as part of the humanitarian response that followed a devastating tsunami that occurred in the region that year. The Quad was formally instituted in 2007 between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, which conducted joint naval exercises the following year. The group was expected to discuss countering Chinese hostility in the Indo-Pacific and the reestablishment of a rules-based international order.[19] The implementation of the Quad partnership was also an essential step in bringing India closer to the United States and would further establish India's role as a significant power. Furthermore, a series of aggressive encounters with China have necessitated an expanded partnership that would come along with the Quad plus partnership.[20] India now has good reason to fear both Chinese encirclement and Chinese domination of the waterways on which India increasingly relies. This means India now has excellent reasons to invest considerably more in developing the capabilities to secure its trade routes and sustain the regional balance of power with China.[21]

Map 2. Ten Degree Channel

Source: based on the CIA Indian Ocean Atlas.

The United States and India may regard the ability to use the ANI to control traffic through the Strait of Malacca as an opportunity. Still, the Malacca littoral states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the regional bloc to which they belong, may regard it with suspicion.[22] They may

fear that outside powers and coalitions like the Quad and the Australia–United Kingdom–United States Partnership (AUKUS) will force them to choose between aligning with the West or with China.[23] ASEAN was formed in 1967 in Bangkok and originally consisted of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have since joined. ASEAN is not a military alliance but a consultative organization that pursues common political and economic interests, acting only by consensus. It has developed a variety of regional conferences to which the United States, India, and China belong. Perhaps ASEAN's approach to the strategic competition between the United States and China seeks to weave the great powers into a web of interests that conflict would disrupt. Establishing a significant military base, especially if the United States engaged in the ANI, would probably cause extreme concern for the ASEAN members, especially the Malacca littoral states. An essential player in ASEAN is Singapore due to its geographic location.

The geopolitical aspect of India-Singapore bilateral relations improved tremendously from the Cold War period to the post-1997 period. This is partly because of the convergence of the ideas and interests of political leaders such as Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Goh Chok Tong. Significantly, Rao and Vajpayee valued the benefits of India's increased presence in Southeast Asia to avoid being isolated from the region and losing international relevance.[24] A shared experience of colonial roots and postcolonial expansion has unified countries along the Strait of Malacca. The fundamentals of India-Indonesia relations have been formed by their shared colonial experiences, anticolonial struggles, and shared worldviews.[25] The same could be said of Malaysia. India views its ties with Malaysia as a core element of its Act East Policy. Both nations firmly commit to multiculturalism, pluralism, and inclusive development.[26] However, India's governmental support of Hindu nationalism may bring India's commitments into question.

Economic Potential

In 2004, the third largest recorded earthquake in history created a tsunami that severely affected many of the islands in the ANI chain and caused hundreds of deaths. The suitability for sustaining large infrastructure on the islands came into question as the ANI's precarious position along one of the world's major fault lines may make it prone to similar natural disasters in the future. Furthermore, the island's geographic isolation, climate, and heavy forestation have made building large infrastructure difficult.[27] However, within the last decade, the Indian government has transformed the ANI to support substantial economic growth. This includes building a railway connecting Diglipur in the north to the central city of Port Blair in the south and upgrading roadways. This provides access to ports via ground transportation on a scale that has not been possible. Furthermore, resort development is occurring on a large scale, which has the tourism industry projected to boom over the next decade. The resort development includes the creation of commercial seaplane base hubs for the

use of seaplanes, which have proved highly successful in tourism areas such as the Maldives. Another vital aspect is upgrading the Veer Savarkar International Airport and creating multiple regional commercial airports on ideally located islands. Perhaps the most intriguing part of the massive infrastructure upgrade on the ANI is a proposed billion-dollar deepwater port with corresponding logistical support on Great Nicobar Island.[28]

The implications of large-scale development on the ANI can drastically improve India's economy. The islands will become more accessible, but they will also potentially become a significant hub along long-established sea lines of communication. The vast amount of untapped natural resources in the region that could now be harvested, including oil, natural gas, essential minerals, and the exclusive right to fish inside one of the last areas where fish stocks are relatively untouched, are eye watering to most economists and are well within India's EEZ purview.[29] China has also shown interest in these areas and has been consistently observed within the ANI EEZ in the last several years. While encroachment into a country's EEZ is not necessarily a threat to a nation's sovereignty, it may be seen as a lesser type of intrusion—and one India should be wary of.

The United States, Quad, and ASEAN members could assist the economic development of the ANI with investment and expertise. ASEAN member economic involvement may make the establishment of military facilities more palatable as well. However, ASEAN members may incite China by doing so, which is a risk they will need to calculate. The growing economic importance of the ANI to India further highlights the need for security. Suppose the ANI could be one of the major hubs along multiple sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the future. In that case, the attention will necessitate and welcome additional involvement from the international community. Theoretically, if the infrastructure is present to support a drastic increase of inhabitants on the island, it would be beneficial to economic interests to welcome a dramatic rise in the ANI population to progress the region's economic output. Furthermore, the disruption of native people on the ANI due to encroachment may further complicate an already complex situation. The next decade may bring a tremendous amount of change to the islands. The United States and the international community should be ready to develop, secure, and partner with India to support mutually held interests. Of course, China has recognized India's development of the ANI and appears to have implemented countering moves in the region.

Chinese Power Projection

China has emerged as a rising power globally with aspirations of global influence that rival its two most formidable opponents, India and the United States. This international power orientation has set the stage for multiple shows of force and some confrontations along India's frontier borders, with Taiwan and potentially other allies in the Pacific region including the Philippines and Japan. China and India have had a long history of clashes on India's frontier land along the Himalayan Mountains. India performed poorly in initial conflicts on its

frontier during the Sino-Chinese War in 1962.[30] However, the Indian military fared much better during the Nathu La and Cho La Clashes of 1967. Hundreds of Indian and Chinese soldiers were killed in a two-week confrontation centered on strategic pass locations along the Chumbi Valley during these clashes.[31] In 2020, skirmishes flared up again along the disputed boundary, causing significant casualties on both sides. This resurgence of combat after nearly 50 years contributed to the growing concern about China's aggressive actions.[32]

In the Western Pacific, tensions between the United States and China have increased steadily for more than a decade. Taiwan is the most important point of contention. China's growing power and increasing concern over Taiwan's preference for independence make a Chinese invasion more likely. The United States has asserted its commitment to Taiwan's autonomy. China regarded the humiliating U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 as an opportunity to gain an advantage by ramping up rhetoric and making large-scale military demonstrations aimed at Taiwan and intended to challenge the U.S. position. Many observers fear that China now has the confidence and capability to invade Taiwan.[33]

The ANI are far from Taiwan, but the strategic distance is less than the physical distance. The United States can enhance its deterrent posture in the East China Sea by taking advantage of strategic terrain elsewhere. However, with Indian attention focused on the Himalayan frontier and U.S. attention on Taiwan, both powers are neglecting the opportunities that the ANI offers. China has challenged India's sovereignty of the ANI in recent years and has sent multiple incursions into Indian waters to directly challenge the ability of the Indian military to defend the ANI in a future conflict. China has already increased its submarine incursions, and in 2020 executed the use of unmanned underwater drones to map the ocean floor around the ANI in the same manner that they have done in the Pacific.[34] These incursions into the ANI EEZ may be part of a Chinese plan to create a "new normal" within the region. However, most alarming to the U.S. and India is the alleged Chinese lease of the Coco Islands, a Burmese possession northwest of the ANI, not to be confused with the Australian Cocos or Keeling Islands to the southeast, and the central Sri Lankan maritime port at Hambantota, which was also leased to China from the Sri Lankan government. A close eye should be kept on the countries surrounding the Bay of Bengal and what agreements those countries have made with the Chinese government. In theory, a buildup of Chinese forces within striking distance would not be difficult. Furthermore, with advancements in surveillance technology and cyber warfare, maritime commerce, military operations, and the ability to influence public opinion on the ANI are certainly within the realm of possibility for the Chinese military. The Indian military has countered Chinese activity by increasing the robust nature of its ANI command to one of the most elite commands in the Indian military. Furthermore, the nearly monthly Chinese submarine incursions into the area have made the Indian navy hyperaware of Chinese activities within the ANI EEZ,

and it is prepared to detect and interdict these vessels if a threat is perceived.[35]

Similarly, there are Chinese ports funded on the Pakistani and Myanmar coasts, which is also a strategic cause for concern.[36] If these ports become bases, they will allow China to interfere with maritime trade throughout the Indian Ocean. This is part of China's *String of Pearls* strategy. The String of Pearl's theory was noticed in a Western article on future energy in Asia in 2004 but was not formalized nor was the phrase ever used by the Chinese.[37] China is perceived to use the String of Pearls strategy worldwide to directly answer China's critical vulnerabilities of not controlling key choke points and trade routes in the world.[38] This inability to maintain control puts China at an impasse on taking further action. The phrases *the Strait of Hormuz Dilemma* and *the Malacca Dilemma* have become common among military circles to describe China's vulnerable strategic problem.

The Malacca Dilemma denotes China's dependence on the Strait of Malacca and inability to secure traffic through the strait. Specifically, China is most concerned about its reliance on energy imports. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) calculations, about 20 percent of global maritime trade and 60 percent of China's trade flows are moved through the strait and the South China Sea, making it the most crucial SLOC for the Chinese economy. Nearly 70 percent of China's petroleum imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, making the Strait of Malacca essential to China's energy security.[39]

The Malacca Dilemma puts the ANI firmly in the crosshairs of the Chinese. The importance of the Indian ANI command comes into full view with Chinese incursion into the region. Besides having a force that necessitates nine flag officers with a lieutenant general in command, the ANI command has some of the best military equipment in the Indian Armed Forces. The naval component includes missile corvettes, tank landing ships, fast attack craft, amphibious warfare ships, and a coast guard squadron.[40] There is a brigade from the Indian Army, including an elite Bihar battalion, a reserve regiment, and an Indian Air Wing with advanced Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters that can operate over the Strait of Malacca. The ANI can also facilitate medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and additional airfields.[41]

With such a powerful force, the question arises if there is a need for the United States to cooperate with India to strategically leverage the ANI and provide an additional presence in the region. As India moves away from an ANI isolation policy and begins to leverage the military and economic potential of the ANI, there must be implications from the Quad that will necessitate joint involvement regarding the ANI and the Strait of Malacca. Among these partners, the United States, Australia, and Japan may be the most beneficial partners to have in the region. They may be willing to put forth considerable efforts and resources to secure mutual interests in the region. However, an increased multinational presence may exacerbate the Malacca Dilemma and cause China to increase its assertiveness and bolster its String of Pearls strategy. This may include

the implementation of significant military forces not just around the ANI but in disputed areas around the world, forming new agreements with neighboring countries to militarize strategic locations and using anti-piracy operations as an alibi for an increased presence in contested areas. Increased incursions on land and sea into the Strait of Malacca and the ANI EEZ may become more prevalent.

In recent years India has appeared to shed some of its deep-rooted anti-imperialism mentalities and in the future may be more open to robust joint relationships with regional and Western powers as indicated by the success of the Quad and mutual security concerns with Western powers. In addition, tourism and agricultural output have grown steadily along with the increasing presence of Indian military forces on the ANI.[42] Many allied nations have shown the desire to increase port calls and exercises as well as engage in joint surveillance of key maritime choke points, including the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Wetar straits. This could be done through the collaborative use of sovereign islands such as the Cocos (Keeling Islands) that belong to Australia and are near many of the same maritime choke points that India is concerned with in addition to the ANI.[43]

The United States would theoretically be the ablest partner for security and potential economic to the ANI, offsetting the Chinese threat in the region. No U.S. naval ship or aircraft has been given access to the ANI. In contrast, Japanese, French, and British naval vessels have visited the ANI, albeit low-key, without much publicity. Indian reluctance reflects past geopolitical tendencies to allow the United States access to the islands that reignite past geopolitical situations between the United States and India, including perceived imperialist fears, Cold War tensions, and, most troubling to India, the support of the United States for Pakistan.[44]

India has other significant fear regarding allowing other countries access to the ANI, particularly the United States and Australia. India has strong feelings that any increased interaction with the United States would almost certainly result in three distinct challenges:

1. The presence of the United States in any form on the ANI would permanently foul chances of cooperation with China in the region and almost certainly escalate tensions about China's Malacca Dilemma.

2. Once an agreement is made to have a U.S. military presence on the ANI, there would be a quid pro quo expectation from the United States that India does not want to be involved.

3. There would be an increased expectation for joint exercises and joint deployments between the United States and India and the possibility of India being caught in a collaborative framework between the United States and its allies, which are not within India's strategic framework.[45]

In any case, the certainty of increased Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean is apparent. China has already had joint exercises with Pakistan and Russia. China has strategically engaged with Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand, which has increased significantly in recent years. In addition, the success of the Quad and Quad plus indicates that mutually beneficial partnerships between India and Western powers are occurring without a threat of imperialistic encroachment. Furthermore, the United States possesses considerably advanced military technology and assets usually only shared with certain allies. Still, in the case of India, the United States may want to make an exception, given the current geopolitical climate.[46] The collaboration in the Western Pacific between the United States and Japan is another indicator of the potential benefits of increased cooperation between the United States and India regarding the ANI and the Strait of Malacca. Lastly, the Cocos, also known as the Keeling Islands, could be beneficial to the United States, India, and Australia by providing the initial opportunity for a joint command separate from the ANI that could demonstrate the benefits of the joint command construct, which could be transferred in some capacity to the ANI at an agreed-on time. As India continues to grow as a world power and China continues to exert its influence in the region, the benefits of having a more robust partnership with the United States in which joint operations and commands are created may significantly outweigh any fears that still exist within the Indian military and government.

Bilateral EABO Possibilities

The U.S. regional partners and allies like Japan and Australia have developed and strengthened international military alliances that have incorporated mutually supporting efforts in the region, such as cooperation in humanitarian crises, natural disasters and maritime security. In addition, the U.S. "pivot to the Pacific" has demonstrated the United States' commitment to stabilizing and combating an emerging Chinese threat. One of the United States' developing military concepts is EABO. EABO is a future naval operational concept that meets the resiliency and forward presence requirements of the next U.S. joint expeditionary operations paradigm. The EABO concept plans to rapidly deploy friendly forces, seize key terrain in and around the maritime domain, and establish strong points that deny the enemy the ability to move forces. The outcome of this concept is that any enemy force will be presented with an anti-access scenario that leaves few courses of action for them. The concept is adversary-based, cost-informed, and advantage-focused.[47] Although this concept is still being developed, there are multiple locations where it could be theoretically employed to significant effect. The ANI would be ideal for EABO and mutually beneficial for countries like India and the United States. Furthermore, additional opportunities could be pursued as a result of EABO, such as seaplane basing.

The United States must have close allies and partners fully invested in this concept. This would be especially important for a future partnership with India to employ U.S. forces on the ANI. Beyond the need for a strong association

between the United States and India to be used effectively, the EABO concept must have sound logistical lines in an expeditionary environment, have a low signature not easily observed in an antiaccess/area-denial (A2/D2) environment, and may need to stockpile massive amounts of weapons.[48] Any agreement to employ forces to execute EABO operations would be a huge strategic and diplomatic victory for the United States and make the defenses around the ANI even more formidable. However, for this to be a reality it may be imperative that the EABO concept be proven as effective and a necessity for future war.

One of the most significant difficulties military thinkers throughout history have tried to solve is determining how the character of war has changed and anticipating what is required to be successful in future conflicts. The ANI holds great potential for multiple nations to collaborate in understanding and revolutionizing warfare with technological advancement, innovative concepts of warfare from the tactical to a strategic level, multination warfare doctrine, and international law enforcement practices. Ideas include EABO, seaplane employment, the employment of the U.S. Marine Corps concept of the littoral combat regiment, and interdiction of piracy and IUU fishing interdiction can all be greatly enhanced in a collaborative effort with the ANI as the key maritime terrain.

EABO is an evolving concept that is rapidly picking up speed as a primary means of employing tactical level units in an A2/AD battlefield as stand-in forces. As technology advances, the reality of how warfare will be conducted in the future changes. The primary mission of EABO is to support sea control operations; work sea denial operations within the littorals; contribute to maritime domain awareness; provide forward command, control, communications, computers and combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C5ISR); targeting, and counter targeting capability; as well as forward sustainment.[49] The EABO concept is tested and modified by the U.S. Marine Corps in the Western Pacific through collaborative efforts with Japan and could also be done in the same manner with India.

A roadblock in testing and approving the EABO concept is the availability of willing allies and partners to develop the idea. In addition, the reality of using the EABO concept must be realistic, meaning that the geographic landscape must be ideally suited for the employment of the concept. The ANI's proximity to the Strait of Malacca and the fact that more than five hundred islands lie within the ANI, as well as the availability of multiple islands immediately outside the ANI archipelago make the EABO possibilities extremely relevant to this region. Furthermore, the opportunity for the U.S. Marine Corps to jointly develop a concept with another elite unit in the Bihar Regiment is a real possibility. This would appear to be a mutually beneficial proposal for India to consider. Along with proving the concepts within EABO itself, the ability to engage in weapons deals, share technology, and eventually implement a series of joint strong points in the region as a deterrent to outside aggression may be strategically appealing to India.

Within the EABO concept, the primary tactical unit should be a littoral combat regiment with a permanent residence within the islands as part of the joint construct. Another option in the region would be the Australian Cocos Islands to the south. Of course, the U.S. and Indian governments may be years away from an agreement that would entail a sizable force of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed on sovereign Indian land. To further develop this possibility, the United States could also send advisory forces or observers to the disputed Himalayan region as a first step in building a collaborative relationship. The reality of high-level cooperation between the Indian military is mainly dependent on China's continued aggression and the perceived need by India to have the United States supplement their forces in some capacity to deter Chinese aggression. Another possibility for expedited progression would be a change in Indian government leadership, although that may also be worse for the United States depending on the outcome. It would be prudent for the U.S. Navy to strongly consider implementing the EABO concept in any future exercise with the Indian military and, most importantly, confirm EABO doctrine as much as possible with the U.S. Marine Corps. This is a challenging task in that new military concepts are never fully proven until a war occurs, and in most cases, the concept needs modification after the first battle. The best example of this truth may be the failed Gallipoli campaign of World War I (WWI) or the U.S. Marine Corps modification of their WWII amphibious doctrine after the Battle of Tarawa. From the EABO discussion come other possibilities such as seaplane employment and joint maritime enforcement possibilities.

Sea Plane Employment

Nearly 60 years after the U.S. Navy retired its last seaplane, the EABO concept has led to a resurgence of interest in marine aircraft. Expeditionary advanced bases will rarely have runways. During WWII, both flying boats, operating from the sea or, if amphibious, from land bases, and floatplanes had a significant role in all naval theaters. Their roles included maritime patrol, antisubmarine warfare, logistics, and air/sea rescue. The Navy kept maritime patrol flying boats in service for two decades after the war. In the 1950s, it envisioned a new generation of marine aircraft, including the Martin P6M SeaMaster, essentially a flying boat equivalent to the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. The program did not survive technical challenges and, more importantly, competition for funds from ballistic missiles, submarines, and carrier aviation. The ability of seaplanes to fly farther and faster than rotary-wing aircraft and land without runways has led to a resurgence of interest. The most apparent missions are logistical support for advanced bases and long-range air-sea rescue, but a new generation of flying boats could also perform combat missions.[50] The ANI has numerous locations for seaplane bases.

International Maritime Enforcement

The international community has vast interests in the Strait of Malacca for

maritime economic reasons as do other strategic competitors. The potential for the ANI to be a significant international hub from which IUU interdiction and antipiracy efforts could be launched is considerable. Many countries along the Strait of Malacca and Southeast Asia depend on fishing as their primary source of protein and a primary driver for their economies. Furthermore, antipiracy efforts are an essential element of security efforts in and around the Strait of Malacca. Nearly 120,000 vessels travel through the Strait of Malacca a year, about one-quarter of the world's yearly shipping commerce.[51] The piracy problem in the Strait of Malacca dates to 1511 when the Portuguese first took the Strait of Malacca and attempted to institute antipiracy efforts on a large scale.[52] The problem has waxed and waned but never completely solved, mainly due to the 933-kilometer length of the Strait of Malacca.[53]

The United States could also establish a presence in the ANI with the Coast Guard. The United States has made significant efforts in counterpiracy operations around the world. The U.S. Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan of 2014 commits the United States to use all appropriate instruments of national power to repress piracy and related maritime crime, strengthen regional governance and the rule of law, maintain the safety of mariners, preserve freedom of the seas, and promote the free flow of commerce.[54] The United States already has multiple partnerships with other nations, and a Coast Guard presence in the ANI could support India and the ASEAN states in both counterpiracy and the enforcement of IUU fishing. The U.S. Coast Guard is in a prime position to function as an international enforcement element easily able to partner in bilateral enforcement operations. Furthermore, the vast potential of the Quad plus members to execute antipiracy interdiction at the western exit point of the Strait of Malacca and across the Indian Ocean is immense. Based on a collaborative effort from the ANI, the combined naval resources of the United States, India, Australia, and Japan could permanently stop piracy around the Strait of Malacca and be a useful diplomatic tool.

Furthermore, the nature of IUU fishing and piracy is an easily agreeable and mutually beneficial set of problems to cooperate on and can be countered in bilateral operations. The win-win scenario appears to be an excellent way to improve relationships and use the ANI for a collaborative effort for the United States and India and potentially for all Quad members. The U.S. Coast Guard should be leveraged as much as possible to facilitate international cooperation and secure mutually beneficial strategic objectives in the Bay of Bengal, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean. The United States is in the best position to make bilateral operations a reality by instituting additional agreements such as other defense and arms agreements, trade deals, and technology sharing. The international community's best interests will only benefit those acting in the world's best interests. International maritime enforcement is a set of problems that will draw support, improve economic interest and cooperation, and further existing partnerships such as the Quad.

In the case of the ANI, it is hard to argue with millennia-old truths regarding maritime terrain and the advantages of controlling one of the world's most traveled maritime choke points in the Strait of Malacca. The challenge for the United States and India is to find common ground on which to align their security efforts in the Bay of Bengal and Strait of Malacca that will necessitate the use of the ANI. Enduring international problems such as IUU fishing and piracy provide increasing opportunities to engage in bilateral operations that align regional, global security, and economic interests for members of the Quad and most of the international community. The additional option of using the U.S. Coast Guard that can be employed as a global maritime police force instead of an overwhelming militaristic naval force like the U.S. Navy has favorable political and diplomatic appeal to both India and the United States.

However, if the escalation of a Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal, Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean continue, members of the Quad will be forced to look at how a war in the region may play out. It would be prudent for Quad members to explore concepts like bilateral EABO employment and seaplane basing in and around the ANI. This exploration would advance potential future employment of strategic ideas and capabilities and allow for a unified effort in deterring Chinese actions in the region. The decision to start engaging in exploratory military concepts may need to be made sooner than later as the strategic stakes of jeopardizing the Strait of Malacca and crucial SLOCs in the Indian and Pacific Oceans are colossal.

The U.S. Coast Guard has the unique potential to accomplish strategic maritime goals, including international enforcement of illegal maritime activities, while also being a softer option for bilateral collaboration. The ANI are ideally suited for a U.S. Coast Guard presence. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security International Port Security Program (IPSP) is ideally suited to support host nation countries and is proven effective worldwide. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead agency for the IPSP. It is employed in a quasimilitary capacity that is ideally suited for governments seeking to avoid the attention a significant U.S. military presence would bring. The program allows sharing of the best port security practices and collaborative efforts to address international maritime issues such as IUU fishing and piracy.[55] The IPSP is much less intrusive to the Indian government, facilitates bilateral collaboration in maritime security, bolsters the Indian military's capabilities, and allows the United States to have a presence on the ANI. Implementing IPSP as part of a packaged security agreement could be a significant first step for the Indian and U.S. relationship regarding the ANI. Due to the robust nature of the U.S. Coast Guard, port visits, joint maritime patrols, and eventually permanently based aircraft, small craft, and ships could all be possibilities.

Another role that the U.S. Coast Guard could take is reviving the U.S. seaplane program. Like the Coast Guard mission of rescue operations, a turboprop class seaplane could be immediately introduced to overseas areas where the Coast Guard has a presence, including the ANI. A collaborative development

effort between the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Indian Navy has the potential to eventually create a strategic seaplane fleet based out of the ANI that was of benefit to the international community and versatile enough to be employed in a combat environment if the need arose. A partnership relationship in which the U.S. Coast Guard could be based on the ANI may be more feasible and practical in the India–U.S. relationship. A potential concern among the many variables that surround a U.S. and India partnership in the ANI are different ideologies that exist between the United States and India.

Ideological Concerns

There may be a future concern residing with the United States over the growing ideological differences between the United States and India. While India is considered a democracy, it is a very different democracy than that of the United States with a classical history of a caste system in which the treatment of the lower class of India's society has drawn criticism and negative attention from the world. Almost immediately after India declared its independence from Great Britain, India was abruptly confronted with Cold War realities when the United States formed an alliance with Pakistan in 1954.[56] The sitting Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, further strained the relationship by taking a stance of neutrality in the Cold War, neither favoring the Soviet Bloc nor the United States. This was the determining factor in the refusal of the United States to stake its regional aspirations on an alliance with India and instead chose to align closely with Pakistan.[57] The alliance between the United States and Pakistan would inflict damage on the U.S. and India relationship for decades and create a considerable distrust from India toward the United States. Deep historical and religious rifts between Pakistan and India have manifested the India-Pakistan border into one of the most volatile regions in the world. In addition, historical foreign policy decisions from the United States regarding India, including large weapons deals with the Pakistani government have been detrimental to the U.S. and India relationship.

Despite the tumultuous Cold War relationship, the U.S. and India relationship improved during the latter half of the Cold War and after the fall of the Soviet Union. The relationship reached a high point during the President George W. Bush era in the early 2000s as common ground was reached on terrorism, including mutually supporting efforts and collaboration in many areas.[58] However, in 2014 with the election of Narendra Modi, considerable challenges arose, primarily from the ideological approach of Modi. A known right-wing Hindu nationalist, Modi's approach to democracy in India is a dramatic shift from what the United States would traditionally view as a pure democracy and may even be called a conservative authoritarian government.[59] Furthermore, under Modi, weapons purchases from Russia during the President Donald J. Trump administration further strained the relationship, nearly resulting in sanctions being imposed on India. However, this was averted after diplomatic efforts.

The hope that the President Joseph R. Biden administration will improve

the relationship further between the U.S. and India is shared by both countries. The Biden administration has put forth the effort to make India a significant partner in its security cooperation efforts on overall strategy to counter China. In terms of trade deals, defense agreements, and information sharing, the United States and India are on track to remain major defense partners for the foreseeable future. The United States is India's largest trading partner, with more than $152 billion in trade a year.[60] As the threat of Chinese influence in the ANI and Strait of Malacca region increases and China continues its aggressive posture along the northern Indian border, the opportunity for the United States and India to dramatically improve cooperation efforts is more of a reality than in decades before. The fact that U.S. forces may have a presence on the ANI despite ideological differences and past relationship woes between India and the United States is promising. However, strategic competition is always full of power plays by other major world powers. China, Russia, Pakistan, and regional authorities have a vote and will all factor into the future of the United States, India, and the ANI.

The implications of strategic competition may be the most critical set of factors that will determine the future of the ANI and how they will be used. The United States and India have many differences regarding overall goals securing and maintaining SLOCs, choke points, and a dominating military presence in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Malacca. The circumstances in the region surrounding the Strait of Malacca will most certainly change in the next decade, and indications point toward an increased Chinese presence at multiple strategic points that would threaten the ANI with strategic encirclement. This should not be allowed to occur by India, the United States, or regional powers.

The necessity for India to increase its cooperation and collaborative efforts with Western nations, including the United States, cannot be ignored. The United States has made considerable efforts to improve its relationship with India on multiple fronts. It has shown its willingness to overlook some ideological differences and past slights to maintain and grow a relationship on much better ground than in the past. The same could be said of India, which is now at a crossroads on what should be done to counter a growing Chinese threat and ensure the security of its increasingly threatened frontier lands, the least of which is the ANI. Perhaps most importantly is the opportunity for India to increase its global standing by being the nation that is willing to partner with others in the world to ensure the security and economic integrity of one of the world's foremost maritime choke points.

Conclusion

Regarding U.S. strategic considerations, the importance of the ANI as a crucial piece of maritime terrain in the first island chain continues to be neglected, and its importance will continue to grow. Military professionals need to un-

derstand the ANI implications and role in future conflict scenarios. India has undertaken considerable efforts to enable the ANI to support a significant economic and military presence. India seems to be gradually heading in the right direction to use the islands for its strategic gain while remaining aware of any environmental ramifications. The ANI are a unique point of convergence between geography, security, and economics that India must further develop and capitalize upon. The United States may be uniquely positioned to partner with India and regional allies in various security, economic, technological, and military capacities.

China has established its strategic ports and airfields in India's immediate neighborhood, especially Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.[61] While China pursues its interests in the region to counter the strategic significance of the ANI, the United States may want to reevaluate how vital the islands are and what is needed to ensure their use favors U.S. interests. The United States may have to take drastic measures to build a relationship that would allow access to the ANI. While the academic literature on U.S. strategic possibilities surrounding the use of the ANI is somewhat sparse, the island's importance remains.

The United States must explore opportunities to take diplomatic, informational, military, and economic courses of action to create an enhanced partnership with India that includes access to the ANI.[62] The capability of the United States to convince India that a U.S. military presence in the ANI would be beneficial for both nations and the region is unclear. Nevertheless, seemingly small cooperative events such as dignitary visits, small-scale exercises, or brief port visits by the U.S. Coast Guard would be beneficial in accomplishing strategic goals and strengthening relationships. Further exploration in these areas would significantly enhance the academic debate and potentially draw the United States, India, and regional partners and allies toward a mutually beneficial outcome regarding the ANI that promotes global security and international economic prosperity.

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The Port-Hopping War
Littoral and Amphibious Operations in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884

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Abstract: The War of the Pacific (1879–84) showcases the development of amphibious warfare during a period of industrialization and technological flux. Historians have traditionally framed Chilean victory in the war as a function of seapower: naval superiority from which victory on land followed as a result. This view underestimates the complex and reciprocal interplay of amphibious and naval operations throughout the conflict. The war can be better understood as a campaign of port hopping, enabled by maritime capacity and naval power, but reliant on amphibious elements to achieve political results and sustain Chilean sea control. In exploring the relationship(s) between amphibious and naval operations in the War of the Pacific, this article historicizes the emergence of modern amphibious warfare as a component of seapower in the industrial era.
Keywords: amphibious warfare, War of the Pacific, technology, nineteenth century

The War of the Pacific (1879–84) is one of many milestones in global military history too often lost in the no-man's-land between the U.S. Civil War and World War I.[1] Fought over the territorial frontiers of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, it remade the political geography of South America. From a historical perspective, it also offers a valuable data point in the evolution of modern industrial warfare. Using then state-of-the-art technologies, Chile defeated the Andean allies, Peru and Bolivia, at sea in the opening months of the war. After a series of amphibious landings up the Peruvian coast in 1880, the Chilean army occupied the capital, Lima, Peru, in January 1881. Punitive peace

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
treaties signed thereafter ceded a belt of nitrate-rich Peruvian and Bolivian territory to Santiago—including Bolivia's only seaport, Antofagasta. Irredentist grievances bubbled up in the twentieth century, making the Peruvian-Bolivian-Chilean frontier what the U.S. State Department in 1919 called "America's Alsace-Lorraine."[2]

Alongside political frontiers, the war smashed technological boundaries as well. It featured a burst of developing industrial weapons: the machine gun, armored warships, electrically detonated mines, and locomotive torpedoes—to name just a few. Experts and amateurs from around the world sifted through technical evidence for insights into the future of industrial war.[3] The tactics and strategies best suited new technical advancements were hotly debated. In the absence of evidence from great power wars, the War of the Pacific took on an outsized significance.

Operationally, the War of the Pacific was equally suggestive of a coming era of joint assaults from the sea.[4] Because the belligerents' desert frontiers were largely impassable to armies traveling by foot or hoof, Chile's success hinged on the movement of thousands of men and animals up the coast by sea, defeating the "tyranny of distance" by securing intermediate waypoints (and with them valuable sites of future resource exploitation).[5] This port-hopping campaign took place in four phases during roughly 18 months.[6] The first was a purely naval contest with Peru for regional sea control. Chilean naval preponderance (assured after October 1879) then enabled three port hops north toward the Peruvian capital: 1) the invasion of Pisagua and Iquique; 2) the Tacna and Arica Campaign; and finally; 3) the landings against Lima. All the while, Peruvian inventors and officials attempted to interrupt Chilean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) with cruisers, torpedoes, and other subterfuges.[7] Taken together, the War of the Pacific speaks to the enduring reciprocity between naval and amphibious operations as well as the challenges of joint cooperation, ship-to-shore troop movements, and the vulnerability of sustainment-by-sea to cheap asymmetric weapons. The upshot: coincident with the advent of industrial war at sea came a campaign of amphibious port hopping that both promoted sea control and translated naval victories into results on land.

The Battlespace: Desert, Sea, and the Imperative of Amphibious Operations

The geography of the Atacama Desert was central to the origins and conduct of the war. The actual desert stretches 966 kilometers along the coast of what is today northern Chile, but it shapes the region more broadly. The discovery of nitrate salts (*salitre*) in the 1840s—used globally in the production of fertilizer and gunpowder—led to a mining boom. Resource exploitation generated revenue and with it interstate frictions between Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. Eventually, in 1879, disputes about taxation—along with other factors—precipitated the War of the Pacific: what was commonly referred to at the time as the *Guerra de*

Map 1. Bolivia and the Peru-Bolivia-Chile frontier, 1885

Note: this map shows prewar political boundaries. Both Peru and Bolivia lost coast-line in the war to Chile.
Source: Nicolas Estevanez, Bolivia *(Paris: Garnier Hermanos, 1885), courtesy of the David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.*

Salitre or Ten Cents War in reference to the Atacama's resources and the taxes levied on them, respectively.[8]

But for all its natural wealth, surviving—let alone sustaining major combat operations—in Atacama and the nearby Tarapacá Desert was (and is) a constant challenge. Much of the region is an almost literal Marscape: a surreal expanse where the National Aeronautics and Space Administration tests its rovers and

astrobiologists consider the possibilities of extraterrestrial life.[9] How to supply and wage an industrial war—complete with thousands of animals—in this space was an open question.[10] North-to-south road routes were rudimentary. The handful of existing railroad tracks almost always ran east-west connecting inland mining centers with seaports.[11]

The difficulty of campaigning across the Atacama made the sea an essential theater of the continental war.[12] Divining lessons from the conflict, in 1896, the British historian Herbert Wilson went so far as to assert that because almost all communication along the Pacific slope was carried over water, "whichever power then commanded the sea must inevitably reduce the other to submission."[13] This Mahanian conviction overstated the point, but the war does provide an example of naval power and its advantages for continental campaigns: whether it is the movement of troops and animals, blockades of ports, naval gunfire support, or even the supply of potable water from shipborne condensers.[14] Indeed, 10 years before Mahan coined the phrase "sea power," the inaugural edition of Chile's *Revista de Marina* looked back on the war, declaring with serene confidence, "*he who controls the sea, dominates the land. . . .* The army is a powerful auxiliary . . . but the navy is indispensable."[15]

All that said, navalist determinism (often explicit in assessments written by naval officers after the fact) should be viewed with skepticism. Seapower was not and is not a sufficient explanation of Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific. Naval assets could neither dislodge Peruvian garrisons from the provinces of Tacna and Arica, nor force Peruvian leaders in Lima to the negotiating table. Even after achieving command of the sea, the operational challenges of amphibious operations remained dramas of great power and contingency for all involved. Just how and why the Chilean Navy and Army cooperated in the amphibious drive up the Peruvian coast follows below, offering both generalizable lessons about and historical precedents in the evolution of modern amphibious operations.

Phase I: The War for Sea Control as the Precondition of Amphibious Operations

The war's first phase was a naval one, designed to achieve preponderance at sea, and with it maritime lines of communication around and/or across the desert. In 1911, the British naval theorist Julian S. Corbett noted, "the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to deny the enemy from securing it."[16] Only then could armies and goods move effectively over water. That logic certainly applied to the War of the Pacific.

Ostensibly responding to a tax dispute, in February 1879 Chilean forces occupied Antofagasta—Bolivia's main port and a key shipping point of the nitrate industry. Peru came to Bolivia's defense per the terms of the two nations' defensive alliance. As armies mobilized, both the Peruvian and Chilean

Table 1. Approximate strength of Peruvian and Chilean naval forces, 1879

Naval order of battle of Peru and Chile, ca. 1879				
	Chile	Notes	Peru	Notes
Armored warships	*Blanco Encalda, Cochrane*	2 x 3,500-ton armored frigates	*Huáscar, Independencia*	1 x 1,80-ton turreted monitor; 1 x 2,000-ton armored frigate
Coastal defense	Torpedo boats	11 x 35–70-ton torpedo-boats	*Atahualpa, Manco Capac;* Torpedo boats	2 x 1,000-ton coastal defense monitors; 2 x spar-torpedo boats
Wooden cruisers, corvettes, etc.	*Abtao, Chacabuco, Covadonga, Esmeralda, Magallanes, O'Higgins, Amazonas, Angamos, Tolten*	10,000 tons of wooden warships	*Pilcomayo, Unión, Limeña, Oroya, Chalaco, Talismán, Mayro*	6,000 tons of wooden warships
Total	22	21,000 tons	13	12,000 tons

Source: Sater, Andean Tragedy, *113–15;* La Marina en la Historia de Chile, *Tomo I, 438; and* Historia Marítima del Perú, *Tomo X, 783–84.*

fleets—headlined by European-built armored warships—prepared to seek out and destroy the enemy (table 1).

The first test of those naval assets came soon enough. In a quixotic attempt to snatch victory through sea power alone, the Chilean admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo deployed the majority of his fleet north to Lima's contiguous port Callao.[17] Modeled on the sort of gunboat diplomacy common in the late-nineteenth century, this effort had the counterproductive effect of opening Chile's supply lines and depots to raids by the Peruvian fleet. Seizing the opportunity, Peru's two oceangoing armored warships, the *Huáscar* (1865) and *Independencia* (1865), slipped passed the main Chilean force, sailing south unopposed. On 21 May, these ships surprised and engaged the wooden Chilean vessels *Esmeralda* (1855) and *Covadonga* (1859) at the small port of Iquique, in what is today northern Chile. Despite a heroic (nigh suicidal) defense by its captain, Arturo Prat, the turreted monitor *Huáscar* rammed and sank the Chilean corvette *Esmeralda*.[18] Nearby—and less happily for Peru—the ironclad *Independencia* ran aground in pursuit of the Chilean *Covadonga*—a catastrophic self-inflicted wound for which the *Independencia*'s skipper was court-martialed.[19]

The loss of the *Independencia* left the Peruvian Navy at a critical disadvan-

tage. Chile now had two seagoing 3,500-ton ironclads at sea against the 1,800-ton *Huáscar*. That capability gap forced a strategic adjustment. Under the command of Miguel Grau, Peru's remaining armored combatant, the *Huáscar* and the wooden corvette *Unión* (1865), embarked on *guerre de course*—a war of raids against shipping—as a matter of necessity.[20] Complete with radically new technologies like automobile torpedoes, Grau's attacks might well be seen as a test-in-advance of the principles advocated by the French "young school" in the 1880s (a reaction to asymmetries vis-à-vis Britain).[21]

Grau's campaign did not want for drama. The U.S. Navy officer and author James Wilson King reckoned that the "havoc" inflicted by the *Huáscar* on the Chilean merchant marine gave it "a notoriety second only to that of the [Confederate cruiser] *Alabama*."[22] King's was a high, if dubious, compliment. Just as Confederate raiders like the CSS *Alabama* (1862) had avoided direct conflict with U.S. Navy forces during the Civil War, so too did Grau skirt around the Chilean fleet, preferring instead to raid civil shipping and port infrastructure with sensational effects. Grau racked up a record, seizing, *Revista de Marina* bitterly recalled, "merchant ships and troop transports, money and important correspondence."[23] Much as the *Alabama* had for the Union Navy before it, defending against Grau's raids tied down a disproportionate number of Chilean warships, forcing them to patrol vast expanses of ocean in search of the *Huáscar*. Grau's most notable success came with the capture of the Chilean steamer *Rimac* (1872) on 23 July 1879: a transport carrying cannon and 300 cavalry.[24] Defenseless and without enough lifeboats to scuttle the ship, the *Rimac*'s captain surrendered, though not before the Chilean soldiers reportedly finished off the alcohol onboard.[25] Beyond its immediate material effects, the incident dramatized the vulnerability of Chilean sea lines of communication to Peruvian raids. As the contemporary observer Clements Markham noted, as long as Grau "kept his ship on the seas under the Peruvian flag the Chilians [*sic*] did not dare to undertake any important expedition."[26]

Back in Santiago, the loss of the *Rimac* (or else the failure to impede the *Huáscar*) was such a scandal that it prompted the removal of Admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo and the appointment of Rafael Sotomayor as minister of war in the field to oversee the military's efforts.[27] Capturing or destroying the *Huáscar* now became the organizing principle of Chilean naval operations.[28] Luckily for Santiago, the *Huáscar*'s months at sea began to wear on the ship. Fouling (the growth of marine life on the ship's hull) decreased its top speed—in the end fatally. Sighted on 8 October 1879 and unable to outrun its pursuers, the Chilean ironclads *Blanco Encalada* (1875) and *Cochrane* (1875) engaged with and captured the Peruvian *Huáscar* at the Battle of Angamos, killing Grau in the process.[29]

The battle marked a pivot in the nature of the war. As was now obvious, Santiago enjoyed, the French legation cabled home, "preponderance over the waters of the Southern Pacific Ocean."[30] That seapower, while impressive, was not an end in and of itself, but rather a means to control communications and

safeguard the movement of troops and supplies north to Peru. Rather than a Mahanian triumph for Chile, victory at Angamos only opened a new phase of the war: one of amphibious operations against a still numerically superior adversary alliance. As Sotomayor pondered the situation in October 1879, he came to appreciate that the conclusion of the war as a matter of pure naval strategy came as a prologue for major amphibious operations.

Phase II and III: Chilean Amphibious Operations in the Desert Borderlands

With the threat from the *Huáscar* eliminated, the Chilean military turned to two missions: the blockade of the enemy coast and the transport of the army north toward the frontier regions and eventually Lima.[31] Given the distance, that effort hinged on port hops: the seizure of intermediate waypoints or as the Chilean *Revista de Marina* described it in 1885, a "step by step, victory by victory" advance "until the triumphant entrance into Lima."[32] Swapping Tokyo for Lima and the "stepping-stone bases which must be seized by amphibious operation" to reach it, makes for a passible description of "island hopping" during WWII.[33] Overcoming the distances of the Atacama Desert or the Pacific Ocean would be untenable without supporting bases forcibly taken along the advance. In the same way that in 1921 Marine Corps major Earl H. Ellis contemplated "the reduction and occupation of [islands in Micronesia] and the establishment of the necessary bases therein, as a preliminary phase of hostilities" against Japan, so too did Sotomayor propose hopping up the coast, amphibiously seizing port bases along the way.[34] In both cases, the challenge of distance could be met by amphibious operations enabled by and reciprocally supporting naval power. The first of these hops was Antofagasta, seized by Chilean forces in the opening days of the war.[35] Where to strike next—how far up the coast to reach and what to risk in doing so—was a hotly contested question.

Phase II: Iquique and Pisagua

There were many possibilities. Pondering various landing sites, Chilean leaders eventually agreed on the mineral-rich Tarapacá province and its port Iquique: a city defended in a manner proportionate to its strategic and economic importance as a center of the nitrate industry.[36] Opting to avoid a frontal attack, Sotomayor instead insisted on two landings to the north of the city at Junin Bay and Pisagua (though specific disembarkation plans were not finalized until the invasion force was at sea).[37] From there an army of nearly 10,000 troops would linkup and march on Iquique. Faced with an attacking army and invested by the Chilean Navy—the theory went—Iquique's defenders would have little choice but to evacuate the port.

It was an elegant plan—one leveraging the advantages of maneuver and joint army-navy cooperation—but frictions soon emerged. The first trial in this "Desert Campaign" was simply to amass the necessary transports to move 9,500 troops and nearly 1,000 animals. Naval forces had secured sea control

at Angamos, but—as these preparations demonstrated—the ability to use the sea hinged on a broader set of maritime assets: troopships, coaling vessels, and landing craft, often hastily adapted from the commercial purposes that underwrote Chilean economic prosperity in peacetime.[38] None were purpose built for amphibious operations, necessitating adaptations on the fly. The bulk of Chile's navy would escort the nine steam transports earmarked for the invasion; no doubt with the *Rimac* fiasco in mind.[39]

This force assembled off of Pisagua on 1 November 1879, where matters got off to a bad start. Due to navigational errors, the fleet rendezvoused at the wrong point and had to steam back toward the assault beaches. Once in position, and already hours behind schedule, the assault confronted a bay defended by two forts and 1,200 dug-in Bolivian troops. Some Chilean officials protested that the landing would be impossible given enemy preparations, rough seas, and narrow beaches.[40] Objections noted, on the morning of 2 November, the attack went ahead. The initial Chilean landing force of 450 made its final approach in open rowboats under heavy fire.[41] Once ashore and constrained by bottlenecks on the beach, it took what must have been an unbearably long hour for the second Chilean wave to arrive. Despite these shortcomings, the allies—now under naval gunfire and a disciplined Chilean assault—broke and retreated toward high ground.[42] A third Chilean wave disembarked in the early afternoon as the advance continued into the hills above Pisagua, completing a rout of the allied defenders.[43] One Bolivian battalion lost 298 of its 498 personnel, well in excess of the total casualties suffered by the invading Chileans (though an untold number of the Bolivian losses were desertions).[44]

In comparison to the action at Pisagua, the landings at Junin with a smaller force of 2,100 troops went smoothly. Apparently, the allies fled in response to preparatory naval shelling.[45] More challenging were environmental factors: friction affects amphibious operations in peculiar ways even in the absence of the enemy's will. Heavy surf and rocky disembarkation points meant that by the time the attacking Chileans had moved ashore at Junin, the fighting at Pisagua had concluded.[46] So much for a coordinated assault.

Despite the challenges, Chilean forces now had a beachhead in Tarapacá Province. But that position was a tenuous one. As Chilean forces consolidated in Pisagua, Iquique remained in Peruvian hands while thousands of Bolivian and Peruvian troops mobilized farther north. Exacerbating matters, water supplies in Pisagua were insufficient to support the armed forces and civilian inhabitants, even when supplemented by the flotilla's ship-borne water condensers.[47] A lack of medical staff ashore (a critical oversight in planning by the army commander Erasmo Escala) was another challenge, only adding to the insecurity of the Chilean position and the misery of the men clinging to it.[48]

The Andean allies responded to the invasion with (on paper) overwhelming force. Attempting to counterattack against the Chilean beachhead, Bolivia's military dictator, Hilarión Daza, brought thousands of troops down from the Bolivian highlands to the coast. Flogging (sometimes literally) his forces on, the

Bolivians' final push through the arid wastes of Tarapacá Province was woefully undersupplied. After marching south for three days, Daza gave up and returned north to the Peruvian port of Arica. When Chilean and allied forces eventually met at the Battle of Dolores (or the Battle of San Francisco) on 19 November, 7,200 allied troops charged Chilean forces dug in on high ground and supported by artillery. Results were predictable and as the official history has it, "the Chilean triumph was unquestionable."[49] Soon after, Peruvian defenders abandoned Iquique and retreated into the desert.[50] Now unopposed, Chilean troops disembarked and occupied the port of Iquique proper on 23 November 1879.[51]

Taken together, Chilean victory in the campaign for Iquique illustrated the advantages and difficulties of sea power projected ashore. The Chilean army was able to move along the desert in ways that were difficult (and often fatal) for the numerically superior Andean allies to attempt overland. The occupation of Pisagua and Iquique offered the Chilean military its first foothold in the campaign north toward Lima. It also denied the Peruvian government access to nitrates revenues from Tarapacá—crucial assets to finance the war and a core aim of Chilean territorial aggrandizement. That said, success could not obscure glaring weaknesses in Sotomayor and Escala's planning and execution: for example, insufficient water supplies and poor beach selection. Still greater tests loomed ahead in the next phase of the amphibious campaign.

Phase III: Tacna and Arica

The fall of Iquique was a strategic and political disaster for the Andean allies. The Bolivian leader Daza lost power in a coup and fled to Europe. Facing growing political opposition, Peru's president Mariano Ignacio Prado followed suit (ostensibly on a mission to procure warships to replace the *Huáscar*). In Lima, Nicolás de Piérola took Prado's place, promising to mobilize Peru's remaining reserves of men and materiel against the Chilean advance, which gathered apace.

The second phase of Chile's port hopping began in earnest in February 1880, targeting the allied garrisons at Arica and the inland city of Tacna.[52] Some in Chile argued for proceeding directly against Callao from Iquique, but Chilean political leaders cautioned against leapfrogging Peru's armies in the south.[53] Not only would these bypassed garrisons endanger the rear of a Chilean offensive, but Tacna Province also offered the best water and forage for pack animals; once again the Pacific Slope's climate shaped the scope of possible operations.

The port of Arica was heavily fortified, creating tactical challenges for a direct attack by sea. Above the city, the 700-foot cliff El Morro sprouted artillery as Peruvians hastily improved the city's defenses. Below, a U.S. Civil War-era ironclad monitor patrolled the harbor, an antiquated but still credible threat (as harassing Chilean ships learned the hard way in February 1880).[54] In March 1880, the Peruvian *Unión* even made an intrepid resupply run into Arica, darting under the nose of the Chilean blockade to deliver Gatling guns and a small torpedo boat.[55]

As at Iquique, the solution to Arica's defensive preparations was to land in

a flanking position at the enemy's rear—not unlike the U.S.–United Nations landings at Inchon during the Korean War. In this case it was the small port of Ilo, 322 kilometer north of the Chilean base at Pisagua and 113 kilometers north of Arica. By mid-February, Chilean forces had mustered four divisions of troops at Pisagua, along with 19 ships and hastily finished barges to transport the landing force.[56] Sotomayor and Escala had learned lessons from the Iquique operation. Chilean advanced units provided close reconnaissance of the beaches ahead of the attack and some thought was given on how to better move troops from ship-to-shore on purpose-built landing craft.[57] Most importantly, unlike at Pisagua, Ilo was undefended. Most units arrived on the docks with dry feet and moved to occupy the nearby city of Pacocha, consolidating their hold on the area by the end of February 1880.

From there, however, difficulties multiplied. Huddled beneath the fleet's guns and hesitant to venture into the desert interior, Chilean forces attempted to lure the Peruvian Army of the South into counter attacking across the arid landscape.[58] Chilean raids escalated steadily, hoping to provoke a response. In early March, a small Chilean amphibious landing against the nearby port of Mollendo broke down into looting and riots. Reports of that attack generated outrage in Peru, but little concrete retaliation from the allies.[59]

Later that same month, slow progress (and simmering political feuds with Sotomayor) led to the replacement of General Escala by Manuel Baquedano as commander in the field.[60] Baquedano moved with new, but not always wise, purpose against the Peruvian garrisons. His target was the town of Tacna, a 129-kilometer march inland from the beachhead.[61] Venturing overland against the allied forces meant crossing a hostile space about which the Chileans knew little—despite some unhappy cavalry forays into the desert.[62] Baquedano's troops paid a high price for that ignorance. Ravaged by mosquitoes, diseases reduced the army's effective numbers by nearly 20 percent.[63] Sotomayor—the man who had done more than anyone to organize the amphibious campaign—died of a stroke in a desert encampment on 20 May 1880.[64]

Despite exhaustion and disease, a week later, on 26 May 1880, 14,000 Chileans engaged and defeated a comparable force of allied troops at Alto de la Alianza.[65] Making a direct frontal attack in the heat of the afternoon against a prepared allied defense, Chilean forces managed to carry the ground at bayonet point.[66] While Chilean casualties were heavy, the allied army more or less disintegrated; handfuls of Peruvian and Bolivian troops broke for Arica or the foothills of the Andes. Thereafter, thousands of wounded soldiers of all nationalities faced infection and death in unsanitary battlefield hospitals, or else a protracted and miserable journey to Valparaiso (via the Chilean Navy) or Callao (via the Red Cross).[67]

Tacna in hand, the road opened south to Arica: an essential waypoint for an advance north on Lima as well as the last point of Peruvian resistance that could conceivably arrest the Chilean offensive.[68] The defenses here—as noted above—were substantial; certainly more formidable than those that had nearly

scuttled Chilean amphibious operations at Pisagua. In addition to fortifications and warships, the Peruvian inventor Teodoro Elmore deployed electrically and pressure-detonated land mines. Unluckily for the Peruvians, advanced units of the Chilean army captured Elmore and forced him to divulge the locations of his minefields.[69]

Marching south along the rail and road network linking Tacna to Arica, the advancing Chileans cooperated with the fleet in several respects before storming the city. In advance of the ground assault, the Chilean navy also bombarded the port, trading fire with coastal batteries for hours in a fantastic display that none-theless failed to coerce the Peruvians into surrender.[70] A land attack followed the next day. Despite heroic and sometimes tragicomic acts of resistance by the Ar-ica's defenders, Chilean forces carried the forts. Famously, the Peruvian officer Alfonso Ugarte wrapped himself in the national colors and spurred his horse off the side of El Morro rather than surrender.[71] More practically, the crew of the *Manco Capac* (1865) scuttled the ship to avoid capture, completing the defeat.[72]

Together, the campaigns against Iquique and Arica secured likely embar-kation points for a campaign against Lima while also denying Peru the nitrate wealth needed to fund its war effort.[73] The Chilean victory at Tacna, further-more, had the effect of knocking Bolivia out of the war for all practical intents and purposes.[74] For Chilean naval forces, victory at Arica freed naval assets to tighten the blockade at Callao, bottling up Peruvian cruisers and preventing resupply operations to garrisons south of Lima.[75] On the one hand, naval forces helped secure bases for future "hops" north, while on the other amphibious landings captured ports to support future naval operations. Peru now faced invasion alone and isolated; a position of desperation that prompted new and innovative methods of littoral defense in the hopes of disrupting the SLOCs on which the Chilean amphibious advance now depended.

Peruvian Littoral Defense: Technologies and Tactics of Asymmetric Resistance

While the army campaigned against Tacna and Arica, the Chilean admiral Galvarino Riveros deployed his forces to blockade Callao and harass Peruvi-an coastal settlements. The capture of the *Rimac* and the *Unión* raid around the blockade at Arica loomed as cautionary examples of the potential of Peru's cruiser war.[76] This effort was largely successful. In March 1880, the Peruvian *Oroya* (1873) left Callao to harass Chilean SLOCs, but failed to do meaningful damage as the Peruvian *guerre de course* came to a close, the Peruvian navy well and truly driven from the sea.[77]

For Riveros, Lima's adoption and deployment of torpedoes and torpedo boats was a still more worrying development: unproven but potentially devas-tating technologies capable of upsetting Chilean investments in heavy, oceango-ing armored ships.[78] Ambitions for these new weapons were high if not always realistic. After the loss of the *Huáscar*, the *Unión* was fitted out with such a variety of torpedoes that the Ministry of the Navy lost count.[79] Incredibly

enough, the Peruvian inventor Federico Blume even built a functional submarine. He hoped the vessel could attack the Chilean ironclads—but it never got the chance.[80] Proposals from overseas promised still more fantastic results from submarine weapons and warships.[81] On the ground, and in contrast to these vaulting expectations, the torpedo's teething pains were starkly apparent to the men trying to employ them.[82] No Chilean ships were sunk by automobile torpedoes during the war owing to technical difficulties and integration challenges. The first successful use of a torpedo to sink an ironclad vessel—fittingly enough given all this practical exposure—came 10 years later during the Chilean Civil War (1891).[83]

At the time, failure to challenge Chilean naval supremacy with imported weapons led to still more inventive (if low-tech) schemes. Twice in the course of the war, improvised explosive devices (*barcas-trampa*) detonated alongside Chilean warships, sinking them at great human cost.[84] The *Loa* (1854) fell victim to a launch carrying fresh fruit and a large explosive. The *Covadonga* was taken in by a similar subterfuge—much to the outrage of the Chilean press and high command.[85] The destruction of the *Loa* and the *Covadonga* spread a numbing dread about torpedoes across the Chilean fleet: an epidemic of "topeditis" quipped one observer at the time.[86] Responding to the attacks, Chilean warships shelled unfortified ports in Peru, to little effect other than to generate misery for the inhabitants.[87]

For all the ingenuity of the Peruvian assymetric effort, Chilean SLOCs remained intact, ready to sustain the next hop north. Failure, however, should not imply that the Peruvian innovations were inconsequential. In fact, by leveraging new technologies and even expanding the dimensions of industrial war to the undersea environment, Peruvian forces showed a path toward the twentieth century. Cheap, asymmetric weapons deployed by the Peruvians had as much in common with Confederate mines (or as Farragut called them torpedoes) and semisubmersible warships as they did submarine warfare in the World Wars. In both cases the defeat or suppression of asymmetric threats to sea communications was a prerequisite for larger amphibious invasions. As a matter of technological development, the Peruvian efforts to harass the Chilean lines of communication were the most innovative achievements of the war and a persistent problem of amphibious operations down to the present day.

Phase IV: To Lima
All of this—the campaigns at Iquique, Tacna, Arica, and the blockade of Callao—was preparation for the ultimate goal of the war: an advance on Lima that would force Peruvian leaders to the peace table and legitimate the Chilean annexation of territory.[88] Pure sea power was insufficient to achieve this result in the near or intermediate term. Major combat operations through amphibious action—or else a successful diplomatic intervention by an interested third party—remained necessary to bring the war to a conclusion.[89]

A test case for the invasion came in the form of still more amphibious raids, now by Patricio Lynch against the plantation estates of northern Peru in September 1880.[90] Supported by two armed transports and the warships *Chacabuco* (1866) and *O'Higgins* (1866), Lynch landed with more than 2,000 troops near Chimbote, some 322 kilometers north of Lima, bypassing the garrisons there and, as General Douglas MacArthur might have put it, "hitting them where they ain't." From there, Lynch marched inland, declaring a war tax on local haciendas. When Peruvian landowners refused to pay, the Chileans destroyed property, tore up railroads, and liberated Chinese "coolies" impressed under truly dire conditions. The redheaded Lynch gained the sobriquet "Red Prince"—*Principe Rojo*—from the Chinese he won over to his campaign.[91] Marching inland, Lynch made Peru howl "systematically and without pity."[92] Satisfied (or perhaps because he faced growing criticism from foreign diplomats), Lynch re-embarked in November 1880, sailing south after two months of campaigning.

Lynch's expedition occupied attentions and honed skills as the Chilean army proper prepared for the offensive on Lima. Baquedano divided forces into three groups with the aim of reducing strains on Chilean maritime transport capabilities. This—the greatest logistical challenge of the war—involved the movement of 24,000 troops and many thousands of pack animals, all consuming well more than a quarter-million liters of water per day.[93] Alongside rented steamships, the Chileans also mustered 35 sailing boats and specially designed launches to ferry personnel and artillery to shore—absorbing lessons from the frictions of the landings at Junin and Pisagua. The logistics of the operation were further complicated by the need to move troops and supplies from Valparaiso to Arica and then onto Lima's environs in a two-phase process; in this case less of a hop and more of a triple jump up the coast.

Moving from Arica, the 1st Division landed near Pisco on 19 November 1880. The garrison there surrendered after naval shelling.[94] A second wave of troops and animals left Arica on 27 November, arriving in Pisco in 2 December 1880, bringing troop numbers there to 12,000. Two weeks later, a final wave consisting of 14,000 fighters in 28 transports brought the bulk of the army north, via a stop in Pisco to re-embark troops there.[95] While these forces organized, a party onboard the *Cochrane* took the small port city of Chilca, only 64 kilometers south of Callao, cutting its telegraph lines and reconnoitering the route north.[96] The Chilean main force made land on 22 and 23 December, occupying Lurin, within striking distance along the road to Lima.[97] Marching overland, Lynch's division—along with what the official Chilean military history calls the "Chinese slaves" he liberated—and Baquedano's main force rallied on 26 December 1880.[98] At sea, warships not dedicated to escorting convoys maintained the blockade of Callao. The *Angamos* even managed to use the range of its guns to harass Peruvian fortifications.

As Chilean forces edged north, Piérola goaded Lima's citizens into defensive preparations. Peru's best armies may have been defeated at Arica and Tacna, but

the population under arms still made for a credible defense: the people in mass responding to the emergency of foreign invasion. Piérola managed to muster more than 29,000 troops (of mixed quality) into the armed forces to defend Lima, reinforced with weapons from Europe and the United States.[99]

Quantity may have a quality all its own, but their inexperience told dearly. These hastily raised units failed against the battle-tested Chilean army, recently arrived by sea. At Chorrillos (13 January 1881) and Miraflores (15 January 1881), Chilean forces defeated what remained of the organized Peruvian resistance on the outskirts of Lima.[100] Naval gunfire proved useful in these engagements, but as at Arica, the key role of the navy was to move the army into position. Lima and Callao fell on 17 January 1881. The first Chilean naval officer to enter Callao—Lieutenant Silva Palma—did so on horseback, leading a detachment of cavalry.[101] Peruvian naval units scuttled their remaining assets, sinking the ironclad monitor *Atahualpa* (1864) with a torpedo.[102] After receiving communications from the shore, the torpedo boat *Fresia* (1881) raced to be the first Chilean ship to enter the harbor, using its speed in an act of sport more than military proficiency.[103]

In all, it was a remarkable display of amphibious power against considerable obstacles. Chilean officials remembered fighting "on the sea and in the desert, combat[ing] the enemy, the climate and the thousand natural obstacles in a strange and unknown country."[104] Lima was the crowning achievement of that campaign. Contrary to Chilean expectations, however, Lima's capture did not bring an end to the war. Peruvian factions retreated to the Andes where they would wage a running guerrilla war for months.[105] As a result, even after major combat operations had ceased, the supply of the several thousand troops in the occupation army remained closely linked to the sea. As a fitting end to this continental war waged from the sea, the naval officer Patricio Lynch took on duties as the de facto last viceroy of Peru, overseeing the Chilean occupation from Lima.[106]

Conclusion: Applying Sea Power Ashore in the Industrial Age

Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific hinged on what might be called *applied seapower*: the ability to translate naval and maritime strength into concrete strategic and political results on land via an amphibious campaign. Perhaps it was no coincidence that Alfred T. Mahan (no less) was on station in the South American Pacific in 1884 to observe the results of Chilean victory. In fact, he did the basic research for *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* in one of Lima's libraries.[107] Just one year later—shortly after the end of guerrilla resistance in the highlands of Peru—the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps conducted their most ambitious amphibious operation in a generation: occupying Panama during a period of revolutionary unrest.[108]

On a longer timeline, the War of the Pacific was a precedent for the imperial wars of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In its impassable deserts

overcome by joint amphibious operations, it shares familiar themes with the Italian invasion of Libya in the Italo-Turkish War (1911–12) and the British campaign against German South West Africa (1914–15).[109] As a case study of hostile shores seized by landing forces, students of the Japanese blitz against the Philippines, the Marine Corps' island-hopping campaign across the South West Pacific, or the landings at Inchon during the Korean War will likewise find familiar echoes in the War of the Pacific. Generalizable trends across these examples suggest lessons about the nature of amphibious operations and maritime warfare.

Seapower, broadly conceived, supported continental operations on two levels during the War of the Pacific. First, naval preponderance was a precondition for the movement of troops and materiel along the desert coast. Quoting from Sir Francis Bacon, Corbett observed in 1911 that "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits."[110] True enough for the Spanish Armada and Wellington's Peninsular Army, and true enough during the War of the Pacific. Picking its battles, the numerically inferior Chilean army notched a string of victories against Peru and Bolivia. Movement by sea allowed Sotomayor to bypass strong points and strike where he pleased up the Peruvian coast. That same naval preponderance also allowed for blockades that degraded the allies' military capabilities over time; not least by forcing marches across impassable deserts. Second, seapower in the form of the Chilean merchant marine enabled the movement of troops and materiel 2,414 kilometers north from Valparaiso to the seat of the war. During the war, the *Compania Sudamericana de Vapores* and *Compania Explotadora de Lota y Coronel* moved tens of thousands of personnel and animals, alongside an amount of coal and water that would have been difficult to fathom a generation earlier.[111] Less tangibly, many Chileans believed that the strength of the Chilean navy staved off external (notably U.S.) intervention in the conflict on behalf of Peru; yet another respect in which control of the sea enabled operations on land.[112]

All that said, naval force was not determinative and any argument that suggests as much underestimates the contingency and reciprocity of the amphibious campaign. Seapower was not enough. In the same way that the Confederate defenders of Charleston Harbor only succumbed to General William T. Sherman's overland army in 1865 after years of pressure from the sea, so too did Callao resist pure naval power throughout the war. Likewise, Chilean attempts at terror shelling did little to weaken Peruvian resistance. A blockade of the coast may have toppled Peru's government eventually, but for the time Peru retained its army in the field. Most of Chilean territorial aggrandizement occurred in the seizure of Tacna and Arica in the first months of the war, but compelling Peru to a peace settlement was another matter. The core issue remained to be settled by major combat in the environs of Lima and ultimately a vicious assault against the rump Peruvian government sheltering in the Andes. Seapower was a necessary but insufficient cause of Chilean victory.

Moreover, operations on land were not simply downstream effects of sea control. Rather, many continental operations reinforced Chilean naval efficacy. Amphibious operations supported sea power as much as sea power enabled amphibious operations. Earl Ellis would make a similar observation in the interwar period as he considered the future role(s) of the Marine Corps as an auxiliary of fleet operations against the Imperial Japanese Navy.[113] Naval gunfire and medical services supported army operations ashore, but the army also seized ports and supply depots on the Pacific slope to sustain naval operations. Overland attacks at Arica reduced coastal defense fortifications that the Chilean navy was otherwise powerless to dislodge, providing safe anchor and denying the ports to Peruvian raiders. The relationship between sea and land was, as such, a reciprocal one.

That reciprocity, however, created as many challenges as opportunities for Chilean officials. Getting units off ships and onto shore was a constant and often deadly fiasco. Bureaucratically, debates between civilian, military, and naval leaders were another key drama of the war. The challenge of joint interoperability is an old one. Navy officials resisted cooperation with the army. Army leaders never fully trusted the navy. Such squabbles reflected the complexity of amphibious operations alongside their advantages in the formative years of modern-industrial war.

In all these respects, the War of the Pacific pointed the way forward to the twentieth century and perhaps beyond. There are few (if any) causal links between the War of the Pacific and interwar U.S. war planning, though the war was well-known to the growing U.S. intelligence apparatus. The parallels between the War of the Pacific and major amphibious operations in World War II are telling, nonetheless. Interwar thinkers engineered their way to defeating the distance of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, responding to the geostrategic position of the United States with the technologies and tactics of amphibious operations.[114] These thinkers responded to the same stimuli as Chilean forces under Sotomayor, who articulated the strategy of the "port-hopping war" as a matter of exigent necessity. The basic process, winning command of the sea and then deploying amphibious forces "step-by-step" as a reciprocal tool of sea power, was as relevant to the War of the Pacific as it was the coming Pacific War in 1941. Whether one emphasizes the challenges overcome by Chilean leaders to engage in successful amphibious operations, or the ingenuity of Peruvian engineers attempting to defend against them, the War of the Pacific offers lessons from the past that are unmistakable in the present.

Endnotes

1. For surveys, see William F. Sater, *Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007); Carlos López Urrutia, *La Guerra del Pacífico* (Madrid, Spain: Ristre Media, 2003); Bruce W. Farcau, *The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000); Roberto Querejazu Calvo, *Guano, Salitre, Sangre: Historia de la Guerra del*

Pacifico (La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1979); and Jacinto López, *Historia de la Guerra del Guano y el Salitre* (Lima, Peru: Editorial Universo, 1980). For naval combat, see Carlos López Urrutia, *Historia de la Marina de Chile* (Santiago, Chile: Andrés Bello, 1969); and Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, *La Armada en la Guerra del Pacífico Aproximación Estratégica-Operacional* (Lima, Peru: Asociación de Historia Marítima y Naval Iberoamericana, 2017). Official studies include Comisión para Escribir la Historia Marítima del Perú, *Historia Marítima del Perú*, Tomo X (Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú, 1988); Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Isabel Jara Hinojosa, and Andrea Novoa Mackenna, *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, Tomo I (Santiago, Chile: Sudeamericana, 2005); and Virgilio Espinoza Palma, *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo V (Santiago, Chile: Estado Mayor General del Ejército, 1980).

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3. Jeffrey M. Dorwart, *The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865–1918* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 9.

4. Though it escapes mention in *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare*, ed. LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983).

5. Used in this sense by Paul Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War* (New York: Random House, 2013), 283.

6. As to the analogy of port hopping versus island hopping, it is absolutely true that the island-hopping campaign had more intellectual coherence, the result of years of planning dating at least to Earl H. Ellis in 1921. However, the improvisational nature of the port-hopping campaign is quite revealing. Without a record of war in the industrial era on which to base assumptions, port hopping emerged as an organic response to defeat the tyranny of distance. The U.S. Marine Corps' island hopping during the period is not a unique insight, but it reflects the basic nature of distance and logistics under the conditions of industrial warfare.

7. Arne Roksund, *The Jeune Ecole: The Strategy of the Weak* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2007); and Theodore Ropp, *The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871–1904*, ed. Stephen Roberts (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987).

8. Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, *Historia de la Campaña de Tarapacá Desde la Ocupacion de Antofagasta Hasta Proclamacion de la Dictadura en el Peru* (Santiago, Chile: Pedro Cadot, 1880), 259. Domestic political pressure, expansionism, and "national honor" played roles as well. See Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 13–19, 37–40.

9. JoAnna Klein, "If Algae Clings to Snow on this Volcano, Can It Grow in Other Desolate Worlds?," *New York Times*, 15 July 2019.

10. *The Coasts of Chile, Bolivia, and Peru* (Washington, DC: U.S. Hydrographic Office, 1876), 265.

11. Clements R. Markham, *War between Perú and Chile, 1879–1882* (London, UK: Sampson Low, Marston, 1883), 93.

12. T. B. M. Mason, *The War on the Pacific Coast of South America Between Chile and the Allied Republics of Peru and Bolivia, 1879–81* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1885), 13.

13. Herbert Wilson, *Ironclads in Action: A Sketch of Naval Warfare from 1855 to 1895*, vol. 1 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1896), 314; and *La Guerra Del Pacífico*, 15.

14. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1890).

15. E. Chouteau, "Introducción," *Revista de la Marina*, no. 1 (July 1885): 6–7, emphasis in original; and Robert B. Seager II, "Ten Years Before Mahan: The Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880–1890," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 40, no. 3 (1953): 491–512.

16. Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longmans, Green, 1918), 77–78.
17. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile* Tomo I, 445–46; and Ortiz, *La Armada en la Guerra del Pacífico*, 43.
18. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 44.
19. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 133.
20. Ortiz, *La Armada en la Guerra del Pacífico*, 43.
21. Ropp, *The Development of a Modern Navy*. The French "Young School" consisted of a group of naval officers who sought to use cruisers and torpedo boats to compete asymmetrically with the Royal Navy in the late-nineteenth century.
22. J. W. King, *Warships and Navies of the World* (Boston, MA: Williams, 1881), 439–41.
23. "Composición de Nuestro Material Naval," *Revista de Marina*, no. 76 (September 1892): 76.
24. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 52.
25. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 146–48.
26. Markham, *War between Perú and Chile*, 115.
27. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, Tomo I, 453.
28. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 52; and *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, 451.
29. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 56.
30. French Legación, "Octubre 29, 1897," in *Informes Inéditos* (Santiago: Andrés Bello, 1980), 270.
31. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 279; and *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, 461.
32. "El Rol de los Vapores Mercantes Nacionales," *Revista de Marina*, no. 6 (December 1885): 657.
33. Robert Albion, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798–1947* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 574.
34. Maj Earl H. Ellis, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-46 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992), 9.
35. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, 440.
36. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 171; and Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, *Historia de la Campana de Tarapacá* (Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Cervantes, 1880).
37. Nicanor Molinare, *Asalto y Toma de Pisagua: 2 de Noviembre de 1879* (Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Cervantes, 1912), 82–83; and Sotelo, *La Armada en la Guerra del Pacífico*, 98.
38. "El Rol de los Vapores Mercantes," 657.
39. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, 444.
40. Mackenna, *Historia de la Campana de Tarapacá*, 788.
41. *Historia del Ejercito de Chile*, Tomo V (Santiago, Chile: Estado Mayor General Del Ejercito, 1980), 174; and Molinare, *Asalto y Toma de Pisagua*, 101.
42. Mackenna, *Historia de la Campana de Tarapacá*, 788.
43. *Historia del Ejercito de Chile*, Tomo V, 227; and López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 70.
44. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 175–76.
45. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo V, 228; and Molinare, *Asalto y Toma de Pisagua*, 145.
46. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 283.
47. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 71; and *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo V, 241.
48. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 176.
49. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo V, 265.
50. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 74; and *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo V, 270, 301.
51. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, 463.
52. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 297.
53. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 77; and Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 213.
54. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, 465; and *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 115.
55. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 290.

56. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 217. López's numbers vary. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 84.
57. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 48; and Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 217.
58. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 50.
59. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 84; and *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 55.
60. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 74.
61. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 225.
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63. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 227; and *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 97.
64. Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Historia de la Campana de Tacna y Arica, 1879–1880* (Santiago, Chile: Rafael Jover, 1881), 217, 886–88; and *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 97.
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67. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 245.
68. Ortiz, *La Armada en la Guerra del Pacífico*, 140.
69. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 250; and Mackenna, *Historia de la Campana de Tacna y Arica*, 1118–19.
70. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 95.
71. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 253. Perhaps he was attempting to descend, but the melodrama makes for better retelling. Mackenna, *Historia de la Campana de Tacna y Arica*, 1149–50.
72. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 123.
73. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, Tomo I, 466.
74. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 114.
75. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 287. For the blockade of Arica, see López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 288–89. For the blockade of Callao, see López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 292.
76. *La Marina en la Historia de Chile*, Tomo I, 465.
77. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 291.
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83. "Sunk by Torpedoes," *New York Times*, 28 April 1891.
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85. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 298–99.
86. Sater, *Andean Tragedy*, 167; and López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 298.
87. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 300.
88. López, *Historia de la Marina de Chile*, 303.
89. *Historia del Ejército de Chile*, Tomo VI, 153.
90. López, *La Guerra del Pacífico*, 106.
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The Maritime Silk Road
Concerns for U.S. National Security

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Abstract: This article examines how China's twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road impacts U.S. national security. While the literature frequently discusses the Belt and Road Initiative, the Maritime Silk Road and its impact on U.S. national security is notably lacking. This article examines the specific impacts on the U.S. Department of Defense and other government departments and agencies. The main findings reveal that the Maritime Silk Road is a U.S. national security concern because it degrades operational security, alters military force projection, and bypasses ethical procurement norms. The author articulates the importance of U.S. action in response to China's global port influence, as well as recommends ways to counter each threat China imposes on the United States through the Maritime Silk Road.

Keywords: operational security, surveillance, force projection, international norms, procurement

The maritime domain continues to display its importance as countries around the world enhance their capabilities in a global race to impact sea control and power projection. China's twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road impacts multiple geographic combatant commands as well as the U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) ability to project forces through military sealift. China's increasing support to global maritime infrastructure directly impacts the U.S. Department of Defense and several other government departments. This article argues that the Maritime Silk Road is a U.S. national security concern because it degrades operational security, al-

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
ters military force projection, and bypasses ethical procurement norms. The article examines the history of the Maritime Silk Road and provides the current and desired future states for foreign port surveillance against the United States, U.S. Navy port access for power projection, and China's procurement practices compared to international norms. The article additionally provides recommendations on alternative U.S. sealift and financial options, enhancing military lethality and intelligence sharing, and maintaining strong international relationships under an ethical framework.

Background

President Xi Jinping announced China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. China designed the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), under the BRI, to connect China to Europe for trade purposes. With the Indian Ocean alone hosting 80 percent of Chinese imported oil and 95 percent of Chinese trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, China prioritized port infrastructure projects to bypass choke points and increase trade route options.[1] The Maritime Silk Road created ports, enhanced existing infrastructure, and financed maritime projects with the incentive for the host nation being an increase in tourism and economic growth. There was an initial mixed, global response to the MSR. In 2017, the international community became skeptical of China's economic diplomacy when Sri Lanka leased the Hambantota International Port to a Chinese company for 99 years in exchange for $1.12 billion.[2] Even though Sri Lanka used the money to strengthen their foreign reserves and was therefore not a victim of "debt diplomacy," news outlets suggested that China intentionally created a loan agreement that would result in a payment default.[3] In 2018, Vice President Michael R. Pence further elevated the debt diplomacy narrative when he stated, "just ask Sri Lanka, which took on massive debt to let Chinese state companies build a port of questionable commercial value. Two years ago, that country could no longer afford its payments, so Beijing pressured Sri Lanka to deliver the new port directly into Chinese hands."[4] After the Hambantota Port deal, Chinese official media reported "another milestone along [*sic*] path of #BeltandRoad."[5] That behavior suggested that China's MSR intentions were to expand global influence by controlling critical infrastructure.

Chinese companies initially announced their intentions to invest in nine overseas ports, with the majority located in the Indian Ocean.[6] Today, MSR port influence expands globally and ranges from Chinese port construction or financing to majority port ownership. MSR contract details are often difficult to obtain, which presents a unique challenge when compiling data on foreign ports with Chinese influence. Also, if MSR nations refinance their loan plans with China in the future, the potential exists for China to increase their ownership or operational control of those foreign ports as a part of the refinancing agreement. Likewise, if a nation defaults on the loan repayment, China may

Map 1. China's Maritime Silk Road global influence

Source: courtesy of the author, adapted by MCUP.

control majority ownership over the port, such as in the case with Sri Lanka. For these reasons, China's international port ownership and/or influence continues to change.

Since announcing the MSR initiative, several friction points such as territorial claims in the South China Sea, espionage by China in the United States, and Chinese human rights violations compounded to create a fractured diplomatic relationship between the United States and China. In response to China building artificial islands and military outposts in the South China Sea in 2018, the U.S. Department of Commerce barred American companies from exporting to Chinese companies involved in the South China Sea construction.[7] After Chinese theft of U.S. technology in the same year, the United States increased tariffs on Chinese imports, to which China responded with their own retaliatory sanctions.[8] In 2018, the *National Defense Strategy* identified China as "a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea."[9] In late 2021, the United States then sanctioned Chinese imports, restricted visas, and imposed investment restrictions against a Chinese surveillance company for enabling human rights abuse against Muslim ethnic minority groups.[10] While these examples depict the diplomatic strain between the United States and China, the MSR also impacts the U.S. military.

Concern #1: Degraded Operational Security

The Current State

China previously required surveillance cooperation as a part of MSR agreements, and they will likely continue this strategy with future projects. During negotiations for the Hambantota Port, China required Sri Lanka to share intelligence as a part of the deal.[11] While the specific details of the intelligence support are publicly unknown, one can assume that China had interest in foreign vessel capability, port call frequency, and port call tactics used by foreign nations. China also manages surveillance facilities at the Cocos Islands, deep in the Bay of Bengal, to observe foreign naval movement throughout the bay and monitor India's missile testing.[12] As China gains influence and control over international ports used by the U.S. military, operational security concerns increase. Since 2011, U.S. Marines have been using Australia's Darwin port on a rotational basis for training.[13] China acquired the port in 2015 on a 99-year lease, which created tension between the United States and Australia.[14] In 2019, Australia announced they would build a new port for American use at Glyde Point.[15] The new port is likely to reduce U.S. security concerns with China, but not every nation will build separate infrastructure. If China owns a berth, controls the port, or holds port stake, they are likely collecting information on countries operating in or near the facilities. While this strategy is not unique to China, the U.S. military must still be aware that Chinese companies likely have the means and motive to collect against them.

China currently tests the U.S. military's operational security in Djibouti, where both nations operate a military base. Djibouti is a strategic location, resting on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is one of the choke points in the Indian Ocean. Shipping lanes from Africa, Asia, and Europe converge here and tension exists between the U.S. Navy base and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) base.[16] Friction occurs because the bases are extremely close together and one international airport means all militaries are using the same facility.[17] The current accommodations provide China with opportunities to collect intelligence on U.S. forces and allies, like France and the United Kingdom. In 2018, commanders at the U.S. naval base in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, claimed several accounts of Chinese personnel attempting to collect information on U.S. military operations.[18] Likewise, China has made several claims against the United States for surveilling their operations in Djibouti.

Desired Future State

The desired future state is for U.S. military forces to enhance operational security while accessing ports throughout the Indian Ocean. This implied end state derives from the description of the strategic environment in the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* as well as the required environment for USTRANSCOM to successfully conduct military sealift. There are a few obstacles that impede the United States from achieving the desired future state. The first obstacle is the covert tactics that China uses to collect information. As previously stated, Chi-

na influences port operations in the Indian Ocean through operational control, port ownership, and economic and diplomatic relationships with MSR nations. China's port influence provides opportunities to surveil foreign nations during port calls. The host nation may surveil U.S. forces and provide the intelligence to China, whether willingly or because of coercive influence techniques. The second obstacle impeding the United States from achieving increased operational security is Chinese intelligence collection platforms. China's cargo-data system, called Logink, is a network that tracks shipments throughout China and giant ports globally.[19] The digitized cargo data provides China with a way to monitor equipment moving around the world, including military equipment moving through commercial ports.

To reach the desired future state, the United States can take several actions to improve operational security. The first action is to enhance relationships with U.S. partners. If the United States is using the ports from a partnered nation, there is an element of trust between the two nations. The concern is that some countries support the United States through partnerships while simultaneously supporting China through the Maritime Silk Road. The United States expects the host nation to deter foreign surveillance. To receive that level of security and deterrence support, the United States must build stronger relationships with partnered nations. Specifically, the United States can reallocate foreign assistance to incentivize partners through cash transfers, training courses, research projects, or debt relief. In addition to economic incentives, the United States can use diplomacy with other nations to describe the benefits of safeguarding sensitive data by denying the use of systems like Logink for military equipment tracking.

The second action the United States can take is to improve the military's operational security measures at the tactical level. Information sharing, whether intentional or not, is an extreme risk to the force. Operational security degrades as soon as sensitive information is publicly released. To suppress the release or distribution of essential friendly information, tactical military units must impose strict operational security measures and consider the risks during planning. The third action is to develop and use defensive capabilities that can deny surveillance and information collection. China will likely know when the U.S. Navy or commercial vessels move through MSR ports but employing defensive measures can reduce the transparency of U.S. port call procedures. The fourth action is to conduct counterintelligence from the tactical to the national level. These operations identify China's intelligence collection tactics and conduct security activities to counter foreign threats.

Risk

There is a significant amount of risk if the United States does not respond to China's growing surveillance threat. If the United States does not attempt to increase operational security, China will better understand U.S. port operations. With that knowledge, China can exploit the U.S. military and predict

movement timelines, resupply operations, and organic security. To reduce the risk and potential harm to U.S. forces, the United States must maintain international relationships, enforce operational security at the tactical level, and enhance defensive capabilities for counterintelligence operations.

Concern #2: Force Projection
Current State
Force projection is the military's ability to project power. The U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), in support of USTRANSCOM, moves more than 90 percent of military equipment and supplies by sea.[20] The MSC "is the leading provider of ocean transportation for the Navy and the rest of the Department of Defense, operating approximately 125 ships daily around the globe."[21] The United States also has several redundancies to move military equipment via sea, including USTRANSCOM, the Department of Transportation, and U.S. flagged commercial ships. These redundancies provide opportunities to surge equipment into a foreign theater.

Currently, the United States can project forces into the Indian and Pacific Ocean region, but China's influence could limit the U.S. military's ability to access foreign ports in the future. During a congressional hearing in 2019, leaders discussed the potential for the U.S. Navy to face "restricted access to important maritime chokepoints and supply routes" as well as general competition for access to ports.[22] In 2019, China denied several requests from U.S. Navy warships to call at Hong Kong.[23] While this example is within China, a similar approach of denying port call requests may surface where China owns or operates foreign ports. Another concern is the increased maritime traffic caused by Maritime Silk Road projects. China's creation of a new container terminal in Port Khalifa, United Arab Emirates, will likely increase port traffic and may delay the U.S. Navy in the future.[24] Traffic directly impacts the U.S. Navy's timely ability to resupply and repair vessels.[25] Disruption of U.S. naval operations may occur in the future from the PLAN as well.

The PLAN is the largest naval force in the world, with more than 300 ships.[26] The PLAN is focusing on blue water capable warships and creating opportunities in the northern Indian Ocean and South China Sea to sustain their naval fleet.[27] Additionally, China conducts military exercises with commercial vessels, violating international norms and creating increased risk for foreign commercial vessels traveling through the South China Sea.[28] The PLAN has several limitations to include air defense, anti-submarine capabilities, logistics, and the inability to sustain a carrier strike group in the Indian Ocean.[29] By increasing port control through the Maritime Silk Road, the PLAN enhances sustainability and extends operational reach. The ports in Gwadar and Hambantota are examples of locations where the PLAN could leverage refueling or docking as a part of the Maritime Silk Road.[30] In this sense, the PLAN uses the MSR to increase operational reach.

U.S. allies and partners collaborate to mutually support freedom of naviga-

tion and deterrence against China in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. The United States is currently involved in multiple international organizations that promote security and freedom of navigation. The Combined Maritime Forces is an example of U.S. commitment to international rules and unified effort. The United States is one of 34 nations involved in the Indian Ocean who combat illegal actions while maintaining security and prosperity for international trade.[31] The United States is also one of eight nations in the International Maritime Security Construct who ensure freedom of navigation and continuation of trade in the international waters of the Middle East region.[32] Additionally, the United States permanently stages military forces on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia. The ability to use that strategic location enables U.S. force projection into multiple combatant commander area of responsibilities. American and British forces also deter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea through joint military exercises.[33] India is another strategic partner that the United States relies heavily on for intelligence sharing, foreign military sales, and naval escort operations through the Malacca Strait.[34] The U.S. relationships with the United Kingdom and India are extremely important to counter the negative impacts to force projection because of their aligned national objectives of deterring Chinese aggression.

While many partnered nations have aligned interests, not all partners maintain the same view toward China. Some countries are partners with the United States while they simultaneously support the Maritime Silk Road. An example of this is the relationship between the United States and Sri Lanka. In 2017, a Chinese company paid $1.12 billion for a 99-year lease of the Hambantota Port, along with majority ownership.[35] Two years later, the U.S. and Sri Lankan military conducted a Joint naval exercise as a part of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training through the Hambantota International Port.[36] With majority ownership of Hambantota, the possibility exists for China to interfere with future operations that rely on the port's access.

Desired Future State

The desired future state is for the United States to enhance foreign port access and maintain redundancies for force projection. This implied future state derives from the requirements of USTRANSCOM and the U.S. Navy to access international ports. China's increasing port control and influence techniques are obstacles impeding this desired future state. Based on data from the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions, China contained the highest concentration of bribery.[37] In 2009, the World Bank barred the Chinese Harbour Engineering Company from engaging in infrastructure projects due to fraud and the company later offered bribes to government officials in Bangladesh in support of the Maritime Silk Road.[38] In general, "60% to 87% of Chinese firms said they had paid a 'tip' or bribe to obtain a license in connection with business transactions in Africa."[39] A low income African nation accepting a monetary bribe is not surprising. What is surprising is the percentage of Chi-

nese firms admitting to bribery when commercial bribery under PRC Criminal Law holds entities liable who commit bribery, even outside of China.[40] It is challenging for the United States to compete with bribery, while supporting international norms and maintaining ethical business practices.

To reach the desired future state, the United States can enhance relationships with partners and allies. While the United States already has strategic partners and engages in information sharing and military exchanges, the continuation of unifying nations with diplomatic values who support international norms is imperative. Through multinational exercises, intelligence support, training opportunities, and other joint efforts, the U.S. and partnered nations can become more unified to counter Chinese MSR expansion. The United States could also leverage the U.S. Agency for International Development to support economic growth in developing nations and offer alternative options to the MSR. While the U.S. Navy will continue relying on foreign ports for force projection, strong relationships with foreign nations enable multiple options for U.S. port access and strategic basing.

Risk

If the United States does not act to enhance force projection, the military risks losing operational tempo. With reduced port availability and/or increased port threats, timelines will likely extend for transporting military equipment from ports of embarkation to ports of debarkation. There are also risks if the United States takes action to reduce the impact on force projection. Increasing security cooperation, growing financial aid packages, and/or enhancing naval lethality all require significant funds. While all three actions are important to maintain international relationships and secure foreign port use, the military budget may not support all actions simultaneously. The United States continues to analyze and adapt foreign assistance through the Department of State and Department of Defense.

Concern #3: Violating International Norms
Current State

Organizations like the World Bank Group and the United Nations create an international norm for investment and procurement processes. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), under the World Bank Group, offers loans and developmental assistance for low- to middle-income countries. IBRD, supported by multiple countries, uses rigorous formal steps to ensure fair and reasonable loans for the receiving nation. IBRD ensures their projects are "economically justified," reinforcing the intent of the World Bank to support developing nations.[41] Additionally, projects must assist with reducing poverty in the host nation and encourage sustainable economic growth.[42] This standard shows how the bank considers the host nation's financial situation, beyond the initial loan. Also, the World Bank provides transparency on their international support, unlike the hidden details of MSR loan agreements.

China's success in MSR loan agreements and procurement practices reduce the international appeal to conform to the strict and fair processes used by the World Bank. As the largest shareholder in the World Bank, U.S. preferences impact the bank's decision making. If more nations seek Chinese financial support instead, U.S. influence may decrease.

Besides the World Bank, the United States is also a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) along with 189 other nations.[43] The IMF provides exchange rate stability as well as economic, financial, and legal support.[44] China and the United States became members of the IMF in 1945 and the United States is currently the largest shareholder.[45] The IMF surveils global economics and standards of living to assess the requirements for or effectiveness of IMF support.[46] The surveillance is extremely important because it displays the IMF system for collecting information, conducting analysis, and making decisions that enhance future economic stability or quality of life. Because the United States and China are members of the IMF, there is little room to leverage the IMF toward projects or support that only favors one of the nations. The United States could be more successful in countering Chinese bank support to MSR nations by providing independent options or coordinating with partners and allies to present alternative options.

Meanwhile, China is the largest shareholder of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which focuses on Asian nation economic development and infrastructure projects.[47] Some nations believe that AIIB acts on behalf of China because China controls half of the voting shares.[48] The United States previously questioned AIIB's standards and safeguards but despite the concerns, many allied nations are members of the bank.[49] To quell these concerns, AIIB frequently conducts joint ventures with the World Bank.[50] The BRI listed the AIIB as a financier and the bank competes with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.[51] As a baseline and global standard, the World Bank's environmental and social framework contains eight areas of analysis.[52] In comparison, the AIIB only imposes specifications on resettlement and indigenous people, increasing the risk potential for people and the environment.[53] As of late 2021, the AIIB updated their environmental and social framework, reducing vulnerabilities pointed out by external parties.[54] With an enhanced framework and global reach, the AIIB is a competitor to other multilateral development banks (MDBs) with U.S. involvement and interest.

Regarding MSR financing, China is more likely to use the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, which are institutional banks that implement the state policy.[55] State-owned banks are less scrutinized and do not require the democratic voting methods displayed in MDBs. The China Development Bank, for example, is "China's largest bank specialized in medium- and long-term lending and bond issuance."[56] State-owned banks may provide China a faster way of approving and providing loans to developing nations. For some nations, the reduced timeline is more beneficial. For these reasons, Chinese banks may appeal more to lower- and middle-class nations

seeking immediate financial support. Currently, lending for the Belt and Road Initiative is greater than all combined efforts of MDBs, which includes the World Bank.[57]

A noticeable difference between the United States and China involves MDBs. The United States is a member of five MDBs, but they are not involved in subregional MDBs like China.[58] Commitment to a subregional MDB may provide personal appeal to a country within that region seeking financial support. Additionally, a nation participating in MDBs and subregional MDBs may claim higher levels of support through the global reach of their bank investments. With that being said, the United States is still the "largest shareholder of global and regional MDBs."[59] China's loan process and contract requirements are vastly different from MDB norms. If a supported country makes national policy or legal changes, China can terminate the supporting contract and demand immediate repayment of a loan.[60] This locks a host nation into operating under the status quo, without the ability to adapt and change. Another difference with "government-to-government lending," as opposed to an MDB, is that if the host nation does not reelect "the preferred China incumbent," China can cancel their loan.[61] This scenario gives China enormous power to expand their influence globally and can lead to the host nation using manipulation and corruption to shape the political outcome.

As a counter, "China's debt risk is performing at US $1 billion for every US $142 billion in BRI assets, meaning a 1-142 chance of problems" with BRI loans.[62] This data suggests that China is very successful in creating loans that ensure the host nation does not default. While it may be true that China's loans are well structured to ensure a successful return, the data does not show the level of Chinese influence and manipulation. As mentioned previously, China's ability to influence foreign politics through economic agreements shows a tremendous amount of control and manipulation to achieve personal gain. Also, the World Bank's rigorous process for creating loan agreements may result in the decision to deny a loan to a developing nation because the forecasted projection does not support economic growth. The World Bank exists to create a better standard of living and ensure sustainable growth, resulting in more selective investment decisions. China's banks do not use the same rigorous processes, meaning they can offer loans faster to countries supporting their national agenda. This makes it difficult for the World Bank and other international banks to justify high standards focused on assessments impacting the environment and social well-being, all while denying corrupt behavior.[63]

One of the biggest violations of international norms is China's current contractor bidding process. The international norm is to award the contract to the local firm "if the bid does not exceed the lowest foreign bid by a specified percentage (often 15)."[64] MDB projects, for example, favor local contractors 40.8 percent of the time, with the remaining percentage awarded to other national bidders.[65] In comparison, China wins the contracts for the Maritime

Silk Road 89 percent of the time.[66] That leaves both local and foreign countries to compete for the contracts only 11 percent of the time. Additionally, China denies some nations from bidding, creating an unfair and unequal bidding process.[67] Sometimes China even enforces a closed bidding, and the host nation must select the construction company that supports China's national agenda.[68] An example of this is the procurement for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects, where the EXIM Bank restricted bidding to Chinese contractors.[69] When China controls the contractors, they deny the host nation with the complete project details, creating a further dependency on China in the future to provide maintenance and technical assistance.[70]

While China's bid rigging disregards international norms, it does not violate international law because China is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which promotes economic and social well-being.[71] China does have laws stating, "No unit or person may illegally restrict or exclude legal persons or other organizations from other areas or systems to take part in bidding or interfere in tender and bid activities in any form" and that bidders may not use deceptive methods for winning.[72] These laws only apply for "tender and bid activities in the territory of the People's Republic of China," which does not impact Chinese infrastructure projects overseas.[73] China is a charter member of the United Nations (UN), and the UN expects member nations to support the UN's guiding principles. The UN Convention against Corruption enforces international standards and the Model Law on Public Procurement states that "all procedures are subject to rigorous transparency mechanisms and requirements to promote competition and objectivity."[74] The Model Law aims to assist other nations in developing procurement law and is therefore not an enforceable law against China. The UN can apply pressure on China for violating international norms, but China is not violating international laws. Laws and procurement frameworks in the OECD and the World Bank do not guide China's financial decisions, enabling China to create a new financial norm through MSR projects.

Out of the 178 agreements in the BRI in 2018, more than 50 percent of host nations did not have government procurement provisions, while another 33 percent had provisions that were so unspecific, they were not enforceable.[75] China is selecting countries for the Maritime Silk Road that offer a strategic advantage with the geographic positioning of the ports, as well as nations that China can influence. With most agreements made with countries that have no enforceable procurement laws or standards, China controls the procurement process. In 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure documented that "non-Chinese companies will compete for BRI contracts on an uneven playing field and participate in projects on Beijing's terms."[76] Three years later, it appears that China's power and influence continues to create an unequal procurement process that bypasses international norms.

Desired Future State

The desired future state is for the United States to reduce China's success in bypassing international procurement norms. The inverse is for the United States to reinvigorate the use of international norms for investments and procurement to solidify those practices as preferred business models. This implied future state derives from the requirement of the United States to remain competitive and counter actions that reduce U.S. economic effectiveness. If China adjusts the international norms through their global influence, the United States must evolve to fit the new standards or risk experiencing a competitive disadvantage. The obstacle impeding the United States from achieving this future state is China's influence tactics that play to the personal appeals of the low- to middle-class countries. Countries who are eager or desperate to enhance their standard of living through the economy are likely to request a loan from China as a part of the Maritime Silk Road. In some cases, countries agree to infrastructure development or port expansion with the promise of increased tourism and economic growth. By coordinating with China, the host nation's current and forecasted economic growth are less scrutinized as a part of the loan development process. Also, the loans supporting the MSR are coming from one country, as opposed to the World Bank. This allows China to quickly decide if investing in a nation is a part of their national interest.

To reach the desired future state, the United States can enhance relationships with partnered nations. If a country is receiving security force assistance or economic relief from the United States, they may be less inclined to support China through the MSR. The second action the United States can take is to increase global information sharing. As a member of the World Bank, the United States can increase awareness of international procurement practices and educate others on effective techniques. This would reduce the number of countries who do not have existing or enforceable government procurement provisions. The third action the United States can take is to offer alternative options for financial and advisory support, as discussed later under recommendations. Such options would require sustainability, efficient processes for loan selection, and fair procurement practices.

Risk

If the United States does not react to China bypassing international norms, China will continue to spread their influence globally and create a new standard for the loan and procurement process. The discriminatory procurement practices exhibited by China may lead other nations to conduct business in a similar manner. There is also risk associated with the United States reacting to Chinese business practices. If the United States reduces the success of China's MSR investments by proposing alternative investment options and educating countries on government procurement provisions, China could respond using information operations. China would likely spread the message globally that the United States is attempting to control the procurement process interna-

tionally by training others to their own standard. The United States can combat these messages through transparency and proof of concept from successful business practices used by the World Bank.

Recommendations

The *Interim National Security Strategy Guidance* stated, "We will confront unfair and illegal trade practices, cyber theft, and coercive economic practices that hurt American workers, undercut our advanced and emerging technologies, and seek to erode our strategic advantage and national competitiveness."[77] This guidance clearly states that the United States will respond to coercive measures, as previously described through China's bribery tactics and bid rigging. While Chinese attempts at surveilling U.S. military operations are not new, the United States must continuously adapt to maintain the competitive advantage. To do so, the author recommends exercising sealift redundancies, strengthening partnerships, creating alternative investment options, enhancing U.S. force lethality through research and development, supporting increased global awareness, and maintaining our ethical framework.

1. Sealift Redundancies

The United States currently has several redundancies for military sealift as well as prepositioned stock afloat. The U.S. Navy, in support of USTRANSCOM, moves most of the military equipment, but the Department of Defense, U.S. flagged commercial volunteers, and vessels in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement are designated as alternative options. To increase readiness, those parties are working together through training scenarios. In 2021, "DoD, the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD), commercial sealift carriers, and maritime labor" conducted a tabletop exercise, reenacting the requirement to use commercial ships in support of the Department of Defense (DOD).[78] Even if China's influence does not close ports to U.S. access in the future, the DOD may still require commercial ships to move the large equipment volume in a crisis or contingency. Military Sealift Command has 17 prepositioned ships globally to support all branches of the Services.[79] While the prepositioned assets are essential for surging forces into a theater, the sustainment is for immediate and short duration. With sealift redundancies currently established, the United States must continue to exercise all alternate capabilities to increase readiness.

2. Partnerships

Guidance from the U.S. president, secretary of defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders identified the requirement for strong alliances and partnerships. The *Interim National Security Strategy Guidance* stated that between our partnerships and making smart defense investments, "we will also deter Chinese aggression and counter threats to our collective security, prosperity, and democratic way of life."[80] The *National Mil-*

itary Strategy listed several mission areas including "reassur[ing] allies and partners and compet[ing] below the level of armed conflict."[81] Admiral Philip S. Davidson added to the importance of partnerships when he stated, "Persistent presence through forward-based and rotational joint forces is the most credible way to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to potential adversaries while simultaneously assuring allies and partners."[82]

The United States conducts global security cooperation and collaboration with partners and allies. Fusion centers are a way in which partners share information and combat national threats. The United States is currently a member of a fusion center that synchronizes efforts by Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations to focus on countering terrorism.[83] Fusion centers like this will initially build collaboration and then continue to refine and enhance capabilities that are more focused on threats from nation-state threats, such as China. The United States is also a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the Quad), along with Japan, Australia, and India. The Quad convened for the fourth time in May 2022 to welcome the new joint initiative of "Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)."[84] The Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group also synchronizes national strategies to coordinate each nation's financial efforts toward sustainable infrastructure.[85]

The United States is also involved in several maritime partnerships. The International Maritime Security Construct involves the United States, the United Kingdom, and six other nations who ensure "freedom of navigation and the free flow of trade for legitimate mariners in the international waters of the Middle East region."[86] This is especially important because it shows a collaborative effort to ensure the free flow of goods and vessels through major choke points such as the Bab el-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the United States, France, Australia, and the UK are all members of the Combined Maritime Forces, along with 29 other nations.[87] The force patrols international waters, upholds "International Rules-Based Order (IRBO)," and promotes security.[88]

The United States must assess current partnerships and look for ways to increase readiness. This can include multinational exercises that test the compatibility of systems and communication. The U.S. military should also train for contingencies, especially for force projection and sustainment with contested port access. To counter China's growing global influence, the United States must assess if current joint and multinational efforts are sufficient. An example of this was in 2021 with the creation of the Australia–UK–U.S., or AUKUS security pact. Through the pact, the United States shared nuclear-powered submarine technology with Australia, which will increase allied capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.[89] The United States must continue to increase collaborative efforts to show a united front, such as with Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the U.S. Navy's multinational exercise conducted every other year. In 2022, 26 nations participated in RIMPAC to display capabilities and promote a free and

open Indo-Pacific.[90] If the United States continues the exercises into the future with enhanced scenarios, the United States can unify a more lethal global force that is both trained on organic capabilities as well as prepared to coordinate and communicate with multiple naval forces.

3. Alternative Investment Options

Because the Maritime Silk Road plays to the personal appeals of developing nations who desire economic growth, it is difficult to persuade those nations to look at alternate options. The United States must use information operations to increase global awareness of alternate options required to counter China's loans. Australia, Japan, and the United States currently have a "trilateral investment initiative" operating in the Indo-Pacific region to support infrastructure needs.[91] This is important because China's current and future initiatives intend to support the Indo-Pacific region and gain more support to expand their influence. The United States, as a key player in the World Bank, has the power and opportunity to offer alternative options to the MSR that are sustainable for the economy and environment.[92] The United States should continue working with allies and partners to offer debt relief to BRI countries who risk defaulting on their payments.[93] This assistance opportunity would reduce the probability of a nation defaulting, resulting in China assuming majority or full port ownership.

The United States could specifically leverage the International Development Association (IDA), a component of the World Bank focused on providing zero- or low-interest loans and reducing inequalities.[94] While the United States and China are both members of the IDA, the United States could propose debt relief initiatives for a low-income nation as either a proactive measure against an MSR contract or as a reactive measure if an MSR nation requires refinancing. The United States is also a member of five MDBs, which include "the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development."[95] The United States applies leadership through these banks by promoting transparency, advocating for grants, and adopting new lending policies that analyze results and performance.[96] The United States has the opportunity to continue encouraging changes to MDBs to instill strict standards that support developing nations and appeal to those experiencing financial struggle. In doing so, the United States maintains a competitive edge over China who attempts to bypass international norms.

The United States also has the largest economy in the world and there are opportunities to leverage that economic advantage.[97] The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018 creates the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) with the mission to "promote private investment in support of both U.S. global development goals and U.S. economic interests."[98] This opportunity expands options for the United States to invest in developing nations beyond the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the predecessor to the new IDFC.[99] The BUILD Act differs

from China's financing through mandatory reporting requirements and transparency. The act requires the IDFC to create desired development outcomes, measures of performance, and release of the assessments to the public through a database.[100] This formalized process shows that the United States wants to enhance developing nation capabilities, as well as adhere to international norms of transparency and feasibility assessments. The United States can present this loan option to counter MSR proposals.

4. Lethal Force: Research and Development

The 2018 *National Defense Strategy* described the need for a more lethal force, including technological innovation.[101] The United States can create a more lethal force by "increasing funding for federal research and development and boosting investment in basic science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education."[102] Army Futures Command and Army Materiel Command continue to innovate and compare the required capabilities for the current and future scenarios in conflict and competition.

As China enhances their capabilities through multidomain operations (MDO), the United States must counter these enhancements. The U.S. goals are to be MDO-capable by 2028 and MDO-ready by 2035.[103] China is enhancing their capabilities in areas such as "artificial Intelligence (AI), hypersonics, robotics, and swarming."[104] According to the *2019 Army Modernization Strategy*, the Army assumes that the budget will remain flat in the future, but research and development will mature.[105] To counter threats to the United States, the Army's focus includes "long range precision fires, next generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality."[106] These initiatives can counter China's increasing military capabilities and global influence through the Maritime Silk Road. As the Army surges energy and resources to modernize the force, there is risk to the readiness of the current force.[107] To ensure readiness, the military must continue to war-game all applicable contingencies, including contested waters and limited port access.

5. Increased Awareness

The information instrument of national power is essential to message joint initiatives and collaborate with partners and allies. The United States can aggregate data on Maritime Silk Road agreements and analyze that information to exploit malpractice and unethical standards, including bribery and other coercive influence tactics. The United States should work with that host nation and neighboring nations to share the information publicly, as a warning to others. Secondly, the United States can work with MDBs, such as the World Bank, to raise awareness and provide procurement guidance to developing nations that do not have enforceable guidelines.[108] In doing so, China will have less control in dictating the financial support and contract bidding process. Additionally, the United States should continue developing fusion centers that focus on sharing intelligence. The Counter-Terrorism Information Facility, hosted by Singa-

pore, is an example of a fusion center that works with the United States to share information.[109] The United States must enhance networking between allies and partners to deter Chinese aggression.

6. Ethics

The *Interim National Security Strategy Guidance* stated, "We will ensure that U.S. companies do not sacrifice American values in doing business in China."[110] Having a strong moral code and using ethics to drive decisions is how the United States maintains mutual trust with partners and allies. As examined earlier, China uses coercive influence techniques to manipulate developing nations. It would be easy for the United States to counter these actions in the same manner. What distinguishes the United States is the ethical decision making. The United States, like any nation, conducts operations that meet their national interests. Not every country, however, uses ethical business practices. By offering alternative financial options and enhancing partnerships to ensure mutual support, the United States maintains the mutual trust required to counter China's Maritime Silk Road and enable force projection

Conclusion

China is using their global power and economic strength to achieve their national objectives. As key terrain in the Indian Ocean becomes contested, the United States must use all instruments of national power to strengthen alliances and partnerships while countering Chinese port influence. At the current state, the Maritime Silk Road impacts the United States by reducing military operational security, altering port availability for force projection, and creating an unethical new norm for internationally financed projects. To counter such impacts, the United States must exercise sealift redundancies, implement alternate investment options, enhance military lethality, and increase global awareness, all while sustaining partnerships and maintaining a strong ethical framework. To achieve these recommendations, the United States must work as a united front in a whole-of-government approach. If the United States fails to act, support from partnered nations will decrease and China will increase their international control over financial procurement standards and infrastructure projects.

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The Black Sea Thread
in Russian Foreign Policy and
How the United States Can Respond

Adam Christopher Nettles

Abstract: This article outlines the evolving geopolitical situation in the Black Sea in the context of Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine. It establishes a historically rooted pattern in Russian strategy tied to the region that runs through most recent acts of Russian aggression against its neighbors. It illustrates how after each Russian conflict with its neighbors in the last 20 years Russia has gained more physical coastline on the Black Sea. It roots this behavior in a centuries-long pattern of Russian behavior grounded in practical and ideational motivations. Accordingly, it establishes that Russian aggression in the Black Sea is likely to be a persistent fixture of global great power competition for the near future. The author then proposes a sustainable solution to counter Russian aggression in the theater through U.S. support of the current trend toward increased European "strategic autonomy" within the bounds of the NATO alliance.

Keywords: Ukraine invasion, Black Sea security, European security, transatlantic policy, NATO, strategic autonomy, Russian strategy, naval strategy, European integration

Part 1: The Black Sea Thread
Persistent Great Power Competition

As the Russians moved toward Kyiv in the first weeks of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a host of different theories as to Vladimir Putin's objectives flooded the discourse. The simple reality, though, is that no

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one can be completely certain what Putin's objectives were in Ukraine at the onset, save the man himself. Some months into the war, however, we can now observe how the Russian military has prosecuted the conflict thus far. What can be seen is a Russian willingness to endure and inflict enormous costs in the south and east of Ukraine. Russia has shown a tenaciousness that was lacking in its attempts to capture the capital or Ukraine's second city, Kharkiv.[1] That is, in areas in Ukraine's south, including along the Black Sea coast, Russian forces have accepted huge human and material costs for their slow but consistent gains.[2] Though reports vary and are still subject to change, it would seem that in the Black Sea port of Mariupol alone Russia was willing to sustain somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 fatal casualties capturing the city.[3] For comparison, in the entire war in Iraq, the Defense Department numbers put equivalent American casualties at 4,431 during a period of eight years.[4] Though reliable casualty counts in this conflict likely will not be compiled for some time, even this rough number illustrates that the cost Russia was willing to pay for the port city of Mariupol was a high one. This would suggest the area around the Black Sea is of critical importance to Russian strategists. When faced with mounting losses in the north by contrast, the Russians simply chose to withdraw and redeploy. These actions fit with what is posited here as a common thread tying the most recent acts of Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, occupying Crimea in Ukraine in 2014, and the current invasion of Ukraine. When this pattern is taken as a whole, it suggests a strong Black Sea-centric focus in Putin's long-term strategic calculations, which needs to be better explored in the context of Russian aggressive actions under Vladimir Putin.

The importance to Russia of the Black Sea is not a new phenomenon. Putin's current policy making and military strategy would likely be recognizable to generations of Russian leaders, both imperial and Soviet.[5] Russia has shown over generations that it is more than willing to make great sacrifices to control this critical naval theater. Put in solely geographic terms, it is important to note the Black Sea is closer to Moscow than the Gulf of Mexico is to Washington, DC.[6] When this physical importance is paired with the deep historical and psychological meaning Russia attaches to the region, it is safe to conclude the area will remain a persistent and core interest to a resurgent Russia. This work will accordingly explore the ideational and geographic realities upon which this Black Sea thread rests. It will then outline how it ties recent acts of Russian aggression against its neighbors together and will conclude with recommendations for U.S. policy makers to best respond to this persistent geopolitical reality.

History Driving Policy

Given Russia's increased use of history in justifying its political actions, seemingly distant historical realities now can have profound and clearly observable policy implications in Russian strategy. Goretti contends that Putin is "returning to the 19th century," when referring to Putin's statements in recent years on Russia's imperial period.[7] If one goes back further in Putin's statements,

however, it can be observed that Putin's use of history in making Russian policy relies also on far more ancient events. There is an abundance of analysis lamenting Putin's use of history, which he weaponizes to further his strategic goals and worldview.[8] In *Foreign Affairs*, for example, Kolesnikov laments that Putin has committed crimes against history and Russia itself. He states that "trying to impose his version of the nation's history, he deprived it (Russia) of its history. And by depriving it of history, he amputated the future. Russia is now at a dead end, a historical dead end."[9] It is fundamental to note, though, the core historical events on which Russia justifies its aggression are generally not invented. Putin's interpretation of such events tends to be self-serving. Yet, the man is not reasoning on complete fiction when it comes to his use of history. This means that there is value in studying and understanding the complex recent and more ancient history of Russia if one wishes to explain these acts of aggression. Taken further, instead of lamenting this rhetorical pattern, Putin's use of history provides Western decision makers with an excellent tool and an opportunity to better predict future Russian behavior. In Putin's words, "To have a better understanding of the present and look into the future, we need to turn to history."[10] In this case, the West needs to look at and take seriously the man's understanding of history to understand his behavior and to both prevent and respond to future acts of aggression. Perhaps the most blatant example of this telegraphing of future aggression can be seen in the cited article on Ukraine penned by Putin himself. In it, he outlines how Ukrainians and Russians are "one people" artificially divided by unjust borders following the fall of the Soviet Union. The piece reads like a history essay despite being a statement by an acting political leader. In the work, he all but telegraphed the invasion to correct the outlined historical wrongs eight months before it began. Accordingly, the first section of this piece will look at the previously mentioned Black Sea thread from a historical lens. It rests on the fact that Putin's use of history gives such events causal relevance in explaining modern Russian acts of aggression.

Medieval Russia: Born on Black Sea Shores
Much analysis of Russia in the Black Sea sources the importance of the region to the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, tying it to the rise of the Russian Empire. However, its profound psychological importance to the Russian historical memory goes back much further to the foundation of the Russian state.[11] Putin said following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea that "everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized."[12] As Putin emphasized here, Russia's origins as a distinct state can indeed be rooted to events on Black Sea shores. The first distinctly Russian state in history, that of the Kievan Rus, adopted Orthodox Christianity roughly a century after its foundation in 988. Prince Vladimir, with whom Putin shares a first name, had for most of his life followed a local pagan faith. He then famously tested the major monotheistic options available to him before converting his kingdom. He considered Catholicism, Islam, and

Orthodoxy, settling on the Greek choice in no small part because of the might and pomp of the Byzantine Empire just across the Black Sea.[13] The formal act of this adoption was seen in the baptism of Prince Vladimir, the first Orthodox king of a Russian state. He was subsequently granted sainthood. As outlined, this occurred on the shores of the Black Sea near Sevastopol in Crimea. Even the Russian script can be traced to connections with the Byzantine Empire, as it was its missionaries in Saints Cyril (from whose name derives the term *Cyrillic*) and Methodius who provided the people of Rus and the East Slavs more generally with their first written language.[14] The two are accordingly referred to as the "Apostles to the Slavs."[15] Therefore, the cultural and spiritual font of the Russian identity can be traced directly to Crimea, and by extension to sources along the shore of the Black Sea.

Some centuries following Prince Vladimir's choice in the late medieval period, a geopolitical seismic shift occurred in the region that would have profound consequences on Russia's relationship with the theater. With the fall of Constantinople and with it the Byzantine Empire to the Ottomans in 1453, the seeds of Russia's understanding of itself as a divinely sanctified imperial power were planted. Some Russian theologians, politicians, and intellectuals began to understand Russia as what is referred to as the "Third Rome." The first articulation of the concept can be traced to a Russian monk named Philotheus of Pskov who had regular contact with the Russian tsar at the time. The key passage he penned that first made the Third Rome concept explicit is the following:

> I would like to say a few words about the existing Orthodox empire of our most illustrious, exalted ruler. He is the only emperor on all the earth over the Christians, the governor of the holy, divine throne of the holy, ecumenical, apostolic church which in place of the churches of Rome and Constantinople. . . . It alone shines over all the earth more radiantly than the sun. For know well, those who love Christ and those who love God, that all Christian empires will perish and give way to the one kingdom of our ruler, in accord with the books of the prophet, which is the Russian empire. For two Romes have fallen, but the third stands, and there will never be a fourth.[16]

This concept framed Russia as heir to an imperial mantle founded in Rome, which subsequently moved to Constantinople on Rome's collapse. Once Constantinople then fell to the Islamic empire of the Turks, Russian elites then posited that the natural heir to this legacy was Moscow, the only major Orthodox capital with the necessary imperial credentials to justify such a claim. It was resting on this concept in 1547 that what was previously the Grand Duchy of Muscovy rebranded itself as the Tsardom of Russia.[17] Tsar, the title taken by the Russian king, accordingly derived from the Russian adaptation of the Roman title "Caesar."

It is from this point that Russian control of the Black Sea became a core component of Russian policy in the area. The importance of this control though was not given to the Black Sea per se, but instead to the access it provided to the wider Mediterranean world, and with it the holy sites of Christianity. This access was tied strongly to a psychological understanding of Russia not merely as a state but as a divinely sanctioned empire and heir to Rome. As an isolated continental power, domination of the Black Sea, therefore, meant direct access to the captured heart of Orthodoxy in Constantinople, the straits of Marmara, and, ultimately, the Holy Land in the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, it became a fixture of Russian foreign policy for, as current events would indicate, the subsequent four centuries.

Imperial Period: The Third Rome Applied

"It is a Matter no longer to be doubted, that the attainment of the absolute sovereignty over the Black Sea is one of the motives whereby the Empress of Russia is induced to hostility against the Turks."[18] This article was written in 1783 just 7 years after American independence from Great Britain and 200 years after the creation of the tsardom of Russia. It was a British publication in an Oxford newspaper discussing the actions of Catherine the Great in Crimea. At the time, she was in the process of invading Ukraine on behalf of Russia. In this case, much as in the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2014, the strategic objective was the Crimean Peninsula. In Catherine's time, the proximate goal of its annexation was the creation of a potent Russian Navy with warm water ports capable of projecting power outside of Russia's continental position in Eurasia. Ultimately, the goals of the invasion were the use of the naval bases of Crimea to reconquer Constantinople and the Turkish Straits from the Ottoman Empire. Known as "The Greek Project," Catherine the Great advocated for the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the restoration of the Eastern Roman Empire under Moscow.[19] This would have opened the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa to Russian power projection and potential exploitation. Such a project fundamentally rested on the complete domination of the Black Sea by Russia.

During the nineteenth century, Russia pushed this strategy even further. In its self-proclaimed role as protector of Eastern Christians, Western powers viewed the decline of the Ottoman Empire in that century with increasing alarm. Both Russia and France declared themselves as rightful protectors of the Holy Land in Palestine and the Levant, each holding imperial designs on the decaying Ottomans. In keeping with the fundamental strategic importance of the Black Sea as Russia's only window to project power in the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia found itself in open conflict with Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War, which it lost.[20] This put a halt to Russian hopes of expanding into the Ottoman Empire for the remainder of the nineteenth century. However, even as recently as the twentieth century, the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II, was still following a similar policy tied to Third Rome thinking. During the First World War, the Russian Empire wished to annex

Istanbul in the final partition of the Ottoman Empire, restoring the ancient seat of Orthodox Christianity. This desire was so advanced that it was formalized in a secret agreement known as the Constantinople Agreement signed during the war. In this text, the Allies agreed to give the Russian Empire Constantinople and other Turkish lands in the event of victory.[21] Of course, these plans, in addition to the tsardom of Russian itself, came to an abrupt halt following the Russian Revolution and the subsequent creation of the Soviet Union.

Cold War: A Frozen Balance of Power

The Communist and officially atheist Soviet state and the Cold War in which it found itself changed the language by which Russia spoke of the Black Sea. There was a marked shift away from such lofty historical justifications toward a cleaner and more modern logic tied to the balance of power. Most observers accordingly did not deem the previously mentioned historical concepts particularly relevant, though it is important to note that the concept still was discussed in academic circles on Soviet studies.[22]

During the Cold War, a favorable balance of power for the Soviets was reached following a brief scare in 1946 during the Turkish Straits crises. In this crisis, Joseph Stalin demanded Turkey allow Soviet ships to pass through the Turkish Straits, threatening war if the Turks refused.[23] Turkey acquiesced, allowing Soviet ships to pass. Just some years afterward, however, it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance to guarantee its territorial integrity and to avoid being strong-armed by the Soviets in the future.[24] Regardless of this highly risky event, throughout the Cold War Turkey continued to control the southern coast of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits as it had for six centuries. The Soviet Union and its satellite states controlled quite literally the rest of the coast. This meant, fundamentally, that there were only two actors deciding strategic policy in the region. By virtue of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey's reduced military relevance, the United States became the de facto alternative actor opposite the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union maintained an acceptable level of naval supremacy in the area and had access to the Eastern Mediterranean, a situation that resulted in relative stability in the theater throughout the Cold War. Through control of the Black Sea, the Soviet Union also had access to the rest of the world during this period from its south. To illustrate just how pivotal this control was to Soviet global power projection, the missiles the Soviets shipped to Cuba that precipitated the Cuban missile crisis were loaded onto ships in Crimea. They were then shipped through the Black Sea all the way to Cuba and, at least temporarily, allowed the Soviet Union to directly menace the U.S. heartland with medium-range nuclear weapons.[25] Given the nuclear reality of that period, this meant that the potential for a localized conflict in the Black Sea was lower by virtue of mutually assured destruction. This balance was a stable one and the region saw no hot conflicts during the Cold War period. The bipolar nature of the conflict meant that unlike today, there was simply far less room to maneuver in the Black Sea or elsewhere.

Map 1. Map showing national alignment during the Cold War, 1987


Source: courtesy of the author, adapted by MCUP.

The Present: A Return to an Imperial Mindset

With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the stable balance of power given by the bipolar world in the Black Sea was shattered. Where previously two actors determined the strategic situation in the region, there were now six outright state actors. Russia kept a coastline on the Black Sea, but no longer dominated the region by any means.[26] Thirty years following the end of the Cold War, the world has observed the evolution of an unstable balance of power, punctuated by multiple continuing armed conflicts. To further add fuel to this flame, Putin and Russia in the post-Soviet period have also seemingly returned to the use of lofty imperial imagery and notions in their creation of modern Russian statehood. When discussing his current invasion of Ukraine, Putin directly compared himself to Peter the Great, stating, "Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. It would seem that when he was at war with Sweden, he took something from them. He did not take anything from them, he simply returned what was Russia's."[27] He made these comments while discussing the annexation of Ukrainian territory along the Black Sea. This combination of power imbalances paired with historically rooted revanchism has resulted in a series of conflicts since his accession to power 22 years ago. A key factor that is often underobserved in these conflicts is that each has enhanced Russia's physical position and control of the Black Sea as the following two figures indicate.

Taken together, it is not difficult to observe that Russia has been astonishingly successful at taking Black Sea coastline in a relatively short period of

Figure 1. Share of the Black Sea coastline, 2000

Source: data compiled by the author, adapted by MCUP.

Figure 2. Control of the Black Sea coastline following attack on Georgia and annexation of Crimea

Source: data compiled by the author, adapted by MCUP.

time as the above charts indicate. It is also important to note that the final 750 km of coastline as indicated in dark gray on the second figure is also the most important section of coastline, at least in part, strategically in the Black Sea.

It represents the Crimean Peninsula, which offers the nation that controls it enormous advantages for naval deployments and power projection throughout the theater.[28] It also satisfies the previously mentioned historical desires of Putin to reconquer the root of Russian identity and faith. The peninsula juts out into the middle of the sea, giving excellent positions for the deployment of missile batteries and the docking of ships. As the current invasion stands in Ukraine, Russia also appears set to further expand this advantage in any final settlement. The final portion of this section will now shift to discussing the ongoing invasion and its potential effects on the situation in the Black Sea in more detail.

The Ukraine Invasion of 2022

With the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine proper, it is not clear how much more Black Sea coastline Russia is looking to take. However, its previously mentioned willingness to sustain and inflict enormous casualties in battles for coastal cities such as Mariupol and its insistence on consolidating regions along the Black Sea coast suggest this war is yet another Russian attempt to control the Black Sea. Unsanctioned comments by Russian generals outright stated that the objective of the war was the occupation of southern Ukraine.[29] Such annexation would give Russia a land bridge not only to Crimea but potentially also allow Russia to access the breakaway Moldovan province of Transnistria, where Russian troops are currently based. It would also further reinforce Putin's historical credentials as a leader in the company of the likes of Peter or Catherine, who each successfully brought these areas into the Russian state.

Notwithstanding Russia's lackluster military performance, it is likely that more of southern Ukraine will come under the control of Russia or states loyal to it when the war is over. As the months drag on, Russia has made agonizingly costly yet consistent advances in the regions along the coast of Ukraine and in the east, having abandoned its assault on the north of the country. If one understands the conflict in terms of a consistent effort to conquer more Black Sea territory for both practical and historical reasons, the following figure would suggest why such a strategy is logical for Russia.

Though completely landlocking Ukraine would be an incredibly bold step, it is not one that is out of the realm of possibility. In such an event, Russia would then have substantially more direct control of the Black Sea proper than even Turkey. Even were it to allow Ukraine a nominal portion of its coastal territory in a final settlement, Russia is poised to become the dominant holder of Black Sea coastline in the region. It also shows in simple terms that, far from being part of irrational lapses of judgment with each of Russia's series of invasions and military actions of the last 20 years, Russia has successfully gone from a somewhat average position on the Black Sea to a dominant one in a relatively short period of time. This has been done through a methodical series of attacks on its neighbors following clear, historically based strategic thinking.

Finally, it must be reiterated that the Black Sea's true strategic value is not in its domination per se, but the access Russia gains to the Mediterranean and

Figure 3. Potential postwar settlement involving annexation of Ukraine's coastline

Source: data compiled by the author, adapted by MCUP.

through that ultimately the rest of the globe. Just as it was in the past, the Black Sea is fundamental for powers on its shores to act as serious players outside of their continental boundaries if they wish to. Russian actions in Syria and increasingly in North Africa are likely part of this larger strategy and depend on sufficient control of the Black Sea to make such operations feasible as Russia attempts to reassert itself as a proper great power and seemingly reimmerses itself in the imperial thinking of its past.[30]

Valiant resistance from the Ukrainian people and human costs notwithstanding, Russia is currently in control of the bulk of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast. Given the sheer asymmetry that existed militarily between Russian and Ukrainian armed forces, in addition to Russia's annexing of strategically important Crimea, it has been something of a surprise Ukraine has resisted so firmly. Regardless, Russia has successfully launched a naval invasion near Mariupol, and after fierce resistance now occupies the city in its entirety.[31] In addition, there is a fleet off the coast of Odessa that many analysts expect could be used to launch another naval invasion in the western part of the country if deemed necessary.[32] Russia also has maintained a full blockade of Ukrainian ports for the duration of the war, a choice that has had a profound global impact on the global food supply.[33] Though Russia has retreated from the Ukrainian capital and second city, the possibility for another offensive in the area is likely placing enormous pressure on Ukraine to focus on defending them at the expense of the

south. Russia's superiority in the sea and air (even if its use of its air advantage has been bafflingly subpar at best) has provided it with relative success in the south of the country.[34]

Though it is always risky to predict the future, this article will go with the working assumption that the final settlement in Ukraine will be in Russia's favor, at a minimum allowing it to maintain control of the territory it currently occupies. It does so from a simple balance of power calculus and in recognition of the fact that Russia already exerts control over much of the territory strategically relevant to naval issues in the Black Sea. This would include Ukrainian naval facilities and naval manufacturing capacities, which are not negligible, particularly when paired with Russian technical capacity and military objectives.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine will likely result in Russia acquiring a substantial and currently underutilized shipbuilding capacity in Ukraine.[35] There are 10 shipbuilding and repair yards in Ukraine that Russia could potentially gain control of in the event of annexation or subjugation of Ukraine. For comparison, Russia currently only maintains six shipyards and repair facilities in its internationally recognized southern territory plus Crimea.[36] Three of these were gained in the annexation of Crimea. This would mean that Russia theoretically would have the ability to double its shipbuilding capacity in its southern region if it is victorious against Ukraine. Therefore, it might further develop the captured facilities and capacities of Ukraine. This is a substantial prospect to be considered when one looks at the future trajectory of Russia's naval capacities in the region and highlights the importance of challenging Russia's ability to consolidate control over Ukraine as a result of this invasion.[37] Already in Kherson by mid-June 2022, there are reports that Russia is doing just this and beginning to use the Kherson shipyards for the production and maintenance of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.[38] In Kherson alone, there are three of these previously mentioned shipyards.

Summary

In summation, there are profoundly important practical and ideational motivations behind Russia's interest in the Black Sea. Accordingly, a common Black Sea thread can be seen weaving its way through Russian acts of aggression under Putin going back at least to Russia's war in Georgia in 2008. Motivated by both, Russia has physically annexed territory along its coast in all of its recent acts of aggression against its neighbors. As the invasion of Ukraine of 2022 shifts to the south and east, it would seem Russia's most recent actions are no exception to this pattern of behavior and will likely result in Russia again expanding its power in the theater.

Part 2: U.S. Interests and Recommendations

All evidence previously cited suggest that Russia is acting to further expand its control in the Black Sea, even at substantial political and material cost. This presents the United States with something of a predicament. By most measures,

the United States does not maintain direct strategic interests in the Black Sea. Regardless, its NATO allies in Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria do. Accordingly, the United States must find a way to navigate this reality in response to the changing security environment of the Russian-Ukraine war theater. However, it is not useful to focus on the region without considering U.S. strategy in Europe as a whole. The Black Sea represents a space where the United States can and should seriously consider delegating responsibility for the region to competent allies as part of a larger European strategy to contain Russia. This is in no small part because any U.S. interests in the Black Sea derive directly from those of these allies themselves. Accordingly, the following discussion outlines broad U.S. interests and offers both a short- and a long-term solution to Russian aggression in the Black Sea. These are designed to satisfy as best as possible what are understood here to be the two broad camps in the currently quite vibrant and contentious U.S. foreign policy discourse. For the purposes here these are divided simply between those who would advocate an increased role of the United States in global security affairs versus those who suggest a less heavy U.S. security footprint in regions such as the Black Sea, though it is recognized there are a plethora of variations in U.S. foreign policy perspectives.

U.S. Interests and an Evolving Public Discourse

> They say, "Trump said Putin's smart." I mean, he's taking over a country for two dollars' worth of sanctions. . . . "I'd say that's pretty smart. He's taking over a country—really a vast, vast location, a great piece of land with a lot of people, and just walking right in."[39]

This is a quotation from former President Donald J. Trump in February 2022, shortly after the invasion of Ukraine began. This stands in contrast to the official statement by President Joseph R. Biden 10 days before:

> The prayers of the entire world are with the people of Ukraine tonight as they suffer an unprovoked and unjustified attack by Russian military forces. President Putin has chosen a premeditated war that will bring a catastrophic loss of life and human suffering. Russia alone is responsible for the death and destruction this attack will bring, and the United States and its Allies and partners will respond in a united and decisive way. The world will hold Russia accountable.[40]

The disconnect between the two de facto leaders of America's political parties highlights the previously mentioned gulf between political camps as to how issues such as Russian expansionism in the Black Sea ought to be dealt with. Though it is still too early to start speculating as to what the next presidential election holds, former President Trump is a serious contender for the next Republican nominee for president.[41] Though the Republican Party has notable

internal differences when it comes to NATO and foreign policy more generally, the simple reality is that what constitutes "U.S. interests" is no longer nearly as standardized as it was even a decade ago, with a substantial element of the Republican Party advocating for a more transactional form of American foreign policy. Challenges on the more progressive wing of the left also advocate for fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy, holding a far more skeptical view toward U.S. participation in global security commitments. Foreign policy has therefore proved to be susceptible to recent trends of political polarization along party lines in the United States.[42] In addition to positions on Putin personally and his actions, a substantial wing of the Republican Party also has openly questioned the utility of NATO, including former President Trump on multiple occasions.[43] The concept of international cooperation more broadly has also been substantially criticized, embodied perhaps most clearly by the United States exiting the World Health Organization during the COVID-19 pandemic.[44] This challenge has also come from the more progressive wing of the American left, with former Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders strongly opposing U.S. participation in international trade agreements.[45] The progressive wing of the Democratic Party is also generally skeptical of U.S. military interventions and its role as a global security provider. Even a president expected to be a consummate foreign policy traditionalist in President Biden decided to respect President Trump's agreement to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Despite claiming to embody the more traditional American commitment to international cooperation with its allies, the president chose to do this unilaterally with minimal consultation of international allies ending abruptly 20 years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.[46] This illustrates that even in what would be considered the traditional political establishment, clarity as to what constitutes "U.S. interests" is in a state of flux on both sides of the political aisle.

This piece does not look at all to offer a normative assessment of these positions but instead tries to present what it considers to be objective interests for the United States regardless of political orientation. Accordingly, it rests on the following assumptions:

> A stable security situation in Europe is of interest to the United States, with or without a substantial U.S. presence. If the United States wishes to scale back its security commitments, it needs to do so in a way that limits disruption to global peace and stability. The main international relations challenge for the United States in this century will be in how it manages the rise of China, not how it responds to a declining Russia.

Interests

With these assumptions, the consolidated interests are as follows.

Peace on the European Continent

As the invasion of Ukraine has shown, Russia is more than willing to violate

the territorial integrity of neighboring states if it deems this is in its interests. Regardless of one's perspective on U.S. foreign policy, it is generally accepted that peace on the European continent is in the interests of the United States. Destructive war in Europe drug the United States into brutal conflicts twice in the twentieth century. In current times, the risks entailed by the use of weapons of mass destruction raise the risks of war between great powers to existential levels. In Europe's east, there are borders that are subject to contestation along the same lines as those in Ukraine. Most alarmingly, these include the Baltic states, NATO members who were also a part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, regardless of whether one finds themselves in the more traditional or more reformist camp on U.S. policy, it can be agreed that peace in Europe is a net benefit to the United States.

Free Hands to Shift Attention to Asia

Despite peace on the continent being important to the United States, to put it bluntly and simply, Europe's importance to American foreign policy simply is not what it once was. Regardless of Russia's attempt to destabilize the security environment in Europe, the fact is that the United States faces a rising superpower, China, in Asia and a continuously declining rival in Russia.[47] Though it is likely to remain a persistent military rival and relevant regional power, Russia's staggeringly poor military performance in Ukraine thus far reinforces the state of decline of Russia as a credible rival to the United States on a global scale.

Though the United States maintains regional interests in Europe, it cannot be forgotten that the United States' primary objective navally and otherwise ought to be contesting the rise of the genuine superpower in China and the Pacific. The bulk of present and future industrial output, general economic growth, and future population lies in Asia.[48] Europe, though of course still important strategically and economically, simply is not projected to be of primary strategic importance to the United States in the coming decades as it has been in decades past. If anything, it is projected to relatively decline more starkly than the United States when it comes to the new distribution of power if it remains in its current institutional form.[49] By contrast, it is also well documented that China is set to be a competitive superpower in coming years. Accordingly, it has begun to flex its new muscles with persistent regularity. To effectively counter Chinese aggression, the United States is going to need the bulk of its naval forces, attention, and strategy making focused on the Pacific if it wishes to provide a credible deterrent to China in the future. As it stands, the Pacific fleet would have a difficult time fighting China in its home waters and preventing a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, for example, according to some analysts.[50] In the future, this difficulty is set to only increase as China expands its naval capacities. Whether one wishes for a more or less involved United States in global security issues, the United States will be a Pacific power regardless of one's political persuasion. From the state of Hawaii to the territories of Guam and American Samoa, the United States has borders near China. This, therefore, means the United States does not have the

luxury to delegate responsibility for peace in the region to the same extent that it could in Europe to deal with a Russia bent on domination in the Black Sea.

Recommendations

Short-Term Solution: Increased NATO Priority to the Black Sea

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is of course still the core of the U.S. security apparatus in Europe and the Black Sea. For now, U.S. policy making simply must continue to function within the bounds of NATO to maintain peace on the European continent in the face of Russian aggression. In recent years, NATO has lowered its priority in the Black Sea. In the moment Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, there were no NATO vessels in the Black Sea at all.[51] This has been explained primarily because of disagreements among NATO members, in particular Turkey, which has attempted to not provoke Russia by patrolling the area with its own fleets. This situation is simply not a sustainable one so long as Russia continues to attack its neighbors in the theater, destabilizing the security situation in Europe. Accordingly, the United States and NATO ought to respond.

Ideal Solution: Set up a Permanent NATO Black Sea Patrol Mission

This piece echoes a slightly modified but simple recommendation to improve deterrence in the Black Sea provided by the Center for European Policy Analysis.[52] A full-time NATO patrol mission, based in either Romania, Bulgaria, or Turkey ought to be present in the Black Sea at all times. If there is any lesson to be garnered from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is that preventing provocation by avoiding the Black Sea has not been successful in countering Russian ambitions in the area.

Though it is a simple solution to propose, it must be noted that Turkey can provide a substantial stumbling block to such a strategy. Even as early as 2016, Turkey's position on Russia has given NATO strategists persistent and well-justified concern.[53] Though the short-term solution is simple on its surface, Turkey's willingness to threaten vetoes of Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO have shown that Turkey's reliability as a NATO partner is likely to be dubious at best when countering Russian aggression. What this means in practice is that the best solution for the United States, increasing NATO's presence in the Black Sea, is one that seems all but doomed to failure. Without Turkey as a reliable ally, NATO and the United States' ability to counter Russia in the Black Sea through such a patrol is substantially limited. Ultimately, so long as Turkey remains committed to healthy relations with Moscow, NATO-based solutions will be subject to a Turkish veto when it comes to actions in the Black Sea.

Long-Term Solution: Supporting European Strategic Autonomy

The longer-term solution could potentially fill in the gaps where NATO's weaknesses have become clear. In addition, it also offers a rare area where more interventionist and more isolationist advocates of U.S. foreign policy can find some

common ground. With an empowered and allied European Union, the United States may be able to avoid the Turkish spoiler found in NATO without having to substantially increase its presence in the area. European fleets, sailing under a European flag, would at least theoretically constitute a riparian state under the terms of the Montreux Convention governing the Turkish Straits. What this would mean is that, regardless of Turkey's position, Europe as an actor would have the legal right to enter and remain in the sea. This would be because the European Union has two member states in Bulgaria and Romania, which have coastlines on the Black Sea. This would also mean they would be allowed to station fleets in the theater longer than the 21-day limit, which currently governs most NATO members.[54]

The Current State of the European Union as a Security Provider

In 2017, 55 percent of Europeans stated they supported the creation of European army.[55] This was the last poll done by Eurobarometer on the issue. However, subsequent polls would suggest support has only increased for such a proposal. A flash Eurobarometer poll in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine showed a remarkable 75 percent of Europeans supported the open statement, "We need greater military cooperation within the EU," though questions on a European army have not been asked by the pollster since 2017.[56] Given just the exit of the UK, where only 39 percent supported such a prospect, it is likely that support for such a proposal has only increased since 2017.

Regardless of whether this support for a different security arrangement in Europe implies support for an outright European army, what is clear is that support for change in the way security is managed in Europe constitutes nothing short of a political mandate. Despite this, it is important to remember the European Union (EU) does nothing quickly. Its incredibly bureaucratic nature also makes it difficult to pinpoint when and where political shifts occur for outside observers. This is not so much a bug but a feature of this distinct political institution. Regardless, it is now safe to say that the last seven years have witnessed a shift in the EU's security ambitions and institutional landscape, one which has only accelerated because of Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Framed as "strategic autonomy" in EU discourse, the European Union and its key players have initiated transforming the EU from an exclusively economic and civilian institution to one which plays a genuine security function.[57] The exit of the United Kingdom from the bloc, traditionally a veto player when it came to an increased security role of the EU, has opened the door for increased security integration driven by activist and Europhile governments in Emmanuel Macron's France and Olaf Scholz's Germany. Such grand initiatives tied to the European Union tend to be met with healthy skepticism in both English and American policy circles. However, recent recommendations by Chatham House have cautioned British policy makers in dismissing this new phenomenon as merely another chapter in Europe's checkered history of security integration stating:

Map 2. Support for a European Army in 2017

Note the support for Britain is not shown (39 percent).
Source: data compiled by the author, adapted by MCUP.

It would be premature for London to dismiss strategic autonomy because the key drivers of a greater European capacity for thinking and acting more autonomously on security and defense—above all the realization that the long-term commitment of the United States to European security is changing as Washington increasingly focuses on the Indo-Pacific, a diagnosis London largely shares—have not altered.[58]

The same warning holds for U.S. strategists. The change in rhetoric in the EU has also been backed up by policy changes. In 2015, Europe quietly created its first true uniformed service when it expanded Frontex's mandate in response to the migration crises. Frontex stated on Twitter, speaking of the decision, "For the first time, the European Union has its own uniformed service—the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps."[59] Though modest, it does indeed represent the first armed, uniformed service under the control of the European Union. As it stands, Frontex's mandate tasks it with protecting both

the land and sea borders of the entire European Union. Its sea element would be comparable to the U.S. Coast Guard in its mission while its land element is more akin to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. On top of this, the creation of a European defense fund, the creation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism, and the development of a more robust European Foreign Service all are symptomatic of the increasing pace of this evolution. However, most importantly, in 2020 serious proposals for the creation of a European Rapid Response force to address global crises were taken up by the European Commission with support from the continent's main military players. Now in March 2022, European leaders have officially agreed to set up such a force, starting out very small at just five thousand troops. Regardless of its small size, however, the institutional implications of this action are of course profound for security in Europe in the longer term.[60]

Though it is bureaucratic and slow-moving, the evolution of the EU in this direction is something that forward-thinking U.S. policy makers need to take seriously, though not necessarily with immediate concern. Naturally, the idea of Europe beginning to take responsibility for its own defense tends to raise alarm bells in many U.S. policy making circles as fundamentally eroding U.S. influence. On the contrary, this article advocates viewing it as a change worth supporting where possible as a cost-effective solution to the Russia problem. As it stands, the United States bears the brunt of the responsibility for the defense of Europe against Russian aggression, both militarily and politically. The current arrangement seems to have far more costs than benefits. A splintered Europe, even with the higher national defense spending states have promised, simply is not capable of seriously defending itself under its current institutional structure. European states are simply too small, with each announced spending increase being designed to defend individual states and not continent as a whole. Instead of weakening the U.S. position, a Europe that is self-sufficient militarily and economically presents the United States with a series of opportunities to ultimately strengthen the transatlantic alliance while at the same time allowing itself more space to focus on Asia and theaters where more critical interests are at stake. Max Bergmann even makes the case in *Foreign Affairs* that without substantial change, the transatlantic alliance's fundamental integrity is at risk. In the event of the rise of a truly anti-transatlanticist administration in the United States, the lack of U.S. interest in defending Europe could quickly devolve into a situation of "every nation for itself" on issues of security in Europe if it maintains its current institutional structure. If the lessons of the World Wars of the twentieth century are any testament, this is clearly a geopolitical nightmare that even the most isolationist policy maker would wish to avoid. Critically as well, it is in Asia where a genuine superpower is rising as opposed to Europe where a collapsed one is desperately attempting to disrupt an established order with diminished resources. Managed properly, this shift toward increased European "strategic autonomy," therefore, could offer a cost-effective and permanent solution to Russia's disruptive actions.

Suggested U.S. Policy

A Naval Element in the European Rapid Response Force

As previously mentioned, the European Union has officially stated its intention to create a nascent armed force under European control. It is designed to be under the control of the European Union, not the member states, meaning the organization is on its way to formally being a military player. This force is set to be operational by 2025 with Germany providing the core personnel for the unit.[61] The objective the United States ought to support would be, within the creation of such a force, the inclusion of a European naval structure with a fleet designated to challenge Russia in the Black Sea. As it stands, no such element is projected to be included. This could act as a permanent patrol group in the likely event that NATO cannot accomplish such an objective.

The ability for Europe to credibly counter Russia would be all but guaranteed if the development of such a force is taken seriously, even if Russia is able to assimilate the bulk of Ukraine's shipbuilding capacity. This is in part due to Europe's enormous shipbuilding capacity and technical abilities as a collective. In the European Union, there are 150 large shipyards. Forty of these are capable of making large seagoing commercial vessels.[62] By contrast, Russia has 11 total shipyards, 3 of which are exclusively for repairs. Even if Russia were able to absorb the Ukrainian shipbuilding industry in its entirety, this would only bring its total shipyard count to 13, as the bulk of Ukraine's shipyards have already been captured in the annexation of Crimea.[63] Clearly, this is paltry in comparison to a more united Europe. The limits of such a force would be all but limited to solely the level of ambition taken at the European level. This new actor in Europe would have economic clout paired with a well-developed arms industry that Russia simply could not match. In addition, simple geographic proximity to the theaters would make this actor far better placed to keep the peace and counter Russia than the United States across the Atlantic. Europe's previously mentioned riparian status on the Black Sea would also open their ability to participate in naval buildups in the sea using ports and facilities on its coast.

Though the legal details would likely have to be worked out given these European fleets' peculiar supra-state status under the governing regime for the Turkish Straits, the ability to challenge Russia directly in the Black Sea would likely immediately change.[64] Europe could deploy fleets through the straits at will as part of a naval rapid reaction force, so long as those fleets are based in the Black Sea in either Bulgaria or Romania, two European Union members who have Black Sea coastlines. Following the necessary construction of more extensive port facilities, the feasibility of Europe maintaining a Black Sea fleet substantially larger and more advanced than Russia, is something that would be more than achievable. The Black Sea would quickly cease to be a Russian lake and become a European one, allied to the United States yet not formally bound by the inefficiencies of the NATO framework.[65]

How to Get There: The Carrot, Not the Stick

Of course, as the creation of such a force is an internal issue that would need to be taken up by European member states, the United States' role will have to be supplementary in such an endeavor. Such a shift also is not expected to be fast. However, the United States maintains a powerful position in discussions of security on the continent, which should not be underestimated. For 70 years, Western Europeans have depended on the United States almost entirely for their practical security while many Eastern Europeans dreamed of joining in that system. As a result, the United States maintains a very strong practical and ideational position in Europe, which allows it to alter discussions and calculations of not only European elites but average Europeans through its diplomatic actions and statements. Were the United States to make it clear that it would support the previously mentioned reforms, worries about the United States' response to the creation of a new security entity alongside NATO would not necessarily evaporate, but it would certainly be far less potent than it has been in recent years. Over the last few decades, the United States has taken an unclear stance on the development of capacities such as those mentioned in this article, occasionally supporting them and at other times expressing alarm at the prospect of a genuine supra-national actor in Europe. Even in the last two American administrations, commitment to European security and the United States' view on Europe's role as a strategic actor have shifted enormously simply by a change in presidential administration. Regardless of political position, an EU with a naval capacity would be a useful deterrent to Russia's destabilization efforts and would be a net benefit to U.S. interests. Europe consists of well-established democracies with shared values to the United States, not to mention a shared cultural and political history. As powers rise in other parts of the world that do not share these traits, the importance of reliable and powerful allies who share liberal conceptions of the world will only increase.

Openness and clarity with European allies, particularly highlighting the less than rosy reality that Asia will be of primary strategic importance in the next century, can go a long way in encouraging Europe to continue to accelerate on its path toward strategic autonomy. This will hopefully result in it taking increasingly ambitious decisions to counter Russian aggression both in the Black Sea and other theaters such as Libya and Syria, with U.S. support. Clear dialogue, not blindsiding actions such as the rapid withdrawal of Afghanistan without consultation, the undermining of European interests in the Pacific in favor of the now isolated British, or the outright hostile rhetoric employed by the previous administration regarding the EU is the path forward to gain a useful, reformed European partner aligned with broad U.S. interests. Uncooperative actions such as those previously mentioned will not likely stop security reform. Instead, they risk causing the reform to come primarily from a place of concern and mistrust as opposed to one of support and cooperation as proposed in this article. The objective of U.S. policy therefore should not be the creation of a geostrategically relevant Europe per se, but a capable Europe that is still a

firm and cooperative ally with the United States. This requires a degree of acting in good faith, which has been perceived in Europe as missing in the previous two administrations.

Conclusions

The Black Sea's importance to Russia is a pattern that can be traced back for more than one thousand years. In the last four centuries, an imperial logic tied to a Third Rome mentality has made the Black Sea even more fundamental to Russian policy makers and increased Russia's willingness to use force in the area. Though the pattern seemingly paused during the Cold War, Russia's most recent conflicts fit in with this longer historical trend and its new imperial understanding of itself. All its recent conflicts with its neighbors have resulted in Russia gaining more physical control over the Black Sea, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is likely to be yet another chapter in that story.

The United States should respond to this trend by broadly supporting Europe's stated desire for strategic autonomy. The United States should do so by supporting the inclusion of a naval element to the European Rapid Response Force created by the European Union in March 2022. Because of its allied status and enormous latent naval force capacity, a reformed Europe with a credible military element could counter Russia in the Black Sea without the need for substantial fleet deployment increases on the part of the United States. Fundamentally, this would also allow for countering Russia with or without needing to worry about a Turkish veto in the NATO alliance. The best way to accomplish this is through open and honest diplomacy with Europe and the avoidance of further actions that undermine the United States' perceived reliability as a partner.

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Like the Sea, So Cyberspace
A Brief Exploration of Establishing Cyberspace Norms through a Maritime Lens

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Abstract: This article compares the history of establishing maritime laws, norms, customs, and standards of conduct with the rise of cyberspace as an artificial domain akin to a digital sea. A brief history of how humanity established enduring norms and standards at sea is described, followed by a comparative analysis of the world's physical maritime domain to digital cyberspace. Recommendations are made for contextualizing cyber threats and policy issues within a naval framework. Finally, the authors offer some brief conclusions.

Keywords: cyberspace, international norms, maritime, piracy, ransomware, cyberwar

Humanity has always held an innate attraction to the maritime domain.[1] It is as familiar and fundamental to us as anything on this Earth, and we have been drawn to it for trade, war, transportation, and nourishment. It has been here for eons in all its splendor and was not made by humankind. Nations have claimed it, but no one can control the sea: one can only hold portions of it at a time—meager territorial claims over a vast ocean scape—a tenuous grasp at best. Over centuries, humanity has learned to coexist with the world's oceans and establish international standards of conduct to share this common good.

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The internet, on the other hand, was created by humankind. Born from the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (a.k.a. ARPANET) in the 1960s, this small network of academic and research institutions has grown from four sites to hundreds of thousands worldwide.[2] Today (as of this draft), the internet contains 4.36 billion pages of information, with the estimated size of Google's total index in the tens of trillions.[3] More broadly, the internet is an environment within the more extensive *cyberspace*: a complex mesh of networks, devices, and elastic nodes by which humankind's information is communicated globally. It is the sum of human knowledge given a matrixed, semicorporeal form of data centers, gateways, and cables—a vast, digital sea of information and organizations. The term *cyberspace*, coined by science fiction writer Ford Gibson in his 1984 novel *Neuromancer*, has since captured the world's imagination and has been used in academic, policy, and media circles for decades. Recent scholars have argued that cyberspace, as a general medium of communication and information sharing, has been around since the discovery of the telegraph.[4] Terms like *netizen*, denoting an active participant of the internet, have made their way into dictionaries like Merriam-Webster (the irony of quoting an online dictionary, once widely available in print, is not lost on the authors).[5]

Much of society's activities involve cyberspace these days: trade, war, transportation (of information), and nourishment (of the mind and soul). It has been described as "a new existential dimension of man," a "non-space place" that humans depend on for speed of communication, constructing and sharing visions and ideas, and performing new forms of commercial enterprises.[6] Nevertheless, our norms for dealing with this digital frontier are mainly nonexistent. Nation-states and nonstate actors exploit it, legitimate businesses anchor their livelihood within it, we entertain ourselves with it, and a grandmother talks to her grandkids via video chat halfway around the world using it.

Perhaps the reader can already see the parallels between the world's physical oceans and the artificial digital ones. Without knowing what it would become, we have created something that resembles that which we are connected to so strongly for life and livelihood: the sea. Much can be learned from the history of establishing maritime laws, norms, and standards of conduct that can be applied to cyberspace. With the world's governments and policy makers grasping at attempts to quiet the cyber threat landscape and enable economic prosperity, drawing an analogy to familiar territory is helpful.

This article seeks to inform, persuade, and encourage the public policy space and interested readers that follow defense and national security matters. The authors start with a view of vulnerabilities and threats that intrinsically tie the physical (maritime) and digital (cyberspace) to create an imperative for establishing norms. A literature review examines the current state of establishing norms. We discuss what was learned from a case study of maritime warfare—the 1980–88 "Tanker War" between Iran and Iraq—and apply those lessons to the cyber domain. Finally, we acknowledge limitations and provide recommendations to policy makers, practitioners, and researchers.

The Imperative:
Cyber Threats Targeting the Maritime Domain

The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Maritime Security and Piracy arm tracks and reports on threats to international shipping, including piracy and armed robbery against ships, and maintains a publicly available database.[7] Furthermore, history has shown that maritime warfare and actions taken by warships on the high seas threaten shipping.[8] Understanding these threats in the maritime domain is an important parallel to understanding the cyberspace domain and the dangers that hold assets at risk within both nation-states and non-nation-states.

Nation-state threats can involve warfare or law enforcement actions. Military actions within or near them can easily threaten international and commercial shipping lanes. From 1981 to 1988, military actions between Iran and Iraq affected merchant shipping in the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, a period known to many as the "Tanker War." The conflict eventually invoked the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, calling for the immediate end of hostilities and the start of UN peacekeeping operations on the Iran-Iraq border until 1991.[9] Political positioning, control of oil investments, and even geography played a role in shaping this threat event as a critical example of how nation-state hostilities affect maritime shipping. George K. Walker, in his thorough review of the Tanker War in *The Tanker War, 1980–1988: Law and Policy*, noted that the conflict between the Arabian Gulf nations, which embroiled the rest of the world, resulted in the most significant loss of merchant ships and mariners' lives since World War II; more than 400 commercial ships were attacked, 200 merchant seamen were killed, and the attacks resulted in the loss of more than 40 million tons of shipped goods.[10]

Non-nation-state threats, and often the focus of much of the literature on maritime threats to commercial shipping, include piracy and terrorism. It might surprise those unfamiliar with the maritime domain to learn that piracy on the high seas continues even today, despite enjoying a 27-year low in 2021, with only 132 piracy and armed robbery incidents reported worldwide by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).[11] A publication sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Science for Peace and Security Programme describe pirate attacks on shipping that have affected maritime, transport, and insurance companies through profit loss and rising costs to transport goods and personnel safety since the turn of the twenty-first century.[12] It is worth noting that, in many cases, maritime shipping continues to face armed piracy without armaments or armed escorts, and few companies can afford (or are legally allowed) to employ private security teams.

During the last decade or more, concern has continued to mount in the maritime sector about the threats posed by cyberspace.[13] Integrated harbor systems and seagoing vessels of all sizes are increasingly reliant, perhaps now entirely dependent, on information technology and communications networks.[14] Newsworthy cyberattacks by cyber threat actors, influenced by or directly af-

filiated with nation-states, have constantly demonstrated a capability to affect operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) through cyberspace effects.[15] Adverse cyber effects comprise a genuine threat to maritime systems and nautical operations. Recent research argued for "maritime cyber resilience," where a system can anticipate, withstand, and recover from a cyber threat with minimum downtime.[16] The convergence of OT/ICS, IT, and always-connected communications technology in the maritime domain means maritime domain leaders cannot ignore cyber threats.

Literature Review of Cyberspace Norms

Current literature on cyberspace norm development is nascent at best, owing to the emerging nature of the topic and the complex, adaptive problem it presents. Cyberspace continues to be a new and challenging domain for policy makers and diplomats and is often ill-understood.[17] The core of helpful literature on the subject comes from international relations, law, cybersecurity journals, periodicals, or government reports (most of them U.S. based). A scholarly search using EBSCO returned only 46 "cyberspace norms" results as an exact match. Much of the literature reviewed discusses nations establishing credible deterrence and cementing national sovereignty over technology infrastructure within a nation's boundaries.

Harvard International Review writer Olga Kiyan described the U.S. and Russian interests in cyberspace as fundamentally different, causing differing approaches to norm development within the United Nations. The two nations lead vastly different working groups with different conclusions.[18] She observes that this fundamental difference occurs due to how the United States and other liberal democracies view cybersecurity as a sociotechnical issue. In contrast, Russia, China, and other like-minded governments view "information security" as "consolidating state cyber sovereignty."[19] This notion is agreed on by noted international policy researcher and advisor Alexander Klimburg in his book *The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace*, in which he describes significant disagreement of values and definitions between liberal democracies and states that prioritize power projection, sovereignty, and control.[20]

In a 2014 analysis of "state-centric cyber peace," Dr. Scott Shackelford and Andraz Kastelic analyzed 34 national cybersecurity strategies to note governance trends that could inform international law and norms development.[21] The authors described the imperative for norm development given the difficulties in building multilateral treaties on international behavior in cyberspace and little agreement in the existing literature at the time on best practices that would inform such actions.[22] Shackelford and Kastelic concluded that, for norms to be successful, they must be "clear, useful, and do-able," and the most significant potential for agreement between disparate nations seems to be in protecting critical international infrastructure on which they all depend, such as international trade, commerce, and financial systems.[23] The authors also noted a significant lack of strategic and policy commitment among nations in prose-

cuting international cybercrime, suggesting difficulty in norm consensus for international law enforcement; the highest convergence existed in those nations with sophisticated cybercrime treatments, such as the United States and United Kingdom.[24]

Government and diplomatic reports on cyberspace norms comprise an essential part of the existing literature on the topic. Two primary groups within the United Nations continue to advocate for cyberspace norm development: The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), comprising 25 member nations established in 2004, and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), including more than 150 participating countries that formed in 2019. It is important to note that the United States, Russia, and China are active participants in both groups. However, the literature states that the GGE is dominated by U.S. and European Union thought leadership, while the Russian Federation advocates for the OEWG as the preferred method of consensus on the issue.[25]

The GGE met for almost a decade and produced numerous reports in 2010, 2013, 2015, and 2019.[26] The United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the 2015 GGE report as Resolution A/RES/70/237, within which states agreed to 11 nonbinding norms to promote stability, free expression, and a disavowal of malicious use of connected technology.[27] In 2017, the United States proposed criteria through the laws of war, requesting endorsement of how they applied in a cyber conflict, but it was struck down by Russia, China, Cuba, and other nations that refused to do so.[28]

In 2021, the third and final session of the OEWG in information and telecommunications resulted in the unanimous endorsement of 150 participating countries for the group's final report to the General Assembly. The report lays out recommendations for voluntary behavior norms, international law, and future dialogue for global cybersecurity. Although consensus was reached, not all countries agreed, disassociating from the final report so as not to be bound by its recommendations.[29]

Finally, it is interesting to note that existing literature has already begun to draw parallels between the maritime domain and cyberspace. Indeed, Evans Horsley's comparison of state-sponsored ransomware through a maritime piracy lens inspired this article.[30] Horsley's analysis of existing international law enforcement against piracy contained within the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how it could be accepted or refuted to apply to state-sponsored ransomware groups is a prime example of the ambiguous nature of existing law and the need for establishing stronger norms.[31] In the next section, we explore this further by applying a maritime lens to cyberspace norms and offer a comparison between a historical maritime conflict—the Iraq/Iran Tanker War—and how lessons learned by the international community in that conflict can be applied to cyberspace before a similar conflict erupts in the digital domain.

Applying a Maritime Lens to Cyberspace Norms

As the literature shows, state and nonstate-sponsored influences affect cyberspace just as they do in the physical realm, such as the maritime domain. Both state and nonstate cyber threats can hold public and private organizations at risk, including those that provide critical services to the public, such as power, water, and sewage infrastructure.[32] Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have all been associated with malign cyber activity targeting U.S. critical infrastructure.[33] Of particular interest is the threat of *ransomware*, which targets government and businesses alike, and has become a money-making scheme of criminal enterprises who "focus on victims whose business operations lack resilience or whose consumer base cannot sustain service disruptions, driving ransomware payouts up."[34] Such actions invoke maritime piracy in a new domain, operating from safe-harbor nations to prey on others in an environment lacking norms and enforcement.[35]

Defining cyberspace itself has been fraught with challenges. Often described as a collection of gateways, routing, switching technology, and independent and interdependent networks, many people see cyberspace as the "worldwide web" or the internet. The reality is far more complex, blending physical and digital environments, machine-code data sets, and human-readable information; only portions of cyberspace are accessible to those with commercially available tools (such as a web browser) to view it. Gálik and Tolnaiová describe cyberspace as a hierarchy with physical, logical, information, and human layers linked and dependent on the other, with information as the basic unit or building block.[36]

As the sea contains an entire ecosystem of life and activity belonging to no single human organization, so too does cyberspace process, store, and transmit data beyond a single organization's control or even understanding, save perhaps one: the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). As a multinational stakeholder governance group based in the United States but established as a nonpolitical nonprofit organization, ICANN is probably as close as we can get to an international governance group for cyberspace, compared perhaps to the IMO with significant differences in authority and political power. ICANN is not associated with an international political governing body like the United Nations and is limited in scope to the searchable internet through regulating internet protocol (IP) addresses and domain naming services (DNS).[37]

Before the IMO established the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (agreed on in 1972 and adopted in 1977), giving way to the UNCLOS signed in 1982 by 117 states, norms within the maritime domain were regional at best.[38] Technology moved faster in the nineteenth century following the industrial revolution, sailing gave way to steam, ships moved faster, and more traffic plied the open oceans. As the premier sea power, England became the standard-bearer for international norms at sea, enforcing Admiralty Law.[39] Such early efforts to organize around international norms gave way to

the first global maritime conference in 1889, hosted by the United States, where rules were codified and agreed on, paving the way for IMO's creation.[40]

Today, 99 percent of the world's merchant tonnage has agreed to at least some IMO regulations, such as pollution prevention.[41] Such essential cooperative efforts led to other treaties, conferences, and international agreements to combat maritime threats such as piracy, thus increasing the international norms and cooperation that the domain enjoys today. The IMO supports all UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) across environmental, economic, and social lines of effort.[42] Could a similar path be followed to establish standards in cyberspace for all nations?

Applying Observations and Lessons from the Tanker War to Cyberspace

Norms in cyberspace are challenging to establish because of code-based cyber weapons, the adaptive and complex nature of cyberspace itself, and the internationally universal belief in not tying one's intelligence apparatus through agreed-on rule sets. The proposed criteria, led by working groups formed through the United Nations and assisted by international think tanks, have resulted in proposed standards that range from target limitations (preventing damage to civilian infrastructure or incident response teams) to outright prohibition of certain types of malicious code.[43] Following the 2015 GGE report and subsequent resolution, in which Russia was a member and a key proponent, Russia conducted a successful cyberattack on Ukraine's electrical grid—a clear example of how a nation can refuse to be limited by norms they agreed to without a straightforward means of imposing cost by the international community. Nevertheless, Nye also posits that countries still have four core reasons to agree on standards to constrain behavior in cyberspace: coordination, prudence, reputational costs, and domestic pressures; establishing this behavior can take time, perhaps decades, to cement as norms.[44]

The law and policy ramifications surrounding the Tanker War compare how warfare improved norms in the maritime domain and how cyberspace norms could similarly be enhanced. There are several lessons about the global social process and international norms. When reviewing the effects of the Tanker War on law and policy, George Walker describes that civic order claims in international law significantly impact public order norms and claims.[45] For instance, the Tanker War caused widespread oil price hikes and supply chain shortages, forcing the international community to side with civic order claims that would ultimately restore the public order norms.[46] In cyberspace, widespread attacks and malfeasance by threat actors, both state and nonstate, affect the international marketplace. In the future, such attacks may force a preference for claims favoring public order norms and establishing transnational cyberspace law, along with governing bodies to administer it.

In the case of the Tanker War, the United Nations, specifically the Security Council, was instrumental in serving as the international body for adjudicat-

ing disputes and, ultimately, bringing about an end to the conflict through mediation and resolution of international peacekeeping once it was made clear that the public order was threatened.[47] International norms are not a perfect or immediate solution, and the Tanker War is one such example: the conflict continued for eight years, intensifying in 1988 before finally reaching a cease-fire by Iran and Iraq accepting UN Resolution 598, a resolution that took years of negotiation while the destruction and bloodshed in the Arabian Gulf continued.[48]

What can be learned about establishing public order norms in cyberspace from a maritime conflict like the Tanker War? Several themes contributed to a final resolution:

- International *commitment* to a governing body and, through the UN Charter, a consensus that resolutions by that body are binding for member states,
- International *resolve* to continue using the UN as a vehicle to seek diplomatic resolution, and
- International *pressure*, through military, economic, and diplomatic channels, to end the belligerents' behavior for the good of the public order and deter future aggression.

A disruptive conflict in cyberspace, with threat actors causing widespread and internationally felt effects, has no established diplomatic channel like the UN Security Council with binding powers to impose costs on belligerents. Walker notes that the United Nations resolutions affirming freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf and surrounding regions played a significant role in the Tanker War. The Gulf Cooperation Council emerged as a critical diplomatic pressure point by the end of the conflict.[49] It seems clear that, if viewed from a historical maritime perspective, cyberspace norms can enjoy some measure of success as a deterrent and that the UN can and should be the body to establish those norms and enforce them.

While international cybersecurity norms are taking shape at the United Nations, individual states must still protect their interests by shaping those norms. The United States, for its part, has a strategic imperative to be a key player in the formation of cyberspace norms, similar to how it was instrumental in hosting the international maritime conference in 1889. The U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission's (CSC) final report, released in 2020, describes shaping cyberspace norms and behavior as a central strategic pillar, going so far as to say that standards will not take shape without America's help.[50] Such a statement may serve as a call to action for American policy makers, particularly as the United States and like-minded democracies prefer a free and open internet for communication and commerce. Still, adversarial nations will undoubtedly see it as a U.S. attempt to take control of international rulemaking. It could set back negotiations in bodies like the United Nations.

The CSC recommendation to establish a Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technology, at the assistant secretary level, within the U.S. De-

partment of State to engage in international diplomacy about cyberspace norms and behavior shaping could perhaps be the most impactful recommendation to further international cyberspace norms.[51] Policy makers with cyber policy and law expertise must engage in higher-level, informed discussions. Looking back to that first international maritime conference in 1889, the president of that conference was Navy rear admiral Samuel Rhoads Franklin—clearly a subject matter expert in maritime security, seamanship, and navigation by title and profession.[52]

Establishing international cybersecurity norms is just one arrow in a quiver of solutions to deal with cyber conflict below the level of what might be considered traditional warfare. While piracy on the high seas was severely curtailed at several historical points, it was never fully extinguished. Shipping organizations must still protect themselves by enacting antipiracy security measures for ships underway in dangerous areas. So too must cyberspace-connected information systems enable a solid cybersecurity program with the right people, processes, and technology.

Increasing cyber resiliency and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure—for example, maritime navigation and port control systems—is a means to reduce the risk of system failure, impose costs on cyberattackers, and support international cyberspace norms by removing easy targets from potential attackers. Regulatory compliance with verification processes such as audits is essential to ensuring standards are met, and these resiliency measures can realistically reinforce norms to deter aggressors.[53] Agencies such as the Coast Guard are vital to ensuring that these critical systems maintain cybersecurity standards.[54] They require clear policies to take enforcement actions if deficiencies are found.[55] An intergovernmental feedback channel that can reaffirm protective and resiliency measures can serve as part of "layered cyber deterrence" and reinforces international cybersecurity norms, particularly for critical international systems such as commerce and finance, of which the maritime domain fits centrally.[56]

As a component of infrastructure under threat from cyberattacks, the use case of cyber-connected maritime systems helps illustrate the need for international cybersecurity norms when viewed from maritime safety of navigation and reinforcement of naval examples. These international standards and practices reinforce good behavior while deterring negative behavior that can cause disastrous effects. Just as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea provides norms and standards for designs like the pilothouse and navigation systems, so, too, must an international standard exist for cyberspace to prevent a threat actor from usurping those systems and causing conditions detrimental to maritime operations and safe navigation.[57]

Conclusions

There are clear parallels between international norms and standards established in the maritime domain that can be likewise applied to cyberspace. Just as the sea serves as a transportation and commerce medium, cyberspace functions as

the twenty-first century "digital sea" for information transportation, thought-sharing, and high-speed commerce that cross national borders in ways never before. Cyberspace knows no absolute sovereignty (although several nations would prefer otherwise), and the netizens of the internet are genuinely an international collective engaged in a global community. Threats in the maritime domain, such as piracy, have loose approximations in cyberspace with ransomware and profit-seeking cyber gangs, just as nation-states hold increasing national interests and develop digital weapons of war.

It is necessary to understand the limitations of this article and the literature reviewed herein. Much of the existing works serve as literature reviews or commentary (expert or otherwise) that seeks to inform or persuade, including this article. The work of Shackelford and Kastelic, published nearly a decade ago, perhaps provides the most comprehensive analysis of national cybersecurity strategies with an eye toward international law and norms development in current searchable literature. Policy makers and informed audiences alike would be well served with up-to-date academic scholarship on this topic, examining trends in strategy development, international agreements, multilateral treaty negotiations, and policy diffusion. Additionally, public-private partnerships and nongovernment organizations should continue to publicly publish thought leadership on the subject outside of paywall limitations that can be leveraged and built on by other analysts, advisors, and scholars for the benefit of all nations seeking consensus in cyberspace norms.

There are real benefits in establishing international cybersecurity norms and standards that can reduce the risk for all cyber-connected systems and organizations. While the United Nations and international think tanks have made significant progress, much more work remains to be done, particularly with attributing cyber actions and holding nations accountable for those actions and the actions of their citizens. It is hard work, but so were those first few international maritime conferences establishing the law of the sea, seeking consensus, and holding nations accountable.

The United States will undoubtedly continue to be viewed as the standard-bearer in establishing international cyberspace norms, but it will take the entire international community to ensure success. Time is needed to grow and refine models, but time is in short supply. Cyberspace moves at machine speed—the United States must continue to exert diplomatic pressure within the United Nations and other alliances, such as NATO, to accomplish the strategic recommendations of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission: promote responsible behavior in cyberspace, deny benefits of damaging exploitation, and impose costs to threat actors.[58] Establishing norms in the cyber domain, with the history of maritime norms to offer context and lessons, will benefit all nations.

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The Cyber Sea
Conflict and Security

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Abstract: The interchange that drives world economics in the past now intersects with and will rest on the electromagnetic spectrum's (EMS) structure that includes cyberspace. Historically, the world's oceans played this crucial role in great power competition, but today that key geography now sits within the EMS's exponential exchange in services between nations for maximal productivity output in free and open markets. The U.S. military must help sustain these crucial lines of communication to channel the spirit and capacity of their nation's people into the new activities that war calls for and efficiently employ them against a threat. Sea lines of communication were of foremost importance in this regard until now, when the EMS, tapped by cyberspace, connects the most amount of people and their productivity to win the next conflict. Cyberspace has consumed the sea.

Keywords: cyber power, seapower, sea lines of communication, SLOC, electromagnetic spectrum, EMS superiority, terrain-based strategy, threat-based strategy

The 2018 U.S. *National Defense Strategy* states that the "long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the [Defense] Department."[1] To this end, the U.S. military prepares a threat-based response to wage a great power competition.[2] That focus sacrifices the here-and-now of a terrain-based response in favor of countering a potential threat. Instead, more must be done to ready the force for present realities. An analysis of the British Empire in its heyday would serve to assist the United

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States in crafting a better security architecture, one embracing a terrain-based model of security, as opposed to a threat-based model.

At the time of the British Empire, the key terrain was the sea. Access to the maritime domain was the critical factor that allowed Britain's military to gain a marked advantage over its adversaries by securing economic gains across the globe. Arguably, the United States kept this focus during the Cold War, i.e., U.S. Cold War strategy did not focus on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's (USSR) defeat in a land war but rather on bolstering an economic and even political exchange among as many nations as possible throughout the world.[3] That influential U.S. terrain-based strategy that depended on sea lines of communication shifted after the tragic 11 September 2001 (9/11) attack on U.S. soil as the military's focus became countering the global terrorism threat. Years later, the current U.S. military strategy still ignores seeing terrain as the key to setting strategy to enhance the interdependent relationship between the economic market and augmenting military power.[4] That insight speaks to the focus of this article: the need to align economic vitality with the military mission during times of peace *and* war. The nation that does so distributes resources efficiently, creating continuous economic development and military effectiveness. Britain was able to keep this appreciation of the state's employment of resources foremost in mind during the height of their empire, leading to decisive results. The United States must do the same when contemplating how best to position itself to prevail in today's conflict at sea.

The question becomes how best to do so. Cyberspace provides the answer. Despite the U.S. Department of Defense's traditional divide by organization and doctrine, now between electronic warfare and cyber operations, both lines of effort attempt to dominate aspects of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) that transmit packets of information.[5] The EMS is much more than radio frequencies and includes the infrared light frequencies that enables ethernet fiber-optic cable connections critical to today's networks. The electromagnetic spectrum's physical ability to facilitate commercial transactions and more broadly human interchange makes the EMS the critical terrain of today. The exponential speed and quantity of service transactions facilitated by the EMS mirrors the British use of the world's waterways in supporting its empire. The United States must safeguard that digital infrastructure to maintain the international norms and practices that sustain the liberal world fashioned after 1945. The British Empire implemented a successful terrain-based military strategy to maintain economic market stability. The United States would yield greater benefits by adopting a similar strategy. Analyzing the British Empire at its peak reveals the myopia plaguing the current U.S. threat-based strategy. Economic considerations must be pulled into the analysis via the key terrain of cyberspace.[6] Cyber power now, as seapower once did, best addresses the economic realities at the core of any military strategy.

U.S. government publications, later addressed in this article, reveal some tentative steps in the direction of paralleling cyber and seapower when trying to

define the EMS. However, that effort is understandably nascent and therefore incomplete. How best to handle cyber realities and how that technology best relates to the EMS will be clearer in the years ahead, probably many years in the future. This article helps align that thinking in terms of a needed military outlook in cyberspace. This conceptual building is underway, and the parallels established here in relation to the British Empire provide some much-needed context. Honing and improving thinking in this regard grows out of the British Empire's efforts at its height of using sea power to help broker a more stable world. Some famous studies undergird this analysis, from Adam Smith's seminal and immensely influential work presenting the virtues of free trade, *The Wealth of Nations*, to tracking the impact of his compilation on Alfred Thayer Mahan's famous history, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. These almost now primary sources are abetted with key scholarship, such as Julian Corbett's *Some Principles of Maritime Power* and Paul Kennedy's important history, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, a comprehensive study but one centering great power discussion on the British Empire. Valued studies of the British Empire include Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire* and Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*.[7] Altogether, these sources provide a great point of departure to further consider how the sea may well yield crucial attributes and traditional power venues to the vast openness of cyberspace.

The British Empire at Its Peak

The British Empire maintained a terrain-based strategy that secured the economic market, preventing the enemy from damaging or destroying society's ability to connect and facilitate a surplus exchange of goods and services to then maximize societal development. The strategy required the military to concentrate on protecting the economic market no matter what the enemy did. The results were impressive. From the mid- to late-eighteenth century and until the 1950s, the British Empire was the world's most prominent political entity, an economic juggernaut, and a powerful military and strategic alliance leader. Of the world's 209 nation-states, 63 were once ruled by Britain. The territories that formed the British Empire ranged from tiny islands to vast segments of the world's major continents, including the Americas.[8] This collection of overseas possessions relied on alliances with the indigenous leaders, elites, and the many people employed by the sovereign. In James Lawrence's *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, he summarizes this reach: "The achievements, however, cannot be denied, and during its heyday, the British Empire was the envy of the world."[9] Due to the British Empire's investment in security, people from any land could invest in themselves, focus on their labor productivity, and make money by operating within the empire's bounds all by virtue of British security.[10] The British Empire attained its powerful status largely because of its terrain-based strategy that secured economic development in peace and war. As another expert wrote, "the eighteenth-century British strength was its policy connection, primarily on military means, to project global trade, financialization, and protectionism."[11]

Many attribute the British Empire's success to maritime power advancing trade made possible by controlling sea trade. Most famously, in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, Alfred Thayer Mahan points to England's terrain-based strategy to secure the economic market. Mahan writes of sea power in 1763:

> The policy in which the English government carried on the war is shown by a speech of [William] Pitt, the master spirit during its course, though he lost office before bringing it to an end. Condemning the Peace of 1763, made by his political opponent, he said: "France is chiefly, if not exclusively, formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us, above all, through the injury to her which results from it. You have left to France the possibility of reviving her navy." Yet England's gains from this agreement were enormous; her rule in India was assured, and all North America east of the Mississippi in her hands. By this time the onward path of her government was clearly marked out, had assumed the force of a tradition, and was consistently followed.[12]

William Pitt ("the Elder") is a towering figure in the history of the British Empire. However, even he could not deter the British Empire decision makers from understanding that the inherent stability born of sea control or denial was the most important factor to winning a future war, not the capabilities of future threats. [13] Mahan underscores the British government's ability to set this policy in motion when he notes, "Both houses of Parliament vied in careful watchfulness over its extension and protection, and to the frequency of their inquiries a naval historian attributes the increased efficiency of the executive power in its management of the navy."[14] A terrain-based strategy had come to dictate British policy resting in the hands of the navy and would remain in place for a very long time.

The British Empire's determination to secure the economic market proved to be successful in peace and war. In peace, that strategy provided stability and confidence that yields the benefits Adam Smith desired: the division and specialization of labor that in turn benefits society.[15] In recent times, scholar Joseph Nye, in an opinion piece with CNN, accurately illustrates that same sentiment, writing that military power provides a degree of security as oxygen is to breathing, something little noticed until it becomes scarce, at which point its absence dominates all else.[16] Similarly, another renowned scholar, Paul Kennedy, in his tome, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,* mentions that great power status changes are determined by whether the "state's economy had been rising or falling, relative to other leading nations, in the decades preceding the actual conflict."[17] Kennedy warns of military power overextension, but his focus on conflict among great powers fails to recognize that military power is not just

for war preparation. Ashley Jackson depicts the more significant benefit of military security: "equality of access to markets sounded fine in theory; in practice, however, Britain was the country in by far the best position to take advantage of it. Underpinning this unique system of overseas settlement and commercial relations was the supremacy at sea of the Royal Navy, vital for the growth and security of the British Empire."[18] Jackson's clarity of the key role of seapower accurately applies to Kennedy's call for efficient employment of state resources but expands the notion of security as something more than just winning wars. A military projection of power must align with the security requirements of the expanding market during times of peace as well. The market provides funding for sustaining security, and security encourages economic expansion. That relationship is cyclical, concrete, and durable should one make the effort to uphold the relationship as consistent state policy. No matter the obvious gains from the approach, getting offtrack occurs too often.

Mahan further depicts the synchronized effects of British strategy and the benefits in peace:

> The needs of commerce, however, were not all provided for when safety had been secured at the far end of the road. The voyages were long and dangerous, the seas often beset with enemies. In the most active days of colonizing there prevailed on the sea a lawlessness, the very memory of which is now almost lost, and the days of settled peace between maritime nations were few and far between. This arose the demand for stations along the road, like the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade but for defence and war; the demand for the possession of posts like Gibraltar, Malta, Louisburg, at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence—posts whose value was chiefly strategic, though not necessarily wholly so. Colonies and colonial posts were sometimes commercial, sometimes military in their character; and it was exceptional that the same position was equally important in both points of view.[19]

As Mahan points out, the British Empire balanced security and economic development, seeking synchronization among the military and commercial markets. The broadest need proved self-evident. How best to make the connection work is less clear but possible should state policy attempt the effort in times of peace and war.

The emphasis on a terrain-based task to secure the economic market was validated in the 1714 Treaty of Utrecht that marked Britain's rising status, exemplifying its military power as that of securing economic production. Its global gross domestic product (GDP) started to increase against that of the French and Spanish.[20] The British Empire's concentration of force beyond its shores grew merchant shipping and sparked wealthy colonial cooperation. That early

strategy propelled economic market extension by connecting more people, all made possible by the military support that secured the sea. War would be a measure of that security, a new expression of peace that set Britain on a path to great power status.

In contrast to the success of the British Empire's strategy, both Spain and France experienced a significant loss in power. Spain's military strategy focused on preserving the crown's wealth, failing to spread that wealth and security among its people and their goods. The Spanish navy eventually paid the cost, as the massive British naval force, made possible by focusing on people, allowed Britain to surpass the Spanish fleet in numbers and quality of seamanship.[21] The French viewed the military as an instrument to win a great conflict, not provide security, which led to the belief that the navy was a subordinate arm to military considerations on land. The French decision makers avoided investing money into ships to economize their fleet and assume a defensive position around France proper. All the while, they invested lots of capital in their large army.[22]

While its chief opponents faltered when crafting policy, the British Empire grew economically and in military effectiveness. The synchronization between these two efforts proved to be equally decisive in providing security and waging war. This balance was not easy to achieve. As Geoffrey Till's book, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* eloquently explains, the British Empire's maritime infrastructure was not only maintaining the security of trading routes but also meant the unprecedented reach of military force: "the absolute supremacy of the British navy gave it such inordinate power far beyond its numerical strength, because 200,000 men embarked in transport, and by God only knowing where they might be put ashore, was a weapon of enormous influence and capable of deadly blows."[23] This statement illustrates that the same security apparatus for economic development quickly converts to significant military effects in a time of conflict. In similar fashion, Kennedy complements the periphery attacks undertaken by the British Empire, all made possible given its employment of financial support to form strategic alliances with other powerful states to then demonstrate the substance of Britain's maritime and continental strategy. His reasoning shows the British Empire's complementary rather than antagonistic efforts to marry commercial gain with military purpose:

> Frederick the Great for example, received from the British the substantial sum of 675,000[Ł] each year from 1757 to 1760; and in the closing stages of the Napoleonic Wars the flow of British funds reached far greater proportions (e.g., 11 million to various allies in 1813 alone, and 65 million for the war as a whole). But all this had been possible only because the expansion of British trade and commerce, particularly in the lucrative overseas markets, allowed the government to raise loans and taxes of unprecedented amounts without suffering national bankruptcy.[24]

Kennedy's emphasis on financial gain sets the productive powers of the state alongside an expanded market, allowing more people to produce (whether in taxes or products) and support the war effort. The payment to mercenaries and allies, the transport of raw material or trading products, and the freedom to employ the army all depended on securing the ocean's avenues of approach on the sea lines of communication.

The British Empire's ability to use its military to secure the economic market led to the empire's consistent attention to including more people from all classes, a means that required the military to foster stability, allowing the state to garner the individual's trust to then maximize their production and support surplus exchanges to achieve constant economic development and sustain military effectiveness. Sea shipping's ability to service large surplus quantities of goods and connect the greatest number of local markets came from the British Empire's access to sea lanes, and then came the claim to overall ocean dominance. The military protected that connection and facilitated an exchange anchored on the sea lines of communication. In sum, the British Empire's military employed a terrain-based strategy.

EMS Superiority

After 1945, the U.S. military assumed the authority and responsibility to protect the free exchange of goods and services across the globe.[25] With that mandate, the British Empire's model remained intact, until now. Some of that regress stems from circumstance. The ocean's advantageous characteristics to connect the most amount of people with large surplus quantities transitioned with the onset of the information revolution.[26] Consequently, today the economic market's decisive point is the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), the collection of electric and magnetic waves found in the cables that connect computers, the wavelengths that connect cellphones, and the radio waves that connect satellites.

The U.S. military's *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, defines a decisive point requiring military attention as "a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor or function that when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success."[27] The EMS is such a decisive point. It has exponentially increased the market and rapidly increased societal advancement. Connecting more people in cyberspace allows for more frequent exchanges of services to meet needs regardless of distance. The EMS can be understood as an economic supply chain rendering information as a commodity that allows a high yield of return from information flow. The physical world offers a plethora of data of varying sorts: imagery, audio, and thermal. But data is not productive until it supplies the needs or wants of a consumer. Turning data into an information commodity requires its cultivation, manufacturing, transport, distribution, and consumption to be productive. Therefore, the EMS should be the military's decisive point when called to advance or protect economic stability, that is, secure national security.[28]

Information passed in the EMS transports itself along trade routes (specific frequencies: electric and magnetic waves) just as it occurs at sea with other goods. The information is received (depending on frequency, power, time, and location) and distributed to the consumer.[29] When the information commodity is received, the linear progression is complete. This frequency-delivered information commodity also smacks of military implications. It provides "positioning, navigation, imagery, communication, intelligence, weather, and engagement of the enemy beyond visual range."[30] However, just as at sea, the duality is as apparent. Any EMS exchange is valued like money and that exchange is possible with secure access and trading routes. The synchronization that drove the British Empire has resurfaced in cyberspace.

Much like the cognitive signal and multiplying effects of money, the information commodity is a force multiplier to the efficient employment of a nation's resources. Adam Smith explains that an individual can only produce a small part of his necessary demands and requires a supplemental exchange to fulfill all their necessities.[31] This crude exchange faltered in operation until the invention of money. Money provides durability in value and ease in transport that can be divided to meet the equitable quantity of multiple demands.

Additionally, the information commodity achieves the desired effect to employ resources appropriately to then meet demand, but at a much faster speed and greater distance than has been possible before the transmission on the EMS. Achieving EMS superiority now becomes a military task, specifically protecting the unfettered information flow and assured access across the electromagnetic spectrum frequencies—a need the U.S. military fortunately recognizes.[32] EMS power, much like seapower, profoundly influences the wealth and strength of a nation, which fosters a constant clash of interests as nations compete to gain a larger share and control of the information flow.[33] Although the physical effects of war occur on land, sea, and air, these effects are exponentially modified by the conduct and the relative productive value of a nation's EMS superiority. EMS superiority enables the global economic market to connect and efficiently facilitate the exchange of supply and demand to increase economic development faster and further than at any time in history. In this way, the EMS offers similar characteristics to the ocean and possesses an obvious need. What Britain had secured at sea must now be a security a state looks to achieve in cyberspace.

This need can be taken further. The commodity of information provides universal value to the world's labor force. Security of that functionality breeds military imperatives. The EMS as dictating an information exchange means combat resources as a means of a whole of government policy correlates to the British Empire's use of its military at its best. The military was at its peak when offering security to a system that used a naval strategy to protect the productive value of state investments in the commercial interchange. As Mahan states, "England by her immense colonial Empire, has sacrificed much of this concentration of force around her shores; but the sacrifice was wisely made, for the gain was greater than the loss, as events proved. With the growth of the

British colonial system, its war fleets grew, but its merchant shipping and wealth grew faster."[34] The British Empire found lasting success by making significant investments in protecting the economic market resting on the decisive sea trade routes. The global EMS trade routes continue to diversify and expand to connect the exchange in services, demanding protection as a guarantee to open and free access to trade in their own right.

A Terrain-Based Strategy

On 11 September 2001, the United States experienced a catastrophic terrorist attack and the U.S. military's primary concern quickly became confronting terrorism. Due to this threat-based focus, the U.S. military restructured and developed capabilities to combat this problem. While a response was warranted, the rush to embrace a terrorist threat had costs. In the words of the *National Defense Strategy* summary of 2018, that new focus led to "a period of strategic atrophy."[35] With the United States engaged elsewhere, both China and Russia enjoyed economic development, with China nearing comparable U.S. GDP levels and gaining global economic influence. As evidenced by China and Russia's modernization efforts, it is becoming clear that both countries "want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model."[36] This development has led to another fundamental shift in U.S. military strategy from a counterterrorism threat-based approach, to a great power competition that also seeks to engage defined threats. In sum, the United States has traded one threat-based task for another. This focus could further shrink the U.S. military's comparative advantage in controlling and protecting the country's need for free markets.

The change is unneeded. China and Russia resemble the British Empire's great power competitors France and Spain in that an ability or need to protect the home waters is a limitation unto itself. Michael Beckley highlights this problem:

> In a war, China could potentially deny the U.S. military sea and air control within a few hundred miles of China's territory, but China cannot sustain major combat operations beyond that zone, and the United States retains low-cost means of denying China sea and air control throughout the East and South China Seas as well as preventing China from accomplishing more specific objectives, such as conquering Taiwan.[37]

That military dynamic means that, while China may achieve near parity with the U.S. global GDP share, China's economic development is dependent upon the very global exchange made possible by U.S. security efforts. Due to China's dependence on the world's raw materials and financial commodities, China's manufacturing could be halted quickly without access to global trade. China's forfeiture of the global exchange in a war setting means a similar loss of a global exchange of information commodities. That capital available in cyberspace is forfeit as well given China's determination to establish a Chinese cyber

barrier, the "Great Firewall."[38] China's failure to maintain its lines of communication at sea or in cyberspace represents a tremendous vulnerability in times of war.

The same vulnerability is present now in cyberspace. The Chinese "Great Firewall" and censorship restrictions resemble the French strategy to provide naval security only close to their shores and only to protect the markets of France. Much like the French forfeiting the value of trading partners, the Chinese government's restriction on access to cyberspace means restricted access to the digital free market of ideas. This shortcoming matters. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates put it this way:

> Counting all categories (including peace, literature, economics, and the sciences), as of 2019 the United States had received 383 Nobel Prizes, the United Kingdom 132, the USSR/ Russia 31, and China 6. All of this contributes to an image globally of the United States as the intellectual and scientific leader. Equally impressive is the fact that more than a quarter of U.S. recipients have been immigrants.[39]

China's determination to seal off what is deemed inimical information in cyberspace stunts its intellectual development, harming innovation. This lack of societal-intellectual improvement underscores that economics is not just manufactured goods but includes information commodities that depend on global markets to fuel more development. Shrinking from the cyber sea means efficiency is beyond the reach of China as is any claim to great power status.

Russia does not compare to the United States in terms of economic development, but it does boast a military that seeks to achieve operational effectiveness in cyberspace.[40] In that regard, it has mounted a significant challenge in terms of nonviolent actions, as one expert stated, a wholly nonmilitary campaign reaching beyond merely cyberspace.[41] But by pursuing a terrain-based strategy that includes securing the EMS to enjoy trade in cyberspace, the U.S. military will restructure and develop capabilities that will help the U.S. government thwart Russian actions in the digital domain. No matter Russia's attack on Ukraine, and, more likely, because of Russia's struggles in imposing a military decision on Ukraine via the violence of invasion, countering the nonmilitary aspects of that state's power projection will remain a U.S. priority.

Currently, the *Joint Operating Environment 2035* exemplifies the need for a U.S. realignment because that document again states a decisive victory focus in a threat-based model. The document does acknowledge the importance of commerce and information connectivity through the EMS. Nevertheless, the aim is only to secure portions of the frequencies in the EMS, not to secure the EMS as a means of global commerce and partnership.[42] A secure cyberspace would build trust and cohesion with the global economic market. In turn, this achievement would inspire more people to connect and exchange information to then provide goods and services. Protecting a free and open EMS simply

amplifies the benefits of the liberal capitalist market, inspired by Adam Smith, which has proven to be the most effective way to achieve economic development and global security.[43]

Implementing a terrain-based strategy will create and consistently reinforce the world's productive resources. The global, liberal capitalist market backed by the U.S. military and its allies should not fear the emergence of China as a great power. China grew to great power status by adopting and becoming a part of that global liberal market. The major threat to the United States and global stability is the EMS's lack of common security. Protecting the EMS, a terrain-based imperative, is a daunting task, much like securing the vast ocean ahead of the soon-to-be-developed British Empire. Given the needed intersection of economics and military affairs, the United States could trust its allies to assume more of a role in safeguarding significant shares of the land, maritime, and air tasks. This cooperation would allow the United States to focus on the challenge of securing the EMS.

Trusting and managing that global commons, if done effectively, could very well lead to a prosperous, prolonged period of peace. That development, should it come to pass, would be a welcome sight. Britain may well have used sea power to create and maintain its empire, but it did so in too exploitative a fashion.[44] Too many areas of the world suffered to ensure Britain prospered. A series of wars followed. In the cyber age, that negative, concomitant impact of exploitation and strife stemming from globalization may well be averted, at least greatly curtailed.[45] Trading goods, services, and ideas online can be done in parity and equity among the nations of the world. A secure, global online commons is needed first; this terrain is the most important feature of the modern age that may well right the wrongs of the past when realigning seapower with cyber power. Conflict at sea is heading to a virtuous rendezvous in cyberspace.

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13. Julian Corbett, renowned British naval theorist, codified much of this thinking of sea control and denial, centering his discussion on sea lines of communication, less terrain. See Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Power* (London, UK: Longman's, Green, 1911), 94–96.

14. Mahan, "Discussion of The Elements of Sea Power," 51.

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31. Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, book 1, "Of the Causes of Improvement in the Productive Powers of Labour, and of the Order According to Which Its Produce Is Naturally Distributed Among the Different Ranks of the People," chap. 4, "Of the Origin and Use of Money."

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Cyberspace and Naval Power

Matthew J. Flynn, PhD

Abstract: Seapower has come to cyberspace as a measure of the so-called greatest transfer of wealth in history given the efforts of China and other states to steal intellectual property online. But the first greatest transfer of wealth comprised Europe's rise to prominence post-1500 ACE. What historians call the "rise of the West" came to fruition with a forfeiture of the ideological promise of sharing the benefits of Western civilization worldwide. Cyberspace promises to align both threads of the new naval power, economic gain, and ideological conviction, a novel change in the history of conflict at sea all made possible by the technical marvel of cyberspace.

Keywords: greatest transfer of wealth, naval power, openness, rise of the West, cyber sovereignty, conflict at sea

O ne main purpose of naval power is attaining resources to drive the economic enrichment of a nation. That push naturally breeds conflict at sea among nation-states seeking the same end. The foremost success in this competition is what scholars call the "rise of the West" and refers to Europe's ability to gain prominence post-1500 ACE, as a realignment of resources went decidedly in favor of the emerging Western nation-states. A series of modest naval expeditions led to a concerted effort to gain riches abroad and bring them to Europe. Military coercion first interdicted and then redirected

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trading networks in the Americas and Asia to such an extent as to revive Europe as a power center that relied on sea lines of communication to accomplish what became the greatest transfer of wealth in history.

Today, a similar change unfolds in cyberspace, but in the other direction. The new greatest transfer of wealth arises from non-Western states acting in cyberspace to steal technology from Western states to then seek advancement on the world stage. To address this reality, those considering conflict at sea must weigh how cyberspace has assumed the mantle of naval power to feed a globalization movement driving regional inequalities. However, smoothing over difference, rather than creating imbalance, appears to be the new mandate of casting cyber power alongside naval power.

The ensuing "sea" conflict in cyberspace struggles to apply geographic dimensions when using the labels West and non-West nomenclature that makes sense only when referring to European countries and the United States as Western. That division falters today since Japan, for example, can be considered Western, not because of its geographic location but because it marries an international trade imperative with some form of democracy. A better focus dismisses geography. A more inclusive means of government contrasts with dictators imposing authoritarian rule while pursuing global trade opportunities as well. The resultant political tension inherent in this contrasting dynamic draws naval power into the cyber realm where geographic boundaries are even harder to attain or maintain than at sea.

The struggle to realign state power continues online as more open states confront governments hoping to limit access in this new space. The issue here is controlling content coupled with the urge to communicate among a population subsuming the mere desire to conduct an economic transaction. That key distinction means a cyber conflict over resources demands an ideological showdown in that domain, as was the case with the rise of the West. It is less things coming full circle than it is naval power as cyber power forcing the rise of the West paradigm to fulfill its lofty ideal of sharing resources globally in the hopes of forestalling conflict. The alternative leaves trade benefiting one region more than others and functioning as a means of imbalance on the world stage. The thesis of this article is that the ideological goal of promoting democracy with trade is a needed choice given that the extension of that ideal to cyberspace via openness can check China's growing power.

The Greatest Transfer of Wealth

In recent times, cyber vulnerabilities have eroded state sovereignty to the point where China, in particular, has plundered intellectual capital from the United States via online theft and espionage. Critics of an open internet lament this "greatest transfer of wealth in human history."[1] Thanks to cyberspace, global interaction now works against Western interests, making that exchange felt in a remarkably short period of time of some 40 years. Stealing Western secrets via cyber access has identified a startling shift of riches among nations that com-

menced in short order, threatening the Western advantage in global trade and perhaps imposing a position of disadvantage.

This fear of economic parity or even inferiority contained a noticeable declaration of hypocrisy given Europe's, then America's, rise to power via a similar exchange, amounting to the first greatest transfer of wealth in human history. Scholar William H. McNeill described this process as the "rise of the West." He stressed the ability of a European power center after the year 1500 to exploit the wealth of existing trading networks in the Americas and Asia during some 400 years.[2] Poverty-stricken Europe then remade itself into the most powerful region of the world.

While McNeill recognized some benevolence in this process, others called out Western expansion as no more than imperialism. This practice allowed a European primacy in world affairs that rested on a social system embracing universalism; only one "modern world" existed, albeit after 1500 one tilted toward European ascendancy.[3] That line of analysis spurred additional research to address why an impoverished Europe rose to dominate more prosperous regions of the globe. If biological factors could help explain the European conquest in the Americas, as Alfred S. Crosby showed in *The Columbian Exchange*, and Jared Diamond stressed in *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, that development did not explain what occurred in Asia where uncontrolled illness did not decimate the population there but Europeans still came to dominate the region.[4] Some based this outcome on internal, European factors. In *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations,* David Landes wrote that a superior work ethic explained the results and that key mentality sprung from geographic conditions; Western Europe simply enjoyed a better climate than other regions, the ensuing salubrious living facilitating a drive toward "industrial innovation."[5] More insight in this respect led to intellectual inclusion. Europeans borrowed ideas from outside their region when they needed to, and, even if in a halting fashion, embraced the best ideas internal to Europe. Less restriction due to shedding prejudice invited an open-mindedness that meant a distinct advantage.

McNeill's book *The Rise of the West* set the parameters of this line of historical inquiry: a dominant China and Middle East giving way to a rising Europe after 1500. Those scholars focused on Asia conceded the main cause of eclipse was a lack of intellectual prowess. For this reason, Asia abdicated a leading role in world affairs, a withdrawal centered on China. For instance, China had initiated a movement in intellectual discovery before seeing Europe birth a "modern science" that eclipsed Chinese efforts.[6] Others championed Asia as too great a region to be pushed to the side even if faltering in the face of modernity. As Eric L. Jones writes in *Growth Recurring: Economic Change in World History*, "economic growth would have been possible in any society had impediments, especially political ones, been removed."[7] Yet, to examine circumstance, whether producing internal weakness or foolishly yielding to it, overlooked the main driver of this evolution. This was the inequality of competition turned into

conflict, although not always a clash predicated on violence and therefore not one of war.

Cyberspace captures that very framework of structure mattering more than geography—when that template is affirmed, the world becomes flat indeed. Joseph Needham called this possibility a "regionless" competition and an inevitable and needed synthesis between East and West.[8] Such a broad action led to a universalism speaking to a unity inherent in science—a global reality surpassing earthly difference and featuring a "cultural essentialist" thinking.[9] For Needham, openness referred to a joint venture in science that had always been humanity's intent. That goal awaited a grand technological accomplishment—such as global connectivity.

Up to this point, human intellectual capital spelled the currency for either taking a region forward or seeing it bypassed. A stagnate or even retrograde movement stemmed from an obtuseness that generated physical realities from intellectual rigidity; a fear of global interaction followed, slowing development within a state and inviting a decline in national power. This reaction crippled the Ottoman Empire's ability to sustain its power when religious dogma crowded out the reforms needed to counter European advances.[10] Addressing barriers to exchange among diverse peoples interacting in a borderland more often than not signified the future prospects of a regional power. Those engaged beyond borders looked forward with confidence to future days; those erecting barriers expressed trepidation about the same end. Those seeking engagement, or Landes's drive to an intellectual openness, encounter McNeill's prophecy of a "world-wide cosmopolitanism" and a world visited by a "vastly greater stability" arising from a "Western imprint." To see such a future meant a stilling of violence as a means of settling disputes due to a "growingly effective international bureaucracy."[11]

For a time, it appeared that a Western-dictated globalization had indeed subsumed the world. Western culture reached the far corners of the Earth largely on the back of the economic success of capitalism. When Europe forfeited its dominant position after the World Wars of the mid-twentieth century, it fell to the United States to deliver this outcome. The fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) heralded this achievement. With the collapse of that state, a long-standing opponent of American-defined democracy, the norm of government empowering as many people as possible moved unimpeded about the world.[12] The pushback was immediate, some decrying the new faith in democracy as no more than a capitalist-based "world war," others denouncing the immorality of Western influence as "neoliberal" and as a means to allow the strong to dictate to the weak, thereby expanding social inequality. Consumerism also surfaced as a global norm and as a less flattering reflection of Western culture.[13] In short, if most nations acted along Western norms of commerce, too many states had found ways to blunt the push for democracy associated with capitalism and did so with U.S. complicity, all in the name of making money.[14] These critics could not stop the movement, however. If not an "end of

history," civilization had achieved a threshold, a single system elevated to appear the banner of modernity, at the least a needed benchmark to reach in order to flourish in a new world.[15]

As governments willingly sought out financial advantage, humanity glimpsed a borderless world as multinational corporations pushed for monetary exchange that relegated demarcation lines to potentially ceremonial markers.[16] In this process of globalization, the nation-state system took a hit as well, and international boundaries appeared to wane in the face of economic advancement.[17]

Content to watch a natural evolution in globalization, the United States prepared to reap the benefits of a world now shaped according to its norms. This change would be a slow process, but one clearly bowing before U.S. interests. One must appreciate the calm and almost welcoming disposition of the United States toward this development. Its vision of world affairs was coming true, and its belief in its *exceptionalism* was reaching fulfillment. Simply motivated by ideas of communion aided by governmental blessings of the effort, humanity had reached for a meeting of the minds, a shared endeavor of making prosperity and hope a global mission.

This self-actualization of the human race fit American lofty sensibilities. When the internet surfaced, this thinking gained further traction, generating a moment when technology had delivered the means of implementing globalization.[18] A missed opportunity had been made good since connectivity meant something more than merely economic advancement. The new age reached past the rise of the West as cyberspace delivered a noble and rightful payoff, one benefiting all and doing so by smashing borders and doing this not by authoring a land invasion propagated by armies answering to a single state or alliance, but doing so by the sheer force of ideas. The international exchange should be one of discourse, of people reaching out to one another, of learning about each other in ways never before possible—instantaneously and without the oversight by either elected or self-appointed authorities.

Cyber Sovereignty

Borders appeared to be dead at this point since one people inhabited the Earth, not citizens of differing states, but those online or "netizens."[19] And then adversaries of globalization spreading via cyberspace declared that openness does not serve as an expression on behalf of humanity; rather, it marks the cultural threats lurking in the new domain. One must be on guard against these insidious, intellectual dangers, and attempting to mount that defense means curtailing an open internet. Championing cyber sovereignty represents a start, not so much a genuine means of curbing connectivity since logical (physical) connection remains, but more of a willingness to stop unfettered human interaction via openness that would result in so much more than seeking online access to turn a profit. One had to dominate the monetary proceeds of cyberspace and control, even stop, the social interaction that accompanies such trade. The rise

of the West mentality had come to cyberspace: profit via a bounty allowing one region to attempt to exploit another but stymie societal connection that might drive parity among competitors.

When it comes to cyberspace, territorial sovereignty enjoys an uneasy transition to the domain. A state exercises control over the physical infrastructure located on its soil providing connectivity to the internet. One expert describes this mandate as authorizing governments to "regulate activities occurring within their territories and to enforce their domestic law."[20] This stand appears straightforward enough and therefore valid. A state would naturally govern online use within its borders. Yet, a government will enable information online to flow onto another country. In this light, cyberspace does not fall under one nation's sovereignty. Rather, countries have an obligation to promote and ensure connectivity. Clearly, nations function as parts to a whole even as those parts may well answer to state sovereignty.[21] *The Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, the West's quintessential answer to placing cyber realities firmly on a legal footing, captures this ambiguity perfectly. "Rule 1" defines "sovereignty" as allowing a state to "exercise control over cyber infrastructure and activities within its sovereign territory," "although no state may claim sovereignty over cyberspace *per se*."[22]

In this confusion regarding what constitutes shared cyberspace lies a growing uncertainty regarding what guarantees openness within a state. No matter a declared respect for territorial sovereignty, Western actions advancing openness transgress on the very idea of sovereignty as a means of connectivity ensuring best business practices. For the West, the de facto norm allows openness to function as an outgrowth of that connectivity. To states fearing openness, new international agreements must make plain the violation of a free exchange of ideas.[23] Given this divergence, territorial sovereignty has not been sufficient to make clear what must happen in cyberspace. Somehow, despite an alignment of cyber sovereignty with the concept of the nation, a clear understanding of openness has fallen outside that norm.

Those supporting cyber sovereignty base their views on the Westphalian state system of 1648. This logic flows from the assumption that agreeing to territorial borders granted Western European nations a reprieve from endless conflict. Once ending the Thirty Years' War with this agreement, prosperity rose and helped Europe attain a dominant position in the world.[24] This characterization of the nation-state system overstates Western achievement. In Europe, defining borders did not always equate to a national identity. That step evolved much more slowly and perhaps arrived only with the French Revolution in 1789. Still, after 1648, Europe did take another big step forward in terms of regional identity and exerting global power, and the fact that conflict among these emerging states assumed more predictable and acceptable forms no doubt played a role in this development.

Bringing to bear some old thinking about nationalism on the new reality of cyber yields a familiar outcome, as nation-state norms become a mechanism for

authoritarian regimes to control the interface. What eventually became a key part of Western expansion—state sovereignty fostering centralized rule—now enables many nations to deny their citizens unfettered access to the internet by implementing government regulations that maintain a watchful eye over all internet traffic.[25] Nations attempting to erect borders in cyberspace to keep out undesirable contacts try to restrict openness as they deem appropriate.

The Reach of Naval Power

To exert naval power generated interaction as much as confrontation among nations. The same applies to cyberspace and that mixing worries countries vulnerable to that exchange. As connectivity continues to grow in cyberspace, those governments fearing openness as the free exchange of information and ideas online offer increased resistance. That opposition stems from leaders of autocratic nations worried about the cultural impact of connectivity, and, surprisingly, from many voices in democratic states responsible for protecting their networks. Altogether, cyber sovereignty becomes a means of trying to thwart openness by retaining state borders in a cyber world.

Those propagating fears of connectivity to enforce cyber sovereignty appeal to Western norms of government-imposed boundaries, law, and possession. To make state sovereignty work in the cyber age, one has to give up on the idea of one world. All people are not the same. Rather, different parts of the world enjoy different rules and norms. Cultural specificities mean a rationale for separation and maintaining an international state system featuring different nations. That goal betrays the most effective use of naval power in history: the rise of the West. The question becomes, can Western powers arrest this process in the cyber age, and to what end? Perhaps shoring up network security can stop a loss of intellectual capital. But to do so cripples the other arm attending economic expansion, a quality resting on American sensibilities. The world could be united by overcoming difference, and the United States had set out to do this from its inception. That conceit did not require all people to be American. Rather, all people clearly should be American because the pursuit of freedom knew no boundaries when considered a universal attribute.[26] With this reference, cyber sovereignty presented a technically savvy body politic with a visceral contradiction: technology speaking to global outreach and a movement endorsing that very connection, but also a cry from within the United States for cyber sovereignty in order to protect the American public from that very outcome.

To dispel such a gross contradiction, the emerging global interchange in cyberspace met with recrimination among U.S. state authorities as a reaction to fears of a borderless world. Fancy defined those past movements where mere cyber connectivity had helped mobilize whole populations to act against their oppressive governments. The Middle East arose as a striking example in this regard, an early success story being the Arab Spring. Then came an unspoken global repudiation of the movement. Populations had acted, to be sure, but the outgrowth had produced dislocation and destabilized the region. Dicta-

tors have weathered that movement to this point, but technology could still usher in a sea change.[27] The United States suffered the most regress in terms of what might come next. Americans had believed a government holding people in check stood for oppression. Now, populations in other parts of the world can agitate for freedom, but have to face an American litmus test demanding an unclear standard.

Other states noticed the hesitation and strove to recover their own sense of purpose. States like Russia and China justified cyber sovereignty as online control that quelled their society of users from thinking that fostered social largesse. In the case of China, big data offers enticement to that very end: increased business activity from better processing power coupled with an upgrade to state surveillance.[28] Thoughts that looked to humanity as one entity, and not many competing groups, suffered in the face of that oppression. Any aspirations of a global, American-led online world faltered as a result as governmental authorities looked to arrest this process of online interaction by enacting controls over the very means of exchange that defined openness.

Embracing control meant that all nations could point to war as the outgrowth of cyber realities. Threats dominate the platform, not promise. Fear should guide the online experience, not trust. What had been an arbitrary experience enjoined with the excitement of connecting with everyone anywhere now has to have intrusive limits and safeguards. People cannot be trusted, the technology cannot be trusted, and the world remains a warzone first and foremost. Cyber merely advances a pending doom, a means to accentuate a familiar path of conflict.[29]

Western governments could no longer be certain of the outcome of such a struggle should unfettered online access be the norm. These power centers hoped to hold onto power by controlling private business. The idea of corporations, the monied interests in the hands of those less willing to obey state boundaries, setting governance, or merely undermining government by doing nothing to rein in the presumed chaos, appeared a real possibility in a cyber age where that sector had in fact created so much of the platform and did so to serve a humanity hungering for connectivity.[30] Profit followed, and nation-states allowed corporations to exist with continued financial gain so long as the corporate entity towed the line of state sovereignty in pursuit of a world resting on devices to make connections in all walks of life, and so arrives the internet of things.

So far, the idea of naval power remained intact and familiar, if one accepted cyber sovereignty. But realigning sovereignty has always been the foremost outcome of naval power gaining resources and has always fueled conflict at sea. Now, U.S. decision makers had to contended with that reality in cyberspace. The connection is that interaction at sea or across cyberspace means redefining sovereignty, or trying to keep it as it always is no matter that impossibility. Resources were certainly one aspect of this struggle, but there remained the ideological imperative accompanying such thinking. After the rise of the West,

Americans defended the best of this European expansion, a hope that enrichment of one region would cause the emulation of that success in other less fortunate regions of the globe. A shared prosperity would emerge and with that change a more peaceful accord among like-minded nations.

Today, the ability to steal ideas online meant non-Western states acted to make this very prophecy come true. But defending cyber sovereignty meant Western states opposed that attempt. While protecting and defending intellectual property made sense, the larger issue of invalidating the ideological premise Americans safeguarded in the rise of the West meant a defeat of casting the American ideal globally.

Naval power was supposed to make good this vision when in American hands. American naval power made sea lanes accessible across the world, a common access to international waters. This guarantee appeared self-serving in the extreme as those norms fueled the American trade juggernaut. Equal access benefits Americans most. But American altruism stresses a universalism in the intent; free trade could benefit everyone. The new greatest transfer of wealth disputes this optimism both in effect and purpose. First, other nations such as China trade across the globe. Second, the ideological need to share ideas as a means to economic empowerment had come to pass, but in an illegal manner according to Western observers. No matter, the obvious contradiction had been exposed: a desire for material resources justified by a promise of parity someday, but a promise that was never honored. Cyber realities had tested the ideological conviction behind Western naval power and found it wanting.

Seeing difference across the globe underscored how democratic (Western) states feared the very connectivity they did so much to foster. Cyber had not brought humanity to a point of bliss, but instead brought crisis. Technology could not save someone; it could only foment a dark reckoning. Human ingenuity could not get one past these inflexible moments. With each advance in cyberspace, humanity faced limitation, not largesse. Such doom spawned only one form of government—one purporting control. Projections of wise leaders in government doing unpleasant tasks for a greater good, albeit a localized good as per any understanding of sovereignty, encouraged obedience among state populations. States did not proctor community, only self-preservation of a lone actor. The internet served both aims, a nurturing of individualism in search of a community but also a fear of overextending one's private reach. Identifying that contradiction as misfortune meant that the outcome mattered more than the process. Those shaping the online world embraced this deliberate emphasis, a by-product of stressing cyber sovereignty. Just as 1648 marked a great abuse of power in the name of sovereignty, so too did a cyber world limited in recollection of democratic activism online.[31] The push online to break the grip of state sovereignty became a forgotten story, and so too did the push of humanity aspiring for change by accepting a clash over thinking, less a war over territory.

Future of Naval Power as Cyber Power

The vilification of cyber as a nemesis to a universalism inherent in the medium made it easy to spurn a sharing of long-held power; rather, a sad reactionaryism took hold. This thinking reversed what the founders of American republican government expected and undermined the advent of democracy already surfacing online.[32] That result means Americans face a crisis when contemplating naval power and a conflict at sea. To deny a realignment of riches as was unfolding in the cyber domain appears an obvious mandate, until the intellectual cost of that act comes to the surface. The ideological baggage of any naval presence came to roost in cyberspace like never before as the online quality of humanness reaching across the globe threatens sovereignty. Most tolerated the business end of connectivity, even encouraged it, for obvious reasons: financial gain. Too many could not condone the output behind a shared human activity of simply sharing ideas, especially not if the world must remain as it was before online realities took hold.

A final contrast remains, set by those proclaiming the virtue of cyber sovereignty. They maintain that the threats online are so great and pervasive that one cannot but conclude that severe restrictions of online use would be the logical extension of cyber sovereignty. At the very least, controls could reduce online use to mere polite conversations, all approved by the state. Moreover, public information could be approved by state authorities, and only sanctioned users could post or access such material. However, such controls would discourage use altogether, a near impossibility not due to financial loss but more due to the absurdity of returning to a life before internet use. The gains are clear from ease of access to information, from financial transactions saving time and money, from the ability to talk to more people more often for more time and at affordable cost. Those seeking retrenchment fail to consider the impossibility of setting the clock back. An appeal to a better existence in the past is easy to sell and nearly impossible to enact.

The demonization of the new continues, however. Governments promise the impossible of controlling online use and hold out the fear of not being able to do that very thing. Assurance and despair seek user obligation to cyber sovereignty. That surrender accepts a status quo that no longer exists, a status quo grossly imperfect in its outgrowth delivering strife and conflict, and a status quo that merely sought self-preservation of an old order that hardly spoke to universal functionality, the very premise of online existence. One could not hold back time, denounce the future, and seek to control the onrush of modernity, even when appealing to cyber sovereignty.

A future defying cyber sovereignty is here, for now. Clearly in the ether of cyberspace stands stateless terrain, a cognitive terrain, an area completely free of state sovereignty. That standing parallels sea power and suggests the rise of the West remains in play as an ideological imperative at long last redressing the regional inequalities that came from that development. More of a sharing of intellectual capital as a means of economic enrichment must come into play,

or the United States must give up on its push for an ideologically shared vision of trade fostering better relations in order to find similarity and accord among peoples. Cyber vulnerabilities have allowed parts of the world to catch up to the West, but that development means the West can right a long-standing ill inflicted on less powerful states that were to meet the promise of advancement someday, but something held as too far off to be actionable, until now. One need only accept this fact of openness and protect it. This feat arrived from an ability to tap a space that had awaited human discovery. Somewhere between Earth and space in the electromagnetic sphere, cyberspace lurked and delivered a universal existence speaking to the best of humanity. That truth is self-evident, best testified to in the efforts of states to redact the existence of openness followed by the state drive for cyber sovereignty to quash the society of users that functions online and produces a community that is bigger than government.

In place of that supposed utopia comes the dystopia of returning the world to what it was before cyberspace. Authoritarian states like Russia and China recoil before this medium.[33] Putin attempts to cast a narrative that abounds in cyberspace and has enjoyed some success in capturing a nostalgic Russian history embracing territorial expansion even if facing connectivity with great trepidation.[34] China's great fire wall stands to keep its citizens apart from online realities, all the while that nation engages in global commerce designed to foster exchange beyond its borders.[35] Smaller states fear the impact of these "cyber rebellions" too.[36] North Korea, for example, remains a reclusive state but one forced to engage in cyber ransom attacks to prop up their cash-starved edifice. Looking beyond its borders is a great imperative to enrich the nation and keeps alive the possibility of internal upheaval from public discontent stemming from web access.[37] Even the United States weighs concerns about online, citizen activism as radicalism at home roils its body politic. To look backward suggests a return to a unifying American identity as divorced from the world, an end tacitly admitting an inability of a democracy to weather a free exchange of information.[38]

Again, such retrograde thinking clashes with online realities that may well be effaced or diminished as a consequence, but not before the folly of such an outcome reveals itself. That struggle, so parochial in the past, now assumes much larger parameters. Openness replaces that narrow ideological construct with a declaration of human access to ideas.[39] This universalism defines a frontier as it should be, the validation of the human need for discovery. To this end, those attempting to defend cyberspace as a positive strive to place cyberspace on a level defying sovereignty. This effort has yet to achieve its full measure, one that accepts globalization as a process reshaping the power structure enacted with the rise of the West.

Cyberspace has closed the gap of riches, but now comes the ideological measure. The online world means Western states must live up to the ideological conviction inherent in the rise of the West as that of sharing resources to create more like-minded peoples who then shun the propensity to turn toward war. In

turn, China will have to do the same. With this recognition comes a vision of cyberspace declaring human interchange as the prized commodity arising from trading goods. Naval power as cyber power forces the acceptance of this other arm of Western expansion, as shared material gain means ideology can at last help defend an open trading system given the altruistic motive behind online existence. This presents another opportunity to foster an exchange across the globe and on a more equitable basis given the difficulty in setting standards of sovereignty in cyberspace. In that dynamic stands a counter to Chinese hopes of expansion via online subterfuge to commandeer the intellectualism defining a so-called Western region today. To compete with the West in cyberspace, China and other authoritarian states must risk becoming like their declared adversaries, a measure of democracy as a symptom of naval power and as the new ideology driving reality in cyberspace as that domain recaptures the lost virtue of the rise of the West.

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The Army and Sea Control
Reconsidering Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-first Century

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Abstract: This article argues that the U.S. Army, rather than the traditional maritime Services, has an emergent opportunity to increase relevancy by exercising sea control to guarantee American access to global markets in competitive spaces in the twenty-first century. In a strategic environment where adversaries are developing sophisticated defenses in-depth to negate American power projection, the institution has a unique capability to create forward positions of advantage with reimagined operational fires commands at scale—as the nucleus of Joint, interagency, and multinational teams—to protect economic prosperity and preserve coalition unity in Central Europe and Southeast Asia in particular, and across the world in general. Advocating for a shift in operational approach that subordinates tactical maneuver in support of operational fires, this article differs from previous scholarship by asserting that the Army should fully embrace sea control, rather than merely providing support to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, to better enable the Joint execution of American and coalition strategies in contested regions.

Keywords: maritime domain, seapower, sea control, Army, Navy, Marines, Alfred T. Mahan, Pacific War, trade, market access, strategy, operational fires command, fires, Joint operations, multidomain operations, combined arms, China, Russia

The U.S. Army faces a daunting task in the emerging strategic environment. As it looks forward to how it will compete in a future global arena that portends a rising China and revanchist Russia, the land power insti-

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tution must argue for credible relevancy, and therefore sufficient funding at a time when other U.S. military Services and agencies are competing for a finite share of national resources. As in any era, this requires the Army to provide a compelling argument that balances requirements for both readiness and modernization. This means that it must present to policy makers in the Department of Defense, the U.S. Congress, and the White House a convincing rationale that justifies support for a purpose-built ground force capable of deterring, and if need be, defeating both peer adversaries and a complex array of rogue state, nonstate, and terror organizations in a variety of expeditionary settings.

Unfortunately, the Army has struggled to define success in a succession of Middle Eastern interventions during the past two decades, where it has found difficulties translating tactical success into lasting strategic gains.[1] Likewise, the more recent argument that it must modernize to potentially execute large-scale combat operations is important, but can be minimized by naysayers who argue that nuclear deterrence, as once argued by British theorist J. F. C. Fuller, has made massive land confrontations between great powers an "obsolete" prospect.[2] Still further, other visionaries have begun postulating that future wars will be fought less as traditional battles between large conventional forces, but more as contests between a dizzying array of cyber, space, artificial intelligence, and autonomous innovations that are defining the information revolution.[3]

In this context, the Army could emphasize a third argument that may prove more convincing: the idea that the U.S. Army, not the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Marine Corps, is now the lead agent to guarantee American access to global markets through the projection of credible and survivable sea control in contested spaces. In a strategic environment where adversaries are developing sophisticated defenses to negate U.S. military expeditionary primacy, the answer may be to project reimagined corps as operational fires commands with multidomain profiles—as the survivable nucleus of powerful joint, interagency, and multinational teams—to protect economic interests and preserve coalition unity.[4] This approach, which would limit adversary options while preserving coalition theater access, would enable American strategy across Central Europe and Southeast Asia in particular, and the world in general, by realizing modernization and buttressing deterrence in the twenty-first century.

Mahan and Maritime Theory

The idea that the Army, instead of traditional maritime Services, should lead assured access to vital markets begins with the basic seapower theories provided by Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late nineteenth century. As a U.S. naval officer, Civil War veteran, and prominent maritime theorist, he argued that industrializing powers relied on international trade to facilitate economic growth and modernization.[5] As articulated in his seminal work, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, published in 1890 as the United States was expanding its global empire, it was in the republic's "production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on" and "colonies, which

facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety" that was to be found "the key to much of the history as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea."[6]

This maritime imperative, which proved essential for powers like the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan to create modern economies, consequently demanded offensive navies not only to secure access to foreign markets but also to protect trade ships that carried goods between domestic and foreign ports—the true lifeblood of the industrial nation-state. Applying the geometric warfare ideas of Swiss theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, Mahan deduced that the objective in war should be to employ lines of operations and decisive points to concentrate the fleet and win decisive battles to create the overmatch required to blockade the enemy coastline and compel a favorable armistice or surrender.[7] While subsequent writers like British theorist Julian S. Corbett later modernized Mahan's fleet-centric ideas by emphasizing cooperative relationships between maritime and land efforts, the basic requirement to assure market access, protect merchant shipping, and maintain decisive maritime military superiority remains operative in the twenty-first century.[8]

In past centuries, the navies of great powers thus served as the primary instrument for intercontinental power projection to open, maintain, and expand economic horizons. As part of this requirement, industrial powers placed premium value on battleship readiness to win large fleet engagements along with diversified capacity to emplace coastal blockades and harass maritime shipping. Having participated in the Union Navy blockade of the Confederacy from 1861 to 1865, Mahan personally observed how sea control, applied as economic strangulation, could starve an adversary of its capacity to make industrial war. The resulting insights, centering on the imperative to maintain a battle-ready fleet, led the American theorist to prioritize large naval engagements—echoing the British Navy's decisive victory against the French and Spanish at Trafalgar in 1805—to preempt such an outcome and maintain national agency.[9]

This requirement for naval dominance provided another key advantage in time of war: the ability to amphibiously introduce land forces along enemy coastlines and, if need be, to support larger interior campaigns. Also an important feature of the American Civil War, Mahan observed how the Union Navy, even though operating under a nascent and rudimentary Joint concept, enabled the Union Army to invade and occupy significant portions of Confederate territory, best represented by the capture of New Orleans in 1862 that led to eventual capture of parts of the Texas coastline and control of the Mississippi River. While these interventions did not necessarily prove decisive to the outcome of the war, they nevertheless provided platforms from which to interdict Rebel blockade runners bringing critically needed supplies as well as create additional dilemmas for the Confederate strategic leadership in Richmond, Virginia.[10]

Looking further back to the American Revolution, the seminal victory of the Continental Army and its French allies over the British Army at Yorktown

in the final stages of the war likewise exemplified the Mahanian theory of sea power in the form of sea control. When the French Navy decisively defeated the British fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake on 5 September 1781, with the resulting naval superiority along the Virginia coast—despite the British fleet's boasting of a more powerful global presence—allowed the French to reinforce the Continental Army's siege with much-needed ground forces to complete the investment of the British position at Yorktown. The combined approach, which was only possible because of the localized dominance that stemmed from the French Navy's unexpected victory, compelled the surrender of a major British field army and set conditions for the achievement of full American independence.[11]

In a more modern context, the Pacific War from 1941 to 1945 between the United States and the Empire of Japan perfectly illustrates the application of Mahanian theory with evolved forms and functions. The 1942 Battle of Midway, as the climatic clash of carriers that had replaced battleships as the decisive instrument of naval warfare, resulted in an American victory that set conditions for a sequence of successful Allied campaigns from Guadalcanal to the Philippines to the very doorstep of the Japanese Home Islands. Stemming from strategic initiative gained by defeating the main Imperial Fleet at Midway, the seminal victory allowed the U.S. military to launch parallel offensives directly through the Central Pacific and up the Southwest Pacific island corridors while destroying Japanese trade networks and starving the overextended empire of vital industrial resources.[12]

The American victory over Japan, in many ways, validated the logic and purpose of Mahan's theories with twentieth-century application. While both ground-based and carrier-attack aviation gained ascendancy over battleships, the basic formula remained the same: the side that concentrated and won the decisive fleet confrontation subsequently enjoyed cascading advantages across air, ground, and maritime domains to both isolate and destroy the enemy in detail. As argued by historian D. Clayton James, "the offensives in the Central and South Pacific were effective in keeping the Japanese off balance along their extensive cordon in the Pacific."[13] The Imperial Navy, on the other hand, enabled American success by departing from Mahan's principle of concentration that had allowed it to defeat Russia in 1904 and instead scattered its carriers from India to the Solomon Islands to Alaska to expand its defensive parameter.

The storied Pacific conflict continues to offer insights for the Army and U.S. Joint forces in the twenty-first century. With the advent of ground-based aviation as a decisive factor in projecting effects across noncontiguous maritime spaces, the Army's fighters and bombers arguably became the centerpiece of both its combined arms approach and the larger contribution to the coalition campaign. While ground maneuver forces often prioritized capturing the next airfield to extend operational reach, the iterative extension of the Army Air Corps' strike range provided continuous, survivable, and diversified interdic-

tion that enabled Navy and Marine schemes of maneuver adjacent to littoral areas.

This phenomenon was established in the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942 where an ad hoc Army-Marine aviation team, called the Cactus Air Force, flew out of Henderson Airfield to provide an intensity of operational endurance that the Pacific Fleet could not match. On multiple occasions, the legendary USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65) engaged in major naval battles, sustained heavy damage, and had to depart the area to seek repairs—often transferring remaining aircraft to the island airstrip to continue fighting. In contrast, Henderson Airfield absorbed numerous Japanese aerial and naval strikes, received replacements for aircraft loses, and rapidly repaired runways and logistical structures to remain fully operational for the duration of the campaign. Further, the Cactus Air Force, despite suffering heavy casualties, provided consistent interruption of the Tokyo Express as the campaign developed into an attritional contest to mass ground forces on the island. This consistency, when matched with the *Enterprise*'s dynamic interventions, resulted in a mostly symbiotic Joint approach that ultimately secured a costly and vital victory.[14]

By applying insights from campaigns such as Guadalcanal to the contemporary strategic environment, a large-scale operational fires command with coverage over critical straits, strong points, and trade routes could provide a similar tactical foundation to enable Joint strategies, secure vital positions of advantage, and ultimately safeguard economic interests in places like the South China Sea and Eastern Europe. While ground-based attack aviation emerged as one of the primary instruments in the Pacific and allowed the Army to enable Joint maneuver with long-ranged fires, the advent of the land-based ballistic-strike complex in the present is threatening to surpass ship platforms in range, survivability, and counterstrike capacity.[15] This means that the Army, rather than the Navy and the Marines, now can provide the operational reach and durability necessary to consistently enable Joint approaches and maintain political credibility in all but the most remote maritime spaces.

The Army and Maritime Strategy

Replacing the British Empire of ages past, the United States continues to thrive as a maritime trade hegemon that requires predictable access to foreign markets to enable commercial arrangements with a global constellation of allies and even adversaries. The result is that despite the centuries of technological and social evolution, the United States, as the world's largest economy, remains inextricably dependent on trade partners, protected shipping lanes, and a large, mostly foreign merchant marine to facilitate more than $5.6 trillion in annual international commerce—including the arrival and departure of more than 11 million shipping containers each year.[16] It means that the U.S. military, with the Navy as the traditional lead maritime agent, owns an enduring mission to safeguard intercontinental trade through peacetime engagement, and if need be, wartime dominance.

Advancing to the present, regional hegemons like China and Russia have embraced antiaccess/area-denial strategies that leverage long-range fires, economic coercion, and political intimidation to stymie American expeditionary capabilities and degrade U.S. influence in contested regions. As argued by the 2018 *National Defense Strategy*, "it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions."[17] This shift in posture consequently poses an emerging threat to American leadership of the global economy with the potential to limit access to critical markets, destabilize existing coalitions, and ultimately disrupt the vital maritime flow of goods in and out of North America.

These new adversary defenses—which are supported by nuclear arsenals and situated within aggressive political designs—are consequently threatening the viability of American maritime forces to credibly lead coalition offensives and maintain viable postures in acute places like the Baltics and South China Sea. For the U.S. Navy, in particular, it has led to questions about the survivability of its vaunted carrier strike groups, the ultimate expression of national power since the Second World War, in the face of innovations with long-range detection and precision strike. As if to underscore the threat, the destruction of the Russian cruiser *Moskva* in April 2022 by several Ukrainian land-based RK-360 Neptune missiles suggests increased, though yet anecdotal, warship vulnerability.[18] As argued in a 2021 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, "China's navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the US Navy's ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the US Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War."[19]

The ballistic-strike threat from China, Russia, and an emerging array of regional adversaries presents a similar challenge for the U.S. Marine Corps and its expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) concept, designed to enable offensive maneuvers across noncontiguous terrain.[20] As argued in *Foreign Policy*, China, as the rising pacing threat, is combining "long-range weapons" with "air defense systems, sea mines, submarines, and electronic warfare and cyber-capabilities" resulting in "a gauntlet of fire that American expeditionary forces cannot be expected to securely traverse."[21] This threat posture, while certainly not insurmountable, nevertheless jeopardizes the potential of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force to not only approach target areas in surface ships but to tactically execute amphibious assaults on islands or coastlines within any enemy's weapons engagement zone. Similar to the Navy's dilemma, antiaccess networks are challenging the introduction of American amphibious forces into theaters at the onset of or during armed conflict.

Given these emerging realities, the U.S. Army, as a much larger, land-based Service, has an opportunity to shift its posture to mitigate these threats to the U.S. Joint force. It can credibly argue that it alone has the scalable capacity to enable a durable, survivable, and convincing scope of sea control to enable

senior Joint commands to establish, as described by airpower theorist Everett Dolman, a "position of continuing advantage" that facilitates the introduction of dynamic forces into contested theaters.[22] Seeking to exploit positional competition, the Army, with its scalability, can contain Russian and Chinese aggression in territories adjacent to their spheres of influence, where ground-based missile systems and land-based attack aircraft are threatening traditional naval and aerial firing platforms. In other words, a forward, mobile, protected, and distributed operational fires command with ground maneuver in support, is the reciprocal answer to this threat.[23]

This means that the Army should emphasize not only its traditional land power roles, but place its contribution to national security within an irreplaceable ability to safeguard American economic prosperity across all aspects of competition, crisis, and conflict. It means that rather than seeing itself as a supporting agent to other Services in the maritime domain, the institution should reconceptualize itself as a legitimate, primary maritime fighting force reminiscent of its dominant role in the island campaigns of the Second World War. By establishing a more credible forward presence with implications of permanency and redundancy across antagonistic spaces, the institution can fulfill the Mahanian imperative—on behalf of the entire U.S. Joint force—to exercise durable sea control that maintains theater access with a multidomain approach that combines maritime strategy, operational fires, and tactical maneuver.[24]

For the Army, however, this does not mean a singular focus on long-range fires at the expense of other functions. The capacity to deploy and execute decisive maneuver by infantry and armored forces will remain central to enabling deterrence and seizing initiative in all types of ground combat. As argued in the Army Futures Command's *Concept for Maneuver in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, its combat formations will continue to execute combined arms warfare by executing a "tempo and pace that precludes effective engagement by adversary layered stand-off systems while simultaneously converging capabilities across multiple domains and environments to gain positions of advantage against the adversary."[25] This indicates that while tactical maneuver in maritime spaces will support the primacy of arrayed operational fires, the cooperative relationship between fire and maneuver—an evolutionary and historical cornerstone of land power—will remain central to the Army's operational design in littoral theaters.

A reconsideration of maritime focus would integrate other traditional Army roles and functions in an expanded context. Given the importance of coalition dynamics in every potential conflict theater, the institution would continue to enable multinational cohesion and unity of effort by leading security force assistance with military partners and executing rotational deployments to enable deterrence. The Army's statuary roles in executing Title 10 requirements, providing critical support to other Services, as well as conducting assigned executive agent responsibilities (e.g., theater logistics, field hospitals, chemical/nuclear defense, etc.) would likewise continue to define its leading role in maritime partnerships.[26] Furthermore, this calibration would also require a realign-

ment of Army active, guard, and reserve components to build innovative and resilient teams.

A decisively expanded maritime role for the Army would consequently evolve as an enhancement, rather than a detraction, for essential Joint partnerships across the Department of Defense and U.S. government. Reminiscent of how Ukraine ground forces sunk the Russian Black Sea flagship and immediately influenced the naval context of the conflict, the institution would be better positioned to enable the emerging concepts of multi- or all-domain operations with increased capacity to orchestrate "zones of proximal dominance" that extend to dynamic "windows of superiority" for both maritime and air forces by converging missile, aviation, drone, electronic, cyber, and special operations fires in any opening engagement.[27] By positioning forward to engage early across competition, crisis, and conflict paradigms, Army forces would provide the foundation for Joint forces to execute "team warfare" and support whole-of-government efforts across deterrence, advise and assist, and combat scenarios.[28]

This approach would consequently prove complementary, yet foundationally distinct, to the Marine Corps' EABO concept that seeks to project "mobile" and "low-signature" expeditionary forces to fight in contested maritime areas.[29] Contributing to a larger Joint concept to secure theater access and enable maneuver survivability, the Army's capacity to deploy and posture at scale would converge fires, deception, electronic warfare, logistics, assault, and, perhaps most importantly, air defense efforts in ways that no other Service can match. Recognizing the attritional character of modern combat, the forward positioning of a redesigned Army corps as an imposing and visible fighting command would allow a symbiotic hammer and anvil approach where durable Army forces would preoccupy adversary attention, provide a fire and counterfire baseline, and preserve Joint theater access while enabling dynamic entry by both Marine stand-in forces and naval strike elements.[30]

The benefits of an Army shift toward prioritizing sea control would likewise allow an enrichment and expansion of both existing and new partnerships with allies and coalitions. Recognizing that many of the ground forces of partnered nations maintain heavy orientation on littoral concerns (e.g., most of the armies of Pacific Rim allies), it would allow the U.S. Army to better align advisory efforts to increase interoperability, deepen relationships, and ultimately preserve national credibility. Further, the fact that the national military hierarchies of many nations with expansive seafaring interests are commanded by army chiefs of staff or senior ground force commanders would allow a more natural alignment with critical partnerships.[31] By increasing fluency and capacity for maritime operations, the Army would thus be better prepared to buttress diplomatic and economic commitments with a more relevant and diversified scope of maritime involvement.[32]

This strategic approach would yield, most obviously, concrete dividends in the Southeast Asia theater that remains largely defined by its maritime context.

As China increases its capacity to resist American "hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism," and more acutely threaten the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines' tactical viability the South China Sea, the Army can provide more durable presence in the region.[33] The shift in maritime strategy—based in a distributed fire, counter-fire, and maneuver architecture directly positioned to deny People's Liberation Army (PLA) access—would enable the political influence required not only to protect trade agreements with allies but to also maintain equilibrium required to maintain favorable economic relations with China. In terms of military calculus, the land power structure would also allow maritime Services to disrupt Chinese thinking through dynamic introduction of maritime and Joint forces at critical points of threat vulnerability.

This strategic approach, which would require tailoring for specific theaters, could likewise increase North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) credibility in Europe. With an aggressive Russia innovating strategies that emphasize, as originally described by its general of the army, Valery V. Gerasimov, a form of hybrid warfare that employs "asymmetric actions" to achieve "nullification of the enemy's advantages"—even as it continues to brazenly assault Ukrainian sovereignty—the Army has the capacity to assure allies and deter threats through robust, layered, and mobile positioning of operational fires commands across the North Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea regions.[34] This type of sea control, again serving as the fulcrum for Joint and multinational teams, would protect American commercial arrangements across the continent by, in effect, shielding the relationships from Russian designs. Expanding on initial actions such as Operation Atlantic Resolve, it would ultimately empower American diplomacy while preserving critical economic interests.[35]

Twenty-first Century Advantage

Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote in 1912, as the preeminent naval strategist of his time, that "force is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished."[36] This truism, which would be proven just two years later in the attritional horrors of the First World War, suggests that the United States should prioritize a force in being concept in competitive regions to deter adversaries rather than belatedly reacting to aggression. For the U.S. Army, this indicates that creating forward positions of advantage in areas of American economic engagement will yield greater value in competition than relying on large, and potentially unrealistic, counteroffensives in crisis or conflict. It means that the institution, perhaps counterintuitively, now has an opportunity to fulfill Mahan's purpose, in a twenty-first century context and form, by both leading and enabling coalition sea control in areas vital to economic prosperity.

This proposal, which ultimately argues for a shift in Army structure and priorities to ensure American primacy, finds further purchase with modernization priorities. While sophisticated Joint and combined arms approaches across all domains will always be required, the Army's contribution should include more politically salient arguments to unleash intimidating strike, counterstrike,

and maneuver capabilities in contested regions to counter adversary designs and cement coalition cohesion. As the institution innovates a new portfolio of strategic, midrange, and short-range fires capabilities to better compete, the construction of integrated, echeloned, and dispersed commands in places like Eastern Europe and East Asia will provide host architectures for integrating and validating the next generation of doctrinal concepts, fighting technologies, training requirements, and cultural evolutions.[37]

This forward structure would combine hardened positions under ballistic shields with dispersed mobile elements to create a distributed fire and maneuver complex beyond the resource capacity of any other Service. Requiring a full corps headquarters optimized to primarily support operational fires as opposed to traditional ground maneuver, the command would synchronize a network of kinetic, virtual, electronic, and information fires, in concert with supporting infantry and armor, to apply sea control with tailored application in disparate environments. Reminiscent of the massive German submarine bases that withstood the heaviest Allied bombing in the Second World War to project a novel maritime assault capability, combinations of visible, invisible, mobile, and deception elements in forward areas could challenge adversary calculus and cement coalition cohesion.[38]

The expansion and projection of arrayed Army air defense systems to protect Joint postures and enable Joint maneuver would emerge as a central component of any redesigned operational fires command. This unique Army capability, perhaps more than any other, would construct a layered umbrella— bristling with integrated short-, medium-, and long-range interceptors and assisted by artificial intelligence-enabled targeting. This would protect Navy and Marine operations in contested spaces while ensuring continued theater access for Joint and coalition forces and prevent requirements for reentry at the commencement of armed conflict. Further, the expansion of air defense networks would safeguard economic and political infrastructure while providing, within limits, coverage for vital shipping across threatened sea lanes.[39]

The construction of corps in both the South Pacific and Eastern Europe with primary but not exclusive orientation as operational fires commands with tailored maneuver capacity would consequently provide proving grounds for Army modernization priorities. Building on initiatives like the emergent Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), an expansion of the concept at the operational level would provide a ready pathway to realize emerging technologies and concepts with tailored application in diverse settings. By systematizing and expanding the MDTF's mission, as described by the Army, to allow "distributed operations and with access to requisite authorities" with "advanced headquarters that synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities in support of strategic objectives," the institution can adopt a more relevant and responsive posture in contested commercial spaces while creating dynamic opportunities for Joint and allied forces.[40]

This shift in form and function would allow new avenues for the operat-

ing force to accommodate accelerated cycles of innovation in partnership with force design organizations such as Army Futures Command, the J7 Directorate for Joint Force Development, and a host of leading-edge civilian partnerships. Acknowledging the timeless requirement to balance continuity and change in warfare, the adjustment could facilitate the integration of technological advancements and disruptors that are defining the information revolution. This could include innovations in artificial intelligence, unmanned swarms, next-generation interceptors, autonomous robotics, and an entire suite of new cyber and space technologies—in addition to emerging information warfare capabilities—with traditional, echeloned combined arms formations across an ever-evolving American order of battle.[41]

The increasing proliferation of unmanned aerial platforms across the contemporary battlefield, as seen in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia-Ukraine conflicts, offers a particular capability where the Army could uniquely contribute to maritime competition.[42] The larger institution, with its capacity to field forces at scale, could provide protected, land-based support complexes to enable the projection of high quantities, if not swarms, of near-autonomous drones to protect forward positions and enable decisive maneuver. This could include aerial drones for deep attack, sentry drones for coastal protection, and submarine drones to deny adversary maneuver. Again, reimagining the German example where submarines emerged to strike Allied ships from impenetrable bunkers—but within a more comprehensive Joint approach, the Army's capacity to influence maritime operations with an enhanced drone portfolio holds immense potential to avoid debilitating attrition in expeditionary settings.[43]

Finally, taking the innovation further, reimagined operational fires commands in forward areas would enable the critical convergence of multifaceted efforts that are proving foundational to achieving success across competition, crisis, and conflict paradigms in the twenty-first century.[44] As articulated in the Army's vision for multidomain transformation, an expanded maritime posture with capacity to apply durable sea control would enable the land power institution to "provide the Joint Force with the range, speed, and convergence" that will be needed to "provide future decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight."[45] This approach would ultimately allow the Army to not only support but enhance vital diplomatic and economic arrangements with a more relevant functionality while supporting the continuous refinement of operational interoperability with strategic allies.

General Mark A. Milley, the 20th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently argued that the U.S. military aims to "shift from battles of attrition to battles of cognition, where we think, direct, and act at speeds the enemy cannot match in order to achieve a perfect harmony of intense violence."[46] The Army has an emerging opportunity to contribute to this mission by embracing an expanded vision of sea control in the maritime domain. By creating reimagined positions of advantage in contested spaces, it can enable Joint and multinational partners to excel against increasingly lethal adversaries. While the traditional

maritime Services may have preserved the United States' access to vital markets in centuries past, the Army, as the lead Service for land power projection, now has an opportunity to not only ensure its continued relevance but to fulfill Mahan's enduring imperative in the twenty-first century.

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Reformists Posing as Revolutionaries
The Penchant for the Endless Repetition of Past Mistakes

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The Fourth Ordeal: A History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 1968–2018. By Victor J. Willi. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 588. $89.99 (hardcover); $34.99 (paperback); $28.00 (ebook). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108902649.

The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Brotherhood in the West. By Lorenzo Vidino. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020. Pp. 296. $90.00 (hardcover); $30.00 (paperback); $29.99 (ebook).

Can one emancipate with a structure that is largely nonemancipatory? And what is the exact role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the context of the massive insurrections known as the Arab Spring? Several observers note that with the Arab Spring, the revolution has been present whereas the revolutionaries have been largely missing.[1] Others note that both the revolutionaries and the revolution have been active, but the reverse of the Brotherhood's fortunes indicates a cycle wherein the counterrevolution has gained the upper hand and that ascendancy has not spared the Brotherhood, even when the latter has always

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"avoid[ed] revolutions and revolutionary change [as they are thought to] lead to unexpected consequences."[2] Still, the predomination of the counterrevolutions does not in any sensible way guarantee that history will work in favor of the counterrevolution indefinitely. Much has been at play, and the following review essay accelerates the magisterial findings in both books to go beyond what each one highlights.

To begin, Willi's *The Fourth Ordeal* presumes that the demise of the Muslim Brotherhood—its fall from grace—in the coup of July 2013 is a tactical error.[3] Put differently, had the proponents of the Brotherhood or Society's fourth guide (Omar al-Tilmsani) prevailed, the *Qutbists* (a vanguard subgroup within the Society that follows the ideology put forth by the radical jihadist Sayyid Qutb [1906–66]) would have little chance in fragmenting the Brotherhood both just before the surge of the Arab Spring and after the group's victory in the presidential elections in June 2012.[4] In what follows, the reviewer will show that rapid ascendancy, while plausible, remains untenable in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. In other words, the demise of the Society could not have been avoided regardless of which competing wing within it had been in control. That demise on 3 July 2013 and the subsequent fragmentation had not been a tactical miscalculation. Rather, it has been the undistorted translation of the driving principle within the soon-to-be one-century-old movement.

This review presupposes that there exists an unbridgeable methodological divide between strategies of and for reform and those of and for revolt. Because Egypt was caught in the midst of a radically incendiary situation, the means, as well as the mindset of reform, subscribe more to the prerequisites of the counterrevolutionary moment and its demands. This is different from ascertaining that the Brotherhood is categorically (that is, as a matter of principle) a regressive or restorative force like, say, the military. Rather, it is the Society's pseudo-revolutionary dynamic and its political duplicity that borders on naivety, which is but another facet of its theoretical poverty and distrust of radical youth forces that dictated its vulnerability to counterrevolutionary forces. The combination of all these shortcomings has dictated its fourth ordeal, the 2013 coup against the democratically elected president and the tagging of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

This review essay pleads for a radical distinction between the social means of a revolution, seeking a rupture with the manners of the past, and those tools aiming at reform, stressing gradualism and long-term change. Once this distinction serving a methodological axiom is set, the Brotherhood's performance in the revolutionary situation put forth by the post-2011 situation cannot be mistaken. This distinction serves also in reading Vidino's *The Closed Circle* as it zooms in on what he chooses to study: the Western part of the Brotherhood and its international branch, meaning the Brotherhood's affiliates in Western Europe and the United States.[5] Perhaps to no one's surprise, both the original/Egyptian brotherhood and its Western structure are reformist in nature. And unlike Willi, Vidino seizes on the logical implications when opting for a reformist

tract, taking part in the political game and hence the reverse of fortunes coming with the impasse of its project in both Egypt and Tunisia as well as in France, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom and, certainly, the United States.

Both Willi and Vidino, from the start, embrace the method of oral history: conducting not a small number of interviews with rank-and-file members of the Brotherhood as well as certain leadership figures and dissenters both in Egypt and abroad.[6] This method the authors contrast with the approach that reads the Brotherhood as a social movement. The advantage of oral history interviews, they advance, is multiple. An interviews-based approach facilitates seeing the movement less as a solid structure and more as a social actor in the real world, that is, combined with a heterogeneous pool of opinions across the movement's hierarchal spectrum. In contrast with Vidino, the interviews Willi conducts are massive and so are his readings of memoirs, brochures, and news updates in blogs and websites. Still, both authors' command of Arabic boosts their grasp on the theme they engage with. The result shows in a plethora of details that corroborate toward their thesis rooted, in Willi's case more than Vidino's, in speculation rather than in a solid historical reading of these facts that they themselves amassed.

Willi's chapter 1, "The Society of the Muslim Brothers," stresses how the niche for his study lies in the lack of serious, reliable, and unbiased literature addressing the Brotherhood.[7] Most of what exists is produced by attention-grabbing pseudoscholars and think tanks. Against a background rampant with simplistic studies and severely lacking in written archives, Willi's project of doing oral history explains the importance of spelling out the details of the "great saga."[8] He does this via zooming in on Hassan al-Banna's project of reviving the faith within a colonial context in which Egypt was a British protectorate. The contextualization is vital to combat cliches. Willi then considers al-Banna's precursors in the political revival of Islam: Muhammad ʿAbduh, Jamal al-din al-Afghani, and Mohammed Rashīd Ridā. The book does not overlook the Sufi elements in al-Banna's vision serving as a "pure" fountain for the reactivation of the faith in the sociopolitical order of the 1920s and 1930s. Later, the reader encounters al-Banna's organizational seven-steps blueprint along with the basic literature of the movement. He ends the chapter by reassuring Western audiences that al-Banna's idea of the caliphate is more of a metaphor, "a catch-phrase" for founding a Muslim parallel to the European Union or the United States of America.[9]

Chapter 2, "The Second Founding (1968–1981)," invokes the post-1954 incarceration of the Brotherhood's leadership under President Gamal Abdel Nasser.[10] The latter almost canceled the Society from existence. However, in the wake of the Arab defeat of 1967 in the war with Israel, and the student protests of 1968, the leaders of the Brotherhood were freed from prisons and connived into Egyptian social life. But it was not until Anwar Sadaat's tenure that the Brotherhood were grudgingly tolerated in a political role. ʿOmar al-Tilmsani became the third guide officially in 1973, and it was his gradualist approach

as specified in al-Tilmsani's predecessor, the Brotherhood's second guide, in *Preachers, Not Judges* (1977). The tract resonates with President Sadaat's policy of appeasement on two levels.[11] The first comes in the context of a rival group, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). The latter aligns itself with a radical jihadi ideology as outlined by Sayyid Qutb, which had been on the rise and threatened to destabilize the country. The second, which is no less important but overlooked nevertheless by Willi, is the prominence of socialist and Communist parties as the latter were exerting pressure on the powers that be of the time. Thus, al-Tilmsani's rendition of the Brotherhood and his overall balanced approach served Sadaat's policy of personalist rule. Sadaat's rapprochement with Tel Aviv and his eventual assassination in 1981 dictated that this tense arrangement with the state becomes now lacking.

In chapter 2, "The Rise of the Vanguard (1981–1991)" Willi refers to how al-Tilmisani's adherents (proponents of gradualism in dealing with the powers that be as well as in the decision-making structure inside the Brotherhood) started losing currency to the more radical elements.[12] Instead, it is now the vanguardist approach, those followers of Sayyid Qutb's ideology as specified in *Signposts Along the Road* (1964), who are gaining momentum.[13] Other than the *takfiri* and jihadi articles of faith, the vanguardists trust in the Qutb's philosophy of *jahilyya* or modern-day structural ignorance whose raison d'être explains Society's need for the vanguards, those people "who engage with society while practicing mental and emotional withdrawal from it."[14] With the vanguards in charge, the Brotherhood expanded both nationally (to all governorates in Egypt) and internationally (literally, worldwide). Meanwhile, it expanded into all professional syndicates and won an important number of seats in parliament.

Of key interest in understanding the fourth ordeal of the Brotherhood is the section titled "The Brotherhood's Neoliberal Turn" in chapter 4, "Brotherhood Incorporated (1991–2001)."[15] The section traces the rise of the business-minded cadre in the Guidance Office, featuring the likes of Khairat al-Shater, who while a vanguardist and jihadist is similarly a business tycoon and strategist. The rise of al-Shater and his cliques, Willi outlines, echoes the Brotherhood's own overall change of perspective where "Quranic ideals with newly acquired market economy concepts . . . [caused] the emerging Islamic discourse embrace [of] . . . the modern business corporation as a model through which one could articulate specifically Islamic policies and objectives."[16] A subsequent section bearing on the consequence of the seismic turn marks the Transformation of the Social Base within the several-decades-long Brotherhood, ending in a quasi-class struggle within the movement. Therefore, the decade preceding 11 September 2001 (9/11) not only witnessed the break up between various Brotherhood national chapters over the first Gulf War, but a rupture with classical Brotherhood formation in Egypt itself.

In chapter 5, "Struggle for Leadership (2001–2011)" Willi carefully reads

the decade spanning the period between 9/11 and the kickoff of the Arab Spring as it marked a further split between the gradualist and vanguardist groups within the Brotherhood. The denialist narrative of 9/11 by people introducing themselves as members of the Society complicated the relationship with the United States given how political Islam was branded by neoconservative and neo-orientalists, in particular the George W. Bush administration (2001–8). The Guidance Office started a public relations campaign denying allegations of its own static disposition and succeeded in establishing a rapprochement with the U.S. administration. On the eve of the 25 January revolt, Willi specifies that the Brotherhood, spearheaded by the vanguards, was never in its best shape. The author lists a number of strategically fatal decisions paving the way for its fourth ordeal.

In chapter 6, "Revolution, Rise and Fall (2011–2013)," Willi enumerates a number of strategic miscalculations that resulted in the fourth ordeal of the Brotherhood.[17] Chief among those several miscalculations, in Willi's opinion, is the inability of the vanguard group to register the scale of the change, both real and unexpected, that the revolutionary situation of post-25 January has made possible. Willi notes a mental lag between the old school activism that marked the leadership on the one hand and the Brotherhood's youth revolutionary zeal and ardor. Against the specific warnings of the Brotherhood's youth, the leadership harried toward a hasty and farfetched alliance the with Egyptian military, expecting to be rewarded for its allegiance with power.[18] The fiasco illustrates not only how the leadership of the Brotherhood (contrary to its youth) showed a lack of imagination on the part of the negotiating cadres of the Brotherhood but deep-seated duplicity as shown in the Maspero and the Blue-Bra Girl incidents. The race for power for its own sake sealed the Brotherhood's unfortunate fate.

In chapter 7, "The Beginning of the Fourth Ordeal (2013–2018)," Willi explains how General Abdel Fattah al-Sissi's crackdown on the Brotherhood sit-ins in both Rab'aa and al-Nahda Squares in August 2013, instead of uniting the remaining leaders, had actually fragmented them further. The crackdown, Willi finds out, has been unprecedented in intensity since Nasser's times in the 1950s and 1960s. Naturally, the second-rank leadership had its chance in steering the Brotherhood. But the vanguard group from exile refused to secede important prerogatives, resulting in a feud, which whether motivated by ego or by ideology, Willi does not specify. What he specifies, however, is the fact that a non-negligible section in the Egyptian leadership of the Brotherhood has promulgated the necessity of the revolutionary path, including the armed struggle against General al-Sissi's dictatorship. But with the execution of Mohammed Kamel in October 2016, the revolutionary path lost currency. However, rivalry and division remain endemic, marking the Brotherhood to this day (near the end of 2022) even when the book closes its study in 2018.

While Vidino's *The Close Cricle* approaches the Western chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood, it does not substantially differ from Willi's monumental

gathering of facts and study. Eternalization of politics and duplicity in using it or the unprincipled deployment of religion rank supreme among Vidino's findings. The seven testimonial chapters are sandwiched between two introductory chapters varying between definitions and hypothesizing and two concluding ones as they synthesize the findings and readings beyond the evidence. This is why, in reference to Vidino's volume, the author is saving the readers the middle chapters because all the seven testimonies (in the seven middle chapters) are squeezed into the synthesized findings and the methodological readings that go beyond the evidence.

In chapter 1, "What Is the Muslim Brotherhood in the West?," Vidino starts with a methodological note regarding the sea of confusion in identifying Brotherhood organizations in the West.[19] The reasons are multiple, but chief among them lies the stigma the name recalls, given 9/11 and the steeped Orientalist portrayals that more often than not present the movement outside space and time. Therefore, policy makers in the West are indeed in the dark, and Vidino's volume sells its credentials to facilitate practical ways of dealing with a number of Brotherhood offshoots in the West. While invariably sharing the belief that Islam is complete in and for itself, the Brotherhood groups do not seek to Islamize Western societies. They aim at facilitating integrations of Muslim immigrants in these societies. Vidino identifies three major categories of Brotherhood organizations: 1) pure Brotherhood bodies that prefer nonpublic or secretive networking; 2) Brotherhood groups where affiliated members maintain an emotional link with the original organization but are not structurally tied to it; and 3) those groups who are only distantly influenced.[20] All the three varieties have a vested interest in being representative of Muslim communities and collaborating with government bodies in a way that prioritize partnerships over funds and political capital in the countries when they are based.

Vidino outlines in chapter 2, "Joining and Leaving the Brotherhood," the criteria for selection of members and subsequently the reasons for these recruits' disillusionment, which are inducive for parting ways with the movement.[21] As to joining, it is the Brotherhood that selects its own cadres, not the other way around. No application in the classical sense is reported. The selection criteria have to do more with signs that promise piousness as well as obedience. Now, in respect to leaving the movement, Vidino zooms in on two principal reasons. The first is disenchantment with the leadership and/or dissatisfactions with the inner workings within the Society. The second specifies the group's ideology and in particular the Brotherhood's gradualist approach as well as its political duplicity. At the end of the chapter, Vidino broaches upon the dissenters' own life after leaving the brotherhood, often reported as tough as the former members had little, if any, social life outside the movement.[22]

All the seven chapters from chapter 3 to chapter 9 examine in detail the moments of recruitment. They contextualize both the joining and the leaving and provide reasons for each. The format used is a testimony, which the author recomposes from face-to-face interviews and email correspondence. The

common thread is the appeal or the radiance that the Brotherhood holds, the enchantment of the early days and months, even years, along with the expectations of serving in a larger-than-life cause in a movement whose name inspires pride. No less common is the stifled dissatisfactions stamping the secretive nature of the Society's inner workings, which the dissenters find no solid reason for maintaining except perhaps due to greed for power and manipulation of the lower- and mid-ranking brothers. Most of the common testimonies Vidino mentions note how the penchant for secrets could be understood when working under or dealing with autocratic governments such as Egypt, Jordan, or Syria but certainly out of context when operating in Western democracies. Likewise, the testimonies note that leading Brothers, those involved with the real decision making, rarely bother to read the languages of the Western societies they are living in, and there are few genuine attempts at understanding these societies' histories and complex dynamics.[23]

In chapter 10, "Joining and Leaving: What the Evidence Suggests," Vidino underlines a methodology in reading the problem of dissenting from the Brotherhood.[24] Most dissenters left because they thought that "current leaders have strayed from Hassan al-Banna's original message."[25] Others raised the concern of secrecy as well as doublespeak in the proceedings, which is thought to serve only "a small nomenklatura of interconnected activists, an aristocratic elite."[26] Put differently, ideological convictions are hardly the reason. Only a tiny minority of the dissenters (Ahmed Akkari, Mohamed Louizi, and the American Brothers) focus on the driving principle behind the various chapters of the Western Brotherhood and find it problematic. They list the leaders' duplicity in playing politics with the powers that be. The face-saving infuriation, with respect to the Danish cartoons that featured Prophet Muhammed from 2003 to 2007, reveals the extent to which the key leaders can go in trading with their presumably principled defense of the faith. Other less fatal problems are listed in the chapter.

In the last chapter, "The Western Brotherhood's Future: From the Arab Spring and Beyond," Vidino draws the picture of the Western Brotherhood transitioning in the direction of post-Islamism. Contrary to Western governments' lack of policy, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) crackdown on their local chapters and tagging the principal Brotherhood in Egypt (following the July 2013 coup) with its Western wing as a terrorist organization stipulate a major geostrategic turn. Adding salt to the wound, as soon as the Arab Spring started, the Western Brothers joined Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and other places (their countries of origin) to assume leading positions there. Still, they left their former positions in the West empty. For converts and those Muslims staying behind in the West, that move, like Rached Ghannouchi's, dealt a serious blow to the image of Western Brothers testifying to the opportunism of these leaders and the uncertain future of Western Brotherhood as a whole. Vidino suggests that the scene is perhaps ready for a post-*Ikhawanism*, very much like post-Communism during the 1970s and the 1980s.[27]

The extensive details pertaining to the extremely divergent pool of opinions between the Brotherhood's inner circle, the small group of decision makers and their contestants, as well as the dissatisfactions, even the dissenting voices of second-rank leaders in the provinces as brilliantly displayed in Willi's study, however, are never a waste of time for the perceptive reader. Such details specify that Willi has actually spelled everything except the essential, or perhaps he has broached upon that essential rather transiently. For if they amount to anything, these extensive details remain food for thought because they confirm how a structure/movement that has been founded for reform cannot by any stretch of the imagination propagate toward reform's antithesis: revolution. Such a situation does not result because of the overblown narcissistic drives of certain leaders or the fact that an aging leadership in the Guidance Office was cut off from rapidly evolving reality, the way Willi tries to convince us.

Leaders who are out of touch with a rapidly evolving revolutionary situation or who have overblown egos are solid empirical factors, but as the historical experience of the *longue durée* shows, they remain marginal because each of Willi's listed factors enjoys no autonomous scenario of its own. The fact that the radical *Qutbists* won over the al-Tilmisani-influenced members of the Shura council or become dominant in the Guidance Office does not alter the situation that the Brotherhood remains marred in theoretical poverty as literally not a single figure among its presumed thinkers dares to question the bedrock of the world's political economy. The Brotherhood's early bidder for the presidency before Mohamed Morsi was Khairat el-Shater, a proponent of the *Qutbist* ultraconservative approach but equally an ambitious business conglomerate with literally billions of dollars of assets.[28] The contradiction in combining piety and worldly success in a world deemed by *Qutbists* to be corrupt to the marrow is worthy of a study all on its own. That study can be the key to explaining how the Brotherhood has had no qualms over sending emissaries to Washington, DC, and freely giving assurances with respect to Israel's future security. Not a small number of observers mistake this Brotherhood's maneuver as Realpolitik. In reality, it offers a death blow to ordinary Egyptians' expectations for a substantial rupture from Mubarak's era. This is an example of Willi's impressive display of facts minutely scanned but not pressed enough to yield and distill a solid historical reading, showcasing that reform cannot befriend and accommodate revolt, in the sense that it cannot meet the people's minimum expectations in the wake of ousting an enduring dictator such as Hosni Mubarak.

Speaking of the Brotherhood's appeal to the U.S. establishment specifies two issues, not one. Apart from showcasing the leadership's lust for political power, its readiness to play with the available-but-abusive rules of the game, nevertheless, betrays severe theoretical confusion, not political acumen.[29] The stipulation of the theoretical clarity stands at odds with Willi's broodings over tactical issues such as the Brotherhood's decades of incarceration and overall underground work carried out as an opposition entity made the movement apathetic to, not just unready to assume political rule. All these are true but

theoretical muddiness made the Brotherhood its own worst enemy because that muddiness renders it incapable of embracing its historical responsibility. Indeed, it is the shallowness of its theoretical foundation that largely decides its own incapacity of spotting an alternative to the post-1945 American order. The combination of putting people of al-Shatir's caliber in key positions in the movement illustrates that they take the laws of the market economy for granted. Similarly, their unconditional readiness to compromise on matters both delicate and of principle such as the Palestinian question confirms how readings that consider the Brotherhood as a radical alternative to Mubarek's corrupt ways are not only slightly mistaken but fundamentally false.

Suffice it to say that ever since its inception in 1928, the Society has never introduced itself except as a fundamentally reformist movement. Why pity the Brotherhood against reformism, the reader legitimately asks? The short answer is that Islam is either revolutionary or it is not. It is worth noting in this context that Prophet Muhammad did not rub shoulders with the Meccan capitalists of his own time, not because he was not capable of, or that the opportunity did not present itself. For historical accuracy, it is the Meccan lords who pleaded with him to preside over their system. And it is he who did not accept because he knew he would be serving their caravans and businesses. He was looking for a world without caravans and business. In the case of the Brotherhood, as Willi's succinct study brilliantly shows but rarely seizes on the fact, the Brotherhood had never been missing committed activists with exceptional talents and organizational skills. Therefore, to blame one faction or pity one subgroup against another is to participate in confusing, not elucidating, the revolutionary/counterrevolutionary situation in Egypt.

Vidino's synthesis from the interviews and email exchanges, however, puts its hand directly on the spot where it hurts the Western Brothers the most, that is on the future of the movement as a whole. The author learned how the multicultural society envisioned by Western Brotherhood is exactly the opposite of what Western governments have in mind or plan for their nations. Pierre Durrani and Mohamed Louizi's testimonies both note how the Brotherhood simply flout multiculturalism to maintain its own parallel societies or ghettos: antiuniversal Muslims communicating with like-minded Muslims and literally cheating the hospitality extended by Western societies. For antiuniversal Muslims nurse the illusion that one day they can conquer Rome or that mythical Western capital in the prophetic tradition from within. In spite of Vidino's bemoaning how Western governments lack a long-term and consistent approach to the Society, this very duplicity in bending laws and abusing multiculturalism could be behind the U.S. policy planners' decision to let Morsi and his government down. It is likely that U.S. planners did not want to have another heart-breaking Islamic republic à la Iran. And in cutting off the head of the mother movement in Egypt, its Western offshoots will be automatically powerless. In this context, we can read the ongoing feuds between Brotherhood leaders inside and outside Egypt, Ghannouchi's statement in favor of post-

Islamism, and the assassination of Mohamed Kamel, rendering the Brotherhood's revolutionary bid useless.

The powerful point of the two books is how they allow Brotherhood members to speak and allow several voices and insiders' informed opinions to sketch the readers', not necessarily the authors', final analysis. The fact that the two authors speak and read Arabic, along with other languages, is an asset and facilitates their intentions to translate their humility and patience (unlike attention-grabbing Orientalists dominating the scene) to learn from the materials and synthesize their learning in these two books. Through such studies, the two authors are likely to transform how Islamist movements are approached and understood. Willi's study in particular highlights the role of functional social movements (in a similar vein to functional states) as the American establishment does not want to divulge the Brotherhood from a functional role, namely quelling genuine revolutionary movements or those that can propagate toward upsetting the post-1945 world order. In *The Fourth Ordeal*, readers find that "US strategic planners used an active and conscious policy of mobilizing political Islam as a means to crush ideologies unfavorable to US interests."[30] Unfortunately, Willi overlooks this methodological thread; literally, he has failed his own pertinent observation. For the Brotherhood was specifically founded to suppress the nationalistic aspirations that emerged in 1920.[31]

Speaking of the number of ordeals and given the reformist agenda of the Brotherhood, or more precisely its lust for power, it is unlikely that the Brotherhood will cease playing with fire from which it bitterly tasted four times so far. Other ordeals will follow suit, because at the moment of composing these lines, there exist reliable news reports that the Brotherhood has been repeatedly involved in direct talks with representatives of General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi's government, the very person who caused the Brotherhood's demise. The fact that the Brotherhood is even willing to sit and consider proposals by representatives of Sissi is evidence of its political naivety. Many will rebut that aspiration to play a role in the future of their country. The number of ordeals, and the vocabulary itself, as the word *mihnā* or ordeal in Arabic stipulates a momentary but also necessary hardship from which a positive situation will eventually follow expresses a willingness to impersonate the naïveté of an idiot forever.

Endnotes

1. Asef Bayat, *Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017); and Fawwaz Traboulsi, *thāwārt bilā thouwār* (*Revolutions without Revolutionaries*) (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Riad al-Rais for Publication and Distribution, 2014).
2. Khalil al-Anani, 2021, "The Four Crises of the Muslim Brotherhood علم عفان | الأزمات الأربع للإخوان المسلمين —Useful Knowledge 1. أزمة الفكر," 19 October 2021, video, 10:24.
3. Willi J. Victor, *The Fourth Ordeal: A History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 1968–2018* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

4. The scientific literature on the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt refers to the social movement as either the Brotherhood or Society, both capitalized.

5. Lorenzo Vidino, *The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020).

6. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 12; and Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 8.

7. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 19.

8. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 12.

9. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 33.

10. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 51.

11. Hassan al-Hudaybi, *Preachers, Not Judges* (Cairo, Egypt: Dar altibaa wanachar elislamia, 1977).

12. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 101

13. Sayyid Qutb, *Signposts Along the Road* (New York: Routledge, 1964).

14. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 107.

15. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 142.

16. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 157.

17. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 182.

18. Alaa al-Aswany, *The Republic of False Truths: A Novel*, trans. S. R. Fellowes (New York: Knopf, 2021).

19. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 4–5.

20. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 8.

21. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 17.

22. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 28.

23. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 147.

24. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 173.

25. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 179.

26. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 179.

27. Vidino, *The Closed Circle*, 191.

28. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 270.

29. Khalil al-Anani, ed., *Islamism and Revolution Across the Middle East: Transformations of Ideology and Strategy after the Arab Spring* (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2021), 10.

30. Willi, *The Fourth Ordeal*, 117.

31. Ahdaf Soueif, *The Map of Love* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999), 224.

Bridging the Theory-Practice Divide in International Relations. Edited by Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020. Pp. 298. $110.95 (hardcover); $36.95 (paperback and ebook).

One of the most controversial issues in the study of international relations (IR) is the divide between theory and practice. Scholars of international relations and policy practitioners have been trying to bridge this gap through various projects and platforms, such as the Bridging the Gap Project.[1] However, some questions remain that need answers. Editors Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney raised questions about the size of this gap, the reason for its existence, the variation of the gap by substantive issue areas, and the impact of scholarly input on some policy problems.

For this edited volume, the editors asked leading scholars in eight different issue areas (trade, finance and money, human rights, foreign aid and development, environment, nuclear weapons and strategy, interstate war, and intrastate conflict) to address these questions in research essays. They then paired these scholars with veteran policy practitioners who comment on them. This unique and creative approach makes *Bridging the Theory-Practice Divide in International Relations* a great contribution to the IR field. It is also important to note that the contributors use data gathered over a 15-year period by the Teaching, Research and International Policy Project of the Global Research Institute at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia.[2]

Human rights is the first topic covered in chapters two and three. Amanda Murdie focuses on the human rights scholarship in the IR field and how it affected the practitioners in and policies of the human rights community. Murdie says that "the social science and IR are not the main academic inputs into this policy area and that the legal scholarship still dominates the human rights policy world" (p. 33). Then, Murdie focuses on the "revolving door, describing the movement of many IR human rights scholars from the academy to the policy community and back again" (p. 34). Murdie's chapter provides additional examples of the efforts to reduce the gap between theory and practice regarding the human rights aspect of international relations. She concludes that human rights research in IR has influenced the practitioner and policy community at higher levels since these scholars of human rights are actively engaged in public

advocacy as well. In chapter 3, Sarah E. Mendelson comments on Murdie's contribution, arguing that "IR scholarship on human rights does not for the most part align with what practitioners mainly focus on" (p. 45). Mendelson says that "what the academy studies does not match what practitioners confront" (p. 46). Mendelson identifies the closing space around civil society as a global problem human rights practitioners face and suggests that IR scholars on human rights should focus on this field.

Chapters 4 and 5 center on global environmental politics. In chapter 4, Jessica F. Green and Thomas Hale contend that although relatively new in world politics, "environmental challenges will occupy a central and growing place in practitioners' attention for the foreseeable future" (p. 55). While analyzing the influence of scholarly work on practitioners, Green and Hale ask the questions of whether scholars intend their ideas to change policy and how decisive their scholarly intervention is for a given outcome. Their thorough chronological approach to the scholarly inquiry and policy level application of environmental politics is an outstanding contribution to the field. Green and Hale believe that "scholars of global environmental politics have had a meaningful influence on the policy realm" and "the study of environmental politics has been undervalued in the discipline" (pp. 72–73). Commenting on Green and Hale, Marc A. Levy's subsequent chapter argues that "their chapter reads a bit as an apologia for IR: we are not really that irrelevant, give us a break" (p. 75). Levy criticizes the emphasis made on "influence" by Green and Hale and says that this effect could also be considered "noise." Levy claims that the IR scholars are "shying away from the most important questions," thereby limiting the practitioners' relevance to the most important topics on the global environmental agenda (p. 78).

The next two chapters focus on the topic of foreign aid. In chapter 6, Christina J. Schneider claims that "primarily economists occupy the nexus between scholars and policymakers in the foreign aid subfield" (p. 79). Schneider provides a brief history of foreign aid in theory and practice, before stating that the existing linkages between academia and the policy world in international relations are "much less than positive" (p. 83). Schneider adds that the interactions between academia and policy communities indicate some positive signs for the future. These indicators include the data of various organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Bank, are made accessible to researchers; the researchers in both policy institutions and academic institutions interact more frequently; and increasing examples of career switches between academia and policy. In the response chapter, Steven Radelet comments on Schneider's contribution and acknowledges her effort by saying "policymakers are not always interested in academic research, and researchers are not always interested in the issues that are most important to policymakers" (p. 97). According to Radelet, timing, incentive structure within academia, and the failure of communication are the main reasons behind this disconnect. Radelet adds that much of the research is focused on growth,

whereas other issues, such as health, education, and clean water, are neglected. Radelet suggests that IR scholars should show more interest in the successes of foreign aid programs, the role of foreign aid in promoting democracy, and the creation of taxonomy of definitions and characteristics of country ownership, and to work together with other specialists to create a valid source for the practitioners of foreign aid.

Trade is the central focus of chapters 8 and 9. In chapter 8, Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. W. Pevehouse argue that more senior scholars, due to the structure of professional incentives, tend to conduct policy-oriented studies and that quantitative work on trade is less likely to have an explicit policy orientation than non-quantitative work. They add that the impact of the work on political economy on the practitioners has been indirect. By depicting the historical evolution of the research in the field of international political economy (IPE), Mansfield and Pevehouse "show that many key avenues of inquiry have been guided by events in the international trade system" (p. 109). Then, they ask whether anyone in the policy realm is paying attention to this research, claiming that evidence suggests the answer is yes. They conclude that to extend the scope and impact of IPE scholarship on policy practitioners "more policy-relevant scholarship should be viewed more favorably by tenure and promotion committees" of universities (p. 118). In his subsequent comment, Robert B. Zoellick suggests that scholars ought to think beyond scientific boundaries to assist policy makers and should use other source material, such as policy officials' speeches, advocacy points from executive departments and organizations, opinion pieces in newspapers, and oral histories. Zoellick suggests six areas for future political economy research to assist those who make trade policy: the role of the U.S. Congress in trade policy, the role of the energetic executive in trade policy, bureaucratic politics within the executive, understanding trade negotiations, trade and foreign policy, systemic international trade issues, and comparative trade politics.

Chapters 10 and 11 emphasize international money and finance. In chapter 10, Thomas B. Pepinsky and David A. Steinberg suggest that "research on international money and finance contributes less policy-focused research than do some other IR subfields" (p. 129). Pepinsky and Steinberg indicate that this field remains a small minority of all published research in leading peer-reviewed journals and those articles focusing on it do not offer explicit policy recommendations. According to the authors, the reasons of this are due to the current research practices that "prevent IR scholars of money and finance from saying anything useful about important real-world events," the discipline of economics providing more suitable analytical tools to guide policy makers, and the choice of IR scholars to focus on money and finance to write on disciplinary concerns disproportionately (p. 129). To overcome these issues, Pepinsky and Steinberg say that these scholars could contribute to policy makers' decisions with their substantial knowledge on governments and policy implementation. In chapter 11, Dimitri G. Demekas comments that the finding of Pepinsky and Steinberg

does not "really come as a surprise" (p. 147). Demekas confirms that politicians make most of the policy decisions and that the theory behind them is done almost exclusively by economists. After asking the question whether this is really a problem, Demekas explains the architecture for international cooperation since World War II, breaking it down into the Bretton Woods period, the G5 era, expansion of transnational regulatory networks, and today's world. Demekas claims that it is "surprising how little attention" international and economic policy cooperation has "attracted among economists" (p. 152). Demekas suggests that IR scholars should focus on the real-world priorities of policy makers and "do a better job in supplying policy-relevant and operationally actionable insights" (p. 153).

The next two chapters mainly focus on interstate conflict. In chapter 12, Sarah Kreps and Jessica Weeks explore which theories policy makers know about, which ones they find most useful and influential, and to what extent do these theories reflect prevailing academic views. Kreps and Weeks conducted a survey of senior members of the "United States national security establishment to examine the knowledge and attitudes of policymakers about four core theories related to interstate conflict," specifically the clash of civilizations, realist theory, the democratic peace, and expected utility theory (p. 156). Their research indicated that significant gaps exist between academic evaluations and policy makers' perceptions, that the policy makers profess the theories work to the extent that they are aware of those, and that the attunement of policy makers to the scholarship varies by topic. The chapter continues by focusing on the four core theories to show the differences and similarities among the academics and policy makers. They suggest that policy makers should be exposed to prominent academic ideas at increased levels. To do so, scholars should publish in outlets, such as *Foreign Affairs*, newspapers, or blogs followed by policy makers. In chapter 13, Peter D. Feaver comments on Kreps's and Weeks's study and lists a series of specific problems at the policy level, comparing those with academic-oriented line of thinking. Feaver suggests that while preparing "a deep-dive for the President with a broad horizon, then you would probably not spend any time on the grand theory debates of academic IR" (p. 177). Feaver recommends to add, "What specific questions regarding international conflict do you wish academics addressed?" as an open-ended survey question for any future research conducted with policy makers to bridge the gap in theory and practice when applied to interstate conflict.

Chapters 14 and 15 center on the topic of intrastate conflict. In the earlier chapter, Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young argue that scholarly work only had a modest direct influence on policy. They suggest that "much of the interstate conflict occurring in the world has taken place in geographic areas where policymakers have historically paid little attention" (p. 181). The same can be said about the academic research on these areas. The authors have found suggestive evidence that emerging issues and more technical ones provide greater opportunities for IR scholars to influence policy. They recommend more

interdisciplinary work by these scholars considering the economic, historical, psychological, and sociological aspects of intrastate conflicts. Scott Edwards follows that study with comments on the subject. Although agreeing with Findley and Young, he recommends that IR scholars try not to persuade the high-level policy makers "to the applicability of scientific insights to a given problem" (p. 202). The agents need to understand how academia can help and human rights or conflict watchdogs should be used as an intermediary.

In chapters 16 and 17, the main focus is on nuclear strategy. Paul C. Avey and Michael C. Desch explore the changing relationship between academia and national security policy between 1945 and 1965 in chapter 16, focusing on nuclear strategy. They employ criteria they found to "determine when and how the current generation of academics working on nuclear issues might influence policy" (p. 208). By giving specific examples from history, Avey and Desch suggest that intellectual dynamics in universities can lead nuclear strategists into intellectual dead ends, showing the limits of connecting theory and practice. To overcome this disconnect, IR scholars should employ more cutting-edge methodologies in social sciences to translate their general findings into specific policy recommendations. In his comment on the previous chapter, John R. Harvey agrees with their thesis and suggests that IR scholars should recognize that government service depletes the intellectual capital of many political appointees. This issue is why they should be crystal clear in policy suggestions and be good in timing.

Chapter 18 is written by the editors, who suggest that "scholarship presented in a consumable format and in ungated venues has a greater likelihood of influencing practitioners and practice" (p. 232). In summary, this book is a groundbreaking contribution to the field of international relations, which helps the scholars, students, and practitioners of the field to realize the need for a platform to communicate.

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Endnotes

1. "Bridging the Gap," Bridgingthegapproject.org, accessed 23 August 2022.
2. "TRIP Project," trip.wm.edu, accessed 23 August 2022.

The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power. By Patrick Porter. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015. Pp. 227. $29.95 (paperback and ebook).

The Global Village Myth is a well-researched and interesting book for international relations and security studies enthusiasts. Patrick Porter, professor of stra-

tegic studies at University of Exeter (UK), explores the concept of globalism, an ideology of power and vulnerability through cooperation. Throughout the book, Porter adeptly applies the globalism theory to case studies—such as net-war, cyber war, drones, and amphibious operations—addressing its validity in the modern battlespace. The monograph illustrates security connections, which influence strategic security planning between countries, and policies, which form the context of the theory of globalism. Under the premise of a complicated post–Cold War world, the *global village* mindset causes a duel between defense and offense. The book asks if technology has compressed space, both physical and strategic space, and whether globalism works against the dynamics of armed conflict today. Overall, the book is enjoyable to read and challenges existing concepts effectively. However, the scope of the argument is extremely narrow and some of the author's assumptions and arguments are not standing the test of time. Globalism is a niche concept, as evidenced by the requirement to spend a chapter defining the theory and differentiating it from globalization. Although not completely an argument for isolationism, this realist and U.S.-centric perspective argues in favor of restraint, lest one risks security over-extension.

One main tenet of Porter's argument is that geography cannot change but geopolitics do, and security should reflect the latter. Countries should adapt their cooperation and level of globalism based on geopolitics. The book focuses on security strategies, not political economy, and the argument is strongest with a clear line between globalism and globalization. Porter thoroughly covers the history of the concept of globalism then makes his argument against the concept. Robert Kaplan's study, *Revenge of Geography*, influenced the argument for this book and is mentioned throughout.[1] While flavored with a heavy dose of realism, Porter uses numerous theories, case studies, wargame scenarios, capability development, and strategic considerations to win over the reader. Overall, the book argues against strategic security expansionism as it creates negative effects globally, and it encourages strategists to find a happy medium between running the world and hiding from it.

A strength of Porter's argument against globalism is his separation of globalization. He links globalization and the spread of "liberal ideals" but clearly delineates the difference between globalization theory and its economic focus versus globalism with its geographic focus. Economic globalization is a fact, not a choice, and heavily impacts strategic security decisions about the cost of war. This separation of concepts strengthens his argument about how geography cannot drive capability development or offensive and defensive postures. The book explores many factors for security outside of globalization. While not global in scale, geography, population, and regional economic priorities present a challenge to security.

Security through expansion of ideals is a classical realist concept used throughout the argument. The book's chronological development of the *security state* and *balance of power* concepts clarify the parallel development of globalism

versus globalization. Porter compares isolation versus globalism and looks at both Asia and Europe historically to explore success and failure of each strategy. By asking if World War II, the Korean War, and 11 September 2001 (9/11) were wins for globalism, Porter argues that each event enhanced the security state through expansion of ideals.

By exploring the difference between globalism (access) and territorial expansion (control), which matters deeply for national strategic security planning, the author further strengthens his argument against globalism. The netwar—nonstate actors using the internet to spread influence and ideas—case study informs the reader about a successful nonstate actor, al-Qaeda, unconstrained by distance but with territorial expansion goals. The covert organization worked for many years to coordinate the 9/11 attacks and build their base. Netwar is not easy and it takes time, expertise, and is difficult to replicate. The internet is not a substitute for physical space and physically fragmented organizations have command and control challenges. Porter later posits that both drones and cyber capabilities require trust in industrial control systems and significant hard infrastructure in order to truly compress space. Cyber offense requires control of certain infrastructure and is not reliant on access, further weakening a drive toward globalism.

Weapons erasing distance by increasing the span of impact further refute *The Global Village Myth* by reducing the requirement for access. Porter argues that globalism does not shrink the world. Geography, region, and capabilities are factors that alter the advantage of global cooperation. The challenge for diminishing the significance of distance is access, basing, and overflight, which is still required for in-depth offense and defense. Greater proximity to the enemy brings improved accuracy for weapons, but less security for those employing the weapons and vice versa. The book illustrates these concepts with historical examples showing that antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD), passive defense, distance and political will, and the impact of "thirsty" air wings have immense sway on strategic security. Porter uses a China and Taiwan amphibious assault wargame scenario to argue that a well-trained force with solid doctrine and political will can effectively defend against a stronger but distant aggressor. Weapons development and the consideration for physical space is a challenge to strategic security development and does not support the global village, as the author successfully argues. However, the narrow arguments against the global village have started to weaken over time.

Although a strong argument against globalism, the book, written in 2015, is already starting to show age and weakness in some of the pro-isolationist assumptions. Porter's limit on the discussion of economic dependencies strengthen the argument against globalism, but ultimately narrows the argument to a point of limited external validity. Groups like ISIS, which were much more successful than al-Qaeda, overcame the cyber war and netwar limitations by building a support base online and translating that into territorial expansion. China has exceeded the offensive assumptions in the amphibious wargame sce-

nario and is more capable of overcoming physical space limitations by stretching their A2/AD umbrella over Taiwan and beyond. Porter underplays the cyber threat by stating that there is a large difference between cyber criminals and strategic security cyber threats. He argues that cyber defense is stronger than is usually credited. The book does not consider the speed of development of cyber capabilities, as illustrated by attacks like the oil pipeline shutdowns and electrical grid blackouts.[2] The argument that cyberwar does not make globalism valid is weak, but the book still makes some good points about the strength of cyber defense in support of isolationism. When discussing the use of drones and the lack of requirements for access, Porter does not give significant space to the decision makers who choose to use drones and speaks primarily to the utility and legality of drones in nonviolent conflicts.

Porter's strongest argument has little to do with globalism. "Countries who seek to be guardians are also agents of chaos" (p. 217). Nations employing globalism through cooperation can cause as many problems as they solve. Porter's well-defined argument about American overextension used Vietnam and Iraq as effective case studies. The book would have been clearer if he maintained the separation between globalism and globalization. The theme of globalism and its failures held throughout. The well-argued book covered a variety of domains and cases studies that made for interesting reading and thorough arguments. Overall, *The Global Village Myth* is a warning against the negative strategic security impacts of overextension and not relying on the global village to meet the state's security needs.

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Endnotes

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2. Venkata Palleti et al., "Cascading Effects of Cyber-Attacks on Interconnected Critical Infrastructure," *Cybersecurity* 4, no. 8 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1186/s42400-021-00071-z.

The Command of the Air. By Giulio Douhet. Translated by Dino Ferrari. 1921; reprint edition, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019. Pp. 362. (free paperback and ebook).

Written a century ago, Italian general Giulio Douhet's book, *The Command of the Air*, expresses his thoughts about airpower after World War I. Douhet emphasizes the importance of the air domain as it started to become part of the battlefield, and he explores the nature of war as it is developed by time and technology.

Douhet stresses the need for an independent air force and airpower, for which he was an early advocate. He believes that command of the air, or as we now refer to as *air superiority*, leads to victory. Those nations that have an independent air force will emerge victorious from conflict and will have a stronger national defense due to the unique nature of the air domain where aircraft can reach behind enemy lines. While aircraft can hit sea and land targets, at the time of his writing, there were no employable naval or land defenses that could oppose air bombing raids on cities. Douhet explains that an air force cannot simply be auxiliary of the navy and army. Although aviation should still be a part of the other military branches, employed as fleet defense, and used in army operations and other missions, he argued, an independent air force holds offensive airpower as its top, essential purpose.

Air power is significant due to its rapidity of movement, reach, armament, and offensive capability against targets in multiple domains, explains Douhet, making it a required organization for this new battlefield. He defines goals and ideals for units and organizations, quantitative effects of aircraft and firepower, and strategy for post–World War I air forces. He also describes optimal characteristics, types of aircraft, and employable tactics. He advocates for quick, decisive action in conflict and is not opposed to bombing civilian infrastructure or using poisonous gases against populations. Douhet sees no distinction between military and non-military objectives after the introduction of air power. Though tragic, Douhet believes that these types of shock-and-awe tactics against civilian targets and population centers would lead to shorter and less bloody conflicts, yielding better results in war. Strategic bombing campaigns lead to decisive victories.

Douhet advises that the goal should be to prevent your enemy from flying their aircraft by attacking the "eggs" and "nests"—bases, supply centers, and planes on the ground—rather than just their "birds" in the air (p. 31). This tactic alone serves as a better defense than any other strategy in the air domain since airpower is inherently offensive. He explains how air operations are significant even during peacetime because the air industry can be used for travel, economic advancement, technology development, relationship-building and cooperation with civil aviation, research and development funding, and publicity for sustainment. Keeping airpower alive during peacetime is critical so that planes can be converted for war quickly.

Even today, air superiority is vital for military success. In addition to an independent Air Force, the United States now has an independent Space Force, allowing both air- and space-minded professionals the organization, budget, and assets needed to keep up with an ever-changing battlefield. Douhet's idea of unified command—Joint service environment—has also come to fruition and is still relevant today. Furthermore, as Douhet also explains, keeping up with technology and understanding the nature of the conflict environment is still essential for national defense and military success.

Douhet's book was first published a century ago in 1921. The way in which

it is organized allows readers to understand the importance of the then new air forces compared to trench warfare of World War I. At that time, the world was exhausted from four years of long, bloody, conventional war. Douhet wrote this study with the goal of explaining the possibilities of aircraft in battle—and beyond—and how this new technology was a game changer during an inevitable war.

While still an interesting and relevant study in many ways, three of Douhet's major ideas are problematic under current scrutiny. First, he states that air forces should always operate in mass. Today, special operations aircrews strive to maintain a small footprint and operate without being detected in hostile or denied territory. These missions would be unsuccessful if carried out "in mass." Today's radars and other air defense systems could easily discover a large quantity of aircraft. Furthermore, technology continues to threaten airborne assets in other ways; a large electromagnetic pulse could disable a group of aircraft traveling in mass, should it be deployed accurately.

Second, the ideas of strategic bombing campaigns are currently not employable against terrorists and other unconventional threats. Many of today's adversaries are hidden among civilian populations and cannot be targeted easily. It would be counterproductive to bomb the civilian towns where these enemies reside, making it impossible to win influence, allies, and an overall war.

Finally, I completely disagree with Douhet's willingness to attack civilian population centers. He did not consider civilians as collateral elements, instead describing them as combatants in future wars because airpower could go beyond traditional defenses. Douhet explored the potential of spreading epidemics, chemicals, and poison into adversarial territory. This type of warfare is inhumane and illegal, even if it was not considered as such 100 years ago. This type of warfare would certainly break the will and morale of the people, but it would never win hearts and minds or a positive reputation on the international stage. Douhet mentions that news travels quickly after civilian targets are bombed, which may serve to break enemy morale, but it also breaks the reputation of the civilized world. Now, news travels even faster with the evolution of the internet, cell phones, and other technology. The rest of the world would quickly discover how barbaric and criminal any nation is for employing such tactics and these actions would negatively impact the country immediately and in the future.

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The Other Face of Battle: America's Forgotten Wars and the Experience of Combat. By Wayne E. Lee, Anthony E. Carlson, David L. Preston, and David Silbey. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 272. $25.70 (hardcover and ebook).

In 1976, John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* helped create a seismic shift in the field of military history.[1] By analyzing the three most famous battles in British history—Agincourt (25 October 1415), Waterloo (18 June 1815), and the Somme (1 July–18 November 1916)—from the perspective of the foot soldiers involved, Keegan reoriented the field toward the study of individual human experiences in combat. Using Keegan's framework, *The Other Face of Battle: America's Forgotten Wars and the Experience of Combat* examines the individual experiences of warfighting to provide a novel and important interpretation of American military history. The authors define "the other face of battle" as "the experience of combat between culturally disparate enemies" (p. 193). They argue that these smaller intercultural wars—specifically the French and Indian War (1754–63), the Philippine-American War (1899–1902), and Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–14)—are the defining conflicts of the American military experience. While Americans have emphasized the importance of large-scale conventional wars against familiar opponents, the historical reality proves the opposite.

Like Keegan, *The Other Face of Battle* draws on three battles as case studies: the Battle of the Monongahela (9 July 1755), the Battle of Manila (4–5 February 1899), and the Battle of Makuan (15 September–31 December 2010). These clashes are employed to construct a chronological understanding of the progression of American attitudes and approaches to intercultural warfare. Unlike Keegan, however, the authors chose these battles because they are overlooked in the mythos of American military history. Further, these battles all consist of American soldiers facing foes who were culturally alien to them. Based on primary accounts of soldiers from both sides, the authors provide a captivating and detailed reconstruction of the experience of combat in each engagement. While the chapters center on the description and analysis of the battles, two interludes provide a broader view of the doctrinal shifts in American military strategy between each fight. One of the monograph's strengths is its ability to build a narrative that explains the development of doctrine and strategy without sacrificing the human element. In the case of the Battle of Makuan, the authors describe American soldiers experiencing the sounds of daily prayer calls and the smells of the Afghan battlefield to transport the reader into an alienating world. The sensory experience of combat is on full display for the reader.

A crucial theme of *The Other Face of Battle* is the contest between symmetric and asymmetric warfare. While symmetric warfare relies on conventional tactics, asymmetric warfare uses irregular tactics, such as guerrilla fighting, as its prime strategy. According to the authors, a critical irony in American strategic thought has been a focus on symmetric warfare. Although American military planners have prepared for conventional struggles, the more frequent intercultural wars were against opponents who used asymmetric warfare. In the context of twentieth and twenty-first century conflicts, the adoption of asymmetric tactics has been the most viable strategic option against the immense firepower of Western militaries. Importantly, however, the authors do not make a claim that

either approach to warfare is inherently superior. For example, while U.S. forces used conventional tactics to defeat Filipino forces at the Battle of Manila, the authors contend that the irregular indigenous forces at Monongahela were the most disciplined and effective in combat.

Another key theme is the influence of human actors. Its focus on intercultural wars speaks to the authors' interpretation of warfighting as a product of culture. In each case study, the battle discussed provided a unique set of problems as both sides were forced to contend with an unfamiliar military culture. The soldiers fighting these engagements could be constrained or possess an advantage based on their perspectives. Nevertheless, the authors are careful not to veer into a sense of cultural determinism, especially as they argue, "Battles are shaped by the imagination of those fighting them" (p. 9). This concept of the experience of combat being shaped by culture is a running theme throughout the narrative specifically because culture is the prism through which combat is experienced. This perspective highlights the importance of intercultural war but also establishes the agency of human actors in shaping and experiencing the battlefield.

The Other Face of Battle also possesses broader implications for how the United States could approach military strategy. The authors contend that American military planners have continually worked under the expectation of future conflicts revolving around conventional opponents. Yet, in their examination of the long-term impact of the Battle of Manila, the authors argue that the American victory was a false confirmation of the superiority of symmetrical warfare, which has created an established motif central to the American way of war. Historians, such as Russell Weigley, have defined the American approach to warfighting by the ability to combat major powers in large-scale conventional struggles.[2] Nevertheless, the authors posit that this fixation is a strategic error. As U.S. policy makers and strategists look to the next war, it is tempting to conclude that the nation will face a major regional power fielding a conventional military. According to the authors, however, it is far more likely that the U.S. military's next war will reflect the case studies discussed. Therefore, there is a need for a strategic shift toward planning for unconventional opponents and asymmetric warfare.

The Other Face of Battle successfully synthesizes individual experiences and grand strategy to construct a new understanding of the American military experience. The case studies provide a clear narrative for how the American military has evolved and the importance of intercultural warfare in its evolution. While American military thinking has centered on symmetrical wars against conventional opponents, *The Other Face of Battle* contends that the opposite experience has defined the American way of war. As the U.S. military prepares for its next war, the case studies discussed reflect the reality that an asymmetrical war against an unfamiliar opponent is a high probability. Intercultural warfare has been a consistent feature of the American military experience and is a requirement for future planning. This book powerfully conveys a universal truth about

war espoused in David Lean's *Bridge on the River Kwai*, "There's always the un-
expected."[3] In the case of *The Other Face of Battle*, there is always the unfamiliar.

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Endnotes

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2. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: MacMillan, 1973).
3. *Bridge on the River Kwai*, directed by David Lean (1957; Sony Pictures, 2011), Blu-ray Disc.

Grey Wars: A Contemporary History of U.S. Special Operations. By N. W. Collins. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021. Pp. 304. $28.00 (hardcover).

Grey Wars is presented as a contemporary history of U.S. special operations. Reading the endorsements the book has garnered, this reviewer looked forward to a comprehensive analysis, but instead found something less than the promise presented in its premise. Neither a professional tome by a practitioner, nor an academic treatise, it more closely resembles a long-piece article that could appear in a publication like *The New Yorker* or *The Atlantic*. It focuses on a visit the author made to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, as part of a group from the Council of Foreign Relations in 2010 with discursions into the history of U.S. special operations during the past half-century. In fact, the majority of the work focuses on the timeline up to 2011 and the killing of Osama bin Laden, as if, perhaps, this was a piece that had initially been shelved and then reconsidered a decade later. Most of the book centers on U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), whose head-quarters N. W. Collins visited on that trip. Surprisingly, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), which alert observers might expect to figure into a discussion on USSOCOM and USCENTCOM area of operations receives a sole mention on page 196.

For those who have a close connection to the commands or an interest in the development of MacDill, the book offers a wealth of details. There are extensive descriptions of the physical space and the construction and expansion of the physical infrastructure, such as water needs being met by two 500,000-gallon reservoirs moved through 43 miles of piping, which continues throughout *Grey Wars*. A description of the expansion of the coalition village in 2001 is provided 10 pages immediately before the conclusion of the text.

To evaluate *Grey Wars*, it is probably more valuable to consider what it omits than what it covers. Given the important role that the Joint Special Op-

erations Command (JSOC) has played in the counterterrorism mission, the main focus of *Grey Wars*, it is disheartening to find the sole reference to it is an offhand comment about it on page 144. Relatedly, there is no discussion of General Stanley McChrystal's innovations as the JSOC commander, which many experts believe turned it into the most lethal and efficient man-hunting organization in history, created a cycle of raids leading to intelligence leading to more raids, and had perhaps a greater impact on breaking the back of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) than the vaunted "surge." Wesley Morgan's magisterial *The Hardest Place: The American Military Adrift in Afghanistan's Pech Valley* used Kunar Province as the lens to evaluate the U.S. military's role in that war and provides a more encompassing analysis of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and, in particular, the rivalries and disconnects between the JSOC special mission units and "vanilla" white Special Operations Forces (SOF).

Understandably, in a short work, Collins may not be able to address every significant event in the development of U.S. Special Operations Forces, but there is no mention of Grenada, Panama, and the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. The book also overlooks operations to capture war criminals in Bosnia and lesser-known operations, such as the assistance provided in the hunt for Pablo Escobar. The Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, well known as the events covered in the book and movie *Black Hawk Down*, is covered. She also spends more than 20 pages on both the shooting down of the Extortion 17 CH-47 Chinook helicopter that killed 38 operators in Afghanistan in 2011 and the history of the area where it occurred dating back to the Soviet invasion. Unlike Morgan, she does not mention Operation Red Wings in June–July 2005—popularized by the book and later movie *Lone Survivor*—and the crash of the quick reaction force helicopter. This disaster arguably had a greater effect on the conduct of the war and coordination among SOF units in Afghanistan than did the 2011 tragedy, which Collins admits received little attention outside the special operations community.

Nearly the entirety of the work is focused on the initial decade of counterterrorism in Afghanistan, with surprisingly little focus on Iraq and the conflict against AQI. It also has little discussion of other major theaters in which U.S. special operations have engaged, such as Yemen, Syria, the Philippines, East Africa, Libya, or the Sahel in Africa. The fight against Iranian-supported Shia militia groups, which consumed years in the Iraq War, receive only passing reference when she describes a 2010 PowerPoint presentation in USCENTCOM headquarters. While Operation Eagle Claw, the hostage rescue attempt in Iran in April 1980 is given a few pages, the absence of a discussion of Iran as an adversary is notable. Conflict with the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is only obliquely mentioned in a paragraph noting that its then leader, Qasem Soleimani, was killed in a drone strike (p. 192). While a summarizing work, such as what Collins wrote, cannot be expected to provide a deep level of detail that a book like David Crist's *The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran* does, it is difficult to provide

an accurate description of U.S. policy in the Middle East without considering the large role this struggle played.

The pivot to Asia made by the administration of President Barack H. Obama, and the promulgation of the U.S. *National Defense Strategy* in 2018 by then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, has reoriented the focus of many national security professionals to great power competition, specifically the threat that an ascendant China and aggressive Russia poses. Collins largely ignores these developments, suggesting only that U.S. special operations units may need to prepare to face a "revanchist Russia" and makes no mention at all of China (p. 210). Although not discussed in the book, an analysis of how SOFs may need to change their training, doctrine, equipment, or selection to address these new challenges could have been valuable. Ultimately, the intended audience of this book is unclear. Its surface analysis of special operations will lack the detail or insightful analysis to make it of interest to professionals, and is neither accessible nor exciting enough for the casual reader seeking a beach or airplane read.

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On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare. Edited by Timothy Heck and B. A. Friedman. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020. Pp. 430. Free (paperback and ebook).

Amphibious operations are important because they have been happening for centuries. Yet, there have been few publications on the different types of amphibious warfare and their operations. The most notable works have been about the initial phrase of Operation Overlord in World War II, including the D-Day landings on 6 June 1944, and how it became the most talked about operation. *On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare* looks at the evolving role of amphibious operations throughout the centuries and even the role these campaigns will play in future conflicts. Editors Timothy Heck and B. A. Friedman do an excellent job and ensured the authors understood the book's purpose. Every chapter brings a unique perspective on amphibious operations while addressing the larger history of warfare. With amphibious warfare being both vast and complex, it is important to have different perspectives on the subject and examine these operations during different wars throughout history rather than focusing on more prominent interactions. Heck and Friedman made sure the chapter authors look at five types of amphibious operations that are currently active in U.S. doctrine: the amphibious support to other campaigns, the raid, the withdrawal, the demonstration, and the assault (p. 5).

The 23 authors put in the work and make sure that they give the history of the issue and the outcome. They then make a point to go in-depth on how they

believe the specific operation they examine fits into the evolving role in history. Looking at amphibious warfare starting in the sixteenth century and extending through the twentieth century highlights how forces prepared for and executed this type of warfare over time. Besides looking through the different centuries, some of the authors explore the potential future of amphibious warfare. This perspective is crucial because both operations and warfare are continually changing. While looking at past operations is important because it shows how they have evolved throughout history, it is essential to look at potential changes and how that will affect any type of preparation.

The last six chapters all look at the future of amphibious warfare and how it will be needed in potential conflicts. In the conclusion, Friedman and Heck wrote that "the history of amphibious warfare is one of both continuity and change, and the future is likely to be more of the same. The projection of combat power from sea to the shore and beyond remains the nature of amphibious warfare, whether carried out by Achilles's Myrmidons or by unmanned systems" (p. 393). This idea is critical to note due to the everchanging nature of warfare and its requirements. Manned or not, amphibious warfare will continue to use combat power.

Another reason why looking at the future of amphibious operations is so important is that the United States must maintain an advantage over its adversaries (p. 338). The United States has to have an approach for and to maintain awareness of amphibious operations if it goes to war, hopefully so the United States can evolve its approach and adapt them to its potential enemies. The editors found authors who wrote about the past who willingly explored topics beyond the U.S. military. The authors who wrote about the future focused on U.S. operations and how adapting its operations toward its adversaries is significant.

Understanding amphibious operations and their evolution in the history of warfare is essential because military interactions and wars are constantly changing. If militaries look at one specific amphibious operation, such as the D-Day landings, there will be missed opportunities to grow and adapt. Heck and Friedman made sure that the authors examined unique topics that would demonstrate both the successes and failures of amphibious operations. *On Contested Shores* exhibits how important it is for militaries to study evolving operations. This book is one that historians as well as people who study amphibious operations should read because the authors bring in information that is vital to history and military forces. This book is integral to understanding the successes, failures, and the larger changes amphibious operations have brought forth throughout history.

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Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning. By Steven T. Wills. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021. Pp. 304. $44.95 (hardcover).

In 1991, the Gulf War marked a monumental shift in U.S. naval history. Beginning after the Cold War concluded, the conflict represented an arena to create a new identity for the Navy. *Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning* by Steven T. Wills explores the impact of the Gulf War and provides a thorough assessment of the shift in U.S. naval strategy in the wake of the Cold War. Wills contends that the end of the Cold War, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and the Gulf War crafted a political environment where the Navy was pressed to shift to supporting land forces in regional conflicts. It was a precipitous shift in strategy because the Navy had focused heavily on potential open-ocean combat against the Soviet Union. Although the Navy transitioned into this support role, Wills argues that the emergence of Russia and the People's Republic of China as potential military threats may necessitate a return to grand strategy.

Strategy Shelved presents a chronological narrative that spans from the inception of Cold War naval strategy after World War II until the formation of a new strategy in 1994. At the beginning of the Cold War, the National Security Act of 1947 saw inter-Service rivalry reach a fever pitch as each branch of the military fought to retain relevance in the new national security apparatus. While the Navy had initially hoped carrier aviation would give them access to nuclear technology, the advent of nuclear submarines provided the Service with a crucial niche in Cold War strategy. Like the Army, the Navy after the Vietnam War reassessed its strategic outlook and reoriented its focus toward the Soviet Union. The growth of the Soviet Navy in the 1970s saw the U.S. Navy develop a maritime strategy that focused on the deployment of a 600-ship force and advanced technology to win a new Battle of the Atlantic. Throughout the 1980s, however, the diminishing threat of the Soviet Union made that concept increasingly obsolete. Seeking to eliminate inter-Service rivalry, the Goldwater-Nichols Act also precipitated a shift away from grand strategy. The U.S. Military's embracing of *AirLand Battle* during the Gulf War then confirmed the novel support role the Navy inhabited. In 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, wrote ". . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," which articulated how the Navy would conduct Joint operations in small-scale regional wars. This emphasis on Joint actions became the strategic focus of the Navy for the next three decades.

Wills posits that the Navy inhabits a unique place in U.S. national security. Drawing on the work of political scientist Samuel Huntington, he argues that the Navy's "lack of civil obligations" and its global role made the Service more amenable to the construction of grand strategy (p. 261). In this respect, *Strategy Shelved* depicts the Navy's struggle to determine its own strategic identity in a changing military and political environment. The crux of Wills's narrative cen-

ters in the 1980s where the assumptions of maritime strategy were challenged. The growth of the Soviet Navy in the previous decade provided U.S. naval strategists with a clear and formidable opponent around which to construct their war planning. The presence of a powerful Soviet Navy reinforced the Navy's strategic identity that relied on grand strategy, but the absence of such an opponent in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War pushed the Service away from this identity. Wills clearly depicts the shift from this grand strategy to the emphasis on Joint operations asserted in ". . . From the Sea." While Wills provides the reader with a clear understanding of how and why this shift in doctrine occurred, the overall success of ". . . From the Sea" is left unclear to the reader. Although many of these answers lie outside of the scope of *Strategy Shelved*, Wills's assertion of the inhibition of the Navy's unique role strategy identity paints the naval publication as a strategic detour.

A running theme across the narrative of *Strategy Shelved* is the influence of civil-military relations on the construction of strategy. For example, Wills discusses the effect of the National Security Act of 1947 and the subsequent "Revolt of the Admirals" in detail. Importantly, Wills contends that debates over the unification of the armed forces did not end in 1949 but continued throughout the Cold War, including the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That legislation's attention to cooperation between the Services saw the focus of the officer corps shift toward Joint duty assignments. Wills argues that this emphasis on Joint duty assignments had a harmful effect on the formation of naval strategy. Citing a "lack of personnel to fill joint assignments," he emphasizes that the Navy was forced to cut the number of officers placed on staffs that formulated strategy (p. 130). The end of the Cold War forced the Navy to shift its strategic focus, but the Goldwater-Nichols Act hampered its ability to adapt to its new environment.

Strategy Shelved provides an insightful and thorough history of the Navy's transition from Cold War grand strategy to Joint operations during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Wills gives the reader a clear understanding of the development of maritime strategy and how its decline created the context for "… From the Sea." The book's narrative identifies the key factors—specifically the conclusion of the Cold War, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the Gulf War—that created a new era in U.S. naval history. This new era, however, saw the Navy shift away from its traditional reliance on grand strategy and cast itself in a support role in land wars. Yet, as Wills asserts, this era may well be ending as the United States faces new geopolitical challenges on the horizon.

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Spymaster's Prism: The Fight against Russian Aggression. By Jack Devine. Lincoln: Potomac Books, an imprint of University of Nebraska Press, 2021. $34.95 (hardcover and ebook).

In *Spymaster's Prism: The Fight against Russian Aggression*, Jack Devine shares his lifelong experience as an intelligence officer and spymaster for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Devine offers a unique perspective on the world of espionage due to his three decades of service with the CIA including working in both the Latin American and Middle East divisions and as acting director and associate director of operation. The book is an astonishing record of life experiences worthy of a spy thriller full of dangerous missions around the globe, misplaced loyalties, treachery, forgery, honeytraps, and covert media placement. Through a detailed analysis and an exciting recall of clandestine operations, Devine creates a complex and vivid web of spies, spymasters, defectors, whistleblowers, and disillusioned staff as well as a gripping account of infiltrations, betrayals, theft of military designs, entrapments, and executions to explain the confrontation between two major intelligence agencies: the CIA and the Soviet's Committee for State Security (a.k.a. KGB). The context is wide and explores Russian espionage from its Cold War beginnings through the alleged interference in the election of President Donald J. Trump, but it is essentially molded on the political culture of the Cold War when United States-Soviet relations were based on mutual distrust and antagonism and espionage was a vital game of learning the rival's secrets.

Spymaster's Prism is presented in the form of a veritable compendium of Russian actions and tactics. It is divided into 13 chapters, significantly called lessons, with the instructive intent to explore the practical issues behind intelligence as well as rationalize the misjudgments affecting the CIA in the past. Devine's purpose is based in his careful and farsighted understanding of Russia's unchanged ability to conduct covert operations, which reflects its permanent wartime mentality. It is no coincidence that the author places the story of Sergei Tretyakov, code name Comrade J, at the front of the book because he asserted that the Cold War never ended. While being one of Russia's top spies, he acted as a double agent, passing top-secret cases to the United States as well. Therefore, Devine says, "Russia had not ceased its effort to gather intelligence to aid it in navigating a new era. Tretyakov's existence offered proof of Russia's continuing espionage" (p. 4).

Each chapter dwells on one aspect at a time, which is part of the comprehensive range of the Russian toolkit such as disinformation, meddling, propaganda, subversion, and intimidation, showing the reader how intelligence has updated and weaponized information through the omnipresence of cyber tools and the proliferation of information. In fact, Devine affirms that "despite all the bombast and rebranding, this is not actually a new strategy. The underlying techniques have not changed since the beginning of the Cold War" (p. 34). Russia's tactical readiness is exemplified by the author's choice to include an

epigraph by the first amir of modern Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, who told his son to "never trust the Russians," a sentiment that echoes throughout the book.

Devine's in-depth and compelling observations provide the reader with the tools to think like an agent and evaluate the importance of time, luck, and expertise when conducting intelligence operations. In each chapter, he dispenses predictive analyses on the direction and possible measures that the CIA should take to counterbalance Russian influence. Devine points out that the competition with Russia cannot be treated as mere geopolitical rivalry, like the one with China, Instead, it should be seen as a relationship that has to be an end in itself.

Throughout the narration, Devine always emphasizes one element—Russia's ability to take advantage of one of the U.S. weaknesses: misinterpretation of events. In parallel, he exposes Russia's large scale and wide-ranging covert actions that depended on the ability to employ them together and reinforce each other to achieve the Kremlin's political objectives. He claims that one of the biggest problems for the United States lies in its failure to recognize that even if the Soviet Union (USSR) is gone, Russia remains a major opponent that demands vigilant attention, especially in foreign policy issues. Most importantly, he asserts that intelligence should not be disjointed from the political sphere when confronting Russia, believing, "Intelligence is not merely a game to be played; it is an essential lever in foreign policy" (p. 63).

Devine maintains a vigorous pace and a gripping style that incorporates failures and successes on both sides in addition to displaying their two opposite ways of conducting spycraft. Devine illustrates how structure and degree of involvement characterize the way in which the CIA and KGB conducted espionage. In fact, the KGB was created in the military and then embedded in government. On the contrary, the CIA was established through the National Security Act in 1947 as a "civilian agency designated to be a counterweight to the Soviet military and Foreign intelligence agencies, the GRU and the NKVD," but under a legal system preventing it from interfering in political affairs. These two divergent aspects led to the necessity to "take a significant time for the FBI and the CIA to develop counterintelligence expertise" (p. 17).

The first part of the book begins with Devine recalling the Moscow Rules, a secret negotiation between the CIA and KGB that served to set an important red line and some limitations on their respective activities. He talks about Soviet-style active measures (*aktivniye meropriyatiya*), which sought to blur the line between secrecy and acknowledgment, truth, and lie by relying on pluralism and the openness of Western society. In light of Putin's struggle to ignore this agreement, Devine calls for an updated version of it together with a renewed containment policy.

Devine emphasizes how the myth of the Russian decline and the American hegemonic paradigm made the U.S. government "more driven and interested in pursuing stateless and rogue-state asymmetrical threats—terrorism, drugs, and counterproliferation" (p. 25). He describes how the illusory belief that Russia's

decline was irreversible, making it incapable of resisting Western initiatives, led to a fatal misconception and the difficulty of accepting Moscow's pushback against Western policies and governments. Furthermore, Devine argues that the phenomenon of source proliferation is part of the active measures developed since the birth of the KGB, creating campaigns designed to "obliquely, perniciously and incrementally undermine the West, its freedom, its system of government, its institutions, and its values during the Cold War" (p. 34).

By their nature, covert actions are directed at changing things. In doing so, they have been linked to hybrid warfare techniques that produce a high degree of complexity. Hybrid warfare creates the ideal conditions for implausibly deniable operations with exploitable ambiguity. The Kremlin has relied prominently on the policy of plausible deniability to try to deploy deliberate obfuscation about acts. Devine argues that the technique of sowing doubt in the existence of objective truth is aimed at disseminating implausible narratives and developing an alternative version of facts. He mentions the case of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 shot down in Ukraine in 2014 as a significant example. While Moscow publicly called to investigate the incident, behind the scenes, the pro-Russian separatists blocked access to the crash site, prompting allegations "that it was a Ukrainian missile or aircraft that brought down Flight 17 in an attack meant to target President Putin" (p. 42).

The author also suggests that this kind of approach, which Yale historian Timothy Snider first developed, was adjusted by Russia to create ambiguity and that it is evident in recent activities in Ukraine, which he considers to be a geopolitical hub for Russian distortion of facts and a ground for aggressive military and covert political action. This strategic relevance is confirmed by one of the author's personal life memories. Devine recalls when he went to Kyiv in 2014 on a promotional tour of his book *Good Hunting* and was accused by Russian state-sponsored media of trying to favor the schism between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, "pushing the bogus narrative that the CIA was behind the schism" and partnered with "authorities in Kyiv" (p. 35).

Devine also considers how Russian politics is highly unpredictable, as Putin's rise to power illustrated. He points out how Putin's background as a KGB officer and his training in Dresden, East Germany, in the waning days of the Soviet Union have shaped his political philosophy and tactical thinking. He stresses Russia's ability to purchase or co-opt business and political elites to build a significant and reliable compliant network. Businesses searching for opportunities and bribes mirror the appeal of the Russian business culture and "byzantine bureaucracy" as well as its use of opacity, illegal acts, and corruption measures to recruit agents of influence in targeted countries (p. 58).

According to Devine, Russian interference methods are so varied and calibrated to multiple objectives that it is impossible to know their scope and breath. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the truthfulness of sources and accuracy of information when dealing with Russian covert operations. Devine writes, "Russian interference activity was aggressive and targeted, but we know very

little about how these strategies were designed" (pp. 88–89). He explains how Russian intelligence operations involve a high degree of scrutiny of people who gravitate around high-ranking government roles to ensure access to information. As the findings in Robert Mueller's *Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election* proved, this system allows the creation of a Trojan horse, that is a network of informants among individuals and institutions.

Devine introduces the figure of the spymaster who did not enjoy the same reputation as secret agents, instead filling the role of running and handling spies and spy networks and defining strategies. Some of the most famous ones are Markus Wolfe, Allen Dulles, James Angleton, and George Kisevalter. Devine details how the KGB used fraudulent moves to expose and deceive their opponents nationally and abroad, to maneuver intelligence services into false paths, and, especially, to get into contact with foreign personnel with the intent of compromising them and recruiting them as moles. He lists famous and obscure cases in the history of espionage that caused a significant loss for the CIA and a competitive advantage for Russia, such as the Rosenberg's spy ring in the 1950s; Soviet spies such as Aldrich Ames, Kim Philby, Heinz Felfe, Robert Hansenn and Klaus Fuchs; and individuals defined as "walk-ins," such as Robert Lee Johnson or Jerry Chun Shing Lee. Devine mentions the recent case of National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden as a revealing example of a flaw within the NSA system, which has been the major source of attraction for Russia. He also claims that its prominent weakness is the lack of a full assessment of the security suitability of its contractors.

Devine explains that the active measures went beyond covert operations. He claims that, even decades after the official collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kremlin's involvement in political assassinations is still the same since it is the legacy of the Stalinism and part of the KGB practice of wet work (*mokryie dela*), which includes murders, kidnappings, and sabotage involving bloodshed (p. 44). He exposes the tragic deaths of some Russian political opponents, such as Sergei Magnitsky, Anna Politovskaya, and Alexander Litvinenko, or assassinations attempts, such as Alexander Navalny, Boris Berezovsky, and Sergei Skripal.

To this concern, Devine brings the reader's attention to the Magnitsky Act of 2016 and its importance to the human rights world for unveiling the systemic injustices and corruption of the Russian elitarian state after the murder of Sergei Magnitsky. This legislation authorizes the U.S. president to impose visa bans and freeze assets of foreign individuals who commit violations against human rights defenders and try to hide money in the United States. Devine states that this is a foreign policy goal for Moscow, and explains Putin's attempt to repeal it as well as his lobbying against the law and its proponent, Bill Browder.

Devine reveals another important element in the longstanding clash between the CIA and KGB—the structure of society. The Soviet Union's traditionally closed society prevented Western agents from gaining access to secret

information whereas the United States' open society allowed a certain degree of soft espionage. In this regard, the Soviets preferred human intelligence—the use of agents in place to gather sensitive information—while the United States relied heavily on technological solutions. Devine discloses that one of the main causes behind some failures of the CIA was the scarcity of reliable and timely intelligence information available to the analysts, especially during the 1950s when it was hard for the agency to obtain intelligence sources and built a network of agents inside the impenetrable USSR. By the early Cold War, the Soviet Union had already infiltrated the United States with an army of spies in all sectors of society, although they were particularly interested in science and technology. From the Rosenberg spy ring in the 1950s, to the capture of Aldrich Ames in the CIA, and Robert Hanssen in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the 1990s, Soviet spies made headline news.

Devine remembers that in the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush made a consistent increase in resources for the intelligence community, redirecting intelligence capabilities to face the threat of international terrorism and the war in Afghanistan. In doing so, the work of an intelligence officer was intertwined with that of warfighters in these major intervention wars. As a consequence, gathering and analyzing were downgraded in favor of counterterrorism priorities and actions against terrorist organizations.

In the central part of the book the author delves into the story of some of the most famous agents-in-place, such as Adolf Tolkachev, Pyotr Popov, Dmitriy Fedorovich Polyakov, Oleg Penkovskij, and Oleg Gordievskij, who contributed to the understanding of Russian strategic thinking and military thought. They have also helped avert nuclear accidents and allowed the United States to dominate the technological domain.

Tolkachev was an aeronautical engineer whose information was of the utmost importance for the United States to access classified Soviet weapons secrets and advances in aviation technology. He spied for the United States for seven years until he was betrayed by a CIA trainee, caught, and executed.

Pyotr Popov passed secrets about Soviet weapons developments and maneuvers for atomic warfare to the CIA while also providing it with extensive information about the procedures of the Soviet's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) procedures and the Soviet intelligence network abroad. General Dmitriy Fedorovich Polyakov and Colonel Oleg Penkovskij both provided valuable intelligence for the CIA and the British intelligence agency MI6 until they were betrayed by Aldrich Ames, a CIA counterintelligence officer who exposed several other U.S. spies working in Mosco. Polyakov, code name TopHat, was a GRU general who approached an American diplomat in Vienna in 1953 to offer his services as a spy for the United States. His information was of vital importance in detecting Soviet nuclear submarines and missile technology. He also alerted the CIA that the GRU knew about the Lockheed U-2 spy plane.

Penkovskij, in particular, spied for the United States in 1961 and 1962, a

strategic period in the Cold War that climaxed during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Devine emphasizes that Penkovskij's intelligence was crucial because it came in the middle of the decision-making process, influencing President John F. Kennedy's choices and his resolution to maintain a measured stance to resolving the conflict. Of the utmost importance was Penkovsky's exposures on a Minox camera that included intelligence on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Gordievskij was one of the most damaging double agents in the history of the KGB. He became a KGB *rezidentura* (head of station) in London in 1983 and decided to spy for the United States due to alienation and disillusionment with the Soviet system. His information proved to be decisive material about Soviet intentions because he alerted the British about the preparation of Operation Ryan, a joint KGB and GRU action for nuclear war, which Margaret Thatcher shared with President Ronald W. Reagan. He also warned Britain's Signal Intelligence Service about Soviet monitoring and its fear of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's command-post exercise Able Archer in November 1983.

Devine argues that, despite the outdated conviction that espionage would decline in comparison with the emerging technical intelligence methods, human agents and human intelligence are still the most crucial tools to access secrets that cannot be gleaned by simply using technology. Without human interaction, even the use of cyber technology would stagnate and be useless. He suggests that President Jimmy Carter and his director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, pushed the CIA toward an emphasis on technical intelligence. "Where Carter and Turner went wrong," he believes, "was the failure to understand that acquiring secrets, even those that were highly technical in nature, often requires human assets." He contends that U.S. intelligence was "still a human source-based intelligence game, with agents needed to gain lasting access both to the plans and intentions of our adversaries, and that remains the case today" (pp. 129–30).

On several occasions the author focuses on one of the most controversial U.S. foreign policy mistakes, the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, suggesting that it provides a lesson to avoid strategic miscalculation as well as being a reminder to improve critical analysis. Devine underlines the CIA's tendency for overconfidence and optimism saying that some of its more bullish officials "learned hard lessons in Hungary, Indonesia, and then Castro's Cuba, the CIA's highest profile covert action failure" (p. 165). Operation Anadyr was the Soviet military deployment that prompted the United States to instigate the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October 1962, but, for Devine, is also an example of intelligence underestimation of Soviet intentions.

In the final part of the book, Devine explains how the CIA covert action programs during the Cold War aided military officers, including sending weapons and providing counterinsurgency training, in their seizure of power in a number of countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, Latin America became an obses-

sion for the United States due to the anti-American and anti-imperialist feelings that led to guerrilla movements that followed Cuba's successful challenge to U.S. dominance. He claims that "since the creation of the CIA's mandate in 1947 to combat Soviet aggression," covert actions that the United States undertook "included such things as supporting political activities, designing and disseminating propaganda, aiding paramilitary activity, and fomenting regime change" (p. 155).

The unfounded fear of the domino theory, which Devine defines as "if one country fell to communism, surrounding countries likely would as well" and the growing sympathies for Marxist ideology prompted the administrations of Kennedy and his successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, to destabilize governments in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uruguay as well as in Southeast Asia, particularly in Cambodia and Vietnam (p. 170). The author focuses on the rise of Salvador Allende in Chile, which induced the United States to destabilize his government until he suffered a U.S.-led military coup in 1973. Yet, Devine notes that the historical precedent of the CIA's secret plans and covert action playbook emerged from its actions during Italian elections in 1948 that subverted a left-leaning uprising. For years after, it became "the CIA blueprint on how to run political campaigns on foreign territory" (p. 18).

Devine offers his insight into the future of covert actions as well. He believes that "a hybrid approach works best, with both strong intelligence collection and covert action" being "essential levers of U.S. foreign policy." These actions, called "intelligence in action," were first developed by Frank Wisner, who Devine refers to as "the CIA's secret director of operations and an accomplished spymaster" (p. 156).

The reading of a book about espionage often involves a certain degree of boredom, being full of inevitable technicalities and cumbersome details about the operational and administrative features of intelligence activities. This element might discourage readers who are not familiar with the context. On the contrary, Devine succeeds in involving the reader with a lively presentation so that even readers who are not the most ardent lover of the espionage genre can catch the dynamics behind it. *Spymaster's Prism* is an essential reading for insiders because it addresses the current strategic dearth of the United States and tries to delineate the possible ways to outpace the Russians. For the general public, it offers a broad historical and geographical scenario that offers plenty of background related to geopolitical competition, no matter the adversary.

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Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry. By Lyle J. Goldstein. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019. Pp. 400. $32.95 (paperback).

Lyle J. Goldstein contests the point that war between the United States and China is inevitable, but does more than simply hope for rational approaches to prevail. He proposes several different policies in various areas in attempts to create what he calls "cooperation spirals" to reinforce positive relationships between the two nations, reducing tensions and the likelihood of conflict. Goldstein proposes these spirals in several areas: Taiwan, economic relations, environmental issues (most critically climate change), the developing world (Africa in particular), the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, Southeast Asia, and India. The final chapter draws important connections between these issues, which is critical to finding some synergy in the proposals. The effort, however, highlights more how incredibly difficult it is to draw together such myriad efforts in diverse issues for a single result.

Meeting China Halfway makes at least two significant contributions to the policy discussions regarding U.S.-China relations. First, it makes substantive policy proposals for both countries. Second, the work uses a significant number of Chinese sources. On this latter point, Goldstein goes to great pains to note that this use does not signify an endorsement of the various views. Instead, and more significant for a Western audience, these documents illustrate that Chinese positions are in fact being debated in China, an important reminder that the nation is not monolithic.

There are shortcomings to the work, though a few may in fact be a feature, not a bug. Goldstein admits that some of his proposals are not perfect, and he invites the reader to develop alternatives. This exercise is critical to having a real discussion of substantive actions that the United States and China can implement to lower the likelihood of conflict. He also acknowledges a great power bias to his argument from the outset, stating that his work "reflects the fact that ultimately peace and stability will flow, first and foremost, from a carefully negotiated consensus among the two leading superpowers that is then shaped and further modified by the other powers and lesser states" (p. 16). While this may be true, the gap between "superpowers" and "other" powers may not be significant enough to have the superpowers make the "initial" move. The inertia of international relations carries on. For Goldstein's "cooperation spirals" to work, they really need to be "cooperation whirlpools," drawing in other actors and building momentum rather than leaving an opening for these other actors to play spoilers down the line. This concept does not just apply to actors like North Korea, which would resist efforts even from China to denuclearize. It would also pertain to Japan, India, and Taiwan.

Goldstein's suggestions make sense as foreign policy proposals, but he pays little attention to the domestic context. For both the United States and China, though especially perhaps for the United States, a significant number of propos-

als would fall at the feet of domestic resistance. The rationality of the proposals also ignores the emotional (nationalistic) factors in many of the issues. The clearest example is that Taiwan is not simply a rational issue for Beijing. For the United States, the ability to "defend" Taiwan has certainly been questioned, to the point where Goldstein is not alone in arguing that it is not realistic for the United States to do so.[1] Attempting to defend Taiwan and failing is not the same thing as abandoning Taiwan, however, and that distinction is an important one. Proposals that reduce U.S. support from Taiwan could just as easily provoke action while showing resolve in a disadvantageous situation may in fact increase deterrence. At least, supporting Taiwan could reassure other allies and friends in the region of U.S. resolve, something that the United States has a spotty record regarding.

The most unfortunate point may be that while the proposals were already difficult to implement in 2015 when the book was first published, much of the U.S.-China goodwill that Goldstein identified took a severe hit with the more confrontational stance of President Donald J. Trump's administration. The paperback edition has no update, though there is little doubt that U.S.-China relations—not to mention the election of a pro-independence Taiwan president—have pushed the countries even further from any sense of "halfway."

While many of Goldstein's proposals may be problematic, the contribution of *Meeting China Halfway* is to make substantive and deliberate proposals to avoid the famed "Thucydides Trap." It is an important step in an even more important conversation.

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Endnote

1. See among others, Alex Ward, "Why There's Talk about China Starting a War with Taiwan," *Vox*, 5 May 2021; and Michael A. Hunzeker, "Taiwan's Defense Plans are Going Off the Rails," *War on the Rocks*, 18 November 2021.

Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. By Steven R. Ward. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009. Pp. 388. $29.95 (hardcover).

Stripped of its current Islamist zeal, there is nothing new about Iran's current efforts to dominate the Middle East. That is the point of *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces* by Steven R. Ward, a retired U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and senior CIA intelligence analyst specializing in the Middle East. The Center for Peace and Security Studies also took part in editing the publication.

Ward starts with the first rise of what was then the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great (ca. 600–530 BCE). He reminds the reader that Persia's vast and formidable empire threatened the independence of the Greek city-states, and the revived kingdoms that succeeded it frequently confronted the Roman, Byzantine, Turkish, and even Russian empires. In the course of history, however, Persia and Iran were also conquered by Alexander the Great's Greco-Macedonian army, the Muslim forces as part of the Rashidun Caliphate, the Mongols under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, and, finally the allied forces of Britain and the Soviet Union during World War II.

The results of the Mongol invasions in particular were both horrific and historically important. The Mongol practice of systematically killing the populations of many of Iran's cosmopolitan cities brought on a rise in religious fundamentalism throughout the countryside because the villages and nomadic tribes were always conservative. The sixteenth century saw the revival of the state and efforts by different shahs to modernize their armies, often turning to the European standard in hopes of safeguarding the country's independence.

Another event that Ward gives special attention is the overlooked importance of the British and Soviet forces' occupation of Iran toward Allied victory in World War II. Of the 17.5 million tons of Lend-Lease aid the United States provided to the Soviets, 7.9 million tons, estimated as enough to equip 60 Red Army divisions, were sent through the Persian corridor. An interesting sidebar is that U.S. involvement in Iran began in August 1942 in the form of an advisory team for the Persian Gendarmerie led by Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the father of the future general.

Ward describes the efforts by Muhammad Reza Shah to use his oil profits to organize a modern military force and restore Iran as a major power. At the peak of that program, Iran possessed more Chieftain tanks and hovercraft than the British Armed Forces and Grumman F-14 Tomcat fighters than the U.S. Navy. Ironically, the Shah's purchases saved the Grumman Corporation from financial disaster, but he did little for the villages and the lower middle class in the cities of his own country. The ultimate price for him was nationwide revolution that deposed the Shah and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. Ward describes the birth of the Revolutionary Guards, gives a brief summary of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), analyzes the reasons for Iranian victories and defeats, and examines the hidden jealousy that persists between the regular army and the Guards.

The book's conclusion is that, in spite of the government's difficulties in providing its forces with modern weaponry and technology, Iran is still a difficult country to conquer and a potential threat to the West. Historically, the easiest directions to attack the country were the territory between Abadan and Busher as the British invasions of 1856 and 1942 proved and secondarily from the direction of Herat in Afghanistan, as the Mongol's invasions and Afghan raids proved. While the book's title refers to the term that the first Persian kings gave their elite guards, it can also apply to Iran's armed forces as a whole—as a

reflection of the Iranian people to keep their own place and identity in world history.

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Independent Scholar

Between Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom: U.S. Army Operations in the Middle East, 1991–2001. By Jourden T. Moger. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2021. Pp. 127. $26.99 (paperback and hardback).

Only a small number of books have dealt with the period of U.S. military operations in Kuwait between 1991 and 2001 and the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–11). The two that come immediately to mind only provided either policy analysis or approached the topic from the specific vantage point of Kuwait, ignoring operations in Iraq. *Between Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom: U.S. Army Operations in the Middle East, 1991–2001* provides insight into the interwar period and the interactions between the United States and Iraq from 1991 through 2001. Jourden T. Moger explains to the reader that Iraq, far from an inactive and routine area of operations, was an active zone and continued to have relevance. The author illustrates this and more by heavily focusing on specific threats generated by Iraq and the needs for deployments to this area. This approach elevates the text because military history scholars can now more accurately pinpoint when and where specific units and battalions moved in and out of the theater and the reasons behind these deployments with greater clarity. These lists and details, though often missed by publishers, have immense value to military historians as it details the "who" and the "where" sought after for detailed narratives.

The first half of the book covers the context of U.S. involvement in the Middle East from a military perspective. The chapters briefly detail events, such as the early modern national history of Iraq, the development of the disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), Somalia, the Gulf War, and the postwar reconstruction. For those who specialize in the Middle East, these points might be familiar and concise, but for the intended audience, this abridged coverage is understandable and does not deserve overly critical comments. The historic details are solid and no major errors were found, especially in regards to the dates or the people involved in the events.

The second portion of the book is a recitation of several operations that were launched in response to various levels of threats that Saddam Hussein and Iraq posed to Kuwait. The operations and their recitations are valuable as they provide background details that may have been kept out of the headlines in the United States and provides more justification for these actions. Many Americans were aware of these events unfolding during the administration of

President William J. "Bill" Clinton and there was some belief at the time that the military was being used merely to distract Americans from political problems at home. This text helps illustrate, however, that there were legitimate military reasons to launch these operations and to strike Iraq when and how they occurred. Some of the latter operations, which serve as individual chapters, also highlight some of the events and thinking that directly fed into decisions of the administration of President George W. Bush to go to war with Iraq in 2003, providing context for why Iraq was on the top of the list of nations in the Axis of Evil. Moger also indicates that there had been prescient warnings and adequate advanced knowledge that the war would not be simple and that the United States would find Iraq as it is today, leaning heavily into becoming a new Iranian province due to the political changes and the new order that emerged after Saddam. The text thankfully takes a neutral stance toward the administration, providing the details in a clear, historically centered, and nonpartisan narrative. Those on both sides of the argument will find something for their positions within the text.

The book is well designed and perfectly laid out. It provides solid maps and charts. Most significantly, it is not long and can be read within a couple of long sittings or within a short time frame. However, it is not necessary to read the entire book at one time to gain a clear understanding. Each operation is virtually self-contained as its own chapter and there are only minor points of overlap. The reader can use Moger's work as a review source, as a whole source, or a reference when needed. The detail of the information and its usefulness is also such that both novel historians and career specialists can garner insight from it. This is not a criticism as too often books of this nature feel that they must descend into either the minutiae of defense budgets or intricacies of policy making and debates, losing value as a result. Military historians want to know specific units, battalions, or corps as well as leadership that has been deployed in these operations. Prior to Moger's publication that information required deep level digging and long periods of either internet sleuthing or dealings with military sources that are reluctant or unable to specifically identify responsive information. By filling the historiographic gap, it makes any library on this topic much more complete. Moger is to be congratulated on producing an extremely valuable text for military historians. More books of this nature and detail are not only welcome but desperately needed.

James Bowden, MA

Shocks and Rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa. Edited by Imad Mansour and William R. Thompson. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020. $134.95 (hardcover); $44.95 (paperback and ebook).

The landscape across the Middle East and North Africa has been marred by rivalries for decades. These competitions have often translated to escalating conflict, violence, terrorism, and mass displacement as has been evident in states across the region including Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, among others, that still face challenges associated with a perpetual cycle of struggles. These tests are often framed within sectarian or communitarian terms to strategically exacerbate ingroup/out-group paradigms for the benefit of key political entrepreneurs in both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. The spasms of rivalries and the actual bones of contention, however, are based neither on religious differences nor communitarian rivalry regardless of the narratives that key actors used. Rather they are based on competition for power and wealth. In *Shocks and Rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa*, editors Imad Mansour and William R. Thompson have compiled a series of chapters that provide highly detailed interdisciplinary examinations of antagonisms within and between groups across this region focusing on shocks and rivalries as well as their short- and long-term impact.

Mansour, a professor at McGill University and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute, and Thompson, a professor at Indiana University and editor of the *Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Politics*, offer a comprehensive analysis employing a combination of theory and case studies, including those related to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Iran-Iraq-Syria nexus, Iran-Turkey relations, and Iran-Israel narratives. Their approach allows for the integration and synthesis of multidimensional analysis of rivalries, including those related to shocks, which according to the authors result in a rapid disruption to the status quo and existing balance of power, causing significant change to economic, social, political, and physical systems. Moreover, according to the authors, events that disrupt the status quo such as the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the Cold War, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 are not only perceived as shocks or threats by decision makers, but are often used as opportunities to expand their sphere of power and influence. They further argue that these shocks have the potential to influence political processes, as well as sociopolitical and security landscapes, that have been evident across the Middle East and North Africa for the last 40 plus years. One key example is the Iran-Iraq War of which its ripple effects reverberate across the wider region today.

As shocks and rivalries among state and nonstate actors continue to shape the geopolitical and security landscapes of the Middle East and North Africa, it becomes increasingly important to assess the macro- and micro-level effect that they may have. In this volume, Mansour and Thompson provide in-depth insight into the importance of examining the region through a combination of theory and case studies to gain a comprehensive understanding of shocks and rivalries and their overall influence on local and regional levels. As Mansour and Thompson note, "Mapping out varieties of shocks would help unearth deeper societal and historical factors to explain rivalries" (p. 6). By providing both

historical and present-day contexts for these challenges, in addition to breaking the region down into a collection of systems, the analytical framework facilitates enhanced understanding of the root causes of shocks and rivalries and the complexities that result from their onset. As a result, it advances a more accurate multidimensional analysis of regional rivalries, such as the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry that expanded under the Nixon Doctrine before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Morocco-Algeria rivalry that dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, a time frame that is often overlooked.

As regional and international civilian and military leaders continue to face challenges associated with regional rivalries, proxy wars, sectarianism, and transnational terrorism, it is vital to have both a historical and current lens to study the Middle East-North Africa region. It helps foster deeper understanding of the covert and overt layers and linkages as well as the many nuances that influence the region from top-down and bottom-up levels. Additionally, a depth of insight into the wider region challenges assumptions that are often flawed, incomplete, or misleading, such as those related to sectarianism, which has been a dominant facet of the region for more than 40 years. As such, the historical and current contexts of analysis that the authors present regarding the shocks and rivalries that have shaped—and continue to shape—this region will help the efforts of stakeholders to enhance stabilization efforts in the short-term and have increased strategic success in the long term.

With state and nonstate actors increasingly engaged in regional rivalries, the nature of conflict has changed across the region. As a result, external wars, such as the Cold War, and internal turmoil have caused and still instigate realignments in rivalry relationships that influence the probabilities of further conflict between and among rivals. In this volume, Mansour and Thompson gathered innovative and invaluable insight into the effects that shocks have had across the region, including in Iran where, according to this volume, "shocks acted to alter decision makers preference towards domestic and foreign policy issues areas" (p. 204). Overall, the authors have given an innovative, interdisciplinary, and multidimensional framework of analysis of the complex rivalry field in the Middle East and North Africa in local and regional contexts. As such, civilian and military leaders, policy makers, academics, and students interested in the region would greatly benefit in the theoretical and case-study analysis the author provide.

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
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
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