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

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Spymaster's Prism: The Fight against Russian Aggression. By Jack Devine. Lincoln: Potomac Books, an imprint of University of Nebraska Press. Pp. 304. $34.95 (hardcover); $26.95 (ebook).

In his second book, author Jack Devine channels more than three decades of experience with the CIA into a profound and persistent warning: "never trust the Russians." In *Spymaster's Prism*: *The Fight against Russian Aggression*, published in 2021, Devine's deep reflection on a career spent focused on Russian intelligence and counterintelligence throughout and after the Cold War shines through with immense detail and personal experience. He clarifies early on that a spymaster is not a spy; rather than managing tactical espionage, a spymaster is responsible for the unique mission of running and handling foreign spies and spy networks. A skilled spymaster can gaze through a prism, faceted by political and military and social factors, to determine how to most effectively employ spies to achieve their country's national interests.

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are joined by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (VAJA), and Israeli Mossad in endeavoring to do this at the very highest levels. And it is through this prism that Devine shares his analysis and opinions on the vulnerabilities the United States bears vis-à-vis Russia. However, Devine's strength of perspective also carries a weakness in the author's somewhat extreme and narrow focus on threats emanating from Russia. While he makes explicit reference to "big power" adversaries and includes China in that group, Devine's recommendations on how to strengthen the American intelligence address only the threats posed by Russia. In a time marked by a strong resurgence of great power competition, his advice feels deflated by the realities and exigencies of an international security environment that must balance much more than Russian aims.

Furthermore, despite his knowledge of how Russia views the geopolitical order and its desired role for expanded influence therein, the solutions Devine prescribes to deter Russian aggression lack feasibility and specificity. To be fair, well over a year prior to the beginning of the war in Ukraine, he advocates for

a "forceful U.S. containment policy response that challenges Russian interests [by] reinforcing our alliances with NATO partners and the democracies in eastern Europe." This, of course, rings uncannily true today, but it is much easier said than done. Ultimately, the reader has an unfair advantage on Devine knowing how a hypothetical scenario indeed played out in reality. He suggests that "bolstered support for Ukraine and the Baltic states would send a clear message to Moscow," but does not expand on the scenario in which Moscow receives and disregards the message, which of course, we are watching play out in our present day.

Still, Devine deftly organizes and presents key developments in Russian/Soviet history, guiding readers to understand the scale and scope of the Russian intelligence machine. Weaving between historical examples and personal anecdotes, Devine hearkens back to a fundamental premise many times that Russia is our strategic adversary and will remain so; to interpret past periods of détente as cooperation warming to trust would be a delusional mistake. To emphasize the constancy of Russia's intelligence strategy, he cites KGB officer Sergei Tretyakov, also known as Comrade J, who aided the United States as a double agent in New York City in the late nineties: "The Cold War never ended. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the KGB had a list of three main adversaries: (1) The United States (2) NATO and (3) China. After the KGB was disbanded and the SVR (the modern-day KGB) was formed . . . the SVR had three main targets: (1) The United States (2) NATO and (3) China." Devine employs insights like these to demonstrate where he sees the United States trailing Russia in the intelligence game. Even in the middle of their defeat in the Cold War and crumbling of the Soviet Union, Devine highlights that Russia never abandoned its spying program or any of its elaborate collection operations. He also expresses worry over a growing trend to abrogate the so-called Moscow Rules, most notably evidenced by Russia's nefarious involvement in U.S. elections. For decades, the United States and Russia had abided by these unwritten but mutually agreed on norms. Devine interprets the flouting of these rules as major cracks in the foundation of an unstable, fraught U.S.-Russia relationship that will only worsen if we fail to redouble our intelligence and spycraft.

Structuring the book are 13 "lessons," one introducing each chapter. Together, they imply a new set of Moscow rules, each affirming that Russia will continue to pour its utmost effort and resources into weakening the United States and its allies through patient and ruthless spy operations. Devine takes time to guide his readers through the making of Vladimir Putin from lowly KGB officer to president, flanked by loyalists and convinced that he can restore prestige to Russia following the chaos and embarrassment of the fall of the Soviet Union. Devine's point is clear: for as long as Putin remains at the helm of the Russian state and its inextricably linked intelligence juggernaut, we should

expect Russia to pursue its national interests at any cost. In the words of Putin, "there is no such thing as a former KGB man," and Devine helps his audience understand that Putin still sees the world through the gimbal-lensed eye of a Cold War spymaster.

Since the Russian invasion in February 2022, a torrent of commentary emerged concerning Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the future of both as much of the Western world rallied around Ukraine. Devine's work, predating the tectonic shift we have witnessed in Eastern Europe over the past year and a half, deserves praise for a prophetic study of Ukraine. In 2018, Devine embarked on a book tour throughout Kyiv to promote a Ukrainian language edition of his first book, *Good Hunting*. On that trip, he met with multiple Ukrainian government and military officials, leading him to make predictions that exactly conform to how the Ukrainians have navigated Russian aggression: "Putin runs a great risk of underestimating the resolve of the Ukrainians to remain a free and independent people . . . Ukrainians [will] fight to the last man." Of course, to balance this prescient assessment, Devine remarks that global players see Volodymyr Zelensky as "inexperienced and who could possibly make unnecessary concessions to Russia," when in fact, his performance has been the opposite.

Spymaster's Prism at times speaks directly to the intelligence community given the author's experience, but it is instructive in developing a fuller perspective of the threat Russia poses to the United States for anyone working in national security, notably in military and policy spheres. However, Devine is intentional about making the book accessible and interesting to those without experience in these domains, animating his arguments with stories of spies like Karel Kayhanen, codename Vik, who placed a red thumbtack in the sign for horse cart rentals next to the Tavern on the Green restaurant, located in Central Park, New York. Had he suspected he was being watched, he was supposed to place a white thumbtack instead. Vik would eventually defect and cause great damage to the Soviet intelligence service. In this way, Devine offers a counter example to the Russian resoluteness in spycraft—allegiances can be porous, and interests can change.

And this is where Devine believes the United States enjoys a critical advantage in that it stands for values—rule of law, sovereignty, and individual liberty—that eclipse those of Russia. He holds conviction in the idea that "American exceptionalism," which underpinned the sense of mission he witnessed throughout the long slog of the Cold War, imbues a special strength and resiliency. Devine's sense of patriotism saturates the pages of this book, but it might also obstruct his interpretation of America's dominance in the global order and domestic affairs. He remarks that the "United States was exceptionally good in comparison to any country in any period in human history," and that this state was attained through the good faith and function of our democratic

institutions. Trust in our democratic institutions is undeniably flagging. And therein lies a weakness Russian spies will try to exacerbate. Readers, much like a spymaster, are left to ponder this conundrum from many angles—how do we heal at home to project power abroad? The specifics of the solution may differ, but one senses that Devine would agree with at least one imperative: the time to act is now.

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Escaping the Deadly Embrace: How Encirclement Causes Major Wars. By Andrea Bartoletti. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022, Pp. 252. $55.95 (hardcover); $35.99 (ebook).

The possibility of major power conflict is a central concern for policy makers and academics. With Russian aggression against Ukraine and Chinese statements on reunification with Taiwan, many commentators argue that the risk of a major power war is increasing. Though tensions are rising among the major powers, questions remain as to how a major power war would begin and whether other states would join. In *Escaping the Deadly Embrace*, Andrea Bartoletti considers those questions and offers a new theory to explain the causes of major power wars.

Escaping the Deadly Embrace identifies how geography contributes to the initiation and spread of major power wars. Bartoletti contends that encirclement is the main independent variable, arguing that "encirclement is present when a great power (encircled great power) shares two different borders with one or two great powers (surrounding great powers)" (p. 7). Bartoletti differentiates between two types of encirclement, latent and actualized. Latent encirclement means that there is no possibility of war with the surrounding powers while actualized encirclement means that there is a strong possibility of a two-front war with the surrounding powers. The difference in the two threat environments depends on the "invasion ability" of the immediate rival, defined as "the operational ability of the surrounding great powers to launch a two-front war . . . in the present" (p. 12). The invasion ability of a rival is the intervening variable that shifts latent to actualized encirclement, thereby increasing the likelihood of major power war. When surrounding powers are geographically present but lack invasion ability that constitutes latent encirclement. The threat environment creates a tense situation with a double security dilemma for a ma-

jor power, but the rival lacks the current ability to launch an attack. To address this dilemma, Bartoletti explains that the encircled great power will seek to reduce the risk of a two-front war in two ways, by (1) finding allies and (2) creating buffer zones. The surrounding powers will respond by forming alliances and creating their own buffer zones. Essentially, the major powers want to improve their security situation, but in doing so both the encircled and surrounding states take actions that reduce their security and set the stage for war.

When the surrounding powers have achieved sufficient invasion ability to launch a joint attack against the encircled power, then the latter must decide whether to suffer the consequences of encirclement or break it by initiating war. The theory provides two scenarios for possible increases in a rival's invasion ability: (1) concentration of forces and (2) closure of the circle. The first scenario suggests that when the surrounding powers have no remaining threats, they have the ability to concentrate their forces against the encircled power. This first situation can occur when winning a war against another opponent or neutralizing an internal conflict. The second scenario involves the surrounding power annexing territory along the borders of the encircled power, thereby closing the circle around the latter. In both instances, the likelihood of a two-front war is not a distant issue, but a "concrete probability in the present" that the encircled power must address immediately (p. 12). When the surrounding powers have the opportunity to increase their invasion ability, the encircled state must start a war to ensure its survival.

Bartoletti explains that war contagion, as shown by other major powers joining the conflict, results from the alliances that emerged as part of the double security dilemma. As the encircled great power forms alliances, the state's rivals will seek to form their own alliances. Bartoletti notes that there "is the formation of a rival-based network of alliances, where each great power joins the opposite bloc of its own immediate rival" (p. 8). The major powers divide themselves into two camps with rivals on opposing sides. Once war begins, the surrounding great powers will be concerned about possible increases in their immediate rival's invasion ability. This increase can occur due to the loss of an ally (via defection or defeat) or the annexation of territory along the immediate rival's borders. When the encircled power initiates a war, the risk of an increase in a rival's invasion ability will cause the surrounding major powers to join the conflict.

Escaping the Deadly Embrace evaluates the argument through three instances of an encircled power and the occurrence of major war. First, Bartoletti explores why France pursued the Italian Wars during the sixteenth century. Bartoletti evaluates that conflict as a series of five major power wars, allowing for a more thorough evaluation on changes in invasion ability as the intervening variable. The next case investigates France, again as the encircled power, during the

Thirty Years War. That chapter demonstrates how France pursued alliances and buffer states to ensure its security, why the War of Mantuan Succession did not result in a major power conflict, and why the French did declare war in 1635. The final case study concerns German efforts to eliminate the double security dilemma prior to 1914. Bartoletti explores a new argument on the initiation of World War I, identifying the construction of strategic railroads in Poland as increasing the invasion ability of Russia. Each chapter thoroughly explores the implications of Bartoletti's theory, drawing on a mix of archival and secondary sources for each of the major wars. Each case makes a compelling argument for how encirclement of the great power contributed to the threat environment as well as the initiation and contagion of war. The final chapter provides an overview of several remaining major wars, including the possible outlier of World War II, with Germany's lack of encirclement.

Escaping the Deadly Embrace offers an interesting theory for understanding how encirclement drives major powers to war. The cases reveal anomalies regarding how the threat environment influences states' behavior. With actualized encirclement, the theory combines the logic of preemption via the imminent threat of an invasion and of prevention that the surrounding great powers have yet to act (annexation or concentration has not occurred, but it could). Bartoletti suggests that the combination creates a "now-or-never logic" for war initiation (p. 25). That logic has two implications for understanding state behavior. First, Bartoletti notes, "changes in the invasion ability of the surrounding great powers pose imminent threats to its survival" (p. 23). Second, that the encircled state must launch "an attack against one of the surrounding great powers . . . [as] the only rational option to guarantee its survival" (p. 24). Following this logic, one would assume that the encircled state has no other available options and that it must declare war immediately for self-preservation.

The French responses in the Italian Wars and in the Thirty Years War challenge this logic. First, France in the first of the Italian Wars (1521–26) initiates local proxy wars in response to the increased invasion ability of Charles V to close the circle by taking the Duchy of Milan. This proxy conflict did end up becoming a major power war, yet the French intended to let only local allies fight initially. The proxy war as a path to great power war appears at odds with the gravity of the threat suggested by the now-or-never logic. The argument suggests that encircled states seek allies to create conflicts that divert the surrounding state's military forces. However, the theory suggests that behavior occurs during latent encirclement, not once the invasion ability has increased.

Second, the theory suggests that the French should have initiated war following the Battle of Nördlingen and the diplomatic victories of Austria in the seventeenth century. The two victories influenced French decision-making

about war with Spain and Austria. Yet, this case presents two anomalies that do not align with the arguments on encirclement. First, the French signed alliance agreements with the Dutch Republic and Sweden after the perceived increase in invasion ability. These acts occurred during actualized encirclement and not during latent encirclement as the theory predicts. In latent encirclement, the French government did offer financial support, to at least Sweden, to fight "wars of diversion" (p. 82). However, the French government had refused "open alliances" with both parties during this period (p. 83). Bartoletti notes that "Richelieu had rejected the same Dutch proposal [alliance agreement] in April 1634," which the two countries signed in February 1635 (p. 84). The French refusal to make commitments during latent encirclement and only offering alliances in actualized encirclement suggests a more complicated relationship between threat and behavior than proposed by the theory. Furthermore, the combination of a proxy conflict in the Italian Wars and this refusal of a commitment prior to the Thirty Years War suggests that strategies of diversion may not fit under the category of seeking allies. Instead, the strategy may be a distinct, independent response to the threat environment.

The second anomaly in the Thirty Years War concerns the initiation of the conflict. Bartoletti focuses on the Battle of Nördlingen and the diplomatic victories of Austria as increasing Austria's invasion ability and as influencing the French decision for war. Yet, the evidence in *Escaping the Deadly Embrace* also suggests that "Spanish refusal to release the Elector of Trier . . . created the casus belli" (p. 83). The logic does not suggest that the encircled power needs a political crisis to initiate war for any reason. The increases in the surrounding power's invasion ability should have immediately imperiled the French state. The actions of France suggest further factors influenced the decision to initiate war. In 1635, France may have been influenced by what Dan Reiter calls "the political costs of preemption." Leaders preferred being attacked as it allows them to appear as if they were the victim and to build sympathy among third parties for support. If leaders strike first, they would risk allies not joining the war.[1] In this case, the actions of the Spanish during the Trier crisis may have given France an opportunity to play victim. Spanish troops massacred French soldiers and conquered a small state under French protection.[2] France could appear as a defender as a result, thereby lower the political costs to initiate war against Spain. Regardless of the precise reason, the use of the crisis raises questions on the severity and immediacy implied by the theory for war initiation. Overall, these anomalies in the cases suggest a need for a more complicated and nuanced explanation on how states perceive threats and react to them.

The theory on encirclement provides two possible opportunities for future work. First, scholars should consider whether a shared border between great

powers is a necessary condition for encirclement. Bartoletti argues "encirclement . . . occurs in the presence of one or two great powers on two different borders of the encircled great power" (p. 10). Certainly, that limitation makes sense to identify possible cases of encirclement in the context of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Yet, the sharing of borders might not be necessary in the interconnected world of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. One could consider shifting the requirement from territorial borders to territorial placement for power projection. For instance, the United States sought to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War via alliances and the creation of an extensive basing network. While World War III did not occur, further study could focus on understanding how encirclement influenced the Soviet Union and exploring whether actualized encirclement emerged during that time.

The second opportunity concerns the role of technology in war initiation. Technology does play an implicit role in Bartoletti's exploration of the origins of major war. In World War I, the question was not whether Russia could engage in a general mobilization to concentrate its forces for a joint attack, but in how long it would take to achieve that general mobilization. Bartoletti theorizes that Russian railroads influenced its invasion ability and thus German decision-making to declare war. Bartoletti acknowledges that technology is a relevant factor in the concentration of large-scale armies. Technology might influence the encirclement of a great power. A double security dilemma could emerge as technology enhances the projection of a major power's military to another region. The capability to concentrate military forces quickly near an encircled power could constitute an increase in invasion ability. Looking even further ahead, the possibility of encirclement may expand as states continue to develop technology that fosters the militarization of space. If states reconsider requirement of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, the possibility to surround a state from above may emerge. Using satellites with weapons systems may allow states to "surround" another to monitor and influence communications while preparing for a first strike.

Overall, Bartoletti provides compelling insights on how encirclement creates a threat environment and influences major power war. The book is a must read for those interested in understanding how rivalries among great powers can spiral into conflicts, with neither side necessarily wanting a fight. *Escaping the Deadly Embrace* provides a welcomed challenge to current scholarship on how power transitions and polarity influence the likelihood of major power war.

Dr. Anthony Marcum is a Lecturer in the Program in International and Comparative Studies at the University of Michigan. His research focuses on post-conflict reconstruction, democratization, and conflict resolution.

Endnotes

1. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," *International Security* 20, no. 2 (1995): 25–28.
2. Iskander Rehman, "Raison d'Etat: Richelieu's Grand Strategy During the Thirty Years' War," *Texas National Security Review* 2, no. 3 (2019): 39–75.

What It Means to Be a Man: How to Become a Better Person. By Major General Bill Mullen, USMC (Ret). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2023. Pp. 208. Open access (paperback and ebook). https://doi.org/10.56686/9798985340464.

Major General Bill Mullen, USMC (Ret) wrote *What It Means to Be a Man: How to Become a Better Person* for young Marines interested in personal and professional growth. The book comes from the author learning from his own shortcomings and with Marines who have occasionally fallen short of the Corps' standards of honor, courage, commitment, and faithfulness. The author sees young Americans today overly influenced by drugs, pornography, social media, and video games, which all can damage mental health. Too often, according to General Mullen, young Marines succumb to these vices as well. He wrote this book, therefore, in the hope that "if it causes one Marine, male or female, to make better decisions and try harder to live up to our core values, then it will have been worth the effort" (p. xvii).

One of the strengths of the book is its accessibility. Mullen wrote it with clear and concise prose that Marines of all backgrounds can follow. He also structured the book to be user-friendly, with 14 brief thematic chapters designed to hold modern readers' attention. It discusses important subjects for leaders such as self-discipline, peer pressure, and mentoring. Discussion questions and suggested readings follow each chapter to help readers engage with and explore the subject matter further. Marine leaders, whether they rate blood stripes or not, could easily formulate and conduct quick learning sessions using any chapter they desire from this text. With this book, one could easily see a sweaty lance corporal discussing professional attitude with his team in the field, school-circled Marines on the quad raising their hands to answer their platoon sergeant's question about character, or a major calling his shop together to discuss the chapter on thinking critically.

Bill Mullen loves history, made evident by his frequent use of historical figures throughout the text. He uses renowned UCLA men's basketball coach John Wooden and former British prime minister Winston Churchill as examples of keeping positive and professional attitudes toward hard work. In his

chapter on the value of integrity and character, Mullen brings in tales of Medal of Honor recipient Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale, 26th president of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, and arctic explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton. Abraham Lincoln makes three appearances: two of them for his forbearance and self-discipline during the Civil War in the first chapter, while his history of working through personal tragedy gets him a central position in chapter 7, the one entitled "Get Back Up."

Some of the author's historical figures are controversial, however. Margaret Thatcher in the chapter on character is dubious since it is hard to think of a more controversial English political figure in the last 50 years. Mullen's admiration of Andrew Marshall is understandable. The former director of the Office of Net Assessment for the Department of Defense worked in government for four decades and mentored countless government bureaucrats. But who does Mullen cite as Marshall's greatest students? Richard "Dick" Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, the co-architects of the ill-considered and costly invasion of Iraq. Lastly, Robert Lee's betrayal of the United States should be enough to exclude him outright, but Mullen includes him because of Lee' self-discipline. To be fair, Mullen denounces Lee for his treason, but why include him at all considering how many other better examples there are? Mullen's discussions of self-discipline, character, and mentorship would have been more effective with a more carefully screened line up.

The book's primary weakness is inclusivity. It starts with the title, *What It Means to Be a Man*. Mullen meant it to catch readers attention but claims that it is in no way "a book about men for men" (p. xiii). For many readers, however, women will appear to be an afterthought. Mullen only included four of them among his historical figures. Instead of Robert Lee, Andrew Marshall, or John Brown (antislavery notwithstanding, he was a literal murderer) why not include Marines like Colonel Nicole A. Mann, a combat veteran fighter pilot and NASA astronaut who earned the *Military Time*'s 2024 Marine of the Year? Why not political scientist, author, and professor Dr. Kyleanne M. Hunter, another Marine pilot and combat veteran who is a renowned expert on the military and gender integration? Why not Brigadier General Lorna M. Mahlock, the Marine Corps' very first Black female Marine to reach general officer rank? Including these women or others like them would have gone a long way toward being more inclusive toward his intended audience.

Mullen would probably argue that the character traits espoused in this book are appropriate for all Marines, and I would agree. But what use is John Walter Wayland's essay about what makes a true gentleman (p. 176), Rudyard Kipling's idealization of Victorian Era manhood in "If," (pp. 170–72), or J. Glenn Gray's *Warriors: Reflections of Men in Battle* (p. 114) to women in his audience? Books

tend to represent the author's point of view. The Marine Corps is not known for sophisticated discussions about gender in the military or in war. The Corps' culture is dominated by the very masculine worldview that can be seen in this book. Bill Mullen is of that world; it is what he knows.

Therefore, as useful as this book could be, I wish it did more. I disagree with Scott Hamm, who wrote the foreword, that it is written for men *and* women. When Mullen entitled it *What It Means to Be a Man*, he targeted males, thereby placing gender squarely in readers' minds. What it means to be a woman in this country is different than what it means to be a man. In the Marine Corps, the differences are even more pronounced because it has a long history of excluding women from occupation specialties and leadership roles, which have hindered their promotion, leadership, and potential. Only recently has the Corps abandoned these exclusions, but this book reminds readers that culture often lags personnel policies. I wish Bill Mullen would have taken the opportunity to use this book to make Marine culture more inclusive of women, which would have better helped *all* Marines live up to their core values. The fact he did not attenuates what would otherwise be a book well worth his audience's time.

Mark R. Folse, PhD

(The reviewer would like to express his sincerest condolences to MajGen Mullen's family and close friends. The above review was written with the highest respect for the book's author and was not meant in any way to tarnish his sterling reputation.)

The Nuclear Club: How America and the World Policed the Atom from Hiroshima to Vietnam. By Jonathan R. Hunt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2023. Pp. 376. $95.00 (hardcover); $32.00 (paperback).

There is a broad (though not complete) international consensus that the prevention of nuclear proliferation remains one of the primary security challenges of the contemporary world. The United States is particularly concerned with this issue, expending significant diplomatic effort over recent decades in seeking to prevent the nuclearization of both North Korea (where that effort has already failed) and Iran (where it is on the verge of failing). Since it took effect in 1970, the lynchpin of the international nonproliferation regime has been the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and 191 states are signatories to it today. On its website, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs calls the NPT "a landmark international treaty whose objective is

to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament."

In his book *The Nuclear Club*, Stephen R. Hunt, an assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, details the history of not only this treaty but the history of international nuclear nonproliferation politics preceding it. In this exhaustive recounting of that history, Hunt also seeks to lay bare the true—and sometimes cynical—motivations behind the development of the nonproliferation norm and the international treaties, including not only the NPT but also the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, built up to enforce it. While the United States and the Soviet Union sought to prevent their postwar disputes in various places around the world from developing an unwanted nuclear element, they also sought to consolidate their own privileged positions in the international system and to ensure that the nuclear club to which they belonged remained a very exclusive one. Smaller powers generally recognized that they did not have the technological capability, at least in the near term, to produce such weapons themselves and were content to halt their further expansion to those states already in possession of them, though they also insisted upon a disarmament clause to the NPT. The initial idea was that "the atomic contagion would be quarantined en route to its eventual eradication" (p. 47). Though nonproliferation efforts have been successful in preventing widespread access to nuclear weapons, the eradication phase has been largely ignored.

Hunt stresses the permanent two-tier system that the nonproliferation regime has produced. He notes, "those . . . states that had demonstrated atomic power before 1967 and henceforth upheld the NPT would be treated as the planet's nuclear guardians. Those who did so afterward would be branded volatile upstarts or dangerous rogues" (p. 7). This has allowed the postwar great power states to consolidate their exclusive nuclear power status and therefore their international hegemony. The nonproliferation regime has prevented direct armed conflict between the great powers, but only at the cost of displacing this violence onto non-nuclear states in the form of proxy wars. This system has protected those in the "club" from violent conflict with its peers but has left those outside of it vulnerable to great power competition and other forms of large-scale violence.

On the path to drawing out these broad implications of the nonproliferation regime to the international order, the body of the book provides a granular understanding of the strategic thought processes and diplomatic twists and turns that took place in its establishment. Hunt properly focuses most of his intention on the United States and Russia. He provides detailed accounts of internal debates in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations

about whether nonproliferation was desirable, and, if so, how to best achieve it. Two particular points of disagreement were whether West Germany should be permitted to possess a nuclear arsenal and whether or not the United States should be able to station portion of its own arsenal on the territory of its nuclear allies. Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet diplomats over these and other issues are extensively delineated and explained.

Hunt's historical analysis is not limited to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe, however. An entire chapter is devoted to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and nuclear nonproliferation in Latin America, covering the geopolitics surrounding the issue between Mexico, Brazil, and other South American countries. Due attention is also paid to India and China throughout the book. Hunt provides a truly global understanding of how the nuclear nonproliferation regime came to be.

This book offers a comprehensive understanding of the historical, strategic, and diplomatic background to anyone interested in the history of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Hunt skillfully lays bare the various motivations leading to its establishment. It was the result of both high-minded ideals and cynical self-serving machinations to consolidate power. Its outcomes have been similarly dual-sided, serving fairly well its goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but also consolidating international power hierarchies and leaving non-nuclear states vulnerable to armed aggression. To anyone interested in the contemporary international order and nonproliferation regime, this book is essential reading.

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