INVESTIGATING IWO

The Flag Raisings in Myth, Memory, & Esprit de Corps

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Marine Corps History Division
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## CONTENTS

Foreword ix  
LtGen Jan C. Huly, USMC (Ret)  
Preface xi  
Iwo Jima and the Struggle for Historical Truth: An Introduction xv  
Dr. Breanne Robertson, Marine Corps History Division

**PART I: IN THE CAULDRON OF WAR**

Chapter 1  
Black Sand and Blood: The 36-day Battle for Iwo Jima, 19 February–26 March 1945  
Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Marine Corps History Division

Chapter 2  
Going to “Tojo’s Front Door”: Recalling the U.S. Army’s Role and the Flag Raising at Iwo Jima  
Col Douglas E. Nash Sr., USA (Ret), Marine Corps History Division

Chapter 3  
Time, Life, and the Flag Raisings on Iwo Jima  
Dr. Melissa Renn, Harvard Business School

Chapter 4  
Raising Flags, Raising Funds: Promoting the “Mighty Seventh” War Loan  
Dr. Austin Porter, Kenyon College

**PART II: MEMORY AND MEANING**

Chapter 5  
Did Joe Rosenthal Save the Marine Corps?: The Existential Fight, 1943–52  
Dr. David W. Mills, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Chapter 6
Politics in the Art of Portraiture: Felix de Weldon’s Marine Corps War Memorial
Dr. Kate Clarke Lemay, National Portrait Gallery

Chapter 7
Another Country’s Flag, Another Country’s Servicemen: Rosenthal’s Photograph and Commemoration of the U.S. Marine Corps in Australia and New Zealand
Dr. John Moremon, Massey University

Chapter 8
How the Iwo Jima Memorial Became a Personal Mortuary Monument for My Japanese Mother
Dr. Yui Suzuki, University of Maryland

PART III: RECOVERING THE PAST
Chapter 9
A Flag for Suribachi: The First and Forgotten Flag Raising on Iwo Jima
Stephen Foley and Dustin Spence, Independent Historians

Chapter 10
“Supplied Flag to Marines to Fly from Mt. Suribachi”: Confirming the Role of LST-779 in the Second Flag Raising
Christopher B. Havern Sr., Naval History and Heritage Command

Chapter 11
Genaust’s Motion Picture Footage: Lost in the Line of Duty
Criss Austin, National Archives and Records Administration

Chapter 12
Correcting the Record: The Huly Panel Looks at the Iwo Jima Flag Raisings
Col Mary H. Reinwald, USMC (Ret), Leatherneck

Chapter 13
“In Fairness to All Parties”: The Marine Corps Corrects the Historical Record
Col Keil R. Gentry, USMC (Ret), Marine Corps University

PART IV: LEGACY
Chapter 14
Every Marine a Flag Raiser: The Legacy and Meaning of the Iwo Jima Flag Raisings
Dr. Breanne Robertson and Paul Westermeyer, Marine Corps History Division
APPENDICES

Appendix A: Official Report of the del Valle Board 267
Appendix C: Official Report of the Huly Panel Investigation, Part II 286
Appendix D: Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation 298
Appendix E: Oral History Interview with Joseph Rosenthal (excerpt) 314
   Edited by Dr. Fred H. Allison, Marine Corps History Division
Appendix F: Biographical Sketches of Key Personnel 322
   Ross E. Phillips with Annette Amerman, Marine Corps History Division
Appendix G: Award Citations 331
Appendix H: Uniforms, Equipment, and Ordnance 335
   Owen L. Conner and Alfred Houde, National Museum of the Marine Corps

Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary of Terms 345
Selected Bibliography 347
Contributors 359
Index 365
Most Americans, whether they are familiar with World War II history or not, recognize the photograph taken by Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal of the flag raising on Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima on 23 February 1945. For many decades, this image was thought to be of five U.S. Marines and a Navy corpsman, and it captured the nation’s patriotic spirit and unflagging commitment to final victory. With wide distribution in magazines, newspapers, posters, and postage stamps, the image inspired renewed patriotism and resolve among war-weary viewers on the American home front. Imprinted in the collective memory of veterans and the general public, the Iwo Jima flag raising became one of the most memorable scenes from U.S. history alongside George Washington crossing the Delaware River and the Spirit of ’76. Yet, while Rosenthal’s photograph remains one of the most reproduced images in our history, surprisingly little has been written about its cultural impact on how the war has been remembered and how the U.S. Marine Corps has been viewed, both historically and in the present day.

As the young son of a Marine stationed at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, in the early 1950s, the Iwo Jima statue located outside the main gate was one of my first memories. That image and the pride and spirit it invoked played no small role in influencing me to pursue a Marine Corps career. One can only imagine the impact this iconic image has had on numerous others over the past years. In reading this book, you will see how Breanne Robertson and the other authors also have recognized the significance of the flag-raising image in countless lives and events that go well beyond that day in 1945.

Due to the presentation of new research and careful observations of amateur historians, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert B. Neller, directed the Marine Corps History Division in 2016 and 2019 to form investigative boards to evaluate the evidence and correct the record regarding the actual participants who raised the flag atop Mount Suribachi. I will admit that when asked to form and lead this undertaking in 2016, and prior to perusing the evidence, many of the board members and I were somewhat dubious at first of the purpose and value of the effort. After all, countless testaments declared, previous investigations verified, books described, statues sculptured, and movies depicted who the participants were. How could they all have possibly been in error for so long? But after meticulous study, discussion, review, and careful deliberation of the evidence
available to us for more than three weeks, our panel was able to provide, beyond all reasonable doubt, the correct identification and position of those who participated in raising the flags atop Mount Suribachi. This book is the result of efforts to record these findings as well as to allow readers to fully explore the cultural meaning of an iconic photograph that has, in many ways, come to represent the feelings Americans have about Marines, the Corps, and World War II.

Breanne Robertson, the editor of this book, served as a recorder for our board’s deliberations and had first-hand knowledge of our efforts. I had the chance to work with her while overseeing the work of the 2016 board and then again in 2017 when she organized a symposium about the findings. The Bowers Board began its work by sharing the additional claims received via Major General Orlo K. Steele with former Huly Panel members and Brigadier General William J. Bowers, who went on to oversee the 2019 proceedings. Robertson carried forward her accumulated knowledge and experience with the Huly Panel as a full member of the most recent board. In Investigating Iwo, she encourages us to explore the connection between American visual culture and World War II, particularly how the image inspired Marines, servicemembers, and civilians to carry on with the war and to remember those who made the ultimate sacrifice to ensure victory over the Axis Powers. Chapters by Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Colonel Douglas E. Nash Sr., Dr. Melissa Renn, Dr. Austin Porter, Dr. David W. Mills, Dr. Kate Clarke Lemay, Dr. John Moremon, Dr. Yui Suzuki, Stephen Foley, Dustin Spence, Christopher B. Havern Sr., Criss Austin, Colonel Mary H. Reinwald, Colonel Keil Gentry, Dr. Breanne Robertson, and Paul Westermeyer shed light on the processes through which history becomes memory and gains meaning over time. The contributors ask only that we be willing to take a closer look, to remain open to new perspectives that can deepen our understanding of familiar topics related to the flag raising, including Rosenthal’s famous picture, that continue to mean so much to us today.

Marines are known for doing things correctly, including detailed documentation of our history. The 2016 and 2019 investigations were important to the Corps’ legacy and our nation’s history in our quest to ensure that those who participated and sacrificed so much are properly and correctly recognized to the best of our knowledge at the time. This book helps further understanding of just how important the proper documentation of this historic event is to our heritage. I represent all of those who participated in these boards in conveying how honored we are to have had the opportunity to correct the record.

Jan C. Huly
Lieutenant General
U.S. Marine Corps, Retired
Along my morning commute from Washington, DC, to Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, I pass no fewer than three iterations of the iconic Iwo Jima flag raising: Felix de Weldon’s monumental bronze statue in Arlington Ridge, Virginia; the National Museum of the Marine Corps’ architectural homage overlooking Interstate 95; and another, more modest version of de Weldon’s design—this one in limestone—installed at the entrance to base. Some days, the number of sightings climbs even higher, such as when temporary mile markers dot the streets in preparation for the Marine Corps Marathon or roadside placards announce the annual Modern Day Marine military exposition. The famous battlefield scene, captured originally by Associated Press photographer Joseph J. Rosenthal, shows six servicemen raising the American flag atop Mount Suribachi during World War II. It is a familiar image to most Americans; yet, its prevalence and prestige among military circles has made it nearly synonymous with one Service branch, in particular: the United States Marine Corps. Thus, when two amateur historians produced compelling evidence suggesting that an error in attribution had been made—that the official lineup of flag raisers was wrong—the matter was serious.

I was a relatively new hire in the Marine Corps History Division in late 2015, when then-director Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer received a professional forensic photographic analysis report detailing discrepancies in equipment, uniform, and physiognomy among the individuals presumed to be pictured in the flag-raising photograph. Although I did not yet know it, my education and experience as an art historian—an admittedly unorthodox background for a career in military history—meant that I would soon take part in the historical reevaluation of one of the most meaningful emblems of the Corps. That spring, the then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert B. Neller, ordered an impartial investigation to evaluate new evidence suggesting that the long-established roster of flag raisers was incorrect. The meetings took place during several weeks in April and again in July, at which time active and retired Marine officers, enlisted servicemembers, and military historians scrutinized details of one of the signature events in Marine Corps history. My assigned role in these proceedings was to provide administrative and research support, although my participation quickly grew to include making queries and visual observations as well. After much deliberation, the members of the Huly Panel, named for the leadership of Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly (Ret), concluded that Private
First Class Harold H. Schultz, a Marine previously unacknowledged in historical accounts of the flag raising, was present in Rosenthal's photograph of that event. The panel further recognized the need to reevaluate the first flag raising and recommended revisions to that official lineup, as well.

In February 2017, the Marine Corps History Division hosted a symposium at the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Quantico to announce the updated roster of flag raisers and facilitate public dialogue about the history and meaning of the flag-raising events. The impressive breadth and quality of those presentations convinced me that an edited volume offered the best publication format to correct the official record. Dr. Neimeyer agreed, and much of the present publication took shape during the following year and a half. In that time, I had the privilege of working with several authors whose chapter contributions herein expand on their symposium talks. Additional essays from my colleagues at Marine Corps History Division, Naval History and Heritage Command, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and from universities around the globe broadened the scope of the project to include writings about the other Service branches; the cultural process by which Rosenthal’s photograph accrued meaning during and after World War II; and international perspectives on the Iwo Jima flag raising and its role in both public and private commemorations of the war.

The manuscript for this book was nearly complete when, in late summer 2018, three amateur historians—one previous researcher along with two new collaborators—furnished photographic evidence supporting the claim that yet another error in attribution had occurred. The imagery provided to the Marine Corps was persuasive, and the Commandant determined that the supposition merited a closer look. Paul J. Weber, then-acting director of the Marine Corps History Division, tasked me with leading the preliminary research in preparation for another board. During the next six months, I worked alongside Marine Corps University colleagues Colonel Keil R. Gentry (Ret) and Master Sergeant Stacy M. Patzman (Ret) to conduct an exhaustive review of primary and secondary source materials related to the Iwo Jima flag raisings. As participants in the 2016 Huly Panel proceedings, Gentry and I were keenly aware of the challenges inherent in reconstructing an event that had transpired nearly 75 years ago. The research team undertook careful study of the film, still photography, oral history interviews, and written records in collections from Texas to Iowa to Maine. To aid in the endeavor, the Marine Corps also enlisted the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to perform forensic photographic analyses.

In February 2019, General Neller again convened an impartial board to adjudicate whether the official flag-raising roster was in error. The Bowers Board, named for chairman Brigadier General William J. Bowers, brought together active duty and retired Marine officers, enlisted servicemembers, and military historians from across Marine Corps University to reassess the participants in Rosenthal’s photograph. Like their predecessors on the 1947 del Valle Board and the 2016 Huly Panel, the members resolved to achieve historical accuracy to the extent that the archival record and modern technology would permit. I served as recorder for the board once again, but my role would be extended. My prior experience with the Huly Panel and the expertise that I had gained in the intervening years permitted me to represent the Marine Corps History Division as a full-fledged member for this board. After more than three months of deliberation, the Bowers Board concluded that the official list of names—already twice corrected—had overlooked the participation of Corporal Harold P. Keller in the second flag-raising event.

This publication, precipitated by the 2016 Huly Panel and 2019 Bowers Board investigations, aims to correct the official record with regard to the first and second flag raisings on Iwo Jima; however,
it does not claim to be the final word on the subject. Rosenthal’s photograph has long fascinated and troubled us. Defined as much by its complicated past as by its signature imagery, the raising of the American flag on Mount Suribachi remains a subject of intense scholarly interest and popular debate. How many flags did the Marines plant that day? Where did the flags come from, and what was their true motivation for swapping them out? How many photographers were present on the mountain, and what can we learn from their work? What qualifies an individual as a flag raiser? And most importantly, what does our continuing fascination with the event say about our identity, our values, and our evolving relationship with the past?

Embracing the contested narratives and layered meaning that enrich Rosenthal’s photograph, this volume presents a multivocal collection of 14 essays. It originated with “The Iwo Jima Flag Raising: Discoveries and Interpretations,” a symposium organized by the Marine Corps History Division and held at the National Museum of the Marine Corps on 23 February 2017 as a forum to discuss persistent misconceptions and evolving scholarship. I am pleased to note that this book features chapters from many of these symposium presenters, as well as selected contributions that fill gaps or explore related themes. Organized roughly chronologically into four sections covering the realities of war, reception on the home front, reconstructions through archival evidence, and the continuing resonance of the Iwo Jima flag raising in the present day, these essays are intended to provide a collective snapshot of our current understanding and appreciation for the events that occurred atop Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945.

This book—and the symposium from which it arose—benefited from the intelligence and generosity of many contributors. On behalf of the Marine Corps History Division, I am delighted to have partnered with historians and archivists from the Smithsonian Institution’s National Portrait Gallery, the National Park Service, and the National Archives, as well as academic scholars and independent researchers from around the globe, in this important undertaking. Representing years of accumulated research across a range of academic and professional disciplines, the authors bring diverse perspectives that permit us to fundamentally reconsider the impact of Rosenthal’s image on American culture both at the time of conflict and in the years afterward. Furthermore, I would like to recognize and thank the following individuals and institutions for their collaboration, encouragement, and support: Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly (Ret); Brigadier General Jason Q. Bohm; Brigadier General William J. Bowers; Brigadier General Robert C. Fulford; Colonel Keil R. Gentry (Ret); Colonel Mary H. Reinwald (Ret); Colonel Dave E. Severance (Ret); Sergeant Major Douglas F. Cutsail III; Sergeant Major William J. Grigsby (Ret); Sergeant Major David L. Maddux (Ret); Sergeant Major Gary Smith; Sergeant Major Justin D. LeHew (Ret); Sergeant Major Richard A. Hawkins (Ret); Master Sergeant Stacy M. Patzman (Ret); Dr. Randy Papadopoulos; Dr. Renee Ater; Dr. Sally M. Promey; Dr. Richard W. Vorder Bruegge and Brian K. Brooks at the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Charles R. Bowery and Jon T. Hoffman at the U.S. Army Center of Military History; Shannon Schwalb, Adria Olmi, and Rodney Foytik from the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at the Army War College; Charles Zoeller at the Associated Press; Criss Austin, Rutha Beamon, Michael Bloomfield, Kaitlyn Crain-Enriquez, Holly Reed, Daniel Rooney, and other members of the motion picture and still picture reference teams at the National Archives and Records Administration; Owen Conner, Joan Thomas, Patrick Mooney, and Alfred Houde at the National Museum of the Marine Corps; Aaron LaRocca, Brent O’Neill, and Sarah Gulick at National Park Service; Patty Everett at Leatherneck; the late Jack T. Paxton from the Marine Corps Combat Correspondents Association; Justin Gamache, cura-
tor at the Wright Museum of World War II in New Hampshire; John Allen at Signature Communications; Tim Evans at Smithsonian Channel; Linda Briscoe Myers at the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas at Austin; Joshua Larkin Rowley at Duke University; Shelby Rodriguez at the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston; Leslie Squyres at the Center for Creative Photography at University of Arizona; Jason A. Knowles at Fentress Architects; Jenna Wakely at Tourism Australia; Stephen Foley; Dustin Spence; Brent Westermeyer; Kay Keller Maurer; Kenneth Smith-Christmas; Margo Wheeler Mattox; Louise Miller; Parker Bishop Albee Jr.; Keller Cushing Freeman; Bonnie Arnold Haynes; Ray Elliott; Marianne Ingleby; Rodney K. Brown; Jeffrey Koterba; Viv Martin; the librarians and staff at the Special Collections Research Center at Syracuse University; National Gallery of Victoria, Australia; Marine Corps Heritage Foundation; Marine Military Academy; Hakes.com; Fifth Marine Division Association; and the Iwo Jima Association of America.

Because my participation on the Huly Panel began during my first year with the Marine Corps History Division, I have joked that the experience served as my acculturation training for better understanding the military. In truth, I am indebted to my campus colleagues who responded enthusiastically to my desire to know more about a hallowed symbol of the Corps. I especially wish to thank Charles Neimeyer, whose decision to include me in the Huly Panel investigation first ignited my curiosity on the subject, and Paul Weber, who directed me to lead the historical charge in advance of the Bowers Board investigation. Dr. Edward T. Nevglo ski assumed the directorship of the Marine Corps History Division when the Bowers Board deliberations were already underway. His embrace of this research and publication endeavor aided tremendously in ushering the book to press. In the History Division, my colleagues Army Colonel Douglas E. Nash Sr. (Ret); Dr. Fred Allison; Dr. Seth Givens; Paul Westermeyer; Annette Amerman; and Kara Newcomer were knowledgeable supporters of my initial proposal, and I have frequently drawn on their generous expertise. National Museum of the Marine Corps colleagues Lin Ezell, Charles Grow, and Christina Johnson were enthusiastic collaborators for the symposium. Dr. James Ginther and Alisa Whitley provided help navigating the collection at Marine Corps History Division’s Archives Branch, and I am grateful to Ross Phillips, Taylor Sorrells, Travis Wakeman, and Peter Owen for their research assistance throughout the project. At Marine Corps History Division/MCU Press, my sincere thanks goes to Dr. Alexandra Kindell, whose enthusiasm and editorial guidance were indispensable in the early stages of this book, and Angela Anderson, who shepherded this volume to publication.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge my family, who showed unflagging support for the book. I am especially grateful to my parents, Keith and Donna Robertson, and to Shannon and Peter Ford; Justin Robertson and Kara Weyand; Chin-Sung and Li-Young Chen; Ann-Lee Chen; Ron and Deanna Tarlton; and Dennis and Patt Davis. They have been a constant source of encouragement and a reminder of the myriad ways that military service inflects everyday life—often in unexpected ways. My final thanks go to my husband, Ray, and our son, Kai, for being with me along the journey. Your love and encouragement mean the world to me.

Breanne Robertson, PhD
Marine Corps History Division
When Stephen Foley phoned the Marine Corps History Division in October 2013, the Irish amateur historian had already devoted months to studying photographs and books about the Battle of Iwo Jima. He had long been fascinated with Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal’s photograph of six servicemen raising the American flag, and his careful examination yielded some surprising observations. The famous image—believed to depict five Marines and one Navy corpsman—revealed that it did not portray anyone carrying the distinctive olive drab canvas bags that medical personnel used to carry their instruments and supplies into battle. The Wexford native sought to alert the U.S. Marine Corps to this discrepancy, since it potentially signaled an error in the official roster of flag-raising participants. Was it possible that Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, the Navy corpsman whose wartime experiences inspired the bestselling book *Flags of Our Fathers*, was not in the photograph? 

An employee of the History Division took down Foley’s contact information and, as far as the Irishman could tell, the matter was dropped.1 Two and a half years later, Foley received an email from a Marine Corps public affairs officer thanking him for his research contributions, which had greatly assisted the Service in its formal investigation of the Iwo Jima flag raising. Another message soon followed, this one from Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, then-director of Marine Corps History Division. Neimeyer explained that General Robert B. Neller, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, had convened an impartial panel to evaluate the evidence and determine the identity of the flag raisers in Rosenthal’s photograph. Not only did the panel’s findings support Foley’s initial hypothesis—that Bradley was not present in the image—but the Marine Corps informed him that it was conducting a follow-up investigation to verify the identity of the individuals who had raised the first flag as well.2

Foley’s research played a limited role in the second panel’s proceedings, but the conclusions were equally profound; in July 2016, the Marine Corps announced a revised lineup for the initial flag raising.3

The announcement attracted widespread attention. Major U.S. newspapers and magazines ran stories about the historical fact-finding mission and speculated about the reasons such errors had gone unnoticed—or, at least, unremarked on—for more than 70 years and even whether some dark conspiracy to conceal the flag raisers’ identities had occurred.4 Since the spring of 1945, when Rosenthal captured the patriotic planting of the flag on a
remote Japanese battlefield, his photograph has embodied the collective effort and democratic ideals of the United States. The photograph circulated on postage stamps and war bond posters during World War II and later inspired a bestselling book, several movies, and Felix de Weldon’s monumental design for the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington, Virginia. Countless reenactments and parodies have appropriated the flag-raising scene as a wordless comment on contemporary issues encompassing partisan politics, international policy, and social activism (figure 0.1). The pervasive presence of the Iwo Jima flag-raising image in popular culture, and the high visibility and regard for the event that reflects on the Marine Corps especially, begs several questions, most notably: How were the mistaken attributions made in the first place? And why did it take so long to correct them?

Tracing the confusing and oft-contested history of Rosenthal’s well-known photograph, this volume aims to unpack the convoluted means by which the past has been reconstructed. The collection of essays acknowledges the messiness of war and the fallibility of remembrance and examines the ways in which meanings and perceptions form—and reform—over time. In doing so, this book sheds light on the particular challenges facing veterans, military families, and scholars who strove for histori-
cal accuracy in support of the official U.S. Marine Corps decision to update the historical personages depicted in Rosenthal’s photograph.

***

When six Marines gathered around the length of Japanese pipe scrounged on the summit of Mount Suribachi, an extinct volcano on the southern tip of Iwo Jima, the battle for the island represented only the latest stepping stone in the Americans’ protracted island-hopping campaign against Imperial Japan during World War II. The importance of the island to American strategy rested with its strategic bombing campaign against Japan. Because Iwo Jima lay only 650 miles from the Japanese mainland, its fighter aircraft based on the island posed a tactical threat to U.S. pilots flying long-range bombing missions against Tokyo, the imperial capital. American military leadership determined that the seizure of the island served a dual purpose; it would curtail Japanese defensive capabilities and secure additional airfields for Allied operations in the Pacific. Just five days into the fierce and costly fight, U.S. commanders ordered a platoon of Marines to scale Mount Suribachi and secure its summit. On 23 February, Marines of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, began the strenuous climb up the steep, rocky terrain to the top of the mountain. To their considerable surprise, the Marines found their ascent to the crater relatively uncontested; they quickly established a security perimeter and accomplished their assigned task of raising the flag. Their collective effort lasted no more than a few seconds; yet, in that brief time, Joe Rosenthal, a civilian photographer working for the Associated Press, captured one of the most famous images of the war (figure 0.2).

With its patriotic theme and compositional precision, the image soon superseded the historical event it depicted to inspire a war-weary nation.

Within days, Rosenthal’s photograph of the flag raising became a sensation on the home front, reproduced innumerable times in newspapers across the United States. Within one month, it had attained mythic status. Still today, the moment remains transfixed in our cultural memory about the Greatest Generation and World War II. It is not hard to understand why; the photograph remains a notable example of the power of the visual image.

On the surface, the photograph of six battle-weary Marines straining to raise the American flag conveys a message of unity, strength, and victory. The flagpole, captured at an ideal 45-degree angle, mimics the jagged, war-torn landscape and slices a broad expanse of sky. With their backs to the camera, the men remain anonymous, their individual identities subsumed by their patriotism and their shared commitment to the task. Above, a stiff breeze unfurls the American flag in a triumphant declaration of battlefield conquest.

The speed and popularity by which the photograph assumed prominence on the home front obscured the historical circumstances surrounding the taking of the photograph itself. In actuality, the flag raising did not signal anything like victory for the American servicemen fighting on the island of Iwo Jima. After all, the flag raising occurred mere days after the Marines made landfall, and the battle was far from over; the conflict would go on for another 31 days and thousands more Americans would die before the island was declared secure.

Marines stormed the beaches of Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945. With 110,000 Americans unloading from 880 ships, the D-day assault was the largest amphibious landing in the Central Pacific to date. The Japanese defenders proved a formidable foe. Under the command of Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Japan’s mining engineers had converted the remote island into an underground fortress. Laborers blasted 16 miles of tunnels, connecting underground hospitals, supply rooms, and other chambers to more than a thousand fortified bunkers and artillery and antiaircraft batteries. Although the U.S. Army Air Forces and Navy had conducted the longest sustained aerial bombardment of the war against Iwo Jima, the as-
sault had little impact on the island fortress, constructed as it was below its surface of volcanic rock. As a result, the conquest of Iwo Jima extracted a staggering toll from the landing force. In 36 days of fighting, U.S. troops suffered 24,000 casualties, including nearly 7,000 killed.7

The flag raising—a brief interlude in a long, brutal campaign—combined with the stress and urgency of combat as well as the passage of time have made the process of recovering facts a challenging endeavor. Soon after Rosenthal’s photograph hit the newspapers, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recalled the surviving “flagmen” to participate in the Seventh War Loan drive.8 The public relations assignment was intended to imbue fundraising efforts with an air of heroism, just as Marine Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone, who received the Medal of Honor for his actions at Guadalcanal, had done during the 1943 War Loan Campaign. But securing an official identification of the flag raisers and arranging their transfer to Washington, DC, proved a difficult task. Before the battle ended, three of the men believed to be in the photograph—Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, Sergeant Michael Strank, and

![FIGURE 0.2](image)

*On 23 February 1945, Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal snapped his famous picture of six Marines raising the U.S. flag on Iwo Jima. Americans first saw the image as a wirephoto on the front pages of newspapers on 25 February. The photograph became an instant media sensation and earned Rosenthal a Pulitzer Prize.*

Joseph J. Rosenthal photograph, courtesy of the Associated Press
Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley—were killed in combat. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Bradley was severely wounded and evacuated to Guam for medical treatment. Of the six, only Privates First Class Rene A. Gagnon and Ira H. Hayes remained unscathed five weeks later, when the telegram arrived ordering the servicemen portrayed in the famous flag-raising image to return to the United States.

Making matters worse, Rosenthal’s image did not capture the only time, or even the first instance, when an American flag was raised on the summit. As amateur historians Stephen Foley and Dustin Spence remind us in their essay, a patrol led by Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier ascended Mount Suribachi, secured the crater, and planted another flag earlier that same day. During their ascent, the Marines had anticipated sniper fire or a sudden attack from caves or machine gun emplacements. They remained visible on the face of the mountain, and Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and sailors watched their progress from the shores and ships below. When the patrol reached the rim of the volcano unopposed, they improvised using a section of water pipe that had been part of a Japanese cistern, selected a site near the top of the cone, and raised the American flag (figure 0.3). Cheers arose among the troops and a number of Navy ships sounded their horns in celebration. Many men wrote about the moment in their diaries and in letters home. But as memorable and important as this event was to the men fighting on the island, it remains virtually unknown to the general public, even today. Instead, Rosenthal’s photograph depicting the replacement of this banner with a larger one captivated the collective imagination of Americans far from the Pacific battleground.

Almost as soon as Rosenthal’s photograph appeared in newspapers, American journalists and readers began to speculate about the identities of the men pictured below the flag. Confusion was perhaps inevitable under these circumstances. Weeks earlier, combat correspondents on Iwo Jima had requested names and personal interviews with the flag raisers, but these efforts centered on the men who had raised the first flag, not the second. CBS reporter Don Pryor interviewed Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr. on board the flagship USS Eldorado (AGC 11), where the young Marine received congratulatory handshakes from U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner and Marine Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith shortly after the first flag was raised (figure 0.4). The radio broadcast never aired due to technical difficulties, but similar reports from the front touted the first flag raising and served as the basis for newspaper articles published back in the states. Meanwhile, the Associated Press, Rosenthal’s employer, developed the photograph of the
second flag raising and wired it via telephoto equipment from Guam to the United States in time for it to appear on the front page of newspapers on Sunday, 25 February. The development and transmittal of Marine Corps combat photographs, by contrast, typically took several weeks. Because the standard military procedure bundled film from Iwo Jima into a weekly courier trip for processing on Guam, the first photographic negatives related to the flag raisings were not entered into the U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Negative Logbook until early March. The resulting press coverage combined the first and second flag raisings into a single event. The New York Times, for example, published a written account identifying Thomas as a flag raiser in the same issue carrying Rosenthal’s photograph on its front page. Although the story noted that the “small flag was supplanted soon by a larger one on a high staff,” readers would have been justified in thinking that Rosenthal had photographed Thomas hoisting the American flag depicted on page 1 as the newspaper did not specify which flag raising—the original or the replacement—the Marine sergeant had helped to erect.

Time magazine correspondent Robert Sherrod believed he had a major scoop in early March, when he reported that the famous flag-raising image depicted the second time an American flag had been planted on Mount Suribachi and that Marine cameraman Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery was the only photographer present for the first one. This information led to charges that Rosenthal’s photograph was staged. There is ample evidence to show that this was not the case, but the persistence of such theories reveals an essential truth: the history of this image—captured in the midst of war—is a messy one.

Rosenthal’s image has long fascinated and troubled us. To be sure, the characteristics that imbue the photograph with such a powerful visual force—its dramatic sense of action, patriotic sentiment, sculptural clarity, and perfectly timed composition—are the same traits that bred confusion and even conjecture that the scene must have been carefully posed. In truth, the replacement flag had nothing to do with Rosenthal but rather was dispatched on orders from Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson for greater visibility to the men fighting below. As Sergeant Michael Strank put it, the larger flag had to be raised so that “every son of a bitch on this whole cruddy island can see it.” Whereas the first flag measured only 54 x 28 inches, the second was nearly twice that at 96 x 56 inches. Notably, even the motivation for the flag swap is disputed,
and rumors have long swirled among Iwo veterans that the second flag raising occurred because Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal wanted the original flag for a souvenir.

The immediate resonance of the photograph confused even Rosenthal, who initially gave conflicting answers about the staging of the composition because he had not yet seen the image and instead replied with the so-called “Gung Ho” group portrait in mind (figure 0.5). \(^{14}\) It was in this context in late March that the Marine Corps undertook the hasty identification of the flag raisers to fulfill President Roosevelt’s directive. Touted as heroes, the flag raisers commenced a nationwide tour as living embodiments of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s tribute to those who served on Iwo Jima: “uncommon valor was a common virtue.” \(^{15}\) Gagnon, Hayes, and Bradley became household names, as did their
now-fallen comrades Strank, Sousley, and Hansen, whose gold-star mothers made public appearances in support of the loan drive as well. By the summer of 1946, however, it had become evident that the Marine Corps had made an error in attribution. Belle Block, the mother of deceased Marine Corporal Harlon H. Block, claimed that her son was pictured in Rosenthal’s famous photograph. Surviving flag raiser Ira Hayes agreed, and penned a letter of support to Mrs. Block. When this letter leaked to the press, the Marine Corps responded with an official investigation to settle the matter once and for all. From December 1946 to January 1947, the del Valle Board, so-called for its chair Major General Pedro del Valle, reviewed field reports, gathered signed affidavits, and conducted interviews with Marines involved with the event. Significantly, the board’s findings confirmed the participation of Corporal Harlon Block and revised the official roster of raisers in Rosenthal’s famous flag-raising picture (see appendix A).

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Fast forward to 2013, when amateur historian Stephen Foley contacted the Marine Corps History Division. Rich in associations and running deep with myth and experience, Rosenthal’s photograph had become a national icon; its persistent appeal and continuing reproduction made it a fixed moment in the collective memory of many Americans—even if they were not alive during World War II. Thus, for the staff at the Marine Corps History Division, Foley’s query was nothing new. The federal historians routinely received phone calls and letters from friends, family members, and occasionally veterans themselves claiming to possess information about—or even to be—an unacknowledged flag raiser. The History Division is particularly wary of individuals or organizations seeking to exploit the popularity of the Iwo Jima event for personal gain. Stolen valor is a real concern, unfortunately, as are disingenuous filmmakers or authors who aim to tarnish the military or, even worse, the memory of a particular servicemember, to sensationalize their story.

The Marine Corps considers all 70,000 of the Marines, sailors, and Coast Guardsmen who fought at Iwo Jima to be heroes. As such, the Corps and its historians have had little incentive to pursue the personal identification of any Marine pictured in the photographs from that day, as this would unfairly privilege one’s proximity to a largely symbolic event over the unparalleled bravery and grit demonstrated by every Marine fighting on the front lines below. Moreover, the Marine Corps already conducted an in-depth investigation into the identity of the flag raisers concluding in 1947. The results of the del Valle Board rested on interviews and documentation collected in the immediate aftermath of the war. There was little reason to doubt the veracity of these findings, and even less reason to think that an inquiry so many decades removed from the event would yield better insights.

For many years, it was common practice in the Marine Corps History Division to answer all public inquiries about the Iwo Jima flag raising with the official identifications determined in 1947. In some cases, the claims received no response at all. For private researchers, such a response can be confusing and infuriating. And indeed, Foley sought out new audiences and collaborators in the interim. He began working with Eric Krelle, a military buff who runs the 5th Marine Division website. Through the meticulous study of still photography and motion picture film from that day, Foley and Krelle noted significant discrepancies in the uniform and equipment carried by the individual previously identified as Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Bradley, whose pistol and medic pouches contrasted sharply with the standard gear of a Marine infantryman, and in November 2014, the Omaha World-Herald published an article detailing their findings. The article in turn generated interest from Matt Morgan, a former Marine public affairs officer, who approached Krelle about producing a documen-
tary for the Smithsonian Channel. As part of the documentary project, Morgan hired two forensic analysts to evaluate Foley and Krelle’s observations using digitally enhanced photographs of the flag raising, and he shared these reports with the Marine Corps in late 2015.

The following spring, the U.S. Marine Corps undertook an official review of the evidence and concluded that the long-accepted roster of flag-raising participants was incorrect. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley had erroneously identified in Rosenthal’s photograph. The investigation determined that a previously unknown Marine, Private First Class Harold H. Schultz, is pictured in the iconic scene instead (see appendix B).

The enthusiasm with which Rosenthal’s photograph circulated and accrued meaning during the Second World War set in motion a series of individual actions and events whose tangled legacy historians are still working to unravel. The publication and wide distribution in newspapers and magazines not only distinguished Rosenthal’s photograph as one of the most celebrated and most frequently reproduced images of the war, it also clouded popular understanding of the flag-raising event, its participants, and its visual record.

The recent correction to the official record serves as a reminder that the photograph, despite its iconic status, remains an artifact, a material object whose surface interaction of light and chemicals produced a visual imprint of an actual historical moment. In conjunction with written reports and eyewitness statements, this primary source material has corroborated and enriched our knowledge of that day. The potential rewards are great—such as the 2006 recognition of Private Philip L. Ward and Private First Class Raymond E. Jacobs as members of the first flag-raising party—but so are the challenges posed. As Criss Austin shows, the physical nature of these materials requires careful custodianship and conservation or they will deteriorate over time. Imperfections within the picture, such as blurriness, positioning, and shadow, further limit the information that scholars can glean from these objects. The mute testimony of these images may remain ambiguous, leaving historians to speculate on the particularities of a scene. And yet, the opposite is also true. As visual evidence generated in the midst of combat, photographs and motion pictures can exhibit a clarity that prompts the reconsideration of accepted knowledge.

Today, the Marine Corps History Division takes a different approach to the continuing stream of letters and phone calls about loved ones purportedly helping to raise the flag. The division takes each query seriously and attempts to provide each person with a definitive answer, even when the records do not support family lore. Of the dozens of queries the division receives each year, the majority involve a Marine whose muster roll indicates that his company or regiment was fighting elsewhere on the island. For those assigned initially to a replacement battalion, it is more difficult to reconstruct their movements during the course of battle. In this instance, the History Division concludes that the individual’s claim is plausible but inadequately supported to insert into the official record. But in light of the 2016 investigation, Marine Corps historians humbly acknowledge that technology is always evolving and that new evidence may yet come to light.

Such was the case in the summer of 2018, when amateur historians Dustin Spence, Stephen Foley, and Brent Westemeyer approached the Marine Corps with another proposed correction to the identifications associated with the second flag raising. General Robert Neller, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, convened another impartial board to determine the participants in Rosenthal’s image in light of this new photographic evidence. As part of the investigation, the Marine Corps extended its prior research to include written correspondence, oral history interviews, and archival
motion picture and photographic materials at the National Archives, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Associated Press, Wright Museum of World War II, and in private collections. The Service also received assistance from the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory to conduct forensic photographic analyses in support of the identification effort. In the spring of 2019, an official Marine Corps panel led by Brigadier General William J. Bowers, President of Marine Corps University, adjudicated the evidence and recovered the heretofore unknown contributions of Corporal Harold P. Keller as a second flag raiser (see appendix D).

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Already recognized as a remarkable photograph embodying the collective spirit of Americans at war, Rosenthal’s image has also attained a measure of notoriety for the repeated corrections made to its historical record. Since issuing its first press release identifying the servicemen on 9 April 1945, the Marine Corps has remained committed to honoring its servicemembers by ensuring historical accuracy. On three separate occasions, the Service has responded to new information by conducting official investigations, and in every case, the Corps determined that a revision to the official list of flag raisers was required. How did errors creep into the initial identification? And why did it take so long—and so many attempts—to uncover the truth?

The essays in this volume attempt to grapple with these questions. The title, Investigating Iwo: The Flag Raisings in Myth, Memory, & Esprit de Corps, is derived from the trio of official Marine Corps investigations that have corrected the roster of individuals pictured in Rosenthal’s flag-raising photograph. Essays by Colonel Mary Reinwald (Ret), member of the 2016 Huly Panel, and Colonel Keil R. Gentry (Ret), member of the 2016 Huly Panel and the 2019 Bowers Board, describe the recent research, analyses, and deliberations that led to the naming of not one, but two previously unacknowledged flag raisers. Providing an insider perspective into the process by which official history is made—and re-made—these essays reveal the thoughtfulness and dedication of numerous individuals and institutions who aided in the effort to “get it right.” But theirs are only the latest developments in a long and complicated history. Examining the depth of feeling that viewers around the globe have attached to Rosenthal’s image, as well as the contradictory narratives surrounding its capture, this volume aims to unravel the meaning and legacy of the Iwo Jima flag raising in public memory and Marine Corps culture.

The essays that follow are organized in four parts. In Part I, “In the Cauldron of War,” four writers consider the wartime context of Rosenthal’s photograph and the evolution of its meaning in relation to war news coverage, government fundraising, and commercial advertising. Part II, “Memory and Meaning,” probes national identity formation and memory construction as it took shape in distinct regions and among specific social groups. A critical reexamination of the archive is the focus of Part III, “Recovering the Past.” Essays in this section aim to restore the historical significance of the first flag raising, counter false narratives that have grown up around both raisings, and offer a clearer view of the evidence currently available to researchers and how it has twice overturned the official Marine Corps record. Part IV, “Legacy,” shows how Rosenthal’s photograph operates as a shorthand symbol of American national identity and military prowess and questions how the recent identifications of Corporal Keller and Private First Class Schultz might impact the prevailing symbolism of the image by underscoring its more modest reality. Although many of the individual essays have a relatively narrow focus, as an aggregate, they begin the process of forging an overall perspective of the event that encourages the reader to draw connections across chapters, to reconsider popular assumptions about the flag raisings, and to reflect on the events’ appeal.
IN THE CAULDRON OF WAR

The authors in this initial part of Investigating Iwo describe the battlefield context and home front response to Rosenthal’s photograph that continue to shape our understanding of events on 23 February 1945. As Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer writes in “Black Sand and Blood: The 36-day Battle for Iwo Jima, 19 February–26 March,” the battle for Iwo Jima was a grueling and costly campaign for the U.S. Marine Corps. The capture of Mount Suribachi and the raising of the American flag on its summit occurred just four days after the initial landings; the battle itself would continue for another four weeks. For the servicemen who fought on the island and for the Marine Corps as a whole, Iwo Jima represents the largest amphibious landing operation up to that date. It holds the singular distinction of incurring the most casualties of any battle in Marine Corps history, and more Marines received the Medal of Honor for their actions during the campaign than for any other battle in U.S. history. The U.S. Army, who shared with their fellow servicemembers the unenviable task of neutralizing the Japanese threat on Iwo Jima, joined the battle on 21 March 1945 and performed mopping-up operations until the end of July 1945. They accomplished this, writes Army Colonel Douglas E. Nash (Ret) in “Going to ‘Tojo’s Front Door’: Recalling the U.S. Army’s Role and the Flag Raising at Iwo Jima,” with unrelenting courage and resolve and staged a flag-raising ceremony of their own on a neighboring island.

On the home front, Rosenthal’s photograph emerged as the singular image of the Battle of Iwo Jima. The immediate proliferation and popularity of the photograph seems natural in hindsight, but the response was unprecedented; the image stands as one of the first contemporary media sensations in the United States. Dr. Austin Porter describes how the publication and wide distribution in newspapers and magazines distinguished Rosenthal’s photograph as one of the most celebrated and most frequently reproduced images of the war. His essay, “Raising Flags, Raising Funds: Promoting the ‘Mighty Seventh’ War Loan,” traces popular media responses to the Iwo Jima flag raising against the backdrop of the Seventh War Loan drive. Considering artist C. C. Beall’s adaptation of the battlefield photograph for the war bond campaign and further iterations of the scene in wartime commercial advertisements, Porter draws attention to the cultural process by which the photograph transcended its historical referent to become a visual icon. Not all media outlets leapt at the opportunity to publish Rosenthal’s photograph, however. In “Time, Life, and the Flag Raisings on Iwo Jima,” Dr. Melissa Renn examines wartime journalistic coverage of the Iwo Jima flag raisings and looks at how Time and Life magazines’ editors responded to war correspondent Robert Sherrod’s allegation that Rosenthal’s photograph had been staged. In marked contrast to other American publications, Time and Life delayed publication of the popular image until late March and offered readers a critical framework for interpreting the scene through visual comparison with Staff Sergeant Louis Lowery’s lesser-known photograph of the first flag raising.

MEMORY AND MEANING

The essays in Part II, “Memory and Meaning,” reflect on both the meaning and malleability of the Iwo Jima flag raising after the war. In her chapter on the Marine Corps War Memorial, Dr. Kate Clarke Lemay recounts the circumstances surrounding the construction of this monument in the immediate postwar years. Lemay directs her analysis toward the process of the nation’s decision making, its collaboration with the sculptor, and the location and symbolism of the monument on Arlington Ridge.
across the Potomac River from Washington, DC. Her thoughtful examination also foregrounds an inherent tension in sculptor Félix de Weldon’s design, which aspired to reproduce historical specificity and portrait likeness in its depiction of the Iwo Jima flag raising, yet also worked to transcend both in its desire to commemorate all Marines who have perished in battle since 1775. The visual culture of public-minded military community is likewise the subject of Dr. David W. Mills’ essay, “Did Joe Rosenthal Save the Marine Corps?: The Existential Fight, 1943–52.” The ubiquitous iconography of the Iwo Jima flag raising and Marine honor guard during the Freedom Train exhibition, writes Mills, formed key visual components of postwar civil patriotism that popularly wed the Marine Corps to American identity in the face of rising tensions and imminent threats to national unity in the Cold War era.

As Dr. John Moremon’s essay in this volume suggests, monuments perform a powerful role in articulating national difference in the cultural landscape. In “Another Country’s Flag, Another Country’s Servicemen: Rosenthal’s Photograph and Commemoration of the U.S. Marine Corps in Australia and New Zealand,” Moremon explores the relevance of the Iwo Jima flag raising to other nations involved in the Pacific theater, namely Australia and New Zealand. As Moremon notes, distinct social sectors in different geographical regions forged national memories in opposition, and interaction with, the American message. Whereas American narratives of the Pacific War have privileged U.S. fighting over the contributions of Allied forces in the region, Rosenthal’s photograph operates abroad more as a symbol of the postwar ascendency of the United States as a world power. Consequently, national narratives of World War II in New Zealand and Australia barely register that the U.S. Marine Corps had a wartime presence in either country, despite both nations hosting U.S. Marines in the early stages of the war. Arguing that memorial space is politically motivated and historically and socially constructed, Moremon demonstrates how the commemorative landscape in New Zealand and Australia forgo Rosenthal’s photograph in favor of modest plaques, which local populations mounted in tribute to the personal relationships their communities formed with the Americans who trained on their shores.

While Moremon, Lemay, and Mills examine the public side in the visual fabrication of meanings, Dr. Yui Suzuki focuses on how individuals use monuments in the private construction of memorialization and grief. Her essay, “How the Iwo Jima Memorial became a Personal Mortuary Monument for My Japanese Mother,” reflects on her family’s experience of the Battle of Iwo Jima and the solace her mother found in laying flowers at the Marine Corps War Memorial. There is no doubt that the memorialization described by Suzuki helps expand the commemorative function of the war memorial, which has historically been confined to honoring the memory of U.S. Marines. For many spectators, the Arlington memorial stands not only for U.S. Marines but for all American war dead. As Suzuki makes clear, even this expanded definition is too narrow. For the relatives of a Japanese soldier who perished in the Battle of Iwo Jima, the Marine Corps War Memorial offered a more fitting mortuary tribute than the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, Japan.

**RECOVERING THE PAST**

The five chapters in this part of *Investigating Iwo* reflect on the increasingly vital role visual evidence has played in contemporary methodology and interpretation. In their chapters on combat photographers Staff Sergeant Louis Lowery and Sergeant William Genaust, respectively, independent researchers Dustin Spence and Stephen Foley and motion picture archivist Criss Austin demonstrate how photography and motion pictures operate as historical documents in their own right and how, in conjunction with written reports and eyewitness
statements, these primary source materials can corroborate and enrich our knowledge of that day.

Spence and Foley, in “A Flag for Suribachi: The First and Forgotten Flag Raising on Iwo Jima,” remind us that it was the first American flag raised on the summit of Mount Suribachi that carried meaning for the servicemen fighting on Iwo Jima. At the time, this flag raising was the more significant of the two. The second flag raising was a non-event, at least to the participants, except that a photographer snapped an opportune image. Their essay recounts this lesser-known event to highlight the contributions of the Marines whose actions that morning lifted the spirits of thousands, and yet they were soon overshadowed in popular memory due to the exceptional visual appeal of Rosenthal’s photograph showing the raising of a replacement flag a few hours later.

If the first flag raising languished in relative obscurity during the past 75 years, the second raising has suffered from dispersed and, on occasion, incomplete recordkeeping as well as from contradictory first-person accounts. While Rosenthal’s photograph appeared in U.S. newspapers just two days after the flag-raising event, the film captured by combat photographers often took a much slower, more circuitous path to the United States. The motion picture footage taken by Sergeant William Genaust, writes Criss Austin, offers a telling case study in this regard. Recent efforts at the National Archives to identify the earliest version of the film in its collection have failed to produce the original footage captured on Iwo Jima. Detailing the provenance research and preservation work of the motion picture archivists in College Park, Austin confirms that the earliest copy of Genaust’s film at National Archives dates to the early 1950s.

Christopher B. Havern’s essay in this volume draws attention to one of many myths that have confounded historians over the years. Among the competing narratives that have grown up around the second flag raising is the claim of Coast Guard Quartermaster Robert L. Resnick, who served at Iwo Jima on board the Coast Guard-manned landing ship, tank LST-758 and who identified himself as the individual who had provided the replacement flag later photographed by Rosenthal. As Havern explains, the log records from the U.S. Navy’s LST-779 disprove this popular misconception by confirming that Navy Reserve Ensign Alan S. Wood, the ship’s communications officer, supplied the larger flag instead.

The challenges and revelations of the Marine Corps’ investigations are recounted in essays by Colonel Mary Reinwald (Ret) and Colonel Keil Gentry (Ret), respectively. Technological advances since 1947 have allowed for additional evidence to come to light. Reinwald and Gentry offer transparency and insight into the 2016 and 2019 Marine Corps investigations. As a member of the Huly Panel, Reinwald describes the evidence, evaluation process, and conclusions that recovered the participation of Private First Class Harold Schultz in the second flag raising. Likewise, in his account of the 2019 Bowers Board, Gentry shows how an expanded archival record combined with technological advances spurred new observations that ultimately proved the presence of Corporal Harold Keller in Rosenthal’s famous photograph.

LEGACY
The concluding chapter, “Every Marine a Flag Raiser: The Legacy and Meaning of the Iwo Jima Flag Raising,” invites readers to reconsider the meaning of the Iwo Jima flag raising and acknowledge its continuing impact on military identity and modern visual culture. As Paul Westermeyer and I argue, the importance of the flag raising lies not in the individual identities of its participants, but rather in its ability to inspire Marines and civilians alike to emulate its model citizenship.

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As we mark the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima with this publication, the Marine Corps
History Division holds the goal of forging new territory for military history scholarship and opening up new ways to evaluate the impact of Rosenthal’s photograph on American society and the Marine Corps from World War II to the present day. For the Corps, especially, the conquest of the Japanese island became a hallmark of Marine Corps history, an honor that has little to do with its signature image. As Hal Buell has observed, “Marines have a special affection for the picture for obvious reasons: their blood paid for the picture and it resonates in their soul.”\(^1\) The essays in Investigating Iwo help us see the weight that this history still bears on the present day. Correcting the official record thus pays tribute not only to the Marines who raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi, but also honors all of the servicemen who fought on Iwo Jima to help secure ultimate Allied victory in World War II.

ENDNOTES

2. Stephen Foley, email correspondence with LtCol Eric Dent, June 2016; and Stephen Foley, email correspondence with Charles F. Neimeyer, July 2016.
5. Occasionally such repurposing generates backlash among active-duty and retired servicemembers, who regard the Iwo Jima flag raising with reverence. Recent controversies include a recreation of the famous photograph that replaced the American flag with a gay pride flag, designed by Ed Freeman for Frontier Magazine in 2015, and the Under Armor T-shirt design “Band of Ballers,” which shows men raising a basketball hoop in a similar fashion to the servicemen raising the American flag on Iwo Jima.
6. This rationale found support after the island’s capture, when Iwo Jima became an important base for the U.S. military during its final assault on the Japanese mainland. By war’s end, more than 2,000 heavy bombers carrying 24,761 Americans had made emergency landings at Iwo Jima during aerial raids on Japan.
7. Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1994), 47. Nearly all of the 21,000 Japanese defenders were killed during the battle.
9. For Marines on the ground, the first flag raising was the more significant of the two events that day. The second flag raising was a nonevent, except that a photographer snapped an opportune image. Consequently, historians have had to contend with conflicting eyewitness statements from the beginning, even from the flag raisers.
10. U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Negative Logbook, Record Group 127, Still Photographs Collection, National Archives, College Park, MD.
12. Robert Sherrod to David Hulburd, 13 March 1945, unnumbered cable, Folder Cables, Box 29, Robert Lee Sherrod Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University Libraries, NY.
16. This policy must have caused consternation to many, including Ray Jacobs, a Marine radioman who was picked up to accompany patrol leader Lt Schrier during the first flag raising. Because Jacobs was assigned to Company F and Schrier’s platoon consisted largely of Company E Marines, historians previously thought that it was unlikely that he was a member of the platoon.
18. Spence, “Unraveling the Mysteries of the First Flag Raising.”
INVESTIGATING IWO
PART ONE
In the Cauldron of War

Two Marine wiremen advance on an open field under heavy enemy fire to establish telephone contact with the front lines during the Battle of Iwo Jima.
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Thayer Soule Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division
The intensity of the World War II struggle for Iwo Jima in 19 February–26 March 1945 is fully seared into the historical memory of the United States Marine Corps—the Service that suffered most in taking this speck of volcanic ash in the western Pacific. Moreover, nothing epitomizes the idealized Corps-wide attributes of determination, valor, and teamwork more than AP photographer Joe Rosenthal’s iconic black and white photograph of a flag raising on top of Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima’s predominant and most recognizable terrain feature. The fact that this flag was raised early in the struggle, with weeks of intense and violent combat to come for the Marines involved, is often missed by those who have not closely studied the battle.

Iwo Jima is considered a seminal event in the history of the Marine Corps for both the Rosenthal photograph and for what took place before and especially after the flag was raised on 23 February 1945, just four days after the landing. The fighting reputation of the Marine Corps was already well established prior to landing on Iwo Jima. However, for the Marines, the titanic 36-day struggle for the island was shocking in its ferocity, lethality, and duration. For example, taking the island ultimately required approximately one-half of all Marine Corps ground combat power then available in the Western Pacific (most of the veteran 3d Marine Division and all the 4th and 5th Divisions) to wrest this single eight-mile-long island from its Japanese defenders. Furthermore, Iwo Jima represents the only battle during the Pacific war where total Marine and Navy casualties (approximately 24,000 killed and wounded) exceeded that of the enemy. It was supposed to be over in two weeks of hard fighting, yet it lasted for more than a month. After the island was declared secured, U.S. Army occupation forces were still flushing out diehards from caves and tunnels located all over the island. In sum, this operation was a tremendously violent and casualty-intense affair from start to finish. For the Marines and sailors on the island, Iwo Jima was a battle they would never forget.
While actual ground combat operations to take Iwo Jima did not begin until 19 February 1945, the fight for the island started well in advance of that date. On 15 June 1944, U.S. naval aircraft assigned to Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58 attacked the island of Iwo Jima, or Iwo To as it was known to the Japanese. Task Force 58 was the U.S. Navy's primary offensive weapon against the empire of Japan for the later stages of the Pacific war, 1944–45. The task force also represented one of the most significant and unique collections of fleet aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and support ships ever combined by the U.S. Navy. While its actual size varied during its two years of existence, by early 1945, Task Force 58 possessed at least 12 aircraft carriers of various sizes, numerous fast battleships, heavy cruisers, destroyers, and hundreds of support boats. It was designed to be the striking arm of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance's massive U.S. Fifth Fleet and is credited by many as being a virtual harbinger of defeat for Japanese forces in the Pacific. One of Admiral Spruance’s subordinates, Rear Admiral J. J. Clark, certainly thought so. During the initial airstrikes against Iwo Jima and neighboring Chichi Jima, Clark believed that Vice Admiral Mitscher's fast carriers, were “a virtually invincible force” against the Japanese throughout the Western Pacific.

The June 1944 naval air attacks on Iwo Jima were necessary to cover then-ongoing operations southward in the Mariana Islands and to get an understanding as to the potential level of defense that the Japanese had prepared thus far on the island. After the Marianas fell to the United States in August 1944, Iwo Jima became the logical next target for U.S. amphibious warfare planners (map 1). As naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison noted, Iwo Jima was geographically situated “almost midway between Honshu [the main Japanese home island] and the Marianas, 625 miles north of Saipan and 660 miles south of Tokyo.” Once American Marianas-based bombing operations against the home islands began in late 1944, taking out the Japanese defenders on Iwo Jima, who would assuredly attempt to interdict the bombers on their way to and from their targets, became even more imperative. These bombing missions required American aviators to endure a largely undefended 3,000-mile round trip at high altitude for nearly 16 straight hours of flying. Furthermore, Japanese radar based on Iwo warned the home islands of impending bombing raids, which made the trip even more of a nightmare for the American attackers.

The U.S. Navy and Army Air Forces’ aircraft that pounded Iwo Jima during the months leading up to the February 1945 amphibious assault also took aerial photographs of the entire island (figure 1.1). Special consideration was given to the island’s one major topographical feature: Mount Suribachi. Later nicknamed “Hot Rocks” by U.S. planners, Suribachi was a dormant volcano located on the southern end of the pork-chop-shaped island that still vented sulfurous fumes visible from the air. Mount Suribachi dominated the only two viable landing sites for any amphibious assault that might be made on the island. Other than the two obvious airfields (and one under construction) and their associated installations located toward the center of the island, what concerned the Americans most was that there were few significant targets initially discernible to their photographic intelligence analysts. Nevertheless, as war correspondent Robert L. Sherrod stated concerning Iwo Jima as a potential target, “We were certain of two things: 1.) we had to have it; 2.) it would be costly.”
Soon after the airstrikes on the island began, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi arrived to take command of all Japanese forces on Iwo Jima. Kuribayashi was a well-regarded Japanese army officer who once commanded the emperor’s Imperial Guard. Like his more famous naval counterpart, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, he also served a tour as a military attaché in the United States during the 1920s. He too held a healthy respect for the latent military capacity of the United States. Nevertheless, Kuribayashi arrived on Iwo Jima determined to defend what he considered sacred Japanese home soil to the bitter end. He fully did not
expect to survive any coming battle with the
Americans.

Unknown to American war planners at the
time, General Kuribayashi decided to defend
Iwo Jima in a fundamentally different way than
previous Japanese efforts. Unlike the situation
faced by the U.S. Marine Corps at Guadalcanal
or even the June 1944 battle of Saipan where
the leathernecks faced suicidal banzai attacks
by Japanese infantry in the open, at Iwo Jima,
this particular tactic was strictly forbidden by
Kuribayashi. Instead, he ordered his troops to
dig in. Moreover, he did not intend to defend
the island at the water’s edge as his counter-
parts had unsuccessfully tried to do at Tarawa
in late 1943. By January 1945, Kuribayashi had
more than 20,000 combat troops hidden in a
vast series of mutually reinforcing strongpoints,
concrete bunkers, caves, and tunnels that made
it exceptionally difficult for superior American
firepower to have much effect on them (figure
1.2). The Japanese defenders were not only on
the eight-mile-long island, they were in it as
well.

Kuribayashi was under no illusion that he
could hold Mount Suribachi from any kind of
determined American assault. Accordingly, he
made the dormant volcano a semi-independent
command and did not assign more than
approximately 1,500 of his 22,000 troops to
its defense. The general’s standing orders were
clear: “Once the enemy began the invasion
of the island, everybody would resist the ene-
my until the end, making his position his own
tomb. Everybody was to kill ten of the enemy.”

PRE-D-DAY WOES
As 1945 began, American war planners real-
ized that the schedule for Operation Detach-
ment was running into problems (figure 1.3).
First and foremost among them was the situa-
tion with General Douglas MacArthur’s recon-
quest of the Philippines. It was taking longer
than expected. Consequently, naval assets that
had been slated for the Iwo Jima assault were
not immediately available. As a result, the orig-
inal assault date of 20 January 1945 had to
be moved to 3 February and ultimately to 19
February as the final possible time to make the
landing. To make matters even more difficult,
the complete conquest of Iwo Jima had to be
accomplished before 1 April 1945, when key
naval assets were slated to be redirected from
the Iwo operation to the larger invasion of Okinawa, Japan.

Thus, when the commanding general of
the Marine Expeditionary Forces, Lieutenant
General Holland M. Smith, argued that his
Iwo assault force would need at least 10 days of
pre-invasion naval gunfire, the U.S. Navy lead-
ership disagreed. The Navy told Smith that he
was only going to get three days of pre-invasion bombardment and that they could not afford the expenditure of precious ammunition with the Okinawa landing coming on so soon after the Iwo operation concluded. A fierce debate quickly broke out between Smith and Admiral Spruance. The Navy commander had planned for Task Force 58 to hit Tokyo at the same time the Marine assault waves were coming ashore on Iwo Jima. The airstrike was designed to take pressure off the naval forces supporting the Iwo landing. Adding to the Marines’ pre-invasion woes, Spruance tasked two of his most modern battleships, the USS *North Carolina* (BB 55) and the USS *Washington* (BB 56) at the last minute to accompany his carriers on the planned Tokyo raid. Although the Tokyo raid was supposed to be secondary to the invasion of Iwo Jima, this effort now had twice the battleship support that the Iwo invasion force had on D-day. Smith was livid at Spruance’s decision to take the best battleships and to limit his requested bombardment to only three days. He bitterly noted in his memoirs that “we had to haggle...
like horse traders, balancing irreplaceable lives against replaceable ammunition. I was never so depressed in my whole life."  

After months of planning and mostly ineffective pre-invasion day bombardment by the U.S. Navy and Army Air Forces, the Joint Expeditionary Task Force commanded by Navy Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner arrived off the shores of Iwo Jima on D-3 as scheduled. The plan for the initial Marine Corps invasion force was to land two divisions abreast on the southeastern beaches of the island and then wheel north toward Kitano Point. The 5th Marine Division, commanded by Major General Keller E. Rockey, was given the D-day task of cutting off and isolating Mount Suribachi from the rest of the island to the north. The 4th Marine Division, commanded by Major General Clifton B. Cates, after clearing a difficult beach objective known as “the Quarry,” was to attack to the right of the 5th Division. The 3d Marine Division, commanded by Major General Graves B. Erskine, was held as a floating reserve by Lieutenant General Smith. The overall commander of the V Amphibious Corps was Major General Harry Schmidt.

D-DAY ARRIVES

On 19 February 1945, as D-day dawned, the U.S. Navy increased its naval and air bombardment of the island. Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions loaded into their assault craft in preparation for landing ashore. The selected beaches had been divided and subsequently subdivided into color coded sections (from left to right): green, red, yellow, and blue beaches (figures 1.4 and 1.5). The 28th Marine Regiment of the 5th Division was assigned the immediate D-day objective of cutting off the narrow neck of land that connected Suribachi with the rest of the

FIGURE 1.4
This beach diagram of the southeast coast of Iwo Jima, Japan, was prepared by the Intelligence Section, Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, using information taken from aerial photographs on 4 July 1944. It shows the color codes and obstacles anticipated at the amphibious landing sites; Mount Suribachi, labeled “Hotrocks,” is visible at far left.

Official Department of Defense illustration
island. They went ashore on the far left of the line at Green Beach. The 4th Division, coming in on the right of 5th Division, was supposed to push onto the Motoyama Plateau after neutralizing the beach defenses at the Quarry. Once both divisions had consolidated on the plateau, the 3d Division (minus the 3d Marine Regiment) was to land (at some point) and continue the momentum of the attack. However, D-day and the immediate days that followed turned out to be much harder than American planners had assumed.
Since July 1944, General Kuribayashi had doggedly improved his underground defenses across the island. Miles of tunnels, some hewn through solid rock, had been created so that the Japanese defenders could support each other without being exposed to American counterfire. One of his largest problems had to do with water. There was no natural source of fresh water on Iwo Jima, so Kuribayashi created an elaborate cistern system to collect rain water. Ubiquitous rain barrels and water pipes were later found on top of Mount Suribachi. The larger cisterns were located underground or, if above ground, had been reinforced with concrete and camouflaged against detection by aerial reconnaissance. The official Marine Corps History Division report on Kuribayashi’s available firepower during the battle noted the following:

The backbone of Kuribayashi’s infantry defense was the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade (five infantry battalions plus one artillery battalion) reinforced and the 145th Infantry Regiment (three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion) reinforced. Generally speaking, his available artillery, which consisted of two artillery battalions and three mortar battalions, was organized into what was known as an artillery group. Also reinforcing the brigade and the regiment were five independent anti-tank battalions, two independent machine gun battalions, and two rocket companies.7

In sum, Kuribayashi had a formidable array of weaponry he could throw at any attacker. Moreover, for the very first time in the Central Pacific, the Japanese utilized substantial amounts of antipersonnel landmines. Since Kuribayashi had accurately predicted the two landing locations for any American amphibious assault, he ordered these areas to be heavily mined. Moreover, due to the nature of the metallic soil on Iwo, the Japanese ceramic landmines were nearly undetectable by American minesweeping devices. The Japanese also rigged up 500-pound aerial bombs and buried them in rows on the approaches that led inland from the beach. These devices were actuated by a pressure plate and were designed to cause incredible devastation, as the Marines would soon discover. The only way for any attacker to get through such a defensive network of explosive ordnance was to slowly and carefully probe for them by hand using bayonets and knives.8

On D-day, at approximately 0900, the assault elements of the Regimental Combat Teams of the 4th and 5th Divisions landed abreast on the beach (figure 1.6). They immediately found the terrace of black volcanic sand exceptionally hard to negotiate—even for the infantry. Except for some occasional heavy mortar shells and sporadic infantry fire, the assault waves made some initial progress. Other follow-on forces, however, soon stacked up behind them. As the day wore on, the surf conditions rapidly deteriorated, making the landing of crucial artillery, tanks, and other vehicles even more difficult. This was exactly what Kuribayashi had hoped would happen. Just after 1000 that morning, the Japanese opened up with every indirect fire weapons system that could range the landing sites. There was literally nowhere to go and no cover since the loose volcanic sand made digging individual foxholes nearly impossible to accomplish. One Marine described the conditions as being similar to “trying to dig a hole in a barrel of wheat.”9 Captain Fred E. Haynes of the 28th Regiment noticed a trend regarding Marine casualties on and near the beach terraces—the killed were usually found in groups. Haynes surmised that Japanese spotters on Suribachi would wait for a group of Marines to gather
“before firing high-explosive rounds into their midst. This [was] why so many Marines who survived the first few days of the battle reported seeing groups of four or five Marines huddled together in death inside a shell crater. A single round in such an enclosed space could take out everybody.”

By nightfall of the first day of fighting, Marine Corps casualties had been heavy, but they had been able to land about 30,000 combat troops. While many of the veterans in both divisions expected to be attacked that night by one of the traditional Japanese banzai assaults, it did not happen. The 4th Division especially suffered that first day from fire coming from the Quarry and the east boat basin. Due to the intensity of the fighting, the Marines had largely failed to reach their day one objectives, but they had seized the tip of Motoyama Airfield No. 1, isolated Mount Suribachi, and were preparing to reduce the Japanese defenses at the base of the mountain the next morning.

One of those men who had survived that first day was African American Marine, Corporal Goodwin G. Doughty. Doughty had been assigned to the 36th Depot Company and had landed on the afternoon of D-day just behind the assault waves. His job was to get ammunition and supplies up to the line companies as soon as possible. The first thing that Doughty noted was the bodies and debris everywhere. He also saw the difficulty of getting off the beach in all that volcanic ash. Doughty observed a Navy beachmaster pleading with Marines feverishly digging in to get off the beach and out of the way of landing craft trying to offload crucial supplies and ammunition. He saw bodies of dead Marines in the sand and even some still rolling in the surf. He wrote that “the whole area was just chaotic.”

Doughty was happy to see that the lighter assault troops had been able to push inland to give the follow-on forces some breathing room on the beach.

Robert Sherrod was one of the first journalists on the beach. The correspondent for *Time* and *Life* had been with the assault waves during the exceptionally bloody battle for Tarawa in 1943 and was no stranger to combat. However, what he saw on the beach shocked even him:

*The sloping sands were spotted with American dead. Here and there were dead Japs [Japanese], but it was apparent that the enemy had not defended his island from the beach. He depended mostly on his mortars, artillery, and hillside machine guns. Whether the dead were Japs or Americans, they have one thing in common; they died with the greatest possible violence. Nowhere in the Pacific war had I seen such badly mangled bodies. Many were cut squarely in half. Legs and arms lay fifty feet from any body. In one spot on the sand, far from the nearest cluster of dead, I saw a*
string of guts 15 feet long. Only the legs were easy to identify; they were Jap if wrapped in khaki puttees, American if covered by canvas leggings. The smell of burning flesh was heavy in some areas.  

While it was clear that the Marines had suffered heavily in killed and wounded those first two days on the beach, both the 4th and 5th Divisions continued their assault. The 28th Marine Regiment commanded by Colonel Harry B. Liversedge, a former Marine Raider, concentrated their fire on a series of caves and bunkers found at the base of Suribachi (figure 1.7). This area seemed to be where the Japanese had focused their mountain defensive
efforts. Marine 37mm antitank guns and even U.S. Navy destroyers offshore fired directly into any bunker and cave entrance that could be located, while the infantry maneuvered to get close enough to hit them with flamethrowers and explosives. It was slow going.

On both the 4th and 5th Division fronts, casualties continued to mount. For the Marines, the combat on Iwo devolved into a series of relentless frontal assaults against dug-in Japanese defenses. Marines usually only discovered Japanese positions when they drew fire from them. Even then, they were difficult to spot. Private First Class Jacklyn H. Lucas located what he thought was a Japanese fighting position near the edge of Motoyama Airfield No. 1. He could not initially see the Japanese soldiers, but he and several of his squad mates fired their weapons in the general direction of where they might be hidden. According to Lucas, they were so close that he believed the Japanese soldiers were fighting from a covered trench no more than four feet from his direct front. The Japanese soldiers finally made a mistake, and two of them stood up in Lucas’s line of fire. Lucas believed he killed at least one of the enemy soldiers before his M1 Garand rifle jammed. Because he was looking down trying to unjam his weapon, he was the only member of his squad who noticed another Japanese soldier roll two hand grenades into their position and next to Private First Class Allan C. Crowson, the squad’s automatic rifleman. Knocking Crowson out of the way and simultaneously yelling “grenade,” Lucas used the butt of his rifle to jam one of the explosives into the volcanic ash while pulling the second underneath his body. At least one of the grenades exploded directly underneath Lucas. His body was lifted into the air by the force of the grenade blast. Thanks to this selfless act of heroism, Lucas saved his fellow Marines from further bodily harm. Incredibly, although gravely wounded, Lucas survived his injuries and was later awarded the Medal of Honor.14

TAKING SURIBACHI AND MOTOYAMA AIRFIELD NO. 1

By D+4, having finally eliminated the Japanese defenders at the base of the mountain, Colonel Liversedge ordered Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, the commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, to send a reinforced patrol to the summit of the mountain. Johnson assigned the mission to former Raider First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier to take a patrol of about 48 Marines, including at least two U.S. Navy corpsmen, to climb the slope and, if possible, raise a flag on its summit. Most of the patrol came from Captain Dave E. Severance’s Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. The patrol did not know what to expect and many of the Marines who ascended Suribachi that morning did not expect to come back down alive. Nevertheless, Schrier gained the crest without any fighting and located a piece of Japanese water pipe and raised a small 3 feel x 5 feet American flag at approximately 1020 (figure 1.8).15 The flag was noticed by nearly everyone on the beach and even nearby U.S. Navy vessels. Ship’s horns sounded and Marines all along the line cheered, with some even throwing their helmets into the air in celebration. It was a tremendously emotional moment for everyone. Apparently, the noise and the flag attracted the notice of a few Japanese defenders hidden in a cave near the summit, but these soldiers were quickly eliminated by other members of Schrier’s patrol. About two hours later, and likely out of fear that the first flag might end up as someone’s battlefield souvenir, a second larger flag was raised to replace the
first one. An action photo of this second flag raising was fortuitously taken by AP photographer Joe Rosenthal. Contrary to some contemporary stories, neither flag raising was staged. Both raisings were spontaneous events, and the second flag only became more famous due to the strong visual impact of the Rosenthal photograph. While some might assume that the raising of the flags on Suribachi that day meant the enemy was nearly defeated, nothing could have been further from the truth. For the Marines, while it was good to know that the menacing presence of Suribachi was no longer an issue, there were still weeks of heavy fighting ahead for everyone.

Amazingly, Rosenthal’s iconic photograph nearly did not get taken. He missed the first flag raising, which took place on Mount Suribachi earlier on the morning of D+4. The honor of taking photographs of the first flag raising went to Leatherneck photographer Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery. Spotting Rosenthal going up to the summit as he was headed down the mountain, Lowery stated that the AP photographer asked him “if there was any use in his going up there.” The staff sergeant replied that he “thought there were good shots to be had because you could see almost the whole beach, with a panorama of the ships and equipment below.” This recommendation was enough to keep Rosenthal moving to the summit of Suribachi. Once on top, he noticed the first flag flapping in the breeze and a group of Marines getting a second one ready to be raised as a replacement for the first flag. Perhaps, he might get an image of them as they raised this second flag? Maneuvering for position with combat cameraman Sergeant William Genaust, Rosenthal almost missed his chance as he and the other photographer went out of their way not to interfere with each other’s shots. Rosenthal noted that “by being polite to each other we almost damned near missed [taking a photograph at all].” Suddenly, and almost without warning, Rosenthal noticed the second flag going up and shouted to the sergeant, “There it goes, Bill!” As Genaust filmed the event on his Bell & Howell camera, Rosenthal did not have his camera viewfinder fully ready. Fortunately, he snapped the shutter at the exact moment the flag was unfurling in the breeze and at a perfect 45-degree angle to the ground. Thus, by sheer luck and good timing, Rosenthal took what is likely the most famous combat photograph in American history.

While the 5th Division focused on Suribachi, the 4th Division faced its own kind of hell in and around the vertical cliffs farther north known as the “Rock Quarry” (figure 1.9). General Cates’ 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, 4th Marine Division, commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Justice M. Chambers, suffered 40 percent casualties in the fighting there. Chambers later received the Medal of Honor for his combat performance on Iwo Jima. Eventually, after three days of exceptionally heavy fighting, the regiments of the 4th Division stood atop the Motoyama Plateau and now faced the heart of the Japanese defenses strung across the center of the island near the second airfield. By D+4 (the same day as the Mount Suribachi flag raisings), the 23d Marines had suffered 1,160 casualties. In total, the 4th Division’s casualties were even higher (but only slightly so) than that of the 5th Division during their struggle to take Suribachi, with more than 2,778 Marines killed or wounded in the first four days of fighting.\textsuperscript{18}

By the time of the flag raisings on Mount Suribachi, the casualty levels had been so intense for both of Major General Schmidt’s assault divisions that he was already required to begin landing the strategic reserve of the 3d Marine Division (minus the 3d Marine Regiment). The two regiments of the 3d Division—the 21st and 9th Marine Regiments—eventually occupied the center of the American line with the 5th Division on their left and the 4th Division on their right. Weeks earlier, the Marines of the 3d Division were concerned that they might not be needed for this battle. By D+4, they no longer worried about being left out of the fight.

Not all Marines were initially assigned to an operating unit. One such Marine was Private First Class Ralph Lee Edwards from Stafford County, Virginia. Originally assigned to the 30th Replacement Draft, Marines in Edwards’ situation waited to be assigned to a unit at the front. In the meantime, most served on the beach unloading a never-ending stream of inbound U.S. Navy resupply vessels. The heavy casualties in the line regiments almost guaranteed that Marines from the 30th Replacement Draft would be in action soon. Thus, on D+4, Edwards found himself assigned to assist a machine gun team with Company I of the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines. He had been given no particular training for his new job, but he quickly learned what was expected. An “examination of the muster roll of the 24th Marines makes it patently clear that the assignment of men and officers from the replacement drafts was done alphabetically” and not based on preexisting skills or occupational specialties.\textsuperscript{20} Edwards recalled seeing the raising of a flag on Mount Suribachi that day. However, this was the same day that Company I lost more
than 20 percent of the Marines in the company. Most of these Marines gave little thought to the flag on Suribachi and instead tried to focus on staying alive. Edwards’ job was to keep his gun fed with an ample supply of ammunition. This meant he had to traverse to and from the beach retrieving it. According to Edwards, getting back down to the beach was not the hard part. Rather, it was finding his gun crew on the return trip that gave him the most consternation. Most of the time, Edwards’ gun crew had moved after he made the trip to the beach. This meant he had to search for them while carrying heavy machine gun ammunition belts in his hands and slung over his shoulder. He did this while hoping he did not have the misfortune of running into a Japanese sniper before he found his gun crew. As an ammo carrier, this meant that, for men like Edwards, “you was [sic] on the travel.”

NISHI RIDGE AND HILL 362A

By 27 February, all three divisions had run into General Kuribayashi’s main line of resistance near Motoyama Airfield No. 2. The 5th Division drew the assignment of taking Nishi Ridge and the heavily defended Hill 362A (figure 1.10). Captain Fred Haynes, a commander in the 28th Regiment, was astounded by the “compartmentalization” of the terrain. He believed that the Japanese could see the entire western half of the island from the top of Hill 362A. This was the likely reason earlier attacks by the 5th Division’s 26th and 27th Regimental Combat Teams had run into such stiff resistance. As a defensive system, Haynes noted that “the hill itself contained four separate tunnel systems. One of these stretched a thousand yards long and had seven entrances.” Nishi Ridge “also had an elaborate defensive network.” Due to the heavy presence of the enemy, the Marines could not conduct ground reconnaissance, and the only way to locate the Japanese was “to move forward, draw fire, and then destroy the unmasked enemy positions.” The fight to take Nishi Ridge and Hill 362A would cost the 28th Marines “an average of 236 casualties per day in three days of fighting.”

The 1 March attack on this defensive complex was particularly devastating to the “flag-raiser” group from Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. That day, Corporal Harold H. Block was killed along with Sergeants Henry O. Hansen and Michael Strank. Hansen was killed by rifle fire, while Strank literally had his heart ripped out of his chest from a mortar blast. The loss of the highly respected Sergeant Strank was especially felt by everyone in Company E. The following day, 2 March 1945, their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, was killed by artillery fire. There were many more casualties to come before this battle was over.

The 3d Division in the center of the line

FIGURE 1.10

Diagram of the Japanese cave system at Hill 362, produced by the Navy’s 31st Naval Construction Battalion, reveals the sophisticated nature of the excavation methods, lighting facilities, and entrance designs developed as part of Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi’s defensive strategy. Official U.S. Navy illustration
made slightly better headway. Due to the intensity of the fighting around Nishi Ridge, General Schmidt had to remind the 5th Marine Division to remain tied in with the 3d Division on its right. This proved easier said than done. Thanks to the arrival of timely tank support, the gap in the line did not become too egregious. After taking Hill 362A and Nishi Ridge, the 5th Division’s regimental combat teams had finally breached Kuribayashi’s main line of resistance on their front. In the fight across the center of the island, Japanese tactics remained simple and highly consistent; during assaults by Marine combat forces, the Japanese “kept underground in their caves during our preliminary barrages, some so deep down that they probably couldn’t hear the roar of our guns. As soon as the shelling ended, their observers pushed out of the cave openings, quickly followed by troops who took up a line of defense.”

TURKEY KNOB, THE AMPHITHEATER, AND HILL 382
Meanwhile, the 4th Division continued to struggle up the east coast of the island. After overcoming a formation of Japanese defensive works along the eastern shore of the island, the 4th Division regimental combat teams were forced to cross an expanse of flat open ground they called “the Amphitheater” that was dominated by a hill called “Turkey Knob.” Major General Cates sent up some M4 Sherman tanks from the 4th Tank Battalion, but they too were unsuccessful in dislodging the Japanese defenders. Here, the Japanese were determined to make their stand. The fighting was especially heavy around Hill 382, known to the Marines as “the Meat Grinder.”

An effective weapon used by the Marines at this time were tanks fitted with bulldozer blades that could literally carve through the Japanese defenses or the highly valued flame tanks that jetted napalm into cave and bunker entrances (figure 1.11). On Turkey Knob, the Marines discovered a huge Japanese concrete blockhouse that had withstood two days of direct fire attacks from their heaviest weapons. The attacks on this part of the Japanese lines had cost the 4th Division more than “4,000 officers and men.” The casualties, even with the addition of Marines from the replacement drafts, “reduced the strength of all battalions to a dangerous point. Almost every unit of the division had tried its hand at assaulting Hill 382 and the strong points in the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob.”

Beginning on 1 March 1945 and continuing for the next several days, the 4th Division made an all-out effort to break through General Kuribayashi’s defenses in their immediate front. Calling in heavy barrages of naval gunfire and artillery, the Marines of the 4th Division finally took the Meat Grinder, Turkey Knob, and the Amphitheater. Their casualties had been intense, though made more so by the Japanese using subterranean tunnels to pop up in locations the Marines had previously secured. Nevertheless, the enemy’s main line of resistance was broken on their front, although much more fighting remained ahead. About this time, contrary to Kuribayashi’s standing orders, a Japanese naval officer named Captain Samaji Inouye “led his sailors in one final banzai charge.” Artillery from the 4th Division mainly broke up this attack, and the rest were killed in hand-to-hand combat with the infantry. The Marines later counted at least 800 Japanese bodies in front of their lines.

Major General Schmidt’s Marine forces launched their greatest coordinated assault on
6 March 1945 (D+15): “All Corps and Division artillery and the medium and heavy guns of supporting vessels joined in this initial preparation.” The attacks were launched from left to right, starting with elements of the 5th Division first, the 3d Division in the center, and finally the 4th Division on the right of the entire line. While the bombardment was spectacular, it made little impression on the Japanese defenders. Ground gained by all three divisions was measured in mere yards and Schmidt did not achieve the breakthrough he hoped he would. Consequently, the Marines of the 3d Division shifted their tactics and made predawn attacks on objectives such as Hill 362C. This tactical change resulted in some degree of success as the 3d Division Marines, for once, caught the Japanese defenders off guard. By 7 March 1945, Major General Rockey’s 5th Division was finally reporting some diminishment in Japanese resistance on their front. By 9 March 1945, a six-man detachment from the 21st Marine Regiment had reached the northeastern shore of the island. To prove it, they sent back a canteen of sea water and forwarded it to Schmidt’s headquarters with the label, “for inspection, not consumption.”

As the Marines closed in on the last Japanese airfield—the partially constructed Motoyama Airfield No. 3—the combat troops
noted that this part of the island was a desolate area of barren rocky ridges: “The tall masses of rocks sprawled and tumbled without pattern, where a series of earthquakes had once pushed up millions of tons of volcanic stone and left them lying in craggy heights and bare, sharp-edged spines several hundred yards long.” Captain Robert Henri of the 3d Marine Division likened it to “going through a miniature Grand Canyon,” with Japanese soldiers concealed “in hundreds of caves and pillboxes among the rocks and boulders.” Henri noted that the fighting from D+16 to D+25 in the 3d Division’s zone of action was typical of the fighting in all three divisional sectors and was characterized “by a seemingly endless series of tragic episodes and unexpected deaths.” Nevertheless, the Marines pressed onward to Kitano Point in the far north end of the island.

THE FINAL POCKET

By mid-March, the back of the Japanese resistance had been largely broken on Iwo Jima. The Japanese who were still alive, however, were far from done with fighting. On 16 March 1945, without consulting Major General Schmidt, the senior American ground force commander on the island, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the senior Navy commander in the Pacific, declared that Iwo Jima was now secure. Nimitz’s announcement was clearly premature. The Marines knew there were still Japanese left alive in and around Kuribayashi’s final headquarters at Kitano Point. Meanwhile, mopping-up operations continued all over the island and the U.S. Army’s 147th Infantry Regiment, originally slated to serve as an occupation force, was asked to deploy early to assist in this effort. By this point, the 4th Marine Division, the most decimated of Schmidt’s combat divisions, started to return to their amphibious shipping located just off shore. Most of Major General Cates’s battalions had lost more than 50 percent of their men.

It was left largely to the 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, and the 26th Marine Regiment to reduce the last holdouts in and around Kuribayashi’s final headquarters (figure 1.12). By Saint Patrick’s Day on 17 March 1945, the 26th Marines had “reached the north coast at Kitano Point and had started to attack around the point, turning south to the northeast side of the rocky gorge” in front of the 28th Marines. Nevertheless, “enemy resistance in this area continued to be formidable from cave and spider foxhole positions.”

About this time, Captain Fred Haynes of the 28th Marines undertook an aerial reconnaissance of the Kitano Point area using a Piper L-4 light observation plane called a “grasshopper” on loan from Marine Observation Squadron 5. Haynes and his pilot flew very low to see if there was a better way to reduce the Japanese holdouts in the rocky crevasses the Marines were now calling “Bloody Gorge.” Thus, the captain was able to convince Major
General Rockey that attacking down the gorge would be as hellish as their previous assault on Nishi Ridge. Wishing to avoid further horrific casualties if possible, Haynes recommended attacking the east side of the gorge while being covered from the opposite side by other Marine units. He noted that “the contorted terrain made it impossible for tanks to operate effectively until armored bulldozers had cleared a road for their advance.” Thus, the reduction of Japanese troops in Bloody Gorge was going to take some time, and it was still going to be costly as the remaining Japanese, despite being offered terms of surrender over loud speakers set up by divisional intelligence sections, seemed determined to fight on to the bitter end.

In and around the gorge, Japanese snipers attacked from everywhere. Marines were picked off singly and in pairs until the very last day of organized Japanese resistance on the island. Consequently, due to the dire need for riflemen, many artillerymen found themselves on their way to various infantry regiments as replacements. One such replacement was Private First Class Donald W. Traub of the 13th Marine Regiment (artillery). Traub stated that he and 49 others of his artillery unit had been selected for this duty by their battalion commander, Major Carl W. Hjerpe. Traub and most of his fellow artillerymen were sent to the 27th Marines. Once with their new regiment, they were given the barest of instructions on how to behave in the front lines. Traub remembered that the best advice he received was to “keep your head down, don’t lose touch with the man next to you, and when you get the order to move out, run forward like hell in a zigzag pattern, then hit the deck while rolling away from the spot where you landed and find some sort of cover.” The advice must have worked since Traub survived the battle. However, he was seriously wounded in the chest on 23 March 1945 as he reached for a cigarette being offered by another Marine. He was eventually pulled to safety by a corpsman, treated, and evacuated to a hospital ship.

**DENOUEMENT**

On 26 March 1945, and into the early morning hours of 27 March, approximately 200 Japanese diehards located in the Bloody Gorge on Kitano Point conducted one last military operation. It was not a banzai attack. Instead, it was more akin to a mass infiltration to cause as much death and mayhem as they could before they were inevitably killed by the Americans. The diehards may have been led by Kuribayashi, but it also had been reported that the general had committed suicide in his bunker by this time. His remains have never been found.

The Japanese ultimately broke into the cantonment of the U.S. Army Air Forces 21st Fighter Group, killing at least 44 aviation personnel and wounding another 88 men. These men had recently been sent to the island to escort the Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber formations on their way to the Japanese home islands. U.S. Marine support units, and most notably the 5th Pioneer Battalion, responded to the crisis and eventually killed all the surviving attackers. First Lieutenant Harry L. Martin of Company C, 5th Pioneer Battalion, organized an ad hoc defensive line. Armed only with his .45-caliber pistol and hand grenades, Martin’s gallant stand enabled the Marines to stem the onrushing Japanese tide. Leading a personal charge into a body of the enemy, he was killed by a grenade blast. Martin was later posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Following this attack, the U.S. Army took over full responsibility for further mop-up operations. It should be noted that, beginning...
in April 1945, the U.S. Army’s 147th Infantry Regiment conducted “over 6,000 daylight patrols and night ambushes,” and “continued to combat over 2,500 surviving Japanese defenders until the end of the war.” The U.S. Army garrison reported by late June 1945 that they had “taken 867 prisoners and had killed 1,602 Japanese.” It also was clear that, by the time of the last organized Japanese attack on the 21st Fighter Group, there were plenty of holdouts still hiding in their tunnels and caves, most likely leaderless and wondering what they should do next. Two Japanese holdouts surrendered as late as 1949.

There can be no doubt that Iwo Jima was the toughest fight of the entire Second World War for the U.S. Marine Corps. Fully one-third of all Marine Corps Medals of Honor (22) awarded during the course of war had their genesis in this single campaign. On 26 March 1945, operational control was passed to the U.S. Army occupation commander and the 147th Infantry Regiment. A few days earlier on 21 March 1945, the last of the second flag-raising party members to be killed on the island lost his life to a sniper. By this point in the battle, reporters had already been asking to interview the members of Rosenthal’s famous photograph. Both Sergeant Strank and Corporal Block (and Sergeant Hansen who had originally been misidentified as a second flag raiser) had already been killed in action. At the time, according to Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine’s commanding officer, Captain Severance, reporters wished to interview any of the flag raisers from the Rosenthal photograph still alive on the island. Severance pointed out that Private First Class Rene Gagnon, then presumed to be a flag raiser, “[was] not [then] in the front lines and available to talk to them.” However, Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley from Hilltop, Kentucky, was in a very “critical area” and the company commander believed that it was more dangerous to extricate him from his foxhole than to leave him where he was. Unfortunately, Sousley was killed anyway, one of the last Marines in the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, to die in battle.

The cost to the Marines of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions had been horrific. General Smith noted that the average battalion of 36 officers and 885 enlisted men “was reduced to approximately 16 officers and 300 men at the end of the campaign.” He observed that it was not unusual for enlisted men as low ranking as a private first class to be leading platoons by the end of the battle. One captain in the 4th Division commanded his battalion for all but the first two days of the entire campaign. Smith claimed the success of the Marines at Iwo struck at the “falsity of the theory that regiments or battalions which are decimated can never win battles.”

He was convinced that Marine esprit de corps won the day at Iwo Jima.

War correspondent Robert Sherrod noted that, although the 2d Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment, 5th Division, “suffered heavier casualties than any other battalion on Iwo, the 5th Division’s losses in all regiments was fantastically high; the infantry battalion that came off the lightest lost 54 per cent [sic] [of its men].” Company B of the 1st Battalion, 28th Marines, “furnished an example of the severity of the losses; [during the battle] the company command changed eight times, the company’s second platoon’s leadership changed 11 times (five lieutenants, one gunnery sergeant, two corporals, one private first class), and Private Dale O. Cassel Jr. of Sacramento, who served three days until he was killed on 14 March 1945.”

By the end of the fighting on Iwo Jima, the
Japanese had lost approximately 22,000 men killed in action, though only about 1,000 Japanese soldiers surrendered—many of them had been seriously wounded. More than 6,800 Marines and sailors and at least one Coast Guardsman were killed in action on Iwo. Later, dozens of U.S. Army soldiers and Army Air Forces pilots and crewmen also lost their lives while securing the island. On D+26, Private First Class Anthony Muscarella, a member of Company E, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, noted that “there were 11 of us left from the original company. All the rest were new faces [replacement drafts]. It did not even look like the E Company that hit the beach.”

Nevertheless, despite the horrendous casualties and after the fighting was clearly over, many of the surviving Marines took the time to visit the various temporary divisional cemeteries before leaving the island (figure 1.13). The remnants of the gallant 5th Marine Division, “The Spearhead” of the operation, limped back to their camps in Hawaii to rest, recoup, and refit. Iwo Jima was the first and last cam-
ampaign the division would ever fight (not counting elements of the 5th Division reactivated for a short time during the Vietnam conflict). All six active Marine Corps combat divisions had been slated for participation in Operation Downfall, the invasion of the home islands of Japan scheduled for late 1945 and early 1946. However, their use was negated when the empire of Japan unconditionally surrendered in September 1945, following the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After the war, some of the Iwo veterans stayed in the Corps for their entire career. Captain Fred Haynes of the 28th Regimental Combat Team was one of them. He ultimately rose to the rank of major general and commanded both the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions before retiring from active duty. Others, such as second flag raisers Private First Class Harold Schultz and Private First Class Ira Hayes, were discharged from the Marine Corps immediately after their wartime service concluded. They, like thousands of other individual Marine veterans of the battle, returned home and began their lives anew as private citizens of the United States, though never forgetting what they had lived through and experienced during the battle of Iwo Jima.

ENDNOTES

1. For the specific costs to the Marine Corps, see Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 1994), 47. According to Alexander, “In its 36 days of combat on Iwo Jima, the V Amphibious Corps killed approximately 22,000 Japanese soldiers and sailors. The cost was staggering. The assault units of the corps—Marines and organic Navy personnel—sustained 24,033 casualties, by far the highest single-action losses in Marine Corps history.”

2. Adm J. J. Clark, USN (Ret), with Clark G. Reynolds, Carrier Admiral (New York: David McKay Company, 1967), 162–66, 182–86; and Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968), 235–43. In a unique operational move by the U.S. Navy in mid-1944, the Navy called this massive battle formation Task Force 38 (TF 58) (when it was commanded by Adm Spruance and VAdm Mitscher) but changed its name to Task Force 38 (when it was commanded Adm William F. Halsey, Jr. and VAdm John S. McCain Sr.). Both task forces largely used, with some notable exceptions, many of the same surface ships and carriers, only changing out the planning staffs. Halsey commanded the U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet, while Spruance commanded the Fifth Fleet; hence, the change in numerical designation from TF 38 to TF 58, depending on who was in overall command at any given time.


6. Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1948), 245. This is perhaps a bit of hyperbole on the part of Smith. Due to so much of the Japanese resistance being protected underground, it is very difficult to determine if increasing the amount of pre-invasion bombardment to 10 days would have made much of a difference in the Marine casualty levels. It may have, but Smith noted that the amount of antiaircraft fire coming from Iwo Jima increased following 70 days of pre-invasion heavy bombing by U.S. Army Air Forces.

7. Capt Clifford P. Morehouse, USMCR, The Iwo Jima Operation (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1959), 124. It should be noted that the Marine Corps History Division historians gathered this data “almost verbatim” from the V Amphibious Corps Landing Force Action Report, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.


12. Clarence E. Willie, African American Voices from Iwo Jima:
Personal Accounts of the Battle [Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2010], 159–60. Depot companies were part of what was called “Corps Troops” and not assigned to any specific combat division. However, their service was invaluable throughout the course of the battle.


14. Jack H. Lucas with D. K. Drum, Indestructible: The Unforgettable Story of a Marine Hero at the Battle of Iwo Jima (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006), 96–101. The story of Jacklyn Lucas is one of the most incredible stories of heroism recorded during the Second World War. Lucas had illegally enlisted in the Marine Corps as an underage minor; according to his memoirs, Lucas was 14 years old when he enlisted. Temporarily assigned to duty in Hawaii, it was soon discovered that Lucas was very much underage and a habitual disciplinary problem, so the Marine Corps began the process of discharging him. Instead, Lucas managed to secretly stow away on the USS Deuel (APA 160), then being fitted out to carry elements of the 5th Marine Division to Iwo Jima. Revealing himself to members of the 26th Regiment on 8 February 1945, Lucas convinced the commanding officer to assign him to the 1st Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment, the same unit as his cousin. Jacklyn Lucas turned 17 years old on the same day he was so horrifically wounded by Japanese grenades. He was the youngest Marine to ever receive the Medal of Honor.

15. After Action Report, Combat Team 28, February–March 1945, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

16. Bradley and Powers, Flags of Our Fathers, 318. Most historical accounts credit a Marine Corps desire for a larger, more visible flag to sustain morale throughout the battle as the primary justification for replacing the first flag.

17. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 60–61. Although now somewhat obsolete due to recent revelations concerning the identities of the first and second flag-raising parties on Mount Suribachi on D+4, Shadow of Suribachi is an excellent resource for determining the actual timeline of events that took place that day.


23. Casualty cards for Sgts Henry O. Hansen and Michael Strank, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

24. Casualty card for LtCol Chandler W. Johnson, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

25. Capt Raymond Henri et al., The U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima (New York: Dial Press, 1945), 163. Henri and the other Marine Corps authors—1stLt Jim G. Lucas, TSgt W. Keys Beech, TSgt David K. Dempsey, and TSgt Alvin M. Josephy Jr.—were combat correspondents who covered the combat activity of all three Marine combat divisions throughout the battle for Iwo Jima.


37. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 98. PhM2c John Bradley, PFC Rene Gagnon, and PFC Ira Hayes were ordered back to the United States in early April 1945 by the president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt would pass away on 12 April 1945. Vice President Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency and one of his first acts was to kick off the Seventh War Bond campaign. Since Rosenthal’s iconic photograph had been selected as the drive’s emblematic logo, the two Marines and one Navy corpsman met the new president on 20 April and immediately launched into the whirlwind of the bond drive. The presumed flag raisers would be accompanied on this tour by TSgt W. Keys Beech. Beech was the combat correspondent who most closely covered the activities of the 28th Marines during their time on Iwo Jima. See Albee and Freeman, “Heroes on Parade,” in Shadow of Suribachi. For a detailed explanation of whom the Marine Corps now believes is pictured in the iconic Rosenthal photograph, see Mary Reinwald and Keil Gentry’s chapters in this volume.

38. Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, 275.


40. Anthony Muscarella, Iwo Jima: The Young Heroes (Memphis, TN: Freedom Press, 1989), 95. PFC Muscarella was, like Medal of Honor recipient Jacklyn Lucas, significantly underage when he enlisted in the Marine Corps. As with Lucas, he also was recognized for gallantry in action and was awarded the Silver Star by Gen Clifton B. Cates for repelling an infiltration attack on his company on the night of 24 February 1945. Muscarella was singlehandedly responsible for killing eight Japanese soldiers attempting to infiltrate his company area.

CHARLES P. NEIMEYER

26
INTRODUCTION

Ever since two American flags were raised atop Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945, many legends and myths have arisen from the Battle of Iwo Jima, an iconic Marine Corps fight. This most celebrated of all Marine battles has done more than any other to cement the public perception of the Corps as the nation’s premier fighting force, one willing to pay any price or bear any burden to achieve its objectives. The loss of 24,053 Marines and sailors from the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions at Iwo Jima, including more than 6,140 men killed in action on land and sea, was the cost of this reputation, representing the “highest single-action losses in Marine Corps history.”

One of the most persistent myths is that this was an all-Marine and Navy battle fought without the aid of the U.S. Army or Army Air Forces. Recently uncovered official U.S. Army records stored at the National Archives, as well as a review of Marine Corps historical accounts published nearly 50 years ago, have now come to light that prove there was yet another flag raising carried out during the Iwo Jima campaign, but with a difference. Instead of being raised aloft by Marines, this flag was planted by soldiers of the U.S. Army. Thus, on 5 May 1945, Major Richard R. Morison raised a flag on Minami Island near Iwo Jima, marking his Service’s contribution. While the Marines’ flag marked the beginning of operations, because they were often the “first to fight,” this flag marks the Army’s contribution that required an equally dirty fight within the mopping-up and occupation phase.

At the time the Army’s flag raising occurred, nearly every American in and out of uniform must have been aware of the iconic image taken by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal, which had been widely reproduced in a variety of news publications as well as in soldier’s magazines and newspapers, such as *Yank* and *Stars and Stripes*, during the previous two months. But the Army’s flag raising received little notice; in this instance, the oversight might have been due to the overwhelming media exposure of the Rosenthal photograph and its subsequent featuring in the nation’s seventh war bond drive, or possibly to the fact that no photograph of any Army flag raising had
yet to emerge. Even the U.S. Army’s official account of the bloody campaign in the Pacific fails to mention it or an Army regiment’s participation in the battle. Today, joint operations are widely conducted and are important for the protection of U.S. national security and world peace from terrorism and other threats, but successful joint operations are not new. Perhaps it is time to resurrect this event from obscurity and to credit the equally obscure Army infantry regiment that raised it.

The Battle of Iwo Jima, known officially as the Iwo Jima Operation by the Navy and Marine Corps, and as the Bonin-Volcano Islands Operation by the U.S. Army, was a joint operation from its inception, with the Army and Army Air Forces contributing significantly to the battle’s outcome and the island’s subsequent role as a base to support bombing raids against mainland Japan. In fact, besides contributing more than 20,000 troops to the island’s garrison after the Marines departed in early April 1945, the Army contributed an entire infantry regiment—the 147th Infantry Regiment—that joined the battle on 21 March 1945, fought the Japanese die-hard survivors until the end of July 1945, and even conducted a flag raising ceremony of its own. This, then, is the story of that regiment and of the flag-raising ceremony they conducted during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

HISTORY OF THE REGIMENT
The 147th Infantry Regiment, a unit of the Ohio National Guard, was activated and inducted into federal service on 15 October 1940, more than a year before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Recruited mainly from the Cincinnati area, the regiment was an integral part of the state’s 37th Infantry Division and traced its roots back to the American Civil War, where it was originally known as the 6th Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Redesignated as the 147th Infantry Regiment on 25 October 1917, it was federalized and deployed to France as part of the 37th Infantry Division during World War I, where it fought as part of the American Expeditionary Forces under General John J. Pershing. During World War II, the 37th Infantry Division was shipped out to the South Pacific four months after Pearl Harbor and was assigned to defend the strategically important Fijian islands beginning in April 1942.

The 147th Infantry temporarily detached from its parent division, which remained behind in Fiji, and took part in the Battle of Guadalcanal. These soldiers experienced sustained jungle fighting from early November 1942 to early February 1943. An integral part of the Composite Army-Marine (CAM) Division, the regiment played a prominent role in the final battles for the island, which ended in victory with Japan’s evacuation of its surviving troops by 8 February 1943. After the island was declared secure on 9 February, the 147th Infantry was retained as the Allies’ “mopping-up” force, remaining behind as the island’s garrison, while the rest of the 37th Infantry Division, which never served on Guadalcanal, deployed elsewhere. Permanently relieved from assignment to its parent division on 31 July 1943, the 147th Infantry Regiment would thereafter operate separately as an independent regiment (figure 2.1). It was frequently attached to Marine Corps units or served under Navy command as it would later do at Iwo Jima.

Usually the regiment’s mission, similar to that of the Marine Corps’ own base defense battalions, was to mop up in the wake of amphibious assaults and to prepare to defend against Japanese counterlandings. Mopping-up essentially consists of identifying and
FIGURE 2.1
Prior to deploying to Iwo Jima, troops from the 147th Infantry conduct a machine gun firing range on the island of New Caledonia, including captured Japanese weapons, such as this 7.7mm Nambu Type 92 heavy machine gun, 24 November 1944.
Official U.S. Army Signal Corps photo

eliminating any remaining enemy resistance by thoroughly combing through terrain that has already been taken. The soldiers of the 147th Infantry performed this duty at Emirau Island, Papua New Guinea, while attached to the 4th Marine Division from 11 April to 1 July 1944, where its men saw no combat except the constant battle against boredom and mosquitoes. However, rather than allowing the regiment to grow stale while performing glorified garrison duty in the wake of the Marine Corps’ seizure of the island, the regimental commander, Colonel William B. Tuttle Jr., insisted that it fill its daily calendar with training activities, ranging from refresher courses on individual skills, such as rifle marksmanship and patrolling, all the way up to battalion-level field exercises. Moreover, the regiment routinely reviewed lessons learned from its experience on Guadalcanal and incorporated as many of these as possible into its standard operating procedures. Toward the end of 1944, it also conducted competitions between the various companies of the regiment and staged training events so that even cooks and clerks were given the opportunity to fire and become familiar with American as well as Japanese weapons.5

Based on battle experience gained on Guadalcanal and during its employment since, the regiment also insisted that when its platoons and companies went into battle they carry additional automatic weapons and flamethrowers, which had proved their utility on Guadalcanal and would once again be used at Iwo Jima when the time came. These weapons, such as Browning Automatic Rifles and Thompson submachine guns, enabled the average rifle platoon of the 147th Infantry to field far more firepower than the standard Army rifle platoon of the time. While the regiment formally adhered to the U.S. Army’s standard table of organization and equipment, its squads were habitually reinforced by each company’s heavy weapons platoon or the battalion weapons company, which provided these additional weapons, such as flamethrowers, in direct support (i.e., their use was directed by the squad leader). This went against Army doctrinal practice, which generally prescribed keeping these assets employed at the company or battalion level where they would provide general support to squads and platoons. The tactical situation on Iwo Jima demanded otherwise, and the success of this practice speaks for itself (figure 2.2). This action also does not rule out the then-common practice of using additional weapons—“battlefield pickups”—found on the field to supplement unit arsenals.

These additional weapons and the knowledge of how to more effectively employ them would stand the soldiers in good stead at Iwo Jima. However, as 1944 neared its end, the regiment, occupying temporary quarters on the island of New Caledonia, had no idea as to where it would be deployed next; although,
many of its men were anticipating the war’s end, believing that they would all soon be going home.

**INTO THE FIGHT**

These hopes were shattered shortly after the 1945 New Year’s celebrations were concluded, when the regiment’s new commander, Colonel Robert F. Johnson, informed his men that “we’re going right up into [General Hideki] Tojo’s front yard.” Though the location of the next campaign was still a secret, Johnson stressed the seriousness of their upcoming assignment, stating that “every man must know this and every man must be prepared.”

Thereafter commenced an intensive training schedule for the regiment, which had lost nearly half of its experienced personnel due to the troop rotation program, which mandated that troops who had been in the Pacific theater for a certain number of months be sent home to the United States. Courses in jungle warfare were set up on New Caledonia, firing ranges were built to hone infantry skills, and instruction in amphibious operations was given to officers and noncommissioned officers. What Johnson
surely knew, but his men did not, was that the regiment would face a determined enemy when they landed at Iwo Jima. As the Marines would soon learn after they landed on 19 February (D-day), the Japanese would defend the island, seen as Japanese soil, with unparalleled fanaticism. By 24 February, the day after the U.S. flag was raised over Iwo Jima, the 147th Infantry was ready. Meanwhile, the Marines, who had landed on Iwo Jima the week prior, had been experiencing hard fighting and had already lost a significant number of men to the fervent resistance of the Japanese.

Fewer than two dozen men of the 147th Infantry’s advance party had sailed with the invasion force, consisting of V Amphibious Corps with its three Marine divisions, at the beginning of February. The main body of the regiment (codenamed Task Unit 11.1.2) with its three battalions, Cannon Company, Antitank Company, and headquarters troops began loading on four troop transports on 24 February and sailed on 4 March 1945 for the invasion force’s staging base at Eniwetok atoll. After dropping anchor on 14 March, the regiment was told that it would remain at Eniwetok until 31 March (D+40), when it would be called forward to begin its assignment as Iwo Jima’s garrison troops, responsible for base defense as it had been at Guadalcanal, Emirau, and New Caledonia. Any relief the men felt upon hearing this did not last long; within hours after their arrival at Eniwetok, the regimental commander received a message from the commander of Task Force 53 participating in the amphibious assault on Iwo Jima, Navy Admiral Harry W. Hill, stating: “Request Task Unit 11.1.2 carrying 147th Inf. be directed proceed [sic] Iwo Jima earliest practicable date.” The message did not state why they were so badly needed. After only a few hours at Eniwetok, the ships carrying the 2,952 men of the regiment weighed anchor and departed that same day (map 2).

The men learned, while en route to Iwo Jima, that the 147th Infantry had been attached to the 3d Marine Division. What had prompted the early departure, of course, was that the seizure of Iwo Jima had proven to be far tougher than the Marines anticipated. Japanese resistance was as stubborn as it was fierce. Losses in the Marine divisions taking part in the assault—3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions—had been astronomical; in this action, battalions had been reduced to companies and companies to Platoons after only a few days of fighting. Consequently, there were far fewer Marines available to finish mopping-up duties on the island. The 147th Infantry’s task on the island had been to do garrison duty after the Marines completed the mop-up phase; however, by the time the regiment arrived, thousands of Japanese defenders still refused to surrender, requiring more ground troops than anticipated to hunt them out of their underground stronghold and kill them. Before the island could be declared secured, these diehards would have to be dealt with. The available evidence indicates that the 147th Infantry was unaware of the magnitude of the fighting that lay ahead of them, though they knew that mopping up after the Marines would not be easy. Despite the prolongation of the campaign, one of Iwo Jima’s three air fields had already been placed into limited operation to handle the crippled bombers returning from air raids on the Japanese mainland needing emergency landing strips, a course preferable to ditching the craft in the ocean.

The ships bearing the 147th Infantry arrived off the coast of Iwo Jima at 1335 on 20 March 1945. Its members saw the battered peak of Mount Suribachi for the first time and heard the sounds of the ongoing battle. In the
words of the regimental commander, “Everyone strained to see how he would physically fit into the regiment’s mission on the island.”

By that point, Rosenthal’s widely publicized photograph of the flag raising on 23 February would have been seen by the men of the 147th Infantry; certainly, they could not have missed seeing the flag still flying atop Mount Suribachi the day they arrived on Iwo, since it was visible from any point on the island.

The regiment’s initial orders had read that the 147th Infantry would defend the new base to be built on Iwo Jima by organizing positions at probable landing beaches, perform continuous observation of the whole coastline, and prepare inland and final defensive positions. These orders were changed that same afternoon to reflect that it would now conduct a relief in place of elements of 3d Marine Division, then engaged in deadly mopping-up operations, and “assist Marine forces in clearing the island of remaining Japanese defenders and stragglers.” It would not, as originally believed, become a component of the Army garrison force, at least for the next two weeks (figure 2.3).

To carry out its new assignment, the regiment disembarked from its transports at Purple Beach on the island’s southwest coast at dawn on 21 March 1945 and occupied its assembly area in Target Area 183-Golf near Motoyama Airfield No. 2 by late that morning (see map 2). The regimental commander and his staff had already met with Marine Corps Major General Graves B. Erskine, the commanding general of 3d Marine Division, at his command post earlier that day, where they received the details about the 147th Infantry’s new assignment. The following day, 1st and 2d Battalions were informed that they would be attached to 21st Marine Regiment and would relieve its 2d and 3d Battalions on 23 March 1945. The 147th Infantry’s 3d Battalion was ordered to immediately begin patrolling around the base of Mount Suribachi, atop of which the flag that had been planted by the Marines on 23 February still fluttered for all to see.

Each of the regiment’s three battalions was assigned its own sector, with the island divided roughly into thirds: 1st Battalion drew the east coast from Target Area 236-Dog to Target Area 186-Able, stretching inland to form a triangle that included Motoyama Airfield No. 3; 2d Battalion was assigned the northeast coast of the island from Target Area 251-Fox to Target Area 236-Dog, reaching inland to the western edge of Airfield No. 3; and 3d Battalion was given the defense of the east and west beaches (see map 2). On its first day of combat, patrols from 1st Battalion killed 23 Japanese while being guided into their new area by Marines familiar with the area. Japanese troops probed their defensive positions that evening, randomly tossing hand grenades that kept everyone awake in their foxholes.

Thus commenced what would prove to be a grueling and dangerous assignment. The soldiers of the 147th Infantry now confronted the enemy face to face for the first time since the Battle of Guadalcanal two years prior. The battalions sent out patrols, set upambushes, and exploited abandoned tunnels and caves during the day; at night, they sprang ambushes upon Japanese troops who had left their underground warrens to search for food and water. It was a bloody business; for example, the troops of the 147th Infantry employed highly effective “corkscrew and blowtorch” tactics, involving the lib-
eral use of satchel charges and flamethrowers, that Marines and soldiers had developed at Peleliu during the previous autumn and were widely disseminated throughout the Pacific (figure 2.4). These tactics forced the Japanese out of their fighting positions, where they would be killed out in the open by overwhelming automatic weapons fire or sealed within their caves. At night, ambush patrols reported sighting dozens of unsuspecting Japanese, who brazenly penetrated American defensive positions to steal food, weapons and, above all, water.

The regiment’s area of responsibility soon grew when, on 26 March, it was assigned the sector being vacated by the hard-hit 5th Marine Division, which was being shipped out to be rebuilt for the impending invasion of the Japanese mainland. It was also the same day that Iwo Jima was officially declared “secure,” signifying the point in the operation when overall command of land forces was finally handed over to the U.S. Army Garrison Force, under Army Air Forces Major General James E. Chaney, who relieved Marine Corps Major General Harry Schmidt of V Amphibious Corps.

Placing the 147th Infantry into the line of
battle on 23 March did have one adverse impact though. During the early morning hours of 26 March, a number of Japanese survivors launched a final, desperate attack against the bivouac area of the Army’s garrison force located near Airfield No. 1 in Target Area 198-Juliet, which was occupied at the time by a number of Army Air Forces fighter pilots from VII Fighter Command, a field hospital, U.S. Navy Seabees, and the Marines’ 5th Pioneer Battalion, 5th Marine Division, and 8th Field Depot, V Amphibious Corps (see map 2). Fifty-three Americans were slain and 119 wounded before a counterattack by the Seabees and 5th Pioneer Battalion, reinforced by elements of the 28th Marine Regiment, then in the process of redeploying aboard their troopships, were able to systematically hunt down and kill the Japanese. A total of 223 enemy bodies were initially counted, with the total rising to 300 before it was all over.\footnote{14}

Had the 147th Infantry not been engaged in widespread mopping-up operations at the time, it may well have been available as the gar-
rison security force as was originally intended, and the impact of the Japanese attack might not have been as significant. As it was, it was bad enough, and thereafter until the last Japanese defender was accounted for, security, especially in the bivouac areas, was strictly maintained. Another result was that, on 26 March, the 147th Infantry was directed by Headquarters, 3d Marine Division, to maintain a company-size general reserve, or reaction force, near the airfield at all times should future incidents such as the 23 March attack reoccur.  

**RELIEVING THE MARINES**

The land forces had come under control of General Chaney on 26 March, yet Major General Erskine of 3d Marine Division continued to serve as the commander of ground combat forces until 4 April 1945. With this development, the regiment now was responsible for the defense of nearly the entire island, including Mount Suribachi, with the exception of the eastern portion of the island that remained under the control of the 9th Marine Regiment. The 147th Infantry Regiment continued its operations, maintaining a rapid tempo designed to prevent the Japanese survivors from coalescing and carrying out large-scale attacks against the American units, which now primarily consisted of Marine units recovering from the battle, antiaircraft units, and construction battalions preparing the three airfields as permanent bases. The pace of operations continued through the end of the month and beyond; by 31 March, the 147th Infantry had killed 387 Japanese troops and had captured 17 (figure 2.5). In turn, the regiment had lost 8 men killed in action and 53 wounded. It was a clear sign that mopping up would not be easy.

On 4 April, the 147th Infantry relieved the last remaining Marine unit on the island—the 9th Marine Regiment—and from that point onward was solely responsible for finishing the mop up on Iwo Jima as well as acting as its defense force (figure 2.6). After Major General Erskine departed and the Army’s operations continued, Erskine showed appreciation for the regiment’s service while attached to his division in his 11 April 1945 commendation letter, writing, “The 147th Infantry Regiment displayed in their debarkation, movement into positions and execution of assigned missions a fine spirit of cooperation and a commendable eagerness for combat” and was “an inspiration to all hands.” While the Marines were now free to prepare for their next mission, the 147th Infantry’s primary mission was just beginning.

Until the end of July, when the last Japanese die-hard defender was dispatched, the 147th Infantry Regiment carried out its deadly...
task with monotonous regularity. Patrols and security sweeps occupied the day and ambush patrols the night. As one day followed another, the number of Japanese killed or captured continued to mount; for example, 963 were killed in April alone, with another 664 captured. The corkscrew and blowtorch tactics continued unabated. Japanese refusing to leave their caves were sealed within by explosives or killed when gasoline was pumped into their hideouts and ignited. In May, 252 were killed, while 186 surrendered, choosing to live instead.

A platoon of Japanese-speaking Nisei was attached to the regiment, whose communication of appeals in the defenders’ native language helped make the “dishonorable” act of surrender more palatable. As time went by, more and more Japanese chose this way out, though diehards continued to exercise their influence on isolated parties who chose to either fight to the death or commit suicide rather than surrender. Many Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) chose to help their captors convince their countrymen to surrender rather than needlessly killing themselves. By the end of June, the number of Japanese killed had fallen to 17, with only 6 surrendering. After that month, only occasional living Japanese were spotted, though when captured most of them proved to be impressed Korean laborers. These events—the Army’s hard-fought battles, Japanese surrenders, and the presence of Korean laborers—demonstrates that the narrative of Iwo Jima has been simplified in historical memory. Events here were far more complex than Rosenthal’s image could convey.

The regiment’s core strength was decreased on 30 June, when its 1st Battalion was relieved from its duties and embarked aboard the USS Rockwall (APA 230), which sailed to the island of Tinian, where the battalion would provide security for the top-secret Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber unit designated to drop two atomic bombs on mainland Japan. Thus, reduced in size by one-third, the regiment was forced to do the same amount of patrolling with fewer men with its two remaining battalions (figure 2.7). A levy of 18 company-grade officers took place on 29 May 1945, further sapping the regiment’s strength. Urgently needed for the Battle of Okinawa, where the casualty rate of Army lieutenants and captains had been extremely high since the invasion of that island began on 1 April 1945, these seasoned officers volunteered to depart Iwo Jima for a tour of duty with the Army’s 96th Infantry Division even though they could have remained on Iwo Jima.

After 30 June, the now-understrength 147th Infantry worked slowly and methodically, taking no chances and using as much firepower as the situation demanded. Since the island had been declared secure since 26 March, the sol-
...diers had no rigid timetable to adhere to, unlike the Marines, who had been forced to take enormous risks to secure their objectives according to schedule. To help address this shortage of frontline troops, the regiment’s Cannon and Antitank Companies were both employed in the line as infantry. Even with this augmentation, there still were not enough troops to cover everything. Additionally, the regiment continued to suffer casualties, usually caused by Japanese mines, snipers, booby traps, and machine gun fire. The ability of the Japanese to infiltrate American positions at night was astonishing, but once they had left their concealed positions, they were fair game for the numerous ambush patrols the 147th Infantry sent out each night.

On 4 June 1945, the enormous cave complex reputedly used as the underground headquarters of the island’s commander, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, was discovered. Although the 147th Infantry had already identified and exploited several other large underground complexes, this one located on the island’s northeast quadrant was the largest. A patrol from Company F, led by Lieutenant James J. Ahern, found the cave still defended by the enemy, who refused calls to surrender. Calling forward a demolition team from the regiment’s Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, led by Lieutenant Joseph Lenoir, the soldiers pumped in hundreds of gallons of gasoline and set it alight. The resulting fire ignited a quantity of ammunition stored inside, killing or wounding many of the surviving occupants who had not committed suicide. Fifty-four survivors surrendered, though two killed themselves shortly afterward.

An exploration of the cave complex soon followed, revealing several subterranean levels that contained offices, ammunition and ration storage areas, sleeping quarters, and radio rooms, all linked by interconnecting tunnels so large that the Americans could walk upright through them. The general’s quarters consisted of several smaller rooms, reinforced with concrete, and fitted with multiple escape hatches. A number of bodies were found inside, all of them showing signs of having committed suicide. However, General Kuribayashi’s remains were not found within, as it was believed he had died or had committed suicide during a counterattack carried out several weeks prior. Lieutenant Lenoir and his men made several detailed sketches of this cave complex as well as several others, mute testimony to the tunneling skills of the Japanese, who had moved nearly their entire force underground before the Ma-

FIGURE 2.7
A soldier of the 147th Infantry, perched on the edge of a cliff on the island’s northeast corner, pauses before leading a search of a cave complex carved out of the island’s rocky soil. During these mop-up operations, the 147th Infantry captured or killed thousands of Japanese troops. Official U.S. Army photo, courtesy of PFC Bruce Elkus via his granddaughter Marianne Ingleby
rine assault commenced on 19 February 1945. With their inspections complete, Lenoir, who had been an Oklahoma oil field “wildcatter” in civilian life, had his men seal the caves shut with explosives to prevent them from being reoccupied by the enemy.\(^22\)

On 11 April, an 11-man ambush patrol from Company A, led by its commander, Captain James T. Kolb, took the largest number of prisoners at one time during the entire battle of Iwo Jima near Target Area 202-Fox, located on the eastern portion of the island. When the patrol spotted two Japanese soldiers emerging from a hole near its ambush position during the early morning hours, Kolb’s men opened fire, killing one and seriously wounding the other. Despite his wounds, the Japanese soldier managed to crawl back into the hole, prompting Kolb to use his Nisei interpreter, Sergeant Ritsuwo Tanaka, to call to the Japanese to come out and surrender or they would be sealed up alive with explosives. After a brief negotiation, Kolb learned that his patrol had stumbled upon the hospital of the 2d Mixed Brigade, located 100 feet underground. The Japanese, led by senior medical officer Major Masaru Inaoka, called for a vote of surrender—69 men voted “aye” and 3 voted “nay” and immediately committed suicide, allowing the others to depart unharmed.

During the next several hours, Kolb and his men assisted 13 Japanese medical officers, 1 warrant officer, and 59 medical enlisted men as they crawled through the cave’s two-foot-square exit. Several wounded men being treated in the hospital also were evacuated. In addition to bringing out all of their medical supplies, the hospital also presented the Americans with six flags and several Samurai swords, which Kolb’s men kept. When asked by the interpreter why he had surrendered with all of his men, the Japanese hospital commander replied that he thought his situation was hopeless and that he trusted that the Americans would obey the “International Conventions of the Red Cross.”\(^23\)

So many were taken prisoner that trucks had to be requested to pick up and drop off all of the Japanese at the island’s POW facility.

Day by day, the gruesome death toll mounted, as well as the number of captures, such that by 30 June 1945, the regiment had killed 1,602 Japanese holdouts and had captured 867 more, accounting for nearly 2,500 of the enemy. The number who died in sealed caves will never be known. In return, the 147th Infantry Regiment suffered the loss of 15 men killed in action and another 144 wounded, as well as dozens more to noncombat-related injuries or sickness (figure 2.8). Many Japanese, whether dead or captured, showed no signs of starvation or privation at all, and a number of them were carrying American weapons, grenades, and even...
GI-issue items, such as ponchos, shelter halves, and leggings.

AN ARMY FLAG RAISING
With the island declared secure for more than a month, members of the 147th Infantry held its own flag-raising ceremony. The Marines in the midst of taking the island took the time to raise the flag, and the Army’s flag represented the coda to the battle. Although it did not occur on the island of Iwo Jima proper, unlike the actual flag raisings that took place on Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945, the Army did raise the American flag on the neighboring island of Minami, a scant 35 miles south-southeast of Iwo Jima. Considered part of the Volcano Islands group, with Iwo Jima forming the largest island, the 1.37-square-mile island of Minami, also known as Minami Iwo Jima or South Iwo Jima, had to be searched and secured to ensure that no Japanese forces held it that might interfere with flight operations on Iwo Jima.

Accordingly, the 147th Infantry was notified on 2 May 1945 by the U.S. Army Garrison Force headquarters that it was to conduct a reconnaissance of the island the following day. Adverse weather prevented Company C, which had been selected to carry out the mission, from departing Iwo Jima until 5 May 1945. As a result, 4 May was used for planning and rehearsals, while Major Richard Morrison, the 1st Battalion operations officer, selected to lead the mission, carried out an aerial reconnaissance that afternoon. No enemy were spotted on the island, so plans were advanced that evening for the amphibious task force, which was to consist of 111 men from Company C, 39 from Company B, 5 medical personnel, and Army photographer Private First Class Bruce Elkus, to depart from White Beach no. 2 at 0233 the morning of 5 May 1945. At the last moment, Major Morrison’s force was joined aboard Landing Craft, Infantry 1094 (LCI 1094) by three “observers” from the Army garrison force headquarters.

Morrison’s task force arrived at the island at 0630 and began circling its four-and-a-half-mile shoreline in search of possible landing beaches. No signs of life were detected, and the LCI lowered its ramp 30 feet from the north-eastern shoreline. Striking rocks, the ship withdrew and launched its dingy, which succeeded in landing a six-man shore party at 0916 to patrol the area in search of a better landing site. Spotting nothing of importance other than a wrecked Japanese airplane and large quantities of washed-up Marine supplies, including crates of C-rations, the patrol was surprised when they flushed an enemy soldier out of his hiding place an hour later. This soldier, who proved to a Korean crew survivor from a Japanese transport that had been sunk at least 40 days earlier, spoke no English but could read and write in the language. Upon interrogation, he wrote that he was the island’s only inhabitant, and had been subsisting off of washed-up C-rations and rainwater.

After being told by radio that the island was clear, Major Morrison and four others, including the photographer, left the LCI aboard the ship’s dingy an hour later. The small boat overturned in the surf, dumping its passengers 40–50 feet from the shore, forcing them to swim the rest of the way. Despite this mishap, Elkus and all of his photographic equipment were retrieved and safely landed. At noon, Morrison and his waterlogged party had reached the summit on the island’s southeast tip and raised the American flag in a brief ceremony. Morrison, who had written a short statement to mark the occasion, said

As an officer of the United States Army, and under authority invested [sic] in me by the Congress of the United States, I hereby do take...
possessed of this island, Minami Iwo Jima, in the name of the United States of America.  

It is assumed that Private First Class Elkus recorded this solemn moment on film, but to date, none of his photographs of the event have been discovered. It would have been interesting to see how this purely symbolic ceremony carried out by the 147th Infantry compared to or was influenced by the one conducted six weeks earlier atop Mount Suribachi by the Marines. After all, Morrison had not been ordered to raise the flag, only to conduct a reconnaissance of the island; so perhaps the flag-raising ceremony was carried out on his own initiative.

Major Morrison and his landing party, along with their prisoner, then tried to return to the ship by rubber raft, since their dingy had been smashed on the rocks earlier while attempting to land. Finally, after several attempts and another capsizing, the major and his men were safely back on board LCI 1094 by 1719 that afternoon. Private First Class Elkus had once again been washed overboard when a wave hit the raft, though whether he was able to save his camera and its precious film remains unknown. Finally, after having to sever its anchor cable after the ship’s stern anchor became caught in the rocks near the shoreline, the LCI carrying the amphibious task force returned safely to Iwo Jima, arriving without incident at White Beach no. 2 at 2215 that night. The sole prisoner was taken to the POW cage, the only concrete result of the day’s activities. There is no evidence that the Army’s flag raising on Minami Iwo Jima was ever publicized, and no further mention of it is recorded in the regimental history. Another landing party was arranged to conduct a reconnaissance of Kita, a much smaller island a few miles north of Iwo Jima, on 30 May 1945, but the group returned without spotting the enemy or raising a flag (figure 2.9).

THE ARMY GARRISON FORCE
By 20 April, there were few Marines left on Iwo Jima, except for the 5,330 buried in the island’s three division cemeteries. The rest had departed for various rest areas in the Pacific, where they would absorb replacements and prepare for the impending invasion of Japan, code-named Operation Downfall. The island was far from uninhabited, however. By that point, 31,000 soldiers, Navy Seabees, and Army Air Forces ground crews had nearly filled the island to capacity. Roads had been built, the three airfields reinforced and lengthened, and scores of new buildings and warehouses were constructed, as well as post exchanges, theaters, and recreation facilities. Within weeks, the island was completely transformed into a forward staging base for the air campaign against Japan.

The 147th Infantry remained for several months as the Army garrison force’s only ground combat outfit. Its primary mission of defending the island from attack remained unchanged, while it continued eliminating any remaining Japanese. There were many other units that began to arrive on the island at the end of March 1945 as well, rapidly swelling the number of troops on the island. Most of these men were involved with supporting the Army Air Forces and its air operations against Japan.

Intended to serve as a ground combat force for the invasion of Japan, the regiment was given a reprieve when it learned of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by two atomic bombs dropped from B-29s operating out of Tinian, Northern Mariana Islands, still being guarded by the regiment’s 1st Battalion. The 147th Infantry finally departed Iwo Jima on 8 September 1945, when it was assigned similar duties on Okinawa, Japan, declared secure by the end of June 1945, following a battle even
bloodier than that of Iwo Jima. Two months of occupation duty on Okinawa followed, during which time the regiment continued to encounter Japanese holdouts. To its members’ relief, the 147th Infantry was notified that it would be returning to the United States at the end of November. Finally, after serving in the Pacific theater for nearly four years, the last man of the regiment arrived home on 12 December 1945. By that point, only three men who had deployed with the original regiment from the United States in 1942 were still serving in its ranks.\textsuperscript{32}

**HOMECOMING**

By 25 December 1945, the regiment had been inactivated at the U.S. Army’s Vancouver Barracks, Washington State, and was reassigned once again as an element of the 37th Infantry Division, Ohio National Guard. Its remaining members were demobilized and returned to their civilian occupations. For the most part, the regiment’s achievements during the Battle of Iwo Jima went unrecognized by the U.S. Army, though the Marine Corps’ official history of the battle, *Western Pacific Operations*, briefly mentioned the 147th Infantry as participating in the mopping-up phase of the battle.\textsuperscript{33} No of-
ficial histories mention that the regiment conducted its own flag-raising ceremony at Iwo Jima, and no photographs depicting the event are known to exist.

Though it served in obscurity in support of the Marine Corps for most of its existence during World War II, the 147th Infantry Regiment carried out its duties well and faithfully during the three and a half years it spent in the Pacific. It had earned the right to display the battle honors bestowed for participation in the “Air Offensive, Japan 1942–1945,” the U.S. Army’s designation of the island-hopping campaign in the western Pacific that included operations on Iwo Jima. Perhaps the most concise description of the regiment’s contribution to victory is best summed up by Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, the commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, who wrote:

[The] members of the 147th Infantry Regiment, whose mission was the destruction of the Japanese forces remaining on Iwo Jima after organized resistance had ended, displayed consistent courage and combat ingenuity in dealing with an enemy determined upon a course of fanatical resistance. Despite conditions of terrain and emplacement favorable to the Japanese, morale remained at a high level and few casualties were sustained. . . . The military proficiency and devotion to duty constantly manifested by the regiment were in great measure responsible for the final security of a vital advance base.  

No Marine or soldier could hope for a more succinct summation of their contributions toward the final victory than that.

ENDNOTES
This chapter was based on a previously published article, see Douglas E. Nash Sr., “Army Boots on Volcanic Sands: The 147th Infantry Regiment at Iwo Jima,” *Army History*, no. 105 (Fall 2017): 6–19.

2. The U.S. Army Air Forces represented the military aviation Service during and immediately following World War II. It was the successor of the Army Air Corps and predecessor of the U.S. Air Force.
3. 147th Infantry Regiment (1st Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry), Lineage and Honors Certificate, Department of the Army, Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
6. 147th Infantry Regiment, Quarterly Unit History Report, January–March 1945, National Archives, Washington, DC, 1.
7. 147th Infantry Regiment, Quarterly Unit History Report, 5.
8. 147th Infantry Regiment, Quarterly Unit History Report.
9. 147th Infantry Regiment, Quarterly Unit History Report.
11. 147th Infantry Regiment, Unit Monthly Combat Journal, 1.
12. The term *corkscrew and blowtorch* refers to an infantry tactic in which two teams attack a stronghold; the first team lays the demolitions and the second team sweeps in with flamethrowers.
15. 147th Infantry Regiment, Unit Monthly Combat Journal, 26 March 1945, 1640 hours, National Archives, Washington, DC, 7.
16. 147th Infantry Regiment, Quarterly Unit History Report, 7.
17. MajGen Graves B. Erskine, commander, 3d Marine Division, Commendation Letter, 11 April 1945, National Archives, Washington, DC.
on the West Coast were forcibly evacuated from their homes and interred at inland detention centers.


20. 147th Infantry Regiment, Quarterly Unit History Report, April–June 1945, National Archives, Washington, DC, 3; and McLeod, *Always Ready*, 159.


25. The American infantry soldier began World War II with the “combat” meal known officially as Field Ration, Type C, or C-ration, which included three individually boxed meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner.


29. Headquarters, 147th Infantry Regiment, After Action Report, Reconnaissance to Kita Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, 30 May 1945, National Archives, Washington, DC.


31. Forward staging base is the correct World War II term. Forward operating base, or FOB, is a modern term used today in modern military parlance. Iwo was to support the staging of air and sea attacks on Japan; it was not an operating base for the attack on Japan as it had no “operating” forces of its own that could do that.


34. LtGen Robert C. Richardson, commanding general, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Commendation Letter, 15 August 1945, National Archives, Washington, DC.
CHAPTER 3

TIME, LIFE, AND THE
FLAG RAISING ON IWO JIMA

by Melissa Renn, PhD

Life magazine for me was like the American flag . . . We felt a great responsibility photographing for Life . . . We had a responsibility to be honest.

~Alfred Eisenstaedt

Things happen twice in America. Once when they happened and then a week later in Life.

On 23 February 1945, Associated Press (AP) photographer Joe Rosenthal took a photograph (figure 3.1). Entitled Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, this image, of six Marines raising the second American flag on the Japanese island of Iwo Jima during World War II, is not only one of the most celebrated and widely reproduced war photographs in history, but also one of the most controversial. This chapter follows Rosenthal’s photograph as it moved through the American press, from its first printing on the front page of the New York Times on 25 February 1945 to its publication in Time and Life magazines a month later on 26 March 1945, and explains why Life delayed publication of the image. Through a close analysis of the responses of Life editor Daniel Longwell and Time and Life war correspondent Robert L. Sherrod to Rosenthal’s photograph, this chapter shows how Time and Life’s coverage of the flag raisings differed from other publications at the time, as well as how the confusion surrounding this photograph began.

ASCENDING MOUNT SURIBACHI

The United States initiated routine strikes on the Japanese island of Iwo Jima on 15 June 1944. The assault continued until the morning of 19 February 1945, when 30,000 Marines landed on the beach.

The harsh terrain and volcanic ash made it difficult for Marines to find secure footing, and they faced extreme challenges when constructing defensive foxholes to protect themselves from enemy fire as they slowly advanced across the island. As Staff Sergeant David K. Dempsey, a Marine Corps combat correspondent noted in a report: “Terrain was the key to every phase of the battle for Iwo. You were struck at once by the resem-
blance of this island to the surface of the moon. Our bombs had cratered every acre with shellholes [sic] 25 feet in diameter.”

By the morning of 23 February, the Marines had isolated Mount Suribachi, but danger still lurked beneath their feet. Several surviving Marines recollected: “The Japanese were not on Iwo Jima, they were in it.” Suffering many casualties along the way, Marines ascended the volcanic mountain. Upon reaching the summit, five Marines and one Navy Corpsman used a length of pipe they found among the wreckage and raised an American flag on Suribachi at approximately 1020 that morning. Marine Corps photographer Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery captured this first flag raising on film with his Rolleiflex camera. Those in command, immediately recognizing its potential inspirational power, decided to send Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon from Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment, up the mountain with a new flag—twice the size of the original so that it could be seen from a distance—to replace the first. Rosenthal arrived at the top as the Marines were attaching the second flag to a length of pipe.
When they raised the flag, Rosenthal took his now famous photograph.\textsuperscript{10}

Rosenthal’s film packs were then flown to Guam, where Staff Sergeant Werner H. Schmitz, 4th Marine Division, developed the negatives. After the Office of War Information approved the images, they were then sent via AP Wirephoto to the United States.\textsuperscript{11} One print is now in the collection of The Museum of Fine Arts, Houston (figure 3.2). Anne Wilkes Tucker notes that it is “possibly the first print made from the negative of this historic photograph. . . . Schmitz made this print of the flag raising and sent it to his wife in 1945, writing to her that this was the first print he made from the negative. The stamps on the back of the small print show that it was sent by mail and passed through military censors.”\textsuperscript{12}

According to Marine cinematographer Norman T. Hatch, who was also the photographic officer (Warrant Officer) in charge of the 5th Marine Division Photographic Section, Lowery’s film was sent “out with the press boat that night, but he did not learn for about 10 days if his film had survived.”\textsuperscript{13} Lowery feared his film had been damaged, since just after he

\textit{TIME, LIFE, AND THE FLAG RAISING ON IWO JIMA}
photographed the first flag raising, he jumped to escape a grenade, damaging one of his cameras. Hatch also described how, after the film was processed and cleared by censors, “Rothenthal’s photo was sent by ‘wirephoto’ to the United States, and Lowery’s photos of the ascent and first flag raising were sent by air to the Division of Public Relations, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.”

THE PHOTOGRAPH IN PRINT

The first news account of a flag raising on Iwo Jima was an AP story printed in the Boston Globe on the same day as the flag raisings, on 23 February 1945. Under the headline “Marines Take Mt. Suribachi: American Casualties on Iwo Mount to 5372,” the Boston Globe report read:

Hard-fighting United States Marines, who have paid the Pacific’s highest price for 58 hours of battle with 5372 casualties at Iwo, wrested 546-foot Mt. Suribachi on the south tip of the island from the Japanese today. The United States flag was raised on the crater’s rim at 10:35 a.m. by the 28th Regiment, signalling [sic] the end of one phase of the five-day-old struggle.

The article continued with a thorough account of the battle and included a photograph taken on 19 February 1945 by Rosenthal, depicting Marines digging into Iwo Jima. It is significant here that this report mentioned only one flag raising. Furthermore, while the article referenced the first flag raising, which actually happened at 1020, it did not state that it was the first of two that day. While it is unclear whether it was known at the time this story was written that there were in fact two flag raisings, it seems very unlikely. As words traveled faster than images at the time, Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising, which happened around noon, would have still been in transmission, and incoming reports only referenced the initial flag raising that occurred earlier that morning. This also may be why the papers used a 19 February photograph for the 23 February story.

Once the press did receive Rosenthal’s photograph, they realized its aesthetic power, as had those who processed it on Guam. On 25 February, the New York Times published the photograph on the front page of its Sunday edition, cropping and printing it vertically under the heading “Old Glory Goes Up Over Iwo” (figure 3.3). The caption for the image stated: “Marines of the Fifth Division hoist the American flag atop Mount Suribachi,” and the body of the article reiterated: “The planting of the American flag two days ago marked a definite change in American fortunes on Iwo.” The article and caption were likely based on the information that accompanied the photograph, as well as AP communiqués from 24 February. The Pacific Fleet communiqué 273 that came from its advance headquarters on Guam on 23 February, and published in the New York Times on 24 February, read: “The Twenty-eighth Regiment of United States Marines was observed raising the United States flag on the summit of Mount Suribachi, on Iwo Jima (Island). At 10:35 A.M. today (East Longitude date).”

Robert Sherrod’s cable sent to Time on the same day only referenced a single flag raising, the one that occurred in the morning, and did not mention the second flag raising or Rosenthal’s image. Sherrod reported that, “when the United States flag was raised over this highest point on the island some marines wept openly.”

Due to the fact that the two flag raisings were not mentioned in the 24 February com-
muniqué, or in other reports or cables prior to 25 February, and that Rosenthal’s photograph was sent via AP Wirephoto with a caption stating, “United States Marines of 28th Regiment, Fifth Division, hoist American Flag atop Suribachi,” it is certainly understandable that the American press thought Rosenthal’s photograph captured the first flag raising that had occurred the morning of 23 February. As newspapers from coast to coast picked up the story and printed Rosenthal’s photograph, many replicated the caption. Thus, this early conflation of Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising with the time of the first flag raising started the confusion. At that moment, two separate events—each with different photographers, different flags, and, as we now know from recent findings, with different flag raisers—became associated with a single image.

Reproduced in papers and periodicals across the nation, Rosenthal’s picture was quickly appropriated for a range of purposes and used to boost morale in a country wearied by weekly war reports showing military setbacks and casualties in the Pacific. Yet, it is important to note that, despite its aesthetic power and seeming legibility, Rosenthal’s Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi is also a misleading image. Flag raisings generally symbolize victory, yet this event neither marked a specific victory nor seemed strategically important from a military standpoint. In fact, the battle was still raging when Rosenthal took his photograph. Some of the men in the photograph would be killed shortly after in the fighting that continued at Iwo Jima for 31 more days, with thousands more casualties on both sides.

For the Marines and others who were on the island on 23 February, the first flag raising that morning—the one documented by Staff Sergeant Louis Lowery—was most meaningful. As Robert Sherrod recalled in his 1945 book on the war in the Pacific:

As we approached the beach about 11 o’clock somebody yelled, “Look, they’ve got the flag up on Mount Suribachi!” It was a dramatic moment. It seemed that we could do anything if we could capture that vertical monstrosity at the south end of Iwo. Tears welled in the eyes of several Marines as they watched the little flag fluttering in the breeze.

**LIFE ON IWO JIMA**

Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising on Mount Suribachi was not printed in ev-
ery newspaper or periodical, however. While one might assume that the popular American magazine Life—with its regular photographic coverage of the Second World War—would have published the image, it initially did not. In the 5 March 1945 issue, which Life devoted to the war in the Pacific, the magazine instead published an AP photograph Rosenthal had taken on 19 February of Marines crouching in makeshift foxholes and surrounded by ash and hundreds of casualties as they ascended the mountain.29 On the following page of the article, Life printed two aerial photographs of the island of Iwo Jima: the first depicted 800 U.S. ships as they headed toward the shore, and the second showed smoke rolling across the island. The caption for the image on the lower half of the page read: “The smoke of fighting . . . rolls over Mt. Suribachi where at the end of the week marines raised the American flag. For the first day of the battle, during the first landings, the weather was good. The next two days it rained and blew, making landing of supplies very difficult.”30 The article placed the flag raising in the context of the costs of the battle: “By week’s end, when the American flag had been raised over Mt. Suribachi, U.S. casualties had risen to 5,372.”31 While the article acknowledged the flag raising, it is noteworthy that Life did not highlight the event or make it the headline story. Life followed this story on Iwo Jima with an eyewitness account from correspondent Robert Sherrod, which meticulously recounted the first three days of the invasion—but did not mention the flag raising at all—and focused instead on the dangerous ascent of Suribachi.32 On the final page of Sherrod’s report, Life reproduced a U.S. Navy photograph showing the harsh terrain and hundreds of casualties.

Life did not publish Rosenthal’s photograph the following week either. Instead, in the 12 March 1945 issue, the editors printed Life staff photographer W. Eugene Smith’s photographs of the Marines’ military advance on Iwo Jima.33 The photographs showed Marines crawling up embankments, advancing across gritty earth and eruptions, and struggling to maneuver amphibious tractors across the inhospitable environment.

Life delayed publication of Rosenthal’s photograph until 26 March 1945, a full month after it had been reproduced in newspapers nationwide. A letter from Life editor Daniel Longwell to Time’s managing editor Roy Alexander explained why Life did not initially run the photograph. Longwell wrote:

Life as you may know, never joined in the acclaim for Joe Rosenthal’s A.P. picture of raising the flag on Mt. Suribachi. We didn’t run it the week it came in, I believe . . . . I recognized the picture filled a great need emotionally, but I was emotionally upset too. [W. Eugene] Smith had turned in almost foolhardy risk taking pictures . . . at Iwo . . . [and later, in Okinawa]. . . . Smith had his jaw shot away working on a casual assignment I had tossed off suggesting some photographer shoot a series on a day in the life of a soldier.34 Sherrod was at Iwo and sent in a hell of a report which we published using some of Rosenthal’s A.P. pictures, which were good but not as risky as Smith’s. Sherrod’s accounts were grim, as that battle seems to have been in everyone’s recollection. Suddenly I was confronted with the flag-raising picture. My first thought was what a damned fool thing to do—they shouldn’t set that example to the other troops. This isn’t the Civil War in movies, the machine gun has been invented. I said that’s a posed picture, something I had been fighting against all through the combat, particularly with the A.P. . . . I cabled Sher-
rod and in his answer he told of Rosenthal’s complaint that this stunt had been set up for [Staff] Sgt. [Louis] Lowery, a Marine Corps photographer for Leatherneck. Rosenthal complained, got a bigger flag and another squad and went up to get the famous picture.  

Rosenthal’s photograph clearly hit a nerve with the Life editorial staff. It is not surprising that Longwell—a Life editor well versed in wartime imagery—viewed Rosenthal’s photograph with suspicion, as it does not look at all like a typical war photograph. Rosenthal’s pyramidal, even sculptural, composition of six strong, heroic men raising Old Glory against a still, clear sky starkly contrasts with the horror and chaos characteristic of most documentary war photographs, such as George Strock’s Dead GIs on Buna Beach, New Guinea (1943), which shows slain soldiers strewn haphazardly across the shoreline with a landing craft half-sunk in the sea. Most war photographs—especially such notable ones as Roger Fenton’s Valley of the Shadow of Death (1855), Timothy H. O’Sullivan and Alexander Gardner’s U.S. Civil War photographs of dead soldiers, and Robert Capa’s photograph of a falling loyalist soldier during the Spanish Civil War—have generally depicted death and destruction. While these photographs have undergone scrutiny as to their authenticity (albeit for different reasons), their immediacy and informality (even if staged) initially seems more real to the eye than the serendipitous formality and classical composition of Rosenthal’s Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi.

Naturally, Life’s editors greeted Rosenthal’s image with great skepticism. How was it possible, during the midst of one of the most difficult campaigns in Asia, for him to snap such a perfect picture? Indeed, it was always a challenge for film and, for that matter, photographers to survive battles unscathed. Life’s editors were accustomed to receiving damaged rolls of film and imperfect photographs shot quickly under difficult conditions. Rosenthal acknowledged his good fortune: “I was lucky to catch the flag-raising at its most dramatic instant, producing a masterpiece.” He even inscribed a signed copy of the photograph to Staff Sergeant Lowery with the message, “To Lou Lowery, who got there first,—a helluva Marine and a great guy, all the best from lucky Joe Rosenthal.”

Rosenthal unintentionally created a classically composed image, one that is also remarkably clear and void of distracting elements, such as stray bullets, splintered trees, smoke clouds, or substantial wreckage. There are no tanks, planes, battleships, or other usual signifiers of modern warfare. Furthermore, Rosenthal’s photograph contradicts Robert Capa’s oft-quoted maxim: “If you want to get good action shots, they mustn’t be in true focus. If your hand trembles a little, then you get a fine action shot.”

There is no blur in Rosenthal’s flag-raising photograph, no evidence of a trembling hand. There is no blood, no death, and no violence. Unlike Lowery’s photograph of the first flag raising—which has in its foreground, a crouching Marine on guard looking out while the others raise the first flag—there is no sense of danger or imminent threat in Rosenthal’s image. In Rosenthal’s photograph, the action seems distant and safe. As Longwell observed, Rosenthal’s photograph does not register as risky; it lacks the horror typical of wartime images taken by his peers, such as W. Eugene Smith’s moving and graphic photographs of explosions, injured soldiers and Marines, and casualties from the battles at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To be sure, the challenging conditions...
on Iwo Jima made it extraordinarily difficult to capture events on film. In fact, Smith was particularly disappointed by his own contact prints from Iwo Jima, despite the editors’ enthusiasm for his pictures. As he stated, “I find not one that I could stand to see in print—and yet much of what I needed was present on the island. . . . the pictures were there, I through my own incompetence failed.” Smith surely appreciated how lucky Rosenthal was to get that shot, and acknowledged the photograph’s greatness. In Smith’s archive at the Center for Creative Photography at the University of Arizona, there is a folder of his clippings about the flag raisings at Iwo Jima, which includes a copy of J. Campbell Bruce’s 1955 article, “The War’s Greatest Picture,” from True (figure 3.4).

**FIGURE 3.4**
W. Eugene Smith Archive, AG33:16/9, Collection Center for Creative Photography, University of Arizona

**FIGURE 3.5**
MajGen Clifton B. Cates on LSM with Robert Sherrod of Time as they come ashore at Iwo Jima in 1945.
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Robert Lee Sherrod Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University Libraries

**FROM THE FIELD**
*Life*’s editors were not the only ones who had reservations about Rosenthal’s photograph. *Time* and *Life* war correspondent Robert Sherrod also questioned the image and the attention it was getting in the press (figure 3.5). In a 13 March 1945 cable to David Hulburd, the chief bureau head at *Time*, Sherrod wrote:

*This is the type of stuff that nobody should have to write because it will destroy some illusions. But since it will ultimately come out it might as well come out now instead*
of waiting, as the heroic painting of Washington crossing the Delaware had to wait, to be disproved. . . . The heroic picture of the flag raised on Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima, used on the first page of TIME, March 5th issue, as well as in every other United States publication, it is assumed, is photographically great but historically it is slightly phony. (Understand here that stamps are being made from it and coins being struck off in its image.) The planting of the flag didn’t quite happen that way, and the historic picture was a post facto rehearsal. The flag—a medium-sized flag—was actually planted atop Mount Suribachi at 10:30 February 23rd. . . . Photographer Joe Rosenthal of Associated Press climbed the mountain that afternoon and took his excellent picture of a larger flag being raised. At the same time he also took a posed picture of a group of marines standing together around the flag waving their hands. . . . This should make a good feature layout for LIFE, showing Rosenthal’s really great picture on one hand, then showing what really happened on the other. There was a photographer with the group that planted the original flag on Suribachi. . . . This original photographer . . . was Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery of Leatherneck Magazine and his pictures by now are in Washington where they can be obtained from Major [Walter W.] Hitesman. . . . Lowery made a sequence of fifty-six pictures of the original raising of the small flag. Leatherneck in Washington will not have them in sequence and will have no captions for them but you may be able to pick out eight or ten for a picture layout from these thirty-two captions which Lowery wrote and spread across the sequence.

Sherrod then listed the 32 captions that Lowery had provided to accompany his photographs. Sherrod closed the cable with his personal take on the photograph, which is certainly understandable in light of what he had just experienced on Iwo Jima and before that as a correspondent reporting on Tarawa and other battles in the Pacific:

I believe this should be treated only as a footnote to history—and an illustration that the war is not a dashing, slashing business but generally a slow-moving, cautious feeling-out of the enemy. . . . This should be no reflection on Photographer Rosenthal—he went up the mountain a few hours later when its gnarled caves were still dangerous with enemy sniper fire.

Sherrod sent another cable on the subject on 16 March, likely in response to Daniel Longwell’s query about Rosenthal’s photograph. Sherrod also outlined how LIFE could obtain copies of Lowery’s photographs of the first flag raising. Thanks for your cable regarding the flag-raising and congratulations to the keen-eyed LIFE editors. Despite the leathernecks’ reluctance you can still get the original flag-raising pictures from the agencies. The Pacific edition of Yank for March 9th (published at Saipan) ran two of Lowery’s tame pictures and Yank in New York undoubtedly has the same layout by now. One was a big slender picture about nine inches tall. The other showed marines lashing the flag to the piece of Jap pipe before raising it—this was in the center of three pictures in the left-hand column. Each of these pictures also has been printed elsewhere—the actual flag-raising was printed in the Honolulu Star Bulletin on February 27, crediting the U.S.M.C. and Photographer Lowery. The Pittsburgh
Sun Telegraph for March 2nd printed the lashing of the flag to a pipe and credited the U.S.M.C.\(^{51}\)

Sherrod followed that cable with another on 17 March, clearly in an effort to put the whole issue to rest. The cable opened with a bold headline, likely in response to follow-up questions from the editors: “FINAL CLARIFICATION OF THE FLAG-RAISING.”

I believe the second flag-raising was unquestionably genuine, though I cannot learn who set it up to replace the smaller one raised that morning, which was sent by Lieut. Colonel Chandler [W.] Johnson whose battalion took Suribachi. . . . My opinion is that the picture of the second raising was posed, but that depends on the definition of posed and whether anything that is genuine can be posed. . . .
The point is made here that a flag-raising is not supposed to be a battle scene—it is a post-battle ceremony. . . . Rosenthal only did what any photographer would do: he set his picture for the best dramatic effect. . . . The marines all looked around to await the photographers’ signal before hoisting the flagpole.\(^52\) After taking his memorable shot Rosenthal (and/or the movie cameramen who also got the same scene) posed the marines around the flag and snapped them waving helmets and rifles . . . Rosenthal happened to get an historic picture of an unheroic moment and almost everyone who saw it misinterpreted it.\(^53\)

With all this information in hand, *Life*’s editors quickly put together a piece on the two flag raisings.

**“THE FAMOUS IWO FLAG RAISING”**

*Life*’s editors clearly felt that they had an obligation to tell the story of the two flag raisings. Thus, in the 26 March 1945 issue, *Life* published a special report titled “The Famous Iwo Flag-Raising” (figure 3.6). On the opening page of the article, *Life* reproduced Rosenthal’s photograph alongside Emanuel Leutze’s painting *Washington Crossing the Delaware* (1851).\(^54\) On the following page, *Life* printed Lowery’s photograph of the first flag raising. This was the first time that Lowery’s photograph was printed in a major American publication.\(^55\) The text of the article provided the first thorough report on the two flag raisings. The article’s captions are equally illuminating. Below Rosenthal’s photograph the text read: “Marines raise flag atop Mt. Suribachi. This is the dramatic picture made by A.P. Photographer Rosenthal. It was second flag raised on peak, which was still under fire.”\(^56\) Below the reproduction of Leutze’s painting, the caption noted: “‘Washington Crossing the Delaware’ bears similarity in composition to Mt. Suribachi photograph. A classic American painting, it was posed by models on the Rhine.”\(^57\) The choice of words here is important. *Life* refers to Rosenthal’s image not as a photograph, but as a picture, the latter which implies something composed. Furthermore, *Life*’s editors did not treat Lowery’s the same way it framed Rosenthal’s. For Lowery’s photograph, the editors used the verb *photographed* to describe his action. The caption read: “First flag on Mt. Suribachi was photographed by S/Sgt [Staff Sergeant] Louis R. Lowery of *Leatherneck*. His camera was later smashed when he plunged downhill to escape a Jap grenade.”\(^58\) *Life*’s editors were conscious of such distinctions. As Longwell emphatically stated: “May I put the place of art in *LIFE* as simply as I can . . . pictures and art are the same thing. Let us not get into aesthetics or semantics.”\(^59\) The article also clarified the details
The story behind the two flag-raising picture is equally interesting. Actually the A.P. picture does not show the first flag-raising on Mt. Suribachi. The only pictures of that historic event were made by S/Sgt. Louis R. Lowery of Lausanne, the Marines’ magazine. The facts were told in the following dispatch sent to Lausanne by a Marine correspondent:

“A four-man patrol of F Company, 1st Marines, made the first ascent of the volcano at 8 o’clock Friday, Feb. 23. They went almost to the top, looked over the volcano rim and went back to report they met no resistance. Then Lieut. Harold Schier, executive officer of F Company, led a platoon to the top.

“This platoon took over the peak, meeting little resistance on the way up. At 9:30 these marines raised the first American flag over Iwo Jima, a ship’s flag from an assault transport, brought ashore in a map case by Lieut. George Wells, sister Battalion Adjutant. A length of Jap pipe was the flagpole.

“With the platoon as it climbed Suribachi was S/Sgt. Louis R. Lowery, staff photographer for Leatherneck. No other photographer came up until after the flag was raised and Lowery got a clear sweep on pictures of the ceremony and the climb up the volcano. As the flag was put up a Jap hulking in a nearby cave hurled a grenade, then charged out waving his sword. Marine fire cut him down and he fell in a bloody heap down the inner slope of the crater, his sword broken. A second Jap hurled a grenade which landed at Lowery’s feet and he dived down the steep side of the volcano, rolling 50 feet before he could stop. The grenade blast missed him but he wrenched his side and broke his camera in his tumble. His only other camera was smashed when he landed on the beach 30 minutes after H-hour.”

Later that day while the peak was still under enemy fire, Joe Rosenthal went up with another group of marines. Standing on rocks and a Jap waist-high at the edge of the volcano crater, he photographed them raising a second and larger flag. This picture, far more dramatic than Lowery’s, was the one published throughout the U.S. and hailed by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal as “that unforgettable photograph.”

War historians will also note that at other heights on the island the Lone Star flag of Texas and a Confederate flag were raised in pictorially recorded and spontaneous bursts of enthusiasm. These events all occurred before the formal flag-raising on March 15 when, with plates roaring overhead and gunfire still rumbling in the distance, Admiral Nimitz took over command as military governor of the island and its offshore rocks.
of the flag raising, explaining to the reader: “Actually the A.P. picture does not show the first flag-raising on Mt. Suribachi. The only pictures of that historic event were made by S/Sgt. Louis R. Lowery of Leatherneck, the Marines’ magazine.” Life’s editors aimed not only to correct the record, but also to emphasize that they, like Sherrod, viewed the first flag raising as the one of historic significance.

In this article, Life presented Rosenthal’s photograph not as a document of war but as a moving, emotional picture that had much more in common with traditional history painting than with war reportage. Like the many iconic history paintings in Western art that preceded it, Rosenthal’s photograph is a pyramidal figural composition with a flag flying prominently at the center. Life’s choice of Washington Crossing the Delaware as the key comparative image in the article was not arbitrary. Leutze’s painting was, like Rosenthal’s, a work that, despite its inaccuracies, also inspired patriotic fervor and healed the nation during traumatic times. Indeed, as one critic wrote about Leutze’s painting in 1851: “This is a picture by the sight of which, in this weary and exhausted time, one can recover health and strength. . . . [It] has the power to work upon the hearts, and inflame the spirits of all that behold it.”

By reproducing Rosenthal’s photograph alongside Leutze’s famed history painting, Life’s editors intended to highlight that it was an image of a second event and not the initial or only flag raising that day on the island, as many believed at the time. Ironically, by associating the photograph with an iconic painting, Life inadvertently elevated the photograph to the same level. In the end, what seems to have remained in popular memory was neither the correct account of two flag raisings as described in the text nor the enlightening captions but the juxtaposition of two patriotic images of American victory in battle.

Time magazine published a piece on the two flag raisings in the 26 March 1945 issue. Time also characterized Rosenthal’s photograph as a picture, as seen in the report’s title, “Story of a Picture.” The Time article likewise made comparisons between Rosenthal’s picture and canonical works of art, and while Time did not reproduce Lowery’s photographs, it did directly comment on the two flag raisings in a parenthetical prominently placed near the end of the piece: “(Neither of these flag raisings was official: last week, when Admiral [Chester W.] Nimitz formally took possession of the island, the U.S. flag was run up near the base of Suribachi with traditional ceremony.)” Below the reproduction of Rosenthal’s photograph, the caption read, clearly in an effort to dispel further confusion: “Second Flag Raising/Nimitz arranged a third.” Figure 3.7 is a documentary photograph by Private First Class R. R. Dodds of the flag raising arranged by Nimitz that the Time article referenced. (This photograph was not published in the Time 26 March article.)

Life and Time’s detailed accounts of the two flag raisings exemplify the challenges of changing the public perception of an image. In just a month, Rosenthal’s photograph had already acquired mythical status, and no amount of factual information—even an exposé in Life and an article in Time—could change it. In 1945, Americans needed and wanted a picture of victory, and they got it from Rosenthal. His photograph—unlike nearly every other photograph taken on the island at that time—did not depict the heavy losses and difficult conditions Marines faced on Mount Suribachi, but rather
represented inevitable triumph. Far more than a war photograph, it now served as a symbol of American victory, transcending the battle itself as well as the circumstances of its production. No longer just a document of the war in the Pacific, it became an American picture. 67

WORDS AND PICTURES
By the time *Life* and *Time* told the story of the two flag raisings, Rosenthal’s photograph had done its cultural work, and was already an icon. By summer 1945, Rosenthal’s photograph had been printed on a stamp, refashioned into recruiting signs and war bond posters, translated into sculpture, and had won the Pulitzer Prize (figure 3.8). 68 Rosenthal’s photograph eclipsed Lowery’s because of its formal qualities and wide circulation, and also because the text and captions that framed its first publication in the press, led to the incorrect linking of Rosenthal’s image to the first flag raising on the morning of 23 February 1945.

While it is often said that iconic photographs (or photographs that become icons) require no words, the editors at *Time* and *Life* knew—perhaps better than anyone else at the
time—that pictures needed words. To be sure, there may never have been an image that required a caption—a precise caption—more than Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising on Iwo Jima. Just imagine if the caption below the photograph in that very first printing in newspapers across the country had stated, “Marines of the Fifth Division hoist the second American flag atop Mount Suribachi” instead of “Marines of the Fifth Division hoist the American flag atop Mount Suribachi.” It is arguable that Rosenthal’s photograph, given its powerful aesthetic composition, could have still served the same emotional need during the war.

As both *Time* and *Life* experienced in 1945, it is nearly impossible to shift the meaning of an image once it is fixed, especially if that image has become an icon. While Rosenthal’s photograph initially seemed to be a straightforward representation of a flag raising, including to those who first published it, clearly that was not the case. As the editors of *Life* certainly understood, pictures required well-written captions. As editor-in-chief Henry Robinson Luce instructed his staff:

*Re Captions. The only mystery attaching to caption-writing is that captions should be excellent. A caption on a picture of a scene should first be sufficiently informative so that the reader is not left irritatingly mystified as to what the picture is supposed to show... No caption should be a flat statement of the point of the story.*

Unfortunately, *Life* and *Time*’s captions (and stories) came too late, and the meaning of Rosenthal’s picture was set by the brief caption that initially accompanied it upon its first publication. However, as the 26 March 1945 articles by *Time* and *Life* demonstrate, the details are essential to understanding Rosenthal’s image. Knowing the full story of the two flag raisings does not diminish the significance of his lucky shot on Iwo Jima; it illuminates the photograph’s singularity.
This chapter expands on an essay the author published in *History of Photography* (2015). It has been revised to incorporate recent findings and new archival research. See Melissa Renn, “‘The Famous Iwo Flag-Raising’: Iwo Jima Revisited,” *History of Photography* 39, no. 3 (August 2015): 253–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/03087298.2014.995057. Thank you to Breanne Robertson for the opportunity to publish this chapter and for her help with the research, and to Angela Anderson, Alexandra Kindell, and Charles P. Niemeyer for their edits and comments on earlier versions of this essay. Thanks also extended to Tara Craig, Jonathan Dentler, James Ginther, LtCol Matthew W. Morgan (Ret), Will Michaels, Annie Trizna, Leslie Squires, Emily Una Weirich, and Nicole Westerdahl for their help with the research for this chapter.


3. A detailed account of the 2016 and 2019 investigations into the identity of the Iwo Jima flag raisers may be found in Mary Reinwald and Keil Gentry’s chapters in this volume.

4. Daniel Longwell joined Time Inc. in 1934 and was one of founding editors of *Life*. Robert Sherrod became part of the staff at *Time* in 1935, and was appointed war correspondent assigned to the commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas from May 1943 to September 1945. See C. W. Nimitz to Robert Sherrod, 28 September 1945, Folder: Incoming Correspondence, Nimitz, Admiral C. W., Box 7, Robert Lee Sherrod Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University Libraries, hereafter Sherrod Papers.

5. For a more detailed overview of the Battle of Iwo Jima, see Col Joseph H. Alexander, *Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 1994); and Charles P. Niemeyer’s chapter in this volume.


9. The historical record is unclear whether PFC Rene A. Gagnon, who in addition to the larger flag carried fresh radio batteries for 1stLt Schrier’s patrol, met Sgt Strank’s four-man wire-laying patrol en route to the summit or whether all five men departed the battalion command post together; however, Capt Dave E. Severance recalls that PFC Gagnon joined Sgt Strank’s detail prior to setting out. See MajGen Fred Haynes, USMC (Ret) and James A. Warren, *The Lions of Iwo Jima: The Story of Combat Team 28 and the Bloodiest Battle in Marine Corps History* (New York: Henry Holt, 2008), 129.

10. He also took 17 other shots with his camera that day: “Rosenthal took sixty-five photographs on Iwo (eighteen of them on February 23).” Peter Maslowski, *Armed with Cameras: The American Military Photographers of World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 233. The second flag raising was captured on film by Pvt Robert R. Campbell and by Sgt William H. Genaust, the latter a Marine motion-picture photographer. See Criss Austin’s essay in this volume for more on the film.

11. The Associated Press began its Wirephoto service in 1935. During World War II, the U.S. Still Photograph-ic Pool (also referred to as the Wartime Still Picture Pool) consisted of three major picture agencies and *Life* magazine. As Robert W. Desmond describes, “Special provisions were made for news photographers and newsreel cameramen whereby their photos of films were available to all in a pooling arrangement. International News Photos, AP News Photos, Acme Newspictures, and *Life* magazine entered into this agreement in February 1942, and it was extended to include all other services.” Robert W. Desmond, *Tides of War: World News Reporting 1931–1945* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1984), 238.


15. This was possible due to the time difference between Guam and the United States. Cables were able to reach the AP the same day, often in time to be printed in the evening editions of newspapers.


17. The 23 February 1945 issue of *The Portland Oregonian* also printed the same photograph and published the AP story under a slightly different headline: “Marine Iwo Casualties 5372 in Worst Pacific Fight, Volcano Taken in Fifth Day, U.S. Ships Damaged.” The caption below the photograph as printed in *The Oregonian* reads: “After taking an ‘impregnable’ Jap pill box (center background), American marines dig in on Iwo Jima. Volcano islands. Note marine in center digging foxhole and bodies, some in open and some covered by sand, which caption did not identify. These are 4th division marines in action February 19.” The caption below the photograph as printed in the *Boston Globe* on 23 February 1945 did not give the date of 19 February for the photograph, and neither the *Boston Globe* nor the *Portland Oregonian* referenced the photograph number or date.

**ENDNOTES**

**TIME, LIFE, AND THE FLAG RAISING ON IWO JIMA**

59
19. As Robert W. Desmond has noted: “Careful arrangements had been made for the transmission of news copy and photographs from Iwo Jima, and a new record for Pacific communications was established when photos of action there were in San Francisco within seventeen and one-half hours of the first assault.” Desmond, *Tides of War*, 433. Rosenthal’s photograph also traveled faster than Lowery’s. Albee and Freeman discuss in detail the timing and release of both Rosenthal’s and Lowery’s photographs in their book. See Parker Bishop Albee Jr. and Keller Cushing Freeman, *Shadow of Suribachi: Raising the Flags on Iwo Jima* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).


22. The information that accompanied Rosenthal’s originally transmitted photograph of the second flag raising can be seen in a print that was at auction in 2015, which show the original AP caption that was attached to the image: “(FX9-Feb. 24) MARINES HOIST FLAG ATOP SURIBACHI—United States Marines of 28th Regiment, Fifth Division, hoist American Flag atop Suribachi, Iwo Jima volcano, after battling Japs to top of crater. Photo by AP photographer Joe Rosenthal on assignment with Wartime Still Picture Pool radioed by Navy from Guam to San Francisco today. (AP Wirephoto) (NRW71315jjr/pl) 1945.” According to the auction record, the code “FX9” indicates this was the ninth image received by the AP’s San Francisco Bureau that day. See “Conflicts of the 20th Century: Lot 70,” Bonhams.com, 21 October 2015.


24. Robert Sherrod to David Hulburd, 24 February 1945, cable 28, Folder Cables, Box 29, Sherrod Papers. It is also important to recognize that Sherrod only gave the subject of the flag raising one sentence in a two-page cable; his cables at that time focused much more on the battle.

25. See “Conflicts of the 20th Century: Lot 70.”

26. Albee and Freeman observed: “Thanks to his photograph, the second flag raising on Suribachi became as symbolically significant to the American public as that episode was strategically insignificant to the course of the Iwo Jima campaign.” Albee and Freeman, *Shadow of Suribachi*, xi.

27. “Iwo Jima was the Marines’ costliest battle ever. . . . The eight-square mile island cost the Americans—Marines, Navy, and Army—28,686 casualties, including 6,821 killed. It was the first time in the Central Pacific campaign that the enemy inflicted more casualties on an American invasion force than it sustained itself.” Donald L. Miller, *D-Days in the Pacific* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 245.

28. Robert Sherrod, *On to Westward: War in the Central Pacific* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945), 191–92. Significantly, this is Sherrod’s only mention of a flag raising on Iwo Jima in the book. Sherrod also footnoted this section with the following comment: “This was not the flag whose raising was photographed and widely reprinted. That one was substituted for the original (and photographed) later in the day.” Sherrod, *On to Westward*, 191. Later in that same entry for 23 February, Sherrod wrote: “Colonel Johnson’s Second Battalion had scaled Suribachi and planted the flags there.” Sherrod’s precision here, specifically his use of the plural “flags,” is important and underscored that there were two flag raisings. Sherrod, *On to Westward*, 194.

29. *Time*, unlike its sister publication, *Life*, did publish Rosenthal’s photograph in their 5 March 1945 issue, with the date of the flag raising incorrect in the caption. Below Rosenthal’s photograph, the caption read: “Old Glory on Mt. Suribachi, Feb. 24, [sic] 1945/To rank with Valley Forge, Gettysburg and Tarawa.” The text noted its aesthetic qualities, comparing it to sculpture: “Few in this generation would ever forget Iwo’s shifting black sands, or the mind’s images of charging marines, or the sculptured picture of Old Glory rising atop Mount Suribachi.” See “Arms, Character, Courage,” *Time*, 5 March 1945, 15.


35. Daniel Longwell to Roy Alexander, 9 March 1965, Box 57, Daniel Longwell Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, hereafter Longwell Papers.

36. Rosenthal’s image also differs from many other war photographs in another respect—its lack of specific information about both the site and people in the image. In fact, it has been Lowery’s photographs, Rosenthal’s other images from Iwo Jima, and the still photographs and documentary films captured by SSgt Meyers Cornelius, Sgt William Genaust, Sgt Louis Burmeister, PFC George Burns, and Pvt Bob Campbell that have

As quoted in Kershaw, Blood and Champagne, 43.

Smith’s photos from Iwo Jima were published in Life

on 12 March 1945 and also on the cover and in a sto-

dy titled “The Battlefield of Iwo” in the 9 April 1945

issue.


As quoted in Hughes, W. Eugene Smith, 152.

As Smith observed, “For something over twenty years two photographs of two different flags as taken by two different photographers at slightly different times on the same day, on the same mountain have been playing out a rather ridiculously uneven rivalry. One is a magnificent photograph and the other is not.” Unnumbered typescript with handwritten notes, AG33:16/10, Smith Archive.

Clipping in AG33:16/9, Smith Archive.

Sherrod was widely regarded for his work as a war correspondent. For instance, MajGen Clifton B. Cates of the U.S. Marine Corps wrote Sherrod complimenting him on his coverage of Iwo Jima: “I wish to express my personal thanks and that of the officers and men of the Fourth Marine Division for your excellent reporting on the Iwo Jima show.” And Francis B. Sayre Jr., who served as chaplain for the U.S. Navy in 1944, wrote: “So it is to TIME that we look for the ‘straight dope’ when we get back to mail delivery again. The most popular correspondent with the boys is your Robert Sherrod. We like the way he calls a spade a spade. . . . Where-as we are gagged by Navy censorship and regulation, Sherrod is not, and he makes the most of it, with mature judgment. The boys like the way this same honest reporting is reflected in the editorial policies of ‘LIFE.’” MajGen Clifton B. Cates to Robert Sherrod, 11 April 1945, Folder, Incoming Correspondence-Cates, Clifton, Box 2, Sherrod Papers; and Francis B. Sayre Jr., Chaplain USNR, to Mr. Walter Belknap, 28 March 1944, Folder, Incoming Correspondence-Belknap, Walter K., Box 1, Sherrod Papers.

Robert Sherrod to David Hulburd, 13 March 1945, unnumbered cable, Folder Cables, Box 29, Sherrod Papers.


Sherrod to Hulburd, 13 March 1945.

There are varying accounts of how Life got Lowery’s photographs. Hal Buell has written that “Lowery’s photos were released by Leatherneck on March 20, transmitted on the AP network, and distributed in print form.” See Buell, Uncommon Valor, Common Virtue, 184. Albee and Freeman also discuss Time and Life’s coverage of
the two flag raisings and Life’s publication of Lowery’s photograph in chapter six of Shadow of Suribachi.

51. Robert Sherrod to David Halberstam, 16 March 1945, Cable 43, Folder Cables, Box 29, Sherrod Papers.

52. This sentence of Sherrod’s report differs from other accounts of the event that day, which have stated that the raising of the flag was coordinated and that the signal was given by Schrier, not Rosenthal.

53. Robert Sherrod to Eleanor Welch, 17 March 1945, Cable 45, Folder Cables, Box 29, Sherrod Papers.

54. In a letter to Roy Alexander, Longwell stated that he was the one who decided to print Rosenthal’s photograph alongside Leutze’s painting. Longwell to Alexander, 9 March 1945, Longwell Papers.

55. As John Moremon discovered, Lowery’s photographs of the first flag raising were published in the Evening Post (Wellington, New Zealand) on 19 March 1945. See Moremon’s chapter in this volume.


57. “The Famous Iwo Flag-Raising.”


59. Daniel Longwell to Andrew Heiskell, 15 October 1948, Box 28, Longwell Papers.


61. The article also noted how the photograph had “arrived on the home front at the right psychological moment to symbolize the nation’s emotional response to great deeds of war.” “The Famous Iwo Flag-Raising,” 17.


63. “Story of a Picture,” Time, 26 March 1945, 60. W. Eugene Smith saved this clipping, along with other articles on Iwo Jima, see AG33:16/9, Smith Archive.

64. “Story of a Picture,” Time, 26 March 1945, 60.


66. “The fiction is taken for truth because the fiction is badly needed.” See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), 19. The Marine Corps did not publish Lowery’s photographs or the story of the two flag raisings until 1947. See Vernon A. Langille, “Instrument of Surrender: Anniversary Review,” Leatherneck 30, no. 9, September 1947, 9; and Bill Miller’s story within that review, 10–14. See also Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, chapter 6, for more on the Marines’ delay in publishing Lowery’s photographs.

67. As Hariman and Lucaites argue, the image “provides a coordinated visual transcription of three powerful discourses in American political history: egalitarianism, nationalism, and civic republicanism.” See Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, 95.

68. I can think of no other photograph, and especially no other war photograph, that has been reproduced so many times in forms other than its original medium. Life reported on some of these as well. In the 30 April 1945, issue, for instance, Life published a photograph of an oil painting based on Rosenthal’s photograph that was being used in the war bond drive. The magazine also did a story on Felix de Weldon’s sculpture. See “Tribute in Transit: Bronze of Iwo Marines Makes a Monumental Move to Capital,” Life, 20 September 1954, 128–32. For other examples of how Rosenthal’s photograph has been appropriated, see Tucker and Michels, War/Photography, 258–79; Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, 93–136; Marling and Wetenhall, Iwo Jima, 195–242; and Martin Kemp, Christ to Coke: How Image Becomes Icon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 225–51.

69. In fact, one of the most prominent studies of iconic photographs, including Rosenthal’s photograph, is titled No Caption Needed. See Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed. For more on this topic, see Wilson Hicks, Words and Pictures: An Introduction to Photojournalism (New York: Harper, 1952); Hicks worked for the Associated Press from 1929 to 1937. In 1937, he became picture editor at Life and later became an executive editor for the magazine, a position he held until 1952.

70. “The Time and Life editors had claimed to set the record straight, but the record seemed to defy correction. Subsequent publications, seemingly oblivious to the March 26 exposé and to Rosenthal’s account, continued to tell the story of a single flag raising, a story that would gather momentum in the weeks, months, and years ahead.” See Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 13.

71. Henry R. Luce to staff, “Notes on Style,” 10 October 1942, Folder, Incoming Correspondence, Time, Inc. 1931–1943, Box 8, Sherrod Papers.
Joe Rosenthal’s *Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima* is arguably one of the most recognizable war photographs ever created. It famously depicts six men raising a U.S. flag during the Marine-led assault on the island of Iwo Jima in February 1945. Visual details such as the fluttering flag, the angled pole, and the straining mass of bodies in the foreground combine to form a dramatic scene. While these elements helped make *Old Glory* iconic, the widespread distribution of Rosenthal’s image increased its popularity. During the final months of World War II, countless photographic reproductions appeared in newspapers and magazines across the country. Subsequently, posters, sculptures, and other media carried modified versions of the image that further amplified the photograph’s wartime renown.

In fact, *Old Glory* was presented in various forms so often in 1945 that the scene soon carried multiple overlapping meanings. This process, which started shortly after the photograph first appeared in national newspapers, included variations that did not necessarily prioritize the fighting at Iwo Jima. Although *Old Glory* initially represented a memorable moment on Mount Suribachi, the photograph and its numerous adaptations connoted the bravery of Marines more broadly, the necessity of civilian sacrifice on the home front, and even paintings of previous American wars. Revisions of *Old Glory* appeared so often in mass media before the war ended that viewers arguably distanced the scene from the historical circumstances in which it was produced.¹ In short, the image evolved from a documentary record of the Pacific War to an icon infused with layers of symbolic value.

This process accelerated after government officials recognized the propagandistic value of Rosenthal’s photograph. A key example of this trend is seen in a war bond poster designed by C. C. Beall (figure 4.1). A commercial artist known primarily for his magazine illustrations, Beall translated *Old Glory* into a painting at the request of officials at the U.S. Treasury Department in spring 1945. More than purely patriotic propaganda, Beall’s graphic became the official poster for the Seventh War Loan campaign (14 May–30 June 1945). Known as the “Mighty
FIGURE 4.1
C. C. Beall, Now... All Together, 1945, offset lithographic poster. U.S. Treasury Department, National Archives and Records Administration
Seventh,” this national, multimedia drive to increase war bond sales included the distribution of millions of Beall’s posters. Related efforts that featured variations of Rosenthal’s Old Glory appeared throughout the country in newsreels, temporary sculptures, and even staged recreations of the original flag raising. Businesses also used variations of Old Glory in advertisements that simultaneously promoted war bonds and corporate enterprise.

The translation of Old Glory from an Associated Press image into a poster gave Rosenthal’s photograph a mythical status rarely bestowed upon individual representations of the war. However, this process did not necessarily lessen the historic value of the photograph; instead, the numerous recreations of Old Glory encouraged viewers to associate the image with a broader series of meanings beyond the fighting at Mount Suribachi. Historians have previously addressed how Rosenthal’s photograph inspired countless recreations during the postwar era, including editorial cartoons, sculptures, and advertisements.² This chapter departs from earlier scholarship by emphasizing the distribution of Old Glory in the context of the Seventh War Loan campaign, specifically. By doing so, the following analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of Rosenthal’s photograph as a promotional device for the sale of war bonds while also reasserting the value of the image as an important historical record from the war’s final months.

**CAPTURING THE MOMENT**

Understanding the relationship between Old Glory and the Seventh War Loan first requires a consideration of the photograph’s creation and initial distribution. In early 1945, Rosenthal was covering the Pacific War for the Associated Press. On 23 February, after hearing rumors of a possible flag raising by U.S. Marines, Rosenthal, along with a film cameraman and another still photographer, hiked to the summit of Mount Suribachi. Shortly thereafter, Rosenthal captured the famous flag raising using his Graflex 4 x 5 Speed Graphic camera. The technical limits of photographing in the field prevented Rosenthal from seeing his work until days later, after his editor had selected Old Glory for distribution to stateside press outlets. Within days, Rosenthal’s image was celebrated in newspapers across the United States. Critics praised the photograph’s dramatic qualities, and it soon appeared in national magazines. Rosenthal received further accolades in early May when Old Glory won the Pulitzer Prize. This award was particularly meaningful as the committee normally only considered photographs produced during the preceding year as eligible for consideration.

The initial popularity of Rosenthal’s Old Glory resulted from a combination of the scene’s dramatic content and the historic circumstances surrounding its creation. The photograph depicts six Marines hoisting a pole topped by a billowing U.S. flag.³ Though their faces are largely obscured, the anonymity of the men reinforces the necessity of group sacrifice during extreme conditions. Set against a stark sky, their collective action signifies an advancing front. As Rosenthal framed the men parallel to the viewer, the scene projects a particularly monumental quality that recalls classical relief sculpture. The resulting asymmetrical mass of bodies simultaneously provides a dynamic “snapshot” aesthetic that evokes a spontaneous moment. In addition to these visual details, the photograph’s warm stateside reception also benefited from a relative dearth of positive news from the Pacific War. In early 1945, U.S. forces faced an
entrenched Japanese enemy fighting with particular ferocity. As a result, progress through the Pacific was often characterized by intense battles across inhospitable terrain. *Old Glory* thus represented more than a powerful visual record of the hard-fought success of the Marines at Iwo Jima; it also served as a significant shot of confidence for civilians who needed affirmation of progress in the war against Japan.

The photograph became so popular that the men involved achieved celebrity status. After government officials identified the servicemen shown, each Marine was pulled from active duty and shipped back to the United States. They were welcomed as heroes and later sent on tour to promote the sale of war bonds. By the end of February, the photograph was so admired that even Rosenthal’s fame rose. A *Washington Post* editorialist wrote that Rosenthal’s popularity “is at the stage where people point him out.” In early March, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal characterized Rosenthal as “gallant as the men” he photographed. Rosenthal typically redirected this attention to the men portrayed in the photograph by noting that the scene “symbolizes their gallant action. That was the toughest fight they ever had.”

Indeed, the ferocity of the fighting at Iwo Jima was particularly intense. Military historians estimate that the Marines suffered 24,000 casualties before securing the island. Enemy knowledge of the island’s irregular terrain, which included beaches full of volcanic ash, made initial advances exceedingly difficult. Representations of the fighting in news media on the home front often addressed these challenges bluntly. For example, in April, the *Saturday Evening Post* printed a large photograph of Marines crawling up a steep incline during the early stages of the assault on the island.

The photograph’s perspective is particularly low, indicating the photographer shot from the ground while crawling up the beach alongside the Marines. The caption observes that these “vulnerable” Marines were “mauled by mortar fire” during their ascent, making their assault a “grim experience.” Similarly, the initial coverage of the fighting at Iwo Jima in *Life* magazine did not include *Old Glory* and instead depicted unsettling photographs of the violent first few days of the invasion. Previous photographs of the fighting in the Pacific portrayed similarly unsettling imagery. For example, Frank Filan’s photograph of the 1943 Marine invasion of Tawara Island, which won the 1944 Pulitzer Prize, depicts a battlefield strewn with mangled bodies, wrecked machines, and uprooted earth. Representing the brutality of war more directly, these and other photographs likely contributed to the popularity of *Old Glory*, which portrays a more positive scene.

The heroic content of Rosenthal’s photograph also allows viewers to overlook details of the fighting that included the ongoing battles at Iwo Jima. For example, *Old Glory* makes no clear reference to the enemy, and the men shown do not seem concerned with defending themselves. Many viewers likely assumed, therefore, that the entire island had been secured. In fact, the Marines did not secure the island until 26 March, a month after Rosenthal shot the photograph. Thus, while the image projects a victorious moment, U.S. forces continued to fight for control of the island. Similarly, the circumstances surrounding the production of Rosenthal’s photograph were deemphasized. News reports largely ignored the many other photographs Rosenthal took atop Mount Suribachi and the fact that *Old Glory* depicts the second flag raising. Acknowledging these details would have potentially compromised the scene’s im-
promptu and “authentic” character. Similarly, the dynamic quality of Old Glory soon led to charges that the photograph was somehow “posed” or “staged.” Rosenthal rebuffed these suspicions by providing numerous details of the photograph’s creation while also acknowledging his fortuitous circumstances.11

Press coverage also broadened the meaning of Old Glory by associating the fighting at Iwo Jima with historic battles from previous American wars. In March, Time magazine compared the fight for Mount Suribachi to battles at Valley Forge, Gettysburg, and Tarawa while also praising Rosenthal’s “sculptured picture of Old Glory rising atop Mount Suribachi.”12 Similar press reports further magnified the scene’s significance by comparing Rosenthal’s photograph to famous works of art. In March, Life, the nation’s premier picture magazine, juxtaposed Rosenthal’s photograph with Emanuel Leutze’s well-known oil painting Washington Crossing the Delaware (1851). Formally, both images depict men at war, hoisting a flag within scenes characterized by movement and heroic action. By comparing Old Glory with such a grand and imposing scene from the American Revolution, the editors at Life linked the fighting at Iwo Jima with a rich visual legacy rooted in patriotic symbols of war.13 Other news outlets simply declared Old Glory to be a powerful work of art. The Kansas City Plaindealer argued that Rosenthal’s photograph “is great art in every sense of the word,” while the Times-Union in Rochester, New York, compared Old Glory to Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper (ca. 1498).14 Viewers were thus encouraged to understand Old Glory as a symbol whose meaning was not necessarily limited to the war in the Pacific, but instead part of a longer tradition of visual heroism.15

This mythical resonance expanded further in May when the Treasury Department released millions of bond posters dominated by Beall’s painted translation of Rosenthal’s photograph (see figure 4.1). Beall’s full-color image depicts six men, their faces obscured, raising the U.S. flag. The lower portion of the poster includes the Seventh War Loan’s official slogan: “Now . . . All Together.” A brief caption below the graphic reads simply: “U.S. Marines at Iwo Jima painted by CC Beall from an Associated Press photograph.” While Rosenthal’s name did not appear on the poster, many viewers would have undoubtedly recognized the source of the graphic. Not surprisingly, press reports emphasized this connection by noting that Beall completed the painting in five days and “copied the Joe Rosenthal photograph exactly.”16

Known primarily as an illustrator of books and magazines, Beall often displayed dramatic contrasts between light and shadow. Unlike Norman Rockwell, his more famous contemporary who also designed posters promoting war bonds, Beall rarely rendered sentimental or humorous content.17 Instead, he typically painted theatrical, narrative-driven scenes characterized by an effective use of color. These traits may have been what encouraged Treasury Department officials to commission Beall to translate Rosenthal’s Old Glory into a painting for widespread reproduction.

The extensive distribution of both the Now . . . All Together poster and its photographic source enhanced the symbolic resonance of both images. Government officials initially sent more than two million copies of the poster across the country for display in a variety of public spaces. At the start of the Seventh War Loan campaign in May, news media informed readers that, “within the next few weeks, you are going to get to know the Beall painting . . .
at least as well as you know your own name.” According to Collier’s magazine, citizens should expect to see Beall’s poster at “the garage at the end of Main Street, the bowling alley, the grocery store and the local chapter of your lodge.”

Another million-and-a-half copies were sent specifically to retail stores, which framed the poster in custom display windows. Additional copies went to military barracks, schools, theaters, subways, railroad stations, banks, and businesses. That same month, the Los Angeles Times noted that the extensive distribution of Beall’s poster seemed to “blanket” the city.

Beall’s Now . . . All Together poster is a unique example of war propaganda as it clearly depicts a painted version of a popular, symbolically rich photograph produced only weeks earlier. To articulate the significance of this translation process, the cultural distinctions between these different types of media requires a brief analysis. Scholars have long argued that the camera’s mechanical quality suggests an objective representation of actual events. Photographs, such as Rosenthal’s Old Glory, are therefore typically understood to denote truthful, accurate records. Conversely, viewers do not expect a painting to convey the same level of verisimilitude. Even when working from a photograph, as Beall freely admitted, a painter makes aesthetic decisions regarding color and design that contribute to a unique, hand-rendered form. Similarly, the artistic skill necessary to produce a painting has long held a higher cultural status over the supposedly simplistic process of photography. This bias is amplified further by the fact that, while a painting is a unique object, a photograph can be reproduced endlessly. A poster such as Beall’s Now . . . All Together that featured a painted image based on a photograph inhabited a unique status; as an image, Beall’s rendering demonstrates a unique hand-painted quality that suggests a higher cultural value than a photograph. However, as an object, the poster is identical to millions of copies, each carrying the same visual content. The end result was a mass-distributed poster featuring an instantly recognizable, hand-painted image that aggrandized the significance of Rosenthal’s already iconic photograph.

In converting Old Glory to a painting suitable for distribution as a poster, Beall made subtle but critical alterations to his photographic source that enhanced the final graphic’s impact. Compared to Rosenthal’s photograph, Beall’s painting depicts a dramatically cropped and compressed scene that forced the flagpole to be raised at a higher, more dramatic angle. Beall also extended the size of the flag while rendering a dramatic background filled with dark blue, green, and yellow tones that suggested an almost spiritual setting. Beall’s inclusion of two small dark explosions in the sky on either side of the flag further amplifies the scene’s drama. Similarly, Beall pushed the men into a smaller, vertically orientated space that provides an increased level of detail and allows viewers to distinguish the figures from one another. This specificity may have been what Rosenthal referred to when he commented that the poster seemed “a little overdrawn.”

Beall’s translative process also benefited from recent changes to commercial art industry standards that allowed painters to openly rely upon photographs as source material. While illustrators had used photographs long before the war, most avoided acknowledging this practice, as viewers understood painting and photography to constitute distinct media. While painting represents a more unique, “artistic” form of representation, artists who used photographs as visual aids risked the corruption of their creative integrity. The bias against the supposed
degrading influences of the camera’s mechanical eye did not subside until the early 1940s, when Norman Rockwell acknowledged his use of photographs as a visual reference. Before then, a painter who used photographs while developing artwork was, according to Rockwell’s 1943 New Yorker profile, “looked down on in the better art circles.” Beall’s bond poster benefited not only from its famous source, but also from changing industry standards that increasingly tolerated the use of photographs by illustrators in the development of painted media.

The Now . . . All Together graphic is even more unique as few posters produced during World War II feature painted imagery based on a famous photograph. The few posters that depict content appropriated from a photograph are characterized by far more intense, often violent subject matter. Between 1942 and 1943, the Office of War Information (OWI), the primary American propaganda agency, commissioned a handful of posters that featured paintings inspired by photographs of violent acts committed by the Axis enemy. For example, Japanese-American artist Yasuo Kuniyoshi created a series of posters that depict victims of Japanese torture. Similarly, the well-known painter Ben Shahn used photographs of Nazi atrocities for paintings intended for distribution as posters. These and similar efforts conveyed the seriousness of the war by addressing the violence experienced by civilians abroad. Moreover, by relying on photographs to develop these scenes, the artists could claim a level of authenticity for both the paintings and the subsequent posters. Many of these graphics, though designed to inform citizens of the seriousness of the fighting, were considered unsettling and did not see widespread distribution. Moreover, unlike Beall’s graphic, they did not rely upon iconic photographic source material.

While drawing from the visual characteristics of both painting and press photography, Beall’s poster demonstrates a unique status that also clearly expressed a patriotic message ideally suited for the promotion of war bonds. Related press materials released by the Treasury Department encouraged viewers to understand Beall’s poster within these specific parameters by praising the graphic as a major component of the Seventh War Loan promotions: “Not only is it a lasting tribute to those who gave their lives in the cause for which we fight, but it is a constant reminder of the many and bitter battles which lie ahead until Japan is decisively crushed.” Thus, government officials promoted Beall’s design for its capacity to signify both the fighting at Iwo Jima and battles in the future. This message became particularly critical in the context of promoting the sale of bonds during the war’s final months.

FUNDING THE FIGHT
Generating the estimated $350 billion required to fight World War II proved a politically difficult task for U.S. government officials. During the early 1940s, Congress substantially raised federal taxes across all income brackets in an effort to cover associated expenses. However, taxes alone were not enough to cover the costs incurred by the war. To generate additional revenue, the Treasury Department promoted and sold bonds through organized campaigns, referred to as war loan drives or simply bond drives. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. oversaw this program, which began before the United States entered the war and increased in importance until 1945. Each drive involved the enthusiastic participation of multiple government agencies and corporate advertisers who worked together to encourage civilians (and servicemen) to invest in bonds.
These efforts were overwhelmingly successful in generating revenue as Americans ultimately purchased more than $185 billion in bonds. The increased reliance on the bond program resulted from a contentious debate about the most effective manner to finance the war. While government officials agreed that the war’s cost presented a serious challenge, little consensus developed regarding how to generate the requisite economic resources. Numerous politicians, including members of President Franklin Roosevelt’s cabinet, felt that bonds would not raise adequate revenue and that an increase in taxes represented the only viable answer. However, passing the necessary legislation proved politically difficult. For example, in 1943, Congress vetoed an expansion of taxes on annual incomes. As the national debt skyrocketed to historic levels, war bonds proved an effective method to generate additional revenue outside of income tax increases. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, who previously argued that higher taxes would be widely unpopular, contended that a volunteer system of contributions, based on bonds, would prove a more popular and effective strategy for financing the war. The resulting loan drives, which were overwhelmingly successful, demonstrated a significant psychological component by allowing bondholders to contribute to the war. The program had a democratic quality as well, as bonds were sold at various monetary levels but with fixed interest rates. As a result, purchasers could invest with confidence on their return at a rate that fit their budget. Consequently, the Treasury Department raised revenues while encouraging civilians to voluntarily contribute to the war.

The bond program generated impressive results beginning with the First War Loan, held in 1942, which led to $13 billion in sales to more than 50 million Americans, or more than 35 percent of the population. Despite this success, Treasury officials quickly expressed concerns that buyers could lose interest in repeat purchases either out of a misunderstanding of the government’s need for continued public financial support or, worse yet, an apathy toward the war effort. To keep bond promotions fresh and encourage repeat sales, officials established a series of separate, consecutive bond loans that featured unique campaign themes. The resulting eight themes attempted to reinvigorate the public and suppress complacent attitudes.

Each war loan featured a comprehensive promotional strategy developed across multiple media platforms, including advertising, film, radio, and printed graphics. The messages and themes of specific bond drives received particularly effective visual support through the distribution of posters developed by committees that included independent artists, government officials, and advertising agencies. Although staff artists more often developed poster imagery, in some cases, Treasury officials offered an artist a contract to create a specific design. Poster committees comprising bureaucrats and artists generally authorized the final designs for distribution. In some instances, the process of evaluating graphics included Morgenthau’s wife, who had a particular interest in posters.

Prior to Beall’s *Now . . . All Together* design, bond posters featured a variety of overlapping themes involving sentimental, militaristic, and patriotic imagery. From the program’s beginning, representations of American soldiers—both past and present—were particularly common. In 1941, Treasury officials designated Daniel Chester French’s famous sculpture *The Minute Man* (1874) as the official symbol of the war bond program. Located in Concord, Massachusetts, near the historic site of the first
shot of the Revolutionary War, The Minute Man served as a powerful symbol of the spirit of the Colonial era. This famous figure, shown striding boldly forward with a musket and leaving his plow behind, appeared in advertisements and posters throughout the war. For example, French’s sculpture dominated a 1943 poster designed by John Atherton that featured the text “For Freedom’s Sake . . . Buy War Bonds” (figure 4.2). Similar to Beall’s appropriation of Rosenthal’s photograph, Atherton’s design relies on an existent image. However, Atherton’s poster relates the current fight to broader, more historical themes by referencing the Revolutionary War. By juxtaposing this imagery with the phrase “For Freedom’s Sake,” Atherton amplified the effect further by suggesting that the independence fought for during the Colonial era was currently threatened by the international crisis.

Bond posters featuring servicemen more often depicted contemporary weapons and battle dress in scenes that vacillated between promotions of American military might and more sober acknowledgments of the war’s violence. Well-known illustrator N. C. Wyeth developed an example of the former type for a poster produced in 1942 (figure 4.3). This image portrays a massive, intimidating Uncle Sam directing an assault of American soldiers and aircraft against an unseen enemy. Layers of smoldering smoke surround the scowling Uncle Sam, who tightly clasps a large, swelling U.S. flag over his shoulder. Though the soldiers in the foreground wear an older style of helmet, the graphic clearly presents a message of contemporary military power. The scene’s colorful, dynamic illustration requires no additional text than the caption that plainly encourages viewers to “buy war bonds.” Similar to Beall’s design, Wyeth’s poster relies upon rich symbolism and a message of military might. However, Wyeth’s painting avoids relying on a known photographic source, instead providing what might best be described as a scene from the enemy’s nightmare.

As the war progressed, bond posters expanded their message to acknowledge the suffering experienced by U.S. soldiers abroad. For example, a poster designed by Robert Sloan in 1943 depicts a U.S. serviceman, his head bandaged, staring at the viewer uneasily before a darkened, desolate battlefield (figure 4.4). While the caption reminds viewers to purchase bonds, the copy above plainly asks, “Doing all you can, brother?” Though the poster does not depict a flag, the combination of the moody, blue sky along with the prominent spot of blood
FIGURE 4.3
N. C. Wyeth, Buy War Bonds, 1942, offset lithographic poster
U.S. Treasury Department, National Archives and Records Administration
on the white bandage worn by an apprehensive soldier provides a surrogate reminder of Old Glory. By acknowledging the pain soldiers experienced abroad, Sloan’s poster reminded civilians of the hardships faced by others amidst the chaos of war. This message was significant as some civilians began complaining about wartime sacrifices shortly after the war started. For example, mandated rationing and shortages of consumer goods led to objections across the country. Posters such as Sloan’s reminded Americans that the ways in which they sacrificed at home, though crucial for the war effort, were incomparable to the experiences of servicemen and many civilians around the world.

As the war progressed and an Allied victory seemed increasingly likely, many bond posters demonstrated a decreased awareness of the violence abroad. For example, a 1944 design by Vic Guinnell portrays a soldier stretching a U.S. flag across an indeterminate space while the accompanying text reads: “To Have and to Hold” (figure 4.5). Unlike Sloan’s design, this image deemphasizes the violence of the battlefield for a more explicitly patriotic scene. Additionally, the text refers simultaneously to both the flag and to the viewer’s bonds. This message was pertinent as government officials periodically expressed concerns that investors may request to cash their bonds before maturity. A similar message is seen in a poster from the same year featuring a smiling young boy
next to text encouraging parents to “Protect His Future.” This design included two overlapping messages. First, it refers to the immediate necessity of protecting the next generation from war, broadly speaking. Second, it alludes to the importance of providing future financial security through bonds.33

As the United States entered what would be the war’s final year, the previous six bond drives were regarded as overwhelmingly successful. However, federal bureaucrats continued to express concerns that potential buyers would feel indifferent about purchasing additional bonds as the war seemed close to a conclusion. As a result, many promotions for the Seventh War Loan featured dynamic, intense rhetoric.

SELLING THE MIGHTY SEVENTH
At the start of the Seventh War Loan in spring 1945, Treasury officials faced a potentially problematic financial situation. As an Allied victory seemed increasingly likely, many government bureaucrats feared that a sense of inevitable victory would lead to a decrease in bond sales.34 In response, Seventh War Loan promotions used the phrase “Now . . . All Together” to convince civilians that the war’s successful conclusion hinged on a united effort between the home front and the armed forces abroad. These efforts were supplemented by bond promotions that featured particularly dramatic rhetoric that often relied on notions of authenticity. The extensive use of Rosenthal’s iconic Old Glory in the Mighty Seventh bond campaign demonstrated an important example of this strategy. As a photograph, this image signified a high level of realism that was difficult to deny. Additionally, its instant familiarity made an ideal icon for reuse in temporary sculptures, stamps, sheet music, newsreel footage, and staged recreations of the flag raising. The Mighty Seventh’s reliance on authenticity also extended to documentary films that viewers likely regarded as intense and possibly shocking.

The sense of unity expressed by Rosenthal’s Old Glory provided a particularly effective graphic to supplement the Seventh War Loan’s official slogan, “Now . . . All Together.” This phrase, which filled the lower section of Beall’s poster, demonstrates an important shift in the rhetoric used to encourage the purchase of war bonds. Conversely, these words clearly convey the combined effort of the Marines shown raising the flag. More important, however, the slogan alludes to the necessity of continued sacrifice from civilians on the home front—financial and otherwise—during the war’s final months. Many government officials feared that the Allied victory over the Axis Powers in Europe in May—which coincided closely with the start of the Mighty Seventh War Loan—would encourage civilians to develop a sense of inevitable victory and an inevitable decrease in bond sales. In fact, the war was far from over. The combination of the strategic complexities of fighting in the Pacific along with the enemy’s continued resolve presented numerous challenges and inevitably intense fighting. Moreover, American politicians and military officials expressed serious concerns with the financial and cultural challenges of rebuilding and stabilizing Europe. As a result, Treasury officials established the Seventh War Loan’s goal at $14 billion, an amount similar to previous efforts.35

To promote continued home front participation in the bond program, Mighty Seventh promotions offered creative interpretations of the “Now . . . All Together” message that linked civilians to the war in surprising ways. This strategy often suggested that the contri-
Contributions of citizens and servicemen were parallel, or even relatively equal, components in the war effort. For example, a Mighty Seventh bond drive poster designed by Phil Wyford prominently features a middle-age man proudly displaying war bonds (figure 4.6). His clean-cut, dapper dress clearly designates him as a white-collar professional. Behind him, a soldier stands in clouds of smoke while firing an M50 Reising submachine gun. The poster’s lower caption reminds viewers of the Seventh War Loan, while the main text reads: “They also serve, who buy war bonds.” This phrase, combined with the juxtaposition between these two men, explicitly aligns civilian bond purchasers with soldiers. Wyford’s poster thus conveys the “Now . . . All Together” message expressed in Beall’s design by linking the war abroad with the purchasing habits of civilians at home.

Countless other Mighty Seventh promotions reinforce a similar idea by making a much more direct reference to Rosenthal’s photograph. In addition to Beall’s poster, Treasury officials commissioned Joseph Reichert, a commercial artist, to recreate Rosenthal’s photograph into a more basic illustration (figure 4.7). This logo-esque graphic translated the complicated forms seen in both Rosenthal’s photograph and Beall’s illustration into a basic icon that featured a streamlined scene with only three Marines. The graphic’s most recognizable element is likely the man at the far right, shown planting the flagpole into the rocky earth. Instead of the four additional Marines seen in other variations of Rosenthal’s photograph, this graphic provides a single additional figure to assist with the flag-raising, which, in turn, emphasizes the large “7” in the background. The austere rendering of Rosenthal’s photograph allowed this design to be easily reproducible in a variety of contexts, and it appeared on posters and related advertising throughout the drive.

Businesses also promoted the sale of war bonds by repeating the themes of specific drives and, not surprisingly, Rosenthal’s Old Glory
served as an easily adaptable image for numerous examples. Most encouraged the “Now . . . All Together” message seen in Beall’s poster while simultaneously carrying a promotion for the corporate sponsor. For example, near the end of the Mighty Seventh drive, an F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Company advertisement combined Rosenthal’s photograph with French’s *The Minute Man* sculpture (figure 4.8). The majority of the ad features a reproduction of *Old Glory*, seemingly unaltered from the original. The text above states simply: “Put all your might into the Mighty 7th War Loan.” Placed directly adjacent to the flag, French’s *The Minute Man* seems to float within a cloud in a manner more commonly seen in Renaissance-era paintings of Christ’s apotheosis. The implied message reinforces the connection between the Colonial era and contemporary fighting through a pseudo-religious scene that suggests *The Minute Man* was resurrected on Mount Suribachi.

Other advertisements played off the popularity of *Old Glory* by borrowing the iconic flag-raising form but substituting the Marines with other figures. An ad for Eversharp pens

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*FIGURE 4.7*
U.S. Treasury Department, the Historical Museum at Fort Missoula

*FIGURE 4.8*
from June 1945 offers an example of this theme (figure 4.9). Here a group of citizens—including a housewife, office workers, and what appear to be manual laborers—strain to raise a large “7,” not a flag. The text above encourages viewers to “Get It Up There!” This phrase references both the large numeral raised by the figures shown and the reader’s own investment in the Mighty Seventh bond drive. At the same time, the ad relies on the iconic form of figures working together to achieve a common goal expressed by both the Seventh War Loan’s message of “Now . . . All Together” and Rosenthal’s Old Glory.

Though visible throughout the era, war-themed advertising imagery presents a complicated conflation of corporate and government messages. For example, while both ads above demonstrate clear support for the bond program, neither references a product sold by the graphic’s corporate sponsor. Similar advertisements that expressed patriotic messages but offered few consumer goods were common during the war for several reasons. Consumers saw shortages of numerous products as the war required countless raw materials. The wartime conversion of the economy similarly meant that citizens faced mandatory rationing of goods, which led to a drastic change in purchasing habits.38 These factors, combined with a general sense of uncertainty about the future, often led to the promotion of austerity that presented corporate advertisers with a serious challenge. To remain in the public’s consciousness, advertisers learned to create patriotic graphics that did not always feature products available for sale. Government officials, acknowledging that advertising agencies could contribute to the improvement of home front morale, worked closely with national advertisers in this effort throughout the war.39 At the same time, ads that appropriated Rosenthal’s Old Glory arguably diluted the photograph’s original potency by recontextualizing the scene within a commercial context.

While corporate ads that relied on Rosenthal’s Old Glory offered variations of the “Now . . . All Together” message, official bond promotions projected a far more “realistic” and, in some cases, intense experience. For example, the Seventh War Loan campaign, as with other bond promotions, included public rallies featuring music, celebrity speakers, and other forms of entertainment. Mighty Seventh rallies also included a recreation of the Iwo Jima flag
raising that involved a “performance” by the surviving servicemen who appeared in Rosenthal’s *Old Glory*. These events, used to promote bond sales specifically, were typically orchestrated in stadiums or open public spaces.40 Related newsreel footage of the drive’s celebratory opening in New York City featured the three survivors from Rosenthal’s photograph raising the flag as an announcer implored: “They raised that flag on Iwo with their blood. Repay them with your bond purchases!”41 While popular and effective in raising bond sales, these events were psychologically taxing on the men involved. The act of repeatedly “restaging” a moment defined by violence and the loss of comrades undoubtedly affected the participants. The mental and emotional toll clearly contributed to the distress of Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, a Marine in Rosenthal’s photograph, who initially contributed to bond promotions but later withdrew from the tour.42

While the spectacle of staged flag raisings ostensibly provided an added authenticity to Beall’s already dramatic rendering of *Old Glory*, a comparable series of promotional events featured an even more elaborate recreation of war. Titled “Here’s Your Infantry,” this traveling 90-minute performance included approximately 1,100 U.S. soldiers who demonstrated various weapons, equipment, and military tactics. Typically staged on an athletic field, “Here’s Your Infantry” events provided civilians with a thrilling—and entirely sanitized—version of mechanized war. Treasury promotions proclaimed that these performances were as “Realistic as War Itself”:

*Doughboys just back from the Philippines, France, Italy, from wherever infantrymen are fighting, will re-create [sic] their experiences and demonstrate their weapons, giving the American public its most vivid realization of the courage of the Doughboy and how that fighting spirit is backed by the best weapons in the world—paid for by War Bond dollars.*

Officials further noted that during these performances soldiers used “their tactics and weapons to *simulate as real* an attack as is possible.” While soldiers demonstrated artillery and troop movements, an announcer explained the exact cost of the weapons being used. Typically, performances culminated with an “attack” on an entrenched group of “Japanese” soldiers.43 Organized across the country in metropolitan areas and small towns, these performances did not typically include an admission fee though viewers were encouraged to purchase bonds.

While “Here’s Your Infantry” essentially turned war into a spectator event, another Mighty Seventh promotion presented a far more disturbing representation of the fighting abroad on film.44 Newsreels played a major role in how American civilians experienced the war abroad, and viewers saw footage of the flag-raising at Iwo Jima around the time of the Seventh War Loan campaign. However, other films provided a different, far more intense level of the war’s reality. *Action at Angaur*, produced in 1945 as part of the Seventh War Loan drive, followed the U.S. Army’s 81st Infantry during the fighting on the Palau Islands in late 1944. The film uses a unique combination of actual footage from the war along with theatrical music and a scripted narrative delivered by an anonymous serviceman. The language and imagery featured is far more intense than that seen in Hollywood productions. Numerous scenes in *Action at Angaur* depict actual footage of Japanese soldiers being burned alive while the narrator says, “By this time we had shot, blasted, or cooked six hundred of the little apes.”45 This violent, racist rhetoric, seen at the time...
as necessary to resist a possible downturn in bond sales, contributed to the dehumanization of the enemy. At the end of the film, viewers were encouraged to purchase additional bonds as a modified version of Rosenthal’s *Old Glory* appeared on the screen.

**CONCLUSION**

The ultimate success of the Seventh War Loan drive is indisputable. The campaign brought in $26.3 billion, which constituted approximately 188 percent of the Treasury Department’s initial goal for the drive. This eventual total set a record as the highest-earning bond campaign of the war. The drive’s success resulted not only from its national, multimedia content, but also from the distinct reliance on a level of realism epitomized by the continued presence of Rosenthal’s *Old Glory*. As the Mighty Seventh’s official poster, Beall’s *Now . . . All Together* did more than provide an effective call to arms. Most viewers likely recognized Beall’s painting as based on the *Old Glory* photograph, which in turn strongly linked the poster to an actual event. Conversely, most other war loan campaigns relied on imagery that lacked this historical specificity. This approach extended to other Mighty Seventh campaign promotions that reached beyond photographic forms of realism. The resulting emphasis was critical in the ongoing effort to encourage civilians to purchase bonds in the war’s final months. Moreover, the success of the Seventh War Loan drive provided a solid base for the transition to the eighth and final bond campaign: the “Victory” drive (29 October–8 December 1945).

Undoubtedly, Rosenthal’s *Old Glory* operated as a powerful record from a particularly difficult fight. The image serves to remind viewers today—as during the war—of the Marines who fought and sacrificed at Iwo Jima. At the same time, the broad distribution and countless variations of Rosenthal’s photograph allowed the original image to transcend the limitations of photography to evoke an even more symbolic connotation. Beall’s bond poster is a single, though valuable, example of how the meanings associated with *Old Glory* were expanded through a complicated process of appropriation and recontextualization. Moreover, this process increased after the war. Since 1945, *Old Glory* has reappeared throughout American visual culture on countless products, including neckties, cigarette lighters, jewelry, belt buckles, and jigsaw puzzles. Variations continue to appear regularly in advertisements, editorial cartoons, posters, and T-shirts. Perhaps the most famous adaptation, Felix de Weldon’s Marine Corps War Memorial at Arlington National Cemetery, was commemorated in 1954. However, as demonstrated by Seventh War Loan campaign promotions, the process of expanding the significance of Rosenthal’s photograph began even before the war ended.

**ENDNOTES**


3. The identities of the servicemen shown has generated


10. Filan’s award-winning photograph, along with several others from Tawara, appeared in Life, 1 December 1943, 27–35.


18. Porter, “The Week’s Work,” Collier’s, 74. The editors at Collier’s had good reason to support Beall’s poster in addition to simply promoting the latest war bond drive. Beall often contributed artwork to the magazine; thus, the editors were promoting an artist whose work was associated with their publication.


20. An earlier sketch by Beall features the same scenes set against what resembles an explosion. Now at the National Archives, this unfinished design features a strong horizontal orientation and more prominent text. This rendering also decreased the size of the six men raising the flag, which would have diluted the scene’s visual impact if printed. This wider orientation suggests this proposal may have been intended for display in buses and trains. See C. C. Beall, They Also Serve Who Buy War Bonds: The Mighty 7th War Loan, 1942–45, poster, National Archives, Record Group 208, Original Artwork for World War II Posters, 1942–1945, 7387436.


27. Kimble, Mobilizing the Home Front, 43.


29. Morse, Paying for a World War, 232–33.

30. French completed his work in 1874, but the sculpture was not dedicated until 1875.

31. Kimble, Mobilizing the Home Front, 26; and Morse, Paying for a World War, 45.


33. Morse, Paying for a World War, 183.

34. Morse, Paying for a World War, 278–81.


37. This practice became commonplace in postwar advertising and political cartoons. For examples of the latter, see Edwards and Winkler, “Representative Form and the Visual Ideograph,” 289–310.


40. For a description of these events, including the sculptural reproductions of Rosenthal’s photograph, see “Statues Unveiled for 7th War Loan,” New York Times, 12 May 1945.


43. Although these performances began during the Sixth War Loan, the Treasury’s periodic bulletin, *Minute Man*, notes that the number of “Here’s Your Infantry” shows expanded significantly during the Seventh War Loan. See “Here’s Your Infantry–A Rousing 7th Spectacle!,” *Minute Man*, 1 May 1945, 8–9. Emphasis in original was underlined.

44. Though billed as a spectator-friendly event, at least one “Here’s Your Infantry” show resulted in injury when an errant bazooka blast left the high school stadium where the performance was held and hit a parked automobile. “Spectator Hurt in War Bond Show,” *Washington Post*, 10 June 1945.


PART TWO

Memory and Meaning

Kathleen O’Connor, age 6, and her brother Michael, age 4, solemnly look across the Iwo Jima flag at a scale model of Félix de Weldon’s statue during a ceremony in Philadelphia on 5 August 1949. Their father, CWO William J. O’Connor, USMC, was killed during the campaign.

Courtesy of TSgt A. Schonefeld, National Archives and Records Administration
CHAPTER 5

DID JOE ROSENTHAL SAVE THE MARINE CORPS?
*The Existential Fight, 1943–52*

by David W. Mills, PhD

Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal stood at the railing of the USS *El Dorado* (AGC 11), staring at the beaches of Iwo Jima as the sun rose over the island on D+4, 23 February 1945. Forrestal contemplated many issues as the minutes ticked away that morning; he was headed to the island for a closer look at the fighting, and he was unsure what lay ahead. A landing craft appeared just before 1000 that morning, and he and the senior Marine at the battle, General Holland M. Smith, descended into the craft wearing life jackets, preparing to go ashore. They watched as the coxswain expertly guided the party to their destination, a landing area designated as one of the Red Beaches on the southern tip of the island. On the way, a member of the crew pointed as Marines hoisted the first flag atop the mountain heights that dominated the island. Cheers arose from the beaches.¹ It was at that moment that Forrestal turned to Smith and said, “Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next 500 years” (figure 5.1).² The banner was small and barely visible, but someone found a much larger flag and ordered it installed in place of the smaller one, and photographer Joe Rosenthal took his famous photograph of six Marines raising the flag over Iwo Jima (see figure 0.2).³ The fact that Forrestal was sure that the Marine Corps now had a long-term purpose revealed that it had an immediate problem of relevancy, and by implication, foreshadowed the existential threat the organization would face in the near future.

**ELIMINATION OF THE MARINE CORPS**

More than a year before the Iwo Jima landings, in December 1943, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had presented his concept of a reorganized military establishment to the highest levels of the federal government, including Senator Harry S. Truman, then the influential head of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Everyone involved in the discussion agreed that a permanent solution would have to wait for the end of hostilities, and immediately after...
the war, discussions began that attempted to eliminate the United States Marine Corps and continued through most of the Korean War. This chapter depicts the ways in which Marine Corps leaders continuously defended the Corps between 1945 and 1952 by befriending members of Congress and through a concerted public relations effort centered on Rosenthal’s photo. That depiction of the brave Marines was immediately famous, catapulting the Corps into the public consciousness at exactly the time it was most vulnerable. Attempts to abolish the Corps continued through 1952, when public and congressional perception of the Marines’ exceptional performance in Korea prompted the president to codify the Marine Corps mission in perpetuity.

Since its creation on 10 November 1775, the Marine Corps was seen as a source of competition for Army and Navy recruits and budgets, and its elimination would have solved many resource problems for the other two Services. The Marines fought off several attempts to abolish the organization in the nineteenth century, always with the help of Congress, while several important conflicts saved the Corps at the beginning of the twentieth century. An expeditionary battalion of 650 Marines seized the

FIGURE 5.1
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (left) and LtGen Holland Smith, commander of the Marine Forces in the Iwo landing, stand at a ship’s rail off Iwo Jima and watch the bitter fighting on the island. Mount Suribachi, where the Marines hoisted the American flag, is visible in the background.
Office of War Information photo 208-PU-70A-1, National Archives and Records Administration
Spanish territory at Guantánamo Bay in 1898, and another Marine force held out during a 75-day siege, outnumbered 100 to 1, in defense of the Foreign Legation in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. The Marines earned their reputation as a tough fighting force, and America fell in love with the Corps. Fathers respected the men’s fighting spirit, while boys dreamed of growing up to join their proud tradition.⁵

If the Spanish-American War and the Boxer Rebellion initiated a flirtation between the American population and the Marines, the Corps’ participation in World War I sparked a passionate love affair. The Marine Corps leadership hit upon an ingenious marketing campaign in early 1917, even before President Woodrow Wilson officially brought America into the war in Europe, promising America’s youth that if they joined the Corps, they would be the “First to Fight” (figure 5.2). Thus, they drew a large number of recruits who were seeking adventure and spoiling for action, hoping to get to the front as quickly as possible and burnishing their reputation as the toughest force in the American military.⁶ Of the many battles in which the Marines participated in World War I, the Battle at Belleau Wood, fought in June 1918, was etched permanently into the memory of an admiring nation. That connection with popular culture was made even more striking when journalist Floyd Gibbons, who lost an eye reporting in the field and military officials mistakenly reported him killed, delivered an uncensored yet vibrant account of Marines in action. Published in the Chicago Tribune, his article gave the Corps a public relations windfall as readers throughout America believed these men represented an elite unit of the American Expeditionary Forces and singlehandedly turned the tide of the battle.⁷

Predictably, once the fighting was over, Congress slashed military budgets and reduced staffing authorizations. Prior to Wilson bringing the United States into World War I, the Marine Corps had close to 11,000 officers and enlisted men. Their numbers grew to almost 75,000 Marines of all ranks by the end of the war; but within two years, those numbers had dwindled to around 17,000. Worse yet, the Marines struggled for relevancy and a wartime mission. The other Services turned a covetous eye toward their meager budgets, and again leveled the accusation that the Marine Corps was redundant and lacked a reason to exist. Thus, the Corps needed a convincing story to keep the executioners at bay.⁸

Finding a mission during the interwar
years was not difficult, as many U.S. Navy and Marine officers had identified a new calling for a small but tenacious force. Since their defeat of the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War, waged between 1904 and 1905, the Japanese were a rising and imminent threat to the United States. In 1920, Commandant of the Marine Corps Major General John A. Lejeune ordered his trusted subordinates to address the problem of how to defeat an enemy who controlled a vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. The dilemma occupied the Marines throughout the 1920s and 1930s, when the Great Depression again threatened their existence. “Alarmed by rumors of its own demise,” wrote military historian Allen R. Millett, “the Marine Corps turned to writing doctrine.” Consequently, under the Commandant’s direction, students and faculty at the Command and Staff College wrote the Tentative Landing Operations Manual, and the Marines became experts in amphibious warfare: assaulting well-defended beaches, taking control of an island such as Iwo Jima, and repeating the process on the way toward Japan. The Japanese surrendered at nearly the same point as the Germans at the end of World War II, due in large part to the Corps taking enemy territory near to the home islands and the atomic bombs detonated in August 1945.

While the Corps had survived intact during the war years, V-J Day reopened the argument that the Corps was an unnecessary force. The Army and Army Air Forces launched the opening salvo against the Marine Corps in December 1945, when President Harry S. Truman sent a message to Congress that emphasized his desire to reorganize the military along the lines Marshall had suggested two years earlier. The general had envisioned a number of changes, which included the idea that anything that flew would be in an independent Air Force, any fighting taking place on land fell under the purview of the Army, and the Navy accepted responsibility for controlling the seas. The plan made no provisions for the Marine Corps, putting its future in doubt. It was Marshall’s proposal that prompted Forrestal’s remark about the 500-year tenure of the Corps in 1945 with the capture of Iwo Jima. Although Truman seemed open to keeping a small contingent of Marines, he privately thought the Corps was a redundant force, and was equally willing to dismantle it altogether. The Army and the Army Air Forces were the primary drivers behind the reorganization effort, with the Navy generally supporting the Marine Corps position. Outspoken and influential Army generals, such as Marshall, former Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Chief of the Army Air Forces Henry H. Arnold, all opposed retaining the Marines as more than a token force, who represented a recruiting and budgetary challenge in the postwar environment.

The Marine Corps leadership organized the opposition to their destruction, designating officers to befriend newspaper reporters, to monitor the activities of the other Services, to write position papers, and to research roles and missions of all Services. A nucleus of Marine colonels—nicknamed the “Chowder Society,” including future Lieutenant General Victor Krulak—formed the main line of defense for retaining the Corps and roamed the halls of the Pentagon and Congress, looking for allies and pleading its case. Their efforts appeared to pay dividends in spring 1946, largely due to the testimony of Marine Corps Commandant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who stressed the wartime accomplishments of the Corps and its expertise in amphibious operations (figure 5.3). He did not beg the Senate to spare his beloved Corps: “The bended knee is not a
had a unique problem. He told his friends and colleagues at the Justice Department that he was concerned for the future of the United States. He argued that families had suffered through the Great Depression and survived the war years by demonstrating great faith in one another and by believing that the righteousness of their cause would ultimately prevail. Almost as soon as the war was over, however, a number of -isms threatened the peace and prosperity that Americans deserved after two decades of struggle. Clark believed some of these menacing ideologies emanated from across the globe and included Communism and totalitarianism, while other philosophies were homegrown and included racism and cynicism. Families and neighbors no longer seemed to look out for one another, but tended only to look out for themselves. “War had fused people into one,” he noted, “but peace brought the disintegration of much of our American unity.”

A colleague suggested to Clark that Americans needed a reminder of their shared history and cherished liberties, but rather than bring all citizens to Washington to reflect on their heritage, why not take that legacy to all Americans where they lived? Clark refined the idea in April 1946, when it morphed into one of the greatest displays of American triumphalism ever attempted. Clark was the driving force behind the Freedom Train, an endeavor to bring more than a hundred of America’s most valued national treasures to the people. Some of these items included the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the flag that six Marines had raised over Iwo Jima and that was memorialized in Rosenthal’s photo. The Freedom Train displayed the relics of American liberties during an 18-month period between September 1947 and January 1949 in

FIGURE 5.3
Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee to express his strong opposition to the proposed merger of the U.S. armed forces, 24 October 1945. Harris and Ewing, courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library

tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years, he must go. But . . . he has earned the right to depart with dignity and honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness.”

In the aftermath of the “bended knee” speech, Congress rejected Truman’s bill, the question seemingly settled, though the president made statements to suggest that he was not finished with efforts to reorganize the military Services. The Marines continued to seek allies in their cause.

THE FREEDOM TRAIN
One friend of the Marine Corps, Attorney General of the United States Tom C. Clark,
an effort that spanned 33,000 miles and visited more than 330 American cities. Most importantly for the Marines, the endeavor put them in the public eye at a crucial moment, as Clark and the newly created American Heritage Foundation wanted the Marine Corps to provide the security for the nation’s treasures and to serve as an honor guard aboard the train at the height of the reorganization fight (figure 5.4).

Clark knew that the greatest challenge the endeavor faced was one of legitimacy, particularly since the government had no stake in the Freedom Train. All administrative and financial obligations came from the private sector support; not a penny came from the federal government. In February 1947, the entire project passed to the American Heritage Foundation, a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization charged with raising money and coordinating the logistics to ensure its success. Specifically, the foundation coordinated the procurement of documents and other artifacts with the Na-
The Freedom Train was magnificent. A brand new diesel locomotive painted in festive red, white, and blue striping pulled seven passenger cars: three contained the historic artifacts, one functioned as a baggage car, and three others served as living quarters for the security detail (figures 5.5 and 5.6). Clark had definite ideas regarding who should serve as the security force aboard the train, and wrote to Forrestal in February 1947 to request that he assign the Marine Corps this responsibility.

“The Freedom Train will need an armed guard to protect its precious and irreplaceable cargo. I am sure that you will agree with me that the Marine Corps . . . is highly qualified for this job.
and this letter is to request you to direct that
this outfit be given this assignment."23 Forrest-
al agreed that the Marine Corps was the right
unit to provide security for the documents, and
passed the tasking to the Marine Corps hierar-
chy.24 Upon receiving Forrestal’s response, the
attorney general was so pleased that he replied
to the secretary: “What the great documents
represent in the immortal words and phrases,
the young men of the Corps, with their tra-
dition of valor, represent in living American
manhood.”25

Not everyone in the federal government
was enthusiastic about the idea that the Marine
Corps would provide the honor guard for this
project. Army Major General St. Clair Streett
suggested that, since the Army, Navy, and
Army Air Forces—soon the United States Air
Force—were instrumental in securing the free-
doms depicted in the documents and artifacts
carried aboard the Freedom Train, then mem-
bers of all branches of the military should serve
aboard the train and rotate through every four
months.26 Each Service had honor guards, high-
ly trained and photogenic individuals who could
have served aboard the train. The Army’s 3d
U.S. Infantry Regiment had guarded the Tomb
of the Unknown Soldier since 1926; the Navy’s
Honor Guard dated back to 1931; and the Ma-
rine Corps had honor guards located at various
Marine bases, though the Silent Drill Team still
had another year before its creation in 1948.
Even the Coast Guard had an honor guard,
which further confused the situation.27 Arguing
that the Corps possessed the unique ability to
perform honor guard duties was futile, but the
Marines had other reasons to claim the respon-
sibility in March 1947. They had a tradition
of providing security for mail trains, the White
House, various embassies around the world, and
the United Nations; therefore, it stood to reason
that guarding the Freedom Train fell squarely
within the Marine Corps mission.28 Clark and
the foundation’s leadership unveiled the proj-
ect to America in a press conference held at the
White House in May 1947 with the question of
the honor guard unresolved.29

TAKING THE BATTLE
TO CONGRESS

While Clark and his aides discussed the details
behind the Freedom Train project, the battle to
disband the Corps began earnestly again in Jan-
uary 1947, when Army officials recommended
another reorganization of the Services. The
military chiefs realized that dropping the atomic
bombs on Japan had ushered in a new era
of warfare, one that reduced the importance
of conventional forces and emphasized strate-
gic bombing and nuclear weapons. The United
States needed air power to deliver an attack on
its enemies, a powerful navy to protect its trade
routes, and a land component to safeguard the
homeland; but America no longer needed the
Marine Corps, they argued.30 Vandegrift and
his inner circle were no longer focused on sur-
vival; the Corps’ existence must be expressed in
the law. The small contingent began to cultivate
relationships with members of Congress, many
of whom were Marine reservists or veterans
of the Corps.31 Many Americans also joined
the fight to save the Marine Corps, reminded
of the sacrifices the Corps endured in defend-
ing the United States, particularly invoking the
symbolism of Iwo Jima. In a February 1947
speech before the Navy Council Conference,
Vandegrift concluded: “The weapon that con-
quered Iwo Jima was not produced in the vast
 arsenals of industry, but in the hearts of the
American people who were represented there
by the finest they could send to do battle with
our mortal enemy.”32
Truman forwarded the reorganization bill on 26 February 1947—with no input from the Marine Corps leadership—and then it proceeded to the two houses of Congress. The Senate approved the bill on 9 July as a matter of routine and with no changes or legislative protection for the Marines; however, things unfolded differently in the House. Former Marines in Congress—such as Paul H. Douglas, George A. Smathers, Joseph R. McCarthy, and Michael J. Mansfield, as well as Carl Vinson, Clare E. Hoffman and others—took on the fight the Marines had waged in earnest since 1945, providing support for them within the framework of the government that sought to destroy them.  

Representative Clare E. Hoffman of Michigan took charge of the bill and kept it before the entire committee instead of passing it on to a subcommittee, as expected. The Marines of the Chowder Society had discussed their concerns with Hoffman, who shepherded the bill through his committee and called numerous witnesses to testify, none of whom could explain how dismantling the Marine Corps was in the best interest of the nation. Hoffman’s committee rewrote the House bill before them with the help of the Chowder Society, setting the framework for the National Security Act of 1947. The House and Senate versions of the reorganization bill required a conference committee to resolve the vast differences between them; when it met, the committee adopted the House version of the bill in its initial discussions, keeping most of the important details. Truman acquiesced, realizing he would not get the independent Air Force he wanted without relenting on protection for the Marines. Most significant, the bill guaranteed the existence of the Marine Corps once President Truman signed the act into law on 25 July 1947. The new directive brought much relief to the Corps’ supporters, who had worked diligently to guarantee the existence of the Service, but it did not mandate the size of the organization. Theoretically, the role of the Marines was vague enough that the president, at any future date, could starve the force to near nothing by slashing its budget. This is exactly what Truman would later attempt to do, and the contention between the Services and the Marine Corps continued.

MARINES ABOARD THE FREEDOM TRAIN

As events played out in Congress, the function of honor guard was left unsettled as the launch date for the Freedom Train approached, with a scheduled departure from Philadelphia in September 1947. The new secretary of defense, Kenneth C. Royall, supported the idea of including all of the armed Services in performing honor guard duties, while the new secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, sternly opposed this suggestion in September 1947. First, Sullivan argued that Attorney General Clark had specifically requested the Marine Corps to fulfill this mission, and noted that Clark was the government official responsible for the security of all historic items aboard the train. Furthermore, the American Heritage Foundation also requested the Marine Corps fulfill the mission of guarding the items. Finally, Sullivan shamed Royall and Strett by suggesting their motives were nothing short of a recruiting effort to benefit the other Services, when the most important aspect of the operation was the safety of the military personnel aboard the train and the protection of the priceless American artifacts. The logical choice for that mission was the Marine Corps, he argued, and “such a sudden change in plans might even create the unfortunate impression that there is dissention among
the services about so small a matter as a security guard of 27 men.” How ironic that Sullivan suggested there was no friction between the Services at the time the Marines were fighting for their organizational existence. Royall and Streett backed down, and the Marines kept the mission for the duration of the Freedom Train tour.

The Marine Corps tapped three officers, three senior noncommissioned officers, and two dozen sergeants and corporals to serve as the Freedom Train Honor Guard (figure 5.7). One of the Marines who served in that unit, Sergeant (later Colonel) Henry W. Steadman, recalled the day a special dispatch came to his unit at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, asking for volunteers who stood between five feet eleven inches to six feet one inch, with a lean appearance in their uniform, to report for an initial screening. Everyone knew that some special duty was available, enticing approximately 200 volunteers to report the first
Officials reduced this number to the final eight selectees during subsequent assessments, including Steadman. The eight Marines from Camp Lejeune joined others from around the nation and formed the Freedom Train Honor Guard, all of whom provided crowd control and continuous security for the priceless documents and artifacts on display. Four Marines were always on guard duty, each armed with .45-caliber pistols, while others greeted visitors and explained the history behind many of the items to citizens as they toured the train. The appearance of the sharply dressed Marines on duty in each major city in America served to enhance the reputation of the Marines and encouraged the public to support the retention of the Corps as a fighting force.

**THE PUBLIC, THE FREEDOM TRAIN, AND THE MARINE CORPS**

Of all the documents and artifacts selected for inclusion on the Freedom Train tour, the public felt the strongest ties to the American flag raised by six Marines over Mount Suribachi (figure 5.8). The Iwo Jima flag had received such notoriety at the time of the Pacific battle that nearly every American had heard of it and felt some association with it. Rosenthal's picture was the only one to have won a Pulitzer Prize in the same year it was taken, suggesting the level of notoriety associated with it and the profound effect on the American public immediately after the war. Now, they could see the flag up close. Because of its inclusion on the Freedom Train, program directors considered the Iwo Jima flag as one of the most important symbols of democracy and freedom, on the same level as the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. The American Heritage Foundation published a companion book, *Heritage of Freedom*, which described each historic item carried aboard the Freedom Train. The description of the Iwo Jima flag read as follows: “Enshrined in the hearts of all Americans is the flag raised on Mount Suribachi by the U.S. Marines in the invasion of Iwo Jima.”

When the Freedom Train made its rounds throughout the United States, the public felt a distinct relationship with the Marines and the flag they raised over Iwo Jima, particularly in Missoula, Montana. The first flag raised on Mount Suribachi that day was taken from the transport ship named after the city, the USS *Missoula* (APA 211), a fact proudly proclaimed.
on the front page of *The Daily Missoulian* on the day the Freedom Train came into town. The article also pointed out that one of their own boys from Evaro, Montana, located just outside Missoula, was finally on his way home from the Pacific. Private First Class Louis C. Charlo was one of the first men to reach the top of Mount Suribachi and was there, providing security for the others, when they raised the first flag over the island. Charlo died in the fighting on Iwo Jima six days later and was interred on the island in a temporary grave until 1948, when he and thousands of other Marines also killed in the war finally came home. Reports of the repatriation of Marines, and their sacrifices in the Pacific, appeared in newspapers around the nation.43

Even cities without a direct connection to the battle responded to the flag as an important symbol of freedom. At a stop in Hagerstown, Maryland, a heavy thunderstorm had kept most people away from the Freedom Train throughout the afternoon. As the rain let up, a reporter made his way onto the train and came upon two veterans standing in front of the glass case containing the flag flown over Iwo Jima. Each of the men had their heads bowed, their hands folded, and their eyes fixed on the flag as they prayed silently. Not wanting to disturb the men in their moment of solemnity, he stood at a respectful distance and waited for the men to finish the ritual they had begun. Silently, the men concluded their meditation and exited the display. Were the men veterans themselves, and had they been on that Pacific island or another battlefield and offered up their prayers for their friends who never came home? Those answers remain unclear.44

On average, approximately 8,500 people could board the train at each stop and view the contents in one day (figure 5.9). Many who wanted to enter the Freedom Train could not because of space limitations, especially in major metropolitan areas, so each city that the Freedom Train visited was required to hold a “Rededication Week.” The purpose of this special time was to review the lessons of the Freedom Train and the cargo it carried. The American Heritage Foundation sent nine men to help coordinate the week-long celebration, officially appointing the city’s mayor as the program chairperson. Those distinctive periods lasted seven days, and were scheduled to begin one week before the train arrived. A Rededication Week could start on a Tuesday or Thursday as easily as a Saturday or Monday, with each day dedicated to a new theme, such as a Veterans Day, a Labor and Industry Day, a Youth Day, or a Women’s Day, among others. Local efforts varied, but the idea was to reflect on the ideals of the Freedom Train before it arrived so visitors were in the right frame of mind to receive the important lessons.

Across the nation, veterans and enthusiasts recreated the events depicted in the Iwo Jima photograph as part of their Rededication Weeks. City officials in Burlington, Vermont, organized a parade the evening before the Freedom Train arrived on 15 October 1947, then repeated the performance on the following day. In addition to the parade, bands played throughout the downtown area, businesspersons donned Pilgrim attire, the city mayor dressed as George Washington, and a group of Marine Corps veterans reenacted the raising of the Iwo Jima flag on the front steps of the Burlington City Hall.45 As part of the Rededication Week that took place in Joplin, Missouri, on 4 June 1948, city officials held a parade to depict the blessings of freedom and liberty. For their entry, the Marine Corps League constructed a float shaped like the island of Iwo Jima, com-
plete with foxholes, and had Marine Corps veterans in battle uniforms reenacting the flag raising from the famous battle. One of the members, George C. Brooks, had only recently completed his 15th operation since suffering wounds on Iwo Jima, but he took his place on the float. Farther west, city leaders in Ogden, Utah, held their parade the evening before the Freedom Train arrived on 26 March 1948. The American Legion Drum Corps led the procession, followed by the Marine Corps detachment from Clearfield Naval Supply Depot marching in front of their float that also reenacted the flag raising over Mount Suribachi.

THE FINAL CONFRONTATION IN CONGRESS

In the midst of all this, the public relations fight to save the Corps continued. Congress may have saved the Corps in law, but the president still controlled the budget, and Truman attempted to starve the Marines into oblivion after signing their reprieve in 1947. The Ma-
Marines had six divisions at the height of the war in 1945, but retained only two emaciated units by 1948, which Truman planned to reduce to one division. The Corps’ leadership continued to fight for the existence of the Marines by playing on its popularity. The Commandant revitalized the role of the Marine Corps as the premier force in readiness and burnished its image as the “First to Fight,” incorporating the iconic image of the Marines in World War II, particularly those at Iwo Jima.48

The Marines also developed relationships with celebrities and Hollywood producers, most famously when the Corps and Republic Pictures teamed up for the production of *Sands of Iwo Jima*, a 1949 war movie that used Rosenthal’s picture as the central narrative framework. Producer Edmund Grainger promised to use his influence in Washington in exchange for Marine Corps support of the motion picture. It was an easy decision for the new Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates, who offered the base at Camp Pendleton, California, for filming, plus huge quantities of weapons, vehicles of all varieties, airplanes, and 2,000 Marines who served as extras in the film. The most important casting decision was for the star of the film, a veteran Marine who kept his younger men alive, teaching them to become Marines themselves. Cates used his position as Commandant of the Marine Corps to request that John Wayne star in the movie, in spite of the actor’s initial reluctance.49 The screenplay memorialized the battle and the flag raising, and even managed a cameo appearance of surviving Iwo Jima veterans Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, and Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon.50 The producers took great care in recreating the flag raising just as Rosenthal’s photograph depicted it, reinforcing the public’s emotional connection with the Marines on Iwo Jima and with the work to save the Corps. Hollywood and the Marine Corps would produce three more movies during the Korean War: *Halls of Montezuma* (1951), *Retreat, Hell!* (1952), and a remake of *What Price Glory* (1952). Additionally, a fundraising campaign to construct the Marine Corps War Memorial was underway. Each of these efforts served to enhance the reputation of the Marine Corps at a critical time in its history.51

The surprise attack on 25 June 1950, which saw North Korean Communists pour over the border into South Korea, served as the final contributing factor to the survival of the Marine Corps. In a herculean effort, the Marines brought the 1st Marine Brigade into action in the rapidly shrinking port city of Pusan, staving off disaster there. Later, the Marines played a pivotal role in the assault at Inchon in September, a move that turned the effort from a purely defensive action to a rout of the North Korean Army. Press accounts throughout the tough fighting in Korea depicted the performance of the Corps, particularly at Chosin and the Punchbowl, as nothing short of effusive, while other Services faced harsh criticism. Members of the House used the flattering exploits as justification to sponsor new legislation clarifying and expanding the responsibilities of the Corps. Truman remained doubtful, believing those sympathetic to the Corps had organized a conspiracy to shine undeserved praise on the Service. He sent Army General Frank E. Lowe to inspect the units in theater and to report on the situation. Lowe’s reports condemned senior Army officials in Korea, but declared that “the First Marine Division is the most efficient and courageous combat unit I have ever seen or heard of.”52 In a letter to a friend in Congress, Truman privately mocked the value of the Marines and joked that it had a public relations arm...
almost as effective as Russian leader Joseph Stalin’s, a biting critique at this early phase in the Cold War. That friend, Representative Gordon L. McDonough, released the letter to the press and the backlash was tremendous. The public swamped Truman with letters objecting to his characterization of the Corps. The overwhelming public support, as evidenced by the public’s letters and glowing articles in the Saturday Evening Post, Look, Fortnight, and numerous daily papers set the stage for what would be the final confrontation.53

During its fight for longevity, the Marine Corps needed an image to rally around, and the Rosenthal picture remained just beneath the public consciousness throughout the battle to save the Service. As historian Robert S. Burrell wrote in Ghosts of Iwo Jima, “The Marine Corps took its case for survival to the American public. The heroism of Marines on Iwo Jima, as symbolized by Joe Rosenthal’s picture, played a key role in mobilizing the support that inspired the National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent revision in 1952—both of which saved the Marine Corps as a fighting organization.”54 The Marines would serve as their best spokespersons. Specifically, the Freedom Train introduced Marines to an admiring public who otherwise might never have met one. The population of the United States stood at close to 151 million people according to the 1950 census, and an estimated 35–40 million citizens participated in Freedom Train activities that featured the Marine Corps.55 Additionally, the Sands of Iwo Jima garnered four Academy Award nominations and was ranked as one of the top 10 money-earning motion pictures of 1950. Reviewers and the public loved the film, including its emotional story and heart-stopping battle scenes, which served to keep the popular image of the Marines in the national spotlight.56 Many members of Congress were sympathetic to the Marines’ plight, and actively sought to protect them. Truman backed down in the face of overwhelming pressure, and in June 1952, he signed into law an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 that specifically outlined the minimum force structure of the Marine Corps, which stood at a minimum of three combat divisions and three air wings in peacetime. Additionally, the legislation gave the Commandant a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it designated the Marine Corps the experts on amphibious warfare.57

This combination of friendly members of Congress, the movie industry, and the Freedom Train came together to hold off the destruction of the Corps until their performance in Korea finally guaranteed their continuing existence. Likewise, the Rosenthal photograph further validated Forrestal’s prediction of a Marine Corps stretching for 500 years into the future as he had promised off the shores of Iwo Jima. Through the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism, the flag that once flew over Iwo Jima serves as a reminder to all Americans—past, present, and future—that some ideals are worth the ultimate price. As long as there is a need to protect our nation, preserving organizations that perform those duties must remain a priority. To paraphrase the poet A. E. Housman, as long as our nation continues to produce the kind of heroes who planted that flag on the island of Iwo Jima, then God will continue to bless our nation.58

ENDNOTES
12. V-J Day, or Victory over Japan Day, refers to the day


6. Allan R. Millett, “Assault from the Sea,” 52, 72–75. V-J Day, or Victory over Japan Day, refers to the day on which Imperial Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies, effectively ending World War II. The term applied to both 14 August and 15 August, when the initial announcement was made (due to time zone differences) as well as to 2 September, when Japan’s formal surrender took place aboard the USS Missouri (BB 63).

5. Krulak, First to Fight, 18–19.


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5. Krulak, First to Fight, 18–19.


50. Ranks listed current at time of the battle. At the time of the movie’s production, these three were believed to be participants in the second flag raising.
58. A. E. Housman, “From Clee to Heaven the Beacon Burns,” in *A Shropshire Lad* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Treubner, 1896). The original line was: “Oh, God will save her, fear you not: Be you the men you’ve been, Get you the sons your fathers got, And God will save the Queen.”
On 23 February 1945, a Navy ensign named Felix de Weldon posted at the Naval Air Station Patuxent near the Chesapeake Bay caught his first sight of Joe Rosenthal’s photograph of the flag raising on the peak of Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima. The now-famous photograph shows six soldiers moving from left to right, working together to drive one end of a pipe into the craggy ground. At the other end, the Stars and Stripes wave toward heaven from its corners strapped onto the pipe with pieces of rope. The image is a series of complex juxtapositions; the pipe with the flag reaches to the left upper half, while the driving force of the men tug the motion back down to the lower right. The hands of the left-most figure reach up, while the intense gaze of the right-most figure anchors the action into the ground. The oppositional forces create a tension that is frozen in time—an always-interesting moment. The fact that the photograph caught a historic moment during World War II, when American soldiers captured Mount Suribachi during the Battle of Iwo Jima, meant that an icon was made.

A sculptor by training, de Weldon had been searching for a moment like this his entire life. His artistic career had taken him from the schools of Austria to England, Canada, and finally the United States. Along the way, he had proven to be exceptionally good at spotting an opportunity. De Weldon, whose primary responsibility in the Navy was to create a visual record of the war, immediately got permission from his commanding officer to make a three-dimensional replica of the photograph. During the subsequent three days, he constructed a scale model in wax. Meanwhile, the Rosenthal photograph was published on the front page of the Washington Post, creating, from the point of view of Headquarters Marine Corps, “tremendous favorable comment.” During the next nine years, de Weldon persisted with his project, developing what would eventually become the Marine Corps War Memorial located on Arlington Ridge, Virginia. President Dwight D. Eisenhower dedicated the memorial on 10 November 1954, the 179th anniversary of the U.S. Marine Corps (figure 6.1).

What today we take for granted as a symbol of military heroism was, in fact, a contested
and embattled design concept at the time of its creation. Indeed, the statue of the flag raisers came into being only through grit and tenacity of de Weldon and the U.S. Marine Corps. From 1945 to 1950, de Weldon’s proposed memorial was the focus of a power struggle between art world traditionalists versus the avant-garde, as well as a case of military officials versus other government agencies. During the early years of the Cold War, the Corps was in crisis, fighting for its very right to exist—separate from the Army into which it was under threat of being subsumed—and its leaders found in de Weldon an artist who could translate the heroic contributions of its members during World War II into monumental visual form. The act of raising the flag, of perseverance during the risk of one’s own peril, clearly indicated American valor, which in turn helped legitimize the Marines’ continuing role as an autonomous fighting force during the Cold War and beyond. De Weldon knew that he had a captive employer, one that would be his patron throughout the rest of his career. To that end, he would go to any length to keep the favor of the Marine Corps. Whereas the art world outright dismissed de Weldon as a hack sculptor, he was upheld by the Marine Corps as the purveyor of its legacy.

**The Role of Art in Legacy: Congress, the Commission, and the Corps**

In February 1946, during the 79th Congress, House Representative Henry D. Larcade Jr. introduced a bill requesting $100,000 for a memorial to “members of the armed forces of the United States who fought in World War II.” Felix de Weldon’s original wax model of the flag raisers accompanied Larcade’s bill, essentially earmarking him as the artist for the proposed memorial. Born and educated in Austria, de Weldon first came to the United States in 1937 by way of Canada. He claimed he had achieved artistic prominence in continental Europe, and then he actually achieved it when he created a portrait bust of Prime Minister Mackenzie King. After entering the United States, he stayed, becoming an American citizen in 1945. While serving with the U.S. Navy during World War II, he was tasked to build the official art collection for that Service branch. The immediate resonance and popularity of Rosenthal’s photograph, reproduced innumerable times in the press and emblazoned on war bond posters and postage stamps, meant that de Weldon’s three-dimensional rendering achieved equal iconic weight, particularly among military officials. By the mid-year, the
figural group depicting the flag raising at Iwo Jima was made into plaster, and placed in front of the Navy Building (now demolished) on Constitution Avenue, where it remained until 1947 (figure 6.2).\(^8\) While the placement of this ephemeral statue paid tribute to the combined amphibious assault of sailors and Marines, the small-scale model and language of Larcade’s proposed bill demonstrate that the congressman’s original idea was to use de Weldon’s sculpture as a monument to the entire war, and not one specifically to those soldiers who fought and died while serving with the U.S. Marine Corps.\(^9\) The memorial’s dedication solely to the Marines would come later.

Rosenthal’s photograph transcended the historical event through its usage in the Seventh War Loan drive, on postage stamps, and Marine Corps recruitment posters. Its powerful symbolic value also nearly coincides with the Freedom Train that toured the country in 1947–49, whose proposal gelled in April 1946.\(^10\) Yet immediately, the proposed statue drew both the ire and the advocacy of Washingtonians. In a letter to the editor of the Washington Post, Forbes Watson, then-chief advisor and consultant for the Treasury Department’s public art program—and who served with the Red Cross during World War I—wrote, “I wonder how many men who fought in Germany would consider the conquest of Iwo Jima a memorial to them?” Watson, clearly livid, went on:

> If Representative Henry D. Larcade consults the Fine Arts Commission or discusses his proposal with a sculptor of standing, he undoubtedly will withdraw his bill without making any further effort to devote $100,000 of the tax payers’ money to a memorial which opportunely trades upon the success of a photograph. Good sculpture isn’t made that way. The idea of this statue was wrong from the start. And to dwell on its ineptitude is superfluous.\(^11\)

Suggesting a compromise, Watson strongly urged a national competition for such a memorial to the war, which he obviously felt would eliminate the offensive sculpture by de Weldon.\(^12\)

In the same issue of the Washington Post, however, another letter supported the statue. Alexander C. Hoagland Jr., who served with the U.S. Naval Reserves from 1945 to 1946, wrote of de Weldon’s group, “Not only does it create in one a stir of pride at seeing Old Glory bodily scaling new heights, but also pictures grime, sweat and aching fatigue, grim shadows of war that we must not let be obscured by the bright lights of victory.”\(^13\) Hoagland thought de Weldon’s statue was a wonderful statement of American military heroism in World War II. A week later, another letter appeared to comment further. A Washington resident named E. Harrison ultimately supported the “flag-raising statue,” but he questioned what the memorial was, in fact, “remembering.” He weighed in on
the weakness of using a battle specific to the Marine Corps as the representative moment for the whole war: “I think Mr. Forbes Watson, author of the other letter, has something when he suggests that the Iwo Jima group would not represent all our fighting forces. . . . Be that as it may, the Iwo Jima group should be made permanent as it now has become a symbol all over the United States and its possessions, of what our men fought and died for.”

Meanwhile, the Commission of Fine Arts heard about the proposed statue and were immediately offended by the blatant copying of a photograph. The commission, established in 1910, has reviewed every work of art and architecture proposed for construction in the city limits of Washington, DC. Its members have been presidential appointees and, until the 1960s, its all-male members wielded the most political power of anyone involved in American art. During that time, at least one seat was reserved for a sculptor, an important position as this member was regarded as the nation’s foremost expert in the medium. In 1946, this seat was occupied by sculptor Lee Lawrie. Upon reading Larcade’s proposed bill, Lawrie scoffed at the amount of money proposed for the national monument. “Considering present prices for materials, wages for labor, and fees for sculptor and architect,” he wrote, “[$100,000] is not enough to create, design, and produce a great national monument to the men of the United States armed forces who fought, sacrificed, and won in the most terrible war in the history of the world.” Lawrie was convinced that the bill would die, if only due to its inept calculation of finances.

Lawrie also cringed at the suggestion of using de Weldon’s copyist design for such an important commission. As the seated sculptor in the Commission of Fine Arts, Lawrie was the barometer of good sculpture. His strength lay in his stylistic fluidity, as he was capable of making equally innovative sculpture in the styles of Gothic Revivalism and the more modern Art Deco. Lawrie was prolific in his sculptural production, but he remains best known for his work on the Nebraska State Capitol complex with Bertram Grosvenor Goodhue. In his designs, Lawrie often worked to translate traditional styles into modern concepts for his contemporary audience, and the capitol buildings exemplify this approach with their Art Deco architectural forms infused with Gothic Revivalism sculpture (figure 6.3). For the innovative Lawrie, then, de Weldon’s proposal was a reduction, an imitation, or even a parroting—laughable at best, and at worst an insult. For the proposal at hand—a memorial to those who fought in World War II—Lawrie was of the same mind as Watson and recommended a national competition instead. In an effort to be fair to de Weldon, he outlined how, if in the context of the competition, “such a group made from the famous photograph of Joseph Rosenthal is the finest design in the competition, then it should receive the commission.”

Lawrie most likely hedged his bets that de Weldon’s copy would never be selected as a winner in a national competition. During a historic moment in which, for many, the United States had proven its exceptionalism by defeating fascism in two theaters of war, artists were leaping at the chance to participate in depicting realistic portrayals of American valor. For example, in 1946 the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) began organizing the overseas American war cemeteries—14 different permanent burial sites for fallen Americans of World War II. Each cemetery had its own set of architect, artist and sculptor (all Americans). For artists, employment with the ABMC
project was the job to get in the postwar period; yet, de Weldon was never considered seriously as a possible artist for this project, in part, because he was so loathed by the Commission of Fine Arts, which worked with the ABMC to select the artists. First, de Weldon was foreign born, an outsider. And more egregiously, people found him a little suspect, particularly when he bragged that the British monarchy commissioned him to make portrait busts. Specifically, he claimed he was commissioned to create a bust of King George V to commemorate the 25th year of his reign; however, the bust, now located in the National Portrait Gallery, London, has the following notes from the registrar: “an Austrian sculptor executed an unauthorized bust of the King created from sketches of His Majesty taken whenever the King went for a walk.” De Weldon also asserted that he earned several advanced degrees, including a PhD in architecture from the University of Vienna. However, the university denied having had a de Weldon, although a “Felix Weiss” had attended classes between 1925 and 1930. De Weldon, people surmised, was a fake.

De Weldon’s proposed design for the war memorial also was perceived as copyist beyond the Commission of Fine Arts, which did not improve matters for him. The National Sculpture Society, the premiere professional organization of American sculptors based in New York City, immediately objected when they caught wind of the proposed design. They felt it was derivative at best. Other professional societies felt similarly; all believed that no artist should be proud of a mere replica. The president of the

FIGURE 6.3
Historical lawmakers (Solomon, Julius Caesar, Justinian and Charlemagne) adorn the south transept of the Nebraska State Capitol in Lincoln. The stylized figures were carved in Indiana limestone from a design by sculptor Lee Lawrie. Courtesy of Ammodramus
Artists’ Guild, Robert F. Gates, wrote to the Commission of Fine Arts regarding the proposed war memorial. Like Watson, he protested the lack of a national competition for what was clearly going to be a major monument in Washington DC. Referring to de Weldon’s design as a “posed tableau,” Gates described how the “present design falls far short of the accepted principles of good sculpture, and that it is artistically unworthy of the idea it symbolizes.”

Judging by how others disdainfully dismissed de Weldon and his design, Gates was being rather polite.

By early 1947, however, the Marine Corps League, an organization composed of Marine Corps veterans, had assumed responsibility for fundraising for the memorial. Realizing that a monument featuring the flag raisers would not be accepted as one to commemorate only World War II, the league changed the proposal. The memorial would now be dedicated to the Marine Corps’ dead from all wars—a smart political move, even if it meant narrowing the entire history of Marine Corps combat to one battle for the purpose of collective memory. Soliciting contributions from friends, members, and veterans of the Corps, in January 1947, the Marine Corps League had raised enough money to create a permanent and enlarged replica of de Weldon’s temporary statue on Constitution Avenue. Despite numerous objections, including those raised by organizations outside of the arts such as American University, in July 1947, Congress passed a proposed statute to raise funds for a Marine Corps War Memorial to be built on public grounds in the District of Columbia. This meant a more prominent site (and a more expensive monument) than the previous location on Constitution Avenue.

Although sculptors and architects disdained the only design that the Marine Corps League would consider—that by de Weldon—politicians like Larcade were eager for the votes of Marine Corps veterans, which in turn would support de Weldon as an artist and which far outnumbered those who objected. Similarly, for de Weldon, the Marine Corps’ sponsorship served as a lifeline. Without them, he never would have received a serious commission from the U.S. government during the immediate postwar period.

Even with the support of the Marine Corps League, however, the Commission of Fine Arts remained unconvinced that de Weldon’s design was appropriate for a national monument and unanimously rejected it several times during the next five years. Citing the enormity of the monument—in its earliest proposed form, it reached a height of 100 feet and a diameter of 1,600 feet—the commission was able to stall the selection of the memorial’s location. In late summer 1947, the Marine Corps League proposed Hains Point in East Potomac Park and liaison officers from the Marine Corps League pleaded with the commission to allow the construction to move forward. However, by September, it was not only the commission that thought the colossal statue a bad idea. Letters from the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Washington National Airport, the Department of the Interior’s National Park Service, and the National Capital Park and Planning Commission all decried the magnitude of such a memorial.

By November 1947, the top brass weighed in, applying pressure to the Commission of Fine Arts. Letters from Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, the Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and Marine Corps Commandant General Alexander A. Vandegrift all urged the Commission of Fine Arts to recommend a Marines Corps War Memorial to be built in Washington. Members of the Commission
of Fine Arts soon found themselves reluctantly viewing scaled and full-size models of the proposed statue. Though the Commission of Fine Arts fully supported a memorial to the Marines, internal notes disparaged fine details such as the 18-inch-long fingers. Lawrie later observed to his colleagues, “I think the whole arrangement of the model with its ugly architecture is very poor. It has no design—everything is oval and fat.” He concluded, “The photograph of the Flag-raising is an appealing one, but that doesn’t mean it would assure good sculpture.” The commission recommended another site be chosen, and again, reiterated their strong desire for a national competition to be held—hoping to get Felix de Weldon, the hack sculptor, fired from the commission.

Unable to get permission for their preferred design, the Marine Corps League let the matter lay dormant for a few years. They were in luck when changes in government favor toward the arts shifted in earnest after the “Truman Porch” scandal. Without the approval of the Commission of Fine Arts, in 1948, President Truman made unadvised changes to the second-floor balcony of the south portico of the White House. The Commission of Fine Arts responded negatively to the decision, angering him. In 1950, President Truman appointed Felix de Weldon to the Commission of Fine Arts, replacing Lee Lawrie as the seated sculptor. Tristan liked de Weldon, who had designed his portrait bust in 1948. Furthermore, it had become clear that the commission’s members were giving themselves the best jobs in the ABMC’s overseas war cemeteries project, which Truman thought distasteful. After the nepotism was made public in the New York Times, the Commission of Fine Arts, and indeed, the way that the government commissioned art, needed a shake-up. De Weldon finally had hope that the commission would work with him, as only one of its former members in the commission remained. With new members, the Commission of Fine Arts finally considered in earnest the Marine Corps War Memorial proposal.

Finally, when the original architect of the memorial’s pedestal, Paul F. Jacquet, died in 1951, Edward F. Neild—a member of the commission—replaced him. The remaining problem to resolve, the location of the memorial, was settled quickly after Neild and de Weldon joined forces. At some point between 1947 and 1951, the height of the monument was scaled back from 100 feet to its actual height of 78 feet (from bottom of pedestal to the top of the flagpole.) After rejecting a proposed location on the north end of Columbia Island on the Potomac River in 1951, finally in May 1952, a 27.5-acre plot known as Arlington Ridge (a.k.a the Nevius Tract) became the designated land for the construction of the memorial. On 23 June 1953, the Commission of Fine Arts formally approved de Weldon’s design, permitting the construction of the Marine Corps War Memorial (figure 6.4).

Thus, by mid-century, against all odds, sculptor Felix de Weldon realized his design for the Marine Corps War Memorial. Its successful construction resulted, in part, because de Weldon had become the darling of the Washington, DC, political elite. De Weldon’s portrait busts today can be regarded as a kind of network of the Truman presidency; likenesses include the president, John W. Snyder, Truman’s secretary of the Treasury, as well as such important naval figures as Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and Admiral Nimitz (figure 6.5). The Marine Corps War Memorial commission stood as the de facto entrée into the elite circles of Washington, DC, for de Weldon, whom art circles at the
time had doomed to remain forever an outsider. De Weldon had achieved the impossible.

THE ROLE OF PORTRAITURE IN REMEMBRANCE

More than any other artist, the sculptor defined American patriotism of World War II in aesthetic terms, creating a visible record that matched the historic actions on Mount Suribachi. Yet today, as we look back on the Marine Corps War Memorial with contemporary eyes, we understand that de Weldon also committed a serious offense—he took part, albeit indirectly, in the misidentification of two Marines: Harold P. Keller and Harold Schultz. A portraitist conducts a close, intimate study of the physiognomy of a person in order to create a work of art. Was de Weldon really the amateur poseur, as his peers and critics would make him out to be? Or, was he committing himself to the service of the Marine Corps, foregoing individual specificity so that the flag raisers would be remembered not as distinct individuals, but as representatives of a greater whole?

In his monumental sculpture, de Weldon expressed a national purpose in a Cold War context. By imaging American heroism on a colossal scale, he created a remarkable solution for the expectation the American public had for a national monument dedicated to U.S. military service. Realism is the key word for understanding his approach. An important aspect of portrait making is to model from life, and as art historian Angela Rosenthal points out, it is even a “social encounter.” In other words, the ways in which the artist and the sitter meet and interact with one another should be considered as part of the eventual portrait’s meaning. Not merely a tool of self-promotion, the portrait as a social encounter creates a lens into the larger historical, cultural, and political contexts of the period. Given that de Weldon relied on 1950s weapons and equipment when modeling the carbines, whose bayonet lug is different than what was true to the World War II versions, the portrait he created was not authentic to the moment it references, but rather a composite.

The making of the Marine Corps War Memorial cost $850,000, which was paid entirely through contributions by U.S. Marines, friends of the Corps, and members of the naval Service. As is now well known, Corporal Harlon Block, Sergeant Michael Strank and Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley died fighting on the island of Iwo Jima after Rosenthal took his
iconic photograph. For these three flag raisers, de Weldon made likenesses from photographs, again relying on physical verisimilitude as his principle approach. Following the practice of realism, for all the figures, he modeled the bodies on six men who posed in the nude. These same men also volunteered to reenact the flag raising so that de Weldon could make life studies from anatomical movement. The three presumed flag raisers who survived the war—Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, and Navy corpsman John H. Bradley—posed for the sculptor, who modeled their faces in clay (figures 6.6 and 6.7). De Weldon then made 36 studies of all sizes, including the large-scale plaster model. From this model, he cast 108 bronze pieces to create the monument we know today. The six male figures are each 32 feet in height, and weigh approximately 100 tons. The colossal pieces had to be hauled by tractor trailers from the foundry in Brooklyn, and heavy machinery hoisted them into place on the pedestal (figure 6.8). The two rifles—an M1 Garand and M1
carbine—depicted in the sculpture measure 16 and 12 feet long; one canteen would hold 32 gallons of water. De Weldon had created the largest bronze statue in the world.

In light of the recent identifications of the flag raisers Harold Schultz and Harold Keller, it is appropriate to query the place of portraiture in de Weldon’s work. Indeed, there is a problem. If de Weldon was making such close studies of his subjects, as well as Rosenthal’s photograph, would he not have noticed some discrepancies in the clothing as well as in the likeness of Bradley or Gagnon? As recent research has revealed, photographs of the men on Iwo Jima that day, along with forensic analysis, demonstrate that the gear Bradley wore was different from that worn by the man who was identified as Bradley in the photograph. Moreover, facial recognition technology used on the photographs indicated that the man on the far side of the flagpole was Keller and not Gagnon. Why would de Weldon, whose merits in portraiture were solely based on his ability to accurately depict a likeness and, therefore, who undoubtedly noticed some of these discrepancies, keep his ideas to himself?

FIGURE 6.6
To give his statue a realistic appearance, Félix de Weldon sculpted each figure from life or after photographs, as appropriate.
This photograph shows Rene Gagnon, survivor of the Battle of Iwo Jima, posing for the sculptor in 1945.
Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 313579
From the outset, the process to identify the flag raisers was rife with tension. The Huly Panel summarized that difficulty from their 2016 investigation: “Previous attempts to accurately identify the flag raisers . . . were complicated by the death of key participants, the stress of combat, the lack of recognition as to the significance of the second flag raising at the time of its occurrence, the haste to include the flag raisers in the 7th War Loan Drive, and the subsequent passage of time.” Hayes had immediately raised objection to the identification of Hansen as a flag raiser, as he knew Block had been there. However, Hansen had already been identified as a flag raiser to the public. Around November 1946, Hayes reported that he was told by a higher ranking officer to “keep quiet” because a bond drive was about to begin. Multiple inquiries then were performed, most notably the del Valle Board investigation in 1947 (see appendix A).

Throughout the inquiries, de Weldon kept a low profile. He needed this commission badly and he made serious financial investment into the project from 1946 to 1952, even as the Commission on Fine Arts contested his proposal. By choosing to keep quiet, he also may have been responding to his employers—the Marine Corps League. This organization can be described as the culture makers of the Marine Corps, and no matter what, he needed to remain in their good graces. The members of the Marine Corps League felt that the iconic Rosenthal photograph, translated into a timeless memorial to honor the Marine Corps, would help relate the importance of the Corps, which was crucial in the late 1940s. As they were not particularly interested in artistic achievement, the fact that de Weldon copied an original work was not a matter of concern to the league. They instead focused on what they felt would best represent the Corps. As art historians Karal Ann Marling and John Wetenhall explain, the Marine Corps needed something to validate its very existence. “Since Andrew Jackson,” they write, “the Marines had survived eleven serious proposals to disband the Corps or to merge it with the Army.” Pointing out how, as late as 1944, Congress considered consolidating the armed forces, Marling and Wetenhall conclude that “not until passage of the National Security Act of 1947 was the issue resolved: Congress . . . affirmed the historic function of the Ma-
rines as a distinct amphibious force.” As long as the Marine Corps League favored de Weldon, he would not question the identification of John Bradley, or Henry O. Hansen, or Harlon H. Block, or anyone else.

De Weldon could not afford to lose the favor of the Marines, because he certainly did not have the support of the art world. Those in New York City loathed him even more than did his peers in Washington, DC. Even though the memorial received no federal funds, de Weldon’s work served as a case of bad art for art critics, even long after it was dedicated. In 1955, art critic Charlotte Devree wrote an essay in *Art News* entitled, “Is this Statuary Worth More than a Million of Your Money?” Devree outlined how much money the federal government was spending on “bad” art, including the Marine Corps War Memorial by de Weldon, which she described as “artistically appalling.”

In spite of the dismal critical reviews, the more important question is whether or not de

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**FIGURE 6.8**

Sculptor Félix de Weldon (lower left) watches as the final components of his statue are lifted into place. Figures were cast at a factory in Brooklyn and shipped on flatbed trucks to the memorial for assembly on-site.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A400903, courtesy Cpl Donald M. Sutton
Weldon was in fact the hack everyone described. Art critics and cultural connoisseurs preferred abstraction, as exemplified by the work of the New York School—the so-called Abstract Expressionists of the late 1940s and 1950s such as Jackson Pollock. Ironically, de Weldon was adept in figurative abstraction. Once set loose from making a copy, he produced works that are more in the camp of modernism than traditionalism. For example, de Weldon’s *Iron Mike* in Belleau Wood, also referred to as the Marine Corps War Memorial, demonstrates the artist’s modernist hand (figure 6.9).

Dedicated in November 1955, this sculpture is located in the woods overlooking the Aisne-Marne American Cemetery in France. In a larger-than-life scale, de Weldon’s bronze relief rests on a granite slab that appropriately recalls a cenotaph. The figure is presented over a plaque with a large Eagle, Globe, and Anchor and the pedestal holds a plaque with text in both English and French. The statue honors the 5th and 6th Regiments of the 4th Brigade (a World War I naming convention), whose men fought the now-famous battle in Belleau Wood for 20 days in June 1918. Because the Marines advanced through wheat fields and meadows only to enter a dense wood, where German emplacements were difficult to identify, the employed battle strategy was ineffective and the Americans sustained casualties of 8,100 officers and men during the intense fight. Nevertheless, despite the brutal assaults on the Marines by German machine guns, snipers and artillery, the American forces won the battle. The victory is attributed to the bravery of the Marines, who often fought hand to hand or with bayonets.

De Weldon’s memorial in Belleau Wood demonstrates his artistic talent. Far from strict realism, the sculpture gives an idea of the kind of character one needed either to have or to adopt in order to face the harsh realities of war. De Weldon was inspired by the impressive performance of the Marines in Belleau Wood, whom in the after action report Germans characterized as “vigorous, self-confident, and remarkable marksmen.” Army General John J. Pershing, who lived in the cemetery quarters just below the wood for a time after the war (while secretary of the ABMC), described the Battle of Belleau Wood as “the most considerable engagement American troops had ever had with a foreign enemy.” In this monument, de Weldon captured a sense of the warrior, as well as the grit that distinguishes the Marine Corps from other branches of the American
military. Unlike typical soldier statues, the memorial does not depict an inanimate soldier at rest. This Marine stealthily moves ahead, bayonet ready, with force and purpose though perhaps also hinting at the intimate circumstances of hand-to-hand combat. The heavily muscled figure is bent in his fearsome drive forward, actively working to move away from us, the viewer; the bronze bas-relief animates a soldier hunting down his opponent. This human body looks archaic and indeed, its actions demonstrate a basic survival instinct. When one looks at this sculpture, you can vividly imagine men like U.S. Marine Captain Lloyd W. Williams, who in the face of certain death said, “Retreat, hell! We just got here.”

De Weldon’s Iron Mike sculpture embodies the fighting spirit of the Marines in a wild way that, in its vast stylistic opposition, complements the relative staid figures of the Marine Corps War Memorial in Virginia. In the tradition of the standing soldier memorials of the Civil War, the Hiker Memorials of the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the doughboys of World War I, a lone Marine stands for several battalions. Compared to the individualized six Marines of the memorial in Arlington Ridge, Iron Mike remains anonymous. Therein lies the tension of remembrance wrapped up in both memorials—be it six identifiable figures or one unknown, both represent hundreds of thousands of Marines. The two separate memorials signify the suffering of all Marines who overcame their foes, the battles, and the terrain. For each commission, de Weldon had to generalize, selecting what to remember—and what to forget. In the case of the Marines Corps War Memorial, he chose to subsume the individuality of the flag raisers in tribute to those Marines throughout history who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to their country. In the case of Belleau Wood, de Weldon focused instead on the ferocity of combat and the almost animal instinct one must have to survive. Yet, both communicate the central importance of these battles to the Marine Corps, despite their vast stylistic differences.

Tellingly, the divergent styles reveal the increasing pressure that the American military felt as the Cold War advanced. Located in eastern France, the Belleau Wood memorial’s figure, with his reptilian-like spine hunched over as he runs forward, is anything but a dignified appraisal of soldiering. Why would such a reminder of scrappy, yet lethal, American militarism be suitable for a mostly French audience? In the 1950s, U.S. government officials were panicked over the increasing influence of Communism in France. From the late 1940s and on, the French government included a substantial number of Communists: in 1945, parliament consisted of 586 seats, of which 365, or 62 percent, were held by the Parti Communiste Français. The Americans understood France to be the battleground of the most important ideological war of the mid-century; Western capitalism, officials argued, must prevail over eastern Communism—even if it came to war. After French citizens witnessed the menacing physicality of the figure in Belleau Wood, how could they dismiss the possibility that the United States would not come back and sacrifice again for their capitalist ideology, since it had already—not once, but twice?

The 1954 dedication of the Marines Corps War Memorial likewise places that monument in a postwar context that helps illuminate exactly how it pays tribute to American heroism (figure 6.10). During the late 1940s and 1950s, the burgeoning Cold War and, specifically, the international threat of Communism captured the attention of U.S. military and political of-
Thousands thronged to the site of the huge Marine Corps War Memorial, located next to Arlington National Cemetery, to witness the impressive dedication ceremony on 10 November 1954. The program featured a dedicatory address by Vice President Richard M. Nixon. The president of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, likewise took time from his busy schedule to make an appearance on the speaker’s platform.

Defense Department Photo (Marine Corps) A401031B, courtesy MSgt H.B. Wells
At a time when American citizens needed reassurance of U.S. military power, de Weldon translated Rosenthal’s iconic photograph into a bronze phenomenon. In Arlington Ridge, visitors can move around the monument to see the figures more clearly, creating both a visual and interactive experience of the flag raising—an event much more convincing of American prowess than gazing at a still photograph. The monumental figures rise 32 feet in height—a scale similar to a four-story building—and the flag pole reaches nearly twice that at 60 feet. The towering scale impresses upon the viewer the magnitude of not only American heroism, but also American military strength. As such, the memorial has come to symbolize “The Good War,” through which the United States emerged as the global leader in the fight for freedom and democracy; its larger-than-life rendering of the flag raising proclaims the enduring strength and capability of the United States to persevere and triumph in the postwar era.

In the wake of World War II, de Weldon made two figurative memorials that encapsulate Marine Corps identity and its influential legacy. Both works of art are figurative yet all individualizing details are removed, subsumed by their commemorative purpose in symbolizing the collective group. Character seems to be the real focus of the Marines Corps War Memorial—as it is in the Iron Mike statue in Belleau Wood. Anonymity thus serves the “common soldier” idea better than the portrait, a fact that Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert B. Neller articulated recently when he stated the Rosenthal image is “not about the individuals and never has been . . . simply stated, our fighting spirit is captured in that frame.”

With both memorials, de Weldon created visual statements that served collective memory as well as American diplomatic missions in the Cold War.

ENDNOTES

The author would like to thank Breanne Robertson for her keen editorial eye, which helped improve this essay, as well as for her wonderful leadership in this book project.

1. The term icon refers to a symbol that represents something with a greater meaning. The power of the icon is how easily understood it is, the magnitude of its symbolism, and the timeliness of its meaning. In the case of Rosenthal’s photograph, even the angle of the flag pole has become iconic such that it is recognizable even when abstractly quoted in architecture. See, for example, the rooftop angle of the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Quantico, VA. For a detailed examination of the process by which an image becomes an icon, see Austin Porter’s essay in this volume.


6. For de Weldon’s claims, see Felix de Weldon, interviewed by Jerry N. Hess, 22 January 1969, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, hereafter de Weldon interview.

POLITICS IN THE ART OF PORTRAITURE
7. When the United States declared war in 1941, de Weldon enlisted in the U.S. Navy.
8. De Weldon interview.
10. Attorney General Tom C. Clark proposed the first Free
11. Forbes Watson, “Letter to the Editor: Flag Raising Stat-
12. Similar to Washington, DC’s Federal Triangle public grounds in DC.
15. In 1946–47, members of the Commission of Fine Arts were: Gilmore Clarke, chairman (landscape architect); David Finley, vice chairman (fine arts administrator), William T. Aldrich (architect), Maurice Sterne (painter), Frederick V. Murphy (architect), and L. Andrew Reinhard (architect).
17. Lee Lawrie, quoted in letter from Gilmore D. Clarke to Fritz G. Lanham, Chairman of the Committee of Public Buildings and Grounds, House of Representatives, DC, 4 March 1946, Commission of Fine Arts minutes, hereafter Lawrie quote.
18. Lawrie quote.
19. The American war cemeteries were the first major postwar project coordinated by the American government. Similar to Washington, DC’s Federal Triangle (1926–31), the entire project was funded by tax payers. See Kate Clarke Lemay, Triumph of the Dead: American World War II Cemeteries, Monuments, and Diplomacy in France (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2018).
23. By 1955, the name Marine Corps League had changed to the Marine Corps Memorial Foundation, an organization that exists today. See “MCWMF History,” Marine Corps League, accessed 26 April 2017.
25. On 1 July 1947, President Truman approved Pub. L. No. 157, S. J. Res. 113 (1947), a joint resolution authorizing erection of a memorial to Marine Corps dead of all wars to begin at private expense on a site located on public grounds in DC.
26. For American University, see Commission of Fine Arts minutes for 22 February 1946, in which “Chairman Clark called attention to a letter of protest received from the American University against erecting the Memorial in Washington.” For the Marine Corps League’s insistence on Felix de Weldon’s design, only once did a resolution not mention de Weldon’s design around June 1947. See Commission of Fine Arts minutes for 19 June 1947.
32. Neild served on the commission from 1950 to 1955. Due to clear favoritism arranging the best government art commissions to be given to members, a report on the situation was prepared by architect Elbert Peets and the head of the Whitney Museum of American Art, Lloyd Goodrich.
34. Note, however, that the construction was held up once again, this time by the National Parks Service and the question of whether Arlington Cemetery needed the Nevius Tract for expansion as war dead were repatri-

36. Thank you to Breanne Robertson for pointing this detail out to the author. For more information detailing the discrepancy, see Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas, “Vietnam Veterans Memorial: ‘Three Marines’?,” Leatherneck, January 2013, 29.


39. This height is not the overall height of the monument mentioned earlier, which base to flagpole is 78 feet. Marling and Wetenhall write that there were 140 plaster pieces. See Marling and Wetenhall, Iwo Jima, 166–67; and Nalty and Crawford, The United States Marines on Iwo Jima, 27.


42. See “Opinions,” in Holy Board, 13.

43. Ira Hayes to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 10 December 1946, “Enclosure 2” from the del Valle Investigation Board, in Holy Board. In October 1946, Bradley also misidentified Hansen, which, in hindsight, raises questions about his credibility. See sworn testimony by John H. Bradley, 3 October 3, 1946, “Enclosure 2” from the del Valle Investigation Board, in Holy Board.

44. “Sculptor Finances Iwo Statue, but GIs Donate Labor,” Washington Daily News, 10 November 1945. Until his death in 2003, de Weldon recounted his own investments in nearly every interview he gave about the project.

45. Marling and Wetenhall, Iwo Jima, 149–50. See also O’Connell, Underdogs, 98–147; and David Mills’ essay in this volume.

46. Charlotte Devree, “Is This Statuary Worth More than a Million of Your Money?,” ARTNews 54, no. 2 (April 1955), 35. As explained above, Devree’s essay launched extreme challenges to the power wielded by the commission, resulting in several studies of government and art that, in turn, led to the founding of the National Endowment for the Arts in 1965. See Lemay, Triumph of the Dead.

47. Reportedly, the black granite slab is the same material as that used for the pedestal of the Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington. See Col Jay Bruder, “The Dedication of the Belleau Wood Memorial,” Marine Corps Gazette 99, no. 11 (November 2015).

48. Marine Corps casualties were the highest in the Service’s history up to that date.

49. 1stLt B. B. Breen, 2d Battalion, 5 Marines at Belleau Wood (APO, Armed Forces Pacific: Project Leatherneck, 1994).


51. While attributed to Williams, the identity of the person who spoke these immortal words is not exactly clear. Ferrebee, “Retreat, Hell! We Just Got Here.”

52. The Parti Communiste Français continued to be major contender in politics in France through the 1970s, before falling behind the Socialist Party in the 1980s.


54. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955, which created a security alliance between Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union to counterbalance that of NATO.

The waterfront of New Zealand’s capital city, Wellington, has altered in shape and form since World War II. Much of the area where *wharfies* (or stevedores) and other dockside workers labored is now a recreational, arts, sporting, and cultural heritage precinct. From the waterside promenade, the harbor resembles a large inland lake. Its entrance to the sea is hidden behind the farthest of two peninsulas that jut out toward the center. At intervals, a container ship, cruise liner, or one of the ferries that link the country’s North Island and South Island will materialize from behind the far peninsula or, after sailing, disappear from view. There are few obvious reminders of the wartime history of this working harbor; however, near the base of a pedestrian bridge that leads back toward the central business district, two plaques announce that Marines passed this way (figures 7.1a and 7.1b). One explains their presence: “THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ARRIVED AT THIS QUAY IN MAY 1942 AND LEFT HERE TO SERVE IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE OF WAR.” The other carries the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor; the motto, *Semper Fidelis*; the shield of the 2d Marine Division, whose association organized for the plaques to be erected; and a pledge: “TO THE PEOPLE OF NEW ZEALAND. IF YOU EVER NEED A FRIEND, YOU HAVE ONE.”¹

The memorial erected by the 2d Marine Division Association in far-off Wellington reminds us that the island-hopping campaign, a part of which Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal photographed, started a long way south of Iwo Jima.² Of the nine Allied countries represented at the surrender ceremony on USS *Missouri* (BB 63) in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945, two countries—New Zealand and Australia—had hosted U.S. Marines in the earliest days of the Pacific War.³ American forces began arriving in the South Pacific countries toward the end of 1941 (Australia) and early 1942 (New Zealand). These included the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, both of which trained in New Zealand before fighting on Guadalcanal. Afterward, the 2d Marine Division recuperated in New Zealand, a duty station that Richard W. Johnston, a war correspondent assigned to the division, later described as “the
land they adored.” The 1st Marine Division meanwhile spent time in Australia, and in the process, adopted the quintessential Australian folk song “Waltzing Matilda” as a battle hymn. Both divisions incorporated into their shields the Southern Hemisphere’s prominent constellation, the Southern Cross, under which they trained and, until 1944, fought (figure 7.2). The 3d Marine Division also spent several weeks in New Zealand in 1943, but it was not in the country long enough to develop the same affection for “the land of the long white cloud”—a popular translation of Aotearoa, the indigenous Māori name for New Zealand.

The plaques that form the Wellington memorial highlight the fact that, in the transnational memory of the Pacific War, each country has chosen which events to emphasize in their remembrance and likewise which events to forget. The American focus on the Iwo Jima flag raising, as captured in Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph, has the effect of foregrounding U.S. fighting in the Pacific War, while at the same time obscuring Allied participation. The photograph remains one of a small number of images from the American experience that dominate popular memory of the conflict. British historian Ashley Jackson suggests that photographic images of American warships burning at Pearl Harbor, kamikaze attacks against American warships, U.S. Marines raising the Stars and Stripes over Mount Suribachi, and the American-made atomic mushroom cloud towering over Hiroshima, Japan, gives the impression that “America is the Allied war effort in the Pacific.” This notion...
has been reinforced by Hollywood portrayals of the Pacific War as an American-Japanese conflict. And yet, while the U.S. Marine Corps had a wartime presence in New Zealand and Australia, their presence is not at the forefront of either country’s historical memories of the conflict. Many Wellingtonians walk, jog, or cycle past the two Marine Corps plaques without realizing their significance.

In New Zealand and Australia, memory of World War II is shaped by factors that might not be familiar to Americans, including the greater emphasis both give to memory of World War I, their divergent experiences during World War II, their perspectives of American strategy in the Pacific during and after the war, and their reactions to the postwar ascendancy of the United States as a world power. The longstanding neglect by American commentators about Australia and New Zealand’s participation in the Pacific War, and especially their cooperation with U.S. forces, likewise has had a profound effect on local perceptions of Rosenthal’s photograph. While ubiquitous in the United States from 1945 to the present, the Iwo Jima image, both in its original form and in parody, has emerged more recently in Australia and New Zealand as a shorthand symbol connoting American dominance in global popular culture rather than conjuring nostalgia toward the American servicemen who fought in the Pacific. Even when American forces, including Marines, are commemorated in the two countries, Rosenthal’s image plays no particular part in the memorial activities. Instead, the commemoration of the U.S. Marine Corps is driven by the wartime interaction between Marines and civilians on the two countries’ home fronts.

Exploring the reception of Rosenthal’s photograph, *Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima* (1945), in these Allied nations permits a better understanding for why American memory of the Pacific theater—constructed around this image—is not, and can never be, universally applied (see figure 0.2).

**FIGURE 7.2**
The 1st Marine Division shoulder patch originally was authorized for wear by members of units who served with or were attached to the division in the Pacific during World War II. The blue diamond insignia commemorates the division’s victory in the Battle of Guadalcanal.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, AND AMERICAN FORCES DURING THE PACIFIC WAR

As part of the British Empire, Australia and New Zealand both followed Great Britain in declaring war against Germany on 3 September 1939. They were committed to the European war but also anticipated a war with Japan, which had already invaded China and harbored further imperial aspirations to conquer territories in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific. The common fear was that Japan would take advantage of the distraction of a large-scale war in
Europe to launch its own attacks in the region, including against Australia and New Zealand. When this did not eventuate in the first weeks of World War II, the two countries sent infantry divisions to the Middle East and agreed to contribute to the Empire Air Training Scheme, which provided aircrews mainly for the air war in Europe. Australia deployed naval forces to the Mediterranean as well. At the same time, both countries took the precaution of strengthening home and regional defenses. In 1940, New Zealand sent a modest force to Fiji and accelerated the training of militia forces at home. Australia meanwhile stepped up its militia training and, in addition, deployed forces to northern Australia, Singapore, New Britain, and Papua and pledged to assist in the defense of the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies.

After Japan entered the war on 8 December 1941, New Zealand and Australia took different paths toward victory. New Zealand further bolstered its home defenses, but it stayed committed primarily to the European theater, deploying only modest forces in the South Pacific. With Great Britain unable to come to their aid in the event of an enemy attack, Australians were rattled—even showing signs of panic—given that their country was closer to the Southeast Asian and Pacific territories that the Japanese conquered in succession. By early 1942, Prime Minister John Curtin had recalled the bulk of Australian land and naval forces from the Middle East. He also famously declared that “Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional ties or kinship with the United Kingdom.” Australian historian Joan Beaumont observes that Curtin’s declaration “did not herald a ‘turning point’ in Australian foreign policy as has sometimes been claimed,” but that it did strain wartime relations with Britain. In truth, Australians and New Zealanders all “looked to America” because they well knew that the United States had a significant interest in the Pacific and could deploy sizable forces into the theater. Great Britain, on the other hand, was tied down by the war against Germany and, following the fall of Singapore in February 1942, it had to use the comparatively small forces it deployed to the Asia-Pacific to hold onto the remaining colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, namely Burma and India. The two South Pacific allies meanwhile were reassured when U.S. naval, land, and air forces began arriving in late 1941. The United States initially had not planned to send forces to either country, but the stunning Japanese advances in the first months of the Pacific War left them no choice. In quick succession, the Japanese overran Hong Kong, Guam, Wake Island, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and New Britain.

Historian Edward J. Drea compares the wartime partnership between the United States and Australia to “a shotgun wedding”; the same analogy could be used for the American alliance with New Zealand. In early 1942, the South Pacific was divided into two American-commanded strategic areas: the Southwest Pacific Area, commanded by Army General Douglas MacArthur, with a base in Australia; and the South Pacific Area, initially commanded by Navy Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, with a base in New Zealand. Marines sent to the region in early 1942 were allocated to the South Pacific Area. New Zealand’s official history of World War II characterizes the sudden U.S. presence in 1942 as the “American invasion.” In the two or three areas of New Zealand’s North Island, where American servicemen were concentrated, they offered reassurance—supplying a trained and well-armed
force for local defense—and they influenced both the social scene and economy. Young Marines in their smart uniforms certainly were capable of turning heads, particularly those of young women. The Americans brought a touch of Hollywood to the remote South Pacific country. They were comparatively well paid, generally well-mannered, curious about the country and its culture, and keen to form social connections whenever possible. Small advance parties of U.S. Marines arrived in New Zealand in May 1942, and then the 1st Marine Division disembarked at Wellington a month later, to be followed thereafter by the 2d Marine Division. Some units, meanwhile, disembarked at Auckland, the major city in the north of the North Island. A Marine Corps combat cameraman who landed at Wellington later recalled that the small capital city seemed “somewhat dismal,” having suffered recent damage from a minor earthquake. His impression also reflected the fact it was the middle of the Southern Hemisphere’s winter, a time when the aptly nicknamed “Windy Wellington” is frequently wind and rain swept. This was certainly not the tropical climate that Marines may have imagined. Most who landed at Wellington were taken north to the Kāpiti Coast, where large camps were established around the townships of Paekākāriki and Paraparaumu. Other than the fact it was not tropical, this area offered reasonably good grounds for training, with access to beaches for amphibious exercises and access on the inland side of the coastal plain to bush and timber-clad hill-sides that served as preparation for fighting in jungle terrain (figure 7.3). By July, the Marines had embarked again, this time for further training in amphibious operations on tropical islands before the battle at Guadalcanal.

As was the case in other countries where Americans landed in 1942–43, New Zealanders joked that Americans were “over-paid, over-sexed, and over here.” Nevertheless, friendships and relationships—many of which lasted a lifetime—were formed. Evidence of shared social experiences and emotional attachments included hundreds of weddings between servicemen and New Zealand women, as well as children fathered by American servicemen both in and out of wedlock (figure 7.4). Later, after the Marines had seen action, memorial notices served as poignant reminders of the impression they had made, such as a simple notice in Wellington’s The Evening Post shortly after the war ended: “LOWE, J., USMC—In proud and loving memory of PFC [Private First Class] John Lowe, killed in action on Tarawa, November 20, 1943, loved grandson of Mrs Gayton, of Cartersville, Georgia. Semper Fidelis. Inserted by his dear friend, Sybil.”

The 2d Marine Division’s return to New Zealand in 1943, after the battle on Guadalcanal, renewed that relationship there. While there were tensions at times, including fights between New Zealand and American servicemen, the wartime relationship appears to have been cordial on the whole. The Americans’ presence was reported to be a factor in strengthening U.S.-New Zealand foreign relations. In April 1943, the New Zealand government publicized a letter sent by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Prime Minister Peter Fraser in which Roosevelt expressed his appreciation for the “cordial hospitality to our American soldiers, sailors, and marines. The result is already the basis of a greater friendship and understanding in the future than we have ever had before.” The Marines’ presence was especially marked at the local level. New Zealanders observed that Marines made an effort to be community members, if only for a time. They demonstrat-
ed respect toward their hosts including, on 25 April 1943, participating in Anzac Day services and parades to honor the soldiers of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), who had landed at Gallipoli, Turkey, on 25 April 1915.20 The residents of a beachside township north of Wellington also praised the efforts of Marines who pitched in to fight a small bushfire that threatened houses. As one resident explained to a reporter, “No one, as far as I know, asked their help; they did not wait to be asked.”21 Not surprisingly, many New Zealanders, because of the relationships formed as well as a natural interest in events in their own part of the world, continued to follow the progress of the Marines as they advanced toward
the Japanese mainland. Newspapers reported on American battles and showed photographs of American soldiers fighting in the Pacific, as well as reporting on events worldwide. While this was partly due to the American press offices supplying the New Zealand press with copy, there also must have been editorial decisions that stories about U.S. Marines were of interest to readers. As U.S. forces closed on Japan, reports of American actions continued to appear in newspapers and cinema newsreels. For example, on 11 July 1944, the *Auckland Star* reported that Marines who had “stormed ashore” at Saipan the month before were now “masters of the island,” having achieved “a smashing blow at the front gate of Japan’s domestic garden.” Casualty figures were not given but the report, emanating from American sources, made it apparent that the fight had been costly, with the battle said to be “the hardest the marines have known in the Pacific war, except possibly the battle for Tarawa.”

As was the case in New Zealand, the presence of U.S. Marines in Australia during 1943 would have been most noticeable in a few select areas. After Guadalcanal, the 1st Marine Division was sent to a camp outside the northern city of Brisbane, but after a few weeks, it moved again to the southern state of Victoria. This area was more suitable for soldiers recovering from service in the tropics. Australian journalist Frank Dexter recalled that there was no publicity regarding the Marines’ arrival, “but when suddenly strange American uniforms began to appear on Melbourne streets we began to take notice. That insignia on their caps was different from anything we had seen. The globe, an anchor, and an eagle. They must be marines.”

The Marines spent approximately six months in Australia before fighting at Cape Gloucester on the island of New Britain. The 1st Marine Division’s brief presence in Australia and its contribution to MacArthur’s advance in the Southwest Pacific meant its actions on New Britain were widely reported in the Australian press. However, the Marines were never the primary story. Australians mainly followed their own troops’ campaigns in New Guinea, which was an Australian-governed territory.

Strategic decisions, national culture, and memory all influenced American relationships with Australia and New Zealand during the war. However, while the Americans had been viewed as possible saviors in 1942, the wartime relationship was less rosy by 1945. Even before the war ended, it was apparent in Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand that the United States remained intent on playing the primary role both in the isolation and defeat of Japan and in shaping the postwar Pacific. Specifically, American strategy seemed to be geared toward reducing the British Empire’s influence in the Asia-Pacific and weakening its role in the peace settlement with Japan. As historian P. G. A. Ord-ers observes, the upshot was that “the British Commonwealth played a peripheral role in the final phase of the Pacific war.” The British Pacific Fleet, to which both New Zealand and Australia contributed warships, supported U.S. Navy Fleet operations shortly before the Battle of Iwo Jima, but this was really the only tangible contribution the two countries made to the main drive toward Japan.

By early 1945, American forces had advanced beyond the immediate areas of both New Zealand and Australia, and the close relationships forged in 1941–43 were showing signs of strain. In Australia, for example, there was a growing sense of frustration concerning MacArthur’s employment of Australian forces. While the Australian government remained committed to the Pacific War, Mac-
Arthur effectively marginalized its forces, which were increasingly relegated to operational backwaters to conduct “mopping-up” campaigns in bypassed areas of New Guinea, Bougainville, New Britain, and Borneo. These campaigns cost the Australians hundreds of casualties but contributed little to the defeat of Japan or the larger war effort. A further source of irritation was what Australians perceived as American-biased press reporting. MacArthur’s headquarters controlled the release of war correspondents’ reports and press releases relating to the Southwest Pacific Area. It seemed that MacArthur was intent on downplaying the Australian contribution to the war and limiting news reports concerning Australian actions. Indeed, so few reports of Australian fighting appeared in Australian newspapers at one stage in early 1945 that an Australian general complained: “The Australian public must be wondering whether we are still in the war.” Interest in the American island-hopping campaign remained strong, as it was apparent that this drive was putting pressure on Japan, but MacArthur’s control of press stories in the Southwest Pacific influenced how some American stories would be received.

**ROSENTHAL’S PHOTOGRAPH IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND**

The American seizure of Iwo Jima was part of the overall island-hopping campaign strategy that U.S. leadership considered vital to winning the war but, at the same time, deemphasized Allied decision making and participation, in contrast to operations in Europe where consensus and compromise were necessary components of a truly Allied advance into Germany. Australians and New Zealanders first learned about Iwo Jima as a wartime objective in June and July 1944, just seven months before the main battle, when newspapers began running stories about American bombing raids against the island. Reports of intensified bombardment in early February 1945 led to conjecture in the press that the Japanese stronghold would soon be invaded. In both countries, reporting of the protracted island-hopping campaign made clear that the United States was shouldering much of the burden in the advance toward Japan. The heavy casualties Americans suffered on Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, and Peleliu received sympathetic coverage in both countries, and on 20 February 1945, Australian and New Zealand radio stations and newspapers delivered detailed reports on the U.S. amphibious landing at Iwo Jima the previous day. Most stories emphasized Marine Corps involvement and predicted another hard battle ahead. The Auckland Star, for instance, reported that Marines stormed ashore “as the tiny island rocked under the heaviest naval bombardment of the Pacific war.”

Reports of a flag raising on Iwo Jima were conveyed to Australia and New Zealand on the day of the event, 23 February 1945. However, by the time the press release from the naval public affairs office at Guam arrived in the two countries, only a handful of newspapers in the western half of the Australian continent had time to insert the story. Adelaide’s The News included a 34-word piece on the front page of its evening edition. Filling a space reserved for stories received at the last minute, the notice reported: “IWO JIMA SUCCESS. New York. –U.S. marines have planted their flag at top of Mount Suribachi, Jap stronghold at southern tip of Iwo Jima. Japs [Japanese] are still holding out in mountains, caves, and tunnels.” Longer reports appeared in both countries’ newspapers the next day. Melbourne’s The Argus, for exam-
ple, dramatized the event, noting that Marines had surrounded Mount Suribachi and “moved up the cliffs under attack by enemy hand grenades and demolition charges” until “the Americans had raised the flag on the peak.”

Some newspapers in Australia and New Zealand showed images of Iwo Jima. The *New Zealand Herald*, for example, published a photograph on 22 February 1945 that had been taken from the air during an air raid some months earlier. Australians and New Zealanders were further assisted in their understanding of the battle for Iwo Jima and, by extension, the flag raising by comparison with a key battle in their nations’ recent history: Gallipoli. Gallipoli was the peninsula in Turkey on which the ANZAC soldiers had landed on 25 April 1915. This battle provided a foundation story for Australians and New Zealanders who shared a belief that the spilling of blood demonstrated their maturation as nations of the British Empire. Recited every year on Anzac Day, the story of Gallipoli was so well known by 1945 that any reference to the 1915 battle would have been immediately understood by readers in the two countries. The *Daily News* in Perth, Western Australia, informed its readers that Iwo Jima’s terrain was “suggestive of Gallipoli,” while the *New Zealand Herald* proclaimed: “COUNTRY LIKE GALLIPOLI. AMERICAN CASUALTIES FAIRLY HIGH.” The comparison with Gallipoli represented a way of explaining the current U.S. battle to readers who were intimately familiar with the history of the 1915 campaign—including veterans who had fought there—and served to create an imagined terrain at Iwo Jima. There is no doubt that the linking of the two battles also served as an accolade for the Marines. Possibly the most deferential piece of writing in this period appeared in an Australian regional newspaper, whose editor suggested that the flag raising on Iwo Jima was a sign that victory in the Pacific was more or less assured:

*The struggle of the gallant marines to gain a foothold, their storming of the heights under ferocious fire, the heavy casualties and, above all, the indomitable courage of the invading troops are all reminiscent of the epic landing of the Anzacs [at Gallipoli] nearly thirty years ago... Each yard is bitterly contested, the Japs [Japanese] are defending “to the last drop of their blood.”... Latest reports indicate that the immortal marines have hoisted their flag on the summit of Mt. Suribachi. That ceremony accomplished with great mortality spells death and destruction to Japanese cities and war industries.*

While the flag raising on Iwo Jima was widely reported, Rosenthal’s photograph was not made available to the press in Australia and New Zealand with the same speed as it was offered in the United States. The two countries’ press organizations did not have ready access to the photographs, including Rosenthal’s image, that had been issued to press organizations at the time. It is possible that some Australians and New Zealanders saw the image in imported publications of American origin. However, for most on the South Pacific home fronts, the first published photograph of any flag fluttering over Mount Suribachi was the image captured by Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, which showed the first flag to be raised that day (see figure 0.3). Lowery’s photograph was supplied to the press in both countries by the U.S. naval public affairs office on Guam, and, of critical importance, the image was of a form acceptable for publication in both countries, where government-produced propaganda and wartime censorship worked together to present the public with a sanitized...
visual representation of the war. Newspapers therefore reported that the Americans suffered heavy casualties on Iwo Jima, but generally they could not show the war dead or serious casualties. Lowery’s photograph aligned with this journalistic approach, since it alluded to the danger and stresses of battle, particularly with “the grim-faced marine in the foreground,” yet also served as evidence of the American success in driving back the Japanese with his comrades’ hoisting of the Stars and Stripes in the background. It was important for the war-weary public of both countries to see the evidence of victory. While Rosenthal’s photograph also would have met the criteria for publication in the two countries, and conveyed an equally positive message about the battle, it was simply not available at the time.

By the time Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising appeared in newspapers in Australia and New Zealand, readers viewed the image as a historical one instead of as a depiction of a contemporary event. The main news stories of May 1945, when Rosenthal’s photograph was first published in the area, included the end of the war in Europe and the exposed horrors of the Holocaust; the American battle on Okinawa, which had started the month before; air raids on the Japanese mainland; kamikaze attacks against Allied warships; the close of the Philippines campaign; and the start of the final campaign by Australian forces in Borneo. The flag-raise photograph was therefore presented to audiences in Australia and New Zealand not as war news but as cultural news because by then the Associated Press photographer had been awarded the Pulitzer Prize. One of the earliest mentions of the photograph appeared on 9 May 1945 when a Tasmanian newspaper, Launceston’s The Examiner, explained that Rosenthal had received the prestigious award “for a photograph of Marines raising the US flag on Iwo-Jima”; yet, the photograph itself was not shown. Sydney’s The Sun likewise explained to readers on 13 May 1945 that Rosenthal’s photograph had “quickly become one of the most famous and most widely publicised [sic] photographs of the war, winning the Pulitzer Prize for photography.” Two weeks later, Melbourne’s The Advocate published the “remarkable and now famous photograph” with an editorial comment that it was “an astonishingly perfect picture in design” and had already sold 7 million copies. Australia’s The Catholic Weekly chose to highlight that Rosenthal was a convert to Catholicism.

The three-month delay between publication of the photograph in the United States and its publication down under was one reason why Rosenthal’s memorable image could never have the same meaning to Australians and New Zealanders as it did for Americans. For Americans, the image had been a record of an ongoing battle; for Australians and New Zealanders, it was from the outset a record of a historical event. Also missing was the emotion associated with seeing one’s own troops and flag. Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that Australians and New Zealanders were less enamored with flag imagery in general. In six years of war, neither country produced a celebrated image that centered on a flag—certainly none with the meaning of Rosenthal’s Old Glory or Yevgeny Khaldei’s photograph of the Soviet flag being unfurled over the ruins of the Reichstag. Australia’s most celebrated battle during World War II was on the Kokoda Trail in Papua New Guinea in 1942, and the imagery associated with this battle is of the muddy mountain track along which men fought and died. When the village of Kokoda
was recaptured in November 1942, an Australian flag was dropped from an aircraft, but the flag is barely discernible in the one well-known photograph of the flag-raising ceremony (figure 7.5). Brisbane’s The Courier-Mail printed the photograph of the ceremony at Kokoda on its front page with a bland explanation that directs the eye away from the barely moving flag in the background, noting that the “picture shows Australian troops, in full kit, at the ceremony.”

This apparent disinterest in flag imagery could be explained by the fact that Australians and New Zealanders maintained a dual allegiance and, accordingly, two flags were important to them. Being subjects of the British Empire, they possessed both imperial and national identities. Great Britain’s Union Jack held meaning—positive and negative—to people in both countries, and the British emblem was incorporated into the designs for their own national flags. In addition, national culture ensured that displays of patriotism were muted. Historians Warren Pearson and Grant O’Neill note that Australians, for example, traditionally are not good at, or comfortable with, articulating national identity or expressing national pride. They developed an “aversion to flag waving” that has only started to be relaxed in recent decades. Australia’s Newcastle Sun, therefore, adopted a mocking tone when reporting that Rosenthal’s photograph had caused “flag raising fever” among American generals. The newspaper quoted a New York Times correspondent’s view that “Joe Rosenthal made our generals flag-raising conscious and now they want to plant Stars and Stripes on every hill-top taken by our sweating, bleeding infantry with photographers there to record the scene for posterity.”

FIGURE 7.5
On 3 November 1942, the Maroubra Force commander, Australian Army MajGen George A. Vasey, marked the recapture of Kokoda with a flag-raising ceremony witnessed by the 25th Australian Infantry Brigade. Today, monuments commemorating the soldiers from both sides line the plateau edge.
Photo courtesy of J. Earl McNeil, Australian Department of Information

ROSENTHAL’S PHOTOGRAPH AND U.S. MARINE CORPS MEMORIALS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Two months after the end of World War II, an anonymous writer to Wellington’s The Evening Post proposed that the New Zealand government or Wellington City Council should construct “a memorial to the gallant men of the United States Marine Corps who for a time were stationed in our midst and to whom we owe so much for keeping the Japanese at a safe distance from our shores.” The only memorial to the Marines at the time was the colors of the 2d Marine Division and an American flag hanging inside St Paul’s Cathedral in Wellington. These had been presented to the cathedral during the war; and they remain hanging in the cathedral to this day.

While there was little appetite in New Zea-
land for a national memorial to Allied forces, Australia’s different wartime experience meant that it was willing not only to remember its relationship with the United States during the Pacific War but also to accommodate a memorial to that relationship. After World War II, the American influence in the Asia-Pacific had caused tensions within the British Empire; but as the Cold War showed signs of heating up, the United States was viewed more as a “great and powerful friend.”

Following the signing of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) in 1951, the Australian-American Association promoted the building of a memorial in the nation’s capital, Canberra. The monument was dedicated by Queen Elizabeth II during her first tour to Australia in 1954 (figure 7.6). For various reasons, this memorial has failed to resonate with Australians, and it never became an active “site of memory.” Historian and cultural commentator Joan Beaumont suggests this is because the events of World War II, and therefore the wartime relationship between the United States and Australia, “slipped quickly from the calendar of national ritual—and, it would seem, cultural memory.”

Even with some adjustments within the milieu of the Cold War, the memory of the U.S. Marine Corps’ wartime presence in New Zealand and Australia tended to be very localized. The 2d Marine Division Association’s memorial at Wellington established the harbor as a site of memory for the Marines themselves. In the early 1950s, the association placed its plaques at the entrance to Aotea Quay, where the Marines had disembarked and embarked; the plaques were later stored and then moved to their current position when the fore-shore was redeveloped. The other notable memorial to the Marine Corps in New Zealand also dates to the early 1950s. The New Zealand-American Association funded memorial gates at the entrance to Queen Elizabeth Park, a nature reserve outside Paekākāriki. The stated purpose of the gates was “to record the grateful thanks of the people of New Zealand to the United States Marines. They camped at this spot from June 1942 to November 1943, while helping to defend this country. Later they fought in the Pacific Islands, where many of them made the supreme sacrifice, and cemented an everlasting friendship.” The fact that Marines were not actually called up to defend New Zealand in 1942 perhaps was deemed irrelevant at the time the memorial was erected, with the
more important point to indicate (as encapsulated in the ANZUS Treaty) that the United States was prepared to defend the country from the perceived Communist threat during the Cold War. To those New Zealanders who had known U.S. Marines, it also was important to show that they never forgot the cost of the Americans’ war. With the restoration of American-New Zealand defense relations—following a two-decade freeze in response to New Zealand’s antinuclear stance of the late 1980s—the site of memory near Paekākāriki has been further developed (figure 7.7). Along with St. Paul’s Cathedral in Wellington, it is the main site for American-New Zealand commemorations. Responding to contemporary visitors’ expectations that there be not just bronze plaques to look at, there is now a stylized memorial that evokes memory of the Marine barracks that stood on the site, along with information panels to educate the visiting public and the flags of both countries. The memorial and its panels reinforce the localized nature of remembrance of the U.S. Marine Corps. Panel texts and photographs focus attention on the wartime presence of Marines and social interactions between Marines and New Zealanders. There is less emphasis on tensions, including outbreaks of fighting, the most notorious being the racially charged Battle of Manners Street, Wellington, in April 1943. While Marines were almost certainly involved, clashes tend to be portrayed as between New Zealanders and (generic) “American servicemen.” There is also little direct reference to the Marines’ battles.

A marked preference for local memorials is evident in Australia as well. In 1954, newspapers reported that a delegation of U.S. Marines, including several veterans of Guadalcanal, had arrived in the country to dedicate memorial gates at the Australian Army’s Balcombe Barracks on the Mornington Peninsula, Victoria. The Australian plaque on one side of the gateway states that the gates were erected “as a mark of appreciation of the fighting qualities of the United States Marine Corps,” while a U.S. Marine Corps plaque (likely drafted by the Australians) on the other side is an expression of “appreciation of the friendship and cordial hospitality which were extended to the officers and men of the 1st Marine Division by the people of this district in the critical year 1942.” The fact the memorial points to a presence by U.S. Marines in 1942, which was the year that many Australians believed their country had been threatened with invasion, rather than 1943, when the Marines were actually in the area, indicates that the timeline had already become hazy within a decade of the war’s end.

By the 1960s, public memory and commemoration of the Pacific War had faded in
both Australia and New Zealand. By the end of that decade, young Australians and New Zealanders exposed to the Hollywood and British film industries knew more about far-off battles in the Northern Hemisphere, such as the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Bulge, than their own countries’ battles. Australians rediscovered the Pacific War in the 1990s when then-Prime Minister Paul Keating started the process of shifting the focus of Australian remembrance of World War II toward the Asia-Pacific. He particularly promoted the 1942 Kokoda Trail battle in Papua New Guinea, which, as Beaumont has noted, fit with his nationalist agenda. While most of the 1942 “turning points” in the Pacific were American battles—particularly Coral Sea (albeit with modest Australian contribution), Midway, and Guadalcanal—Kokoda was fought almost exclusively by Australians, with logistics support from Papuan laborers and American aircrews; therefore, this battle could be heralded as an Australian contribution to the “turning back” of the Japanese. The Kokoda battle was so heavily promoted by the mid-2000s that many Australians were willing to embrace the “attractive and superficially plausible” notion that it contributed to a so-called “Battle for Australia,” in which the country is supposed to have narrowly averted an invasion. This belief that the country was “saved” in 1942 culminated in a Battle for Australia Day eventually being proclaimed in 2008. The problem with respect to the U.S. Marine Corps is that the parochialism of Australia’s remembrance of the Pacific War has resulted in declining acknowledgment of any battle in which Australian forces played a more limited role. There is therefore little public acknowledgment of the American island-hopping campaign and its significance to Australia during World War II.

While the Iwo Jima flag raising has never featured prominently in Australian or New Zealand remembrances of the Pacific War, there is an awareness of Rosenthal’s photograph as part of American culture. The Americanization (or at least American influence) of Australian and New Zealand popular culture started in the 1930s, if not earlier, and was propelled forward during and after the Second World War. Rosenthal’s acclaimed image was reproduced in American books and magazines sold in the two countries. It also was one of the images to be included in the Time/Life illustrated histories of the war purchased by families and held in many public libraries—indeed, the author poured over such books in the 1970s when he was an Australian schoolchild. Meanwhile, American novelist Leon Uris’s Battle Cry (1953) found a readership in New Zealand, in part, because the country featured prominently in the storyline. At different times, Hollywood also has promoted South Pacific remembrance of the U.S. Marine Corps, with trans-Pacific marketing ensuring that audiences in both countries gained exposure to film portrayals of Marines in their countries. In 1950, Sands of Iwo Jima opened to mixed reviews across both Australia and New Zealand. Audiences watched Sergeant John M. Stryker (played by John Wayne) dying, as one reviewer explained, on “the slopes of Mt Suribachi, as the Marines re-enact that famous wartime scene of the raising of the flag.” The fact that it was unlikely Sergeant Stryker could start his war in New Zealand and end it on the slopes of Mount Suribachi, as neither the 1st nor 2d Marine Divisions fought there, was no doubt lost on most audience members. Nevertheless, the film reviewer’s comment suggests the scene of the flag raising needed no particular introduction. The familiarity with the photograph
was also evident in the 1953–54 reporting of the construction and dedication of the Marine Corps War Memorial at Arlington Ridge, Virginia. In Tasmania, Launceston’s *The Examiner* did not even attempt to explain the battle or the photograph when it described the memorial as “a 75-foot reproduction of the historic raising of the US flag on Mount Suribachi.”

As in the United States, Rosenthal’s image more recently has been an inspiration for artists and activists. Art historians and critics have not explored the extent to which the photograph inspired artists in New Zealand and Australia; however, extant examples allow for some cursory examination. One of the better-known examples of commandeering the image dates to 1977. At this time, activists for indigenous rights in Australia saw the need for an Aboriginal flag as a symbol of their identity. At least one poster, advertising a “land rights dance,” paid homage to Rosenthal’s famous image by portraying Aboriginal men raising the new Aboriginal flag over their traditional lands (figure 7.8). The poster was a nod to the artistic merit of Rosenthal’s photograph and evidence that transnational cultural appropriation of the image was possible.

Six decades after the war, when director Clint Eastwood’s *Flags of Our Fathers* (2006) played in Australian and New Zealand cinemas, the Iwo Jima flag raising appeared not to require much explanation to audiences, despite the war itself being not particularly well remembered by the younger generation. Australians and New Zealanders have long been exposed to Rosenthal’s photograph of the event, either from seeing it reproduced or from cultural references in diverse places ranging from Lego sculptures to the cover of the book and film poster for *Flags of Our Fathers* to cartoon parodies (including *The Simpsons*). A Rosenthal-inspired mural by Australian street artist Fukt that shows Marines raising a McDonald’s Drive-Thru sign—a commentary on American capitalism and the perceived threat of globalization—therefore works for his intended local audience. Conversely, Australians and New Zealanders are not always comfortable with its popular usage. When a Tourism Australia advertisement portrayed a family struggling with a beach umbrella in a pose clearly inspired by the Rosenthal photograph, it was criticized by some Australian veterans as “ill-conceived” and insulting to the memory of U.S. veterans (figure 7.9). Notably, similar criticism occurred in 2001 when the Australian cricket team visiting Gallipoli attempted to pay homage to the “Anzacs” of 1915 by imitating a famous photograph of soldiers playing cricket at Gallipoli—a “clumsy public relations stunt” that fell flat with the Australian public.

As the controversy over the Tourism Australia advertisement demonstrates, Rosenthal’s photograph is recognizable to Australians and New Zealanders, even if it occupies a marginal place in their collective memories of World War II. Both countries have their own interpretations of the war, emphasizing the contributions of their national forces. New Zealand and Australia’s geographical locations, hosting of American forces, and participation in their own island campaigns have ensured that the Pacific theater occupies a place in their narratives of the war. This is particularly the case for Australians, for whom the Pacific War is
LAND RIGHTS DANCE
BALMAIN TOWN HALL
FRIDAY JUNE 17TH 8 P.M.

JUNIOR & THE GOLDTOPS — WASTED DAZE
Proceeds to N.S.W. Land Rights Conference

$2.50
central to the notion of a “Battle for Australia” and hence, remains more important to their cultural understanding of World War II. New Zealanders, however, continue to favor memory of the European theater, particularly the campaigns in Greece, North Africa, and Italy, where the 2d New Zealand Division—the main combat division raised during the war—incurred most of the country’s casualties. For Māori, the European theater holds even deeper meaning because the 28th (Māori) Battalion—the only indigenous infantry battalion—fought there. The battalion’s mana (a concept that ties in prestige, authority, and a spiritual power) and tapu (sacredness, forming part of the Māori spiritual and social code) mean the European theater will always be prominent in memory of the war, most especially for those iwi (tribes) that supplied men to the battalion.

Rosenthal’s image of the American flag over Mount Suribachi does not resonate down under because it does not slot into the accepted narratives of World War II experience in either Australia or New Zealand. The Stars and Stripes are instantly recognizable, and this prominent symbol of U.S. patriotism only reinforces the fact that Rosenthal captured the actions of another country’s servicemen. Consequently, the Iwo Jima flag raising is of interest to New Zealanders and Australians primarily as an American cultural icon. Memorials, by contrast, generally carry greater meaning for Australians and New Zealanders, particularly when they are erected on localized sites of memory. This is due in large part to the personalized nature of U.S. Marine Corps relationships in these South Pacific nations. One final example underscores this point: in Ballarat, Victoria, a tree planted to mark the wartime presence of units of the 1st Marine Division commemo-

rates, according to the plaque positioned next to it, “the friendship established between the United States Marines and the citizens of Ballarat [sic] during their sojourn here in early 1943” (figure 7.10). Dotting the landscape of Australia and New Zealand, such plaques denote the Marines’ actions on these home fronts in a fashion that can be woven seamlessly and harmoniously into national narratives honoring New Zealand and Australia’s contributions to, and sacrifices in, World War II.

ENDNOTES
1. The plaques erected by the 2d Marine Division Association in 1951 were originally a mile away on Aotea Quay, until repositioned when that area was redeveloped.
2. As a correspondent for the Associated Press, Rosenthal distinguished himself as a battlefield photographer in
This plaque appears at the base of a tree planted in the Ballarat Botanical Gardens around Lake Wendouree to commemorate the U.S. Marine Corps' wartime presence in Ballarat, Australia.

Courtesy of Viv Martin

FIGURE 7.10

The Pacific theater of operations at Hollandia (now Jayapura), New Guinea; Guam, Mariana Islands; Peleliu and Angaur, islands of Palau; and Iwo Jima, Japan.

3. Delegates from Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, China, Canada, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United States witnessed the formal ceremony of Japanese surrender that brought an end to World War II.


5. Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 463–64. While the prevalence of U.S.-Japanese conflict in visual media has no doubt shaped global perceptions of the Pacific War, Jackson’s perspective also is shaped by his own country’s collective memory of World War II, which is Eurocentric and in fact Anglocentric. British focus on the war against Nazi Germany has resulted in an “amnesia” in popular memory about the Asia-Pacific War. For more on this topic, see Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson, ed., *British Cultural Memory and the Second World War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).


7. Also known as the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the Empire Air Training Scheme was designed to train British Empire aircrews for service primarily in the British Royal Air Force. See Andrew Stewart, “The 1939 British and Canadian ‘Empire Air Training Scheme’ Negotiations,” *The Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 93, no. 377 (2004): 739–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/003553042000300214.

8. As part of this effort, the Australian government participated in defense discussions between the British Empire, Netherlands East Indies, and the United States.

9. Due to the time difference, this declaration of war occurred on 7 December in the United States.


17. This phrase was commonly used in Australia as well. From 17 February to 30 April 2010, the City Gallery in Melbourne hosted the exhibition *Over-Paid, Over-Sexed and Over Here?: U.S. Marines in Wartime Melbourne 1943* in tribute to the “friendly invasion” of American servicemen during World War II.


20. “Anzac Day Commemoration,” *Rodney and Otamatea Times, Waitamata and Kaipara Gazette* (NZ), 28 April 1943, 3. By 1943, Anzac Day, which was observed in both Australia and New Zealand, commemorated those who served and the fallen from all wars, particularly World War I and World War II.


33. “Gallipoli of the Pacific Seas,” *Daily Examiner* (Grafton, AU), 24 February 1945, 2.

34. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy asked the four major picture-gathering agencies (Associated Press, International News Service, Acme Newspictures, and *Life* magazine) to pool their resources to supply all daily and weekly newspapers with images from the front lines. Wartime censorship guidelines required that all photographs be cleared officially in Washington, DC, before being released to the press. For an expanded discussion of photographic censorship in Australia, see Prue Torney-Particki, “ ‘Grave Security Obligations’: The Australian Government’s Refusal to Accredited Newspaper Photographers to Combat Areas during the Second World War,” *War & Society* 16, no. 1 (2013): 113, https://doi.org/10.1179/027294797791201201.


36. See the photograph in the *Evening Post* (Wellington, NZ), 19 March 1945.


50. Some units of the 1st Marine Division had been based there after Guadalcanal.


55. Based largely on Uhr’s experience with the 6th Marine Regiment during World War II, the book tells the story of how a diverse group came together to form an effective team in battle. Part of the novel takes place in New Zealand, where the Americans trained in preparation for the Battle of Guadalcanal and later returned for rest and recovery before the Tarawa campaign.


59. A reviewer from *The New Zealand Herald* notes of *Flags of Our Fathers* that “this multi-layered plot reveals that the photograph of the celebrated six men raising the US flag on Mt Suribachi before the battle for the Japanese garrison of Iwo Jima was not all it seemed.” Within this statement seems to be an assumption that the image is sufficiently well recognized that no explanation is necessary—unless, perhaps, there is an assumption that young people who do not know the context can “Google it” if they wish. See “Behind the Lines of *Flags of Our Fathers,*” *New Zealand Herald*, 2 November 2006.


64. New Zealand’s contribution to the Pacific War was, by contrast, very modest, with a half-strength infantry division fighting in three small actions during 1943–44, along with air and naval contributions. Consequently, as military historian Reg Newell notes, New Zealand’s participation in the Pacific has been virtually, but not completely, “lost to public memory.” See Reg Newell, *Pacific Star: 3NZ Division in the South Pacific in World War II* (Auckland, NZ: Exisle Publishing, 2015), 9.

65. Plaque in Lake Wendouree Gardens, Ballarat, Victoria, Australia.
How the Iwo Jima Memorial Became a Personal Mortuary Monument for My Japanese Mother

by Yui Suzuki, PhD

Based on Joe Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize-winning photo Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial is commonly known as the “Iwo Jima Memorial.” To most Japanese civilians, the image of six U.S. soldiers planting an American flag atop Mount Suribachi symbolizes the Battle of Iwo Jima (19 February–26 March 1945) and all the soldiers who fell during the intense combat, which incurred heavy losses on both sides. That this massive, towering public monument was built solely to honor all U.S. Marine Corps personnel who died defending their country is a fact lost on most Japanese tourists who visit the site.

For example, the best-selling Japanese travel guidebook series, Chikyu no arukikata (Globe-Trotter Travel Guidebook) introduces the Marine Corps War Memorial by explaining that it is a memorial dedicated to the Battle of Iwo Jima. It explains that the monument was modeled after Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph, with a subsection that provides additional information of the battle itself. There is no mention that the memorial is dedicated to all U.S. Marine Corps personnel who have given up their lives in service. The 2006 film Letters from Iwo Jima directed and co-produced by Clint Eastwood also has made the site quite popular among Japanese tourists, especially among the younger generation. On my most recent visit to the memorial, I watched with horror as three Japanese tourists in their 20s snapped smartphone shots in front of the monument while making silly, embarrassing poses. I made sure to keep a good distance from them lest other visitors thought I was part of their frivolous group. As monuments that pay tribute to the dead, memorials are particularly complicated in the ways they may provoke and produce multiple and conflicting voices and meanings, layered with public views and personal interpretations.

The Marine Corps War Memorial was one of the first places my mother wanted to see when she and my father flew out from Japan to Washington, DC, to visit their only daughter. Having lost her own father, Fumio Tenmyo, at Iwo Jima when she was four, my mother had always been interested in the history of the notorious battle. Therefore, she was thrilled that...
she could finally visit the Iwo Jima Memorial and pay her respects more than 60 years after the war. It was a way of commemorating the battle and, more important, of paying tribute to her father who never returned. In this essay, I write about my mother’s engagement with the Iwo Jima monument, especially the memorial’s role as a site of commemorative ritual and as a material object that connects the living and the dead. According to historian John Bodnar, memorials elicit both official and personal cultural expressions and serve as sites for the exchange between the two. While I certainly agree with this idea, my mother’s personal connection with the Marine Corps War Memorial as a kind of mortuary monument reveals the extremely complex nature of memorials, especially war monuments, in which there are always opposing camps (“us and them,” “the victor and the defeated,” “the allies and the enemy”). Her experience with the Iwo Jima Memorial is one example in which individual motivations actively appropriate and apply new meanings to a memorial, often contradicting (and at times usurping) its original function. As such, it is important to acknowledge that war monuments will always be subject to continuous reinterpretations by those who engage with them directly.

To understand my mother’s treatment of the Marine Corps War Memorial as a kind of mortuary monument for her father, one must

FIGURE 8.1
The author and her mother on 20 October 2008 at the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial, Arlington, VA.
Courtesy of the author
have some knowledge of Japanese beliefs and practices around death and the afterlife. Even today, mortuary practices and the agency of departed and ancestral spirits, known as *hotoke*, remain a vital part of Japanese everyday life. Spirits of the Japanese dead, including ancestors, are entities who act as guardians of the household lineage they belonged to while they were alive. Ian Reader states,

*Traditional Japanese cosmology considered that each person had a soul (tama) which invested the physical body with life: death was a result of the severance of the tama from the physical body. The soul did not, however, cease with death but journeyed to the world of the dead while continuing to maintain an interest in this world, especially in its extant kin, looking over and protecting them as a guardian ancestral spirit.*

Thus, they are propitiated by the living through a variety of daily and seasonal rituals performed at the family altar or at their graves. I have fond childhood memories of my grandmother making daily offerings to the family altar that contained my grandfather’s memorial tablet with his posthumous “Buddhist precepts name” and his memorial portraiture, a black and white photo of a man with fleshy cheeks and round glasses. Every morning and evening, she would offer him and our ancestral spirits steamed white rice on a small plate and a glass of water. She would then light two slender sticks of fragrant aloeswood incense and chant a brief Buddhist prayer. Even though I was a young child, I instinctively understood the importance of this daily ritual as a way of maintaining our ties to those who have crossed over. These rites also ask our kindred spirits to protect us from harm as we go about our day. Other memorable moments with my grandmother include our walks to my grandfather’s grave on the grounds of a local Buddhist temple. After offering fresh flowers from her garden and a bundle of incense there, my grandmother would scoop water from a wooden bucket with a ladle and pour it over his grave marker, a beautiful, glossy slab of dark gray slate. I loved helping her pour the water and watch the grayish slate slowly turn dark bluish-black as the water ran down the polished rock surface, making it gleam and sparkle in the sun. As I poured ladle after ladle of water from the bucket, my grandmother would recount the same story she always told me on these visits:

*Your grandfather died in Iwo Jima during World War II and his body was never recovered. He most likely perished in one of the underground tunnels where the temperatures would reach up to 104° F. Food and water supplies were so scarce that the soldiers all suffered from terrible heat, exhaustion and thirst. So let’s make sure to give your grandfather a lot of water to quench his thirst.*

Growing up with no father, a protective
mother, and a much older sister; my mother was always looking for ways to keep the connection to her father alive, whether this was through visiting his grave or making offerings to the family altar (that contained his memorial tablet and photograph) whenever she visited my grandmother. She had only a few memories of her father before he was drafted, such as the times she sat on his lap in the early mornings, watching him eat breakfast and read the newspaper. According to my grandmother, my grandfather was a gentle and serious man who worked as a researcher for the Japanese Imperial Agricultural Association, a central organization for agricultural cooperatives. He also had an incredible ability to focus. One time, he was completely immersed in his reading and failed to notice that one of his kimono sleeves had caught fire from the embers of the charcoal burning inside the hibachi beside him.5

Fumio Tenmyo was 43 years old when he was drafted into service for the Japanese Imperial Army and sent to Iwo Jima in February 1945. According to the inscription on his grave-stone, he was a first lieutenant at the time of his death. He was well past the age for being drafted, but the situation in Japan was dire by this time. Within a month after he left for Iwo Jima, he was presumed killed in action, his remains still missing even now. My mother’s continuous desire to find meaningful ways to connect with her father remained strong all through her life.

It was a dry, breezy, sunny October day when my parents and I drove out to Arlington, Virginia, to visit the Iwo Jima Memorial. Cast in bronze above a polished granite base, this colossal sculpture stands on a grassy knoll that stretches out for several acres. That day, the Stars and Stripes flapped vigorously in the wind as if to reenact the moment Rosenthal
YUI SUZUKI

144

framed his famous shot of the six men hoisting the flag on Mount Suribachi. Even though we had seen both Rosenthal’s iconic photograph and the reproduced images of the memorial countless times in the media, our encounter with a three-dimensional object was unexpectedly refreshing and full of impact as we stood in awe by the impressive 78-foot memorial towering over us. The dense weight of the 100-ton bronze seemed to impart a sense of determinism, valor, and strength on the part of the American soldiers as they struggled to secure the flagpole into the ground.

Just a year before her U.S. visit, my mother had seen a documentary about Iwo Jima and about continued efforts by individuals and the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency to recover the war dead and bring them back home. She began to harbor the far-fetched notion that perhaps my grandfather’s bones had somehow ended up in a U.S. military cemetery, maybe even at Arlington. For this reason, when my mother visited the Marine Corps War Memorial, it was as if she were visiting his grave. She brought a bouquet of flowers for him, but had a hard time trying to figure out where to leave it. I did not think it was appropriate for my mother to treat the memorial as a personal grave marker, especially after reading one of the inscriptions on the base: “In honor and memory of the men of the United States Marine Corps who have given their lives to their country since 10 November 1775.”

There were quite a few visitors congregating around the monument and I feared that it might offend some of them if they were veterans or had friends and family who served in the U.S. Marine Corps. I was already self-conscious of the fact that we were the only group of Japanese at the site. My father and I also noticed the burnished gold names and dates of the major Marine Corps engagements encircling the base. I said to my mother, “I don’t think you should leave those flowers here for grandfather. It’s not a memorial honoring all those who died at Iwo Jima. It’s specifically dedicated to all U.S. Marines who died fighting for their country.” My mother ignored my pleas saying, “Does it matter whether you are American or Japanese if you want to honor the dead? This isn’t just for grandfather. It’s also for all those who died and never made it back to their country. Why would anybody be offended by such a gesture?” I stopped arguing because I knew that my mother would have a retort for anything I could say. But to meet me halfway, she placed her bouquet in an inconspicuous area, rather than at the official side of the memorial where public ceremonies and parades are held. I sighed and conceded, thinking that at least she did not insist on burning incense or dowsing the monument with water.

Today, I look back at our family visit to the Marine Corps War Memorial with feelings of happy nostalgia mixed with a tinge of sadness and regret. My mother passed away a few years later from cancer, and we never made it back to the monument together. My second trip back to the site came years later, when I was invited by a colleague to write a personal reflection for this collaborative publication on the Iwo Jima flag raising. As I stood in quiet contemplation gazing at the monument, a myriad of thoughts and emotions went through my mind. Despite my mother’s insistence on visiting the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial, she had never once set foot in Tokyo’s controversial Yasukuni Shrine, the monument that commemorates Japan’s war dead—including my grandfather—as deified spirits. Yasukuni is well known internationally, for the monument also enshrines war criminals, and is regarded by many countries, particularly
South Korea and China, as glorifying Japan’s forcible colonization program and aggressive militarist past. I wondered why my mother was so insistent on visiting the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial when she had never once bothered to visit Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, Japan, where she resided.

I believe my mother avoided Yasukuni Shrine because it was a place that was too engrossed in contemporary politics and tinged with an attitude of victimization. The shrine is also complicated by the fact that many of the religious rites performed there for the war dead belong to a category known as “spirit pacification rituals” (chinkonsai). Japan has a long history of venerating the dead, and an equally powerful notion and belief that those who died a wrongful death were particularly inclined toward negatively impacting the living through curses. Perhaps my mother did not want to connect to her father that way, to regard him as an angry ghost who would cause harm to his living kin. She would often tell me that her father was always protecting us. When I was offered my first tenure-track job as assistant professor and thinking about whether or not to take it, my mother insisted that everything was going to be okay and I should take the job because my grandfather was protecting me. She was convinced that he was sending some sort of sign
from the other world because the day I received
the offer coincided with the death anniversary
of my grandfather (17 March).

Joshua A. Irizarry’s ethnographic research
on Japanese mortuary objects and mortuary ob-
servances well articulates my mother’s (and my
own) reactions regarding her deceased father as
a typical and important part of Japanese every-
day life and ritual practice. Particularly insight-
ful is his view that spirits of the Japanese dead
belong simultaneously of this world and the
other. Material things, particularly memorial
objects, “mediated how the Japanese represent
and experience the transcendent in both mem-
orial ritual and in their daily interactions.”

Irizarry states that these interactions with the
dead are part of a decades-long process that
begins at the wake and funeral and continues
with the living through daily offerings and reg-
ular interactions, such as visits to family graves.
Being a lifelong process for the living, Irizarry
further notes that the person is likely to have
multiple, shifting relationships with memorial
objects at different stages of remembering and
“different understandings of the semiotic pro-
cesses in which they have been engaged.”

This idea of memorial objects mediating
and representing daily interactions between the
living and the dead was certainly true for my
mother and myself. For us, the Iwo Jima Me-
orial became both a sacred site and a material
object that mediated our personal relationships
with Fumio Tenmyo. More than half a century
after the loss of her father and the war, the U.S.
Marine Corps War Memorial was not about
“the defeated us” and “victorious them.” For
her, it was just another opportunity to have a
private moment with her father in front of an
iconic monument that by this time came to rep-
resent the Battle of Iwo Jima itself, thanks to
Joe Rosenthal’s seminal photograph.

As I stood gazing at the war memorial this
second time around, I reflected on how materi-
al objects, whether a colossal sculpture, a sim-
ple grave marker, or a framed photograph of
a loved one, allow us to deal with the imma-
nent fact of death. I had been thinking a lot
about one’s mortality lately, more so than usual
because it was one of those summers where I
received an unusually high number of death
announcements. I do not recall having to write
so many condolence cards at once, so much so
that it made me think about my own inevitable
demise.

I hired an estate lawyer and drew up my
will, so that I could at least be prepared. In do-
ing so, it drew out many internal conversations
as well as discussions with friends about our own
mortality and the aftermath, including whether
to cremate or bury, the high costs of funeral ser-
cices and cemetery plots, ideal places to scatter
one’s ashes, and so forth. Cicero once stated,
“The life of the dead is placed on the memories
of the living.” My grandfather and my moth-
er continue to live through my thoughts, ac-
tions, and words. But those are not enough. As
sensing, feeling, embodied creatures, we have
a perpetual yearning to stay firmly connected
to our deceased loved ones. Tangible, material
objects allow us to satiate those longings, help-
ing us to reanimate and rekindle our memories
of the deceased and to immortalize them. We
kiss their photographs, collect their bones, scat-
ter their ashes, chase their scents embedded in
their clothes, visit their graves, and leave offer-
ings and gifts for them. And memorials, as both
a sacred place and physical presence, allow this
magic to happen.

ENDNOTES

1. The United States suffered 6,800 fatalities and close to


5. Hibachi is a traditional Japanese heating device designed to hold burning charcoal.


Numerous photographers climbed Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945 to capture an image of the American flag flying on the summit. Among the cameramen who witnessed the second flag raising was PHOM3 John Papsun, U.S. Coast Guard, whose distant view of the crest shows Sgt Henry O. Hansen pulling taut a guy-wire to secure the flagpole. Three additional photographers—Associated Press correspondent Joe Rosenthal, Sgt William H. Genaust, and Army PFC George Burns—can be seen standing nearby.

Courtesy of PHOM3 John Papsun, National Archives and Records Administration
A FLAG FOR SURIBACHI
For more than 70 years, the enduring image to emerge from the Battle of Iwo Jima has been that of six men struggling to raise the American flag atop a windswept mountain on this small Pacific island 650 nautical miles south, southeast of the Japanese capital, Tokyo. This photograph, taken by Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal on Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945, continues to be one of the most recognizable war photographs ever taken and is to this day one of the most reproduced images in the world (see figure 0.2). But before Rosenthal had the opportunity to take his iconic photograph, another American flag was raised on the summit that day, an event that has been less celebrated over time (figure 9.1). Through confusion, ambiguity, and simple bad luck, this flag and the servicemen who raised it have long been overshadowed by Rosenthal’s famous image of a replacement flag being hoisted on the same spot some hours later. Those who photographed the original flag raising likewise have been obscured by the visual allure that has ensured Rosenthal’s image remains recognizable to the American public even to this day. This chapter highlights the actions of these men in an attempt to redress the balance of an event that is central to the history of the U.S. Marine Corps, specifically, and American military history, in general. Revisiting this topic—taking a closer look at the first flag raising and how it has been forgotten—permits a more complete understanding of its meaning to the Marines who fought on Iwo Jima as well as the ways in which historical memory can both obscure and inform later generations.

THE MENACE OF SURIBACHI

The southern tip of Iwo Jima is dominated by Mount Suribachi, an extinct volcano that rises more than 500 feet in height. The Japanese had fortified the mountain with weapons ranging from large caliber coastal guns and cleverly concealed artillery pieces to a myriad of concrete pillboxes and bunkers housing machine guns, riflemen, and mortars. These defensive positions were often linked by an extensive sys-
tem of caves, man-made tunnels, and trenches. From the lofty heights of the volcano, the Japanese could observe the movements of any attacking force and direct fire on them while also controlling the fire of batteries farther to the north. It was imperative to the success of the U.S. assault that Mount Suribachi be neutralized as soon as possible and its heights be used to American advantage. During the Battle of Iwo Jima, the primary objective of the 5th Marine Division’s 28th Marines was to secure the narrow southern portion of the island, while other division elements, along with the 4th Marine Division, would shift right to secure the first airfield and to begin the drive up the main body of the island.2

Detailed preinvasion planning ensured that the 28th Marines’ regimental combat team would ultimately secure the enemy bastion that Mount Suribachi had become; however, the events following the initial landing would determine which units would secure its summit.3 Landing at 0900 hours on 19 February, the initial assault waves of U.S. forces encountered light to moderate enemy fire until the beaches became congested with Marines of the following waves, some of whom were support troops. Struggling to negotiate the soft volcanic ash and series of steep terraces just inland from the invasion beaches, the Marines and corpsmen became targets for the Japanese defenders, who unleashed a furious hail of fire on them, particularly from artillery and mortars emplaced on the slopes of Mount Suribachi. Nevertheless, by 1035, lead elements of the 1st Battalion had advanced across the narrow neck of the island, effectively cutting it in two. With a tenuous presence on the western shore, the regiment turned south to face the mountain head on.4

Under almost continuous fire, the 28th Marines overcame determined enemy opposition to encircle the mountain. In many areas, the rough terrain prevented tanks from providing support, and it was up to fire squads, well-rehearsed in small unit tactics and aided by demolition and flamethrower teams, to neutralize these formidable enemy positions. The regiment suffered tremendous casualties, particularly on 21 and 22 February, when it moved against the main body of Japanese defenders at the base of Mount Suribachi; however, by the afternoon of 22 February, the 28th Marines had the remaining opposition forces nearly surrounded.5 The next phase in securing the volcano would be to seize and occupy the crest itself, even though mopping-up operations continued.

FIGURE 9.1
Photograph taken by SSgt Meyers A. Cornelius of Marines posed beneath the first flag after they helped secure the summit of Mount Suribachi. Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of SSgt Meyers A. Cornelius, National Archives and Records Administration.
in search of well-concealed enemy positions at its base.

On 21 February, the operations officer for 28th Marines, Major Oscar F. Peatross, had to consider what might bring about the final capture of the mountain. On this day, the regiment received a message stressing the importance of seizing Suribachi as soon as was practicable. “At that time,” Peatross later recalled, “we had our arms practically wrapped around Suribachi. Complete seizure meant to us sending a patrol to the top of the mountain and cleaning out the caves at the base of the volcano.”

The following day, 22 February, a patrol from Company G, 3d Battalion, moved down the western face of the mountain toward the southern tip of the island. On the opposite shore, a patrol from Company E, 2d Battalion, moved around the eastern base of the mountain to link up with the 3d Battalion unit. Both sought suitable routes up the slopes of the volcano, but preinvasion naval bombardment had destroyed existing trails such that there were none to be found in the patrol areas. The only passable route up the volcano lay in 2d Battalion’s zone facing the northern and northeastern slopes.

While the Marines had confidence in their plan to take the objective, the commanding officers understood that victory over such a clearly visual symbol would strengthen U.S. resolve across the entire island. For days now, the mountain stood menacingly over the Americans, its Japanese defenders raining death and destruction on those fighting below. Colonel Harry B. Liversedge, commanding officer of the 28th Marines, met with the 2d Battalion’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, to discuss what to do when a force successfully reached the summit. Liversedge felt it was important to let the troops fighting elsewhere on the island know that the mountain had been secured. After much discussion, including the possibility of lighting smoke pots, the colonels adopted Johnson’s idea of raising the American flag. Liversedge had only one stipulation: the patrol to the summit should be led by an officer capable of directing all types of supporting fire should it be required. To that end, he recommended First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, the executive officer of Company E, to lead the patrol.

Liversedge was familiar with Lieutenant Schrier, as the two men had previously served together in the Marine Raiders. They also shared parallel service records in that they could both be termed mustangs, or officers who had been promoted from the ranks. Liversedge had enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps in 1917 before receiving a commission in 1918. He commanded the 3d Marine Raider Battalion from September 1942 to March 1943, whereupon he took command of the 1st Marine Raider Regiment. Schrier had enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1936. Six years later, while serving as a platoon sergeant with the 2d Marine Raider Battalion, Schrier participated in the famed “Long Patrol” on Guadalcanal and led part of his company to safety following a Japanese ambush during U.S. operations behind enemy lines during this patrol. His decisiveness may have impressed Marine Corps leadership to the point that he was offered a commission early in 1943. Soon thereafter, as the regimental reconnaissance and observation officer for the 1st Marine Raider Regiment, Schrier led small parties behind enemy lines to gather information on Japanese troop movements and suitable landing sites for upcoming operations in the New Georgia area of the Solomon Islands—actions that would have been known to Liversedge, his commanding officer. Although
the Raider units disbanded in early 1944, it was not long before Liversedge and Schrier found themselves working together again in the 5th Marine Division. The division had many former Raiders in its ranks, along with personnel drawn from the similarly disbanded Marine parachute units. On Iwo Jima, Schrier was the only 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, executive officer with prior combat experience, a fact that was not lost on Liversedge when he selected Schrier to lead the combat patrol up Mount Suribachi.

To accomplish the flag-raising mission, Johnson directed Company E, commanded by former Marine parachutist Captain Dave E. Severance, to provide the patrol. Severance in turn chose his 3d Platoon based on its proximity to 2d Battalion’s command post. Because the platoon’s strength was down to 24 men from its D-day complement of 46, Severance augmented the 3d Platoon’s depleted ranks with men drawn from his company machine gun and mortar sections. A replacement corpsman, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Gerald D. Ziehme, also joined the 3d Platoon as one of its regular corpsmen was unfit for duty. Two teams of stretcher-bearers, each containing four men, also accompanied the patrol; they carried metal Stokes litters as opposed to the normal wood and canvas ones, since they were a more secure method of moving casualties over rough terrain (figure 9.2).

Corporal Harold P. Keller saw the stretcher-bearer teams and thought: “We’ll probably need a hell of a lot more than that.” Already a veteran of three earlier campaigns, Keller suspected a daunting task lay ahead.

**PLOTTING A PATH**

In preparation for the main combat patrol’s mission, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson dispatched smaller patrols, one each from Companies D and F, to reconnoiter a way to the top. On the morning of 23 February, Sergeant James D. Mulligan led a patrol of approximately 10 men from Company D up the slopes of Mount Suribachi. The group had been patrolling with others from their company around the eastern slopes near the beach when word of their new mission reached them. Due to the steep terrain in this area, Sergeant Mulligan decided it was not possible to continue as a 10-man team. He and others returned to their company lines; however, Corporal John J. Wieland decided to carry out the mission, along with two others.

Accurate details about the actions of Wieland’s patrol have been lost to time and the frailty of memory. According to one account, Corporal Wieland was accompanied by Pri-
vates First Class Fred M. Ferentz and Robert C. Mueller. In another account, no mention of Mueller is made, but Private First Class Dale E. Olson is mentioned. Both accounts describe the difficulties of scaling the near-vertical side of the volcano using rifle slings as makeshift ropes. This perhaps explains why Mulligan’s original group split up; it was a dangerous journey, and the mountain face could not be scaled by all 10 men at once. With Mulligan’s departure, Wieland took the lead of the remaining men as next in the chain of command. The patrol apparently reached the rim of the crater, where they borrowed discarded enemy binoculars to view the U.S. fleet offshore. Wieland and his men then engaged in a brief skirmish with Japanese defenders atop the volcano before descending by the main trail to report to their company commander. The patrol apparently reached the rim of the crater, where they borrowed discarded enemy binoculars to view the U.S. fleet offshore. Wieland and his men then engaged in a brief skirmish with Japanese defenders atop the volcano before descending by the main trail to report to their company commander.

By contrast, the successful ascent of the Company F patrol, whose progress was observed by Marines at the 2d Battalion command post and elsewhere, directly influenced Johnson’s decision to allow Schrier’s force to begin its climb. That morning, Captain Arthur H. Naylor Jr., commanding officer of Company F, ordered Sergeant Sherman B. Watson to take as many men as needed and reconnoiter a way to the summit, but cautioned that they should avoid contact with the enemy. Watson chose three men—Private First Class Louis C. Charlo, George B. Mercer, and Theodore J. White—to accompany him on this task (figure 9.3). The small group moved as swiftly as conditions underfoot would allow; Watson recalled later that it was much quieter than they expected and that they encountered no enemy resistance. Scouting near the top for enemy emplacements, they quickly descended to report back. Since Watson’s group could be seen making its ascent without opposition, Johnson directed Schrier to begin his patrol’s climb before Watson and his men had returned. He handed Schrier a small American flag and told him to raise it when they secured the peak. In a November 2010 letter to the authors, Colonel Dave Severance recalled that Schrier passed the flag to Private Philip L. Ward to carry up the mountain, but after such a lengthy passage of time it is difficult to now corroborate this statement. Ward does appear in many of Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery’s photographs in proximity to the flag.

When Schrier received his orders from Johnson and the men replenished ammunition and water in final preparation for their ascent, Staff Sergeant Lowery learned of the plan to secure the crest of the mountain and raise the national colors at its summit. A Marine photographer working for Leatherneck magazine, Lowery had covered previous Marine landings and, unlike other combat cameramen, had no specific unit assignment and could go where he pleased. Fate had positioned him near Johnson’s command post that morning, and he immediately readied himself to document the events as best he could.

As Schrier and his men moved toward the base of the mountain through Company F lines, the patrol picked up a radioman. Earlier that morning, the 2d Battalion communications sergeant had called the Company F command post, instructing Private First Class Raymond E. Jacobs that he was to switch on his radio set and wait for the patrol. Jacobs was told to report to the officer in command and provide communications for the patrol throughout its mission. It is unclear why Company E did not
supply a radioman from its own unit; however, Jacobs recalled later that his company had been wired in to 2d Battalion headquarters since the day prior and, because of this more dependable line of communication, their company radio sets had been shut down.24 The patrol proceeded on its way with the sound of distant gunfire ever present, yet there was no resistance from the defenders of Mount Suribachi.25 Before the men had set out, planes and naval gunfire had bombarded the mountain yet again. All around lay the wreckage.
of battle. Damaged and discarded equipment was strewn everywhere. Enemy emplacements showed the effects of the tremendous firepower it had taken to neutralize them. They met no resistance here and no living Japanese combatants were visible, though several enemy dead were passed in places. The Marines were only too well aware from the preceding days that the Japanese had burrowed deep within the mountain. Passing cave entrances, some of the men tossed grenades inside to make sure they did not pose a threat. There was the constant fear that they were heading into a trap. Had Watson and his men been allowed to make their ascent without opposition only for the Japanese to draw this larger patrol in before attacking? If Wieland’s small group managed to scale the heights in their sector, had that action alerted the enemy of a more significant American force that would soon follow? It was a real fear felt across the 2d Battalion.

By now, the Americans and the Japanese knew that there would be only one outcome to the battle. General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the Japanese commander, knew he could not win but hoped to inflict such heavy casualties on the Americans that they would reconsider invading the Japanese home islands. Constructing his main defenses across the center of the island, he nevertheless had hoped Suribachi would hold out for 10 days. Yet, on only the fifth day, the Americans were on the brink of seizing this strategic feature through a combination of superior firepower and aggressive tactics. The fanaticism of the Japanese defenders was matched in equal measure by the resoluteness on the American side to overcome the enemy. It remained to be seen just how high a price the Japanese would exact from the Americans for this eight square miles of Pacific real estate. Now watching the advance of Lieutenant Schrier’s patrol from below the mountain, other units within the 2d Battalion were prepared to come to their aid if needed.

**SEIZING THE SUMMIT**

It is difficult to imagine how the small band of Marines and corpsmen comprising Schrier’s combat patrol felt as they moved warily toward the volcano. With only snatches of sleep and eating simple rations in the main, the previous days’ actions had taken a physical and mental toll on the men. They had seen friends die or suffer grievous wounds, but all were aware of the importance of the task at hand. Knowing they were in the toughest fight the Marine Corps had yet faced in the Pacific theater gave them a determination that, if they were successful in capturing the summit and hoisting the American flag aloft, it would reinvigorate those who witnessed it and spur them on to ultimate victory.

As the path grew steeper, some of the men resorted to scrambling on their hands and knees. The climb was particularly tough on those who were burdened with the weight of machine guns and heavy loads. Flamethrower operators Corporal Charles W. Lindberg and Private Robert D. Goode carried tanks with more than 70 pounds of fuel. Inch by closer to the top, Schrier decided to send out flankers to protect the patrol from possible attack. During their strenuous ascent, cameraman Lowery asked the men to hold up the flag so he could get a photograph, presumably in case they did not make it to the top of the mountain (figure 9.4). The image shows Private First Class Manuel Panizo reaching for the flag held by Private First Class John T. Schmitt. Ahead of them, Corporal Thomas J. Hermanek glances back to witness the spectacle.

Near the summit, Schrier split his force in
two, ordering some of the men to take up defensive positions around the edge of the crater while others prepared to descend into the bowl of the dormant volcano. Reports tracking their movements streamed in to the 28th Marines' headquarters by radio and by messenger and were logged in their regimental intelligence section (R-2) journal:

10:15—Troops en masse observed on top of Suribachi led by Lt. Schrier.

10:18—[forward landing team] Fr. LT


Two former Raiders, Sergeant Howard M. Snyder and Corporal Harold Keller, made it over the rim first. Private First Class James A. Robeson came next carrying an M1918 Browning automatic rifle. What the young rifleman
lacked in stature, he made up for in his willingness to volunteer for the toughest assignments. Robeson was backed by the patrol’s leader, Lieutenant Schrier and his radioman Jacobs. Private First Class Leo J. Rozek and Corporal Robert A. Leader brought up the rear.33

With Marines now positioned inside the rim of the volcano, tensely watching for sight of the enemy, the remaining members of the patrol advanced into the bowl. Some searched the ground for material to use as a makeshift flagpole, while others checked cave openings for any sign of enemy attack. A Japanese soldier emerged backward from a cave entrance, and Keller opened fire as the man ducked from sight. As if on cue, other cave entrances came alive with Japanese defenders throwing grenades at the Marines. The Americans responded immediately, tossing grenades and laying down rifle fire in and around the cave entrances.34 Even as this action occurred, Leader and Rozek found a piece of pipe they deemed suitable for a flagpole. It came from a rainwater cistern built by the Japanese. As Iwo Jima did not have any freshwater at that time, these cisterns, situated all over the island, were an important source of drinking water for the Japanese garrison. The Marines passed the length of pipe to higher ground where Schrier and others waited.35 Circling the small band of men crouched around the pole, Lowery photographed their progress as the flag was reverently attached (figure 9.5). In contrast to the firefight taking place in the crater, Lindberg recalled how this moment—preparing to raise the first flag—seemed to him, strangely quiet.36

Without much ceremony, the small group thrust the flagpole into the soft volcanic ash. They were soon joined by others who helped drive the pole deeper for greater stability. Because strong winds whipped at the flag and threatened to dislodge the pipe from the ground, the Marines jammed rocks against the base of the pole to keep it upright.37 In many ways, this small group represented the broad spectrum of the 5th Marine Division, a mixture of former Raiders and Marine parachutists and newly enlisted for whom Iwo Jima was their first taste of combat.38 Hailing from cities and rural farms across the nation—from California to North Dakota, Florida to Washington—all were united in their determination to get the job done and go home to their families. In those few minutes around the pole, the men’s chests must have swelled with pride made bittersweet with the knowledge of the sacrifices of others and of the difficult fight still to come.
JUBILATION ON IWO JIMA

After the flag went up, Lowery continued to capture the scene as the men grouped around the flagpole, many hands firmly grasping it (figure 9.6). Unlike the second flag, which was raised as a replacement in an already secured area, the first flag raisers were aware that the enemy was present, albeit largely out of sight. Nearby, riflemen like Privates First Class James R. Michels and Harold H. Schultz resolutely watched against a possible Japanese counterattack. As a member of this security detail, Robeson steadfastly refused to appear in Lowery’s photographs and jokingly referred to his friends as “Hollywood Marines.” Nevertheless, the smiling faces in these photographs reveal what it meant to these men to see their country’s flag “unfurled to every breeze.” This was the first time a foreign flag had flown over sovereign Japanese territory during World War II, and the Marines appreciated the significance of that fact.

Even so, none anticipated the tumultuous reaction from the shores and ships below when it became clear that the American flag had been raised on the summit. Offshore, crafts of all sizes sounded horns in a salute to this small band of men who had raised their country’s flag in a defiant gesture to the enemy. Below the mountaintop, men who could see it cheered and hollered. Some shed tears of joy. Private First Class Charles W. Tatum of Company B, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, remembered that his unit was in a reserve position close to the beach on the morning of 23 February. Around 1030, Tatum’s friend Private First Class Clifford Evanson slapped him on the back, drawing his attention to the small flag fluttering in the distance. He felt immensely proud as shouts of joy echoed across the island. Over the years, many other Marines have remarked on that same moment and what it meant to them. But on Iwo Jima in 1945, the sight of the flag flying was just a brief respite from the perilous task at hand. Enemy mortars continued to drop shells in this area, so Tatum and Evanson returned to work, improving their foxhole.

On the summit, some Japanese reacted to the sight of the U.S. flag by emerging from caves and throwing grenades at the Marines who, in turn, swiftly moved to quell the attack. In an interview months later from his bed at the Bethesda Naval Hospital, corpsman Bradley recalled that “the flamethrowers did a fine job on top of the mountain.” With the opportunity for photographs clearly over, the Americans returned their full attention to the business of combat.
These battlefield conditions underscore the significance of Lowery’s photographs. Turning his camera from the flag raising, he photographed scenes of deadly combat as the Marines neutralized Japanese resistance (figure 9.7). Compared with the relatively serene, uncluttered flag raising captured later by Rosenthal, Lowery captured the grittiness and urgency of war. At one point, a Japanese soldier threw a grenade in his direction. Diving to escape its blast, the cameraman slid many yards, damaging his equipment in the process. Reluctantly, he left the mountaintop to see whether he could obtain a replacement. On his way down, Lowery met a trio of cameramen ascending: two Marines and a civilian. Sergeant William H. Genaust was a film cameraman who had been documenting the battle since D-day. With him was Private Robert R. Campbell, a still photographer, and Joseph Rosenthal of the Associated Press. Lowery informed them they had missed the flag raising, but they should continue on as there was a tremendous view from the top. After this brief exchange of pleasantries, they parted company.

CAPTURING THE MOMENT

With Mount Suribachi in American hands, this vantage point would be vital as an artillery spotting position to aid the Marines as they continued the advance to the north. Soon, the Marines of Companies E and F were joined by artillery observers with high-powered binoculars and special range-finding equipment. But the flag flying at the volcano’s peak also became the focus for others who wished to send a photograph or story back to the American public. After Schrier’s platoon had started out on its journey, Marines from Company F, under the command of Captain Naylor, were ordered to the mountaintop to assist in sealing cave entrances and mopping-up operations. One of those present with the Company F force was a young Marine from the Midwest. Pulling a small camera from his pocket, Private First Class Mike N. Mykris decided to take his own souvenir shot of the flag (figure 9.8). Perhaps this photograph represents an instance of “battlefield tourism,” but even so, the significance of the flag raising was not lost on the young man who had his Browning automatic rifle shot from his hands on D-day.

Other photographers and correspondents, both military and civilian, were eager to get to the summit of the volcano to get their own “scoop.” Among the first of the military photographers to reach the top after its capture were Sergeant Louis R. Burmeister from 28th Marines; Staff Sergeant Meyers A. Cornelius,
the 5th Marine Division Photographic Section laboratory chief; and Army Private First Class George Burns, working for \textit{Yank} magazine. These cameramen set about taking photographs as part of their battlefield assignments; however, the historical record remains unclear as to when they actually arrived. In a written account accompanying his photographs for \textit{Yank} editors in Honolulu, Hawaiian Territory, Burns stated that he traveled with “a platoon from E Co[mmpany].”\textsuperscript{47} Burmeister likewise asserted that he tagged along with Schrier’s patrol.\textsuperscript{48} However, he also may have made his own way up the mountain, tailing Schrier’s patrol, or perhaps joined Naylor’s reinforcement shortly thereafter. Among the photographs taken by Cornelius is a scene of the men inspecting enemy caves and a posed shot of the patrol group beneath the first flag, suggesting that he arrived either during or immediately after the first flag was raised. He even managed to take a shot of Lowery standing close to the flagpole (figure 9.9). Because Burns shot scenes of Marines attacking Japanese caves within the crater that resemble Lowery’s photographs, the Army photographer’s arrival probably coincided with that skirmish. Likewise, the striking similarity in subject and composition among photographs taken by Burns and Burmeister might lead one

\textbf{FIGURE 9.8}

\textit{PFC Mike Mykris, a member of Capt Arthur Naylor’s Company F patrol, captured this personal snapshot of the first flag after he and his fellow Marines reached the summit on 23 February.} Courtesy of the family of the late PFC Mike N. Mykris

\textbf{FIGURE 9.9}

\textit{Photograph taken by SSgt Meyers A. Cornelius showing SSgt Louis Lowery beneath the first flag, which Lowery had documented in such detail.} Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy SSgt Meyers A. Cornelius, National Archives and Records Administration
to surmise that the two men accompanied each other in documenting points of interest along the summit (figures 9.10 and 9.11).49

Many of those present at the battle had different reasons for wishing to get to the top. One of the most unusual occurrences of the day centered on a Catholic Jesuit priest from the U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps. With his assistant James E. Fisk, Father Charles F. Suver made the steep climb, recalling later that they had to take something of a detour to avoid a sentry posted to deter unauthorized persons from going up Suribachi.50 Only yards away from the flagpole, Suver set up an altar fashioned from sandbags and anything else close at hand. With a battlefield congregation of Marines gathered around him, Father Suver celebrated one of the most unique religious services of all time.51 Marines took a few moments to pray, giving thanks for their safe passage thus far and to remember those who had fallen. Their weapons, however, were never far from hand as sporadic firing continued to take place.

THE SECOND FLAG RAISING AND AMERICAN MEMORY

A few hours after the first flag raising, Rosenthal and his companions again captured the scene in the vicinity of the first flag, but they also were fortunate to have timed their arrival to photograph and film the second flag being raised. Genaust and Campbell were aware that the first flag was to be replaced by a much larger one, since both men had been sent up Mount Suribachi by Warrant Officer Norman T. Hatch, head of the 5th Marine Division’s photographic section. Hatch had been informed by the division’s intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Roll, that the small flag was to be replaced by order

FIGURES 9.10/9.11
(Top) Photograph taken by Army PFC George Burns showing the first flag. Burns was covering the invasion for Yank magazine.
Official U.S. Army photo, courtesy PFC George Burns, George Burns Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
(Bottom) Photograph of the first flag taken by Sgt Louis Burmeister, who was attached to the 28th Marines. The Marine holding the Bessing automatic rifle is PFC Louis Charlo from Company F, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. These two photos are so similar in content that it is likely that Burns and Burmeister tailed Lt Schrier’s patrol and moved around the summit photographing things of note.
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Sgt Louis Burmeister, National Archives and Records Administration
of Major General Keller E. Rockey, the division’s commanding officer, who felt it would be better for morale if the American flag could be seen more clearly. Afterward, it also was rumored that Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, upon seeing the first flag on Suribachi’s summit, had asked for it as a souvenir but that the irascible commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, was not about to let anyone—even Forrestal—have the flag.

Upon receiving orders from Johnson, the 2d Battalion’s assistant operations officer, Second Lieutenant Albert T. Tuttle obtained a larger set of colors from USS LST 779, a landing ship, tank beached near the base of Mount Suribachi. Lieutenant G. Greeley Wells, battalion adjutant, remembered that this flag was then given to Company E runner Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, who was heading to the top with fresh radio batteries. As Gagnon was preparing to depart the command post, he encountered a four-man patrol led by Sergeant Michael Strank from Company E that had been tasked with laying telephone wire to the top. The other members included Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, and Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley. It appears Strank gave Schrier this larger second flag and told him the reasons for replacing the first flag with it.

Schrier, adamant that there should be no time at which an American flag was not flying over the island, carefully directed the replacement flag’s raising, while the first one was simultaneously lowered to the ground along with the length of pipe to which it had been attached. As Rosenthal took his soon-to-be-famous photograph of the second flag on its upward journey, Genaust filmed the scene, while Campbell managed to take a photograph of the first flag being lowered (see figure 13.1). Both Burmeister and Burns also claimed to have photographed the second flag as it was being raised but, to date, no pictorial evidence to that effect has been discovered.

Two days later, the American public would wake up to Rosenthal’s picture of the flag raising in their Sunday newspapers (see figure 3.3). Lowery’s most widely recognized image, by contrast, did not appear in U.S. publications until late March accompanying a story in Life magazine, which at least acknowledged that there were two flag raisings on Mount Suribachi. More images would appear in the September 1947 issue of Leatherneck, but others would not surface for years. The fact that Rosenthal’s photograph appeared on the home front weeks earlier meant that it would soon represent the flag raising on Iwo Jima for the American public. As days and weeks passed, popular interest focused solely on those present in Rosenthal’s photograph. Official attempts to identify the flag raisers and return them to the United States where they would be hailed as heroes followed accordingly.

While the American public embraced the photograph as a symbol of imminent victory, it would be weeks before those fighting on the island would see the grainy image in newspaper clippings from back home, many not realizing that the scene pictured represented something other than the small flag whose raising had elicited such a memorable reaction in person. Sadly, too few of the men immortalized that day in photographs and on film would live to see the images that Americans back home experienced from the war. Moving to the north some days after the flag raisings, 28th Marines and other units of the 2d Battalion would encounter even stiffer resistance from the enemy in places such as Hill 362A and Nishi Ridge.
The desperate fighting there took a terrible toll on the already depleted ranks of Marines. Raising a flag had not inured anyone to enemy shot or shell. By battle’s end, four men from Company E’s original 46-man 3d Platoon walked off the island relatively unscathed. 

REMEMBERING THE FIRST FLAG RAISERS

Unfortunately, the delay in publishing Lowery’s work and that of other Service photographers made it difficult for anyone connected to the first flag to have their story heard. The reality of the fighting on Iwo Jima meant that many of those who knew the details of the first flag raising (and indeed the second) had been killed or wounded and evacuated. Significantly, some of the intrepid cameramen were among the casualties. On 4 March, Sergeant Genaust was killed in action when assisting other Marines investigating an enemy cave. 

Sergeant Burmeister was wounded in action on 7 March and evacuated. Meanwhile, survivors from Schrier’s patrol were still fighting on Iwo Jima and more concerned with staying alive than with contributing names to the flag-raising lineup, even after the island had been declared secure on 16 March. There was a sense of apathy among those questioned; as if the event had occurred a lifetime ago. Moreover, all of the attention focused on a photograph of the second flag raising, which did not have the same significance to those who had witnessed the first.

As time passed, those present at the first flag raising attempted to be heard, but it was too late. The Seventh War Loan drive, which ran from May to July 1945, celebrated this second flag raising in such a way that it appeared as if it was the only flag raised that day. No one on the bond drive was associated at that time with the first flag raising. Representations of Rosenthal’s famous photograph appeared on posters encouraging Americans to continue supporting the war effort. A postage stamp, released in July 1945, reproduced the image in a color similar to Marine green, or a dark grayish green. In 1949, the Hollywood movie Sands of Iwo Jima further reinforced the idea that the only flag raised on Mount Suribachi was the one made famous by Rosenthal, although the first flag is mentioned at the beginning of the movie. Consequently, when the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial was unveiled in November 1954, some of those who had helped raise the first flag were present but did not receive much media attention. Complicating matters further, the appeal of Rosenthal’s photograph and the second flag raising gave rise to a phenomenon where, over the years, many people wrongly claimed some association with the events there, which did nothing to aid those who were genuinely connected with it. Marines such as Lindberg, Ward, and Jacobs attempted to bring their story out from the shadow of the second flag and give the first flag raising the proper historical significance.

The passing of years and difficulty in piecing together various accounts makes it harder for a true and accurate representation to be given, but a continued interest in an event from more than seven decades ago allows the stories of these individuals to be heard even after their passing. Their accounts and recollections have helped shape our understanding of an event that continues to mean so much, but which has been bedeviled by past inaccuracies and misunderstandings.

For a few short hours atop a windswept mountain, high above a desolate landscape where merciless fighting raged, a small group of men shared fleeting moments of joy and gratitude in a brief respite from the difficulties.
of fighting on this barren rock. When Secretary of the Navy Forrestal saw the small flag they had raised and photographed there, he turned to Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith and said, “Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next 500 years.”

Mount Suribachi was not captured to raise a flag, but rather a flag was raised to signify, at a critical moment in the battle, that this important feature had been secured by U.S. troops.

ENDNOTES
3. Much of the 28th Marines’ training was devoted to carrying out mock assaults against a hill mass similar to the one they would face in battle. See Richard Wheeler, The Bloody Battle for Suribachi (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 8.
11. Extract from records of Maj Harold G. Schrier, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO. Schrier was commissioned as a second lieutenant on 2 January 1943.
14. Severance stated later that he would have been confident choosing any one of the three rifle platoons. The fierce and desperate fighting since landing on 19 February meant that all three of Severance’s rifle platoon leaders were not fit for duty after being wounded in action. Among the wounded platoon officers was 1stLt John K. Wells, commanding officer of Severance’s 3d Platoon. The fact that Col Liversedge had already nominated Schrier relieved Severance of providing a suitable replacement. See Parker Bishop Albee Jr. and Keller Cushing Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi: Raising the Flags on Iwo Jima (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 34–35.
15. Normally, two Navy corpsmen accompanied each rifle platoon, but PhM3c Clifford R. Langley had been wounded on 21 February and would not return to duty until 26 February. Originally assigned to the 27th Replacement Battalion, Ziehme volunteered to join PhM2c John H. Bradley as members of the patrol. See Robert Imrie, “Vet Tries to Prove He’s in Iwo Jima Photo,” Albany (NY) Times Union, 18 March 2003. Bradley also confirmed Ziehme’s participation in Schrier’s patrol; however, he erroneously recalled the replacement corpsman’s surname as “Zimik.” See extract from adapted interview with PhM2c John H. Bradley, Box 3, World War II interviews, Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, DC, hereafter Bradley interview.
16. No known record exists naming all the men who comprised this patrol and no accurate number has been given for those involved. Most accounts state the strength of the patrol as approximately 40 men, but it is likely that this number refers to the main body and excludes the stretcher-bearer teams.
17. Wheeler, The Bloody Battle for Suribachi, 130. A former Marine Raider, Keller previously saw service at Midway, Guadalcanal, and Bougainville, where he was wounded in November 1943.
19. John J. Wieland, “Scaling Mount Suribachi,” transcribed by Lowell V. Bulger, Raider Patch, January 1980, 11–13. Although Wieland identified the third member of this patrol as Olson, the authors of this essay believe that the 1945 report identifying Mueller is more reliable due to its chronological proximity to the event. Furthermore, Mueller confirmed his presence on this patrol and recounted details of it in a telephone interview with Stephen Foley on 29 October 2015.
20. The story of the Company D patrol has received little attention in postwar discussions of Iwo Jima, even as one account of its movements appeared in Marine Corps Chevron, a newsheet printed by Welfare and Recreation.
A FLAG FOR SURIBACHI

Marine Corps Base San Diego, CA, as early as September 1945. The Raider Patch, a newsletter compiled by former members of the Marine Raider units, revisited the topic in January 1980. From this latter publication, details about the patrol are furnished by Wieland. The actions of this patrol are not recorded in any official unit records and the men do not appear to have been within sight of the 2d Battalion command post, despite its descent along the same path later taken by Schriever's patrol. Wieland also claims to have returned to the summit later that same afternoon; at which time, he and Ferenz supposedly declined Rosenthal's request to raise the second flag. Details such as this have led some Marine veterans, including Dave Severance, to refute the veracity of Wieland's story. See “Heroes of Iwo Issue Still Rages,” Marine Corps Chevron 4, no. 35 (8 September 1945): 2; Wieland, “Scaling Mount Suribachi,” 11–13; and Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 37.

26. In a 1993 interview with Parker Albee and Keller Freeman, Severance explained that he thought the Japanese would “shoot the hell out of the four-man patrol,” and when that did not happen, he “thought they were waiting for a larger unit.” See Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 43.
27. This was a departure from the traditional doctrine of Japanese military thinking that stressed the need to stop an invader at the beaches with counterattacks or banzai charges. See Bartley, Iwo Jima, 11; and Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1994).
28. Snaking its way upward, the patrol's progress was monitored by those watching below. Severance recounts how he thought he was sending his men to their deaths. See James D. Bradley with Ron Powers, Flags of Our Fathers (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), 203.
32. 28th Marines, R-2 Journal, February 19–March 25, 1945, entries for 23 February 1945. A copy of this journal was provided to Dustin Spence by PFC Charles W. Tatum, who served on Iwo Jima with Company B, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, 5th Marine Division.
34. Wheeler, The Bloody Battle for Suribachi, 131. Many scholars tend to omit this earlier instance of Japanese resistance, favoring to cite instead the skirmish that immediately followed the first flag raising. A member of the original 3d Platoon that had landed on D-day, Cpl Richard Wheeler, was wounded on 21 February and evacuated from the island. Many years later, he chronicled the Battle of Iwo Jima. Although he was not present atop Mount Suribachi, he circulated questionnaires among the survivors of his platoon, asking them to provide details of the events surrounding the flag raising as they remembered them. Authors Marling and Wetenhall support this version of events, quoting Cpl Charles Lindberg as saying that there were sounds of a minor skirmish in the cone below as the Marines prepared to raise the flag. See Marling and Wetenhall, Iwo Jima, 48.
36. Perhaps Lindberg was singularly focused on the job at hand. See Marling and Wetenhall, Iwo Jima, 232fn13.
37. Combat photographer Sgt Louis Burmeister later recalled of his experience atop Mount Suribachi: “What a windy place! It was so windy. Your pants when the wind blew through sounded like flapping . . . You could hardly talk to anybody, it was so noisy from the wind.” See Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 63.
38. A couple of days after the flag raisings, PltSgt Ernest I. Thomas Jr. gave a CBS radio interview in which he stated: “Three of us actually raised the flag—Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, our company executive officer, Sergeant Henry O. Hansen of Boston, and myself. But the rest of the men had just as big a part in it.” Prompted by the discovery of more of Lowery’s photographs, Dustin Spence conducted further research on the first flag raising; his findings were published in Leatherneck in 2006 and greatly aided the 2016 Huly Panel investigation into both flag raisings. For an official roster of participants in the first flag raising, see Mary Reinwald’s chapter in this volume. See also, PltSgt Ernest I. Thomas Jr. interview, 26 February 1945, Archives Branch, History Division, Quantico, VA; and Dustin Spence, “Unraveling the Mysteries of the First Flag Raising,” Leatherneck 89, no. 10, October 2006.
40. Kessler and Bart, Never in Doubt, 70–71.
42. Bradley interview.
43. Keene, “Louis Lowery Captured Leatherneck History on Film,” 33. The timing of Lowery's descent from the mountain is often portrayed as being immediately after the Japanese counterattack, but his photographs documenting this episode mean he was probably there for some time. In Leatherneck’s archives a photograph is
attributed to Lowery that shows the flag photographed from an angle whereby he was lying prone on the ground. Whether it was intentional or not, it could be because he was taking cover.

44. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 59. See also, the excerpt from Rosenthal’s oral history interview in this volume (appendix E).

45. Mike Mykris, interview with Stephen Foley, 29 October 2015, hereafter Mykris interview. It is not known why Mykris was carrying a handheld camera on Iwo Jima.

46. Mike Mykris, interview with Stephen Foley, 29 October 2015, hereafter Mykris interview. The effort to secure Mount Suribachi was not confined to one small unit but was a collaboration of efforts within the battalion and indeed beyond it. Such operations were necessary lest the enemy consider reoccupying positions from their subterranean network of tunnels.

47. George Burns Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

48. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 62.

49. See, for example, images by both photographers that depict the Catholic Mass atop Mount Suribachi and the first flag flying.

50. Marling and Wetenhall, Iwo Jima, 53–54. Dave Severance disputes that there was a military checkpoint near the crater.

51. There is some disagreement among scholars as to the timing of the religious service. Suver was adamant that it took place after the first flag was raised and before the second, recalling that he and his assistant watched the second flag being raised from a foxhole. In Flags of Our Fathers, James Bradley supports this timeline with a letter his father wrote home in which PHM2c John H. Bradley penned: “About an hour after we reached the top of the Mt. [mountain] our Catholic Chaplain had Mass and I went to Holy Communion.” For information regarding Suver’s mass, see James E. Fisk, “Mass on a Volcano,” Catholic World, January 1949, 312–16; and Bradley and Powers, Flags of Our Fathers, 216.


53. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 47. Hatch disputed the account that Forrestal asked for the first flag. He states that Forrestal was a meticulous recordkeeper and also that there is no record of this request in the 5th Marine Division records. See Jones, Warshots, 163.

54. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 48–49. The flag measured eight feet by four feet eight inches. For an in-depth explanation of the origins of the second flag, see Christopher Havern’s chapter in this volume.


56. Richard Wheeler, A Special Valor: The U.S. Marines in the Pacific War (New York: Harper, 1983), 383. In his 1946 letter to Belle Block, Ira Hayes recalled that Sgt Strank informed him and the other members of the wire-laying detail that they had received orders to raise a replacement flag when they reached the summit. Ira Hayes to Belle Block, 12 July 1946, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

57. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 64–65.

58. For more on the flag-raising coverage in Life magazine, see Melissa Renn’s essay in this volume.

59. Rosenthal personally delivered his film back to the USS Eldorado (AGC 11) later on 23 February, where it was put on a seaplane bound for Guam to be developed, checked by censors, and then sent by radiophoto back to the United States. The images by Lowery and other photographers did not move with the same haste. Later publication of photographs by Lowery appeared, for example, in Bill Miller, “The Whine of Sniper’s Bullets Comprised the Only Opposition,” Leatherneck 30, no. 9, September 1947; and W. G. Ford, “Atop Mt. Suribachi with Sergeant Lou Lowery,” Leatherneck 83, no. 6, June 2002, 52–53.

60. Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 95–96.

61. The second flag raising went unnoticed at the time by almost all except those in its immediate vicinity. See Kessler and Bart, Never in Doubt.

62. These Marines included Keller, Michels, Ward, and PFC Graydon W. Dyce. This was typical of all Marine frontline units on Iwo Jima. See Wheeler, Bloody Battle, 140; and “World War II Casualty Card Database,” Reference Branch, History Division, Quantico, VA.

63. Genaust’s body was never recovered. Years later, expeditions returned to the place where it was believed he died in attempts to recover his remains, but to no avail. See Bill D. Ross, Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor (New York: Vanguard Press, 1985), 284.


65. See, for example, Dave Severance’s statement on this subject, as quoted in Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 97–98.


67. Lindberg devoted much of his later life to highlighting the first flag raising. Jacobs, too, tried to have his role in the event recognized considering he had been mis-identified in Lowery’s most widely known image of the event. See Christy Spahalski, “Marine Vet Recalls First Flag Raising,” Marine Corps Chevron, 12 March 1982, 3; “He Helped Raise First Flag on Iwo Jima,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 29 May 1988; Nancy Jacobs, letter to the editor, Us 9, no. 8, 22 April 1983; and Dustin Spence, “Unraveling the Mysteries of the First Flag Raising,” Leatherneck 79, no. 10, October 2006, 34–43.


STEPHEN FOLEY AND DUSTIN SPENCE 168
“SUPPLIED FLAG TO MARINES TO FLY FROM MT. SURIBACHI”

Confirming the Role of LST-779 in the Second Flag Raising

by Christopher B. Havern Sr.

On 19 February 1945, U.S. naval, land, and air forces launched Operation Detachment, the amphibious assault to seize the Japanese-held island of Iwo Jima. Though the battle would last 36 days, it is largely remembered for the 23 February events during just a few hours on the extinct volcano Mount Suribachi at the island’s southern end. That morning, as John C. Chapin wrote in The Fifth Marine Division in World War II, “a patrol from Company E of the 28th Marines did discover a path up the mountain which they were able to ascend, and at 1037 that morning of D plus 4 [23 February] the American flag was hoisted on top of Mt. Suribachi.”1 It was this flag raising, as witnessed by Secretary of Navy James V. Forrestal, that prompted him to remark to Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, commanding general, expeditionary troops for the invasion, “Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next 500 years.”2 Ironically, it was not the raising of this particular flag, but its replacement that served to do what Forrestal had predicted. It was the second flag raising, documented by Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal and Sergeant William H. Genaust, that would serve as the embodiment of the Marine Corps and its ethos in the eyes of the American public. The image that recorded 1/400th of a second in human history transmogrified from a simple serendipitous photograph to an exemplar of American iconography.3 It has assumed a significance that is more than cultural, occupying a position that is arguably unequaled in American history (see figure 0.2). Given its ultimate significance, the event is bounded in even greater irony, as the second flag raising was not even mentioned in the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines’ action report. As James Bradley, author of Flags of Our Fathers, wryly noted, “The Action Report made no mention of a second flag raising [sic]. It was, after all, only a replacement flag.”4

Some participants saw these events as a moment in the performance of their duty, while some sought celebrity from their involvement. Others proclaimed association with the event, yet had either only the remotest connection.
or were not even present; as if being associated with the flag raising would confer, by some transitive property, a degree of status upon them. Given this phenomenon, the event’s stature generated not only an insatiable interest, but a corresponding controversy. The years subsequent to the battle saw the emergence of a vast literature. Most readers might expect that most matters regarding various aspects of the multifaceted battle would have, in the years since, been identified, debated, and resolved to confirm not just a consensus, but an orthodoxy. More particularly, the narrative of the flag raisings on Suribachi had seemingly been established. After all, it was the subject of several iterations of Marine Corps official histories and also the subject of Parker B. Albee Jr. and Keller C. Freeman’s *Shadow of Suribachi: Raising the Flags on Iwo Jima*. The authors conducted interviews with many of the participants and timed the publication of their book to coincide with the event’s 50th anniversary in 1995.

The aforementioned sources state that the landing ship, tank USS *LST-779* provided the second flag. After Secretary Forrestal expressed an interest in acquiring the first flag raised by Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, the battalion’s commanding officer, told Second Lieutenant Albert T. Tuttle, assistant operations officer for 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, to go down to one of the ships on the beach and get a battle flag “large enough that the men at the other end of the island will see it. It will lift their spirits also.” Lieutenant Tuttle went on board *LST-779*, beached near the base of the volcano, and obtained a larger set of colors. Fittingly, the flag obtained from *LST-779* that would soon fly over the first captured Japanese home territory had been salvaged from Pearl Harbor. Tuttle returned to the command post with the larger flag and Colonel Johnson directed him to give it to Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, the runner from Company E who was headed up the hill with replacement batteries for First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, Company E’s executive officer. As Gagnon carried this second, larger flag (96” x 56”) up the slope, Rosenthal was just beginning his ascent of the mountain.

This narrative was further bolstered in 2000. As part of the commemoration of the 55th anniversary of the assault on Iwo Jima, *World War II* magazine published an article by R. C. House for the January issue wherein he interviewed Alan S. Wood, the communications officer on board *LST-779*. In the article, Wood detailed his having provided the replacement flag. Later in May that same year, James Bradley and Ron Powers published *Flags of Our Fathers*. The volume recounted the role of Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley in the flag raisings, the photograph, the bond tour, and subsequent events. After spending 46 weeks as a *New York Times* bestseller, 6 of which were spent at number one, the events of 23 February 1945 saw a significant resurgence of interest.

Soon thereafter, however, a dissenting version of what transpired emerged. In August 2001, Coast Guard Quartermaster Robert L. Resnick, who had served at Iwo Jima on board the Coast Guard-manned *LST-758*, attended the 5th Marine Division Reunion at West Palm Beach, Florida, and identified himself as the individual who had provided the flag for the raising photographed by Rosenthal and filmed by Genaust (figure 10.1). His claim was accepted as fact by many of the attendees and the president of the 5th Marine Division Association, who later made Resnick an honorary member of the reunion group. In a 2004 interview with Coast Guard Public Affairs Specialist Second
Class Judy L. Silverstein for the July 2004 issue of the Reservist Magazine, the former quartermaster stated, “‘It never occurred to me to seek glory for Bob Resnick,’ he said. ‘But the (LST-) 779 kept receiving credit for supplying the flag and I wanted to set things right.’”

Resnick’s claim to have provided the flag for the second raising, which was recognized by the U.S. Coast Guard, caused considerable consternation among Marine Corps veterans. It even prompted the Marine Corps History Division to make a request to the U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office to disavow Resnick’s assertions and to remove material related to his claims from their website. The contention between the two Services was even reported in the Army Times. Despite the Marine Corps’ request, the Coast Guard did not withdraw its support for Resnick’s claims. In the succeeding years, the intensity of the dispute subsided though was never fully resolved. To further muddy the waters, Marion Noel, a member of LST-779’s crew, was interviewed by the Roanoke Times on the 60th anniversary of the Mount Suribachi flag raisings. In the interview, Noel stated, “The ship’s log says that our commanding officer, Alan Wood, furnished the flag.”

Further, he recalled that he and Donald W. Noel, his Navy veteran son, had “obtained the ship’s log from LST-779, which contained an entry from Feb. 23, 1945, stating that the ship supplied the flag for the raising.”

It was Noel’s interview that prompted further consultation of LST-779’s logbooks for more information on the subject. In the interest of diligence and to ensure corroboration of the historical record, the relevant primary documentation found in archived logbooks, war diaries, action reports also required attention for not just information on LST-779 but also that for LST-758; the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines; the 5th Marine Division; and the Haskell-class attack transport Talladega (APA 208). In the course of conducting this research, the author intends to lay the matter to rest.

**LST-779 AND LST-758**

Historians often claim that the landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP) or “Higgins Boat” “won the war” because of its integral role in transferring men and materiel from ship to shore. The versatile landing ship, tank (LST), however, was no less important in the conduct of amphibious operations. The Allies classified four types of vessels as LSTs. The Prototype (British conversion), Type I, and Type III LST designs were built in Commonwealth shipyards in England, Ireland, or Canada, while only the Type II was exclusively built in U.S. shipyards. Originally conceived in the United Kingdom and known as a tank landing craft (TLC), the design was brought to the United States by a delegation from the Admiralty and submitted to the Navy’s Bureau of Ships in November 1941. After some design modifications, and with the concurrence of the Allies, the design was approved and the type designator was changed to landing ship, tank (LST, Allied Type II). Of the
1,052 Type II vessels built during World War II, 117 were transferred to either the Royal Navy or the Royal Hellenic Navy under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. Still other LSTs were commissioned in the U.S. Coast Guard and crewed by their servicemen. According to the Naval Vessel Register, the official inventory of ships and service craft titled to the U.S. Navy, there were seven classes of Type II LSTs. The first three classes of the Type II built during the war years were all of the same design and built simultaneously on both coasts and in shipyards along the Ohio and Mississippi River systems. The LST-542-class was essentially similar to the LST-1 and LST-491-classes.

As members of the LST-542-class, both LST-758 and LST-779 displaced 1,625 tons light and 4,080 tons under full load. With a speed of 11.6 knots, they had a complement of 117 sailors and could accommodate 163 troops. Their equipment included two LCVPs and they were armed at commissioning with eight 40mm guns and twelve 20mm guns. Aside from their type and class, these ships were further linked. Both were built in Pennsylvania, along the Ohio River, within miles and weeks of each other. LST-779 was laid down on 21 May 1944 at Neville Island, Pittsburgh, by the Dravo Corporation, while LST-758 was laid down on 5 June 1944, 10 miles downriver, at Ambridge by the American Bridge Company. The former was launched on 1 July 1944, while the latter launched on 25 July 1944. LST-779 was commissioned into the Navy on 3 August 1944 with Reserve Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Joseph A. Hopkins in command, while LST-758 was placed into commission in the Coast Guard, then under the Navy Department, on 19 August 1944, with Coast Guard Lieutenant Felix J. Molenda in command (figure 10.2).

Continuing in parallel, both ships made their way down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to the Gulf Coast, where they conducted shakedown training and final fitting out. After loading the tank deck with heavy construction materials earmarked for forward areas and five sections of landing craft, tank (LCT) on the main deck, LST-779 made final checkups and departed New Orleans, Louisiana, on 7 September for the Pacific Fleet. After transiting the Panama Canal on 18 September 1944, the ship steamed to San Diego, California, visiting Acapulco, Mexico, en route. On 8 October, LST-779 departed San Diego unescorted and arrived at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaiian Territory, on 18 October. During that time, LST-758 departed Gulfport, Mississippi, on 11 September, loaded with equipment for deployment in forward areas and proceeded via the Canal Zone and arrived at Pearl Harbor on 21 October. Having unloaded their materiel, both ships undertook a period of intensive training with units from the Army and Marine Corps in Hawaiian waters.

It was not until January 1945 that both LSTs embarked their combat loads of men and materiel in preparation for the Iwo Jima assault. LST-779 was loaded with ammunition, gasoline, equipment, the Marines of the 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, and eight amphibious trucks (DUKW) from the Army’s 473d Amphibian Truck Company. On 22 January, assigned to Task Group 53.3 (Tractor Flotilla), LST-779 departed Hawaii, setting a course for the Marianas. LST-758 also was assigned to Task Group 53.3 (Tractor Flotilla) with 12 other Coast Guard-manned tank landing ships and was underway by 1 February 1945 en route to Saipan, Marianas, via Eniwetok, Marshall Islands. The ship arrived at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, on 10 February and after anchoring “began transfer of troops and exchange of
personnel and cargo. Loaded provisions and supplies. Landing teams, serial 128 and 227, Marines of the Fifth Marine Division.” Both LSTs conducted landing rehearsals off Tinian on 13 February, and then upon return to Saipan, they conducted logistics operations until departing on 15 February in convoy bound for Iwo Jima.

19–22 FEBRUARY

After uneventful passages, each ship arrived in its designated area off the island on 19 February 1945 [D-day]. LST-779 reached Area Charlie at 0702, and LST-758 arrived in Area Able at 0712. LST-779 lay off the beach during that day and part of the next while the initial assault waves landed in smaller craft (map 3). Meanwhile, LST-758 lowered LCVPs into the water after 0730 and opened the bow doors to launch the landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs). By 0744, all seven had launched and were heading toward the beach, which was reached at 0900. During these launching operations, the port bow door was cut away and had to be removed. After landing their Marines, the LVTs returned to LST-758 to load supplies. By 1211, 10 LVTs were on board and the bow doors were closed to enable the LST to maintain its position on the LST line. Between 1427 and 1530, the ship launched the LVTs for a return to the beach. At 1615, it was hit by a shell starboard amidships that punctured the pontoon.

“SUPPLIED FLAG TO MARINES TO FLY FROM MT. SURIBACHI”
causeways but did not puncture the hull. By 1840, the vessel had received 11 LVTs and hoisted the ramps. The next day LST-758 remained on the LST line in Area Able, picking up and launching LVTs transiting to and from the beach with supplies. Responding to various air raid alarms, LST-758 remained on the LST line for the remainder of the night. Through this period, the landing ship had unloaded 85 percent of its supplies.²⁵
In the meantime on 20 February [D+1], LST-779 moved in close to the beach and around 1400 launched eight General Motors DUKW amphibious trucks (or ducks), which proceeded to Yellow Beach 1. With the DUKWs unable to land because of crowded conditions on the beach, LST-779 maneuvered toward Yellow Beach 2 to re-embark the landing craft. As she was maneuvering, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, commander, attack force, Task Force 53, ordered the tank landing ship to beach on Red Beach 1. After maneuvering with difficulty through the small craft, the ship beached on the right flank of Red Beach 1 at 1634, the first LST to land on Iwo Jima and began unloading at 1640 in response to a call by forces ashore for heavy artillery. At 1650, the ship’s 40mm guns engaged targets on Mount Suribachi. Five minutes later, at 1655, the 40mm battery ceased firing having suppressed the target.26

By 0400 on 21 February [D+2], the Marines had unloaded all the heavy artillery on board together with part of the ammunition and gasoline. At 0425, LST-779 was straddled by heavy enemy fire. A Japanese mortar round hit a gasoline-laden LVT within 10 feet of the ship’s bow, and the resulting explosion produced fragments that pierced the hull. At 0443, the tank landing ship began to withdraw from the beach. Afterward, Lieutenant Hopkins, LST-779’s commanding officer, reported on board the amphibious command ship USS Auburn (AGC 10) and conferred with Rear Admiral Hill and his staff, who questioned him regarding beaching conditions, traction for vehicles on the beach, and the amount of cargo unloaded by his ship. Rear Admiral Hill also complimented LST-779’s efforts as a job well done and ordered her not to re-beach until notified. From 0800 to 1800, the ship lay off Iwo Jima near the line of departure taking LVTs and DUKWs on board to unload propellant and shells. During that time, at 1500, the ship’s commanding officer received orders to launch the pontoon barge. At 1604, the first barge (No. 16) was launched and secured alongside, followed by No. 14, which was secured forward of No. 16 at 1706. At 1923, sea swells and fresh wind caused No. 16 to puncture LST-779’s hull just above the water line, allowing cresting waves to enter the hull. Conditions prevented them from reloading the barges, which were in danger of breaking loose as the lines and cables kept parting.27

That same day, LST-758 moved into the new line of departure 2,000 yards from the beach. The LST continued to pick up and launch LVTs and pontoon causeways in preparation of towing them to the beach. The causeways were beached on Red Beach 1, but were later broached by the heavy surf. Despite this, cargo unloading continued until midnight.

On 22 February [D+3], the line of departure had moved in to 1,000 yards and LST-758 took up position there. In this position at 0915, the bow doors were opened to lower the ramp to launch two maintenance LVTs. These launchings completed “the disembarkation of all Marine officers, Navy officers and C. B. [construction battalion or Seabees] officers and personnel of the Marine Corps, Navy, Construction Battalions and All [sic] LVTs.” The vessel was then beached on the left flank of “red beach one” at 1112.28 The bow ramp was lowered upon landing and LVTs came on board to remove the remaining cargo (figure 10.3). By 1345, the ship was completely unloaded and the crew made preparations to retract from the beach at 1607. When the engines were reversed, however, the port engine was reported to be disabled. The starboard propeller had what “appeared to be a
section of an LVT ramp, the wire of which was wrapped around the propeller.” Eventually, the starboard engine had to be stopped too. The salvage tug USS Shackle (ARS 9) was signaled to come to the LST’s assistance. With the tow cable secured, LST-758 was under tow at 1830 and remained in tow of Shackle to seaward of the line of departure. A heavy sea made it impracticable for divers to inspect or clear the ship’s propellers.29

LST-779, conversely, had both barges break loose at 0103 on 22 February, and although the ship’s crew attempted to recover them, their efforts proved unsuccessful. Close to the line of departure at 0933, the ship launched another barge (No. 13) and secured it to the starboard side. DUKW crews began unloading ammunition off the bow ramp at 1000. The barge put a small hole in the starboard side at 1320. After being told to close in on Red Beach 1, the ship was anchored 400 yards offshore to await orders. After shifting anchorage to 800 yards off Green Beach, the anchor dragged and the ship remained underway the remainder of the evening to maintain position off the beach.
23 FEBRUARY [D+4]

At 0830 on 23 February, LST-779’s commanding officer received orders to beach on the left flank of Green Beach 1 and did so at 0842. Throughout the early part of the day, the beach party continued unloading the remainder of the 2d Howitzer Battalion’s ammunition and other cargo. Meanwhile, units from the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, took the summit of Mount Suribachi and men from the battalion reserve, Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, raised a flag. This first flag, which was tied to a pipe found on the height, had been brought ashore from the attack transport USS Missoula (APA 211). Shortly afterward, Lieutenant Tuttle, at the battalion commander’s direction, went to the nearest vessel on the beach, LST-779, in search of a larger flag. That LST-779 was the source of the flag that Tuttle transferred to Private First Class Gagnon, who was headed up the hill with replacement batteries, is corroborated by LST-779’s logbook for 23 February (figure 10.4). The log entry for 1100 states, “Supplied flag to Marines to fly from Mt. Suribachi” and was signed by Navy Reserve Ensign Alan S. Wood, the ship’s communications officer.

Ensign Wood recounted that a “marine came on board asking for a larger flag, so I gave him our only large flag.” Later, for the 55th anniversary of the flag raising, Alan Wood stated in an article in World War II magazine:

“...A battle-weary Marine appeared aboard LST-779, which was beached closest to the mountain in a long line of LSTs. As Wood recalled, the Marine asked to borrow a large flag. Wood asked him, ‘What for?’ and the Marine responded, ‘Don’t worry. You won’t regret it.’ Wood got approval from his skipper for the loan, which, of course, became a donation.

“I barely remember the Marine who came aboard to get the flag,” Wood said later, “and I don’t know if he was one of the group which raised the flag or not. He was dirty and looked tired, and had several days’ growth of beard on his face... Even though he couldn’t have been more than 18 or 19, he looked like an old man. I have looked carefully at the pictures of the men who raised the flag, but I recognized none of them.”

Wood’s assertion that LST-779 was beached closest to the mountain in a long line of LSTs gives further credence to the notion that this particular LST provided the colors. After all, it stands to reason that, given the dan-
gerous environment that existed on Iwo Jima that morning, with Japanese soldiers emerging from unseen locations and snipers firing on Marines, it is unlikely that anybody would go beyond the closest ship to try to obtain a flag, unless one was not available from there.

Curiously, while the *LST-779’s War Diary* for February 1945 documented the ship’s actions for 23 February and each of the days prior and subsequent, there is no mention of the ship’s role in providing the flag for the raising on Mount Suribachi. The ship’s Iwo Jima Action Report likewise made no mention of the part played by the ship as the provider of the flag. In the case of the latter, having documented Lieutenant Hopkin’s meeting with Rear Admiral Hill and his staff, the report stated:

*This ship remained in the area around the east coast beach of Iwo Jima until 28 February 1945. During this period the remainder of the 2nd 155mm Howitzer Battalion, FMF [Fleet Marine Force], V Amphibious Corps Pacific and its equipment was successfully unloaded on the beach. In addition we launched three of our four side-carried pontoon barges and unloaded APA’s; successfully unloading three more complete LST cargos [sic].*

Given this evidence supporting *LST-779*’s claim to having provided the flag, what then of *LST-758*? Any consideration of this ship’s role must begin with Judy Silverstein’s article based on her interview with Robert Resnick. Silverstein noted that Resnick was on the bridge on the morning of 23 February and that, just after 1115 that morning, a Marine identified as Rene Gagnon came on board the LST. Resnick recalled climbing to the signal bridge and rummaging through a wooden bunting box where he found a large flag. After being confronted by a signalman, Resnick said, he climbed up to the flying bridge, “his nose aligned with the heels of the ship’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Felix J. Molenda, as he got to the top rung. It was from there he presented his case. Preoccupied with reprimanding a junior officer, the skipper stammered out, ‘Uh, very well.’” Resnick “scampered down the ladder to the signal bridge and then back down to the bridge, where he handed the Marine the flag. Gagnon then asked for a 20-30-foot pipe as a substitute. Gagnon headed down to the Tank Deck, where he was given a 21-foot galvanized steel steamfitter’s pipe.” Resnick recalled Gagnon slinging the pipe weighing more than 150 pounds over his left shoulder and tucking the flag under his right arm. After which, he began his trek up Suribachi. He said, “Gagnon barely made any headway” in the island’s soft sand. Resnick continued to report that Gagnon, “dropped the pole and pulled it by its nose. Evidently, he called up to the summit and two other Marines shouldered the pipe and Gagnon carried the flag the rest of the way up.” By his estimate, Resnick said it was probably a 20-minute journey. The article then stated that, as *LST-758* was “beached under the precipice of Mt. Suribachi,” so the ship lost track of the men as the hill obstructed their view.

In the article, Resnick also claimed to have interacted with another of the flag raisers, Private First Class Ira Hayes. He recalled that he had met Hayes on Saipan about a week prior to the Iwo Jima landings and that the two had breakfast together one day after Resnick came off his watch. Resnick stated that he and Hayes “became good friends in the week it took to transit the Pacific Ocean toward Iwo Jima. ‘And as he left the vessel, he gave me his rain poncho’.”

There are very significant problems with
Resnick’s recollections as they were related to Silverstein. At the time that *LST-779’s* logbook states that the ship supplied the flag, *LST-758’s* logbook indicates that it was still under tow with *Shackle* (figure 10.5). This nullifies Resnick’s assertion that *LST-758* was beached at the base of Mount Suribachi. His LST would remain underway under tow throughout much of the day and finally anchored with *Shackle* in the lee of Iwo Jima at 1920 that evening, after which divers from the salvage ship entered the water to inspect the LST’s propellers (figure 10.6).39

In light of this, Resnick could have provided neither flag nor pipe to Rene Gagnon as he claimed. Also, given his contention that he and Hayes became friends in the transit to Iwo Jima, that too could not possibly have been true. First, the transit from Saipan to Iwo Jima took a little more than three days, not the week stated. While the mention of a week’s time might be a simple misstatement of the duration of the transit in light of the years since the event, his second assertion that Hayes gave him his poncho before disembarking from the LST is even more dubious. Hayes and the other members of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, were not embarked on *LST-758*. As stated above, the units embarked on that ship were elements of 1st Battalion, 28th Marines, and 2d Battalion, 27th Marines. Hayes and the other members of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, who constituted the flag raisers, approached their landing on Green Beach on board the attack transport USS *Talladega* (APA 208) (figure 10.7). The unit had embarked on the ship at Hilo, Hawaiian Territory, on 7 January 1945.40 As such, Resnick and Hayes could never have interacted on Saipan as the former asserts. While Robert Resnick may have re-
received a poncho from a Marine, that Marine was not Ira Hayes.

In light of the documentary evidence, it is impossible to conclude that LST-758 provided any materials for either of the flag raisings on the summit of Mount Suribachi as claimed by Robert Resnick. It is not the intent of the author to discredit Resnick or the U.S. Coast Guard. Both undoubtedly were present at Iwo Jima as part of Operation Detachment, but neither had any connection, direct or otherwise, to what transpired atop that hill on 23 February 1945. Having landed at Red Beach 1, but not on D+4, LST-758 was never at the base of Suribachi and, more important, was under tow off the island that particular morning. LST-779, however, was clearly in position on Green Beach closest to the extinct volcano’s base, as indicated by both the textual record and the associated imagery (figures 10.8–11).

Some readers may say that settling this question, even within historical circles, is of little importance. They might see it simply as arcane trivia that serves as fodder for wagers between the veterans of the different Services in VFW and American Legion halls. The reality, however, is that this could not be further from the truth. Given the position of imagery in the American pantheon, as discussed above, its constituent components are of importance to a good many people, as verified by the response of veterans and historical offices regarding Resnick’s claims. It was because of this contention that the author undertook this investigation. Only by conducting archival research and consulting the relevant documentation can this
A Marine in a prone position atop Mount Suribachi. LST-779 is visible in the background, closest to the base of the hill.

National Archives and Records Administration, Still Pictures Division, 127-GR-14-93-A419741

FIGURE 10.9

Marines use a flamethrower on Japanese still concealed in a cave under rocks. LST-779 is visible in the background, ca. 24–25 February 1945.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Sgt T. R. Robbins, National Archives and Records Administration, Still Pictures Division, 127-GW-320-110646

FIGURE 10.10

Shortly after the second flag was raised and secured atop Mount Suribachi. The stern of LST-779 is visible.

Official U.S. Coast Guard photo, courtesy PHOM3 John Papsun, National Archives and Records Administration, Still Pictures Division, 26-G-4140

FIGURE 10.11

Green Beach 1 with Mount Suribachi in the background on 24 February 1945. The small wrecked ship in the foreground is Japanese. The landing ships include (from bottom to center): LSM-264, LST-724, LST-760, LST-788, LST-808 (with a LCT embarked), and LST-779 (carrying a pontoon causeway).


“SUPPLIED FLAG TO MARINES TO FLY FROM MT. SURIBACHI” 181
contentious matter be resolved. The detective work to draw the appropriate conclusions required the consideration of not just those records that confirmed the role of LST-779, but those that, in the end, disproved that role assigned to LST-758 by Robert Resnick. Having done so, it is the author’s hope that as the 75th anniversary approaches, the matter of which ship provided the flag seen in Rosenthal’s photograph and Genaust’s film has finally been laid to rest.

ENDNOTES
The author previously published an article related to USS LST-779 (landing ship, tank) in the January/February 2018 issue of Naval History entitled “In the Right Spot, Twice.” This chapter constitutes a further investigation of the roles of LST-779 and the U.S. Coast Guard-manned USS LST-758 in the second flag raising on Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945. The quoted portion of the title comes from LST-779’s logbook entry on 23 February 1945.

1. John C. Chapin, The Fifth Marine Division in World War II (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1945), 10. Many sources cite a time frame between 1020 and 1037 that morning; however, the after action report of Combat Team 28, 2d Battalion, provides an official timestamp of 1020 for the first flag raising.


5. The vastness of the literature on the topic is indicated by a subject search for “Iwo Jima, Battle of, Japan, 1945” in OCLC WorldCat, which identified 409 non-fiction books in English. While Rosenthal’s photograph established the visual parameters of the recollection of the battle for Iwo Jima, the battle’s narrative arose contemporaneously. Initially, the wire service reports of war correspondents on the island shaped the nascent historical record. Almost immediately, however, the official narrative emerged in the battle’s aftermath, as the units involved submitted their action reports, logbooks, and war diaries. It was these primary documents from which the official histories were fashioned. The first of these, Chapin’s The Fifth Marine Division in World War II, was published in August 1945, before the Japanese signed the articles of capitulation and the war’s official end on 2 September 1945. In subsequent decades, additional official Marine Corps publications chronicled and commemorated the events of Operation Detachment and the exploits of the Corps. See LtCol Whitten S. Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1954); Clifford P. Morehouse, The Iwo Jima Operation (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1960); LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, The Battle for Iwo Jima (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1962); Bernard C. Nalty and Danny J. Crawford, The United States Marines on Iwo Jima: The Battle and the Flag Raisings (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 1967); George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Western Pacific Operations, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1971); and Col Joseph H. Alexander, Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima, Marines in World War II Commemorative Series (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1994).


11. The author was a historian with the U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office at the time.


18. They were built at a length of 328 feet, beam 50 feet and drafts of 2 feet 4 inches forward, 7 feet 6 inches aft (light); 8 feet 3 inches forward, 14 feet 1 inch aft (seagoing); and 3 feet 11 inches forward and 9 feet 10 inches aft (landing with a 500-ton load). For more on their build specifications, see NavSource.


22. These included LST-70, LST-761, LST-787, LST-789, LST-760, LST-763, LST-764, LST-792, LST-784, LST-782, LST-775, and LST-793. The Coast Guard at War, vol. VI, Pacific Landings (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Public Information Division, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 1946), 175.

23. These units were from the 1st Battalion, 28th Marines, and 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, also referred to as Landing Team (LT) 128 and LT 227. LST-758 War Diary, February 1945 (Declassified by NDC, Authority: Executive Order 13526, on 31 December 2012), Ancestry.com, II, hereafter LST-758 War Diary, February 1945.

24. LST-779 War Diary, 3; and LST-758 War Diary, IV.

25. LST-758 War Diary, 3.


28. LST-758 Iwo Jima Action Report, V–VI.

29. LST-758 Iwo Jima Action Report, V–VI.

30. Though the maps of the invasion and operational graphics identified the landing area as simply “Green Beach,” LST-779’s logbook refers to the beaching location as “beach Green 1,” therefore, the reference as “Green Beach 1.” See Deck Log, 23 February 1945, RG 24, Entry 118, NARA (Declassified by NND927605 and NND803052), hereafter LST-779 Deck Log.

31. Nalty and Crawford, The United States Marines on Iwo Jima, 5–8. Bradley and Powers assert in Flags of Our Fathers, that it was Johnson’s opposition to the expressed interest of Secretary Forrestal to obtain the flag as a souvenir that prompted the former to dispatch Tuttle to get another, larger flag. Bradley and Powers, Flags of Our Fathers, 207.

32. LST-779 Deck Log.


34. This article was written by R. C. House and originally published in the January 2000 issue of World War II magazine. See House, “Iwo Jima.” It is understandable that Wood did not recognize the flag raisers. He had given the flag to 2dLt Albert T. Tuttle. The assistant operations officer of 28th Marines was not among those atop Mount Suribachi.

35. LST-779 War Diary, 4–5; and LST-779 Iwo Jima Action Report, 3. APA is the designator for an attack transport ship.

36. Silverstein, “Iwo Jima.” 24. The text in this excerpt was edited by the author to correct the spelling of Gagnon’s first name and the spelling of Suribachi. The date and time format also were modified to remain uniform with the rest of the text.


38. Silverstein, “Iwo Jima.”

39. LST-758 Deck Log, 23 February 1945, RG 26, NARA.

40. 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, Action Report, Section V-Embarkation and Movement to the Objective.

“SUPPLIED FLAG TO MARINES TO FLY FROM MT. SURIBACHI” 183
Since 2013, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has been called upon to preserve, restore, and digitize documentaries, training films, cartoons, newsreels, and raw footage shot by combat cameramen for events commemorating the 75th anniversary of World War II. Among the historical events included in NARA’s motion picture holdings are the flag raisings at Iwo Jima. On the morning of 23 February 1945, Sergeant William Homer Genaust raised his Bell & Howell camera to capture one of the most iconic moments in American military history. While Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal recorded the now-famous second flag raising on Iwo Jima as a single image in black and white, Genaust documented both the first and second flags in real time, in full color, and on motion picture film. When General Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps, called for an official review in 2016 to investigate issues regarding the identities of the flag raisers, the Genaust film became crucial evidence for retired Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly and other members of the review panel (figure 11.1). Concurrently, the Smithsonian Channel and Lucky 8 television requested that NARA provide high-resolution digital scans of the Genaust flag-raising footage for a production titled *The Unknown Flag Raiser of Iwo Jima* (2016), which summarized the Huly Panel’s findings.¹ Yet like all of the visual evidence related to the Iwo Jima flag raisings—whether still photography or motion picture—the historical record was incomplete.

NARA carefully preserves, records, and maintains resources such as the footage taken by Genaust at Iwo Jima, but the physical difficulties faced by combat cameramen and the technological obstacles of shooting, developing, and disseminating combat footage during World War II has meant that the visual record is neither as consistent nor as informative as modern researchers, including Huly Panel members, would hope. By the time the motion picture entered the collection on 7 November 1975, all of the primary information about its duplication and dissemination had been lost.²
Because the U.S. Marine Corps processed combat photography at various locations and reconstructed footage to generate wartime narratives suited to diverse educational and entertainment purposes, archivists and preservationists working on the motion picture were left with numerous unanswered questions about when and how each copy in the collection was made. In 2016, NARA partnered with the U.S. Marine Corps and the Smithsonian Channel/Lucky 8 to study and digitize the footage.

This chapter outlines what we know about the Genaust film’s origins, its life after creation, and how the digitization request from the Smithsonian Channel/Lucky 8 brought to light the challenge of determining provenance for the multiple versions within NARA’s collection. The Genaust footage provides an important visual record of the flag-raising events in a way that still photos cannot; however, like all historical records, it still needed to be verified and contextualized with corroborating evidence. In this case, NARA staff, the producers at the Smithsonian Channel/Lucky 8, and the Huly Panel have done much of that work. Their research took a two-pronged approach, combining scientific investigation and historical research to better understand the path the original film may have taken; its assembly at the Navy Photographic Science Laboratory (NPSL) in Anacostia, Maryland; and its repurposing for study and dissemination to troops and the general public to determine how the original was used and why it never arrived at the National Archives. Their findings have, in turn, shed new light on the provenance of the most original copy and the critical interpretation of Genaust’s motion picture, with the aim of making it a reliable source of evidence for the Huly Panel (and, subsequently, the Bowers Board) and an accessible historical document for viewers of the Smithsonian Channel’s documentary, NARA patrons, and the general public.
ten issued only a revolver, rather than rifles, as the film equipment was heavy, and filming and changing out rolls of film was the primary focus of their duties.

Sergeant William Genaust was one of many combat cameramen serving with the Marine Corps on Iwo Jima during World War II. Genaust was born on 12 October 1906 in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, where he studied dentistry, business administration, and photography and worked as a stock control clerk with the Ford Motor Company until enlisting with the Marine Corps on 11 February 1943 to be a combat cameraman. After graduating from the Marine Corps Photographic Section’s School of Cinematography at Quantico, Virginia, he was sent to Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, on 15 May 1944. Wounded by a sniper on 9 July, Genaust earned a reputation for bravery and a steady hand while filming during combat and as “The Old Man” for having enlisted at age 36. Genaust filmed the approach and landing on Iwo Jima with the 4th Marine Division on 19 February 1945 and continued filming the activities of the Marine Corps, including reconnaissance missions, recovery of wounded soldiers, disposal of dead Japanese soldiers, Marines at rest, and the flag raisings throughout the campaign (figure 11.2). Genaust was killed by Japanese small arms fire on 3 March 1945 while investigating a cave on Hill 362A on the northern end of Iwo Jima.

The film that Genaust and other combat photographers shot in the field was then sent to one of several labs. Still photography went to a lab in Guam; aerial and reconnaissance film was processed by Kodak in Waikiki, Hawaiian Territory, for the Pacific front; and motion picture film went to the United States, where the staff at the NPSL would process it. Once at the lab, the 100-foot reels—equivalent to more than two minutes of run time—were developed and loosely assembled into longer rolls of about 400 feet based on dates on the slates that cameramen filmed as part of the roll. A roll could contain footage from one or more combat cameramen, depending on what was sent from the field. The NPSL staff then reviewed the film and possibly recut it for purposes of intelligence gathering, training, and documenting historical events. This information is very important in the context of understanding the Genaust footage as the flag-raising scenes were spliced together at the NPSL out of order. The first 35 seconds are actually of the second flag raising, and the last 19 seconds are of the first flag after it had been raised (figure 11.3). The lab personnel in 1945 would have had no way...
of knowing in what order the footage occurred without the direct input of the cameraman or his superiors. Since Genaust was killed in action on Iwo Jima, he was unable to supply additional information to guide NPSL in processing his combat footage.

The military had its reasons for sending film to different labs based on proximity and operational demands. For example, aerial reconnaissance provided vital information for battle planning and enemy locations, while motion picture film tended to be used for post-battle analysis and documentation. According to Marine Corps photographic officer Major Norman T. Hatch, prior to Iwo Jima in “all the previous engagements, little or no coordinated effort, at a senior command level, ensured specific assignments would be accomplished or that duplicate photo coverage, both still and motion, would be held to a minimum. In addition, plans were laid for the quick pickup of military and press photography for delivery on a daily basis.”

Motion picture film had an added layer of complexity in that multiple iterations were often required to create a completed production, such as a training film, documentary, or feature-length presentation. A single title may be assembled from discrete elements, such as a reel of film with only the image on it and a reel of film with only the soundtrack on it, that are then combined onto another complete reel. In some cases, anywhere from 20 pieces of film to hundreds are used to make up one production. In the case of the Genaust film, given the high interest in the content during the spring of 1945, it was reprinted multiple times and for multiple purposes, including intelligence gathering, newsreels for the troops, newsreels for the public, war loan drives, and a joint Marine Corps-Hollywood studio documentary short film titled *To the Shores of Iwo Jima* (1945).

Before the film could be used, it had to be taken off the island and processed, which involved then-Warrant Officer Hatch who was in charge of the 5th Marine Division Photographic Section on Iwo Jima. Though young, Hatch had on-the-ground experience. Just two years before Iwo Jima, he had been a staff sergeant running onto the beaches of Tarawa to shoot footage that was later used to gain support for the American war effort in the Pacific. The film, *With the Marines at Tarawa* (1944), helped to bolster the U.S. war effort at a time when the balance of power was tipped toward the Japanese. By 1945, Hatch had been promoted to the rank of warrant officer, and it was his job to order Sergeant Genaust and Private Robert R. Campbell to film the Marines heading up Mount Suribachi with the second flag. Divi-ision photographic officers, such as Hatch and his staff, rotated from their duty station to deliver the raw film that had been shot each week since landing (e.g., D+7, D+14, D+21) for

FIGURE 11.3
*A still frame taken from 428 NPC 2429 shows the slate Genaust used to designate the scenes he filmed on Mount Suribachi.*
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Sgt William H. Genaust, National Archives and Records Administration
processing at the NPSL. On D+8, Hatch sent First Lieutenant Herbert B. Schlosberg, photographic officer for the 4th Marine Division, to take film, including the Genaust footage, to NPSL to be developed. As the commanding officer of the 5th Division Photographic Section, Hatch later received orders from Vice Admiral J. H. Towers, deputy commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief for operations in the Pacific theater, and General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, to take the next batch of material off of Iwo Jima. By the time of Hatch’s departure for the states on 8 March (D+18), Genaust had been dead for five days, and Hatch knew that the film Schlosberg had couriered to the United States contained the flag raising, already made famous by Rosenthal’s still photograph of the event (figure 11.4).

**FIGURE 11.4**

WO1 Norman T. Hatch (left) rests his elbows on a D-2 (intelligence) box while talking to 1stLt Herbert Schlosberg, photographic officer for the 4th Marine Division.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

**GENAUST’S FILM ON THE HOME FRONT: COPIES AND DISTRIBUTION**

Hatch flew out on 13 March, making stops at Pearl Harbor and San Francisco to receive additional temporary orders. Having been the photographic officer to order the cameramen up Mount Suribachi, he was directed to fly to Washington, DC, where he arrived on 17 March, to meet with the Commandant of the
Marine Corps. Hatch needed to vouch for the authenticity of Rosenthal’s photograph due to the debate over whether or not the photograph was staged. During this meeting, Hatch reported to his superiors that the photograph captured a candid moment, which Genaust’s motion picture footage verified. Further complicating the matter, he told a small white lie he hoped would turn out to be true: that Genaust’s footage could stand in for Rosenthal’s photograph in Marine Corps publicity materials.

Also on 17 March, Vandegrift and Hatch met with executives from the Associated Press and Time Life. The Marine Corps wanted to use the flag-raising image for recruitment and bond drives, but would have been stymied if the Associated Press charged the inflated sum of a dollar per use, which is equivalent to approximately $14 in 2019. Unlike the Rosenthal photo, combat camera film is owned by the Marine Corps as work-for-hire and so available for use by it and the U.S. government without payment or attribution. Thus, Hatch knew there were 24 images per second of motion picture film, and he gambled that one of those frames could stand in for the photograph.

The civilian and military leadership directed Genaust’s raw footage to be used in a variety of formats, including in To the Shores of Iwo Jima (figure 11.5). Short films, such as this one, were shown in theaters along with feature-length films. Since the Great Depression, Americans who were short on cash in the 1930s and 1940s could get good value for the 35 cents it cost them to enter the theater. Double features often were broken up by newsreels, cartoons, and other shorts. In an era without television, the 20-minute short brought the war to Americans in vivid Technicolor. Upon Vandegrift’s orders, Hatch headed from Washington to the Naval Photographic Studio (NPS) Depot in Holly-
wood, arriving on 27 March. While at NPS, he finally reviewed the footage that had been shot by Genaust in preparation for the documentary short, *To the Shores of Iwo Jima*. At this point, it was unclear if the footage was the camera original brought back by Schlosberg or a copy. From Hollywood, Hatch traveled back to the NPSL in Anacostia to craft the public release details of the footage before being widely shown to the public. As the primary cameraman during the Battle of Tarawa, and integral to crafting the Academy Award-winning documentary, *With the Marines at Tarawa*, Hatch understood the power of moving images to impact public opinion. On 30 April, he returned to NPS to work on the material for *To the Shores of Iwo Jima*, which was coproduced by the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Warner Brothers, and United Artists. Much like *With the Marines at Tarawa*, *To the Shores of Iwo Jima* was used to depict the true realities of warfare, as the public had only been provided with sanitized versions of battles prior to the release of *With the Marines at Tarawa*. *To the Shores of Iwo Jima* was intended to depict war with authenticity and engender more financial support from the public to end the war, as Japan was the only Axis power left fighting after Germany’s surrender on 7 May 1945.

*To the Shores of Iwo Jima* was released on 7 June 1945 and received an Academy Award nomination for best documentary short. The combat camera footage also was used in black and white newsreels, such as Universal News, for release to the public, and in United Newsreels, which were shown only to armed forces personnel. Black and white footage was included as part of the Seventh War Loan campaign. For this particular bond drive, the surviving Marines identified as flag raisers toured the country to encourage further financial contributions for the ongoing war effort. By 1945, the nation was weary. Victory in Europe had been achieved, but America was confronted with a lonely and possibly long fight in the Pacific still to endure. Military leaders were preparing for a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands that worried even the most stalwart general officers. The photographs and moving images from Iwo Jima, including Genaust’s film, documented the costs paid by the Navy and Marines in the Pacific and reminded Americans to stay committed to the war.\textsuperscript{15}

**UNDERSTANDING THE ARCHIVAL RECORD: PROVENANCE AND PRESERVATION**

The footage, indeed, served its purpose during the war, but the life of the film did not end in 1945. As a part of the information dissemination and public campaign processes in 1945, the Genaust film had been reprinted multiple times. Additional 16mm copies and 35mm blow-ups were made then and during the course of several years thereafter. Several of these copies made their way into NARA’s collection along with hundreds of thousands of other reels of film related to the war. After being contacted by the producers in charge of the Smithsonian Channel/Lucky 8 project, NARA archivists attempted to hunt down the original Genaust camera footage. They found a mix of 16mm and 35mm film located within three collections: Film of Marine Corps Activities, Un-edited Motion Picture Films, and Department of the Navy–Moving Images Related to Military Activities. The archival unit sent 12 copies of the footage to the Motion Picture Preservation Lab at NARA with a request to definitively identify the original and provide high-resolution digital scans for the Smithsonian Channel production.
As the nation’s recordkeeper, it is the responsibility of NARA to preserve and assist researchers and scholars in contextualizing the events that make up the lexicon of U.S. history. Home to the second-largest motion picture, audio, and video collection in the United States, NARA has full intellectual and physical control over 495,000 reels of film, 242,500 audio recordings, and 127,300 video recordings. The nation’s 14 Presidential Libraries, also under NARA’s purview, hold approximately 91,000 dynamic media records between them, and there are more than 200,000 items across the agency waiting to be formally accessioned into the collection. World War II content accounts for approximately one-fifth (96,000 reels) of the moving image footage at the National Archives.

One of NARA’s larger and frequently used collections is the collection of the 17,000 reels of motion picture film in the Marine Corps’s holdings. The collection is predominantly unedited and covers the full spectrum of Marine Corps activities at home and abroad. There are approximately 12,000 reels of color 16mm film spanning from World War II through the 1980s and 4,500 reels of black and white and color 35mm film of footage for World War II and the Korean War era. A smaller percentage of material is made up of edited training and documentary films, though far more training and documentary films of Marine Corps content are held within NARA’s U.S. Navy Record Groups, including 428 NPC, the record group and series that holds copies of the Genaust footage.16

The Motion Picture Preservation Lab is responsible for identifying film copies of titles for permanent retention of incoming accessions, evaluating the physical condition of the collection, and preserving the records and digital conversion for access.17 Its fundamental mission is to identify and preserve the most original copy that arrives at the archives, which can range from the camera original, to a faded scratched print shown in training rooms, or a duplicate that has been reprinted over several generations. Selection of appropriate preservation actions, including reformatting, is a collaborative process between the archival branch and the preservation lab staff. To ensure that NARA’s preservation masters and digital copies accurately reflect the period in which they were shot, the staff adheres to the goal of preserving and digitizing collections in a historically accurate manner. All the staff must, therefore, be familiar with film stock types and processes during the last century, such as nitrate film shot in the early twentieth century; Technicolor prints; and 16mm Kodachrome, as in the case of Genaust’s flag-raising footage. For films of significant interest and value, additional staff time and research is required to help contextualize film content. Much of this work is done when records are preserved or digitized for anniversaries, events, or when records of interest are brought into the collection. Some examples of these events, in addition to the Iwo Jima flag raising, have been activities related to the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963, to the death of former Marine, astronaut, and senator John Glenn in 2016, or to the discovery of the earliest known color home movie footage of Yellowstone National Park from 1930.

Upon full inspection and analysis, it became apparent that NARA lacks the original reversal film stock that was in Genaust’s camera on Iwo Jima, 23 February 1945.18 Many of the film collections at NARA are accompanied by shot list cards that include a history of how many times a film was copied. Item 127 R 3224 within the Film of Marine Corps Activities col-
lection was thought to be the original Genaust flag-raising footage segment that had been excerpted out of item 127 R 2438 (figure 11.6). However, the index card for 127 R 3224 includes a note from December 1968 stating, “We do not have any of this. We only have 35mm #4077 interneg blow-up.” The term interneg refers to an intermediate negative copied from an original or another source; in this instance, all three copies of the film in NARA’s custody with this item number were created sometime after 1958 from very poor color reproduction (figure 11.7). Moreover, the film record listed on the reverse of the index card shows that the film was copied on seven different occasions between 1968 and 1980.

In the search for the original film, item 127 G 4077 from the Unedited Motion Picture Films collection was not considered within the framework of this project as it consisted of 35mm blow-ups known to be poor reproductions from 16mm copies. The next item number to be evaluated was 127 R 2438, or the reel that the flag-raising footage had been excerpted. The index card for this item notes that a new master copy was made in May 1972 and then refers back to item 127 R 3224, stating: “For Flag Raising Scene - See Index #3224. There is no 16mm Flag Raising scene left—all missing—we have 35mm blow-up Inter-neg & inter-pos.” The term interpos refers to an intermediate negative with a positive image. All three copies of the film in NARA’s custody with this item number were created after 1971 and did not contain any of the flag-raising footage.

Finally, item 428 NPC 2924 from the Department of the Navy collection was evaluated and this reel was deemed complete, containing all of the material from 127 R 2438 as well as the flag-raising footage from 127 R 3224, but none of the six copies were the original. The oldest copy in the best condition was printed around 1951, while the other five copies were printed sometime between 1964 and 2004. The 1951 Kodachrome copy is NARA’s most original source.

In circumstances such as this, the staff at NARA makes every effort to bring the most historically significant asset it holds to the public. For this particular footage, the Kodachrome copy from 1951 was scanned in 4K resolution, which offers twice the resolution as high definition and four times as many pixels. In addition
to the U.S. Marine Corps and the Smithsonian Channel/Lucky 8 collaboration, NARA has provided elements containing material from the Genaust film for the Academy Film Archive’s forthcoming restoration of *To the Shores of Iwo Jima* as part of their preservation efforts for that film.\(^{20}\)

The life of a film, and often its contributors, particularly related to combat and especially if taken out of context, experiences a circuitous existence. Despite having more information about where the original film went, and where it may have gone, the whereabouts of Genaust’s original camera footage is still a mystery. Film is both robust and fragile; it has the capacity to outlive the memory of the images it captures, but repeated handling or copying and poor storage environments can make it unusable or unsalvageable. The original Genaust film may be lost entirely, it may still be in another repository, or it may be hidden in one of the many locations it traveled to in the course of its multiple uses. Wherever the original may be, NARA remains faithful to all the film in its custody in perpetuity.

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**ENDNOTES**

1. This one-hour television special from producer Marine LtCol Matthew W. Morgan first aired on the Smithsonian Channel on 3 July 2016. It remains popular and has been nominated for several awards. Executive Producer Tim Evans, Smithsonian Channel, email to Breanne Robertson, 22 June 2017.

2. A well-described collection will include shot lists with locations, names of subjects if known, equipment identification, and additional information about the cameraman, director, and agency. Rarely does the information include much about the film stock used, camera equipment, or printing generation history.
3. In archival film practice, the most original copy refers to the camera original or the copy that is generationally closest to the camera original. Much like photographs, motion picture film is copied from a camera original; one copy can be made at a time, or multiple copies can be made at once, then additional copies can be made from those copies. Each successive copy is referred to as a generation.

4. Most Marine divisions had approximately 15–20 combat cameramen on the muster rolls; however, the total number of cameramen, civilian and military, on Iwo Jima is poorly documented and therefore difficult to verify. At the time of the Battle of Iwo Jima, the 4th Marine Division was staffed as follows: one public relations officer, 13 combat correspondents, two combat photographers (one from the G-3 operations section), one artist/photographer, and one clerk. It is likely that the other two divisions involved in the battle were staffed the same way. Jack Paxton, executive director of the Combat Correspondents Association, email to Breanne Robertson, 7 December 2017.

5. Due to the nature of their work in the field, these were often written on whatever was available—notebooks, scraps of paper, chalked on helmets. So, for our purposes, the archival term is slates.


7. The Naval Photographic Studio (NPS) in Hollywood, CA, was specifically set up for the Eleventh Naval District as the headquarters for naval photographic activities and to distribute training films. The NPS contracted directly with Hollywood studios to produce more than 200 training and documentary films in 1944–45.

8. Hatch later recalled his order to Genaust and Campbell: “My boss, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Roll [5th Marine Division intelligence officer], came to me about 1100 and said that Major General Keller Rockey [commanding general of 5th Marine Division] had requested that a larger flag be flown that could be easily seen by all combat troops. The larger flag was considered to be a morale booster. Lieutenant Colonel Roll advised that I had better get my photographers up on the mountain to photograph the second flag raising as it would be considered the official flag raising for the island. Fortunately, Genaust and Campbell were in my command post replenishing their film supplies, so I sent them right away.” Norman T. Hatch, “Flags Over Mount Suribach,” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 2 (February 2004).


11. For a detailed discussion of this debate, see Melissa Renn’s essay in this volume. Hatch also reflected on this controversy in his 1995 Leatherneck article “Two Flags.”

12. This number was calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s CPI Inflation Calculator.

13. At that point, Hatch had no idea whether Genaust’s footage was good or not as 1stLt Schlosberg had arrived in the United States just a week before Hatch did and the film needed to be developed, assembled, and reviewed, which could take several days. See Hatch, “Two Flags,” 24–29; and Paul Farhi, “The Iwo Jima Photo and the Man Who Helped Saved It,” Washington Post, 21 February 2013.

14. The film was crafted after the battle and included footage from multiple combat cameramen. It went into production in May for release in June. The Services frequently produced a film after major battles (e.g., Tarawa, Guadalcanal, Midway, Tunisia, San Pietro, Aleutians), so it was not unusual for a photographic officer to go to Hollywood, which also was where the First Motion Picture Unit was located.

15. For a nuanced analysis of the Iwo Jima flag raising and its role in the Seventh War Loan drive, see Austin Porter’s chapter in this volume.

16. The number 428 refers to the record group from the Department of the Navy; and NPC is the series designator for Naval Photographic Center.

17. NARA treats, preserves, and digitizes more than 3,000 reels of film each year. The lab is one of less than a dozen fully operational film labs left in the United States, and NARA is committed to film-to-film preservation for as long as film stock and equipment are available. In addition to photochemical preservation, the lab digitizes approximately 800 reels per year for direct access to the public and is capable of scanning in footage at high definition (HD) or with a horizontal resolution of 2,000 (2K) or 4,000 (4K) pixels.

18. Unlike negative film, reversal film produces a positive image on a transparent base, which was the standard for the Bell & Howard camera Genaust used on Iwo Jima.

19. This item contains all of the other footage in 428 NPC 2924 except the flag-raising material. We will return to this film reel later in the chapter.

20. As part of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Science, which was founded in 1927, the Academy Film Archive now holds more than 190,000 items since it began collecting in 1991.
A simple click of the camera’s shutter preserved a moment of Marine Corps action on Iwo Jima. Associated Press cameraman Joseph Rosenthal’s flag-raising photograph captured one event during the incredible battle for this small island. Yet, circumstances made this moment different; the photograph took on a life of its own, immortalizing its subjects, both human and not. The time, place, and dire straits in which the free world found itself contributed to the popularity of the image. The United States, after several years in a cataclysmic two-front war, was desperate for something positive. The photograph embodied so much for the American people that the men in the picture, regardless of what else they had done on Iwo Jima or in other battles throughout the Pacific, were viewed as heroes not just for raising a flag but for raising the spirits of the nation.

American officials, recognizing the photograph’s popularity, seized the opportunity and sent the surviving Marines and corpsman on a war bond tour throughout the country. The men became celebrities, whether they liked it or not, and their names became a part of Marine Corps history. Thanks in large part to the photograph, the flag raising evolved into an iconic image for Marines and was used as the basis for the Marine Corps War Memorial, second only to the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor as a symbol of the United States Marine Corps.

Still viewed as heroes by many today, Sergeant Michael Strank, Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, and especially Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, the Navy corpsman, became known to generations of Marines who value the contributions of those who came before them. Countless Marines memorized the names of the Marines and sailor in Rosenthal’s photograph from their earliest days in the Corps. But what if the Marine Corps got it wrong and the men in the photograph were not the ones identified decades ago? What if a mistake, however inadvertent, had been made? And what about the other flag raisers, the ones who had hoisted a smaller flag atop Mount Suribachi earlier that day? For these reasons, in early 2016, the Commandant
of the Marine Corps directed that an impartial group investigate claims regarding mistaken or overlooked participants in the Iwo Jima flag raisings. General Robert B. Neller’s orders brought together the team, known now as the Huly Panel, which has made its best effort to correct the record obscured by the fog of war, poor memories, and other challenges to reconstructing the past.\(^2\)

**TWO FLAGS, ONE MOMENT**

American servicemembers landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945, and a short four days later, the commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, sent a patrol to secure Mount Suribachi, an extinct volcano at the southern tip of the island. Sergeant Henry O. Hansen and Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley were part of the patrol headed by First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, the executive officer of Company E. An American flag was raised that morning at approximately 1020.\(^3\) Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, a photographer for *Leatherneck*, captured the event on his Rolleiflex twin lens reflex camera. Schrier, Bradley, and others are clearly evident in these photographs (figure 12.1).\(^4\)

A few hours later, a resupply patrol, tasked with replacing the first flag with a larger one, was sent to the top of Mount Suribachi. Johnson sent the replacement flag with the runner from Company E, Private First Class Rene Gagnon, who also was carrying fresh batteries for Schrier’s SCR-300 radio. Prior to departing the battalion command post, he joined four Marines from Company E’s 2d Platoon—Sergeant Michael Strank, Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, and Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley—whom Captain Dave E. Severance had dispatched to lay communications wire on the volcano.\(^5\) Joe Rosenthal, an Associated Press photographer, along with Sergeant William H. Genaust and Private Robert R. Campbell, 5th Marine Division combat cameramen, soon followed.\(^6\)

The second flag was raised at approximately 1220 as the first flag was lowered. Genaust filmed the preparation and raising of the second flag, but there is a break of undetermined length in his footage between the time the raisers hold the flag in a horizontal position and when the flag stands almost fully upright.\(^7\) Campbell photographed the first flag as it was lowered, but did not capture the second flag as it ascended. Rosenthal photographed the second flag raising, as one of his shots would become the iconic photograph, *Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima* (1945).\(^8\)

The fighting on the island took a huge toll on the Marines, including those involved in the second flag raising. Both Block and Strank were killed in action on 1 March 1945, as was Hansen. On 12 March, Bradley was wounded and evacuated the next day. Sousley was killed on 21 March. In the end, Gagnon and Hayes were the only ones believed to be in Rosenthal’s photograph who were left alive and uninjured.

When Rosenthal’s photograph made its way to the home front, the sensation it created prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to recall the flag raisers from battle to take part in the Seventh War Loan drive.\(^9\) Gagnon returned in April 1945 and identified his fellow flag raisers as Hansen, Bradley, Strank, Sousley, and Hayes. Shortly thereafter, Bradley and Hayes were ordered to Washington, DC, to confirm Gagnon’s identification.\(^10\) During these late stages of the global conflict, leadership tasked the survivors with participating in the war bond tour to boost financial and popular support for...
the war effort. At this point, decision making centered on finishing the war rather than documenting history.

CLAIMS
During the last 70 years, various individuals have claimed, and continue to claim, that men other than those identified were the ones who actually raised the American flag atop Mount Suribachi. Many of these claims, often made by relatives, friends, and even other Marines, have quickly been disproved through examinations of historical records, command chronologies, photographs, and eyewitness accounts. The of-
ficial historians of the Marine Corps History Division have taken all of these claims seriously, but they also have had to deal with faulty recordkeeping dating back to the flag raising on 23 February 1945 and events soon after.11

Among the earliest claims that sparked an official response from the Marine Corps came from one of the surviving flag raisers who had participated in the Seventh War Loan drive. In July 1946, in response to a letter from Belle Block, mother of deceased Marine Corporal Harlon Block, Hayes admitted that Block, not Hansen, was the Marine at the base of the flagpole in Rosenthal’s photograph.12 A board convened at Headquarters Marine Corps in December 1946 to investigate the matter. With Major General Pedro A. del Valle as the president, the panel worked to determine the identities of the raisers in the famous flag-raising image (figure 12.2). The del Valle Board released its findings in January 1947. The opinion of the board was that Corporal Harlon Block, Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Bradley, Sergeant Michael Strank, Private First Class Franklin Sousley, and Private First Class Ira Hayes raised the second flag on Mount Suribachi. Then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, approved the board’s results (appendix A).

Since this official correction to the roster of flag raisers in Rosenthal’s photograph in 1947, the Marine Corps History Division has continued to field public inquiries seeking to modify further the list of servicemen atop Mount Suribachi. Editors at Leatherneck magazine also have received numerous requests to assist the claimants in proving their presence. The staff of Leatherneck has consistently adhered to a policy of following the Marine Corps’ lead and, when presented with a claim, often refers the individual to the History Division, where the historians have ready access to reference and archival sources as well as the authority to address Marine Corps history in an official capacity. While most of the claims have been debunked, a more serious claim, backed by compelling visual evidence, was made in 2014.

On 23 November 2014, the Omaha World-Herald published a story by Matthew Hansen entitled “New Mystery Arises from Iconic Iwo Jima Image.” The story detailed the efforts of two history buffs, Stephen Foley and Eric Krelle, to prove that Bradley, the corpsman awarded the Navy Cross for his actions during the Battle of Iwo Jima, was not actually present in Rosenthal’s photograph as had been believed for almost 70 years.13 They presented persuasive evidence that a mistake may have been made, and other media outlets expressed interest, including producers from Lucky 8 television pro-
duction company, who commenced plans for a documentary with the Smithsonian Channel. In 2015, the Marine Corps was notified of the new evidence, and after an initial review, decided to conduct a more thorough analysis.\textsuperscript{14}

THE HULY PANEL AND THE SECOND FLAG RAISING

At the direction of the Commandant, a panel convened to “accurately identify and appropriately credit” the flag raisers seen in the Rosenthal photograph.\textsuperscript{15} On 22 April 2016, the panel, consisting of both active duty and retired Marines and civilian historians, assembled at the Alfred M. Gray Research Center on Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, to review the newly discovered evidence alongside extant photographs, eyewitness statements, and motion picture film (figure 12.3). Board members initially focused on just the second flag raising, but in the process of answering certain questions, uncovered issues related to the first flag raising that required further scrutiny.
Panel Participants
Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly (Ret), a former deputy commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, served as president of the panel. Other members included then-Brigadier General (select) Jason Q. Bohm, director of Marine Corps University’s Expeditionary Warfare School; Colonel Keil R. Gentry, director of the Marine Corps War College; and Sergeant Major Justin D. LeHew, Training and Education Command’s senior enlisted advisor. The sergeant major for the Marine Corps University, Sergeant Major David L. Maddux, and Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, director of History Division, also were members. Retired Marines Sergeant Major Richard A. Hawkins, mentor/instructor of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Instructional Group, and the author of this chapter also served as panel members with Dr. Randy Papadopoulos, secretariat historian for the Department of the Navy. The History Division offered administrative and research support throughout both reviews. Dr. Breanne Robertson provided the bulk of this effort.

Panel Protocols
Lieutenant General Huly ran the panel in a manner similar to Marine Corps selection boards, including a precept signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to start the panel’s work and the swearing in of its members. Everyone took the following oath:

Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will perform your duties as a member of this board without prejudice or partiality, that you will not disclose the proceedings or recommendations except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps or higher authority, so help you God?

Thus, the mission of the panel was taken seriously and solemnly, but participants also had the secure space necessary to allow for an earnest and robust debate.

The mission of the panel as stated in the precept was to review newly discovered photographic evidence, initiated by Foley and Krelle and provided to the Marine Corps by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Morgan (Ret), producer of the Smithsonian Channel documentary, and the proposed corrections related to the participants in the second flag raising. The panel was further directed to review all available evidence before making a recommendation to the Commandant in the form of a written report. Therefore, the Huly Panel members had a specific task couched in institutional protocols appropriate to the Marine Corps as a Service branch, including treating all of the Marines who fought on Iwo Jima, regardless of their connection to the flag raising (see appendix B).

The Marine Corps History Division took the lead in preparing resources for consideration. Compiling previous reports, documents, personal correspondence, unit rosters, books, articles, and, most important, photographs, the staff provided each panel member with binders of information. Initial references included then-current official history and commemorative publications, book-length studies, and selected articles. Primary source documents from the del Valle Board, including a memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Hagenah, the executive officer of the Division of Public Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, who shepherded the servicemembers initially identified as flag raisers upon their return to the United States, also were reviewed. Other documents in the initial assessment included forensic analyses of digitally enhanced images and correspondence drawn from pre-
Several panel members contributed additional reference material, including authoritative books and articles on the battle and relevant archival photographs, such as those published in *Leatherneck* (figure 12.4). Motion picture footage from Sergeant William H. Genaust’s film also was available for review. In other words, the assembled members had historical sources as well as secondary analyses provided by historians, enthusiasts, and scientists to use during the investigation.

With orders in hand, staff in place, and resources ready, the panel commenced with its duties. As president of the panel, Lieutenant General Huly ensured that all members were given the freedom to talk openly throughout the proceedings. While some individuals were more verbose than others, all consistently had the opportunity to provide negative or positive input and to ask questions. At specific points, Huly would canvass the panel to confirm that all agreed with a conclusion and, if not, to work toward a consensus. Although he recognized that 100-percent certainty on all questions might not be possible, the general did an admirable job ensuring that each of us felt comfortable with the decisions made. By frequently polling for opinions, Huly guaranteed that any doubts that could be addressed were discussed and adjudicated, as needed.

As might be expected, significant discussion ensued during every session. Although the read-ahead materials helped streamline the panel’s efforts, remaining gaps in the historical record required substantial research and deliberation. Debate often resulted in the need to review additional material, including unit rosters, casualty cards, and other official documents, and the staff of the History Division was on call to provide whatever was needed from their archives.

**Sense of Responsibility**

Each panel member had a clear understanding and appreciation for the responsibility with which he or she had been tasked. Marines generally have an interest in military history, but they also maintain a special appreciation for Marine Corps heritage and recognize both the accomplishments and sacrifices during the Battle of Iwo Jima. Comprised entirely of Marines, save Dr. Papadopoulos, the panel understood the significance of the flag raising from their earliest days in the Corps. Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising was the inspiration for the Marine Corps War Memorial, sculpted by Felix de Weldon, which figures...
prominently in the lives of Marines past and present. It serves as the location of Marine Corps Sunset Parades, the finish line of the annual Marine Corps Marathon, and the site of countless ceremonies (Figure 12.5). Some Marines choose this place to imbue the most important moments in their lives—promotions, retirements, and appointments—with the memory of past Marines. Because de Weldon’s monument to the Corps has become one of its most identifiable symbols, the need to ensure the accurate identification of those who raised the flag was understandable. The necessity to “get it right” was mentioned several times throughout deliberations and none on the panel shied away from that responsibility.

Although it did not influence the board’s final recommendations or sway decisions throughout the board’s deliberations, the hope that Bradley could be confirmed as a flag raiser was evident from the beginning as the board’s initial discussions centered around the corpsman. Each panel member was cognizant of the ramifications of removing him from the heralded ranks of the flag raisers and the impact it would have on the Corps and his family. No Hollywood producer could have scripted the scene any better than having five Marines and a corpsman raise the flag. Given every Marine’s deep affection, respect, and appreciation for their corpsmen, and knowing full well their long and illustrious record of taking care of Marines, often at the risk of their own lives, it seemed especially appropriate that a corpsman was there yet again with his Marines at one of the Corps’ most significant moments.

Since most of the new assertions as to the identity of the flag raisers centered around Bradley, the Huly Panel spent a large amount of time focused on his presence or absence from both flag raisings. Even when it became abundantly clear that Bradley could not have been the man in position three during the second flag raising, panel members worked hard to determine if there was even the remotest possibility that Bradley could have been in any of the other positions. At one point during discussions, a panel member remarked that “he’s just not there. And we have to stop trying to ‘force’ him there.” The Huly Panel adhered diligently to the facts when finalizing its report, but later, when the members reconvened to consider the
first flag raising, they experienced a palpable sense of relief as it became evident that Bradley was, in fact, involved in the first flag raising.

While no one doubted the importance of the panel’s actions, some initial discussion lingered on the potential impact the results might have when announced. One member remarked that he did not expect the report to garner much attention. Several other members disagreed vehemently and related anecdotes about public interest. Any changes made to accounts of battles or operations would draw interest; a change, regardless of how seemingly minor, to not only one of the key battles but also one of the most important symbols of the Corps would draw significant attention. And that view proved to be correct.23

**Challenges**

Historical events cannot be reconstructed; memories fade, sources are lost, and other obstacles occur that make finding the truth of history elusive. The Huly Panel members faced many of the same challenges as full-time historians. In this case, the investigators were frustrated because there seemed to be so much evidence of who was present at both flag raisings, but there also remained gaps in the documentation that had to be explained, annotated, or verified using other sources.

**The Genaust Film**

One of the most challenging yet fascinating panel sessions came with the review of the Genaust film. The motion picture shot by Sergeant Genaust, a combat cameraman who filmed the only footage of the second flag raising, was both informative and exasperating. The portion of the film devoted to the actual flag raising was reviewed multiple times, with each frame given close scrutiny. The film was usable but not of the sharpest quality.24 For the panel members accustomed to the technology of the digital age, it was frustrating to view the film without the ability to zoom in on particular features.

Viewing the Genaust film was especially challenging due to one significant problem: the film provides neither continuous action nor chronologically arranged scenes. Numerous breaks of undetermined length can be seen in the film. The most important break comes between the raisers grasping the pole horizontally and the actual raising of the flag. This disruption in the film’s time sequence raises many questions: How long was the break? What did the raisers do during that time? Could Marines have joined or left the group during the break? Could Marines have swapped positions? Was there time to put on or take off clothing or equipment? The break created uncertainty in the minds of the panel members, and the film’s secrets could be neither reconciled nor ignored.25

An especially interesting element of the film was noticed by one sharp-eyed board member. While slowing the speed of the film and attempting to track the movements of the men using their gear, stance, and physical characteristics as individual markers, it became apparent that one of the raisers looked like he wore a helmet in one frame but, in the next, he seemed to be wearing a soft cover (figure 12.6). Was this a trick of light or was it another break in the film where a new Marine took the place of the previous one? Ultimately, this uncertainty could not be completely resolved, but the panel decided with a reasonable degree of certainty that the same Marines who picked up the flagpole initially also lifted the banner to its zenith without changing positions or being relieved by anyone else.
Photographic evidence was given greater weight than just about every other piece of evidence, including eyewitness accounts. Many police officers can attest to how notoriously unreliable eyewitnesses are, and the panelists saw examples of this in several instances. The testimonies by witnesses were especially unreliable when accounts were given years or decades after the battle. Panel members quickly learned to ask about the context of these accounts, especially the dates of their recording. Time and again, the panel determined that witnesses who became “experts” on the flag raising in later years, and whose testimony was used to support the original identifications, were not actually present on Mount Suribachi during the flag raisings. While they may have been on Iwo Jima, their descriptions of the flag raising often were based on secondhand accounts, assumptions, and hearsay. This additional information made a difference as much of their testimony directly conflicted with other evidence.

Interestingly enough, some of the worst confusion resulted from conflicting accounts from the flag raisers themselves. Both Hayes and Bradley confirmed Gagnon’s initial identification of the original men who raised the second flag in spring 1945, and both changed their minds in December 1946 after Hayes wrote to Block’s mother. Bradley also later contradicted himself as to where he was during both flag raisings. In a letter written a few days after the event, Bradley told his parents that he was involved in the flag raising, although he was not specific as to which one. In a subsequent interview, he denied being involved in the first flag raising even though photographic evidence proves his participation. In the end, it became clear that historical memory is not static, but rather an interplay of what was remembered, forgotten, and constructed over time to serve the purpose of the person recounting events. Hindsight, perspective, and self-interest can combine to build what seems to be a vivid memory that can, at times, be corroborated or rejected as fact. At other times, stories take on lives of their own.

**THE RESULTS OF THE HULY PANEL**

After reviewing evidence and debating the merits of each perspective on it, the panel had to produce a report summarizing their findings for the Commandant. Panel members grew more deliberate in their choice of words as they finalized their report. Could someone be definitively identified as a raiser if the evidence shows him before the flag was raised and later with his hands on the pole when it was vertical even if there was no photographic evidence showing him actually raising the flag? How much certainty is required to declare someone a “true” flag raiser? Must the standard be 100 percent—
even if it is unachievable in most cases—or is the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard enough?

In making their recommendations, the panel members accepted the futility of achieving 100-percent certainty about the identity of the flag raisers except for Private First Class Ira Hayes. All agreed that the preponderance of evidence proved unequivocally that he is shown raising the American flag in Rosenthal’s photograph. The group was satisfied with “beyond a reasonable doubt” certainty when the board compiled the results of their work. In addition to Hayes, the Huly Panel affirmed the prior identifications of Sergeant Michael Strank and Private First Class Rene Gagnon. Private First Class Franklin Sousley also was confirmed as a flag raiser, but his attribution in the photograph shifted from the Marine in position five to the one in position three. Finally, the Huly Panel determined that Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley was not present in the second flag raising. Due to the distinctive rifle sling attachment, broken helmet liner strap, and bulging pocket of the individual in the images, the Huly Panel members recommended that the Commandant of the Marine Corps accept the proposed designation of Private First Class Harold Schultz as the Marine in position five (see sidebar of findings).

**AFTER THE FIRST PANEL**

The panel concluded at 1600 on 27 April 2016, and General Huly briefed the results of the board and its recommendations to General Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps, on 4 May 2016. Representatives of Headquarters Marine Corps notified the families of the raisers and others with a significant involvement in the flag raisings of the results.

The Office of U.S. Marine Corps Communications offered information distribution guidance to public affairs offices throughout the Corps on two significant points of emphasis: first, that previous identification efforts had been done in good faith based on the information and resources available at the time, though proving inaccurate; and second, Bradley and all of the men involved at Iwo Jima were heroes, and their participation in the flag raising, or lack therein, does not define their service. The Rosenthal photograph stands as an important symbol of the bravery and sacrifice of more than 70,000 servicemembers who participated in that battle.

After the press releases went out, journalists interviewed panel members, including Dr. Neimeyer and myself. The article I wrote covering the results of the panel, published in the August 2016 issue of *Marine Corps Gazette*, likewise elicited a large volume of letters and emails from readers who had strong feelings on the flag raising and the efforts of the panel. The Huly Panel members’ belief that the raisers were still of great interest to the American people proved to be true.

**THE HULY PANEL RECONVENES**

After confirming the identity of the Marines who raised the second flag on Mount Suribachi, General Neller ordered a similar review of the first flag raising to confirm the identity of those involved, since it was clear there had been some prior misidentifications. The Commandant stated the bottom line clearly: “Our history is important, and we owe it to our Marines and their families to ensure it is as accurate as possible.”

Before the panel reconvened on 5 July 2016, the official Marine Corps record listed First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, Platoon
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Position 1.
Corporal Harlon H. Block
No new evidence or recent allegations contradicted Block being the man in position 1. A comparison of photos taken by Joseph Rosenthal throughout the actual flag raising with the film shot by Sergeant William H. Genaust shows the person in position 1 with equipment and a facial profile consistent with Block. Coupled with Private First Class Ira H. Hayes’ identification of Block as a flag raiser in 1946 and confirmation by the del Valle board, no evidence suggests that Block is not the Marine in position 1.

Position 2.
Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon
Similar to Block’s identification, no new evidence called into question Gagnon’s identification as of 2016. Upon his return to the states in 1945, Gagnon identified himself as the Marine in position 2; this identification was later corroborated by both Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley and Hayes. Although his face is obscured throughout most of the film and photographs, a brief glimpse appears to be Gagnon, and the gear he wore in other clearly identifiable photos is consistent with the gear worn by the Marine in position 2. As did the del Valle board, the Huly Panel concluded that Gagnon helped to raise the second flag.

Position 3.
Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Bradley to Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley
In addition to Gagnon’s initial identification of Bradley as the individual in position 3, Bradley confirmed this according to a memorandum to the director of the Division of Public Information, Headquarters Marine Corps on 24 September 1946 from Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Hagenah for the del Valle Board. In his own letter to General del Valle on 26 December 1946, Bradley stated, “I was on top of the hill already and when the flag was raised I just jumped up and gave the group a hand.” In a letter to the same board on 16 December 1946, Captain Dave Severance also agreed that, to the best of his knowledge, Bradley was one of the flag raisers. The photographic evidence, however, does not support this (see appendix B). If Bradley is not in position 3, then who is? Surprisingly, determining the individual in position 3 was relatively easy after closely analyzing photographs for specific equipment and gear. Private First Class Sousley, originally identified as the Marine in position 5, is seen in photographs atop Suribachi wearing an empty canteen cover, a cartridge belt without suspenders, wire cutters, and a soft cover under his helmet. He is not seen wearing a field jacket, and his trousers are not cuffed; his gear is identical to that worn by the individual in position 3. In addition, there is a moment in the Genaust film and in a Rosenthal photograph where the face of the individual is briefly seen. The individual looks like Sousley. In the Huly Panel’s opinion, Sousley was in position 3, not position 5, in Rosenthal’s image.
Position 4.
Sergeant Michael Strank

As was the case with Block and Gagnon, no new evidence was discovered to call into question Strank’s participation in the second flag raising. Although the del Valle Board determined that the Marine in position 4 was Sergeant Strank, the Huly Panel worked to confirm this since position 4 was the most obscured in both the photograph and the film. But it was both the film and the Rosenthal photographs that once again helped to confirm what was already known. The Huly Panel, after thorough review, ruled out the possibility that the obscured individual in position 4 could have been Bradley. The individual in position 4 is not wearing medical unit 3s or any other gear that Bradley was. Before the break in the Genaust film, it appears the Marine in position 4 was wearing a soft cover. The clarity of the film is not such that it is absolute, but one thing is certain based on other photographic evidence—Bradley only wore a helmet. Strank, however, is seen in several photographs wearing a soft cover beneath his helmet.

In addition, in the Genaust film, the ring finger on the left hand of the individual in position 4 is clear; the finger is bare. Photographs clearly identifiable as Strank show that he was not wearing a ring on that finger. Bradley’s left hand, however, clearly shows a ring on his ring finger in images.

Position 5.
Private First Class Franklin Sousley to Private First Class Harold H. Schultz

If Sousley is in position 3, who is in position 5? The equipment, or lack thereof, indicates that it cannot be Bradley. Again, Genaust’s film and the photographs taken by Lowery, Campbell, and Rosenthal were thoroughly reviewed and two key pieces of evidence helped to greatly simplify the identity: a broken helmet liner strap and the right front pocket. Only one Marine that fateful day on Mount Suribachi had a broken helmet liner strap hanging from the left side of his helmet—Private First Class Harold Schultz, another member of Company E. And, just as significantly, the individual in position 5 had a distinctive rifle. The sling of that Marine’s rifle was attached to the stacking swivel, not to the upper hand guard sling swivel as was appropriate. Again, photographs and motion picture showed that the only Marine with his sling attached in that manner was Schultz. Further analysis showed that both Schultz and the Marine in position 5 had a bulge in the right front pocket of his field jacket. However, and very puzzling, no previous identification or claim that Schultz was a flag raiser had been found as of spring 2016.

Position 6.
Private First Class Ira Hayes

Hayes was the easiest of all to identify. In addition to Gagnon and Bradley identifying Hayes during the spring of 1945, Hayes admitted that he was a flag raiser and the photographic evidence strongly supports these claims.
Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr., Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, Corporal Charles W. Lindberg, Private First Class Louis C. Charlo, and Private First Class James R. Michels as the Marines who raised the first flag. As with the second flag raising, the identity of the first flag raisers also had been called into question over the years; Leatherneck even ran a feature article in its October 2006 issue in which filmmaker and amateur historian Dustin Spence asserted that Charlo was not a member of this specific patrol, but that Private Philip L. Ward was. Thus, the panel members began investigating the lesser known, but tactically more important, initial flag raising on 23 February 1945. The members of the panel remained the same with one exception; Sergeant Major Gary Smith, sergeant major of Marine Corps Systems Command replaced Sergeant Major Justin LeHew, who was no longer able to participate.

The conduct of the panel mirrored their first session in many ways as the panel again reviewed photographs, historical documents, and eyewitness statements. Benefiting greatly from lessons learned the first time around, the members also were more knowledgeable about the events of 23 February 1945 on Iwo Jima that allowed the review of the first flag raising to proceed in a quicker, more efficient manner. Additional sources were needed, but the panelists had the basic information in hand.

**Raising the First Flag**

Early in the morning of 23 February 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, the commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, ordered that a route reconnaissance be conducted up Mount Suribachi to determine the presence of enemy forces. Marines from Company F were chosen for the task, and Sergeant Sherman B. Watson, Private First Class George Mercer, Private First Class Theodore White, and Private First Class Louis Charlo set out. They reported the absence of enemy forces, so Lieutenant Colonel Johnson ordered the executive officer of Company E, Lieutenant Harold Schrier, to lead a patrol to secure the top of Mount Suribachi and raise the American flag. First Lieutenant G. Greeley Wells, the battalion adjutant, provided the flag.

Marines from 3d Platoon, Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, made up the majority of Schrier’s patrol, but other 2d Battalion Marines also participated. Staff Sergeant Louis Lowery, a Leatherneck photographer assigned to the 5th Marine Division, accompanied the patrol. His photographs of the flag raising would later provide critical evidence as to the identity of the raisers and others present on Mount Suribachi. As Schrier’s patrol made its way up the mountain, they passed the initial reconnaissance team returning to the beach. Upon reaching the summit, Marines from Schrier’s patrol dispersed to provide security while others scouted the area for an appropriate place to hoist the flag. Two Marines—Corporal Robert A. Leader and Private First Class Leo J. Rozek—found a piece of pipe that served as the flagstaff. Schrier and four other Marines—Thomas, Hansen, Lindberg, and Ward—worked to attach the flag to the makeshift pole while Lowery photographed their efforts (figure 12.7).

After firmly securing the flag to the pipe, the Marines selected a high-visibility location and carried the flag to the designated site. Photographic evidence shows the same five Marines either touching the flagpole or within its reach at this time, though one more person appeared with them—Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Bradley (figures 12.8 and 12.9). The flag was raised at approximately 1020; however,
Correcting the Official Record

Originally, the official Headquarters Marine Corps’ records included Charlo and Michels as flag raisers. While both were present on Mount Suribachi, no evidence exists to indicate that they raised the flag. Charlo was a member of the initial reconnaissance team who left the summit before anyone else arrived, and while he later returned between the flag raisings and provided security, he was not present for the first event. Similarly, Michels also provided security, and despite his proximity to the flag in one of Lowery’s photographs, no evidence exists that shows him touching the flag at any time during the raising.

The second Huly Panel concluded at 1600 on 8 July 2016, and the Commandant agreed with its members’ recommendation to change the official Marine Corps historical record. It now reflects that the following Marines and sailor raised the first flag on Iwo Jima on 23 February 1945: First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr., Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, Corporal Charles W. Lindberg, and Private Philip L. Ward. It is somehow fitting that Hansen and Bradley, whose names were removed as second flag raisers, helped raise the first banner that those fighting on Iwo Jima considered the more important of the two.

While the Huly Panel strove for factual accuracy, further forensic analysis of the images should be conducted to confirm its results. Given today’s advanced technology, such analysis is entirely possible. Neller recommended that such analysis be conducted with the hope that the flag raisers’ identities may one day be confirmed with as much certainty as possible.36

QUESTIONS REMAIN

Seventy years later and with very few veterans alive who served on Iwo Jima, some questions may never be completely answered. The Huly Panel devoted significant time to address such puzzling questions as the break in Genaust’s footage. And yet, questions remain:

- Why were the flag raisers not identified clearly from the beginning?
- Why did Hayes, Gagnon, and Bradley collectively identify Bradley as the individual in position three?
- Why did neither Hayes nor Bradley
correct the record when the Hansen-Block mistake came to light in 1946?

• Why did it take well into the twenty-first century for someone to conduct forensic analysis of the photographs?

• Why did no one notice the absence of a corpsman’s gear on anyone depicted in the photograph or the memorial?

• And perhaps most puzzling, why did neither Schultz nor Bradley correct the record?

While no one may ever truly know why a mistake of this magnitude was made, the panel developed some plausible explanations. The flag itself, understandably so, was the focus of Rosenthal’s photograph not the individual Marines. And therein lies the beauty of the image; it symbolized the United States and its triumph over fascism, the continued march to victory, and the impending defeat of a determined and brutal foe that resonated not only with Marines at Iwo Jima and other servicemen in theater but also with civilians at home. The men were the instruments who raised the flag and the fact that they could not be individually identified strictly by the photograph itself added to the heft and symbolism. It was not their identities but rather whom they represented—the thousands of Marines and their corpsmen fighting their way through the Pacific—that gave the
photograph, and later the monument, such meaning and historical significance.

In addition, to everyone present on Mount Suribachi that day, the second flag raising was not necessarily memorable. When the first flag rose over the island, shouts and celebrations were heard from the Marines on the beach as ships in the surrounding waters sounded their horns. Little attention was paid to the second flag as it went up; it was a replacement, not a significant event compared to the morale-boosting first flag. Even Schrier, the patrol leader, was not looking: “At the time the picture was taken, I was busy taking down the original flag, and can not definitely identify any member.”

A third significant factor adding to the confusion surrounding the identities of the flag raisers is that the battle for the island of Iwo Jima still raged for weeks after the original event. The flag was not raised on the last day of the 36-day battle. It went up on day five, and there was still much fighting to be done.

And the fight was a costly one; by the time Iwo Jima was secured, 6,140 Marines had been killed in action and another 17,913 were wounded. The dead included four of the Marines identified as flag raisers: Strank, Sousley, Block, and Hansen. Bradley was among the seriously wounded, leaving only Gagnon and Hayes to emerge from their time on Iwo Jima physically unscathed. The casualties among the flag raisers must be considered another possible reason for the misidentification.

There may have been another reason, however, that creates a disturbing picture of what happened when the surviving flag raisers returned to Washington, DC. From the letter Hayes wrote to Belle Block in 1946, we find hints to wartime exigencies that are harder to grasp in the peace that followed:

\[ I \text{ tried my darnedest to stay overseas but couldn’t, all because they had a man in there that really wasn’t, and beside [sic] that had Sousley and myself switched around. And when I did arrive in Washington D.C. I tried to set things right but some colonel told me to not say another word as two men were dead, meaning Harlan [sic] and Hansen. And besides the public knew who was who in the picture at the time I didn’t want no last minute commotion.38 } \]

After the initial identification was made, right or wrong, were the remaining three under pressure not to make waves?

Members of the Huly Panel engaged in much speculation, especially on the motives of both Bradley and Schultz. Several plausible rationales for the silence of both men in the years after they left Iwo Jima were developed that helped provide at least a few possible answers.

There is no record of any claims made by Schultz indicating he was a flag raiser (figure 12.10). From what little is known about him, Schultz was a solitary man both in the Corps and in civilian life. He did not marry until he was in his 60s and never mentioned the flag raising to anyone in his new family.39 After he died, his stepdaughter found a copy of Rosenthal’s Gung Ho photograph in his desk drawer (see figure 0.5). He had written his name and the names of other Marines on the back. He made no mention of the flag raising. In today’s fame-at-all-costs culture, Schultz is especially hard to understand. But given his personality and the times, his actions (or lack thereof) may be easier to comprehend. A low key, deliberate man, Schultz may have thought he had simply done what was expected of him and recognized the event for what it was: putting a flag up, not some courageous action. In a war in which
so many acts of courage, bravery, and self-sacrifice were common, he may have believed that his participation in raising the flag that day was not worthy of adulation or recognition, let alone fame.

There are good reasons for the assumptions made by the board, drawing from other sources. In the case of Schultz, he may have been on the other side of the event from Marines but heard their gripes as many others did. During the passing years, the Marines who raised the first flag on Iwo Jima felt resentment and jealousy about the subsequent fame that the Marines of the second flag raising experienced. While countless Americans know of the second flag raising, most assume that it was the only one. Some of the first flag raisers felt ignored, one stating that “we did the dirty work and they got the credit.” Another plausible reason might be that Schultz did not appreciate the fame in the immediate aftermath of the battle, and when he finally did, proving his presence would be too problematic given the distance, time passed, and death of so many others who were there. He also may have wanted no further reminder of that day, that battle, or that war nor did he want to constantly relive it either on a war bond tour or during interviews or whenever he met other Marines. His refusal to acknowledge his participation could have been a coping mechanism. Or it could be that he was not interested in the fame.

But what about Bradley? He had to know at some point that a mistake had been made. Why did he not say something, especially after the del Valle Board reported the first mistaken flag raisers. He confirmed Hayes’s assertion that it was Block vice Hansen in Rosenthal’s famous photograph; so, why did he not take the same opportunity to admit that he was not in the second flag raising either? While no one can know for sure, two important points must be considered in any speculation about what Bradley did or what his possible motivations were. First and foremost, Bradley was a true hero and his heroism had nothing to do with the flag raising. On 21 February 1945, D+2, he saved a wounded Marine at great personal risk to himself (see appendix G).

In addition, Bradley was later wounded in action and left the island on 12 March after being hit with shrapnel in both legs. It is entirely plausible, given his wounded status, that he was

FIGURE 12.10
The Huly Panel determined that PFC Harold H. Schultz, a previously unidentified Marine, is present in Rosenthal’s iconic image of the second flag raising. Schultz joined the Marine Corps Reserve on 23 December 1943. When his company was activated in 1944, Schultz began training at Camp Pendleton, CA, and Camp Tarawa, HI, in preparation for the invasion of Iwo Jima. He was wounded in action during the Battle of Iwo Jima and later honorably discharged with the rank of corporal in October 1945.
Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Smithsonian Channel
initially confused about which flag raising he partook. Or maybe he, like Hayes, was “pressured” by public information officers before the war bond tour to simply go along with the program; after all, he did raise a flag on Iwo Jima. He may have thought that the mistake was not that noteworthy, and he would simply participate in the war bond tour and that would be the end of it. He had no way of knowing in the summer of 1945 that the flag raising would become such a significant part of Marine Corps history. Bradley’s actions after the war support all of these possibilities. According to his son, James Bradley, his father refused all interviews and instructed his family to tell reporters when they called that he was fishing. He had no desire to discuss the flag raising or even the battle. Was this out of a sense of guilt or shame? Or was it a desire to downplay what may have started as a misunderstanding but spun out of control? One can only speculate as to Bradley’s motivations, but given the manner in which he led his life both before and after 23 February 1945, he deserves the benefit of the doubt.

THE “GOODNESS” IN THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATIONS

One panel member made an astute observation about the benefit of the previous misidentification of the flag raisers. Bradley’s son wrote Flags of our Fathers in tribute to his father and those who served on Iwo Jima. The odds are very good that he would not have written the book if his father had not been identified as one of the flag raisers. James Bradley’s book became a best seller and was later made into a movie directed by Clint Eastwood. A companion movie, Letters from Iwo Jima, showing the Japanese side of the battle, also was produced by Eastwood in 2006. Millions of people around the world saw these movies and learned of the heroism, sacrifice, and courage of those who fought in one of World War II’s most costly battles. Many, especially those born decades after World War II, would not have known about the battle, the island-hopping campaign, or the incredible sacrifices, valor, and devotion of the Marines and sailors fighting in the Pacific in the 1940s had the book not been written. Bradley’s mistaken identification helped ensure the Marines he worked so hard to save were not forgotten, but rather were celebrated by future generations of Americans.

The irony of the need to identify those who raised a flag made famous by a photograph in which identities were obscured was not lost on the panel members. Several sidebar discussions ensued about the importance of what the flag raisers symbolized vice who actually participated in the event. While by no means being disrespectful to the Marines on Mount Suribachi that fateful day, many of the panel members recognized that the subsequent fame the raisers experienced was primarily for their presence in the photograph not their participation in the actual flag raising or, ironically, their actions during the battle. Had Rosenthal not taken the picture, the identity of the men in the photograph would, in all likelihood, have become the stuff of sea stories and memories shared years later. The subsequent attention that the image received created the need for the identification.

Like so many Marines throughout the Corps’ history, those who raised both flags were in fact working parties. They had no idea they would play such a significant role in Marine Corps history that their names would be forever remembered or that they would be memorialized on a statue at Arlington Ridge (figure 12.11). They were simply doing what they were told, affixing a flag to a pipe and
readying themselves to return to the battle in which their brothers-in-arms were still deeply engaged. While they must have experienced their own joy at seeing the Stars and Stripes fly over what had already been an incredibly costly and vicious battlefield, they were probably only thinking about the morale boost their action would bring to the Marines in the thick of the fight. They had no way of knowing the impact of their actions. In all likelihood, at the time of the flag raising, they considered the event a minor highlight with no inkling about what was to come. Their immediate concerns were winning the fight and surviving the war; half of the raisers did not achieve their goal.

Ironically, the significance of Rosenthal’s photograph and the Marine Corps War Memorial that it inspired remains not who raised the flag but rather whom and what they represented. While our desire to correct the historical record is both understandable and necessary, there also were secondary benefits. In an email responding to an article on the Huly Panel’s findings in the October 2016 issue of Leatherneck, Nancy Jacobs, the daughter of Raymond Jacobs, wrote:
Thank you for the article clarifying the identities of the men in the First Flag Raising. My father, Raymond Jacobs, never claimed to be a flag raiser; he only claimed to be the radioman in the photos during the flag raising. It took a long time for people to believe him and he would be very happy with the results of the investigation.42

Her email is a poignant reminder of the true spirit of the flag raisers and the others who fought on Iwo Jima; they were not looking for fame or attention. They were simply serving their Corps and their country, and that moment on top of Mount Suribachi will still hold a special place in the hearts of Marines regardless of who raised the flags.

ENDNOTES


2. See appendices B and C (Precepts and Huly Panel Reports). During the second meeting of the Huly Panel, the members made a conscious decision to refer to itself as an investigative panel, since the term board carries legal implications due to its military usage in promotion boards and Judge Advocate General's (JAG) investigations.

3. Most sources list the time of the first flag raising as having occurred sometime between 1020 and 1037. This was a point of discussion during the Huly Panel's second iteration, but the members were unable to come to a satisfactory conclusion. Consequently, the first Huly Panel report gives 1020 as the approximate time of the event; the second report records the event at 1030. Both are estimates based on a review of historical records, eyewitness testimony, and secondary literature. In 2019, the Bowers Board determined that the after action report of Combat Team 28 was the most official document to record the time of the first flag raising and hence, concluded that the event occurred at approximately 1020.

4. See R. R. Keene, "Louis Lowery Captured Leathernecker History on Film," Leatherneck, October 2006, 32–33; and Dustin Spence, "Unraveling the Mysteries of the

First Flag Raising," Leatherneck, October 2006, 34–43.


6. Genaust and Campbell received orders to photograph the replacement flag raising from WO1 Norman T. Hatch, photographic officer of the 5th Marine Division. The photographers did not accompany the resupply patrol as stated in the Huly Panel report, but rather scaled the mountain on their own shortly thereafter. Historians Karal Ann Marling and John Wetenhall incorrectly place William Hipple, Newsweek correspondent, on the summit; however, as Parker Bishop Albee and Keller Cushing Freeman have noted, Hipple departed Rosenthal's company at the base of Suribachi to pursue another lead. See Parker Bishop Albee Jr. and Keller Cushing Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi: Raising the Flags on Iwo Jima (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 146.

7. Witness accounts and secondary literature are inconsistent in their estimates of what time the replacement flag was raised. Whereas Capt Dave Severance, commander of Company E, posits that the larger flag went up around noon, other sources contend that the event occurred as late as 1400 that afternoon. The challenge of pinning down an exact time arises from the fact that there are no official entries recording the event in the battlefield journals of the 2d Battalion, 28th Regiment, or 5th Marine Division. Members of the Huly Panel agreed on 1220 as the probable time of the second flag raising based on their review of available primary and secondary sources.

8. In addition to Rosenthal, other still photographers present at the second flag raising included Marines Sgt Louis R. Burmeister and SSgt Meyers A. Cornelius and Army PFC George Burns.

9. Roosevelt's decision to bring home the Marines and corpsman in the photograph and assign them to a public relations detail came at the suggestion of Louis Ruppel, executive editor of the Chicago Herald-American. See Albee and Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi, 98–99.


11. There are several branches within the History Division, and this hierarchy allows the staff to focus on various functions. As part of its regular duties, the Reference Branch provides historical research and reference services for Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps units, other military organizations and government agencies, and the general public. It receives numerous inquiries related to the Iwo Jima flag raising and provides the most current official information. Marine Corps History Division is unable to instigate full investigations such as the one undertaken by the Huly Panel.

12. Ira Hayes letter to Belle Block, 12 July 1946, enclosure, del Valle Report, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA, hereafter Hayes letter to Block.

14. The Marine Corps History Division received reports detailing the forensic image analysis undertaken by two independent firms, Combs Forensic Services and Forensic Video Consulting, in fall 2015 and winter 2016, respectively. For more on the History Division’s response to public queries related to the Iwo Jima flag raisings, see Breanne Robertson’s essay in this volume.


16. Neimeyer served as recorder for the board as well. Ranks and titles are listed as of time of service on the panel.

17. The read-ahead materials prepared for Huly Panel members included the History Division’s official history monograph by Bernard C. Nalty and Danny J. Crawford, *The United States Marines on Iwo Jima: The Battle and the Flag Raisings* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1995); reports on forensic image enhancement and comparison by Michael Plaxton of Forensic Video Consulting and Allen R. Combs of Combs Forensic Services; articles and chapter excerpts from secondary publications; and eyewitness testimony from Iwo Jima veterans. These materials were supplemented with primary source documentation, such as casualty cards, muster rolls, and combat photography from History Division’s Reference and Archives Branches and the National Archives and Records Administration.

18. Material related to the del Valle Board investigation are housed at Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. Some of the documents in this file are in the form of copies or typed transcripts, not originals.

19. Correspondence from an Iwo Jima veteran, Cpl Joseph J. Kobylski, was of particular interest to the Huly Panel, since he contacted the History Division and the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation to question the inclusion of John Bradley as a flag raiser in Rosenthal’s iconic photograph. Although some of his observations about equipment coincide with the visual evidence later brought forward by Stephen Foley and Eric Krelle, Kobylski’s central aim to insert another veteran in the photograph could not be substantiated. See the Iwo Jima Flag Raising subject files, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

20. An official Marine Corps publication until 1976, *Leatherneck* possesses a treasure trove of photographs from World War II, including many from the battle for Iwo Jima. The famous photographer, Louis Lowery, was on the Leatherneck staff during the battle and was the principal photographer during the first flag raising.

21. Kate Clarke Lemay provides an in-depth history of the memorial in chapter 6 of this volume.


24. The degraded quality of the film hampered forensic photographic analyses during the 2019 Bowers Board investigation as well. For a detailed account of the quality and number of copies of Sgt William Genau’s motion picture film at the National Archives, see Criss Austin’s chapter in this volume.

25. Further examination of the motion picture footage in conjunction with still photographs permitted the FBI Digital Evidence Laboratory to match individual frames in Genau’s film before and after the breaks with still photographs during the 2019 Bowers Board investigation. See Keil Gentry’s chapter in this volume.


27. Bradley initially expressed surprise at Hayes’s assertion regarding Block’s presence in the photograph, which had been published in the press, but later supported the proposed update in identification. See Hayes letter to Block; Hagenah memo; and John Bradley to Pedro del Valle, 26 December 1946, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.


29. Oral historians and scholars studying public or collective memory have had to broach this issue throughout their careers. See Todd Brewster, “Remembrance (More or Less) of Things Past,” *Civilization* 6, no. 4 (August/September 1999); and the special issue of *Journal of American History* 75, no. 4 (March 1989), which examines the challenges of memory in the study of American history.

30. The Office of U.S. Marine Corps Communication is-
sued a memorandum detailing the Huly Panel findings and providing public affairs guidance in August 2016.


34. While most Americans know the Rosenthal photograph, that first flag raised was celebrated by Marines and sailors at the time, serving as a morale booster after an initially hard landing and the big fight ahead. For the operational significance, see chapters by Charles P. Neimeyer and by Stephen Foley and Dustin Spence in this volume.


36. In 2019, the Marine Corps received assistance from the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory in performing additional forensic photographic analyses of still imagery and motion picture film of the second flag raising.

37. Harold G. Schrier, letter to MajGen Pedro del Valle, 10 December 1946, Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

38. Hayes letter to Block.

39. Harold Schultz’s stepdaughter Dezreen McDowell recalls him mentioning the flag raising only once and in passing. Schultz clearly preferred to remain discreet about his participation, and the conversation was only brought to light after the 2016 Huly Panel findings were made public. See Tom Bowman, “Marine Corps Misidentified Man in Iconic Iwo Jima Photo,” All Things Considered, NPR, 24 June 2016.


42. Nancy Jacobs, email to author, 4 October 2016.
In many ways, it would have been better to have never identified the men in Joseph Rosenthal’s iconic photograph of the second flag raising on Mount Suribachi. As nameless figures, the servicemembers would represent everyone who fought on Iwo Jima. Yet, anonymity ceased to be an option when President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided the men in the photograph should participate in the Seventh War Loan drive. On 30 March 1945, Headquarters Marine Corps sent a confidential telegram stating:

TRANSFER IMMEDIATELY TO US BY AIR . . . 6 ENLISTED MEN AND/OR OFFICERS WHO ACTUALLY APPEAR IN ROSENTHAL PHOTOGRAPH OF FLAG RAISING AT MOUNT SURIBACHI.¹

This order set in motion a protracted effort to officially identify the flag raisers that would culminate 74 years later when the Marine Corps revised the historical record for the third time. In 2019, a board led by Brigadier General William J. Bowers determined that Corporal Harold P. Keller is the Marine pictured on the far side, near the base of the flagpole, and that Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, previously believed to be in that position, contributed to the flag raising but is not pictured in the photograph.

Why is it important to identify six men raising a replacement flag so long after the fact? Part of the answer is that when the Marine Corps associated names with the faceless figures in Rosenthal’s photograph, it assumed the responsibility to get it right. General Alexander A. Vandegrift, 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps, articulated that duty in a letter to Sergeant Henry O. Hansen’s father following the del Valle Board’s initial revision to the flag-raising roster. In 1947, the Marine Corps formally accepted the board’s positive identification of Corporal Harlon H. Block in the position at the base of the flagpole, which had been assigned previously to Hansen. Informing the deceased sergeant’s family of the change, Vandegrift wrote, “I hope you will agree that, in fairness to all parties, the Marine Corps was obligated to correct the mistaken identification.”²
That sentiment rang equally true in 2016, when the Huly Panel undertook a second investigation and corrected the placement and identification of Privates First Class Harold H. Schultz and Franklin R. Sousley on the near side of the flagpole. The mandate for historical accuracy and integrity asserted itself again just two years later, when compelling visual evidence suggesting another possible correction was brought to the attention of the U.S. Marine Corps.

This chapter traces the most recent effort of the Marine Corps to evaluate the claims submitted for official review, which entailed performing an independent investigation to gather and analyze as much information as is currently available about the second flag raising and ultimately adjudicating the evidence to either confirm or revise the official Marine Corps record. In addition to giving transparency to the Bowers Board proceedings, it highlights the assistance of numerous organizations and individuals who aided the Marine Corps in its third—and hopefully final—examination of Rosenthal’s iconic photograph.

NEW CLAIMS ABOUT THE SECOND FLAG RAISING

I first became involved with the official effort to identify the Iwo Jima flag raisers in December 2015, when Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, then-director of the Marine Corps History Division, asked me to take a look at some photographs that external researchers had submitted with the claim that the visual evidence disputed the nearly 70-year-old historical record. The material made a persuasive argument that an error may have been made and, as Colonel Mary H. Reinwald (Ret) describes earlier in this volume, led to the formation of the Huly Panel in the spring of 2016, which recommended a revised roster of raisers for both the first and second flag raisings. Most notably for the current discussion, the panel concluded that Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley was not pictured in Rosenthal’s photograph but that a previously unidentified Marine, Private First Class Harold H. Schultz, had helped raise the second flag instead.

The potential impact of these changes weighed heavily on the minds of panel members. As the Huly Panel formulated its conclusions, there was robust discussion around the possibility of future changes to the identifications pending new evidence and advances in photographic analysis. Additionally, there was considerable speculation as to why Private First Class Schultz had remained mostly, if not completely, silent on his presence in Rosenthal’s photograph. At the conclusion of the panel’s deliberations, I remained bothered by the apparent fact that only four of the six flag raisers were present in the Gung Ho photograph, a group portrait Rosenthal captured soon after the second flag was raised (see figure 0.5). Specifically, why were Corporal Harlon H. Block and Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon absent from the picture? Two years later, these concerns would lay at the heart of another investigation.

On 17 July 2018, amateur historian Dustin Spence sent a 102-slide PowerPoint presentation of historical photographs in support of four new claims to retired Major General Orlo K. Steele. Because the Huly Panel considered not only the participation of Private First Class Schultz but also confirmed the presence of the five previously identified flag raisers in Rosenthal’s photograph, the slides offered compelling evidence that potentially overturned the board’s results. Specifically, Spence and his fellow researchers, Stephen Foley and Brent Westemeyer, asserted: 1) that Corporal Harold
P. Keller is the Marine pictured in the position long associated with Private First Class Gagnon; 2) that Sergeant Michael Strank’s role as a second flag raiser could be confirmed through photographic evidence; 3) that Private First Class Gagnon is the Marine in the foreground of Private Robert R. Campbell’s photograph capturing the lowering of the first flag; and 4) that the Marine standing behind Sergeant Hansen in Rosenthal’s Gang Ho photograph is Corporal Block.

Spence, Foley, and Westemeyer’s assertions rested largely on photographic evidence, some of which the Huly Panel reviewed in 2016. The imagery submitted in the slide deck included still frames from the motion picture footage Sergeant William H. Genaust captured. Isolating early moments in the film sequence as the Marines begin lifting the flagpole, the researchers claimed that Sergeant Michael Strank was recognizable in position 4, on the far side of the pole across from Private First Class Ira H. Hayes. Although the individual in question is partially blocked by Hayes and the motion picture, even as a still frame, is somewhat blurry, the researchers claimed that Strank’s soft cap and jaw were identifiable characteristics that could confirm his presence in Rosenthal’s photograph. When the Huly Panel analyzed this portion of Genaust’s film, the members had observed the soft cap of the Marine in position 4 but determined that the poor image quality and undefined gaps in time precluded more definitive conclusions.

Whereas the image package aimed to strengthen the identification of Sergeant Strank in Rosenthal’s photograph, the other proposed identification disputed the presence of Private First Class Gagnon. Two photographs by Private Robert R. Campbell formed the centerpiece of this argument. Although multiple photographers were present on the summit of Mount Suribachi during the second flag raising, Private Campbell was the only one to capture the lowering of the first flag and the raising of the second flag in a single frame (figure 13.1). This photograph is familiar to veterans, civilians, and researchers alike and has subsequently appeared as the cover image for numerous publications about the Battle of Iwo Jima. Significantly, the image provides a distinct, if diminutive, view of the Marine in position 2. Another Campbell photograph shows First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier and Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr. saluting the second flag after the Marines raised it to a vertical position (figure 13.2). Like the flag-lowering photograph, this image provides a frontal view of the Marine on the far side of the flagpole. Because the face in both images is cast in shadow, these photographs appeared to lack discernible detail to prove or disprove the attribution of Private First Class Gagnon. Enlarged details of both photographs submitted by the researchers purported to show a clear view of the face, uniform, and weapon of the Marine in position 2. Arguing that the individual closely resembles Corporal Harold P. Keller, the brief further theorized that the slender Marine positioned at the top of the first flagpole, nearest to the viewer in Campbell’s photograph of both flags, is Private First Class Gagnon.

In addition to the archival photographs the Huly Panel previously reviewed, the brief introduced several images from private collections and from the George Burns Collection at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center. To support their identification of Corporal Keller, Spence, Foley, and Westemeyer supplied a photograph captured by Army Private First Class George Burns, who was a combat cameraman working for Tank magazine during the
FIGURE 13.1
In this well-timed photograph, Marine combat cameraman Pvt Robert R. Campbell captured the lowering the first flag while the raising of the second flag is visible in the background. 1stLt Harold G. Schrier made sure that the raising and lowering occurred simultaneously so that the American flag would never be absent from view for the Marines fighting below.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Private Robert R. Campbell, National Archives and Records Administration
Battle of Iwo Jima. The image, taken between the first and second flag raisings, shows Corporal Keller shaking hands with Sergeant Howard M. Snyder on the edge of the crater (figure 13.3). Burns’ caption list for the film roll annotates the photograph with identifications of both Marines and explains that the pair were the first to reach the summit. This photograph was supplemented with several personal snapshots of Corporal Keller during and after his military service.

Additional versions of the Gung Ho photograph enlarged the visual archive further. While Genaust’s film reveals that the Marines had waved and cheered for several seconds while posing for the group photograph, the fame of Rosenthal’s still photograph has eclipsed other copies in the historical record. Two images, taken by Burns, provide partial views of the individual standing behind Sergeant Hansen. In Rosenthal’s Gung Ho photograph, this Marine is almost entirely obscured by Sergeant Hansen;
only a tuft of hair is visible. Consequently, most reproductions of the *Gung Ho* photograph do not even note that an individual is present (see, for example, figure 12.4). The pair of *Gung Ho* portraits in the Burns Collection, the researchers asserted, provided sufficient detail of the Marine for a favorable comparison to Corporal Block.

Recognizing the potential impact this evidence would have on the findings of the Huly Panel, Major General Steele forwarded the email to Lieutenant General Jan Huly, who had overseen the previous investigation. On
9 August 2018, General Huly shared the file with members of the Huly Panel and Brigadier General William J. Bowers, commanding general of Education Command and president of Marine Corps University. Upon review, General Bowers directed a research effort to evaluate, corroborate, and determine the authenticity of the evidence presented, followed by recommendations for further action based on this assessment. As former members of the Huly Panel assigned to Marine Corps University, the task fell to Dr. Breanne Robertson and me.

**VERIFYING AND CORROBORATING THE VISUAL EVIDENCE**

Robertson and I determined that the first step was to verify the authenticity of the photographic imagery submitted for consideration. Because the researchers provided a PowerPoint presentation rather than raw digital image files, we had no way of knowing how closely the images approximated the originals. Had they been modified to sharpen detail or reduce shadows? Was the image represented in its entirety or had it been cropped? Was the file compressed and, if so, did this degrade the overall resolution?

The initial appraisal of photographs fell to Robertson. Trained as an art historian, she painstakingly reviewed the images included in the PowerPoint presentation and then developed a parallel version using high resolution scans taken directly from the print or negative, as available, during repeated visits to the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robertson also liaised with the Associated Press to obtain high resolution digital image files of Rosenthal’s photographs. These included details of the Associated Press photographer’s Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph, the *Gung Ho* group portrait, and a candid shot of the raisers immediately after the second flag had been raised (figure 13.4).

Working in the Still Picture Research Room at the National Archives, Robertson viewed photographs Coast Guard Photographer’s Mate Third Class John Papsun took as well as the myriad images Marine Corps combat cameramen took of the event. In the Marine Corps’ holdings, these images are filed under the “flag raising” subject heading and include not only the first and second flags as they appeared on 23 February 1945, but also photographs taken on the summit of Mount Suribachi in subsequent days as the elevated vantage point became a key position for 3d and 4th Marine Division’s artillery spotters. Robertson also searched for images depicting Private First Class Gagnon elsewhere on the island, since any photograph of him during the battle would provide insight into the particularities of his uniform and equipment and would offer a point of comparison for analyzing the flag-raising photographs. Because Gagnon served as a runner for Company E, Robertson hoped to glimpse the Marine in images of the 5th Marine Division command post, to no avail.

Through conversation with the still picture archivists in College Park, Robertson learned that the National Archives’ photograph collection did not necessarily correspond to the original negatives preserved in cold storage. To cross-reference the print and negative holdings, Robertson consulted several volumes of logbooks, which the Marine Corps used to record every negative from the Pacific theater. Because the logbooks were maintained in the photographic laboratory on Guam, the entries are organized by the date a roll of film was developed, not by the original date of exposure. As
a result, the only way to search for entries related to the flag raisings was to browse the bound volumes page by page. This inconvenience was more than compensated by the value of the information obtained. Robertson successfully generated a complete inventory of official Marine Corps photographs taken on Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945 and requested any negative that did not appear in the print collection. Unfortunately, many of the photographs could not be found in either repository. Because the Marine Corps did not transfer the photographs and negatives to the National Archives until the 1970s, it is not clear when or why certain images were missing; however, the stamped word “deleted” over a negative’s
assigned number in the logbook did accurately indicate when an original had been destroyed, perhaps because of visual defects (such as blurriness) or because the image approximated another photograph and so was considered a duplicate. Her diligence ensured the Bowers Board would have the best possible imagery with unquestioned provenance to review.

Meanwhile, the first step I took was to reach out to Corporal Keller’s daughter, Kay Keller Maurer, by phone. She shared memories of her father after the war and verified that she had several scrapbooks containing photographs along with other memorabilia related to his military service. She told me that her father never claimed to be a flag raiser to her or any of her siblings. Maurer did not recall her mother mentioning Keller’s participation in the flag raising either; however, she went on to say that if the information was meant to remain a secret, then her mother would have kept silent. She then related a story of her father recording reminiscences of his time on Iwo Jima on audiocassette for fellow Marine and author Richard Wheeler, who had served with Keller in Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment. She was not sure what her father had said on the tape, she explained, because no matter how hard she had tried to eavesdrop, her father made sure she was out of earshot during his recordings. When I related this story to my colleague, Master Sergeant Stacy Patzman, USMC (Ret), she immediately became intrigued and volunteered to track down Wheeler. Within an hour, she determined that Wheeler had passed away in 2008, that he had resided with his sister at the end of his life, and that his sister continued to maintain his room and basement study just as he had left it. I wondered whether we might find the recording of Keller’s oral history among Wheeler’s belongings. We reached out to Wheeler’s sister, Margery Wheeler Mattox, who invited us to visit her home in Pine Grove, Pennsylvania.

**IN THEIR OWN WORDS: ORAL HISTORIES AS EVIDENCE**

Corporal Richard Wheeler served alongside Keller as a member of Company E’s 3d Platoon during the Battle of Iwo Jima. Although Wheeler did not make it to the summit of Mount Suribachi with his fellow Marines on 23 February due to being medically evacuated on D+2, he became the de facto historian for his platoon after the war. In addition to numerous articles on the battle and the flag raisings, he published two books on the subject, *Iwo* (1980) and *The Bloody Battle for Suribachi* (originally published in 1965 and updated in 2007). Wheeler’s veteran status and personal connections gave him unparalleled access and insight into the actions taken by Company E on 23 February 1945. His research files included audiocassette tapes, interview transcripts, and letters from the men who fought with him on Iwo Jima. Due to the potential treasure trove of information to be found among his personal effects, Master Sergeant Patzman and I gladly took Mattox up on her offer and made a two-day research trip to Pennsylvania.

With the assistance of Mattox and her neighbor, Louise Miller, we spent the first afternoon reviewing and cataloging the large volume of material in the house. Meanwhile, Robertson conducted research nearby at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, where she made high resolution scans from photographs in the George Burns Collection. Robertson joined us the following day to photograph and collect material related to the Battle of Iwo Jima, including a stack of audiocassette
tapes for analysis and eventual accession into the Marine Corps History Division’s Oral History collection.

Due to the advanced age and fragile condition of the tapes, History Division arranged for them to be digitized and transferred to compact disc after our return to Quantico. With the hope of hearing a firsthand account of the second flag raising, I eagerly listened to the audio file containing Keller’s experiences on Iwo Jima. After all, Keller is pictured in the Gung Ho group photograph taken only moments after the second flag was raised. Even if he did not profess to be a raiser himself, he was an eyewitness to the event and so might shed light on who was. To my chagrin, his narrative began after his platoon had left its position on Mount Suribachi.10

Next, I arranged to visit the home of Corporal Keller’s daughter in Clarence, Iowa. In preparation for my trip, I made several phone calls to follow up on information Maurer and Westemeyer had provided. Since Keller grew up in Brooklyn, Iowa, and returned there after the war, the Brooklyn Historical Society seemed like a logical place to start. I contacted Mary Jo Thompson, director of the society, to determine if the collection’s holdings included any material on Keller. She confirmed that they had a small display covering his service in its museum, and she agreed to help me view the artifacts via Facetime on 24 September 2018. Unfortunately, the display did not contain any new information.11

I then reached out to James G. Zigler, adjutant of the Francis Gallagher American Legion Post 294, to determine if Keller had ever discussed his participation in the flag raising with fellow veterans. Zigler provided me with the names and phone numbers of four post members who were veterans of World War II, though none recalled Keller claiming to be a flag raiser. To the contrary, one veteran, Stanley Walford, told me that Keller was busy mopping-up Japanese resistance on the crater of Mount Suribachi when the flag raising occurred. Dale Lippincott revealed that he was not well acquainted with Keller and so declined to offer further comment, while Darrel Dyer and Dean Montgomery stated that Keller did not talk much about his experiences on Iwo Jima, so they could not offer an opinion about his proximity to the flag raising. In addition to being fellow legionnaires, Keller had worked for Montgomery at Surge, a dairy equipment company, after the war.12

It seemed likely that Keller, if he were a flag raiser, would have left some record of his participation in that famous event among his personal effects. Upon my arrival in Iowa in late September 2018, I met with Kay Keller Maurer, who graciously permitted me access to her father’s memorabilia. I was quickly able to verify the provenance of the personal photographs of Keller presented by Spence, Foley, and Westemeyer in their PowerPoint presentation to the Marine Corps (figure 13.5).

In addition to photographic evidence, I hoped to find some mention of Keller’s participation in the flag raising among the stack of letters saved by his loved ones, similar to the letter Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley wrote to his parents describing his role in raising the first flag. An article from the Surge company newsletter, published circa 1977 and preserved in Keller’s scrapbook, provided a cryptic but potentially meaningful clue. It stated, “Harold rarely talks about his service days in World War II and practically never mentions Iwo Jima where he happened to be one of that group of Marines who raised the American flag on Mount Suribachi.” The article goes on to
say, “At 12:15 p.m. a Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press came by for a picture. . . . The photographer climbed upon a cairn of rocks as Harold Keller and his comrades lunged forward and drove the flag home.” Based on the clear identification of “Harold Keller and his comrades” as having their hands on the flagpole in this article, Keller must have told someone that he had a hand in raising the flag (figure 13.6).

A missive dated 17 September 1945 from the commander of Marine Barracks Quantico, Major General P. H. Torrey, was also pasted in his scrapbook that stated, “Any unproved and malicious gossip about any member of our Marine Corps is a direct reflection on you as a member or former member of our Corps. Nothing is more malicious and indecent than the tearing down of characters and lives through the spreading of untruths.” It seemed to me that this order must have held personal significance for Keller for him to save it. Could it have caused him to remain publicly silent regarding his participation in the flag raising? Unfortunately, I found no further reference to the flag raising in Keller’s personal correspondence. Little did I know that a wartime letter describing the corporal’s participation in that storied event would come to light from an unexpected source eight months later.

After completing the search for primary evidence related to Keller, I contacted Private First Class Gagnon’s son, Rene Gagnon Jr., on 9 October 2018 to determine if he or other members of his family had any material in their possession that would confirm their father’s place in the Rosenthal photograph. My inquiry also aimed to test the theory that Gagnon was the individual seen assisting the first flag lowering in Campbell’s photograph of both flags. Because the unidentified Marine in the foreground of Campbell’s image is also pictured smoking a cigarette and wearing a Ka-Bar fighting knife in another photograph, I inquired whether these aspects were consistent with what the younger Gagnon knew about his father’s wartime experience (figure 13.7). Gagnon confirmed that his father was a smoker and that he carried a Ka-Bar on Iwo Jima. He also stated that he had seen a battlefield photograph of an individual whom he identified as his father. I then emailed Gagnon two cropped details of Campbell’s photograph for his review along with the message, “Attached are two versions of the photo with the Marine smoking. Is the smoking Marine PFC Rene Gagnon?” He responded, “Neither of these two photos [is of Rene Gagnon] . . . the one I have is with [the] flag still being tied to pole prior to raising . . .
will print and forward tonight!"\(^{14}\) Despite this initial exchange, Gagnon’s son declined to assist further with the investigation.\(^{15}\) Although I never received the promised photograph, it is extremely unlikely that any such image would have depicted Private First Class Gagnon. The only photographs showing the American flag being tied to a length of pipe on 23 February 1945 are those taken by Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery in preparation for the first flag raising, hours before Gagnon arrived at the summit.

**EXPANDING OUR SEARCH**

In addition to verifying independently the photographic evidence submitted by Spence, Foley,

\[ \text{FIGURE 13.6 (left) } \]

Although friends and family members do not recall Cpl Harold Keller ever claiming to be a flag raiser, the Marine’s personal scrapbook contained a company newsletter clipping that proclaimed his presence in Joe Rosenthal’s famous photograph.

Photo courtesy of Kay Keller Maurer

\[ \text{FIGURE 13.7 (above) } \]

In a photograph of the first flag flying on the summit, Pvt Robert R. Campbell captured a Marine smoking a cigarette. The individual’s slight build combined with similarities of helmet camouflage pattern, the tear in his service shirt, and the presence of a haversack and Ka-Bar indicate that he is the same individual pictured at the top of the flagpole in Campbell’s photograph of the first flag being lowered.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Private Robert R. Campbell, National Archives and Records Administration
and Westemeyer, we conducted a thorough review of secondary sources that suggested other lines of inquiry to include research notes and oral history interviews scholars collected on the subject. We reached out to museums and historical societies to request their assistance in locating previously overlooked artifacts and documents related to our search. Robertson and I also worked with outside researchers, especially with Foley, Westemeyer, and Spence.

In our quest to be thorough and review firsthand source material to the greatest extent possible, Robertson engaged Dr. Parker Bishop Albee Jr., professor emeritus at the University of Southern Maine in Portland, and obtained nearly a dozen audiotape cassettes and transcripts of oral history interviews that he and co-author Keller Cushing Freeman had conducted in the early 1990s for their book, Shadow of Suribachi (1995). Of particular relevance to our investigation were interviews with and letters from the former commander of Company E, Captain Dave E. Severance; former commander of 3d Platoon, Company E, First Lieutenant John Keith Wells; First Sergeant John A. Daskalakis of Company E; former adjutant for 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, Second Lieutenant G. Greeley Wells; former assistant operations officer for 28th Marines, Captain Fred E. Haynes; and Marine combat cameraman, Sergeant Louis R. Burmeister. The source material contained one surprise. In his interview with Albee and Freeman, G. Greeley Wells talked about First Sergeant Daskalakis’ efforts to identify the flag raisers in Rosenthal’s photograph and that the Marines were reluctant to come forward. At one point, Wells describes Daskalakis’ frustration with the identification process and, later, his realization that “this knucklehead, hell he was there, he just didn’t say anything.” In response, Freeman suggests that the reticent Marine was Private First Class Ira Hayes, to which Wells responds, “Well it might have been Ira, but there was also another guy.” He does not name the other Marine in the interview, but he goes on to say that the person did not want publicity for the flag raising.16 This passing remark may be a clue as to why Corporal Keller did not come forward at the time. Unfortunately, with Wells’ death on 22 September 2014, we were not able to ask him for clarification on the other individual, and Daskalakis made no mention of “another guy,” such as Wells described, in his interview either. Was Wells referring to another member of the flag-raising party or merely an eyewitness who knew more than he had admitted previously?

Taking advantage of the Marine Corps’ rich collection of oral histories at History Division, I also reviewed the official career interviews of Major General Pedro del Valle, who oversaw the 1947 investigation that corrected the identification of Corporal Block in the Rosenthal photograph, and Brigadier General Robert L. Denig, who served as director of the Marine Corps Division of Public Information during the Seventh War Loan drive. Oral history interviews with Marine correspondent Technical Sergeant W. Keyes Beech and civilian photographer Joseph Rosenthal also promised to yield details about the flag raising and the official U.S. Marine Corps effort to assign names to the raisers soon thereafter. None provided new insight into the process by which the Marine Corps initially identified the flag raisers.17

Seeking additional first-person accounts of the Iwo Jima flag raisings, the research team successfully located a videotaped interview with Private Philip L. Ward, a participant in the first flag raising and platoon mate of Corporal Keller. Conducted by the Montgomery County Historical Society, Indiana, on 17
April 1991, the oral history describes actions atop Mount Suribachi. Ward’s account largely reinforces the accepted narrative of events as it has been presented in the scholarly literature. During the interview, the former Marine is asked to identify the men in a photograph taken by Staff Sergeant Louis Lowery. The image depicts four Marines patrolling the crater of Mount Suribachi after the first flag raising (figure 13.8). Although analysis of the helmet camouflage pattern and rifle sling attachment confirms that the Marine on the far right of the group is Private First Class Harold Schultz, Ward mistakenly identifies the individual as Private First Class Manuel Panizo. Interestingly, Keith Wells misidentified Schultz as Private First Class James R. Michels in the same photograph. Ward and Wells’ errors in identification highlighted the challenge of relying on eyewitness testimony provided so many years after the action. As a result, the research team had the unenviable task of attempting to reconcile contradictory narratives provided through myriad sources during the past 75 years.

The contradictions are not surprising. The stress of combat, the passage of time, and differences of perspective all contributed to the differing accounts of the events on 23 February 1945. Moreover, the second flag was a replacement banner; its raising was so inconsequential to the Marines present that no one bothered to note the time, resulting in estimates ranging from 1200 to 1400, with an approximate time of 1200 being more likely. Because Rosenthal arrived just prior to the second flag raising and departed the summit soon thereafter, his oral history offers a precise timeline not found in most accounts. After taking a handful of pictures after the second flag raising, the Associated Press photographer returned to the 28th Marines’ command post to grab a bite to eat. There, he remembers noting the time as 1305, which puts the time of the second flag raising closer to noon.

In the course of the investigation, we consulted with the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Quantico, Virginia; the Wright Museum of World War II in Wolfeboro, New Hampshire; and the Manchester Historic Association in Manchester, New Hampshire, in search of uniform articles worn by Private First Class Gagnon during the Battle of Iwo Jima. From our experience on the Huly Panel, we understood that idiosyncrasies of uniform could provide identifying characteristics. Specifically, we noted a tear in the service shirt worn by the unidentified Marine for whom Spence, Foley, and Westemeyer had proposed was Private First Class Gagnon. None of the museums possessed Gagnon’s combat utilities, although the Wright Museum of World War II does hold his dress blue uniform. Robertson also made telephone inquiries to the Marine Military Academy in Harlingen, Texas, and the Weslaco Independent School District in Weslaco, Texas, to obtain additional portraits of Corporal Block for comparison to Burns’ Gung Ho photographs, which unfortunately did not yield any new visual evidence.

PARTNERING WITH THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

With the initial research phase of collecting and authenticating evidence related to the claims now complete, the next step was to seek professional evaluation of the images. Following the recommendation of the Huly Panel to seek forensic photographic analysis, the Marine Corps made an official request on 31 October 2018 to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for assistance. The initial request focused on the
one of the challenges of identifying the flag raisers is establishing known photographs of individuals for comparison. even for marines who witnessed the events of 23 february 1945 firsthand, this is a difficult task. as a result, various names have been assigned to the marines from company e, seen here in a photograph by ssgt louis r. lowery patrolling the rim of the crater after the first flag raising. from left to right: sgt henry o. hansen, pfc james a. robeson, pfc philip l. ward, and pfc harold h. schultz. cpl charles w. lindeberg and pfc robert d. goode have their backs to the camera.

official u.s. marine corps photo, courtesy staff sergeant louis r. lowery, louis r. lowery collection, archives branch, marine corps history division

proposed identifications and new image comparisons put forth in the 102-slide powerpoint brief spence, foley, and westemeyer submitted to the marine corps. in a subsequent request, we asked the fbi to analyze all six positions. robertson supplied the fbi with an external hard drive with high resolution digital image files. scanned at varying resolutions ranging...
from 4800 to 12,800 dots per inch, the images comprised both complete photographs and cropped details showing individuals of interest to the investigation. The package also included known images of Sergeant Strank, Corporal Keller, Corporal Block, Private First Class Gagnon, and other Marines as a baseline for physiognomic analyses (or determining the characteristics of facial features), as well as a reference glossary of uniform items and weapons to assist the scientists in their manual comparison of these elements.

The FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory analyzed the best quality images Robertson could produce. The FBI used a combination of facial recognition software, to include beta testing new software, and manual comparisons. Analysts painstakingly traced the movements of individuals in the Genaust film to establish their positions in the still photographs. By comparing fluctuating elements, such as the American flag flapping in the breeze, the FBI was able to establish the precise timing of the still photographs in relation to the motion picture footage. Images were processed to improve the visibility of facial features, as well as details of clothing, footwear, gear, and weapons.

Camouflage patterns of uniforms were key in identifying individuals. Although camouflage patterns repeat themselves in bolts of material, once they are sewn into clothing and helmet covers, the camouflage pattern location and fabric creases become as distinct as a fingerprint. The restricted candidate pool aided the analysis. The total number of individuals on the summit of Mount Suribachi around the time of the second flag raising is estimated to be approximately 100. This is a considerably smaller set of potential candidates than is normal for most forensic image analyses, which amplifies the significance of discrete characteristics as described in the FBI’s findings below.

The FBI confirmed that the Marine in position 1, Corporal Block, is also the Marine pictured behind Sergeant Hansen in the Gung Ho photograph (figure 13.9). The conclusion was based on the match between the camouflage pattern and creases in the helmet cover in Burns’ versions of the Gung Ho photograph and those of Block in Rosenthal’s photograph of the raisers stabilizing the second flagpole.

For position 2, the FBI compared facial, helmet, clothing, gear, and weapon characteristics in Campbell’s photographs, Burns’ photographs, Rosenthal’s Gung Ho photograph, and personal photographs. Facial similarities com-
combined with the creases formed by the double bandoleers in Corporal Keller’s utility coat in combination with the distinctive folds and camouflage pattern of his M1 helmet cover formed individual characteristics that permitted his positive identification as a second flag raiser in Campbell’s photographs (figure 13.10).

For position 3, the FBI was able to confirm the identity of Private First Class Sousley based on the camouflage pattern on his helmet cover; the positioning of his soft cap under his helmet; creases in his clothing; and his equipment, especially the telephone lineman’s pouch hooked to his utility belt. These characteristics

FIGURE 13.10

High resolution digital scans, taken directly from the negative of Pvt Robert R. Campbell’s photograph depicting 1stLt Harold G. Schrier and Pfc Ernest I. Thomas Jr. saluting the second flag, reveal remarkable detail of the Marine in position 2. Facial similarities combined with the creases formed by the double bandoleers in the Marine’s utility coat and the distinctive folds and camouflage pattern of his M1 helmet cover permitted the FBI to make a positive identification of Cpl Harold Keller.

Cropped detail of official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Pvt Robert R. Campbell, National Archives and Records Administration
are clearly visible in the *Gung Ho* photograph, where he was previously identified and in Rosenthal’s flag-raising and flagpole-steading photographs.

For position 4, the FBI was not able to make a definitive identification. The primary challenge is that the Marine is mostly obscured in both flag-raising and flagpole-steading photographs. Although more of the individual’s face is visible in the Genaust film, the low resolution does not allow for a positive identification. The FBI determined limited support for the proposition that the serviceman is Sergeant Strank based on the distinctive manner in which he wears his utility coat over his field jacket, a uniform configuration also visible in Rosenthal’s flagpole-steading image and the multiple *Gung Ho* photographs, and the pronounced curvature of the bill of his soft cap, which is discernible in Genaust’s motion picture footage and in the *Gung Ho* photographs (figure 13.11).

The FBI was able to determine strong support for the proposition that Private First Class Schultz is the individual in position 5. This conclusion was based on the camouflage pattern on his helmet cover and the broken helmet liner strap that dangles on the left side. These characteristics are clearly visible in the *Gung Ho* photograph, where he was identified as the Marine kneeling next to Corporal Keller, and in both Rosenthal’s iconic photograph and Genaust’s film.

The FBI positively identified Private First Class Hayes as the individual in position 6. Their conclusion was based on multiple similarities in the camouflage pattern on his helmet cover as well as the difference in his weapon—an M1 carbine—as opposed the more prevalent M1 Garand rifle carried by most other Marines on the summit. Furthermore, as one
of the few Native Americans on Mount Suribachi that day, Private First Class Hayes was distinguishable in still photographs and motion picture footage for his skin tone.

The final claim requiring formal examination was the hypothesis that the individual in the foreground of Campbell’s flag-lowering photograph is Private First Class Gagnon. Obviously, if the FBI was to determine that the Marine pictured therein is Gagnon, then the messenger could not possibly be present in Rosenthal’s flag-raising photograph, which was taken simultaneously. Unfortunately, the forensic photographic analysis was limited in scope, as the Marine Corps’ research team was unable to furnish the FBI with any archival or personal photographs wherein Gagnon is identified either atop Mount Suribachi or elsewhere on Iwo Jima during the battle. The lack of a contemporaneous photograph for comparison narrowed the FBI evaluation to images of Gagnon taken during the Seventh War Loan drive in late spring 1945, as he was posing for sculptor Felix de Weldon in 1950 and as he attended other postwar occasions (see figure 6.6).\(^{23}\) The FBI successfully determined that the slender Marine in Campbell’s flag-lowering photograph is the same person seen smoking a cigarette in Campbell’s photograph of the first flag. Could this individual be confirmed as Private First Class Gagnon? Although the scientists noted some facial similarities between the Marine in Campbell’s photographs and later images of Gagnon, they could not clearly discern whether a mole was present on the individual’s right cheek—a distinguishing characteristic of Gagnon’s physiognomy—since the perceptible mottling of skin tone in the flag-raising photographs is on scale with the film grain. As a result, the FBI could neither confirm nor deny that the individual in question is Private First Class Gagnon.

### THE BOWERS BOARD DELIBERATIONS

On 4 February 2019, the Marine Corps convened a panel to review the new claims regarding the identity of the second flag raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima. The board was composed of Brigadier General William J. Bowers, commanding general, Education Command; Colonel Robert C. Fulford, director, Expeditionary Warfare School; Colonel Keil R. Gentry (Ret), Education Command; Sergeant Major William J. Grigsby, sergeant major, Training and Education Command; Sergeant Major Douglas F. Cutsail, sergeant major, Education Command; Master Sergeant Stacy M. Patzman (Ret), Education Command; and Dr. Breanne Robertson, Marine Corps History Division. Armed with the FBI’s findings, which were based on professional forensic analyses of the photographic evidence, the Bowers Board was tasked with applying its collective knowledge and experience of the Marine Corps to determine the identification of the Iwo Jima flag raisers with as much certainty as possible. Key to this process was placing the photographic evidence in its historical context.

Shortly after the first flag was raised on the morning of 23 February 1945, the decision was made to replace it with a larger flag.\(^{24}\) At approximately the same time this mission was handed down, Sergeant Michael Strank received orders to form a patrol to lay communications wire from the Landing Team, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment (LT228), command post to the top of Mount Suribachi. He selected three members of his squad to accompany him—Corporal Harlon Block...
and Privates First Class Ira Hayes and Franklin Sousley. Private First Class Rene Gagnon, a battalion runner from Company E, was at the command post getting ready to take fresh radio batteries to the top of Mount Suribachi when Second Lieutenant Albert T. Tuttle arrived with a larger flag from LST-779. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler Johnson, directed Gagnon to carry the larger flag to the summit. Gagnon joined Strank’s patrol for the trek up the volcano.

When they arrived at the summit, Sergeant Strank reported to First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, telling him that “Colonel Johnson wants this big flag run up high so every son of a bitch on this cruddy island can see it” or words to that effect. Since Schrier and his men were already busy mopping-up Japanese resistance, it is likely that he ordered Strank and his patrol to prepare the second flag. That this assignment fell to Strank, Block, Hayes, and Sousley is consistent with the photographic record, since all four Marines are seen holding the makeshift flagpole prior to the second flag being raised. Roughly 20–30 minutes after their arrival at the crest, Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal, motion picture cameraman Sergeant William Genaust, and combat cameraman Private Robert Campbell reached the summit hoping to take pictures of the American flag that had been planted earlier that morning. However, when the first flag came into view, the photographers realized that a replacement banner would soon go up in its place. Genaust filmed four individuals holding the flagpole in a horizontal position, getting ready to raise the second flag. Based on the military importance of retaining squad integrity as well as the positions held by these men in subsequent photographs, the four Marines are (from left to right): Sergeant Strank on the far side of the pipe with Private First Class Hayes, Private First Class Sousley, and Corporal Block on the near side (figure 13.12). With a high wind atop Suribachi catching the large banner measuring 96 by 56 inches and attached to a 150-pound pipe, it is not surprising to see two additional Marines enter the picture frame to lend a hand in lifting the pole to an upright position. The late addition of these servicemen brings the flag-raising party to six members, which corresponds to the presence of Corporal Harold Keller and Private First Class Harold Schultz in historical photographs of that storied event.

The FBI had already found strong support for the proposition that Private First Class Schultz is the Marine in position 5 based primarily on the camouflage pattern on his helmet cover and his broken helmet liner strap. The Bowers Board combined this scientific visual analysis with the fact that Schultz’s rifle sling is attached to the stacking swivel instead of the sling swivel, causing the rifle to hang lower on his shoulder. To assess whether this characteristic was unique to Schultz, the panel reviewed the Genaust film and approximately 100 photographs known to have been taken on Suribachi that day and did not find another Marine exhibiting both a broken helmet liner strap and a rifle sling attached to the stacking swivel (figure 13.13). This led the board to conclude that the individual in position 5 is positively identified as Private First Class Harold Schultz.

To be sure, the most difficult flag raiser to identify was in position 4. The serviceman’s face and most of his clothing and equipment are obscured in all of Rosenthal and Campbell’s photographs. Furthermore, the brief glimpses of his face in Genaust’s film are not sufficient for identification due to the low resolution; howev-
er, the person in position 4 is wearing a soft cap, which is consistent with oral histories from other Marines who have remarked on Strank’s tendency not to wear his helmet. With degraded motion picture footage being the only photographic evidence available for the rear position on the far side of the flagpole, the FBI offered only limited support that Strank is the Marine in that position.

Until Spence, Foley, and Westemeyer submitted their 102-slide presentation for the Bowers Board’s consideration, Strank’s identification had been rooted in the eyewitness statements of Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley and Privates First Class Gagnon and Hayes. As alluded to above, the crucial piece of information that permitted the panel to identi-
fy Strank as a second flag raiser was the atypical style in which the sergeant layered his utility coat over his field jacket, the latter of which was normally worn as an outer garment. Upon closer examination of Rosenthal’s photograph of four men steadying the second flagpole, the clothing of the individual associated with position 4 reveals the metallic glint of an open zipper beneath an unbuttoned utility coat, whose left patch pocket is discernible due to bulging caused by its contents (figure 13.14). Other identifying features include the presence of a watch on his left wrist, the absence of a ring on his left hand, and stains or discoloration on his trousers. To assist with its deliberations on this topic, the Bowers Board enlisted the aid of Owen L. Conner, senior curator of uniforms and heraldry at the National Museum of the Marine Corps, to offer his expert opinion on the type and configuration of uniform pieces in the historical photograph. Upon careful scrutiny of the image, Conner determined that the Marine was indeed wearing a utility coat over his field jacket. He prepared a mannequin with the same garment configuration for the panel members to assess in person.

Concurring with Conner’s uniform analysis, the board then reviewed more than 100 historical photographs to determine whether any other individuals exhibited this same manner of dress. In all the photographs taken atop Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945 that were available to the board, only two people are seen wearing a utility coat over a field jacket. One of these men is an unidentified individual standing next to Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley near the first flagpole; however, that person is also wearing a ring on his left ring finger, excluding him from further consideration (see figure 13.7). The only other service-man wearing a utility coat over his field jacket is Sergeant Strank, who can be seen sporting this unorthodox layering in the *Gung Ho* photographs.

In Rosenthal’s group portrait, Strank’s utility coat is buttoned and he is not wearing a ring. His sleeve covers his left wrist, so the presence of a watch cannot be confirmed or refuted based on photographic evidence. Nevertheless, the habit of wearing a wristwatch during battle would be consistent with Strank’s role as a squad leader, as fellow Iwo Jima veteran John Keith Wells notes in his memoir, “*Give Me 50 Marines Not Afraid to Die*”.28 There remains, however, a discrepancy between Strank’s appearance in the *Gung Ho* image and the individual in the flag-stabilizing photograph, since the sergeant has fastened both the field jacket and utility coat (see figure 13.11). Only a few minutes had passed between the second flag raising and the group photograph. Had Strank closed his jacket while others were securing the flagpole with guy wires? The members of the Bowers Board discussed this question at length and agreed that such a change was not only possible, but likely under the circumstances. It is reasonable to assume that Strank would have unbuttoned his utility coat and unzipped his field jacket to cool off after the steep climb up Suribachi, and later rezipped and buttoned his clothing to shield himself from the sharp breeze. The FBI’s forensic photographic analysis combined with the contextual evidence outlined above led the Bowers Board to conclude some-to-strong support that Sergeant Michael Strank is the individual in position 4.

Historical context is also important when considering whether Private First Class Gagnon is pictured at the head of the first flagpole as it is being lowered. To be sure, the lack of a contemporaneous photograph of Gagnon in combat utilities hampers a positive identifi-
FIGURE 13.14
A close-up detail of Rosenthal’s flagpole-steadying photograph shows that the Marine in position 4 has layered his combat uniform in an unusual manner. Through consultation with National Museum of the Marine Corps uniform curator Owen L. Conner, the Bowers Board and the FBI determined that the pictured individual is wearing his utility jacket over his field jacket.
Cropped detail of Joseph J. Rosenthal photograph, courtesy the Associated Press
cation. Fortunately, Gagnon’s assigned duty as the battalion runner for Company E augments the photographic record by providing valuable clues into his movements and actions on Mount Suribachi that day. Former 2d Battalion, 28th Marines’ adjutant G. Greeley Wells emphasized this aspect of Gagnon’s battlefield experience in a letter to the New York Times, published 17 October 1991: “Rene Gagnon was in the [Rosenthal] picture because of his mission and returned the first flag to me. It was put in our company safe and we all went about the grim business of securing Iwo.”

Despite Wells’ assertion that the New Hampshire Marine is “in the picture,” his statement indicates that Gagnon, as a messenger, would have shifted his focus to the mission of retrieving and returning the first flag immediately following the successful delivery of the second. This shift in priorities is wholly consistent with his participation in lowering the first flagpole and reaching for the smaller banner as depicted in Campbell’s photograph. Additionally, the equipment worn by the Marine in question is in keeping with a battalion runner, whose dangerous and repeated crossings to the front lines necessitated a lighter load. Notably, the individual is carrying a Ka-Bar fighting knife on his utility belt, as Gagnon was known to have done. Gagnon’s absence in the Gung Ho photograph further suggests that he already may have been on his way back to the command post with the first flag in hand. Moreover, the individual bears a striking resemblance to Gagnon. In the photographic evidence supplied to the Marine Corps, Foley, Spence, and Westemeyer observed that the mole on Gagnon’s right cheek appears to be in the exact position near the Marine’s cheekbone and nose in the Campbell photograph. Although the FBI was not able to verify the presence of a mole due to the lack of resolution at the film’s grain level, a visual comparison of the smoking Marine and Gagnon posing for sculptor Felix de Weldon show remarkable similarities of the nose and chin in profile. For these reasons, the Bowers Board determined limited-to-strong support that the flag-lowering subject in Campbell’s photograph is Private First Class Rene Gagnon.

In June 2019, the Bowers Board briefed its findings to senior Marine Corps leadership. Striving for the utmost historical accuracy and thoroughness in the investigation, Headquarters Marine Corps directed an external review of the panel’s conclusions. Robertson packaged the board’s report and all supporting evidence for delivery to Jon Hoffman, chief historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, who performed a meticulous peer review on behalf of his organization. On 12 July 2019, the Center of Military History validated the findings of the board.

CONCLUSION

With the historical and photographic analyses and corresponding identification of the flag raisers complete, the remaining mystery is why Corporal Keller and Private First Class Schultz, both of whom survived the war, chose to remain mostly silent about their presence in Rosenthal’s photograph. The reasons are elusive. We do know, however, that reticence among the flag raisers was the norm. Perhaps the best-known anecdote in this regard is the allegation that Hayes threatened Gagnon with bodily harm in an effort to keep his participation a secret.

Harold Schultz was severely wounded on 13 March 1945 and medically evacuated from the island. As a result, he was not on the ship USS Winged Arrow (AP 170) when First Sergeant Daskalakis tried to identify the flag raisers to send back to the United States. Originally from
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. Cpl Harlon Block
2. Cpl Harold P. Keller
3. Pfc Franklin Sousley
4. Sgt Michael Strank
5. Pfc Harold Schultz
6. Pfc Ira Hayes

Rosenthal photo with 2019 Bowers Board findings.
Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Position 1
Corporal Harlon H. Block
No new evidence or recent allegations contradict Block being the Marine in position 1. To the contrary, the FBI’s identification of Block in the Gung Ho photograph reinforced the conclusions of the 1947 del Valle Board and 2016 Huly Panel. Furthermore, his presence in the Joseph Rosenthal photograph is consistent with being part of the same squad as Sergeant Strank and Privates First Class Ira Hayes and Franklin Sousley. No evidence suggests that Block is not the individual pictured at the base of the flagpole.

Position 2
Corporal Harold P. Keller
When Private Robert R. Campbell’s photographs of the second flag were enlarged, startling detail emerged. But detail alone does not result in identification as attribution requires comparison to a known person. In this case, a visual comparison with Army Private First Class George Burns’ photographs and AP photographer Joe Rosenthal’s Gung Ho photograph, in which Corporal Keller is identified, proved crucial to the Bowers Board’s deliberations. Facial similarities combined with the creases formed by the double bandoleers in the Marine’s utility coat, along with the distinctive folds and camouflage pattern of his M1 helmet cover, formed individual characteristics that permitted a positive identification of Corporal Harold Keller as the Marine in position 2. His presence in the photograph was further reinforced in a letter postmarked 31 March 1945 that stated: “Had a letter from Ruby Keller [Keller’s wife]. She said Harold helped plant the flag on Mt. Suribachi, so he felt quite a thrill over that.”

Position 3
Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley
No new evidence or recent allegations contradict the Huly Panel’s conclusion that Private First Class Sousley is the Marine in position 3. The camouflage pattern on his helmet cover, the positioning of his soft cap under his helmet, creases in his clothing, and his equipment, especially the telephone lineman’s pouch hooked to his utility belt, can be seen in both the Gung Ho photograph, where he has been previously identified, and in Rosenthal’s flag-raising and flagpole-steadying photographs. Moreover, his presence in the iconic photograph is consistent with being a member of the same squad as Sergeant Strank, Corporal Block, and Private First Class Hayes.
Detroit, Schultz moved to Los Angeles after the war and joined the U.S. Postal Service, eventually retiring in 1981. He lived a quiet life and married Rita Reyes sometime in his sixties. His stepdaughter, Dezreen MacDowell, later recounted to Time magazine that, several years before his death in 1995, he mentioned in passing that he “was one of the flag-raisers on Mt. Suribachi.” She replied, “My God, Harold, you were a hero.” To which he said, “No, not really, I was a Marine.”

Harold Keller likewise maintained a low profile with regard to the flag raising. He mentioned his participation to loved ones shortly after the event but kept silent later in life. In late May 2019, after the Bowers Board had concluded its deliberations, Keller’s daughter discovered a letter written by a family friend postmarked 31 March 1945 that said, “Had a letter from Ruby Keller [Keller’s wife]. She said Harold helped plant the flag on Mt. Suribachi, so he felt quite a thrill over that” (figure 13.15). Keller had apparently written to his wife Ruby from Iwo Jima and mentioned his participation in the flag raising. He never shared this information with his children, however. Additionally, there is no record that he shared this information when First Sergeant Daskalakis tried to identify the flag raisers while embarked on the Winged Arrow. After leaving Iwo Jima, Keller turned down an officer’s commission and returned to his hometown of Brooklyn, Iowa, where he resided until his death on 13 March 1979.
Neither Schultz nor Keller publicly disputed the official Marine Corps record nor did they seek fame. As veterans of the battle who understood the context of the flag raising, it could be that they did not want to be lionized for raising a replacement flag. Indeed, the answer may lie in the words of former Corporal Charles W. Lindberg, who manned a flamethrower and helped raise the first flag atop Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945. Lindberg explained, "Every man that went ashore at Iwo, and every man at sea, raised that flag—every one of us.

"IN FAIRNESS TO ALL PARTIES"
We carried it up there, and we had our hands on the pole, but all of you here raised it, and most of all, the men who didn’t come back—they all raised it.”

ENDNOTES
1. Telegraph, 30 March 1945, as quoted in Parker Bishop Albee Jr. and Keller Cushing Freeman, Shadow of Suribachi: Raising the Flags on Iwo Jima (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 96. For a transcript of the del Valle Board’s report, see appendix A.
3. For a detailed overview of the Huly Panel proceedings, see Mary Reinwald’s chapter in this volume. The panel’s reports can be found in appendices B and C.
4. At the time of the Huly Panel proceedings, there was no indication that FPC Schultz had ever divulged his participation in the second flag raising to a friend or family member; however, after the Marine Corps released the findings of the board, Schultz’s stepdaughter Dezreen McDowell stated that he had mentioned it to her once in passing. See Tom Bowman, “Marine Corps Misidentified Man in Iconic Photo,” All Things Considered, NPR, 24 June 2016.
5. The Bowers Board retained the position numbers used by the Huly Panel in its identification of Marines in Rosenthal’s photograph.
7. MajGen Orlo K. Steele, USMC (Ret), to LtGen Jan Huly, USMC (Ret), email correspondence, 20 July 2018.
8. Kay Keller Maurer, telephone conversation with the author, August 2018.
11. Mary Jo Thompson, telephone and Facetime communication with the author, 24 September 2018.
15. Despite repeated attempts to reach him, Rene Gagnon Jr. did not respond to follow-up emails or phone calls from myself or other representatives of the U.S. Marine Corps.
17. Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
19. Wells, “Give Me 50 Marines Not Afraid to Die.”
22. This calculation includes the Company E patrol led by 1stLt Harold G. Schrier, the Company F patrol led by Capt Arthur H. Naylor Jr., combat cameramen, the Navy chaplain, and his assistant.
23. This image is actually printed in reverse, as the mole appears to be on Gagnon’s left cheek in the photograph.
24. The scholarly literature records two possible motivations for the replacement flag: 1) to install a larger flag that would be more readily visible to troops fighting elsewhere on the island, and 2) to return the first flag to Secretary Forrestal, who allegedly desired the banner as a personal souvenir.
27. The Oath, directed by Dusan Hudec, aired at Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Washington, DC, on 8 November 2018, 58:30 min.
32. Albert and Velma Ward to PFC Albert E. Ward Jr., 31 March 1945, private collection, Michel Ward, Gilman, IA.
PART FOUR
Legacy

A wounded Marine seeks out graves of his dead comrades after the dedication of the 4th Marine Division cemetery on Iwo Jima, 15 March 1945.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy Kress, Library of Congress
On 23 February 1945, Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal snapped a photograph of six Marines raising the American flag during the Battle of Iwo Jima. The image circulated in magazines and newspapers, became the signature image on war bond posters and postage stamps, and was even awarded the Pulitzer Prize. Rosenthal’s photograph retained its iconic status after the war through a continuous process of reproduction and satire. From sculptor Felix de Weldon’s monumental rendition of the scene in the Marine Corps War Memorial to modern graphic T-shirt designs and searing political cartoons, the flag raising at Iwo Jima has served as a cultural model upon which Marines and U.S. citizens alike have inscribed, revised, and debated the performance of patriotic citizenship.

Yet, an inherent tension resides between the image’s malleable agency as a cultural model and its historical specificity as a visual artifact of war. In 2016, the U.S. Marine Corps undertook an official review of the evidence and concluded that the long-accepted roster of flag-raising participants was incorrect. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley had been erroneously identified in Rosenthal’s photograph. The investigation determined that a previously unidentified Marine, Private First Class Harold H. Schultz, was pictured in the iconic scene instead. Three years later, the Corps conducted another investigation into the identification of the flag raisers. Photographic evidence again revealed an error in attribution. Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, long believed to be depicted on the far side of the flagpole, was absent from Rosenthal’s famous image. The Marine Corps, with assistance from the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory, recognized another Marine, Corporal Harold P. Keller, as a key participant in the storied event.

To what extent have these factual corrections undermined or rewritten the symbolic capital assigned to Rosenthal’s famous image? By foregrounding empirical evidence after decades of accumulated lore and meaning, has the recent scrutiny given to the individual flag raisers diminished the scene’s emotional and rhetorical resonance?
A PROMISE OF VICTORY
Although it may sound odd, given the stature of Rosenthal’s photograph in the history of American war imagery, the flag raising atop Mount Suribachi was not a heroic act in itself. It was a minor event during a fierce battle, and the Marines who carried the flag up that hill and attached it to a piece of discarded Japanese pipe were merely fulfilling an assigned task, doing a duty. A duty that was, by the standards of the Pacific War, mundane and unremarkable.¹

Mere days into the month-long fight for the Japanese island of Iwo Jima, U.S. commanders ordered a platoon of Marines to ascend Mount Suribachi, the highest point on the island, and plant the American flag on its summit. Such a visible marker of American progress was intended to lift morale and harden resolve of the men on the ground, where the most difficult fighting lay in the days and weeks ahead. The Marines had anticipated a treacherous climb—Mount Suribachi remained a live threat—but the patrol encountered little resistance during their ascent. Upon reaching the crest of the volcano, they established a security perimeter, stuck a couple of flags on a prominent point, and returned to the battle (figure 14.1).

The likelihood of any patrol being enshrined in the historical memory of the Corps—let alone the entire nation—is exceedingly small. And yet, this is exactly what happened for a group of Marines on 23 February 1945, as their simple act of raising aloft the American flag found purchase in Rosenthal’s remarkable photograph. Within days, the image became a media sensation on the home front. In a matter of weeks, the scene transcended its battlefield context to embody the will and hope of the nation.² But the power of the photograph does not come from any unique bravery exhibited on the hill that day or from the presumed strategic importance of the event; its visual and emotional impact derives instead from its framing, its composition, and the anonymity of the six figures, whose faces turn away from the viewer so that they stand not for themselves or for individual glory but for every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine who struggled, sweated, and bled during the Pacific War.

In contrast to the triumphant tenor of Rosenthal’s photograph, the flag raising scarcely denoted the pacification of Mount Suribachi, let alone the entire island. Public perceptions of the image as an emblem of ultimate victory emerged on the U.S. home front, far from the remote Pacific island where the flag raising took place and long before the outcome of the battle had been decided. It is practically guaranteed that, even as that flag was being raised, servicemen locked in deadly strife were going beyond the call of duty elsewhere on Iwo Jima. Some were dying; men whose names we will never know were making the supreme sacrifice. Even on the summit, the battle went on. As the chapters in this volume by Stephen Foley, Dustin Spence, and Melissa Renn make clear, the prize-winning photograph did not capture the only or even the first American flag to be raised on the summit that day.³ Earlier that morning, First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier and five members of his patrol had forged a makeshift flagpole from Japanese pipe and embedded the heavy staff in the volcanic soil. The American flag whipping in the breeze was an impressive sight for the servicemen fighting on Iwo Jima, apparently triggering an emotional response from Americans and Japanese alike. Within minutes of planting the first flag, the Marines encountered enemy resistance from Japanese soldiers who had been concealed in nearby caves. The Americans swiftly put down the attack, but the skirmish demonstrated the
need for constant vigilance and a more thorough operation of mopping-up. Yet, even after *Life* magazine published Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery’s picture of the first flag-raising event alongside Rosenthal’s image in March 1945, the formal precision and emotional weight of the latter eclipsed the circumstances surrounding its capture. For a war-weary public in the states, it did not matter that the Marines were raising a replacement banner; the scene resonated with Americans far from the Pacific battleground, supplying in concrete visual terms the promise of Allied victory and an ultimate end to the war.

Interpretation and framing of its message began almost immediately, as the U.S. government leveraged the popularity and visual power of the photograph to bolster public morale. Deployed strategically in the public sphere, the flag-raising imagery performed a rhetorical function that imbued it with symbolic associations extending well beyond the historical constraints of the battlefield. The citizenry embraced the snapshot, filtered through
mass-media and government news outlets, as an embodiment of soldierly unity and valor. The dramatic image represented the long struggle of the Pacific War, and the surviving Marines presumed to be in Rosenthal’s photograph were sent on the Seventh War Loan drive. Reinforcing long-held mythologies about American warfare, the flag raising ostensibly confirmed an idealized national self-image and rekindled expectations for an approaching victorious end to the war. Additionally, its projected heroism confirmed for viewers their belief that U.S. servicemen always fight for a just cause and in a virtuous manner. This culturally preferred mode of interpreting U.S. warfare provided a particular framework for seeing the image. It also came with predetermined notions of heroism and valor.

THE RAISERS AS ROLE MODELS
The Iwo Jima flag-raising image derives power from more than its formal beauty; it conveys the struggle and ultimate victory of U.S. Marines who would play a critical role in bringing the war to an end less than six months later. As incidental heroes—that is, ordinary Americans whose collective effort produced a specific moment of national achievement—the men provide a malleable surface for the articulation of these ideals. The instant celebrity and veneration given to the flag raisers illustrates the immense emotional need Rosenthal’s photograph fulfilled for anxious civilians at home. Touted as heroes, the flag raisers commenced a nationwide tour as living embodiments of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s tribute to those who served on Iwo Jima: “uncommon valor was a common virtue” (figure 14.2). Privates First Class Rene A. Gagnon and Ira H. Hayes and Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley became household names, as did those of their fallen comrades Sergeants Michael Strank and Henry O. Hansen and Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley, whose gold-star mothers made public appearances in support of the loan drive.

Pulled from battle and thrust into the limelight, each man was elevated to the status of a cultural figure, a model worthy of admiration and emulation. The public demand was not easy for the men, especially Hayes, who felt tremendous guilt about leaving his brothers-in-arms while the battle still raged. But it is important to recognize that the cultural import of these men was derived from their ability to embody a set of abstracted values in pictorial form, not from their personal actions on or off the battlefield.

Arising from an actual historical event, the Iwo Jima photograph and its roster of participants became subjected to mass-mediated modes of remembering and understanding the war. In 1949, the event was dramatized in a film starring John Wayne, and in 1954, it was cast in bronze as a colossal statue for the United States Marine Corps War Memorial next to Arlington National Cemetery. The combination of visual attributes and symbolic connotations transmuted the historical referents within the picture frame, causing the anecdotal qualities of the scene to become subsumed by its rhetorical fiction.

The visual tableau—featuring service-members from all corners of the United States and of varying ethnic backgrounds—enacts a slippage of meaning in which the figures become abstracted embodiments of the national body politic through their collective action. With faces obscured, the anonymous Marines permit an interpretive elision that substitutes the common soldier in place of the specific individuals. Additionally, because they are en-
gaged in civic ritual—a flag raising—rather than combat, these ordinary actors provide a rhetorical bridge uniting military and civilian, battlefield and home front. As models for ideal civic behavior—a connection made explicit as Marines and civilians appeared interchangeably during the war loan drive—the men transcend their denotative representation in the photograph and emerge as free-floating signifiers within this larger cultural discourse. Consequently, during the war, the flagmen came to stand for the Greatest Generation, a fictional construct of the American body politic whose attendant associations of unity, resolve, and ultimate victory have served as a touchstone for subsequent generations.

If the Iwo Jima flag raising looms large in American cultural memory writ large, it holds particular potency as an emblem of patriotism and heroism among military personnel. As the primary motif driving the Seventh War Loan campaign, the Marine Corps War Memori-
al, and the National Museum of the Marine Corps, the multigure scene has become nearly synonymous with the U.S. Marine Corps. More than offering a universally admired and recognizable brand image for the Service, the flag raising has become integral to Marine Corps identity to such a degree that generations of Marines have striven to emulate the iconic moment in nearly every clime and place.

Even before the Second World War ended, the Marine Corps—much like the nation for which it fought—recognized the enduring power of Rosenthal’s flag-raising image. Chapters in this volume by scholars Kate Clarke Lemay and David W. Mills demonstrate two instances in the immediate postwar period when the Corps leveraged the fame and popularity of the photograph to advance its cause in remaining an autonomous military Service. While the very midcentury survival of the Marine Corps depended on the effective deployment of evocative battlefield imagery to civilians and government officials, military leaders also crafted a cultural curriculum around the flag raising for dissemination among its own ranks. Many recruits arrived at boot camp with images of the Iwo Jima flag raising dancing in their heads, and the Marine Corps obliged by adding the event to the canon of inspirational legends and myths taught during Basic Training. Once the flag raisers entered Marine Corps lore, they, too, became battlefield heroes worthy of emulation.

In 1954, shortly after the Korean War ended, the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial was dedicated in Arlington Ridge, Virginia. The monumental statue garnered national attention, serving as a prominent and permanent reminder of one of the Corps’ proudest events. Enshrined in bronze, the Iwo Jima flag raising assumed its place alongside hallowed battles such as Belleau Wood as a defining moment for the Corps. Moreover, Marines continued to be influenced by Sands of Iwo Jima (1949), which not only featured cameo appearances of the surviving flag raisers but also enjoyed a long shelf life, playing beyond its initial release and existing in numerous television reruns. Reverence for the flag raising persisted well into the 1960s, when aspiring Marines played with Marx Miniature “Sands of Iwo Jima” toy sets long before they embarked on their formal military careers and ventured off to boot camp (figure 14.3). With the iconic scene at the forefront

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**FIGURE 14.3**

The Battle of Iwo Jima has often surfaced in unexpected corners of American culture. This toy soldier set depicting the battle was produced in the early 1960s by Louis Marx and Company. Similar sets were produced into the late 1970s, and even today, the battle and its iconic flag raising remain a popular subject for toy soldier enthusiasts and war gamers alike.

Courtesy Hakes.com
of Marine Corps identity, both imagined and real, it was only natural that subsequent generations of Marines would aspire to recreate the flag-raising event and potentially elevate their own names to the pantheon of Marine Corps lore.\textsuperscript{10}

Recreating the iconic flag-raising moment required a set of circumstances that were difficult to duplicate, however. The Battle of Iwo Jima took place near the end of a long, hard-fought campaign across the Pacific Ocean and against a determined foe. In December 1941, Imperial Japanese forces had initiated the fight against the United States by attacking Pearl Harbor without first declaring war. As a conventional conflict carried out on a large scale and against a peer nation, the Second World War elicited little moral ambiguity among either deployed combatants or civilians in the states. In contrast, the global conflicts in which Marines fought after World War II appeared disproportionately one-sided, against opponents whose military forces could not accurately be considered on par with the U.S. military. Rather than conducting offensive actions against a dangerous foe, as it had in the Pacific theater, the United States regularly performed defensive actions and counterinsurgency campaigns against guerrillas and terrorist organizations in territories belonging to our allies. A triumphant raising of the American flag over regions governed by friendly nations, even in the context of a coordinated battle, simply looked bad.

The Marine propensity for emulating the Iwo Jima flag raising was amply illustrated in the landing at Inchon and the Battle of Seoul during the Korean War. To the American servicemen on the ground, the circumstances of the campaign closely mirrored Iwo Jima and its signature flag raising. Months earlier, North Korean forces had invaded South Korea with no warning. The ensuing war was a conventional conflict, with professional soldiers fighting one another, and the North Korean Army was a credible foe. Under United Nations Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur, the U.S.-led United Nations force successfully executed a surprise amphibious landing at Inchon on the west coast of Korea and pressed inland to recover the South Korean capital of Seoul, which had fallen to the North Koreans earlier in the summer during a string of humiliating defeats pushing the Allies to the Pusan Perimeter, a defensive line in the southeastern corner of the peninsula.\textsuperscript{11}

With its dramatic coastal invasion and seizure of the capital, Marines envisioned this campaign as the dramatic climax of the peninsular conflict and, hence, an opportunity ripe for a Suribachi-esque flag raising. In fact, Colonel Lewis B. Puller, then-commander of the 1st Marine Regiment, ordered that the first of his units to seize an objective within the city limits of Seoul raise an American flag. Fulfilling Puller’s directive, Captain Robert H. Barrow’s Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, dutifully planted the U.S. banner atop Hill 79. The event was meaningful for the servicemen, who had endured a tense river crossing to reach the site, and legendary \textit{Life} magazine photographer David Douglas Duncan captured the scene for posterity (figure 14.4). Even so, the symbolic claim staking was premature. As even Captain Barrow admitted, “Putting the flag on a bamboo pole over a peasant’s house on the edge of Seoul does not constitute retaking the city.”\textsuperscript{12}

Appropriate or not, the feat established the 1st Marines in Corps memory. It also launched a friendly rivalry to see which regiment—the 1st Marines or the 5th Marines—would ultimately raise the flag marking the true libera-
tion of Seoul. Two days later, the 5th Marines tore down the North Korean flags flying over the Seoul government compound and raised the American flag in their stead. Meanwhile, the 1st Marines fought its way into the French, Soviet Union, and United States embassies and prominently displayed U.S. flags therein to signify their recovery from North Korean control. The diplomatic faux pas of mounting the American colors on buildings belonging to sovereign, allied nations requires no further explanation, and indeed, the exuberance and single-mindedness of the Marines who carried out these actions inspired one of the many apocryphal tales attached to Puller. Reacting to the spate of flag raisings in Seoul, an Army officer from X Corps headquarters reportedly growled at Puller, “Ever since that flag-raising on Iwo Jima, I’m convinced that a Marine had rather carry a flag than a weapon.” In reply, the legendary Marine officer quipped: “Not a bad idea. A man with a flag in his pack and a desire to put it on an enemy strongpoint isn’t likely to bug out.” His was a pointed response; the U.S. Army was still smarting over allegations that soldiers had fled or surrendered too easily during the initial North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel.

More than merely being an opportune jab at a sister Service, Puller’s remark also provides insight into the standing order that had instigated the “flag race.” The commander rightly anticipated that the prospect of another famous raising would inspire his Marines to fight harder and faster in pursuit of the legendary status awarded to the Iwo Jima event and its patrol members. Despite their best efforts, none of flag-raising events during the Battle of Seoul produced an image as memorable as the Rosenthal photograph. And while the Inchon/Seoul campaign remains an important episode in Marine Corps history, the iconic, reputation-making moment of the Korean War emerged not through a triumphant flag raising over newly liberated territory, but rather through the dogged advance of frozen Marines—refusing to give in to superior odds, carrying their dead and wounded to safety—as they fought through the Chinese and North Korean forces encircling them in Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir’s snowy mountain passes.

In subsequent decades, the World War
II flag raising remained an iconic emblem in Marine Corps history and culture. Following a tradition began in September 1956, the Marine Corps Drum & Bugle Corps and the Silent Drill Platoon delivered weekly musical and marching performances on the grounds of the Marine Corps War Memorial. The Sunset Parades took place at dusk in the summer months and further elevated the flag-raising scene as a sacred backdrop for ritual performance in the civil religion of the Corps (figure 14.5).  

Beyond the nation’s capital, Marines enjoyed few opportunities to reenact Iwo Jima’s dramatic flag raising. Perhaps in response to the unchecked practice of displaying the American flag during the Korean conflict, the Marine Corps issued a standing order forbidding dramatic raisings in Vietnam. U.S. forces had deployed to Indochina to provide aid to the South Vietnamese people, not to claim portions of the beleaguered peninsula on behalf of the United States as planting American flags
on local mountain tops would suggest. When U.S. commanders felt that a ceremonial flag raising was required, they ordered the South Vietnamese colors be hoisted as the multilateral engagement was taking place in that country’s jurisdiction. The majority of fighting did not encourage such symbolic acts, however. Characterized by brief, fierce ambushes, sniper attacks, and random shelling, the day-to-day tactical experience of counterinsurgency was neither as clearly defined nor as dramatic as the capture of Mount Suribachi during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations precluded nationalist displays of territorial conquest. Combat engagements, meanwhile, were generally of short duration and hardly approached the renown of such fabled battles as Guadalcanal, Chosin, or Iwo Jima. The loss of the Iranian embassy in the spring of 1980 and the fatal bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War represented the confusing, unconventional warscape the Corps now operated in; triumphant flag raisings were obsolete.18

During the Gulf War in 1990–91, many in the United States tried to recapture World War II-era feelings and symbolism. The Iraqi conflict represented the first time in decades that U.S. forces had deployed for a conventional combat engagement against regular armies, and the heavily televised war inspired a surge of patriotic euphoria on the home front. Following the quick, decisive victory of Operation Desert Storm, President George H. W. Bush declared that the “specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula.”19 Such self-congratulatory statements lost their luster; however, as live reporting revealed how severely lopsided the campaign proved to be. Masses of surrendering Iraqi soldiers did not present a muscular backdrop for history making.20

On 11 September 2001 (9/11), the method and scope of modern American warfare changed forever. The devastating terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, shocked and mobilized the American citizenry, which had not experienced a foreign attack on domestic soil since World War II. United through grief and a fierce resolve for retribution, the nation was once again in need of an emotional salve. Standing amid the wreckage of the twin towers, a trio of first responders raised the American flag—a demonstrable act of patriotism, hope, and defiance in the wake of tragedy. The resulting photograph resonated with viewers and circulated widely in the weeks following the attacks (figure 14.6). With its small group of uniformed men working together to hoist the American colors, the scene bears more than a passing resemblance to Rosenthal’s battlefield image.21

The 9/11 terrorist attacks incited a widespread call for justice, which many defined as military retribution against al-Qaeda and other nongovernment actors who had plotted the event. Within days, Congress passed a resolution authorizing the use of military force against various terrorist factions, including the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Marines were more determined than ever to manufacture their own piece of history, but the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were unsuited to dramatic raisings of the American flag. Such displays only served to alienate the Afghan and Iraqi peoples, whom the United States was struggling to win over during its counterterrorist operations. In Iraq, where the United States was attempting to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein
without provoking a mass uprising of the Iraqi people, American troops were forbidden from making displays of triumphalism, especially involving the U.S. flag.

It happened anyway. On 9 April 2003, when Marines advanced into Baghdad and were ordered to secure buildings in the center of downtown, they encountered a large crowd of Iraqi civilians at the Firdos Square traffic circle where a large statue of Hussein had been erected. The Marines and Iraqis worked together to bring the statue down, eventually using an M88A2 Hercules armored recovery vehicle. One of the American crew climbed the vehicle’s A-frame boom and draped an American flag over the fallen statue’s head, a disrespectful gesture captured on film by the many journalists present for the event (figure 14.7). When the Iraqi civilians called for an Iraqi flag to be displayed instead, the Marines swiftly corrected course and replaced the U.S. flag with the Iraqi banner. Unfortunately for the American servicemembers, the damage was already done. Photograph after photograph showed Marines committing political iconoclasm as well as a nationalist claim staked on foreign soil. Long after the widely publicized event, some of the Iraqi participants would even express regret for the toppling.

LEGACY AND MEANING
Despite the periodic controversy surrounding international incidents like the Firdos Square flag raising, the iconic scene of six Marines
hoisting the American flag atop Mount Suribachi remains a potent one in the cultural mythology of both nation and Corps. As historians Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites have argued, the well-known image provides a platform for cultural reflection. Whether in the favorable comparison of first responders in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or in the sharp-edged critique of current events, the scene supplies an ideological scaffolding through which arguments about a variety of contemporary subjects can be made. It comes as little surprise, then, that the architectural design for the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, Virginia, intended to conjure the 45-degree angle and overall silhouette of the second flag raising (figure 14.8). In its most prominent embodiments—the former entrusted with the preservation of its heritage, the latter with its corporeal sacrifice—the Marine Corps fully embraced the multfigural motif as both a venerable reminder of the Service’s distinguished past and an aspirational emblem to inspire a noble future.

Political cartoons, conversely, employ subversive mimicry to communicate their message. In their analysis of such manipulations of the Iwo Jima flag raising, scholars Janis L. Edwards and Carol K. Winkler note that it is precisely the perceived symmetry or lack thereof in...
which social criticism is forged.\textsuperscript{27} For instance, political activists in the #RESIST movement recently criticized President Donald J. Trump’s adversarial relationship with the National Park Service through the humorous substitution of wild animals—specifically, bears—propping up a pine tree amid a desolate landscape ravaged by commercial logging (figure 14.9). While the evocation of the battlefield conjures Rosenthal’s familiar composition, the replacement of the U.S. military and the American flag underscores the current administration’s seemingly lackluster commitment to national parks and conservation efforts.

For such parodies to successfully communicate their message, contemporary viewers must possess a strong familiarity with the original. Rich in association and running deep with myth and experience, Rosenthal’s photograph has become a national icon; its persistent appeal and continuing reproduction have made it a fixed moment in the collective memory of many Americans—even if they were not alive during World War II. As Paul Messaris has demonstrated in his study on visual literacy, many viewers cannot identify the battle but, as with previous generations, they interpret the picture as a victorious scene of American military might. This discrepancy in accumulated knowledge suggests that their exposure to the imagery derives from its current circulation in reproductions and parodies, divorced from the original prototype.\textsuperscript{28} To what extent, if any, has the Marine Corps’ recent correction to the historical record impacted the emotional and rhetorical resonance of the flag-raising photograph among audiences in the present day?

The emotional resonance and popular fervor surrounding Rosenthal’s photograph during the Second World War prompted a series of errors and misunderstandings whose legacy historians have spent decades trying to unravel. For example, when wartime publications ran the second flag-raising photograph alongside articles naming members of the first flag-raising party, the combination of text and image conflated the two events and relegated other combat photographers’ work to the sidelines—a consequence that has since prompted some to suspect the active suppression of competing flag-raising imagery. Scholarship provides ample evidence to show that this was not the case, but the persistence of such theories reveals an essential truth: the history of this image—captured in the midst of war—is a messy one.\textsuperscript{29}

In 2015, Stephen Foley approached the Marine Corps with compelling evidence that there had been an error in attribution for the flag-raising party in Rosenthal’s iconic image. As Mary Reinwald describes earlier in this vol-

\begin{figure}
\centering
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\caption{In 2017, the Alt National Park Service generated an internet meme by superimposing the word “Resist” on artist Robert Bissell’s Blowdown! (2012), a painting inspired by Joe Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising that features six bears raising a fallen tree amid a clear-cut forest.}
\end{figure}
ume, Foley and fellow military enthusiast Eric Krelle had observed equipment and uniform discrepancies for the individual presumed to be Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley. The questions raised from such careful attention to visual detail eventually led General Robert B. Neller, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, to convene a panel to reevaluate the evidence. Thus, in the spring of 2016, an official Marine Corps investigation recovered the contributions of a previously unknown Marine, Private First Class Harold H. Schultz, and revised the official roster for those pictured in Rosenthal’s iconic image.

Remarkably, the 2016 identification of Schultz was neither the first nor the last time the Marine Corps would mandate a correction to the historical record. Soon after the flag-raising photograph became famous, the visual strength of the image propelled the hasty identification and recall of its participants in support of the Seventh War Loan drive. Although the financial campaign had been a success and the United States ultimately won the war, Marine Corps expediency had caused an error in attribution. In 1946, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, tasked the del Valle Board (named after Major General Pedro A. del Valle) to assess the likeness of the individual pictured at the base of the flagpole. Using eyewitness statements and photographs of the event, the board determined that Corporal Harlon H. Block, rather than Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, had participated in the second flag raising atop Mount Suribachi.

In 2018, the Marine Corps again received a challenge to the historical record regarding the second flag raising. Whereas the 1947 and 2016 investigations focused on the Marines positioned nearest to the photographer, the most recent effort hinged on the identification of the two men positioned on the far side of the flagpole. High-resolution scans taken directly from the film negatives of two additional combat photographers, Army Private First Class George Burns and Marine Private Robert R. Campbell, revealed that the facial features, uniform, and equipment for the position attributed to Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon bore a notable resemblance to Corporal Harold P. Keller. Forensic photographic analyses from the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory validated this supposition, and in May 2019, the Bowers Board, led by Brigadier General William J. Bowers, corrected the record a third and, it is hoped, final time.30

The making and remaking of history with each successive challenge to the roster of flag raisers holds the potential for undermining the particular appeal that Rosenthal’s iconic image maintains in American culture. And yet, in each of the above instances, the distinctive identity and life story of the individual has had no measurable impact on the iconic status or cultural meaning assigned to the event. Rather, the recent corrections to the official record serve as a reminder that the photograph, despite its iconic status, remains an artifact of war, a material object whose surface interaction of light and chemicals produced a visual imprint of an actual historical moment.

In a process that began with media distribution of the image during the war and evolved through countless manipulations and recontextualizations thereafter, the flag-raising photograph has coalesced cultural attitudes about communal effort, militarism, and heroism that defy the facts of the actual event. On an island where uncommon valor was a common virtue, the flagmen were heroes not for raising the American flag on a barren volcanic peak, but for doggedly and skillfully fighting a deter-
mined foe, for their willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice in service to the nation. But the specific individuals do not instill meaning in the photograph or add to its rhetorical force. Rather, the strength of the photograph abstracted these men, obscuring their individual identities with a patriotic pastiche of national attributes.

ENDNOTES

2. See Austin Porter’s chapter, “Raising Flags, Raising Funds,” in this volume.
3. Rosenthal’s image was one of more than 100 photographs taken by combat cameramen atop Mount Suribachi that day.
4. Adm Nimitz reflected on the Battle of Iwo Jima in a Pacific Fleet communiqué dated 16 March 1945: “By their victory, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions and other units of the Fifth Amphibious Corps have made an accounting to their country which only history will be able to value fully. Among the Americans who served on Iwo island, uncommon valor was a common virtue.” Less than a decade later, an excerpt from this speech would be inscribed on the U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial. See CINCPOA Communiqué No. 300, 16 March 1945, in Navy Department Communiqués 301–600 and Pacific Fleet Communiqués March 6, 1943 to May 24, 1945, vol. II (Washington, DC: Office of Public Information, U.S. Navy, 1945).
7. Hayes was often singled out for his Native American ancestry, which the media praised as being “truly” American.
9. See Kate Clarke Lemay and David W. Mills’s chapters in this volume.
20. After the Gulf War, the Corps continued its short duration mission, most often still as peacekeepers or providing humanitarian support following national disasters. Occasionally, Marines evacuated noncombatants from trouble spots, but dramatic flag moments were again unusual.
22. *Hercules* refers to the acronym created by the term heavy equipment recovery combat utility lift and evacuation system.


30. See Keil Gentry’s chapter in this volume.
In Replying
Refer to No: AT-1282-tew

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps
Washington 25, DC

15 January 1947

From: The board appointed to determine the identity of personnel who participated in the Mount Suribachi flag raising
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Subject: The identity of personnel who participated in the Mount Suribachi flag raising as photographed by Mr. Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press
Reference: (a) CMC letter dated 4 December 1946, 1240-10, DGA-1153-jg
Enclosure: (A) Report of the board appointed to determine the identity of personnel who participated in the Mount Suribachi flag raising as photographed by Mr. Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press

1. In compliance with reference (a), the board’s report, Enclosure (A), is submitted herewith. Enclosure (A) includes all correspondence pertaining to the investigation.

[signature]
P. A. DEL VALLE, A. A. VANDEGRIFT
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps General, U.S. Marine Corps
President Commandant

Approved: Disapproved

[signature]
REPORT OF THE BOARD

Appointed to determine the identity of personnel who participated in the Mount Suribachi flag raising as photographed by Mr. Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press

I. Authority

2. The board was convened by [Commandant of the Marine Corps] CMC letter dated 4 December 1946, 1240-10, DGA-1153-jg.

II. Matter Investigated

3. The board met at 1300, 4 December 1946, all members being present.
4. The convening order, hereto prefixed, was read and the board decided upon following the usual procedure for an investigation.
5. The board examined the following documents, attached as exhibits:
   A. Copy of photograph taken by Mr. Joe Rosenthal of the Suribachi flag raising on 23 February 1945.
   B. Memorandum for Commandant of the Marine Corps from director, Division of Public Information, dated 18 November 1946, with Enclosures (A) to (L).
   C. Memorandum for Commandant of the Marine Corps from director, Division of Public Information, dated 27 November 1946, with one enclosure.
6. Consideration of all these documents, especially Enclosures A and B of Exhibit B (sworn statements of Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley and Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon), supported a conclusion that the following men were the participants in the historical flag raising atop Mount Suribachi photographed by Mr. Joe Rosenthal on 23 February 1945:
   Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley
   Sergeant Michael Strank
   Private First Class Ira H. Hayes
   Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon
   Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley
   Sergeant Henry O. Hansen
7. In order to clear up the point as to whether or not the late Corporal Harlon H. Block was a participant as alleged in Enclosure (I) to Exhibit B (copy of letter from former Private First Class Ira H. Hayes to Mrs. Block) the board decided to submit written questionnaires to the following persons:
   (1) Captain Dave Elliott Severence, USMC, commanding officer of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th Marine Division, from March 1944 to August 1945.
   (2) Captain Harold G. Schrier, USMC, reported patrol leader [who] participated in subject flag raising
8. In addition, the board decided that a member of the board should interview former Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, confronting him with the conflicting affidavits of the other two surviving participants of the flag raising. The board then adjourned.
9. The board met at 1300, 13 December 1946, and all members of the board were present. Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter presented a statement concerning his interview of former Private
First Class Ira H. Hayes, along with two affidavits, an annotated photograph, and an annotated pamphlet obtained from Hayes—all attached hereto, and marked as Exhibit D.

10. The board examined the documents constituting Exhibit D and decided upon the following actions:

   (1) That Lieutenant Colonel E. Hagenah should be interviewed by the board as soon as practicable.

   (2) That Bradley and Gagnon should be informed of the contents of Exhibit D (contradictory affidavits from Private First Class Ira H. Hayes) and be requested to comment.

   (3) That a questionnaire be mailed to former Sergeant Thomas J. Hermanek Jr. in order to verify statements made by Private First Class Ira H. Hayes.

   (4) That no contact with former Corporal Donald J. Short or Private First Class William F. Cotter was necessary because identification of Sergeant Henry O. Hansen in the Suribachi group picture was verified to the satisfaction of the board using Sergeant Hansen’s official record.

11. Several informal meetings were held between 13 December 1946 and 12 January 1947 in order to evaluate incoming correspondence and determine necessity for originating further inquiry.

12. The board met at 1030 on 13 January 1947 to consider all evidence recently obtained, including letters newly received from former Private First Class Gagnon, former Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley, and former Corporal Thomas J. Hermanek Jr.—all enclosed and marked Exhibit E.

13. After exhaustive analysis of all the evidence available, the board decided that the investigation was complete, and that the evidence supported certain conclusions.

III. Conclusions

14. That the figure shown on the extreme right (at foot of flagpole) in Mr. Joe Rosenthal’s photograph of the Mount Suribachi flag raising has been incorrectly identified since 8 April 1945 as being Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, now deceased.

15. That, to the best of the ability of the board to determine at this time, the above-mentioned figure is that of Corporal Harlon H. Block, also deceased.

16. That the incorrect identification was caused by a combination of factors, which include:

   (a) Mr. Joe Rosenthal’s failure to take names of the participants because he believed the photograph to have been blurred by movement and consequently ruined.

   (b) The fact that three of the six actual participants were killed in action prior to the initiation of inquiry into the identity of the participants.

   (c) The reluctance of former Private First Class Ira H. Hayes to be identified as a participant or to return to the United States at the time the first inquiry was made at Iwo Jima in early April 1945.

   (d) That the original official identification was made in Washington [DC] with the help of Bradley and Gagnon, both of whom were bystanders who merely helped the four-man patrol raise the flag.

   (e) The need for haste in identifying the participants (in order that they be present for the Seventh War Loan campaign) precluded a more thorough investigation originally.
IV. Opinion.

17. The board unanimously agrees that as a result of its investigation the following named men participated in the Mount Suribachi flag raising shown in the photograph taken by Mr. Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press and that they appear as revealed on the accompanying annotated print:
   1. Corporal Harlon H. Block, deceased
   2. Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon
   3. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley
   4. Sergeant Michael Strank, deceased
   5. Private First Class Ira H. Hayes
   6. Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley, deceased

V. Recommendations.

18. That the records of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps be corrected to agree with the opinion of this board—namely, that the name of Corporal Harlon H. Block, deceased, be substituted for that of Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, deceased, as identifying the figure of the extreme right (at the foot of the flagpole) in the subject photograph taken by Mr. Rosenthal.

19. That Enclosures A, B, and C, letters informing certain interested parties of this change in identification of one figure in the photograph, be signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and mailed prior to any public release of the information.

20. That no official blame be assessed any individual in the naval Service because of the number and diversity of factors found to have been contributory to the original error.

[signature]
P. A. DEL VALLE,
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps,
President

[signature]
W. T. CLEMENT,
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Member

[signature]
ALLAN SUTTER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Member and Recorder
ENDNOTES

1. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication’s format.

2. This document refers to *Old Glory Goes Up on Mt. Suribachi*, the famous flag-raising photograph at the center of the investigation.

3. At the time these statements were made, Bradley, Hayes, and Gagnon were no longer active service; however, for consistency and clarity, their ranks at the time of the flag raising are used.
From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Lieutenant General Jan Huly, USMC (Ret)
Subj: Precept Convening the Huly Board to Review New Information Regarding the Identity of the Second Flag Raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima

1. Members. The Huly Panel is appointed, consisting of you as president and the following additional members, to review new information regarding the identity of the second flag raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, as depicted in the iconic photograph taken by Joe Rosenthal:
   - Colonel Keil Gentry, USMC, Director, MCWAR
   - Colonel Jason Bohm, USMC, Director, EWS
   - Colonel Mary Reinwald, USMC (Ret), Editor, Leatherneck
   - Sergeant Major Justin LeHew, USMC, SgtMaj, TECOM
   - Sergeant Major David L. Maddux, USMC, SgtMaj, EDCOM
   - Sergeant Major Richard A. Hawkins, USMC (Ret)
   - Dr. Randy Papadopoulos, Historian, Navy Secretariat
   - Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Director, USMC HD/GRC

2. Recorder. Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer will also act as recorder.

3. Administrative Support Personnel. Administrative support personnel will be provided by Education Command as required.
4. **Date and Location.** The Huly Panel is ordered to convene at the Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA, on 19 April 2016, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

5. **Mission.** The Huly Panel will review newly discovered photographic evidence provided by the Lucky 8 television group, in association with [Smithsonian Channel] television, and their claim related to the identity of participants in the second flag raising on Iwo Jima. The board will also review photographs, video, eyewitness statements, and other available evidence related to the flag raising. The board will provide opinions and recommendations to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the form of a written report, which can be made public as soon as possible, in order to accurately identify and appropriately credit the flag raisers depicted in the Rosenthal photograph.

6. **Guidance.** The board will proceed in accordance with the following specific guidelines.
   a. The board should keep the following in mind as they deliberate. All Marines and sailors on Iwo Jima served with dedication and valor and we as a Corps are proud of the legacy of “uncommon courage” that they established and embody. Those Marines atop Mount Suribachi were still embroiled in the heat of battle at great personal risk, and accomplishing a mission to raise our national ensign to show resolve and to motivate others who might see it. The photographs were spontaneous and involved those in proximity. No one had a reasonable expectation of associated fame or immortality. With the fluidity and risk of battle, individuals moved in and out of the multiple flag raisings, many “trying to help” and without clear memories of who was where and when. The del Valle investigation highlighted the challenges of memory under stress. Despite the increased use and value of forensic photographic analysis, with the death of many Marines and corpsmen involved and the passage of seven decades, we may never know for sure who did what, from where, and when.
   b. The board will be as objective as possible with available data when making identifications.
   c. The board must not presume identifications beyond what can be authenticated or corroborated.
   d. Although the board may find photographic evidence and individual statements in conflict, the board shall not impugn the reputation or diminish the contributions of any individual, team, or unit.
   e. The director of the Marine Corps History Division shall furnish the board with all available material for review.

7. **Confidentiality of Panel Proceedings.** Unless expressly authorized or required by me, neither you nor any member of the board, recorder, or administrative support personnel may disclose the proceedings, deliberations, or recommendations of the board. Upon completion of the board, you will receive further guidance on what information may be made public.
   a. The following oath or affirmation shall be administered to the recorder by the president of the board:
   
   *Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will keep a true record of the proceedings of this board and, further, that you will not disclose the proceedings or recommendations except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps or higher authority, so help you God?*
b. The following oath or affirmation shall then be administered by the recorder to each member of the board including the president:

*Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will perform your duties as a member of this board without prejudice or partiality, that you will not disclose the proceedings or recommendations except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps or higher authority, so help you God?*

c. The following oath or affirmation shall then be administered to the administrative support personnel:

*Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will not disclose the proceedings or recommendations except as authorized or required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps or higher authority, so help you God?*

[signature]
R. B. NELLER

ENDNOTE

1. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication's format.
From: Lieutenant General Jan Huly, USMC (Ret)
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Ref: (a) CMC letter Huly Panel Precept of 19 April 2016


1. In accordance with reference (a), the board’s report, enclosure (1) is submitted. The enclosure includes the reference material and key photographs reviewed by the board in furtherance of its requirement to review new information regarding the identity of the second flag raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima.

2. The references used by the board in the course of its deliberations were cross-checked with extant published sources related to the flag raising, historical division photographs, and the forensic material provided by the Lucky 8 television group.

[signature]
JAN C. HULY

ENDNOTE
1. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication’s format.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Corps University
Marine Corps History Division
3078 Upshur Avenue
Quantico, VA 22134-5100


Ref:
(c) Spence, Dustin. “Unraveling the Mysteries of the First Flag Raising.” Leatherneck 89, no. 10, October 2006, 34–43.
(e) Keene, R. R. “Louis Lowery Captured Leatherneck History on Film.” Leatherneck 89, no. 10, October 2006, 32–33.

Encl:
(1) CMC letter dated 19 April 2016, Precept Convening the Huly Panel to Review New Information Regarding the Identity of the Second Flag Raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima [Cover Letter Ref (a)]
(2) Report of the Panel Appointed to Determine the Identity of Personnel Who Participated in the
Mount Suribachi Flag Raising as Photographed by Mr. Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press [Del Valle Board Report]

(3) Excerpts, Muster Roll of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines (April 1944; October 1944; January 1945; February 1945); Casualty Card of Private First Class Harold H. Schultz

(4) Excerpts, Muster Roll of Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division (January 1945)

(5) Casualty Card of Sergeant William H. Genaust

(6) Genaust, “Iwo Jima D+4,” Roll 13

(7) Casualty Card of Corporal Harlon H. Block

(8) Casualty Card of Sergeant Michael Strank

(9) Casualty Card of Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley


AUTHORITY
The panel was convened by CMC Precept letter dated 19 April 2016. [Encl (1)]

PANEL COMPOSITION

President
Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly, USMC (Ret)

Member
Colonel Keil R. Gentry, USMC, Director, MCWAR

Member
Colonel Jason Q. Bohm, USMC, Director, EWS

Member
Colonel Mary H. Reinwald, USMC (Ret), Editor, Leatherneck

Member
Sergeant Major Justin D. LeHew, USMC, SgtMaj, TECOM

Member
Sergeant Major David L. Maddux, USMC, SgtMaj, EDCOM

Member
Sergeant Major Richard A. Hawkins, USMC (Ret)

Member
Dr. Randy Papadopoulos, Navy Department Secretariat Historian

Member/Recorder
Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Director, History Division

Administrative Support
Dr. Breanne Robertson, History Division

DATE AND LOCATION
The Huly Panel convened at the Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA, at 0900 on 19 April 2016. The board concluded at 1600 on 27 April 2016.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In accordance with the enclosure, the Huly Panel reviewed enhanced forensic photographic evidence, photographs, film, eyewitness statements, and other available evidence related to the flag raising. The evidence reviewed by the board represents an aggregation of years of painstaking research by numerous historians, authors, forensics experts, and others.

On 23 February 1945, as part of the operation to take Iwo Jima, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment, was
assigned the mission of securing Mount Suribachi. As planned once the Marines secured the summit, they raised the American flag. As that first flag snapped in the wind, cheers rose from the beach, ships sounded their horns, and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal turned to Major General Holland M. Smith and said, “Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years.” At the time, the first flag raising was the more significant of the two flag raisings to those present. The second flag raising would likely have been lost to history if it were not for Mr. Joseph “Joe” J. Rosenthal’s iconic photograph. Given this context, the stress of combat, and the passage of time, it is not surprising that facts surrounding the second flag raising have been difficult to determine.

The 1947 del Valle Board focused primarily on correcting the identification of the individual in position number 1. That board determined the identities of the six flag raisers in Mr. Rosenthal’s photograph of the second flag raising atop Mount Suribachi as shown in the figure on p. 206. The del Valle Board relied on witness statements and the iconic photograph to identify the flag raisers. Since 1947, additional evidence has come to light and there have been significant advances in photographic forensics.

Identifying personnel in specific locations and times based upon the positioning of visible combat gear and clothing is difficult. People may reposition their gear and clothing, thereby changing their appearance in photographs and film. Nevertheless, physical recognition of faces, body positions, and combat gear present the strongest corroborative evidence this board had to consider at this time.

The Huly Panel used the position numbers indicated in the figure on page 207 to reference individual locations.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On 23 February 1945, Sergeant Michael Strank, Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, and Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley were members of the same squad in Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. [Encl (2)]

2. On 23 February 1945, Private First Class Harold H. Schultz was a mortarman with Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. [Encl (3)]

3. On 23 February 1945, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley was a corpsman with Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. [Encl (3)]

4. On 23 February 1945, Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon was the battalion commander’s runner from Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. [Ref (b), p. 8]

5. On 23 February 1945, Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery was a Leatherneck photographer assigned as a combat cameraman to 5th Marine Division. [Encl (4)]

6. On 23 February 1945, Sergeant William H. Genaust was assigned as a combat cameraman to 5th Marine Division. [Encl (4), Encl (5)]

7. On 23 February 1945, Private Robert R. Campbell was assigned as a combat cameraman to 5th Marine Division. [Encl (4)]

8. On 23 February 1945, commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, ordered executive officer of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, to lead a platoon-size patrol with the mission to secure the top of Mount Suribachi and raise the American flag. [Ref (b), p. 5]

9. Staff Sergeant Lowery and Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley were members of the patrol. [Ref (d), p. 45]

10. The first flag was raised at approximately 1020 on 23 February 1945 atop Mount Suribachi. [Ref (b), p. 5]

11. Staff Sergeant Lowery took photographs of members in the vicinity before and after the first flag raising. [Ref (c), pp. 34–43]

12. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley participated in the raising of the first flag atop Mount Suribachi. [Ref (c), pp. 34–43]

13. Private First Class Schultz was in the immediate vicinity of the first flag raising atop Mount Suribachi. [Ref (c), pp. 34–43]

14. On 23 February 1945, commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, ordered a resupply patrol to carry a second, larger flag to replace the first flag. [Ref (b), p. 8]

15. On 23 February 1945, Mr. Rosenthal was a photographer with the Associated Press (AP). [Encl (2)]

16. On 23 February 1945, Sergeant Strank, Corporal Block, Private First Class Hayes, Private First Class Sousley, and Private First Class Gagnon were members of the resupply patrol, accompanied by Mr. Rosenthal, Sergeant Genaust, and Private Campbell, that carried the second flag to the top of Mount Suribachi. [Ref (d), pp. 64–67, and Encl (2)]

17. The second flag was raised at approximately 1300 on 23 February 1945 as the first flag was simultaneously lowered. [Ref (e), p. 32]
18. Sergeant Genaust filmed the preparation and raising of the second flag. [Encl (6)]
19. Sergeant Genaust stopped filming the preparation of the second flag prior to it being raised, and he moved to a new position. [Ref (d), p. 67, and Encl (6)]
20. Before the break in filming, the Genaust film shows four individuals focused on getting into position on the flagpole. [Encl (6)]
21. Sergeant Genaust resumed filming after an undetermined period of time. [Encl (6)]
22. After the break in filming and just prior to the raising of the flag, the Genaust film shows that the second flag raisers were focused in the direction of the first flag and not on each other. [Encl (6)]
23. Sergeant Genaust continued filming and captured six individuals raising the second flag. [Encl (6)]
24. Mr. Rosenthal photographed the second flag being raised. [Encl (2)]
25. Private Campbell photographed the first flag being lowered, while the second flag was being raised (figure 13.1). [Ref (f)]
26. Shortly after the second flag was raised, Mr. Rosenthal took a group photograph around the second flag, which became known as the *Gung Ho* photograph (figure 0.5). [Ref (f)]
27. Corporal Block was killed in action (KIA) on Iwo Jima on 1 March 1945. [Encl (7)]
28. Sergeant Strank was KIA on Iwo Jima on 1 March 1945. [Encl (8)]
29. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley was wounded on 12 March 1945 and evacuated by air on 13 March 1945. [Ref (b), p. 11]
30. Private First Class Sousley was KIA on Iwo Jima on or about 21 March 1945. [Encl (9)]
31. Private First Class Gagnon made the original identification of the second flag raisers in Mr. Rosenthal’s iconic photograph upon his return to the United States. [Encl (2)]
32. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley, Sergeant Strank, Private First Class Sousley, Private First Class Hayes, and Private First Class Schultz are identified in Mr. Rosenthal’s *Gung Ho* photograph (figure 0.5). [Ref (g), Ref (h), and Ref (f)]
33. At some later time, Private First Class Schultz identified himself as the fifth individual from the right in an inscription on the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Encl (10)]
34. The 1947 del Valle Board determined the individual in position 1 is Corporal Harlon Block. [Encl (2)]
35. No known evidence contradicts the findings of the del Valle Board as to the identification of the individual in position 1. [Ref (a)-(i), and Encl (1)-(11)]
36. The individual in position 1 is wearing a strap across his back that is consistent with a bandoleer (see figure 0.2). [Encl (2)]
37. The Genaust film shows all six flag raisers positioned around the upright pole. [Encl (6)]
38. Sergeant Genaust stopped filming for a second time. [Encl (6)]
39. Sergeant Genaust resumed filming after an indeterminate number of seconds. The gear worn on the individuals holding the flagpole is consistent with the persons from positions 1, 3, 4, and 6 shown before the second break in filming. [Encl (6)]
40. During the break, Mr. Rosenthal moved slightly to the right of his original position. In this way, he was able to capture a profile view of the individual in position 1, a frontal view of the individual in position 3, and a partial view of the individual in position 6 (figure 13.4). [Ref (i)]
41. Sergeant Genaust continued filming and captured the individuals in positions 1, 3, 4, and 6, who are shown stabilizing the flagpole, while the individual in position 5 is walking away from the flag. [Encl (6)]

42. Mr. Rosenthal took a contemporaneous photograph of the individual from position 1 shown in the Genaust film, where his face and equipment are clearly seen (see figure 13.4). [Ref (i)]

43. The face of the individual in position 1 in the contemporaneous photograph by Mr. Rosenthal resembles the service photograph of Corporal Harlon Block (see figure 13.4). [Ref (i)]

44. The 1947 del Valle Board determined the individual in position 2 is Private First Class Gagnon. [Encl (2)]

45. Private First Class Gagnon identified himself as the individual in position 2. [Encl (2)]

46. The Genaust film and Private Campbell’s photograph of the two flags show the individual in position 2 with a rifle slung over his shoulder, which is consistent with Private First Class Gagnon’s table of organization weapon. [Encl (6)]

47. The momentary glimpse of the face in position 2 appears to be Private First Class Gagnon. [Encl (6)]

48. The 1947 del Valle Board determined the individual in position 3 is Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley. [Encl (2)]

49. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley identified himself as the individual in position 3. [Encl (2)]

50. The individual in position 3 is wearing an empty canteen cover, a cartridge belt without suspenders, wire cutters, soft cover under helmet, but is not carrying a rifle or wearing a field jacket. Additionally, his trousers are not cuffed. [Encl (11)]

51. Photographs show Private First Class Sousley wearing an empty canteen cover, a cartridge belt without suspenders, wire cutters, soft cover under helmet, but he is not wearing a field jacket. Additionally, Private First Class Sousley’s trousers are not cuffed. [Encl (11)]

52. Photographs show Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley not wearing an empty canteen cover, wire cutters, or a soft cover under his helmet. He is shown wearing a field jacket, two medical unit 3 bags, first aid pack, Ka-bar, full canteen cover, and suspenders. Additionally, his trousers are cuffed, and he is wearing leggings. [Encl (11)]

53. The Genaust film shows the individual in position 3 moving into a subsequent position where his face and his equipment are clearly seen. [Encl (6)]

54. Mr. Rosenthal took a contemporaneous photograph of the individual from position 3 shown in the Genaust film, where his face and equipment are clearly seen (see figure 13.4 or the detail in figure 13.14). [Encl (11)]

55. Photographic analysis of Mr. Rosenthal’s photograph identifies the individual from position 3 as Private First Class Sousley. [Encl (11)]

56. The 1947 del Valle Board determined the individual in position 4 is Sergeant Strank. [Encl (2)]

57. The Genaust film shows the individual in position 4 moving into a subsequent position where a portion of his left hand is visible. [Encl (6)]

58. Mr. Rosenthal took a contemporaneous photograph of the individual, who is shown in the Genaust film in position 4, where the bare ring finger of his left hand is clearly visible. [Encl (11)]
59. A ring is clearly visible on the ring finger of the left hand of Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley in photographs Private Campbell and Staff Sergeant Lowery shot prior to the second flag raising. [Encl (11)]

60. No ring is visible on the ring finger of the left hand of Sergeant Strank in the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Ref (g)]

61. No medical unit 3 bags, or other gear worn on the torso, are visible on the individual in position 4. [Encl (6) and (10)]

62. Sergeant Strank is not wearing any gear other than a helmet over a soft cover in the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Ref (g)]

63. In the Genaust film before the break, the individual in position 4 appears to be wearing a soft cover. [Encl (6)]

64. In the Genaust film after the break, the individual in position 4 appears to be wearing a helmet. [Encl (6)]

65. Of the photographs available to and reviewed by this board, none show Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley wearing a soft cover on Mount Suribachi. [Ref (a)-(i), and Encl (1)-(11)]

66. Sergeant Strank was wearing a soft cover under his helmet in the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Ref (g)]

67. The 1947 del Valle Board determined the individual in position 5 is Private First Class Sousley. [Encl (2)]

68. The individual in position 5 has a broken helmet liner strap hanging from the left side of his helmet. [Encl (11)]

69. Private First Class Schultz has been identified in photographs as having a broken helmet liner strap hanging from the left side of his helmet. [Encl (11)]

70. From the photographs and film footage examined, no one else has been identified atop Mount Suribachi with a broken helmet liner strap hanging from the left side of his helmet. [Ref (a)-(i), and Encl (1)-(11)]

71. The individual in position 5 has a sling attached to the stacking swivel instead of being properly attached to the upper hand guard sling swivel of his rifle. [Encl (11)]

72. Private First Class Schultz has been identified in photographs as having a sling attached to the stacking swivel of his rifle. [Encl (11)]

73. From the photographs and film footage examined, no one else has been identified atop Mount Suribachi carrying a rifle with a sling attached to the stacking swivel of his rifle. [Ref (a)-(i), and Encl (1)-(11)]

74. The individual in position 5 has a bulging right front field jacket pocket. [Encl (11)]

75. Private First Class Schultz has been identified in photographs as having a bulging right front field jacket pocket. [Encl (11)]

76. There is no indication Private First Class Schultz or anyone else ever mentioned him as raising the flag on Iwo Jima. [Encl (10)]

77. The 1947 del Valle Board determined the individual in position 6 is Private First Class Hayes. [Encl (2)]

78. Private First Class Hayes identified himself as the individual in position 6. [Encl (2)]

79. The Genaust film and the Rosenthal photograph taken after the flag raisers have raised the flag
to a perpendicular position clearly indicate the individual in position 6 is Private First Class Hayes (see figure 13.4 or the detail in figure 13.14). [Encl (6)]

80. The del Valle report concluded that “the need for haste in identifying the participants (in order that they be present for the Seventh War Loan campaign) precluded a more thorough investigation originally.” This haste caused confusion as to the identity of the flag raisers. [Encl (2)]

81. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley wrote to his parents on 26 February 1945: “I had a little to do with raising the American flag and it was the happiest moment of my life.” [Ref (h), p. 216]

82. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley wrote to Major General del Valle on 26 December 1946: “Things happened so fast I didn’t think much of this flag raising until we returned to the U.S. from Iwo Jima.” [Encl (2)]

OPINIONS

1. Previous attempts to accurately identify the flag raisers in Mr. Rosenthal’s iconic photograph were complicated by the death of key participants, the stress of combat, the lack of recognition as to the significance of the second flag raising at the time of its occurrence, the haste to include the flag raisers in the Seventh War Loan campaign, and the subsequent passage of time. [FF 29, 80, 82]

2. The April 1945 effort to comply with the directive to immediately return the flag raisers in Mr. Rosenthal’s iconic photograph and have them participate in the Seventh War Loan campaign resulted in Marine Corps officials incorrectly identifying some of the second flag raisers. [FF 80]

3. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley, Private First Class Hayes, and Private First Class Gagnon may have felt pressured to maintain Private First Class Gagnon’s original identification of the flag raisers in support of the Seventh War Loan campaign. [FF 80]

4. The traumatic injuries Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley sustained in combat on 12 March 1945 may have resulted in him not thinking further about the flag raising or his role in it until after his return to the United States. [FF 29]

5. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley may have conflated his participation in the first flag raising with the second flag raising. [FF 29, 81, 82]

6. The individual in position 1 is Corporal Harlon Block. [FF 1, 16, 34, 35]

7. The individual in position 2 is Private First Class Rene Gagnon. [FF 4, 16, 31, 44, 45, 46, 47]

8. The individual in position 3 is not Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Bradley. [FF 50, 52, 53, 54, 55]

9. The individual in position 3 is Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley. [FF 1, 16, 32, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55]

10. The individual in position 4 is not Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley. [FF 56, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65]

11. The individual associated with position 4 in the Genaust film is Sergeant Strank. [FF 1, 16, 32, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66]

12. During the first break in the Genaust film, Sergeant Strank placed a helmet on top of the soft cover on his head. [FF 63, 64, 66]

13. The individual in position 4 is Sergeant Strank. [FF 1, 16, 32, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66]
The individual in position 5 is not Private First Class Franklin Sousley. [FF 50, 51, 53, 54, 55]

The individual in position 5 is Private First Class Harold Schultz. [FF 2, 13, 32, 33, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75]

The board has no opinion as to why Private First Class Schultz never identified himself as a flag raiser.

The individual in position 6 is Private First Class Ira Hayes. [FF 1, 16, 32, 77, 78, 79]

Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley participated in the first flag raising and remained atop Mount Suribachi throughout the second flag raising. [FF 8, 9, 12, 32, 81]

The opinion of the board is that the identification of the second flag raisers is as depicted in the figure on p. 207. [FF 1-82]

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the records of Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps reflect the identification of the individuals in the photograph as follows:
   a. Position 1 Corporal Harlon Block
   b. Position 2 Private First Class Rene Gagnon
   c. Position 3 Private First Class Franklin Sousley
   d. Position 4 Sergeant Michael Strank
   e. Position 5 Private First Class Harold Schultz
   f. Position 6 Private First Class Ira Hayes

2. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should inform the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Medical Officer of the Marine Corps of the results of this board before they are made public.

3. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should inform the appropriate relatives of Corporal Harlon Block, Private First Class Rene Gagnon, Private First Class Franklin Sousley, Sergeant Michael Strank, Private First Class Harold Schultz, Private First Class Ira Hayes, and Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Bradley of the results of this board before they are made public.

4. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should issue a public statement regarding the correct identification of the second flag raisers. This statement should include acknowledgment of the collective efforts of all who contributed to telling the story of the sacrifices and heroic achievements of all Marines, sailors, and Coast Guardsmen during the battle of Iwo Jima.

5. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps recognize that all previous efforts at identification were conducted in good faith and that no official blame be assessed for previous inaccuracies in the historical record.

6. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps direct that this board report and associated records be deposited in the Marine Corps History Division’s archives.

7. That the Office of Legislative Affairs should inform appropriate members of Congress and congressional staff of the results of this board before they are made public.

8. That Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps should make public the findings of this board.

9. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should coordinate the public release of the findings of this board with the Office of U.S. Marine Corps Communication.
10. That the National Museum of the Marine Corps and other Marine Corps monuments, displays, and educational programs should be updated to reflect the correct identification of the second flag raisers.

JAN C. HULY
Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret)
President of the Board

KEIL R. GENTRY
Colonel, USMC

JASON Q. BOHM
Colonel, USMC

MARY H. REINWALD
Colonel, USMC (Ret)

JUSTIN D. LEHEW
Sergeant Major, USMC

DAVID L. MADDUX
Sergeant Major, USMC

RICHARD A. HAWKINS
Sergeant Major, USMC (Ret)

RANDY PAPADOPOULOS
PhD, Navy Department Secretariat Historian

CHARLES P. NEIMEYER
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret)
PhD, Director, History Division

ENDNOTES

1. At the time the board met, History Division had not yet moved into the Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center.

2. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication’s format.

3. According to Rosenthal, the photographers ascended the mountain separately from the resupply patrol. This timeline was compressed in earlier publications such as Nalty and Crawford, leading to this inaccurate characterization in the Huly Panel report.
In reply refer to:
1000
CMC
5 July 2016

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Lieutenant General Jan Huly, USMC (Ret)
Subj: Precept Convening the Huly Panel to Review the Identity of the First Flag Raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima

1. **Members.** The Huly Panel is appointed, consisting of you as president and the following additional members, to review the identity of those involved in the first flag raising atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima:
   - Brigadier General Jason Bohm, USMC, Commanding General, Training Command
   - Colonel Keil Gentry, USMC (Ret)
   - Colonel Mary Reinwald, USMC (Ret)
   - Sergeant Major Gary Smith, USMC, Sergeant Major, Marine Corps Systems Command
   - Sergeant Major David L. Maddux, USMC, Sergeant Major, Marine Corps University
   - Sergeant Major Richard A. Hawkins, USMC (Ret)
   - Dr. Randy Papadopoulos, Historian, Navy Secretariat
   - Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Director, USMC HD/GRC

2. **Recorder.** Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer will also act as recorder. The recorder will make all reasonable efforts to keep a true record of the proceedings of the board.
3. **Administrative Support Personnel.** Administrative support personnel will be provided by Education Command as required.

4. **Date and Location.** The Huly Panel is ordered to convene at the Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA, on 5 July 2016, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

5. **Mission.** In an extension of its analysis of the second flag raising, the Huly Panel will review photographic evidence and claims related to the identity of participants in the first flag raising on Iwo Jima. The board will also review eyewitness statements and other available evidence related to the flag raising in order to accurately identify the flag raisers.

6. **Guidance.** The board will proceed in accordance with the following specific guidelines:

   a. It is my intent that the deliberations and findings of the board be conducted with integrity and be free from external influence, pressure, or prejudice to the process. Accordingly, the board, and all those participating, will refrain from any disclosures outside of the board until after I have reviewed and accepted its report. Any requests for disclosure outside of the board prior to that point shall be referred to me. This does not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by existing statute or executive order relating to communications to Congress, an inspector general, or any other whistleblower protection.

   b. Further, the board should keep the following in mind as they deliberate. All Marines and corpsmen on Iwo Jima served with dedication and valor and we as a Corps are proud of the legacy of “uncommon courage” that they established and embody. Those Marines atop Mount Suribachi were still embroiled in the heat of battle, at great personal risk, and accomplishing a mission to raise our national ensign to show resolve and to motivate others who might see it. The photographs were spontaneous and involved those in proximity. No one had a reasonable expectation of associated fame or immortality. With the fluidity and risk of battle, individuals moved in and out of the multiple flag raisings, many “trying to help” and without clear memories of who was where and when. Despite the increased use and value of [forensic photographic analysis], with the death of many Marines and corpsmen involved and the passage of seven decades, we may never know for sure who did what, from where, and when.

   c. The board will provide opinions and recommendations to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the form of a written report, which can be made public as soon as possible.

   d. The board will be as objective as possible with available data when making identifications.

   e. The board must not presume identifications beyond what can be authenticated or corroborated.

   f. Although the board may find photographic evidence and individual statements in conflict, the
board shall not impugn the reputation nor diminish the contributions of any individual, team, or unit.

g. The director of the Marine Corps History Division shall furnish the board with all available material for review.

h. Until the completion of proceedings, this board’s location shall be the appointed place of duty for all active duty Marines assigned to the board or in support thereof.

[signature]
ROBERT B. NELLER

ENDNOTE
1. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication’s format.
From: Lieutenant General Jan Huly, USMC (Ret)
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps


Ref: (a) CMC letter Huly Panel Precept of 5 July 2016


1. In accordance with reference (a), the board’s report, enclosure (1) is submitted. The enclosure includes the reference material and key photographs reviewed by the board in furtherance of its requirement to review information regarding the identity of the first flag raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima.

2. The references used by the board in the course of its deliberations were cross-checked with extant published sources related to the flag raising, historical division photographs, and forensic and other primary source materials in the collections of the Gray Research Center and History Division.

[signature]
JAN C. HULY

ENDNOTE

1. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication’s format.

Ref:
(f) Keene, R. R. “Louis Lowery Captured Leatherneck History on Film.” *Leatherneck* 89, no. 10, October 2006, 32–33.
(g) Spence, Dustin. “Unraveling the Mysteries of the First Flag Raising.” *Leatherneck* 89, no. 10, October 2006, 34–43.
Encl:
(1) CMC letter dated 5 July 2016, Precept Convening the Huly Panel to Review Information Regarding the Identity of the First Flag Raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima [Cover Letter Ref (a)]
(2) Reference Photographs of the First Flag Raising on Iwo Jima, 23 February 1945, with Annotations Determined by History Division on 1 July 2016
(4) Personnel Determined by History Division on 23 June 2003 to have been Members of the Patrol that Occupied Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945
(6) Excerpts, Muster Roll of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines (April 1944; October 1944; January 1945; February 1945)
(7) Excerpts, Muster Roll of Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division (January 1945)
(8) Evaluation of Casualty Cards for Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th Division, determined by History Division on 1 July 2016; Casualty Cards for Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th Division, based on February 1945 Muster Roll
(9) Eyewitness account by Private First Class Raymond Jacobs
(10) Excerpts, Muster Roll of 2d Battalion, 27th Marines (February 1945)

AUTHORITY
The board was convened by CMC Precept letter dated 5 July 2016. [Encl (1)]

BOARD COMPOSITION
President Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly, USMC (Ret)
Member Brigadier General Jason Q. Bohm, USMC, CG, TECOM
Member Colonel Keil R. Gentry, USMC (Ret)
Member Colonel Mary H. Reinwald, USMC (Ret), Editor, Leatherneck
Member Sergeant Major Gary Smith, USMC, SgtMaj, SYSCOM
Member Sergeant Major David L. Maddux, USMC, SgtMaj, EDCOM
Member Sergeant Major Richard A. Hawkins, USMC (Ret)
Member Dr. Randy Papadopoulos, Navy Department Secretariat Historian
Member/Recorder Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Director, History Division

Administrative Support Dr. Breanne Robertson, History Division

DATE AND LOCATION
The Huly Panel convened at the Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA, at 0900 on 5 July 2016. The board concluded at 1600 on 8 July 2016.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

At the direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps the Huly Panel that analyzed the second flag raising on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, 23 February 1945, reconvened in order to review the photographic evidence and claims related to the identity of the participants in the first flag raising.

In accordance with enclosure (1), the panel reviewed forensic photographic evidence, photographs, eyewitness statements, and other available evidence related to the first flag raising. To the individuals participating in the Battle of Iwo Jima, the first flag raising was the more significant of the two flag raisings on Mount Suribachi; however, AP photographer Joseph Rosenthal’s iconic photograph caused the second flag raising to overshadow the first flag-raising event, resulting in less publicity and documentation related to the individuals involved in the first flag raising.

Previous attempts to accurately identify individuals involved in the first flag raising were complicated by the stress of combat, the lack of popular recognition as to the significance of the first flag raising, and the subsequent passage of time. The evidence reviewed by the panel represents an aggregation of years of painstaking research by numerous historians, authors, forensics experts, and others.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Current official Marine Corps records identify the first flag raisers as:
   a. First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier [Ref (a), (b)]
   b. Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr. [Ref (a), (b)]
   c. Sergeant Henry O. Hansen [Ref (a), (b)]
   d. Corporal Charles W. Lindberg [Ref (a), (b)]
   e. Private First Class Louis C. Charlo [Ref (a), (b)]
   f. Private First Class James R. Michels [Ref (a), (b)]

2. Early on the morning of 23 February 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, commanding officer, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, ordered a team to ascend Mount Suribachi to conduct route reconnaissance and determine enemy disposition on the summit. [Ref (c), p. 11]

3. The individuals who comprised the reconnaissance team on Mount Suribachi were Sergeant Sherman B. Watson, [Private First Class] George Mercer [misidentified as corporal in original report], Private First Class Theodore White, and Private First Class Louis C. Charlo, all members of Company F, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. [Ref (c), (e), and Encl (2), p. 2]

4. The reconnaissance team encountered no enemy activity on the summit of Mount Suribachi. [Ref (e), p. 41]

5. On 23 February 1945, commanding officer, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, ordered executive officer, Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, to lead a platoon-size patrol with the mission to secure the top of Mount Suribachi and raise the American flag. [Ref (a)–(b), (d), (j)]

6. At the base of Mount Suribachi, First Lieutenant G. Greeley Wells, battalion adjutant for 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, provided an American flag to First Lieutenant Schrier on orders from the battalion commander prior to the patrol’s ascent. [Ref (a), (c), (j)]
7. The patrol led by First Lieutenant Schrier consisted of 3d Platoon, Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, reinforced by other elements of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, and Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, a Leatherneck photographer assigned to the 5th Marine Division. [Ref (a)-(b), (f)–(g), and Encl (6)–(8)]

8. First Lieutenant Schrier’s patrol departed the base of Mount Suribachi at approximately 0830 and passed the reconnaissance team descending from the summit. [Ref (b), (d), (f), and Encl (2), p. 3]

9. The reconnaissance team returned to Company F, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, at the base of Mount Suribachi shortly after they passed the Schrier patrol proceeding up the mountain. [Ref (d), p. 41]

10. The following individuals have been identified as members of the patrol led by First Lieutenant Schrier that occupied the summit of Mount Suribachi at approximately 1000:
   a. First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier [Ref (a), (d), (f), (g), (j), (l)]
   b. Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr. [Ref (a), (d), (f), (g), and Encl (6), (8)]
   c. Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery [Ref (a), (d), (f), (g)]
   d. Sergeant Henry O. Hansen [Ref (a), (d), (g) and Encl (6), (8)]
   e. Sergeant Kenneth D. Midkiff [Ref (d), (j), and Encl (6), (8)]
   f. Sergeant Howard M. Snyder [Ref (d), (g), (l), and Encl (6), (8)]
   g. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley [Ref (d), (g), and Encl (6)]
   h. Private First Class Raymond E. Jacobs [Ref (g), (l), and Encl (6)]
   i. Corporal Harold P. Keller [Ref (c)–(d), (j), (l), and Encl (6)]
   j. Corporal Robert A. Leader [Ref (d), (f), (j), (l), and Encl (6), (8)]
   k. Corporal Charles W. Lindberg [Ref (a), (d), (f)–(g), (j), (l), and Encl (6), (8)]
   l. Private First Class Graydon W. Dyce [Ref (j), pp. 140, 143, and Encl (6)]
   m. Private First Class Clarence H. Garrett [Ref (c)–(d), (j), (l), and Encl (6)]
   n. Private First Class Thomas J. Hermanek Jr. [Ref (l), p. 241, and Encl (6)]
   o. Private First Class Donald S. Howell [Ref (i), p. 203, and Encl (6)]
   p. Private First Class Raymond H. Larsen [Encl (5), (6)]
   q. Private First Class James R. Michels [Ref (a), (c)–(d), (f)–(h), (j), and Encl (6), (8)]
   r. Private First Class Manuel Panizo [Ref (d), (j), and Encl (6), (8)]
   s. Private First Class James A. Robeson [Ref (c)–(d), (f), (j), (l), and Encl (6), (8)]
   t. Private First Class Leo J. Rozek [Ref (d), (f), (j), (l), and Encl (6)]
   u. Private First Class John T. Schmitt [Ref (l), p. 241, and Encl (6), (8)]
   v. Private First Class Harold H. Schultz [Ref (g), p. 37, and Encl (6)]
   w. Private First Class Fred J. Walsak [Encl (5), (6)]
   x. Private Kenneth S. Espenes [Ref (j), p. 143, and Encl (6)]
   y. Private Robert D. Goode [Ref (d), (l), and Encl (6), (8)]
   z. Private Philip L. Ward [Ref (d), (g), (i), and Encl (6)]

11. The following individuals were assigned to 3d Platoon, Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, as of 23 February 1945, but cannot be confirmed as being members of the Schrier patrol:
   a. Corporal James E. Hagstrom [Ref (j), p. 143, and Encl (6), (8)]
   b. Private First Class Clarence R. Hipp [Ref (j), p. 143, and Encl (6), (8)]
   c. Private First Class William J. McNulty [Ref (j), p. 143, and Encl (6), (8)]
d. Private Clark L. Gaylord [Ref (j), p. 143, and Encl (6), (8)]
e. Private James D. Breitenstein [Ref (j), p. 143, and Encl (6), (8)]
f. Private Charles E. Schott [Ref (j), p. 143, and Encl (6), (8)]

12. All of the members in the patrol led by First Lieutenant Schrier cannot be identified due to insufficient evidence. [Ref (a)–(l), and Encl (6)–(8)]

13. When the patrol reached the top of the mountain, its members dispersed along the crest of the crater to occupy security positions while the headquarters element looked for a suitable place to raise the flag. [Ref (d), (j)]

14. Corporal Robert A. Leader and Private First Class Leo J. Rozek found the pipe to which the first flag was affixed. [Ref (d)–(f), (j), (l)]

15. Staff Sergeant Lowery photographed the preparation of the first flag. [Ref (d), (e), (f), (l), and Encl (2), pp. 4–8]

16. The following individuals affixed the first flag to the pipe:
   a. First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier [Ref (d)–(f), (j), and Encl (2), pp. 4–7]
   b. Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr. [Ref (d)–(f), (j), and Encl (2), pp. 4–7]
   c. Sergeant Henry O. Hansen [Ref (d)–(e), (j), and Encl (2), pp. 4–7]
   d. Corporal Charles W. Lindberg [Ref (d)–(e), (j), and Encl (2), pp. 4–7]
   e. Private Philip L. Ward [Ref (g), p. 35, and Encl (2), pp. 4, 7]

17. The flagpole was carried horizontally for a short distance from the place where it was prepared to the location where it was raised. [Ref (e), p. 39]

18. The following individuals were either touching or within reach of the flagpole just prior to the first flag being raised:
   a. First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier [Encl (2), p. 8]
   d. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley [Encl (2), p. 8]
   e. Corporal Charles W. Lindberg [Encl (2), p. 8]

19. The first flag was raised on the summit of Mount Suribachi at approximately 1030.² [Ref (a–l)]

20. Staff Sergeant Lowery was reloading the film in his camera as the first flag was being raised. [Ref (d), (e)]

21. No photographs or film are known to exist that depict the actual raising of the first flag. [Ref (a)–(l), and Encl (2)]

22. Staff Sergeant Lowery resumed taking photographs of the first flag immediately after it was raised. [Ref (d)–(f), (g), and Encl (2), pp. 9–15]

23. The following individuals were in contact with the flagpole on the summit of Mount Suribachi immediately after the first flag was raised:
   c. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley [Ref (g), and Encl (2), pp. 9–15]
   d. Private Philip L. Ward [Ref (g), and [Encl (2), pp. 9–15]
24. Immediately after the event, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson and First Lieutenant Schrier communicated via radio regarding the first flag raising. [Encl (2), pp. 11, 13–15, and Encl (9)]

25. The following individuals provided support in the immediate vicinity of the first flag raising:
   a. Sergeant Howard M. Snyder, security [Ref (g), (j), and Encl (2), pp. 9–10, 13–15]
   b. Corporal Raymond E. Jacobs, radio operator [Ref (g), (l), and Encl (2), pp. 9–15]
   c. Private First Class James R. Michels, security [Ref (g)–(h), (j), and Encl (2), pp. 12]
   d. Private First Class Harold H. Schultz, security [Ref (g), p. 37, and Encl (2), pp. 9–14]
   e. Private First Class James A. Robeson, security [Ref (c), (f), (l)]

26. Of the photographic evidence available to and reviewed by this panel, none show Private First Class Charlo in the vicinity of the first flag as it was being raised. [Encl (2)]

27. A patrol led by Captain Arthur H. Naylor Jr., commanding officer, Company F, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, and consisting of members of Company F, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, ascended the summit to reinforce security after the first flag raising and prior to the second flag raising at approximately 1300. [Ref (e), p. 46]

28. All of the members in the patrol led by Captain Naylor cannot be identified due to insufficient evidence. [Ref (a)–(l)]

29. Navy Reserve Chaplain Lieutenant Charles F. Suver and his assistant, Sergeant James E. Fisk, ascended the mountain after the first flag raising and prior to the second flag raising. [Ref (d), pp. 42, 53, and Encl (2)]

30. In addition to the above, the following individuals were present on the summit after the first flag raising and prior to the Gung Ho photograph taken immediately after the second flag raising by AP photographer Joseph Rosenthal:
   a. Sergeant William H. Genaust [Encl (2), p. 16, (3), (7)]
   b. Sergeant Michael Strank [Encl (3), (5)]
   c. Sergeant Sherman B. Watson [Ref (d), p. 41]
   d. Corporal Harlon H. Block [Encl (3)]
   e. Private First Class Louis R. Barmeister [Ref (e), pp. 62–66, and Encl (2), p. 18]
   f. Private First Class George Burns, USA [Ref (e), pp. 62–66, and Encl (2), p. 16]
   g. Private First Class Louis C. Charlo [Ref (d), p. 41, and Encl (2), p. 18]
   h. Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon [Encl (3)]
   i. Private First Class Ira H. Hayes [Encl (3), (5)]
   j. Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley [Encl (3), (5)]
   k. Private First Class John R. Thurman [Encl (5), (10)]
   l. Private First Class Theodore White [Ref (d), p. 41]
   m. Private Robert R. Campbell [Encl (2), p. 16, (3), (7)]
   n. Civilian Joseph J. Rosenthal [Encl (2), p. 16, (3)]

OPINIONS

1. The following six individuals raised the first flag (FF):
   a. First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier [FF 1, 5, 6–8, 10, 12, 15–19, 22]
   b. Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr. [FF 1, 7–8, 10, 15–19, 22-23]
c. Sergeant Henry O. Hansen [FF 1, 7–8, 10, 15–19, 22-23];
d. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley [FF 7–8, 10, 17–19, 22–23];
e. Corporal Charles W. Lindberg [FF 1, 7–8, 10, 15–19, 22];
f. Private Philip L. Ward [FF 7–8, 10, 15–19, 22–23].

2. The following individuals did not raise the first flag as previously indicated in the official historical record of the Marine Corps:
   a. Private First Class Louis C. Charlo [FF 1–3, 8–9, 13, 20–22, 26];
   b. Private First Class James R. Michels [FF 1, 7–8, 10, 13, 20–22, 25].

3. Although Private First Class Charlo did not raise the first flag, he was a member of the reconnaissance team prior to the first flag raising and later returned to the summit as security reinforcement prior to the raising of the second flag raising. [FF 2–4, 8–9, 13, 20–22, 26]

4. Although Private First Class Michels did not raise the first flag, he provided security in the immediate vicinity of the event. [FF 5, 7–8, 10, 13, 20–22, 25]

5. Private First Class Michels was previously identified as a participant in the first flag raising due to his prominent positioning in the photograph taken by Staff Sergeant Lowery immediately after the event (see figure 0.3). [FF 1, 13, 20–22, 25]

6. There may be additional members of the patrol led by First Lieutenant Schrier, but they cannot be identified due to insufficient evidence. [FF 5, 7–8, 10–12, 30]

7. There may be additional members of the patrol led by Captain Naylor, but they cannot be identified due to insufficient evidence. [FF 27–28, 30]

8. Additional individuals may have been present on the summit during the flag-raising events on 23 February 1945, but they cannot be identified due to insufficient evidence. [FF 1–30]

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the records of Headquarters Marine Corps reflect the identification of the individuals in the first flag raising as follows:
   a. First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier;
   b. Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr.;
   c. Sergeant Henry O. Hansen;
   d. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley;
   e. Corporal Charles W. Lindberg;
   f. Private Philip L. Ward.

2. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should inform the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Medical Officer of the Marine Corps of the results of this panel before they are made public.

3. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should inform the appropriate relatives of First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr., Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, Corporal Charles W. Lindberg, Private First Class Louis C. Charlo, Private First Class James R. Michels, Private Philip L. Ward, and Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley of the results of this panel before they are made public.

4. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should issue a public statement regarding the correct
identification of the first flag raisers. This statement should include acknowledgment of the collective efforts of all who contributed to telling the story of the sacrifices and heroic achievements of all Marines, sailors, and Coast Guardsmen during the battle of Iwo Jima.

5. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps recognize that all previous efforts at identification were conducted in good faith and that no official blame be assessed for previous inaccuracies in the historical record.

6. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps direct that this panel report and associated records be deposited in the Marine Corps History Division’s archives.

7. That the Office of Legislative Affairs should inform appropriate members of Congress and congressional staff of the results of this panel before they are made public.

8. That Headquarters Marine Corps should make public the findings of this panel.

9. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps should coordinate the public release of the findings of this panel with the Office of U.S. Marine Corps Communication.

JAN C. HULY
Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret)
President of the Board

JASON Q. BOHM
Brigadier General, USMC

KEIL R. GENTRY
Colonel, USMC (Ret)

MARY H. REINWALD
Colonel, USMC (Ret)

GARY SMITH
Sergeant Major, USMC

DAVID L. MADDOUX
Sergeant Major, USMC

RICHARD A. HAWKINS
Sergeant Major, USMC (Ret)

RANDY PAPADOPOULOS
PhD, Navy Department Secretariat Historian

CHARLES P. NEIMEYER
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret)
PhD, Director, History Division

ENDNOTE

1. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication’s format.

2. The time for this event was established as 1020.
APPENDIX D

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BOWERS BOARD INVESTIGATION

Report of the Board’s Review of New Claims Regarding the Identity of the Second Flag Raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima

Ref:


Encl:

(1) CMC letter dated 4 February 2019, Precept Convening the Board to Review New Claims Regarding the Identity of the Second Flag Raisers atop Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima
ed 11 July 2016; Memorandum for the Record: Errata, dated 31 August 2016; and Memorandum for the Record: *Gung Ho* Photo Identification, dated 22 March 2017 [Huly Panel Report]


(4) Excerpts, Muster Roll of 2d Battalion, 28th Marines (February 1945); Excerpts, Muster Roll of Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division (February 1945); Photograph of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California (Spring 1944)

(5) Possible Complement of the Patrol led by First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier on 23 February 1945, as determined by Mr. Stephen Foley and Colonel Keil R. Gentry, USMC (Ret), on 1 February 2019

(6) Excerpts, After Action Report from Combat Team 28

(7) Timeline of Archival Photographs depicting the First and Second Flag Raisings on Iwo Jima, 23 February 1945, as determined by Dr. Breanne Robertson on 1 February 2019

(8) Excerpts, D+4 Foreword and Photograph Captions written by Private First Class George Burns

(9) Memorandum of Iwo Jima Uniform Analyses by Owen L. Conner, dated 6 February 2019

(10) Casualty Cards for Sergeant Michael Strank, Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley, and Private First Class Harold H. Schultz

**AUTHORITY**

The board was convened by CMC precept letter dated 4 February 2019. [Encl (1)]

**BOARD COMPOSITION**

President

Brigadier General William J. Bowers, USMC,
Commanding General, EDCOM

Member

Colonel Robert C. Fulford, USMC, Director, EWS

Member

Colonel Keil R. Gentry, USMC (Ret), EDCOM

Member

Sergeant Major William J. Grigsby, Sergeant Major, TECOM

Member

Sergeant Major Douglas F. Cutsail, USMC, Sergeant Major, EDCOM

Member

Master Sergeant Stacy M. Patzman, USMC (Ret), EDCOM

Member/Recorder

Dr. Breanne Robertson, History Division

**DATE AND LOCATION**

The board convened at the Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center, Quantico, Virginia, at 0900 on 4 February 2019. The board concluded at 1700 on 6 May 2019.

**PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

On 17 July 2018, Mr. Dustin Spence sent an email with a 102-slide PowerPoint presentation to Major General Orlo K. Steele, USMC (Ret). The brief, based on the diligent research of Mr. Stephen Foley and Mr. Brent Westemeyer, asserted multiple claims: (1) that Corporal Harold P. Keller of Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment, is pictured in Associated Press photographer Joseph J. Rosenthal’s famous flag-raising photograph in the position currently associated with Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon
(2) that Sergeant Michael Strank’s role as a second flag raiser can be confirmed through photographic evidence [Rosenthal/4502230115], (3) that Private First Class Gagnon is pictured in Private Robert R. Campbell’s image of both flags as the first flag lowerer at the head of the flagpole [Campbell/112718], and (4) that the Marine standing behind Sergeant Henry O. Hansen in Rosenthal’s *Gung Ho* photograph [Rosenthal/4502230131] is Corporal Harlon H. Block. Many of the photographs included in the brief were reviewed as evidence during the 2016 Huly Panel investigation, convened by the Commandant on 19 April 2016, which determined the participation of Private First Class Harold H. Schultz in the second flag raising [Encl (2)]. However, Mr. Spence, Mr. Foley, and Mr. Westemeyer also introduced historical photographs from the private collection of Corporal Keller and from the George Burns Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, that were not available to the Huly Panel members. These additional photographs provided perspectives and camera angles not available to the Huly Panel.

Because this brief presented new and compelling evidence that countered the official U.S. Marine Corps roster of second flag raisers, Major General Steele forwarded Mr. Spence’s email to Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly, USMC (Ret), on 20 July 2018. On 9 August 2018, Lieutenant General Huly shared the PowerPoint presentation with members of the 2016 Huly Panel, as well as Marine Corps University’s Commanding General, Education Command/President, Brigadier General William J. Bowers. The consensus among the Huly Panel members and Brigadier General Bowers was that the photographic evidence was persuasive enough to merit further investigation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was informed of this development.

A research team consisting of Dr. Breanne Robertson and Colonel Keil Gentry, USMC (Ret), with assistance from Master Sergeant Stacy M. Patzman, USMC (Ret), undertook a detailed assessment of the claims put forward in the brief. These three individuals work at Marine Corps University. This small team expanded on prior source materials to include written correspondence; oral history interviews; and photographic negatives, prints, and motion picture footage held in public and private collections across the country. Dr. Robertson and Colonel Gentry further multiplied their efforts through collaboration with Mr. Foley, Mr. Westemeyer, and Mr. Spence.

The historical evidence assembled for this board’s review reflects contributions from several individuals and institutions. As such, the cumulative data exceeds the quality and depth of research previously considered by the 1947 del Valle Board or 2016 Huly Panel [Encl (3), Encl (2)]. Of particular note:

- To evaluate the integrity of the photographs included in the Spence/Foley/Westemeyer slide deck, Dr. Robertson consulted the U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Negative Logbook and developed a parallel version using high-resolution scans taken directly from the archival print or negative, as available, from collections at the National Archives, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, and Associated Press.
- Based on a formal request dated 31 October 2018 from the director of Marine Corps Staff, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Digital Evidence Laboratory undertook manual and automated analyses to assist with corroboration of the individuals associated with the second flag raising, first
flag lowering, and *Gung Ho* photographs across multiple visual media; equipment and clothing comparisons; and facial comparison examinations of subjects under review.

- The team examined Marine Corps veteran and author Richard Wheeler’s personal papers, which served as the basis for two historical monographs on the Battle of Iwo Jima: *Iwo* and *The Bloody Battle for Suribachi*. Wheeler was a member of 3d Platoon, Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment, during the Battle of Iwo Jima. His research files included audio-taped recordings of oral history interviews and letters from Wheeler’s platoon-mates who fought on Iwo Jima, including Corporal Keller.
- The team reviewed Corporal Keller’s personal effects and collected pertinent items, including historical photographs, letters, and newspaper clippings maintained in a family scrapbook.
- The team interviewed Mr. Rene Gagnon Jr. (Private First Class Gagnon’s son) via telephone and email. The team also contacted the Wright Museum of World War II, Wolfeboro, New Hampshire; the Manchester Historic Association, New Hampshire; and the National Museum of the Marine Corps, Triangle, Virginia, to obtain battlefield photographs or personal effects of Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon for comparison to the flag-raising photographs, to no avail.
- The team consulted with the Marine Military Academy, Harlingen, Texas, and Weslaco Independent School District, Texas, to obtain additional photographs of Corporal Harlon H. Block for comparison to the *Gung Ho* photographs, to no avail.
- The team conducted telephone interviews with the four remaining World War II veterans who are members of the Brooklyn, Iowa, chapter of the American Legion, an organization to which Corporal Keller also belonged.
- In addition to revisiting official service record books and personal photographs of Sergeant Strank and Corporal Block, the team viewed *The Oath*, a documentary about Michael Strank.
- The team compiled material from a variety of other sources, including but not limited to: a 1991 video interview with first flag raiser and eyewitness to the second flag raising Private Philip L. Ward, maintained by the Carnegie Museum of Montgomery County and the Crawfordsville District Public Library, both in Crawfordsville, Indiana; artifacts held at the Brooklyn Historical Museum, Iowa; and the research files amassed by Dr. Parker Bishop Albee Jr. and Ms. Keller Cushing Freeman for their book, *Shadow of Suribachi*.

Once the initial research was complete, the board reviewed forensic photographic analyses, historical photographs and film, eyewitness statements, period uniform items presented by National Museum of the Marine Corps Uniforms and Heraldry Curator Owen L. Conner, and other available primary and secondary source materials related to the flag raising. The evidence reviewed by the board represents an aggregation of years of painstaking research by numerous historians, authors, forensics experts, and others.

The board adopted the position numbers previously assigned by the Huly Panel, as indicated in Mary Reinwald’s chapter, to refer to individual locations within Rosenthal’s photograph.

To build and reinforce objectivity of analysis and deliberation, the board also took the step of leveraging the latest technology and resources of the federal government, most notably by engaging the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to assist in identification of the participants. This board benefited from the FBI’s assistance...
in many ways. The FBI produced a report for the board using a seven-point scale ranging from +3 to -3 [see Reference (e)] to determine the degree of certainty for identifying individuals on Iwo Jima. The board adopted this scale for its deliberations on the four claims identified above. This method allows and accounts for inevitable improvements in technology that may, in time, strengthen our ability to authenticate and corroborate the individuals involved on Iwo Jima. In fact, the Marine Corps submitted a secondary request for the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory to perform the same forensic analyses to corroborate the previous identifications of Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley, and Private First Class Harold H. Schultz, as second flag raisers.

Finally, this board did not operate under time constraints or exigencies, anchoring its deliberations and findings on use of the most current technology, proven forensic photographic analysis methods of the FBI, examination of all available evidence, and the use of a common grading scale for authentication and corroboration of identities. The accuracy of the board’s conclusions is based on the evidence, analyses, and technology available at this time. The board acknowledges that inevitable advances in technology and/or the introduction of additional photographic evidence may offer further context or clarity to this board’s conclusions.
FINDINGS OF FACTS RELATED TO CLAIM ONE

Is Corporal Harold P. Keller in Position 2?

1. Corporal Harold P. Keller was a member of 3d platoon, Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment (E/2/28). [Encl (2), (4); Ref (a), p. 182]

2. On the morning of 23 February 1945, Corporal Keller was a member of First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier’s patrol, which was tasked with securing the summit of Mount Suribachi and raising the first American flag. [Encl (5), (9); Ref (b), p. 115]

3. At 1020, Lieutenant Schrier and five members of his patrol (Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr., Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, Corporal Charles Lindberg, Private Philip L. Ward) raised the first American flag on the summit. [Encl (2), (6)]

4. After the first flag raising but prior to the second flag raising, Army Private First Class George Burns of Yank magazine arrived at the summit and captured two photographs of Corporal Keller and Sergeant Howard M. Snyder shaking hands. [Encl (7), (8)]

5. Sergeant William H. Genaust and Private Robert R. Campbell, combat cameramen assigned to 5th Marine Division, and Associated Press photographer Joseph J. Rosenthal arrived at the summit shortly before the second flag raising. [Encl (4); Ref (c), p. 65]

6. The historical record indicates the second flag raising occurred between 1145 and 1230. A variety of times are provided across multiple first-hand accounts for the second flag raising, making it difficult to specify the precise minute the flag raised. [Ref (c), p. 65; Ref (d), p. 51]

7. Mr. Rosenthal captured a photograph of the second flag as it was being raised. [Encl (7); Ref (c), p. 65; (e)]

8. Private Campbell took a contemporaneous photograph of the first flag being lowered while the second flag was being raised [Campbell/112718]. This photograph shows a frontal view of the individual in position 2. The camouflage pattern and configuration of his clothing and equipment are clearly visible. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

9. Subsequently, Private Campbell captured a photograph of two Marines saluting the second flag [Campbell/112719]. This photograph shows a frontal view of the individual in position 2. The camouflage pattern and configuration of his clothing and equipment are clearly visible. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

10. In the photographs taken by Private Campbell, the subject in position 2 is wearing a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and two bandoleers slung over one shoulder, which causes distinctive creases in his utility coat. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

11. Private First Class Burns and Mr. Rosenthal took photographs of a large group posing beneath the second flag that later became known as the Gung Ho image. [Encl (7)]

12. In Private First Class Burns’ photographs depicting Sergeant Snyder and Corporal Keller and in the Gung Ho photographs, Corporal Keller is wearing a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and two bandoleers slung over one shoulder, which causes distinctive creases in his utility coat. [Encl (7), (8)]

13. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined extremely strong support (+3, i.e., the highest possible level of support) for the proposition that Corporal Keller is the subject in position 2, further stating, “In other words, Cpl Keller can be identified as the subject in Position #2 in the 2nd Flag Raising Photograph.” [Ref (e)]
14. The FBI report determined some support for exclusion of Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon as the subject in position 2. [Ref (e)]

CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO CLAIM ONE
1. With extremely strong support for identification, the board determined that the subject in position 2 is Corporal Harold P. Keller.
2. With extremely strong support for exclusion, the board determined that the subject in position 2 is not Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon.

FINDING OF FACTS RELATED TO CLAIM TWO

Is Sergeant Michael Strank in Position 4?
1. Sergeant Michael Strank was a member of 2d Platoon, E/2/28. [Ref (d), p. 50; (e)]
2. Sergeant Strank received orders from Captain Dave Severance, commanding officer of E Company, to collect a small patrol and lay communications wire to the summit of Mount Suribachi. [Ref (d), p. 50]
3. Sergeant Strank led a four-man squad that included himself, Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, and Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley. [Encl (2); Ref (d), p. 51]
4. When Sergeant Strank arrived at the summit, he relayed to Lieutenant Schrier the order from Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, commanding officer of Landing Team, 2d Battalion, 28th Marine Regiment (LT228), to raise the second flag. [Ref (d), p. 51]
5. Sergeant Genaust filmed the preparation and raising of the second flag. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
6. Sergeant Genaust captured four individuals holding the flagpole prior to it being raised. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
7. Sergeant Genaust stopped filming and resumed again after an indeterminate length of time. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
8. After the break in filming, the Genaust film shows six Marines holding the flagpole prior to it being raised. The Marine in position 4 is wearing a soft cap. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
9. Mr. Rosenthal took a photograph of the second flag as it was being raised. [Encl (7); Ref (c), p. 65]
10. Mr. Rosenthal took a subsequent photograph showing four individuals supporting the flagpole after it has been raised [Rosenthal/4502230123]. These individuals correspond to positions 1, 3, 4, and 6. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
11. In Rosenthal/4502230123, the Marine in position 4 is wearing an unbuttoned utility coat over an unzipped M1941 field jacket. He is wearing a watch on his left wrist. There is no ring on his left hand. [Encl (9); Ref (e)]
12. After the second flag raising, Mr. Rosenthal and Private First Class Burns took a group photograph of Marines standing beneath the second flag that became known as the Gung Ho photograph. [Encl (7)]
13. In the Gung Ho photographs, Sergeant Strank is wearing a helmet with a soft cap underneath and a buttoned utility coat over a M1941 field jacket. He is not wearing a ring on his left hand. [Encl (9); Ref (e)]
14. More than 100 photographs depicting the approximately 100 Marines and sailors ascending and atop Mount Suribachi were taken by Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, Sergeant Louis R. Burmeister,
Staff Sergeant Meyers A. Cornelius, Sergeant William H. Genaust, Private Robert R. Campbell, Army Private First Class George Burns, Coast Guard Photographer’s Mate 3d Class John Papsun, and Associated Press photographer Joseph J. Rosenthal on 23 February 1945. [Encl (7)]

15. Of the photographs reviewed by the board, only one other individual, who has not been previously identified, can be seen wearing a utility coat over a M1941 field jacket. He is wearing a ring on his left hand. [Encl (7)]

16. Sergeant Strank was killed in action on Iwo Jima on 1 March 1945. [Encl (10)]

17. Eyewitness statements identify Sergeant Strank in position 4. [Encl (3)]

18. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined limited support (+1) for the proposition that Sergeant Michael Strank is the subject in position 4. [Ref (c)]

CONCLUSION RELATED TO CLAIM TWO
1. The board determined some-to-strong support for the proposition that the subject in position 4 is Sergeant Michael Strank.

FINDING OF FACTS RELATED TO CLAIM THREE
Is Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon at the Head of the First Flag as It Is Being Lowered?
1. Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon was a member of E/2/28. [Encl (4)]
2. The military occupational specialty of Private First Class Gagnon was messenger. On 23 February 1945, Private First Glass Gagnon was the battalion commander’s runner from E/2/28. [Encl (4); Ref (f), p. 8]
3. After the first flag raising, Private First Class Gagnon received an order to courier radio batteries and a larger American flag to the summit of Mount Suribachi and return the first, smaller flag to the LT228 command post. [Encl (3); Ref (d), pp. 49–50.]
4. At some point, Private First Class Gagnon joined the wire-laying detail led by Sergeant Strank. [Ref (d), p. 51]
5. After Private First Class Gagnon arrived at the summit, the second flag was raised as the first flag was simultaneously lowered. [Encl (7)]
6. Eyewitness statements place Private First Class Gagnon on the summit during the second flag raising. [Encl (3)]
7. There is a lack of verifiable contemporaneous photographs of Private First Class Gagnon on the summit during the second flag raising. [Encl (7)]
8. Private Campbell took a photograph of the first flag being lowered [Campbell/112718]. [Encl (7)]
9. The individual at the head of the first flagpole in Private Campbell’s photograph is wearing a camouflage-patterned helmet cover, a small pack or haversack on his back, an M1936 pistol belt with Marine utility knife or “Ka-Bar,” and leggings over his boots. There is a hole beneath the right armpit of his service shirt, and he is wearing a watch on his left wrist. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
10. Prior to the first flag being lowered, Private Campbell captured a photograph of an individual smoking a cigarette [Campbell/112715]. This individual is wearing a camouflage-patterned helmet cover, a small pack or haversack on his back, an M1936 pistol belt with a Marine utility knife or Ka-Bar, and leggings over his boots. There is a hole beneath the right armpit of his service shirt, and he is wearing a watch on his left wrist. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BOWERS BOARD INVESTIGATION
305
11. After the second flag raising, Mr. Rosenthal and Private First Class Burns took group photographs that became known as the *Gung Ho* image. [Encl (7)]

12. Private First Class Gagnon is not depicted in the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Encl (2), (7); Ref (e)]

13. The individual pictured at the head of the first flagpole in Private Campbell’s photograph is not in the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Encl (7)]

14. The individual smoking a cigarette in Private Campbell’s photograph is not in the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Encl (7)]

15. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined with extremely strong support (+3) that the individual at the head of the first flagpole in the flag-lowering photograph and the individual smoking the cigarette is the same person. [Ref (e)]

16. Due to a lack of fine detail in Private Campbell’s photographs and a lack of contemporaneous photographs clearly showing the face, uniform, and equipment of Private First Class Gagnon from the summit, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined no conclusion regarding the comparison between Private First Class Gagnon and the flag-lowering individual [Campbell/112718]/smoking subject [Campbell/112715]. [Ref (e)]

17. Sometime after the second flag raising, Private First Class Gagnon returned the first flag to the LT228 command post. [Ref (g), p. A26]

18. While still on Iwo Jima, Technical Sergeant Keyes Beech, in conversation with Lieutenant Schrier and Private First Class Gagnon, identified the men pictured in Mr. Rosenthal’s photograph as: Sergeant Michael Strank, Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley, and Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon. [Encl (3)]

19. After their return to the United States in April 1945, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley and Privates First Class Gagnon and Hayes served on temporary assigned duty in support of the Seventh War Loan drive. [Ref (d), pp. 95–124]

**CONCLUSION RELATED TO CLAIM THREE**

1. The board determined limited-to-strong support for the proposition that the flag-lowering subject in Private Campbell’s photograph is Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon.

**FINDING OF FACTS RELATED TO CLAIM FOUR**

*Is Corporal Harlon H. Block in the *Gung Ho* photograph?*

1. Corporal Harlon H. Block was a member of 2d Platoon, E/2/28. [Encl (4); Ref (d), p. 50]

2. Corporal Block was a member of the wire-laying detail led by Sergeant Strank. [Encl (3); Ref (d), p. 50]

3. Corporal Block arrived at the summit prior to the second flag being raised. [Encl (3); Ref (d), p. 51]

4. Mr. Rosenthal took a photograph of the second flag as it was being raised. The individual in position 1 is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover. He also wears a bandoleer, stretching from his right shoulder to his left abdomen, over his M1941 field jacket. [Encl (7); Ref (c), p. 65]

5. Private Campbell took a contemporaneous photograph of the first flag being lowered while the second flag was being raised [Campbell/112718]. This photograph shows a profile view of the
individual in position 1 standing closest to the camera to the left of the second flag pole. The camouflage-patterned helmet cover worn by this individual is clearly visible. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

6. Subsequently, Private Campbell captured a photograph of two Marines saluting the second flag [Campbell/112719]. A partial view of the subject in position 1 and the camouflage-patterned helmet cover on his headgear is discernible behind and to the right of the individual in position 2. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

7. Moments later, Mr. Rosenthal took a photograph showing four individuals supporting the flagpole after it has been raised [Rosenthal/4502230123]. These individuals correspond to positions 1, 3, 4, and 6. [Ref (e)]

8. In Rosenthal/4502230123, the individual in position 1 is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover. He also wears a bandoleer, stretching from his right shoulder to his left abdomen, over his M1941 field jacket. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

9. After the second flag raising, Mr. Rosenthal took a group portrait that became known as the Gung Ho photograph. [Encl (7); Ref (e), p. 66]

10. The individual standing directly behind Sergeant Henry O. Hansen is almost entirely obscured in Mr. Rosenthal’s photograph. The subject has heretofore never been identified. [Encl (2), (7)]

11. Contemporaneous with Mr. Rosenthal’s Gung Ho photograph, Private First Class Burns took two nearly identical photographs of the same group of Marines. The face and helmet of the individual standing directly behind Sergeant Hansen are partially visible in these photographs. [Encl (7), (8)]

12. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined extremely strong support (+3) that the Marine in position 1 and the partially obscured individual in the Gung Ho photograph are the same person. [Ref (e)]

13. Eyewitness statements place Corporal Block in proximity to the second flag as it was being raised. [Encl (3)].

14. Corporal Block was killed in action on Iwo Jima on or about 1 March 1945. [Encl (10)]

15. In 1947, the del Valle Board identified Corporal Block as the Marine in position 1. [Encl (3)]

16. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined limited support (+1) for the proposition that Corporal Block is the subject depicted just to the left of the flagpole and in the back row of subjects depicted in the Gung Ho photograph. [Ref (e)]

CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO CLAIM FOUR

1. With extremely strong support for identification, the board determined that the subject in position 1 is Corporal Harlon H. Block.

2. With strong-to-extremely strong support for identification, the board determined that the previously unidentified individual behind Sergeant Henry O. Hansen in the Gung Ho photograph is Corporal Block.

FINDING OF FACTS RELATED TO POSITION 3

Is Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley in Position 3?

1. Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley was a member of 2d Platoon, E/2/28. [Encl (4); Ref (d), p. 50]
2. Private First Class Sousley was a member of the wire-laying detail led by Sergeant Strank. [Encl (3); Ref (d), p. 50]

3. Private First Class Sousley arrived at the summit prior to the second flag being raised. [Encl (3); Ref (d), p. 51]

4. Mr. Rosenthal took a photograph of the second flag as it was being raised. The subject in position 3 is wearing a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and an ammunition belt featuring an empty canteen pouch and sheathed TL pliers (steel-gray, with nonslip handles). [Encl (2), (7); Ref (d), p. 65; (e)]

5. Subsequently, Private Campbell captured a photograph of two Marines saluting the second flag [Campbell/112719]. The subject in position 3, who is closest to the camera and to the immediate left of the flagpole, shows a frontal view of the camouflage-patterned helmet cover and face. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

6. Moments later, Mr. Rosenthal took a photograph showing four individuals supporting the flagpole after it has been raised [Rosenthal/4502230123]. These individuals correspond to positions 1, 3, 4, and 6. [Ref (e)]

7. In Rosenthal/4502230123, the individual in position 3 is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover. He also wears a soft cap under the helmet, which tilts down to the left of the subject’s face, and an ammunition belt featuring an empty canteen pouch and sheathed TL pliers. A wire reel handle dangling from the belt over the left leg is also clearly visible. [Encl (2), (7); Ref (e)]

8. After the second flag raising, Mr. Rosenthal and Private First Class Burns took a group portrait that became known as the Gung Ho photograph. [Encl (7), (8)]

9. In the Gung Ho photograph, Private First Class Sousley is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover. Also visible is a soft cap under the helmet, which tilts down to the left of the subject’s face. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

10. Eyewitness statements place Private First Class Sousley in proximity to the second flag as it was being raised. [Encl (3)].

11. Private First Class Sousley was killed in action on Iwo Jima on or about 21 March 1945. [Encl (10)]

12. In 2016, the Huly Panel identified Private First Class Sousley as the Marine in position 3. [Encl (2)]

13. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined extremely strong support (+3, i.e., the highest possible level of support) for the proposition that Private First Class Sousley is the subject in position 3, further stating, “In other words, PFC Sousley can be identified as the subject in Position #3 in the 2nd Flag Raising Photograph.” [Ref (e)]

CONCLUSION RELATED TO POSITION 3
1. With extremely strong support for identification, the board determined that the subject in position 3 is Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley.

FINDING OF FACTS RELATED TO POSITION 5
Is Private First Class Harold H. Schultz in Position 5?

1. Private First Class Harold H. Schultz was a mortarman with E/2/28. [Encl (4)]

2. On the morning of 23 February 1945, Private First Class Schultz was a member of First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier’s patrol, which was tasked with securing the summit of Mount Suribachi and raising the first American flag. [Encl (2), (8)]
3. At 1020, Lieutenant Schrier and five members of his patrol (Platoon Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas Jr., Sergeant Henry O. Hansen, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, Corporal Charles Lindberg, Private Philip L. Ward) raised the first American flag on the summit. [Encl (2), (6)]

4. Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, a combat cameraman for Leatherneck assigned to 5th Marine Division, accompanied Lieutenant Schrier’s patrol and captured photographs of the mission to secure the summit of Mount Suribachi and raise the first American flag. [Encl (4), (7)]

5. After the first flag raising but prior to the second flag raising, Staff Sergeant Lowery captured photographs of Private First Class Schultz providing security in the vicinity of the first flag raising. [Encl (2), (7)]

6. In a subsequent photograph, Staff Sergeant Lowery captured a photograph of Private First Class Schultz walking alongside Sergeant Henry O. Hansen and Private First Class James A. Robeson atop the summit of Mount Suribachi [Lowery/Coll2575.19]. This photograph provides a frontal view of Private First Class Schultz in which the camouflage-patterned helmet cover and rifle sling attached to the stacking swivel are clearly visible. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

7. Sergeant William H. Genaust and Private Robert R. Campbell, combat cameramen assigned to 5th Marine Division, and Associated Press photographer Joseph J. Rosenthal arrived at the summit shortly before the second flag raising. [Encl (4); Ref (c), p. 65]

8. Mr. Rosenthal took a photograph of the second flag as it was being raised. The camouflage-patterned helmet cover is visible on the subject in position 5. [Encl (7); Ref (c), p. 65; (e)]

9. Sergeant Genaust captured motion picture of the second flag raising and the events immediately following, when Marines are stabilizing the flagpole. The individual in position 5 can be seen wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and a dangling strap on the left side of his head. The subject also has a sling attached to the stacking swivel instead of being properly attached to the upper hand guard sling swivel of his rifle. [Encl (2), (7); Ref (e)]

10. Private Campbell took a contemporaneous photograph of the first flag being lowered while the second flag was being raised [Campbell/112718]. This photograph shows the individual in position 5 stepping away from the other members of the flag-raising detail. Although the Marine is almost entirely obscured by the group lowering the first flag and the surrounding terrain, the camouflage pattern and dangling strap on his headgear remain partially visible. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

11. After the second flag raising, Mr. Rosenthal and Private First Class Burns took a group portrait that became known as the Gung Ho photograph. [Encl (7), (8)]

12. In the Gung Ho photographs, Private First Class Schultz is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and a soft cap underneath, which curves down on both sides. The helmet tilts up on the left side of his head, with a broken helmet liner strap dangling on this side. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]

13. In 2016, the Huly Panel identified Private First Class Schultz as the Marine in position 5. [Encl (2)]

14. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined strong support (+2) for the proposition that Private First Class Schultz is the subject in position 5. [Ref (e)]

CONCLUSION RELATED TO POSITION 5

1. With strong-to-extremely strong support for identification, the board determined that the subject in position 5 is Private First Class Harold H. Schultz.
FINDING OF FACTS RELATED TO POSITION 6

Is Private First Class Ira H. Hayes in Position 6?

1. Private First Class Ira H. Hayes was a member of 2d Platoon, E/2/28. [Encl (4); Ref (d), p. 50]
2. Private First Class Hayes was a member of the wire-laying detail led by Sergeant Strank. [Encl (3); Ref (d), p. 50]
3. Private First Class Hayes arrived at the summit prior to the second flag being raised. [Encl (3); Ref (d), p. 51]
4. Mr. Rosenthal took a photograph of the second flag as it was being raised. The subject in position 6 is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and distinctive creases in the fabric. His complexion is noticeably darker than most of the individuals present on the summit of Mount Suribachi, and he is carrying an M1 carbine. [Encl (7); Ref (c), p. 65; (e)]
5. Mr. Rosenthal took a subsequent photograph showing four individuals supporting the flagpole after it has been raised [Rosenthal/4502230123]. These individuals correspond to positions 1, 3, 4, and 6. [Ref (e)]
6. In Rosenthal/4502230123, the individual in position 6 is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and distinctive creases in the fabric. His complexion is noticeably darker than most of the individuals present on the summit of Mount Suribachi, and he is carrying an M1 carbine. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
7. After the second flag raising, Mr. Rosenthal and Private First Class Burns took a group portrait that became known as the *Gung Ho* photograph. [Encl (7), (8)]
8. In the *Gung Ho* photographs, Private First Class Hayes is wearing a helmet with a camouflage-patterned helmet cover and distinctive creases in the fabric. His complexion is noticeably darker than most of the individuals present on the summit of Mount Suribachi, and he is carrying an M1 carbine. [Encl (7); Ref (e)]
9. Eyewitness statements place Private First Class Hayes in proximity to the second flag as it was being raised. [Encl (3)].
10. After their return to the United States in April 1945, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley and Privates First Class Gagnon and Hayes served on temporary assigned duty in support of the Seventh War Loan drive. [Ref (d), pp. 95–124]
11. In 2019, the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory determined extremely strong support (+3, i.e., the highest possible level of support) for the proposition that Private First Class Hayes is the subject in position 6, further stating, “In other words, PFC Hayes can be identified as the subject in Position #6 in the 2nd Flag Raising Photograph.” [Ref (e)]

CONCLUSION RELATED TO POSITION 6

1. With extremely strong support for identification, the board determined that the subject in position 6 is Private First Class Ira H. Hayes.

OPINIONS

1. Previous attempts to accurately identify the flag raisers in Mr. Rosenthal’s iconic photograph were complicated by the death of key participants, the stress of combat, the lack of recognition as to the
significance of the second flag raising at the time of its occurrence, the haste to include participants from the flag-raising event in the Seventh War Loan drive, and the subsequent passage of time.

2. An in-person review of period uniforms in consultation with National Museum of the Marine Corps Uniforms and Heraldry Curator Owen L. Conner is consistent with the uniform configuration worn by Sergeant Strank in the *Gung Ho* photograph (buttoned utility coat over zipped M1941 field jacket) and the visible portions of the uniform of the subject in position 4 of Rosenthal/4502230123 (unbuttoned utility coat over unzipped M1941 field jacket).

3. Sergeant Strank is the only individual present in the photographs reviewed by the board with this uniform configuration who also is not wearing a ring on his left hand.

4. Prior to the break in the Genaust film, the presence of four Marines holding the second flagpole in combination with the identification of Sergeant Strank, Corporal Block, Private First Class Hayes, and Private First Class Sousley in positions 4, 1, 6, and 3, respectively, indicates that squad integrity of the wire-laying detail was retained.

5. Private First Class Gagnon was present in the vicinity of the second flag raising at the time Mr. Rosenthal captured his well-known photograph of that event.

6. Private First Class Gagnon played a key role in the second flag raising by carrying the larger American flag to the crest of Mount Suribachi and returning the first flag to be safely preserved.

7. Private First Class Gagnon may have departed the summit to return the first flag to the LT228 command post when the *Gung Ho* photograph was taken.

8. The individual in Private First Class Burns’ *Gung Ho* photographs resembles known photographs of Corporal Block.

9. All members of the wire-laying detail led by Sergeant Michael Strank are depicted in the *Gung Ho* photograph.

10. All members of the second flag raising are depicted in the *Gung Ho* photograph.

11. The individual at the head of the first flagpole in Private Campbell’s photograph [Campbell/112718] resembles known photographs of Private First Class Gagnon taken after his return to the United States.

12. The individual pictured smoking a cigarette in Private Campbell’s photograph [Campbell/112715] resembles known photographs of Private First Class Gagnon taken after his return to the United States.

13. The uniform configuration of an M1936 pistol belt with a Marine utility knife or Ka-Bar is consistent with, albeit not exclusive to, the military occupational specialty of a messenger.

14. Early identification of Private First Class Gagnon in position 2 may have arisen from his participation in the simultaneous lowering of the first flag and the raising of the second flag.

15. Historical evidence clearly highlights the national imperative in 1945 for the defeat of Japan. The Seventh War Loan drive served as an essential component to prepare the nation fiscally for the final phases of war. The exigencies of the moment and the desire to capitalize on the victory at Iwo Jima symbolized by the second flag raising contributed to the initial misidentification of the flag raisers.

16. The participation of Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley, Private First Class Gagnon, and Private First Class Hayes in the Seventh War Loan drive had positive strategic impact on the war.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Barring the presentation of new evidence to the contrary, the board concludes the identities of the subjects in the second flag-raising photograph are as follows:
   a. Position 1: Corporal Harlon H. Block
   b. Position 2: Corporal Harold P. Keller
   c. Position 3: Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley
   d. Position 4: Sergeant Michael Strank
   e. Position 5: Private First Class Harold H. Schultz
   f. Position 6: Private First Class Ira H. Hayes

2. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps inform the appropriate relatives of Sergeant Michael Strank, Corporal Harold P. Keller, Corporal Harlon H. Block, Private First Class Rene A. Gagnon, Private First Class Ira H. Hayes, Private First Class Harold H. Schultz, and Private First Class Franklin R. Sousley of the results of this board before they are made public.

3. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps issue a public statement regarding the revised identification of the second flag raisers based on the best information currently available, to include an acknowledgment of the collective efforts of all Marines, sailors, soldiers, and Coast Guardsmen during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

4. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps recognize that all previous efforts at identification were conducted in good faith and that no official blame be assessed for previous inaccuracies in the historical record.

5. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps recognize the assistance of Mr. Stephen Foley, Mr. Brent Westemeyer, Mr. Dustin Spence, Mrs. Kay Keller Maurer, Ms. Margery Wheeler Mattox, and Ms. Louise Miller; the FBI’s Digital Evidence Laboratory whose personnel performed the FBI analyses; Dr. Parker Albee, professor emeritus at University of Southern Maine; Mr. Charles Zoeller, Associated Press communications officer; and Mr. Justin Gamache, curator at the Wright Museum of World War II.

6. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps direct that this board’s report and associated records be deposited in the Marine Corps History Division’s archives.

7. That the Office of Legislative Affairs inform appropriate members of Congress and congressional staff of the results of this board before they are made public.

8. That the findings of this board be made public.

9. That the Commandant of the Marine Corps coordinate the public release of the findings of this board with the Office of U.S. Marine Corps Communication.

10. That the National Museum of the Marine Corps and other Marine Corps monuments, displays, and educational programs be updated to reflect the correct identification of the second flag raisers.

WILLIAM J. BOWERS
Brigadier General, USMC
President of the Board

ROBERT C. FULFORD
Colonel, USMC

KEIL R. GENTRY
Colonel, USMC (Ret)
ENDNOTE

1. This printing represents as closely as possible the original document, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling and to accommodate for readability and this publication's format.
Joseph Rosenthal's description of the famous flag raising on Iwo Jima comes from an oral history interview conducted by Benis M. Frank on 25 June 1975. Frank served as the Marine Corps History Division's oral historian from 1965 to 1991. Indeed, he started the program. Frank traveled to San Francisco from Washington, DC, to meet with Rosenthal at his home. A major aspect and collecting focus of History Division's Oral History Program was (and remains) obtaining career interviews of noteworthy Marines or others who had a direct bearing on the history of the Corps. Rosenthal, although not a Marine, certainly played a substantial role in Marine Corps history by snapping the iconic Mount Suribachi flag-raising photo.

The following interview segment represents only a small part of the full 200-minute interview conducted by Frank. This interview resulted in an 85-page transcript. The interview was recorded with audio only on a reel-to-reel tape. In 2002, this audio tape, along with thousands of others, was digitized along with the transcript. These documents are now retained within the oral history collection at History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.

When conducting an oral history interview, the interviewer will use a common technique of asking a broad, open-ended question and then allow the interviewee to speak at length on the topic. This allows the person to provide a thorough description of the event or experience in context, with reflections on its significance and effect, fully capturing the human perspective and personal experience. By this method, the interviewee recounts what they consider most compelling information that remains clearest in their memory. In the following interview, Frank asks a single question whereby Rosenthal tells his story. The interview continues for many pages with little input or prompt from the interviewer, as Rosenthal stays on subject, is well-spoken, and gives a cogent account of this historical event with a good bit of context and feeling. To provide the interview with structure and organization, simulated questions have been inserted in brackets at appropriate points to keep the reader on track.
Frank: How did the Marines compare with them [referring to other components of the military that Rosenthal had visited previously as a war correspondent]?

Rosenthal: The Marines are the greatest guys for going with on a fight! Sometimes they’re boring as hell during peacetime; and yet, I guess I have to swallow that because when they’re walking around, you can still see that pride in uniform. You don’t see a sloppy Marine because it’s been so hard to get into this Corps—The training has been so severe, and they have made good, and they know they’ve made good; and this is a number one team. They have read about their own history and it’s been drilled into them. And when they go out into a battle area, they may not be conscious of their doing it, but they’re urged along to make history of their own for the next group that comes along . . . . They are a select group; they have gone through difficult training to get in and stay in, and admonishment or an infraction is a very serious thing to them, even minor ones. I’ve watched them. They are proud of the accomplishments of their buddies. Some of the guys who’ve been in the most terrific action are the ones [who] are most surprised that you’re talking about them.

[What stands out in your mind about the fighting on Iwo Jima?]

Iwo Jima, in my mind, was like Peleliu, only more of it. How can you explain going through the rain without getting wet? I was sitting in a shell hole and felt something burning my pants leg; and it was a tiny piece of metal. I just brushed it aside. Where in the hell did that come from? The piece of shrapnel, if it had come on a direct line, it would have torn through my leg. It had ricocheted a couple of times. That was as close as I came. It was very difficult to move around in, to move ahead. The sand was quite deep. You had to plow your way through; it was tiring. You picked out a spot, maybe 10 yards ahead at a time. How can you tell when the right time is to run ahead on a field, pick it out? A bullet doesn’t tell you when it’s coming.

Anyway, there were a lot of down-to-earth scenes. An assault landing is not something nice and neat, where a man carries and runs forward with a flag and he is hit by a nice, clean shot; [he] passes the flag to somebody else, and they go on. It smells; it’s bodies lying around—maybe an arm here or a leg here or part of it. Dark splotches on the sand where the blood is seeping down. There are a number of places where up-ended rifle marks [a buried body]. Where a buddy has placed it for graves registration. And to see a lot of the smoke and the sounds, all kinds of sounds from little cracks to thundering types of things. To see corpsmen with stretchers slightly bent over; but they’re still great targets as they run, trot with somebody in a canvas stretcher.

I once shouted, “Hey, see if you can come around that place here!” And somebody yelled back, “Why in the hell don’t you do something useful?” It got to me. I went over to try to give a hand. But then, they got to where they were going, and I went on to do what I was being paid to do by AP [the Associated Press]. Yes, I was being paid to do this. I was getting a salary as an Associated Press correspondent. I had choices. I could go
Of course, if you’re in the landing boat, there’s only one direction [to go]. You know everybody’s going that way. What keeps you going is that the other guys are doing it. What the hell right have I to go back when they’re doing this. Yes, they’re creating pictures for me too.

I never felt that there would be any great loss if I were knocked off. I’d hate to be wounded badly; I’d hate to have a part of me shot away. When I got into the landing boat, off the ship— Now, we were scheduled to land about H+1 hour [one hour after the first waves had hit the beach]. We didn’t land until H+3 hours because of the mess, because of various other things that were happening. A heavy surf was piling up a lot of the boats; some of them were being hit by zeroed in artillery, messing up the beach. We circled for a long, long time. There were 18 or 20 youngsters in that boat, and there I was. By now, I’m the great veteran—New Guinea, Guam, Peleliu. I’m hardened. I’m supposed to be. I didn’t want to know these guys. I didn’t want to be friends. As I looked around the boat, I figured [that] you, you, you, maybe you are not coming back; you, you, you are very likely to be wounded—some, more or less, badly. With a little luck, some of us are going to come back. What if I started chatting with little Charlie Smith: What’s your family like? Let me see your pictures. Get intimate. And then I find that Charlie Smith got it. This happened to me at Guam going into the boat. I got to know some of the guys.

[Can you describe the progression of events that brought you to the top of Mount Suribachi and in position to capture the famous flag-raising image?]

My stumbling onto that picture was, in all respects, accidental. I had been out to the command ship the evening before and was headed back toward shore. And as it got close, a boatswain on an LCT [landing craft, tank] told us, Bill [Hipple, correspondent for Newsweek] and me, that they heard over the radio that there was a flag—American flag—going up to the top of the mountain [Mount Suribachi]. I couldn’t see it out there, but someone said he thought he saw a spot up there. Well, “I’d better go take a look.” Now, there were other correspondent-photographers along the way, but I didn’t know where they were.

But I went up, and I was late [by] at least an hour—an hour and a half—as they pinned it down later on. I found that the official time for that first flag going up there was about 1035 in the morning. And near as I can pin down, the time . . . this is by consulting with a priest who said mass up there, and various other things, which I did objectively—I mean, I went backward. I found that my picture was taken closer to noon. Anyway, when I heard that, I thought I’d better go up and take a look. Now, I heard that it was a patrol of four guys that had gone up there. That’s the way I heard it. By the time that I got there, there was, more or less, a stream of guys going up. It’s hard climbing. Every once in a while, we’d have to duck because there’d be [someone would shout] “fire in the hole” and throwing grenades in the caves. But as I approached the brow of the hill of Suribachi, I saw guys about a 100 yards away from the flagpole that was already up. And it was a fairly small flag on a long pole, and it was [waving] in the breeze. There again I felt one of those little clutches at the heart—this was our flag. I’m still touched by recollection. Stopped there for a moment.

And as I came closer— There were several Marines [who] were kneeled on the ground, and one of them had a folded flag in the traditional triangular folded [shape] under his arm. And they had a pole out there, and they were fiddling around with some
kind of wire or rope—whatever it was—and I said, “What’s doing, fellows?” They said, “Well, we’ve got to take down the other flag and keep that as a souvenir, and put up this larger flag so they can be seen better around the whole of the island.”

That gave me time to walk around, and I made a survey. Now, I had no idea of any great importance to be attached to those pictures. It was an incident during the battle. I wasn’t thinking, of course, in any terms that it would be a lasting picture, an inspiring thing, or any of that. It was one of a number of pictures that I was taking during the course of the battle. Some of them were tense situations; some of them were, more or less, pictorial in nature and so on. First of all, I tried to find the four guys [who] had been mentioned. I had some names. I looked around; I couldn’t find them and I got no help from the lieutenant either. You know, he had things to do; he was busy. There was still shooting into caves. There was still a lot of potential opposition all around the place. That was Harold G. Schrier. . . . I don’t mean it as critically as it might sound, because I do appreciate that he had things to do.

So I attempted to get those fellows; but it seemed to be too difficult to do and I just, again, I passed over it. I’m not thinking of something of any great importance anyway. So as I walked over and took a position where I could estimate that I would get the whole throw of this pole upward with that larger flag. I looked around and I spotted a couple of sandbags that raised me a foot or so, and I’m already pretty close to the ground. Well, it was enough, and I simply waited for a moment or two.

[Now you are in position to take a photo. What happened next?]

By that time, Bill Genaust, the Marine photographer, came across in front of me and over to my right, just an arm’s length. He said: “I’m not in your way, am I, Joe?” And I said, “Oh, no.” I turned from him, and [looking] out of the corner of my eye, I said, “Hey, Bill, there it goes!” By being polite to each other, we both damn near missed the scene. I swung my camera around and held it until I could guess that this was the peak of the action, and [I] shot. Of course, I couldn’t say positively I had the picture—something like shooting a football play; you don’t brag about it until it’s developed.

Notice the historic moving sequence that he [Genaust] shot on this in color film—You’ll note one thing: that that action of that flag raising starts right now. There’s no preliminary footage. That’s the reason that we both almost got caught short by this Alphonse-Gaston act. Bill was that kind of a guy. He was a high-grade guy. Bill was killed a few days later, a week or so later. He got too close to a cave entrance where Japanese [soldiers] had holed up, and [they] got him caught right in a cross fire. Now they shot him, and they pulled him inside the cave. I went down to inquire about him a couple of years after, and also 10 years after, and I could not find the grave registration for him. I think it was one of the caves that they simply had to seal up.

[Once the photograph is taken, what happens?]

After shooting this picture—and by this time, there was something like 50 Marines around, up on that top of that hill—some of them were still occupying themselves by testing caves and occasionally shooting, but there were grenades tossed and so on. So, it was still active up there. There I was. What I did after the first picture that I shot, I took a second picture of a couple of the Marines. One held the pole, while others were going for a
guy rope to hold it in an upright position. That was kind of a dull picture—didn't turn out too well. And then for a third picture, I went around and said, “Come on, fellows, I want to get a bunch of you. Wave your helmets and give it the old gung ho.” They said, “Nah. We don’t want—” I said, “Come on. It’s a historic picture.” I was just kidding, of course. I had no idea that any picture that I was taking had any lasting value. Well, I took that picture, and that third one was the end of a film pack. I substituted another film pack and repeated that one then I came down the hill. As I came down, took a couple of other inconsequential type pictures. Oh, I did take pictures of myself up there with my friends. And we changed positions and angle of the camera.

Now, I came down from the hillside; and although it was about one o’clock, as I recall, when I got down—and the reason I can remember: I was getting hungry. I bummed a small pack of rations. It was sufficient for me. Most guys threw the stuff around, but I liked it. I learned not to carry too much equipment. A couple of pairs of socks—that was important—not necessarily a change of any other clothing. No, you didn’t need to call on it for several days. I didn’t carry but one K-ration package about the size of a crack-erjack box; but what I did carry and kept was the key [that] wound or unwound the tin top from the little hash that most of the guys threw away. I kept that key because some of the guys who were more persnickety were throwing their tins—chopped ham in a little tin—throwing it on the beach. Hell, I had my key in my pocket, and that’s all I needed to carry. I’d pick up on the beach enough to satisfy my hunger. The first couple of days, you’re not eating much anyway. A canteen of water was much more valuable. I carried two canteens of water, a package of K-rations, a couple pairs of socks. I did carry a small, compact flash unit. Maybe a half dozen flash bulbs just in case I was in a cave. I did carry a telephoto lens.

[Can you describe how you came to learn that one of the photographs you took atop Mount Suribachi was quite a sensation?]

Now the flag picture—Someone [who] was in the darkroom that saw it come up and responded to it, and said that was a good picture. And this is what I was told by guys who were out there in the lab. While I was still out there at Iwo, I got a radio message. It said, “Congratulations on fine Suribachi flag picture.” Or something to that effect. Now, I didn’t know which picture they meant, and I thought perhaps it was the one that I worked on getting these guys up there, not the one that was entirely accidental.

[What is your perspective on the famous image and its composition? Why do you think it received so much acclaim?]

I had nothing to do with the number of people who were in that picture or who raised that flag. I did not give a signal as to when it would go up. All of the fortunate things that can happen in one picture happened together without any urging on my part. In this picture, I say that every essential of the picture happened as a fortunate circumstance for the photographer. The wind whipped that flag across the subjects in defiance of inertia. Normally, when you swing a pole up that way, the flag would be draped behind. It would have changed the complete composition entirely; it would have made it a mediocre composition. It whipped across because there was a wind at that particular time in the direction indicated in the picture. It took that flag across and made it part of the good composition; and I certainly didn’t have the wind to make
it go that fast. Now the lighting effect, which comes from above—a noontime sun directly above these figures—gives it a sculpturing effect. The strain that is implicit in these pictures is because that is not a wooden pole; it happens to be an iron or lead pipe, something like 20 feet long, perhaps two inches in diameter. [It weighed] maybe 150 or 200 pounds, I would guess. It had to be thrown up in a sudden movement, an exertion of energy there; that shows in the picture. All of these elements [were] not under my control.

When I took that sandbag and piled it up so that I could get up high enough to get some of that bramble from cutting too much of the foreground, it was just the right amount. Those guys who blasted the top of the hill—the Japanese position there and left those bags around there, left me just enough. I think without some of that bramble in the foreground it also would lose something that contributed to the picture: the wildness of the scene gives it, again, more energy in the picture.

And this is why, as I said before, had I been setting up such a picture in the first place, I think I would have used fewer guys—maybe three or four. I would have had them, perhaps, turn their heads a little bit so that they might be recognized. I'd have done things with all the skill that I say I've got. I think [as a result] I would have diminished its impact. I'm satisfied that never again will I have as good fortune in one picture. And yet, there are pictures that have as much meaning to me, that were difficult to get to and get away with; and I think I've been a very lucky guy for some time.

I was certainly, at that time, a lucky guy to be with great fighting guys, boys who became men very fast. And they did it for us. To this day—I don't want to lay it on [too thick]—but I'm appreciative that they did our fighting for us and for the people who are still here, citizens who are still here. Tremendous sacrifice!

[When did you finally see the photograph? What was your reaction?]

The first time I saw the picture was a few days after the radiogram. I say, I must have gotten that on perhaps the seventh or eighth day of the battle. Then I was there for about 12 days (13 or 14) at Iwo. Probably I saw it, myself—I would say perhaps about—perhaps 12 days after I had taken it. And when I saw it, I said: “That is a good picture. Good!” Who am I to differ with so many editors, you know?

I did have that feeling that it was all right. And there were copies of the picture around; and several of my buddies latched on to them. And then when I got the word that I was expected to come back, I left all those first prints there. But that doesn't matter. What's an “original”? I mean, it's all in the negative. Now, that negative is still in the vaults of the Associated Press. It's a thin-base film—probably has a lot of pinpoints on it now. I think a better print is really off of a copy of a good print. Although technically, it belonged to all of the syndicates—news services in the pool [such as] International News Photos, Time, Life, Associated Press, NEA [Newspaper Editors Association]-Acme—they agreed that Associated Press would copyright it; and that was for the purpose of protecting it from commercial use. They didn't want, for instance, to have a picture like this turn up for an underarm deodorant ad.

[Were you involved in any of the public relations activities featuring the flag-raising image?]

And so, I came back. What they wanted me back there for was it was already engendered and in motion—the activity tour using this picture for the Seventh War Loan drive. They
wanted me back there to do a little public relations; public relations for Associated Press, public relations for the War Bond Drive.

[After returning to the States,] I was often asked to give speeches. Like one time, the guy in Louisville [Kentucky], Headquarters Recruiting there, wrote to me; and he wrote months ahead—he wrote in something like November for a February or March possibility—and he said very much to do that here, this friendly Kentucky small town— It turned out to be such a payoff for the Marines that, I think, it's almost indescribable. I saw some of the nicest people that I've ever seen in my life. From Louisville, they had to fly in helicopters about a hundred miles to this little Elizaville Cemetery, I think, near Franklin [Kentucky]—itself a small town. When we got there, it seemed like all the people, maybe all 125 of the region, were there at the cemetery. The governor flew in a helicopter too.

The whole thing was so beautiful. From little kids—little tots—on to teenagers and beyond, and some veterans, and some aging people from another war way back. They all were there. And this [Private First Class] Franklin [R.] Sousley was a symbol to them; really a symbol to them. They were so proud of this guy giving his life for his country. I was expected to make a talk—not the governor, who was really an attractive guy—I was forewarned. And I made notes about the battles; and I figuratively threw them all away when I looked out there on these people and I felt radar right back. All I could say was:

I'm proud to be here. I had the good fortune to be a correspondent in that war, one of many correspondents. And our job was to try to transfer something of what our boys were doing out there, transfer that to the people at home so that they could know what kind of job they were doing out there.

We simply judge ourselves among ourselves on how well or how poorly we do that job.

Sometimes it works out well. I had a vicarious part in it because a picture I took somehow transmits to you an action on the part of one of your own boys. We owe him, we all owe him, and all the boys like him. We, who are here today, owe him.

I thought I only took a minute and a half or something like that. I felt the quiet was good. I even had a feeling that I was good later and that's awful. And yet it was the most rewarding thing that I had ever in 30 years [done]. How do you do— I appreciate— And then we all should appreciate trying to say the right things. I was so glad that I went to Louisville.

[How did the photograph affect you personally? What is its significance?]

Now, I do have the right to sell copies of the picture. I started to do it; and damn it, I couldn't do it. I simply couldn't get myself to do it. I suppose that sometime, if I'm in poverty—which I'm not that far gone by a long shot—maybe I'll sell some pictures.

I see all that blood running down the sand. I see those limbs out there. I see those awful, impossible positions to take in a frontal attack on such an island where the batteries opposing you are not only staggered up in front of you, but standing around at the sides as you're coming on the shore. The awesome situation! Before they ever reach that peak. Now, that a photograph can serve to remind us of the contributions of those boys—that was what was important—not who took it or that even a photographer took it, or a carpenter, or whoever. This was a very important contribution to our survival—and they did it. And, of course, I'm pleased that I—and it could have been anybody—but it was me (I can't avoid that) who took the picture. The important thing is [that] what it is and what
it does to reflect and remind people that these guys were there.

ENDNOTES

1. During its history, the current agency known as Marine Corps History Division has carried multiple titles, including Historical Section, Historical Branch, Historical Division, and History and Museums Division. For the purposes of this work, we will use the modern terminology for the division.

2. This partial transcript has been edited to facilitate ease of readership, eliminating obvious gaffs, duplications, and false starts. Otherwise, the text reflects what was spoken at the time, and readers are asked to bear in mind that they are reading a transcript of the spoken word rather than the written word. Note that some of the scenes described above are graphic in nature.

3. “Alphonse and Gaston” was an American comic strip by Frederick Burr Opper from the early 1900s. These bumbling Frenchmen’s antics explored extreme politeness, coining the phrase “After you, my dear Alphonse.”
C. C. BEALL
Cecil Calvert Beall was born on 15 October 1892 in Saratoga, Wyoming. Moving to New York City for his education, he studied at the Pratt Institute and the Art Students League of New York. Beall earned acclaim for his work for Collier’s and the Saturday Evening Post, eventually becoming the art director for the National Democratic Party throughout President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. During World War II, Beall produced covers for Collier’s depicting various World War II heroes. He also created the official poster for the Seventh War Loan campaign, using Rosenthal’s famous photograph. At the war’s conclusion, Beall’s rendering of the Japanese surrender ceremony aboard the USS Missouri (BB 63) was selected as the official portrait of the event by President Harry S. Truman. Beall passed away on 4 May 1970.

HARLON H. BLOCK
Harlon Henry Block was born in Yorktown, Texas, on 6 November 1924. Block was inducted into the Marine Corps through the Selective Service System in San Antonio on 18 February 1943 and transferred to Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego. After recruit training, Block attended the Parachute Training School at San Diego. Shortly after his qualification, he was promoted to private first class. Prior to Iwo Jima, he participated in the campaign at Bougainville before returning to the United States and transferring to Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, in the newly created 5th Marine Division. Block landed on Iwo Jima on D-day, 19 February 1945. On 23 February, Block participated in the second flag raising on Mount Suribachi, but was killed a few days later, on 1 March, in an attack on Nishi Ridge. Initially buried on the island, his remains were returned to Texas for a private burial in January 1949.

JOHN H. BRADLEY
John Henry Bradley was born at Antigo, Wisconsin, on 10 July 1923. Prior to his enlistment in the Navy on 13 January 1943, Bradley completed a funeral director’s apprenticeship. He attended boot camp at Farragut, Idaho, and was assigned to the Naval Hospital Corps School and the 28th Marines of the 5th Marine Division. He landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February and performed feats that earned him the Navy Cross just two days into the fighting. On 23
February, Bradley assisted in the raising of the first flag on Mount Suribachi and was present at the raising of the second flag. On 12 March 1945, he received shrapnel wounds to both legs from an enemy mortar shell for which he was awarded a Purple Heart. After recovering, Bradley was ordered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to appear for the Seventh War Loan campaign. He was medically discharged from the Navy on 13 November 1945. After the war, Bradley owned and operated a funeral parlor in Antigo, Wisconsin, until his death on 11 January 1994 at the age of 70.

**LOUIS R. BURMEISTER**

Louis Raymond Burmeister was born 30 June 1924 in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. Enlisting in the U.S. Marine Corps on 29 June 1943, Burmeister was designated a photographer for the 5th Marine Division’s 28th Marines and landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945. He was present on 23 February when the second flag was raised atop Mount Suribachi, though his work has not been widely acknowledged in general accounts. Burmeister took several photographs at the second flag raising and claimed to have taken one identical to Rosenthal’s shot; however, Rosenthal’s image found national success, while Burmeister’s was lost to history. Burmeister also photographed Father Charles F. Suver, the Navy’s Jesuit priest, administering Mass on the summit that afternoon. Burmeister was subsequently wounded and was awarded a Purple Heart. After the war, Burmeister ran a camera and gem shop in Medina, Ohio. He passed away on 2 November 1993 in Cleveland, Ohio.

**ROBERT R. CAMPBELL**

Robert Russell Campbell was born in Alameda County, California, on 10 September 1910. He was a still photographer for the U.S. Marine Corps during World War II. Following the first flag raising, he was ordered by 5th Marine Division chief photographer, Warrant Officer Norman T. Hatch, to photograph the second flag raising. Private First Class Campbell accompanied his good friend, Joseph Rosenthal, to the summit of Suribachi for the second flag raising, taking the photograph that shows the lowering of the first flag simultaneously with the raising of the second. Campbell survived the remainder of the war and worked with Rosenthal at the *San Francisco Chronicle* until his death on 4 April 1968.

**LOUIS C. CHARLO**

Louis Charles Charlo was born on 26 September 1926. Charlo was a Native American from the Bitterroot Salish tribe in the town of Evaro in northwest Montana and was the great grandson of the famous Chief “Charles” Charlo, also known as Little Claw of the Grizzly Bear. In November 1943, just weeks after his 17th birthday, he enlisted in the Marine Corps. Charlo attended recruit training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego and landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945, serving in the Philippines, Okinawa, and the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan. On 23 February 1945, Burns was photographed with Joseph Rosenthal on the summit of Mount Suribachi during the second flag raising, and one of Burns’ photos from Suribachi was featured on the cover of the Pacific edition of *Yank* magazine shortly after the flag raising. After the war, Burns returned to upstate New York and worked as a photojournalist for *Life*, *Look*, and the *Saturday Evening Post*. He also served as the chief news photographer for General Electric. Burns passed away on 7 May 1988 and is buried in Park View Cemetery in Schenectady, New York.
as a Browning automatic rifle gunner for Company F, 28th Marines, 5th Marine Division. On 23 February, he participated in the initial four-man reconnaissance patrol led by Sergeant Sherman B. Watson to ascend Mount Suribachi and was long believed to have participated in the first flag raising on the summit. Charlo was killed in action on 2 March 1945 and posthumously awarded a Purple Heart. Though initially buried on Iwo Jima, his remains were returned to Montana and buried at St. Ignatius Catholic Cemetery in 1948. In 2016, the Huly Panel determined that Charlo did in fact provide security on the summit of Mount Suribachi between the first and second flag raisings.

**MEYERS A. CORNELIUS**

Meyers Arthur Cornelius was born on 3 November 1915 in Oklahoma City. Cornelius grew up working in his uncle’s photography shop before journeying to Chicago to study music for a time. During World War II, he joined the Marine Corps and served as a combat photographer at the Battle of Iwo Jima, taking photographs of the first flag raisers. After the war, Cornelius continued working in photography, serving as president of the Professional Photographers of Oklahoma in 1947. In 1949, Cornelius moved to Tulsa, Oklahoma, and opened a photography business that he owned and operated until his retirement and relocation to Oklahoma City. Cornelius passed away on 26 March 1991 and was laid to rest in Memorial Park Cemetery in Tulsa.

**WILLIAM H. GENAUST**

William Homer Genaust was born on 12 October 1906 in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and raised in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In February 1943, he was inducted into the Marine Corps through the Selective Service System. As a combat photographer, Genaust filmed action on Saipan and Tinian, sustaining a leg wound on Saipan for which he was awarded a Purple Heart. On 23 February 1945, he accompanied Private First Class Robert Campbell and AP photographer Joseph Rosenthal to the top of Mount Suribachi, where he captured motion picture footage of the famed second flag raising. While the battle raged on, Genaust was reported as missing in action on 3 March after being shot near a cave around Hill 362A in northern Iwo Jima. He was ruled killed in action on 4 March. His remains were never found. Genaust was posthumously awarded a Bronze Star for his actions on Saipan in September 1945. In 1995, a bronze plaque was placed atop Mount Suribachi in his honor.

**RENE A. GAGNON**

Rene Arthur Gagnon was born in Manchester, New Hampshire, on 7 March 1926. On 6 May 1943, Gagnon was inducted into the Marine Corps Reserve through the Selective Service System. After his training at Parris Island and a brief assignment in Charleston, South Carolina, he was assigned to the Military Police Company of the 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, and quickly transferred to the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, with whom he landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945. Gagnon served as the company runner for Company E on 23 February tasked with supplying fresh radio batteries and a larger flag for the troops already on top of Mount Suribachi. After the Battle of Iwo Jima concluded, Gagnon was ordered by the president to appear on the Seventh War Loan campaign. He was discharged on 27 April 1946 at the rank of corporal. Gagnon passed away on 12 October 1979 after suffering a heart attack in his hometown of Manchester. Initially buried in the Mount Calvary Cemetery, he was reinterred at Arlington National Cemetery on 7 July 1981.

**EDWARD R. HAGENAH**

Edward Reno Hagenah was born on 16 April 1902 in New York City. He joined the Marine Corps for the first time in 1924 and was discharged in 1928.
after advancing to the rank of sergeant. Between his tours of duty in the Marine Corps, Hagenah worked in the newspaper business as general manager of Lee Enterprises and an affiliate of the *Brooklyn (NY) Daily Eagle* and the *Washington Post*. On 20 March 1935, he rejoined the Marine Corps, accepting an appointment as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. During World War II, Hagenah participated in both theaters and served as an aide to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Thomas Holcomb. In September 1944, he was promoted to executive officer of the Division of Public Affairs, eventually overseeing Private First Class Rene Gagnon’s initial naming of the Marines in the Rosenthal photograph. After World War II, Hagenah served in Korea as a senior advisor to the Korean Marines with the Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. He passed away on board a hospital ship on 2 December 1950 from a heart attack and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

**HENRY O. HANSEN**

Henry Oliver Hansen was born in Somerville, Massachusetts, on 14 December 1919. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in June 1938. Following completion of his initial training, Hansen was sent to the Marine Corps Sea School in San Diego and served on the USS *Arkansas* (BB 33). Following a request for combat duty, Hansen attended Parachute School at Marine Barracks New River, North Carolina, and was assigned to 3d Parachute Battalion, experiencing combat for the first time in the Bougainville campaign. In 1944, Hansen reenlisted and joined the 28th Marines in the newly created 5th Marine Division. Hansen landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February and was a member of First Lieutenant Harold Schrier’s 3d Platoon of Company E that transported and raised the first flag on Mount Suribachi. He also was present for the second flag raising and appears in the group photograph of Marines and corpsmen posing beneath the flagpole. Hansen was killed by an enemy machine gun burst on 1 March 1945. Initially buried on Iwo Jima, his remains were reinterred in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii, in 1947.

**NORMAN T. HATCH**

Norman Thomas Hatch was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on 2 March 1921. After graduating from high school, Hatch enlisted in the Marine Corps in July 1939. Following recruit training, Hatch taught English at the Marine Barracks Washington and later wrote for *Leatherneck* magazine before being assigned to the U.S. Navy’s public relations office. Eventually appointed a warrant officer, Hatch was assigned to San Diego, California, for duty with the 5th Marine Division as their chief photography officer in June 1944. On 19 February 1945, along with the rest of the division, he and his fellow combat correspondents landed on Iwo Jima. Following the initial flag raising, Hatch assigned Private First Class Robert Campbell and Sergeant William Genaust to document the second flag raising on Mount Suribachi. Hatch’s career in the Marine Corps came to an end when he retired from the Reserves in 1967 at the rank of major. As a civilian, Hatch ran a photography agency, sold photography equipment, worked as a civilian audiovisual advisor in the Pentagon, and was a consultant to the White House press office and Congress. He passed away at the age of 96 on 22 April 2017.

**IRA H. HAYES**

Ira Hamilton Hayes, a Pima North American Indian, was born in the Gila River Indian Community, a reservation in Sacaton, Arizona, on 12 January 1923. Hayes served in the Civilian Conservation Corps prior to joining the Marine Corps on 26 August 1942. Following recruit training, Hayes attended the Parachute School, and in March 1943, deployed with the 3d Parachute Battalion, Divisional Special Troops, 3d Marine Division, partic-
ipating in the campaigns for Vella Lavella in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville. When the Marine parachute units were disbanded in February 1944, Hayes transferred to Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th Marine Division, at Camp Pendleton, California. On 23 February, he assisted in the second flag raising on Mount Suribachi. After the Battle of Iwo Jima ended, Hayes embarked for Hawaii, where he was ordered by the president to participate in the Seventh War Loan campaign. He was honorably discharged on 1 December 1945 at the rank of corporal. Hayes returned to the Gila River Indian Community, where he died at Bapchule, Arizona, on 24 January 1955.

RAYMOND E. JACOBS
Raymond Edward Jacobs was born in Bridgeport, Connecticut, on 24 January 1926. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in May 1943 at age 17 in Los Angeles. After recruit training in San Diego, Jacobs volunteered for Marine Raider training. In March 1944, he transferred to Company F, 2d Battalion, 28 Marines, 5th Marine Division, after the Raiders disbanded, and volunteered for radio operator training. Jacobs was ordered to accompany First Lieutenant Harold Schrier’s patrol from Company E to provide them with a radioman and supported the raising of the first flag on the peak of Suribachi. On 10 March, Jacobs suffered a wound in his back caused by shrapnel from a Japanese mortar. He was discharged in 1946 but remained in the Marine Reserves. He also served in the Korean War as a stateside instructor. After active duty, Jacobs worked for 34 years with television station KTVU-TV in Oakland, California, as a reporter, anchor, and news director. He passed away on 29 January 2008 at the age of 82.

CHANDLER W. JOHNSON
Chandler Wilce Johnson was born in Fort Dodge, Iowa, on 8 October 1905, but grew up in Highland Park, Illinois. He was educated at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, graduating in 1929. Through the 1930s, he served in the Philippines, Nicaragua, and China. Johnson was the commander of the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, on Iwo Jima. Johnson gave the order for First Lieutenant Harold Schrier to lead a patrol to the summit of Mount Suribachi and raise the first flag atop it. On 2 March 1945, Johnson was killed by a mortar shell. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for his leadership on Iwo Jima and was laid to rest in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Hawaii.

HAROLD P. KELLER
Harold Paul Keller was born on 3 August 1921 near Brooklyn, Iowa. Before enlisting in the Marine Corps on 6 January 1942, Keller worked as a lineman for the Brooklyn Mutual Telephone Company. During World War II, he served with the 2d Raider Battalion and the 5th Marine Division. Keller fought in notable battles prior to Iwo Jima, including the Makin Raid and Bougainville, where he was awarded a Purple Heart for a wound suffered on 8 November 1943. On 19 February 1945, he landed on Iwo Jima with Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines. As a member of First Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier’s 3d Platoon, Keller was one of the first Marines to reach the summit of Mount Suribachi on 23 February and photographs show him in proximity to both first and second flag raisings. He returned from overseas on 23 April and separated from the Marine Corps on 19 September 1945. After the war, Keller worked for Surge, a dairy equipment company, and served his community for 30 years with the Brooklyn Fire Department, eventually becoming fire chief. Keller’s participation in the second flag raising went unnoticed until 2018, when amateur historians Stephen Foley, Dustin Spence, and Brent Westemeyer raised concerns about a possible error in attribution. In 2019, the Bowers Board confirmed that Keller helped raise the American flag atop Mount Suribachi as captured in Rosenthal’s famous photograph. Keller passed away in
a car accident on 13 March 1979 and is buried in Brooklyn Memorial Cemetery in Iowa.

**CHARLES W. LINDBERG**

Charles Willard Lindberg was born on 26 June 1920 in Grand Forks, North Dakota. After graduating from Grand Forks High School, Lindberg enlisted in the Marine Corps in Seattle, Washington, in January 1942. After completing recruit training in San Diego and serving with the 2d Raider Battalion, he deployed with the 5th Marine Division and participated in the first flag raising on Iwo Jima on 23 February 1945. While in combat on Iwo Jima, Lindberg was shot through the arm, leading to his evacuation and eventually a Purple Heart. In addition, he was awarded a Silver Star for his valorous service on Iwo Jima as a flamethrower operator. Lindberg was honorably discharged in January 1946. After the war, Lindberg moved to Richfield, Minnesota, and worked as an electrician for 39 years. Like Raymond Jacobs, Lindberg spent his later years advocating for recognition as one of the first flag raisers. Though he passed away on 24 June 2007 at the age of 86, the Huly Panel did not confirm his role as a first flag raiser until 2016.

**JAMES R. MICHELS**

James Richard Michels was born on 18 January 1918 in Chicago, Illinois. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in January 1944, previously working as an arc welder at Whiting Corporation. Assigned to Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Division, Michels was a member of First Lieutenant Harold Schrier’s 3d Platoon and features prominently in Louis Lowery’s famous photograph of the first flag raising. He received a shrapnel wound to the finger on 23 February, the same day as the flag raisings, and was awarded a Purple Heart. Michels survived the Battle of Iwo Jima and was discharged on 18 May 1946. After the war, he returned home to Riverside, Illinois, living there until his death on 17 January 1982 at the age of 63. He is buried at Queen of Heaven Catholic Cemetery in Hillside. The 2016 Huly Panel ruled that he provided security for the first flag raising.

**LOUIS R. LOWERY**

Louis Robert Lowery was born on 24 July 1916 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. As an employee of a Pittsburgh newspaper when the war started, Lowery took a leave of absence to enlist in the Marine Corps in 1943. As a combat photographer, Lowery captured the landings at Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, notably photographing the first flag raising on Iwo Jima. Lowery was later commissioned and rose to the rank of captain in the Marine Corps Reserve, retiring in January 1962. Following World War II, Lowery continued to serve on the staff of Leatherneck as photography editor. He later served as photography director for the Marine Corps Association until his retirement in 1982. He died on 15 April 1987 and is buried at Quantico National Cemetery in Virginia.

**JOSEPH J. ROSENTHAL**

Joseph John Rosenthal was born on 9 October 1911 in Washington, DC. In 1929, he moved to San Francisco, California, where he worked in the offices of the Newspaper Enterprise Association. By 1932, Rosenthal had become a news photographer, working as chief photographer and manager in San Francisco for Times Wide World Photo, later joining the Associated Press. Despite being declared ineligible for military service due to his poor eyesight, Rosenthal joined the United States Maritime Service as a photographer and served in the British Isles and North Africa before rejoining the AP in 1944. As a war correspondent, he covered the landings at Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, Guam, Peleliu, Angaur, and Iwo Jima. On 23 February, Rosenthal accompanied his friend, Private First Class Robert Campbell, and Sergeant William Genaust to the peak of Suribachi and snapped the Pulitzer Prize-winning
photograph of the second flag raising. After the war, Rosenthal joined the San Francisco Chronicle, where he worked for the next 35 years. Rosenthal passed away on 20 August 2006 in Novato, California, from natural causes at the age of 94.

HAROLD G. SCHRIER
Harold George Schrier was born in Corder, Missouri, on 17 October 1916. Schrier enlisted in the Marine Corps in August 1936, serving in China for two years prior to the outbreak of World War II. In 1942, he was assigned to the 2d Raider Battalion and saw action on Midway, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Bougainville, earning a field commission in February 1943. Schrier was reassigned to 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, when the Raiders were disbanded in 1944, landing with the unit on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945. Two days later, Schrier assumed command of 3d Platoon after First Lieutenant John Keith Wells was wounded. On the morning of 23 February, he led the patrol up Mount Suribachi that raised the first flag. For his actions on Iwo Jima, Schrier was awarded the Navy Cross and Silver Star, having previously received the Legion of Merit for his actions on Guadalcanal as a part of the 2d Raider Battalion. After the war, he assisted in the filming of the movie Sands of Iwo Jima (1949) and later went on to serve in Korea at Pusan, Inchon-Seoul, and Chosin, for which he would be awarded a Bronze Star for his actions. He retired from the Marine Corps in 1957 as a lieutenant colonel. Schrier died on 3 June 1971 in Bradenton, Florida, and is buried in nearby Ellenton.

FRANKLIN R. SOUSLEY
Franklin Runyon Sousley was born in Flemingsburg, Kentucky, on 19 September 1925. On 5 January 1944, he was inducted into the Marine Corps Reserve through the Selective Service System. Following his recruit training at San Diego, Sousley was assigned as an automatic rifleman to Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, of the 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, eventually being promoted to private first class on 22 November 1944 while training in Hawaii. On 19 February, Sousley landed on Iwo Jima and later appeared in the photograph taken by Joseph Rosenthal on the summit of Mount Suribachi. On 21 March, Private First Class Sousley was killed by a Japanese sniper around Kitano Point on the northern end of Iwo Jima and buried in the 5th Marine Division Cemetery there. His remains were returned to the United States and reinterred in the Elizaville Cemetery in his native Kentucky on 22 March 1948.
MICHAEL STRANK
Michael Strank was born at Conemaugh, Pennsylvania, on 10 November 1919. Strank joined the Marine Corps in October 1939 and was stationed at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; Parris Island, South Carolina; New River, North Carolina; and San Diego, California, until his transfer in September 1942 to the 3d Raider Battalion at Uvea in the Wallis Islands. He later saw action at Pavuvu in the Solomon Islands and Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville in 1944. Following the disbanding of the Marine Raiders, Strank transferred to Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th Marine Division, storming the volcanic beaches of Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945. Four days later, he participated in the second flag raising on the summit of Mount Suribachi. While staging an assault on the northern sector of the island on 1 March, Strank was killed by Japanese artillery fire. Like many of his comrades, Strank was buried on Iwo Jima but later reinterred at Arlington National Cemetery in January 1949.

ERNEST I. THOMAS JR.
Ernest Ivy Thomas Jr. was born on 10 March 1924 in Tampa, Florida, but grew up in Tallahassee. Before the war, Thomas studied aeronautical engineering at Tri-State University in Indiana (now Trine University). He enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve on 27 May 1942, despite being colorblind. Due to his excellent performance at boot camp, he was retained as a drill instructor at Parris Island. Longing to see combat, Thomas transferred to 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th Marine Division, in March 1944. He landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945. Thomas was a member of Company E’s 3d Platoon, led by First Lieutenant Harold Schrier, that raised the first flag on Mount Suribachi. Thomas was killed in action by enemy rifle fire on the northern end of Iwo Jima on 3 March 1945. He was posthumously awarded a Navy Cross and a Purple Heart for his actions on 21 February 1945. He was buried on Iwo Jima but reinterred in Roseland Cemetery in Monticello, Florida, in 1948. In 2016, his participation in the first flag raising on Mount Suribachi was confirmed by the Huly Panel.

PHILIP L. WARD
Philip Lavon Ward was born on 10 March 1926. A native of Crawfordsville, Indiana, Ward quit high school to help support his family and worked at a local creamery in nearby Mace. Two days before his 18th birthday, he enlisted in the Marine Corps to avoid being drafted into the Army. Ward hopped a freight train to attend basic training in San Diego, California, and saw his first action with Company E, 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, on Saipan in June 1944. After landing on Iwo Jima on 19 February, he participated in raising the first flag on Mount Suribachi on the morning of 23 February 1945 and appears in Rosenthal’s Gung Ho photograph following the second flag raising that same day. He was discharged on 20 July 1946. After his service in the Marine Corps in World War II, Ward enlisted in the Army in 1958 and eventually served three tours of duty in Vietnam, working in the Transportation Corps. Ward owned a truck driving business in Indiana following his retirement from the Army in 1976. He passed away on 28 December 2005 at his winter home in McAllen, Texas, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. In 2016, the Huly Panel confirmed Ward’s role in the first flag raising.

FELIX W. DE WELDON
Felix Weiss de Weldon, sculptor of the Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington, Virginia, was born on 12 April 1907, in Vienna, Austria. Obtaining his bachelor of arts degree at Marchetti College in Vienna in 1925, he went on to earn his master of arts and master of science degrees in 1927 and allegedly added his PhD in 1929 from the University of Vienna’s Academy of Creative Arts and
School of Architecture. Further studies in art and architecture took him to Paris, Rome, Florence, and Oxford. De Weldon arrived in the United States in 1937 and was naturalized in 1945. He was commissioned to sculpt the 100-ton bronze Marine Corps War Memorial, which was dedicated on 10 November 1954, after more than nine years’ work on the subject—sometimes for as many as 19 hours a day. During his career, he designed more than 70 full-length statues and nearly 800 smaller sculptures, in addition to a large number of portraits, murals, and other paintings. Among his works, which have been shown from Egypt to Japan, are busts of such notables as England’s Kings George V, Edward VIII, and George VI; President Harry Truman; Marine Corps General A. A. Vandegrift; and Admirals Chester W. Nimitz, William D. Leahy and Louis E. Denfeld. De Weldon passed away on 2 June 2003 in Woodstock, Virginia, and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

CORPORAL JOHN J. WIELAND

Wieland enlisted in Des Moines, Iowa, in January 1942, attending recruit training at San Diego, California. He was originally assigned to the 2d Raider Battalion in July 1942, and after the Raiders were disbanded, he was assigned to 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, 5th Marine Division. Wieland was wounded on 1 March 1945 and later awarded the Silver Star for his actions on Iwo Jima. He was honorably discharged from military service in late 1945.
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John Henry Bradley, United States Naval Reserve, for extraordinary heroism and conspicuous devotion to duty while serving as a Corpsman attached to a Marine Rifle platoon of the Second Battalion, Twenty-Eighth Marines, FIFTH Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces at Iwo Jima, on 21 February 1945. During a furious assault by his company upon a strongly defended enemy zone at the base of Mt. Suribachi, Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Bradley observed a Marine infantryman fall wounded in an open area under a pounding barrage by mortars, interlaced with a merciless crossfire from machine guns. With complete disregard for his own safety, he ran through the intense fire to the side of the fallen Marine, examined his wounds and ascertained that an immediate administration of plasma was necessary to save the man’s life. Unwilling to subject any of his comrades to the danger to which he had so valiantly exposed himself, he signaled would-be assistants to remain where they were. Placing himself in a position to shield the wounded man, he tied a plasma unit to a rifle planted upright in the sand and continued his life saving mission. The Marine’s wounds bandaged and the condition of shock relieved by plasma, Bradley pulled the man thirty yards through intense enemy fire to a position of safety. His indomitable spirit, dauntless initiative, and heroic devotion to duty were an inspiration to those with whom he served and were in keeping with the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Corporal Charles W. Lindberg, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a Flame Thrower Operator of Company E, Second Battalion, Twenty-eight Marines, FIFTH Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, from 19 February to 1 March 1945. Repeatedly exposing himself to hostile grenades and machine-gun fire in order that he might reach...
and neutralize enemy pillboxes at the base of Mount Suribachi, Corporal Lindberg courageously approached within ten or fifteen yards of the emplacements before discharging his weapon, thereby assuring the annihilation of the enemy and the successful completion of his platoon’s mission. As a member of the first combat patrol to scale Mount Suribachi, he courageously carried his flame thrower to the steep slopes and assisted in destroying the occupants of the many caves found in the rim of the volcano, some of which contained as many as seventy Japanese. While engaged in an attack on hostile cave positions on 1 March, he fearlessly exposed himself to accurate enemy fire and was subsequently wounded and evacuated. By his determinations [sic] in manning his weapon, despite its weight and the extreme heat developed in operation, Corporal Lindberg greatly assisted in securing his company’s position. His courage and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

FIRST LIEUTENANT HAROLD GEORGE SCHRIER
Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Harold George Schrier, United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as Executive Officer of Company E, Second Battalion, Twenty-Eighth Marines, FIFTH Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, on 23 February 1945. On the morning of 23 February when his combat team had advanced to the base of Mount Suribachi after four days of severe fighting, First Lieutenant Schrier volunteered to lead a forty-man patrol up the steep slopes of the mountain. Quickly organizing his patrol and placing himself at its head, he began the torturous climb up the side of the volcano, followed by his patrol in single file. Employing the only known approach, an old Japanese trail, he swiftly pushed on until, covered by all the supporting weapons of his battalion, he gained the top of the mountain despite hostile small-arms and artillery fire. Forced to engage the remaining enemy in a sharp fire fight, he overcame them without loss in his patrol and occupied the rim of the volcano. Although still under enemy sniper fire, First Lieutenant Schrier, assisted by his Platoon Sergeant, raised the National Colors over Mount Suribachi, planting the flagstaff firmly on the highest knoll overlooking the crater, the first American flag to fly over any land in the inner defenses of the Japanese Empire. His inspiring leadership, courage and determination in the face of overwhelming odds upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Silver Star Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to First Lieutenant Harold George Schrier (MCSN: 0-19234), United States Marine Corps, for gallantry and intrepidity as Commanding Officer of Company D, Second Battalion, Twenty-eighth Marines, FIFTH Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, on 24 March 1945. Realizing the seriousness of the situation when a group of approximately one hundred Japanese infiltrated through the main
defensive positions shortly after midnight and launched a fanatical attack against the rear of his lightly-manned command post, First Lieutenant Schrier boldly rallied his men and opposed the onrushing enemy, setting a courageous example. His leadership and fighting spirit throughout this action were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

PLATOON SERGEANT ERNEST IVY THOMAS JR.
Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Platoon Sergeant Ernest Ivy Thomas, Jr., United States Marine Corps Reserve, for extraordinary heroism as a Rifle Platoon Leader serving with Company E, Second Battalion, Twenty-Eighth Marines, FIFTH Marine Division, during action on enemy Japanese-held Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, 21 February 1945. When his platoon leader was wounded, Platoon Sergeant Thomas assumed command and, before supporting tanks arrived to cover him, led his men in an assault on a fanatically defended and heavily fortified sector at the base of Mount Suribachi. With the tanks unable to proceed over the rough terrain beyond positions seventy-five to one hundred yards at the rear of our attacking forces, Platoon Sergeant Thomas ran repeatedly to the nearest tank and, in a position exposed to heavy and accurate machine-gun and mortar barrages, directed the fire of the tanks against the Japanese pillboxes which were retarding his platoon’s advance. After each trip to the tanks, he returned to his men and led them in assaulting and neutralizing enemy emplacements, continuing to advance against the Japanese with a knife as his only weapon after the destruction of his rifle by hostile fire. Under his aggressive leadership, the platoon killed all the enemy in the sector and contributed materially to the eventual capture of Mount Suribachi. His daring initiative, fearless leadership and unwavering devotion to duty were inspiring to those with whom he served and reflect the highest credit upon Platoon Sergeant Thomas and the United States Naval Service.

CORPORAL JOHN J. WIELAND
Silver Star Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Corporal John J. Wieland, United States Marine Corps Reserve, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a fire team leader of Company D, Second Battalion, Twenty-eighth Marines, FIFTH Marine Division in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands on 23 February 1945. In order that the Battalion Commander could plan the final assault, Corporal Wieland volunteered to form and lead a patrol of two men up the sheer cliffs of the volcano to locate enemy resistance and find routes of approach. Leading his men toward the summit over terrain in the face of heavy enemy rifle fire, he aided in repulsing several enemy attacks including one hand to hand engagement. Under is skillful leadership, the patrol ascended to the summit of Mount Suribachi, the first
American troops to reach this vital position and brought back information of great value for the subsequent seizure of this Japanese stronghold. Corporal Wieland’s resolute courage, indomitable spirit and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
U.S. MARINE CORPS
UTILITY UNIFORM (P1941)
Despite the creation of a new, improved combat uniform in early 1944, the vast majority of U.S. Marines who assaulted Iwo Jima were still dressed in the same utility uniform that had been approved for general issue in November 1941.1

Period photographs and color film footage of the invasion document how this uniform was often highly personalized by individuals. While in action, Marines were typically seen wearing multiple clothing layers with the uniform. The decisions made in how to layer garments were undertaken at the personal level and were not part of established rules or regulations. As a result, Marines were rarely seen in exact, specific uniform systems during combat operations. Each man chose suitable articles of clothing from his respective issue and wore these items in layers according to his own personal preferences; specifically, wool flannel or cotton service shirts were worn under the utility coat or, for the first time (widely seen in the Pacific theater), the 1941 model field jacket was worn in combat. In rarer cases, the U.S. Army’s winter combat (or “Tankers”) jacket made an appearance, when worn by Marines who were able to acquire them circuitously.2

At Iwo Jima, the layering of garments was likely a result of the colder temperatures experienced during the battle. The widespread use of the M1941 field jacket, in particular, was unique to the action. While the majority of Marines are photographed wearing the jacket as an outer layer, the occasional Marine chose to wear his field jacket beneath his utility coat. Sergeant Michael Strank can be seen with this unusual configuration of uniform in the Gung Ho group photographs taken by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal and Army Private First Class George Burns after the second flag raising. At first glance, the layering of a lighter cotton coat over a medium-size, wool-lined jacket might seem impractical, but the failures of the M1941 jacket were well-known by 1945. The lack of adequate pocket storage and the ease with which the light khaki fabric stained may have informed Sergeant Strank’s decision to wear his utility uniform as a cover for the field jacket.

The 1941 utility uniform was arguably the first unique combat uniform fielded by the U.S. Marine Corps. It replaced the cotton khaki summer field uniform worn since 1927, which had seen action on Guam, Wake Island, the Philippines, and Guadalcanal, during the early days of World War II.3
The utility uniform coat was made of herringbone twill cotton with four riveted buttons for the enclosure of the front. These buttons (first manufactured in copper-plate, or copper finish and later black painted steel) were emblazoned with “U.S. Marine Corps” in a circular pattern. Each coat cuff also had a single riveted button of the same type. Three large, flapless, buttonless patch pockets were sewn to the front of the uniform coat. Two pockets were on each skirt at the waist and an additional pocket was sewn on the wearer’s left breast. The chest pocket was stenciled in black ink with the U.S. Marine Corps’ Eagle, Globe, and Anchor insignia with the letters “USMC” above it. The baggy, straight-cut utility trousers had four pockets. Early versions were manufactured with two patch-style pockets at the front, while in later contracts these were modified to more traditional interior, slash-style trouser pockets. On the trousers’ seat were two open, flapless patch pockets. The fly consisted of four to five riveted buttons of the same type as the utility coat.

While the utility uniform was manufactured in a variety of sizes, the baggy uniform design was often ill-fitting for most wearers and its appearance varied widely according to the body type and size of each Marine. As a result, period photographs often show efforts by individuals to modify or adjust their clothing to size. This was especially true with the utility trousers, which due to their straight-leg tailoring often required Marines to roll, fold, or cut the pant leg fabric to obtain their preferred height. Since Marines also tended to unblouse trousers from their canvas leggings, this habit features...
even more prominently in period photographs. The practice is best illustrated in the difference between the combat utility trousers of Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley, whose rolled cuff reveals leggings underneath, and Private First Class Franklin Sousley, whose trousers hang straight, as seen in the Iwo Jima flag-raising photographs.

U.S. MARINE CORPS M1 HELMET

By February 1945, nearly every U.S. Marine participating in the assault on Iwo Jima was equipped with an M1 helmet. These helmets were typically worn with reversible camouflage helmet covers that covered the M1 steel shell. Inside, a plastic liner (i.e., resin-impregnated duckcloth) was attached to the main helmet by a thin leather liner chinstrap.

The M1 helmet had been the primary Marine Corps combat helmet since 1942, when it replaced the M1917A1 helmets worn on Wake Island, Pearl Harbor, and the Philippines. For much of the war, Marines were readily identifiable because of their unique camouflage covers. Developed in May 1942, and adopted in September the same year, the reversible covers had a beach or desert “brownside” pattern and an opposing green, tan, and brown “greenside” jungle pattern. They were made from two separate sections (left and right) of herringbone twill cloth that were sewn together to fit (more or less) smoothly over the M1 helmet body. In all, during the war, three different patterns were created. The first version was constructed of solid cloth. The second and third versions improved on the design with the addition of 16 reinforced button holes that allowed for the addition of foliage. During the invasion of Iwo Jima, Marines were typically seen wearing all three types, as little effort was made to remove old types from the supply system.

When the plastic helmet liner and steel helmet were worn together, the thin leather liner chinstrap attached to the inside of the liner was folded over the steel helmet brim. Despite numerous small improvements made to the design during the course of the war, these straps were commonly damaged or removed by individuals during combat operations. A close examination of photographs of U.S. Marines during World War II often shows M1 helmets worn with or without the leather strap. During the flag raisings on Iwo Jima, Private First Class Harold Schultz can be seen with a broken leather liner strap, a distinguishing visual attribute that greatly assisted Huly Panel members in his proper identification.

U.S. MARINE CORPS
UTILITY CAP, 1944

The debut of the U.S. Marine Corps World War II-era 1941 utility uniform was notable for a lack of a specific hat or cap designed to be worn with the combat uniform. When not wearing steel M1 helmets, Marines commonly wore summer or winter service garrison “overseas” caps, fiber sun helmets, helmet liners, or (when available) the short-billed
U.S. Army herringbone twill cap.\textsuperscript{11} It was this paneled U.S. Army cap that was the direct forerunner of the Marine Corps utility cap commonly seen by 1945 and during the battle for Iwo Jima.

The early Army herringbone twill caps had a very short bill, panels, and were designed to look “baggy” in appearance. The style was popular with the Marines who could obtain them. These men often attached their Eagle, Globe, and Anchor ornaments to the front of the cap. With the development of an improved modified utility uniform in 1944, the Marine Corps borrowed heavily from this design and finally introduced a service-wide utility cap unique to the Marine Corps.

The new 1944 Marine Corps caps were most notable for the movement of the center seam to allow for the application of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Eagle, Globe, and Anchor stencil in black ink on a center panel. The caps also had longer, more pronounced bills, measuring 7.5 inches in width and 2.5 inches in length, regardless of the individual wearer’s personal head size.\textsuperscript{12} While retaining the baggy appearance of a railroad engineer cap, the bill was similar in style to baseball caps of the era. Records indicate that the 1944 utility caps were issued one per individual beginning in November 1944.\textsuperscript{13} By 1945, they were widely seen in the Pacific and proved exceptionally popular; the caps were often seen worn under helmets by Marines in the field.

The long cap bills seen protruding from under the M1 helmets were one of several details that greatly assisted the Huly Panel in determining which Marines participated in the Iwo Jima flag raisings. During the second flag raising, Private First Class Franklin Sousley and Sergeant Michael Strank both wore utility caps in this manner.\textsuperscript{14} Sergeant Henry Hansen, by contrast, eschewed his helmet entirely. Wearing only a soft cover during much of his time on the summit, Hansen is easily recognizable in photographs of the first flag raising taken by Staff Sergeant Louis Lowery, as well as in the \textit{Gung Ho} group photographs beneath the second flag taken by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal and Army photographer Private First Class George Burns.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\linewidth]{figure_h.4}
\caption{U.S. Marine Corps utility cap, 1944}
\end{figure}

\textbf{OLIVE DRAB FIELD JACKET (M1941)}

During the Battle of Iwo Jima, temperatures were noticeably colder than in prior Pacific campaigns. As a result, many Marines were seen wearing their second-pattern M1941 field jackets in action.\textsuperscript{15} Two of the flag raisers in the Rosenthal photograph are readily identifiable by their jackets: Corporal Harlon Block and Private First Class Harold Schultz.

Often referred to informally as the “Parsons’ jacket” for U.S. Army Major General James K. Parsons who originally designed it, the M1941 field jacket was similar in style to popular civilian windbreakers of the era. The short, waist-cut jacket was made of a light olive drab, wind- and water-resistant cotton poplin fabric.\textsuperscript{16} The interior of the garment was lined with wool flannel and was enclosed by a full-length zippered fastener and plastic button cover flap. The back of the jacket featured a “half-belt” with buttons to allow the servicemember to tighten the fit at the waist to their personal preference. On the front, two diagonal, internal slash
pockets allowed for the placement of hands during inclement weather. Originally intended to replace wool field jackets, the M1941 jackets were meant for “light combat wear” and could be layered with heavier wool overcoats or rainwear.\textsuperscript{17} For many reasons, despite their neat and well-tailored appearance, the M1941 field jacket failed in Europe as a combat uniform.\textsuperscript{18} In reality, soldiers could not easily carry the additional layers required for combat operations. The short coat and light fabric also stained easily and quickly presented an unprofessional appearance in the field. The field jacket was soon replaced by the much more practical, popular, and effective M1943 field jacket system. By 1943, remaining supplies of M1941 field jackets were relegated to the warmer China-Burma-India and Pacific theaters for both Army and Marine Corps units.\textsuperscript{19}

In period photographs, the M1941 field jacket can be readily identified by its distinctive zipper, plastic buttons, and “half-belt” cloth closures at the sleeve cuffs and waist. Among the many distinctive features of Private First Class Harold Schultz’s appearance that aided the Huly Panel in making a proper identification was the bulging right pocket of his olive drab field jacket. When viewed in combination with the broken helmet liner strap and unusual rifle sling attachment, the members of the Huly Panel were able to track Schultz’s movements in the motion picture film shot by Sergeant William Genaust and in still photographs depicting both first and second flag raisings.

\textbf{U.S. MARINE CORPS FLANNEL AND COTTON SERVICE SHIRTS}

U.S. Marine Corps uniform regulations of 1937 note the issue of both cotton and flannel service shirts to enlisted Marines.\textsuperscript{20} These shirts were most often worn with the winter service or summer service uniform. However, by 1945, the service shirts also doubled as undergarments with the loose-fit-
ting herringbone utility uniform coat when individual Marines deemed necessary. Perhaps nowhere else during the war was this practice so colorfully illustrated than on Iwo Jima. Official images from the battle and personal photographs accompanying collections donated to the National Museum of the Marine Corps document the practice of service shirts worn as underlayers repeatedly on Iwo Jima. Shown here is an example of the wool service shirts typically worn by Marines and corpsmen under their coats during the battle.

**U.S. MARINE CORPS CARTRIDGE BELTS**

At the outbreak of World War II, U.S. Marine Corps riflemen were often still equipped with M1910 cartridge belts, as well as the U.S. Army-designed M1923 cartridge belt. Marine Corps contracts for the M1923 belts brought slight modifications to the adjustment buckle and cosmetically removed the Army’s black “U.S.” marking from the front of the belt, in favor of “U.S.M.C.” stamped on the interior side. The M1923 belt’s individual pouches were designed to carry .30-06 caliber ammunition in clips for the Marines’ M1 Garand rifles.

While individual equipment, such as canteens, field packs, and first aid, was worn by all Marines, cartridge belts were the exclusive property of the Marine riflemen. Marines such as officers or enlisted men serving in crew-served weapons wore pistol belts to support side arms or to carry ammunition for their M1 carbines. In photographs of the second flag raising, Private First Class Franklin Sousley
is recognizable for wearing a cartridge belt without suspenders along with wire cutters and an empty canteen cover.

**U.S. NAVY COMBAT MEDIC HARNESS SYSTEM**

One of the most unique examples of field equipment observed on Mount Suribachi during the first and second flag raisings is the U.S. Navy first aid pouch harness system worn by Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class John H. Bradley.

Adopted by the U.S. Navy in 1943, these oversize first aid medical pouches were worn as a pair on the respective hips of the corpsmen. The top flap of the pouch was secured by two “lift the dot” snaps and the opening contained an inner sleeve to protect the pouch contents from contamination. These dual pouches could be worn with either equipment straps or with a wide set of specialized medical suspenders that better distributed the load bearing weight of the bags.

First aid pouches or earlier medical pack bags were standard equipment for most corpsman in combat in the Pacific. These personnel were rarely seen wearing standard infantry equipment, such as the M1923 cartridge belts. This discrepancy in equipment was one of the first visual clues that an error in attribution may have occurred with regard to the servicemen pictured in Associated Press photographer Joseph Rosenthal’s famous flag-raising image.

**U.S. M1 GARAND RIFLE**

The standard service rifle used by American forces during the Iwo Jima campaign, the M1 Garand was developed at Springfield Armory by Canadian engineer John Cantius Garand. The semiautomatic rifle was designed to be efficiently manufactured and easily maintained. Weighing approximately 9.5 pounds, much heavier than its predecessor the M1903 Springfield Bolt Action rifle, the gas-operated rifle utilized an eight-round clip to chamber and fire a .30-06 caliber cartridge. The M1 Garand can be distinguished from other rifles by its substantial length and the circular bolts on each side of the rear sight.

Although the Marine Corps was reluctant to replace the trusted M1903 Springfield, the M1 Garand fulfilled the need for a rifle that could deliver significantly more firepower. After much testing controversy, the recommendation was made in 1941 to adopt the M1 rifle as sufficient numbers became available. The M1 Garand served on all fronts throughout the Second World War, proving itself as successful, and as beloved by its users, as its predecessor: the M1903 Springfield.

The M1 Garand was integral to the Huly Panel’s investigation into the true identity of the Iwo Jima flag raisers pictured in Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthal’s photograph. The individual in position 5, long believed to be Private First Class Franklin Sousley, had a unique flaw. The Marine had attached his sling to the stacking swivel at the end of the wooden stock of the rifle, rather than to the proper swivel attached to the stock ferrule. Upon further consideration of other factors, such as the loose helmet strap, members of the Huly Panel concluded that the individual was Private First Class Harold Schultz, who exhibits these same.
idiosyncrasies in uniform and equipment in photographs and motion picture footage from that day.

**U.S. M1 CARBINE**

First delivered in 1942, the .30 caliber M1 carbine saw extensive use throughout the Pacific theater, including Iwo Jima. The carbine was designed primarily as a self-defensive weapon for troops not on the front line, such as those operating artillery, mortars, or machine guns; it is distinguishable from the M1 Garand rifle by its smaller size and its distinctive 15-round magazine. The carbine provided greater range, accuracy, and effective stopping power than a pistol, the typical weapon for troops in rear areas. Though it became popular among frontline troops, its range was severely limited by its size and under-powered cartridge. The M1 carbine features prominently in Staff Sergeant Louis Lowery’s famous photograph taken of the first flag raising at Iwo Jima. In that image, Private First Class James Michels prominently brandishes an M1 carbine while providing security for the flag raising.

**U.S. M1 GARAND AMMUNITION BANDOLEER**

Constructed of lightweight cotton material and measuring approximately 22.5 inches long and 4.75 inches wide, the M1 Garand ammunition bandoleer was designed to carry a total of 6 stamped, steel en bloc clips of .30 caliber ammunition for a total of 48 rounds. Fully loaded, each bandoleer weighed approximately 3.5 pounds.

Most soldiers or Marines were issued two bandoleers for immediate combat use. Shipped to
combat zones in a wooden crate that held a total of 1,344 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition, it would not have been uncommon for Marines to receive bandoleers directly from the shipment container and carry them on into battle. Worn diagonally across the chest, the M1 Garand ammunition bandoleer permitted Marines to carry extra ammunition to share with fellow riflemen in combat.

ENDNOTES

2. The National Museum of the Marine Corps’ collection contains a winter combat jacket worn by Marine Gunner Clifton J. Cormier during the Battle of Iwo Jima (2005.92.1). He had obtained the jacket on New Zealand, and his oral history relates how the unique uniform item nearly cost him his life.


10. See appendix B.


13. Tulkoff, *Grant Gear*, 32. The earliest production contract (Nom 55773) observed for utility caps is 28 July 1944.

14. See appendices B and D.

15. The designation “M1941” was not used at the time. The modern term is primarily retained by material historians and collectors to differentiate between several different styles of field jackets used by U.S. forces during World War II. The term is used here for the sake of brevity.


17. The wool service jackets to be replaced were the U.S. Army’s service dress uniforms. These open collared uniforms, which traced their roots to World War I, had performed as the field uniforms in the interwar era and were no longer appropriate for use in modern combat operations by World War II. Mark R. Henry, *The U.S. Army in World War II* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001), 18.


20. The uniform regulations created in 1937 would remarkably remain in place until fully revised in 1949. During the war years, however, they were continually amended and deleted through hundreds of letters of instruction from Headquarters Marine Corps.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABMC</td>
<td>American Battle Monuments Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZAC</td>
<td>Australian and New Zealand Army Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty signed in 1951 to protect the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Amphibious attack transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-ration</td>
<td>Type C ration, an individual canned, precooked, and prepared wet ration of food for field issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chowder Society</td>
<td>A group of Marine colonels who advocated in the Pentagon and Congress for the retention of the Marine Corps in the aftermath of World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corpsmen</td>
<td>Enlisted medical personnel in the U.S. Navy, often serving as medics in the Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-day</td>
<td>The day on which an important military operation is to begin; for the Battle of Iwo Jima, this date was 19 February 1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUKW</td>
<td>A six-wheel amphibious truck used in World War II by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps (a.k.a. the Duck)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>GI</td>
<td>Government issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>High definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCI</td>
<td>Landing craft, infantry</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCT</td>
<td>Landing craft, tank; the predecessor to the LST, Allied Type II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing ship, tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCVP</td>
<td>Landing craft, vehicle and personnel (a.k.a. Higgins boat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVT</td>
<td>Landing vehicle, tracked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Materiel</td>
<td>Military materials and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Security Act of 1947</td>
<td>The act merged the Department of War, which became the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Navy to create the National Military Establishment under the new position of secretary of defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPSL</td>
<td>Naval Photographic Science Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Photographic Studio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Detachment</td>
<td>The designated name for the American landing and subsequent seizure of Iwo Jima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWI</td>
<td>Office of War Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJ</td>
<td>Society of Jesuits</td>
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<td>TG</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
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<td>U.S. Navy, Reserve</td>
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<td>Veterans of Foreign Wars</td>
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<tr>
<td>V-J Day</td>
<td>“Victory over Japan Day” or “V-J Day” celebrates the date that Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies, effectively ending World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in action</td>
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</table>
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INDEX

Action at Angaur, 78, 81n45
Ahern, Lt. James J. (USA), 38
Alexander, Roy, 50, 60n35, 62n54
Alt National Park Service, 263
American Heritage Foundation, 90, 93, 95–96, 100n22
amphibious trucks (DUKW), 172, 175–76, 345
Amphitheater, the, 19
ANZAC Day, 125, 128, 137n20
AP Wirephoto, 47–49, 59n11
Arlington Ridge, VA, xi, xxv–xxvi, 102, 108, 115, 117, 118–19n34. See also Marine Corps War Memorial
Arnold, Henry H., 88
Artists' Guild, 107
Atherton, John, 71
atomic bombs, 25, 37, 41, 88, 92, 121, 323
Hiroshima, 25, 41, 121
Nagasaki, 25, 41, 323
Auburn (AGC 10), 175
Australia, xxvi, 120–39
Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), 125, 128, 134
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty, 131–32, 138n46, 345
Barrow, Capt Robert H., 257–58
Basilone, GySgt John, xviii
battles
Guadalcanal, 8, 28–29, 31, 33, 120, 124, 126, 132–33, 138n55, 153, 166n17, 194n14, 260, 328, 335
Okinawa, 8–9, 37, 51–52, 129, 323, 327
Beaches, 10, 174–75
Green, 11, 176–80
Purple, 33
Red, 85, 175–76, 180
White, 40–41
Yellow, 175
Becall, C. C., xxv, 63, 65, 67–71, 74–76, 78–79, 80n17–20, 322. See also Seventh War Loan drive
Beech, TSgt W. Keyes, 26n37, 230, 306
Belleau Wood, 87, 114–17, 256. See also Iron Mike
Bended knee speech, 88–89. See also Vandegrift, Gen Alexander A.
Blandy, RAdm William H. P. (USN), 9
Block, Belle, xxii, 168n56, 198, 211. See also Block, Cpl Harlon H.
Bloody Gorge, 21–22
Boeing B–29 Superfortress, 22, 37, 41
Boston Globe, 48, 59n17
Bowers, BGen William J., x, xii, xxiv, 218, 224, 236, 264. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation
Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation, 298–313
Brooklyn Historical Society, 227, 301
Brooks, George C., 97
Bruce, J. Campbell, 52
Buell, Hal, xxviii, 61n50
Burmeister, Sgt Louis R., 60n36, 161–65, 167n37, 215n8, 230, 295, 304, 323
Burns, PFC George (USA), 60n36, 148, 156, 162–64, 215n8, 220, 222–23, 226, 231, 233, 243, 264, 295, 299, 303–11, 323, 335, 338
Burrell, Robert S., 25n4, 99
Bush, George H. W., 260
Camps
Lejeune, 94–95
Mackay, 132
Paekákáriki, 132
Pendleton, 98, 212, 299, 324, 326, 328
Russell, 132
Tarawa, 212
Cassel Jr., Pvt Dale O., 23
Cates, MajGen Clifton B., 10, 16, 19, 21, 26n40, 52, 61n46, 98
Chaney, MajGen James E. (USA), 34, 36
Chambers, LtCol Justice M., 17
Charlo, PFC Louis C., 96, 155–56, 163, 208–9, 292, 295–96, 323–24
Chowder Society, 88, 93, 345
Clark, RAdm J. J. (USN), 6
Clark, Tom C., 89–93, 118n10, 118n26. See also Freedom Train
Clement, BGen W. T., 270. See Official Report of the de Il Valle Board
Cold War, xxvi, 99, 103, 109, 115, 117, 131–32
Collier’s magazine, 68, 322. See Beall, C. C.
Commission of Fine Arts, 105–8, 118n15
Conner, Owen L., 240, 299, 301, 311. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation
Cornelius, SSgt Meyers A., 60n36, 152, 161–62, 215n8, 253, 305, 324
Crowson, PFC Allan C., 15
Curtin, John, 123
Cutsail, SgtMaj Douglas F., 236. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation
Daskalakis, 1stSgt John A., 230, 242, 244
Official Report of, 267–71
Dempsey, SSgt David K., 26n25, 45, 59n6
Denig, BGen Robert L., 118n33, 230
de Weldon, Felix W., xi, xvi, xxvi, 79, 83, 102–19, 201–2, 214, 236, 242, 251, 329–30
Digital Evidence Laboratory, xxiv, 216n25, 217n36, 233, 251, 264, 300, 302–12. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation
Dodds, PFC R. R., 56–57
Doughty, Cpl Goodwin G., 13
Duncan, David Douglas, 257–58
Eagle, Globe, and Anchor (USMC), 114, 120, 195, 336, 338
Eastwood, Clint, 134, 140, 213
Edwards, PFC Ralph Lee, 17–18
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 88, 102, 116
Eldorado (AGC 11), xix–xx, 168n59
Elkus, PFC Bruce (USA), 24, 37, 40–41
Empire Air Training Scheme, 123, 137n7
equipment
ammunition bandoleer, 234, 243, 280, 303, 306–7, 342–43
cartridge belt (M1923), 206, 281, 340–41
combat medic harness system (1943), 341
M1 helmet, 206–7, 231, 234, 238, 243, 337–38
utility cap (1944), 160, 337–38, 343n13
Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 10, 24, 33, 36
INDEX

Evanson, PFC Clifford, 160
Eversharp, 76–77. See also Seventh War Loan drive
Fisk, James E., 163, 295
Flags of Our Fathers, xv, 134, 139n59, 168n51, 169–70, 183n31, 215
F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Company, 76. See also Seventh War Loan drive
Forrestal, James V., xxi, 66, 85–89, 189–90, 194, 198, 204–8, 215n6, 323, 325
Freedom Train, xxvi, 89–101, 104, 118n10
Honor Guard, xxvi, 90, 92–95, 100n38–39
French, Daniel Chester, 70
Fulford, Col Robert C., xiii, 236. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation
Gallipoli, 125, 128, 134
Gates, Robert E., 107
Ghormley, VAdm Robert L. (USN), 123
Ghosts of Iwo Jima, 99
Gibbons, Floyd, 87
Goode, Pvt Robert D., 157–58, 161, 232, 293
Great Depression, 88–89, 189
Grigsby, SgtMaj William J., xiii, 236. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation
Guadalcanal, xviii, 8, 28–33, 120, 122, 124, 126, 132–33, 138n55, 153, 166n17, 194n14, 328
Guam, xix–xx, 47–48, 59n15, 60n22, 123, 127–28, 136–37n2, 168n59, 186, 224, 316, 327, 335
Guinnell, Vic, 73. See Seventh War Loan drive
Halls of Montezuma, 98
Hatch, WO Norman T., 47–48, 163, 168n53, 187–90, 194, 215n6, 323, 325
Haynes, Capt Fred E., 12, 18, 21–22, 25, 230
Henri, Capt Robert, 21
“Here’s Your Infantry,” 78, 81n43–44. See also Seventh War Loan drive
Heritage of Freedom, 95. See Freedom Train
Hill, RAdm Harry W. (USN), 9, 31, 175, 178
Hills
379, 257–58
362A, 18–19, 164, 186, 324
362C, 20
INDEX

368

Marine Military Academy, 231, 301

Marling, Karal Ann, 112, 167n34, 215n6

Marshall, Gen George C. (USA), 85, 88, 119n53

Martin, 1stLt Harry L., 22

Mercer, PFC George B., 155–56, 208, 292


Midway, 133, 194n14, 328

Minute Man, The, 70–71, 76, 81n43. See also Seventh War Loan drive

Missoula (APA 211), 95, 177

Missouri (BB 63), 100n12, 120, 322

Mitscher, VADM Marc A. (USN), 6, 25n2

Molenda, Lt Felix J., 172, 178

Morgan, LtCol Matthew W., xxii–xxiii, 59, 193n1, 200

Morgenthau Jr., Henry, 69–70

Morrison, Maj Richard R. (USA), 27, 40–41

Motion Picture Preservation Lab, 190–91

Motoyama Airfield
   No. 1, 13, 15–17
   No. 2, 18, 33
   No. 3, 20, 33

Mulligan, Sgt James D., 154–55

Muscarella, PFC Anthony, 24, 26n40

Mykris, PFC Mike N., 161–62, 168n45–46

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), xiii–xxiv, xxvii, 27, 80n20, 184–85, 191, 216, 224–25, 300. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation


National Park Service (NPS), 107, 118–19n34, 263

National Sculpture Society, 106

National Security Act of 1947, 93, 99, 112, 345

Naval Air Station Patuxent, MD, 102

Naval Photographic Studio (NPS), 189–90, 194n7, 346

Navy Photographic Science Laboratory, 185–88


Neller, Gen Robert B., xx, xxiii, 117, 184, 196, 199, 205, 209, 264


New Zealand, 120–39, 343

Nimitz, Adm Chester W. (USN), xxi, 21, 56–57, 107–8, 188, 254, 265n4, 330

Nisei, 37, 39, 43–44n18

Nishi Ridge, 18–19, 22, 164, 322

North Carolina (BB 55), 9

Now . . . All Together, 64, 67–70, 74–77, 79. See also Seventh War Loan drive

O’Connor, CWO William J., 83

Office of War Information (OWI), 47, 69, 346


Olson, PFC Dale E., 155, 166n19

Omaha (NE) World-Herald, xxii, 198

Pacific Negative Logbook (USMC), xx, 300

Papadopoulos, Randy, 200–1. See also Official Report of the Huly Panel Investigation, Part I and II

Papsun, PHOM3 John (USCG), 148, 224, 305

Patzman, MSgt Stacy M., 226, 236. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation

Pearl Harbor, HI, 28, 121, 138n34, 170, 172, 188, 257, 337

Peatross, Maj Oscar F., 153

Pershing, Gen John J. (USA), 28, 114

Pryor, Don, xix–xx

Puller, Col Lewis B., 257–58

Quarry, the, 10–11, 13, 16

Reichert, Joseph, 75–76. See also Seventh War Loan drive


Retreat, Hell!, 98, 115, 119n51

Richardson, LtGen Robert C. (USA), 43


Robeson, PFC James A., 158–60, 232, 293, 295, 309

Rockey, MajGen Keller E., 10, 20, 22, 164, 194n8

Rockwall (APA 230), 37

Rockwell, Norman, 67, 69

Roll, LtCol George A., 163, 194n8
Roosevelt, Franklin D., xviii, xxi, 26n37, 70, 124, 196, 215n9, 218, 322–23
Royall, Kenneth C., 93–94
Rozek, PFC Leo J., 159, 208, 293–94

Sands of Iwo Jima, 98–99, 133, 165, 256, 328
Schlosberg, 1stLt Herbert B., 188, 190, 194n13
Schmidt, MajGen Harry, 10, 17, 19–21, 34
Schmitt, PFC John T., 157–58, 293
Schmitz, SSgt Werner H., 47
Severance, Capt Dave E., 15, 23, 59n9, 154–55, 166n14, 166–67n20, 167n26, 167n28, 196, 206, 215n7, 230, 304
Shackle (ARS 9), 176, 179
Shahn, Ben, 69
Sherrod, Robert, xx, xxx, 6, 13, 23, 45, 48–50, 52–54, 56, 59n4, 60n28, 62n52
Silent Drill Team, 92, 259
Silverstein, PA2 Judy L., 171, 178–79
Sloan, Robert, 71, 73
Smith, LtGen Holland M., xix–xx, 8–10, 23, 25n6, 85–86, 166, 169, 278
Smith, SgtMaj Gary, 208. See also Official Report of the Huly Panel Investigation, Part I and II
Smith, W Eugene, 50–52, 60n34, 61n41–44
Smithsonian Channel, xxiii, 184–85, 190, 193, 199–200, 273
Snyder, Sgt Howard M., 158, 160, 210, 222–23, 293, 295, 303
Spruance, Adm Raymond A. (USN), 6, 9, 25n2, 108
Staafford, Col David A., 57
Stars and Stripes, 27
Steadman, Sgt Henry W., 94–95
Steele, MajGen Orlo K., 228
Sutherland, Col David A., 57
Sullivan, John L., 93–94, 107
Sutter, LtCol Allan, 268, 270. See also Official Report of the del Valle Board
Suver, Father Charles F., 163, 168n51, 295, 323
Talladega (APA 208), 171, 179–80
Tanaka, Sgt Ritsuwo (USA), 39
tank landing craft (TLC), 171
Task Force 58, 6, 9, 25n2
Task Group 53.3 (Tractor Flotilla), 172
Task Unit 11.1.2, 31
Tatum, PFC Charles W., 160, 167n32
Tentative Landing Operations Manual, 88
Time magazine, xx, 45–62, 67, 244
To the Shores of Iwo Jima, 187, 189–90, 193
Torrey, MajGen P.H., 228
Towers, VAdm J.H., 188
Tourism Australia, 134, 136
Traub, PFC Donald W., 22
Treasury Department, 63, 67, 69–70, 74–75, 78–79, 81n43, 104, 108. See also Seventh War Loan drive
True, 52
Truman, Harry S., 26n37, 85, 88–89, 93, 97–99, 108, 110, 118n30, 322. See also Freedom Train
Turner, VAdm Richmond Kelly (USN), xix, 9–10
Tuttle, 2dLt Albert T., 164, 170, 177, 183n31, 237
Tuttle Jr., Col William B. (USA), 29

Unknown Flag Raiser of Iwo Jima, The, 184

uniforms,
field jacket (M1941), 206–7, 235, 240–41, 244, 281–82, 304–7, 311, 335–39, 343
service shirt (1937), 229, 231, 305, 335, 339–40
utility uniform (P1941), 335–40

U.S. Army
Air Forces, xxvii, 6, 10, 22, 24, 25n6, 27–28, 34–35, 41, 43n2, 88, 92
21st Fighter Group, 22–23
VII Fighter Command, 35
81st Infantry Regiment, 78
96th Infantry Division, 37
147th Infantry Regiment, 21, 23, 28–31, 33–44
Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, 38
Garrison Force, 34, 40–42

U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 220, 224, 226, 300. See also Official Report of the Bowers Board Investigation

U.S. Coast Guard, xxvii, 92, 148, 170–72, 180, 182, 190, 224
Historian's Office, 171, 182n11

U.S. Marine Corps
V Amphibious Corps, 10, 25n1, 31, 34–35, 178
1st Marine Division, 121–22, 124, 126, 132, 136, 138n50, 198, 257–58, 325
3d Marine Division, 5, 10–11, 17–21, 24–25, 31, 33, 36, 121, 325
9th Marines, 17, 36
21st Marines, 17, 20
1st Battalion, 33
4th Marine Division, 5, 10–23, 27, 29, 31, 47, 152, 186, 188, 194n4, 224, 248
23d Marines
3d Battalion, 16
24th Marines
3d Battalion, 17
25th Marines
2d Battalion, 24
4th Tank Battalion, 19
5th Marine Division, 5, 10–20, 23–25, 27, 31, 34, 159, 215, 322, 327
26th Marines, 18, 21
1st Battalion, 26n14
2d Battalion, 23
27th Marines, 18, 22
1st Battalion, 160
2d Battalion, 13, 179, 183n23, 291
28th Marines, 10, 14, 18, 35, 49, 152
1st Battalion, 179, 183n23
2d Battalion, xvii, 15, 18, 23, 46, 153–58, 163–64, 167n22, 169, 170, 177, 179, 196, 208, 215n7, 226, 236, 242, 250, 322, 324, 326, 328–30
3d Battalion, 153–21
13th Marines, 22
5th Pioneer Battalion, 22, 35
Photographic Section, 47, 162–63, 187–88
Raider Battalion
1st Marine Raider Regiment, 153
2d Marine Raider Battalion, 153
3d Marine Raider Battalion, 153
U.S. Navy, 6, 8, 10, 15, 17, 25, 50, 61n46, 88, 103, 118n7, 126, 138n34, 163, 172, 325, 341
Third Fleet, 25n2
Fifth Fleet, 6, 25n2
Honor Guard, 92

V–J Day, 88, 100n12, 346

war bonds, 63–81


Watson, Forbes, 104–5, 107
Watson, Sgt Sherman B., 155–57, 208, 292, 295, 324
Washington (BB 56), 9
Washington Crossing the Delaware, 53–56, 67
Washington Post, 66, 102, 104, 325

weapons
M1 carbine, xix, 110–11, 235, 244, 310, 340, 342
M1 Garand, 15, 110, 235, 244, 340–43
M1918 Browning automatic rifle (BAR), 29, 158, 161, 163, 324

Wells, 1stLt G. Greeley, 164, 208, 230, 242, 292
Wells, Lt John Keith, 166n14, 230–31, 240, 328
Weslaco Independent School District, TX, 231, 301

Wetenhall, John, 112, 118n12, 119n39, 167n34, 215n6
What Price Glory, 98

Wheel er, Cpl Richard, 167n34, 226, 301
White, PFC Theodore J., 155–56, 208, 292, 295, 325

Williams, Capt Lloyd W., 115, 119n51
Wilson, Woodrow, 87

Winged Arrow (AP 170), 242, 244
With the Marines at Tarawa, 187, 190
Wood, ENS Alan S. (USNR), xxvii, 170–71, 177, 182n13, 183n34
Wright Museum of World War II, xxiv, 231, 301, 312
Wyeth, N. C., 71–72. See also Seventh War Loan drive
Wyford, Phil, 75. See also Seventh War Loan drive
Yamamoto, Adm Isoroku (Japanese Imperial Navy), 7
Yank, 27–53, 162–63, 220, 223, 303, 323
Yasukuni Shrine, xxvi, 144–45, 147n6
Ziehme, PhM2c Gerald D., 154, 166n15, 201