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Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger Marines of the OSS



by
Major Robert E. Mattingly
United States Marine Corps

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1989

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Foreword

The History and Museums Division has undertaken the publication for limited distribution of various studies, theses, compilations, bibliographies, and monographs, as well as proceedings of selected workshops, seminars, symposia, and similar colloquia, which it considers to be of significant value to audiences interested in Marine Corps history. These "Occasional Papers," which are chosen for their intrinsic worth, must reflect structured research, present a contribution to historical knowledge not readily available in published sources, and represent original content on the part of the author, compiler, or editor. It is the intent of the division that these occasional papers be distributed to selected institutions, such as service schools, official Department of Defense historical agencies, and directly concerned Marine Corps organizations, so the information contained therein will be available for study and exploitation.

This story of the Marines of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the European Theater in World War II is unique in its breadth of coverage, its detail concerning individuals, its documentation, and its readability. The product of an Individual Research Project during the 1978-1979 academic year at the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College, "Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger" won the school's Clifton B. Cates Award for Research. We are particularly pleased that it was prompted in part by messages about OSS Marines in Europe that occurred in the POW appendix to the final volume of our official history of World War II, *Victory and Occupation*.

Robert E. Mattingly enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1959, was chosen after service in the 2d Marine Division and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing for a fleet candidate NROTC scholarship, and was commissioned when he graduated from Columbia University in 1965. He retired as a lieutenant colonel in 1983. A tank officer and intelligence sub-specialist, the author's FMF assignments took him to all three active-duty Marine divisions and the 2d Wing. During 1966-68 he spent 20 months in Vietnam serving with the Tank, Reconnaissance, and Headquarters Battalions, 3d Marine Division and as a liaison officer to the Vietnamese Army's 1st Division. Other overseas tours included duty as a regional Marine officer in Beirut and with the United Nations Command J-3 in Korea. Lieutenant Colonel Mattingly served twice at Headquarters Marine Corps, attended professional schools, and was on NROTC duty at the University of Southern California. He was involved in intelligence activities conducted by the Special Operations Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the Iran Hostage Crisis. His final active-duty assignment was as Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asian Affairs.

This paper is reproduced just as it was submitted at Quantico in 1979. This means there are typographical errors, some of which were corrected in ink by then-Major Mattingly. None of these stylistic errors change in any way the content of the study. Where there are errors of fact, they are the author's honest mistakes given his level of knowledge at the time he wrote his story. Since that story is a pioneer effort of surpassing value overall, we wanted it published just as it was submitted, as a contribution to a fascinating and very little-known episode in our history.

The opinions and facts presented in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Marine Corps or the Department of the Navy. Lieutenant Colonel Mattingly has copyrighted his paper and retains full proprietary rights to it. In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes comments on this publication from interested individuals and activities.




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STUDENT RESEARCH AND WRITING

AY: 1978-79

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
EDUCATION CENTER
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QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134



TITLE: HERRINGBONE CLOAK - GI DAGGER: MARINES OF THE OSS

AUTHOR: MAJOR ROBERT E. MATTINGLY, U. S. MARINE CORPS

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The Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Quantico, Va.

ABSTRACT

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
Before 1941 the United States had no intelligence service worthy of the name. While each military department had its own parochial tactical intelligence apparatus and the State Department maintained a haphazard collection of 'country files' there was no American equivalent to the 400-year-old British espionage establishment or the German Abwehr. No one in Washington was charged with putting the jigsaw puzzle of fact, rumor, and foreign innuendo together to see what pictures might develop or what portions might be missing. Even those matters of vital interest to policy makers remained uncoordinated, unevaluated, uninterpreted, and frequently in the wrong hands. That was in 1941.

Four years later the scene was forever altered. The organization which achieved this dramatic turnabout was the Office of Strategic Services, better known by its initials: OSS. Headed by William J. Donovan, a World War I hero, Republican politician, and millionaire lawyer, the OSS infiltrated agents into every country of occupied Europe and raised guerilla armies in most. This paper examines the small but representative role played by Marines assigned to this country's first central intelligence agency. In so doing, it provides the first serious attempt to chronicle a totally forgotten chapter of Marine Corps history.

(NOTE: Clifton B. Cates Award winning paper for research during 1978-79 Academic Year)

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

"HERRINGBONE CLOAK - GI DAGGER"
MARINES OF THE OSS



AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PROJECT

BY

MAJOR ROBERT E. MATTINGLY
U. S. MARINE CORPS

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Robert E. Mattingly

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PREFACE

Four distinct events led to the composition of this paper. The first occurred in Seoul, Korea during 1972. On a visit to the Yongsan Post Library, I discovered a recently published book entitled OSS- The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Organization. As an intelligence officer I was intrigued by the title and became fascinated by the contents. As a Marine, I was doubly interested in the occasional references to OSS men who were identified as U. S. Marines. But, after some perfunctory searches through the standard popular Marine Corps histories yielded nothing about Marines and the OSS, I simply forgot about the subject.

When I was offered the opportunity to write an Individual Research Paper at Command and Staff College, I began thinking about a subject. Major Don Bittner, the military historian, challenged me to find a topic which would contribute something new and involve in-depth research utilizing primary source material. Little did I realize that, like most sailors setting forth for uncharted waters, my academic voyage would be quite so lengthy.

At about the same time, I happened to be glancing through Volume 5 of the History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II. In one of the closing chapters I noticed several pages concerning Marine Prisoners of War in Europe. My interest piqued, I read the section in detail

and discovered the names of several OSS Marines who had been captured while on missions behind enemy lines in France.

Preliminary scouting in the Command and Staff College Library yielded a few more tidbits tucked away in yellowing copies of the Marine Corps Gazette. Then, I contacted Mr. Benis Frank, the Oral Historian at the Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington and co-author of the previously mentioned Volume 5. It was Ben Frank who sold me on the idea of trying to document Marine Corps participation in OSS and offered to guide my research.

America, alone among the great powers, entered World War II without a real intelligence service worthy of the name. By the time Hitler's 'Thousand Year Reich' collapsed in a sea of rubble and Japan's 'Rising Sun' was eclipsed, the United States had developed a large and amazingly competent apparatus for both strategic and tactical intelligence. This organization began as the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and later was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The current Central Intelligence Agency is lineal successor to their traditions.

OSS was by nature a secret organization. The majority of its operational history still remains to be told. Of greater difficulty even than the problem of classification was the identification of Marines who were a part of the story. I began with exactly 6 names of Marine officers.

In a sense this paper is only a beginning. Despite approximately 1,000 hours of research and writing it inevitably falls short of recounting the full tale. Much of the research effort was done via the mails because primary sources were located in areas not readily accessible to an officer who was also a fulltime student. As late as mid-April I was still uncovering new OSS Marines and compiling dossiers. The rough draft deadline was, by then, a month behind me.

The result was a conscious but regretful decision to limit the scope of my writing to OSS activities in North Africa and Europe. Perhaps one day I will be able to fill-in-the-blanks for those Marines who served in India, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, and China.

Throughout my approach has been to present the Marines of OSS as people - to tell something of their backgrounds as well as their wartime exploits. The reader will quickly discern that they form an unusual group. Most were highly educated and successful civilians whose talents met the test of unique operational challenges. Diversity was a singular characteristic of OSS recruits and diverse indeed was the small but distinguished group which served in Marine green.

This is a story which can be found in no book yet published. Its subject is thirty years old but the archival cobwebs and outdated security classifications do not tarnish the patina. The Marines who populate these pages shared many of the dangers of their counterparts in the Pacific but until now they have been almost completely ignored or forgotten. I have concentrated on Marine involvement in OSS operations

at the expense of more fully discussing analytical or administrative functions. This fact is not intended to detract from the very real accomplishments of those who served in such capacities but simply to make the narrative more interesting. When I showed a few chapters of the draft to one of my fellow students, he read them carefully and exclaimed: "This is amazing stuff but its too interesting to be a Command and Staff Research Paper". I hope every reader feels something of that enthusiasm.

In a sense, this paper will be a night drop behind the lines of conventional Marine Corps history. The "green light" goes on in Chapter One.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper consumed the better part of my stay at the Command and Staff College in Quantico. While the words and interpretations herein are solely mine, they would have never reached paper without the help, friendship, and wise counsel of a number of people.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson USMC, author of The Armies of Ignorance; James Ladd, author of Commandos and Rangers of World War II; and Joseph E. Persico, author of Piercing the Reich assisted me with valuable advice and documentary support from their own files.

Major Don Bittner of the Command and Staff College and Dr. John Gordon of the College's Adjunct Faculty assisted me with suggestions on sources and research methodology. Dr. Gordon also provided much key material on the Raider Battalions and the role of the enigmatic Evans Carlson. My classmates Major Barry Banks, USMC, Major Bob Kirkpatrick, USMC, and Major Ty Tisdale, USA read parts of the manuscript and offered constructive criticism on content, style, and grammar.

The majority of my research was done at the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard. I found this to be an extremely easy place to work largely because of the highly professional and helpful staff. While virtually every member of the 'team' there assisted me when I requested help or advice, one person deserves special note. Mr. Benis M. Frank, the Oral Historian, loaned me not only office space but also proved a veritable treasure trove of anecdotes, analyses, and just plain good advice. I could not have written the paper in its present form without him.

Mssrs. Owen and Schafer of the Information and Privacy Activity at CIA are also due considerable thanks. Although swamped with Freedom of Information Act requests, they provided me with several valuable OSS documents which have never seen public distribution.

Finally, my wife Heike and my daughter Alex supported me throughout the project. Only their understanding and commitment enabled the idea to become the written word. One day perhaps Alex will be able to read this and know why "Daddy always disappears".

CHAPTER I

"THE WORST SLAP IN THE FACE..."

Early on the evening of 22 December 1941, a man carrying a locked briefcase emerged from the large neoclassical building at 25th and "E" Streets in Northwest Washington. Buttoning his overcoat against the winter chill, he passed quickly between the fading Ionic columns and headed for the shelter of a waiting car.

Had the messenger glanced westward, he might still have enjoyed a dim view of the Lincoln Memorial, otherwise, the neighborhood was uninviting. The building itself had until recently been occupied by the National Institute of Health. Now it was a down-at-the-heels companion to a seedy skating rink, some dilapidated warehouses, and a can-strewn vacant lot.

Little of this made an impression on the man with the briefcase. He was on his way to the White House with a personal memorandum for the President of the United States.

Author of the single page document was Colonel William J. Donovan. For the past four months, Donovan had spent a good deal of time at 25th and "E" - headquarters of the recently established Office of the Coordinator of Information which he headed. The nondescript location was a perfect 'cover' for America's first attempt at a civilian strategic intelligence organization.

Donovan's message, classified Top Secret, had been written with a politician's inbred instinct for timing. The first major face-to-face meetings between British and American military planners were just getting underway. - This conference* would decide the initial course of allied strategy in the war against the Axis. Donovan - whose appointment as civilian coordinator of "all information and data which may bear upon our national security" had been greeted with blatant hostility by the Army, Navy, and J. Edgar Hoover - wanted his views represented.¹

The Coordinator of Information was undeterred by such opposition. At fifty-eight, William Donovan had seen his share of physical and political scrapping. He was a short, muscular man, fifteen pounds heavier than when he had quarterbacked the Columbia varsity against Yale, but not a whit less aggressive. Behind his emotive eyes and Cayneyesque brows lay a mind which 'could see an acorn and visualize an oak'. And he had guts.

In 1917, Dwight Eisenhower had been involved in training duties. No shot had ever been fired in his direction. Omar Bradley spent the Great War in Arizona and Illinois. Lucien Truscott served in Arkansas. But William J. Donovan had seen plenty of Germans and, judging from his three wounds, more than one had seen him. As commander of the 165th Infantry - formerly the 'Fighting 69th New York' - Donovan won the Medal of Honor and six other personal decorations from three governments. He came home to practice law with the descriptive and unshakeable nickname 'Wild Bill' as well as a collection of ribbons second only to Douglas MacArthur.

* Codename ARCADIA

A life-long Republican, Donovan vigorously supported Herbert Hoover in 1928 and, for a time, seemed to be a 'shoo-in' for Attorney General.* He had run unsuccessfully for the New York governorship in 1932, a bad time to be a Republican candidate for any elective office. Later, as a private citizen, Donovan travelled to a number of the world's trouble spots. During the 30's he turned up to watch Mussolini dismember Ethiopia and saw Hitler's Condor Legion smash Spanish towns. More recently he had undertaken two major quasi-official missions abroad for his former law school classmate Franklin Roosevelt.

Known personally by nearly every member of the Cabinet - and familiar to millions of Americans as "Roosevelt's mystery man" - Donovan established direct contact with important leaders in Britain and the Balkans.

Most important of these was First Sea Lord Winston Churchill whose influence allowed Donovan access to the inner workings of British intelligence. It was Donovan's appointment as COI in July, 1941 which enabled Churchill to begin passing super secret ULTRA signals intercepts to the United States Government.²

Thus, by the time the position of Coordinator of Information was established, Donovan had made a considerable impression on his fellow New Yorker at the White House.³ Roosevelt, who admired and trusted him, once remarked to Navy Secretary Frank Knox that:

"Frankly, I should like to have him (Donovan) in the Cabinet, not only for his own ability but also in a sense to repair the very great injustice done him by Hoover".⁴

* Donovan's appointment was blocked by party archconservatives who wanted no part of the Irish Catholic community represented in 'their' starting line-up.

But Donovan was not a member of the Cabinet. Nor was he a participant in the ARCADIA discussions. He had begun the job of fashioning his intelligence organization with determination and zeal. Now, he was proposing a step which seemed necessary for a nation at war: creation of an instrument for clandestine military action against the enemy.

Specifically Donovan's memorandum recommended:

"1. That as an essential part of any strategic plan, there be recognized the need of sewing the dragon's teeth in those territories from which we must withdraw and in which the enemy will place his army; for example the Azores and North Africa. That the aid of native chiefs be obtained, the loyalty of the local inhabitants cultivated; Fifth columnists organized and placed, demolition material cached; and guerilla bands of bold and daring men organized and installed.

2. That there be organized now, in the United States, a guerilla corps, independent and separate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a maximum spirit of the offensive. This force should, of course, be created along disciplined military lines, analgous to the British Commando principle..."⁵

For a nation two weeks into a major war, Donovan's ideas probably made some strategic sense. Practically however, the proposed 'guerilla corps' was on shaky ground. In the first place, the entire tone smacked of 'combat fever'. With American forces in no shape to fight anything but a world-wide delaying action, the memorandum sought to further dilute U. S. arms by organizing and equipping a highly specialized unit which would take only top-quality men.

The commando concept also contravened Donovan's personal notions about how secret intelligence operations should be conducted by proposing creation of an instrument to conduct partisan operations before the groundwork could possibly be laid overseas.

Finally, "strictly from a bureaucratic point of view, the memo was fatally flawed in calling for a guerilla corps independent of the Army and Navy. For Donovan to think, even with FDR's endorsement, that such an organization could be brought to pass in the face of the military's obvious objections, was, charitably, an act of lunacy".⁶

Across the Potomac the December wind whistled around the new Arlington Navy Annex building. Most of the complex - which resembled a large straight comb from the air - was dark. But in Room 2004, office of the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, light still seeped around the hastily installed blackout curtains. Thomas Holcomb was working late.

Balding and bespectacled, Holcomb had just begun his fifth year at the helm of the Corps. He was an energetic, practical man, well respected both within military circles and on Capitol Hill. "As one of Lejeune's bright young captains of 1916, 'Tommy' Holcomb had won the friendship of then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt. In later years, President Roosevelt would frequently open a remark to Holcomb with the phrase, 'we Marines'."⁷

That night Holcomb - who like Donovan was not directly involved in ARCADIA - was absorbed in the reports from his dwindling defense force on Wake Island. Soon he would face a very different sort of challenge; one which would require all of his store of presidential goodwill to repel. For Donovan's memorandum had proposed that his commandos be separate from the Army and Navy and Holcomb's Marines fit that requirement to a 'tee'.

Meanwhile, at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, the President and Knox were chatting amiably with a distinguished houseguest. Cigar smoke

edded around the frosty windowpanes and the sound of carollers floated from beyond the national Christmas tree. The visitor was Prime Minister Churchill himself and the topic: grand strategy.

Churchill had arrived earlier the same day after crossing the Atlantic aboard HMS Duke of York. During the voyage he had spent considerable time drafting his personal views on joint U. S. - British action against Germany and Japan. Now, he was listening attentively to Roosevelt's revelation of the Donovan proposal.

There can be little doubt that the Prime Minister approved of the commando concept, if not in the creation of the specific instrument for its implementation. Furthermore, he too was focusing on the Azores and North Africa. Part of his written notes for the strategic discussions read: "we ought to try hard to win over French North Africa, and now is the moment to use every inducement and form of pressure at our disposal upon the Government of Vichy..."⁸ Yet, despite his strong desire to orient maximum power toward the Mediterranean, Churchill tentatively agreed to consider postponing immediate action there in favor of Knox's ideas concerning "a highly dubious action calling for commando raids on Japanese-held islands which would be launched from bases in California".⁹

As the brandy snifters clinked, the commando question seemed to be only a matter of administrative and organizational wrinkle smoothing. Knox controlled the naval establishment and Roosevelt was the Commander in Chief. Unknown to Holcomb was the fact that his outfit was being considered as the source of manpower, but not necessarily command. For the Major General Commandant, it was to be a Christmas present only slightly more desirable than a case of institutional hemorrhoids.

President Roosevelt formally answered Donovan's memorandum the following day. In noncommittal language he indicated that the proposed commando service had some merit and that he would see to it that the idea was fully considered.¹⁰ The question of where the notional organization should be placed within the defense structure was not addressed; however, there were a number of circumstances which pointed straight toward the Marine Corps.

"Throughout the decade of the Thirties, the Marines experimented with the concept of raider-type forces, generally as elements of larger exercises. The continuing interest in such units was demonstrated by the formation of Provisional Rubber Boat Companies from Companies "A", "E", and "I" of the Seventh Marines during Fleet Exercise - 7 in February, 1941."¹¹ The Tentative Landing Manual of 1935 had also discussed raiding operations, albeit in limited detail. But these factors were undoubtedly secondary to more personal ones.

James Roosevelt, the President's son, was fresh from a six-month stint as Donovan's military aide at COI. A Marine Reserve Captain, 'Jimmie' Roosevelt had connections which placed his hands squarely in a position to stir the commando pot. More importantly, in the person of gaunt, jut-jawed Major Evans F. Carlson, the Marine Corps possessed a guerilla warfare zealot with unique practical experience.

Son of a New England Congregationalist minister, Carlson was an enigmatic figure who had served seven years as an army officer before enlisting as a Marine private in April, 1922. His first choices of duty had been: "the Legation Guard at Peking, or a chance at Officer's School, in the order mentioned".¹²

Carlson's Marine career was a succession of virtuoso performances - save only for a flat note when he was bounced from flight training for aeronautic inaptitude. He won the Navy Cross in Nicaragua and later served as Executive Officer of the Marine Guard at Roosevelt's Warsprings, Georgia retreat. There, he too became personally acquainted with FDR and won the admiration, confidence, and trust of his son. James Roosevelt's decision to become a Marine officer stemmed in great measure from his association with then-Captain Carlson.

Evans Carlson was "an Old China Hand par excellence. In 1937, he pulled off a feat which impressed Edgar Snow, Joseph Stilwell, and just about everybody else who knew anything about China".¹³

Departing from Shanghai in mid-November, Carlson travelled by rickshaw, boat, railway, and horseback to reach the Yen-an Province headquarters of Mao Tse Tung's Eighth Route Army. The first foreigner to join the elusive Chinese communist military, Carlson remained with Mao and his lieutenants for several months. Not only did he participate in patrols and observe the fighting against Japanese troops, he also built a profound respect for the Eighth Route Army's leadership. Back in Shanghai, Carlson wrote a detailed and glowing report.¹⁴ By the time his tour ended in November, 1938 he had already begun a book about his experiences.

In China, Carlson had been far from the bureaucratic arm of Navy Department officialdom. Once in the United States however, his enthusiasm for closer ties with Chinese other than Chiang-Kai-Shek came under careful scrutiny. Pressured to restrain his praise and submit any manuscript for official review prior to publication, he resigned

in a fit of righteous indignation. As of 30 April 1939, Carlson's Marine service temporarily ended. His contacts with both Roosevelts did not.¹⁵

Carlson lectured, attended some University classes, and returned to China during the next two years. But as war loomed closer, he heeded various urgings to return to the Marine Corps. In May, 1941 his book^{*} published and largely ignored, Carlson was back in harness but no longer as a Regular.

As the gray days of 1941 dwindled toward an equally bleak-appearing New Year, Major General Holcomb found himself arrayed against a powerful coalition of military romantics bent on utilizing his outfit as a convenient niche for the derring-do 'guerilla corps'. Moreover, the prospect loomed that he would get the irascible Donovan as well, neatly gift wrapped as an instant Brigadier in the Marine Reserve.¹⁶

The commando idea appeared to be riding a Hegelian wave. Churchill liked it; Roosevelt concurred in principle and was interested, Knox was actively involved. The popular press was full of praise for British commando exploits. James Roosevelt attached a clipping from the San Diego Union to a six page personal plan calling for "development within the Marine Corps of a unit for purposes similar to the British Commandos and the Chinese Guerillas".¹⁷ This scheme proposed that rather than piddling with Japanese bases, the Marines should go right after the enemy home islands!

* Twin Stars Over China published in 1940 by Dodd, Mead and Company, New York.

In preliminary discussions with Secretary Knox, Holcomb attempted to side-step formation of a special unit by pointing out that the Marines had already sent observers to view commando training in England and by emphasizing that small raiding forces had participated in Fleet maneuvers.¹⁸ If this ploy was designed to short-circuit the Donovan appointment, it failed. Instead, Holcomb received a letter from Admiral King, Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet,* asking for substantive details and noting that "the President is much interested in the development and use of the equivalent of British 'commandos'".¹⁹

Just to ensure that the Commandant had gotten his meaning 'loud and clear', King dispatched a second reminder the very next day which read:

"Will you please have your people follow-up and follow through on the equipment and ammunition (for training) of "Commando" troops - with first priority for units on the West Coast (Pacific Fleet).²⁰

While mulling over just what "commando" troops Admiral King had in mind, Holcomb received an information copy of yet another message. This one emanated from U. S. Naval Headquarters in London and was addressed to COMINCH. It proposed that "a troop of 7 officers and 100 enlisted men, U. S. Marine Corps, be assigned to temporary duty with the British Commandos for training at the Commando Special Training Center and that this troop participate with the British Commandos in combined operations against enemy shores".²¹

*abbreviated COMINCH

This suggestion set alarm bells clanging within Marine Corps Headquarters. General Holcomb immediately drafted a response directly to King. In it he pointed out that Marines of both the 'Destroyer Transport Battalion'* and the Parachute Battalion were already receiving such training. He further argued that no further separate units should be organized while the Corps remained below its authorized strength. As a counter-proposal, the Major General Commandant offered to send a "small group of officers and non-commissioned officers to England".²²

At this point, Holcomb was probably beginning to feel like the falcon in Yeat's "Second Coming".** Outgunned and badgered on the flanks, the Major General Commandant called for reinforcements. On Monday, 14 January, he set the stage for a personal counterattack.

Classified letters left Marine headquarters that day addressed to Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC, at Quantico and Major General Charles F. B. Price, USMC, in San Diego - these being the senior Marine officers in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets respectively.

The two letters were identical and began:

"1. Suggestion has been made that Colonel William J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the Commando Project."

*properly designated First Separate Battalion, Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

**Turning and turning in the widening gyre
 The falcon cannot hear the falconer
 Things fall apart; the center cannot hold
 Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, ..."
 William Butler Yeats
 "The Second Coming"

Holcomb went on to briefly outline Donovan's achievements and requested both addressees to provide "a frank expression of opinion...as to the advisability of accepting this suggestion".²³

Major General Smith reacted with predictable hostility. Obviously the entire question raised 'Howling Mad's' hackles. Never one to mince words, Smith responded:

"The appointment of Colonel Donovan to brigadier general could be compared to that of Lord Mountbatten in Great Britain - both are "royal" and have easy access to their own immediate superiors. The appointment would be considered by many senior officers of the Corps as political, unfair, and a publicity stunt. It is the unanimous opinion of the staff of this headquarters that commando raids by the British have been of little strategical value. We have not reached the stage where our men are so highly trained and restless for action that they must be employed in commando raids. I recommend against the appointment."²⁴

Not only was the Donovan appointment opposed on the grounds that "the Marine Corps should not have to go outside its ranks to secure leaders" but the whole 'commando' idea was viewed as tainted bait. Clearly something larger than an usurping Brigadier was uppermost in both men's minds.

Throughout the previous twenty years the Marine Corps had painstakingly built a vehicle - the large amphibious operation - which its leaders considered the surest path to institutional survival. Now it seemed that an Irish lawyer who had the President's ear might run that concept into shoal water. General Smith noted that "all Amphibious Force Marines are considered commandos" and that there were already enough 'by-products' in the still-building 1st Marine Division.

Price's reply, on the other hand, began on the note of benign heresy. After prudently disclaiming any "personal observation and

contact", Price stated: "the undersigned is inclined to judge that Colonel Donovan is well qualified by natural bent and experience for the assignment contemplated and probably more so than any General Officer of the Marine Corps at present available for such assignment". (Holcomb was doubtless 'in orbit' at this point.)

Then however the reservations began. These revolved principally about the more mundane question of where the 'commandos' should be recruited. "If the personnel to conduct this new activity", Price wrote, "can be recruited almost entirely from new resources it would be the judgment of the undersigned that the entire spirit and plan of employment of the Commando Groups is directly in line with the aggressiveness and traditions of the Marine Corps...".

In short, General Price had nothing against either Donovan or his commandos so long as the structure of the 'real' Marine Corps was not adversely effected. Otherwise, he opined, the grave personnel problems already faced by the Corps (particularly in NCO's) would be aggravated beyond reason if it became necessary to launch a new regimental-size unit.²⁵

Price followed-up his official response with a second 'personal' written the same day. In it he expressed further grave misgivings at the prospect of taking on any additional tasks while the Marine Corps was engaged in fleshing-out its newly authorized structure. Of even greater private importance to Price was the danger that "this sort of thing will develop into a tail which will eventually wag the dog".²⁶

Holcomb used these replies to buttress his arguments with Admiral King and Secretary Knox. But for several weeks the situation regarding Donovan's appointment remained clouded. Conjecture and

correspondence regarding 'U. S. Marine Commandos' continued.

The first bright spot appeared on the same day Smith and Price were drafting their rejoinders. In a Secret letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, King recommended disapproval of the London proposal and adoption of the plan outlined by Holcomb in his 10 January letter. King went on to specifically state: "It is further recommended that the participation in active operations of the U. S. Marine Corps group sent for Commando training not be approved".²⁷

Admiral King was a longtime friend of both Holcomb and the Marine Corps. Yet, his disapproval of the plan which would have eventually resulted in Marines serving under the British Combined Operations staff, was hardly a major victory for the Commandant. Three days later, his mood as dingy as the remnants of the previous week's snow fall, Holcomb wrote a personal letter to his trusted confidant Samuel Meek, of Time Incorporated in New York. The tone of this extraordinary piece of correspondence vividly illustrates the stakes Holcomb perceived to be involved:^{*}

"The Donovan affair is still uppermost in mind. I am terrified that I may be forced to take this man. I feel it would be the worst slap in the face the Marine Corps ever was given because it involves bringing an outsider into the Marine Corps as a leader in our own specialty that is, amphibious operations. Because commando work is simply one form of amphibious operation. It will be bitterly resented by our personnel both officer and enlisted, and I am afraid that it may serve to materially reduce my usefulness in this office..."²⁸

^{*}Obviously, Holcomb and Meek had discussed this matter before. How many such conversations of what was essentially a highly volatile proposition with national security implications occurred cannot be determined. What is plain however is that politics in 1942 was no more respectful of 'classification' than it is today.

The fact that the United States Government was involved in some sort of 'commando' project could not indefinitely escape notice by the press. On the same day Holcomb wrote Meek of his concerns, Newsweek told its readers: "Officials are seeking a name* for American units corresponding to the British commandos, eventually to be used in continental raids from England."²⁹

This sort of publicity probably strengthened General Holcomb's hand. From the outset, both King and Stark had been interested in the organization of a force which might prove a useful adjunct to naval operations. The recurring theme of "British" and Donovan's largely European orientation began giving pause for reflection. Could this have an impact on Navy plans and resources for the Pacific?

Whatever the cause, by late January, subtle changes began to appear in the Admirals' correspondence. The term 'commando' was replaced by the more generalized and nonspecific 'commando-type' - usually hyphenated and always italicized as if to show there was nothing magical in the appellation after all.

Of more direct importance, three Atlantic Fleet high speed attack transports were ordered to weight anchor and proceed to San Diego. These were precisely the same ships which would be required for the sort of amphibious raiding implied in the commando idea.

Commandant Holcomb heaved a sigh of relief and fell smoothly into step. On 24 January he received a copy of COMINCH despatch 231940

*This item aroused great reader interest. For the next several issues, Newsweek's 'letters' column carried recommendations for names. One of these was "Rangers".

which directed Admiral Nimitz, then flying his flag in U. S. S. Pennsylvania, to:

"Develop organization and training of Marines and Naval Units of "Commando-type" for use in connection with expeditions of raid character for demolition and other destruction of shore installations in enemy held islands and bases. Employment of some small units embarked in submarines appears practicable by use of rubber boats."

Nimitz in turn passed the problem on to Brigadier General Clayton Vogel of the Joint Training Force noting "it appears that four such units may be organized within an infantry battalion without appreciably altering present organization...".³⁰

To support Vogel and Nimitz, the War Plans Section of Headquarters Marine Corps drafted a message to the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet for Admiral King's signature. This highlighted the paucity of specialized personnel on the West Coast and directed transfer of infantry, machine gun, and mortar troops from the First Separate Battalion to San Diego. These would form the nucleus of the Pacific Fleet "commando-type" unit. On 5 February King signed this message and also approved trimming the proposed 107 Marines for training in Scotland to "two officers and twenty enlisted men". The subject of future employment was pointedly omitted.³¹

The pattern of events was now unmistakably plain. The President and Secretary Knox wanted commandos. Prime Minister Churchill had endorsed raids on the Japanese. Donovan seemed to be primarily oriented toward Europe. Very well, the Marine Corps would indeed establish commando-type organizations but their primary area of employment would be in the Pacific - the Navy's ballpark.

There was another major reason for getting the whole panoply of problems associated with the original proposal put swiftly in order. On 23 January, the U. S. Service Chiefs had conducted their first full scale meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff. But while the urbane Englishmen spoke with a concerted voice, the Americans still tended to view problems from their individual service perspectives. Clearly such would not do and General Marshall finally decided that the U. S. Chiefs would have to get together beforehand and resolve differences in private. This led to the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and resulted in a decreased ability for the Navy to promulgate independent positions. Since Donovan considered his commando force as merely an adjunct to intelligence operations, it is reasonable to infer that Admiral King wanted to head-off any discussions of the proposal in an arena where he might be outvoted by his contemporaries.³²

Holcomb was far too shrewd to expect that unless he made some concrete alternative available to both King and Knox chances remained high that he would get both commandos and Donovan. He said as much in a lengthy "Dear Barney" letter to Vogel on 10 February. This filled-in some of the blanks in the Donovan case and indicated that the matter was not yet put to rest. In fact, Holcomb noted that "it turned up again today, but indications are that it has again quieted down". The Commandant went on:

"I fear, however, that the idea is too strongly imbedded to remain dormant very long unless we move promptly to broaden our amphibious training in such a way as to head off any outside interference."

After giving some of the reasons for opposing Donovan personally (most of which have already been covered by a **synthesis**

of previously cited letters and memoranda) the newly promoted Lieutenant General of Marines went on:

"... we must act and act quickly. We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our most important missions, viz: the execution of amphibious raids."³³


The following day, Holcomb sent a similar letter to Smith. In it he directed that "the highest priority" be given to getting the recently emasculated 1st Separate Battalion back up to strength. Smith was also told to plan for the possibility of forming a regimental-size unit for similar purposes.

In closing, the Commandant finally placed the semantical issue squarely in the open: "Incidentally", he wrote, "I don't like the term "Commando"; we are looking for a better term -- one more fitting for the Marines. Havy any suggestions?"³⁴ To underline the confidential nature and urgency of these matters, both letters were hand-carried by commissioned officer couriers.

Now that he was convinced that strategy had reached its limits and tactics were required, Holcomb took another calculated step. On 16 February, he redesignated the 1st Separate Battalion to 1st Marine Raider Battalion. Similarly, the newly activated 2nd Separate Battalion became the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion. This took care of the name 'commando' once and for all.*

Then the Commandant played one of his personal 'hold' cards. The 2nd Raider Battalion was to be commanded by Evans Carlson. His executive officer - none other than Jimmie Roosevelt. Since this was

* How the name "Raider" was arrived at is unclear. Smith recommended that the units be called "Shock Battalions".



the unit most likely to be utilized in any initial test of the concept, Holcomb's choice of leadership neatly placed the two most visible Marine Corps proponents in a position to 'fish or cut bait'.

Gradually the crisis atmosphere at Marine headquarters subsided. Knox's advocacy of the Donovan appointment apparently moderated and the Navy was left to develop plans for employing the new Raider Battalions. Interest in the project did not disappear however since the 'very high authority' was still discussing the matter with his opposite number in Britain.

On 4 March 1942, Churchill sent his Most Secret personal message #37 to Roosevelt. This discussed a wide range of strategic matters including the nagging problem of launching offensive operations in North Africa - then known as Operation GYMNAST - while the situation in the Pacific remained critical. With this in mind, the Prime Minister wrote:

"Permit me to refer to the theme I opened to you when we were together. Japan is spreading itself over a very large number of vulnerable points or trying to link them together by air and sea protection. The enemy are becoming ever more widely spread and we know this is causing anxiety in Tokyo. Nothing can be done on a large scale except by long preparation of the technical and tactical apparatus. When you told me about your intention to form commando forces on a large scale on the California shore I felt that you had the key. Once several good outfits are prepared, any one can attack a Japanese-held base or island and beat the life out of the garrison, all their islands will become hostages to fortune. Even this year, 1942, some severe examples might be made causing perturbation and drawing further upon Japanese resources to strengthen other points."³⁵

This suggestion reignited the smoldering embers of controversy. Admiral King discussed the matter with Holcomb to ensure that the spirit of the President's desires were being carried out. This caused some

discomfiture for the Commandant who reported in a personal letter to Brigadier General Fegan: "I thought the "D" case was all settled but have just learned that another memo has gone to the Big Boss in the matter. He is still trying to get the job that we thought we had headed off. Is there anything that you can do?"³⁶

This second "scare" was short-lived. Donovan never became a Marine of any rank. Carlson, on the other hand, nearly joined OSS and Holcomb's son, Franklin, was already indirectly working for the man his father so stoutly resisted.*

It would be a fundamental error to view the "Donovan Affair" as more than one facet of COI's effort to establish a single viable strategic intelligence organization. Contrary to Holcomb's comments, there is no available documentary evidence that Donovan personally sought either a Marine commission or direct command of his proposed 'guerilla corps'. Thus, the philosophical issues raised by his projected appointment were much less acutely felt outside the Department of the Navy.

In hindsight, the Commandant's "strong and utter disapproval" and the initial notion that the commandos should be separate from the Army and Navy probably made the idea untenable from the outset. Activation of the highly visible 'Raiders' firmly barred the door.

Early 1942 was a time in which a variety of plans and programs were discussed, evaluated, and either implemented or discarded. With the formation of the JCS, Donovan realized that his organization could not function without substantial assets which could only be made

*Details of Carlson's and Holcomb's part in the story of OSS appear in subsequent chapters of this paper.

available through that forum. Consequently, he merely shifted his requests. As early as 2 March, he wrote to General Marshall asking for 2000 grades and ratings for the purpose of "building up an organization of military personnel for subversive activities in various countries".³⁷

This task was already underway and Marines would play a small but interesting role in clandestine operations throughout the world. This paper tells some of their story.

CHAPTER II

"ONE OF A KIND, UNIQUE..."

"In 1941, long months before Eisenhower's and Mark Clark's men starting piling ashore on the Moroccan and Algerian beaches, the quality of the U. S. commercial agents in North Africa underwent a sea change that might have perplexed even such a connoisseur of pixies as "Barnaby's" ^{*} fairy godfather."¹ These fellows were indeed a strange lot. All appeared to be in middle-age and despite their business suits, there was a faintly military air about them. One in particular was a tall, lean, soft-spoken gent who walked with a noticeable limp and could chatter away in Arabic as well as any foreigner in the Maghreb. There were twelve of these men altogether, apostles not of commerce but of intelligence. The gimpy-legged linguist was coordinator of their activities. His friends called him "Bill" but he signed his official correspondence: William A. Eddy, Lieutenant Colonel, -USMCR (Ret).

Eddy was no stranger to either intelligence gathering or the Mid-East. Born in Ottoman Syria of Presbyterian missionary parents, he spent his early boyhood near Sidon in what is today Lebanon.

In 1908, young William was sent to Wooster, Ohio for an American education. Following secondary school, he entered Wooster College in 1913, remained there for two years of varsity football and

*"Barnaby" was a small boy whose adventures appeared in a syndicated comic strip published by the New York newspaper P.M. from 1941-1962. His fairy godfather was Mr. O'Malley.

basketball, then transferred to Princeton. Graduating in 1917 with a Bachelor's degree in literature, Eddy applied for a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Wartime pressure had reduced Marine officer training to the bare essentials. On 31 October 1917, scarcely 4 months after donning his gold Second Lieutenant's bars, Eddy was in France. As intelligence officer for the 6th Marines, Lieutenant Eddy sought his information firsthand. When reconnaissance patrols were necessary, he frequently led them himself.

On the night of 4 June 1918, Eddy and two enlisted Marines were the first to find and report German movements in the Belleau Wood area.² Crawling well behind enemy lines, the little group brought back information which conclusively located the axis of the German advance toward Paris. His work that night earned him the Distinguished Service Cross.

Six days later Eddy was back on his belly in no-man's land in company with Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas.* American maneuver had been restricted by poor maps and thick woods as well as German Mausers. Eddy climbed a tree and noted the effects of allied artillery. Despite being chased down by snipers on several occasions, the Lieutenant stuck it out. His patrol report is a classic for brevity, clarity, and accuracy.³ The results were highly satisfactory. The Germans got a rain of several hundred tons of U. S. and French artillery shells; the Marines, Belleau Wood; and Eddy, the first of three Silver Stars.³ A year before he had barely left the quadrangles of 'Old Nassau' now he was a well-decorated veteran of whom even such a hardened campaigner as

*Thomas later became a Marine General

Earl
Elder

Eddy



Albertus Catlin wrote: "Eddy's conduct was distinguished to a degree by unerring judgment, immediate action, and a remarkable sangfroid."⁴

Wounded in action for the first time on 25 June, Eddy continued to serve in the front lines. He won the Navy Cross at St. Mihiel but in his weak physical condition, contracted a near-fatal case of pneumonia. Invalided back to the United States, he was placed on the retired list as a Captain having been designated "unfit for active service".

Following a slow recovery, Eddy re-entered Princeton earning his M. A. in 1921 and a Ph.D. the following year. But adventure was in his blood so in 1923 he accepted a post as Chairman of the English Department at the American University in Cairo. Although his childhood Arabic was rusty at first, by the time he returned to the U. S. in 1928, Eddy was fully fluent and taught classes in both languages.*

Eddy next took-up residence at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire as Professor of English. A specialist in 18th century literature, he wrote the definitive essay on Gulliver's Travels and was chosen as editor for the Oxford University Press Standard Edition of Swift published in 1935.⁵ In 1936 he became president of Hobart College in New York, a post he held until June 1941.⁶

Eddy the educator never quite lost touch with the Marine Corps. In 1936 he proved sufficiently vital to be promoted to Major on the retired list.

*A further footnote in the biography of this remarkable man was the fact that he is credited with introducing basketball to the Middle East; organized a league which was still active forty years later; and, translated the current American rule book into Arabic.

During December, 1940, Eddy and Major General Holcomb apparently met by chance at a Washington social function. The subject of their conversation as well as its location remains unrecorded. What is clear is that Eddy, concerned about the events in Europe and the Mideast, offered to resign as President of Hobart and return to active duty in the Corps if his services could be profitably utilized.

Holcomb was usually not keen on such arrangements, particularly in view of the professor's obvious physical condition, but it was a time of crisis in the Naval intelligence community and Eddy certainly possessed impressive credentials.* Experienced Arabists did not grow on trees. Within the next few weeks, the Major General Commandant discussed Eddy's proposal with Rear Admiral Anderson, the Director of Naval Intelligence. On 28 January 1941, he despatched a short personal note which began: "I am writing to find out how quickly you can report for duty, should your services be required, which I am inclined to think will be the case."⁷

During the next several months, a series of letters and cables went back and forth between the two men as Eddy sought his release from the college trustees and Holcomb attempted to pin down if ONI really wanted his retired Major. The upshot of all this correspondence

*Neither the President nor Knox were satisfied with military intelligence efforts during the period. The Battle of Britain was in full tilt and shipping losses in the Atlantic were rising. No one seemed to be able to provide well analyzed information on whether England could survive and Ambassador Kennedy in London was providing little encouragement. In fact, Kennedy's retreat for a winter vacation in Florida prompted the London News Chronicle to the following bon voyage commentary: "Joe Kennedy deceives many people, his suave monotonous style, his nine overphotographed children, and his hail-fellow-well met manner conceal a hard-boiled businessman's eagerness to do a profitable business deal with the dictators."⁸

was a set of orders to active duty effective in June, 1941.⁹ Scarcely two months later, Eddy was on his way back to Cairo as Naval Attache wearing the silver oak leaves of a Lieutenant Colonel.

Cairo was a natural assignment for Eddy as well as a homecoming of sorts. As Naval Attache he was in a position to observe the fighting between British forces and the Italians and to report on the balance of seapower in the eastern Mediterranean. As a scholar and Arabist, he was doubly useful because of his previous contacts with all levels of Egyptian society. Such a man could not, and did not, escape the notice of Donovan.

In October, 1941 COI had gained presidential approval to expand its overseas operations. North Africa, a recurring theme in the organization's history, was pinpointed for "a concrete illustration of what can be done".¹⁰ Since much of the area was wide-open to German and Italian penetration because of the status of occupied France, North Africa "presented a unique opportunity for the United States in the field of intelligence, fifth column, subversion, and related activities. Until COI was organized, however, there was no agency prepared to exploit the situation and no unified plan for future action there".¹¹

Tangier*, sitting directly opposite the British bastion at Gibraltar, was considered the most important listening post in French

*Tangier (often mistakenly spelled Tangiers) was one of the first "international cities" in the world. About 1/3 the size of London, it had changed hands numerous times. Once it was a British possession but its usual masters have been the Spanish and Portugese. During the 19th century it became headquarters of the international business and diplomatic community. Thus, when France took virtual control of most of Morocco, Tangier already had a peculiar historical identity. This was recognized by the Conference of Algeciras in 1906 and by further agreements in 1912, 1923, and 1924. In 1942, it was surrounded by the Spanish zone on the landward sides but remained nominally neutral territory.

Morocco. Its location drew spies and rumor peddlers by the score. Donovan arranged for Eddy to be returned to Washington, thoroughly briefed regarding COI plans, and assigned there as his personal representative.*

The twelve 'control officers' who had been operating as accredited commercial "vice consuls" were to be placed under Eddy's leadership, thus freeing Robert D. Murphy, a State Department officer also working under cover for COI, for high level liaison with the GYM-NAST planners. Eddy's appointment was considered significant enough to warrant mention in a personal memorandum from Donovan to the President.¹²

Eddy's job was a ticklish one for several reasons. First, there was the obvious Axis presence which made security a vital and frequently dangerous aspect of his work. Second, the British were also deeply concerned and involved in both Morocco and Algeria. Before despatching his personal representative, Donovan was careful to coordinate with William Stephenson - codename INTREPID - the British Security Coordinator in America.**

COI specifically recruited several civilians to beef-up the Tangier operation, one of whom was the noted anthropologist Carlton Coon. Eddy also took with him an assistant, young Second Lieutenant Franklin P. Holcomb USMCR, the Commandant's son.

* Eddy's transfer from Cairo was opposed by both the ambassador and ONI; however, a personal plea by Donovan to Knox overrode all objections.

** Stephenson was very active in advising both Donovan and the President on intelligence matters. In the context of Eddy's assignment, he was frank in pointing out the rivalry between SIS (British Secret Intelligence) and SOE (Special Operations Executive - the "Operators"). It was in large measure such briefings which convinced Donovan not to separate these functions in his organization.

Frank Holcomb had recently graduated from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Like Eddy, Holcomb too walked with a limp, his right knee having been badly mangled in a college days auto accident. It is quite doubtful that Holcomb would have become a Marine officer under normal circumstances but with letters of recommendation from the likes of Generals Smith, Price, et. al. a Board of officers decided that he might be commissioned for specialist duty with DNI. Within a month of reporting for active duty, Frank Holcomb was angling for an assignment as Eddy's 'number two' in Cairo - a request which his boss, Lieutenant Commander Bode, promptly torpedoed with the following comment:

"While Lieutenant Holcomb's performance of duty in this section has been of a conspicuously high standard and highly satisfactory, he does not possess the requirements desirable under present circumstances as Assistant Naval Attache, Cairo."¹³

Yet, when Eddy boarded the East-bound Pan Am Clipper on 3 January 1942, Holcomb occupied an adjoining seat. The machinations involved in securing this appointment remain obscure but they are likely linked to those which resulted in Franklin's initial commission; having the senior U. S. Marine on active duty as one's father was surely an advantage.

Eddy and Holcomb arrived in Tangier and set to work organizing a system of intelligence reporting. This included use of the diplomatic pouch and was supplemented by a clandestine radio net. Utilizing transmitters supplied by SIS, the new attache and his assistant began operation of a base station - codename MIDWAY - which was linked to LINCOLN (Casablanca), FRANKLIN (Oran), PILGRIM (Tunis), and YANKEE (Algiers). Eddy also kept in touch with the British in Gibraltar. His formal reports went straight to Donovan.¹⁴

In March, the JCS issued their first directive to COI. This involved initial guidance for support to proposed plans for an invasion of the Azores. This directive "had a significance wholly apart from its subject matter. In March the general reorganization of information agencies in Washington was pending. It was also in that month that the JCS proposed to the President, with Donovan's concurrence, that COI be made a supporting agency to the JCS."¹⁵ Thus, the quality of work done by 'Eddy and Company' would impact directly on whether the agency survived.

During the Spring of 1942, Eddy travelled extensively throughout his area of responsibility. Holcomb remained largely in Tangier and Casablanca. Dressed in civilian clothes, he flitted back and forth between the Spanish and International Zones, playing the spy game to its hilt. Looking back on this period after the war, he recalled: "It was a strange time. I knew the German, Italian, and Spanish agents, and a great many of them knew me. This was particularly true of the attaches. We all knew each other and, I should say there was sort of a working agreement not to get in each other's hair too obviously. On the other hand, it was necessary not to tip one's hand in front of the opposition."¹⁶

In May, the radio net paid a first big dividend. The British were extremely concerned with what was left of the French fleet*. With the Laval government cuddling-up to Hitler, it was vital that the French battleship Jean Bart which was anchored at Casablanca, be closely monitored. Since Eddy was away in Lisbon, it fell to Holcomb to

*The majority of the French fleet had been sunk by the British in July, 1940 at Mers el Kebir or was swinging helplessly at anchor in Toulon.

coordinate the "watch". The young lieutenant performed this job so effectively that on 9 May, a cable arrived from the Royal Navy stating:

"Congratulations to all concerned for the efficient working and speed of the Casablanca News Service. It is of the utmost value."

Holcomb received what amounted to a 'mention in despatches' for this piece of work.¹⁸

Collecting naval intelligence was only part of the Tangier operation. Eddy, Holcomb, Coon and the others were also up to their necks in projects to solicit support for the Allies from the always rebellious Riffs whose charismatic leader Abd-el-Krim was then in the 15th year of an enforced 'vacation' on the island of Reunion. There were plans for a "hit list" of Gestapo officers and agents and for bribery of Vichy officials. More importantly, Eddy sought to secure arms, in massive quantity, for French colonial troops many of whom were patently anti-German. This request began a tug of war between Tangier and Washington. Donovan was not in favor of placing so many chips on one 'horse'.

Eddy and Murphy responded to COI's misgivings with the warning that "we will not find such leaders elsewhere, and dare not lose them now...the least we can do is help supply them on their own terms which are generous and gallant".¹⁹ When Washington failed to budge, Eddy petulently messaged: "If Murphy and I cannot be trusted with a few millions francs in an emergency then I should be called back and someone who can be trusted sent...We are desperately hoping and waiting."²⁰

The tenor of these comments aroused COI headquarters but the Joint Chiefs, who would have to supply the arms, were wary. Fearing that any military supplies delivered might fall into Axis hands and

recognizing - far better than Donovan - the logistical difficulties involved, they flatly rejected the proposal. Donovan was disappointed, but to bolster Eddy's morale, he wrote back: "If we are right, it will all work out..." Tangier got a little money but no guns.²¹

The resistance plan did not die however. When General Henri Giraud escaped from captivity, his person was briefly seen as a rallying point for all anti-Nazi Frenchmen.* While Murphy worked this angle, Eddy attempted to revive the plan for supporting Riff leaders in Spanish Morocco. To emphasize the need for some sort of action, the Naval Attache returned to Washington to personally argue the respective alternatives. At the time, he estimated Carlton Coon and Gordon Browne - a former Boston insurance executive - could summon more than 10,000 Riffs to the Allied banner.

Unfortunately, as Eddy would point out in a 10 June briefing to JCS, the two plans were by nature mutually exclusive. Giraud had been a key figure in bagging Abd-el-Krim and no pied noire in his right mind would welcome an armed insurrection by the same natives France had been fighting for 80 years. The Riffs, on the other hand, would not be keen on spending blood without some sort of promise that their efforts would lead to independence.

Eventually it was decided to play the Giraud 'card' first while organizational plans proceeded for a Moorish uprising. Meanwhile, two parallel links were established to Riff leaders - codenamed TASSELS and STRINGS - who were unaware of each other's connections to COI.

* Giraud escaped from a German maximum security prison by climbing down a thin rope smuggled to him inside a wine bottle. He made his way into unoccupied France and was contacted there by Murphy's net.

Both had substantial intelligence collecting capabilities since their followers moved freely throughout the entire area, undeterred by borders and unnoticed by either the French or Spanish. "These men knew how to handle arms and conduct guerilla warfare in difficult terrain".²²

Sensing that something was brewing in Morocco, the Laval Government began a heavy crackdown on pro-allied sympathizers. This hampered Eddy's activities and heightened his concern that the moment for opening North Africa to a near bloodless expeditionary force landing might be rapidly slipping away. Consequently, he flew to London to solicit British support.

Franklin Holcomb was also busy. On 9 July, he and a date were cornered in a local nightclub (shades of Bogart's Casablanca) by a group of Italians. The ensuing episode was later reported to the Commandant in the following terms by Admiral Kirk.

"The Ities here (Tangier) are not so clever. As a matter of fact, ten of them one night tried to pick a fight with the assistant naval attache who was alone except for a lady. The Italian consul himself, Duke Badoglio led the gang..."

Holcomb's fists proved adequate to the challenge and Kirk's note went on to say that "the whole affair helped us a lot with the Spanish and hurt the Wops..."²³ The lieutenant did not go unrewarded. When news of the brawl somehow reached the attention of the President, Roosevelt responded by directing an immediate promotion to Captain.²⁴

In England, Eddy's mission took a quick U-turn. Instead of talking with the British he found himself face-to-face with Eisenhower, Patton, Doolittle, and General Strong, the Army's G-2.

July, 1942 was a watershed for American involvement in North Africa. The month began with the JCS firmly fixed on a cross-channel

invasion of France (Operation SLEDGEHAMMER) as the best means of supporting the Russians. Churchill's government, reeling from criticism of losses in the Western Desert, faced a vote of 'no confidence' in the Commons. President Roosevelt, agonized by what a change of leadership in Britain might mean, received a message from the Prime Minister on 8 July, which strongly urged that GYMNAST be implemented quickly. In it, Churchill pleaded:

"I am sure that French North Africa is by far the best chance for effecting relief to the Russian Front in 1942... Here is the safest and most effective stroke which can be delivered this autumn

It must be clearly understood that we cannot count upon an invitation or a guarantee from Vichy. But any resistance would not be comparable to that which would be offered by the German army in the Pas de Calais... This is a political more than a military issue. It seems to me that we ought not to throw away the sole great strategic stroke open to us in the western theater during this cardinal year."²⁵

American opposition to GYMNAST centered in the dispute between Marshall and King over whether the Atlantic or Pacific should get priority in naval planning. Roosevelt, a confirmed advocate of "Europe first" finally settled the argument by sending both of these, along with his most trusted personal advisor, Harry Hopkins, to London with marching orders to get the problem solved. After a series of acrimonious meetings and a spate of personal messages it was determined that SLEDGEHAMMER was not feasible and North Africa would be the target. Roosevelt called it: "a turning point in the whole war".²⁶

It was while this delegation - referred to by the President as the 'three musketeers' - was in London, that Eddy arrived. Button-holed by Colonel Edward Buxton, Donovan's Executive Officer, he agreed to dinner at Claridge's Hotel on 24 July. Other guests were to be

Doolittle, Strong and Patton. "If Eddy could convince this group of hard-nosed military men of the value of his plan, he would have a direct line to the War Department."²⁷

When Eddy appeared for dinner he was, uncharacteristically, dressed in full uniform. Five rows of ribbons neatly traced his left breast pocket. "Do you know Bill Eddy?" Buxton asked George Patton.

His gaze riveted on the Marine's chest, 'Old Blood and Guts' responded: "Never saw him before in my life but the son of a bitch's been shot at enough hasn't he?"²⁸

Thus began a conversation which carried through until the small hours of the next morning. Even Strong - a bitter enemy of Donovan and his organization - came away impressed. Later that afternoon, Eddy met General Eisenhower for the first time.

And so, in that final week of July 1942, three things were settled: The United States would invade North Africa before year's end; Eisenhower would command the operation; and the new codename would be TORCH. Eddy's intelligence outfit would prepare to strike the match. The newspapers were full of Midway and the Russian front. "Fierce Fighting 80 Miles from Stalingrad", the Baltimore Sun headlined, but help was on the way.²⁹

Eddy flew to Tangier and within a week was back to London. At 0930 on 2 August, he delivered a detailed briefing to Eisenhower, carefully covering the situation in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Eddy's insight and grasp of what would be required in the proposed multi-division amphibious assault so impressed Ike that the new commander drafted a long "eyes only" message to General Marshall which ended:

"Colonel Eddy of the U. S. Marines will arrive in Washington this week. He possesses much information which will be valuable to the Chiefs of Staff. It is recommended that he return, through here, to his post in Tangiers [sic] at earliest possible moment."³⁰

In the States, Eddy and Donovan went over plans for all subversive and intelligence activities designed to support TORCH. Money was no longer an obstacle - "Wild Bill" cheerfully approved a tentative two million dollar budget for the operation. On 11 September, Eddy briefed the assembled JCS on his plans. Most of these were approved "with the proviso that control of all secret activities should be vested in the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower."³¹ This caveat would soon raise a minor tempest.

Murphy too was soon in Washington. His political evaluation impressed Donovan who immediately trotted his star diplomat off to see the President. Roosevelt listened to Murphy's report with interest and decided, on-the-spot, to give him Ambassadorial rank. Between a retired Lieutenant Colonel and an Ambassador there now yawned a protocol gap as wide as the Grand Canyon. Murphy became Donovan's 'top man' in North Africa. Eddy remained titular head in Morocco but took his political orders from Murphy in Algiers.

While Patton trained his Morocco assault force in the same Solomon's Island (Maryland) exercise area recently evacuated by the 1st Marine Division,^{*} Eddy's apparatus swung into action. Data on ports and airfields were collected, the Atlantic beaches clandestinely surveyed, and known agents carefully watched. Unfortunately, much of

* 'Howling Mad' Smith was Patton's amphibious assault tutor.

the intelligence was little better than a travelogue. The best efforts to secure reliable hydrographic information on the three proposed landing beaches and the Sebu River channel leading to Port Lyautey were proving to be dismally inadequate.

In an attempt to solve this extremely serious deficiency, Eddy concocted a daring plan - approved by Patton without recourse to any other authority - to smuggle two experienced local watermen out of Casablanca. These would be flown to the United States and then accompany the invasion fleet back across the Atlantic. One of the two men scheduled for this voluntary 'snatch' was the chief pilot of Port Lyautey whose name was Malverne. Eddy gave control of the mission to his resident in Casablanca, David King. But it was Frank Holcomb and Gordon Browne who were tasked with the actual rascality.

Holcomb was directed to drive the nearly two hundred miles from Tangier to Casablanca in his old black Chevy. Behind this, as usual, he pulled a small open-topped trailer.

Dragging a trailer was something most prudent drivers did in 1942 Morocco. Gasoline was sometimes hard to find and it was advisable to take one's own on long trips. Therefore, the sight of some fuel drums would not elicit special interest. Or so was the hoped, for wedged behind the drums, covered with a carpet and some burlap was Malverne.

Moroccan nights can be clammy, frigid affairs in winter but Holcomb and Brown were most concerned about their passenger's ability to take the pounding of the drums and the carbon monoxide which billowed from the car's exhaust. Driving as fast as they could (consistent with their 'cargo's' survival) they passed through the first

of six separate checkpoints without incident. The second was likewise routinely negotiated. The next few would not be simple.

At checkpost #3, a coughing, wheezing sound began emanating from the trailer. Browne got out and walked casually around, kicking the tires and shaking the drums while Holcomb spoke with the guards. They were waved through.

As the coast road wound closer to Tangier, traffic thickened. More and more Arab villages dotted the roadside, their mud brick buildings encircled by thorn bush barriers against both wind and prying eyes. Soon Holcomb and Browne's progress had been reduced to a crawl. The Spanish border police were notoriously slow and that night was to be no exception. The coughing began once more. This time it was a good deal more persistent.

Finally the car drew up to a barber-stripped wooden barrier. Holcomb hurried into the customs shed with the passports while Browne nervously eyed the guards in their German-style coal scuttle helmets. One began to circle the car. Browne got out.

After peering into the back seat, the guard paused to light a cigarette and then continued toward the trailer. Browne winced as another cough came from beneath the carpet. But the sentry, who must have been stone deaf, merely poked at the burlap bags and continued his inspection. The Spaniard may have noticed nothing, but his dog was not so careless. As Holcomb emerged with the stamped passports, he saw the animal posed in the classic 'point' - leg lifted, tail straight, nose directed toward Malverne's hiding place.

"There was only one thing for me to do" he later recalled.

"Up in the front seat I had a big Virginia ham - something that had

been sent from home and that I had been saving for weeks. I took one look at the big, curious eyes of the dog, and I threw the ham at him."³²

The gate swung open. Holcomb, Browne, and their still-gagging passenger, lurched forward, narrowly missing a parked truck. A final rear-view reflection of the Customs Post revealed a puzzled set of sentries, a yapping mutt, and Holcomb's prize ham lying in the dusty Moroccan roadway. The final two checkpoints were a snap.*

On the morning of 8 November 1942, 83,000 Americans and more than 15,000 British soldiers, sailors, and airmen landed in Oran, Algiers, and across the Atlantic beaches near Casablanca. The French Navy and some ground troops, particularly the colonial infantry - who wore an anchor on their hats and called themselves Marines - briefly fought back. But within four days, Eisenhower had his North African bases. A week later, he and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham struck a bargain of convenience with French Admiral Darlan which ensured the loyalty of the 105,000 Vichy troops outside metropolitan France. Then, his rear secured, Ike turned eastward toward Rommel.

OSS was to play a largely analytic and political role in the rest of the North African operations although there was some ground combat activity by the first 'Operational Group' personnel.

* Malverne eventually reached the United States and later performed his piloting chores with such dexterity that he was awarded the Navy Cross. General Marshall however was not amused. In a personal message to Eisenhower (who knew nothing of the scheme) the Chief of Staff decried the entire affair citing the risks involved in its execution.³³ Certainly, had Holcomb and Browne been apprehended, the landing sites might have been totally compromised.

Franklin Holcomb would later transfer to OSS, rise to Major and direct counter-intelligence operations in France. Eddy was promoted to Colonel on the personal recommendations of both Donovan and Eisenhower.³⁴ He had an important part in intelligence organization and planning for the invasion of Sicily and would serve as Roosevelt's personal interpreter at the Cairo conference. On 12 August 1944, he was released from active duty to accept appointment as the first American Minister to Saudi Arabia.³⁵

Of Eddy's service in those muddled months before TORCH, when the United States seemed everywhere at bay, Ambassador Murphy would write: "...no American knew more about Arabs or about power politics in Africa. He was one of a kind, unique; we could have used a hundred like him."³⁶

CHAPTER III

"FOR EXCELLENT PERSONAL REASONS"

Five weeks after the North African invasion began, a U. S. Marine Captain turned north from London's Brook Street, passed through a series of concertina wire barricades, and entered the offices of United States Naval Forces, Europe at 20 Grosvenor Square.

The young officer wore the then-unfamiliar silver wings of a parachutist centered above a row of ribbons which bore no resemblance to any normally seen in an American officer's mess. There was an air of confidence about him, something which bespoke a maturity beyond his years or rank. Tall, husky, and dark-eyed, he had the manner of a veteran soldier.

The harried yeoman to whom he presented his orders sensed none of this. Drawing a large rubber stamp from his desk, the clerk placed a blurred imprint on the papers, initialed them in the prescribed black ink, and handed them back to the waiting officer. Within 15 minutes, his business complete, Captain Peter J. Ortiz, USMCR, was back beneath the wind-stripped limbs of Grosvenor Square's trees. He too did not waste much time. There was another aircraft to catch. Ortiz was going back to Morocco.¹

Peter J. Ortiz was 29 years old. Born in New York City during a violent electrical storm, he grew up in La Jolla, a picturesque seaside village in Southern California. After elementary school,

Peter's father - longtime Parisian publisher Philippe G. J. Ortiz - insisted that his son be educated in Europe.

Peter dutifully attended the Lycée de Pau and Bayonne. Later he spent a year at the College du Montcel in Versailles. But school bored Ortiz. He was more interested in rugby and mountain climbing than literature or mathematics. In 1932 he quit the classroom and traded his school books for the white kepi of a Private in the Foreign Legion.

The Legion proved to be more hard work than adventure but he was young, strong, and intelligent. The desert and discipline made him tough as well. For five years, Ortiz served in North Africa, learning to fight the sand and sun more often than the Riff Berbers. He was a model soldier and advanced steadily in rank; took parachute training with the 7th Regiment at Meknes; became a Sergeant. Near the end of his enlistment, Ortiz was NCO-In-Charge of an armored car squadron. "Sign on again", the Colonel said, "and you'll be an officer."

It was a tempting offer and Ortiz almost took it. Yet, he had not seen America for a decade and was anxious to try his hand at something new. Discharged from the Second Regiment in 1938, he returned to California and sought work in the film industry as a technical advisor on war movies.

When the Germans attacked Poland the next year, Ortiz smelled action. Failing to find a place aboard a merchantman leaving New York for France, he travelled to Canada where the problems of an American citizen looking to get into the war were simplified. Ortiz caught his ship. Unfortunately so did a U-Boat. Luckily he was a good swimmer.

October 1939, found Ortiz back in the uniform of the Legion's 11th Regiment where he rose swiftly to First Lieutenant. The Legion

fought well during the battles of May-June 1940 but in the end it was overwhelmed. Lieutenant Ortiz did not walk into captivity with the masses of sullen French soldiery. Instead, he went to a POW camp on a stretcher with a Mauser slug in his back.

German doctors saved his life. By way of repayment, he immediately attempted to escape.

For the next year, Ortiz toured occupied Europe - Germany, Poland, finally Austria - always as guest of the Wehrmacht's Stalag system. He was labelled a 'troublemaker' and 'dangerous'. Finally, in October 1941 he made a clean break, eluded the clutches of the Gestapo, and slipped safely into neutral Portugal. From there it was a ship back to New York. America was still at peace when Ortiz left Lisbon, half-way across the Atlantic the sun rose on December 7th.

During his stay in Portugal, Ortiz was contacted by both the British and Free French military representatives who offered him commissions. This time, however, he cast his lot with the United States. In June, 1942, his back healed, Ortiz of the Legion became a Private in the United States Marines.²

It was a time of strange recruits at Parris Island, yet very few sported a row of decorations and French parachutist insignia on their graduation uniforms. In recommending Ortiz for immediate commission his commanding officer wrote: "We spotted him shortly after his arrival. From appearances, the Marine Corps would be unbeatable if all our men were like him."³

While the rest of his recruit platoon went on to further training, Ortiz waited for his commission. Soon after pinning on his gold bars, he was transferred to New River, N. C. for service with a Marine

Parachute Battalion. It was a good assignment in terms of previous experience. Ortiz already had well over 100 jumps.

Instead of becoming a platoon commander he was instantly promoted to temporary Captain (a not uncommon practice for officers going on special assignments where specific ranks were required) and assigned to the Office of Strategic Services for duty as Assistant Naval Attache and Marine Corps Observer, Algiers.

Recognition of the OSS contribution to the success of TORCH, had prompted calls for more of the same in Tunisia. In early 1943, General Mark Clark, commanding the Fifth Army, requested direct support operations and a small group of OSS men was directed to establish an operating base at Oujda, Algeria.

Clark had arrived in December, 1942 with instructions not only to prosecute the war in North Africa but also to begin long-range planning for an eventual move into continental Europe. Mindful of the uncertain status of Spain, he was also designated as the primary commander for a contingency plan - Operation BACKBONE - targeted against Spanish Morocco. OSS was requested to support both the shooting war in Tunisia and the intelligence collection requirements for BACKBONE. So critical was the concern over what Franco might do, that a considerable supply of arms and ammunition destined for the Patton's Second Army was diverted to dumps located nearer to Spanish territory.⁴

In order to gain experience in the "fighting" portion of this new assignment, Colonel Eddy arranged for a few Americans - all military members of OSS - to join the SOE's mission (Codename BRANDON) which was cooperating with the British First Army. "Participation in this British operation constituted the first OSS experience in sabotage and

combat intelligence teams in front areas and behind enemy lines. That the jobs actually done by the handful of OSS men who joined in the SOE Tunisian campaign were not typical of future activity was due as much to the exigencies of the battle situation as to the misunderstanding of their function by the British and American Army officers whom they served."⁵ Rather than intelligence collectors, the members of BRANDON were simply reconnaissance troops whose instructions were to find Germans and kill them.

Peter Ortiz had flown from London to Gibraltar, then on to Casablanca. On 13 January, he reported to Tangier and Captain Holcomb. Holcomb directed the newly arrived "observer" to spend a few days in Morocco and then contact Eddy in Oran.

Ortiz' orders were extraordinarily general. He was simply to go to North Africa and observe the fighting in any fashion which seemed appropriate. This latitude presented a situation which, for Ortiz, made combat inevitable. He struck out immediately for the headquarters of the U. S. Second Corps, near Tebessa. Once there, he secured further authorization to roam about virtually at will and attach himself to any unit that struck his fancy. In his 'after-action' report, Captain Ortiz wrote:

"I was, for excellent personal reasons and as a representative of the Marine Corps, particularly desirous of seeing and taking part in action against the Germans. I happened to be in Gafsa* when the evacuation order was received. Although later claimed by the press as a perfect example of an orderly and well-planned retreat, I thought it characterized by confusion and an alarming contagion of panic. Dozens of

* near Kasserine Pass

vehicles were damaged or abandoned and a number of American soldiers and local civilians run over through inadequate traffic control. Bridges were prematurely blown-up, stranding our men on the wrong side."⁶

During the ensuing battles, Ortiz first joined an armored recon unit from the British Derbyshire Yeomanry; next caught on with a Foreign Legion outfit for a week; and ended-up with the U. S. 1st Armored Division. He was bombed, mortared, strafed, and participated in one tank action where he witnessed the terrifying effectiveness of the German 88mm dual purpose gun.

On 3 March, Ortiz reported back to Colonel Eddy, made his report, and requested more 'combat time'. Eddy was reluctant to continue giving his Captain such free rein but during the course of their conversation, the subject of heavy casualties being suffered by BRANDON surfaced. Naturally this opened new vistas for Ortiz who promptly volunteered to serve as a replacement for another Marine, Captain Elmer Harris, who had been wounded by a mine that morning.⁷ Finally, perhaps recalling his own personal activities at Belleau Wood, Eddy agreed. Ortiz was off again.

On 8 March, he left Algiers for Guelmna where he reported to the commander of BRANDON. The British Colonel sent Ortiz forward to the operational base at Le Kouif, which was supporting the 2nd Corps' tactical area. There he was given a squad of five anti-Franco Spaniards and a British radio operator. Their mission was to link-up with another similar group commanded by an SOE Captain and "do some mischief with the Jerries".⁸

The SOE groups were now concentrating their efforts to the south of Bir-el-Hatig as a means of detecting any movement by the 21st Panzer Division, elements of which were thought to be at Matleg, 50

miles away. Ortiz and his English counterpart decided to conduct a series of foot patrols toward the Matlag Pass in hope of gaining both intelligence and a chance for a fight.

On the night of 18 March, Ortiz' squad pushed-off in a pouring rain. Three days later, they were well beyond the allied lines and moving across the rough cross-compartments Northwest of the pass. It was still raining. At 2300, Ortiz called a halt. Leaving his assistant, a Spaniard named Amando, in charge he struck out alone for the main roadway far below.

Crossing a valley in which he constantly sank to his knees in mud, Ortiz finally reached the highway and began cautiously looking for tank tracks. It was pitch black and the downpour blotted out any sound.

Moving slowly in and out of the shallow wadis which cut across the roadbed, Ortiz spent nearly two hours on his personal reconnaissance. Then, just before turning back, the enemy he was seeking found him.

Ortiz was hit by the first burst of fire. One bullet shattered his right hand and another grazed his left leg. Rolling to this left, he saw the flashes of a machine gun 30 yards to his front. Rising to one knee he began throwing Petard anti-tank grenades lefthanded. The first fell short but the second scored a direct hit, exploding with "a terrific blast that stopped all automatic fire".⁹

With rifle shots still singing around him from another position further to the right, Ortiz crawled away. Despite loss of blood and the effects of shock, he managed to reach his men who carried and dragged him all the way back to friendly lines.¹⁰

After a series of hospitals and a successful operation on his hand, Ortiz reported back to Eddy for further assignment. He asked for more combat duty. This time however the Colonel was adamant. Ortiz was an enfant terrible who needed a rest before he resumed his one-man mission against everything teutonic. Eddy ordered him evacuated. Much to his chagrin, Captain Ortiz was placed on the first available aircraft destined for the long trans-Atlantic flight home. He arrived in Washington on 27 April and characteristically, reported directly to Headquarters Marine Corps the next day.

Ortiz immediately began preparing a detailed report of his activities for Donovan. In it he recounted not only his personal experiences but also observations of British and American tactics, weapons, and equipment. His practiced eye and thoughtful conclusions obviously impressed "Wild Bill" who scribbled across the top: "Very interesting, please re-employ this man as soon as possible."¹¹ Captain Ortiz' war was far from over.

A few days after Ortiz was wounded, the remaining OSS personnel with BRANDON were withdrawn to Algiers. This marked the end of an experiment which was "inevitable wasteful of talented and trained men".¹² OSS would not repeat the same mistakes in Italy or France. BRANDON was a 'learning experience' which paid dividends by demonstrating to the Army the need for better reconnaissance units and removing OSS from the business of providing them.

CHAPTER IV

"A PUNGENT COLLECTION..."

Before COI came into existence, America had no coordinated intelligence organization worthy of the name. If one wanted a Michelin Guide of the Haute Savoie, information on religious customs in Lebanon, or a list of key labor leaders in occupied Europe, chances were ten-to-one that none could be found without extensive research. Britain had her Secret Intelligence Service, Germany the Abwehr, but all the United States possessed was a set of parochial military intelligence sections and a woefully inadequate collection of threadbare diplomats. Donovan changed all that.

COI was a beginning, but only that. After the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it became apparent that the normal scope of service intelligence activities - and the expertise to carry them out on a global scale - was sadly lacking. As Donovan needed the Armed Forces, so they needed him and his intellectuals. In the end, it was a 'shotgun wedding' with Franklin Roosevelt fingering the trigger. On 13 June 1942, by Presidential Executive Order, the Office of the Coordinator of Information was abolished and the Office of Strategic Services created. Under the heading of "Military Order", OSS was given two broad missions:

"The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following duties:

- a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."

1

William J. Donovan was appointed Director of OSS.

Interestingly, the appointment was announced while Director Donovan was in London. Less surprising was his travelling companion, British Security Coordinator William Stephenson. That such news should reach this pair in the capital city of the English-speaking peoples was a fitting footnote to the new partnership between Great Britain's four hundred-year-old intelligence tradition and America's infant counterpart. "The war produced many examples of good Anglo-American relations, even if there were also some bad ones. None can have been more varied and at the same time more intimate and confidential than those which existed between 'Little Bill' Stephenson and 'Big Bill' Donovan and their respective organizations."²

OSS eventually comprised a recruitment and training organization, administrators, communicators and the usual retinue of clerks, codemen, and supply personnel found in any large military formation. But it took its character from quite a different breed. "It was a pungent collection of thugs, postdebutantes, millionaires, professors, corporation lawyers, military professionals, and misfits, all operating under high tension and in whispers."³ The 'thugs' aside, all of these categories would be represented by men in the uniform of the United States Marines.

This paper is not the place for a detailed description of the OSS structure. Nor is it intended as an institutional history. But to place the story of Marines and OSS in its proper framework, one must

understand the main components of what Dr. Goebbels referred to as "Donovan's Monkey House".⁴

A wiring diagram of OSS would show six major branches* but major intelligence and clandestine operations were centered in five functional areas:

- Research and Analysis (R & A)
- Special Operations (SO)
- Morale Operations (MO)
- Secret Intelligence (SI)
- Counter-espionage (X-2)

Research and Analysis Branch handled the bulk of detailed work in geographic, scientific, economic, political and of course military studies. To staff it, Donovan recruited the "best academic and analytical brains that he could beg, borrow or steal from the universities, laboratories, and museums" both at home and abroad.⁵

"R&A was the first concerted effort on the part of any world power to apply the talents of its academic community to official analysis of foreign affairs."⁶ Research and Analysis was headed by Dr. William Langer, a noted Harvard historian who would later organize CIA's Board of National Estimates. Langer's personal assistant was Marine First Lieutenant William Applebaum, a transplanted Russian Jew who spoke three languages and was described by Donovan as "a brilliant organizer".⁷

* Central Admin and Technical; Intelligence Service; Psychological Warfare Operations; Training; Services; New York and West Coast Offices.

Applebaum (whose original name was Wolf) immigrated to the United States at age 14. He attended the University of Minnesota earning both his AB and MA in geography. But business was his specialty. Bill Applebaum became one of the first men in America to apply marketing research techniques to the retail supermarket industry. He joined OSS in June, 1942 and was immediately given the task of bringing order to the chaotic organizational situation in Donovan's 'brain trust'.

Applebaum initially attempted to secure a commission in the Army but was rejected because of dental problems. He then turned to Langer who suggested he try the Marine Corps, which was surprisingly cooperative in granting direct appointments in specialist categories. Dr. Langer endorsed Applebaum's application with high praise and pointed out that his aide was frequently required to travel abroad. "He will," the endorsement stated, "be distinctly handicapped unless he appears in uniform."⁸ On 15 July 1943, Applebaum was commissioned a First Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve with the specialty code MSS - Strategic Services.

Applebaum did indeed travel abroad. During his tenure with OSS, he would conduct 'trouble-shooting' trips to England, France, Italy, Egypt, India, Burma, and China. While in Washington, he served as secretary to the R&A Executive Committee, top-policy making body within the organization. In that capacity, Applebaum was privy to the inner-most workings of American intelligence during World War II. Bad teeth or no, he was, in the words of Colonel David Bruce^{*}: "an outstanding officer of unparalleled organizational ability."⁹

* Bruce later became U. S. Ambassador to France (1948-49), Germany (1957-59) and Britain (1961-69).

Other Marines who served in R&A included First Lieutenant Gordon Craig, Captain George H. Owen, Captain Richard Gard, Captain Joseph Charles, and Colonel James McHugh.

Craig was born in Scotland and educated at Princeton and Oxford (Rhodes Scholar 1936-38). A Phi Beta Kappa in history, he was deeply involved in planning U. S. military resupply routes through West Africa during the early days of the war. Later he served with the Department of State and with Marine combat forces in the Pacific. The author of several books, he is perhaps best known to military history students for his contributions to Makers of Modern Strategy, which although published in 1943, remains a standard text.¹⁰

Captain Gard arrived in OSS by rather circuitous routing. Born in Vancouver, he studied Japanese literature at the University of Washington and received his MA in Oriental Studies from the University of Hawaii. Commissioned for intelligence duty in June, 1941, Gard was a Second Lieutenant at Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked.

During the first several years of the war, Gard served in the South Pacific. He saw action at Guadalcanal and New Georgia before being shipped home to the Japanese interpreter school in Colorado. In 1944, weakened by constant bouts of malaria, Gard dropped out of language school and was assigned the demanding task of managing the Hostess House and Bachelor Officer Quarters at Marine Barracks, Klamath Falls, Oregon. OSS rescued Gard from this sinecure in December, 1944 and brought him to Washington as a member of the task force studying the planned invasion of the Japanese homeland.* Gard's knowledge of the Asian Buddhist community

* Before entering the Marine Corps, Gard won a scholarship from the Buddhist Council of Japan and had spent a year studying the Zen sect in a Japanese monastery.

proved particularly helpful in laying the groundwork for policies of the occupation government. He was awaiting transportation to the OSS station at Kunming, China when the war ended.¹¹

Captain George H. Owen provides a somewhat typical profile of the lawyer turned OSS intelligence officer. Born in Germany before World War I, he grew up in Europe and was educated largely in France. Before returning to the United States for college and subsequently law school, Owen had mastered German, French and Spanish.

From 1939 until early 1942, Captain Owen taught International Law and Diplomatic History at Fordham University in New York. In April, 1942 he moved to the Department of the Treasury's Foreign Funds Control Division. Here his main task was detailed investigation of Sterling Products Company, a subsidiary of I. G. Farben, which had extensive business interests in Latin America. Owen's skill in the Sterling investigation and in a later related examination of foreign banking operations, prompted his recruitment by the Special War Policies Unit of the Justice Department.¹²

The Special War Policies Unit was an ad hoc task force established to support the Inter-American Committee for Political Defense, a hemisphere-wide group with headquarters in Montevideo. Owen was head of the section charged with monitoring subversive activities of Axis firms in South America. Working under State Department "cover", he was the chief point of contact for a host of intelligence agencies including the FBI, Army Intelligence, British Censorship, and the like.

As draft pressure mounted, Owen sought a commission in the Marine Corps. As a personal friend of Major General Henry L. Larsen, USMC this posed scant problem and he was appointed a First Lieutenant in January, 1943.¹³

Despite what appeared to be a perfect background for OSS, Owen's first choice of duty was flight training. He had proven to be a capable lawyer and scholar but as an aeronaut these skills proved to be of little value. His gangly build (6'1" - 134 lbs.) was compounded by an amazing lack of coordination. Never having been much interested in athletics, he was at a distinct disadvantage in the rigorous physical fitness environment of pre-flight training. Lieutenant Owen "bilged out" of Naval Aviation and into the Research and Analysis branch of OSS.

In December 1943, he was assigned as Targets Officer in Algiers, the major operating base for OSS in the Mediterranean Theater. Owen's responsibilities revolved around the analysis of reports coming from agents in occupied France. He also produced 'finished' intelligence products for use in the planning of Operation ANVIL, the allied landings in southern France during August, 1944.¹⁴

Joseph Charles, like Bill Applebaum, became a Marine Officer by accident. A University of Illinois Phi Beta Kappa, Charles received his MA and PhD. from Harvard. He remained in Cambridge as an Assistant Professor of History following graduation in 1936. Charles' area of specialization was Jeffersonian democracy. He joined OSS in December, 1942 and after a brief sojourn in Washington, was ordered to the R&A office in London.

Local draft boards were not impressed with able-bodied men who stated that they engaged in 'vital civilian war work' but gave no details. Since Charles was classified 1-A, he took steps to become an officer in the United States Navy.* When his application for a Navy

* Those OSS civilians who failed to apply for commissions were usually drafted. The most apparent example is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Schlesinger was also a member of R&A in London... as a Private First Class. By the time the allies had liberated Paris, he had displayed sufficient merit to be promoted to Corporal.

commission reached OSS, someone in R&A decided that he would make a better Marine (perhaps the Navy already had their quote of 'spooks' for that month). In any case, Joseph Charles became a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in June, 1943.¹⁵

Charles spent most of the war in London working with British SIS on government problems associated with the occupation of Europe. He resigned from the Corps in September, 1945 to accept a position with the State Department.

R&A personnel did not usually become involved in "secret missions". One exception to that generalization was First Lieutenant Edward T. Dickinson, Jr. USMCR.

Dickinson was a 32-year-old Yale man who had started for the 'Old Blue' varsity football team in 1932. Prior to joining OSS, Dickinson served as Executive Director of the Planning Commission of the War Production Board. He was an expert on factories - how to build them and naturally enough how to destroy them.

Commissioned a First Lieutenant on 4 October 1943, Dickinson was first sent to Cairo. After only a month there, he was ordered to R&A London for assignment to Special Operations Branch. His job: "technical appreciation of methods to be used in sabotaging French industry". Ed Dickinson was to coordinate all plans for bringing French factories engaged in war-related work to a standstill.¹⁶

Dickinson's undercover work involved a "dangerous and unusual mission to Sweden".¹⁷ During the spring of 1944 one of the major Allied targets for strategic bombing was the German ball bearing industry. Despite an OSS plan to buy most of the ball bearings produced by the SKF Company in Gotteborg, about 7% were being sent to Germany.

Dickinson travelled into the neutral country and played a role in determining just how many bearings were going to Hitler - a Swedish State secret. Armed with this information, the U. S. Economic Warfare Mission was able to stop all shipments.¹⁸

"Prior to D-Day, Lieutenant Dickinson was in charge of all American target planning for strategic sabotage operations in occupied Europe, including not only selection of the targets based on economic analyses but also the technical aspects of the actual sabotage operations.

From D-Day until the liberation of France he was active in planning tactical and strategic operations for the French Maquis in support of Allied military advances."¹⁹

For his role in this operation and subsequent appreciations of industrial damage in France, Lieutenant Dickinson was awarded the Bronze Star. Later he would serve as a member of the Strategic Bombing Section of the OSS Mission to Germany.*

Most members of the OSS eagerly volunteered for the agency, nearly all considered it a passport to either adventure or personal challenge. Very few indeed were long-service career military professionals. Colonel James Marshall McHugh, USMC, was a regular in a reserve outfit. Service with OSS was, in many ways a personal purgatory. For if James McHugh was not damned, he was plainly in 'outer darkness'. The man who cast him there was none other than General George C. Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*After the war Dickinson held several important public posts. These included: Commissioner of Commerce for the State of New York; Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for Installations; and, Vice-Chairman of the U. S. National Security Resources Board.

The story of how McHugh came to OSS is inextricably bound to the American experience in China. McHugh was, even more than Evans Carlson, an 'Old China Hand'. Therein lay the roots of his undoing.

'Jimmie' McHugh was born three days before the 20th century began. He grew up in Marshfield, Missouri, won an appointment to the U. S. Naval Academy and graduated with the Class of 1922. After Basic School, young Lieutenant McHugh was ordered to the Marine Detachment, American Legation, Peking. With the exception of a short tour at Headquarters in the early '30's and the obligatory pilgrimage to Quantico for Junior School in 1937, McHugh spent the next twenty years in China. He loved the land and the people, became proficient in several dialects and spoke Mandarin flawlessly. Few jobs escaped his purview. Guard Officer, Public Relations Officer, Company Commander, PX Officer, Signal Officer, Property Officer, McHugh became the institutional memory of Peking and Shanghai. And throughout the tapestry of jobs and titles there ran a recurrent thread - Intelligence Officer. On 30 October 1937, Major James M. McHugh was designated Assistant Naval Attache to a China which was already at war with Japan.²⁰

The job of an attache is to keep his eyes open, make contacts, and report. McHugh had been doing this for years and had been frequently commended for his work. He became a close friend of both Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and the ubiquitous Madame Chiang as well as Chiang's political advisor W. H. Donald. "As an intimate in the palace circle, he served as Ambassador Johnson's eyes and ears, much to the irritation of his fellow attache at the time, Colonel (Joseph) Stilwell, who saw McHugh always bustling with private knowledge and whispering to the Ambassador."²¹

In August, 1940, Major McHugh returned to the United States for a tour at the Senior School at Quantico. He barely had time to settle in when a call came from Major General Holcomb. McHugh was to return to China and "carry out personal and confidential instructions from the Secretary of the Navy". Following three days of confidential briefings at Naval Intelligence in Washington, McHugh caught a flight for the West Coast and made connection with the Pan Am clipper for Hong Kong.²²

Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel shortly after the United States entered the war, McHugh was now the Naval Attache to the Chinese government in Chungking. "McHugh had always been fearless in making reports whenever he felt the good of the United States was concerned."²³ But as allied forces were pushed back through Burma now-Major General Stilwell began to truly live-up to his nickname: 'Vinegar Joe'. Stilwell was a largely apolitical professional soldier. Colorful, salty, and angered by incompetence, corruption and foot-dragging, he labored with missionary zeal in a forgotten arena. As a combat commander, Stilwell had few peers but when it came to dealing with the arrogant, suspicious and overly-sensitive Chinese he was out of his element. Not that he did any better with the British for whom he reserved even higher plateaus of scorn.

In late 1942, Chiang began lobbying for a change in the China-Burma-India command structure. His champion was General Claire Chennault, boss of the famous 'Flying Tigers'. McHugh reported these machinations directly to Knox, adding some of his personal observations about Stilwell's inability to 'get along' with the Chinese government. In October, Chennault drafted a letter to President Roosevelt (which was handed carried by Wendell Wilkie) claiming that air power could win

the war in Asia and that only Stilwell stood in the path of full cooperation between the United States and China.

It seemed that Vinegar Joe's days were numbered but the axe fell instead on the neck of the messenger.

"Chiang Kai Shek and Madame summoned McHugh to lunch and emphasised the benefits to the Allied cause of replacing Stilwell with Chennault. McHugh heartily endorsed the suggestion in a report to Secretary Knox in which he stated that Stilwell's insistence on the recapture of Burma was a personal ambition resulting from his defeat there....

Secretary Knox passed the report on to Secretary (of War) Stimson who showed it to (General) Marshall who was infuriated." ²⁴

McHugh was due to return to the United States for consultations. Marshall demanded that he not be allowed to return to Chungking or anywhere else in China... ever.

McHugh's tour in limbo began. He reported to the Director of Naval Intelligence in December, 1942. In February he was transferred to an Engineer Battalion at Camp Lejeune. May found him with orders to Quantico. Meanwhile, General Donovan entered the picture. After some exploratory discussions, OSS requested that McHugh (who had since been again transferred - this time to the Navy's Logistics Planning department) be assigned to R&A. ²⁵

When this request reached Headquarters Marine Corps, it went straight to Commandant Holcomb. Unfortunately, the enclosure to OSS' request contained the 'verboden' word 'China' in the same paragraph as 'overseas'.

Holcomb called Knox. Knox called Donovan. Views were exchanged. Two days later, the Secretary of the Navy wrote a personal memorandum to Lieutenant General Holcomb.

"With reference to our conversation concerning Colonel McHugh, who is on duty with the Navy, I have talked further with General Donovan and have been advised that there is no intention of sending him to foreign duty, and that his services are desired by General Donovan here.

Under these circumstances, I should like to have McHugh relieved and proper orders issued to have him report to General Donovan."²⁶

What Donovan had in mind for McHugh was eventual elevation to a fairly senior position in either R&A or SO. Whether this became known to Headquarters or was further discussed with Secretary Knox is unclear. Whatever the stimulus may have been, the response is plain. After only a few months at OSS, McHugh was again transferred, this time to Hawaii. His odyssey was not over yet.

Now stuck in the Service Battalion of Fifth Amphibious Corps, McHugh wrote to Donovan stating that he wanted to return to OSS. Donovan replied that he 'would be glad to have him'.²⁷ Meanwhile, Stilwell had been detached from his duties in China thus leaving the way somewhat more open for McHugh's renewed employment there.

Assistant Director of OSS, Charles Cheston, became the intermediary in an attempt to resecure McHugh. On 12 December 1944, McHugh's transfer was once again requested in writing.²⁸ Soon afterward he was back in the 'cloak and dagger' fold, this time as assistant to Brigadier General John Magruder, Deputy OSS Director of Intelligence. It was a convenient arrangement, as Magruder happened to be McHugh's brother-in-law.²⁹

James McHugh's story does not have a happy ending. As late as the spring of 1945, he was still trying to return to the China where he had spent virtually his entire adult life. On 16 February, McHugh called on Stilwell in Washington and "expressed regret over certain

passages in the report concerning him" ...Stilwell told him to "forget it."³⁰ A few weeks later, The Foreign Economic Administration invited McHugh to become their special representative with Ambassador Hurley's staff in Chungking. On 7 March 1945, Hurley personally approved this arrangement subject to concurrence by General Vandegrift. The Commandant also gave his qualified blessing to the arrangement and sought approval by the Secretary of the Navy based on McHugh's strenuous assertion that the "appointment would be directly to F. E. A. and in no sense a loan or 'plant' by the OSS".³¹ Approval was not forthcoming, General Marshall was as powerful in March, 1945 as he had been in December, 1942.

On 1 October 1945, OSS was officially disbanded and its personnel shifted to either the War or State Departments. A total of 52 Marine officers who were still on OSS rolls received a blanket Marine Corps Special Order covering their administrative transfer to one of the new custodians of U. S. strategic intelligence.³² Senior man on the list was Colonel James M. McHugh, the highest ranking regular Marine to serve with Donovan's Dreamers. A few months later, McHugh retired.

Another OSS China analyst's story has a happier ending. Major C. D. Gower was a University of Chicago, PhD. who had been teaching anthropology at Lingnan University in Canton when World War II began. After the Japanese occupied Canton, Gower had moved to Hong Kong. There 'the professor' went into captivity during December, 1941. All of this comprises part of the unique story of Marines with OSS but of greater interest is the fact that Gower's first name was Charlotte and she was the only known distaff leatherneck on Donovan's staff.

Charlotte Gower was nearly forty years old the day she entered the Marine Corps recruiting station in Kanakee, Illinois. A stout lady with graying hair and glasses, she hardly appeared to be the ideal candidate for commissioning in the Armed Forces. But Charlotte Gower was the type of person who belied looks and could be counted upon to do a job and do it correctly.

Born and raised in Illinois, she had attended Smith College and later earned her advanced degrees at Chicago. A woman of wide experience, she spent two years in France working on prehistoric archaeological digs for Yale and later was appointed Director of the American School of Prehistoric Research.

Between 1928-30, Gower carried out an intensive study of peasant life in a Sicilian community near Palermo. During this research, she demonstrated an outstanding ability to collect, analyze, and present material of a technical nature.³³ Upon her return to America, Gower became Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin.

In 1938, Charlotte Gower was recruited by Lingnan. There she served as head of the Anthropology Department and as Dean of Women. After her capture in Hong Kong, she spent some months in a Japanese internment camp and was repatriated along with other U. S. civilians in 1942. In his letter of recommendation to Headquarters Marine Corps, Dr. Robert Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, called her "an exceptionally capable and brilliant woman".³⁴ The Marine Corps soon concurred fully with that assessment.

Commissioned a Captain in the Marine Corps Women's Reserve on 29 January 1943, Gower reported directly to Headquarters for duty.

Without benefit of any particular military training, she was immediately assigned to a series of recruiting trips designed to secure applicants for Woman Marine officer screening.

"Major Gower (then a Captain) was one of the original staff of the Corps' Women's Reserve. She was selected by the Director of Reserve to organize and supervise all of the training for Marine women with particular emphasis on specialist recruitment and training. The excellence of the results of her work is attested to by the highly satisfactory accomplishments of Marine Women throughout the various activities to which they are assigned.

On 17 November 1943, in addition to her other duties, Major Gower became the Officer-in-Charge of the Women's Reserve Section. In this capacity she had supervision of the entire activities of the Women's Reserve. She also headed the board which selected all Women candidates for officer training."³⁵

The early days of the Women's Reserve program were complicated by the fact that much of the training was done in Navy schools and Navy recruiters frequently were used to select candidates. This naturally led to a situation where the Marine Corps got what amounted to leftovers. Major Gower completely reversed this trend, utilizing a fine mix of diplomacy and firmness. By March, 1944 she had a smoothly running system which could be turned over to the M-5 Section of Headquarter's Plans and Policies Division.

Charlotte Gower did not have much time to search for a new challenge. On 17 April 1944, her services were specifically requested by OSS. The qualifications were obvious. Not only did Major Gower speak Chinese, she also spoke French and Italian. More importantly, she had spent considerable time overseas and had seen the Japanese operate firsthand. The Division of Reserve "very reluctantly relinquished her services".³⁶

On 1 June 1944, Major Gower reported to OSS for duty. She finished the war as an analyst with R&A and was demobilized late in 1945. One of the first 8 women officers to claim the title "Marine" was also one of the last to be demobilized. After the war, Charlotte Gower went back to teaching but she retained a strong interest in the Marine Corps and remained active in the Reserves. She retired as a Lieutenant Colonel, without pay, in the early 1960's.

Today there are a number of Woman Marines - both officer and enlisted - in the intelligence profession. Charlotte Gower of OSS was the first.³⁷

CHAPTER V

"ZDRAVO, PURVI AMERICANEC"

The black Halifax from RAF Bomber Command thundered across the Albanian mountains toward Yugoslavia. Inside its belly were three tons of ammunition, small arms, radios and a single passenger. All were fitted and rigged for a parachute drop.

Flying at 8,000 feet, the pilot and crew members scanned the sea of darkness below looking for a prearranged signal: five fires in the shape of a cross. It was nearly midnight, 19 August 1943.

Suddenly a red light glowed within the aircraft. Ahead and slightly to the left were five dancing fires. Nearby a sixth light blinked in rhythmic Morse. As the port side gunner answered with his Aldus lamp, the passenger checked his chute and removed a rectangular section from the floor of the bomber. Cold air streamed into the plane. Gingerly the man balanced his body with one foot on either side of the makeshift exit. Above his head the red glow flashed to green. An instant later he was gone.

The chute blossomed and the man found himself swinging gently in a silent world. Captain Walter R. Mansfield USMCR was only seconds from becoming the first American to set foot in Yugoslavia since the Belgrade Consulate had locked its doors more than two years ago.¹

Captain Mansfield's canopy caught a gust of wind. He drifted away from the signal fires. Then the ground rushed up and he tumbled to earth in a pile of boulders.

"I got out of my harness, hid my chute, drew my .45 and waited in the cold. Within ten minutes I heard voices, yelling out in Serbian. "Zdravo! Zdravo! Piatelj! (Greetings! Greetings! Friend!) I answered and was soon surrounded by a small group of weird ragged-looking men, most of whom had black beards and hats bearing a skull and bones emblem. I told Lt. Perich, their leader that I was an American, whereupon they all began to whoop, holler, and kiss me (black beards and all) shouting 'Zdravo, Purvi Americanec' (Greetings, first American. I mustered up my Serbian to reply, 'Zdravo Chetnici!' - The first American had landed."²

The drop zone a few hundred yards up the mountain was bustling with activity. Several dozen guerillas were busy tending the fires while others formed a rough perimeter defense or waited for the supply drop. Moments after Mansfield reached this scene, the Halifax roared over again spewing 15 bundles in its wake. These were quickly gathered-up and the 'first American' met his British counterparts: Colonel Bailey and Major Greenless both members of the SOE mission which had parachuted into Montenegro on Christmas Day 1942. Bailey, a former mining engineer, had worked in Serbia before the war and spoke the language fluently.³

After several hours of hiking, the guerillas reached their base camp. There Manfield was introduced to the man to whom his mission was directed, General Draga Mihailovic, the 'Robin Hood of Serbia'.

Yugoslavia has been called a country with seven frontiers, six Republics, four languages, three religions, and two alphabets all in search of one boss. Its name literally means 'the land of the Southern Slavs' and as late as 1918 it was not a country at all. When Germany attacked Yugoslavia in April 1941, the national army was quickly subdued and the reigning monarch, 18 year old King Peter,

fled into exile. But within the rugged mountains and deep forests resistance to the Nazi's and their puppet troops, the Ustase, grew. Two men would lead the fighting. One of these was Mihailovic, the other was Josip Broz, better known by his nom de guerre: Tito.

Mihailovic commanded the loyalty of the largely Serbian Chetniks.* The Chetnik organization had its origins in veterans groups and was pro-royalist. "It had a central command with a chief and local organizations in a large number of places throughout the country but principally in Serbia. For many members, Chetnik work was a full-time activity, even in peacetime."⁴

When the order for surrender of Yugoslav forces became official on 16 April 1941, Mihailovic refused to obey it. He told his commanding officer: "You may lay down your arms, but I am going to continue the struggle in the Chetnik way, together with those who are brave enough to follow me."⁵

Three weeks later, Mihailovic reached his intended headquarters site, the high plateau of Ravna Gora in Western Serbia. With him were seven officers and 24 soldiers. Around these he planned to mold a guerilla army.

Mihailovic was in his late forties. Of medium-build, his most impressive feature was a wildly tangled black beard streaked with gray. His face was broad, and behind a pair of round steel-rimmed glasses lurked dark, wild eyes. He was every inch a soldier. By the time Mansfield arrived near the Mountain of Cemerno, thousands of Serbians had rallied to the Chetnik banner.⁶

*The term Chetnik is derived from the Serbian word ceta meaning armed company.

While Mihailović was building his army, another Yugoslav of very different character was waiting in history's wings. Josip Broz, General Secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party, was a Croatian. Born in what was then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Broz served in the Carpathian campaigns of early World War I. Wounded and captured by the Tsarist Russians, he escaped from his POW camp just in time for the Bolshevik Revolution. "He stayed on in Russia and became a Communist Party member in 1919, returned to Yugoslavia with a Russian wife in 1920, and in 1924 was elected to a local post in the illegal CPY."⁷ During the next fifteen years he would adopt the name 'Tito' and see the inside of more than a few jails. And he would rise in the Party for his allegiance to Moscow never wavered. On the eve of the war, Tito became General Secretary.

The German invasion posed a significant dilemma for Tito and the communists. On one hand, the reactionary monarchy against which they had struggled was cast aside, but since Germany and the Soviet Union were still allies nothing could be done to openly antagonize the new regime. This problem did not long persist. When Hitler attacked Russia, open warfare seemed in order. Yet, in calling for aid to the Mecca of Marxism, the Comintern issued a statement which may have begun Tito's disaffection with Moscow:

"Take into consideration that at this stage your task is the liberation from Fascist oppression and not Socialist revolution."⁸

On July 4th, the Yugoslav Politburo met secretly in a nondescript house on the outskirts of Belgrade. The members, all veterans of clandestine political conflict, called for the raising of a national

community army. At the time, the party probably numbered about 10,000 and included many members who had fought with the Republican forces in Spain.* So the call went out and the 'Partisan' movement began:

Initially the partisans were amazingly successful. Within a few weeks Tito made mince meat of two fully-equipped but abysmally-led Italian divisions in Montenegro. Large quantities of arms and ammunition fell into Partisan hands. On September 18th, Tito himself took control of all military operations, making his field headquarters near Valjevo in the Serbian hills.

Throughout the war, Communist party members formed a minority of the Partisan movement but Tito ensured that from the very outset his supporters were in most command positions. Thus it is not surprising that when he met Mihailovic on neutral ground half-way between his headquarters and the Ravna Gora both sides were suspicious.

Their first parlay ended inconclusively but a second was agreed upon. This took place on 27 October 1941 at Brajci. By this time, Mihailovic had been designated Minister of War by King Peter's Government-in-Exile and the first allied liaison officer, British Captain D. T. Hudson, had already arrived to coordinate SOE assistance to the Chetniks.**

"This second conference ended with some measure of agreement. Mihailovic was to obtain half of the production of the Partisan-held Uzice ammunition and rifle factory. In return, Mihailovic promised

*The 4th of July is now a major Yugoslavian holiday known as Dan Borca - the day of the fighter.

**Hudson was another mining engineer who had worked in Yugoslavia before the war. He was landed by submarine on the Montenegrin coast along with 3 Yugoslavs on 20 September 1941.⁹

Tito a share of whatever parachute drops he might obtain from the British."¹⁰ This deal did not last a fortnight.

Mihailovic rightly believed that Tito would never accept a return of the monarchy. Grossly underestimating the organizational skill and numbers of the Partisan movement, he decided to occupy Uzice himself. On the night of 2 November, Chetnik forces attacked Uzice and were soundly trounced by Tito's men. After that Yugoslavia was a three-way war: Chetniks, Partisans, and Germans.¹¹

The break could not have come at a worse time. The Germans were in the midst of an all-out drive to 'pacify' those areas under guerilla control and, one by one, the 'liberated' population centers fell back under Axis control.

Almost nothing of this internecine feuding revealed itself to the outside world. In both London and Washington the issue of aid to Yugoslavia was split along ethnic lines. Both capitals attracted lobbyists from the various nationalities who championed their own causes at the expense of the others. Serbians pointed to Mihailovic and Peter as legitimate symbols of Yugoslav resistance. Croats and communists championed the Partisans without mentioning their leadership... if indeed they knew who was in charge. Tito's name did not surface in the West for several more months. Meanwhile both the British and American governments dealt with Peter and his Ambassador in Washington, Constantin Frotic.

The Partisans and Chetniks disagreed as much in strategy as they did in politics. German retaliation fell most heavily upon the more numerous Serbs and threatened to weaken Mihailovic's recruiting base. Consequently, he adopted a 'hide in the hills and develop the army' philosophy which saved casualties but failed to hurt the enemy

Tito, on the other hand, exerted every ounce of his energy to attacking German lines of communication whatever the cost.

"The Partisans were revolutionaries, the Chetniks were for restoration of the status quo. The Partisans appealed to the broad masses of Yugoslavia, the Chetniks... with minor exceptions to the Serbs. The Partisan movement was an organization of young people.... They were clean shaven - Tito never missed a day shaving even during the most difficult battles. While the Chetniks were an older group, they looked more so because they let their beards grow in the old Serbian tradition. The Partisans were a highly disciplined centrally directed organization, the Chetniks much less so. Women played an important role in the Partisan movement, none among the Chetniks."¹²

These then were fundamentally different organizations. In fact, their only two points of similarity were a desire to free Yugoslavia of foreign rule and a continuing search for outside support.

As news of the fighting in Yugoslavia's mountains trickled out, it gradually became apparent that Mihailovic was not the only guerilla leader. Hudson's reports of a far greater level of activity by the Partisans (he never mentioned Tito by name) spurred the British to send new emissaries in search of more information.¹³

Colonel Bailey was the first of these. In addition to his liaison and fact-find role, it was hoped that Bailey could induce greater levels of violence against the Germans since the war in North Africa was then reaching a critical stage.*

In April, 1943 SOE dropped two all-Yugoslav teams (codenames: HOATLEY I and FUNGUS) into Croatia and Bosnia.** These were the vanguard.

* Bailey jumped into Mihailovic's area on the same day Captain Ortiz left for Morocco.

** Both of these teams flew from a captured Italian air base at Derna, Libya - the site of Presley O'Bannon's exploits in the Barbary Wars. Mansfield also left from Derna but he was unaware of the historical connection with the Marine Corps.¹⁴

Both went in 'blind' since no one seemed to know where Partisan headquarters might be. Luckily, FUNGUS landed close to Tito's subordinate headquarters at Brinje and was hospitably received. Soon SOE's Cairo base was preparing to send in its first British officers. A three-man mission commanded by Major William D. Jones was infiltrated by sea "slowly and comfortably drifting to the moonlight turfs of Croatia".¹⁵ This team immediately determined that the chief Partisan stronghold was not in Brinje but they did arrange for a direct para-drop to Tito's command post on Mount Durmitor near Zabljak.

On 28 May 1948, SOE launched the TYPICAL mission which consisted of British Captain F. W. Deakin,* Canadian Captain William F. Stuart, and four NCO's. All were parachuted into the Montenegrin mountains and soon were established at Tito's secret headquarters. SOE now had direct liaison teams with both major Yugoslav resistance organizations and OSS was anxious to get in on the act.

This was easier to contemplate than to accomplish "Plans to land OSS men on the Yugoslav coast were consistently blocked by the Royal Navy which at SOE instigation 'requisitioned' every small vessel that OSS requested. It finally required General Donovan's personal intervention in London to clear the way for OSS Yugoslav missions."¹⁶

A number of officers were initially primed for the first Yugoslav insertions. Among these were Army Captains M. O. Benson

* Deakin was a personal friend of Winston Churchill having served as primary research assistant during the writing of Churchill's biography of his famous forebearer the Duke of Marlborough.

and George Selvig. Two additional officers were sent from Washington and confusion reigned as to exactly which officers should be dropped and to which group. In the midst of several cancellations imposed by bad weather, Major Huot,^{*} head of Special Operations branch for OSS Cairo, visited London. There he met Captain Mansfield for the first time.

Walter R. Mansfield had just celebrated his 32nd birthday. Born in Boston he was educated at Roxbury Latin School and Harvard, receiving his AB in 1932 and a law degree in 1935. Before the war, Mansfield was a practicing member of Donovan's law firm and later served as Assistant U. S. Attorney for South New York.

After joining OSS as a civilian, Mansfield applied for a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve. He attended the Reserve Officer Candidate Class in 1942 and was subsequently ordered to the Marine Parachute Training School at New River on Donovan's personal request.¹⁷ In June, 1943 Mansfield flew to London to serve as a staff member at OSS's own parachute training center which was then beginning to prepare agents for clandestine entry into Europe. He had been in England only a few weeks when he met and favorably impressed Huot.

As soon as Mansfield arrived in Chetnik territory he began receiving briefings from Mihailovic and his principal staff officers. Since the General spoke no English and the Captain little Serbian, conversations were carried on in French.¹⁸ Mansfield kept in touch with OSS Cairo by coded radio messages. From the outset, 'the first American' was impressed.

* Huot was a business associate of Frank Knox and had been a newspaperman in France before the war.

"For two years they (Chetniks) had been living off the land and sleeping in the mountains. They received no pay and little clothing, relying on the generosity of the peasants for food. Despite this, each guerilla followed orders without question, cheerfully carrying out long marches over the steepest mountains, always ready to risk his life for his commander."¹⁹

One morning, the Germans launched a battalion-size surprise attack on the headquarters. Aided by a thick fog they succeeded in slipping past the outposts and were nearly into the camp before being spotted. A sharp fight followed with each side losing about 20 killed. Mansfield saw his first action that morning. He also witnessed the character of Yugoslav guerilla warfare when Mihailovic's men rounded up 5 prisoners. After a short period of interrogation, all were shot on the spot.

Their position totally compromised, the Chetniks promptly moved deeper into the hills. For 15 straight hours more than 500 men and pack animals force marched through a driving rain storm. It was not until well past midnight that Mihailovic deemed it safe to re-establish his camp.

Mansfield was amazed at the conditioning of the ragged troops but he had still to see them in offensive action. This situation was remedied when he and Hudson were allowed to accompany a mission to disrupt the main railway from Belgrade to Dubrovnik.

The site chosen for interdiction was a bridge and tunnel complex. Mansfield and Hudson decided to wreck a train inside the tunnel and then blow the bridge to block any repair crews from the nearest town. Three hundred Chetniks would be involved in the operation.

Hudson's experience as an engineer fitted this task to perfection. He took the bridge. Captain Mansfield, who had also been trained to use

demolitions, got the tunnel. Since the evening train normally passed the selected area at about 1730, it was decided to lay the charges one hour before. This would diminish the likelihood of their discovery by enemy patrols.

"After our reconnaissance party reported that the coast was clear, I entered the tunnel with five men, leaving one group at either end. The track rested on very short ties, supported by rock and cinders. We walked about 200 feet before my eyes became accustomed to the darkness and I could see the other entrance about 300 feet away. I put two half-pound blocks of TNT under the rail, connected up the primacord and snapped the fog signal detonator on the track - a simple job."²⁰

Then the unexpected occurred: the 1730 train came chugging around a bend. Mansfield and his men ran for their lives, barely clearing one end of the tunnel as the engine steamed in the other. A muffled bang followed, then a squealing of brakes. Out puffed the engine.

A thunderous crash reverberated through the hills. Hudson had laid 100 pounds of ring-mained charges at each end of the bridge. When his sentries heard the train, he yanked both igniters and headed for the forest. Two minutes later 100 feet of bridge and large chunks of concrete piling dropped into the river below.

Mansfield's TNT had taken out 6 feet of track but somehow failed to derail the train. Nevertheless, it was now stuck. The Chetniks swarmed out of the hills, captured the passengers and did what damage they could to the engine without further explosives. As the first German patrols arrived, the raiding party withdrew behind a screen of ambushes.

During the following months, Mansfield and Hudson would see more action. In September, Army Lieutenant Colonel Albert Seitz^{*} had been parachuted to Mihailovic's camp becoming the senior OSS representative to the Chetniks. Meanwhile, both the British and Americans had dropped liaison teams to Tito. Major Huot led the U. S. contingent while the SOE group was headed by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean.^{**} Clearly the Partisans were beginning to be viewed as the predominant active guerilla army. British aid to the Chetniks slowed to a trickle.²¹

Seitz had arrived in Chetnik territory as part of an SOE mission commanded by British Brigadier C. D. Armstrong. Unlike Maclean, Armstrong was blatantly anti-OSS. Seitz would later describe him as "the rare type of Englishman who sneers at anything American and dislikes having Americans close to him."²² It was certainly far from an ideal situation and one which could only worsen in the days to come.

In early October, Mihailovic decided to give the allies another example of what his forces could do if properly supplied. He chose as his target the railway complex at Visegrad and the bridge spanning the Drina River. If successful, this operation could cut German lines of communication between Bosnia and Serbia.

* Seitz was a West Point drop-out who had served in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. After the war he was involved in the disastrous attempts to infiltrate CIA teams into Albania (these were betrayed by Kim Philby, the KGB agent operating inside British Intelligence).

** Maclean was another personal friend of Churchill and veteran SOE operative. He had served as a Conservative MP and also as an intelligence officer in Moscow.

On the night of 2 October 1943, Chetnik forces began moving into position and at dawn, two days later, they struck. More than 2000 bearded Serbs threw everything they had at the 800-man Nazi garrison. After fierce fighting, the Chetniks captured the town; destroyed the bridge; and continued to harass the Germans as they withdrew. This pursuit carried Mihailovic's men into Partisan territory.²³

Immediately a worthwhile anti-German operation was converted into civil war. Rather than supporting the Chetniks, Tito attacked them. His forces allowed the Nazi's to escape and concentrated on driving Mihailovic's guerillas back into the hills. Partisans occupied Visegrad and their Radio Free Yugoslavia announced to the world that the entire operation had been Tito's. The BBC parroted this claim.²⁴

Mihailovic was enraged at London's niggardly support and resentful of BBC Serbian-language broadcasts which portrayed Tito as a heroic figure. Ignoring further advice from Armstrong, he invited Sietz and Mansfield to conduct a tour of all Chetnik-held territory in order that they might draw their own conclusions. On 6 November, they set-out on horseback to do just that.

It was an extremely enlightening trip. The Chetniks virtually controlled large sections of Serbia and the party moved easily in many areas. Only when it became necessary to cross major rivers did problems arise. In one case Mansfield, disguised as a Serb, walked straight through a German checkpoint and across the Drina River Bridge at Gorazde.²⁵ Eventually the two men split-up. But wherever they went, support for Mihailovic seemed overwhelming.

Of course this passage did not totally escape notice by the German intelligence system. Soon there were more and more brushes with security troops. Finally, the way back to Mihailovic barred by increased counter-guerilla operations, it was decided to attempt an escape to allied territory in Italy. Mansfield, Bailey, and Yugoslav Captain Tudorovic were able to establish radio contact with OSS, Cairo. Arrangements were made for a seaborne exfiltration by the Royal Navy. On 15 February 1944, the 'first American' and his companions were picked-up near Cavtat on the Dalmatian coast. Seitz and his party crossed into Partisan-held territory and were flown out the next month.²⁶

Based on the reports of Mansfield and Seitz, Donovan tried to continue American support to both the Chetniks and Partisans. "Under Donovan's arrangement, Yugoslavia would be broken into two separate zones. Tito would control the western sector and Mihailovic the eastern region. Both guerilla armies would be responsible to the allied command in Italy."²⁷ President Roosevelt accepted this idea but Churchill was vehemently opposed to splitting Anglo-British efforts. Donovan, with characteristic flair, offered to personally parachute into Yugoslavia to negotiate an end to the rivalry.²⁸

At the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt was gradually won-over to the British position. Aid to Mihailovic dwindled to nothing. Desperately, the Chetniks negotiated a modus vivendi with local German commanders but Mihailovic himself remained firmly pro-American. Mansfield, Seitz and other OSS operatives who had had direct contact with the Chetniks were bitterly disillusioned by this stance. But when Roosevelt proposed new OSS missions to Serbia, the British violently opposed them and the idea was withdrawn.²⁹



Његово Величанство

КРАЉ

по милости Божијој и вољи народној

КРАЉ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ

благоволео је потписати следећи Указ
ка предној нашој Министара Војне
морнарице и ваздухопловства

одликујемо

Кипелана војске Сједињених Америчких Држава
Captain Mansfield P. Walker, U.S.N.C.
Краљевским орденом

БЕЛОГА ОРА

са мачевима

петим (V) редом

ослобођављујући га и његоваг тавога

Министар Војне морнарице и ваздухопловства
нека обухвати изврши

Пейар с. р.

Министар Војске, морнарице и ваздухопловства
дивизијом генерал у пензији и резерви
Борисав М. Ђистовић с. р.

Кашњакар Краљевског ордена дукс обух Повељу

Ташкомир М. Walker у
као доказ његових одликовања

Указ № 38

1946 год.

у Лондону

№ 1320

30 октобра 1946 год.
у Лондону

у Лондону
[Signature]

[Signature]

After Tehran, Churchill told King Peter that all aid would go to Tito. In the end, the Royal Government disavowed Mihailovic in a vain hope that the Partisans might accept Peter as a postwar figure-head monarch.

When the Russians entered Yugoslavia in late 1944, Mihailovic offered to cooperate with them. This idea was accepted long enough for the Red Army to disarm the Chetniks and begin turning them over to the Partisans. By December, 1944, "naked, barefoot, and hungry remnants of Mihailovic's forces were retreating through the Bosnian mountains... appealing for entry into any Allied Army."³⁰

"Mihailovic did in East Europe what the Gaullist organization was ordered to do in West Europe: It lay low to keep an army in being for the day of an allied landing... The only Allied troops to arrive were the Russians. Tito's forces hunted down Mihailovic and captured him in the Spring of 1946, months after World War II had ended."³¹

In July, 1946 Mihailovic fought his last battle. When he entered the courtroom in Belgrade, he was old, tired and defeated. Greeted by jeers, hisses, and cries of "hang him" Mihailovic listened impassively as the charges against him were read. They took eight hours.

Not only was Mihailovic on trial but every allied liaison officer who had been with him was also denounced. In his address to the court, Mihailovic said: "I wanted nothing for myself."³²

The verdict was a foregone conclusion. At dawn on 17 July, the 'Robin Hood of Serbia' was shot to death on the golf course at Topcider, once a favorite resort of the Diplomatic Corps.

CHAPTER VI

"DID YOU PLAY FOOTBALL IN COLLEGE?"

"He stood six foot five in his leather jumping boots and weighed close to two hundred and thirty pounds. A British parachute emblem and a small American flag were neatly stitched to the sleeves of his combat jacket. There was also the conventional military insignia, and a .357 Magnum revolver strapped to his thigh. His name was John Hamilton and he was a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps (Reserve)."¹ The big blond man who wrote these words was describing himself. At twenty-seven he had already seen a lifetime of adventure. His physical description is accurate enough, but the name John Hamilton while technically correct, is misleading. The lieutenant was much better known as Sterling Hayden - sailor, author, actor, and now a Marine with OSS.

Sterling Walter Hayden was born in Montclair, New Jersey on 26 March 1916. At seventeen, he quit school and went to sea aboard the sailing schooner Puritan out of New London. For the next nine years, Hayden followed the wind and waves. He began as a common seaman and ended as ship's master.²

In the late 1930's Hayden's good looks and cocky attitude earned him a Hollywood screen test. He became an overnight sensation. But celluloid action could not compare with what he had already tasted. Although he was engaged to beautiful starlet Madeleine Carroll, Hayden

jumped at a cryptic invitation from COI Director Donovan to test his mettle at the British Commando School.*

In November 1941, Hayden sailed to Scotland with a British convoy. When he reported to the American Embassy in London, no one seemed to know what to do with him. After a week of cooling his heels, however, Hayden received orders to report to the Commando Training Center at Archnarry.

Once again his reception was muted. The Commanding Officer, Colonel Young, found Hayden's story that his acting ability might pay off as a spy somewhat dubious. But he was big and lean and tough.

"So they told him to train and he trained - a pale tall figure in British battledress, minus insignia, wearing American hunting boots and no hat - all wrapped up in a Hollywood trenchcoat. He trained with Dutchmen and Poles and Belgians, and French and Danes and Norwegians, all of whom had been in combat. All were fighters, with rank and military bearing and the confidence of men who know their job...After a day's work in driving rain, this group would assemble in a dark beamed room, warmed by a small coal fire, for the ration of whiskey - two per man - and to learn the news. First the national anthem, and then the announcer's voice: "Good evening. This is the Home and Forces program of the BBC. Here is the news..." And it was always bleak."³

Hayden was a civilian novice among military experts, but he did well. After passing through the initial rigors of Commando life, Hayden was sent to the Parachute School near Manchester. He made ten jumps without incident. But in March, 1942 his luck ran out. Hayden landed in a stone quarry. When the ground crew found him, he had a broken ankle, dislocated knee, and spinal injuries. No more commando work now, only a trip back to the U. S. and his marriage to Miss Carroll.

* Hayden had met Donovan through the latter's son who was also a sailing buff.

While his injuries healed, Hayden brooded. Donovan urged him to apply for a commission in the Navy. But the Navy was not looking for torpedo boat skippers with bad legs and dubious backs. Hayden was politely rejected. So he took a schooner and sailed her to the West Indies. There at the Shell Oil reservation on Curacao he got rip-snorting drunk with six Marines from the security detachment. They ended-up at the Americano Hotel. When the manager told Hayden he could remain but the Marines had to go, the former actor mustered up all his commando skills and threw the manager into the street. For that he went to jail.⁴

Bailed out by his agent, Hayden sold his boat. Flying back to New York he made his decision. After breakfast the next day he telephoned the nearest Marine Corps Recruiting Station. Within hours Hayden was on a train bound for Yamesee, South Carolina - railhead for the Recruit Depot at Parris Island. That evening's New York Daily News carried a photograph of Hayden enlisting as a Private in the United States Marines.⁵

It did not take Private Hayden long to discern a certain difference between commanding one's own schooner and taking orders from a drill instructor. He had passed Commando training and he passed Marine boot camp too. Singled-out for officer's training he was immediately assigned back to OSS at Donovan's request.⁶

Following a short period of indoctrination in Washington, Second Lieutenant Hayden received orders to proceed to Cairo.

"Cairo, like Algiers in the Western Mediterranean, had by then become an intelligence service Capital. The war itself had mainly long passed it by."⁷ The Americans were not very comfortable there. "The city was somehow connected in their minds with Imperialism, Kipling, and all that."⁸

Even among the British there was much evident friction. This was particularly true of the 'secret' organizations which competed among themselves with an ardor only slightly diminished from that reserved for the Germans. "The entire British clandestine bureaucracy was torn by bitter factionalism; fervent champions of competing Balkan resistance groups were united only in their equal distaste for emissaries of the Foreign Office."⁹

Donovan had displayed great early interest in the Middle East. In late 1942, he had sanctioned organization of a working group known as "Project 90" under the leadership of Eddy's cousin, Army Colonel Harold Hoskins. The precept of Hoskin's outfit was a somewhat naive belief that the United States could be the most effective agent in the area because it was untainted by the pecuniary interests of imperial Britain.¹⁰

Predictably, His Majesty's servants took considerable exception to this view and 'Project 90' fizzled. But there was a lingering bad taste in the mouth of the British lion when the first OSS contingent arrived to set-up shop in an ornate Egyptian villas which "looked like a bastard Taj Mahal."¹¹ It was to this atmosphere that Hayden reported.

Standing at rigid attention before the Commanding Officer, cap and orders beneath his left arm, Hayden must have been a martial spectacle to behold. The Colonel looked him over and asked: "Haven't I seen you somewhere before?"

"I don't know sir."

"Your face is familiar, did you play football in college?"

"No sir, I never went to college."¹²

This line of questioning exhausted, Hayden was told to read all available reports regarding the situation in Greece. For the next few days he did little else. Finally, with no meaningful job in view, he requisitioned a jeep. Hayden drove down to the Alexandria waterfront, talked himself into the Royal Egyptian Yacht Club, and went sailing.

Hayden had been told that he was to skipper one of a number of Greek fishing boats which OSS proposed to run into German occupied territory. Instead, he was transferred to Monopoli, a small Italian port south of Bari. "With the aid of 400 Partisans, and using a fleet of fourteen schooners (supplied by the Wrigley's Chewing Gum executive who commanded the OSS Maritime Unit), Hayden's group ran supplies through the German Adriatic blockade to the Partisan-held island of Vis."¹³ The average cruising speed of his flotilla was seven knots. The Germans had 35 knot "E" boats and aircraft. But the convoy system worked.

In early January, 1944, Hayden took a 45-foot boat across the 80 miles of hostile water between Monopoli and Vis. Moving at night and putting into one of the thousands of Dalmatian coves, Hayden avoided detection. He reached Vis safely, dropped his supplies and started back. The water pump quit and his engine froze.

Accompanied by his assistant, Gunnery Sergeant John Harnicker USMC, Hayden and the rest of the crew paddled to the mainland.

"We hooked up with about thirty of the toughest bastards on earth. None of them had had a bath in years. All had been in the thick of the fighting and marching all up and down Bosnia and Croatia. They would only take one cigarette at a time, which they passed around in circles."¹⁴



This Yugoslav version of the "Wild Bunch" soon learned that a German patrol boat was weatherbound a short distance away. Without a word it was clear that the vessel must be attacked. When the shooting started, Hayden had difficulty pulling the trigger on what appeared to be a crew of German naval cadets. Harnicker had no such qualms. He was "just as cool as you please, which is what you get for being a regular Marine."¹⁵ The boat soon surrendered and was commandeered by the Partisans. Wounded Germans were given what medical treatment could be provided by the guerilla corpsman who turned out to be a French surgeon. Since there was no anesthetic available, the doctor used a field expedient. After preparing the wound, he simply smashed each patient in the temple with his pistol butt. Then he operated.

Shortly thereafter Hayden took the "prize" patrol boat back to Vis.

Lieutenant Hayden (Hamilton) was also involved in the savage fighting which raged around Vis and the neighboring islands of Hvar, Brac, and Solta. These operations were directed against the crack German 118th Jaeger Division. In addition to the Partisans there were British troops from "2", "43" and "40" Commandos - the latter two being Royal Marine outfits.¹⁶

He was bombed by Stukas, chased by patrol boats, ambushed ashore and afloat. Hayden took his boats into Albania, the Adriatic islands, and mainland Yugoslavia. He was at it for a full year. During these days he developed "a tremendously close feeling" for Tito's men. Sent to the Yugoslav interior as part of a rescue team for downed allied airman, he remembered that "the crews of planes would

leave their shoes, anything they could spare with the Partisans... We knew they were Communists, we knew they had commissars, but there was very little discussion of that."¹⁷

"Most OSS officers who worked with Tito's guerillas were not political ideologues. They saw Tito's troops only as courageous and dedicated fighters against a common enemy. Other Americans, like Seitz and Mansfield had taken a similar view of the Chetniks."¹⁸

When Hayden returned to the United States in November, 1944 he wore the red, white, and blue striped ribbon of the Silver Star Medal. His marriage was 'on the rocks' but his war was not yet over. Within the next few months he would dine with Eleanor Roosevelt, enjoy a thirty-day leave, and make first contacts with the Communist Party of the United States.¹⁹

By February, 1945, Hayden was back in Europe, this time as a member of the OSS section attached to the First Army in France.*

During the spring of 1944, Lieutenant Hayden had been involved in the rescue of 26 Americans (including eleven nurses) whose plane had been forced down by engine trouble over Albania. This craggy, small country - wedged uncomfortably between Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Adriatic - offered a guerilla warrior's paradise. Unfortunately, it also provided the normal Balkan resistance situation: Germans, royalists, and communists.

The Albanians, regardless of their political ilk, were a nasty lot. Known for cupidity, courage, cruelty, and blood feud, they spoke

*The remainder of Hayden's Marine career will be discussed in a later chapter of this paper.

a language known as Shqip and referred to themselves as Shqipetars, which means roughly 'sons of the eagle'. Anthropologists tell us that a nation's character is often vividly expressed in its folk music. One popular Albanian ballad began: "Let us fight, as is our custom". Another, "Tell mother that her son got married; and if she asks what kind of bride, tell her he got three bullets in the chest."²⁰

Before the war, Albania was nominally ruled by King Zog the First (and last). The King fled when the Italians invaded, leaving the country ripe for civil war. Because resistance groups spent most of their time and effort fighting each other, U. S. policy was to limit the supply of weapons and ammunition provided to any one faction. By November 1943, the Communist National Liberation Front (FNC) controlled most of the country and was the only effective force known to the Allies. Led by Enver Hoxha, "a fat, pudgy, self-indulgent fellow with a white face", the Communists were to be backed by OSS because they appeared to be "the best of a very bad lot".²¹

The first OSS mission to Albania was codenamed TANK. This was a three man team landed by British motor torpedo boat on the night of 17 November 1943. TANK's radio operator was Gunnery Sergeant Nick R. Cooky USMC. "The British SOE mission to Albania had refused to cooperate with OSS agents, unless they accepted British Command and used British communications. The three men therefore, with FNC support, established themselves independently in a cave by the sea."²² From there, Cooky began sending a series of intelligence reports to the Cairo-based SI Balkan Section headed by 1st Lieutenant Harry Harper, USMCR.

Despite some initial success the TANK mission encountered problems with both their health and the enemy. In February, 1944

the team was forced to evacuate when the Germans began a systematic campaign to clean-out guerilla units in the nearby Shushica Valley.

Another OSS team was infiltrated the next month and in July, Cooky, now a 2nd Lieutenant USMCR, was parachuted back into the Albanian mountains.²³ During the next five months, he would see plenty of action as the Communist guerillas cooperated with the Red Army's drive toward Tirana, the capital city. From September onward, Cooky commanded a field unit, supplying some of the best hard intelligence to come from a thoroughly confusing situation. He proved to be "uniformly successful in maintaining amicable relations with the Albanians and was equally adroit in culling factual information from the welter of rumor and half-truth that surrounded any Balkan situation."²⁴

Tirana, a city of mud wall, mosques, muezzins, and minarets was light years away from Cooky's hometown of Dilles Bottom, Ohio. For the former miner and truck driver serving as the United States intelligence officer in such an alien setting it proved a challenge. But Lieutenant Cooky met it. His commander would later write of his service: "In more than a year of service in the field, some of it under extremely hazardous and difficult conditions, Lt. Cooky has an unexcelled record."²⁵

Comrade Hoxha delayed for some time the permanent establishment of a complete "city team". Finally in February, 1945, the Communists permitted OSS to set-up an eleven man unit. "An interesting move by the Provisional Government was the refusal to accept U. S. civilians. This order effectively prohibited the entry of the principal OSS expert on Albania (until he later joined the Consular Staff)."²⁶

Until official State Department representatives arrived in June, OSS provided the only link between the Government of Albania and the United States. The Tirana team remained in Albania until October, 1945. Lieutenant Cooky was among the last to leave. On 28 September in a brief, simple ceremony Captain Thomas E. Stefan, Field Artillery and Second Lieutenant Nick R. Cooky, USMCR were decorated with the Partisan Star by Albanian Foreign Minister Omer Nishani.

Cooky later received the Bronze Star Medal from the United States. For previous service behind the lines in Italy, he was awarded the Merit Cross of War and the Order of the Crown.²⁷

First Lieutenant Harper, the Balkan SI Chief, was also involved in the liberation of an exotic capital. His was Sofia.

Harry Harper was 34 years old in 1944. Born in Chicago, Harper attended public schools and later graduated from Yale. In 1934 he went to work as an editor for Reader's Digest. Soon after the war began, Harper enlisted in the Army and was assigned to a Tank Lighter Company at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts. In November 1942, he was transferred to Fort Ord in California. When OSS began recruiting volunteers for 'dangerous and secret operations' Harper volunteered. He became a member of the outfit in August, 1943.²⁸

As an Army Specialist 4th Class, Harper suffered an endemic problem for OSS enlisted men. His skills outdistanced his 'horsepower'. Consequently, he applied for a direct commission in the Marine Corps "for service with the Office of Strategic Services". Harper became and 'instant Marine Officer' on 21 January 1944. His assignment was waiting. The next month he was sent to Cairo where he was directed to become an 'expert on Bulgaria'.

The Bulgarians are a glum and unlucky race. "Through no desire of their own... they have had their national name attached to the Bogomil heresy which taught that Satan was Christ's brother, and to the ugly sin of buggery (bulgary). All of their neighbors detest them."²⁹ Just about every misfortune which can befall a people has been inflicted on the Bulgars. During World War II, they naturally picked the wrong side and ended-up losing their always shaky independence.

In late August, 1944, OSS dropped a two man team to Greek guerilla forces which were harrasing the German and Bulgarian troops withdrawing from Thessalonika. This team was to accompany the advancing Greek forces toward Sofia.

The German rearguard fought a skillful and deliberate delaying action. This combined with a series of riotous welcomes in nearly every town to seriously impede the allied advance.

OSS was anxious to reach Sofia in order to safeguard and expedite removal of more than 300 POW's - most of whom were American flyers. Lieutenant Harper was directed to head a four man team which would drive by civilian car from Istanbul straight to the capital city. Once there he was to negotiate with the Bulgarian government for immediate custody of the prisoners.³⁰ Incredibly, this 'cut and paste' approach succeeded. On 7 September, having bluffed his way right through an enemy country, a Marine lieutenant calmly set down to negotiate with the Bulgarian General Staff.

It turned-out that the Bulgarians had 342 allied POW's at a camp near Shumen. Harper demanded their immediate release and transport to safety. On 9 September, a special train was despatched to Shumen with orders to bring the airmen to Sofia.

The situation was confused and complicated by the fact that Harper's four men constituted the sole allied 'occupation force'. While the train was steaming toward Sofia, the lieutenant learned that a heavy German bombing raid was scheduled to hit the main rail yard. Although he spoke little Bulgarian, Harper managed to locate the express and have it sidetracked at Gorna Orehovista, some thirty miles away. The air attack arrived on schedule and plastered the Sofia station... minus the train. The next day, Harper telegraphed Istanbul and arranged for the POW's to enter neutral Turkey. For his audacious and diplomatic coup, First Lieutenant Harry H. Harper, USMCR received the Legion of Merit.³¹

After the Red Army occupied Sofia, Harper returned to Cairo. He was transferred to OSS headquarters at Caserta, Italy in February, 1945 and subsequently was involved in OSS activities in Austria following the German collapse.

Since Marine Officers were involved in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, only Rumania was without proper sea soldier representation. Captain William L. Cary, USMCR filled that slot.

Bill Cary, like Harper, was a Yale Man (AB '31, LLB '34). Not content with a total 'Old Blue' image, he also attended Harvard Business School, graduating Magna Cum Laude in 1938.

Before the war, Cary practiced law in Cleveland, served with the Securities and Exchange Commission in Seattle and in 1940 became Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. In February 1942, he began a stint as legal specialist on the staff of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in Rio de Janero.³²

Cary applied for a Marine Corps commission in late November, 1942 and was brought onboard as a First Lieutenant Public Affairs officer in January, 1943. After completing the Reserve Officer Indoctrination Course, he became Public Relations Officer of MCAS Cherry Point. This mundane job did not satisfy Cary's urge for more important and stimulating assignments. In December, 1943 he volunteered for OSS.³³

In the Spring of the year, having finished his indoctrination to Donovan's world, Cary was assigned to SI Branch for service in the Mediterranean Theater. He initially flew to Algiers and moved from there to Caserta, Italy with the rest of the 2677th OSS Regiment.

At Caserta, Cary was designated Executive Officer for the OSS team scheduled to participate in the liberation of Bucharest. Cary's C. O. was Commander Frank G. Wisner, USNR another lawyer who later became Deputy Director of CIA.*

The "Czar of Russia once sneered: 'Rumania is not a country, it's a profession'. In the days prior to World War II, Rumania was a striking testimonial to the old Balkan proverb: 'The fish stinks from the head first. The government was lazy, crooked, unreliable and unbelievably avaricious.'³⁴

Yet the Rumanians were good soldiers. After their country joined the Axis, they fought well against the Russians, thereby earning a special spot on the Red Army's 'Most Wanted' list. When that passle of avenging angels began to approach their borders, the Rumanians promptly deposed immoral, selfish, and stupid King Carol; replaced him with his

*Wisner committed suicide in 1965.

son Michael, and declared for the Allies. A week later, the first OSS team - 21 men in a B-17 - flew directly to Ploesti airfield.* Nearby were POW compounds housing over 1,000 American flyers, most of whom had been downed in the great air offensive against the nearby refineries.³⁵

Wisner and Cary's mission flew into Bucharest directly from Italy. It was early September and the Red Army was nearing the outskirts of the city. Cary later remembered:

"We went over in a bomber while the Germans still occupied the Yugoslav coastal area but their anti-aircraft fire was rather ineffective. I handled all sorts of administrative problems and intelligence activities in conjunction with the late Henry Roberts, later Professor of History at Columbia. Our principal job was political intelligence until the United States Mission arrived in late December, but we also handled a lot of problems involving pilots who had been shot down when bombing Ploesti."³⁶

OSS gained quite a haul in Rumania. Particularly significant were the complete State Records of the previous administration and "some ten thousand dossiers from the Nazi Party... From these sources and from sixty former Axis agents (some of them acting as doubles) OSS X-2 identified over 4,000 Nazi intelligence officials and agents, more than one hundred subversive organizations, and some 200 commercial firms used as cover for espionage activities."³⁷

Captain Cary remained in Bucharest until January, 1945. He then returned to Italy for a new assignment. Predictably it involved another Balkan capital: Belgrade.

* Nearly all of the POW's were flown-out in B-17's of the 15th Air Force. Transport aircraft were unavailable because of their concentration for the upcoming Arnhem operation in Holland.

By the autumn of 1944, OSS had fifteen separate teams attached to Tito's partisans. The senior American officer was Major Charles W. Thayer, a "witty, pipe-smoking officer... with one major political prejudice - a strong anti-Soviet bias, acquired during years of diplomatic service in Stalin's Moscow." Cary flew to Belgrade to become Thayer's Exec.³⁸

Unlike Bucharest, the Yugoslav capital yielded little good intelligence on the Germans. Partisan cooperation with the Anglo-American allies began decreasing as the Soviets approached. "Political coverage", which was Cary's field, "was somewhat better. OSS maintained contacts both in the various ministries and with the more or less silent opposition groups. Since the State Department did not arrive for several months, these reports formed the only U. S. coverage of Yugoslav political developments."³⁹

Cary's war ended in Belgrade but his OSS service did not. When the mission was withdrawn in July, he proceeded to Paris and subsequently to Frankfurt where he worked on the massive evidentiary collection effort aimed at German war criminals.*

OSS was directly involved in the liberation and initial American representation in four Balkan nations. Marine Officers played a part in each.

* Cary was Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission during the Kennedy Administration. He currently teaches law at Columbia, the alma mater of both Franklin D. Roosevelt and William Donovan.

CHAPTER VII

"I'M GOING TO BLOW THIS BRIDGE, AND I'LL DO THE
SAME TO YOU IF NECESSARY"

"All the different kinds of leaders were grouping and re-grouping, forming alliances and breaking them up with threats of assassination: the klephts, the primates, the bishops, the islanders, Greeks from abroad, and the British."¹ Those words, were written to describe the situation in Greece during the winter of 1821 but could serve equally well - with the inclusion of the Americans - as a synopsis of the same season in 1943.

Greece was then occupied not by the Turks, but rather by Germans, Bulgars, and a few Italians. To make the scene complete there were competing guerilla forces which owed allegiance to either the non-resident monarch, King George, or to the Greek Communist party. British SOE was having great difficulty sorting-out exactly who was loyal to whom, under what circumstances, and for what price. When OSS opened its Cairo station in 1943, it stepped squarely into the political dung heap.

Exiled Prime Minister George Papandreou summed up the atmosphere accurately: "The country is an inferno. The Germans are killing. The Bulgarians are killing. The Security Battalions are killing. The guerillas too are killing. Everyone is killing and burning. What is going to be left of our unhappy country?"²

Several Marines would soon find out.

Captain Gerald F. Else, USMCR was born in Redfield, South Dakota in July, 1908. Else entered the University of Nebraska in 1924 but transferred to Harvard where he graduated summa cum laude in 1929. A scholar of classical Greek and Latin, Else remained in Cambridge completing his M. A. in 1932, and receiving his PhD. in 1934. He then took a teaching job in the Department of Greek and Latin, until he was recruited into COI as a civilian.³

By January 1943, it was apparent that Greece was a target of increasingly high intelligence priority. Similarly, it was clear that those OSS personnel not in uniform as officers would soon find themselves draftees. Else therefore applied for a direct commission in the Marine Corps Reserve and OSS endorsed his request with a plea for retention within the intelligence agency.

Although he was over-age and color blind, Else was finally commissioned in August 1943, under Special Program 28-42 and assigned straight back to OSS as a Captain.⁴

Captain Else continued to work in the Greek Section of SI's Washington headquarters until late summer 1943. Then he shipped out for Egypt via Brazil and Nigeria.

"I was delayed enroute by problems unspecified (I realized later that the reason with the Cairo and Tehran Conferences, which must have produced an acute shortage of air transport) ... It amuses me to recall that I was originally recruited for OSS because of my knowing Greek - ancient Greek - and that knowledge was one of the chief obstacles to learning the modern language which I tried to do after reaching Cairo."⁵

Else arrived in Cairo during November 1943, and set to work developing a network of agents who could be infiltrated into predetermined target areas.

The biggest problem faced by OSS in the Middle East was not recruitment or training but rather transportation. Parachute training (usually conducted in British Palestine) was inevitably followed by excruciating delays in aircraft availability. The British, who controlled all air assets for operations in Greece and the Balkans, carefully placed American requests for support at the bottom of the list. "The question of a small air unit under OSS control was unsuccessfully raised. Motor Torpedo boats were requested repeatedly but never arrived. Of all means available, Greek caiques, which usually transported agents in about one and a half months, proved to be the fastest."⁶

Caiques were small vessels used for fishing or limited cargo hauling. Varying in size from two to eighty tons, these were manned by crews ranging up to six or seven men. Few could make more than 4 knots. Ofcourse all were virtually defenseless.

Eventually OSS put together a fleet of 36 such craft, most of which were leased by British SIS.* The port of Alexandria was the normal 'jumping off' spot. From there the boats usually proceeded to one of several small harbors in Cyprus. Here agents went aboard still smaller caiques which ran into a clandestine base at Kusadası, Turkey, transferred to even more flimsy (and usually wind-powered) versions; and in these made the final stage of their trip to occupied Greece.⁷

Merely sailing the Aegean Sea was a tricky business. Although men had been doing it for thousands of years, they had done so by

* SIS was only too glad to help anyone having problems with SOE.

choosing their season and waiting for the weather. The Aegean has no tide and the winds blow north only during the summer. In the winter storms come up from any direction and the shallow bottom makes for dangerous waves. Of course there are hundreds of rocks to run upon as well.⁸ But the OSS 'navy' proved equal to the task and Else's section put more than 80 agents - primarily Greeks - ashore during 1944.*

Else remained in Cairo until the Fall of that year serving as assistant to Rodney Young, a former archeologist who had spent years in Greece and spoke the language fluently. As the Germans began slowly to retreat northward, OSS set about organizing the usual 'capital liberation team'. Young was to command with Else as his Executive Officer. On 12 October, they and two other members of the Cairo staff flew directly into Athens, arriving there days before the transport rich British could get in. Soon afterward, Young resigned and Captain Else became Commander of the Athens mission.⁹

Civil war broke out in Greece on 3 December 1944 with the British backing the EDES guerilla army (royalist) against the ELAS (communist) irregulars. OSS personnel termed this 'the unpleasantness' and attempted to carry on as neutrals. This was not easy since fighting raged in Athens proper. As one agent put it:

*The Germans mercilessly hounded any team which was unlucky enough to be compromised. The taking of hostages, summary executions, and torture were routine.

"During the first week the combination office-billet was situated a half-block from the front lines. With a British machine gun firing day and night from next door, a Greek military barracks down the street, and ELAS mortar shells falling all about, there were few periods quiet enough to concentrate on long reports."¹⁰

In January, Else left Athens for Caserta to head the Greek SI desk for the entire European Theater. Within a month of his arrival, the situation became so befuddled by conflicting State Department directives that he was recalled to Washington. After a short mission to Liberia he was demobilized in December 1945.

While Captain Else was providing some of the 'brains' behind OSS operations in Greece, Gunnery Sergeant (later Warrant Officer) Thomas L. Curtis, USMC was supplying the brawn.

Curtis, unlike many Marines in OSS, was a career man. Born in Massachusetts, he enlisted in 1935, served in Hawaii until 1939 and was discharged. The next year Curtis joined-up again. Soon he was hard at work in the Reconnaissance Section of Amphibious Corps, Atlantic, teaching rubber boat handling to members of what became the 1st Raider Battalion.¹¹ When OSS began to become involved in paramilitary training, Curtis was one of the first Marines to be transferred to the new organization. It was not much of a transfer. Headquarters of the Amphibious Corps in those days was at Quantico. So was the OSS training camp.

Sergeant Curtis taught new recruits the fundamentals of clandestine entry, patrolling, submarine exiting procedures, and hand-to-hand combat. He was a big, tough, beefy man and he knew his trade. In October 1943, now a Gunnery Sergeant, Curtis was tapped for an operational mission.¹²

Curtis arrived in Cairo after a stop at Oran, Algeria. Immediately, he was made a member of the team being put together for an important sabotage job in German-occupied Greece.

The commander of Curtis' mission was Army Air Corps Major Jim Kellis, an unusual recruit in an unusual outfit. Most men joined OSS based on vague promises of 'dangerous work behind enemy lines'. Kellis actually proposed his own project to Army G-2 as part of a comprehensive plan for clandestine warfare to be conducted in his ancestral homeland and site of his own college education. This, in brief, is how a Marine Gunnery Sergeant found himself aboard the caique St. John several hundred yards off a swampy area of northeastern Thrace in early May 1944.¹³

Kellis and two Navy enlisted men were already in Greece having infiltrated by foot across the Turkish border in December. It was their radio message to the secret base at Kusadası which initiated the second phase of the EVROS mission. When the St. John cautiously worked her way toward the landing area it was nearly midnight. Everything was quiet and the beach seemed deserted. But Kellis was waiting.

"One of my guerillas who had contacts in the vicinity had lined up some fishing boats which we needed to get through the swamp, and also to unload the caique, which couldn't come in very close because of the shoal water. The rest of us lay low in the cane... In gathering the boats, my men were observed by some fishermen. So our presence would not be leaked to the Germans, we took into custody everyone who saw us. By nightfall we had sixty boats and 120 fishermen under guard. That night I rowed out to meet the St. John. The plan was for me to flash an "O" when I saw her, and they would reply with an "M". We had to be pretty careful, for German 'E Boats' patrolled the areas; moreover there were coastal batteries and searchlights on the hills; and a division and a half of German and Bulgarian troops were stationed at Alexandroupolis, a few miles from our pinpoint.

At eleven-thirty I spotted the schooner. She kept moving around slowly, and I was not sure of her identity, having never seen her before. Finally after half an hour, I decided to chance it and flashed my recognition signal. It was returned immediately."¹⁴

Quickly Kellis gave the go-ahead for unloading and his armada of requisitioned lighters sallied from the swamp. In less than an hour, the entire EVROS team was ashore with Thompsons, grenades, and enough explosives to do the job for which they had been sent. At that moment, several important Greek bridges were doomed.

The EVROS team had been launched into action in accordance not only with Kellis' ideas but upon formal request of the JCS. German steel production was a concern to the strategic planners and a key ingredient in the process was chrome ore. Much of this came from neutral Turkey. OSS was directed to cut that supply.¹⁵ The Research and Analysis branch in Washington had information that most of the ore was carried into Nazi controlled territory by two rail lines. Both of these wound through the eastern mountains of Bulgaria and Greece, crossing several major gorges atop modern bridges. Dropping these would at least partially solve the problem.

Kellis had hoped to blow the huge 'International Bridge' which connected Greece and Turkey at the Evros River border. "This was a huge structure and although a difficult operation its destruction would have stopped literally all rail traffic into Greece. The State Department vetoed this plan for fear of Turkish reaction..."¹⁶ Instead, the two spans picked by R&A were targeted.

The first of these was the Alexandroupolis Bridge in Greece, the second Svilengrad Bridge in Bulgaria. Kellis took Svilengrad, a

long (210 foot) low affair which would require over a thousand pounds of plastic explosive. Curtis drew Alexandroupolis, tottering on fifty foot piers in the center of a deep ravine. This one would need only about 550 pounds of demolitions since its height would magnify any damage and make repair much more complicated.

There were more than 300 Greek guerillas involved in training for the mission. Of these, 30 were specially selected members of the elite 'Black Squad'. Only they were told of the exact targets.

Their supplies supplemented by clandestine parachute drops, the team practiced for several weeks before Kellis decided the time was right. On 27 May 1944, both sabotage units moved into positions near the respective targets. Meanwhile, a third unit was sent in the opposite direction and directed to launch diversionary attacks to mask the true purpose the burgeoning resistance battalion.¹⁷

Curtis' group of 50 men (including 15 Black Squad experts) soon determined that their bridge was guarded by a screen of German patrols with thirty Greek policemen actually stationed on both ends of the span. After a hair-raising near ambush by one German reconnaissance party, all of the raiders managed to slip inside the roving cordon. Below them was the target, codenamed JOLIET. Curtis started down.

Packing a Thompson, two .45's, and an assortment of charges and detonators, Curtis walked straight up to the nearest policeman, shoved his submachine gun into the man's stomach and calmly announced in fractured Greek: "I'm going to blow this bridge and I'll do the same to you if necessary". The Greek and some of his contingent decided instead of resisting to help. The less willing were tied to trees and work proceeded.¹⁸

Suddenly rifle shots began ricocheting off the steel girders. A German patrol had arrived. While the Greek guerilla security element fought a short but savage engagement with the intruders, Curtis hurried with the charges. When everything was set, he cut the time delay from nine minutes to three and pushed the plunger. Then the greatest middle distance sprint in Greek history got underway.

"The Gunny had done his work well. An explosion shook the wooded hills, and the huge bridge went skyward as one unit, lifting and twisting high in the air. The flame of the exploding charges was visible 20 miles away, and a shower of debris rained down for several minutes after it was over. Hemingway would have gnawed his beard with envy."¹⁹

After several brushes with Germans and Bulgarians rushing to the respective scenes of carnage, both attack groups made it safely back to their operating base. Word of the mission's complete success was flashed to Cairo and the goat-skin wine bladders were passed around. It took several months before either bridge could be put back into even a shadow of its former capacity.²⁰

Six weeks later, the EVROS mission was withdrawn from Greece by caique, returning to Egypt through Turkey. Kellis received the Legion of Merit and Curtis the Bronze Star. Both men would later serve with OSS-trained guerillas in China and both would win the Silver Star there. For his performance in Greece, Gunnery Sergeant Curtis was meritoriously promoted to Warrant Officer.²¹

Captain Else and Gunny Curtis provide an interesting duet in the libretto of Marines with OSS. One a scholarly organizer, observer, and analyst, the other a burly operator. Curtis retired as a Captain in the early 1960's. Else returned to academia and became Director of the

Center for Coordination of Ancient and Modern Studies at the University of Michigan. He never did fully master modern Greek.

CHAPTER VIII

"EXIGENCIES OF THE SITUATION..."

The officers and men of OSS came from everywhere, friends chose friends - especially in the early days - and Donovan was alleged to have told one man who expressed an interest in joining-up: 'Write me a memorandum saying how you can be of service to this organization, and if I agree, you're hired'. In the beginning, it was said you could get a direct commission just by being a good lawyer. During the boom season, all you had to do was know one.¹

OSS had more than its share of rich men, polo players, football stars, and professors but it also numbered cowboys, communists, crusaders and just plain crazies. Once recruited, all of these had to be evaluated and trained before they could be employed against the Axis.

Although ideas popped from Donovan's brain faster than airborne soap suds from Lawrence Welk's bubble machine, organization was not 'Wild Bill's' long suit. "While all wartime agencies operated in disarray, OSS had its own unique brand of administrative confusion. Young officers recruited under the most secret conditions would report for duty to a well-guarded Washington headquarters only to be asked, "Do you have any idea what OSS might have hired you for?"²

Even if the recruit knew the answer, the problem of determining whether he was suited to perform the intended task remained. OSS missions - particularly those of the operational branches - placed

special (and in some cases unique) demands on the personnel assigned. "By late 1943, the organization, then hardly a year old, was busily and somewhat haphazardly recruiting men without benefit of any professional or uniform screening process."³

In October, 1943 it was proposed that OSS create a unit of psychologists and psychiatrists to evaluate the mental and emotional fitness of incoming personnel. This suggestion was enthusiastically received by both the Training and Planning Staffs since both had already experienced the headaches associated with preparing men for overseas duty who simply could not 'cut the mustard'.

"The locus of the undertaking was a Fairfax County country estate forty minutes outside Washington, a farm with rolling meadowland and self-respecting shade trees, massive barn and satellite sheds... which provided ample space for setting-up all sorts of stressful situations, indoors and outdoors."⁴ The official name for the installation was Station "S", but most people simply referred to it as 'S' school. There were only a few 'faculty' in the beginning, but from the outset one of them was a Marine: First Lieutenant John W. Gardner, USMCR.

Gardner was 31 years old in 1943. Born and raised in California, he attended Stanford University where he excelled not only in the classroom but also garnered 'All-American' honors as a varsity swimmer. Graduating with 'great distinction' in 1935, he went on to earn his Masters Degree the following year and a Ph.D. from the University of California in 1938.

From 1939 to 1942, Gardner taught psychology, first at Connecticut College and later at Mount Holyoke. Shortly after the war

began, he joined the staff of the Federal Communications Commission as a propaganda analyst. It was from the FCC that John Gardner was recruited by OSS.⁵

Gardner applied for a Marine Corps commission in August 1943 and was appointed a First Lieutenant on 15 September. Like many such 'direct' commissionees, he did not get around to attending Marine Officer training until early 1944.

The task confronting the Assessment Staff was that of developing a system of procedures which would reveal the personality of an OSS recruit. This, it was hoped, would shed significant light on a man's adaptability and serve as a reliable prediction of how he might fare on some special mission behind enemy lines. The chief overall purpose was to eliminate the unfit. This proved no small undertaking since by its very nature OSS performed an astonishing variety of functions in a host of remote climes... all without the coveted 'job description' which traditional evaluators found so indispensable.

This paper is not the forum to discuss in detail how the assessment staff functioned. That is covered in splendid detail by their Assessment of Men published shortly after the war. But any Marine Officer who harkens back to his OCS days will recall evaluations corresponding to 'the construction situation', 'the bridge building situation', 'the stress situation', or the 'high wall situation'. All of these had both their philosophic and practical genesis at Station 'S'.

OSS mounted a major effort in the Balkans during 1943 and in Italy and France in 1943-44. Even as the D-Day operations commenced, plans were already being made against the day when the focus of clandestine warfare activity would shift to Asia. In June, 1944 Gardner was

transferred from Fairfax to the pleasant Southern California environs of Capistrano Beach Club, near San Clemente. Here he and other staff members established Station 'WS', a facility similar to 'S' which was designed to serve the needs not only of West Coast OSS recruits but also to reassess European veterans on their way to the Orient. Eventually, assessment centers would also be located overseas at Kandy, Ceylon (Camp 'K') and Kunming, China.⁶

If the R&A branch produced the world's first really scholarly approach to analyzing strategic intelligence, so the Assessment Staff can legitimately lay claim to pioneering applied psychology as it related to occupational selection. Of itself this was no mean achievement.

No systematic effort had previously been undertaken in the United States which aimed at determining an individual's total personality. "The psychologists and psychiatrists who handled the program for OSS later used the techniques developed under the stress of war to establish centers for the Veterans Administration and several leading universities."⁷

John Gardner left the Marine Corps as a Captain. He would later become president of the Carnegie Corporation; serve as a consultant to both the U. S. Air Force and the United Nations; and author several books. From 1965-68 he was Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and today heads the consumer advocate group 'Common Cause'.

Like assessment, the problem of training OSS recruits was a complex one. "There was no precedent in America for such an operation and it was necessary at first to piece together various fragments of seemingly relevant knowledge from other agencies of the Government,

to borrow instructional techniques from the British, and to adapt certain technical aspects of orthodox military training to the conditions approximating those under which guerilla units and resistance organizers might operate."⁸ Since the paramilitary part of these requirements could best be handled by active personnel of the armed forces, Donovan began seeking instructors almost as soon as the war began. One of his first recruits was Lieutenant Colonel Philip G. Strong, USMCR.

Philip Grandin Strong was a banker by profession and a Marine by avocation. Born in Englewood, New Jersey in 1901, Strong grew up in the comfortable circumstances associated with life among New York society. His father, Benjamin Strong, was Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and young Philip was educated at the Hill School. After missing World War I, Strong entered Princeton in 1919 but left after two years to take up banking himself. In early 1926, he joined the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve as a Second Lieutenant.

A crack shot, Strong was active in the Reserve marksmanship program during the late 1920's and early 30's. In both 1935 and '36, he captained the USMCR Rifle Team at the National Matches.

During this period it was unusual for a Reserve officer to attend formal Marine schools since orders to such courses were at the individual's personal expense. But Captain Philip Strong was an exception. In 1936, he graduated from the Junior School 'with distinction', ranking 7th in a class made up almost entirely of regulars.

In August 1940, Strong was promoted to Major and ordered to active duty as Assistant to the Director of the Marine Corps Reserve. By December he had a new job: Marine Corps Representative to the Strategic Information Section of the Navy's Foreign Intelligence Branch.⁹

It was in this job that Major Strong caught the eye of William J. Donovan.

On 16 January 1942, Donovan wrote to Secretary Knox requesting Strong's transfer to COI.¹⁰ This query was passed to Major General Holcomb who opposed it. So did Admiral King who in a reply directly to Donovan cited the recent transfer of Colonel Eddy as an example of 'poaching' by the Coordinator's office.¹¹ As usual, 'Wild Bill' was not intimidated. After a second personal memorandum to Knox, the issue was settled. Strong was ordered to report to Donovan's headquarters on 18 February.¹² He was there for less than a week.

On 23 February, Strong and several others reported to the British SOE sabotage school in Canada. He returned to Washington in late March and was appointed Chief Instructor and Executive Officer of OSS Training Branch. By May, Strong was off again, this time to observe commando and paramilitary training in Britain and Scotland.¹³

It was during this period that OSS set-up its initial training program. Strong and his Commanding Officer, Colonel Preston Goodfellow, an Army Reserve Officer, were the chief architects. The concept was simple. Basic training normally required about 3 weeks to complete. It was largely military in nature stressing such subjects as map and compass reading, small arms firing, demolitions, and camouflage techniques. Following this introduction, recruits received more specialized instruction and field work designed to prepare them for branch assignments.

The JCS was always concerned with Donovan's ability to train the personnel which he frequently recruited straight from civilian life.

In July, 1942 Walter Bedell Smith, then-Secretary to the Joint Chiefs, requested a report from COI which detailed not only the administrative functioning of the organization but also its operational programs and training methods.¹⁴

Donovan's staff prepared a 30 page reply which provides the best early synopsis of the general functions, organizational outline, and projected employment of COI/OSS. This document was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs on 17 August 1942.¹⁵ In it, training was extensively discussed. Goodfellow and Strong recommended that the program be structured to include:

- a. Preliminary School (2 weeks)
- b. Basic School (2-3 weeks)
- c. Advanced Training School (2 weeks)
- d. Parachute Course (1 week)
- e. Maritime Training School (1 week)
- f. Industrial Sabotage Course (3-4 weeks)
- g. Localized Social School (3 weeks)

To accomplish the training objectives, qualified military and civilian instructors were being assembled. The bulk of these were to be drawn from the armed forces and thus JCS support was deemed essential.

Obviously any ambitious training program such as that outlined by Goodfellow and Strong required considerable chunks of terrain. By July 1942, COI had secured four major operating areas. All were within easy reach of Washington.

Areas "A" and "C" were located adjacent to the Marine Corps base at Quantico on land formerly utilized by the Civilian Conservation

Corps. Comprising nearly 9000 acres these were used for basic military and communications training. Today most of Areas "A" and "C" form the Prince William Forest Park.

Area "B" was of similar size. It spread over the vicinity of Catoclin Mountain in Maryland, currently the site of Camp David, the presidential retreat. Area "B" was for advanced training.

RTU-11 (the 'Farm') was located in Maryland, about 20 miles from downtown Washington. This was the location for intelligence training.

Later in the war, OSS would acquire and open several more training areas including Area "E" across the Potomac from Quantico and Area "F" at the Congressional Country Club in suburban Maryland. In 1944, a West Coast facility was briefly established at Camp Pendleton. Later, this was shifted to Catalina Island opposite San Pedro.

Strong was not involved in OSS training programs when these developments occurred. During August 1942, considerable friction developed between the military members of COI training and the headquarters staff which was still largely civilian. Disgusted with what he viewed as 'meddling' and anxious not to spend his war in Washington, Strong requested a transfer to combat duty. After a short tour at the Headquarters of I Amphibious Corps, he fought the remainder of the war with a Navy Battleship Division in the Pacific as Fleet Marine Officer.

Lieutenant Colonel Strong participated in 19 major operations and was awarded the Legion of Merit for his work as advisor and intelligence officer with Battleship Squadrons Six and Two.¹⁶ He was promoted to Colonel in 1948 and retired from the Marine Corps Reserve as a Brigadier General in 1957.

Throughout the war, OSS never fully implemented a comprehensive training policy. Some personnel were sent overseas without any particular indoctrination because it was assumed that their roles would be primarily administrative. "In some instances where the exigencies of the situation in the field made it necessary for them to be transferred to more active duties, the lack of training constituted a handicap."¹⁷ On balance, given the chaos which surrounded OSS throughout its organizational life, the initial plans laid-out by Strong and Goodfellow worked remarkably well. When the Allies launched their major European offensives in Italy and France, graduates of OSS schooling proved equal to the operational challenge.

CHAPTER IX

"WHO KNEW NOT FEAR...."

In Southeastern France lies a rugged region called the Haute Savoie. Today the area is largely known for the imposing Cathedral of Notre Dame at Grenoble and the chic ski resort of Val d'Isere. But during the long dark night of German occupation, Frenchmen came to the Haute Savoie not to pray or ski, but to fight. There, on a high plateau surrounded by mountains, a melancholy drama was played out during 1943-44.

Vercors plateau is thirty miles long and about twelve miles wide. A forboding natural fortress, 3,000 feet above sea level, it is covered by one of the largest forests in all France. On its windswept top live 5,000 small farmers and a few of Western Europe's last surviving wild bear.

Vercors was of special interest to General de Gaulle as well as the clandestine warfare planners of SOE and OSS, for in addition to the bears, 3,000 Free French maquisards were lying low there. "A vast plan was being worked out to turn Vercors into a redoubt against which enemy attacks would beat in vain and which, by its example, would summon the entire Alpine resistance to the colours. From it raiding parties would descend into the plain and it would perhaps even form a corner of liberated France, the 'Vercors Republic'."¹

Contacting and arming this group would be difficult but it was deemed a vital task. Special men were required and SOE decided to form an inter-allied team: British, French, and American. The mission was to be called UNION. The job of organizing it fell to SOE's 'Section RF' headed by Sir Colin Gubbins, the real "M"* of British secret operations.

RF was located in London's Dorset Street quite near the offices of Free France at Dorset and Wigmore. It was there that the three men chosen for UNION assembled. The British member was H. H. A. Thackwaite, a pre-war schoolmaster who had become a clandestine warrior by way of St. Paul's and Corpus Christi, Oxford. As radio operator, the French supplied 'Monnier' one of the best in the business. The American was Marine Captain Peter J. Ortiz, last seen in North Africa. It was to be a 'first team' effort in point of quality as well as chronology.

UNION had a singular task: determine the military capabilities of maquis units reported active in Savoie, Isere, and Drome. Its ordre de mission emphasized that the leaders of such units should be impressed with the fact that "organization for guerilla warfare activity, especially after D-Day, is now their more important duty".²

On the moonless night of 6 January 1944, five months before OVERLORD, a Briton, a Frenchman, and a U. S. Marine jumped from a RAF bomber in their own personal invasion of 'Fortress Europe'.

* James Bond aficionados will recognize the fictional "M" as 007's boss.

The members of UNION followed the standard SOE practice of parachuting in civilian clothes. This time however, each carried his military uniform. Once they linked-up with the maquis reception committee at the drop zone, Thackwaite made it clear that they were military men on a military mission. The small band thus became "the first allied officers to appear in uniform in France since 1940". In this regard, Thackwaite was later to write: "Ortiz, who knew not fear, did not hesitate to wear his U. S. Marine Captain's uniform in town and country alike; this cheered the French but alerted the Germans, and the mission was constantly on the move."³

UNION found several very large groups of maquisards itching to fight, however, only about 500 had weapons and it would take considerable time to arrange for clandestine arms drops and training. Thackwaite, Ortiz, and Monnier took the time, maintaining a running contact with London by radio.

It might reasonably be supposed that the team remained hidden in the high country but this was simply not the case. Ortiz in particular was fond of going straight into the German-occupied towns. On one occasion, he strolled into a cafe dressed in a long cape. Several Germans were drinking and cursing the maquis. One mentioned the fate which would befall the 'filthy American swine' when he was caught. This proved a great mistake. Captain Ortiz threw back the cape revealing his Marine uniform. In each hand he held a .45 automatic. When the shooting stopped, there were fewer Nazi's to plan his capture and Ortiz was gone into the night.⁴

When he was not emptying bars and training partisans, Captain Ortiz displayed yet another remarkable talent - stealing Gestapo vehicles

from local motor pools. The citation from King George VI which made him a member of the Most Honourable Order of the British Empire reads in part:

"For four months this officer assisted in the organization of the Maquis in a most difficult department, where members were in constant danger of attack...he ran great risks in looking after four RAF officers who had been brought down in the neighborhood, and accompanied them to the Spanish border.

In the course of his efforts to obtain the release of these officers, he raided a German military garage and took ten Gestapo motors which he used frequently.... he procured a Gestapo pass for his own use in spite of the fact that he was well known to the enemy...."⁵

UNION found an extremely confused situation in its operational area. "Lack of transportation and money were serious problems and security at the regional and departmental levels was poor. UNION used its influence to coordinate several resistance organizations with divergent political views and loyalties. The maquis threat to German occupation forces grew proportionately."⁶ Clashes became more frequent as the resistance forces appeared in areas formerly thought 'safe' by the Nazis.

Despite the winter weather, 3 Panzer Grenadier battalions attacked Vercors in February, 1944. Ill-equipped though they were, the French fought back with such skill and determination that the Germans eventually were forced to employ two full divisions in sealing off the plateau.

While the maquis were brave, they continued to lack not only heavy weapons but also blankets, field equipment, mess gear, uniforms, ammunition, and radios. They could fight hit-and-run actions but their increasingly defensive posture did not bode well for long term survival.

In late May, UNION was withdrawn by Lysander utility aircraft. Within two weeks however, two new missions - JUSTINE and EUCALYPTUS - were dropped into the same area.

By July a general mobilization of all Vercors was in progress and so were German countermeasures. As the French well knew these would be heavy. La Chapelle en Vercors was heavily bombed on 12 and 13 July. The following day - to celebrate France's greatest national holiday, Bastille Day - American B-17's parachuted nearly 1,500 canisters of arms and ammunition into the fields near Vassieux.

"The inhabitants ran out in the streets shouting and waving to the fliers as the Fortresses circled over the roofs. Thirty minutes later the Germans began bombing and strafing the town. This continued from morning to evening and prevented the men from collecting the containers. Only at night was it possible to gather 200 of them. The Germans also started the destruction of La Chapelle en Vercors. The town was ablaze and fighters machine-gunned people endeavoring to save their belongings from their homes."⁷

On 19 July, the Germans launched a glider-borne assault directly into Vassieux. Two companies of Waffen SS siezed the town and held it against four violent maquis counterattacks. During the bitter fighting, the SS lost nearly 60% of their strength but the French, lacking artillery, could not dig the survivors out of the town which was almost completely destroyed. Those civilians who had not fled were rounded-up by German relief forces and executed on the spot.

Thus, while the Allies were breaking out of the Normandy beachhead, in the Haute Savoie action was going largely in favor of the occupation forces. It was into this deteriorating situation that Ortiz' second UNION mission parachuted.


UNION II was one of a new type OSS mission: the Operational Group. OG's were heavily armed contingents whose mission was 'direct action' against the Germans. The most militarized of OSS units, their jobs involved not only sabotage but also seizing key installations to prevent the retreating Germans from destroying them. Members always operated in uniform.

UNION II took off from Knettershall Airfield in England aboard B-17's of the USAAF's 388th Heavy Bomb Group. With Ortiz, who was carrying one million francs for the resistance, were Air Corps Captain John Coolidge, Gunnery Sergeant Robert La Salle, and Sergeants Charles Perry, John Bodnar, Fred Brunner, and Jack Risler, all U. S. Marines. Another member of the mission was a Free French officer, Joseph Arcelin (codename 'Jo-Jo') who carried false papers identifying him as Sergeant George Andrews, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.⁸

The mission began badly. It was a daylight drop into a good zone near the town of Beaufort, but despite ideal conditions tragedy struck the team at once. Sergeant Perry's steel parachute cable snapped six inches from the drogue. UNION II jumped with British-style chutes - backpacks with no reserve. Perry was dead on the drop zone.⁹

In addition to the men of UNION II, the 388th dropped 864 containers to the French 'Bulle Battalion' which was operating in the Col d'Arele. While the supplies were being gathered, Ortiz and Captain Bulle began working out plans to attack German security forces in hopes of taking some pressure from the Vercors.

During the next week, UNION II was busy instructing the members of the Bulle Battalion on the functioning and maintenance of the weapons which had been parachuted to them. Then they began a series of patrols



designed to link-up with other resistance groups believed to be operating around Beaufort.

"On 14 August we proceeded to Beaufort where we made contact with other F. F. I.* companies and from there went on to Montgirod where we were told there were heavy concentrations of Germans. We were able to enter the town but had no sooner done so than we were heavily shelled by German batteries located in the hills around the city. We were forced to retire and hid out in the mountains near Montgirod with the Bulle Battalion. The Germans quickly surrounded the area."¹⁰

As soon as the mission left Montgirod, strong German security forces entered the town. They found two wounded maquisards in the parish church, shot them, and burned the building to the ground. Then they took hostages.

Meanwhile, UNION II came under heavy fire and was forced to retreat deeper into the hills. The Germans cleverly maneuvered Ortiz and his men into an unfamiliar area of steep ravines and blind canyons. By mid-day UNION was surrounded.

Ortiz had been in tight spots before and, after conferring with Cooledge, Bulle, and F.F.I. Captain Escande, he decided to make an attempt at sneaking through the German cordon. As the sun sank below the surrounding mountain peaks, the trapped party crawled past the enemy and got cleanly away.

Crossing the Isere River at Centron, the party moved along the wooded southeast slope of the Isere Valley and by the next morning was well hidden in rocky ground about a thousand meters from the

*Forces Francaises de l'Interieur

small village of Longefoy. Leaving Coolidge in charge, Major Ortiz set out on another one man reconnaissance mission.

Carefully working his way into the village, Ortiz noted there were no Germans about. Feeling a bit more at ease, he next learned that Operation ANVIL - the invasion of Southern France - had begun and that German forces had passed through earlier heading northeast toward Aime.

"I contacted the Mayor and requested food; he was understandably nervous at first, but as his confidence returned he and others became very hospitable. Food and drink were brought to us at our hideout. I found an excellent O. P. and spent much of the afternoon observing enemy movement in the valley. At nightfall, UNION entered Longefoy and was comfortably lodged by the inhabitants "11

It was to be the last good night's sleep for Ortiz and several others for months to come.

The team was now far from its operational headquarters and everyone was anxious to return there as quickly as possible in order to coordinate operations in support of ANVIL. Ortiz explained it would be risky to move during daylight but all agreed that time was vital.

On 16 August 1944, UNION II moved slowly back across the Valley, crossed the same bridge at Centron and proceeded into the town. Coming out the other side, disaster struck.

As the group ascended a ramp leading to the main highway, a German convoy roared round the corner. Spotting the Americans, who were armed and uniformed, the German trucks screeched to a halt and soldiers tumbled out firing. Brunner later recalled:

"Major Ortiz, Sergeant Bodnar and Sergeant Risler withdrew into the southwest section of the town; Major Coolidge, 'Jo-Jo' and I took the southeast. We retaliated as best we could, working our way under fire toward the east. I called out to 'Jo-Jo' to follow us but he remained in the town.

At this time Captain Coolidge received a bullet in the right leg but he kept going. By then we had reached the bank of the Isere, I dived in and swam across under fire. I had some difficulty as the current was very swift. It was then that I became separated from Coolidge and did not see him again until we met at the Col d'Arecle on 18 August."¹²

Ortiz, Risler and Bodnar were receiving the bulk of the German attention. As they retreated from house to house, French civilians implored them to give up in order to avoid reprisals. Ortiz ordered the two Sergeants to get out while they could but neither would go without him. As the enemy fire increased, Ortiz remembered the hostages from Montgiron and the massacre at Vassieux.

"Since the activities of Mission Union and its previous work were well known to the Gestapo, there was no reason to hope that we would be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. For me personally the decision to surrender was not too difficult. I had been involved in dangerous activities for many years and was mentally prepared for my number to turn up. Sergeant Bodnar was next to me and I explained the situation to him and what I intended to do. He looked me in the eye and replied, "Major, we are Marines, what you think is right goes for me too".¹³

Ortiz began shouting to the enemy - he tried English, French, and German - but the fire did not slacken. Finally a brief lull developed and he yelled again, saying he was coming out. As he stepped into the street, an old Frenchwoman, ran to him and tried to cover his body with her own. Disengaging himself from this human shield, he walked calmly toward the German lines, machine gun bullets kicking up dust around him. Finally the firing ceased.

The German commander was suspicious but agreed to Ortiz' proposal that his men would surrender if the townspeople were not harmed. When only two more Marines emerged however, the enemy Major became agitated

and demanded to know where 'the rest of the Company' was. It took a half-hour's search before the Germans were satisfied that three men had been holding off an entire battalion.

Bodnar and Risler were quickly disarmed but before they could say much, Ortiz called them to attention and directed that they give no information other than that required by the Geneva Convention. This greatly impressed the Germans who began treating them all with marked respect. A few hours later, Arcelin was caught in a nearby field.

The four prisoners were taken to the main enemy headquarters at Bourg St. Maurice. Ortiz told his men to claim they were paratroopers from the ANVIL operation and that Arcelin should hold to the story that he was a U. S. Marine of French ancestry. This ruse worked well, despite the fact that 'Jo-Jo' could not speak a word of English.

Later in the afternoon, while being transferred to Moutiers, Ortiz worked his cigarette lighter from his pocket and tried to set the back seat of the staff car on fire, hoping to escape in the resulting confusion. The attempt succeeded only in infuriating the Germans and ruining some velour. But it was a portent of thing to come.

At the Kommandantur, Ortiz was searched and relieved of his identification card, some papers, and 35,000 francs. He managed to conceal another 65,000 francs however and demanded loudly to be treated with the same respect due a German field grade officer. Soon he met Major Kolb, his new guardian, who was tasked with delivering the 'prize catch' to Albertville. Progress on the road was slow. The enemy now so feared the maquis that a Company of motor cycle troops was employed to escort Ortiz' car. Ortiz was pleased to note that the little column stopped at every possible ambush site and sent out patrols.

Kolb, a veteran soldier who had won the Iron Cross in both World Wars, treated Ortiz like an indulgent father.

"He quickly proved that he knew a great deal about me. In great detail and accurately he described our air operation, the burial ceremony for Sergeant Perry, various engagements and the manner and position of our movements since leaving Montgirod. These, he said, had been reported by a shepherd who was one of his field agents."¹⁴

The maquis of the Savoie had learned the lesson of Vercors well. The task of the guerilla is to delay, to disorganize, and to panic, not to defend in place. As Ortiz and the rest of UNION were moved progressively eastward, they had the satisfaction of watching their captors struggle with a succession of ambushes. It took the 157th Division three full days to move 40 miles through an area which they allegedly controlled.

On one occasion, Ortiz found himself in a small village which the retreating troops were systematically looting. Townspeople, seeing him surrounded by German officers and wearing an unfamiliar uniform, ignored his captors and begged him to discipline the unruly soldiers.

On 21 August, Ortiz was in Chambéry. Sensing that the situation was becoming increasingly critical, he asked for an opportunity to see the local Commanding General. Surprisingly the request was granted and the Marine Major marched in, saluted, and proposed that the 157th surrender to UNION! Unfortunately, General Flaum was not about to do any such thing. At least it had been worth a try.

By early September, Ortiz, Bodnar, Risler, and Arcelin were in the northern Italian city of Bussolono. Here they received their first really professional search.

"They examined every body hair, every orifice, and found the 65,000 Francs I had concealed as well as my map and compass. On or about 3 September, Germans escorted us to the Kommandantur and locked us in an office for a few minutes while the guards were being detailed to take us to Torino. I rapidly searched the office and pocketed several useful maps."¹⁵

At Turin (Torino), the members of UNION were thrown into a stinking civilian prison which already housed 25 U. S. Army officers and men from a chemical battalion. After a week in this pesthole, the entire group was moved to a German POW transit camp near Manatova. On the way, Ortiz tried to persuade the Army officers to join him in rushing the guards and commandeering the bus. They turned him down flat saying that the war was almost over and it was not worth the risk.

From Manatova, the journey continued by rail. The POW's now numbered several hundred - British, French and Americans - most of whom had been captured in Italy. Crammed into boxcars of the famous French 40 hommes/8 chevaux variety the prisoners began a 3 day trip to southern Germany via the Brenner Pass. On the way, Ortiz attempted to escape by twisting open a barbed wire barrier rigged along the boxcar's sliding door. He had almost completed his task when the train unexpectedly stopped and an alert guard found his handywork. For that, the Major received a beating and promises of future 'special treatment'.

Finally, on 29 September, Ortiz and the other members of UNION reached their final stop: the Naval POW camp Marlag/Milag Nord located in the small German village of Westertimke outside Bremen. Happily, this was one of the best Stalags in all of Germany. Except for periodic searches and thrice daily roll calls, the Germans were content to merely guard their 'guests'.

Marlag 0, the officers camp, contained about 400 men. Counting Ortiz, only three were Americans. The senior Allied officer was a Royal Navy Captain who made it plain to the new arrival that escapes 'were out'. Ortiz promptly proclaimed himself 'senior American POW' and announced he would set his own rules. On 18 December 1944, he made his first try accompanied by Navy Lieutenant (jg) Hiram Harris.

Ortiz spent more than a hour cutting away at a series of wire fences and managed to reach an open field beyond the camp. Harris however was caught by a roving patrol and the alarm sounded. Searchlights picked-up Ortiz and both men were kicked around a bit before being thrown into solitary confinement. Since getting caught was nothing new for Ortiz, he merely bided his time waiting for the right moment to try again.

By February 1945, the small American contingent at Westertimke had grown. One new arrival was just the sort of man to work with Ortiz: Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, USMCR.*

Walt Taylor had participated in OSS operations in Corsica. In August 1944, he joined the Strategic Services Section attached to the U. S. 7th Army for ANVIL. On D+4 (19 August 1944) Taylor reported to the headquarters of the 36th 'Texas' Division along with Captain Justine L. Greene USA - a noted New York psychiatrist - and Corporal James S. Sweeney USMC.

The 36th was the right flank division in General Alexander Patch's drive northward. Greene, Taylor, and Sweeney were directed to determine the extent of German defenses near Grasse, an area which had been bypassed.

* For Taylor's earlier adventures see Chapter XII

Leaving the American lines, the little reconnaissance party drove to Mons, an ideal observation post perched on a hill about twenty miles from Grasse. There they were welcomed by the local maquis who offered to provide an agent for infiltration of the German-held city.¹⁶

The next day, Taylor and a Frenchman drove out of Mons in a 'liberated' Citroen. The plan was simple. Taylor would take the agent as far as the last maquis outpost, drop him there and await his return.

"The agent had been leading the resistance fighting ever since our landing and was absolutely exhausted, falling asleep time and time again while I briefed him... I headed for the town of Saint Cezaire, which was declared to be in the hands of the Resistance... However, during the night what evidently was a Company of Germans had taken up positions in Saint Cezaire. On approaching the dead still town by a steep and winding road, we ran into a roadblock of land mines; we both thought it was the Resistance and the agent took my carbine and jumped out of the car to walk toward the lines of mines. He lasted just about 10 feet beyond the car and died with a bullet through the head."¹⁷

Taylor still thought it might be a trigger-happy maquis ambush but then he spotted what appeared to be a German forage cap. Backing up as fast as he could, the Lieutenant slammed into the roadside coping. Rifle fire began perforating the Citroen.

Just as Taylor reached for the right door handle, a German leaped from a nearby ditch and flipped a 'potato masher' grenade under the car. It exploded with a roar, blasting Taylor out into the road unconscious. When he came too, he was looking up at the stoney faces of his ambushers. Grenade fragments had chopped-up his left leg and mangled his left hand.

After being strafed by American planes during the trip, Taylor and his escort arrived in Grasse. On the way, the Lieutenant managed to shred an incriminating document and stuff it behind the car seat. At Grasse, Taylor was "subjected to intensive interrogation which ended when he vomited on the uniform of his inquisitor".¹⁸

During the same period that Ortiz and the members of UNION were being shunted about, Taylor experienced a similar odyssey. He passed through six different hospitals before finally reaching the medical prison at Freising near Munich. A month later Taylor was shifted to Moosberg. In January, 1945 his wounds were considered sufficiently healed to allow confinement at Marlag Nord.

Despite the pleas of some of their fellow POW's, both Taylor and Ortiz were perversely impenitent. They immediately began planning another escape attempt.

With allied forces drawing closer each day, the pair began collecting civilian clothes, maps, food, and other items which they could obtain through the well organized blackmarket system operating in and around the camp. But suddenly, on 10 April, the Commandant ordered all prisoners to prepare to move within three hours. Their destination was the port city of Lubeck - a journey of at least 8 days on foot.

The column left with such haste that many POW's were simply left behind. Ortiz however was singled out for special observation and his plan to hide in Westertimke was immediately foiled. About three hours after leaving Marlag Nord, opportunity beckoned in the form of marauding RAF Spitfires.

As the planes roared in low to shoot-up the motley mass streaming north, Ortiz, Taylor, Air Corps Lieutenant Donald McNaughton, and Royal Marines Warrant Officer Stancombe made for a nearby wood. Panic reigned. The four escapees worked themselves deeper into the trees and waited. As the aircraft disappeared, the column moved on, leaving them behind unnoticed.

Ortiz expected Allied troops to pass through the region within a day or two but the progress of fighting was much slower than that.

"We spent ten days hiding, roving at night, blundering into enemy positions, hoping to find our way into British lines. Luck was with us, once we were discovered but managed to get away, and several other times we narrowly escaped detection. Fortunately, most Germans seemed to have a bad cough.

By the seventh night we had returned near our camp. I made a reconnaissance of Marlag O... There seemed to be only a token guard and prisoners of war appeared to have assumed virtual control of the compounds."¹⁹

The little band was now in bad physical shape. A combination of little food and drinking swamp water had made McNaughton and Stancombe ill. Taylor was covered with boils and Ortiz was very weak. On the tenth day, disgusted at the slow advance of the British Army, the four men decided it might be better to live in their old huts than starve to death outside. With Ortiz in the lead, they merely walked back into the camp. No commotion was raised by the guards and the remaining POW's gave them a rousing welcome. Among the reception committee were Arcelin, Bodnar, and Risler, all of whom had hidden when the evacuation commenced.

At last on 27 April, the battle reached Westertimke. German troops were still stoutly resisting the advance of the British 7th

Guards' Armored Division and much of the small village was destroyed. Knowing that the Allied forces would not fire on the POW camp, an SS unit parked several self-propelled guns there. The prisoners dug in. Soon the fighting was all around the compound and Arcelin was wounded by flying shrapnel.

On 29 April, Marlag Nord was liberated. Most POW's were only too happy to board trucks for the rear... but not Ortiz.


Along with Bodnar, Risler, and Taylor, he presented himself to Lieutenant Webb, a Navy radar officer who was attached to a Royal Marine commando battalion operating with the Armored Division. Ortiz later explained, "we Marines wanted to join this unit in order to bag a few more Germans before hunting season closed."²⁰ The offer was rejected by the POW repatriation officer and all went to staging areas behind the front.

Ortiz was evacuated to Brussels where he immediately reported to the OSS officer-in-charge and requested assignment to further combat duty. When the war ended, he was in California being briefed for a mission to Indo-China.

Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, Commander of the Twelfth Fleet, recommended Major Ortiz for a second Navy Cross. The citation reads, in part:

"On 16 August 1944, during the conduct of a special mission designed to immobilize enemy reinforcements, Major Ortiz and his team were attacked and surrounded. Disregarding the possibility of escape, which course of action would have certainly caused severe reprisals to be taken upon the villagers, Major Ortiz surrendered and the townspeople were thereby spared.

The story of the self-sacrifice of Major Ortiz and his Marines has become a brilliant legend in that section of France where acts of bravery were considered commonplace. Subsequently imprisoned and subjected to numerous interrogations, he divulged nothing..."²¹



In 1946, when Ortiz returned to civilian life and the film industry, he was the most decorated Marine Officer to serve with OSS.

In addition to the Navy Cross with gold star, he had also received the Legion of Merit and Purple Heart from the United States. Britain had made him a member of the Military Division, Order of the British Empire. But it was France which recognized the 'hero of the Haute Savoie' most prolifically. Ortiz was made a Member of the Legion of Honor and awarded the Croix de Guerre (two palms, gold star, silver star, and five citations), the Croix de Combattants, the Ouissam Alouite, and the Medaille Coloniale.

CHAPTER X

"FIRST JED TO KILL A BOCHE..."

In August 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and their advisors met at the Quebec Conference. The Allied invasion of Sicily had begun the previous month and during the conference, plans for a subsequent attack on Italy proper were discussed and approved.

Up until that time Marshall and the American Joint Chiefs had been willing to consider such other limited operations as the seizure of Corsica and Sardinia; increased aid to the Balkan partisans, bombing central Europe from Africa; and even limited landings in the south of France. "But by the time 'Quebec' actually arrived, Marshall had reordered his priorities, and he was firm in insisting that the cross-channel attack, now known as Operation OVERLORD, take precedence.... Marshall wanted to make sure that any involvement in the Mediterranean Theater would not lead to a postponement of OVERLORD, plans for which had already identified 1 May 1944 as a likely target date.¹

With France established as the priority target, OSS moved to secure an equal voice in continental intelligence operations which were then an exclusively British preserve. In May 1943, David Bruce, Donovan's man in London, had begun a series of negotiations with Sir Stewart Menzies (known as "C") aimed at securing just such a status. Menzies, head of MI-6, eventually accepted the American proposals and soon afterward, Operation SUSSEX was begun as a joint Anglo-American effort.

SUSSEX, a plan to infiltrate 50 two-man teams into France was plagued with problems from the outset. Not only were the British resentful of OSS's new role, but U. S. Army G-2 did its level best to ensure that recruitment of SUSSEX personnel would be hamstrung. Donovan himself eventually became directly involved in the intra-American squabble.

"At a confrontation in the office of General Jake Devers, the American Theater commander in London, the Army intelligence man left no doubt that he trusted neither Donovan or his ideas. Donovan replied in a low voice without any inflection or emotion: "Unless the general apologizes at once, I shall tear him to pieces physically and throw his remains through these windows into Grosvenor Square".² The apologies were both immediate and prolix.

SUSSEX was an intelligence collection operation conducted jointly by OSS SI branch and British SIS. The paramilitary and sabotage aspects of clandestine warfare were assigned to OSS SO Branch and British SOE. The counterpart of SUSSEX in this respect was Operation JEDBURGH. To coordinate this rising tempo of planning, a joint Anglo-American enterprise designated Special Force Headquarters was established. SFHQ would organize all underground resistance in France to support the coming invasion. Fifty JEDBURGH teams were initially envisioned. Each to be composed of one American, one French, and one British officer. These would be dropped, in uniform, to rally and advise the maquis. In Belgium and Holland, respective officers of those nations would take the place of the French officer in each team.

Milton Hall, an Elizabethan manor house about 100 miles north of London, was chosen as the JEDBURGH training and assessment center.

"It was one of those enormous private houses which dot the English countryside and put American millionaires to shame. Almost without effort, Milton Hall swallowed the 240 men of the Jedburgh Operation, together with what the British called the 'permanent party', the instructors, batmen, cooks, and drivers, who had been collected together to run the operation and to serve it."³ There amid Cromwellian armor and oak-beamed hallways, the JEDBURGHs learned the fine points of the sabotage trade.

"Paratrooper boots thudded from a training harness into neat lawns and men practiced silent killing in the sunken gardens. From the croquet pitch came the crackle of small arms.... and the acrid smell of burnt powder blended with the traditional odor of boxwood and roses."⁴

Jedburgh field training was conducted at several other locations and it was from one of these, the royal burgh on Scotland's Jed River, that the operational name was derived. "Each man was to be handpicked both for his high intelligence, his skills as a partisan, his personal courage, his ability to command respect, and his fairness - for a 'Jed', as they were known for short, was expected to be captain, judge, confessor, and quartermaster - to say nothing of demolitions expert, gunsmith, linguist, marksman, poacher, and doctor."⁵

SUSSEX and JEDBURGH were part of a vast Allied plan to deceive Hitler as to the location and timing of the main assault against France. Codenamed BODYGUARD, this operation extended to virtually every theater of the war and was the greatest deception ever attempted.

JEDBURGH's major goal was to tie down potential enemy reinforcements by employing guerilla warfare and sabotage. Since Brittany

contained sizeable numbers of German troops which could strike at the flank of the actual OVERLORD landing area, it was given special attention by the Special Forces Headquarters.

Troop concentrations in the south of France were also considered. OVERLORD's smaller brother - OPERATION ANVIL - was an integral part of the strategic offensive. But shipping, air support, and other logistical considerations precluded launching ANVIL until at least 8 weeks after the Normandy attack. Consequently it was determined that resistance forces of the FFI would bear the burden of creating havoc there until the Mediterranean landings took place, and thereafter supporting the drive northward.

To coordinate Special Force operations in the south, a Special Operations Center (SPOC) was established in Algiers and both JEDBURGH and OG teams were staged there. One of these was Jedburgh Team BUGGATI commanded by Major Horace W. Fuller, USMCR, codename: KANSUL. With him were French Army Captain Guy de la Roche, British Major Hiram Crosby and French Lieutenant Marcel Guillemont. BUGATTI's target was Tarbes, the 'adopted ancestral home' of the de la Roche family.⁶

Provincial capital of the Haute Pyrennes, Tarbes was a market town. Farmers brought their corn and tobacco there. But despite its relatively small population (about 25,000 in 1944) it also boasted some industry. Of particular importance to the Germans - and thus to OSS - was Hispano-Suiza plant which produced aircraft engines and the Arsenal National, fabricator of 150mm and 250mm guns. There was also a railway yard with facilities for repair and refurbishing of rolling stock. Nearby was the oil refinery at Peyrouzet. Several regiments of Germans garrisoned the area.

SOE had been active in the Tarbes area since January, 1943 when Maurice Southgate (codename HECTOR) had been parachuted into the area along with a courier, Jacqueline Nearne. HECTOR's mission had been to determine the status of resistance forces in the Pyrennes foothills and along the Spanish border. These proved to be sound; "they numbered nearly a hundred and all had passed the same stiff initial test: escape from a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany. Some serious immediate sabotage was attempted in Tarbes arsenal at midsummer but only a day's delay was caused...".⁷

As D-Day approached, SOE stepped-up its own activities in the Haute Pyrennes and it was to the resistance forces of the British WHEELWRIGHT circuit that BUGATTI was specifically directed.⁸

'Hod' Fuller came to his command by an unusual route. Born and raised in Massachusetts he was educated at Milton Academy and Harvard. During his undergraduate days, Fuller played varsity football and ice hockey. He was also one of the founding fathers of the Harvard Flying Club. Upon graduation in 1930, Fuller entered the Harvard Business School.

A year later his love for adventure led him to secure a commercial pilot's license and a job with East Coast Aircraft Corporation, a small company based at Boston Airport. By that time America was in the depths of the Great Depression. In 1932, East Coast Air folded and Fuller was out of a job.

Rather than returning to Harvard, Fuller instead wangled a position as engineer on the 85' diesel auxiliary yacht "Pilgrim". Within weeks he was off on a round-the-world cruise during which he worked not only on the main engine but also taught himself to handle

all of the electrical and refrigeration work. "Pilgrim's" voyage lasted 23 months.

In 1934, his wanderlust partially slaked, Fuller went to work as an engineer at the Bethlehem Steel plant in Quincy. Eventually he became head of the department which tested diesel and gasoline engine designs. Fuller was at the Fore River factory when Germany attacked Poland... but not for long.

"As soon as the Nazis attacked, I joined a group of Americans and went to France to volunteer my services. I was attached to the 19th Transport Regiment, 10th Division, 10th French Army Corps and served at the Front all through the battles for Flanders and on the Somme. When the Armistice came I was demobilized, a heartbreaking experience since I had just received an appointment for the next officer's course and a posting to the Foreign Legion."⁹

Soon after returning to the United States, Fuller wrote to Marine Corps headquarters requesting an application for training and commissioning as a Motor Transport Officer. His interests and motivation toward service as a Marine had by then already been well demonstrated since he had served as a volunteer reserve enlisted man during his Harvard days and was carried on the inactive roles as a Corporal until 1935.¹⁰

On 13 May 1941, Horace Fuller was appointed a First Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve and directed to report to Quantico for duty with the Motor Transport School. Within two weeks he became the chief diesel engine instructor in the Corps.

After several months of teaching, Fuller wrote the Major General Commandant seeking a place at the formal Reserve Officer's Refresher Course. In it he pointed out that:

"Having served from January until July, 1940 in the line of the French Army with the 19th Regiment, 10th Division, commanded by General Georges, as a driver and small unit leader of tanks, armored cars, and ambulances, and have been engaged with the enemy covering the withdrawal of French units from Dunkirk through Flanders (where I received the Croix de Guerre on 8 June 1940), it is my desire to better fit myself as an Officer of Marines and to better acquaint myself with current Marine Corps methods. I hope to serve in Marine Corps armored units in the line."11

Fuller got his school and a set of orders to one of the Marine Corp's newest units: the First Amphibian Tractor Battalion at Dunedin, Florida. There, Fuller was given command of Company "C" and directed to inspect the new LVT's as they came off the Food Machinery Company's Lakeland assembly lines. Following several months of training, Company "C" entrained with its vehicles and moved to the 1st Marine Division's base camp at New River, North Carolina.

By May, 1942 Fuller had been promoted to Captain and was holding down the post of Battalion Executive Officer. He still had the job when the 1st Division sailed for New Zealand on 10 June. In Wellington, new officers and equipment reached the battalion and Fuller was given another Company to command. When the Marines landed at Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, Hod Fuller's LVT's were among the first to hit the beach.

During the following weeks, the Division engaged in a series of operations which relegated the LVT's to a largely logistical role. But that did not spare Captain Fuller. On 3 October he was inside a bunker which suffered a direct hit during a Japanese air attack. A collapsing timber smashed his leg and proved to be a ticket home.

At first the leg seemed to heal well but by February, 1943 Fuller had developed a noticeable limp and was in constant pain.

Detached from his temporary job as Assistant G-2 of Amphibious Force Pacific, he was promoted to Major and shipped East to the Naval Hospital at Chelsea, Massachusetts.

Five weeks later, an operation having repaired his battle damage, Fuller left Chelsea for Quantico. There he was assigned to the tactics section of the Reserve Officer Training School. But despite being elevated to Battalion Commander, Fuller was not content with watching the war go by from the shores of the Potomac. He had, in fact, already laid the groundwork for a transfer to Europe. In a letter to Major Andrew Wylie, Fuller pointed out:

"While sailing on various small yachts and making voyages on French and Italian sailing vessels in the Mediterranean, I have spent considerable time on the southern coast of France as well as in Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Sicily, and Elba."¹²

Wylie was in a position to help. Scion of a wealthy Washington family, he was head of ONI's East European desk and had direct contacts with OSS. On 1 September 1943, Hod Fuller received orders to report to Donovan.

New Year's Day 1944 found Fuller in England awaiting assignment to the OSS Parachute Training Unit, then commanded by another Marine, Major Bruce B. Cheever, USMC.¹³ Shortly thereafter, he was tapped for duty as a 'Jed'.

Team BUGATTI left Blida, near Algiers, early in the evening of 28 June 1944. A single black B-24 flew the mission. After an unremarkable five hour flight, the drop zone was spotted and Fuller, Crosby, de la Roche, and Guillemont 'hit the silk'.

On the ground things worked equally smoothly. A resistance reception committee was on hand to greet the Jedburghs and gather their equipment. By 0200 on the 29th, BUGATTI was safely stashed in a farmhouse some 6 kilometers from the small town of Montrejeau. The next day, Fuller left early for a rendezvous with George R. Starr (codename: HILAIRE) one of SOE's most daring organizers in the south of France and architect of WHEELWRIGHT.* Accompanying him was Anne Marie Walters (codename COLLETTE) Starr's courier.

Since the area was swarming with Germans, Fuller travelled in civilian clothes. This was not accepted practice for 'Jeds' because capture would automatically result in execution as a spy. But COLLETTE convinced the members of BUGATTI that there was little chance of avoiding Germans and that uniforms would result in instant combat. The wisdom of her rationale became immediately apparent. Soon after Fuller departed, a company of SS troops was spotted moving toward the farmhouse. Only a quick exit from the second story saved detection.

"We were then taken at night to the maquis camp near Arbon. Here all attempts to reach Algiers were most unsatisfactory as our B-2 (radio) set had been damaged in the drop. Although I brought another B-2 back from HILAIRE's headquarters, our first messages were always reported as indecipherable. The maquis consisted of about 100 men, all of whom were poorly armed, but with their remaining store of plastique, we immediately blew up four pylons on the 150,000 kilowatt power line through the Arbon Valley. This supplied power to the aircraft factory in Toulouse."¹⁴

* Starr's exploits in France are worthy of a complete book. He survived the war and was highly decorated by both the British and French.

After a fortnight of frustration caused by faulty radios, BUGATTI finally managed to raise Algiers. Then began a series of pleas for arms and ammunition:

"Guns and ammo needed urgently.... send petrol and generator as soon as possible.... Area unsafe for free movement. Bren guns needed quickly."

"No arms and Boche everywhere. Am sabotaging power and rail lines continually. Need supplies."

"Daylight dropping impossible. Boche patrols make movement dangerous. All vehicles forbidden to move and shot at on sight. Immediate strength at least 3,000 maquisards but no arms."

15

By 10 July, still without supplies, Fuller decided on a risky move. A new radio and some previously delivered weapons were cached in the village of Lannemezan. Unfortunately, the town was garrisoned by 1,200 German soldiers. Captain de la Roche and a four man team volunteered to try to retrieve these desperately needed items. Moving at night in a purloined truck, they succeeded not only in getting the equipment but also returning with it to the Arbon hideout. With the new radio, BUGATTI was finally able to regain contact with the SPOC and on the night of 16 July, a lone plane dropped containers to the maquis. Though many of these broke open before reaching the ground, the resupply proved a godsend for the next day, 600 Germans began to systematically invest the farm area.

Fuller pulled his men back to an open hillside with a wooded area protecting the flanks. De la Roche and a special contingent armed themselves with British Gammon grenades in case the enemy brought up tanks.

At about 1730, the Germans began slowly advancing toward the maquis positions. Taken under fire, they brought mortars and heavy machine guns into play. Eventually the maquis withdrew into the forest leaving 16 dead Germans on the field and having suffered no casualties themselves.

Fuller immediately shifted his headquarters deeper into the Pyrennes, this time to the vicinity of St. Bertrand des Comminges about 16 miles to the west. While on the move, he learned that the Arbon farm had been compromised by an Italian who lived in Montrejeau. Fuller ordered the resistance to deal with him.

"Several days later one of our patrols shot him in Montrejeau and he was taken to hospital wounded. We then sent a visitor to the hospital who slit his throat during the night."¹⁶

BUGATTI's main camp now contained about 35 men, all of whom were well armed but had little ammunition and few explosives. Another maquis unit at Arbas was better equipped and ~~they~~ began a systematic campaign of sabotage directed at railway lines and power stations. Fuller radioed a report of the fighting which ended with the sanguine phrase: "Hope I'm first Jed to kill a Boche."¹⁷

On 20 July, Fuller determined that the situation could best be handled by splitting his team into two separate parts. Captain de la Roche was directed to take charge of the Tarbes area while Fuller directed the maquis in the valleys of Nistos, Luchron, and as far east as Saint Gaudens.

Both of these groups were busy. On one occasion, de la Roche was ambused while riding a motorcycle. He lay in a ditch while the Germans unsuccessfully searched all around him and had the traumatic

experience of watching his companion captured, tortured , and executed on the spot.

In addition to the enemy, Fuller and de la Roche were also forced to address the ticklish problem of internal rivalries in the resistance. Their position in this regard was decidedly hampered by a continuing inability to produce either weapons or money. During the entire course of BUGATTI's operation, only a single supply drop was received. The air of suspicion and mutual antagonism which surrounded the communist FTP,^{*} the MUR,^{**} and the Franc Pommies was never fully overcome but de la Roche, in particular, succeeded in bringing about an uneasy accommodation. The open internecine warfare which characterized all of the East European guerilla movements was thereby avoided.

By 20 July, BUGATTI had hit all its designated targets and was busy blowing railroads faster than the Germans could repair them. One of the biggest successes was complete interdiction of the line which ran south into Spain. This blocked 50,000 tons of iron ore at the frontier.

BUGATTI had also been ordered to destroy the oil refinery at Peyrouzet. Fuller was loath to undertake this mission because of the potential impact on the area's power economy. Happily, M. la Chaux, the manager, was a confirmed patriot of the resistance and had participated in several stiff firefights as a maquis commander. La Chaux proposed a simple but effective plan for eliminating production without sabotaging the equipment.

* FTP: Francs Tireurs et Partisans

**MUR: Mouvement Unis de Resistance

The refinery required large amounts of water. Under the manager's supervision, its irrigation canals were systematically bled dry. The Germans, unable to locate the control valves, were powerless to resume operations. Two days after they pulled-out, la Chaux was producing enough gasoline for the entire Toulouse area.

With the ANVIL landings about to commence, General DeGaulle issued orders for a full-scale rising in southern France. When the coded message was broadcast by the B.B.C. on 14 August, Fuller and his team were still desperately short of explosives and ammunition. Nevertheless, actions were initiated throughout the entire Haute Pyrennes which literally paralyzed German road movement. Every road which could be covered was allocated to various ambush parties. Soon havoc was the norm.

On 18 August, Fuller received word that the commanding general in Tarbes was attempting to flee. The Germans assembled a column of trucks and civilian autos and were preparing to withdraw toward Montrejeau along the Route Nationale. Every available maquisard was directed to stop this movement.

Obviously, the Germans were now in a state of confusion. Truscott's VI U. S. Corps was driving north from its Riviera beaches spearheaded by a mechanized brigade. The Free French II Corps had forced the enemy back into Toulon and was pushing westward toward Marseilles. With the prospect of crumbling defenses along the Rhone Valley, the possibility loomed that all German forces between the Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay would soon be faced with either surrender or encirclement.

Major General Mayr in Tarbes found neither of these options palatable. Within minutes of leaving the village both became more inviting. The evacuation column was immediately attacked by the maquis. Mayr and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Kountze, were both hit in the initial fusillade of Sten and Bren Gun fire. A bad situation soon became a rout. Cars and trucks were set alight and German soldiers seemed to rush aimlessly about in the maelstrom. Twenty were killed, 35 wounded and the rest taken prisoner. Tarbes was liberated.

A few days later Fuller jubilently messaged Algiers:

"What a show. Our maquis liberated Tarbes and Loubon. Boche fleeing into Spain. Prisoners, arms captured... Have Boche general and staff prisoner here. Want large heavy arms drop to attack Boche division at Dax."¹⁸

BUGATTI's headquarters now became the Hôtel Moderne but Fuller and de la Roche did not spend much time there. For the next three weeks both were involved in a series of actions which culminated in an organized maquis force of nearly 5,000 men. While the bulk of these forces drove northward toward Bordeaux, a series of ambushes was strung out along the Franco-Spanish frontier. Patrols in this sector captured more than 400 Germans, bringing BUGATTI's haul to approximately 1,000.

Operations were now going so successfully that Fuller was no longer content to wait in vain for request air support from Algiers. Having overrun several airfields and being a pilot, he simply organized his own air force. Although hampered by lack of fuses for the German bombs, the planes did pay dividends in reconnaissance and liaison roles. The SPOC, while praising this innovation, firmly refused Fuller's request to send a flight back to North Africa.



Lieutenant Colonel Horace W. Fuller, USMCR (front row, third from right) Commanding Officer, Jedburgh Team BUGATTI at ceremonies marking the liberation of Tarbes, Haute Pyrennes, France, 1944.

(Photo courtesy Captain Francois de la Roche, USMCR)

As the enemy was driven from French soil, the enmity of the various factions within the maquis resurfaced.

"We saw the whole situation was becoming one of politics with the different groups within the FFI starting to fight among themselves for power and, as the mission which had been given us was a military one, we carefully avoided anything to do with politics.... We therefore began demobilizing our men. All weapons were taken and stored in a caserne at Tarbes and all military affairs in our region handed over to the FFI."¹⁹

For their work in France, Fuller and de la Roche were awarded the Silver Star and Croix de Guerre. Fuller was also mentioned in despatches by SOE and made a Knight of the Legion of Honor by France. He finished the war with a Chinese commando battalion having been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel while in the Pyrennes. Demobilized in December, 1945 he worked for a succession of airlines both in the United States and abroad. Fuller was later promoted to Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and retired as a Brigadier General in 1957. He died in 1971.²⁰

CHAPTER XI

"HOW THE HELL DID A MARINE GET HERE?"

The story of Marines with the OSS is full of occupational transitions. Few of these are more startling than that of Captain William Francois Angetique Grell, USMCR.

Grell was born in Antwerp, Belgium on 22 February 1899, the son of a prominent grain broker. When World War I began, the Grell family moved to London. As soon as he was old enough, Bill Grell enlisted as a Private in the Belgian Army. In April, 1916 he began his military career by digging gun emplacements for the 104th Battery, 6th Artillery.

"Successively I became a signal corps man, field telephone operator, lineman, despatch writer, forward observer, and member of a gun crew. Promoted to Corporal I took charge of a 75mm gun. I was actually two and a half years in front line duty for which I received four chevrons."

In May 1917, Grell was selected for officer training and after a probationary period was commissioned in April, 1918. The following month he was wounded, but returned to his regiment in time to witness the German capitulation. By then he was a decorated veteran with four personal decorations and two Mentions in Despatches.

Following World War I, Grell and his brother Leon went into the grain business in Antwerp. This proved lucrative enough until the depression struck. In 1930, Grell left Belgium for the United States

with plans to open another grain brokerage. But America was no more immune to the economic slump than was Europe. Instead Grell found a job at New York's Hotel St. Moritz. In 1934, Arthur Herssens, a prominent importer of brewing malt, offered Grell a position with his firm. For the next five years, business boomed. When World War II cut off European suppliers, Grell went back to being a hostelier.

In December, 1942, having been turned-down by both the Army and Navy, Grell applied for a commission in the Marine Corps. Surprisingly, he was accepted. The reason soon became apparent. The Corps was critically short of mess officers and Grell was then manager of the Drake Hotel, one of New York's best. Ordered to Camp Elliott, Grell became Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Officer's Club.

This was not Bill Grell's idea of war. He requested a transfer to intelligence. The application was promptly denied. Then, "in May, 1943 a chance meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Hall, OSS representative on the West Coast, allowed him to talk his way out. Without going into details, Hall promised Grell an intelligence job and also some action."²

"On reporting to Washington, Grell was subjected to the spy-thriller conceits of rear-echelon security officers. He arrived in his Marine uniform and was told to buy himself a civilian suit, to cut all the labels out of it, then to wait at his room in the Statler Hotel for a phone call."³ Grell gamely tolerated this and further equally simple-minded instructions.

Following his OSS training, Grell flew to London where he became part of the first American group assigned to work with SOE. His initial assignment involved coordination of supply drops to France... flights in which he frequently participated. "We were working with an

unusual type of individual", Grell later recalled, "many had natures that fed on danger and excitement. It was not unusual to find a good measure of temper thrown in."⁴

By late August, 1944 the situation in northern France had developed to the point where most of the OSS and SOE teams were being overrun by the advancing allied armies. But in the southwest, much remained to be done. Grell, who spoke fluent French as well as Flemish and German, was ordered to fly to Limoges and take charge of operations against the considerable enemy forces which remained there. For while Limoges itself was in Free French hands, the countryside was not.

"On the north bank of the River Garonne, between Bordeaux and Point de Grave, there were between 25,000 and 40,000 Nazi troops. Another 20,000 were moving through the Angouleme-Poitiers area, trying vainly to escape northwest. Twenty-five thousand more still occupied La Rochelle and Saint Nazaire and other scattered groups of an estimated total strength of between 5,000 and 10,000 remained in Puy de Dome and Allier."⁵

Grell's mission was given the codename GERMINAL. With him were Army Lieutenants Harry E. Griffiths and Robert Cutting. Two other members, Captain Reeve Schley Jr. and Sergeant Philip Potter, were already in the Limoges area having been flown-in a few days earlier. GERMINAL's written orders were to make contact with the organizers of the SO/SOE "F" circuit and place those circuits at the disposal of U. S. forces when they entered the maquis' operational zone. Additionally, Grell was directed to make a complete report of the political situation in the Zone Sud, to reallocate agents of the "F" circuit as necessary, and to return certain designated members of "F" to London. This was expected to be a far from simple task, one which would require tact and diplomacy as well as possible physical courage. Grell was

enjoined not to gloss-over problems. Perhaps to heighten his awareness of this last point, he was assigned the nom de guerre of GRUMBLER.⁶

MISSION GERMINAL launched from Tempsford Aerodrome in England on the morning of 9 September 1944. The Hudson bomber covered the route with no difficulty and landed at Limoges before noon. Immediately upon deplaning, Grell linked-up with the other members of his group and proceeded to a temporary headquarters which had been established in the former Gestapo building.

After a day of administrative work, Grell and his team set about locating missing members of circuit "F". This task was complicated by the thousands of German soldiers who were still armed and active in the countryside, not to mention the maquis who had a propensity to ambush anything that moved. In his log of the mission, Grell wrote:

(11 and 12 September 1944)... This morning we travelled from Limoges to Montlucon via Gueret. Enroute, we observed thirty-one enemy vehicles which had been ambushed by the FFI. The vehicles were completely destroyed or rendered useless. It may be assumed that a large percentage of the personnel were killed in the ambushes. A small number of men were captured, but few prisoners are taken by the F. F. I. German columns retreating to the North in hope of using Belfort Gap lost heavily in men and equipment."⁷

In the afternoon, GERMINAL arrived at the maquis' command post north of Cerilly. Here they met a number of F. F. I. guerillas with whom Captain Schely had been working. The Frenchmen invited Grell and his group to come along on a night ambush which they had already organized in the vicinity of the village of Sancoins. Accepting this 'call to arms' with alacrity, Grell, Schley, Griffiths, and Navy 2/c

Petty Officer Roger Faucher* all followed the maquis motorized patrol as it headed toward Sancoins.

The maquis were anxious for action. Rumors were spreading that the Germans were negotiating a surrender to the U. S. Third Army. This suspicion irritated the F. F. I. because it not only insulted French national pride but also promised to curb their successful retaliation program.

"The German Major General who was attempting to evacuate troops from this territory had realized that eventual escape through the Americans was impossible and that continued movement eastward would mean the loss of a great many men and a good deal of equipment since they were hemmed-in and harassed by the Maquis along the entire route. They did not dare surrender to the Maquis as they felt there was no limit to the retributions that might be inflicted upon them....

The F. F. I. would accede to terms only grudgingly since they wanted the weapons the enemy would surrender."⁸

Grell and the rest of the ambush party arrived in Sancoins early in the evening. There they were invited to dine with the local maquis before the ambush was set.

Although the Wehrmacht had taken a stiff pounding from allied aircraft as well as the French guerillas, its intelligence apparatus was still functioning. No sooner had GERMINAL settled into Sancoins, then a German major came in under a flag of truce seeking 'a word with the American Captain who has just arrived'. Grell received this emissary in company with his men, their French counterparts, and Marine Second Lieutenant William B. Macomber, Jr.

* Faucher, codename FRANCOIS, was the radio operator for OSS Mission FREELANCE which was parachuted into the Puy de Dome region on 18 July 1944. Another member of FREELANCE was the noted political commentator and writer Joe Alsop.

William Butts Macomber was a 23-year-old Yale man who had enlisted in the Class III Marine Corps Reserve during March, 1942. Although only of medium height, Macomber was constructed along the lines of a #10 woodscrew. During his college days, Bill Macomber played varsity football, lacrosse, and captained the Eli wrestling squad. During one summer vacation, he had sailed with several North Atlantic convoys as an engine room wiper.

Bill Macomber came from the sort of background which Donovan seemed to most prize. His great grandfather, I. W. Butts had been a newspaper publisher, businessman and politician in upstate New York. His grandfather, Francis Macomber, an eminent jurist and Justice of the New York State Supreme Court. Young Macomber had come to Yale by way of Phillip's Academy in Andover, Massachusetts where he excelled in sports and was president of the debating society.⁹

Macomber wanted to be a Marine officer. He took extra course work in his pre-law program in order to graduate before his class. Then, upon reaching Parris Island, he was disqualified because of poor eyesight. But anyone with the combative nature of a wrestler was not about to be deterred by such a setback. Macomber petitioned for a waiver and this request was duly granted.¹⁰

Commissioned a Second Lieutenant on 1 December 1943, he was already slated for duty with OSS. After initial training in the U. S., Macomber flew to England. Assigned to the SO Branch, Macomber was immediately tapped for the role of weapons instructor with a team of reinforcements for the SO/SOE FREELANCE circuit which was operating in the vicinity of Puy de Dome, Cantal. This was the same circuit to which

Petty Officer Faucher belonged. FREELANCE was headed by an experienced British Officer, Captain John Farmer who had been in France since 30 April.¹¹ There were four other officers in Macomber's party: Major Edwin Lord, AUS, Second Lieutenant Richard Duval, AUS, Second Lieutenant Michel Block, AUS, and Canadian Captain Pierre Meunier.

After a false start on 25 August, the FREELANCE augmentees climbed aboard an RAF Halifax early in the evening of the 28th. The aircraft flew to the proposed drop zone and by 0100 the next morning was circling over what was supposed to be the designated area. While the team checked their chutes and prepared to jump, the pilot scanned the darkened landscape for a maquis signal. But no flashing lights appeared. Despite Lord's request to drop the mission 'blind' the aircraft commander wheeled his bomber to the north and returned to base with the OSS men still onboard.

RAF Bomber Command was unable to produce an aircraft for a third try at infiltrating Lord and company so the job was turned over to the U. S. Eighth Air Force's 492nd Bomb Group (Heavy).^{*} At 2200, 31 August 1944 the team was ready for another try. Before departing, Lord requested that the OSS representative at Harrington Field instruct the pilot to drop the mission "with or without ground signals".¹² The aircraft, aging and rust-pitted Liberators, were usually painted black

*The 492nd was specifically tasked with carrying out Operation CARPETBAGGER, the aerial support of resistance groups in France. The Group was formed from squadrons of B-24's which had originally been part of the 479th Antisubmarine Group. In November, 1943 these were attached to the 482nd Bomb Group (Pathfinder). Early in August, 1944 the 492nd was officially 'blessed' with the CARPETBAGGER role and its squadrons were redesignated 856, 857, 858, and 859.

glossy black (the better it was thought to reflect enemy searchlights). Their ball turrets were removed and the resulting space covered with a sliding panel. When removed, this panel provided 'the hole' through which agents parachuted. "Carpetbaggers flew alone at altitudes as low as five hundred feet, as slowly as 120 miles an hour over the drop zone. Navigation for the solitary aircraft was the difference between depositing an agent accurately and safely or leaving him hopelessly lost. The lone plan^e on a dropping mission risked the treacherous hazards of low-level navigation, particularly as it wove through mountain passes. A heavy bomber, flaps down, running in to drop an agent was a pigeon for enemy fighters."¹³ And there was always the weather. On the night of FREELANCE's departure, that too was bad.

A storm was sweeping down from the Hebrides, bringing with it heavy rain and stiff winds. For a time it was uncertain whether the mission would be allowed to proceed but finally the Liberator's engines sprang to life and the big black bird lumbered into the night sky. The plane missed most of the storm. It was the pilot and navigator who missed the drop zone.

"At shortly after midnight, the pilot asked me over the intercom if we still wanted to jump blind and if I were sure all our men would jump. I replied in the affirmative to both questions and told him I was jumping first.... When the 'hole' was opened we found we were so crowded that we could not take the proper jump positions and all of us got a number of tangles in our suspension lines when we dropped. It had stopped raining and the wind had died down but we were not certain if we were jumping "blind" or not, although I had been unable to see any ground lights through the hole.

We jumped at 0110 hours the morning of 1 September at 600 feet. In order to locate my group on the ground I checked the chutes in the air to determine the direction of descent, and could only count three chutes besides my own."¹⁴

Bill Macomber jumped fourth. He and Lieutenant Block landed in a plowed field near a small road. Major Lord came down in another field a few hundred yards away. Lieutenant Duval split the difference and ended up in a tree. The Canadian Captain was nowhere to be seen.

As the drone of the bomber's engines faded, the four men cautiously whistled to each other. They were obviously in the wrong place, behind enemy lines, and with no idea of their exact location. Suddenly Lord heard voices.

Out of the night four more shadows appeared. They were armed men, wearing civilian clothes... and they spoke French. One of the shadows began to quietly whistle the Marseillaise. Lord replied with 'Tipperary'. Silence. The rain began to fall again.

Lord plucked up his courage and called softly: "Americans". The shadows answered: "Francaises". Contact was established.

It was immediately determined that the four maquisards had seen the four parachutes descending and come to investigate. All were teenagers. They told the OSS men that their company headquarters was located near the village of Lurcy-Levy, only a few kilometers distant. Macomber checked his map. FREELANCE was more than 15 miles from its designated drop zone.¹⁵

After several hours of searching in vain for Captain Meunier, the eight men moved cross country to the maquis command post. There they were greeted by an excited group of guerillas who hung an American flag on the wall of their farmhouse hideout. Backs were slapped, hands shaken, and promises of help in finding the missing Captain made. At first light, Macomber and Block set out with a maquis escort to find him.

Carefully skirting the village, the patrol finally found their companion. Meunier's exit from the Liberator had been delayed when a static line from one of the previous jumpers wrapped round his leg. By the time he could untangle himself and drop clear of the aircraft, he was several miles from the others. He had spent the night hiding in the woods. By noon, the entire group was reunited at a small chateau near Fragne, the headquarters of Captain Denis Rake a British SOE officer.

Each member of the newly arrived team was given a specific local mission. Macomber drew that of advisor and weapons instructor for a company of 150 maquisards commanded by Captain Henri Tardivat.

"The first major job this company had after I joined them was the occupation of Vichy. It seemed that although the city had been 'officially' liberated a little over a week before, it was still under control of many of the same people that had flourished under the Petain regime. Thus, my company and one other were sent to take over. This was accomplished with little difficulty, a few arrests were made, and the situation seemed fairly well under control. The only disquieting element lay in the fact that the other company which came down with us was FTP (communist). This caused certain alarm in some quarters.* 16

Following three days in Vichy, Macomber's maquis went back to ambushing German convoys. It was then that the rumors of a possible surrender began to spread.

Macomber and Block, with their respective companies, took up positions near the main road leading eastward from Sancoin. Here they

* Lt. Duval who had parachuted in with Lord and Macomber was the advisor for this company. This arrangement served to ease the situation somewhat.

were contacted by Colonel Roussel, commander of the French 1st Regiment.* Roussel was as much 'in the dark' as everyone else regarding the possible armistice negotiations, but indicated that his sketchy information indicated that the preliminary discussions had allegedly been conducted between the U. S. Third Army and German forces somewhere west of Vichy. Several German officers in Sancoin had requested that they too should be covered by any such agreement. Would Macomber and Block assist the maquis in negotiations, Roussel asked.

Immediately agreeing, the two young lieutenants left their outfits and proceeded toward Sancoin. At a prearranged spot, they were met by several German officers. Talks got underway in which several points immediately became clear. First, the Germans did not want to surrender to the maquis but rather to be granted safe conduct to the American lines. Second, they refused to be disarmed until they had successfully cleared the guerillas' operating areas. Finally, their commander desired that any convoy moving to the actual surrender point be led by an American officer, in uniform.

Macomber and Block stalled. They had no orders to engage in such discussions and no authority to accept or offer terms. The best they could do was relay the German proposals to their superior officer for decision. The parlay ended on this note and both returned to their headquarters.

While Duval set off to look for Major Lord, Macomber entered Sancoin proper. There he found a tense situation. In one part of the

*The 1^{er} Regiment had been disbanded in 1940. When the Allies invaded France, Roussel had recalled it to active service under FFI command.

town were six thousand fully armed German combat troops. Facing them were one company of the 1st Regiment and a motley assortment of FFI guerillas.

Now Macomber was the only American present - a long Marine Second Lieutenant in the midst of a potential major battle. More negotiations commenced, this time in the Town Hall. Once again the Germans repeated their demands, still Macomber fudged. He would, he said, have to consult his commander. But to keep the parties talking rather than shooting, Macomber volunteered to lead the surrender convoy westward toward Orleans. At about this time, Captain Grell and the members of GERMINAL entered the picture.

Grell and Macomber agreed to meet the German commander, Colonel Brucker, the next morning at 1100. Having so informed the German courier, the OSS and FFI officers pondered the situation. They had perhaps 300 armed maquisards and two companies of the 1st Regiment immediately available should shooting break out. Brucker, on the other hand, had the best part of 5 battalions, many of his men were combat veterans. The concensus was that a possible trap was being laid. The key question was, "where was the Third Army?". Grell decided to find out.

The former hotel manager, his wrestler assistant, and four Frenchmen armed themselves to the teeth with submachine guns, carbines and grenades. Then, they commandeered two civilian cars and headed for Bourges, some 60 kilometers away. After careening down blacked-out country roads, Grell's party reached their destination only to learn that the city was in the hands of the FTP and that the closest American units were thought to be at least 100 kilometers distant. Recalling his midnight ride, Grell later wrote.

"We were tired. It was two o'clock in the morning and I had an eleven o'clock appointment with a Nazi Colonel. While trying to find a place to sleep, we learned that an 'American Colonel' had passed through Bourges a few hours earlier headed south. We concluded from this that an official surrender offer had been tendered through other channels and that this (American) Colonel was some sort of envoy."¹⁷

The group headed back toward Sancoin. The return trip was only slightly less harrowing since the FTP was notoriously trigger happy and no one except Germans moved upon the roads. Grell and Macomber missed the partisans but ran instead into a small convoy of enemy officers moving in the same direction under maquis escort. One of the Germans was Colonel Brucker. Together, the two groups proceeded toward the headquarters of German Major General Elsar. Everywhere they saw signs of maquisard activity: dead horses, rotting corpses, abandoned or burned-out vehicles.

Elsar had ensconced himself in a large chateau near Arcay. As Grell, tired, somewhat bedraggled, but in uniform stepped from his car, an American Army officer leaned from an upstairs window and exclaimed by way of greeting: "How the hell did a Marine get here?"¹⁸

And so, on the warm autumn morning of 12 September 1944, a total of 19,000 Germans surrendered. In his mission report, Lieutenant Macomber wrote of this amazing capitulation:

"To my mind it is one of the outstanding events in the overall story of the Maquis resistance in France. Of course Elsar's 19,000 were not militarily defeated by the Maquis which surrounded them. They were actually overcome by the joining of the American Third and Seventh Armies, for this destroyed their escape route and ended forever any chance of their getting back to Germany. Nevertheless they were 19,000 troops - well equipped with plenty of ammunition and food. Furthermore, the majority were not occupational but frontline combat soldiers. The nearest American regular troops that could be brought against them were

those of the Third Army north of the Loire, and every bridge across the Loire was blown. If they had chosen to fight it out, it would have meant the diversion of sizeable forces and considerable cost in time, manpower, and materiel. Had there been no Maquis active, the Germans would almost certainly have followed this course. It is highly significant that the Maquis so completely destroyed their nerves by continual sniping and ambush and by killing every prisoner which fell into their hands."¹⁹

The mysterious 'American Colonel' proved to be a personal representative of General Macon, Commander of the Third Army. Appropriately, his name was "French".

Macomber and the rest of the FREELANCE mission busied themselves with the final details for enforcing the armistice. The next day, they made preparations for terminating their mission to the Maquis, and, on 15 September, Lord, Duval, Block, Macomber, and Petty Officer Faucher headed north toward Paris in two civilian cars. Along the way they passed thousands of German soldiers, well dressed, cleanly shaven and still armed, plodding slowly to their rendezvous with a POW camp. Some of them were singing marching songs. Lord said they looked far from beaten. But beaten or not, they were out of the war.

Captain GRELL and the members of GERMINAL remained in France for three more weeks tracking down members of "F" circuit and issuing orders for the integration of maquis units into the FFI. GERMINAL was declared complete on 8 October 1944.

Lieutenant Macomber was almost immediately transferred to the Far East. After reporting to OSS Station "K" at Kandy, Ceylon, he joined Colonel William R. Peers' OSS Detachment 101 in Burma. As a member of "101" Macomber participated in combat operations along

the Burma-Thai border.* Bill Grell immediately went to work on a different target: Germany itself.

By early December, 1944 Allied armies were approaching the borders of Hitler's Reich. But enemy resistance was stiffening and Anglo-American supply lines were in chaos. What lay in wait beyond the Rhine? Despite massive technical intelligence efforts, no one could be certain.

Of particular concern to Eisenhower and the rest of the SHAEF upper command echelon were increasingly frequent references to a "national redoubt" in the Bavarian Alps. No amount of aerial photographs or signals intercepts could determine whether the alpine fortress was a citadel or a chimera.

OSS was directed to find out. Meanwhile, the Allied Armies in Italy were slowly slugging their way northward toward the Swiss and Austrian borders. Germany was hemmed-in on all sides but her troops were still fighting.

* Following the war, Macomber returned to Law School and upon graduation, joined the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency. He later transferred to the Department of State as Special Assistant to John Foster Dulles. Macomber was U. S. Ambassador to Jordan (1961-64); Assistant Administrator of AID (1964-67). He subsequently served as a Deputy Under Secretary of State and as U. S. Ambassador to Turkey.

CHAPTER XII

"ONE MARINE ELEVEN HUNDRED GERMANS"

The tall freckle-faced American strolled casually into the elegant hotel room as though he owned the entire premises. Twelve German officers were seated at a polished table; outside hundreds of heavily armed enemy troops were busy turning the Italian town into a fortress. The American eyed the Germans and said: "I've come to offer you a chance to surrender before we start our air bombardment and ground attack."¹ First Lieutenant George M. Hearn, USMCR was about to accomplish one of the most dramatic coups of any OSS officer in World War II.

Lieutenant Hearn was dirty and unarmed but he made an immediate impression nonetheless. Over six-foot-tall and heavily muscled, he looked like a football player and spoke with the authority of a commander. Both descriptions were accurate, although his command was hardly one to strike fear into the assembled enemy. What was highly inaccurate was his assertion that the city of Chioggia was marked for imminent attack. Hearn's airplanes did not exist and his ground troops amounted to a handful of guerillas and six Italian Marines.

George Hearn had entered the Marine Corps in 1943 following graduation from San Jose State College in California. Commissioned on 1 December, he immediately volunteered for duty with OSS and was so detailed once his basic Marine training had been completed.

Hearn was initially assigned to the operating base at Algiers. Later he became a member of the Maritime Unit operating in the Adriatic.

His first job involved the training and conduct of clandestine agent and sabotage infiltrations by cabin cruiser and rubber boat along the northern Italian coastline.

By mid-1944, the allied drive in Italy had been stymied by Field Marshall Kesselring's Gothic Line. All attempts to batter through the mountain defenses brought heavy casualties to the British Eighth and U. S. Fifth Armies. Clearly flanking attacks from the sea were called for. But Anzio and Salerno had been costly near-failures and the bulk of Allied shipping was tied up in supporting the 'main' fronts in Normandy and southern France.

Raids, on the other hand, might bring such chaos to the German rear area that any penetration of the Gothic Line would unhinge the whole system. To accomplish just this task, OSS began a series of supply runs to the Italian partisans operating north of the Po River.

In northern Italy, six principal anti-Fascist parties had banded together to form the Comitato di Liberazione per l'Alta Italia, commonly referred to as CLNAI. Headquarters of the resistance was centered in the industrial city of Milano. In November 1944, several top CLNAI leaders, including future premier Ferruccio Parri, were smuggled out of Italy through neutral Switzerland by the OSS. "On 7 December 1944 an agreement was signed by SACMED authority whereby OSS and SOE would each allocate 80 million lire per month to support CLNAI. This money would be repaid to the British and American Governments after the war.

In the summer, fall and winter of 1944, OSS was instrumental in harnessing resistance groups throughout North Italy and forging

them into a weapon that could create a major diversion of German effort on the Italian front. In the interior, partisan bands were equipped and trained and their operations coordinated for maximum effectiveness. 2

Lieutenant Hearn and his associates were concerned lest major partisan operations begin too soon. The Po Delta area was a major agricultural region. Three hundred years before, the Venetians had begun building a vast system of dams, dikes, and bypasses which resulted in changing the entire course of the Po. Napoleon had also conducted extensive engineering projects in the vicinity. If the Germans destroyed the dams and pumping stations, not only would the Po become a nightmare for the Italians but it would also present the advancing Allied armies with a water barrier as formidable as the mountains.

It was a ticklish situation and when the British and American advance began in earnest in early 1945, the partisans grew increasingly restive. By mid-April Bologna had been liberated and the guerillas were itching to commence operations. OSS operatives who continued urging restraint were greeted with mal occhio - the evil eye.

Just south of the mouth of the Po is a large island, the Isola Donzella. OSS planned to use this as a main supply base but the Germans struck first. On 20 April, they attacked the island which was defended by several companies of poorly armed irregulars. For two days a series of short but bitter fights erupted up and down Donzella. The guerillas had one important advantage - they knew the island's terrain backward and forward. Eventually the Germans decided to cut their losses. On 22 April, most retreated back to

the mainland, blowing the only connecting bridge on their way out and killing all farm animals upon which they laid eyes.

That morning, OSS headquarters in Ravenna asked for a volunteer to join the partisans on Isola Donzella. Lieutenant Hearn jumped at the opportunity. Accompanied by Corporal Peter Rago - an American GI from Staten Island - and six members of the San Marco Marine Regiment, Royal Italian Navy, Hearn boarded a Chriscraft and set course northward. Seldom had the Maritime Unit operated in daylight (Hearn had done 29 previous missions at night) but the Luftwaffe had been gradually expunged from the Italian sky and the little motor yacht made the passage without incident.

Once ashore, Hearn learned that some enemy troops still occupied the northeastern tip of the island and were holed-up in the small village of Ca Tiepolo. There were now about 300 guerillas on hand, all of whom were anxious for Hearn to lead them. Moving toward Ca Tiepolo, Hearn and his motley force came under sporadic rifle and machine gun fire. Soon German artillery began accurate fires from the mainland as well. The Italians wavered.

Sensing that the position was too strong to attack. Hearn and his San Marco Marines set about establishing a rough defensive line. This proved a wise precaution. Soon after sundown the enemy made a bid to rout the guerillas by a surprise attack.

"Amidst the crack of the shells, the chatter of machine guns, the crump of mortars, and glowing red star clusters, he, his San Marco Marines, and his one Corporal were tiny desperate figures running up and down the frontline partisan positions. Hearn and his men encouraged them to fight, to stand their ground, not to flee before the violent German pressure.... the advance was checked." 3

The next morning, Hearn took stock of the situation. Although the enemy had not been crushed, he continued to control most of the portion of Donzella which overlooked the mouth of the Po. This ruled-out any German retreat across the river on the mainland. But seven miles up-river was a major ferry point. Hearn wanted to block that route as well but first he needed to eliminate any possibility of further action on the island. The only solution was to launch another attack.

Taking the only bazooka in the guerillas' small arsenal, Hearn crawled to within a hundred yards of the main German position. Two quick rockets sent sandbags flying. Then, three of his Marines rushed the bunker. Heartened, the guerillas followed this lead and within 90 minutes the island was theirs. Twenty Germans surrendered, the rest were either killed or managed to escape to the mainland.

His rear secure, Hearn sent a patrol of twenty guerillas and one Italian Marine NCO across to the mainland. Six hours later, this little group returned with the news that the Germans were pulling-out northward; good ambush sites were available; and the populace was waiting for 'liberation'.

Emboldened by the patrol report, Hearn picked 40 men and headed for the ferry.

After a three hour march, the ambush party reached their harbor site. Hearn's men were now several miles inland and well over a hundred miles ahead of the advancing British Eighth Army. They set up their two mortars, laid-out fields of fire for the pair of machine guns, and waited.

Within an hour two German trucks appeared. Both were loaded with troops. Hearn calculated the range and dropped a 60mm mortar bomb dead center on the first truck. The machine guns opened fire. It was over in two minutes. Dead soldiers littered the road and the living had their hands skyward. The guerillas cleared the road , posted a guard on the prisoners and resumed their firing positions. Forty-five minutes later the same scene was reenacted.

For most of the day, Hearn's group kept to this script. The ferry was out of earshot and worked so slowly that only two or three truckloads could be moved across at one time. Proceeding piecemeal, the convoy was methodically chopped to pieces without a single friendly casualty. Just before dusk, Hearn withdrew back to the island and radioed the day's results to Ravenna: thus far he had knocked-out a dozen vehicles, killed nearly a hundred Germans, and had a growing bag of POWs. In response to this news, OSS despatched two resupply drops and promised reinforcements.

During the night, the planes came over and parachuted additional arms and ammunition to Donzella. Then Hearn got his first sleep in more than 3 days.

At ten o'clock the next morning, several landing craft flying the White Ensign of Britain's Royal Navy growled into the Po estuary. On board were 60 windburned veterans of the Long Range Desert Group's "Special Demolition Squadron Number 1" better known as Popski's Private Army. With them they brought six more San Marco Marines, additional weapons and supplies, and their own favorite mode of transport: 20 jeeps each mounting a .50 caliber machine gun.⁴

Popski's men had orders to sweep inland and roar about the countryside in their accustomed fashion shooting-up everything German that moved. Hearn was to facilitate their operations by going back to the mainland himself and organizing guerilla support for both the PPA and the advancing allied ground troops.

Fifteen miles to the North was the Adige River. Beyond that lay the Brenta River which empties in the Lagoon of Venice. The principal defensive terrain in the region was occupied by the town of Chioggia, an old fortress. The Germans were concentrating their forces there. Hearn organized a 35-man patrol and moved out.

After five hours of steady but cautious advance, they reached the Adige. No Germans had been seen so Hearn commandeered two small fishing boats and crossed the river. The Brenta was three miles further... still no resistance. Just as dusk was settling on the mountains to the west, the first contact occurred.

A strong German outpost on the south side of the Brenta opened fire on the patrol's advance guard. Hearn immediately posted his his men in front of the blocking position and taking the remainder circled around to the right. Soon he had the enemy caught with the river to their backs and a turned flank. Forty-five more sets of hands were raised.

That night, dozens of refugees from Chioggia filtered through Hearn's perimeter. One told an interesting story. "The Germans" , he said, "are evacuating. By tomorrow there will only be twenty or thirty left in the city." This news prompted the Lieutenant to enter the town proper.

Before dawn, Hearn and Corporal Rago set out toward Chioggia with a small party of Marines and guerillas. Soon they met an Italian fisherman who was headed into the city. With Rago interpreting, Hearn asked the man if he had heard anything about the German's leaving or wanting to surrender. The fisherman replied that he had indeed heard such rumors. Hearn told him to go and find a German officer and tell him that the American Army was advancing and that an American officer wanted to parly.

Within fifteen minutes, three Germans carrying a white flag appeared. Hearn told them he had been sent to accept the surrender of Chioggia. They eyed him suspiciously and said they needed to discuss this with their commander, perhaps the American would like to accompany them? Hearn instantly started to sweat. How many commanders could thirty troops have?

Turning to Rago, the only other American within a hundred miles, Hearn said: "Go back to our men and tell them to hold their fire until I return". In a few minutes Rago was back (it did not take long to 'pass the word' to 35 men) and the two OSS men headed for town with the German officers.

"In ten minutes we were in the town proper. One glance at the streets and I knew my worst fears were justified. For the first time a sharp sense of personal fear hit me. Hundreds of heavily armed German troops were milling around; every second one had an automatic weapon slung over his shoulder. Barbed wire and sand bagged buildings were everywhere. Surrender? If ever a place looked ready for a fight this was it." 5

Hearn and Rago were escorted to the main hotel, which doubled as the Kommandatur. There the Lieutenant met his twelve Germans. The senior officer, a Kriegsmarine Captain signalled for him to take a seat. Hearn began: "I am Lieutenant George Hearn of the United States Army. I am in command of the forward scouting unit of my regiment...." 6
In graphic detail, the Lieutenant explained that the Air Corps was about to launch a devastating raid on Chioggia and that only an immediate surrender could prevent further bloodshed. The Germans glanced at each other and whispered back and forth. Finally the Captain asked: "If I agree to surrender can you call off the air attack immediately?"

Now was the time for 'poker nerves' and Hearn had them.

"I will call off the Air Force as soon as I return to my unit", he said. "And by the way," Hearn continued, "exactly how many men will you be surrendering?"

"Eleven hundred", came the reply. Eleven hundred! Hearn's mind reeled. He had barely enough food for his own men. How in the devil was he going to cope with over a thousand POWs? While he did some fast calculating, the Lieutenant's blue eyes never wavered. He explained that he would be back a two o'clock to work out the final details. The Germans seemed anxious to get it over with, so why not accommodate them?

Hearn rose, saluted, and marched out. Then he and Rago climbed into a waiting horse-drawn cart and drove slowly out of the city. Back at his guerilla command post, Hearn immediately sent men in every direction to search for the PPA. At least they looked like an advance guard.

It was one-thirty when a jeep carrying Lieutenant Harold S. C. Wallbridge of Popski's 'R' Patrol came roaring into view. Steve Wallbridge listened incredulously to Hearn's story. He had gotten the message that something was brewing at Chioggia but that was all. Wallbridge's arrival raised the 'allied' strength to six jeeps and 50 men. With two Second Lieutenants now on the scene, the German position was sur^ely hopeless!

While the PPA jeeps swung downriver to find a bridge, Hearn and Wallbridge requisitioned two bicycles and pedaled furiously back into the town. Arriving at the Kommandatur, Hearn announced that the air attack had indeed been cancelled

and that the 'main allied force' would bypass the city to avoid any incidents. Soon additional reconnaissance troops would arrive. The Germans accepted it all as gospel.

That night, German and British soldiers jointly patrolled the streets of Chioggia. The majority of the garrison was directed to stack its arms and withdraw to the coastal defense positions overlooking the Adriatic approaches to Venice. The German commander turned over all of his files, including a complete chart of the barrier mine field. In addition to the bag of prisoners, Hearn and Wallbridge inventoried eight batteries of 88mm dual purpose guns and a battery of coast artillery. It took two days for the first regular army units to reach the area and relieve the lieutenants of their charges. Ironically, the division assigned to this duty was Italian and had never before liberated a town.

Lieutenant Hearn received the Bronze Star for his daring coup at Chioggia. Today it seems a small reward. The Italian Government was more grateful. Hearn was one of only a handful of OSS officers to receive the Silver Medal for Military Valor. His citation reads in part:

"... assigned to duty with the Saboteur Unit of the San Marco Marine Regiment, Royal Italian Navy, he took part in 30 operations behind enemy lines. During a series of bold and successful actions carried out with saboteur squads and partisan groups, Lieutenant Hearn participated in the liberation of a large area of the national territory, alone he captured the city of Chioggia, together with 1400 prisoners..."



Ministero della Marina

L. A. R. il Surotenente Generale del Regno

su proposta del Ministro della Marina
con suo decreto del 8 marzo 1946 ha conferito la
Medaglia d'Argento al Valor Militare
al 1st Lt. *in campo.*

George J. G. Hearn

032 P. 98 U.S.M.C.R. - 2677 Reg. 251 119.

Destinato insieme ad altri militari USA ad operare nel
"Deposito Sabotatori del Reggimento 'S. St. Marco', R.M.I., partecipando
a 50 operazioni aeree delle linee noriche. Durante una serie di fortu-
nate azioni aeree da lui condotte al comando di Squadra Sabotatori e di
Banda partigiani, partecipando alla liberazione di vasta zona di territorio na-
zionale, tra cui la città di Ploagias, catturando 1400 prigionieri.
Esempio di sereno ardimento e comportamento valoroso.

Parte italiana, luglio 1944 - maggio 1945
Art. 4 Decreto 1946.

Il Ministro
[Signature]

Lieutenant Hearn celebrated the final victory in Italy in Venice. During his debriefing, he wondered what the Corps would think of an officer who passed himself off as an Army lieutenant. Musing, Hearn said: "They'll probably just say one Marine should be able to take those eleven hundred Germans prisoner." ⁸

Like many members of OSS who served behind the lines in Europe, Hearn was quickly transferred to the Far East. He was in China when Japan capitulated. After the war, he returned to his native North Carolina and became an automobile dealer.

Hearn's mission was one of the last in a long series of OSS operations in Italy. While a number of Marines were involved there, the activities of two are especially worthy of mention.

Captain Elmer Harris was the Marine Officer whose wounds in North Africa provided Peter Ortiz' entré into the SOE BRANDON operation. Born in Ketchikan, Alaska Territory, Harris was a regular officer. Commissioned on 28 March 1942, he completed the three month Basic School course at Marine Barracks, Philadelphia and upon graduation was assigned to the newly formed Ninth Marines in San Diego.

Having had pre-war experience with boats as marine representative for General Petroleum Corporation, Harris was one of the first Marine officers recruited as an OSS instructor. During August 1942,

Harris was sent to the secret SOE training school at Oshawa, Canada. Upon completion of the clandestine warfare course, Harris was assigned to the OSS parachute training unit at Area 'A' near Quantico as an instructor.

In late December 1942, Harris was selected for the initial OSS Operation Group contingent in North Africa. Under the usual cover of "Marine Corps Observer", Harris reported to Colonel Eddy in Tangier. Shortly thereafter he was wounded near Sbeitla, Algeria. ⁹

His wounds healed, Harris continued to work with the OSS staff attached to Allied Headquarters in Algiers. On the night of 8 September 1943, when the government of Italy surrendered and declared for the allies, maquis groups all over the island of Corsica rose in revolt. * Seizing the main radio station, the guerillas began broadcasting appeals to the U. S. command in North Africa for assistance.

"French headquarters hastily prepared the Battalion de Choc and several units of Moroccan and Algerian troops, as a skeleton Expeditionary Force to aid in the liberation of the island. AFHQ requested OSS to supply troops as a token Allied force to accompany the French.

Donovan ^e selected one Operational Group (OG) of two ₁₀ officers and thirty men to carry out the mission..."

One of them was First Lieutenant Harris.

*The word "maquis" which was adopted to describe all active resistance groups in France is of Corsican derivation. Its literal meaning is a scrubby, tough, native bush.

The North African ports were in turmoil as French warships embarked the rag-tag brigade. Luckily for the Allies, the German signal intercept service had been badly decimated in the retreat of Rommel's Afrika Korps, and few of the frantic operational messages which flashed back and forth among the invasion force were picked-up. ¹¹

On 17 September, Harris and the other OG personnel landed unopposed at Ajaccio, the principal Corsican city.* They found the situation to be thoroughly confused and as complicated as the recent helter skelter embarkation scene on the Algerian docks. Corsica is almost 120 miles long and as much as 50 miles wide in certain places. Mountains are everywhere with more than a few rising better than 6,000 feet above the sea. While there were plenty of willing maquisards, there were also some 80,000 Italian troops and a few battlions of Germans. The majority of these were in no mood to seek combat and were rather attempting to escape to nearby Sardinia across the Bonifacio Strait.

The Operational Group moved northward with the French combat troops hoping to block the Axis withdrawal. But going cross-country in Corsica is a task suited better to mountain goats than men. Progress was agonizingly slow and the natives proved far more interested in rounding-up Italians -- whom they have hated for centuries-- than in fighting Germans. The French commander reproved the maquis for this attitude and was promptly labelled a typical metropolitan snob. The entire operation degenerated into name calling and while Corsica was freed

*In addition to being the Corsican capital, Ajaccio prides itself more properly on being the birthplace of Napoleon Bonaparte.

most of the Germans got away.

By mid-October, 1943 the Corsican campaign was over. OSS immediately established a base there for operations against occupied France and those parts of Italy still controlled by the German Army. Harris returned to Algiers and then proceeded to Brindisi where as a member of the Fifth Army's OSS detachment he was directed to establish a program for training agents to parachute into North Italy and France.

In April 1944, Harris began to suffer acute abdominal pains. His condition soon became so severe that he was evacuated to Bethesda Naval Hospital. When initial diagnosis failed to reveal the exact nature of his medical problem, Harris was placed on "light duty" at OSS Headquarters. Obviously a different perception of that term existed in 1944 than is commonly held today. Harris' assignment was to proceed to Guantanamo Bay and carry out UDT operations designed to rid the anchorage of outmoded anti-submarine nets. Having accomplished this, he was posted to the OSS Underwater Swimmer School at Catalina Island as an instructor.

In November 1944, the abdominal pains came back. Hospitalized once again he underwent surgery for intestinal ulcers. In December he was released back to full duty and finished the war as Commanding Officer of the OSS Air Operations Unit and Parachute School in China. For his service there, Harris was awarded the Legion of Merit.¹²

Another OSS Marine who cut his combat teeth in Italy was Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, the officer who joined Ortiz's escape party from Westertimke's forced march.*

Taylor was a tall, lean Harvard PhD. who also happened to be a neighbor of General Donovan on New York's elegant Sutton Place. Twenty-nine years old, Taylor had graduated from Yale in 1935 and continued his education in Cambridge at Harvard. Like Charlotte Gower, he was an anthropologist. He spoke fluent Spanish - which he learned as a boy in South Texas - and also some French. Taylor was commissioned in 1943 and ordered to Camp Lejeune. He spent only a few months there before volunteering for OSS.

"On 20 September 1943 I was directed to report to OSS in Washington. Upon arrival I was told to go to the Interior Control Board at the Main Navy Building. This proved to be a mistake but before that fact was realized, I had been interviewed by American and Chinese officers and was accepted for some kind of duty. When the error was discovered, I reported to "Q" Building - the OSS processing station - but the Interior Control Board wanted me back. This was not congenial to OSS. I was assigned to the Special Operation Branch and sent off to a two week sabotage school." 13

Taylor was anxious to put his new knowledge to work, but instead was told to do a 'staff study' of the communications system of southern France. He escaped from what loomed as an extensive project by requesting an immediate transfer to the Training Branch SO school in Algiers as an instructor.

* See Chapter IX of this paper.

His assignment approved, Taylor flew to North Africa in December 1943, where he was immediately involved in preparing SO agents for missions into France and Italy. After graduating from the SO parachute course, Taylor left Algiers in March 1944 for Corsica. There he became a member of the SI team whose mission was the infiltration of agents and radio operators into enemy territory.

Between March and July, Taylor participated in twenty operations. Since these were limited to periods of no moon, the pace was frantic. Taylor was frequently running an operation every night for 8-10 days at a time. While the locales were varied, each mission had several basic similarities. Launching and pick-up were accomplished with PT boats and rubber dinghies. Taylor would do the initial map study and briefing; plan the loading of the boats; locate the drop-off point; and then go ashore himself to conduct a brief personal reconnaissance of the area. It sounds simple enough but there was a very decided 'catch'... the Germans patrolled the infiltration areas both on land and at sea. Agents who were caught could expect no mercy.

On the night of 22 June 1944, Taylor found himself rocking gently to and fro in a rubber boat about 300 yards off the Italian coast. Nearby was a second dinghy. All told there were five men spread between the boats: two British dinghymen, two Italian agents, and one Marine Second Lieutenant. The shoreline was dark and everything appeared to indicate a routine insertion.

The mission, codenamed MONREAL/LOCUST was proceeding normally. Taylor planned to land the party, ensure that the area was deserted and then return to the waiting Air Rescue Boat which had brought the party from Corsica.

"When the dingies were about 150 yards from shore, the motors of the ARB were suddenly started and immediately a red flare lit up the coast; gunfire began at once and the ARB raced out to sea. In the dingies, I gave the order to "freeze" while the flares were alight and only to row when they extinguished. Since the area was almost continuously illuminated for the following fifteen minutes, little progress was made. However, the light did provide ample opportunity for study of the coastline and it was learned that the pinpoint did not lie directly ahead. When the flares and gunfire stopped, the dingies were directed North. After proceeding but a little way it was realized that we were going in the wrong direction but since the enemy had been alerted, I decided to look for a new landing spot, which had been indicated in a previous study of aerial photographs." 14

The ARB was gone but Taylor continued the mission. Soon the dinghies were beached and the agents unloaded. The landing had been made at the base of a sheer cliff. Cautiously Taylor explored the area and found a small trail leading away from the little cove. After a hushed conversation and final 'good luck's' the agent began moving inland. Taylor and his two British counterparts were now faced with the problem of being on a hostile shore some hundred miles behind the enemy lines. One rubber boat had been punctured in the landing and the radio was dead.

It was now nearly 0200 and Taylor made the decision to return seaward in the single good rubber boat in hopes that the ARB would return to the area. After twenty minutes of hard paddling, the rescue ship was spotted. Unfortunately the Germans found the ARB at almost precisely the same time. Tracers began zinging through the night sky and a German patrol boat swept into view.

Once again the ARB's engines roared to life and the craft headed out to sea. Flare light bathed the area and only the shadow of the waves presented Taylor's little group from being discovered. The German patrol boat passed so close to the men huddled in the dinghy that the voices of the crew and the thud of their shoes on the metal deck could be clearly heard.

When the gunfire and flares had ceased, Taylor decided that the chance of a pick-up that night were gone. Fifty miles away was the largely uninhabited island of Gorgona. The decision was made to try and row there. The men had only a box of emergency rations and no water. Dawn was but a few hours away.

At 0530, as first light began to break in the East, the wind picked up. Naturally it was blowing in the wrong direction. At 0600 rain squalls developed and the little dinghy was pitched about like a cork. It was not until four or five hours later that the wind shifted to the Southwest. By that time, despite

continuous rowing, little headway had been made. Three men in a rubber boat were sitting a few miles off the Italian coast in broad daylight. Taylor had few options, Gorgona was now out of the question and the water would only last for a day and a half at the outside. Consequently it was determined that the only course of action was to remain in the immediate vicinity, pray that no German ships or aircraft passed, and trust to the Corsica operations staff.

All that day the three men took turns rowing the boat in one direction and having the wind push it back again. When night fell, they were dog tired but undetected. Taylor took the dinghy back to within 1000 yards of the pinpoint and waited.

At about midnight an enemy convoy passed with much flashing of signal lights. Thirty minutes later, Taylor began signalling to seaward with his red flashlight. A few more minutes passed and suddenly the sound of engines rumbled across the water. Taylor signalled again. No response.

Out of the darkness loomed the ARB. It was moving slowly toward shore. More signals with the flashlight yielded no recognition. Summoning their last ounce of strength, the men began rowing after the ARB, flashing the light and whistling. The power boat disappeared.

Now in a panic, Taylor removed the red filter from his light and began sweeping it around the area. This was guaranteed to get results from the shore but it paid off. As the first

rounds began falling into the water around them, the ARB hove to. Taylor and the two dingymen scrambled aboard. This time the flares and tracers were left permanently behind. For his coolness in continuing the mission and his leadership in enemy territory, Second Lieutenant Taylor was awarded the Bronze Star. His citation reads in part:

"Under fire on three occasions during two successive nights southeast of Genoa, and constantly in peril in enemy waters and ashore far from our lines, Second Lieutenant Taylor conducted himself with coolness and heroism to successfully carry out an important mission." 15

George Hearn left the Marine Corps in 1946 and returned to his home state of North Carolina where he opened his own automobile dealership. Elmer Harris helped pioneer the Alaskan wilderness as part of a group of businessmen involved in local aircraft companies. Walter Taylor was flown back to the United States upon his POW camp's liberation. He remained active in the Marine Corps Reserve until the mid-1950's when he moved to Mexico as part of his job with the University of New Mexico's anthropology program.

Before the Salerno landings, OSS had very limited experience in tying together the full range of activities associated with both clandestine operations and intelligence gathering functions. The lessons learned there stood the Allies in good stead during both OVERLORD and ANVIL. But all of these lessons were necessary in order to crack the toughest nut of them all: Germany itself.

CHAPTER XIII

"MAN, YOU MUST BE LOST OR SOMETHING"

On New Year's Day, 1945 a stocky officer reported to the headquarters of the Seventh U. S. Army's Strategic Services Section. While Marines were no common sight in eastern France, the Battle of the Bulge was still echoing through the Ardennes and Second Lieutenant Peter Viertel's arrival occasioned less comment than normal.

The Seventh Army SSS was only one of several such units attached to major commands, but it was surely the most successful. "Largely ineffectual detachments served with the Third and Ninth Armies. The First Army had thrown its detachment out shortly after D-Day... Only the OSS unit attached to the Seventh enjoyed a genuine standing in the field, a reputation won largely through meticulous planning and inventory of Nazi defenses in advance of the invasion of southern France."¹ Viertel would do nothing to tarnish that lustre.

Boss of the SI section was Henry Hyde, an acid-tongued civilian master of the doubleentendre. Viertel became one of his star pupils. Only a few months past his twenty-fourth birthday, Peter Viertel had nonetheless already seen plenty of life. Born in Dresden, Germany he had come to America as a boy and grew up in the babylonian Hollywood of the 1930's where his father worked as a motion picture director.

Viertel was himself a talented writer. Before he could vote ,

Viertel had authored the screen plays for Alfred Hitchcock's "Saboteur" and Warner Brother's "The Hard Way". His short stories appeared in national magazines and he had a full-length novel to his publishing credit. Viertel's intelligence was matched by good looks, a pleasant personality, and a devastating tennis backhand. The first two qualities would be of direct assistance during his OSS service.²

In July 1942, Peter Viertel enlisted in the Marine Corps. Of this decision, Frank Morely, his publisher at Harcourt-Brace would later write:

"...from the beginning he had an unserving devotion toward the Marines. He had, I believe, easier opportunities for obtaining a commission elsewhere, but he far preferred to enlist as a Private in the Corps. In that, and in every other way, he has always shown the proper spirit."

3

A year went by during which Viertel's time was largely confined to pounding a typewriter in San Diego. Not wanting to spend the entire war as a 'Remington Raider', Viertel applied for Officer Candidate School. He was screened, accepted, and commissioned a Second Lieutenant in August, 1944. OSS was desperately searching for German-speaking recruits. Viertel fitted that key requirement.

Alexander Patch, Commanding General of the Seventh Army, was pushing Hyde's section for detailed agent reports. But the Frenchmen who had proved so valuable in their own country were totally unsuitable for missions beyond the rapidly approaching Rhine. Hyde needed native Germans who knew not only the language

but also the day-to-day inner workings of life under the Nazi regime. One source of such men was immediately apparent.

But there was a significant catch: all were former members of Hitler's armed forces.

"Using POWs as agents was then expressly forbidden by SHAEF, and the prohibition against recruiting German soldiers had been rigorously respected by the British. Canvassing for potential spies among POWs was questionable as well under the Geneva Convention.

Patch was nothing if not practical. He told Hyde to go ahead and use the prisoners. Hyde reminded him of the SHAEF prohibition. Patch asked who was the key to evading this obstacle. "General Donovan", Hyde informed him.

Hyde flew to London to meet Donovan and to perform the kind of Jesuitry which was second nature to him. Before his departure, Patch had said, restraining a wink, that if Hyde could not follow orders, then he was finished with the Seventh Army. General Donovan conveniently agreed that Hyde had no other choice but to follow his field commander's orders; therefore, Donovan's hands were clean. The SHAEF prohibition was thus quietly sidestepped. On his return, Hyde informed his people that their objective now lay across the Rhine. Recruiting began immediately." 4

Hyde organized his men and outlined their mission. One of three officers chosen to evaluate potential agents was Peter Viertel. Another was newly arrived Marine First Lieutenant Charles A. (Carl) Muecke, a William and Mary Phi Beta Kappa of German descent.⁵ To round-out the group, Hyde picked the unit's paymaster, Army Lieutenant Peter Sichel, a British-educated German Jew who was heir to the famous Sichel wine importing empire.

Seventh Army G-2 set about identifying likely prospects. Once given a few leads, Viertel, Sichel, and Muecke took over. Potential recruits were first assigned to routine working parties. Then each

man was casually detailed to a job which took him to an area out of sight and sound of the others. Once isolated, the 'target' was picked-up by a member of the assessment team and individually grilled. If a man passed this initial interview, he was observed for a few days and then routed to Hyde for the final 'hard sell'. Those found completely suitable and appropriately motivated were blindfolded and taken to a safehouse for indoctrination, training, and assimilation of a cover story.

Lieutenant Muecke also performed the vital function of acquiring genuine documents for use by agents inside the Reich. Those which could be so had were collected from other POWs.

"Muecke had once gone into a cage to collect documents. He stood on a jeep before ten thousand prisoners and spoke to them through a loudspeaker. He told the prisoners to turn-in their leave papers, hospital passes, travel permits, and ration coupons. One soldier objected. 'Under the Geneva Convention we don't have to give these things to you.' A dozen others leaped to their feet and shouted the man down. 'Be quiet. Can't you see an officer is speaking'." 6

Teutonic respect for authority was thus one of OSS's most valuable recruiting aids.

The Geneva Convention was frequently stretched if not downright ignored. Those POWs who were recruited simply disappeared from camp rosters. Since there were several hundred thousand German prisoners, the disappearance of a man here and there could be, and was, laid to administrative oversight and his physical absence to routine transfer.

Initially Hyde attempted to infiltrate his agents in the same manner utilized in France, namely through the frontlines on foot or by jeep. But the U. S. Army's combat soldiers were often little more cooperative than was the enemy. Ground troops frequently refused to participate in what they viewed as an insane scheme to send Nazis home to Hitler with American assistance. After taking heavy casualties, Viertel proposed that further infiltrations be performed by short-range paradrop. This idea resulted in a series of highly successful operations which were euphemistically dubbed "tourist mission". Unfortunately for the early 'tourists' there was little time for parachute training. Some made their first jump directly into clandestine combat.

The 'tour' consisted of an agent moving along a predetermined route inside Germany. Specific instructions on what to look for and remember were hammered into the recruit. The German proclivity for methodical attention to detail made this task easier. Agents were as well prepared as possible. Instead of a mere 'dogtag', each was equipped with a complete and frequently totally authentic batch of papers, passes, forms, and the like. Documents which could not be gleaned from Muecke's periodic sweeps through the camps were manufactured. Initially most came from OSS magnificent London forging center. Later, a rubber stamp factory and printing firm in Strasbourg were doing top quality work as well. "An ex-German clerk assisted in the draftsmanship of Soldebuecher, Wehrpassen, etc., and a former Austrian of the Gebirgs-Jaeger Regiment advised on

travel procedures and executed endorsements." ⁷

During January and February 1945, twenty of the thirty-one agents who were dropped by parachute successfully completed their assignments and returned through the Seventh Army's lines. During the same period, footbound infiltration attempts suffered more than 60% casualties.

Women offered even greater potential than male POWs. Even if they spoke German with a slight accent, their presence within the Reich could be laid to all sorts of exigencies of war. Viertel came up with three prize recruits in particular: Maria, Emily, and Ada.

Maria came from the rough mining area south of Strasbourg in the Alsace. Viertel found her cooling her heels in a detention camp for Nazi collaborators. During the previous three years, Maria had been the loving mistress of a local Gestapo officer. Now, with the outcome of the war a forgone conclusion, she wanted to perform some act which would wipe away the stain of her error and put her back in the good graces of her neighbors.

A cover story was concocted which portrayed Maria as a German Army nurse. Meanwhile she completed a very basic parachute training course and learned how to spot information of military significance. Maria did not completely change her ways however. She was accustomed to being around soldiers and never claimed to possess the highest of moral standards. While at the SSS training areas, she ingratiated herself to agent and ally alike in a random and physical fashion.

On 3 February 1945, Maria was transferred to the airfield at Lyon to await the plane which would drop her near Stuttgart.

"Just before takeoff, Maria informed Peter Viertel that she had a novel problem. She was, the stunned Marine learned, pregnant. Why now? Why had she waited so long to tell him? Maria made it clear that she had no intention of frustrating the mission. But she wanted to strike a bargain. She expected to be gone less than two weeks. After she had thus performed her part of the agreement, she wanted the Americans to arrange an 8 abortion."

Viertel was uncertain of his options but finally decided to go ahead. Maria was dropped as planned, carried out her mission brilliantly, and was subsequently overrun by advancing American units. The OSS kept its side of the deal. Lieutenant Sichel took Maria to the local French hospital and described her as a modern day Joan of Arc who had given 'everything but her life' for the resistance. There were no problems with the doctor.

Emily and Ada did not work out as well. Ada was an Italian acrobat. To her parachuting was child's play. She hated the Germans and wanted nothing more than to hurt them. But despite five separate flights over the crumbling Fatherland, she was never able to match-up with a navigator who could locate the proper drop zone.

Emily was recommended by French intelligence. She too proved an apt pupil and was anxious to operate behind German lines. It seemed too good to be true and it was. After a successful drop,

Emily removed the crystals from her radio and replaced them with a set provided by the Deuxieme Bureau. Thereafter she operated solely for France.

Meanwhile, other Marines were serving with OSS field army detachments. Captain John Hamilton (Hayden) had the ill-fortune to be assigned to the First Army. From the beginning the G-2 had made it plain that he wanted as little to do with Donovan's special warriors as possible. After August 1944, there was only a token OSS force attached to the command and when Hayden arrived in early January 1945, the situation was unimproved.

"The jeep was driven by a man who was far from home. "Captain", he said, "if you don't object to the question, haven't I seen you somewhere before?"

"Not that I can recall", said the officer. It was cold, colder than Maine. Maybe, he thought, when I get near combat my circulation slows down. "Captain", if you don't object to the question, is that there a German soldier suit you got on?"

"I'm a Marine."

The driver whistled. "A United States Marine? Man, you must be lost or something." 9

Hayden spent the remainder of the war with the First Army. It was a far cry from his experiences in the Adriatic. There was little for the OSS detachment to do and eventually he found a job working with the political section of the G-2. Hayden's OSS superior was 24-year-old blue blood, Stuyvesant Wainwright II, a wealthy conservative who later served two terms in Congress. Wainwright delighted in taunting Hayden about his passionate support for Tito

and his avowedly left-wing politics. Hayden responded with unidigital salutations and saluted with the communist clenched fist.

The Third Army also had its Marine: Second Lieutenant John Wallendahl Mowinckel, USMCR. Mowinckel was born in Genoa, Italy in July, 1920. His father, John A. Mowinckel, was head of European operations for the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The Mowinckel's were a distinguished Norwegian family - one of young John's uncles had been Prime Minister - and it showed in the Lieutenant's features. Tall, blond, and fair-skinned, he spoke six languages: Norwegian, French, German, Italian, Spanish and English. ¹⁰

Mowinckel was an excellent skier and ice hockey player. Educated in Switzerland and at St. Paul's in Concord, New Hampshire, he entered Princeton in 1939 as a modern languages major. While at Old Nassau, Mowinckel joined the Marine Corps Reserve as a Private. Commissioned in October 1943, he graduated from the 38th Reserve Officer Class and was detailed to OSS for duty.

Following the normal cloak and dagger training, Mowinckel was shipped-off to England where he joined the Third Army's OSS detachment. During the drive through France he won the Bronze Star and Crois de Guerre for fighting his way out of a German ambush while on an agent drop fifteen kilometers beyond the front. ¹¹

As has already been noted, the Third Army detachment did not shine so brightly as did that of the Seventh. By Lieutenant Mowinckel could not be blamed for the lacklustre record. In early May 1945,

he won the Silver Star less than a week before hostilities ceased. The Third Army was then sweeping southeast through Austria toward the Red Army forces from the opposite direction.

"On 3 May 1945, Lieutenant Mowinckel courageously volunteered to infiltrate through enemy lines to establish contact with Soviet forces thought to be in the vicinity of Perg, Austria. Accompanied by two intelligence agents, he fearlessly proceeded far beyond the front. Although halted and interrogated by German SS personnel, Lieutenant Mowinckel succeeded in talking his way out and proceeded with his vital mission." 12

The activities of men like Viertel, Hayden, Mowinckel, and Muecke all resulted in the intelligence penetration of Hitler's Reich. But in general the rewards were less dramatic than those achieved by the longrange missions dropped from London.

An essential element of all successful intelligence collection operations is the ability to transmit information to those who can analyze and distribute it. "As the final battle against Germany began, the Reich presented problems which largely nullified all previous agent communications techniques. OSS solved these through the development and use of a device known as Joan-Eleanor (J-E)." 13

Joan-Eleanor was the codename for a remarkably compact two-way radio. Operating on a line-of-sight basis at very high frequency, the J-E's signal was virtually impossible to detect through the normal direction finding procedures. The set itself was less than six inches long and weighed only four pounds. Since it was battery powered there was no requirement for external electricity.

J-E did have one important drawback and that was range.

Since the system was developed to allow agents to operate amid the mainstream of German civilian life - far from the front - a relay was necessary. The answer to this was a small group of Mosquito bombers. The Mosquito could speed across the German sky at 30,000 feet. In its reconfigured tail section was the J-E operator who spoke to the agent on the ground. Conversation was in plain language and all transmissions were recorded. This procedure allowed the same amount of information to be passed in a short message that had previously required up to an hour.

Joan-Eleanor was the brainchild of Navy Reserve Lieutenant Commander Stephen H. Simpson, Jr., a thirty-seven-year-old electrical engineer. "Before the war, Simpson had been an RCA scientist with a long interest in radio-transmission technology dating back to 1928. As a young man, Simpson worked on a pioneer RCA project to rebroadcast the Christmas tolling of Big Ben via shortwave from London to New York's radio station WJZ. Sixteen years later, Simpson found himself assigned to OSS London, still probing the potentialities of radio wave propagation." ¹⁴

While J-E was Simpson's idea, the man who changed concept to capability was DeWitt Goddard, another former RCA scientist. Simpson had Goddard yanked from his job at Riverhead Labs in New York, commissioned in the Navy, and flown immediately to England. The new officer was put into the field with such speed that he did not even own a uniform.

Once the OSS communicators* were satisfied with Joan-Eleanor's potential, the system was field tested by an agent parachuted into Holland. Soon the results were in - J-E was cleared for use inside Germany. The men chosen for the first missions deep into the Reich were almost exclusively anti-Nazi expatriates. Most of them were former trade unionists with strong socialist or communist political backgrounds.

Then yet another problem loomed. The Mosquito, while extremely fast, was limited in range. The planes had been stripped of every nonessential item to accommodate the added weight of the J-E operator (including the IFF gear). Adding agents and jumpmasters would diminish the combat radius of the aircraft still more. Additionally, the Mosquito was a British airplane with no set logistical support system in the American Army Air Corps.

OSS wanted a plane which could fly at roughly the same speed and altitude as the Mosquito but had the 'legs' necessary to carry agents as far east as Berlin. The result was utilization of the new Douglas A-26, a twin-engine attack bomber which could outrun many of the Luftwaffe's night fighters and possessed a 1400 mile range. Two of these aircraft were wheedled from the Air Corps. The A-26 would thus carry the agent and the Mosquito the J-E equipment and operator.

All seemed ready, then yet another hitch developed. The stalling

*It is worthy of note that one of OSS's most important communications officers was Marine Reserve Major Frederick Willis. Willis was in his late 40's when he was commissioned to act as Executive Officer for the Communications Branch. A World War I Army combat veteran, he was the only Marine Corps Reserve Officer appointed directly to Field rank for duty with OSS.

speed of the A-26 was more than 150 knots. OSS was used to dropping agents at much more leisurely paces. To ensure that the "26" could safely disgorge its human cargo, Simpson requested a series of test jumps. The results gave immediate cause for concern.

The first two dummies dropped from 'the hole' splattered off the bulbous underside turret. Longer static lines were rigged and the tests continued. After a few more tries, the dummies began to clear. Now human jumpers were required. The first man to successfully exit was Marine Gunnery Sergeant Larry Elder, a member of the Special Force parachute training detachment.¹⁵ Right behind him was Sergeant George Usher of the RAF. Joan-Eleanor and the A-26 were alerted for a visit to the German capital.

In addition to the trade union men, OSS had recruited a number of Belgian agents. These were primarily targeted against the elusive National Redoubt. Soon after his return from GERMINAL, Captain William Grell was placed in charge of handling these operations. As head of the OSS Belgian desk, Grell brought not only operational experience of his own but also his credentials as a native .

Grell's brother, Leon, was also involved in this work. Leon Grell became a Marine officer in much the same way that DeWitt Goddard had 'joined' the Navy. Without benefit of any formal Marine Corps training or even American citizenship, Leon Grell was assigned the task of preparing agents for infiltrating the Bavarian mountains. His duty title was 'conducting officer'.

Leon would meet the agents at a nondescript location in London. He would check their clothing (provided by a highly competent .

OSS 'custom tailoring' service) and escort them to RAF Harrington. There another security check was conducted to ensure that no shred of evidence existed which could link the agent to England. When Grell was satisfied, a second security man took over and did the entire thing yet a third time. All personal papers and valuables were collected and held for the agent's return. Then the false identification items were handed out.

"Grell went over their papers, ID cards, ration card, census card, birth certificate. He opened the suitcase which he had brought from London and began distributing items. "Wear this money belt around your waist. Keep your big money in it. Remember, you're a conscript laborer, Live like one. Grell gave each man a set of pills. The blue pill was benzedrine sulfate to overcome fatigue. The white pills were knockout drops which would put someone out for six hours. The third was the cyanide-laden "L" pill. The capsule was encased in rubber. To kill himself, the agent would have to bite into it. The rubber casing would otherwise allow the pill to be swallowed harmlessly.

16

The Grell would issue each man a pistol and his jumping coveralls. The weapons were of U. S. manufacture and were supposed to be buried along with the jumpsuit. This obvious precaution was usually ignored because there is something intrinsically comforting about having a Smith and Wesson in one's pocket. Agent jumpsuits were specially fabricated models with a mustard and green camouflage pattern. A long zipper ran from neck to crotch, allowing the agent to get out quickly after hitting the ground. With these preliminaries accomplished, the agent would don his helmet and chute, receive a final safety check, and board the A-26.

Deep drops were astonishingly successful. OSS parachuted more than two hundred agents into the Third Reich and nearly all of the

Longrange missions were from Harrington. But there were casualties. One was Sergeant Fred Brunner, the member of Ortiz' ill-fated UNION II who had escaped by swimming the Isere under fire.

Brunner had been awarded the Silver Star for his work in France. When the mission was withdrawn he continued to service with OSS in England. In mi-March 1945, Brunner was detailed to act as jumpmaster for the CHISEL mission, a longrange penetration to Hamm, Germany.

CHISEL revolved around a communist coal miner turned intellectual named Karl Macht. The drop date was set for 19 March. Lieutenant Commander Simpson was having trouble with the Air Corps, but his difficulties appeared to be waning.* Or so it seemed until he learned that the plane scheduled to fly CHISEL was badly in need of repair and carried a faulty radio.

Usually OSS was placed in the position of asking the Air Corps to fly deep missions but on this occasion the roles were reversed. Simpson wanted the flight scrubbed but the Air Corps opted to 'get it over with'. The aircraft was A-26 #524. This plane had carried out the OSS HAMMER mission to Berlin some days earlier. Now it was sitting on the tarmac at Harrington with both engines torn down. Additionally, a storm was brewing and weather all the way to the target was forecast to be marginal.

The crew assigned to fly CHISEL had never worked together.

*The problems with the Air Corps were largely those of coordination. The 492nd Bomb Group had thought it would be given a chance to fly regular bombing sorties after it had finished supporting the maquis in France. Agent dropping was both dangerous and ungalamorous.

Lieutenant Emmel, the pilot, was not fully 'checked-out' in the A-26. Nevertheless, a desk-bound colonel decreed that the mission would go.

At 2230 on the night of 19 March 1945, the glossy black bomber roared into the rainy sky and turned east. Its motors quickly droned into the blackness and in a few moments all that was left was the sweep of the wind and the splattering of rain drops on the oil-soaked parking stands. There were four crew members and the agent aboard. None was ever heard from again. ¹⁷

Peter Viertel returned to writing after the war. Today he is married to screen star Deborah Kerr and lives in Klosters, Switzerland.¹⁸ Carl Muecke returned to the the United States and worked as a newspaper reporter in Arizona while studying the law. He now sits on the bench of the U. S. Circuit Court in Phoenix.¹⁹ John Mowinckel also followed the journalistic profession as a reporter and economic analyst for U. S. News and World Report. He later joined the U. S. Information Agency and served as various posts in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. From 1971-75, Mowinckel was Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Vienna. Today he lives in Paris and is associated with the International Energy Agency.²⁰ Sterling Hayden resigned his Marine commission in 1947 stating that his wartime experiences had taught him that land combat was not his metier. Hayden wrote the Commandant that in any future conflict he would prefer to serve strictly at sea as a Coast Guard or Navy

officer.²¹ No longer active in motion pictures, Hayden lives on Cape Cod and devotes his time to writing. William Grell remained in the Marine Corps Reserve and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in the early 1960's. He too returned to his civilian occupation of hotel manager and lived for many years in the Belgian Congo. Now eighty years old, he has settled in New England.

EPILOGUE

The duties of the Office of Strategic Services were to collect and analyze information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to plan, organize, and employ Special Forces at their direction. In a sense, the OSS was viewed as a purely wartime expedient which should be liquidated as soon as the immediate conflict ceased. Certainly President Truman saw it that way. The Office was terminated on 1 October 1945 by Executive Order. As of that date, the United States was in precisely the same condition vis-a-vis intelligence as it had been in June, 1941.

A goodly number of governmental officials and private citizens liked it that way. J. Edgar Hoover was particularly satisfied. He already had grandiose plans to co-opt the foreign intelligence mission for his FBI. The State Department, which under Truman's Order absorbed the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS, heaved an institutional sigh of relief and rapidly dismantled most of the analytic apparatus. Scholars were out...diplomats were in.

The War Department received the remaining personnel and assets of the Secret Intelligence and Counter-espionage Branches. Special Operations - the paramilitary branch which had done such yeoman service behind enemy lines - was simply scrapped.

It would be several years before the nation fully realized that its role as a legitimate Great Power made 'business as usual' impossible. The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the National Security Act of 1947, was a belated attempt to reconstruct and refine the organization which Donovan had built during World War II. By then, most of the Marines who served with OSS were civilians once more.

Today it is tempting to wonder whether those men (and woman) were really 'Marines' at all. Any schoolboy knows that the U. S. Marines captured Guadalcanal, stormed Saipan, and raised the flag on Mount Surabachi. The Marine Corps' official histories of the war rightly concentrate on these achievements in the Pacific. Similarly, most popular historical writing focuses on the great amphibious operations to the exclusion of everything else.

Nowhere is the Donovan controversy discussed in any detail. Only Updegraph and Ladd even allude to his role in the establishment of the Raider Battalions. Not one Marine officer in a hundred has

ever heard of Peter Ortiz, Walter Mansfield, Hod Fuller, or George Hearn. But they were Marines in every sense of the word and thought of themselves as such.

Charles Henry Fenn, an expatriate Englishman, who served as a Marine Captain in Burma and China and was later deprived of his U. S. citizenship for failing to maintain continuous residence in America summed it up well:

"I served with the Office of Strategic Services for a total of 23 months overseas, partly in India and the Hukong Valley of Burma but mostly in South China. I was far from the normal Marine Corps, but I never forgot that I was a U. S. Marine Officer. I was awarded the Bronze Star for establishing the intelligence network in French Indo-China and the Soldier's Medal as leader of the POW rescue mission to Canton. Now my citizenship has been taken from me.

I am, indeed, most regretful to be dropped from the Marine Corps' rolls, but I realize this is inevitable for one who has been deprived of his citizenship. I reaffirm my gratitude for the lasting benefits which I received through my association with the Corps. Semper Fidelis." 2

Marines take pride in having 'fought in every clime and place'. During World War II, some of those places were: Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Corsica, France, Greece, India, Italy, Malaya, Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

Today, inside the entrance to Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, the following words are enscribed: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Someday perhaps the full truth regarding the limited but important role of Marines with the OSS will be fully recounted. In the meantime, this paper is a beginning.

NOTES

CHAPTER I - "THE WORST SLAP IN THE FACE..."

¹Contemporary accounts of opposition to Donovan's appointment - Hoover referred to it as "Roosevelt's folly" - are plentiful. A representative example is "Job for Donovan" Newsweek (July 21, 1941), pp. 15-16. The best concise description of the entire appointment process and its ramifications is found in William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance (New York: Dial Press/James Wade, 1977) Chpt. 3.

²A short biographical summary of Donovan's career comprises Annex A to this paper. A more extensive popular biography is Corry Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston: Little Brown, 1970). See also Corson, pp. 119-128 and F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (London: Harper & Row, 1974) p. 199 for details on what was probably the most significant allied intelligence source during World War II.

³For details of Donovan's charter as COI see Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS (New York: Walker, 1976) pp. 5-8. It should be noted that this comprises the first of two published volumes of the official wartime history of the Office of Strategic Services and its forerunner the Office of Coordinator of Information. The original report was prepared during 1946-47 under the aegis of the Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Kermit Roosevelt was the Chief Historian. Originally classified Top Secret, the report was "sanitized" by C A and released to the National Archives in 1975 (in this case, "sanitized" means that most names of American personnel and certain details of financial transactions with other intelligence services have been deleted). The published versions are exact duplicates of the National Archives copy with the major exception that they do not contain the primary 'exhibits'. Hereafter, all reference to the War Report relate to the published version unless otherwise noted.

⁴Elliott Roosevelt, ed., The Roosevelt Letters (New York: Random House, 1952) Vol. III, p. 297. See also H. M. Hyde, Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York During World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1962), p. 34.

⁵Top Secret Memorandum, William J. Donovan to The President of the United States, dated 22 December 1941. A facsimile is lodged in Annex B of this paper. (Copy in National Archives copy of War Report).

⁶Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 177.

⁷Robert D. Heintz, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1962) p. 306.

⁸Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1954) Vol. III, p. 648.

⁹Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, Manfred Jones, ed., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (London: Barrie, Jenkins, 1976) p. 85. Hereafter referred to as Wartime Correspondence.

¹⁰War Report, Vol. I., p. 16.

¹¹Charles L. Updegraph, Jr., Special Marine Corps Units of World War II (Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1972) p. 1. See also James Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II (London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1978) pp. 95-96 and John W. Gordon, "The U. S. Marines and an Experiment in Military Elitism: A Reassessment of the Special Warfare Impetus 1937-43" (n.p.) pp. 1-5. Copy provided by the author.

¹²Michael Blankfort, The Big Yankee (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947) p. 123.

¹³Gordon, "Experiment in Elitism", p. 7.

¹⁴Captain Evans F. Carlson, USMC, "A Report on the Military Activities in Northwest China with Special Regard to the Organization and Tactics of the Eighth Route Army (Ex-communist)" dated 23 March 1938. This report, originally classified 'Confidential', is lodged in the Library of the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (Copy provided by Dr. Gordon).

¹⁵U. S. Department of the Navy, Oral History Transcript of Major General Oscar F. Peatross, USMC (Ret), (Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1975) pp. 70-76. See also Blankfort, pp. 264-288.

¹⁶Udegraph, Ladd, and Gordon all discuss the Donovan appointment. Detailed documentation of the developing Marine Corps position follows in subsequent notations. Facsimiles of most primary documents are lodged in Annex B of this paper.

¹⁷Confidential letter, Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR to The Major General Commandant dated 13 January 1942. (Classified Raider File, Marine Corps Records, National Archives, Washington; hereafter referred to as Raider File). A copy is ~~located~~ in Annex B to this paper. For an interesting comment on Roosevelt's plan to attack Japan proper see: U. S. Department of the Navy, Oral History Transcript of Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer, USMC (Ret), (Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1974) pp. 195-96. So far as publicity for the British commandos in the American press was concerned, see Evelyn Waugh, "Commando Raid on Bardia", Life (November 17, 1941) as a representative but more elegantly written example of the genre

¹⁸Ladd, Commandos and Rangers, p. 95.

¹⁹Secret Memorandum, Admiral E. J. King, USN to Major General Holcomb dated 8 January 1942. (Original lodged in Classified Central Files, Marine Corps Records, National Archives, Washington; hereafter referred to as Classified Central Files) See Annex B for complete facsimile.

²⁰This message is quoted verbatim in Confidential Letter, Major General Holcomb to Major General Clayton B. Vogel, USMC dated 10 February 1942. (Copy lodged in Classified Central Files). A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper.

²¹Secret message, SPENAVO London to COMINCH #091421 January 1942. (Copy lodged in Classified Central Files). The substance of this message is repeated in Secret Letter, COMINCH to CNO dated 16 January 1942, a copy of which is provided in Annex B to this paper.

²²Secret Letter, Major General Commandant to COMINCH dated 10 January 1942. (Copy ~~lodged~~ in Classified Central Files).

²³Confidential letter, Major General Commandant to Major General H. M. Smith, USMC dated 14 January 1942. (Copy ~~lodged~~ in Classified Central Files). The letter to Major General Price was identical in every detail to the one sent Smith. A facsimile is ~~located~~ in Annex B to this paper. Apparently, another copy went to Major General C. B. Vogel USMC as well.

²⁴Confidential Letter, Major General H. M. Smith, USMC to Major General Commandant dated 16 January 1942. (Original lodged in Classified Central Files). A copy of Smith's complete and acidic reply is ~~located~~ in Annex B to this paper.

²⁵Confidential Letter, Major General Price to Major General Holcomb dated 16 January 1942 (Original lodged in Classified Central Files). A complete facsimile is ~~located~~ in Annex B to this paper. See also Updegraph, pp. 2-3.

²⁶Personal Letter, Major General Price to Major General Holcomb dated 16 January 1942. (Original lodged in the Thomas Holcomb collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard; hereafter referred to as Holcomb Papers). A complete facsimile is ~~located~~ in Annex B to this paper.

²⁷Secret Letter, COMINCH (King) to CNO (Stark) dated 16 January 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File). A complete facsimile is ~~located~~ in Annex B to this paper.

²⁸Personal Letter, Major General Holcomb to Mr. Samuel Meek dated 19 January 1942. (Copy lodged in Holcomb Papers). A complete facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper.

²⁹Newsweek, (January 19, 1942) p. 9.

³⁰Secret Letter, CINCPACFLT (Nimitz) to CG 2ndJTF (Vogel) dated 24 January 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File).

³¹Secret Memorandum, Holcomb to COMINCH (King), Subject: "Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of "Commando-type", dated 4 February 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File). A complete facsimile is located at Annex B to this paper. See also, Secret despatch, COMINCH to CINCLANTFLT dated 5 February 1942, Ibid.

³²For details of the Navy's official perception of the entire period, see U. S. Navy Department, Report to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs (1st Session, 79th Congress, October 22, 1945) pp. 55-62. This document is commonly referred to as the "Eberstadt Report". The Records of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives (Washington) are an additional source. These contain primary documentation of the complete spectrum of JCS activities including later dealings with OSS; hereafter referred to as JCS Report.

³³Confidential letter, Lieutenant General Holcomb to Major General Vogel dated 10 February 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File). A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper.

³⁴Confidential letter, Lieutenant General Holcomb to Major General H. M. Smith dated 11 February 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File). A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper. The reader is cautioned that the letter to Smith is identical to that written to Vogel (see note 33 above) for the first page only. Both of these comprise an important synopsis of Marine Corps positions relative to the Donovan appointment and the means to counter it.

³⁵The complete text of this message is reproduced in Wartime Correspondence pp. 184-86.

³⁶Personal letter, Lieutenant General Holcomb to Brigadier General Fegan dated 9 March 1942. (Copy lodged in Holcomb Papers). A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper. As for what Fegan "could do" about the Donovan matter, it should be noted that as Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Division, both Carlson and James Roosevelt came under his authority. It is impossible to determine whether this personal link to the President was utilized. However, James Roosevelt in particular was no great respecter of military rank when it came to expressing opinions or getting his way. For an interesting example see the previously cited Pfeiffer Transcript.

³⁷Secret memorandum, Coordinator of Information to Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 2 March 1942. (Copy lodged in JCS Files). See also Alfred D. Chandler, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins, 1970) Vol. I, pp. 253-54.

CHAPTER II - "ONE OF A KIND, UNIQUE..."

¹John Chamberlain, "OSS, Life (November 19, 1945) p. 119.

²Robert B. Asprey, At Belleau Wood (New York: Putnam, 1965) p. 165. For more detailed information regarding Eddy's 4-5 June patrol, see U. S. Army, Records of the Second Division (Regular) (Washington: The Army War College, 1927) Vol. 8. This work, hereafter referred to as Second Division Records is comprised of 10 large volumes. Pagination is not present in those utilized by this writer.

³Second Division Records, Operational Reports and War Diaries, Marine Brigade, 1918, Vol. 7. (n.p. as previously noted) See also Jane Blackeney, Heroes, U. S. Marine Corps 1861-1955 (Washington: Guthrie, 1957) p. 147.

⁴Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, USMC, With the Help of God and a Few Marines (New York: Doubleday and Page, 1919) p. 424.

⁵Who Was Who in America, (Chicago: Marquis Press, 1968) p. 278.

⁶U. S. Marine Corps, Biographical Summary W. A. Eddy (Washington: circa 1943) n.p. This is a very rough MS apparently prepared for the Public Relations Branch of Headquarters Marine Corps. (Copy lodged in Biographical Files, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, hereafter referred to as Biographical Files). See also Ford, Donovan of OSS, p. 135 and R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972) pp. 41-42.

⁷Personal letter, Major General Holcomb to Major W. A. Eddy dated 28 January 1941. (Copy lodged in Holcomb Papers).

⁸For the best concise account of this period - which saw another important Donovan "mystery man" trip - see Corson, pp. 110-120. The quotation from the London News Chronicle is repeated in Newsweek (December 16, 1940) p. 16.

¹⁰War Report, p. 93.

¹¹Ibid., p. 94. See also, Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964) pp. 90-93.

¹²Top Secret Memorandum, William J. Donovan to President Roosevelt, dated 3 January 1942. (Copy lodged in National Archives edition of War Report). A complete facsimile is located in Annex C to this paper.

¹³Memorandum endorsement, OP-16-F, Office of Naval Intelligence to 2nd Lieut. Holcomb, F. P., Request for duty as Assistant Naval Attache, Cairo, dated 23 June 1941. (Copy lodged in Marine Corps Files, Federal Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri; hereafter referred to as FRC Files).

¹⁴War Report, p. 94.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁶Major Guy Richards, USMCR, "The Damnedest Assignments", an unpublished rough MS, apparently written for Public Relations Branch, Headquarters, Marine Corps, in 1948, p. 442. (Partial copy lodged in Holcomb Papers; hereafter referred to as Richards MS).

¹⁷For a detailed account of the action alluded to in the note, see Warren Tute, The Deadly Stroke (New York: Coward, McCann, 1973).

¹⁸Letter, U. S. Naval Attache, Tangier to Director of Naval Intelligence, dated May 20th, 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files). A facsimile is located in Annex C to this paper.

¹⁹William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Norton, 1947) p. 239.

²⁰Secret Message, Naval Attache, Tangier to Coordinator of Information, dated 14 April 1942. (Copy lodged in Millard Goodfellow Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; hereafter referred to as Goodfellow Papers).

²¹Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 244.

²²War Report, Vol. II, p. 14.

²³Quoted in, Personal letter, Rear Admiral A. G. Kirk, USN to Lieutenant General Holcomb dated 8 August 1942. (Copy lodged in Holcomb Papers).

²⁴News of this promotion was relayed to the Commandant by Captain McCrea, the President's naval aide. See Memorandum for the Record dated 27 July 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

²⁵Most Secret Personal message #107, Churchill to Roosevelt dated July 8, 1942, reproduced in Wartime Correspondence, p. 222.

²⁶Top Secret and Personal message, Roosevelt to Churchill dated 27 July 1942, Ibid. p. 227. For details of the entire affair, see the excellent concise account in Warren Tute, The North African War (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1976) pp. 62-71.

²⁷Smith, p. 51

²⁸Quoted in Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa-the OSS and American Espionage (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948) p. 87. A similar account is given by Smith. For details of Eddy's written approach to JCS which was similar to his midnight briefing of Strong, Patton, and Doolittle, see his Memorandum to JCS dated 10 June 1942. (Copy lodged in Goodfellow Papers).

²⁹(from Associated Press) "Fierce Fighting 80 Miles From Stalingrad", Baltimore Sun (30 July 1942) p. 1.

³⁰Secret, "Eyes Only" message, Eisenhower to George C. Marshall (#1027) dated August 10, 1942. (Copy lodged in Eisenhower Papers).

³¹Smith, p. 56.

³²Richards MS, pp. 442-445. Alsop and Braden also relate this story in essentially the same terms; however the ham incident is not mentioned.

³³Secret message, Marshall to Eisenhower, dated 2 October 1942. (Copy lodged in Eisenhower Papers).

³⁴See series of correspondence lodged in FRC Files. Eisenhower also recommended that Eddy be made Senior U. S. military attache in North Africa.

³⁵Who Was Who in America, p. 278.

³⁶Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 92. Eddy left the State Department in October, 1947 to become political advisor to the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Interesting during the 1958 Lebanon crisis, the American diplomat sent to resolve the situation was Robert D. Murphy. Upon his arrival, Murphy learned that the U. S. Marine forces were being advised on political matters by a retired Colonel: William A. Eddy. Colonel Eddy died in Beirut on 3 May 1962 and is buried near his Sidon birthplace.

CHAPTER III "FOR EXCELLENT PERSONAL REASONS"

¹Special Order, Commandant of the Marine Corps to Captain Peter J. ORTIZ, USMCR, 012779 dated 23 December 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

²The account of Ortiz' early life and service with the Foreign Legion is from an unpublished MS prepared by Headquarters Marine Corps in 1952 - apparently for submission to the Reader's Digest. Check of that publication reveals no evidence that the story was ever considered for publication. The author of the MS is unknown; however there are a number of direct quotations from Ortiz which suggest that he cooperated with the writer. The style is very similar to that of the previously cited Richard's MS. A complete copy of the rough document is located in the Biographical Files, Marine Corps

Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard; hereafter referred to as Digest MS.

³
Ibid. p. 4.

⁴
War Report, Vol. II., p. 19.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Secret Memorandum, Captain Peter J. Ortiz, USMCR to Major General William J. Donovan dated 15 May 1943. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.) This document constitutes Ortiz' "after action report" for his assignment in North Africa. It and several other still-Secret appendices are located in the classified archives of the Marine Corps Historical Center.

⁷The injury to "a Marine Officer" is mentioned in the War Report, Volume II, p. 21. As usual, no name is provided. However, a casualty list for members of the OSS Naval Command dated 16 September 1945 which was provided by CIA reveals: "Harris, Elmer, Captain, USMCR, WIA land mine, Tunisia, 3 March 1943". For more on Captain Harris see a later chapter of this paper.

⁸Secret Memorandum, Ortiz to Donovan, op.cit. (n.p.)

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid. The handwritten note from Donovan to his Executive Officer, Colonel Buxton, is written across the top of the first page.

¹¹Digest MS, p. 5.

¹²War Report, Vol II. p. 21.

CHAPTER IV "A PUNGENT COLLECTION..."

¹Military Order, "Office of Strategic Services", The White House, June 13, 1942, /s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander-in-Chief. (Copy lodged in National Archives Copy of War Report, Volume I, p. 282.) A facsimile is located in Annex C to this paper.

²Hyde, Room 3603, p. 174.

³John Paton Davies Jr., Dragon By The Tail (New York: J. W. Norton, 1972) p. 287.

⁴Ford, Donovan of OSS, p. 122. The 'monkey house' description was actually based on fact. When COI occupied the National Health Institute building, the top floor was still being used as a laboratory containing a variety of animals - goats, guinea pigs, and monkeys. In order to secure the space for his offices, Donovan complained that an infected monkey had gotten loose and bitten a stenographer. The lab was forced to move out and COI gained use of the entire structure.

⁵Speech, Allen Dulles to Eire County Bar Association, "William J. Donovan and National Security", (Buffalo, N. Y.) 4 May 1959.

⁶Smith, p. 13.

⁷Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 8 June 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

⁸Letter, William L. Langer to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 21 June 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

⁹Letter, Colonel David K. E. Bruce to William J. Donovan dated 14 May 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

¹⁰Who's Who in America (1978), p. 710.

¹¹Gard's brief military biography is based on a synthesis of letters, reports, and official orders lodged in FRC Files.

¹²Letter, George H. Owen to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 19 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Owen's application of commission stated: "I have no hobbies other than reading books on history and government. I 'get around' socially and am familiar with foreigners, their mentality, mannerisms, classes, and politics."

¹³Letter of Recommendation, Major General Henry L. Larsen, USMC to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 8 December 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹⁴Letter, OSS, Allied Armies in Italy (R&A) to Dr. William L. Langer, Washington, dated 18 April 1944. (Copy lodged in Algiers Outpost File, Entry 73, Box 5, RG 226, National Archives.)

¹⁵Charles' military biography and the background of his 'administrative convenience' commissioning in the Marine Corps Reserve is documented in a number of letters, memoranda, and applications lodged in FRC Files. Apparently, he merely went out and bought a set of Marine uniforms without benefit of any officer training. Charles died in 1952 and was buried at Arlington with appropriate Marine Corps participation.

¹⁶Confidential Letter, Head, Planning and Operations Staff, OSS, London to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 20 February 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) See also Letter, Brigadier E. Mockler-Ferryman, British Army (SOE) to OSS, London dated 19 October 1944. (Ibid.)

¹⁷Letter, R&A London to Director of Strategic Services dated 12 May 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹⁸War Report, Vol. II, p. 262.

¹⁹Memorandum, OSS London to Head, SO Branch, Washington dated 19 August 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

²⁰Transcript of Record, Lieutenant Colonel James Marshall McHugh, U. S. Marine Corps, dated 2 June 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) This is an unusual three page record of McHugh's entire Marine career up until 1943. Precisely why it was prepared is unclear although the author appears to be McHugh himself.

²¹Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell And The American Experience in China 1917-45 (New York: Macmillan, 1971) p. 338.

²²Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles, USN (Ret), A Different Kind of War (New York: Doubleday, 1967) p. 335.

²³Tuchman, Stilwell And The American Experience in China, p. 239.

²⁴Ibid. See also, Charles F. Romanns and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell's Mission to China (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953) pp. 248-254.

²⁵Letter, Commanding Officer, Naval Command, OSS to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 11 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

²⁶Memorandum, Secretary of the Navy to Lt. Gen. Thomas Holcomb, USMC dated 13 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) A facsimile is provided in Appendix C to this paper.

²⁷Memorandum, Major General Peck to Commandant of the Marine Corps (Vandegrift), Subject: Telephone Conversation between Peck and Mr. (Charles) Cheston (of OSS), dated 9 December 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Vandegrift was no stranger to either McHugh or China having served himself at the Peking legation during the mid-thirties in company of such Marines as Carlson, McHugh, and Samuel Griffith. In the record of conversation, Cheston stated that he "personally felt McHugh's proper place was as naval attache there."

²⁸Letter, Commanding Officer, Naval Command (OSS) to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 12 December 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

²⁹Miles, A Different Kind of War, p. 20. Magruder became head of the residue of OSS after Donovan left in late September, 1945. Unable to convince President Truman of the need to keep the painfully constructed intelligence apparatus intact, he eventually resigned in disgust.

³⁰Letter, Colonel J. M. McHugh, USMC to Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, USN, (CNO) dated 12 March 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) See also handwritten memorandum, McHugh to Vandegrift of same date. (Ibid.)

³¹Ibid.

³²Marine Corps Special Order, 2445-40/DFA-904-acj dated 1 October 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) This order is a major source for identifying Marine officers who were attached to OSS. Although by no means a complete list (it only addresses those who were still attached on the date of issue) it proved a 'goldmine' for the author.

³³Letter, Dr. Robert Hutchins to Director, Division of Reserve, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, dated 6 January 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Private and Official Letter, Colonel Clark W. Thompson, USMC (Director, Marine Corps Reserve) to Commandant of the Marine Corps, dated 31 May 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Thompson recommended Major Gower for a personal decoration in recognition of her outstanding service to the Corps. She subsequently became one of the first Woman Marines to receive the Navy Letter of Commendation - now the Navy Commendation Medal.

³⁶Letter, Commanding Officer, Naval Command, OSS to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 17 April 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

³⁷For the definitive study of the Women's Reserve see: Lt. Col. Pat Meid's Marine Corps Historical Pamphlet "Marine Corps Women's Reserve in World War II" published by Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1968. Major Gower is mentioned in several places.

CHAPTER V "ZDRAVO PURVI AMERICANEC"

¹Walter R. Mansfield, "Marine With The Chetniks", Marine Corps Gazette (January-February, 1946) p. 3.

²Ibid. p. 4.

³Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic And The Allies (Rahway, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973) p. 70.

⁴Constantin Fotic, The War We Lost (New York: Viking, 1948) p. 146. See also Fitzroy Maclean, The Heretic (New York: Harper Brothers, 1967) pp. 108-113.

⁵Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic And The Allies, p. 20.

⁶For a good account of Mihailovic's early career and the organization of his Chetnik guerilla army see: Albert Seitz, Mihailovic, Hoax or Hero?, (Columbus, Ohio: Leigh House, 1953).

⁷Roberts, p. 23.

⁸Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1953) p. 174. This work is an abridged translation of Josip Broz Tito - Prilozi za Biografiju (Belgrade: Kultura, 1953).

⁹Maclean, The Heretic, p. 114.

¹⁰Phyllis Auty, Tito (London: Longmans, 1970) p. 191. See also Roberts, p. 34.

¹¹The Chetniks later claimed to Hudson that the attack on Uzice was a reprisal for Partisan skirmishes initiated against them in another area. Roberts, probably the authoritative source available in English, discounts the reciprocity charge.

¹²Roberts, pp. 49-50.

¹³Initially, all news coverage of the shadow war in Yugoslavia praised Mihailovic. Even the Daily Worker made the mistake of naming him as leader of the Partisan movement. For a good example see The New York Times Magazine (1 February 1942) article by Middle East correspondent Ray Brock. This situation changed drastically when respected Balkan-watcher Louis Adamic published a remarkable accurate assessment of the situation in the Saturday Evening Post (19 December 1942). Thereafter it seemed to be 'choose a chmapion' and the Tito-Mihailovic controversy fueled the always simmering fued between hyphenated Americans of Yugoslav ancestry.

¹⁴

Letter, The Honorable Walter R. Mansfield to author, dated 18 January 1979.

¹⁵

Michael Howard, Grand Strategy (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1956) discusses this period in some detail. The direct quote is from William Jones, Twelve Months With Tito (Bedford (U.K.) Bedford Press, 1946) p. 2.

¹⁶

Smith, p. 134-35.

¹⁷

Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated February 5, 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹⁸

Mansfield, "Marine With The Chetniks", p. 5.

¹⁹

Ibid. p. 6.

²⁰

Ibid. p. 8.

²¹

Seitz, Mihailovic, Hoax or Hero?, p. 13-14. Seitz discusses Anglo-American relations and antagonism at some length. Mansfield is more diplomatic. Roberts, once again, is the best neutral observer.

²²

Roberts, p. 129-35

²³

Mansfield, "Marine With The Chetniks, (Part II), p. 17.

²⁴

Roberts, p. 153.

²⁵

"Marine With The Chetniks", (Part II) p. 18.

26

Roberts, p. 156. Captain Mansfield was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for his work in Yugoslavia. The Royal Government-in-Exile also decorated him with the Order of the White Eagle with Swords. Mansfield would later win the Legion of Merit in China.

27

Smith, p. 142.

28

Walter R. Mansfield, "IS There A Case for Mihailovic?" American Mercury (June, 1946) pp. 716ff.

29

Most Secret Message, Churchill to Roosevelt dated 1 September 1944. (A facsimile appears in Wartime Correspondence, p. 568. In this message, Churchill chided Roosevelt for allowing Donovan the initiative to even prepare groundwork for additional support missions to the Chetniks. The President meekly replied two days later: "I am directing Donovan to withdraw any plans for such an operation".

30

"Where is Mihailovic?", Newsweek (December 25, 1944) p. 47.

31

C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles (New York: MacMillan, 1969) p. 237.

32

Maclean, The Heretic, p. 284.

CHAPTER VI

"DID YOU PLAY FOOTBALL IN COLLEGE?"

1

Sterling W. Hayden, Wanderer (Toronto: G. J. McLeod, 1963) p. 312.

2

A brief biography of Hayden (Hamilton) is located in the Biographic Files, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard. Apparently prepared as a press release in 1946, it bears no author or pagination.

3

Hayden, Wanderer, p. 301.

4

Ibid. p. 306.

- 5
"New Marine", New York Daily News (27 October 1942) p. 3.
- 6
Letter, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 12 March 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)
- 7
Sulzberger, p. 238.
- 8
Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War (London: Macmillan, 1947) p. 527.
- 9
Smith, p. 124.
- 10
Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965) p. 137.
- 11
Hayden, p. 310.
- 12
Ibid.
- 13
Smith, p. 146.
- 14
Hayden, pp. 316-17.
- 15
Ibid.
- 16
Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II, p. 156.
- 17
U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, "Hearings on the Communist Influence and Infiltration of the Hollywood Motion Picture Industry" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951) p. 132.
- 18
Smith, p. 147.
- 19
Hayden, p. 328.
- 20
Sulzberger, p. 45-7.

21

Ibid. p. 479.

22

War Report, Vol. II, p. 125.

23

Restricted Memorandum, Commandant of the Marine Corps to Secretary of the Navy dated 4 July 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) The sense of this document is that Cooky's commissioning should not be delayed simply because he is unable to provide evidence of a Navy physical examination. The writer points out - probably tongue-in-cheek - that there are no facilities available since Cooky is "carrying out secret operations behind enemy lines".

24

Restricted Letter, H. T. Fultz, 2677th Regiment (Provisional) OSS, to 1stLt Harry Harper, USMCR, Chief Balkan SI Section, dated 10 April 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

25

Ibid. Fultz was the American civilian who the Albanian Government initially refused to accept. He eventually became the first acting American Ambassador to the Tirana regime.

26

War Report, Vol. II., p. 126.

27

Restricted Letter # 95, American Mission to Albania to The Honorable Secretary of State, Washington, dated 6 October 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Lieutenant Cooky was one of only four Americans decorated by the Albanian communist resistance.

28

Letter, Specialist 4/c Harry H. Harper, AUS, to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 23 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

29

Sulzberger, p. 63.

30

War Report, Vol. II., p. 333.

31

Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces Mid-East (Cairo), Citation to accompany award of the Legion of Merit to First Lieutenant Harry H. Harper, USMCR dated 8 November 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

32

Who's Who in America (1978), p. 526.

33

Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 18 December 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) This is the standard form letter from OSS to HQMC requesting detail of an active duty officer to the Director of Strategic Services. These invariably state that the officer in question is needed and qualified for a special overseas assignment.

34

Sulzberger, p. 79.

35

War Report, Vol. II., p. 331.

36 Personal letter, Dr. William L. Cary to author dated December 20, 1978.

37

War Report, Vol. II., p. 332

38 Cary letter of 20 December 1978 briefly discusses this period. The direct quote is from Smith, p. 154.

39

War Report, Vol. II., p. 337.

CHAPTER VII "I'M GOING TO BLOW THIS BRIDGE, AND I'LL DO THE SAME TO YOU IF NECESSARY"

1 David Howarth, The Greek Adventure (New York: Atheneum, 1976) p. 77.

2 Sulzberger, p. 240.

3 Who's Who in America (1978), p. 921.

4 Letter, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 24 June 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

5 Personal Letter, Dr. Gerald F. Else to author dated 30 November 1978.

6 War Report, Vol. II, p. 120.

7 Ibid.

⁸Howarth, The Greek Adventure, p. 39.

⁹Else letter of 30 November 1978. See also War Report, Vol. II, p. 329.

¹⁰War Report, Vol. II, p. 330.

¹¹T/Sgt. Arthur E. Mielke, "Gunny Curtis", Leatherneck (January, 1946) p. 22.

¹²Letter, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 19 September 1943 and other miscellaneous correspondence concerning orders and transportation lodged in FRC Files.

¹³LCdr. Richard M. Kelly, USNR, "Mission to Greece", Bluebook (November, 1946) pp. 76-78. Kelly was Commanding Officer of the OSS Maritime Unit in the Adriatic during 1943-45. He wrote a series of articles on American exploits behind enemy lines for Bluebook during 1946-47 based on insider information and personal interviews with the participants. Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, former Chief Counsel of the CIA, claims that the Kelly series contains the most accurate writing on OSS operations published prior to the War Report. Pforzheimer should know. He possesses what is probably the best personal collection of intelligence literature in the world.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁵War Report, Vol. II, p. 122. The JCS directive is Memorandum #816 (Copy lodged in JCS Files, National Archives).

¹⁶Kelly, "Mission to Greece", p. 83.

¹⁷Report of Mission Evros, OSS Historical File # 215, p. 3. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.)

¹⁸"Mission to Greece", p. 85.

¹⁹Mielke, "Gunny Curtis", p. 22.

²⁰War Report, Vol. II., p. 123

21

Correspondence relating to Curtis' award of the Bronze Star for service with the Evros mission in Greece and his later award of the Silver Star in China is located in FRC Files. As was often the case in OSS-originated awards, the citations provide few details.

CHAPTER VIII "EXIGENCIES OF THE SITUATION..."

¹Alsop and Braden, Sub Rosa, p. 22-23.

²Smith, p. 5. See also William Morgan, The O. S. S. and I (New York; Norton, 1957) pp. 16-17.

³OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men (New York: Rhinehart, 1948) p. 4.

⁴Ibid. p. 5

⁵Who's Who in America (1978) p. 1099. See also, Personal History Questionnaire, Office of Public Relations, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va. case of 1st Lt. John William Gardner, USMCR, dated 17 February 1944. (Copy lodged in Biographical Files, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard.)

⁶Assessment of Men, pp. 316-349.

⁷War Report, Vol. I, p. 240.

⁸Ibid. p. 231.

⁹Transcript of Military Service of Colonel Philip W. Strong, 04030, USMCR, Records Branch, Personnel Department, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 9 August 1955. This document along with a variety of correspondence located in FRC Files provides the basis for Strong's brief biography.

¹⁰Letter, Coordinator of Information to Secretary of the Navy dated 16 January 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹¹Letter, Major General Commandant to Chief of Naval Operations dated 21 January 1942, and Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Coordinator of Information dated 22 January 1942. (Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.)

¹²Letter, William J. Donovan to Secretary of the Navy dated 17 February 1942 and Memorandum, Secretary of the Navy to Chief of Naval Operations dated 18 February 1942. (Copies lodged in FRC Files.)

¹³Transcript of Military Service, op. cit.

¹⁴Letter, Secretary of the Joint Staff to Coordinator of Information dated 9 July 1942. (Copy lodged in JSC Files.)

¹⁵Memorandum, William J. Qonovan to Brigadier General W. B. Smith dated 17 August 1942. (Copy lodged in National Archives copy of War Report, pp. 296-329.)

¹⁶Confidential Letter, Commander Battleship Squadron TWO to Secretary of the Navy dated 16 March 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹⁷War Report, Vol. I, p. 240.

CHAPTER IX "WHO KNEW NOT FEAR"

¹Henri Michel, The Shadow War (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) p. 325.

²M. R. D. Foote, SOE in France, p. 357.

³Ibid. See also Smith, p. 174. It should be noted that Smith while calling Ortiz "the first full-fledged OSS member" into France is two weeks in error on the date of UNION's drop.

⁴Digest MS, p. 6.

⁵A copy of the complete citation is lodged in FRC Files.

⁶War Report, Vol. II, p. 194.

⁷Ibid. p. 195.

⁸Activity Report of Sergeant Frederick J. Brunner USMC, OSS (SO) W. E. Section dated 4 October 1944. (Copy provided to author by Central Intelligence Agency.) Hereafter referred to as Brunner Report.

⁹Sergeant Perry was buried in the Catholic cemetery on the Col de Saisies. His time of death is listed as 1445, 1 August 1944 in OSS records.

¹⁰Brunner Report, p. 2.

¹¹Major Peter J. Ortiz, USMCR, "Chronological Report of the Capture and Subsequent Captivity of Members of Mission Union", dated 12 May 1945. (Copy provided by Central Intelligence Agency.) Hereafter referred to as Ortiz Report. Both the Brunner and Ortiz reports were classified 'Secret' until released by CIA.

¹²Brunner Report, p. 4.

¹³Ortiz Report, p. 2.

¹⁴Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁵Ibid. p. 5.

¹⁶Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Kelly USNR, "Spy Work Ahead", Bluebook (August, 1947) pp. 90-92. Captain Greene also became a POW. In late October, 1944 he and Army Lieutenant Jack Hemmingway (Ernest Hemmingway's son) were wounded and captured during a mission beyond the American lines near Vosges. Corporal Sweeney was unluckier still. He was Killed In Action near Mannheim, Germany on 29 March 1945.

¹⁷Letter, Walter W. Taylor to Head, Historical Branch, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, dated 31 May 1966. (Copy lodged in Marine Corps Historical Center Archives, Washington Navy Yard.)

¹⁸Benis M. Frank and Henry I Shaw, History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II (Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1968) Vol. V, p. 748.

¹⁹Ortiz Report, p. 13.

²⁰Ibid. p. 15.

²¹A copy of the complete citation is lodged in FRC Files. See also, Digest MS p. 6. Interestingly, the story of Peter Ortiz is difficult to find in Marine Corps history. Frank and Shaw give it the best albeit limited treatment in their section on Marine POW's. Heinl's Soldiers of the Sea does not mention Ortiz' name and Moskin's U. S. Marine Corps Story has only a few lines 'cribbed' from the official history.

CHAPTER X "FIRST JED TO KILL A BOCHE..."

¹Wartime Correspondence, p. 31.

²Smith, p. 174. The direct quote comes from a speech by Ambassador Bruce to the annual dinner meeting of the Veterans of OSS, Washington, D. C. 26 May 1971.

³Alsop and Braden, p. 141.

⁴Ford, p. 233.

⁵Anthony C. Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Harper, Row, 1975), p. 577.

⁶Letter, Captain Francois de la Roche, USMCR to Brigadier General E. H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) dated 10 January 1979. (Copy provided to author by Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard). This letter - although erroneous in spots - gives some interesting aspects of the BUGATTI mission from the recollections of Captain de la Roche's father Guy, a member of the Jedburgh Team. Hereafter referred to as de la Roche letter.

⁷Footnote, pp. 283-84.

⁸Operational Synopsis, "Team Buggati" June-September 1944, 7 pp. This document contains the Ordre de mission for BUGATTI and a literal rendering of all significant message traffic between the team in France and the SPOC in Algiers. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency).

⁹Letter, Horace W. Fuller to Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Robillard, USMC dated 7 May 1941. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹⁰Chronological Record of Service, FULLER, Horace Williams, USMCR 7 pp. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹¹Letter, First Lieutenant Horace W. Fuller, USMCR to Major General Commandant, dated 10 September 1941. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹²Letter, Major Horace W. Fuller, USMCR to Major Andrew Wylie, USMCR dated 5 March 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Wylie himself is an interesting and star-crossed figure. A slightly built officer who sported a 'very military' mustache, Wylie spent most of World War II as the Navy's Soviet expert. He was one of very few Americans to visit Moscow (March-June 1944) and established links with the Russian Naval Attache in Washington, Commodore Tegorichev. In June, 1945, Wylie was selected to become the first post war Naval Attache to Poland - an extremely unusual posting for a Reserve Officer. Especially promoted for this assignment, he reached Warsaw in September. On 26 December 1945, Wylie and his driver were proceeding for Gdynia toward Szczecin. Because of fog and darkness they missed a detour sign and arrived at a series of anti-tank barriers. Wylie left the car and began walking slowly in front while the driver zig-zagged through the barbed wire and concrete obstacles. Suddenly there was a scream and a splash. The chauffeur heard cries in English and ran toward the sound. It was then that he realized that he was on one section of a demolished bridge over the Oder River. Panicking, the driver ran to the nearest town (about 2 kilometers away) and brought back some members of the local security police. These were later joined by Russian soldiers. A nightlong search was conducted without result. On 30 June 1946, a barge captain discovered a badly decomposed body lying in the weeds near Stettin. The corpse was dressed in a tattered green uniform with American buttons. In the trouser pocket was a United States diplomatic passport with the name Andrew Wylie still legible.

¹³Official Orders, SO Branch, OSS London to Major Horace W. Fuller, USMCR dated 10 January 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) See also Headquarters, Parachute Unit, OSS, London Special Order 2-44 in same location.

¹⁴Serial #14, "Bugatti Mission Report" (undated but apparently written by Fuller during October, 1944). No pagination is present on the original but the complete document is 6 pages long and will be referred to in terms of first page, second page, etc. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency). Hereafter referred to as BUGATTI Mission Report.

¹⁵Operational Synopsis, p. 2. Message from BUGATTI to SPOC of 10 July 1944; 12 July 1944; and 13 July 1944 respectively.

¹⁶BUGATTI Mission Report, 2nd page.

¹⁷Operational Synopsis, p. 3. Message from BUGATTI to SPOC of 21 July 1944.

¹⁸Ibid. p. 3. BUGATTI message to SPOC of 23 August 1944.

¹⁹"BUGATTI Mission Report", 5th page.

²⁰Letter, Commanding Officer, OSS Detachment EUTOUSA (Bruce) to Commander, Naval Forces Europe (Stark) containing proposed citation for award of the Silver Star to Lieutenant Colonel Fuller and dated 20 March 1945; Certificate of "Mention in Despatches" (3 palms for separate awards) dated 5 September 1947; and other miscellaneous documents lodged in FRC Files.

CHAPTER XI "HOW THE HELL DID A MARINE GET HERE?"

¹Letter, William F. Grell to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 10 December 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

²William F. Grell, "A Marine With OSS", Marine Corps Gazette (December, 1945) p. 15.

³Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich (New York: Viking, 1979) p. 188.

⁴"Marine With OSS", p. 16.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Activity Report, Captain William F. Grell, USMCR, OSS, (SO) W.E. Section, dated 5 November 1944, p. 4. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.)

⁷Mission Log, The GERMINAL Mission, OSS (SO), W. E. Section, undated, pp. 1-2. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.) This is an unusual 12 page document which provides a day-by-day synopsis of GERMINAL's activity. It was written and signed by Grell and Lt. Griffiths. The log describes GERMINAL from the time the members departed London for Tempsford aerodrome until the mission was terminated in Paris on 8 October 1944.

⁸Activity Report, Major Edwin Lord, AUS, Codename: Leonce; Circuit: FREELANCE, dated 4 October 1944, p. 19. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.) This is a well written and extremely detailed summary of FREELANCE a mission which was dropped near Montlucon in the Department of the Allier on 31 August 1944. Second Lieutenant William B. Macomber, Jr., USMCR (codename: Mederic) was the weapons officer for FREELANCE.

⁹Letter, Edward G. Miner to Major General Commandant dated 14 February 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

¹⁰Memorandum, Officer Procurement Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 2 September 1943; and, Letter, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 3 September 1943. (Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.)

¹¹ Foote, p. 365.

¹²Activity Report, Major Edwin Lord, AUS, p. 3.

¹³Persico, p. 158. See also, Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) Vol. III, pp. 500-509.

¹⁴Lord Activity Report, p. 4.

¹⁵Activity Report, Second Lieutenant William B. Macomber, Jr., USMCR, Circuit: FREELANCE, OSS (SO) W.E. Section, dated 28 September 1944. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.) A nine page document which traces Macomber's participation in FREELANCE from his infiltration drop on 31 August 1944 until his return to London on 19 September 1944.

¹⁶Ibid. p. 3.

¹⁷"Marine With OSS", p. 17.

¹⁸Ibid. p. 18.

19

Macomber Report, p. 5. For a detailed account of the actual mechanism of surrender by a German battalion, see Activity Report of 2ndLt Michel G. Block, AUS, OSS (SO) W.E. Section, dated 2 October 1944. (A copy declassified and released by CIA is in the author's possession.)

CHAPTER XII " ONE MARINE...ELEVEN HUNDRED GERMANS"

1

Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Kelly, USNR, "One Against A Thousand", Bluebook (February, 1947) p. 14.

2

War Report, Vol. II, p. 110.

3

Kelly, "One Against A Thousand", p. 17.

4

For the complete story of Popski's Private Army, see the personal memoir of its commander: Vladimir Peniakoff, Private Army (London: Johnathan Cape, 1950). Chapter VII deals with PPA activities in Northern Italy but Hearn is not mentioned and Popski takes credit for Chioggia.

5

"One Against A Thousand", p. 23.

6

Ibid.

7

Decree of the Naval Ministry of Italy with citation to accompany award of the Medaglia d'argento al Valore Militare (Silver Medal of Military Valor) to First Lieutenant George Hearn, USMCR, 2677th Regiment (Provisional) OSS. dated 4 January 1946. (Copy and facsimile certificate lodged in FRC Files.)

8

"One Against A Thousand", p. 25. For a more detailed discussion of the San Marco Marines, see: Commander Marc Antonio Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957), and War Report, Volume II, Part III. Lieutenant Hearn and the San Marco Sabotage Unit are also mentioned in Kelly's "Bionda Mission" Bluebook (April, 1947) pp. 74 ff. As has been previously noted, Kelly was Commanding Officer of the OSS Maritime

Unit in the Adriatic. Interestingly, the first MU commander was Marine Corps Major Russell Duncan. Duncan's service with OSS was abbreviated by a set of orders to Senior School (December, 1943). Previously he had the distinction of being one of the token "two officers and twenty enlisted Marines" sent to England for Commando training at the height of the Donovan affair discussed in Chapter 1 of this paper.

9

Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 4 January 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

10

War Report, Vol. II, p. 60.

11

For an excellent account of German signal intelligence activities during the war, see: Wilhelm F. Flicke, War Secrets in the Ether, (Office of Training Services, National Security Agency, 1953) This is a translation of the original MS entitled Kriegsheimnisse im Aether, which Flicke wrote shortly after the war and which was confiscated on security grounds by Army intelligence.

12

Headquarters, U. S. Forces, China Theater, General Order # 250 dated 29 November 1945, Citation to accompany award of the Legion of Merit to Captain Elmer Harris, USMC. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

13

Restricted Letter, Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, Jr., USMCR to Commandant of the Marine Corps, undated but apparently written in July, 1945. This is a four page synopsis of Taylor's service with OSS from September 1943 until his return to the United States in June, 1945. Taylor states that the purpose of the letter is to describe his activities as a Marine Officer since there was apparently no record in his OQR at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

14

Activity Report, Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, Jr., USMCR, SI Operations Officer, Detachment "C", 2677th Regiment (Provisional) OSS, dated 25 June 1944. This document describes the LOCUST and MONTREAL missions from Corsica. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.)

CHAPTER XIII "MAN, YOU MUST BE LOST OR SOMETHING"

¹
Persico, p. 107.

²Letter, Sidney Biddell to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 21 December 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Biddell was associate producer to Cecil B. deMille at Paramount Pictures.

³Letter, Frank V. Morley to Commandant of the Marine Corps, dated 31 December 1943. See also: Letter, Harry M. Warner to CMC dated 6 January 1944. (Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.) Harry Warner was President of Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc.

⁴
Persico, p. 109. See also: War Report, Vol. II, p. 294.

⁵Who's Who in America (1978), p. 2332.

⁶Persico, p. 111.

⁷War Report, Vol. II, p. 295.

⁸Persico, p. 264.

⁹
Hayden, Wanderer, p. 329.

¹⁰
Letter, Captain John A. Cade, USN, (Ret) to Commandant of the Marine Corps, dated 12 April 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) See also: Who's Who in America (1978), p. 2329.

¹¹
Headquarters, U. S. Forces, European Theater, General Order #310 dated 16 November 1945. Citation to accompany award of the the Bronze Star Medal to 2ndLt John W. Mowinckel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve. See also: Liste des Officiers Americains De l'OSS avant obtenu la Croix de Guerre Francaise, Decision # 531, 17 Mars 1945. (Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.)

12

Headquarters, Third United States Army, General Order # 251 dated 15 September 1945. Citation to accompany award of the Silver Star Medal to Second Lieutenant John W. Mowinckel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, for gallantry in action in Austria. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

13

War Report, Vol. II, p. 287.

14

Persico, p. 161. For more details on the interesting career of Major Willis prior to his commissioning in the Marine Corps Reserve, see his personal letter to CMC dated 28 May 1943, and Request for Assignment of Personnel, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 4 June 1943. (Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.) Donovan wanted Willis - who was then Vice President of Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation and its subsidiary Auto-Ordnance Corporation - so badly that he personally signed the usual bureaucratic form .

15

Ibid. p. 172

16

Ibid. p. 209.

17

Muster Roll, Marine Barracks, London, England, report of 1 April 1945. (Microfilm copy located in Muster Roll Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard.) This document lists Sergeant Brunner as MIA as from 20 March 1945 and gives the aircraft type and tail number. Persico gives a good account of the CHISEL mission in Piercing the Reich but does not mention Brunner's name. However, a telephone conversation with him on 22 February 1979 confirmed that Brunner is listed as "liaison NCO/jumpmaster" on the OSS mission report, a copy of which was declassified and provided to Persico by CIA under a Freedom of Information action.

18

Fonecon, author and Persico, 22 February 1979.

19

Who's Who in America (1978), p. 2332.

20

Ibid. p. 2329.

21

Letter, Captain John Hamilton, USMCR to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 24 July 1947. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

EPILOGUE

1

Executive Order 9621, "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions", The White House, Washington, D. C., September 20, 1945. (Copy lodged in Record Group 226, National Archives.)

2

Letter, Charles Henry Fenn to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 8 January 1954. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

APPENDICES

The research and writing of "Herringbone Cloak- GI Dagger" yielded much documentary material which has never been published or even alluded to in secondary sources. My original intent was to include this type of material in the appendices. Once I began to uncover new sources however it became apparent that simply duplicating every interesting letter, memorandum, citation or mission report would result in a 1000 page paper. Consequently I have limited the 'exhibits' to those items which are themselves of singular importance or which can serve as exemplars. Since the initial chapter regarding the "Donovan Affair" is of particular importance to the story I have included most of the previously classified material relating to that period of Marine Corps history. Nearly all of the footnoted documents are in my possession and the interested reader is welcome to contact me should he desire a copy.

Major Robert E. Mattingly USMC
12006 Skipjack Court
Woodbridge, Va. 22192

A Brief Biography of William J. Donovan

"Wild Bill" Donovan was born in Buffalo, New York on New Year's Day of 1883. He was educated in that Up-State city and entered Columbia College, Columbia University in 1901. While at Columbia, Donovan played quarterback on the varsity football team. Graduating in 1905, he immediately enrolled in Columbia Law School where he was a classmate of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

In 1907, Donovan began a law practice in Buffalo. Five years later he was instrumental in founding a cavalry troop of the New York National Guard in his hometown. When the cavalry was called-out for operations along the Mexican border, Donovan left his law books. By the outbreak of World War I he was a Major.

Donovan earned his nickname in France as a battalion commander and later as regimental C. O. of the 165th Infantry - popularly then known as the 'Fighting 69th New York. He was wounded three times and received a number of combat decorations including the Distinguished Service Cross and the Medal of Honor for gallantry in action at Landre-et St. Georges during the Meuse Argonne offensive.

Following the war, Donovan served as an unofficial U. S. military observer in Asia and then resumed his law practice. He was U. S. District Attorney for Western New York 1921-24 and Assistant U. S. Attorney General for the same area in 1925. During this period, Donovan became extremely active in Republican Party politics. From 1925-29 he was Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States and was also a member of several international organizations including the Red Cross and the Rio Grande Compact Commission which he chaired.

In 1928, Donovan was presumed heir-apparent to the Attorney Generalship of the United States but his appointment was opposed by party conservatives largely because of his Irish-Catholic background. President Hoover instead offered him the post of Governor of the Philippines which Donovan declined.

Donovan returned to private law practice and, in 1932, ran unsuccessfully for the governorship of New York State. Subsequently he was involved in a number of personal fact-finding trips to world trouble spots including Spain and Ethiopia. When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Donovan's expertise in European affairs and his friendship with political rival FDR resulted in a series of quasi-official visits to England and the Balkans.



Donovan was psychologically prepared for the shock of a new European war. By then he was 57-years-old and had a proven track record in observing international affairs. Additionally he was a millionaire, a sophisticated patriot-nationalist, and best of all - so far as the President was concerned - an ardent interventionist. Moreover he was a close friend of Knox, the Republican Vice-Presidential nominee in 1936, whom Roosevelt had brought into the Cabinet as a symbol of national harmony.

Not only did Knox recognize Donovan's talents but so did Churchill's dapper Canadian emissary, William Stephenson, the now famous 'Man Called Intrepid'. Together, Stephenson and Knox were instrumental in securing for Donovan his appointment as Coordinator of Information, a title which he held from July, 1941 until COI was redesignated as OSS the following year.

Largely because of military opposition to the new central intelligence service, initial attempts to impart legitimacy to the organization by giving Donovan general officer rank were rebuffed. After the success of OSS operations in North Africa however, Donovan was appointed a Brigadier in April 1943. He became a Major General in November, 1944.

After President Truman dissolved OSS in October, 1945, Donovan briefly served as aide to Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. He returned to private practice in 1946 but continued to actively support the lobbying effort which eventually resulted in the formation of the CIA. President Eisenhower appointed him American Ambassador to Thailand in 1953.

Donovan died on 8 February 1959 in Washington.

No 94
December 22, 1941
6 P. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM. William J. Donovan

Permit me respectfully to submit the following:

I have not been advised of the particular proposals our government is to make for consideration as a joint strategic plan for the winning of the war. I fear, however, that there may be no suggestion that an integral and vital part of such plan would be the preparation and conditioning of those people and those territories where the issue is to be fought.

Based on my observations of wars during the past five years, I believe it would be a serious error to ignore or neglect such preparation and such conditioning.

On the offensive, this kind of operation is necessary in order to disintegrate the resistance. On the defensive, it is necessary in order to harass the enemy as local conditions may permit.

We can consider this under two types of guerrilla warfare:

1. Setting up of small groups working as bands under definite leaders.
2. The establishment of guerrilla forces military in nature, in order to secure cohesion and successfully carry out a plan of campaign.

It is unnecessary to stress that modern large-sized armies are greatly dependent on roads, railways, and signal communications, and the creation of supply and munitions dumps, to keep themselves supplied with food, munitions and gasoline—without which they cannot operate. These communications constitute a desirable target both of the military and sabotage type.

The principle laid down is that the whole art of guerrilla warfare lies in striking the enemy where he least expects it and yet where he is most vulnerable.

Specifically, I suggest the following:

1. That as an essential part of any strategic plan, there be recognized the need of sewing the dragon's teeth in those territories from which we must withdraw and in which the enemy will place his army; for example, the Azores or North Africa. That the aid of native chiefs be obtained, the loyalty of the inhabitants be cultivated; Fifth columnists organized and placed, demolition material cached; and guerrilla bands of bold and daring men organized and installed.

2. That there be organized now, in the United States, a guerrilla corps independent and separate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a maximum of the offensive and imaginative spirit. This force should, of course, be created along disciplined military lines, analogous to the British Commando principle, a statement of which I sent you recently.

1975

COMINCH FILE
A16-3/(0012)

UNITED STATES FLEET
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

January 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM:--

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To : Major General Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
Subject: Use of "Commandos" in Pacific Fleet Area.

1. The Secretary told me that the President is much interested in the development and use of the equivalent of British "commandos".
2. The Secretary told the President that you have such groups in training.
3. The President proposed the use of "commandos" as essential parts of raiding expeditions which attack (destroy) enemy advanced (seaplane) bases in the Pacific Fleet area.
4. Please let me have your views - and proposals - as to such use.

E. J. King
E. J. KING

UNCLASSIFIED

*auth: OOR memo of 6/3/72
by: declassification of WWII Records*

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U.S. MARINE CORPS
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11/30-chb

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND JOINT TRAINING FORCE
Camp Elliott, San Diego, Calif.

13 January, 1942.

RESTRICTED
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR.
To: The Major General Commandant, Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.
Via: The Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force.
Subject: Development within the Marine Corps of a unit for
purposes similar to the British Commandos and
the Chinese Guerrillas.
Enclosures: (A) Proposed organization.
(B) Notes on proposed training and character of
employment.
(C) Newspaper clipping "The Commandos".

1. The complete domination in force of the Western coasts of continental Europe has resulted in the formation by the British of a force popularly known as "The Commandos". The purpose of this group of especially trained and equipped fighters is to inflict on the enemy surprise and swiftly moving blows. The tactic is similar to the jab in boxing, the aim being to destroy confidence, disrupt well laid plans, create panic, fear and uncertainty, destroy or demolish key concentrations, and in general impede the enemy's attack and prepare the way for your own offensive action. These Commandos have proven of great value in situations such as have existed in Europe, Egypt and Africa, where the British could not go on the offensive. Similarly the Eighth Route Army in China has proven an invaluable obstacle to any continued Japanese offensive in the North China, or Border, District. The Japanese have not found it possible to withstand for any long period the pressure placed by these groups as soon as the Japanese line of supply became extended. Similar successful action is reported now being used in Northern Malaya and Indo-China.

2. It is submitted that the position of our forces in the Pacific would be greatly aided by similar action on Japanese positions in the Mandated Islands, and perhaps later the Philippines by units based to the South; even more devastating action frontally by landing on Japan proper from Kito north to Aomori would certainly demoralize the enemy.

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Subject: Development within the Marine Corps of a unit for purposes similar to the British Commandos and the Chinese Guerrillas.

Transportation by submarine, and landings by rubber boats, would seem practicable. No discussion is made here of similar Atlantic situations which, however, do or will exist.

3. A review of Marine Corps history indicates that our country does not need to go outside of this organization for a body of men capable of executing such missions. There are many officers and men with experience in Nicaragua who have had similar experience. A study of modern British experience would, of course, be helpful. This is now available in written form in the Office of the Coordinator of Information. For purposes of discussion there are attached hereto Appendices A and B showing proposed tables of organization, requirements of men and materiel and type of training. It is especially important that each unit down to, and including, the squad should be able to operate independently of the higher units.

4. The matter is especially urged as it is believed it fits the entire tradition of action and boldness held by the Marine Corps, and there is reason to believe that other branches of the armed forces are considering doing the job.

Dec 9 1948

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Officer in Charge S&D

James Roosevelt
JAMES ROOSEVELT.

3050-50

13/25-rpb 0024 1st Endorsement January 14, 1942.
HQ, 2d Joint Training Force, Camp Elliott, San Diego, Calif.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Major General Commandant.

1. Forwarded.

2. The thought expressed in the basic letter is concurred in, insofar as the value of such an organization is concerned. It is believed, however, that the Marine Divisions should complete their organization and train units now authorized prior to the formation of any such new organizations.

R.L. Parker

Clayton B. Vogel
CLAYTON B. VOGEL.

RECEIVED
JAN 28 1942
WAR PLANS SECT
Bldg 600

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APPENDIX "A"

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF MOBILE COLUMNS (COMMANDOS).
(To be called "Rangers" or some other appropriate name.)

Introduction: In order to be effective these units must be highly mobile, well integrated, and yet possessing flexibility. The psychological attitude of the members is extremely important for success will depend on harmony of action, keen judgement and unhesitating willingness to sacrifice themselves to the accomplishment of the task. The appeal of adventure or the hope for glory are inadequate stimuli. These men must be indoctrinated with the conviction that their efforts and sacrifices are providing a vital contribution to the preservation of freedom in all its forms. Hence the desirability for leadership that is essentially psychological; hence, also, the need for a higher percentage of leaders to the number of fighters, and for a closer relationship between leaders and fighters than is customary in orthodox military organizations.

ORGANIZATION:

COLUMN (approximating a battalion): 4 companies.
COMPANY: 3 sections.
SECTION: 2 squads.
SQUAD: 10 men (1 leader and 9 others).

For simplification members of the column will be known as either LEADERS or FIGHTERS, the leader of the column being entitled Commander.

COMMAND and STAFF:

COLUMN: 1 Leader
1 Asst. Leader
3 Staff Leaders
1 to perform functions of Adjutant,
Operations and Intelligence.
1 for supply.
1 for communications.
2 Medical Officers
4 Radio Operators
1 Clerk
3 Cooks
3 Others
2 Corpsmen

Total: 20 C&S.

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COMPANY:

1 Leader
 1 Asst Leader
 2 Radio Operators
 1 Medical Officer
 2 Corpsmen
 3 Others

Total: 10

SECTION: 1 Leader
 1 Asst Leader
 1 Radio Operator
 1 Corpman
 3 Others

Total: 7 C&S

SQUAD: 1 Leader
 1 Asst Leader

Total: 2

RECAPITULATION:

	Squad	Section (2 Squad)	Company (3 Sec)	Column (4 Cos)
Leaders	2	6	20	82
Staff				3
Fighters	8	16	48	192
Medical Officers			1	6
Corpsmen		1	5	22
Radiomen		1	5	24
Cooks				3
Clerk				1
Others		3	12	51
Total	10	27	91	384

EQUIPMENT:

Haversack	Small radio, walkie-talkie type
Canteen	(1 per Squad)
Belt, pistol*	Map case
Belt, rifle*	De-hydrated rations*
Belt, TSMG*	Boots, lace, three-quarter length,
Carrier, grenade	moccasin toe, composition (non-
Compass, prismatic	slip) sole.
Wire cutters	Pistol, .45 cal., automatic*
Thompson SMG*	Rifle, Springfield or Garand*
Demolitions*	

* Character of mission to determine which of these items will be carried.

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APPENDIX "B"

CONFIDENTIAL NOTES ON TRAINING, TYPES OF MISSIONS, and
 QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL.

MISSIONS:

It is believed that training should be designed to prepare men to execute the following missions:

- (a) Landing on foreign shore for the destruction of munitions plants, magazines, aircraft centers, shipping, industrial plants, or other vital production or transportation installations.
- (b) Landing on foreign shore for the purpose infiltrating into the rear of enemy positions and operating in conjunction with landings in force at other points.
- (c) Landing on foreign shore for purpose of conducting ground reconnaissance and/or gathering information (capturing personnel and documents).
- (d) Employment on land as foot scouting patrols for secret penetration of the enemy position.

TRAINING:

Training for these missions should be conducted with moderate secrecy, especially of those stages involving landing operations and the execution of sabotage missions. The length of the training period should be not less than three months. The following subjects should be covered:

Physical drill, with frequent conditioning hikes,
 Duties of the Scout-sniper,
 Scouting, individual conduct by day and by night,
 Map and aerial photograph reading,
 Orientation,
 Simple sketching,
 Panoramic sketching,
 Visual signalling,
 Military intelligence,
 Care and preservation of equipment,
 Marksmanship, Rifle, TSMG, Pistol,
 Grenades, hand and rifle,
 Demolitions, care and use of,
 Individual cooking,
 First Aid and Hygiene,
 Individual conduct and maintenance in bivouacs
 and camps,
 March conduct,
 Security,
 Boats, rubber and sailing,
 Night operations, Tactical exercises,
 Simple Japanese phrases.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

243

QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL:

Selectees should be above the average in intelligence, strong of physique, and possess at least a modicum of idealism.

Training should seek to assure that individuals (including leaders, administrative personnel and medical men) possess a thorough knowledge of the weapons to be used, develop a physical hardiness that will enable them to accomplish marches of from 30 to 50 miles in 24 hours, understand how to guard against the usually prevalent diseases, be able to subsist on native food, possess a comprehensive knowledge of the employment of demolitions, develop initiative and resourcefulness as well as a readiness to subordinate self to harmonious team-work, and the creation of a deep conviction of the value of the democratic way of life, together with a deep-rooted determination to accomplish the missions which will contribute to its preservation.

Leaders must be men of recognized ability who lead by virtue of merit and who share without reservation all material conditions to which the group may be subjected, arrogating to themselves no privileges or perquisites. They must possess the ability to plan and to execute, and their judgement must be adequate to meet successfully all problems. Above all they must be able to adapt themselves quickly to unexpected situations, readjusting group action to the accomplishment of the mission in the light of conditions actually encountered.

Discipline should be based on reason and designed to create and foster individual volition.

Equipment should be sufficiently light to insure mobility, and yet sufficiently complete to enable the group to accomplish its mission.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CONFIDENTIAL
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• The Commandos

NOTHING IS MORE terrifying than a fear of the unknown and unseen enemy that strikes without warning and where least expected. The British seem to understand this fear and they have acted to spread it with devastating effect in widely separated parts of the world against their axis enemies.

Last week they were in Norway, raiding and destroying German bases and fortifications. So swiftly and silently did they move that their enemies were unaware of their presence until too late to resist them. This week they have struck again, this time in Malaya, far back of the Japanese lines. So swiftly and so efficiently did they strike here that a convoy was destroyed and a column demoralized before the surprised Japs realized what was taking place.

Such incidents will not, of course, win a war. But they help. Repeated often enough they can create an uneasiness and a terror in the minds and hearts of the enemy that much of their self-assurance can be destroyed. Once an army becomes jittery and fearful of an enemy it cannot see and whose presence it cannot detect, its usefulness is impaired. Soldiers, no matter how brave or foolhardy they may be in the face of danger they know exists and which they can locate precisely, have no less fear of the unknown, the unseen surprise attack than anyone else.

The Commandos, if they continue their blows, will be accomplishing far more than the size of their operations may indicate. They constitute a secret, surprise weapon that the Germans, the Italians and the Japs haven't been able to match.

San Diego Union, 6 Jan 1942

Apparatus 'C'

CONFIDENTIAL

IN REPLYING ADDRESS
THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT
AND REFER TO NO.

AO-111-hem
(08B1442)



CONFIDENTIAL HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

14 January 1942.


From: The Major General Commandant.
To: Major General H.M. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps,
Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.
Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

1. Suggestion has been made that Colonel William J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the "Commando Project".

2. It will be recalled that Colonel Donovan served with distinction in the 27th Division during World War I. He has since then observed practically all wars that have taken place; and in particular has specialized in Commando Operations (amphibious raids).

3. A frank expression of opinion is requested from you as to the advisability of accepting this suggestion. Replies will be Confidential and will be forwarded as promptly as possible direct to the Major General Commandant by air mail where appropriate.

T. HOLCOMB.



19/15

UNCLASSIFIED

11987

RECEIVED
JAN 26 1944
WAR PLANS SECTION
MARINE CORPS

Op-22-A2a

A16-3(4)

Serial (0025)

*Dist. to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th, 100th*S E C R E TFILE *NEW*

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
 To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 Subject: Commando training, U. S. Marine Corps.

Reference: (a) Spenavo, London, Secret Des. 091421 of January 1942.
 (b) MCC Secret ltr. Serial 202942 of January 10, 1942 to Cominch.

1. Reference (a) proposed that a troop of 7 officers and 100 enlisted men, U. S. Marine Corps, be assigned to temporary duty with British Commandos for training at the British Commando Special Training Center and that this troop participate with the British Commandos in combined operations against enemy shores. Training similar, in part, to Commando training is now being given to the Destroyer Transport Battalion of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, and to parachute troops. It is believed that no further separate units should be organized for training as Commandos until all organizations of the Marine Divisions are filled to full strength. To carry out the suggestion of reference (a) would require the separation of trained personnel from the First Marine Division which would be inadvisable at this time.

2. In lieu of the suggestion contained in Reference (a), it is recommended, as proposed by the Major General Commandant in Reference (b), that a small group of selected officers and non-commissioned officers be sent to England for a period of about one month for Commando training, such personnel to be used as instructors in the Fleet Marine Force on return to the United States. It is further recommended that the participation in active operations of the U. S. Marine Corps group sent for Commando training be not approved.

CC: Major Gen'l Comdt. ✓

E. J. KING

CONFIDENTIAL
CFBP-for.
Serial 01008.

Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.

16 January, 1942.

From: Major General Charles F. B. Price, Marine Corps.
To : The Major General Commandant.

Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Reference: (a) MGC ltr to Maj-Gen. Price, 14Jan42,
AO-111-hem (08D1442) CONFIDENTIAL.

1. The undersigned knows Colonel William J. Donovan only slightly and principally by reputation and not from personal observation and contact. Within these limitations, the undersigned is inclined to judge that Colonel Donovan is well qualified by natural bent and experience for the assignment contemplated and probably more so than any General officer of the regular Marine Corps at present available for such assignment.

2. If consideration of the point at issue is expanded to include the advisability of the Marine Corps assuming the execution of the "Commando Project" in addition to the mission to which it is already committed in its normal function in support of the Fleet, then additional angles of the problem become of vital importance and should be soberly considered.

3. The tremendous expansion of the Corps compared to its former peacetime strength in personnel has resulted in spreading very thinly the limited number of officers and non-commissioned officers available who are qualified by professional study, training and experience to fill the essential command and staff positions in the increasing number of higher tactical units required to meet the war-time demands on our Fleet Marine Force. Regardless of the excellence of the human material which is joining the Corps at this time, their deficiencies in training and experience cannot be quickly overcome and they will not be ready to advance into these responsibilities until they have been seasoned by considerable experience. If they can gain this experience under reasonably efficient supervision, there is every reason to expect that their progress will be steady and not too costly

CONFIDENTIAL

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-2-

C O N F I D E N T I A L: Serial 01008


Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

in the normal consequences of the trial and error method. A careful husbanding of our resources in trained personnel therefore becomes of paramount importance at this time.

4. If the personnel to conduct this new activity can be recruited almost entirely from new resources it would be the judgment of the undersigned that the entire spirit and plan of employment of the Commando Groups is directly in line with the aggressive spirit and tradition of the Marine Corps, that it will add immeasurably to the fame and prestige of the Corps and must inevitably attract to our ranks the most adventurous and able spirits of America's manhood.

5. If, on the other hand, our very limited resources in trained officers must be further dispersed and if the best of the adventurous spirits and "go-getters" among our men must be diverted from the Fleet Marine Force in meeting the requirements of this additional activity, (Commando Project) then the undersigned would recommend seriously against assuming this additional commitment.

CHAS. F. B. PRICE.



249
JAN 16 1942

IN REPLYING
REFER TO NO

CFEP-for.
PERSONAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
SECOND MARINE DIVISION FLEET MARINE FORCE
Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.

UNCLASSIFIED

16 January, 1942.

Dear Tom:

I have sent my formal reply to the question of commissioning General Donovan and I realize that the additional paragraphs which I added were probably foreign to the issue inasmuch as I was not requested to express an opinion in that respect, but I could not forego recording my misgivings at the prospect of taking on anything more for the Corps until we have brought some degree of order out of the confusion which exists with respect to our normal activities here.

There is another thing in this connection which I could not very well put in my other letter and that is the grave danger that this sort of thing will develop into a tail which will wag the dog eventually. I know in what quarters the idea of foisting this scheme upon the Marines originated and I opine that if it is developed along the lines of a hobby in the hands of personnel other than regular Marine officers it could very easily get far out of hand and out of control as well.

It appears pretty clear to me that you are in a position of having to comply and that nothing can be done about it so please accept my sympathy.

After talking with Joe Fegan I am inclined to agree with him that Bierman would probably be a good man to head this service, or at least to hold a responsible position. The only man in my own acquaintance who I believe would have outstanding qualities for this type of leadership is Pelham D. Glassford, former Brigadier General, U. S. Army, now retired. You will probably remember him as Director of Public Safety in Washington, D.C., at the time of the Bonus Army trouble.

PERSONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

As a matter of fact, in this Command Service could be directly recruited in the realm of football players and other athletes and from the memberships of sports clubs throughout the country, a very effective unit would probably be formed. My only misgiving is that our own house is not sufficiently in order at this moment to undertake this, moreover, our resources in trained personnel are already strained to a dangerous point.


The activities of our recruit depot here in Camp Elliott are progressing nicely. By tomorrow night we will have 3,500 men under instruction here and additional ones will come along in weekly details. The activities involved in adjusting ourselves to this plan are in themselves an excellent experience for my young men and I anticipate great benefit to the trainers as well as those being trained.

There is a little matter of personal interest to me which I would like to bring to your benevolent attention. Betty's husband, Captain John B. Hendry, was picked up on his annual physical with symptoms of diabetes. He has been, for nearly four months now, undergoing the depressing routine of our senseless medical service; kept in solitary confinement most of the time, frequently on starvation diets, subjected to all kinds of witless experimentations, kept in ignorance of his true condition and threatened with ultimate retirement involving semi-starvation for himself and his family. The boy was in a pretty low state of morale even before the war broke; since then, of course, he is desolated at the prospect of being ineffective at a time when every good citizen is doing his bit. He is before the retiring board this week and the report of his board will go forward with his request for retention on active duty if practicable, or return to limited active duty at once if the report of the board results in his retirement. Rupertus is very anxious to have him here at the Base, especially now that he has been directed to reopen the sea school. Captain Hendry has just returned from a tour of duty at sea on the U.S.S. HOUSTON in the Asiatic Fleet. He is also a graduate of Sill and a field artillery expert and should be very useful in that capacity. I suggest no special favor in this case but I would ask for the most benevolent action which is consistent with the law and the best interests of the Corps.

PERSONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Dolly and I are both well and enjoying San Diego a lot. She joins me in best wishes to Bertrice and to you.

Sincerely yours, 

Charley Price
CHAS. F. B. PRICE,
Major General, U. S. Marines.

Major General Thomas Holcomb, U. S. Marines,
The Major General Commandant,
U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C.

01/101

HEADQUARTERS, AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET,
MARINE BARRACKS, QUANTICO, VIRGINIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L

16 January, 1942.

From: Major General H. M. Smith, USMC.
To : The Major General Commandant.
Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Reference: (a) Your letter AO-111-4em (03B1442), 14 Jan 42.

1. As requested in reference, the following opinions are expressed:


(a) All Amphibious Force Marines are considered as commandos and may be trained to a high degree under their own officers in this form of raiding.

(b) The appointment of Colonel Donovan to brigadier general could be compared to that of Lord Mountbatten in Great Britain -- both are "royal" and have easy access to the highest authority without reference to their own immediate superiors.

(c) The appointment would be considered by many senior officers of the Corps as political, unfair, and a publicity stunt.

(d) An appointment as brigadier general, Marines, doubtless would indicate that he is to form commandos from Marine Amphibious Force. The Commandant would lose control of that number of Marines assigned as commandos. We have enough "by products" now.

(e) No strictures are cast upon Colonel Donovan. He



2325

Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

has a reputation for fearlessness but he has never been a Marine and his appointment would be accepted with resentment throughout the Corps. It would be stressed that the Marines had to go outside their own service for leaders.

(f) It is the unanimous opinion of the staff of this headquarters that commando raids by the British have been of little strategical value. We have not reached the stage where our men are so highly trained and restless for action that they must be employed in commando raids.

(g) I recommend against the appointment.

H. M. SMITH

UNCLASSIFIED

Text

Mr. Samuel W. Meek
420 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y.

19 January 1942

Dear Sam:

I am writing with further reference to a proposed article in LIFE about Earl Ellis. I resent Mr Palmer's attitude as expressed in his letter to Admiral Stark, a copy of which I enclose, and in his letter to Mr. Luce. I can see nothing whatever to be gained by the publication of this article and I can see a great deal of harm. As for publicity, the Marine Corps has fine, clean, honorable publicity and feels that for the time being at least it needs no more. Mr. Palmer wishes publicity for the Navy. Let him get it at their expense, not ours. I hope that Mr. Luce will be willing to suppress this story and that if this "bird" goes elsewhere with his stuff that I will hear about it.

It was fine to have you both to dinner the other night. Mrs. Holcomb and I both thoroughly enjoyed meeting Mr. Luce. He is certainly one of the most interesting men I have met and I must thank you for the opportunity of seeing him. I hope that you can bring him to the house again soon and that I may have the pleasure of seeing him often.

Again let me say that the MARCH OF TIME on Wake was the best job of its kind I have ever seen. I am writing officially to the corporation about it.

The Donovan affair is still uppermost in my mind. I am terrified that I may be forced to take this man. I feel that it will be the worst slap in the face the Marine Corps ever was given because it involves bringing an outsider into the Marine Corps as a leader in our own specialty that is, amphibious operations. Because commander work is simply one form of amphibious operation. It will be bitterly resented by our personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, and I am afraid that it may serve to materially reduce my usefulness in this office, if any, because I am expected and properly so to protect the Marine Corps from intrusions of this kind.

Always sincerely,

Enc.

T. HOLCOMB.

238

12225

Cinepac File No.
AS/
A16-3(1)/(60)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

RECEIVED
FEB 1 1942
WAR PLANS SECTION
MARINE CORPS

Serial 019 W

~~SECRET~~
S-E-C-R-E-T

JAN 31 1942

FILE

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force.

Subject: Organization of "Commando" Units.

Reference: (a) Corinch despatch 251940 of January 1942.

1. Reference (a) is quoted for information:

"DEVELOP ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF MARINES AND NAVAL UNITS OF "COMMANDO" TYPE FOR USE IN COMBINATION WITH EXPLOITING OF THIS CHARACTER FOR DESTRUCTION AND GROUND PROTECTION OF ISLAND INSTALLATIONS IN BRITISH HOLD ISLANDS AND LARGELY UNDEVELOPED OF SUCH SMALL UNITS EMPLOYED IN BATTLES ARE APPROPRIATE PRACTICABLE BY USE OF RUBBER BOATS".

2. In order to carry out the foregoing directive, it is desired that immediate steps be taken to organize and train four "Commando" type units in your force. Details of organization, development, and training are left to your discretion, subject to the following:

(a) It is considered that the most suitable vessels for transporting Commando units are APD's. Request has been made that four such vessels be returned to the Pacific and, if so returned, they will be sent to San Diego for training with the troops.

(b) The strength of Each Commando unit should be such that it can be transported on one APD. It appears that four such units may be organized within an infantry battalion without appreciably changing present organization except for assembling the most suitable personnel and material in one battalion. By retaining battalion organization for the four units, they can be administered and trained under one controlling head and may be used, tactically, as individual units or in combination with each other.

Auth: DOD memo of 5/3/72
Subj: Reclassification of WWII Records

UNCLASSIFIED

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Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

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A3/
AIG-3(1)/(00)

Serial 019

17 1942

SECRETED (with DUD in me of 5/3/42
date) R. classification of WWII - R. e. u. e

Subject: Organization of "Commando" Units.

(c) The purpose of Commando units is conceived as being to make speedy and surprise approach to a lightly defended island base; to land by stealth and without gunfire or air support; to make rapid advance on important installations, such as radio stations, fuel storage, gun batteries, inflammable buildings, etc.; to effect maximum destruction by means of bombs, grenades, incendiaries, and any other means that may be developed and furnished to such units; and to make rapid withdrawal.

(d) The personnel for such units should preferably be volunteers and have qualifications similar to those required of parachute troops.

(e) Some men should be especially trained in scouting and patrolling, both by day and by night, so they may be landed, probably at night by rubber boats from fast vessels or submarines, to conduct the necessary ground reconnaissance to determine strength and disposition of defending forces and the location of remunerative attack objectives.

3. The Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force is authorized and directed to request the services of any personnel who may be familiar with training, organization, and methods of foreign Commando units.

4. Please keep the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet informed of the progress made pursuant to this directive.

5. Transmission via U.S. registered air mail is hereby authorized.

Copy to:

Cinch

Opnav

Paj. Gen. Comdt.

Comsecfor

C. T. HENRIS

3050-50
5/18-cvs
00010

257

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS SECOND JOINT TRAINING FORCE
Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.

RESTRICTED

4 February 1942.

SECRET:

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.

Subject: Organization of "Commando" Units.

Reference: (a) CinCPac secret ltr AE/A16-3(1)/(86) serial
019W, dated 24Jan42.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the 2d Marine Division is hereby directed to organize immediately and train four "Commando" type units.

2. The specific missions contemplated for these units are as follows:

- (a) Raids on lightly defended island bases, with or without air and gunfire support, to destroy enemy installations.
- (b) Landings, probably in rubber boats, for reconnaissance.

3. The following details of organization are specified:

- (a) Each unit should be organized so that it can be transported in one (1) LST, considering also that elements of units may operate from submarines.
- (b) The four units will be administered and trained as a battalion.
- (c) The four units will be trained to act singly or as a battalion.
- (d) The battalion will not be considered as part of any combat team of the 2d Marine Division.
- (e) The personnel will be volunteers having high physical qualifications.

4. Training of units will include the following but the development and special training of the units is left to your discretion:

- (a) Demolition and destruction.
- (b) Day and night scouting and patrolling.
- (c) Combat intelligence.

1975
RESTRICTED

Adm. ...
5-22-48

3050-50
5/18-cvs
SECRET:
00010
Subject:

Organization of "Commando" Units.

5. The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, is directed to request, via this headquarters, the services of any personnel who may be familiar with training, organization and methods of foreign Commando units or whose services in any other manner are desired.

6. Please keep the Commanding General, 2d Joint Training Force, informed of the progress made, by reports separate from reports of state of training of TO units.

CLAYTON B. VOGEL.

Copy to: CinCPac,
Comdt., USMCI

E CORPS

JAN 9 1948

From: Commanding General, 2d Marine Division
To: Commanding General, USMCI
or Staff of USMCI

FILE

1. This information is to be kept
classified as RESTRICTED

R. L. Parker

12372
RECEIVED
FEB 9 1948
WAR PLANS SEC
MARINE CORPS
FILE

IN REPLYING ADDRESS
THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT
AND REFER TO No.

AO-283-njp
(003A3442)



HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON

SECRET

FEB 4 1942

*Auth. Dev. in memo of 5/31/72
by R. K. [unclear] of [unclear] [unclear]*

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET:

Subject: Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of
"Commando" Type.

References: (a) COMINCH Dispatch 231940 January 1942.
(b) CINCPAC Serial 019 to CG 2d JTF, dated
24 January 1942.

1. In connection with the references, it is understood that three APD's have been ordered from the Atlantic Coast to the Pacific Coast in order to provide vessels for training special duty units in the Second Marine Division.

2. Pending return of the Sixth Marines from Indigo, the Second Marine Division has only one regiment (Second Marines) as a basis for absorbing the 5,000 recruits to be assigned that Division during the month of February. The assignment of one battalion of that regiment to special duty at this time would interfere seriously with the reorganization now in progress.

3. The First Separate Battalion, or APD Battalion, attached to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, has been in existence for years and has been undergoing intensive training in the execution of small-scale amphibious raids and surprise landings for the past year.

4. In view of the above, it is proposed to issue orders increasing the strength of the First Separate Battalion by sufficient personnel to permit the transfer by rail to the West Coast of one experienced Infantry Company, Machine Gun Platoon, and 81mm Mortar Section, to serve as a nucleus for the organization of the Second Separate Battalion in the Second Joint Training Force, which may be used for the purpose indicated in references (a) and (b).

UNCLASSIFIED

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
(003A3442)

SECRET

Subject: Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of
"Commando" Type.

5. The above is the most rapid and efficient method, under present conditions, of carrying out the provisions of references (a) and (b) and, at the same time, leave a similar unit on the East Coast.

6. Approval of this plan is requested.



T. HOLCOMB

Approved: *E. King* - *H. Fisher*
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

RM.

UNCLASSIFIED

Auth. Declassify 5/3/72

July Declassification of 5/11/72

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

AO-134-hem

February 4, 1942.

Subsequent to receipt of the attached Memorandum by Colonel Peck, he and I had several telephone conversations relative to modification thereof. The following dispatch proposed by me was the one finally accepted as best fitted for the purpose. Colonel Peck proposes to submit this dispatch to COMINCH tomorrow, February 5, for transmission if approved.

TRANSFER DETACHMENT SEVEN OFFICERS AND APPROXIMATELY 200 ENLISTED FROM FIRST SEPARATE BATTALION AF AF TO COMMANDANT MARCORPS FOR FURTHER TRANSFER OVERLAND WEST COAST AS NUCLEUS AND BATTALION BEING ORGANIZED THERE FOR USE IN AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS X ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF DETACHMENT AS MAY BE DIRECTED BY COMMANDANT MARCORPS TO COMGEN AF AF X REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL SHORTAGE FIRST SEPARATE BATTALION BE EFFECTED SOON

CAF

*On 5 Feb '42 Col Peck advised me that above dispatch was sent
CAF*

Subj: Reclassification of WWII
UNCLASSIFIED
Auth: DOD (10/1/11)
Date: 10/1/11

1975

UNCLASSIFIED

*Auth. O.C. Memo 2 19 42
by Sec. Nav. Dept. 2 19 42
Francis*

COMINCH FILE
FF1/ P11-1/(0062) UNITED STATES FLEET

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D C

Serial (0062)

February 5, 1942

SECRET

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Commando Training of U. S. Marine Corps
personnel in England.

Reference: (a) Spcnavo London Secret despatch 021301
of February, 1942.
(b) OpNav Secret Despatch 191737 of January,
1942.

1. The Commander-in-Chief approves the arrange-
ments proposed in reference (a) for a detachment of two (2)
officers and twenty (20) enlisted men to proceed to England
for a two-month period of Commando training beginning April
1, 1942.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations is requested to
make the necessary administrative arrangements, and to notify
the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, of the date on which it
is desired that this detachment report to the Chief of Naval
Operations. Arrival of the detachment in England at least
one week prior to April 1, 1942 is desired.

3. The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, is requested
to form and equip this detachment and to issue the necessary
orders in conformity with the instructions of the Chief of
Naval Operations.

George C. Dyer

GEORGE C. DYER,
Flag Secretary.

E. J. KING.

12311

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FEB 6 1942
WAR PLANS SECTION
MARINE CORPS

File in

FOR DEFENSE



In reply refer to Initials
and No.

263

1975

12357

(SC)P11-1/KK
Op-16-A-2-a
Serial 0130816

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
FEB 9 1942

WAR PLANS SECTION
HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

FILE *(Handwritten signature)*

FEB 9 1942

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
Subject: Commando Training of U. S. Marine Corps personnel
in England.
Reference: (a) Secret ltr. from COMINCH, FF1/P11-1, Serial
0062, dated February 5, 1942.

1. In accordance with paragraph two of reference (a), it is recommended that the proposed detachment of twenty men and two officers be formed and equipped at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., in such time that departure may be effected not later than March 1, 1942.

2. It is not considered essential that the officers and men be ordered to report to the Chief of Naval Operations, but it is requested that the officers be given verbal instructions to report to the Intelligence Division of this office not later than February 16, 1942 for necessary procedures involved in designation as Special Naval Observers.

3. The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, is further requested to submit a complete roster of this detachment to the Chief of Naval Operations as soon as practicable.

4. It is assumed that the Quartermaster, U. S. Marine Corps will arrange transportation to the United Kingdom by surface vessel scheduled to depart not later than March 1, 1942.

5. The enlisted men will travel as troops without passports.

(Handwritten signature)

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
By Direction

Auth: 1806 memo of 5/3/72
Subj: Reclassification of 2001-1-100000

SECRET

COPY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET

MEMORANDUM

9 February 1942.

From: Admiral King
To: Lt. Gen. Golcomb

Will you please have your people follow up and follow through on the equipment and ammunition (for training) of "Commando" troops with first priority for the units on the West Coast (Pacific Fleet) By Equipment is meant everything needed to make the "Commando" units effective - to include, for instance, demolition, portable radio, rubber boats, special weapons, etc.

KING

Original in safe in Cante's office
JSC

COPY

COPY

1975

Washington, D. C.

Date: JAN 9 1948

From: Commandant of 265 Marine Corps
to: Chief of Staff, S & C Files, Division
of Plans and Policies

AO-134-hem
(09A4142)

1 The subject of this memorandum is
referred to RESTRICTED
2 The subject of this memorandum is
referred to RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

February 10, 1942.

R. L. Parker

Dear Barney:

On 14 January I wrote you a letter advising that a suggestion had been made that Colonel William J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the "Commando Project". For obvious reasons, I didn't mention in my letter that this suggestion was made by very high authority, and that my reaction was one of complete disapproval of the idea. I purposely refrained from giving you any of the background or my reaction; this, in order that I might get a frank expression of opinion from you relative to the suggestion. I called on several other General officers of the Marine Corps for their opinions also.

I expressed to higher authority my utter disapproval of the Donovan angle and the question died down. It turned up again today, but indications are that it has again been quelled. I fear, however, that the idea is too strongly imbedded to remain dormant very long unless we move promptly to broaden our amphibious training in such way as to head off any outside interference. In this connection I quote a memorandum, dated 9 February, just received from COMMACH, which affords us the opportunity desired:

"From: Admiral King
To: Lt. Gen. Holcomb

Will you please have your people follow up - and follow through - on the equipment and ammunition (for training) of "Commando" troops - with first priority for the units on the West Coast (Pacific Fleet). By equipment is meant everything needed to make the "Commando" units effective - to include, for instance, demolition, portable radio, rubber boats, special weapons, etc."

/s/ King

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED

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Before stating the action we must take in this matter I shall give you an outline of my reasons for objecting to the appointment of Donovan.

From a morale standpoint alone, the introduction of a separate special corps within the Marine Corps would be most undesirable. Moreover, the assignment of an outside officer over and above a large number of regular, professional officers, who by reason of long and continuous active service and experience are better qualified, would be considered by the latter as a reflection on their ability, experience, training, and courage.

I have great respect for Colonel Donovan's World War record, for his accomplishments since the World War, and for his fine personality; I have no reason to question his qualities as a leader. However, the vital facts are that he has had no Marine Corps experience whatever, that he does not have the indoctrination and background which makes the Marine what he is, and that he has not had the amphibious experience which most Marine officers have had. If it is borne in mind that the Marine Corps throughout its history has specialized in bush warfare and amphibious operations; that particularly since World War I, it has conducted uninterrupted research in the history of this type of warfare; that it has developed a special technique, both in its schools and during annual maneuvers of its forces; that it is, so far as known, the only organization in the world which specializes in all phases of amphibious warfare; then it must be realized that were an officer brought into the Corps to supervise "Commando" work it would be a complete repudiation of our officer personnel, and would be so regarded. I know the temper, the feelings, and the ideals of our officer and enlisted personnel. I take into consideration the fine record Marine Corps units made in World War I; the fine work they have done in our small wars since that date; and the creditable part which has been made in the present war. It is my considered opinion, and that of all the officers with whom I have discussed the question in hand, that to appoint Colonel Donovan an officer of the Marine Corps, regardless of the rank given him, to take charge of "Commando" work would be a severe blow to the morale of our Corps, and therefore a blow to National Defense.

RESTRICTED
CONFIDENTIAL

Although the infantry units of our Amphibious Forces are essentially "Commando" units, the disruption of organizations in their formative period has precluded, to a very large extent, the organization, equipment, and training desired for this purpose. Now, in view of COMINCH's memorandum, herein quoted, and as a means of forestalling the Donovan case, we must act and act quickly. We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our important missions, viz: the execution of amphibious raids.

In compliance with CinCpac's directive, you have directed the organization of four "Commando" units, to be administered and trained as a battalion (your letter 3050-50 over 5/18-cvs over 00010, 4 February 1942, just received). Since that was written, you have received instructions from me to organize the 2d Separate Battalion; this, I assume, will comprise the units you already started in accordance with above directive plus the reinforced company which we are sending to you from the 1st Separate Battalion from Quantico. The organization, equipment and training of this battalion is of first priority. We must go beyond this, which will be second priority, viz: the preparation of an infantry regiment for amphibious operations. In other words, we must get one battalion ready at the earliest practicable date, followed as soon as possible by one regiment, even at some sacrifice for the time being of the other units in the matter of experience personnel and equipment.

I want to emphasize that I consider the so-called "Commando Operations" only one feature of normal Marine Corps work. In fact, the later operations of the British Commandos indicate that they are following more and more our normal doctrine on landings. They have reprinted our FT-167.

However, in view of the situation now facing us, it is imperative that we get underway at once with greater emphasis on training in night operations ashore and afloat, patrolling beaches from the sea, air infantry, rubber coats, raids from cruisers and destroyers, patrolling from submarines and possibly some additional attention to individual combat.

Similar Directives are being issued to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.

I am having prepared tables of special equipment considered essential for (1) 2d Separate Battalion and (2) battalions of the Amphibious Force. I will also send you a copy of the list of special equipment for the 2d Separate Battalion, now being prepared by Amphibious Force, Atlantic

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

Fleet. It has been proposed that we include in the Separate Battalion a platoon of parachutists; your radio comment on this proposal is requested.

According to the records in this office you now have on hand 10 rubber boats; 40 will be shipped to you from Akron, Ohio, this week, 40 the week following, and 20 the week following that.

From this long letter I am sure you and all others concerned will appreciate the importance of getting this project underway immediately. It is really a matter of grave concern to me, as it may have a very important influence on our future.

Please treat this subject, as regards personalities, as strictly Confidential. Also please keep me fully and frequently informed as to the progress you are making in the organization, equipment, and training of the units in question, as well as for the remainder of the Force. Incidentally, I don't like the term "Commando"; we are looking for a better term - one more fitting for the Marines. Have you any suggestions?

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

T. HOLCOMB.

P.S. If you desire his services and feel that he would be of material assistance in furthering this project, I will give favorable consideration to ordering Lt. Col. Edson out to you for duty as Commanding Officer of the 2d Separate Battalion.

As I have already told Price, Colonel L.C. Shepherd will be sent to you for duty as Commanding Officer of an infantry regiment upon the return of Colonel Wharton from INDICO.

Major General Clayton B. Vogel, U.S.M.C.,
Marine Corps Base,
San Diego, California.

1975

269

Date: JAN 8 1948

AO-283-njp
(03A4242)

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Officer-in-Charge S & C Files, Division
of Plans and Policies.

~~RESTRICTED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. The classification of this document is changed to **RESTRICTED**.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. The office is to bring the recipient's attention to the original of the correspondence of this change.

11 Feb 42

R.H. Parker

By direction

Dear Holland:

On 14 January I wrote you a letter advising that a suggestion had been made that Colonel William J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking charge of the "Commando Project". For obvious reasons, I didn't mention in my letter that this suggestion was made by very high authority, and that my reaction was one of complete disapproval of the idea. I purposely refrained from giving you any of the background or my reaction; this, in order that I might get a frank expression of opinion from you relative to the suggestion. I called on several other General officers of the Marine Corps for their opinions also.

I expressed to higher authority my utter disapproval of the Donovan angle and the question died down. It turned up again yesterday, but indications are that it has again been quieted. I fear, however, that the idea is too strongly imbedded to remain dormant very long unless we move promptly to broaden our amphibious training in such way as to head off any outside interference. In this connection I quote a memorandum, dated 9 February, just received from SMITH, which affords us the opportunity desired:

"From: Admiral King
To: Lt. Gen. Holcomb

Will you please have your people follow up--and follow through--on the equipment and organization (for training) of "Commando" troops--with first priority for the units on the West Coast (Pacific Fleet). By equipment is meant everything needed to make the "Commando" units effective--to include, for instance, demolition, portable radio, rubber boats, etc., etc., etc."

1/5/48

Before at this the action we must take in this matter I shall give you an outline of my reasons for objection to the appointment of Donovan.

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(03A4242)

CONFIDENTIAL

From a morale standpoint alone, the introduction of a separate special corps within the Marine Corps would be most undesirable. Moreover, the assignment of an outside officer over and above a large number of regular, professional officers, who by reason of long and continuous active service and experience are better qualified, would be considered by the latter as a reflection on their ability, experience, training, and courage.

I have great respect for Colonel Donovan's World War record, for his accomplishments since the World War, and for his fine personality; I have no reason to question his qualities as a leader. However, the vital facts are that he has had no Marine Corps experience whatever, that he does not have the indoctrination and background which makes the Marine what he is, and that he has not had the amphibious experience which most Marine officers have had. If it is borne in mind that the Marine Corps throughout its history has specialized in bush warfare and amphibious operations; that particularly since World War I, it has conducted uninterrupted research in the history of this type of warfare; that it has developed a special technique, both in its schools and during annual maneuvers of its forces; that it is, so far as known, the only organization in the world which specializes in all phases of amphibious warfare; then it must be realized that were an officer brought into the Corps to supervise "Commando" work it would be a complete repudiation of our officer personnel, and would be so regarded. I know the temper, the feelings, and the ideals of our officer and enlisted personnel. I take into consideration the fine record Marine Corps units made in World War I; the fine work they have done in our small wars since that date; and the creditable start which has been made in the present war. It is my considered opinion, and that of all the officers with whom I have discussed the question in hand, that to appoint Colonel Donovan an officer of the Marine Corps, regardless of the rank given him, to take charge of "Commando" work would be a severe blow to the morale of our Corps, and therefore a blow to National Defense.

RESTRICTED
CONFIDENTIAL

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(03A4242)

CONFIDENTIAL

Although the infantry units of our Amphibious Forces are essentially "Commando" units, the disruption of organizations in their formative period has precluded, to a very large extent, the organization, equipment, and training desired for this purpose. Now, in view of COMINCH's memorandum, herein quoted, and as a means of forestalling the Donovan case, we must act and act quickly. We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our important missions, viz.; the execution of amphibious raids.

You have the First Separate Battalion, which has been trained along the general lines required for so called "Commando" duty. It was necessary to detach approximately one-third of this unit to the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, in order to comply with a directive from CINCPAC that four companies be organized immediately on the West Coast. The reorganization of this reinforced company in the First Separate Battalion should be given the highest priority.

However, we must go beyond this, which will be a second priority, viz.; the preparation of an infantry regiment for amphibious operations of this type. In other words, we must get one battalion ready at the earliest practicable date, followed as soon as practicable by one regiment, even at some sacrifice for the time being of the other units in the matter of experienced personnel and equipment.

I want to emphasize that I consider the so called "Commando Operations" only one feature of normal Marine Corps work. In fact, the later operations of the British Commandos indicate that they are following more and more our normal doctrine on landings. They have reprinted our MFP-167.

However, in view of the situation now facing us, it is imperative that we intensify this type of training with particular emphasis on night operations ashore and afloat, patrolling beaches from the sea, air infantry, rubber boats, raids from cruisers and destroyers, patrolling by units landed from submarines, and possibly some additional attention to individual combat, in order that a unit of any size can be made ready on the shortest possible notice for any special task. Such units should be trained and equipped to conduct demolitions, sabotage, and intelligence missions.

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COLLECTED

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(03A4242)

CONFIDENTIAL

The normal training of parachute units should also fit them for such special missions. There will undoubtedly arise many situations in active operations in which it is not feasible to land parachute troops as such, and in such situations they should be available for employment in surface ships in the execution of tasks for which they are specially qualified.

A similar directive has been issued to the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet.

The Tables of Organization for the Separate Battalion prepared by Edson are under study, and they will be approved with minor modifications. It is considered desirable to include an 81mm Mortar Platoon in order that the Battalion as a whole may be available for employment in the landing attack if no appropriate special mission can be found. A copy of the letter transmitted with the proposed Table was sent to San Diego by officer messenger last night.

The next 90 rubber boats to be delivered are being sent to San Diego to equip the Second Separate Battalion. Steps are being taken to procure additional rubber boats as soon as practicable for use at New River. In the meantime, it is suggested a few might be sent to New River from the 90 available at Quantico. In this connection, also, an order is being placed for several hundred 7-man rubber boats as it will be difficult to embark the 10-man boats in normal transport planes or gliders.

Please treat this subject, as regards personalities, as strictly Confidential. Also please keep me fully and frequently informed as to the progress you are making in the organization, equipment, and training of the units in question, as well as for the remainder of the force. Incidentally, I don't like the term "Commando"; we are looking for a better term--one more fitting for the Marines. Have you any suggestions?

With all good wishes.

Sincerely,

T. EDSON.

Major General Holland K. Smith, U.S.M.C.,
Commanding General,
Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.

2385
02/106
061

1st Endorsement. February 9, 1942.
Headquarters, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet,
Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Recommended organization for a battalion embarked
on destroyer transport.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the recommendations set forth in the basic letter, with the following modifications:

(a) That all pistols listed in the enclosed tables be replaced by semi-automatic carbines as soon as this weapon becomes available.

(b) That the designation of this battalion be changed to the "1st Shock Battalion."

2. The organization and equipment recommended in the basic letter are considered to be particularly well suited for amphibious operations in Atlantic Ocean theaters. It will be noted that this battalion requires six (6) APDs and a small amount of space on one (1) AK for complete embarkation. The organization recommended permits the embarkation of one (1) rifle company on each of four APDs. In event that an APD is not available or is employed on a separate mission, it is still possible to employ the remainder of the battalion as a unit without rearrangement of the embarked troops.

3. Studies which have been made of various possible operating theaters in the Atlantic Ocean have invariably indicated the desirability of employing a highly trained shock unit from light, fast transports as a part of the Amphibious Force in conjunction with any main landing which might be made. These studies have also indicated that this battalion, in order not to limit its usefulness, should be provided with a small amount of motor transportation. This transportation, with rear echelon personnel, can be embarked on an AK and join the battalion upon arrival of the main force.

4. It will also be noted that 60-mm mortars have been included in the weapons company, instead of 81-mm mortars, with a view to increasing the mobility of that company. This substitution is considered to be necessary in order to permit the battalion to advance a reasonable distance inland. In situations which may be encountered on small islands in the Pacific, or elsewhere, wherein a deep advance is not required, it is thought that the weapons company should be equipped with 81-mm mortars instead of 60-mm mortars.

13 Feb

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2385 02/106 051 1st Endorsement (Cont.) February 9, 1942.
Subject: Recommended organization for a battalion embarked
on destroyer transport.

5. The designation, "1st Shock Battalion," is suggested
since it is believed that the term is more descriptive of the
unit's probable type of operations than "1st Separate Battalion"
or "1st Destroyer Battalion."

H. H. SMITH

Copy to: 2d JTF


Handwritten initials

2385

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 16, 1942



Major General Thomas Holcomb,
Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps Headquarters,
Room 2001, Arlington Annex,
Arlington, Va.

My dear General Holcomb:

General Wilkinson has for a few days to me a copy of a letter of January 31, 1942 from the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, Washington, asking for a survey of officer personnel available for duty at sea.

I am sending General Wilkinson the data on our officers today, listing as available for sea duty all of our Navy and Marine Corps officers, in and when their records are supplied.

As to these reliefs, I hope very much that careful effort will be made to select the right men, and that I will have an opportunity to examine the record of any man before he is assigned here.

The type of work required here calls for a special type of officer, one with a scholastic approach to problems of war, tempered by practical experience in the field. Those who might make the best officers commanding men, or commanding ships, might not be the best men for our purposes.

Each of our work is, as you know, done for the direct

General Thomas Holcomb

-2-

Feb. 16, 1942

use of the naval and military commanders of the United States, and I am particularly anxious to have the attitude of the Navy and Marine Corps properly represented in the preparation and consummation of any such work.

For that purpose not many officers are required, but those that are must be men of the highest intelligence, experience, breadth of mind, and technical skill. A random selection of Reserve or retired officers would, I am sure, fall far short of our needs. It occurs to me that some men of the type we need might be found among those who, regardless of their proficiency as officers, have been retired for physical reasons.

I know you will understand why, from the point of view of being as useful as possible to the Navy and Marine Corps, I am anxious to secure the best men possible for assignment to this office as replacements for any who may be detached.

Very truly yours,




William J. Donovan

*Like contact
Jimmy
Roosevelt ??*

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9 March 1948

Dear Joe:



I thought the D case was all settled but have just learned that another memorandum has gone to the Big Boss in the matter. He is still trying to get the job that we thought we had headed off. Is there anything that you can do? Your letter came too late to stop Updike's commission as I had finally approved it. He is in much better shape than he was and seems to have been doing useful work.

I left on a southern trip last Tuesday in my plane and got back yesterday. Visited Dunedin and saw the amphibian tractors, Miami, and Parris Island. Was much impressed by the work they are doing at the latter place. The Greybeard Platoons are working hard and I think the plan will be a big success. I certainly hope so. I was also tremendously interested in the glider training at P. I. and had a ride in one. It was really delightful.

I am going off on another trip to New River toward the end of the month and

sometime, early in April will try to get to the West Coast. If I go Beatrice will be with me and we would be most pleased to accept your invitation to stay with you if you really have room. Beatrice came back from Miami, leaving there the same day I did. She is very much better but had a bad cold from all the rain and cold weather they have been having there. You see, she put the California climate on the bum last year and I had to go out and straighten it out. I took the sunshine to Miami but it was too late and she insisted on coming home. She is going down to stay with Hazel Hunt and later with Edith Hill at New River about the 19th of March.

Best regards,

Very sincerely,

T. HOLCOMB.

Brigadier General J. C. Fegan, USMC
Marine Corps Base
San Diego, Calif.

C O P Y

Combined Operations Headquarters,
War Cabinet Office Annexe,
14, Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

22nd July, 1942.

Dear Admiral:

I am enclosing a copy of a report made by the Commandant of the Commando Depot on the United States Marine Corps detachment which recently completed a course at the depot.

It is a great pleasure to read such a report, and I would like, personally, to offer my congratulations to the officers and men concerned.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Louis Mountbatten.

Admiral H. R. Stark,
United States Navy,
20, Grosvenor Square,
London, W.1.

REPORT ON UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

Length of Course - 8th June 1942 to 29th June 1942.

Programme of Work - Already submitted.

GENERAL REPORT.

The whole of the detachment were a credit to the United States Marine Corps, from the start they were all keen and entered into an arduous training with enthusiasm and cheerfulness.

They have undergone an arduous Commando training with an exceptionally unconquerable spirit which never wavered during the course.

I am sure that they have very much benefited by the course and are fit to take their place in a Commando.

Captain Roy J. Batterton proved himself to be a fearless and efficient leader of his men. He would make an excellent Troop Leader in a Commando.

Staff Sergeant George V Clarke, Sergeant Way Holland, Sergeant George J. Huddock and Sergeant Curtis A Tatum proved themselves excellent N.C.Os. and possess exceptionally fine leadership qualities and could control their men under very difficult conditions.

It was a pleasure to be associated with such an excellent detachment.

/s/ L.E. Vaughan,
Lieut.-Colonel,
Commandant,
Commando Depot.

Achnacarry,
Spean Bridge,
Inverness-shire.
29th June, 1942.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON D C

X H/1 ca. 11.
X Report

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

*Have
Brown
C. H. [unclear]*

May 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: Captain Peter J. Ortiz

SUBJECT: Chronological report of my activities as U.S. Assistant Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attache for Air at Tangier, Morocco, and U.S. Marine Corps observer in North Africa.



I arrived at London, England, on December 30, 1942.


I reported to the United States Naval Attache office where I was instructed to carry out my basic orders, to wit, to report in Tangier, Morocco, to Colonel William A. Edôy, U. S. Naval Attache. I reached Gibraltar by military airplane on January 5 and learned that the shipping schedule was at that time very irregular between Gibraltar and Tangier and decided consequently to go on by plane to Oran, Algeria, and then on to Casablanca, French Morocco, and finally to Tangier by train. I spent two days in Oran and Argew where I studied the "Torch" operation landings that had been made there and also contacted a number of locally influential French residents, military and civilian, some of them former acquaintances with whom I discussed the economic, political and military aspects of the

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[Redacted]



 Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa hearing opinions of interest to ONI and MI. Flying to Casablanca I spent a few days there and at Fedahla and Rabat, much in the same manner as in Oran, and then entrained for Tangier where in the absence of Colonel W. A. Eddy, I reported on January 13 to Captain F. P. Holcomb, USMCR, Assistant U.S. Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attache for Air.

Leaving Tangier on January 15 I returned to Casablanca and went on to Fez where I spent a few days observing and participating in the training of a French parachute unit and then went on to Algiers via Oran reporting to Colonel W. A. Eddy, USMC, on January 19. Colonel Eddy gave me full latitude to carry out my instructions as I wished. However, he suggested, when I expressed my intention of immediately going up to the forward zone, that I first spend a little time in the Algiers sector completing my documentation on the "Torch" operation particularly as at the time there was little activity at the front. During this period I was able to spend profitably a few days with the 509 Parachute Battalion (Colonel E. Raff) taking part in interesting maneuvers and fire problems. I have many personal friends in the 509th and I am convinced

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that it is a crack organization. The fact remains, however, that it has not yet successfully completed a major mission. It has been greatly over-publicized, much to the discomfiture of the few officers and men who can still review its much ballyhooed accomplishments dispassionately and objectively. The press releases and radio broadcasts have led the majority of its members to believe that they are heroes covered with glory and feel that they should return to the States to be adulated by the grateful population. I mention this as an example of the effect on Army military organizations of uncontrolled publicity.

On February 8 I flew to Youks-les-Bains, made my way to 2nd Corps Headquarters near Tebessa where I secured authorization to roam about at will, attaching myself to and serving with units of my choice. I was for excellent personal reasons and as a representative of the Marine Corps particularly desirous of seeing and taking part again in action against the Germans. Through personal reconnaissance and Arab connections I was in a position on one or two occasions to give information of value to unit commanders. I happened to be in Gafsa when the evacuation order was received. Although later claimed

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 4 - [REDACTED]

by the press as a perfect example of an orderly and well-planned retreat, I thought it characterized by confusion and an alarming contagion of panic. There was no enemy pressure during the entire night either in Gafsa or on the road north to Feriana. Yet dozens of vehicles were damaged and abandoned and a number of soldiers and civilians run over through the inadequateness of traffic control. A railway bridge was blown prematurely and a train had to be left on the south side. The Derbyshire Yeomanry, an aggressive British light armoured reconnaissance regiment, was left to conduct the delaying actions. Actually it was not necessary to do more than maintain contact with the enemy as the German advance was sufficiently slow and cautious to eliminate the necessity for delaying action combat. A few Messerschmitt's and JU-88's came over at sunset completely destroying a few vehicles among which was a two-and-one-half-ton truck in which I had placed my bedroll. This contained among other things all the notes I had accumulated thus far. Leaving the Derbyshire Yeomanry near Feriana I made my way to Kasserine and on to Sbeitla, unofficially attaching myself to the 1st Armoured Division. Finally after having been utilized piecemeal over more than a hundred miles of front and suffering

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heavy losses through no fault of its commander, this division was able to concentrate its remaining armour east of Sbeitla. A large-scale tank battle took place in which the 77mm. high velocity German gun proved far superior to our own 75 mm. A tank is only as good as its gun and its gun as good as its sight. We spend tens of thousands of dollars to build an excellent tank and then equip it with an inferior gun and a gun sight worth a dollar or two. Our optical equipment must be improved. Our tank crews fought well and bravely but frequently in their eagerness they were enticed within range of cleverly placed German 88mm. guns. Our tank destroyers which can fire only to the front found this a severe handicap in a running retreating battle. Our air support was negligible, in fact, non-existent; the Germans', well coordinated. In Kasserine I ran into a Foreign Legion captain, an old friend, rushing reinforcements to his almost completely encircled regiment near Fichen. An ex-Foreign Legionnaire, I could not resist going up with him. The regiment put up a remarkable fight, demonstrating conclusively that seasoned and determined troops can, albeit with very inferior equipment and armament, hold out against a numerically superior and better armed enemy. When finally the order to withdraw was given, the regiment exacted a high price for

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- 6 -
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for every inch of terrain conceded the enemy. I left the regiment when it was eventually ordered south of Tebessa for rest and reorganization, thinking it advisable to report back to Colonel Eddy.

Flying back to Algiers from Youks-les-Bains on March 2, I told the Colonel I wished with his permission to go back to the front immediately. I had always displayed much interest in the Colonel's SOE operational groups. When he mentioned the officer casualties that they had recently suffered, I jumped at the opportunity of asking him to allow me to take command of a group. I wish to make it clear that I did so entirely on my own initiative and assuming full responsibility. Colonel Eddy was reluctant to give his consent in view of my status as Assistant Naval Attache and Marine Corps observer but consent was finally wrung from him. Leaving Algiers March 8 I reported in the evening of the same day at Guelma to Colonel Young, British commanding officer of the SOE groups on the Tunisian fronts. The Colonel directed me to go south to le Kouif reporting to Major G. ^QQuinney, a Britisher in charge of the operational groups working with 2nd Corps. Major ^QQuinney placed me in command of a group of five Spaniards and a British radio operator instructing me to join forces

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with Captain Robert who was operating with his group south of Sbeitla. After some difficulty I contacted Captain Robert finding him at the Headquarters of a squadron of my old friends in the Derbyshire Yeomanry. Captain Robert was as determined as I to get a German tank or two and we quickly became fast friends. For a week we scouted the sector for enemy tanks and vehicles, investigating all probable night harboring places. On reports or even vague rumors of enemy tanks within a radius of fifty miles we would start out immediately, sometimes tracking them for hours at night, but were never lucky enough to contact them. Our men were getting tired, so we went to Sbeitla cleared a house of booby traps, and rested for a day and night. By mutual agreement Captain Robert and I decided to operate separately, with probable enemy tank concentrations in the vicinity of Faid and Matleg as our common objectives, he approaching from the northeast and I from the northwest, but without attempting to maintain contact or coordinate our action.

Leaving Sbeitla in the morning of March 17 with my group I reached the Bir-el-Hatig at about 1000 where General Robinet had just established Combat Command B Headquarters. I presented myself to General Robinet, placing myself and command at his disposal. The General, after acquainting me with his plan of battle, explained that his imminent southeast drive

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would leave his left flank dangerously exposed to enemy tank action, if the German 21st Panzer Division, reportedly in the Matleg area, chose to roll down the Sengdal Valley. He asked me to reconnoitre the Matleg mountains northeast of the pass and the pass itself to determine the enemy's armoured strength (if any) and if possible his intentions. After arranging a radio and communications schedule with his communications officer, I proceeded up the Valley to the Ganet-Hadid range, establishing an OP at 2000 on its northeast end overlooking the Sidi-Bou-Sid--Maknassy road, the entire width of the Valley, and the Djebel--Ksaira range on the east side. Leaving Amado, my second-in-command, in charge of the group, I went out on reconnaissance crossing the Sidi-Bou-Sid road, skirting the Djebel Ksaira and Djebel Rechaib mountains, crossing the Matleg road about two miles northwest of the pass, reaching the immediate vicinity of the probable harboring places of enemy tank concentrations at about 2300 without having yet some unmistakable signs of enemy presence. It had been raining almost incessantly for three days. Crossing the valley, much of which was under water, and sinking above my knees in the soft mud, it was quite apparent to me that it would be impassable for any type of vehicle for some days to come. Consequently the menace to Combat Command B's left flank was obviated. However, I thought it might eventually prove useful

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to know the enemy's position and if possible, wished for personal reasons to get within range to utilize one of the very effective Petard grenades I was carrying. It was an extremely dark night, still raining heavily, the visibility so poor that I could scarcely see bushes and trees a few yards away. Inching my way along I reconnoitred many wadis for more than two hours without finding anything more than tank tracks. Suddenly near the pass at very close range automatic weapons to my front and right opened fire on me. Before I could fall to the ground a bullet had gone through my right hand and another had grazed my right leg. Rolling a few yards to my left merely to reach rather inadequate cover I could make out the dim silhouette of a vehicle some thirty yards to my front. I managed to throw in a Mills grenade but it fell short and had little effect. I then got in a well-aimed Petard grenade. It exploded with a terrific blast and stopped the automatic weapon fire from the front and I heard excited shouts and cries of men in pain. Still under fire from my right I crawled with extreme caution about 100 yards to the left rear then got on my feet, made my way with difficulty, due to the loss of blood and shock, back to the Ganet-Hadil where I found my men, who had heard the firing at a distance, very much on

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the alert. My British radio operator, Mullins, had been trying to establish contact with CCB but probably due to the mountains between us and their position had been unsuccessful. In view of this communications failure I thought it preferable to return to Combat Command B's Headquarters, reaching the position at about 0800, March 18. General Robinet warmly expressed appreciation of our efforts, awarded me the purple heart, requested his S-2, Major Morly, to send dispatches to Major ^GQuinney and Colonel Dickson, G-2, 2nd Corps, commending our action, and personally conducted me to a well equipped surgical unit where my hand was immediately and successfully operated on. Coming out of the anaesthetic I learned somewhat to my annoyance that the General had sent my group back to Major ^GQuinney who, following the displacement of 2nd Corps Headquarters, had just established his base camp near Feriana. Under protest I was sent via several evacuation units to a field hospital near Tebessa. The surgeon there wished to do a little butcher work on my hand and also casually spoke of months of hospitalization and convalescence in Cran. Much opposed to the program I sent a message to a friend at the airfield of Youks-les-Bains who came out, quietly took me to the field, and arranged my air transportation to Algiers.

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I reported to Colonel Eddy, March 22, at 1600, then was admitted to the 29 Station hospital where I received excellent medical attention until my departure from Algiers. To my chagrin Colonel Eddy insisted that I return to the United States as soon as the medical officer would allow me to travel. My status as Assistant Naval Attache at Algiers placed him and myself in a rather awkward position as it is not in accordance with the "rules" for a diplomatic representative to participate in action. However, he expressed his wish that I soon return to North Africa officially assigned to his organization. Following Colonel Eddy's instructions I reported in Tangier, reporting to Capt. F. P. Holcomb, USMCR, who ordered me back to the United States. Returning via ATC I reached Washington, D. on April 27 and reported to Marine Corps Headquarters April 28, at 0800.

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THE GERMINAL MISSION

Log Book

FINAL

The following were the personnel of the GERMINAL Mission:

Captain William F. GRELL, O-17860, USMCR
Captain Reeve SCHLEY, Jr., O-1031128, CAV
1st Lt. Robert F. CUTTING, O-460414, FA
1st Lt. Harry E. GRIFFITHS, O-1309254, INF
Sgt. Philip B.K. POTTER, 11121960

9 September 1944

Captain GRELL, Chief of GERMINAL Mission and Lt. GRIFFITHS left LONDON for TEMPSFORD Airport. At 0850 hours these officers with Lt. ANSTETT left TEMPSFORD on a Hudson bomber for LIMOGES. Lt. ANSTETT was returning to his Jedburgh team now located at CHATEAUROUX.

Arrived at the LIMOGES airport at 1140 hours. The following officers were present for the reception:

Major STAUNTON
Major DE GUELLIS
Capt. FRASER
Flight Lt. SIMON
2d Lt. MARCEL

The Hudson bomber returned to LONDON, leaving LIMOGES at 1200 hours. Major STAUNTON, eight Allied airmen, who had been stranded in FRANCE, and three unknown bodies with secret orders returned to ENGLAND.

Our agents had taken over the former German Gestapo Headquarters in the city of LIMOGES. This served as a temporary Headquarters for the GERMINAL Mission.

The following officers and men were present at the Headquarters:

Major SHANNON
Jedburgh Team LEE
Jedburgh Team JAMES

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Major FOSTER
Captain SCHLEY
Lt. CUTTING
Sgt. POTTER

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GERMINAL visited ELLIPSE's office in the TIVOLI. ELLIPSE being in PARIS for business reasons saw Cdt. VERMEULEN, DMR Assistant. Further use of the LEE and JAMES Jedburgh teams was discussed. Cdt. VERMEULEN suggested retaining Jedburgh Team LEE for the time being in LIMOGES. He further suggested the return of the Jedburgh Team JAMES to LONDON. Major REWEZ had returned to LONDON in order to obtain jeeps for the purpose of building up a flying column to hinder the Germans retreating northward.

10 September 1944

The GERMINAL team met to discuss their future plans. It was their intention to contact all American agents operating in South-western France. Agents whose missions had been completed would be sent to PARIS.

Two Canadian soldiers, attached to the American Army and four civilians were picked up in a stolen jeep. The two Canadian soldiers were turned over to Captain FRASER pending orders from proper Army authorities. The four civilians were turned over to the DMR at LIMOGES.

Contacted PERCY PINK at COGNAC and requested officer in charge to meet GERMINAL in LIMOGES Wednesday, 13 September 1944.

Major LORD and 2d Lt. DUVAL reported at LIMOGES. Their mission had been completed and having reported to LIMOGES they were given orders to return to PARIS.

11 and 12 September 1944

This morning we travelled from LIMOGES to MONTLUCON via GUERET. En route we observed thirty one enemy vehicles which had been ambushed by the maquis-"F.F.I."-in this area. The vehicles were completely destroyed in many instances and others rendered useless. It may be assumed that a large percentage of the personnel were killed in the ambushes. A small number of men were captured, but few prisoners were taken in the hit and run tactics used by the F.F.I. units. German columns retreating to the North in hope of using the BELFORT GAP lost heavily in men and equipment.

While in MONTLUCON we visited "CASERNE DE RICHEMONT". In August the Germans were blockaded for five days within these for-

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tifications with their water supply cut off. In spite of strong F.F.I. resistance the German Gestapo added another page to their book of atrocities. The "BARRAQUES-NEUFS" of the "CASERNE DE RICHEMONT" were burned to the ground. The blood coated walls and floors of the torture chamber and the odor of stale blood gave evidence of the tactics used by the Gestapo.

The GERMINAL team visited "CHATEAU DE FRAYNE", headquarters of Captain FARMER and FANY WAKE. We contacted Petty Officer Roger FAUCHER, U.S.N. here and gave him his orders to report to PARIS. Due to transportation difficulties it is necessary to give our agents ample time to reach a given destination.

Captain GRELL, Captain SCHLEY, Lt. GRIFFITHS, and Petty Officer FAUCHER visited the maquis headquarters north of CERILLY and had dinner in the officer's mess. Following a fine meal, a company of F.F.I. with whom Captain SCHLEY had been working, were ready to set out on a large scale ambush. We accepted an invitation to take part in this encounter and followed their motor column to SANCOINS. It was here the mission became non-tactical and automobile lights were lit. We learned of a German armistice which involved some twenty-five hundred German troops in this region.

It was at SANCOINS that we located 2d Lt. MACOMBER who had been doing liaison work in this area with the F.F.I. This Lieutenant had agreed to lead the German column to American troops where they would surrender. The big question was "Where were the Americans?" Pending completion of his mission Lt. MACOMBER was ordered to report to PARIS.

In order to make the best of this opportunity and knowing of the aggressive spirit of the maquis, we set out for BOURGES at 2400 hours in hopes of finding the American forces. We had no information as to the situation between SANCOINS and BOURGES. For two hours we drove on a road littered with dead horses, abandoned German vehicles and several road blocks.

We did not locate American troops in BOURGES but found the town in the hands of the F.F.I. and not the Germans.

The F.F.I. was able to show Captain GRELL a copy of an armistice signed the previous day by Major General MAKIN, AUS and General ELSAR of the German Army.

The armistice provided for the safe passage of the 19,000 Germans in this area. They were to proceed north, under arms, by 13 September to the south bank of the LOIRE and there to surrender unconditionally to the American Third Army.

This information had not yet reached the German forces sta-

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tioned near SANCOINS area, so we left at daybreak for SANCOINS in order to report this situation. En route we met the German Colonel in command of the SANCOINS area together with Colonel ROUSSEL, F.F.I. who were proceeding to General ELSAR's Headquarters. On 10 September, the day of the armistice, without knowledge thereof, Colonel ROUSSEL had captured and disarmed 1100 Germans. He was anxious to retain these arms for the F.F.I., although quite willing to turn his prisoners over to the American forces. At Colonel ROUSSEL's request and as maquis representatives, we accompanied these officers to General ELSAR's Headquarters, located near ARCAY.

At the German Headquarters we met Lt. Col. FRENCH, AUS, liaison officer of the Third U.S. Army who obtained an agreement from General ELSAR permitting Colonel ROUSSEL to retain arms taken from 200 German S.S. troops who were not governed by the terms of the armistice. Colonel ROUSSEL was requested to be present at the meeting to be held 16 September 1944 at MER where the distribution of arms surrendered by the Germans would be settled. It was understood that the F.F.I. would receive their proportionate share.

Returned to SANCOINS where we lunched with Captain CARANDEAU who had been extremely active in this area. He was responsible for a number of successful ambushes. Another maquis leader worthy of mention is Captain TARDIVAT who was held in high esteem by the American liaison officers for his fine leadership.

Visited CHATEAU DE ST. AUGUSTIN. M. AULANIER and the Comtesse de ROLAND are extremely popular with the F.F.I. because of their unselfish efforts during the war. Their Chateau was used as a safe house and hospital for the F.F.I. M. AULANIER was able to keep the area well fed during the German occupation by falsifying the production figures of the farmers.

13 September 1944

Left Chateau AUGUSTIN for SANCOINS. Observed German columns heading north toward the LOIRE for final disposition by the American Third Army. The German columns were ragged but the German soldier was quite well dressed and well supplied with souvenirs and smokes.

Visited Chateau BEGUIN, Maquis Headquarters at LURCY LEVY. The Americans operating in this area had done an excellent job and consequently American liaison officers were extremely popular.

Proceeded to MONTLUCON in order to leave orders for Lt. ALSOP to report to PARIS on or before 20 September 1944.

Officers who operated in the area of the Headquarters at LURCY LEVY were Major LORD, Captain FARLER and FANY WAKE, Captain SCHLEY,

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Lt. ALSOE, Lt. MACOMBER, Lt. DUVAL and Lt. BLOCH.

Arrived at VICHY at 2400 hours and met Captain MEUNIER (Canadian Army) of the "F" Section.

14 September 1944

VICHY had a decidedly unhealthy political atmosphere and there existed a large minority of pro-PETAIN French and much to our surprise, a few pro-LAVAL people still existed. Inclosed are some historical documents which may be of interest to O.S.S. (Incl #1)

Captain HALLOWS (British Army) was present and was able to give us information of the following agents:

VIRGINIA HALL
2d Lt. RILEY
2d Lt. GOILLOT

This group was moving north to report in PARIS.

15 September 1944

Travelled to CLERMONT-FERRAND where we contacted the following:

Col. GASPAR, Maquis Chief of Staff for the AUVERGNE district
Lt. Col. HOYENNE, DMR.
Major VECTEUR
Major DE GUELLIS
Flight Lt. SIMON

ISOTHERM had left for LONDON prior to our arrival.

We learned that POLYGCNE, DM Zone Sud, was in a hospital in LYON as a result of strafing fire by the American Air Force.

The group proceeded to LIMOGES reaching our Headquarters at 2030 hours.

A parachutage was scheduled for the LIMOGES Airport between 2330 hours and 0230 hours. Three planes were scheduled to come but only one arrived. Twelve containers and seven packages were received. The general contents were food, boots, socks, and grenades. The reception committee operated very smoothly. The following personnel were in this committee:

Captain FRASER.
2d Lt. GURIET, Aide to the DMR.
30 French Air Corps personnel.

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16 September 1944

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Major GILDEE of Jedburgh Team IAN reported at the LIMOGES Headquarters and proceeded directly to LONDON. Major STAUNTON returned from LONDON in a Hudson bomber. The GERMINAL team visited ORADOUR SUR GLANE. It was here that the Germans annihilated with few exceptions the complete village and its population. For pictures of German atrocities, see the GERMINAL Mission "Atrocity File".

17 September 1944

Lt. MORGAN arrived at LIMOGES Headquarters. His mission was completed and he was ordered to report to PARIS.

Several American and British agents operating in this area were awarded the CROIX DE GUERRE in a most impressive ceremony by Colonel RIVIER. Copies of the citations are inclosed (Incl #2) and the event was published in the local newspaper (Incl #3 and Incl #4).

18 September 1944

Received a telegram from LONDON which cancelled all future Dakota Operations for the LIMOGES Airport and substituted the Airport at LE BLAHC.

19 September 1944

Received notification of the departure from MONTLUCON for PARIS of Captain DUSSAQ and Lt. ALSOP.

Necessary repairs to our transportation were effected.

20 September 1944

The mission divided into two groups in order to work in different areas.

Group "A" (Captain SCHLEY and Lt. GRIFFITHS) went to MONTLUCON to gather information on MILHAUD. Learned that MILHAUD was captured by the Gestapo 1 May 1944 while operating in his safe house at 16 rue Rimard in MONTLUCON. He was immediately taken to the CASERNE in MONTLUCON and later moved to an unknown Gestapo prison. Madame L'HOSPITALIER who operated the safe house was also arrested but later released. Madame DERIOT who was in this house at the time of the arrest was questioned and released. The above information was given by Madame RENARD, rue DANTON A DESERTINE, MONTLUCON and from 2d Lt. ROBERT L'HOSPITALIER of the British Army.

Drove to CHATEAU DE FRAYNE in order to pick up reports left by Lieutenants FAUCHER and BLOCH and Lt. MACOMBER. Contacted Captain FARMER, Captain RAKE and FANY WAKE at the Chateau. This British

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team was without contact with LONDON and without orders.

Group "B" (Captain GRELL, Lt. CUTTING and Sgt. POTTER) drove to LE BLANC in order to make arrangements for agents returning directly to LONDON. Major SHANNON and Captain BROWN left LE BLANC for LONDON at 1530 hours.

Contacted Lt. MCCARTHY and gave him instructions to proceed to PARIS.

Continued to CHATEAUROUX and contacted the HAMISH Jedburgh team at the Hotel de la Croix Blanche. This team was ordered to report to PARIS Headquarters during the coming week.

21 September 1944

Group "A" drove to CHERMONT-FERRAND in order to trade automobiles and secure gasoline. The automobile was requisitioned by Captain RENE, a friend with whom Captain SCHLEY worked in the maquis. It was interesting to note that the maquis who were dressed in rags only a few weeks before were developing into a well dressed, well disciplined military organization.

Group "B" visited Lt. Col. MIRGUET, Chef of the F.F.I. in the INDRE area. Group "B" left CHATEAUROUX at 1130 hours for LIMOGES where they arrived at 1800. The GERMINAL Mission received a telegram from Lt. Col. VAN DER STRICHT instructing them to report in PARIS on or about 10 October 1944.

Jedburgh Team HAMISH left by auto for PARIS at 1100 hours.

22 September 1944

Group "A" left CLERMONT-FERRAND for LIMOGES. The two groups met at the LIMOGES Headquarters. A meeting was held in order to make plans for the future.

23 September 1944

Captain FRASER of the American Army and Captain BISSETT left for PARIS by automobile.

All American agents in the LIMOGES area were given orders to report either to LONDON or PARIS so arrangements were made to close the LIMOGES Headquarters.

Visited Dr. ROUX at his Chateau Mont Bas Gajoubert, Par Meziere sur Issoire. Dr. ROUX's Chateau was used as a safe house during the German occupation. He did commendable work during this difficult period in this chapter of French history.

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24 September 1944

At 1800 hours we set out for VICHY via MONTLUÇON. Dined at 2100 hours and then continued to VICHY, arriving at 2330 hours. On arrival we learned of the accidental death of Captain BISSETT (British Army).

Captain BISSETT had been travelling to PARIS with Captain FRASER. At 0100 hours they were preparing for their departure. While loading their jeep a Marlin Sub-machine gun fell on the sidewalk, became cocked as a result of the blow on the cement and immediately fired one round. This single bullet struck Captain BISSETT in a vital spot and he died a few seconds after the accident. A complete and detailed report was submitted by Captain FRASER on his arrival in PARIS.

A most fitting funeral and burial service was organized for the Captain by the F.F.I. Captain FRASER and Captain MEUNIER of the Canadian Army arranged for details such as contacting Allied Forces officers in the area and informing them of the times and places where ceremonies would occur.

25 September 1944

At 0930 hours an F.F.I. guard of honor was formed outside the Hotel Radio. Allied Forces officers who acted as honorary pall bearers were:

Captain GRELL	Major MACKENZIE
Captain SCHLEY	Captain MEUNIER
Lt. GRIFFITHS	Captain FRASER
Lt. CUTTING	
Sgt. POTTER	

At 1015 hours the body was taken to the Protestant chapel where a brief service was held. The coffin was beautiful, covered with Union Jack and surrounded by wreaths presented by various units of the Allied Forces. The funeral procession was carried out in a military manner with a Guard of Honor formed by the F.F.I.

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26 September 1944

Captain BISSETT was buried at 1000 hours. The following American and British officers were present:

Major MACKENZIE	Captain SCHLEY
Major DE GUELLIS	Lt. GRIFFITHS
Captain ANDRE SIMON	Lt. CUTTING
Captain GRELL	Sgt. POTTER

The F.F.I. again furnished a Guard of Honor. The body was interred in the Cimetiere de Vichy.

27 September 1944

Left VICHY at 0945 hours en route to TOULOUSE via CLERMONT-FERRAND. The group lunched at AURILLAC and had supper at GAILLAC. Arrived at TOULOUSE at 2230 hours.

28 September 1944

GERMINAL held a conference with Colonel BRICE, DMR in TOULOUSE. It was learned that PERCY PHILK had moved from TOULOUSE to MARSEILLES in order to get plane transportation to LONDON. All Jedburgh teams formerly in TOULOUSE had left for AVIGNON.

29 September 1944

Left TOULOUSE at 1200 hours and arrived at MONTPELLIER at 1800 hours.

Contacted CLAUDE ARNAULT alias NERON. Having completed his mission he was ordered to report to PARIS Headquarters.

In MONTPELLIER we found prices out of control and the black market flourishing. Examples of prices charged for commodities are:

- American cigarettes—150 to 200 francs per pack.
- Whiskey —110 to 150 francs per jigger.
- A fair meal —400 francs upward.

The F.F.I. are systematically fighting these conditions and are endeavoring to combat the black market.

30 September 1944

The GERMINAL Mission visited Cdt. JACQUES, also known as SULTAN, Assistant DMR in MONTPELLIER.

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We visited the German prison camp in this area. The F.F.I. had 2,500 German prisoners there. Most of these are used for the purpose of clearing mines on the coast. Many of the French officers in charge of these prisoners have served time in German concentration camps and are well qualified, and do provide treatment similar to that which they received at the hands of the Germans. We left MONTPELLIER at 1530 hours and arrived at NIMES at 1800 hours.

1 October 1944

The GERMINAL team relaxed in NIMES while the automobiles were being repaired.

2 October 1944

Left NIMES at 0930 hours and arrived at AVIGNON at 1030 hours. Continued on to VALENCE arriving there at 1800 hours. On the road from NIMES to VALENCE we passed miles of German wreckage; horse-drawn vehicles, trucks, cars, tanks, anti-aircraft guns and other wreckage all gave evidence of the defeated German columns trying to retreat North to the BELFORT GAP.

In this area a large percentage of all railroad rolling stock had been destroyed by the Air Forces.

3 October 1944

The GERMINAL Mission contacted Captain PLANAS, Service Sociale F.F.I. and Captain COSTES of the Deuxieme Bureau in VALENCE in order to secure information available on Major PETER ORTIZ of the U.S. Marine Corps. The only information available was that he was arrested while wearing civilian clothing. The arrest was made by the Wehrmacht. Further information was expected within a week and a full report was promised by the Deuxieme Bureau in VALENCE to be sent to Captain GRELL of PARIS Headquarters.

Visited LA CHAPELLE EN VERCORS. In this small town the Germans destroyed all of the houses (Incl #7) because of the active aid given the underground forces in the vicinity. All unoccupied farm houses in the area were considered to be owned by members of the maquis and on that basis, destroyed.

Proceeded to GRENOBLE arriving there at 1730 hours. We contacted Major COX who was in command of the O.G.'s from ALGIERS. He had no pertinent information for the team so we continued on to MCIRANS arriving there at 1900 hours.

4 October 1944

Continued our drive northward arriving in LYON at 1130 hours.

There we visited Colonel POLYGONE at l'Hopital Ste. Jeanne d'Arc (see report for 15 September for cause of hospitalization). Colonel POLYGONE, as a result of being wounded, is fit only for administrative duty. He had received orders to report to Headquarters in PARIS.

Visited Cdt. CARRE, DMR in LYON. He informed us that Captain JOHNSON was at CHAMPDOR Monday 3 October.

All bridges on the RHONE that we saw had been partially or completely destroyed by the Germans in their retreat. As a result, in cities such as AVIGNON and LYON, we found North bound military traffic bottle-necked.

5 October 1944

Contacted 2d Lt. MORPURGO and 2d Lt. NONNI in LYON. Their mission was completed and they were ordered to report in PARIS on or about 10 October 1944.

6 October 1944

Due to illness in the GERMINAL group, departure for PARIS was delayed one day.

7 October 1944

Left LYON at 1400 hours and arrived in AUXERRE at 2030.

8 October 1944

Left AUXERRE at 1000 hours and reported in at PARIS Headquarters at 79 Champs Elysees at 1500 hours.

A map showing the area covered by the GERMINAL mission is attached (Incl #5).

Also attached is a guide to the Photo File (Incl #6).

INCLOSURES

- Incl 1- Historical Documents
- Incl 2- Citations by Col. RIVIER
- Incl 3- "Le Centre Libre", newspaper
- Incl 4- Newspaper clipping of Citations by Col. RIVIER
- Incl 5- Map
- Incl 6- Guide to Photo File
- Incl 7- Newspaper clipping; destruction of LA CHAPELLE EN VERCORS.

/s/ William F. Grell

WILLIAM F. GRELL
Captain, USMCR

/s/ Harry E. Griffiths

HARRY E. GRIFFITHS
1st Lt., Inf.

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Primary Sources (Marine Corps)

1. Biographical Files, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard. These are a series of alphabetized folders dealing with Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel who have been the subject of historical research or public relations press releases. There is little material on Marines who served with OSS but a few names such as Carlson, Holcomb, Ortiz, Eddy, McHugh, and Gardner are listed.

2. Classified Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard. These contain extensive information on the formation of the Raider Battalions including much correspondence between the principal Marine Corps commanders. There is also a good file on Major Ortiz which was provided to Mr. Benis M. Frank by the Central Intelligence Agency. The bulk of the World War II material is subject to declassification upon request.

3. Combined Lineal List, U. S. Marine Corps (NAVMC 1005DP - 3rd Revision). 1945. The "Blue Book" which provides basic data on all Marine Officers who were on active duty at the time of issue. Unlike its modern version, the wartime edition lists 'specialty codes'. These generally equate to the current Military Occupation Specialty (MOS). A line-by-line examination of the 1945 edition reveals 39 officers with the specialty code MSS: Strategic Services. These officers were commissioned specifically for service with OSS. While the lineal list contains only officers and does not identify those Marines who were not commissioned for OSS duty but nevertheless served with the organization, it remains a most important primary source document.

4. Manuscript Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard. These contain a number of collected personal papers, photographs, musical scores, art work, and other historically valuable items which have been donated by various individuals. The most important documents utilized for this work come from the large (approximately 5 linear feet) collection of General Thomas Holcomb's personal papers. These are arranged in chronological order. There is no index, but patient research provides substantial reward.

5. Oral History Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard. An extensive collection of tape recordings

and typewritten transcripts covering a wide range of Marine Corps personalities of all ranks. The Oral Historian, Mr. Benis M. Frank is a walking encyclopedia of Marine history and can direct the researcher to primary source material which might otherwise be overlooked. This paper could not have been written without his aid and support.

B. Primary Sources (Official Records other than Marine Corps)

1. Central Intelligence Agency Archives, U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C. 20505. The majority of OSS operational records are in custody of the CIA. These are not available for review by private researchers but may be requested from the Agency's Information and Privacy Coordinator in writing. Declassification of World War II vintage material is currently in progress; however, the work is very slow. To obtain documents from CIA's archives, one must be able to provide substantial information on the exact topic. This is largely because OSS records are not computerized. Each document requested by a private individual must also be reviewed for national security information and privacy considerations. The author found CIA to be most cooperative in declassifying documents such as activity and mission reports. Unfortunately there is but a very small staff to handle literally thousands of enquiries. No historical work of any real merit can be complete without reference to the CIA archives. They form the basis for much of this paper.

2. Federal Record Center Archives, Federal Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri. These contain thousands of linear feet of documents relating to members of the Armed Forces. Access to FRC Files is difficult and could only be accomplished with the assistance of the Marine Corps Historical Center. In order to remain within the spirit of the Privacy Act, only that information of a non-derogatory or innocuous nature was utilized in writing this paper. Most of the basic biographical data on OSS Marines came from this source. Of particular importance were copies of Marine Corps Special Orders and duplicates of individual award citations.

3. National Archives of the United States, Record Group 226, Modern Military Records, Washington, D. C. The National Archives holds approximately 1,500 linear feet of records

from the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. These are of some value to the detailed researcher of organizational history but are devoid of operational details. The magnitude and complexity of this collection requires considerable time and patience to fully exploit. Much of the material has already appeared in print elsewhere. Record Group 226 also includes a complete copy of the sanitized War Report of the OSS; however, as pointed out in the footnotes to this paper, the War Report is not comprehensive and provides few names. The staff of Modern Military Records is most helpful but much overworked. Researchers intending to utilize the Archives must obtain a pass.

C. Interviews and Personal Correspondence Received

Dr. William L. Cary (OSS operations in Rumania and Yugoslavia)

Lt.Col. William R. Corson, USMC (Ret) (Political infighting and background on the organizational structure of American intelligence 1935-45. Lt.Col. Corson graciously provided me with his copy of the unpublished documentary 'exhibits' from the OSS War Report.)

Dr. Harold Deutsch (Operations of R&A Branch, OSS London)

Dr. Gerald Else (OSS operations in the Mideast and Greece)

Dr. John Gordon (Marine Corps special warfare initiatives). Dr. Gordon, a member of the Command and Staff College adjunct faculty, encouraged me in my research and provided copies of several key documents on Evans Carlson, James Roosevelt, and the formation of the Raider Battalions.

Lt.Col. William F. Grell, USMCR (Ret) (OSS Operations in France and Germany).

James Ladd (Mr. Ladd is author of Commandos and Rangers of World War II. He provided a most interesting discussion of Marine Corps relations with the British Commando School in Scotland and offered to research British SOE records in London).

Honorable Walter R. Mansfield (Operations in Yugoslavia with Mihailovic's Chetnik guerillas)

Mr. George W. Owen (Correspondence and assistance in locating and declassifying OSS mission reports in custody of CIA.)

Mr. Joseph E. Persico (OSS Operations in Germany). Mr. Persico is author of Piercing the Reich, the most comprehensive account of OSS missions inside Nazi Germany. He too encouraged me in this project and generously provided copies of some documentary material which had previously been released to him by CIA.

Captain François de la Roche USMCR (Jedburgh Mission BUGATTI) Captain de la Roche provided valuable background material for the chapter on BUGATTI as well as a photograph taken in Tarbes, France in September, 1944 which shows Lieutenant Colonel Fuller, USMCR the BUGATTI mission commander.

D. Primary Sources (Private Collections and Published Material)

1. Goodfellow, Millard P., A collection of his personal papers. Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The Goodfellow collection is one of, if not the best, private source of OSS records. Goodfellow as Deputy Director of OSS during the war and kept extensive files. The collection contains most of his correspondence and memoranda as well as much collateral material. It is frequently cited in scholarly works on American intelligence. I was only able to mine this source by mail and thus fell far short of realizing its true potential. Any researcher who is within geographical range of Palo Alto should find the Goodfellow papers a treasure trove.

2. Loewenheim, Francis L., Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. New York and London: Barrie, Jenkins, 1975. This 800 page volume contains an annotated commentary and facsimile reproduction of hundreds of personal and 'eyes only' messages between the President and Prime Minister. There is excellent documentary material on the 'commando service' proposal and on OSS operations in the Balkans as well as much discussion concerning war aims, strategy and the like. A very valuable source, well indexed and quite handy for checking the real words rather than someone's interpretation.

3. SOE in France, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office; 1966. This is the official history of the Special Operations Executive's

clandestine warfare accomplishments in France. While Captain M.R.D. Foote (a former SAS officer) is listed as author, the work is really a succession of SOE operation orders and mission reports strung loosely together. Immensely detailed and indexed, it is one of the five or six best references yet published on special operations. I include it as a primary source because of the extensive footnoting and lack of journalistic license by Captain Foote.

A. ~~War~~ War Report of the OSS, New York: Walker, 1976. 2 Volumes. The War Report must be the beginning of an research concerning OSS. Despite the fact that it was censored by CIA prior to release, the report contains the single most comprehensive coverage of OSS in print. Unfortunately it is unindexed and confusingly arranged. Furthermore, the published version does not include the documentary exhibits referred to in the text. These may be obtained from the National Archives but require a stiff fee for reproduction. One of the requirements imposed by CIA prior to release was the deletion of all but a handful of personal names. Still, I referred to and quoted from the War Report throughout the research and composition of this paper.

Ⓔ. Secondary Sources (Books)

Alsop, Stewart and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa. Harcourt, Brace, and World. 1964. One of the first books to deal with OSS operations. There is a good account of Holcomb's role in the Port Lyautey pilot caper. No index, footnotes, or maps. Good background and easy reading.

Barrett, David, Dixie Mission. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies. 1970. Detailed discussion of the background and accomplishments of the OSS mission to the Chinese communist forces in Yen-an.

Bird, Michael J., The Secret Battalion. New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston. 1964. A short but detailed account of maquis activities in one part of the Haute Savoie region of France. Some of the narrative covers the time in which missions Union I and Union II were active there. Written from the French perspective.

Corson, William R., The Armies of Ignorance. New York: Dial Press, 1977. An extensive and scholarly study of the American intelligence community, chiefly in the period 1935-75. Excellent analysis of the in-fighting among the various intelligence agencies. Outstanding documentation and explanatory notes. A required source. Good glossary, index, and bibliography.

Chandler, Alfred D., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. A 5 volume collection of the most important letters, messages, memoranda, etc. of the late President. Provides a very useful guide to

location of actual documents in the National Archives. A particularly helpful section contains a daily recapitulation of Eisenhower's activities from 23 June 1942 through 5 May 1945. Several OSS Marines are mentioned including Eddy, Holcomb, and Mansfield. Well indexed and easy to use.

Cline, Ray S. , Secrets, Spies, and Scholars. Washington: Acropolis, 1976. One of the better general treatments of the U. S. intelligence establishment 1940-75. For background material the first two chapters are a good concise account of COI/OSS in the early days. While the skeleton of this work is quite strong, the meat is largely left to others. Disappointing footnotes.

Davies, John Paton, Dragon By The Tail. New York: Norton. 1972. A personal account of Davies' experiences in China and the Soviet Union. Good background on China with some collateral information on Evans Carlson. Extremely well written. Weak bibliography.

Erllich, Blake, Resistance: France 1940-45. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. A general history of the French resistance which avoids polemics. Useful for sociological and political aspects of the guerilla army. Little on OSS. Index.

Ford, Corry, Donovan of OSS. New York: Little, Brown, 1970. A sympathetic biography of Donovan which focuses less on the OSS than on the life of the titular subject. Little treatment of organizational details and no mention of the "Commando Service" controversy. Still, a good departure point for research. Several OSS Marines are mentioned. Appendices and index are useful.

Heilbrunn, Otto, Partisan Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1962. A short philosophical treatise whose main value to OSS research lies in the few pages contrasting the organizations of Tito and Mihailovic.

Johnstone, Major J. H. USMC, An Annotated Bibliography of the United States Marines in Guerilla, Anti-guerilla, and Small Wars Action. Washington: Historical Branch (G-3), HQMC, 1962. A short and very incomplete review of the literature (including some unpublished) relating to the title. Much outdated and of limited value to begin with. Nothing on OSS but a few references to Marines in China.

Hayden, Sterling. Wanderer. New York: Knopf, 1963. An autobiography of the actor, author, sailor and OSS Marine officer. Chapters 61 through 67 give an excellent and historically accurate account of Hayden's experiences in Yugoslavia and France as well as his training in the British commando school.

Kirkpatrick, Lyman. The Real CIA. New York: Macmillan, 1968. A source of some general value in tying OSS to its successor. Well indexed and better written than most 'pro-Agency' works.

Langer, William. Our Vichy Gamble. New York: W. W. Norton, 1947. One of the first books to deal with the American political and intelligence machinations in unoccupied France and North Africa during the days before TORCH. Langer was later a key member of Donovan's staff. Excellent background for the COI period especially when taken in tandem with Murphy's Diplomat Among Warriors.

MacLean, Fitzroy. The Heretic. New York: Harper, Row, 1957. An informed and tolerable detailed view of wartime Yugoslavia and thereafter woven around the life of Tito. The author, a conservative Member of Parliament, was the senior Anglo-American liaison officer with the partisans 1942-45. See also MacLean's earlier work Escape to Adventure.

MacMillan, Harold. The Blast of War. London: Macmillan, 1947. The recollections of Britain's postwar Prime Minister. Much insider information on the secret bureaucratic battles between SIS, SOE, and OSS.

Michel, H. and B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch. Les Idees Politiques et Sociales de La Resistance. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1954. Reproduction and commentary of selected speeches, clandestine broadsides and French language BBC broadcasts. Very useful appendix of acronyms and abbreviations. Extensive bibliography of French language writings on the maquis. Entirely in French, dictionary advised.

Moran, John B. Creating a Legend. Chicago: Moran/Andrews, 1973. An exhaustive annotated bibliography of books, articles and films by and about Marines. Despite its scope, sources on Marines in OSS are few. Grell, Curtis, and Mansfield do appear.

Murphy, Robert. Diplomat Among Warriors. New York: Doubleday, 1964. The memoirs of an American diplomat who served with and for the OSS in Vichy and North Africa as well as the Balkans. Good material throughout, especially regarding Eddy.

OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men. New York: Rhinehart, 1947. The definitive work on OSS selection and training. Very detailed coverage and many interesting sidelights on the organization and operational aspects of the organization slip through. Good index and photos. Recommend any OSS researcher take a hard look at this one.

Oblensky, Prince Serge, One Man In His Time. New York: McDowell, 1958. This is a hard book to find but worth the looking. Oblensky spends about half of the book getting out of Russia and into his fortune but once World War II commences he chronicles the typically 'untypical' life of an OSS recruit and operative. Fascinating reading.

Persico, Joseph E. Piercing the Reich. New York: Viking, 1979. The best book yet written on OSS operations against the German homeland. Required and exciting reading. High style with superb scholarship.

Peers, William and Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. A popular history of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma. Well written narrative with an outstanding appendix listing every member of '101' including the Marines. Unfortunately, like most books on OSS you must know the service affiliation to find men like Macomber, Fenn, Owen, and McDevitt.

Peniakoff, Vladimir. Popski's Private Army. New York: Thomas Crowell, 1950. Of some small value in scene-setting for North Africa and Italy. No index or bibliography.

Roberts, Walter R. Tito, Mihailovic And The Allies, 1941/45 New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1978. The best account yet written on wartime Yugoslavia. Good detail on allied missions to both sides in the guerilla war against the Germans. Excellent index and some good photos. A work of high scholarship.

Saunders, Hilary St. George. The Green Beret. London: Michael Joseph, 1949. An excellent early account of the recruitment, organization, training, and employment of the British commando forces which Donovan so admired. First three or four chapters are particularly good.

Shaw, Henry and Benis M. Frank, History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968. Volume 5. This work contains a good recapitulation of the POW experiences of Major Ortiz and Lieutenant Taylor.

Sulzberger, C. L. A. A Long Row of Candles. New York: Macmillan, 1969. An extraordinarily valuable background source on the Balkans. Elegantly written and containing the diary entries of Mr. Sulzberger's travels throughout the world both before and during the war. One hundred pages of this is better general thematic material than 50 average books. Good sections on Greece and Yugoslavia.

Sweet-Escott, Bickham. Baker Street Irregular. London: Methuen, 1965. A personal remembrance of highjinks and spy escapades with SOE. Quite readable and full of insider information. Among the best general works on clandestine operations published.

Updegraph, Charles L., Jr. Special Marine Corps Units of World War II. Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1972. The best starting point for research into the Raider Battalions. Only a glimmer of the Donovan connection but enough smoke to recognize that more information exists. Updegraph's work is the basis for James Ladd's chapter on the Raiders in Commandos and Rangers of World War II. Contains excellent documentary leads.

The following book is of special import

Smith, R. Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. If I were asked to name the single starting point for OSS research it would be Smith's. Working entirely from unclassified sources, he produced a tolerably accurate and extraordinarily broad account of the agency from its inception to its demise. The amount of research involved in this book is staggering. While there are a few factual errors, in the main the text is clear, elegantly written, and massively documented. The bibliography is among the most extensive yet compiled.

F. Secondary Sources (Newspapers and Magazines)

Chamberlain, John. "OSS" Life (19 November 1945) pp. 119-132
One of the first popular accounts of OSS activities. Pleasant reading, little substance. Eddy is mentioned several times.

Case, Lynn. "The Maquis Republic of the Vercors", Infantry Journal (April, 1947) pp. 29ff. A short but well written article dealing with the tragedy of Haute Savoie.

Donovan, William J. "Intelligence: Key to Defense", Life (September 30, 1946) pp. 108ff. A brief summary of the OSS's role in World War II coupled with a strong plea for retention of a national central intelligence capability.

Funk, Arthur. "American Contacts with the Resistance in France", Military Affairs (February, 1970) pp 9ff. An excellent scholarly article covering much ground but done with considerable skill.

Grell, Captain William F., USMCR, "A Marine With OSS", Marine Corps Gazette (December, 1945), pp. 14ff. Grell's personal account of the GERMINAL mission as well as some of the preparator work.

Kelly, Richard M. "Mission to Greece", Bluebook, (November, 1946) pp 76ff. A very detailed and well written account of the OSS mission to blow the bridges between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria in which Gunnery Sergeant Curtis was a key participant.

"One Against a Thousand", Bluebook (February, 1947), pp. 14ff. The adventures of 1st Lieutenant George Hearn USMCR in Italy highlighting his part in the capture of Chioggia. Kelly was a Navy Lieutenant Commander who commanded the OSS Maritime Unit in the Adriatic. He published a series of articles in Bluebook between 1946-48 which contain perhaps the best and most detailed accounts of OSS operations available prior to publication of the War Report. These are all available on microfilm at the Library of Congress.

Krock, Arthur. "OSS Get's it Coming and Going", The New York Times (31 July 1945). An editorial decrying the rush to begin dismantling the OSS organization and shifting its assets to the Departments of State and War.

MacLean, Fitzroy, "The Setting for Guerilla Warfare", Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (August, 1963) pp. 206 ff. Thoughts of the highest ranking allied liaison officer to the Yugoslav partisans. Nothing specifically on OSS but a good short course in British reasoning behind recognizing Tito at the expense of the Chetniks.

Mansfield, Captain Walter R., USMCR, "Marine With the Chetniks", Marine Corps Gazette (January - February, 1946). A personal account of Mansfield's mission to Mihailovic. Well written and a key source. Much quoted in secondary reference material on OSS.

"Ambush in China", Marine Corps Gazette (March, 1946) pp. 13 ff. Narrative account of Mansfield's experiences with a Chinese guerilla raiding force behind Japanese lines. Some interesting biographical details in addition to the 'shoot-em-up' portions.

Wager, Walter. "The Private War of Peter Ortiz", See (November, 1960) pp. 24ff. A somewhat fanciful account of Ortiz's missions Union I and II to the Haute Savoie. High melodrama, low accuracy.

In addition to the foregoing cited work, I found the collected resources of the New York Times, Newsweek, Time and Life magazines during the period 1940-45 to be a most useful resource. The number of articles, many of which carried no 'by-line', utilized in reading into the situation was very large. An additional excellent source was the OSS publication "The War This Week" which appeared regularly throughout the conflict and included many important newspaper clippings from the American press.

MARINES OF THE OSS

During the mid-1950's, Headquarters Marine Corps requested that CIA provide a listing of those Marines who had served with OSS during World War II. The Agency replied that no such list existed. The following roster is the first and only known attempt to compile a roster of these men and to identify the areas in which they served. The result is almost certainly incomplete and contains only the names of Marine officers. It will however provide a beginning for future research into a fascinating and nearly forgotten chapter of Marine Corps history.

COLONELS

William A. Eddy	North Africa
James M. McHugh	Washington

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Rensen J. Cole	Washington
Horace W. Fuller	France, China
Franklin P. Holcomb	Morocco, Algiers, France
Peter J. Ortiz	Tunisia, France
Carl B. Peters	Washington, England
Phillip G. Strong	Washington
George T. Van der Hoef	China
Frederick A. Willis	Washington
Andrew Wylie	Washington

MAJORS

Bruce B. Cheever	England
Richard A. Gard	China
Charlotte D. Gower	Washington
William G. Hamilton	England, France
Albert F. Moe	China, India
James T. Patterson	England, France

CAPTAINS

William L. Cary	Rumania, Yugoslavia, Italy
Joseph E. Charles	England, France, Germany
Gordon A. Craig	West Africa, Algiers
Gerald F. Else	Cairo, Greece, Liberia

Francis T. Farrell
 Leon Grell
 William F. A. Grell
 John Hamilton (aka Sterling Hayden)

Elmer Harris

William A. Holmin
 Emil M. Krieger
 Robert P. Leonard
 Walter R. Mansfield
 C. L. A. Mathieu
 George H. Owen
 Sabastian Passanessi
 Winthrop Rutherford, Jr.
 Richard E. Sullivan
 Leon H. Weaver

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

William Applebaum
 Peter Benson
 John C. Bradley
 Joseph F. Campisi
 John H. Cox
 Edward T. Dickinson, Jr.
 William E. Duggan
 Charles H. Fenn
 John W. Gardner
 Harry H. Harper
 George M. Hearn
 William E. Jones
 Rolfe Kingsley, Jr.
 Clarence J. Lewis, Jr.
 William B. Macomber
 Alan K. Magary
 Hugh A. McDevitt
 John J. Meilly
 John W. Mowinckel
 Charles A. Muecke
 Robert Rubin
 John S. Russell, Jr.
 George S. Seabury
 Michael Shaughnessy
 Lewis B. Walton, Jr.
 Edward R. Weismiller
 Richard D. Wylly

China
 England
 England, France
 Cairo, Italy, Yugoslavia,
 Albania, France, Germany
 Tunisia, Corsica, Italy,
 China
 Algiers, Italy
 France, Germany
 India, Burma
 England, Yugoslavia, China
 China
 Algiers, Cairo, Burma
 Algiers, Sardinia, Italy
 Tunisia, France, Germany
 Washington
 China

Washington
 China
 China
 London, Italy
 Burma, China
 London, Sweden, France
 China
 Burma, China
 CONUS
 Cairo, Bulgaria
 Italy
 China
 Cairo, Italy, Austria
 India, China
 France, Burma
 London, France
 Malaya, Burma, China
 London
 France, Germany, Austria
 France, Germany
 London
 Washington
 Cairo, Ceylon, Malaya, Burma
 London
 China
 France
 France

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Nick R. Cooky
Robert L. Hitt
William T. Jolly
Walter W. Taylor
Robert G. Scurrah
Peter Viertel

Italy, Albania
China
China
Corsica, Italy, France
China
France, Germany

WARRANT OFFICERS

Thomas L. Curtis
John L. Richardson

Greece, China
CONUS, London, Ceylon

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