Curriculum Evolution
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
1920-1988

by
Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner
United States Marine Corps Reserve

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1988

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John Archer Lejeune, 1869-1942, Register of His Personal Papers. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret). 1988. 123 pp. Covers some of the more than 6,600 documents of the Lejeune Papers in the Library of Congress, photocopied for the Marine Corps Historical Center, and a small collection of related items donated to the Center. Correspondence of the Thirteenth Commandant is explored with particular reference to the nine years of his commandancy, which "remain the least known and appreciated of his accomplishments." Includes biographical sketch.

To Wake Island and Beyond: Reminiscences. Brigadier General Woodrow M. Kessler, USMC (Ret). 1988. 145 pp. Vivid and highly readable memoir detailing General Kessler's Marine service and, in particular, his efforts in helping to set up the meager defenses of Wake Island in World War II, his involvement in the subsequent battle, and his experiences as a Japanese prisoner of war. Published exactly as it was written in the author's legible handwriting.

Foreword

The History and Museums Division has undertaken the publication for limited distribution of various studies, theses, compilations, bibliographies, and monographs, as well as proceedings at selected workshops, seminars, symposia, and similar colloquia, which it considers to be of significant value to audiences interested in Marine Corps history. These "Occasional Papers," which are chosen for their intrinsic worth, must reflect structured research, present a contribution to historical knowledge not readily available in published sources, and represent original content on the part of the author, compiler, or editor. It is the intent of the division that these occasional papers be distributed to selected institutions, such as service schools, official Department of Defense historical agencies, and directly concerned Marine Corps organizations, so the information contained therein will be available for study and exploitation.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner was tasked to write this study in 1988 in partial answer to the inquiries of a Congressional subcommittee investigating the historical content of the senior service schools' curricula. His position as military historian on the staff of Quantico's Command and Staff College for the past 13 years has given him insight regarding the courses taught recently, but his research and clear presentation of the situation in previous decades is equally valuable. The college is the Marine Corps' top professional school for officers and its annual student bodies composed for the most part of majors with considerable career promise, encompass many of the men and women who will lead the Corps in future years.

Lieutenant Colonel Bittner was a regular officer, serving on active duty from 1963-1968, before transferring to the Marine Corps Reserve and attending graduate school at the University of Missouri. In 1974, he received his doctoral degree in history from Missouri, and the following year he returned to active duty as a Reserve officer on special assignment to the faculty of the Command and Staff College. He has been an teacher and curriculum innovator at Quantico and active as well in professional historical organizations. A lifelong interest in modern British history is reflected in the publication in 1983 of his book, *The Lion and the White Falcon: Britain and Iceland in the World War II Era* (Archon Books), and the 1984 monograph, *The Royal Marine Officer Corps of 1914 and A Ghost of a General*, a compilation of his essays issued by the Royal Marine Historical Society. He is continuing his studies of Royal Marine officers with the aim of writing a social and professional history of these men in the 1815-1914 century.

We are printing Lieutenant Colonel Bittner's study just as it was submitted, without altering in any way its content. We consider it to be of significant value in recounting the academic history of the Corps' "Senior School," as it used to be called. The opinions and facts represented in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Marine Corps or the Department of the Navy. In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes comments on this publication from interested individuals and activities.

EDWIN H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CURRICULUM EVOLUTION:

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE,

1920-1988

The U.S. Marine Corps has a three tiered professional military education system for its career officers. The system was built in three stages: The Basic School* in 1891, the Command and Staff College* in 1920, and the Amphibious Warfare School* in 1921. Since then, this concept has remained until 1988, except for a brief period between 1941-1943 when the Command and Staff College and Amphibious Warfare School were temporarily suspended due to the need for career officers elsewhere because of the urgent wartime situation. In 1946 the system was reestablished and has functioned since then, without any closure, despite the heavy demands for officers in the operational forces in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

In 1920, the Command and Staff College opened its doors to its first students. It was envisioned as a one-year school for field grade officers to prepare them for command and staff duties at their current and possible future grades, in organizations at levels commensurate with their ranks. This

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* - The names are as of 1988. In 1891, the school for newly commissioned second lieutenants was called "The School of Application," in 1920 that for field grade officers was titled "The Field Officers' Course," and in 1921 that for company grade officers was named "The Company Officers' Course." Since then, each school has had a variety of names, but the missions and grades of their respective students have remained essentially as originally conceived.

general mission has essentially remained since 1920, although the primary focus of the Marine Corps has changed considerably in the ensuing six decades. The curriculum was modeled after the two institutions most available for such a school, and on operations and doctrine most familiar to its instructors and students: that of the U.S. Army schools at Fort Benning and Fort Leavenworth, both with an infantry orientation.

In the 1920s, despite this initial Army focus, a naval orientation gradually appeared in the curriculum. By the 1930-31 Academic Year, 216 hours of instruction in "landing operations" had appeared in the curriculum of the College. By then, a struggle occurred for the "heart and soul" of the Marine Corps. Much of this was waged at Quantico and within the professional educational system of the Marine Corps, most specifically within the Field Officers' Course. This focused on the development of an offensive amphibious mission for the Marine Corps, leading to the seizure and not just defense of advanced naval bases as part of a naval campaign. The schools devoted themselves during the 1932-33 Academic Year to developing the tentative doctrine for such a mission, and the instructional materials needed to teach it within the schools, using Marine Corps equipment, Marine Corps organizations, and Marine Corps problems set within a maritime operational scenario. This led to the writing of the "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations" and a complete shift of the focus and content of the curriculum of the College towards amphibious operations and away from the former predominately Army

orientation. Until 1941, this remained the thrust of the College as it educated its officers for the forthcoming war.

However, as World War II approached in 1941, the Marine Corps was forced to prioritize several competing needs. As it expanded in size to one and then two operational divisions (and eventually six), a need arose to screen officer candidates and train second lieutenants; despite the importance of educating and training field grade officers, the need to train the company grade officers assumed a higher priority. Hence, in January 1941, the College closed its doors and its staff and students assumed other duties associated with this new priority. But by 1943, the Marine Corps recognized the increased need for school trained officers with command and staff skills needed in the Pacific in the operations involving Marine Corps regiments, divisions, and corps. Hence, in 1943, an operationally oriented "Command and Staff Course," soon renamed "Command and Staff School," opened at Quantico. Its three month courses taught its students the command and staff skills deemed immediately necessary in the Pacific Theater of Operations.

After V-J Day, the Marine Corps confronted both demobilization and new responsibilities in the post-war world. Hence, in 1946, it re-established the former three tiered professional military education system which had served it so well between 1920 and 1941. The initial full year academic course for the College, now named "Senior Course" and later the "Senior School," commenced in September 1946. The curriculum remained focused on the amphibious mission developed prior to World War II, with the instruction now rooted in both theory and the

lessons learned from actual combat operations. However, in the post-war years, the curriculum reflected the changed technological era as the implications of both the atomic age and helicopters were incorporated into the course of study.

Into the 1960s, the amphibious role of the Marine Corps remained central to the curriculum. However, the College, in 1964 officially named the "Command and Staff College," had to take cognizance of other events in an ever changing world. Counterinsurgency and computer instruction thus became part of the curriculum. Also, the instructional method shifted away from lectures to the seminar mode of learning.

As the College proceeded through the 1970s and towards the end of the 1980s, the amphibious operation has remained the central focus of its curriculum, as indeed it should since by law this is the primary mission of the Marine Corps. But in these two decades, three major curriculum reforms have occurred, one in 1972, the next in 1982, and the third in 1988. These have gradually expanded the scope of what has been taught at the College. The operational instruction remains the heart of the curriculum, but other areas of instruction have been added or expanded; this has included the return of military history (non-tactical) to the core curriculum, and the inclusion of strategic studies, oral and written communication, various aspects of leadership studies, orientation to the mass media, and adjunct faculty seminars taught by reserve field grade officers, all with PH.D.s, in their fields of expertise which also support the mission of the College. With the largest

percentage of its curriculum ever devoted to such "enrichment" or mental broadening studies, the College has dedicated itself to producing an educated "whole man," an officer well-grounded in the operational skills so necessary in a professional military officer, but also one who can place any military operation to which he might be committed within a knowledgeable strategic and diplomatic context.

In the 68 years of its history, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College curriculum has gradually evolved from one of mirroring that of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College to one that is rooted in the Marine Corps mission of amphibious operations linked to the needs of the nation and its maritime services. It educates its officers in both the professional skills needed to function on the contemporary battlefield, and in the knowledge necessary to place such operations in a larger context and to lead the highly skilled and capable men and women who serve in the armed forces of the United States. The goal has thus become to produce a professional, educated, and sophisticated "whole man" officer. In achieving this goal, its curriculum has unfolded along evolutionary, not revolutionary, paths, retaining from the past what has been and is of value, but adding from the contemporary eras what has been necessary to accomplish its mission.

CURRICULUM EVOLUTION

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

1920-1988

DR. DONALD F. BITTNER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE

MILITARY HISTORIAN

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

EDUCATION CENTER

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5050

APRIL 1988

IT HAS BEEN MY BELIEF FOR YEARS

THAT THE SCHOOLS SHAPE THE CORPS...

THE SCHOOLS ARE THE CAUSE AND THE FLEET MARINE FORCES

...ARE THE EFFECT.

Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge, USMC

1 January 1940 (1)

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INTRODUCTION

This history of the curriculum of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College spans the 68 years from the institution's founding in 1920 to the present year. A complicating factor has been the basic fact no real history of the professional military education system of the Marine Corps has been written. For the Education Center of the Marine Corps and its component schools, there are no histories similar to those of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College (Dr. Timmothy Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918 [1978], and Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College [1982]), or the Naval War College (Dr. Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession [1977], Dr. John B. Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the United States Naval War College [1984], and S. M. Barnes, "The United States Naval War College: A Staff Study of Its Historical Background, Mission, Educational Philosophy, and Principles..." [1954]), or the British Army Staff College at Camberley (Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 [1972]).

The closest such history was that of First Lieutenant Anthony Frances, USMCR, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," written in 1945. This is valuable for background information for the period before and during World War II, based upon his access to records no longer in existence; however, it is a brief

overview history. In 1978, the Marine Corps Historical Center published a history of Quantico titled Quantico: Crossroads of the Corps; but this is a chronological history of the base, of which the Education Center is only a part. Hence, this volume could provide only general background information; it is not a detailed history of the College and its development.

Thus, it has been necessary to include in this examination of the curriculum not only the progressive stages through which it has evolved in almost seven decades, but also some history of the founding of the Marine Corps educational system, the shift in the mission of this service in the 1930s, and other information about the students of the College. A curriculum does not exist in a vacuum; it has to relate to a greater whole. Hence, the simultaneous development of both the curriculum and the institution, coupled with that of the Marine Corps and the professional military education system of which it is a part.

A brief note on sources would also be appropriate. Any work of history is only as good as its sources. With respect to the Command and Staff College, many documents pertaining to both its early and recent history have not survived. Those that have are scattered in various locations, obviously having been separated from their original files. Recent records that do exist are those of the author, retained by him as a faculty member since joining the Command and Staff College as the military historian

in 1975. Hence, there are some materials for the 1920s, 1930s, 1970s, and 1980s, while gaps exist for the other decades and years in between. The "best sources" available within the time frame for preparing this paper have been used; often, these were the base newspaper, the Quantico Sentry, and the professional journal of the Marine Corps officer, the Marine Corps Gazette, both of which provide a general account of developments at the senior educational institution of the Marine Corps. As appropriate, the memory of the author has also been utilized.

Donald F. Bittner
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Military Historian
Quantico, Virginia
April 1988

NOTE ON SPELLING, PUNCTUATION, CAPITALIZATION

In this history of the evolution of the curriculum of Marine Corps Command and Staff College, extensive use has been made of both primary and secondary materials. These span almost seven decades. When using direct quotations from these sources, the author has retained the spelling, punctuation, and capitalization as used in the quoted source. With respect to the "Field Officers' Course," and the "Company Officers' Course," useage in the Marine Corps varied as to the use of the possessive case in the titles of each in the 1920s and 1930s. Unless a quoted source used the non-possessive case, the author has used the possessive case in reference to both courses since this seemed to be the form used by most Marines in the inter-war years.

The Marine Corps Professional Military Education System: The Founding Concept

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College, initially called the Field Officers' Course, received its first students on 1 September 1920. Although there had been temporary schools established for the training of Marine officers during World War I, other than the School of Application (now called The Basic School) established in 1891 for the training of newly commissioned second lieutenants, this Field Officers' Course marked an innovation in the education and training of career Marine Corps officers. (2) As a 1945 history of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico succinctly noted, "This was the first time that a course of formal study was organized specifically for senior Marine officers." (3)

The new institution also had a clearly defined mission. By 1922, after the experience of two one-year classes, this was articulated in the following manner: "to prepare the students to function as field officers in infantry commands and to fill the more important staff positions in the Marine Corps." (4)

This mission statement in concept has remained essentially unchanged in the ensuing seven decades; although changed conditions in the nation's international and strategic positions, the nature of warfare, new technology, and an altered service mission have occurred since 1920, the conceptual

underpinning of the institution remains the same, as is revealed in the current mission statement for the 1987-88 Academic Year:

> To provide intermediate level professional military education for field grade officers of the Marine Corps, other services, and foreign countries; to prepare them for command and staff duties with Marine Air-Ground Task Forces with emphasis on amphibious operations and for assignments with departmental, joint, combined, and high level service organizations. (5)

This concept, underlying so much of the 20th Century Marine Corps, owed its genesis to Major General John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps. His ideas on a military educational system were developed prior to World War I, and his experiences in that conflict only confirmed the need for such a system. He eloquently articulated his concept before the House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs on 26 February 1920, stressing the link between education and the American soldier:

> There used to be an old theory that the soldier ought to be ignorant and illiterate and like dumb, driven cattle. I think our experience in this war shows the more intelligent, the more educated, and the more initiative a man has, the better soldier he is.

In his ideas, however, Lejeune envisioned an educational system for both the troops and officers. With respect to the latter, he continued:

> We have had to look out for the officers as well as the men... A great many of us have had a desire for a long time to see a school established where officers will learn their duties as captains and field officers. Our officers have to be self-educated. Few of us have had the opportunity of going to Fort Leavenworth or the Army War College or the Navy War College, and the average officers have had no opportunity to learn anything in regard to their higher duties except by studying themselves or what they have learned from practical experience. It is our aim for all of our officers to have as good opportunities to obtain a military education as the officers of the Navy or Army. Education is absolutely essential: an educated officer makes for educated men and an ignorant officer makes for ignorant men. (6)

The Commandant had already ordered the creation of the nucleus of what would eventually become the Education Center of the Marine Corps. Two new schools at Quantico for officers other than new lieutenants were established, with both focused primarily on infantry skills: in October 1919, the Marine Officers' Training School and in January 1920, the Marine Officers' Infantry School. However, two similar schools operating concurrently was unsatisfactory; also, the subject of Marine officer education was under review. Hence, in July 1920 both schools were merged into one organization, with separate courses for field grade officers and company grade officers. A staff was appointed to develop a curriculum, and the first

class ordered to assemble. By September, the need to have a formal school structure, with various schools organized to suit the needs of the diverse students had been recognized, thus the Field Officers' Course opened its doors, to be followed a year later by the Company Officers' Course. (7)

In his endeavors, Lejeune had the support of the Secretary of the Navy. In a speech at Quantico on 5 March 1920, Josephus Daniels told his audience that:

> No Americanism has the right to call itself by that proud name that does not seek to uplift, strengthen, and make more efficient every man in America. With that spirit in our Marine service, our naval service, and our army, we shall before a great while attract into the service the flower of the country, and we will hold those of good judgment and ambition by putting before them the opportunity of the highest advancement. That day is past in America when preferment is exclusively in the grasp only of those who have been to Annapolis and West Point. We shall open the doors of promotion to men from the ranks. We have seen in historic wars that some of the greatest soldiers of natural genius and ability have made themselves superior to men of greater opportunities. We shall lift up always and never pull down. We shall open no doors of advancement to men who are not worthy and fit, who do not qualify themselves by study to make themselves the equals of those who enjoyed the best advantages. (8)

However, such ideas were not just the result of the World War I experience or General Lejeune. As he had indicated in his testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee, a minority of farsighted officers had already been discussing this very concept. The first year of the publication of the officers' professional journal, The Marine Corps Gazette, in 1916 saw the idea debated in its early issues. In reaction to future commandant Ben Fuller's piece on the establishment of a Marine Corps war college, numerous responses appeared. Another future commandant, Fuller's successor, the then Lieutenant Colonel John H. Russell, who himself would support the education system in the 1930s, continued on a theme he had raised earlier that year: the need for a Marine Corps mission, and one by implication closely associated with the Navy. He commented in December 1916 that the "Naval War College is the Marine Corps War College. It is there that we obtain our conception of war." In his view, that was where broad outline was obtained; however, as Russell continued: "It then becomes the duty of the Marine Corps to establish an educational system and such educational institutions that will enable it to perfect the work as outlined by the Naval War College." (9) In a series of essays in response to Colonel Fuller's commentary, the correspondents were not disputing the concept of a professional educational system, but ultimately what form it would take. One even submitted a tentative outline of a curriculum of such an institution. (10)

The intellectual ferment and discussion reappeared in the pages of the Gazette immediately after the war. In September

1919, Major E. W. Sturdevant stated the need for professional military training for the officers of the Corps in a piece titled "A System of Instruction for Officers of the Marine Corps." In the introduction, he noted the obvious, well aware of natural grouping of officers (newly commissioned officers whose only experience was in France, older officers who had not served there but remained "on foreign tropical service," and training of future officers of the Corps) who would oppose such a system:

> The Marine Corps is now called on to furnish officers equipped for a far wider range of duties than ever before. The Military art in general has also expanded, new forms have appeared, the old familiar branches we have studied for many years have been greatly enlarged and they all need much more thorough study to acquire proficiency."

Sturdevant addressed the even then old argument of "generalist versus specialist," and concluded that "the Marine Corps system of education should be like a university, which provides a certain number of required courses and a certain number of electives." And "higher education" in the profession was a necessity: "That such education is necessary for the Marine Corps goes without saying, as well as the fact that we cannot rely upon the Army or Navy to give it to us, but must provide it for ourselves." (11)

By June 1921, the Marine Corps Gazette announced to its readers that such a system was now in place and ready to function. It also noted that the Field Officers' Course already

had a class in session, with a second to assemble in October of that year. However, the goal of 25 field grade officers in each had been impossible to achieve due to the needs of the service; hence, although the number of students would remain at 25, the student body would be composed of both field grade officers and senior captains. (12)

However, despite the policies of the leaders of the Corps and the vision of their future successors, opposition to this new concept existed within the officer corps, with views ranging from hostility of the very idea of such professional military education, to various complaints about having to attend school after fighting in "The Great War," to objections of students being taught by officers junior to them (despite the instructors' qualifications), to views that "experience was the best teacher." Marine Corps leaders in the field of professional officer education throughout the 1920s periodically took up the pen and authored pieces in the Gazette as they attempted to refute such views and convince the officer corps of the need for such education, as indicated by the periodic "soft sell" articles which appeared in the inter-war years. Some combatted the view of education or the study of the profession as being "too high brow" and studious officers as being "impractical." Throughout the period, a theme of "selling the product" appeared in the pages of the Gazette, as well as informing the officer corps of what was happening within the educational system, especially at the Field Officers' Course. (13)

Whatever the views of the officer corps, the fact remained that the Marine Corps had established a professional military education system for them; and the goal was clearly articulated to it, although all the officers may not have been listening. As Colonel Dunlap commented, "I foresee a time when all our senior officers will have passed through the schools as they now exist;" by this, he meant the now established The Basic School for newly commissioned lieutenants, the Company Officers' Course (now called Amphibious Warfare School), and the Field Officers' Course (now called Command and Staff College), with appropriate attendance at the Naval or Army War College. (14) But five years after its establishment, what was the Field Officers' Course?

The 1920s: The Field Officers' Course - The Influence of the Army

As the Major General Commandant had stated in his annual report for 1920, the decade of the 1920s revealed a common approach and theme: the Field Officers' Course, as well as the Company Officers' Course, were created in the image and taught as adjuncts to the equivalent level schools of the U.S. Army. After the 1924-25 Academic Year, the following summary remarks were made by Colonel Robert Dunlap:

> Course of instruction during this school year was largely founded on the courses prescribed in Army schools and the text books in tactics were largely books, pamphlets,

and mimeographed sheets prepared by the Infantry School, Fort Benning, and the Command/General Staff School, Leavenworth. (15)

To accomplish its educational objectives with the projected annual student body of 25 students, the Field Officers' Course was actually a part of the Marine Corps Schools, which was headed by a Commanding Officer with an appropriate staff. Both the Field Officers' Course and the Company Officers' Course in turn had their own separate Directors. The course, now running from September to June, was grouped into three areas of study: the Department of Tactics, the Department of Topography, and the Department of Law. (16)

From its initial class, the Field Officers' Course confronted a problem common to all its succeeding ones: not all students entered the school with the same background, even in the area of basic military skills. Despite the ideal of covering everything in greater depth, such could not always be easily accomplished, then or now. As the end of course report for the 1924-25 Academic Year noted, "Topography was still taught in a more or less elementary form to the members of both classes, irrespective of their experience and training in that subject." (17)

Each year, the end of academic year reports noted that grades were given only in tactics, topography, and law. Significantly, the report for the 1923-24 Academic Year noted, "The greater part of the time was devoted to tactics." (18)

Another significant aspect of the Field Officers' Course soon appeared: the students were expected to master the instruction, pass examinations, and meet the overall standards the school demanded of them. Stated another way, they were held accountable. Thus, for the first five classes it became apparent that attendance did not mean automatic graduation:

Table I

Attendance/Graduation Figures:

Field Officers' Course, 1920-21 to 1924-25

Academic Year	Number of Students	Graduates	Comments
1920-21	24	24	Honor: 2; Distinguished: 6. "following somewhat the system then in vogue in the Command and Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth."
1921-22	24	24	"All members of the class graduated, each given a class standing as warranted distinction."
1922-23	22	15	"Remainder of class either failed or received qualified certificates."
1923-24	20	19	
1924-25	22	20	2 received "no grades"

Throughout this period, the Field Officers' Course remained modeled on the U.S. Army course of instruction at Fort Leavenworth. This was not surprising, since the major military event of the century had been World War I where many of the Marine leaders, including Major General Commandant Lejeune, had served in France with the Army and Leavenworth trained officers. Thus, the infant Field Officers' Course initially

patterned itself after its older sister service institution. Within a few years, this would soon be an issue of great controversy at Quantico. But in the meantime, the Field Officers' Course continued on its evolutionary path.

One element remained constant, then as now. That was and is the ideal goal of producing a well educated, reflective, professional officer. In words that could have been said in 1988, Colonel James C. Breckinridge addressed this subject in 1929. The Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Schools articulated the ideal in a Marine Corps Gazette article in December of that year:

> Military reasoning should be analytical and critical above everything, because military problems are not susceptible of academic proof; and that which has been proven by force of arms in one place has been disproved in another. There is no formula for waging war or fighting battles; to apply a rule is to invite, or demand, disaster.

Breckinridge, above all, sought to teach his students how to think, and not recite rules and formulae. As he continued:

> These students are taught not to learn what is handed to them, and to accept it because it is handed to them in a college, and to mold their minds upon precedent and chronology. They are taught to dissect, to analyze, and to think. They are taught how to develop their inherent intelligence and to use their minds for original thinking....We need officers who are trained to reason briefly, clearly, decisively, and sanely. (19)

Breckinridge then addressed the ideal of the Field Officers' Course within the Marine Corps Schools. He specifically noted the following about the senior educational institution of the Marine Corps:

> And the Field Officers' Course finally removes the limits and restrictions to originality, and teaches its students to apply themselves and their innate abilities to every situation that demands an analysis and a decision." (20)

Of course, this was an ideal; but was it the reality of the 1920s? Objective critiques, even in surviving records of any institution, often only address the ideal or what the writers desire to be known. However, Colonel Breckinridge's article produced a response from a student, also published in the Gazette. In a critique of the course, he addressed problems of which Colonel Breckinridge surely was aware, and which plague all military schools, especially those at the command and staff college and war college levels.

If the ideals of Colonel Breckinridge are relevant in 1988, the critique from Lieutenant Commander H. S. Jeans could also have been penned today. In it, he notes the perennial problems of too many subjects to be studied in too little time; the problems of tests, grades, and standings which interfere with learning; and the real issue of trying to ascertain the "school solution" to satisfy faculty and "the Marine Corps" which can interfere with the ideal as articulated so precisely by Colonel Breckinridge. (21) This essay gives a rare insight into what

was really occurring at the Field Officers' Course, a glimpse behind the official records, statements, and few surviving documents.

By the end of its first decade of existence, the Field Officers' Course was firmly established within the Marine Corps. Between 1920 and 1930, 198 Marine officers, six Naval officers, and two Army officers had attended the Field Officers' Course. (22) The leadership of the Corps firmly supported the concept of professional military education throughout an officer's career. Brigadier General George Richards, at the opening exercises of the Marine Corps Schools in August 1931, addressed past achievements, and compared previous and current views, at least those supported by the Corps' leaders:

> Prior to the war the various attempts to educate the officers met a considerable amount of criticism. Too much education was somewhat frowned upon. The supposedly educated officer was looked at askance by the others. The 'high brow' was unhesitatingly rated as "impractical" by his brother officers. It was the "practical soldier" who ruled the boat. Early in the war, our military forces awoke to the need for trained officers, particularly specialists and staff officers, for higher units who understood the tactical use and limitations of various arms and could relieve commanders of the detailed work required for the components of the various arms and services in the various combat situations. As soon as possible after the war... our school was broadened, bringing into existence... the Field

Officers, Company Officers, and Basic Schools... As soon as student officers discovered how much this school could teach, the spirit of opposition to schools in general ceased to exist and instead officers began to seek assignment to school duty. (23)

Of course, part of this was the ideal view. In addition to persuading recalcitrant officers of the wisdom of studying their profession, the real world intervened. Despite the support of the senior leadership of the Corps, there were still only so many officers in the Marine Corps and too many commitments. Hence, because of the need to send expeditionary forces to Nicaragua and China, the courses at the Marine Corps Schools were interrupted and the officer students sent to these unexpected duty stations. For the 1928-29 Academic Year, the Company Officers' Course was suspended while the size of the student body in the Field Officers' Course was reduced considerably. By the 1929-30 Academic Year, some semblance of order had returned and 17 students reported for the Field Officers' Course that year.

But new issues were soon to arise. These concerned not the idea of professional military education for officers, but what the focus would be in the schools. Linked to this would also be the future direction of the Marine Corps and its mission. In retrospect, the indications of this fight for the "soul of the Marine Corps" were evident. In 1930, under "Marine Corps Schools," the pamphlet for Quantico already noted that, although the Field Officers' Course was ten years old and had been patterned after the course of study at Fort Leavenworth,

changes were occurring. By 1930, a new department had been added: the Department of Overseas, whose instruction:

> Takes up a large part of the students' time. This instruction is most important for Marine Officers and has gradually developed from a few hours until it now occupies about one-fifth of the students' time." (24)

The Fight for the Soul of the Corps: Amphibious Warfare

The issue soon would arise: "Where was the institution heading?" A reactive piece to that of Lieutenant Commander Jeans' Gazette article appeared in that journal in 1931. Titled "A Plea for Revision of the Field Officers' Course," Major John A. Gray addressed the real issue of the school and the future of the Marine Corps, and provided a clue of what would be coming:

> The Field Officers' Course patterns itself closely to the corresponding courses of the Army schools, which, admirable as they are for the purposes of the Army, have neither the flexibility nor the scope that a course of instruction for Marine officers should have, and which in fact contains material better eliminated and replaced by subjects of far more value in a course designed for the education of Marine officers. (25)

Major Gray had the right idea, but the incorrect direction. His plea was one for a greater focus on "small wars" and the context within which they occur. However, in the 1930s, another

direction would be chosen: west, into the Pacific, with an orientation to the Navy and the amphibious mission of the Marine Corps.

An indication of the future occurred during the 1926-27 Academic Year. That year, as Major General Commandant Lejeune reported, "An overseas Expeditionary course has been added to the curriculum of the Field Officers' Schools." Then Brigadier General Dion Williams in 1933 addressed this in the Marine Corps Gazette in yet another detailed presentation on the Marine Corps officer education system:

> This is interesting as showing the increasing tendency in the Marine Corps to get away from the strictly Army courses of study at the schools and then embark upon a course of the subjects applicable to the primary mission of the Corps as an integral part of the Naval Establishment, namely 'to support the Fleet or any portion thereof in the execution of its mission' by the organization and employment of Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces for overseas Advanced Base duties with the active Fleet. (26)

The course of study of the Field Officers' Course reflected both the by now traditional course of study heavily influenced by the Army and the shift to a maritime orientation, coupled with subjects which revealed the state of war and technology at the time. Thus, with regard to the letter, officers were required to take courses in animal management (9 hours), equitation (30 hours), and pack transportation (8 hours); such instruction reflected the state of technological development,

availability of mechanical transport, and the heritage of the Marine Corps in small wars. But the focus on the latter was declining, as only 10 hours were listed under "small wars," which included all aspects of this topic from introduction to tactics.

Army influence was apparent in courses of study in map maneuvers (30 hours, of which only four were in landing operations), military organization (8 hours, which included infantry battalion, regiment, brigade, and division organization, plus cavalry units), solution of map problems (20 hours, to include Army estimate of the situation and Army forms), various elements of Army concepts in tactical principles and decisions (96 hours), tactics and techniques of the various arms - air service (23 hours, to include Air Corps organization, bombardment aviation, The Air Division Operations against Hostile Air Force, The Air Division in Defense of a Coast Line, and Aviation in Support of an Army on the Defense), Tactics and Techniques of the Various Arms - Cavalry (8 hours) and tanks (4 hours). However, even though instruction based upon Army organization and doctrine consumed much of the instruction of a course numbering 1,016 hours, the future lay elsewhere.

The focus was already beginning to shift to operations either unique to the Marine Corps or associated with the Navy. Of course, the historical staff rides to the sites of the battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and First and Second Manassas consumed 24 hours of course time. But more

importantly, the students were studying Gallipoli (4.5 hours), the British raid on Zeebrugge in 1917 (1.5 hours), and German landings on the Russian islands in the Baltic in 1917 (1.5 hours), as well as maritime strategy in Central American waters, the Pacific, and the Atlantic, Naval gunfire in support of landing operations, and Marine Corps operations and war plans (1.5 hours each). More significantly, even before the major shift to the amphibious mission and attendant study and development of doctrine thereto, the 1930-31 Academic Year curriculum already contained 216 hours of instruction under the title of "Landing Operations." (27)

The stage was now set for a battle for the "heart and soul" of the Marine Corps, and this would partly be waged within the professional military education system established at Quantico, of which the Field Officers' Course would play a major role. In 1932-33, this would be decided, primarily through the efforts of the Director of the Field Officers' Course (also referred to as the Senior Course or the Second Year) and executive officer of the Marine Corps Schools, Colonel E. B. Miller, with the support of the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, the now Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge, and the Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Brigadier General John H. Russell, who by February 1933 would be the Assistant Major General Commandant and by April 1934 would assume office as the Major General Commandant. To Miller, the problem was simple: although an educational system existed, it was in spirit and content a defacto extension of that of the U.S. Army. On 15 August 1932, Miller presciently stated the issue:

[the] prolonged use of this Army material, now taken from all of the Army schools, has so saturated the entire Marine Corps schools system that its foundation is still resting on Army principles, Army organization, and Army thought." (28)

This simply was unsatisfactory, since Major General Commandant Ben Fuller had already stated his concern that the Marine Corps was not doing enough to prepare itself for its unique mission: "Land operations in conjunction with the Navy and the conduct of small wars." Equally significant, Major General Fuller further noted that "the probability of the Corps being again included in large Army operations is remote." (29)

With this as guidance, Miller then proceeded to propose the direction that the Field Officers' Course in 1932-33 would take. In this, he addressed the next and most obvious question: why teach Marine officers Army doctrine, approach, and tactics? Although Marine and Army organization, equipment, and operations ashore had appeared similar, this was essentially superficial. For Miller, the issue was simple and involved the whole foundation upon which all training at Quantico rested: instruction "must involve Marine organizations, Marine equipment, Marine problems, Marine operations, with a Naval, not Army, background." As Miller noted, "The Marine Corps is not an Army; the Army is not the Marine Corps." For Miller, the orientation and foundation of the Marine Corps Schools was misplaced. In the schools, when the students arrived, "Why teach them Army? Why? Why? If fighting on land is a Marine's job then why not teach Marine?... Marine organizations, Marine

equipment, Marine problems, Marine operations, with a Naval, not Army, background?"

Miller then made his proposal: to shift the focus of the Field Officers' Course to one of landing operations. But to do this, the Marine Corps had to develop its own course of study and textbooks, i.e., doctrine, independent of that of the Army, for its own "'peculiar missions': Land[ing] Operations in conjunction with the Navy and the conduct of Small Wars." He thus made his recommendation for the coming year: "The prime objective of the Marine Corps Schools for the year 1932-33 to be to prepare a Field Officers' School course for 1933-34 based on Marine Corps doctrine, organization, and equipment." In this key major evolutionary but turning point year, Miller proposed the following specific program:

> By developing a Marine Corps doctrine.
>
> By a study of Marine Corps organization.
>
> By a study of Marine Corps-Naval Staff System.
>
> By a study of Marine Corps-Naval Supply System.
>
> By a study of Marine Corps equipment and armament peculiar to our needs.
>
> By a great expansion in our study of Landing Operations in conjunction with and in support of the Navy.
>
> By a great expansion in our study of expeditions in situations not involving declared war.
>
> By a greater development of the subject of Naval gunfire support, Naval air support, amount of Naval support needed for various types of operations under varying conditions.
>
> By a study of Naval-Marine communications peculiar to our type of operations.
>
> By a study of the joint and separate preparations to be made by the Marine Corps and the Navy prior to embarking on a Naval-Marine operation on expedition.

By writing our own tactics and technique for our own units, and our own armament and equipment.

By preparing problems based on our own probable mission and our own organization.

By writing, as far as we can go in the time, our own text books for guidance of both instructors and students.

By collecting available data, at Headquarters and elsewhere, on past expeditions and past maneuvers, in which Marines have taken a part. (30)

In this proposal, Colonel Miller received the full support of General Breckinridge. As he noted, the coming year was a "turntable," during which "we will re-orient ourselves, and pick up the new track upon which we must travel for the future." Breckinridge noted that the long list of what Miller proposed to do "is more complicated in appearance than fact." As he continued:

> To accomplish the numerous items outlined is more a mental adjustment than anything else. We are no longer seeking precedents; we propose to establish our own because they suit us, and because we want them. It will require a natural wrench to part from the universal leadership of the Army schools. But, we have been on our own feet for twelve years and we no longer need to be lead by anybody.

Hence, classes under the old curriculum would be suspended and the students shifted to new studies. Breckinridge succinctly outlined what would be and was done: "To meet the changes of the year 1932-33, it will be necessary to create a new and entirely different sort of Field Officers' class for that year, and for that year only. To a large extent, the class and the staff will

be merged into one body for study and research." (31)

After a hesitant beginning, Colonel Miller's goal was soon achieved. By the 1934-35 Academic Year, instruction and problems were related to Naval campaigns and Marine operations in support of them. As the Marine Corps Schools regulations for the Field Officers' Course for that academic year noted:

> The course for the second year class includes the entire field of landing operations with special emphasis on the Marine brigade, the Fleet Marine Force, both when acting independently and when part of the fleet. Command and staff functions in all types of operations and from small independent units up to and including the mobilization, organization, and operation of the largest probable Marine force. The study of small wars forms an important part of the course. (32)

To achieve this goal, the schools essentially closed their doors, suspended the previous courses of study, and formed themselves into committees to study landing operations and prepare a tentative doctrinal manual on landing operations. From this would come not only the future doctrine, but the textbooks and curriculum for each course within the Marine Corps Schools. In this the Field Officers' Course took the lead; its staff and students, organized into study groups, did a detailed study of the failed British amphibious operation at Gallipoli, as well as using the "lesson learned" experiences the officers had acquired in the various landing exercises in Hawaii and the Caribbean. (33)

The net effect of this was seen immediately in the 1934-35 Academic Year. A mission had now been clearly defined in a positive manner, an old concept rejected, and the curriculum of the schools adjusted to this new reality. In response to a request from the editor of the Marine Corps Gazette, the Marine Corps Schools clearly presented the new direction (as well as a new "sell" campaign to the officers of the Corps) in August of 1934. There could be no doubt of what was happening:

> Probably no single or combination of factors has contributed so much to crystallizing school opinion, and forcing a change in our ideas as to the educational requirements and needs of the Marine Corps as the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force. This Force, as a component part of the U.S. Fleet organization, is lending color and purpose to every Marine Corps activity, and has already served to amplify and clarify the mission of the Marine Corps Schools.... Consequently, it would appear that our educational system should be predicated primarily on fitting ourselves for service with the Fleet Marine Force in one capacity or another.... The creation of the Fleet Marine Force has had the salutary effect of removing the last vestige of doubt as to the real objective of the Marine Corps Schools, which after all, is to increase our knowledge of the art and science of war as applicable to Marines, and thereby train ourselves to execute more efficiently our probable tasks in peace and war.

Clearly, the focus became, as the now General Breckinridge advocated, the "infusion of naval thought into the courses in order that we might better comprehend the Navy's method of conducting war and our place in the scheme of national defense as a part of the Navy." Conversely, the Corps had rejected the previous Army oriented and based curriculum, concepts, teaching, philosophies, and, most important, the assumption that in a future war the Marines would serve with that service and hence "train ourselves to serve with the Army." (34)

The net effect of this change was felt in all the schools, but especially in the former Field Officers' Course, now called the "Second Year Class." Because the system of professional military education was based upon a building block approach, with the officers passing through each phase at appropriate points in their careers, the "Second Year Class" would be the major culmination and capstone of the new program. After graduation from this course, selected Marine officers would receive their next and final professional military education at either the Army or Naval War College, where the higher perspective of war and strategy would be addressed.

With this change of focus on the mission of the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps Schools, especially the "Second Year Class," now concentrated on the techniques of learning and implementing the new "landing operations" doctrine, later to be called "amphibious operations." In previous years, Marines had begun to study the defense of advanced naval bases. Now, they stressed the seizure of such facilities; or, stated another way,

the Corps shifted from defensive to offensive operational concepts now associated with the term "amphibious assault." (35)

However, the Marine Corps still had to prepare for both its old and new missions. Hence, students at the Marine Corps Schools continued to study "small wars" and some aspects of defense of advanced naval bases in both the "First Year Class" and "Second Year Class," while a new course was added to those offered at Quantico: a year long "Base Defense Weapons Course." Wake Island in December 1941 showed that such a mission associated with "advanced base defense" was not illusionary. (36)

But the future lay with the amphibious operation, still titled "landing operations." And the study of this form of war, in an offensive mode associated with the Navy, was the cornerstone of the "Second Year Class" curriculum in 1934-35. Because the Marine Corps was still developing doctrine and techniques to implement what was still a new approach and mission, the course focused on operational problems which were designed to teach the students and, simultaneously, assist in developing amphibious operational doctrine.

Hence, for 1934-35, the "Second Year Class" consisted of 1056 hours of instruction. Of this, 239 remained "unassigned," to be used at the discretion of the faculty as they deemed appropriate; in concept, they would be used to augment instruction within the structure of the various problems. A general analysis of the remaining 817 hours reveals where the school was heading: offensive amphibious operations in support of a naval campaign. (37)

TABLE II

Instructional Hours, Second Year Class, 1934-35 Academic Year

Primary Focus: Landing Force Operations

Illustrative Problem (landing attack): 97 hours

Project Problem (landing operations): 279 hours

Special Tactical Study (landing operations): 30 hours

Staff and Command Maneuvers (two sides map maneuvers in landing operations): 75 hours

Naval War College Problem (landing operations): 75 hours

"Traditional Focus"

Illustrative problem (defense of a base): 89 hours

Project problem (small wars): 140 hours

Miscellaneous: Military government, plus "lecture course" on military history, separate arms and services, military and naval matters from outside sources: 32 hours

Unassigned hours: 239 hours

Even in the "lecture course," the emphasis remained on the new as well as the traditional: "A course in military history has been included in this year's course for both classes... This course will be devoted largely to a study of amphibious operations and small wars." (38) Of course, this study of military history also had another purpose, echoing that of Colonel Breckinridge in 1929 who had urged that such study be approached in the appropriate manner, i.e., to learn and not to confirm:

> Some may contend that a course in military history is not worthwhile, in view of the fact that the development of new weapons, and a constant change in the methods and means

of war are conclusive proofs that the commander of today has no practical lessons to learn from situations and events that occurred in the past. However, the human element is always present in war, and the study of military history stamps indelibly on our minds those facts and causes which gave rise to success or failure. (39)

By the end of the 1935-36 Academic Year, yet another piece appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette addressing the subject of the Marine Corps Schools, professional military education for career officers, and the new mission and orientation of the Marine Corps. Clearly, this was part of a continual effort to educate and convince the officer corps on all of these functions. However, unlike the piece of two years earlier, this new essay was more general in nature. Of course, it addressed many of the same issues, but often phrased differently. For example, with respect to the World War I experience of the Corps, Captain Arthur T. Mason wrote that:

> It came to be realized that the experiences of the Corps in the World War were to be regarded as highly exceptional rather than the normal; that such a situation might, and probably would, never occur again; that the status of the Marine Corps was, as always, that of a naval force; that the Navy and the Marine Corps were mutually interdependent, the disparity in relative importance be what it may; that we were soldiers of the sea not in name only but in actuality; and that our whole future usefulness, and existence, depended upon a practical application of these facts.

There appeared the now repeated theme of focus and mission: in a future war, "it has long been realized that essential operations... would be those required to obtain land areas necessary for the support of the Fleet.. and... that the seizure and defense of advanced bases is the primary mission of the Marine Corps...."

With respect to the schools, they would conform to this mission by concentrating on Marine Corps tasks: "in the main, amphibious operations and small wars." This had to bring a major revision of curriculum, since these subjects (primarily the amphibious mission) "had hardly been touched upon before. The seizure, occupation, and defense of advanced bases is new to modern American naval thought which, heretofore, has been occupied with the primary task of solving the problem of defeating the enemy fleet afloat." Through their curriculum and studies, the Marine Corps Schools proclaimed itself as unique, for there could be found "no analogy in any other service school at home or abroad."

The individual courses of instruction were then addressed in general, with the repeated theme of a tiered professional education system and planned sequence. In addressing the senior course, Captain Mason noted that it was "specially designed for older officers after a period of service and increase in rank has occurred." Of course, such students ideally would have attended the previous schools. A mission statement then appeared, repeating that for the 1934-35 Academic Year. Later, he focused on the curriculum, stressing that 80% of the course

comprised operational problems in which the students "learned by doing" through "the conduct of an operation from its inception to its end." The problems involved both the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases. Whereas the Gazette article two years earlier had discussed the elements of the curriculum and the number of hours devoted to each, Captain Mason did not go into such detail for the concluding 1935-36 and forthcoming 1936-37 Academic Years; rather, he presented the curriculum in general terms and told the readers what would be expected, i.e., philosophy of education and how this was implemented.

Mason concluded by stressing the association of the Schools and the Fleet Marine Force. This obviously was an attempt to bridge the two attitudinal groups associated with the value of schooling versus that of practical experience, which Colonel Dunlap had addressed in 1925 and General Richards in 1931. Hence, the piece which "presents the views of the Commandant and Staff, Marine Corps Schools," concluded by linking education and the operational forces:

> The degree to which the Schools fulfill their function may then be measured by the extent to which they prepare officers for wartime service in the Fleet Marine Force and in capacities contributing to the combat success of that organization.... The relation between the Schools and the Fleet Marine Force is very close in more than the mere geographical sense.... The action and reaction of the Schools and Fleet Marine Force, one on the other, is very constant. We may characterize the Schools as the research unit which seeks and develops the principles and data

relating to our task; the Fleet Marine Force as the experimental laboratory which translates these principles into action and tests their practicality. (40)

World War II: Closure to Command and Staff Course

As the Marine Corps entered World War II, it had a new mission, developed a doctrine attendant to it, was working on the means to implement it, and had inculcated both the new mission and the doctrine into its professional education system for its career officer students. However, problems loomed; the number of students who attended these schools was small, especially the Field Officers' Course (whatever it was called). At an average of 25 students per course, by 1941 a maximum of 450 students could have attended (not graduated) from this course. (18 courses times a maximum student body of 25 students equals 450. However, note that the courses for 1927-28 and 1928-29 were either suspended or reduced in size; a student body of 25 per course was a theoretical ideal not actually achieved each year.) However, the total number of school trained officers, either in the old "Army" or new "amphibious" system, was also a misleading figure. Many of the graduates were old, and had either died, or retired, or were physically unfit for operational service; others had been rapidly promoted, and would soon be major commanders in a rapidly expanding Marine Corps.

Herein lay the problem. The Marine Corps had correctly identified its proper future mission and had tackled the problem of how to conduct it. The Pacific would be the theater of its

operations, and the enemy an island empire, with outlying defenses. Even if the Japanese fleet was defeated, its island bastions would have to be assaulted and seized. Although an embryo Fleet Marine Force existed to do this, hardly anyone could have envisioned a World War II final strength of six Marine Corps combat divisions, four Marine Corps aircraft wings, supporting troops initially under First Marine Amphibious Corps and later FMFPAC, and all of this eventually organized into two Marine amphibious corps. Equally important would be a major support establishment existing to train, equip, and procure the needed troops and equipment for the Pacific war.

All of this required manpower. By February 1941, the Marine Corps had commenced its expansion with the activation of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. In an unprecedented expansion, the base of the operational combat manpower officer pool had to be filled before looking to the mid-level command and staff billets. In reality, this meant screening officer candidates and, after identifying those selected for commissions, training the new second lieutenants. No matter how important command and staff training was, the junior company grade officer now took precedence. Hence, despite the advances made in professional officer career level education and the new "heart and soul" of the amphibious mission which had been infused into the Marine Corps Schools, in January 1941 the Quantico Sentry announced the inevitable: The "Senior Class" had graduated, and "no plans for the further continuance of the schools, with the exception of the Candidate and Reserve Officers Courses, have been

announced." (41) By 7 December 1941, the Marine Corps Schools were reduced to five training courses: The Basic School, Base Defense Weapons Course, Reserve Officers Course, Candidates Course, and the Correspondence School. Except for the Base Defense Weapons Course, a career officer equivalent to the Company Officers' Course (or whatever name it carried) for captains, the three resident courses were now devoted to training candidates and lieutenants. (42) In the period just prior to and in the early days of World War II, command and staff level education would be sacrificed to other prioritized needs which the rapidly expanding Marine Corps had to make, but a price would have to be paid for this.

A finite number of officers were available for field duty as operational units were built from the bottom up and new personnel trained. In this process, both initial forces had to be created and, as combat operations commenced in the Pacific, replacements sent to them while simultaneously the Fleet Marine Force continued to expand. However, this process extracted a toll. Major General Charles F. B. Price, Commanding General, Defense Force, Samoa area, addressed the issue in 1942:

> Among the difficulties progressively developing as a result of the rapid expansion of the Marine Corps, perhaps the most perplexing to Senior Commanders in the field is the growing shortage of officers with experience and other requisite qualifications to perform efficiently the duties of the four principal staff functions for Brigades and higher units. The trial and error method of gaining such

[staff] experience is extremely wasteful in time, material and human lives and some correction for the situation confronting us is of vital importance to the Corps. (43)

This problem, of which the leadership of the Corps was cognizant, was finally solved in 1943. In March of that year, the first class of a short and operationally oriented course assembled at Quantico. Composed initially of captains and majors with a few lieutenants and Army officers, and later larger numbers of sister service and allied officers, this Command and Staff Course, later titled "School," was not a career course but one designed to give the needed skills required for officers which immediate combat operations would require. The Quantico Sentry announced the new 12-week course and its objectives on 26 March 1943: "This course will be devoted exclusively to the training of staff officers for Marine divisions, regiments, and battalions, with particular emphasis on amphibious warfare." Later, the scope would expand to include corps operations, as the new school reacted to increasing operational needs of the Pacific war. By 1945, nearly 500 staff officers had graduated from this course, including 44 naval officers, 25 army officers, and 37 allied officers from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, The Netherlands, and France. (44) The size of the classes had also increased, reaching 55 students per course by February 1945 from an initial class size of 35 in March 1943.

As in the inter-war era, eventually the officers of the Corps were informed about the new school through the Marine Corps Gazette in February 1945; unlike the previous decades,

however, the purpose was clear and the officer corps needed little convincing of the value of such instruction. In an article titled "How Staff Officers Are Trained," the obvious was stated: "because of its rapid expansion, the Marine Corps during the early days of the war developed a shortage of qualified staff officers." In February 1943, Headquarters, Marine Corps issued the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools the appropriate guidance for the new course: to prepare officers "to perform efficiently the duties of the four executive staff sections in the Marine battalions, regiments, and divisions." Course content reflected what was occurring in the war, as the instructors were "required to examine thoroughly all related texts and reports, and incorporate in its instruction the latest professional doctrines and trends." To do this, the experienced staff not only "kept abreast of the latest developments in modern warfare, coupled with a thorough study of plans, orders, and special action reports from units in the field," but they visited their sister institutions at Forts Benning and Leavenworth, and at the Naval War College, and sent members of the staff into the combat areas to see what was occurring, balanced this against the curriculum, and submitted reports for discussion back at the School. Such observers had been present during the Saipan and Palau operations.

Thus, the focus of the course was operational, i.e., what was needed for the immediate pursuit of the war effort. The curriculum of the 12-week course reflected this. After an initial review of basic military fundamentals, the Command and Staff School structured its curriculum in the following manner:

TABLE III

Curriculum:

Command and Staff School, 1945

Problem	Hours	Comment
Regiment in the Attack	15.5	Map problem, emphasis was on battalion and regiment operations and logistics (S-3 and S-4)
Regiment in the Defense	10.0	Terrain exercise, in which the students had to select a MLR, OPs, and CPs, site infantry weapons, select artillery positions, and identify anti-mechanized barriers.
CPX - Regiment	10.0	Students assumed staff positions of battalion and regiment, and functioned as such in a simulated attack.
CPX - Regiment	45.0	Similar as in ground exercise, except this was an amphibious operation.
Attack on an Enemy Held Position	106.0	The major staff exercise of the course. Students submitted G-2 estimate, commanders estimate, corps operation plan, task organization, and a landing team operation plan.
Defense of a Base	54.0	Map problem; focus - staff duties in planning the defense of an island base.
Jungle Warfare	11.5	Regimental map problem; focus - regimental staff duties.
Project Problem	40.0	Unique: no solution was provided. Focus - division staff. Students divided into five groups and assumed various positions, including division commander. All five groups were assigned the same mission and intelligence, then prepared plans, orders, and annexes "just as though it was an actual operation."

In addition, there were various guest lecturers. This program had one weakness: the students received all of the instruction in the classroom except for one terrain exercise, two command post exercises, and a few demonstrations. However, within the operational focus of the school, the theme was obvious: essentially offensive in nature, either amphibious assault or subsequent operations ashore. Defense of an island base, although included in the curriculum and a final heritage of the pre-1932 orientation of the Corps, was slowly receding into the background as the reality of war and the implications of that conflict confronted the Marine Corps and its educational system. (45)

The Command and Staff School (nee Course) illustrated how far the senior educational institution of the Marine Corps had evolved. The war had accelerated developments which had already commenced in the previous decade. In two and a half years, the School had trained more Marine and sister service officers, with a new infusion of foreign officers into its student body, than had been educated and trained in the 21 years of its existence prior to World War II. Its scope of tactical operations had also expanded in response to the real world situation: correctly envisioning amphibious operations in support of the Fleet as the appropriate mission for the Marine Corps, the pre-war school taught in terms of regiment and brigade. By V-J Day, it had to plan, teach, and evaluate at the levels of the operational division and corps, while a Marine (General Roy Geiger) had commanded an operational army (10th Army) and others had served on a staff at that level. It now remained to be seen what

would happen in the post-war world of professional military education for the career field grade officers of the Marine Corps. And the Corps anticipated this, for in February 1945 it announced plans to lengthen the course from three to six and eventually nine months, when the needs of the service would permit it.

The Initial Post World War II Period: The Senior School

With the end of the war, a combination of demobilization coupled with preparation for increased post-war responsibilities confronted both the United States and the Marine Corps. At Quantico, major reorganizations and loss of personnel both occurred. Within the Marine Corps Schools, the post-war years saw the reestablishment of the former three tiered professional military education system for career officers. For career field grade officers, their school now had another new name: "Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course." The initial post-war class convened in September 1946, commencing an eight month course of instruction, with the second annual class programmed for September 1947. By now, the mission of the school was a confirmation of the decided shift in focus and mission of the 1930s, coupled with the experience of war. The new mission statement was brief and to the point:

> To train field grade officers for command and staff duties in appropriate echelons of command within the Fleet Marine Force with primary emphasis on advanced instruction in the doctrine and techniques of amphibious warfare.

A reading of the course description infers what would be included in the curriculum, and what was now de-emphasized. Within the framework of amphibious operations, World War II experience had raised a new element hitherto not addressed in such statements - aviation:

> The [Senior] Course is primarily designed to cover the conduct of amphibious operations employing battalions, regiments, division, corps, and corresponding aviation organizations contained within the Fleet Marine Force. Instruction is designed to produce commanders on the battalion and regimental level and executive staff officers (and assistants) on all levels. (46)

Significantly, there was no mention of "small wars," and officers who would be assigned to special staff duties were to receive training for such assignments prior to attendance at the "Senior Course." The course was programmed for 64 students, one-third of whom were to be aviators.

Shortly after the war and as the Senior Course became re-established, the old controversy about "experience and practicality" versus too much theory arose again. Actually, a blend of the two was ideal, but in letters to the Marine Corps Gazette the issue appeared in its extremes. But in reading such correspondence, the content of the Senior Course is clear: the lessons of the amphibious assaults of World War II, taught by the personnel who not only participated in them but performed their duties successfully. The theory and techniques were those of 1943 to 1945. (47)

The practical experience of the war continued to influence the curriculum of the Senior Course. As the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools wrote in 1949, during the war:

> Senior officer students reworked and enlarged on problems involving the seizure of Pacific islands, problems notably similar to those encountered by their predecessors of the nineteen thirties and varying in solutions according to the accelerated material developments of later days. As always, the beaches were the laboratory of the Schools.

Since 1945, however, the practical experience of war was not available. Hence, as part of the curriculum in the post-war years, the students took to the field. As General Lemuel Shepherd wrote, "in order that the instruction may not lose its sense of reality, frequent resort is had to the medium of command post exercises, demonstrations, field exercises, historical rides, and terrain exercises." Most important, this process culminated with staff and students joining Fleet Marine Force units for a two-week amphibious command post exercise, which "gives the students an opportunity to apply and observe in practice all of the various lessons learned in the increments during the previous eight months." As always, the sister services and foreign officers, coupled with outside guest lecturers, were scheduled to give the students a "broader picture of national and international problems and development[s]." (48)

In 1950, just 15 days prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the Senior Course graduated its last class of 98 students before the Marine Corps found itself involved in

another war. (49) Unlike World War II, however, the school remained open and continued its sequence of annual classes. Meanwhile, in yet another internal reorganization of 1 September 1950, the school, now renamed "Senior School" became a component part of the new Educational Center, whose Commanding General reported to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Schools. However, the mission statement remained as in 1946, except that the term "amphibious operations" replaced "amphibious warfare," a change which occurred in 1948, (50) as did the disappearance of Marine Barracks, Quantico, which now became Marine Corps Schools, Quantico.

By 1954, the Marine Corps had returned to a peacetime mode. Again, the officer corps was informed about the professional education system through which they were expected to pass. At the Senior School, however, a change had occurred. Now, by policy, the students were lieutenant colonels and colonels, with a mission of training them for command of regiments or groups, and for all aspects of service on division, wing, or landing force staffs. In the nine-month course, the emphasis was now on <u>both</u> air and ground units, and training for all aspects of staff duty. Instructional methods remained as before: a combination of lectures, field problems, and demonstrations, culminating in a one-month amphibious command post exercise, <u>Operation Packard</u>, during which one week was spent at sea conducting an amphibious landing at Camp Lejeune. Reflective of the new era, the School also devoted "considerable amount of time to atomic warfare." As in the late 1940s, the Senior School claimed to make use,

through its library, not only of published books, but also 50,000 classified and 60,000 non-classified papers; these included "operation reports for most of the major engagements of the armed forces during World War II and Korea."

By 1954, the Senior School had assumed a definite operational focus, with most of the curriculum devoted to what would be considered the tactical or operational aspect of military affairs. That academic year, the students culminated their studies at Camp Lejeune in Operation Packard by planning an amphibious operation involving two Marine divisions and two Marine aircraft wings. (51) Hours wise, the curriculum appeared as follows:

TABLE IV

Senior School, 1954-55 Academic Year:

Curriculum Hours

Topic	Hours
Command and Staff Subjects	550
Aviation	85
Naval Gunfire and Artillery	50
Mechanized Warfare	38
Engineer	25
Naval Subjects	27
Communications	13
Atomic Warfare	54
Total	842*

* - In the hour total, it is unclear if the four weeks devoted to Operation Packard were included in this or if they were counted separately.

Meanwhile, the size of the student body was growing. The Senior School on 3 June 1955 graduated 119 students. Three months later, on 6 September 1955, the 1955-56 class convened, with 126 students in the school. In the opening address to the students, the Director of the Educational Center, Brigadier General H. P. Paige, challenged them to use their "imagination and an unbiased viewpoint" when encountering "an almost unlimited number of problems still to be solved." Paige continued that "we must never be satisfied with the old and imperfect way of doing things." (52)

In August 1956, another Senior School class convened in Breckinridge Hall aboard Quantico base. A Quantico Sentry article of 10 August 1956, in announcing that a new director had assumed his duties at the Senior School, also noted that "at the beginning of the school year 1955-56, Senior School adopted the seminar method of instruction. This method proved greatly superior over the lecture method previously used." The Sentry then commented that this was one of the most "notable changes to be affected at the Senior School in several years." (53)

However, this concealed a major upheaval in the institution which occurred just prior to the 1956-57 Academic Year, one which the new director of the Senior School would have to implement. This occurred as a result of a study of professional military officer education, which focused upon what should a Marine officer know to competently command a Marine infantry regiment, aircraft group, and/or to perform duty on a general staff of a Marine division or aircraft wing. Then how much of

this should be taught by the Senior School, and finally how should it be taught by the Senior School? Also, the technological nature of warfare was changing, hence the Senior School could not avoid being affected by these dual influences. However, its mission remained essentially as before:

> To provide professional education for Marine Corps officers of the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel in command and staff duties appropriate to the current and next higher grades.

With a student body of lieutenant colonels and colonels, however, the level for which the School trained and expected its graduates to serve had increased. This was now, although in concept similar to 1920, a much higher goal in the reality of the changed circumstances of the 1950s.

This mission was amplified by a further statement, which in turn reflected the changed technology of war and the increasing demand placed upon the professional officers only 10 years after the end of World War II.

> Primary emphasis is placed on advanced instruction in doctrines and techniques of amphibious warfare to include the large scale all-helicopter assault and the employment of atomic weapons. Instruction designed to broaden the professional background of the students is included as well.

Clearly, in less than one decade, just re-teaching World War II doctrine and techniques would no longer be appropriate or satisfactory; the needs of the student and new technology now placed increased demands on the designers of the curriculum.

Even in the brief amplifying statement, the old concept of the waterborne ship-to-shore amphibious assault was beginning to be superceded by "large scale all-helicopter assault," at least as a theoretical teaching point even if the aviation assets were then not actually available in great quantity. In concept, the School, as in the mid and late 1930s, was teaching doctrine to match the eventual capability to implement it.

Because of the aforementioned study, four major changes were made to the curriculum of the Senior School. This included a large increase in the time allocated to aviation instruction, to include sending the ground officers for two weeks to the Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina. Also, the time allocated to the study of nuclear weapons increased, with a goal of ensuring that general staff officers and commanders would not be completely dependent upon the specially-trained nuclear weapons employment officer. Third, the course of instruction was presented at a "graduate professional level, not unlike a graduate school at a large university;" however, the Senior School stressed the older operational oriented aspects of previous years, stressing the solution of military problems, preparation of staff papers, preparation of plans, orders, and estimates. In addition, considerable time was also devoted to improving written and oral communication skills, as well as improving reading speed and retention.

The fourth major change occurred in curriculum organization, time allocation, and accountability. As Colonel H. Nickerson

noted in the Gazette, "the title, time allocation, and content of the phases of the 1955-56 courses are completely different from the past, with the exception of the final phase, [Operation] Packard." The course was now organized into eight (8) phases, and the time in each was viewed in weeks and not subjects and hours:

TABLE V

SENIOR SCHOOL CURRICULUM,

1955-56 ACADEMIC YEAR

Phase	Weeks	Title	Focus
I	5	"Fundamentals of Combat and Basic Tactical Doctrine"	Basic background orientation to principles of war, combat fundamentals, and FMF organization. Ground officers to Cherry Point for aviation orientation. Phase concluded with objective examination.
II	3	Weapons	Capabilities and limitations of available and potential weapons. Included "conventional, atomic, and super weapons and delivery systems." Concluded with two part test: objective and problem.
III	3	Staff Functioning	Basic staff procedures, organization, and relationships. Initial orientation to foreign armed forces. Concluded with objective examination.
IV	11	Employment of Marine Forces	Instructional vehicle: Advanced Base Problem XII. Both offense and defense included, with special situations (climate, terrain, political) included. Concluded with a subjective type and problem solving examination.

TABLE V (Continued)

Phase	Weeks	Title	Focus
V	7	Employment of Marine Forces	Application. Advanced Base Problem XIII. Amphibious operations and control of ground assets ashore, based on a continuing situation. Raids and defense of advanced naval base were included. No examination: marked requirements were completed throughout the Phase.
VI	2.5	Concept of Future Operations	Evaluate current weapons, organizations, and tactical concepts in light of new developments and possible improvements in case of future war. Students responded to staff concepts. Oral presentations also given.
VII	1	Marine Corps Policies	Designed to enable officer to "present and support the best interests of the Marine Corps at all times and in all situations." Instruction also included prisoner of war psychology and survival techniques.
VIII	3.5	Amphibious Command Post Exercise (Packard VII)	Senior and Junior School joined together "to acquire practical experience in planning and executing an amphibious operation."

Included in the curriculum were guest speakers, averaging one per week, from the government, military, and civilian communities; these guest lecturers had the avowed goal to "stimulate thought and broaden the professional background of the students." (54) Despite this last statement, the focus of the Senior Course remained operational, concentrating upon the Marine Corps and its amphibious mission. Interestingly, by 1955

no mention was made or instruction apparently given in "small wars" and the complex issues such conflict would present in the decades after World War II.

With this organization, the Senior School continued into the 1960s. The focus and emphasis remained the same; on reporting the upcoming graduation of the 1962-63 class, the Quantico Sentry noted the now standard, but re-phrased, points on 24 May 1963:

> The course covers the organization, equipment, and employment of amphibious forces up to and including corps level. Use of the helicopter for movement of troops and equipment is particularly emphasized.

The Sentry also noted other elements which were included to broaden the students' professional background: in addition to studying the general policies of the Department of Defense and the individual services, they also examined military history, political-military theory, American foreign policy, emergency actions short of war, counterinsurgency, use of nuclear weapons, and effective military writing and speaking. (55)

However, before the United States, the Marine Corps included, became overwhelmed in Vietnam, the traditional approach of the Senior School continued. By 1962, the 13th evolution of Operation Packard, initially conducted in 1947, was held. This final problem reflected the importance the Marine Corps and its formal school system placed on training its future senior leaders in the by now "traditional" concept of the amphibious assault. Not only were the 300 students of the

Senior and Junior Schools sent into the field, but in so doing Packard XIII involved 1500 personnel of the Atlantic Fleet and Quantico supporting units, 1000 communicators and support troops from the 2nd Marine Division and Force Troops-Atlantic at Camp Lejeune, and aviation assets from the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. The students also embarked aboard Navy amphibious ships at Quantico, were transported by sea off Onslow Beach, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and then conducted an amphibious Command Post Exercise, to include executing their ship-to-shore movement followed by subsequent operations ashore. The problem focused on assisting "another country stricken by subversion and outside aggression."

The objectives of this extensive and unique in-the-field exercise were also quite clear:

> To prepare these officers to plan concurrently with Naval Commanders and to make plans, quick decisions and take action during mock combat conditions in a simulated landing assault involving widespread dispersion, these students must also apply the techniques of executing, controlling and protecting the ship-to-shore movement of their troops.

Packard annually was updated and revised, to ensure realism and to provide for the application of the principles taught through the academic year. This was deemed most appropriate, for as the Quantico Sentry reported on 18 May 1962, over half of the Senior and Junior Schools' student officers would be reporting to "Fleet Operating Forces" that summer; past experience with

Packard had indicated that "such actual field conditions are the best way to prepare these officers for this future duty." (56)

However, if counterinsurgency was slowly intruding into the curriculum of the Senior School and if the Packard XIII scenario sounded like Vietnam, the objectives of the exercise and what the students actually did on it were firmly rooted in World War II and post-war traditions of the Senior School. Hence, when the 1962-63 class assembled in August 1962, the reported focus remained traditional, and in the general statement made about subjects "aimed at supplementing the professional background of the students," no general or specific mention was made about the situation in Southeast Asia. (57)

1964 and Beyond: The Command and Staff College

In 1964, another reorganization occurred at Quantico. On 23 July 1964, Headquarters, Marine Corps announced that the names of the Senior and Junior Schools would be changed to the "Command and Staff College" and "Amphibious Warfare School" respectively. As the Division of Information release noted, "the new designations are intended to more accurately reflect the level of training and functions of these schools." The newly designated "Command and Staff College," however, had a familiar mission statement:

> To provide professional education for Marine officers of the rank of major and lieutenant colonel. Its syllabus is tailored to prepare them for command at the regimental and aircraft group level, and for staff duty at the division,

aircraft wing and higher Fleet Marine Force levels. Also included is preparation for duties appropriate to the grade of lieutenant colonel and colonel with departmental, combined, joint, and high-level service organizations. (58)

However, this was more than just a simple name change. The foundation for the "modern" Command and Staff College of 1988 can be seen in the underlying substantive changes which would occur in the College. Although possibly overlooked, the grade of the officer student had changed again, moving down one level from colonel and lieutenant colonel to lieutenant colonel and major; this would commence a trend which by the 1980s would see all the U.S. students in the class be of the grade of major or captain (major selectee). By implication, this would eventually begin to affect the curriculum of the school in future years.

But for 1964, major changes had occurred as a result of the general officers conference of that year. In addressing the professional military education program for officers, they concentrated on the Senior course. Because of this meeting, changes in substance as well as name occurred. In fact, some of terminology of that year is still in use today. For example, "the planners for the new high level course have envisioned a sort of field grade workshop, where broader development of the individual is sought." In 1982, the terms were "field grade officers' workshop" and "the whole man concept."

In a major revision of the curriculum, "a good portion of the student's time will go into individual research projects,

with corresponding free time for independent work written directly into the course syllabus. Other new approaches included required reading (with oral book reports), a reshaped NBC warfare course, a study of unified and specified commands, treaty obligations and mutual defense agreements, and the capabilities and limitations of allied forces. The new course of study also included area studies (by the 1970s titled "strategic appraisals"), linked to contingency planning process. (59)

Some of the course of instruction at the College in the late 1970s would still bear similar titles associated with this reform; for example, the package in the Strategy Division in 1978-79 titled "Treaties and Alliances" was in reality the "Treaty obligations and mutual defense agreements" of 1964. (60) The College had now begun to address in its curriculum other areas of study outside its previous narrow Marine Corps and amphibious warfare focus (note the new emphasis on "unified" and specified "commands," and potential service "with departmental, combined, joint, and high-level Service organizations"). This commenced an ever expanding process which has been necessary to meet the necessity of preparation for service in the rapid, complex, and ever changing world of the late 20th Century.

All of this was predicated upon the assumption that the Command and Staff College curriculum should be based upon the educational needs of the service and the experience background of its officer students at this point in their careers; this meant the students would have 12 or more years commissioned

service, consisting primarily of majors but with a few lieutenant colonels also in each class. As a policy, this continued in effect until the 1983-84 Academic Year, when the first class of all Marine Corps majors assembled. (NOTE: in the 1982-83 Academic Year, only one lieutenant colonel received orders to the College. The Commandant of the Marine Corps also desired that the students be competitive; competitive not against each other, but against the high standards expected of a Marine officer. In 1988, this is phrased as "meeting the expectations each officer demands of himself." The requirements of the course were to "test the officer's powers of logic, judgment, and ability to communicate. Formal examinations, except in foreign language, were abolished; evaluations were based upon student performance as problems were faced and solved.

As the Director, Brigadier General F. J. Karch, wrote: "The Command and Staff College has become a field grade officer's workshop" in which the students confront problems and acquire experience through solving them. To achieve these goals, the curriculum was again reformed, organized into nine sub-courses:

TABLE VI

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM,

1966-67 ACADEMIC YEAR

Sub-Course	Title	Hours	%	Comments
1	Doctrine, Policies, and Procedures	49	4	Review of military fundamentals. Designed to have all students at a common base.
2	Executive Leadership	101	9	Despite title, primary focus was on effective communication: writing, speaking, reading, and listening. Professional reading program of six books. Written communication the key: three papers - Gazette type article, staff study, and individual research project.
3	Management Techniques and Procedures	93	7	Marine Corps Focus: planning, programming, budgeting, and management of resources. Two computer assisted management games were used.
4	Geopolitical and Current World Situation	90	8	Focus: U.S. national objectives, foreign policy, and military strategy. Goals included student awareness of world, social, economic, and political factors. Foreign officer presentations included.
5	Organization and Functioning for National Security	120	10	Research and development issues, with a focus on contemporary and future years.
6	Air-Ground Task Force Operations	160	14	Application exercises: staff estimates, command decisions, and preparation of combat plans and orders.

7	Amphibious Operations	392	33	Focus on doctrine and techniques. Sub-course and academic year culminated in Marine Expeditionary Force level command post exercise. Computers used, including evaluation.
8	Counter-insurgency	64	5	Main focus: high level analysis and planning, despite claim that "the student is prepared for command and staff assignments in planning and conducting all phases of counterinsurgency programs."
9	Foreign Language	114	10	Three options: French, Spanish, or Vietnamese. Comprehension goal: vocabulary sufficient to conduct routine tasks, movement, or business.

The guest speaker program of the College was also increasing. In contrast to previous years when an average of one per week addressed the students, now over 80 guest lecturers were scheduled in the academic year. These came from government, industry, labor, and education, as well as the military. However, lectures and examinations constituted only 13% of the instructional methodology of the College. The rest of the curriculum was implemented by a variety of individual and group applications.

Ultimately, the College expected its officers to be proficient in the planning and conduct of "force in readiness" operations, with a primary emphasis on amphibious operations; to exercise judgement and decision making capabilities in situations expected to be encountered in the future; as a leader, to be able to communicate his knowledge and leadership in writing and orally; to be qualified in the new management techniques so important in the national military establishment; and to think critically. (61)

In analyzing this reformed curriculum, several points should be stressed. Despite the major war in Vietnam, the primary focus of the College remained amphibious operations. Only 64 hours, or 5%, of the curriculum was devoted to counter-insurgency, although officers also had the option of studying Vietnamese in the foreign language subcourse. Second, management as a clearly identified skill desired in the field grade officer was now stressed. Third, computers were entering the instructional program, a trend which through the years has

become even more pronounced; this included the elimination of the Packard amphibious command post in-the-field exercise, to be replaced by a final exercise in which computers played a role. Fourth, the guest speaker program designed to broaden the students' background was increasing, as well as other elements of the curriculum designed to achieve this same purpose; in later years these would be grouped under the Strategy (later renamed Battle Studies [Military History] and Strategy) Division, and elements of the Command Division instructional programs. Finally, a short lived foreign language program was instituted, one which would not survive because of competition for time from other subjects and, equally important, its goals could not be achieved within the hours allocated and the difficulties of adults acquiring foreign language skills.

If the reforms of 1964 laid the foundation for the "modern" Command and Staff College, it assumed its recognizable form in the early 1970s. That decade saw the College divide its course of study and teaching faculty into three divisions: Command (which later was renamed "Command and Management" and has since returned to Command), Landing Force Operations, and Strategy (now Battle Studies [i.e., Military History] and Strategy) Division. By then, also, the use of computers and computer instruction was increasing (in 1988 all student conference groups have a computer and the students are tasked with becoming familiar with this technology); the adjunct faculty of reserve Marine officers from academe were not only assisting the College, but also beginning to offer instruction; the emphasis

on the writing and research program was well established, with the evolution of this program in the ensuing 16 years striving for marked improvement in written communication skills; a guest speaker program, which then was tapping outside sources has now expanded beyond the scope of that of 1972; and the continued use of various instructional methods designed to enhance student individual and group effort, encourage peer learning from officers who have key skills, and build teamwork, just as would occur in the operational forces; and, finally, the increasing number and expected contributions from the sister service and international officers.

Writing in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1972, Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka, the Director of the College, reviewed its status as of the summer of that year. He noted that the College, in order to meet the needs of its students and the Corps, had become a blend of the cerebral and physical, for the two had to merge: for if the operations of the Corps were physical, the management of its assets was mental. Hence, in the Marine officer both aspects of his abilities had to be developed.

However, the mission of the College remained essentially the same as it always had been: "to provide professional education for Marine Corps field grade officers to prepare them for command staff duties through the grade of colonel." He noted that the heart of the curriculum remained amphibious operations, now structured to include low, mid, and high level intensity conflict. However, reflecting the year in which he wrote, Jaskilka also stressed that "we have de-emphasized instruction

based on our Vietnam experience. In effect, we have taken our heads out of the jungle. We are resharpening our skills in the amphibious business and again firing up the great Navy-Marine team." (62)

In 1972, the curriculum consisted of 1,135 hours of instruction, plus 58 hours of administrative time. The course of study for 1972-73 reflected the new internal organization of the College and its evolving curriculum:

TABLE VII

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM,

1971-72 ACADEMIC YEAR

Areas of Study	Hours	Comments
COMMAND		
Leadership	107.5	
Professional Skills & Fundamentals	89.5	
Staff Functioning	38.0	
Management	114.0	Increased in hours from 16 in 1956-57, to 83 in 1966-67, to 114 in 1971-72. Included computer fundamentals (30 hours) and maintenance management (37 hours), the latter taught at Fort Knox.
Electives	150.0	Included the individual research project or effective (written) communication courses for 60 hours; other electives had values of 30, 60, or 90 hours, and spanned the spectrum from approved off-duty university courses, to foreign language, to history, to cross cultural communications, to selected advanced professional courses.

Adjunct Faculty Seminars	12.0	Commenced offering courses in 1971-72 Academic Year, meeting twice with their seminars on four visits to the College.
[SUB-TOTAL	511.0]	
LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS		
Amphibious Operations	279.0	Course year culminated in a 90 hour Marine Amphibious Force amphibious planning exercise, with student plans executed in a CPX.
Operations Ashore	140.0	
Special Subjects	19.0	
[SUB-TOTAL	438.0]	
STRATEGY		
Counterinsurgency	43.5	
National Policy	1.5	
Organization, Function, & Decision Making Within Department of Defense	16.5	
Army, Navy, Air Force Concepts	37.5	
Strategic Surveys	56.0	
Military Strategy	18.0	
Domestic Forces Factors	13.5	
[SUB-TOTAL	186.0]	
ADMINISTRATION	58.0	
TOTAL HOURS	1,193.0	

With this as a base, the Command and Staff College continued its mission of educating its students through the 1970s and into the 1980s. The essential structure and approach as outlined by Brigadier Generals Karch and Jaskilka evolved slowly and gradually. All traces of counterinsurgency instruction gradually disappeared from the curriculum, except for an occasional guest lecture and academic problem associated with foreign and internal defense planning or an overview analysis from the strategic and diplomatic policy levels of what had occurred in Vietnam; by 1978, the old "Centralia" exercise had disappeared from the course of instruction. An amphibious operation problem set in the South China Sea, called Hainan, was changed in locality to Denmark in 1978, to reflect the renewed interest of the Marine Corps in Europe, NATO, and the northern flank of the alliance in Norway.

However, the College continued its program of broadening the overall background of its students, while developing their professional skills. This included an expanded electives program, which at one time included university professors from local institutions who taught graduate level courses (minus the tests, papers, and grades) as well as the in-house offerings of military history and strategy. The effective communication program remained, with most of the students taking the written communication course while only 10% enrolled in the graduate level research seminar taught by the College's Military Historian; at one time, this program included public speaking and television communication options, but these were phased out by 1978. Gradually, however, the academic electives

disappeared, partly due to financial reductions in the program's funding and partly due to increasing competition for instruction hours from other programs. Thus, by the 1981-82 Academic Year there were only four in what was retitled the "Professional Studies Program": military history, strategy, ground operations, and air operations. The adjunct faculty program, however, continued to thrive, as the Marine Reserve Officers continued to offer subjects related to both their academic expertise and the perceived needs of the students and the Marine Corps. (63)

However, what was appropriate for almost two decades could not continue indefinitely. As the Marine Corps headed into the 1980s, it was confronted with new challenges, changing equipment, and a post-Vietnam officer corps; hence the Command and Staff College would undergo another curriculum reform. This occurred in 1981-82, and was implemented in the 1982-83 Academic Year. The impetus for this came from a new Director of the Education Center, Major General David Twomey, and it was developed and executed under Colonel John T. Garcia, Chief of Academics at the College in 1981-82 and Director of the College between 1982-84. Colonel Garcia's successors in turn have continued to build upon the changes of 1982, as the institution has continued to evolve towards the end of the 8th decade of the 20th Century.

The new curriculum reforms centered around three major areas: the return of military history to the core curriculum of the College; indepth education and training, in addition to core curriculum instruction, for officers in what was titled SAGE (Selected Air-Ground Education) in ground and aviation (a combat

service support option was included in 1983), with the assignment to a SAGE track being dependent upon each officer's MOS; and the goal of having a major computer or manual war game execution phase for all the amphibious and land warfare operation problems, which still remained the heart of the curriculum of the College. Within this program, the development of "the whole man" concept was articulated; this was defined to mean an officer professionally qualified in command and staff duties; educated in the areas of military history, strategy, foreign relations, and similar areas so vital for an understanding of the context within which military operations occur; the continued development of written and oral communication skills; and the further enhancement of leadership skills and physical training so needed by leaders in the Marine Corps of the 1980s.

All of this was done within the framework of a changing student body. By policy, officers could not attend the College who had over 15 years commissioned service; in fact, their length of service has declined to where the average student in 1988 has between 12 and 13 years of commissioned service. The student body, in contrast to previous years and decades, is not only younger chronologically but also in grade; since 1983, of the U.S. students, only majors, with a few lieutenant colonel selectees or senior majors who will be considered by the lieutenant colonel's selection board which would convene during the academic year, have attended the College. As recently as the late 1970s, former battalion and squadron commanders, and officers who had served on major staffs at Fleet Marine Force,

joint, and specified commands, and at the departmental level, were students at the College. These experienced student officers, who at times became defacto assistant faculty, are now part of the past. Equally important, a generation of non-combat veterans compose the student body; through a combination of time and changed policies, this is almost a unique situation in the 68-year history of the Command and Staff College. All of this, coupled with the ever changing international situation, potential threats, and increasing commitments of the Marine Corps, and an assignment pattern whereby 70% of the students in the future would be returning to the Fleet Marine Force, required the changes which occurred in 1982.

The curriculum changes, however, were evolutionary and not revolutionary. The study and final program consumed almost a year of work by four officers on the staff, augmented as appropriate by other instructors in their areas of expertise. The net result was a new curriculum, but one built upon the foundation of the old. It blended the continued broadening mental perspective of the officer students, while remaining true to Major General Twomey's charge to the students to "hone their warfighting skills and merit the trust that the young Marines of the Corps placed in them as commissioned officers and leaders." (64)

The curriculum of 1982-83 was an inter-related one, planned to support each area of instruction although the College was still divided into three separate areas for instructional purposes: Landing Force Operations, Command, and Battle Studies [Military History] and Strategy. In 1982-83, there were

1,240.25 academic hours of instruction; this included 97.5 hours of student Academic Study and Preparation Time. The general mission remained as previously, with the terms associated with the MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) now being used. And the blend of enhancing operational skills combined with the enrichment elements of the curriculum combined to present to the students the most diverse and demanding course of study yet produced by the College. (65)

TABLE VIII

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM,

1982-83 ACADEMIC YEAR

Areas of Study	Hours	Comments
LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS		
Amphibious Operations	291.0	Included five operational problems; final was a computer war game during which the students executed their plans against a reacting enemy. Since initially conceived in 1975, the location has shifted from Israel to Lebanon to the Persian Gulf. For combat arms officers returning to the Fleet Marine Force, they participated in a one week combined arms exercise at Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms, California.
Operations Ashore	172.0	
Special Subjects	24.50	
Selected Air Ground Education	104.50	Initially included only air and ground. In 1983, Combat Service Support added. For 1988, Joint Operations track will be added for joint staff service officer designees.
[SUB-TOTAL	592.00]	

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Areas of Study	Hours	Comments
COMMAND		
Leadership	156.0	
Professional Skills & Fundamentals	150.0	Included one week of military justice. Effective writing part of this program, but students in research seminar came/come under history hours.
Staff Functioning	31.0	Defacto operational problem taught on command and staff procedures.
Management	48.75	
Adjunct Faculty Seminars	22.0	Seminars originally conducted during four visits, two two-hour seminars each meeting. Now, adjunct faculty come three times a year, meeting for three times for three hours each during each visit. Topics taught are in the academic area of expertise of the faculty.
[SUB-TOTAL	407.75]	
BATTLE STUDIES [MILITARY HISTORY] AND STRATEGY		
Fundamentals of Military and Maritime Strategy	10.0	
Current National Issues	21.0	
International Security Relationships	6.0	

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Areas of Study	Hours	Comments
Other Services, Roles, Missions, Organization and Operations	21.0	
Counterinsurgency	8.0	By 1987, hours increased; now part of Landing Force Operations Division
Campaign Analysis	40.0	Initially 12 campaign analyses of 2.5 hours each. Hours cut back, so as to force prioritization of analysis. Each conference group did/does one, presenting its findings to the class. Campaigns are those, generally, which have occurred in the 20th Century. They involve those in which the Marine Corps, the U.S. sister services, American allies, former foes and now friends, and former friends and now potential foes, have fought. The heart of the core curriculum history program.
Historical Introductions	6.0	Part of the initial core curriculum in 1982, these introduced Landing Force Operations problems. Now eliminated.
Historical Perspectives	25.0	Includes military historian presentations, two military history professional readings seminars, and history guest lecture program, which focuses on U.S. military history, professional biographical presentations, and the military traditions of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain/Latin America, and Russia.

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Areas of Study	Hours	Comments
War Since 1945 Symposium	6.0	Symposium now renamed "War in the Modern Era Symposium." Focus: the Nature of Modern War (presented by the military historian), morning seminars in which the students in the War in the Modern Era Seminar present the results of their work, and an afternoon rotating sequence of two or three guest speakers conducting seminars on the topic of "War in the Modern Era."
[SUB-TOTAL	143.0]	
ACADEMIC STUDY AND PREPARATION TIME	97.50	Number of hours will vary each academic year. Time linked to an identified area of study.
TOTAL	1,240.25	

The Command and Staff College in 1988

This was the academic program of the Command and Staff College in the 1982-83 Academic Year, and in essence has continued into the 1987-88 Academic Year. Since then, it has evolved as perceived needs or changes have necessitated alterations. For the 1988-89 Academic Year, these are already being planned. As the Command and Staff College heads into the 1988-89 Academic Year, these changes will have been made based upon recent laws, especially in the area of joint staff training, the general guidance given by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, and the perceptions of the faculty. As of March 1988, the rough breakdown of curriculum hours for the next academic year will be as follows:

TABLE IX

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM BREAKDOWN,

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Division	Hours
Command	311.5
Landing Force Operations	541.0
Battle Studies [Military History] and Strategy	137.0
General Officer Lectures	9.0
Sister Service Lectures	23.0
Lectures of Opportunity	18.0
Academic Study and Preparation Time	194.5
TOTAL	1,234.0

The general focus of each division would be as noted below for the last two decades. The Battle Studies [Military History] and Strategy Division has the task of presenting the "environment" instruction. This is the element of the curriculum designed to broaden the perspective of the students and educate them in areas other than military operations. Its offerings will be grouped as follows:

TABLE X

BATTLE STUDIES [MILITARY HISTORY] AND STRATEGY DIVISION PROGRAM

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Military History
(Campaign Analyses)
(Military Historian Presentations)
(Guest Speaker Program

War in the Modern Era Symposium

U.S. Service History Symposium

History and Strategy Professional Readings Seminars (Four)

Strategy Symposium

Joint Operational Planning and Strategic Mobility

Command and Staff College Symposiums

International Officer American Culture Information Program

The Command Division of the Command and Staff College has always had a unique place in the development and presentation of instruction. This division has been and is a bridge between the Battle Studies [Military History] and Strategy and Landing Force Operations Divisions, since it offers instruction in both "enrichment" and operational areas. Its elements of the 1988-89 course of instruction will be:

TABLE XI

COMMAND DIVISION PROGRAM,

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Command/Staff Functions and Plans

Effective Written Communications

Naval Justice

Training Management

Military Fundamentals

Micro Computers

Leadership and Executive Development

Effective Briefing & Persuasive Speaking

Media Awareness

COJASMMM/SOLMC

Adjunct Faculty

Finally, the heart of the College's curriculum will remain, as in the past, the operational element of the course of study. It must be remembered that the Command and Staff College is an intermediate level school and such an institution is thus a blend of a war college and a career level school; it thus must offer both traditional academic instruction and operationally oriented training. Without these two blended elements, the graduates would be ill-prepared to function in the military, national, and global arenas of the contemporary era. The program for Landing Force Operations Division in 1988-89 will be:

TABLE XII

LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS DIVISION PROGRAM,

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Combat Concepts Review

Introduction to Amphibious Warfare

Landing Force Operations Planning

Amphibious Operations Field Trip

Marine Air-Ground Task Force in the Defense

Low Intensity Conflict Operations

Seizure and Defense of an Advanced Naval Base

Norway Air-landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Offensive Operations

Fire Support Coordination Application Course

Marine Expeditionary Force in Amphibious Operations

Selected Air-Ground Education

Since operations are the core of the Command and Staff College curriculum, what is the primary focus which will be addressed in them? The following table notes the general subjects with which all Marine officers must be professionally competent:

TABLE XIII

LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS DIVISION: EXERCISE EMPHASIS, 1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Amphibious Operations

Compositing

Joint and Combined Operations

Special Operations

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

Integrated Combined Arms

Integrated All-Source Intelligence

Command, Control, Communications

Task Organization

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare

Flexible Combat Service Support

Air Defense/Air Command and Control

Tactical Deception

Rear Area Security (66)

In achieving this, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, has given general and not detailed guidance. Thus, at the meeting with the faculty of the College in February 1988, he noted that with an officer corps composed of non-combat veterans, they must realize certain things about

war, especially the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with combat. In the development of operational skills, the College has a key role for it must develop in the students "a framework of thought so as to have the entire force going down the same path together." He further alluded to one key aspect of what must be conveyed to our officers: that "principles do not change but our officers must do it in a hurry" under conditions on the contemporary or future battlefield. General Gray emphasized that he would not tell the College what to do in specifics, but would state his goal:

> A whole and bold new approach from an institutional perspective - but one must be able to take this and understand the larger direction in which we are going. (67)

In implementing the Commandant's desires, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College will continue on an evolutionary rather than revolutionary path. Even in the major reorientation of mission and curriculum of 1932-33, the Field Officers' Course actually built upon the slow evolution of the previous 12 academic years, plus other work occurring simultaneously at the Marine Corps Schools of that era. Since then, continuity and change have been inter-twined as the curriculum of the College has evolved. Lieutenant Colonel Al Emerson addressed this in 1982 when he informed the readers of the Marine Corps Gazette about the curriculum changes which would occur in the 1982-83 Academic Year:

The Command and Staff has always kept pace with the needs of the Marine Corps and its students. This usually has required only minor shifts in direction or emphasis. Hence, the major focus of change is principally in the evolutionary improvement and expansion of existing traditional programs. Over the years, leaders within the Education Center have wisely and carefully preserved time-tested programs, resisting change for the sake of change. Yet, with equally sound judgement, they have also had the foresight to anticipate and plan for future needs. (68)

CURRICULUM EVOLUTION

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

1920-1988

ENDNOTES

[1]As quoted in "The Education Center: The Path to Professional Achievement" by Major Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, Unpublished Manuscript, July 1979.

[2]The Field Officers' Course open in 1920 and the Company Officers course in 1921. The main reason for this was controversy over which company grade officers would be retained in the Marine Corps after the post World War I reductions, what rank they would hold, and where they would be placed on the appropriate grade lineal list. Two boards were held, the Russell Board in 1920 and the Neville Board in 1921, the latter which overturned the results of the former. This was a highly internal politicized issue, which had an influence on the officer corps structure, sense of professionalism, and direction of the post-war Corps, the ramifications of which continued into the 1930s. For a brief discussion of the issue, see Brigadier General Robert H. Williams, USMC (Ret.), "Those controversial Boards," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1982, pp. 91-99. How the results of the Neville Board had an impact into the 1930s, influenced a new promotion reform bill, and a discussion of differing perceptions on past service, promotion, and the future, see Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, "Conflict Under the Dome: Senator Hugo Black, Major General Smedley Butler, and the Challenged Promotion of Major General John H. Russell, United States Marine Corps," Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1984.

[3]First Lieutenant Anthony Frances, USMCR. "History of the Marine Corps Schools," Unpublished Manuscript, December, 1945, p. 28.

[4]Major Jesse F. Dyer, USMC, "The Military Schools in the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, March, 1922, p. 23. Major Dyer is listed as the 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, having served between March 1919 and July 1920, but the first at Quantico, as the previous eleven were Commanding Officers of the School of Application; see Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," 'Commandants: Marine Corps Schools', p. 109. For the first report of the Field Officers Course, see the Annual Report of the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps for 1920; in this, General Lejeune wrote that, although based upon the Army School of the Line (now called the Command and General Staff College) at Fort Leavenworth, "this course is not as extensive nor as advanced as that at Fort Leavenworth, but it is exceedingly well adapted to meet the needs of the

field officers of the Marine Corps, and for the purpose for which this school was organized." (p. 21).

[5]United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Program of Instruction, 1987-88 Academic Year, dated 4 February 1988. By 1929, the initial sister service officers had graduated from the Field Officers' Course; by 1929, there were five navy and 2 army graduates from the new institution. The first foreign officers attended the reopened World War II three month courses in 1943, and the first foreign officer (from Britain) to graduate from the year course was in the 1947-48 class. Since then every class has at sister service officers from all three U.S. armed forces, plus foreign officer attendance that has ranged from one student to 25 international officers. (See Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, "Historical Overview, Command and Staff College Foreign Military Officer/International Officer Program, 1943 to Present," dated 1 July 1981.)

The wording of the mission statement of the College has changed through the years, even within the last 12 years. However, the concept remains and the same and recent word shifts reflect either new definitions within the armed forces or slight shifts of emphasis. Compare the mission statement in the text with that for the 1975-76 Academic Year:

> To provide high level professional education with emphasis on Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in amphibious operations for field grade officers of the Marine Corps, other services, and foreign countries; to prepare them for command and staff duties at regiment/aircraft group and division/wing levels and assignments with departmental, joint, combined and high level service organizations. And to conduct appropriate courses for selected reserve field grade officers with emphasis on amphibious operations in order to prepare them for command and staff duty at the regimental/group and division/wing levels. (Program of Instruction, Marine Corps Command and Staff, 1975-76 Academic Year, dated 9 September 1975.)

[6]House of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee, Major General John A. Lejeune, USMC, testimony of 26 February 1920.

[7]Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," pp. 27-28.

[8]Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference File: Quantico, Virginia. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels spoke at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, on 5 March 1920.

[9]LtCol John R. Russell, USMC, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1916, p. 363. Russell had been an instructor and served on the staff of the Naval War College between 1908-1910.

[10]Discussions on a Marine Corps War College," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1916, pp. 361-373. LtCol George C. Thorpe, USMC, proposed the curriculum; see pp. 367-368.

[11]Major E. W. Sturdevant, USMC, "A System of Instruction for Officers of the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1919, pp. 232-238.

[12]"Military Education in the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1921, p. 230.

[13]See especially Colonel Robert Dunlap, USMC, "Education in the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1925, pp. 149-156. On page 149, he discusses the anti-education view in general, with a vivid and succinct example of an older and prevailing attitude.

[14]Dunlap, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1925, p. 153.

[15]Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference File: Quantico. "Remarks on Course of Instruction, 1924-1925." Typed summary comments on card inserted into the file. Handwritten comment noted "Colonel Dunlap in charge," but gives no date. See further comment in endnote 17.

[16]For comparison, in 1988 the Command and Staff College is divided into three "divisions": Landing Force Operations (the equivalent of the old Department of Tactics), Leadership (the old Department of Law had been subsumed into this division, with more areas in the leadership area now covered by that all inclusive term), and Battle Studies (i.e., Military History) and Strategy. The latter is the major conceptual change in the organization of the current Command and Staff College from its ancestor of the 1920s: the old Department of Topography would now be viewed as being part of Landing Force Operations Division, with the study of history and strategy, although acknowledged in the 1920s as important, now raised to a separate division, a status reflecting the importance ascribed to this area of study.

[17]Marine Corps Historical Center: Geographical Reference File: Quantico. "Remarks on Course of Instruction, 1924-25." The organization of the Field Officers' Course and its curriculum, along with that of the Company Officers' Course, appears in articles in the Marine Corps Gazette, remarks on instruction at the end of various courses, and in the reports of the Major General Commandant. Colonel Dunlap discusses this in some detail in his Marine Corps Gazette article of December 1925, p. 155. With respect to topography, he noted the unequal backgrounds of the students in this area, that not all the students had the advantage of graduation from the Company Officers' Course or other training, or duty where expertise in this subject could be acquired; hence "it has been found necessary to increase the number of periods in Topography, for should they not be particularly good in that subject it reacts later when they come to map maneuvers, terrain exercises, or tactical walks." (p. 155).

[18]Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference File: Quantico. "M. C. Schools, Field Officers' Course, 1920-21"; "M. C. Schools, Field Officers' Course, 1921-22"; "M.C. Schools, Field Officers' Course, 1922-23"; M. C. Schools, Field Officers' Course 1923-24"; "Marine Corps Schools, 1923-24"; "M.C. Schools, Field Officers' Course, 1924-25"; Marine Corps Schools, 1924-25"; and "Remarks on Course of Instruction, 1924-25." On these comment cards, there are no indications of compiler, writer or dates of preparation.

[19]Colonel J. C. Breckinridge, USMC, "Some Thoughts on Service Schools," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1929, pp. 231, 232, and 237. Colonel Breckinridge, however, was aware of the problem of schools and potential student reaction to what was occurring in them. As he also wrote, "military schools conform too closely to the ritual of techniques and events" (p. 236). Breckinridge served as Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Schools, a subordinate agency responsible to the Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico; he later served as Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

[20]Breckinridge, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1929, p. 237.

[21]Lieutenant Commander H. S. Jeans, USN, "Field Officers' Course at Marine Corps School(s)," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1930, pp. 49-50 and 105-106. It should be stressed that LCdr Jeans was a "friendly critic," and he made this clear in his comments. His comparison with the Naval War College at Newport, of which he was also a graduate, is in contrast probably an idealized one. LCdr Jeans also addresses the problems, still existing, of limited facilities, lectures, and too large classes. In many ways, similar comments have been

uttered to the author in his 13 years as the historian at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, especially the critique by Major Dick Jaehne, USMC, during the 1982-83 Academic Year. In some ways, this reveals that the ideals and practical problems associated with this type of education are universal, transcending time and place. However, everything is relative; Colonel Dunlap wrote in December 1925 that "this course is difficult but not so difficult that the average officer can't complete it satisfactorily. The morale is high, and conditions of living not too bad (for the student in the Field Officers' Class they are good). If the student will relax when the period for relaxation comes, if he will take regular exercise, he leaves at the end of the course a wiser man, and one who feels happier because he is more confident of his professional ability." (Dunlap, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1925, p. 156). The latter statement, despite his friendly critique, would be one with which LCdr Jeans would have concurred.

[22]"The Marine Corps Schools," in United States Marine Corps, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, 1930, p. 33.

[23]Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference File: Quantico. Brigadier General George Richards, USMC, Opening Exercises, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, dated 28 August 1931. General Richards was the Paymaster of the Marine Corps in 1931. Of course, this is also an ideal which the general officers of the Marine Corps tried to establish in the officer corps. The professionally aware and motivated officer, and those just executing orders, came to the Schools. A balanced and demythologizing view of the inter-war Marine Corps and a portrayal of the entire spectrum of its officers can be found in Brigadier General John Letcher, USMC (Ret.), One Marine's Story, McClure Press, Verona, Virginia, 1970.

[24]"Marine Corps Schools," United States Marine Corps, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, 1930, p. 32. In 1931 this part of the pamphlet was published: see Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley, USMC. "The Marine Corps Schools," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1931, pp. 14-15.

[25]Major John A. Gray, USMC, "A Plea for Revision of the Field Officers' Course," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1931, p. 64.

[26]Brigadier General Dion Williams, USMC, "The Education of a Marine Officer. II. The Marine Corps Schools." Marine Corps Gazette, August 1933, p. 19. Unlike the previous "sell" and informative articles published in this journal in the previous 13 years, General Williams penned a series of four lengthy articles on this subject. This issue also contained a detailed breakdown of the Field Officers' and Company Officers' Courses, to include subjects taught and hours devoted to each one. In 1933, the Secretary of the Navy approved the creation of the

Fleet Marine Force as an integral part of the U.S. Fleet, under the operational control of the fleet commander. This officially ended the organizational entities and commitments of the old expeditionary forces, generally envisioned for expeditionary duty in small wars. The missions of the Fleet Marine Force in conception and eventual development would be the amphibious mission. For a brief discussion of this, see Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.), Chapters 10 and 12; and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR, Progress and Purpose: A Development History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1973), Chapters II and III.

[27]Williams, "The Education of a Marine Officer II," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1933, pp. 23-28. General Williams gives the entire course of study, and hours devoted to each, of not only the Field Officers' Course for 1930-31, but also the Company Officers' Course and the Basic Course.

[28]As quoted in Bittner, "The Education Center," p. 6. Original in Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference File - Quantico.

[29]Amphibious Warfare Research Facility, Breckinridge Library, Education Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. (Hereafter referred to as Breckinridge Library). Historical Amphibious File. General Fuller quoted in Colonel E. B. Miller to Commandant, Marine Corps Schools', letter dated 15 August 1932. Subject: "Field Officers' Schools, Marine Corps, 1932/33."

[30]Breckinridge Library, Historical Amphibious File. Miller to Breckinridge letter dated 5 August 1932. Objectives listed in the text are as phrased and quoted from Miller's letter. By implication in Colonel Miller's letter, other areas needed reform. As he noted, the average age of the students in the forthcoming Field Officers' Course for the 1932-33 course was 49! Their total years were 978! The youngest officer was 38, while the oldest was 58; ten of the students were in their 50s, nine in their 40s, and only one below 40. This problem of an overaged officer corps would be rectified in 1934, when John Russell become Commandant, and achieved a major promotion reform: advancement based on merit by selection by promotion board instead of vacancy and seniority. See Bittner, "Conflict under the Dome."

[31]Breckinridge Library, Historical Amphibious File. Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, to Major General Commandant endorsement on Colonel E. B. Miller's letter of 15 August 1932, dated 18 August 1932. For a discussion on how this was partly done, see Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 45, and the detailed student studies retained by Breckinridge Library in the Historical Amphibious File.

[32]Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," p. 46. This was published in "Marine Corps Schools, 1934-35," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1934, p. 58. The report for the "Field and Company Officers' Schools, 1934-35, read as follows: "New objective of the school to prepare officers for staff and command in the Fleet Marine Force. Schools to have a closer coordination with that part of the Marine Corps. Tactics and techniques of that Force to be especially emphasized." (Marine Corps Historical Center: Geographical Reference File: Quantico). The Fleet Marine Force had been established in 1934 as an integral operational element of the U.S. Fleet under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. See Major General John H. Russell, USMC, "The Fleet Marine Force," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1936, pp. 1408-1412.

[33]For a discussion of this, see Millett, Semper Fidelis, Chapters 10 and 12; Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," pp. 48-50, and Clifford, Progress and Purpose, Chapters II and III. Many of the studies which contributed to the "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations" are retained in the Amphibious Warfare Research Facility, otherwise known as Breckinridge Library, Education Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. See the "HAF File," i.e., Historical Amphibious File.

[34]"Marine Corps Schools, 1934-35," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1934. p. 57.

[35]For early 20th Century studies on the defense of advanced naval bases, see the studies conducted at the Naval War College by Majors John H. Russell, Robert Dunlap, and Dion Williams, and Captain Earl Ellis, in that order between 1908 and 1913, the originals of which are retained in the Naval War College Archives (Record Group 8, Box 79, Files XBAA). It is no accident that, as previous citations and text have noted, Russell, Dunlap, and Williams were influential in guiding the change in direction of the Marine Corps as they rose in power; Ellis foresaw a Pacific War against Japan where this new direction would be necessary, but had died in the Pacific while on a mission in Japanese held islands.

[36]Brigadier General Robert Devereux, USMC (Ret.) oral interview with LtCol D. F. Bittner, USMCR, at Ruxton, Maryland, dated 17 November 1983. General Devereux, then a major, commanded the Marine garrison on Wake Island against the Japanese attack against that island in December 1941. Devereux was a graduate of the Base Defense Weapons Course.

[37]The distinction between amphibious operations in support of naval as opposed to a continental (i.e., Army) campaign may seem esoteric, but was obviously a distinction made by Marines of that era. General Holland M. Smith, USMC, a protege of

General John H. Russell, the main trainer of troops in amphibious operations on the east and west coasts in the early days of World War II (who had served with the Army, graduated from some Army schools, and trained and commanded Army troops during World War II) drew this distinction in a series of articles in the Marine Corp Gazette after World War II. See especially LtGen H. M. Smith, USMC, "The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy, Part I," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1946, pp. 12-18.

[38]"Marine Corps Schools, 1934-35, Marine Corps Gazette, August 1934, p. 59. The division of the curriculum as contained in Table II is that of the author. The total of 32 hours under the grouping of miscellaneous was ascertained by subtracting all the listed hours for the other areas from the total of 1056 instruction hours.

[39]"Marine Corps Schools, 1934-1935," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1934, pp. 59-60.

[40]Captain Arthur T. Mason, USMC, "The Role of the Marine Corps Schools," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1936, pp. 7-9 and 61-64. In 1936, both the Marine Corps Schools and the Fleet Marine Force were located at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

[41]Quantico Sentry, 31 January 1941. This unofficial base newspaper had been founded in 1935. It also noted that the "Junior Class" and "Base Defense Weapons Course" had graduated on 20 December 1940.

[42]Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," p. 69.

[43]As quoted in Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," p. 88.

[44]Quantico Sentry, "New Staff School Organized," 26 March 1943; and Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools, pp. 88-89, 108, and 110. On 1 April 1944, the "Command and Staff Course" became the "Command and Staff School" (Quantico Sentry, "New Schools Designations," 7 April 1944). Frances lists 37 allied officer graduates, while current Quantico records cite only 33 names. For the numbers of allied officers, see Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, "Historical Overview, Command and Staff College Foreign Military Officer/International Officer Program, 1943 to Present," dated 1 July 1981, with the following breakdown: United Kingdom (8), Canada (3), Australia (4), New Zealand (1), The Netherlands (12), and France (5). All the names and figures for the allied officer attendees generally have been confirmed by separate correspondence with each respective country; however, one Australian was "unknown" and one name of 12 in the Quantico records for The Netherlands was unknown to Dutch authorities, but was so similar to another that they postulated that one officer had been counted twice.

[45]"How Staff Officers are Trained," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1945, pp. 61-63. In April 1944, the Command and Staff School, in addition to a new name, also received a separate director: Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans, USMC, a World War I, Caribbean Wars, and World War II veteran. He was experienced in the focus of the school; he commanded 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, was Quartermaster of I Marine Amphibious Corps, and commanded the 17th Marine Engineer Battalion on Cape Gloucester. Colonel Rosecrans was awarded the silver star for gallantry on Tulagi, plus had purple hearts from France in 1918 and Tulagi. (Quantico Sentry, "Col Harold E. Rosecrans New Director of C & S School," 14 April 1944).

[46]Marine Corps Historical Center. Geographical Reference File: Quantico. Unsigned/undated document, "AO-3-myc, Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course." The document also contains details for all the other schools within the Marine Corps Schools (Amphibious War School, Junior Course, The Basic School, Communication Offices' School, and Field Artillery School; by internal analysis, this was obviously prepared prior to July 1946. See also Commandant of the Marine Corps to Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, letter dated 15 July 1946.

[47]See especially Colonel Donald Spicer, USMC, "Marine Corps Schools - Up to Date," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1946, pp. 58-59. At this time, and for the next 30 years, the Marine Corps was and has been fortunate in having experienced officers who blended combat experience and theoretical knowledge as the instructors assigned to the senior educational institutional of the Marine Corps.

[48]Quantico Sentry, "Article by Major General (Lemuel) Shepherd Explains Marine Corps Schools," 13 January 1949. In 1949, General Shepherd was both Commanding General, Marine Corps Barracks, and Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, in accordance with the major post-war reorganization of Quantico which occurred in 1946.

[49]Quantico Sentry, 8 June 1950, at the graduation, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois addressed the class and presented the diplomas; one of the graduating students was the former battalion commander of the Senator, LtCol William Piper, who commanded 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, when Senator Douglas was a company commander during the new Britain campaign. This provides a contrast to the Command and Staff College of 1988, when by policy only majors attend; ideally, none of the students would be in the zone for promotion to lieutenant colonel, although only once has this occurred since this new policy was implemented. Generally, since 1975, the number of students in the zone for lieutenant colonel when that board has met during the school year has spanned the spectrum from 4 to 42.

[50]Marine Corps Historical Center. Geographical Reference File: Quantico. Marine Corps Schools General Order Number 76, "Reorganization of Marine Corps Schools," dated 1 September 1950. For the mission statement, see Senior School in "Marine Corps Educational Center," The Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia (1952).

[51]"The Development of MCS." Marine Corps Gazette, September 1954. Senior School is discussed on pages 40-43. For a discussion of Operation Packard, see Quantico Sentry, "Senior Students Plans Amphibious Five Day Problem," 17 March 1955.

[52]Quantico Sentry, 2 June 1955 and 8 September 1955. The article of 2 June also stated the mission of the Senior School.

[53]Quantico Sentry, "Col W. Buchanan is Now the Director of Senior School," 10 August 1956. In all fairness, almost all published articles in the Marine Corps Gazette over the previous three decades stressed that the instructional philosophy and technique used in the senior educational instruction of the Marine Corps utilized the seminar or conference method of instruction. Was the reliance upon the lecture method a result of the World War II need to train as many officers as quickly as possible, coupled with the rapid increase in the student body since 1946?

[54]Colonel H. Nickerson, Jr., USMC, "Senior School . . .New Look," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1956, pp. 13-15.

[55]Quantico Sentry, "Grads to Hear SecNav Speak," 24 May 1963. Author's emphasis. The Sentry article reporting the graduation of Senior and Junior Schools one week later returned to the more familiar wording of the mission (Quantico Sentry, 31 May 1963).

[56]Packard XIII received considerable publicity in the Quantico Sentry in May 1962. See Quantico Sentry, "Junior-Senior Schools Participate in Packard," 4 May 1962; "Packard Underway for Norfolk Sunday", 10 May 1962; and "Packard Ends Today; Graduation Friday," 25 May 1962.

[57]Quantico Sentry, "CMC Will Address Students Attending Ed Ctr Monday," 24 August 1962.

[58]Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Division of Information Release No. GD-211-64 dated 22 July 1964.

[59]"Formal School Training Sooner, Changes Due at MCS," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1964, p. 1.

[60]Program of Instruction, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1978-79 Academic Year, dated 30 June 1978.

[61]Brigadier General F. J. Karch, USMC, "Marine Corps Command and Staff College," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1967. General Karch states that the stimulus for the reforms came from the July 1963 General Officers Symposium, and that the Commandant, General David M. Shoup, was the force behind them.

[62]Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka, USMC, Director, C&S College, "Command and Staff College Today," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1972, pp. 25-30.

[63]There is no brief overview record of these evolutions. This account is based on the experiences of the military historian, Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, of the Command and Staff College, who joined the faculty in 1975, and his records, documents, and recollections of service on the staff.

[64]This was a theme in every address Major General David Twomey gave to every class which commenced at the College during his tour as Director of the Education Center or Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Opening exercises, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, and 1985-86 Academic Years. For a report of such an opening exercise, see Quantico Sentry, "160 officers convene at CSC," 21 August 1981.

[65]Lieutenant Colonel Russell A. Emerson, USMC, "It's Academic! CSC: Prospectus for the 1980s," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1982, pp. 62-67. In addition to Lieutenant Colonel Emerson, Colonel John T. Garcia, USMC, Lieutenant Colonel Roy DeForest, USMC, Lieutenant Colonel Vic Russillo, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, assisted in the preparation of this piece. For the specifics of the curriculum of each academic year, see the Programs of Instruction, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1982-83 Academic Year, dated 27 September 1982; 1983-84 Academic Year, dated 15 July 1983; 1984-85 Academic Year, dated 14 November 1984; 1985-86 Academic year, dated 15 July 1985; 1986-1987 Academic year, dated 25 September 1986; and 1987-88 Academic Year, dated the 4 February 1988. The initial effort to mutually support in a conscious way the instruction of other divisions occurred in the 1979-80 Academic Year, when Lieutenant Colonel Roger Knapper, USMC, Head of the Strategy Division, ensured that all of this division's instruction supported or dovetailed, as much as possible, with that of either the Command or Landing Force Operations Division.

[66]Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holden, USMC, "Marine Corps Command and Staff College: Meeting the Needs of the Corps," draft article for Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988.

[67]General Alfred M. Gray, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps meeting with Command and Staff College Faculty, Heywood Hall, The Basic School, 22 February 1988.

[68]Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Emerson, "C&SC: Prospectus for the 1980's," Marine Corps Gazette, p. 62.

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL LINEAGE (UNOFFICIAL)

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE*

19 May 1918 - 10 March 1919: Tactical Department, Overseas Depot, Quantico, Virginia**

11 March 1919 - 2 January 1920: Transition and Reorganization, Field Depot, Quantico, Virginia**

3 January 1920 - 31 August 1920: Marine Officers Infantry School**

1 September 1920 - 31 January 1941: Field Officers' Course, Marine Corps Schools Detachment, Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia***

1 February 1941 - 31 January 1943: Suspended****

1 February 1943 - 31 July 1946: Command and Staff School*****

1 September 1946 - 30 August 1950: Senior Course, Amphibious Warfare School******

1 September 1950 - 31 July 1964: Senior School, Educational Center

1 September 1964 - Present: Command and Staff College, Education Center

* - At various times in its history, the Command and Staff College (under its current and former names) has been part of the following parent organizations: Marine Corps Schools Detachment, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia; Educational Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia; Education Center, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia; and Education Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

** - The names of the organizations responsible for all tactical training, based at Quantico, prior to the establishment of a formal professional military education system for Marine Corps officers which would encompass an entire career in 1920. This three tiered system was finally functioning with three schools in 1921.

*** - In the mid-1930s, the Field Officers' Course had several names, including Senior Class, Second Class, and Senior

APPENDIX B

OVERVIEW: MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, 1988

The Command and Staff College possesses an historical lineage which can be traced back to the American participation in World War I, although the College was not officially established until 1920. Although its curriculum, based upon doctrine, tactics, and evolving emphases, has changed through the years, the goal of this educational institution, whatever its name and internal organization, has always remained the same: to train and educate field grade officers to perform command and staff duties commensurate with their rank.

Today, the College is an educational institution devoted to educating and training not only Marine Corps officers, but also those of the three U.S. sister services and selected foreign nations. Every class is divided into 12 permanent conference groups, with each having at least two foreign and two sister service officers in it. The 1987-88 Academic Year class has the following officer composition.

Service	LtCol/Cdr	Maj/LCdr	Total
U.S. Marine Corps		123	123
U.S. Army		12	12
U.S. Navy		9	9
U.S. Air Force		2	2
Foreign Officers	9	15	24
TOTAL	9	161	170

The academic year at the Command and Staff College is 43 weeks in length. Although professional operational topics are the "core" of the curriculum, the College maintains that a professional officer must be an educated and well-rounded individual in addition to being tactically and operationally proficient. Hence, the core curriculum also contains such key subjects as military history, strategic studies, leadership, electives taught by reserve officers with university affiliations, and written communications, whose purpose is to broaden the officer's overall background and add depth to certain subject areas deemed of special importance by the school. In addition, invited guest lecturers from the armed forces, government, academe, and business provide the students and staff with personal views and differing insights into a variety of subjects of professional, national, and international interest.

Course. These were all within the organizational structure of the Marine Corps Schools Detachment, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

**** - Suspended due to need for experienced officers elsewhere, especially in screening officer candidates and training second lieutenants. Reopened in 1943, with three month "command and staff courses," primarily composed of reserve officers, with a curriculum devoted to the needed operational and staff skills deemed immediately necessary in pursuit of wartime needs.

***** - Initially Command and Staff Course; from 1 April 1944, Command and Staff School within the Marine Corps Schools Detachment, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

******- Since 1946, the senior educational institution of the Marine Corps has taught one course per academic year. These courses have commenced in either August or September, and graduated in May or June. In addition, a reserve course now exists, consisting of pre-course instruction and two, two week phases taught in July of each year.

The Command and Staff College curriculum is thus a blend of professional military subjects, augmented by appropriate outside professional and civilian instruction, which provides its students with offerings in military subjects as diverse as amphibious operations, fundamentals of offensive and defensive combat, joint operations, command and staff functioning, logistics, Marine aviation, military law, and perspectives on the sister services and foreign nations. All of this is, as from the very beginning, constructed around appropriate operational exercises. In 1988, through the use of current technology, the students war game on computers their various operation plans in realistic global scenarios.

Finally, because of the vital importance of the Marine Corps Reserve in our total force structure, the Command and Staff College offers a four week reserve course, divided into pre-course instruction and two two week phases which the reserve officer attends in consecutive sequential years. The reserve course contains the operational heart of the regular 43 week course, providing the attendees with a fundamental background in command and staff planning in amphibious operations. Thus, in the event of mobilization, the reserve officer will be able to function in whatever billet to which he might be assigned.

APPENDIX C

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT BODY SIZE, SELECTED YEARS, 1920-1988*

Academic Year	Number of Students	Academic Year	Number of Students
1920-21	24	1962-63	126
1921-22	24	1975-76	139
1922-23	22	1976-77	143
1923-24	20	1977-78	144
1924-25	22	1978-79	148
1927-28	Closed	1979-80	146
1928-29	Semi-closed	1980-81	148
1929-30	17	1981-82	156
1932-33	20	1982-83	160
Mar 1943	35	1983-84	162
Feb 1945	55	1984-85	168
1946-47	55	1985-86	171
1949-50	98	1986-87	168
1954-55	119	1987-88	170
1955-56	126	1988-89 (Projected)	180
1961-62	124		

* - Totals compiled from various sources. From 1975 to 1988, based upon documents compiled at the beginning of each academic year; totals include only those officer students attending the school on permanent change of duty station orders, and not equivalency students.

APPENDIX D

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

ACADEMIC HOUR LOAD, SELECTED YEARS

1930-31 TO 1988-89 (PROPOSED)

Academic Year	Miscellaneous	Command Division+	Landing Force Operations Division+	History/ Strategy Division+	Total Instructional Hours
1930-31	64.0*	222.5*	678.0*	51.5*	1,016.0*
1934-35	239.0	**	785.0	32.0	1,056.0
Feb 1945	***	***	292.0	***	***
1966-67	234.0`	357.0	616.0	210.0	1,183.0*
1971-72	58.0``	511.0	438.0	186.0	1,135.0
1975-76	0.0```	594.5	351.5	144.0	1,090.0
1976-77	0.0```	581.5	383.5	135.5	1,100.5
1977-78	0.0```	492.0	414.5	140.5	1,047.0
1978-79	0.0```	480.0	435.5	128.5	1,044.0
1979-80	0.0```	495.5	480.5	132.5	1,108.5
1980-81	0.0```	509.5	447.5	126.0	1,083.0
1981-82	0.0```	530.0	445.0	144.5	1,119.5
1982-83	0.0```	405.0	592.0	143.0	1,140.0
1983-84	0.0```	378.5	583.5	145.5	1,097.5
1984-85	0.0```	379.5	572.0	153.5	1,105.0
1985-86	0.0```	350.5	586.5	159.0	1,095.0
1986-87	0.0```	353.5	564.5	191.5	1,109.5
1987-88	0.0```	311.5	543.0	130.0	984.5
1988-89 (Planned)	50.0^	311.5^	541.0^	137.0^	1,039.5^

+ - The names of these divisions are somewhat "generic", and partly conform to those in use at the College between 1975-1988.

* - For the 1930-31 and 1965-66 Academic Years, the sources did

not "group" the hours and subjects by division. These groupings are thus arbitrary, as the subjects might have been assigned in 1987-88.

** - For the 1934-35 Academic Year, almost all of the course was "operational". The 32 hours of "miscellaneous" topics have been listed under "history/strategy" due to the nature of the subjects listed.

*** - Total number of hours not available; only the hours for the operational problems were listed.

` - In the 1965-66 Academic Year, these hours under "Additional Time Allocations" were Reserved for Director (17), Physical Conditioning (77), Administrative Time (21), and Holidays (119).

`` - 58 hours of Administration Time. This total is NOT included in hours of instruction.

``` - Although listed as "zero", from 1975 to 1988 there were real hours in the category; in addition to holidays and physical training, from 1982 to 1988 "Academic Study and Preparation Time" has been included in the curriculum, specific hours set aside for student study.

^ - Hours as given are those planned for the 1988-89 Academic Year, as of spring 1988. Included in the figure of 50 instructional hours are the following: General Officer Lectures (9.0), Sister Service Lectures (23.0), and Lectures of Opportunity (18.0). In addition, student Academic Study and Preparation Time will account for 194.5 hours.



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