

C5A/A16-3(3)

Serial 00165

FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER,

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
December 4, 1943

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From: Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Via: Commander Central Pacific Force, U. S. Pacific
Fleet.
Subject: Report of Amphibious Operations for the Capture
of the GILBERT ISLANDS.

Enclosures: (A) Narrative of T.F. 52.
(B) Medical Report.
(C) Intelligence Report.
(D) Communications.
(E) Air Attack of 11/25/43 - CTF 52 Serial 00166.
(F) Aircraft Operations.
(G) General Notes on Atoll Attack.
(H) Report of Naval Shore Bombardment.
(I) Details of Loadings of GALVANIC Shipping.
(J) Copy of Report of Support Aircraft Commander,
GALVANIC.
(K) Important Recommendations.

1. This report will concern itself with the general features of the amphibious operations for the capture of the GILBERT ISLANDS, including recommendations looking toward an increase in future effectiveness; and with the detailed narrative of operations of the Northern Attack Force, which the Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force directly commanded. As a preliminary, a short description will be given of the organization of the FIFTH Amphibious Force.

2. The FIFTH Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, assigned for operational control to the Central Pacific Force, was organized on August 24, 1943, under the command of Rear Admiral R. K. TURNER, U.S. Navy. Study of the prospective Central Pacific campaign, which evidently will be somewhat prolonged in time, indicated the desirability of the establishment of a permanent organization designed to:

- (a) Undertake simultaneously several coordinated amphibious operations;
- (b) Provide a single superior troop command which will be charged with responsibility for continuity of planning and training, improvement in technique, and operations of amphibious troops to be employed in the sweep across the Pacific;
- (c) Provide an Amphibious Air Commander for planning and control of the employment of air units and air liaison parties involved in the direct support of amphibious operations; and for coordinating the organization of aviation ground elements to be assigned to captured bases;

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(d) Provide for continuous planning for amphibious operations of naval forces in harmony with the intentions of the high command, and in collaboration with a similar planning agency attached to the command of amphibious troops;

(e) Provide effective administration of vessels and shore units of the FIFTH Amphibious Force, and the issue of Amphibious Type Instructions.

3. Steps were taken to expand the organization of the FIFTH Amphibious Force to fulfill these requirements by the addition of the following agencies:

(a) Assigning FIFTH Amphibious Corps, under command of Major General Holland M. SMITH, U.S.M.C. as part of the Task Organization of the FIFTH Amphibious Force; with General SMITH exercising full and continuing operational command of the amphibious training and operations of all troops in the Central Pacific Area assigned for amphibious attack. This arrangement was effected on September 4, 1943. The Corps Headquarters includes a planning staff based ashore in PEARL HARBOR.

(b) Task Group TWO, FIFTH Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral H.V. HILL, U.S. Navy, in command of units which may be assigned for particular operations. Rear Admiral HILL reported on September 19, 1943.

(c) Task Group THREE, FIFTH Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral R.L. CONOLLY, U.S. Navy, in command of units which may be assigned for particular operations. Rear Admiral CONOLLY reported on October 23, 1943.

(d) Administrative Command, FIFTH Amphibious Force, Commodore V.B. PHILLIPS, U.S. Navy, with headquarters ashore in PEARL HARBOR. Commodore PHILLIPS reported on October 15, 1943.

(e) Commander Aircraft, FIFTH Amphibious Force, Colonel W.O. EARECKSON, U.S. Army, who reported on October 3, 1943. On October 23, 1943, Colonel EARECKSON was relieved by Captain E.B. SALLADA, U.S. Navy. During actual operations, this officer acts as air advisor to the Force Commander with respect to the air support of all amphibious attack groups. Command of Support Aircraft at each occupied position is exercised by the Prospective Commander of the shore-based air forces. Command of the local Combat Air Patrol and Anti-submarine Patrol is exercised by the Attack Group Commander. It should be understood that, while no air units are permanently assigned to the Amphibious Force, all aircraft engaged in the local support of operations come under command of the local Attack Group Commander during the periods when they are in the air in the vicinity

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of that Attack Group.

(f) Planning Staff of FIFTH Amphibious Force, with headquarters ashore in PEARL HARBOR, and under the Administrative Commander in the absence of the Force Commander.

4. With the Force Commander acting as the Commander of Group ONE, the organization outlined in the preceding paragraphs permits the prosecution of three simultaneous amphibious attacks, under naval commanders permanently assigned to the Force. The Force also includes the troop and aircraft commanders who have over-all supervising and coordinating control of the operations of amphibious troops and amphibious aircraft, respectively. An organization of this character should prove effective in collecting, evaluating, and applying amphibious combat experience to future operations.

5. When the FIFTH Amphibious Force was organized, none of the vessels which were to comprise that force were available. Some were in the Northern Pacific Area preparing to evacuate assault troops employed in the KISKA Operation. Others were engaged in transporting troops to various parts of the Pacific. The remainder were in the Atlantic, either enroute, or about to sail, for the Pacific. Several transports and cargo vessels were new, and had never engaged in amphibious operations.

6. The SECOND Marine Division, assigned for the GILBERTS Operation, was in WELLINGTON, still considerably below combat strength. Although this division had been through the GUADALCANAL Campaign, only one combat team had engaged in amphibious training within the past year; that one team had received eight days' ship-to-shore training during June. The 27th Army Division, also assigned, was in OAHU. This division had engaged in some elementary boat exercises, but had received no amphibious training worthy of the name.

7. The Marine Defense Battalions who were to serve as garrison troops were in scattered detachments in SAMOA, WALLIS, NANOMEA and NUKUFETAU. The Army Defense Battalion for MAKIN, to be taken from troops in HAWAII, had not yet been organized, while the Army Aviation Engineer Battalion was constructing an airfield on BAKER ISLAND. The Acorns, See Bees, most of the communication units, most of the aviation ground units, air and gunfire liaison groups, and the minor naval units, were still on the Mainland; many had not yet been organized, and few had received any but elementary individual training. A complex problem was presented of organizing these various units; appointing commanders and assembling staffs; moving them to their final

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embarkation points; and providing even a small amount of organizational training. To this was added the problem of giving basic amphibious training to troops and ships of the assault echelons; then of conducting final battle rehearsals of the projected operation in which all the troops and supporting naval and air forces would be employed in their battle tasks; then of concentrating these scattered forces in position to make the assault on Dog Day, and finally of following up promptly with garrison troops. Combatant vessels and aircraft, some of them newly commissioned, many of whom had not seen action or been attached to task forces, necessarily had to be given their group and force tactical and battle training enroute to the combat area.

8. In view of the wide physical dispersion of the forces, particularly the ground elements, and the fact that it was necessary for many of the newly appointed commanders to collect and train new staffs, it seemed particularly necessary to assemble the principal commanders in PEARL for personal conferences, indoctrination, and the discussion and oral approval of plans. This was finally partially accomplished, and useful results followed, although the time for the work was limited. These personal conferences, in fact, provided the basis for drafting the principal directives. It cannot be too strongly urged that responsible commanders and their staffs be appointed as far in advance of operations as possible, in order that they may have time to familiarize themselves with the problem in hand, to get acquainted with their forces and with each other, and to be prepared to offer advice to the superior commanders. In military operations the promotion of morale and mutual confidence is greatly dependent on personal contacts of this character.

9. In the GILBERTS Operation; the master plan required the simultaneous capture of MAKIN and TARAWA, and the subsequent occupation of APENIA. The following table is an outline of the relationship of the major elements of the amphibious organization. The appropriate operation plans and orders show the details of the organization. Task Force numbers 52; 53, and 54 were temporarily assigned the FIFTH Amphibious Force, to avoid undue complications in the derivation of subordinate unit numbers. Task Force 54 included the entire amphibious organization; Task Force 52 was the force employed in the capture of MAKIN; and Task Force 53 was the force employed in the capture of TARAWA and APENIA.

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of the GILBERT ISLANDS.Table of Major Elements of the Amphibious Organization
Assault Force (TF 54), Rear Admiral TURNER.

- (1) Amphibious Corps, Major General Holland M. SMITH, USMC.
- (2) Support (Amphibious) Aircraft, Colonel EARECKSON, USA.
- (3) MAKIN LST Groups 1 and 2 (9 LST, 3 LCT, 2DD, transporting LVT's and Defense Battalion).
- (4) TARAWA LST Groups 1 and 2 (12 LST, 5 LCT, 2DD, transporting LVT's, and Defense Battalion).
- (5) MAKIN Garrison Group (2 Ap, 2 AK, 2 DE, transporting Garrison and Construction Troops).
- (6) TARAWA Garrison Group (2 AP, 2 AK, 2 DE, transporting Garrison and Construction Troops).
- (7) APEMAMA Garrison Groups 1 and 2 (3 AP, 2 AK, 4 LST, 3 LCT, 3 DE, transporting Garrison and Construction Troops).
- (8) APEMAMA Reconnaissance Group (1 submarine, transporting a Marine Reconnaissance Platoon).

NOTE: (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) (less the submarine) passed to command of the local Task Force Commanders on arrival at destinations. LCT were loaded on LST and launched at destinations.

(9) Northern Attack Force (TF 52), Rear Admiral TURNER.

- (a) Transports, Captain LOONIS (4APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSD)
- (b) Support Groups (4 OBB, 4 CA, 3 CVE, 13 DD, 1 AM)
(NOTE: Additional Support Aircraft were provided by other carrier groups).
- (c) Northern Landing Force, Major General R.C. SMITH, U.S. Army. One Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Division, A.U.S., plus reenforcing units.
- (d) Garrison Force, Colonel TENNEY, U.S. Army.
Army and minor Naval garrison units.
- (e) Aircraft, MAKIN Base, Colonel THORP, U.S. Army.
Army base aircraft units. (Also commanded Support Aircraft, less Combat Air Patrol and anti-submarine patrol, after shore headquarters were established).

(10) Southern Attack Force (TF 53), Rear Admiral HILL.

- (a) Transports, Captain KNOWLES (12 APA, 3 AKA, 1 AB, 1 LSD).
 - (b) Support Groups (3 OBB, 3 CA, 3 CL, 5 CVE, 21 DD, 2 AM).
- NOTE: Additional Support Aircraft were provided by other carrier groups).
- (c) Southern Landing Force, Major General Julian C. SMITH, USMC,
Two regimental Combat Teams of the SECOND Marine Division plus reenforcing units.

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Corps Reserve, One Regimental Combat Team of SECOND
Marine Division. (Not to be committed except on author-
ity of CTF 54).

- (d) Garrison Force, TARA, Captain TATE, U.S. Navy.
Marine Corps Garrison Troops.
Navy Acorns, Casus, Sea Bees, Marine and Naval air
units, minor Naval garrison units. (Also commanded
support Aircraft, less Combat Air Patrol and anti-sub-
marine patrol, after the quarters were established
ashore).
- (e) Garrison Force, APEMANA, Captain COGSWELL, U.S. Navy.
Marine Corps Garrison Troops.
Navy Acorn, Casu, Sea Bees, Marine and Naval air units,
minor Naval garrison units.

10. The plan of the Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, envisaged three phases of the GILBERTS Operation.
These phases necessarily overlap, but in general terms were:

- (a) The assault.
- (b) The occupation of the positions by garrison and devel-
opment forces, and the evacuation of the assault troops
- (c) The development of the positions as air and minor
naval bases.

The assault forces comprised the SECOND
Marine Division and one Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Army
Division, reinforced by medium tank companies and advance ele-
ments of the garrison forces. The assault forces on evacuation
were to leave in the captured positions the infantry and field
artillery elements initially assigned to the garrison. The bulk
of the garrison forces were Marine and Army Defense Battalions,
construction battalions, and aviation ground organizations.
These were to be moved in behind the assault troops as rapidly
as the tactical situation and available transportation would
permit. Each unit of the assault and garrison forces was to take
in, in general, five units of fire and thirty days' consumable
supplies, plus necessary organizational equipment. The trans-
portation of permanent base facilities, garrison equipment,
and of supplies sufficient to establish a sixty-day level, was to
be inaugurated as soon as the garrison troops were moved in.
It was directed that ships of the first echelon were to be loaded
to no more than 60% capacity, in order to permit a balanced load
and a reasonably rapid discharge in combat areas where ships would
constantly be subject to enemy attack. Furthermore, due to the
very difficult unloading conditions at these atolls, only a few
vessels could be expected to unload simultaneously at anything
approaching a reasonable rate.

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Enclosure (I) has been drawn up for the purpose of listing in detail the ground units employed in the entire operation, the equipment and supplies they carried, and the shipping requirements of the operation up to the conclusion of the occupation phase.

11. Owing to the imminence of succeeding amphibious operations, which would require all vessels of the FIFTH Amphibious Force, and the fact that the Covering Forces must necessarily be withdrawn from the forward areas after about two weeks, it became essential, in spite of some disadvantages, to move all the garrison forces forward very closely behind the assault forces, instead of spreading them out over a somewhat longer period. The Commander of Task Force 54 was charged with responsibility for these movements, which involved about four-fifths of the garrison forces. The Commander Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was charged with the responsibility of the movement of the remainder, and for building up and maintaining the required level of supplies.

12. Forces destined for the various positions, except the troops in NEW ZEALAND, SMOL, ELLIS, and the ELLICE ISLANDS, plus large quantities of equipment and stores, were assembled in OAHU, reorganized, and prepared for final embarkation. A short period of time became available in which to give the assault troops a small amount of basic amphibious training, both in NEW ZEALAND and HAWAII. Abbreviated final rehearsals of the assault echelons were held in EFLTE and HAWAII though some of the combatant vessels and a large part of the carrier aircraft could not participate. This training, and these rehearsals, curtailed as they had to be, were invaluable. This basic training and battle rehearsals are considered essential to success against defended positions.

13. Although operations for the capture of atolls have long been studied by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, this is the first operation in which we have engaged in atoll warfare. There are many points of difference between this and amphibious assault against an enemy occupying large land masses. The following features may be considered as characteristic of amphibious attack against atolls:

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-----Favorable to the Attack

- (a) Small size of the islets of the atoll imposes on the defenders the use of small garrisons. If garrisons are split among the islets, they are not mutually supporting.
- (b) Lack of depth of defenses, which largely must be at the edge of the shoreline. Practically the entire perimeter must be defended, thus contributing to local weakness. Underground installations below 3 to 5 feet are impracticable: pill-boxes, bunkers, trenches, gun positions, storehouses, tankage, etc., must all be above ground.
- (c) Small land area does not give defenders freedom of maneuver for counter-attack.
- (d) Trees and undergrowth generally are not heavy and defenses cannot be well hidden. Defenders have little natural cover.
- (e) Heavy gun installations are unusual, and cannot be well protected.
- (f) Little natural protection against efficacy of bombing and gunfire.
- (g) Reinforcement is impracticable.
- (h) Airfields cannot be used when attacker has combatant ships in vicinity.
- (I) Quick repair or construction of airfields is practicable after capture.

Unfavorable to the Attack.

- (a) The attacker lacks accurate topographic and hydrographic information. Ground reconnaissance of defenses is impracticable.
- (b) Wide fringing reefs; generally rough and strewn with niggerheads and boulders, and wide range of tides, permit beaching of landing boats for only short periods during high tides.
- (c) Small number of smooth sandy beaches free from rocks results in damage to boats. Unloading of troops, equipment, and stores is greatly retarded.
- (d) Lack of depth for deployment after landing constrains attackers to employ rather thin attack lines, and permits them small room for maneuver.
- (e) Nearby atolls provide facilities for air support of defenders.

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- (f) Wide reefs and narrow channels facilitate use of mines, several rows of wire, and boat and personnel barricades.
- (g) Larger islands almost always on windward side of the atoll; heavy surf on this side prevents landings in strength except from the lagoon side. Lagoon landing beaches are usually far distant from entrances to the lagoon.
- (h) Landings must be made directly in the face of the strongest defenses.
- (i) Restricted area does not permit attacking troops after landing, to outflank enemy, but requires them to make direct assaults on narrow fronts, and thus invalidates any advantage of superiority in numbers. Lack of area also restricts the effective deployment of superior artillery.
- (j) Long and narrow islands cause waste of bombs and projectiles which fall in the water.
- (k) Small size of islets and positions of reefs give restricted sea areas for the maneuver of gunfire support vessels.
- (l) Lack of natural sources for fresh water.

14. Our lack of anything like adequate information of the atolls and the enemy situation in the GILBERTS was, after considerable effort, considerably rectified through;

- (a) The employment of aircraft for taking large numbers of vertical and oblique photographs of land areas, beaches, lagoons, reefs, channels, and defense installations.
- (b) The employment of the NAUTILUS on a special mission to obtain horizontal panoramic photographs of the atolls to observe enemy activities; and to obtain data as to surf, tidal, wind, and current conditions.
- (c) The assembly of about fifteen British who had lived in the various islands, or had been shipmasters operating small steamers and schooners among them. Most of these individuals were either members of the British armed forces or of the British civil establishment. Under authority of the Navy Department, they were employed and paid as experts. The information obtained from them was invaluable, in spite of some of it being inaccurate in matters affecting many of the details particularly applicable to our operations.

15. It soon became apparent that, at least at TARAWA,, landing boats could not pass through the protective wire

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and log barricades which had been erected to seaward on the reefs and beaches. Experiments in breaking up such barricades were made with LVT's (amphibian tractors). These tests turned out very favorably. After some difficulty, fifty additional amphibian tractors were obtained for the SECOND Marine Division, and fifty for the use of the 27th Army Division. Eighteen LVT (2)'s could be loaded in one LST, which at the same time carried one LCT on its upper deck. Each Attack Force used three LST's so loaded. In addition, the SECOND Marine Division transported 75 LVT(1)'s in transports, though this involved leaving behind a considerable number of landing boats. The amphibian tractors, though unarmored, proved invaluable for landing troops and supplies, for tearing out wire and log barricades, for dragging drowned trucks ashore, and for towing stranded boats off reefs. The capture of TARAWA would have been far more difficult had these vehicles not been employed.

15. Preliminary supporting operations by covering forces of the FIFTH Fleet involved shore-based air strikes on enemy bases in the MARSHALLS; carrier air strikes on NAURU and TARAWA on Dog minus TWO Day; carrier air strikes on MILE, MAKIN, and TARAWA on Dog minus ONE Day; Ship bombardment of TARAWA on Dog minus ONE Day; and shore-based air scouting. Aircraft from the South Pacific Force also struck NAURU, and provided scouting by shore-based aircraft.

16. Enclosure (A) gives the detailed narrative of the operations of Task Force 52 and of Task Force 54 units until they joined Task Forces 52 and 53. Other enclosures give in some detail accounts of certain special features of the operation which may be of interest. Enclosure (K) submits recommendations are considered applicable to future amphibious operations.

17. Worthy of most favorable notice is the splendid spirit of cooperation, with subordination of special interests, which prevailed throughout the period of preparation and during the operation. Personnel of all armed services, whether Army, Navy, Marines; or Coast Guard, and whether serving at sea, ashore, or in the air, gave loyal service to each other and to the common aim. This magnificent display of national solidarity augurs well for the future.

H. B. Stark
H. B. STARK,
Flag Secretary.

R. K. TURNER.

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ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

The operations of Task Force FIFTY TWO in preparation for, and during the GALVANIC Operation are divided into three periods as follows:

- (1) October 5 to October 30 inclusive - Planning, training and loading.
- (2) October 31 to November 9 inclusive - Rehearsing and reequipping.
- (3) November 10 to November 30 inclusive - Operating in accordance with GALVANIC directives.

Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO issued the following directives for operations, supplementing Operation plans issued by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, Commander Central Pacific Force, and Commander Task Force FIFTY FOUR.

- (1) ComFIFTHPhibFor serial 0052 of 30 September 1943 - "Amphibious Training of Transport Division TWENTY and Troops of the 27th Infantry Division, U. S. Army."
- (2) ComFIFTHPhibFor serial 00113 of 26 October - "Schedule of Training Exercises for TF 52, TG 50.2, TG 54.4, period October 31 to November 3, 1943."
- (3) CTF 52 Attack Order A3-43.
- (4) CTF 52 Training Order A4-43.
- (5) CTF 52 Training Order A5-43.
- (6) CTF 52 Cruising Order A8-43.
- (7) CTF 52 Cruising Order A8A-43 (Amended).

1. October 5 to October 30, 1943.

From October 5 to October 18th, 1943, Commander Transport Division TWENTY and the Commanding Officer of the 165th Regimental Combat Team conducted joint amphibious training on selected beaches in the HAWAIIAN Area with ships of Transport Division TWENTY and troops of the 165th Regimental Combat Team

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of the 27th Division, U. S. Army. The training was carried out in accordance with instructions and schedules contained in ComFIFTHPhibForPac serial 0052 of September 30, 1943.

Training was somewhat curtailed by adverse weather conditions and poor beaches. The ALCYONE and PIERCE, due to their late arrival at PEARL, did not become available for training until October 12th and as a consequence, conducted a somewhat shorter training program. The LEONARD WOOD, CALVERT, NEVEILLE, and ALCYONE returned to PEARL on October 18th and unloaded at dock berths. The PIERCE conducted one additional landing exercise at MAKUA on the Northwestern coast of OAHU, completely unloading over the beach and returned empty to PEARL on October 20th. There were no fire support or control vessels available for this training.

Final loading commenced on October 21st and was completed on October 28th. Troops were embarked on October 30th.

Commander Task Force FIFTY TWO held a conference of the principal commanders on October 28th, and orders for the attack rehearsal, as contained in CTF 52 Training Orders A4-43 and A5-43 were discussed in detail. At this conference, the following modifications in the rehearsal program were made:

(a) The NEW ORLEANS would remain in PEARL for urgently needed repairs and would not participate in the rehearsals. The Captain and certain officers of the NEW ORLEANS would observe the rehearsals from the BALTIMORE.

(b) ComDesRon 47 in HOEL, MACDONOUGH, GRIDLEY, MAURY, MORRIS HUGHES, and MUSTIN would join the task force off MAUI at 0800, November 1st, or as soon after their arrival in the HAWAIIAN Area as practicable.

(c) Four destroyer escorts, DUFFY, WHITMAN, LE HARDY and W.C. MILLER were assigned to reenforce the screen until the seven destroyers referred to in paragraph (b) joined.

(d) Rear Admiral MULLINIX in the LISCOMB BAY would sortie with the force. The CORAL SEA and CORREGIDOR would join as soon as practicable after arrival in the HAWAIIAN Area.

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- (e) Task Group 54.4 (DALE, LST's 31, 79, and 178) would sortie separately at 1600, October 31st.
- (f) Task Group 50.2 (Rear Admiral RADFORD in LEXINGTON, BELLEAU WOOD and MONTEREY) would sortie at 1300, October 31st.
- (g) TF 52, less the above units, would sortie from PEARL commencing 0800, October 31st.
- (h) TF 52 would return to PEARL, commencing entry at 0700, November 4th.
- (i) If ComCruDiv SIX did not arrive in time to participate in the rehearsal, Captain BATES in the MINNEAPOLIS would be in command of the cruisers; Rear Admiral GRIFFIN would be in command of the Support Group; and Captain ZACHARIAS would be in command of Fire Support Unit ONE.
- (j) DUFFY and WHITMAN were assigned to Fire Support Unit TWO until MAURY and GRIDLEY join. LE HARDY and W. C. MILLER were assigned to Air Support Group until HUGHES and HOEL join joined.

2. October 31st to November 9th.

TF 52, less detached units, sortied from PEARL commencing at 0800, October 31st. After clearing swept channel, LISCOMB BAY, with screen, operated independently, remaining major vessels with assigned screen were formed in a column of types in order Cruisers, Battleships, Transports. Gunnery exercises were conducted as scheduled.

At 1600, TF 52 formed cruising disposition 311 and proceeded during the night to vicinity of MAALAE BAY, MAUI.

At daylight, November 1st, the force made the first rehearsal landing with simulated gunfire and air support, in accordance with CTF 52 Training Order A4-43. All troops were landed, but no supplies and equipment were sent ashore due to the desire to prevent damage or injury which could not be repaired before the operation. Upon completion of this exercise, troops reembarked and the exercise was repeated at daylight, November 2nd.

LST's 31 and 78 with their embarked LVT's did not arrive until November 2nd because of delay in loading, and engine breakdown.

FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER.

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
December 4, 1943.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

During the night of November 2 - 3, TF 52, in Cruising Disposition 3L1, proceeded to the vicinity of KAHOOLOAWE, and at dawn on November 3rd, made the rehearsal landing, in accordance with CTF 52 Training Order A5-43, employing gunfire and air support. Assault troops were embarked and proceeded to the Line of Departure, but did not land because of the danger of damaging boats on the rocky beaches.

On completion of this exercise, troops reembarked and TF 52 proceeded to PEARL HARBOR commencing entry at 0700, November 3rd.

The GRIDLEY and the MORRIS did not participate in the exercises because of engineering casualties. The CORAL SEA joined on November 1st and the CORREGIDOR on November 2nd.

On entering PEARL troops debarked and returned to base camp. All ships re-provisioned and refueled in preparation for final departure from PEARL on November 9th.

CTF 52 held a conference of the principal commanders and commanding officers of large ships, on November 5th. Operations during the rehearsal period were discussed in detail and the following important decisions were made:

- (a) The first air strike on the objective would be delayed until 0610 to permit pilots to more readily distinguish their targets.
- (b) The number of planes in the initial strike would be increased.
- (c) The strength of the Combat Air Patrol during the forenoon would be increased.
- (d) Arrival at the objective would be delayed one hour and the escorting fighters for the initial air strike would be decreased as necessary to effect this.
- (e) The Ship's Gunfire Support Plan was reviewed in detail and subsequently re-issued as a result of decisions made.
- (f) CTF 52 amended and re-issued his Cruising Order A8-43 as Cruising Order A8A-43 (Amended).

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

On November 5th, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, directed that Dog Day for GALVANIC be delayed one day from November 19th to November 20th. West Longitude date, and as a consequence, the final date of departure of TF 52 was postponed until November 10th.

On November 7th, Commander Central Pacific Forces issued his Operation Plan CEN 5-43 as an alternate plan for GALVANIC. This plan would be placed in effect only if directed by Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area. This alternate plan covered the contingency of non-availability of all carriers, and capture of TARAWA and MAKIN in succession.

NOTE: In the following narrative, all dates are west longitude; all times are local, unless otherwise indicated. No mention is made of routine flight operations, zig-zagging, routine drills, exercises, target practice firings, reforming of force dispositions on completion of such exercises, or small surface and aircraft radar contacts which were subsequently identified as friendly.

3. November 10 to November 30, 1943

November 10

0700 TF 52, plus MASSAU, BARNES, INDIANAPOLIS, COTTEN, COWELL, SUMICO and SCHUYKILL commenced sortie from PEARL by types. On clearing the swept channel, task force exercised by types, conducting secondary battery, anti-aircraft firings, and flight operations.

1630 Formed Cruising Disposition 3L1 on fleet course and axis 209° (T), fleet speed 13.5 knots ENROUTE MAKIN via Route BERRY.

1700 Set clocks back one-half hour to zone plus 10 time. Commander Central Pacific Force directed CTF 57 to conduct aerial reconnaissance of ARADIA on Dog minus ONE Day to determine presence or absence of enemy troops and extent of enemy installations. CTF 57 was directed to report results to Commander Submarines, U. S. Pacific Fleet; for reply by radio to NAUTILUS and all Task Force Commanders, GALVANIC. CTF 52 reported that on November 10th, a close aerial reconnaissance of ARADIA disclosed no landing strip, as pre-

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

viously reported. No anti-aircraft fire was received, but there was some evidence of the presence of small enemy detachments. There was no evidence from the air of any enemy force on APEMAMA.

November 11

- 0800 Set clocks back one hour to zone plus 11 time.
- 0708 Changed fleet course and direction of fleet axis to 204°(T). Conducted force and type tactics including simulated air attacks during forenoon and afternoon.
- 1818 All ships turned on VF lights for 15 seconds, for drill. Commander South Pacific Force directed Commander Aircraft, South Pacific, to place air search plan CAST in effect on Dog minus FOUR Day, to be continued until otherwise directed by Comcenpac.
- PADDLE departed from KWAJALEIN patrol area to take station for GALVANIC. NAUTILUS will depart from JOHNSTON ISLAND tonight proceeding to station for GALVANIC.
- LST's 20, 69, and 169 of TG 54.7, arrived FUNA-FUTI from TUTUILA.

November 12

- 0642 Changed fleet course and direction of the fleet axis to 215° (T) and changed fleet speed to 14 knots.
- 0742 SCHUYKILL reported that at present fleet speed of 14 knots, she was making maximum turns possible. Fleet speed was therefore slowed to 13.7 knots. Conducted force tactics and deployment during forenoon and type tactics during afternoon. Maneuvered disposition for training by emergency TBS signals after dark.
- 2125 CALVERT reported that she was unable to make 13.7 knots due to blower trouble.
- 2139 Changed fleet speed to 13 knots.
- 2213 CALVERT completed repairs to blower and at 2217 fleet speed was changed to 13.5

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

November 13

Repeated exercises held on November 12th.

TF 54.4 arrived CANTON at 132200 GCT and will depart for Point EASY at 150600 GCT, enroute to MAKIN.

November 14

Repeated exercises held on November 13

CHARLES R. GREER reported for duty in TG 54.10.

CTF 57 reported AirGenPac searches for the 14th negative.

November 15

0700 Changed fleet course and axis to 222° (T).

Conducted force and type exercises during forenoon and afternoon.

1000 Two CORAL SEA Avenger pilots reported sighting the wake (about) of a recently submerged submarine in approximate position 05° 15" N., 167° 58' W. HOEL was sent to search the area and reported negative results after one hour's search.

1609 In preparation for fueling on course 090° (T) on 16th, changed fleet axis to 270° (T) and formed Cruising Disposition 3Fl, which is same as 3Ll with following changes in station assignment:

| | | |
|----------------------|---|--------|
| IDAHO | - | 3265 |
| PENNSYLVANIA | - | 3290 |
| SCHUYLKILL | - | 3000 |
| SUAMICO | - | 2.5180 |
| All DD's on Circle 7 | | |

CTF 57 reported Aircenpac searches for the 15th negative.

To clarify an ambiguity in command, CTF 52 made the following changes to Annex (F) of Attack Order A3-43:

(1) Rear Admiral TURNER was designated at CTG 52.11.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

(2) Rear Admiral GRIFFEN was designated CTG 52.13.

(3) TG 52.11, less TG 52.1, was redesignated TG 52.12, composed of TU 52.2.1, TU 52.2.3 and NEW ORLEANS, under command of Rear Admiral GIFFEN.

CTF 52 received CTG 52.3 Operation Order 1-43 and directed CTG 52.3 to modify it as follows:

Make search on 9th and 10th days in the semi-circle ahead i.e., to the northward instead of the southward. Make an afternoon search instead of a morning search on 9th day. Each carrier have a three plane hunter-killer group armed with depth charges ready on deck.

CTF 52 directed CTG 52.2 to have one plane of the rear anti-submarine patrol on the 16th, find EMERY and inform her by visual signal of the location of the force.

TG 54.5 departed FUNAFUTI for GALVANIC at 1800 (zone plus 12).

TG 54.8 and 54.9 departed PEARL for GALVANIC.

November 16

0500 Changed fleet course to 170° (T).
0520 Changed fleet course to 120° (T).
0530 Changed fleet speed to 8 knots in preparation for fueling.
0600 Commenced fueling in accordance with CTG 52.2 Fueling Plan A7-43.
0815 Changed fueling course to 090° (T) and fueling speed to 9 knots on recommendation of SUMICO.
0910 EMERY joined disposition.
1745 All ships except CORAL SEA completed fueling. TF 52, less CORAL SEA and MORRIS, formed Cruising Disposition 3L1 on fleet course and axis 270° (T) at fleet speed 11.5 knots. CORAL SEA and MORRIS were directed to rejoin CTF 52 during daylight November 17th and SUMICO, SCHUYLKILL and EMERY to proceed as previously directed by CTF 16, on completion of fueling CORAL SEA.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

2127 Changed fleet speed to 10.5 knots.

CTF 52 directed CTG 52.3 to instruct all pilots to watch for and report location of any LST task groups moving to objectives in accordance with CTF 52 Movement Order Al-43.

CTF 57 reported that recent photos of TARAWA showed dual purpose 5" guns at grid position MH 1212. These guns have not been mentioned in previous reports.

TG 54.6 and 54.7 departed FUNAFUTI for GALVANIC.

CTF 52 directed all ships to reduce visual signalling to a minimum and to cover lights and plane cockpit covers to prevent reflection of sunlight and consequent danger of sighting from the air.

CTF reported Aircompac searches for the 16th negative.

TG 52.2 maintained a five plane anti-submarine patrol with three planes in the forward semi-circle and two planes in the after semi-circle during fueling operations.

Cincpac reported that blue planes had intercepted radar transmissions and possible navigational beacons from both MAKIN and TARAWA.

CTF 57 reported the probable presence of an enemy submarine northwest of MANOMEA on the night of November 15th.

November 17th

0600 CORAL SEA and MORRIS rejoined disposition.

0625 With TF 52 ahead of schedule, CTF 52 decided to change course to the southwest to avoid enemy probable air search sectors and to increase speed accordingly. Changed fleet course to 210° (T) and increased fleet speed to 13.5 knots.

1335 Changed fleet course to 270° (T).

1341 Changed fleet course and axis to 286° (T) to head for Point FOX.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

1700 Set clocks back one hour to zone plus 12 time.

During daylight, Cardiv 24 maintained a four-plane combat air patrol over the disposition and TG 52.2 maintained a three-plane anti-submarine patrol in the forward semi-circle.

CTF 52 directed PHELPS and MACDONOUGH to transfer ECM and associated publications to LEONARD WOOD in the transport area prior to entering the lagoon, and directed transfer of same equipment from any other ships entering the lagoon.

CTF 52 directed ships to have boiler power available for maximum speed as follows:

| | |
|-------------|----------|
| Battleships | 16 knots |
| Cruisers | 25 knots |
| Destroyers | 25 knots |

Boilers for maximum speed to be available as follows:

| | |
|-------------|------------------------|
| Battleships | On three hours' notice |
| Cruisers | On two hours' notice |
| Destroyers | On one hour notice |

CTF 57 reported that own bombers over TARAWA observed no enemy planes, vessels, or signs of life from 2500 feet, with weak AA fire from the east end of BITITU ISLAND.

CTF 57 reported Aircenpac searches for the 17th negative except sector searched by plane 18V241 which is reported missing.

TG 53 was in sight during daylight in a position about 18 miles to the southwestward.

November 18

0625 Changed fleet course and axis to 325° (T).

0815 U.S.S. HEERMANN delivered mail from CTF 53 to CTF 54 in PENNSYLVANIA, and Comcenpac in INDIANAPOLIS.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 0936 Comcenpac, in INDIANAPOLIS, with BARNES, MASSAU, COTTEN, COWELL and HEERMAN left the disposition to join TF 53.
- 1050 Changed fleet course and axis to 315° (T).
- 1436 Changed fleet speed to 12.5 knots.
- 1500 Heard strong radio carrier wave on 30.5 Mcs. FM with occasional letter YS, and similar signals on 33.8 Mcs. with identifying letters BN and ML, apparently aircraft beacons, identity unknown. No U. S. equipment is known to have the characteristics noted.

During daylight, Cardiv 24 maintained a four-plane combat air patrol over the disposition and in the afternoon made a 175-mile search in the northern semi-circle, and TG 52.2 maintained a three-plane anti-submarine patrol in the forward semi-circle.

From radio reports, CTF 52 estimated that an enemy plane had contacted one of our search planes at 1555 zone plus 12 time in position 00° - 05' S, 178° 50' E.

CTF 57 reported Aircenpac searches for the 18 th negative.

TF 53 was in sight during daylight in a position about fifteen miles to the south-southwestward.

- 1253 CTF 53 reported that one TF 53 destroyer was conducting hunter-killer operations against a positive submarine contact in latitude 03° 00' S., longitude 175° - 39' E.

CTF 57 directed Aircenpac attack planes to concentrate on gun positions, ammunition dumps and shipping during MAKIN and TARAWA strikes on the 19th and to avoid hitting the airfield, buildings and native villages.

NEW MEXICO reported hearing a very strong radio carrier wave on 61 Mcs.

CTG 54.4 reported that TG 54.4 was being tracked by a MAVIS which was finally driven off by gunfire in position 00° - 20' N., 176° 20' E.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

CTF 52 cancelled Cardiv 24 afternoon search for the 19th because of the distance lost by the carriers during launching and recovery.

November 19

- 0934 COLORADO reported one BOGIE bearing 270° (T) distance 65 miles from TF 53. Combat air patrol was vectored out and at 0952 in position 0° 34' N., 176° - 07' E., shot down one MAVIS.
- 1045 Changed fleet course and axis to 300° (T).
- 1111 Changed fleet course to 306° (T).
- 1114 Combat air patrol reported sighting a submarine bearing 230° (T) distance 22 miles from the PENNSYLVANIA. Two TF 53 destroyers were directed to conduct search. No further reports on this contact were received.
- 1322 CTF 53 reported two large BOGIES bearing NW distance 135 and 116 miles from TF 53.
- 1325 CTF 52 directed all carriers of TF 52 to scramble fighters and TF 52, to form Cruising Disposition 3L2 and prepare to repel air attack. BOGIES orbitted to the northwest at distances in excess of 100 miles.
- 1327 CTG 52.3 reported results of morning searches to 125 miles negative.
- 1419 BOGIES were identified as friendly, believed to be own. Carrier planes over MAKIN & TERAWA.
- 1427 Formed Cruising Disposition 3L1. CTG 54.4 reported one "BETTY" trailing that task group. Combat air patrol was vectored out and made contact with the group but were unable to locate the snooper.
- 1525 BOGIE reported bearing 180° (T), distance 55 miles.
- 1534 Above report was amplified to report many BOGIES. Formed Cruising Disposition 3L2 and prepared to repel air attack.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1540 Own fighters made interception and reported BOGIES to be eight to twelve B-24's.
- 1545 Formed Cruising Disposition 3L1.
- 1647 Changed fleet speed to 12 knots.
- 1702 Changed fleet course to 300° (T).
- 1710 Changed Fleet course and axis to 000° (T).
- 1910 CTG 54.4 reported five "BETTIES" in the vicinity.
- 1930 CTG 54.4 reported task group under air attack.
- 1940 CTG 54.4 reported one "ZEKE" shot down and other planes driven off by gunfire.
- 1938 Changed fleet course to 310° (T) by turn movements.
- 1950 Changed fleet speed to 11.5 knots.
- 2005 Made surface radar contact bearing 016° (T), distance 28 miles, which was tracked and reported to be on course 278° (T), speed 27 knots at 2014.
- 2017 CTF 52 directed cruisers and destroyers to raise steam for full power and directed CTG 52.2 to form an attack group composed of MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, BALTIMORE, PHELPS, GRIDLEY, MAURY and FRANKS.
- 2028 Unidentified force was reported to be composed of five large and five small ships on course 278° (T), speed 17 knots.
- 2100 Unidentified force bearing 356° (T), distance 24 miles, was identified as TG 50.2. Attack Group was ordered to rejoin disposition and cruisers and destroyers were ordered to resume previous boiler condition.
- 2238 Obtained radar bearing of land bearing 246° (T), distance 22.5 miles. Land was subsequently identified as MARAKI ISLAND and was passed abeam to port, distance 14 miles at 2330.

ENCLOSURE (A)
COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION
NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

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Com Gen, 27th Division requested permission to land one infantry company and one shore fire control party on the north tip of BUTARITARI ISLAND on the afternoon of DOG Day and to land the balance of the battalion and one shore fire control party on the south end of KURA ISLAND on the morning of Dog plus ONE Day and requested one destroyer for gunfire support. This operation was not so scheduled in existing plans.

On the recommendation of the Commanding General, FIFTH PhibCorps, CTF 52 disapproved the proposed landings until such time as the capture of BUTARITARI ISLAND was assured according to plan, and informed ComGen, 27th Division that after the capture of BUTARITARI ISLAND, CTF 52 would provide fire support-to-shore operations on request. CTF 52 directed REVENGE to make permanent transfer of all Class 3 publications and ECM to LEONARD WOOD early on Dog Day. Directed REVENGE to fuel, load lube oil, stores, and provisions to capacity from U.S.S. ALCYONE and on departure of CTF 52 from LAKIN, to report to ComNavBase, MAKIN, for duty under CTF 57.

CTF 57 reported AirCenPac Searches for the 19th Negative. CTF 52 advised CTG 52.1 that, unless otherwise advised to the contrary by CTG 52.1, CTF 52 would make How Hour at LAKIN 0830, and William Hour about 1100 both zone plus twelve. CTG 52.1 was directed to advise CTF 52 of his present best estimate as to the time of William Hour.

CTF 57 reported results of APELIMA reconnaissance negative. CTG 52.1 reported that the best estimate of William Hour is 1100, but advised that William Hour be set at 1030 due to tidal conditions.

SCHUYLER and EMERY arrived FUIAFUTI at 192300 GCT.

NOVEMBER 20

0430 Directed TF 52 to deploy in accordance with Force Approach plan. Annex (E) to CTF 52 Attack Order A3-43.

0601 Transports entered Transport Area and commenced lowering boats as follows:

| | |
|--------------|------|
| LEONARD WOOD | 0603 |
| CALVERT | 0605 |
| NEVILLE | 0605 |
| ALCYONE | 0605 |
| PIERCE | 0607 |

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 0610 Signalled HOW Hour at MAKIN as 0830 zone plus twelve and WILLIAM Hour at MAKIN tentatively as 1030 zone plus twelve
- 0615 Own aircraft commenced first strike on MAKIN and completed strike at 0635.
- 0625 PENNSYLVANIA spotting plane reported no breakers on RED Beaches with swells believed to be not over three feet in height.
- 0640 Gunfire Support ships commenced scheduled fires on order of CTG 52.
- 0700 MAKIN LST Group No. ONE entered Transport Area.
- 0751 MISSISSIPPI reported serious fire in No. TWO turret, continuing scheduled fires with other turrets without interruption; no other details given.
- NEVILLE reported troops landed on ENTRANCE ISLAND with no opposition.
- 0802 LST's 31 and 78 completed debarkation of LVT's.
- 0810 NEVILLE reported ENTRANCE ISLAND reduced without opposition; NEVILLE proceeded to Transport Area No. TWO.
- PHELPS, MACDONOUGH arrived on station marking Line of Departure.
- 0825 Ceased scheduled fires; own aircraft commenced strafing Beaches RED and RED TWO and completed attack at 0830.
- 0833 First wave landed on Beaches RED and RED TWO.
- 0850 Gunfire Support ships commenced firing scheduled fires.
- 0900 Confirmed WILLIAM Hour at MAKIN as 1030, zone plus twelve time.
- 0912 CTG 52.1 reported hydrographic conditions were bad at both RED Beaches.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 0921 On receiving report that there were no enemy forces on ENTRANCE ISLAND, CTF 52, on the recommendation of ComGen, FIFTH Amphib Corps, directed the withdrawal of troops from that island.
- 0930 Commenced scheduled fires for YELLOW Beach Landing.
- 0938 REVENGE, followed by PHELPS and MACDONOUGH, entered MAKIN Lagoon and commenced sweep No. ONE.
- 0954 LST 179 entered MAKIN Lagoon to discharge LVT's and ICT.
- 1001 Reported to ComFIFTH Fleet that troops landed on RED Beach, MAKIN, at 0830 against no opposition.
- 1025 Ceased scheduled fires for YELLOW Beach landing. Own planes strafed YELLOW Beaches.
- 1030 Completed scheduled fires for RED Beach landing. ComGen, 27th Division reported following information obtained from wounded seaman in first wave of LVT's and tank lighters on Beach RED TWO: Troops received fire from what was believed to be two 3" guns with machine gunfire also encountered at several hundred yards off the beach; parapets appear to be false as no fire was received from them; enemy fire came from trees; surf was very light.
- 1041 First wave landed on Beach YELLOW TWO against machine gun fire from the beach and cross fire from two hulks anchored between YELLOW and YELLOW TWO Beaches.
- Directed planes and DEWEY to silence gunfire from the hulks.
- 1050 Commander Landing Force, MAKIN, reported that natives stated there were about 450 enemy troops, 450 laborers and two tanks on HORSE ISLAND and that most of the strength was concentrated between the tank traps. Troops are not in contact with the enemy at present time. Forward echelon of the 27th Division reported first three waves landed on YELLOW Beach opposed by heavy machine gun fire.

Succeeding waves did not land due to machine gun cross fire, boats lying to out of machine gun range.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1119 Ordered CTD 20 to send LST's 31 and 78 inside MAKIN Lagoon to launch LCT's.
- 1122 Own planes commenced bombing and strafing two hulks near YELLOW Beaches.
- 1143 REVENGE reported sweep No. ONE completed and proceeding with sweep No. TWO.
- 1159 Reported to ComFIFTH Fleet that later information indicated first wave, Beach RED, was opposed by small mortar and machine gun fire; that opposition ceased after troops landed and that troops had advanced to western tank trap by 1100. Also reported that troops landed on Beach YELLOW at 1043 against heavy machine gun fire which was soon reduced by medium tanks and that natives report 900 Japs on the island.
- 2
- Also reported ground progress favorable and that MISSISSIPPI had a bad fire in Turret No. TWO, with no details available at present.
- 1204 ComGen, 27th Division, reported enemy had been pushed back to east tank barrier. (This was an erroneous report).
- 1219 DEWEY, inside lagoon, commenced firing on two hulks near YELLOW Beaches.
- 1225 MISSISSIPPI reported one officer 39 men dead, 3 men critically injured, 6 seriously injured as a result of fire in No. TWO turret. Preliminary investigation indicated that right and left guns were loaded and powder charge in center gun ignited while loading, but resulting fire did not spread to powder in the hoist. Magazines and handling rooms were flooded.
- 1234 Directed TU 52.2.2, less NEW ORLEANS, to join TG 52.3 and formed TG 52.13 in accordance with Annex (F) to CTF 52 Amphibious Attack Order A3-43. Directed combatant vessels of TU 52.1.1 (less MINNEAPOLIS, DEWEY, HULL and PHELPS, who were directed to continue call fires) to form Screening Disposition XRAY.
- 1245 Troops commenced landing again on Beach YELLOW TWO.
- 1257 DEWEY ceased firing on hulk and stood out of MAKIN Lagoon.

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COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1317 ComGen, 27th Division, reported 41 prisoners taken at Beach YELLOW.
- 1324 ComGen, 27th Division, reported FLINK POINT and UKLANGONG POINT occupied by own troops.
- 1325 CTD 20 reported boats able to land at Beach RED TWO with maximum of five at any one time, and that he was not in communication with Beach YELLOW TWO.
- 1350 Directed LST's 31, 78, 179 to assist in unloading transports as directed by CTG 52.1.
- 1358 Commenced unloading supplies on Beach YELLOW TWO.
- 1430 ComGen, 27th Division, requested permission to employ one battalion less one company, to continue attack by shore to-shore movement against KUMA ISLAND early on Dog plus ONE Day.
- 1500 ComGen, 27th Division, reported that air reports indicated junction of RED and YELLOW forces, but that this had not been confirmed by ground forces.
- 1512 CTG 52.1 reported percentage progress of unloading as follows:
- | | | | | | |
|--------------|---|-----|---------|---|-----|
| LEONARD WOOD | - | 31% | CALVERT | - | 16% |
| NEVILLE | - | 23% | PIERCE | - | 13% |
| ALCYONE | - | 11% | | | |
- 1530 ComGen, 27th Division, reported YELLOW Beach prisoners identified enemy troops on MAKIN as part of THIRD Naval Unit, APO YOKOSUKA Naval Base.
- 1531 CTG 52.1 reported casualties as: 3 dead and 13 wounded.
- 1645 REVENGE reported all sweeps completed, no mines swept; will buoy Sweep TWO tomorrow when light conditions are favorable.
- 1700 On receiving report that unloading on RED Beaches was impracticable during darkness, due to tidal conditions, and that unloading on YELLOW Beaches was impracticable due to

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

continuing opposition to send LST's and LCT's inside the lagoon for the night, and machine gun fire ashore, CTF 52 decided to retire with the transports to the southeastward returning at daylight.

1746 ComGen, 27th Division, reported that ground forces reported junction of RED and YELLOW forces.

1710 ComGen, 27th Division, reported that natives stated that four U. S. pilots downed east of KUMA ISLAND were taken from BUTARITARI to MARSHALLS four days ago.

1815 Formed Cruising Disposition 3L4 for night retirement to southeastward.

1910 Reported to ComFIFTH Fleet that progress at MAKIN was satisfactory; that RED and YELLOW forces had made juncture; that about one half of BUTARITARI ISLAND was in our hands with some resistance still continuing to east; and that transports averaged 25% unloaded.

NAUTILUS reported being attacked by gunfire without challenge while four miles west of MAIANA ISLAND while enroute APEMAMA.

CTF 57 reported Aircenpac searches for the 19th negative; 3V destroyed one "BETTY" near MAKIN at 1615 zone plus twelve time.

ComGen, 27th Division, reported that captured document indicates that a small detachment of 950 SECOND Naval Air Unit was stationed on BUTARITARI ISLAND as of 1 May 1943.

CTG 52.3 reported that all Dog Day scheduled operations and support missions were completed. Losses were reported as one Avenger, operational, and one Avenger missing from bombing mission; no enemy air or surface craft were sighted.

November 21

0416 Surface BOGIE reported bearing 270° (T), distance 17,000 yards.

0430 Executed EMERGENCY TURN NINE to course 000° (T), and increased speed to 15 knots. Ordered ComDesRon ONE, in

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

PHELPS, to investigate surface BOGIE. (Thought to be TG 54.6, but no IFF and no response to TBS required taking precautions).

- 0445 Executed EMERGENCY TURN SIX to course 060° (T), range to BOGIE commenced opening.
- 0447 ComDesRon ONE reported BOGIE was TG 54.6 (6 LST's and 1 DE)
- 0632 Formed Screening Disposition XRAY, NEVILLE proceeding to Transport Area TWO and other transports to Transport Area ONE for unloading.
- Ordered REVENGE to lead LST's of TG 54.6 into MAKIN Lagoon and ordered LST's to anchor in the swept area within visual signalling distance of Beach YELLOW TWO and to unload when and where directed by the Beachmaster. Assigned CALDWELL to TG 52.11 screen.
- 0655 CTG 54.6 and CALDWELL reported for duty.
- 0715 NEVILLE reported continued resistance in the vicinity of Beach YELLOW TWO with cross fire from the hulks near Beach YELLOW. Ordered support aircraft to bomb and strafe the hulks..
- 0715 MISSISSIPPI reported two additional deaths from turret fire making a total of one officer and forty-one men; four cases are still critical.
- 0815 Planes and shore guns opened fire on hulks near Beach YELLOW.
- 0821 Enemy resistance at Beach YELLOW TWO decreased; g. 221 lentle to permit landings; boats commenced landing supplies.
- 0834 In order to speed up unloading which was going very slowly due to bad beach conditions at RED Beaches, ordered ALCYONE to move into MAKIN Lagoon and anchor; ordered LEONARD WOOD and CALVERT to move to Transport Area TWO and to unload at Beach YELLOW TWO; ordered PIERCE to remain in Transport Area ONE and to unload at Beach Red TWO, all vessels to move in close and anchor at discretion with a short scope of chain.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 0900 Ordered ComDesRon ONE to have six destroyers shift oil tonight in preparation for fueling from transports on 22nd.
- 0900 ComGen, FIFTHPhibCorps and party left PENNSYLVANIA for inspection trip ashore.
- 0922 CTD 20 reported casualties as of 0830 as follows:
- | | | |
|------------|---|-----------|
| Bed | - | 21 |
| Ambulatory | - | 14 |
| Dead | - | 6 |
| TOTAL | | <u>41</u> |
- 0924 Directed CTG 54.6 to commence launching pontoon sections, and with personnel and boats available to him to assist Beachmaster in getting them into position.
- 1100 ComGen, FIFTHPhibCorps reported situation ashore as follows
- Enemy losses very heavy, own light. Morale high. Considered situation in hand. Attack to eastward now progressing eastward of tank barriers. Enemy pocket south of hulks cleared out. Unloading over reefs is being carried out by sleds and bulldozers near ON CHONG's Wharf. Unloading at Beach RED slow due to congestion. Out of 36 LVT's on Beach RED, 32 are in commission. No report on LVT situation at Beach YELLOW TWO.
- 1134 ComDesRon ONE reported channel inside lagoon well buoyed.
- 1141 CTF 52 reported to CTG 50.1, 50.2, 52.3 that many planes closed TF 52 on the 20th showing no IFF or improper code and requested all pilots be instructed accordingly.
- 1148 Ordered BELLE GROVE to proceed into MAKIN Lagoon and anchor in position to assist in salvaging and repairing damaged boats.
- 1200 CTD 20 reported unloading progress as follows:
- | | | | | | |
|--------------|---|-----|---------|---|-----|
| LEONARD WOOD | - | 44% | PIERCE | - | 24% |
| CALVERT | - | 26% | ALCYONE | - | 34% |
| NEVILLE | - | 42% | | | |

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1245 As a result of contacts with TG 52.13 night of 20th, CTF 52 directed TF 52, when retiring for the night, to remain east of 172° 40' E., Task Group 52.11 remaining north of 02° 45' N., and Task Group 52.13 between 02° 45' N., and 02° 15' N. CTF requested CTG 50.2 to operate his group west of 172° 40' E.
- 1251 Informed CTG 50.2 that one plane, believed to be "86 BLUE" at 1050/21 bombed a target other than the one assigned when three others in the same flight hit correct target. Unverified report indicates 15 casualties among own troops resulted. Requested corrective action be taken. (Casualties later were found to be 5).
- 1500 Directed Support Aircraft Commander, MAKIN, to take over control of Support Aircraft.
- 1500 Due to unsatisfactory communications, directed Support Aircraft Commander in PENNSYLVANIA to take over control of Support Aircraft.
- 1600 Due to tidal conditions at Beach RED TWO and congested beach conditions at Beach YELLOW TWO, CTF 52 decided to withdraw to the southeastward during the night leaving the ALCYONE, BELLE GROVE, LST's and LCT's inside the lagoon to unload as practicable during the night with REVENGE and CALDWELL patrolling the lagoon entrances and Transport Area No. TWO.
- 1610 CTG 52.1 reported casualties as of 1200/21 as follows:
- | | | |
|------------|---|----|
| Wounded | - | 52 |
| Ambulatory | - | 38 |
| Dead | - | 4 |
| TOTAL | | 94 |
- 1615 As a result of continued reports of congested beach conditions, CTF 52 directed ComGen, 27th Division, to assign additional personnel to unloading boats and clearing beaches. He was further directed to use base personnel in LST's, if required and to work shifts during the night to accomplish these tasks.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

1645 CTG 52.1 reported percentage progress of unloading at 1630/21 as follows:

| | | | |
|--------------|-------|---------|------------------------|
| LEONARD WOOD | - 75% | PIERCE | - 49% |
| CALVERT | - 46% | ALCYONE | - 67% (believed error) |
| NEVILLE | - 52% | | |

1700 ComGen FIFTHPhibCorps and party returned aboard PENNSYLVANIA and made an amplifying report of ground situation at MAKIN.

1730 CTG 52.1 reported percentage progress of unloading at 1730/21 as follows:

| | | | |
|--------------|-------|---------|-------|
| LEONARD WOOD | - 80% | PIERCE | - 54% |
| CALVERT | - 50% | ALCYONE | - 62% |
| NEVILLE | - 53% | | |

1745 Directed ComGen, 27th Division, to take steps at once to improve landing facilities at piers and beaches, and to use pontoon sections for construction of additional piers as practicable.

1750 ComDesRon ONE reported NLO #15 had requested PHELPS to be on station, eastern part of sector 6 at 0800/22 for call fire.

1800 TG 52.11 less ALCYONE, BELLE GROVE, REVENGE and CALDWELL formed Cruising Disposition 314 for night retirement to southeastward.

1830 Informed ComGen, 27th Division, that PHELPS would be ordered for call fires as requested by NLO #15 but that PHELPS would not fire until boat reconnaissance had verified enemy presence. This action was taken to spare the native village.

CTF 52 cancelled present Fire Support assignments effective when fire support vessels rejoin disposition tonight. Fire Support assignments for 22nd will be made by CTF 52 on request of ComGen, 27th Division.

2005 CTG 52.3 reported all requested support missions on Dog plus ONE Day, were completed; no enemy air, surface or submarine sightings; one Avenger and one Wildcat plus pilot lost in operations.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

2009 Directed CTG 52.13 to fuel two of his destroyers from one of his battleships on 22nd and two more destroyers from same battleship on 23rd. Planned to send one TG 52.11 destroyer to augment TG 52.13 screen for two days during fueling operations.

November 22

0547 Formed Screening Disposition XRAY, WOOD, PIERCE and NEVILLE proceeding to Transport Area TWO and PIERCE to Transport Area ONE to continue unloading.

0557 Ordered CTG 52.1 to send one LCT to Beach RED TWO to test beach conditions at high water.

0610 HULL left disposition proceeding to join TG 52.13 to augment screen during fueling operations of that group.

0707 MACDONOUGH went alongside PIERCE to fuel.

0715 BURNS went alongside LEONARD WOOD to fuel.

0735 MISSISSIPPI reported turret two main train and elevation circuit grounded and numerous fire control loads in need of renewal.

0835 Requested CTG 50.3 to establish and maintain during daylight 22nd, a six-plane A-S hunter-killer group to cover approaches to MAKIN from eastern semi-circle.

0930 CTG 52.1 reported percentage progress of unloading as follows:

| | | | |
|--------------|-------|---------|-------|
| LEONARD WOOD | - 83% | PIERCE | - 60% |
| CALVERT | - 58% | ALCYONE | - 86% |
| NEVILLE | - 60% | | |

Directed CTG 52.1 to reassign boats and LST's at discretion, for unloading ships lagging behind. Directed shore party at Beach RED to move to Beach YELLOW TWO.

1042 BUTLER completed fueling from PIERCE.

1120 KIMBERLY went alongside CALVERT to fuel.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMBANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

1150 BURNS reported a doubtful submarine sound contact; after a short search by BURNS and planes, results were reported negative.

1200 CTG 52.1 reported percentage progress of unloading as follows:

| | | | | |
|---------|-----|------|---------|------|
| LEONARD | OOD | -84% | NEVILLE | -71% |
| CALVERT | | -72% | ALCYONE | -95% |
| PIERCE | | -66% | | |

Commenced arrangement to reembark two battalion landing teams with greater part of artillery and tanks.

1219 MINNEAPOLIS reported submarine periscope sighted in a position bearing 275° (T) distance 9500 yards from UKIANGONG POINT; planes and destroyers commenced search which was discontinued at 1305 with negative results.

1245 Requested CTF 57 send ambulance plane to MAKIN on 23rd for 17 stretcher cases.

1307 MACDONOUGH completed fueling from PIERCE.

1325 CTF 57 reported ambulance plans with capacity of 30 stretcher case and 20 sitters, would arrive MAKIN at 232330 GCT.

1332 DE LAY went alongside LEONARD WOOD to fuel.

1332

1341

Reported to ComGenPac that it was estimated that TD 20, plus BELLE GROVE, would be ready to depart MAKIN for PEARL on the 24th. Unless otherwise directed CTF 52 proposes to escort this group with WILLMAN, WHITMAN, and W.C. MILLER and to augment escort during daylight 24th with one TF 52 destroyers.

1400 PLUNGER reported being strafed by Jap fighter during rescue of aviator shot down near MILE; six men wounded three seriously. PLUNGER is proceeding on course 160° (T) at 14 knots to position 05° 00' N. 172° 40', to await further instructions.

1430 ComGen, 27th Division, reported all organized resistance on MAKIN had ceased and that own forces controlled all of the atoll; reported ready to assume command. CTF 52 directed ComGen, 27th Division, to assume command of MAKIN.

ENCLOSURE (1)

COMMANDEER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

CTF 52 reported to ComConPac that capture of MAKIN had been completed and that ComGen, 27th Division, had assumed command ashore.

- 1501 Informed ComConPac that it was planned to send one BB and three DD of TG 52.13 to arrive POINT BEECH for fuel at 251900 GCT.
- 1510 NEW ORLEANS and CALDWELL departed MAKIN in company to rendezvous with MOBILE, RUSSELL, ANDERSON and TG 54.8, 54.9 and TU 16.10.2 at 0800/23. After rendezvous, group was directed by CTF 54 to proceed in company to Point GEORGE thence as directed by own task force commander. TG 54.8, plus NEW ORLEANS and CALDWELL, to proceed to MAKIN to arrive 0700/24.
- 1516 Directed CTG 52.13 to send one battleship and two destroyers of his group to arrive Point BEECH at 251900 GCT to rejoin him at day-break 26th. Informed CTG 52.13 that one destroyer of TG 52.11 would be ordered to join him at daybreak 25th to rejoin CTF 52 at same time 26th.
- 1520 KIMBERLEY completed fueling from CALVERT.
- 1530 CTG 52.1 reported casualties as follows:
- | | |
|------------|------|
| Bed | - 64 |
| Ambulatory | - 38 |
| Dead | - 6 |
| TOTAL | 108 |
- 1542 Directed CTG 52.13 to have HULL rejoin CTF 52 at MAKIN at dawn 24th.
- 1553 Requested ComConPac provide seaplane transportation from MAKIN to FUNAFUTI on 23rd for about ten observers returning to PEARL.
- 1603 Ordered DEWEY to rendezvous at 231900 GCT with MISSISSIPPI in position 02° 45' N., 172° 40' E., to receive three stretcher cases for delivery to MAKIN and further transfer by plane to FUNAFUTI.
- 1608 DALE went alongside PIERCE to fuel.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1625 Advised CTD 20 that one and possibly two battalion landing teams would reenbark on 23rd.
- 1627 DEWEY completed fueling from LEONARD WOOD.
- 1630 CTG 52.1 reported percentage progress unloading as follows:
- | | | | |
|--------------|-------|---------|--------|
| LEONARD WOOD | - 91% | PIERCE | - 100% |
| CALVERT | - 86% | ALCYONE | |
| NEVILLE | - 96% | | |
- 1645 CTG 54.6 reported percentage progress unloading as follows:
- | | |
|-------------------------|-------|
| LST 476 at KING's WHARF | - 5% |
| 477 beached | - 0% |
| 480 beached | - 80% |
| 479 anchored | - 0% |
| 482 anchored | - 0% |
| 481 beached | - 0% |
- 1716 DALE left from alongside PIERCE to return on 23rd to complete fueling.
- 1735 Requested CTF 57 direct ambulance plane to anchor in lagoon entrance between FLINK POINT and KOTABU ISLAND.
- 1800 TG 52.11, less ALCYONE, BELLE GROVE, NEW ORLEANS, CALDWELL, HULL and REVENGE formed Cruising Disposition 3L4, for night retirement to the southeastward to return MAKIN at daylight 23rd. REVENGE remained at MAKIN conducting anti-submarine patrol in Transport Area TWO. LST's and LCT's continued unloading during the night.
- 2051 ComSubPac requested ambulance plane rendezvous with PLUNGER at 05° 00' N., 172° 40' E., to remove wounded.

ENCLOSURE (1)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

2141 CTF 57 advised PLUNGER of ambulance plane due MAKIN 23rd and directed PLUNGER proceed MAKIN.

2300 ComGenPac directed CTF 52 arrange with ComSubPac for suitable rendezvous of a TF 52 surface vessel with PLUNGER.

November 23

0039 ComSubPac directed PLUNGER to proceed from position 05° N., 172° 40' E., toward MAKIN, remaining north of 4° N., until rendezvous and routing instructions were received from CTF 52.

0419 CTF 52 directed PLUNGER proceed on course south to arrive at 232200 in position 03° 30' N. to rendezvous with REVENGE.

0445 CTF 52 directed REVENGE to proceed to 03° 30' N., 172° 40' E., rendezvous with PLUNGER and escort her to MAKIN; and to escort PLUNGER back to same position on her departure from MAKIN.

0600 Formed Screening Disposition XRAY, transports proceeding to Transport Areas for unloading.

0606 DEWEY left disposition proceeding to rendezvous with MISSISSIPPI.

0625 Directed Beachmaster at Beach YELLOW TWO to give priority in beaching and unloading to LST 31, 78 and 179 in order to make these LST's available to assist in reembarking troops and equipment on transports.

0634 Detached W. C. MILLER from TG 54.9 at Point GEORGE and directed her to proceed MAKIN with TG 54.8 to be available to escort transports to PEARL.

0639 Directed TG 54.4 to discontinue further unloading from transports, to beach and unload as soon as practicable preparatory to assisting in reembarking troops and equipment in transports.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 0710 IDAHO reported periscope sighted bearing 200° (T), distance 5,000 yards from ship. Planes and destroyers commenced search in the area and discontinued search at 0737, results negative.
- 0747 Large BOGIE reported bearing 317° (T), distance 20 miles, planes coming in low.
- 0748 Ordered all ships to prepare to repel air attack.
- 0754 BOGIES now bearing 335°(T), 12 miles.
- 0755 BOGIES now bearing 330° (T), 10 miles, coming in low.
- 0758 Comcenpac directed CTF 52 to use FRAZIER, HINERMAN and DASHIELL to escort TD 20 to PEARL. CTF 53 was directed to arrange to fuel these vessels and direct them rendezvous as directed by CTF 52 who was directed reinforce escort with WEITMAN, WILEMAN and two TF 52 destroyers until dark 25th, when WILEMAN, WEITMAN and the two destroyers are to proceed TARAWA and report to CTF 53 for duty.
- 0759 Ordered heavy ships to increase speed to 15 knots and transports to prepare to maneuver.
- 0802 BOGIES bearing 128° (T), 38 miles, designated Raid # 2.
- 0803 Raid #1, bearing 000° (T), 6 miles identified as friendly.
- 0804 Formed Cruising Disposition 3L3.
- 0810 Disposition, less ships inside lagoon, clearing transport area.
- 0812 All BOGIES reported friendly.
- 0826 Reversed course by turn movement, returning to Transport Area to continue loading.
- 0835 Requested CTG 50.2 photograph BUTARITARI target area 835 to 842; incl., 846, 848, 852 to 856 incl, 894 to 896, incl., and 899 for study of effectiveness of air and surface bombardment.
- 0835 Formed Screening Disposition XRAY.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 0850 CTG 52.1 requested permission to bring ALCYONE outside lagoon, but CTF 52 directed CTG 52.1 leave ALCYONE in the lagoon and reembark troops and equipment there.
- 0845 Comgen, 27th Division, reported that congested beach conditions at Beach YELLOW TWO would not permit reloading there and requested permission to reload all ships at Beach RED TWO. Comgen, 27th Division, was directed to reload PIERCE at Beach RED TWO and other ships at Beach YELLOW TWO as previously directed.
- 0900 Cancelled orders to W.C. MILLER.
- 0900 PHELPS went alongside CALVERT to refuel.
- 0905 Informed CTG 50.2 and 52.3 that anti-submarine and Combat Air Patrol had approached formation without IFF resulting in an air alert and loss of time in unloading. Requested corrective action be taken.
- 0930 Comgen, 27th Division, requested LST's 477, 479, 481 and 482 loaded with anti-aircraft and engineering equipment be given priority in unloading over LST's loaded from transports. This was approved by CTF 52 and orders so issued.
- 0931 CTG 54.4 reported LST's 31, 78 and 179 completely loaded from transports.
- 0937 Submitted situation report (CTF 52 232133 and 232137) to Comcenpac.
- 1012 DEWEY rejoined disposition and transferred six MISSISSIPPI patients to LEONARD WOOD for further transfer to ambulance plane on arrival.
- 1027 Directed MACDONOUGH at 0600, 24th, to transport Comgen FIFTHPhib Corps and party of 15 to TARAWA, rejoining CTF 52 by nightfall same date.
- 1030 Comgen, 27th Division, reported all organized enemy resistance on KUMA ISLAND had ceased.
- 1045 Reported to Comcenpac that First and Second Battalion Landing Teams, medium tanks, 2/3's of light tanks and 27th Division Headquarters were being embarked for return to HAWAII.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1109 Ambulance plane from FUNAFUTI landed in MAKIN Lagoon.
- 1110 CTG 54.4 reported unloading progress report as follows:
LST's 476 - 100% LST's 480 - 85%
 481 - 10% 482 - 0%
 477 - 0% 479 - 0%
- 1148 Comgen, 27th Division recommended command of MAKIN be passed to Garrison Commander.
- 1233 Informed Comgen 27th Division and CTG 52.1 that departure time for transports has been set at 1200, 24th.
- 1245 Cancelled orders to MACDONOUGH to make trip to TARAWA.
- 1252 PHELPS completed fueling from CALVERT.
- 1257 Directed CTF 53 to fuel FRAZIER, HEERIMANN and DASHIELL at daybreak 24th, at Point GEORGE and direct them on completion of fueling to rendezvous with TD 20 during daylight same day along route MAKIN to Point VIOLET. Gave ETD MAKIN as 1200/24.
- 1323 Reported to Comcenpac that occupation phase of MAKIN was completed and recommended that Comgen 27th Division pass command of MAKIN to Garrison Commander, Colonel TENNEY, U.S.A.
- 1327 MUSTIN went alongside CALVERT to fuel.
- 1330 REVENGE and PLUNGER arrived MAKIN. PLUNGER transferred six wounded and recovered aviator to LEONARD WOOD.
- 1351 Made all LST's and LCT's available to Comgen 27th Division for reembarkation of troops and equipment.
- 1400 CTG 54.6 reported four LST's now at KING's WHARF.
- 1403 Requested CTG 57 send sea plane to MAKIN on 24th to transport Comgen FIFTHPhibCorps and party of 15 to TARAWA, plane to be available on arrival TARAWA to transport wounded to FUNAFUTI.
- 1420 Directed Comgen 27th Division to clear the ramp on KING's WHARF of all LST's unloading and to put LST's 480, 481, and 476 alongside in succession to embark tanks, guns and equipment.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1435 Ordered CTG 54.6 to discontinue unloading LST's at KINGS' WHARF and to use unloaded and partially loaded LST's and LCT's to reembark troops and equipment in transports.
- 1450 Comcenpac directed that command of MAKIN pass from Comgen 27th Division to Garrison Commander, Colonel TENNEY, U.S. Army.
- 1521 Directed Transdiv 20, plus BELLE GROVE plus escort, depart MAKIN about 1200, 24th for PEARL. See CTF 52 240521.
- 1523 Ordered NEW ORLEANS to delay arrival of TG 54.8 at MAKIN until 1100, 24th
- 1625 Ambulance plane departed MAKIN for FUNAFUTI.
- 1700 MUSTIN completed fueling from CALVERT.
- 1731 Comcenpac cancelled designation of FRAZIER as escort for TD 20, due to emergency required and directed CTF 52 substitute one TF 52 destroyer, preferably DALE or CALDWELL as replacement.
- 1800 TG 52.11, less ALCYONE, BELLE GROVE, LST'S LCT'S, NEW ORLEANS, CALDWELL, HULL, and REVENGE forming Cruising Disposition 3L3, for night retirement to the southeastward to return to MAKIN at daybreak.
- 1805 REVENGE and PLUNGER departed MAKIN for position 03° 30'N, 172° 40' where REVENGE was directed to leave PLUNGER, return MAKIN and conduct anti-submarine patrol in Transport Area TWO during night.
- 1810 BURNS reported good sound contact bearing 310°(T), distance 1420 yards; MUSTIN was ordered to assist BURNS in developing contact.
- 1845 Submitted situation report to Comcenpac(see CTF 52 240645)
- 1902 Directed BURNS and MUSTIN remain in vicinity of sound contact for the remainder of the night conducting hunter killer tactics. Contact was not regained.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO.

1937 CTF 57 advised CTF 52 that plane for Comgen FIFTHPhibCorps and party would arrive MAKIN about 0730, 24th.

1953 Advised REVENGE that MUSTIN and BURNS were conducting sub search about three miles south of UKIANGONG POINT during the night.

November 24

0514 KIMBERLEY reported sound contact ahead and was directed to develop contact.

0515 Disposition was maneuvered clear of submarine contact by 90° emergency turn movement to the left to course 160° (T).

0516 Large explosion and resulting fire was observed bearing 273° (T) distance about 15 miles.

0517 KIMBERLEY reported contact bore 200° from the fleet center; disposition was maneuvered clear of this area by 60° emergency turn movement to the left to 100° (T).

0531 Fires in the direction of the explosion no longer visible.

0538 From TBS transmissions received information that LISCOME BAY had exploded and sunk, believed to be as a result of a submarine torpedo hit.

0551 Executed ships right to 040° (T) approaching Transport Area TWO.

0612 Formed Screening Disposition XRAY, NEVILLE, CALVERT and WOOD proceeding to Transport Area TWO and PIERCE to Transport Area ONE to continue loading.

0620 CTG 52.3 reported by TBS that LISCOME BAY had exploded and sunk. Explosion was believed to have resulted from a submarine torpedo hit but no details were available. Destroyers were engaged in rescuing personnel estimated to be about 60% of the complement; and in searching for the submarine.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO.

- 0630 Directed rescue destroyers to deliver survivors to transports at MAKIN for return to PEARL and directed MACDONOUGH to proceed to assist in picking up survivors.
- 0635 CTG 52.3 reported senior survivor of LISCOME BAY was believed to be Lieutenant Commander BEEBE (Initials unknown) who did not know whether sinking was the result of a torpedo hit or a gasoline explosion.
- 0646 Deported sinking of LISCOME BAY to Comcenpac.
- 0700 CTG 52.1 designated WOOD and NEVILLE to receive LISCOME BAY survivors.
- 0714 Advised Comcenpac that MISSISSIPPI would return PEARL with transports.
- 0740 CTG 52.13 reported five Wildcats which departed at one-half hour before sunset on 23rd had not been heard from since. (Later it was ascertained these pilots had landed on Lexington)
- 0810 Second Echelon of Staff of Comgen FIFTHPhibCorps transferred to NEVILLE for transportation to PEARL.
- 0837 PB2Y3 from FUNAFUTI landed in MAKIN lagoon.
- 0940 Comgen FIFTHPhibCorps and party of staff, observers and correspondents departed for TARAKA via plane.
- 0949 CTG 54.6 reported percentage program of unloading as follows:
- | | |
|----------------|---------------|
| LST 476 - 100% | LST 482 - 25% |
| 480 - 96% | 479 - 50% |
| 481 - 96% | 477 - 96% |
- 0951 Ordered CTG 52.3 maintain Combat Air Patrol of eight planes over disposition to be augmented by eight planes from LEXINGTON.
- 1000 MORRIS and HUGHES arrived MAKIN and went alongside NEVILLE and WOOD respectively to transfer 53 officers and 204 enlisted LISCOME BAY survivors, 41 of whom were stretcher cases. HULL rejoined disposition.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO.

- 1010 Decision was made to leave TG 54.8 with four destroyers to unload in MAKIN Lagoon on departure of TG 54.13. All other combatant vessels of TF 52 would be concentrated in the area to the southeast in supporting distance against enemy surface attack. CTF 52 advised Comcenpac of his decision and recommended that one carrier task group keep a sixteen plane combat Air Patrol over MAKIN and that the carrier task group operate to the southeast of MAKIN.
- 1100 TG 54.8 plus NEW ORLEANS and CALDWELL, arrived MAKIN. Captain THEISS, chief of Staff, Commander TAYLOR, Staff Gunnery Officer, and Lieut-Comdr. HEYEN, U.S.N.R., left U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA to go aboard YOUNG AMERICA to assist CTG 54.8 in getting ships unloaded. YOUNG AMERICA proceeded into Lagoon followed by ISLAND MAIL.
- 1113 MORRIS and HUGHES departed MAKIN in company to rejoin CTG 52.3.
- 1115 Directed Comdesdiv FOUR with MUSTIN, BURNS, CALDWELL and DEWEY to proceed into MAKIN Lagoon and report to CTG 54.8 for duty as protective vessels against air attack. Directed REVENGE to conduct anti-submarine patrol off entrance as directed by Comdesdiv FOUR.
- 1206 Decision was made to send two cruisers and two destroyers to Point BEACH for fuel to arrive forenoon 25th, vice MISSISSIPPI and two destroyers of TG 52.13 as originally planned. Informed Comcenpac.
- 1234 CTG 50.1 reported enemy aircraft approaching TG 50.1 in position about 60 miles north of MAKIN.
- 1243 Ordered TG 52.11, less detached units, and ALCYONE, plus WHITMAN and WILHELM, to form Cruising Disposition 314, fleet course and axis 245°, speed 10 knots. Sent RED alert message to MAKIN and directed ships to prepare to repel air attack. Directed CAPE CONSTANTINE and CAPE SAN MARTIN to fall in astern of transports. ALCYONE stood out of lagoon.
- 1313 Received report from LEXINGTON fighters that interception had been made and that Combat Air Patrol shot down six Zekes with loss of one F6F. Maneuvered disposition on various courses at 14 knots.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO.

- 1350 CTD 20 reported following casualties of 27th Division and attached naval units:

| <u>27th Division</u> | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Killed in action | 63 |
| Wounded in action | 119 |
| Non Combat injuries | 22 |

| <u>Navy and Coast Guard Units</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Killed in action | 2 |
| Wounded in action | 1 |

| <u>Totals</u> | |
|---------------------|-----|
| Killed in action | 65 |
| Wounded in action | 120 |
| Non Combat injuries | 22 |

- 1354 Sent Condition GREEN to MAKIN.
- 1358 Slowed disposition to 5 knots on course 000°, and then 090° (T).
- 1500 Transports rejoined disposition; increased speed to 13.5 knots and changed course to 135°(T). CAPE CONSTANTINE and CAPE SAN MARTIN entered MAKIN Lagoon.
- 1506 MACDONOUGH reported results of search for LISCOME BAY survivors and for submarine negative.
- 1617 Requested Comcenpac to arrange to send British Commissioners and one radio technician to MAKIN to arrive as soon as practicable.
- 1627 After receiving dispatch and interview reports, CTF 52, in his 250427, reported to Comcenpac the known facts on the sinking of the LISCOME BAY.
- 1640 Directed DASHIELL and HEERMANN to join TG 54.13 along route from MAKIN to Point VIOLET.
- 1705 Directed CTG 54.2 with MINNEAPOLIS, SAN FRANCISCO, GRIDLEY; MAURY proceed Point BEECH for fuel to arrive forenoon 25th, then rejoin CTF 52.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO.

- 1715 Ordered TG 54.13 (TD 20, plus BELLE GROVE, WHITMAN, WILEMAN, DALE and HULL) Proceed as previously directed.
- 1745 MISSISSIPPI joined TG 54.13 and Captain HUNTER in MISSISSIPPI assumed command of the group. TF 52, less CORAL SEA, CORREGIDOR and their destroyer screen, formed Cruising Disposition 3L1, fleet course and axis 110° (T), fleet speed 15 knots.
- 1822 CORREGIDOR, CORAL SEA and destroyer screen joined disposition.
- 1830 Executed ships left to 090° (T).
- 2000 Sent situation report (250800) to Comcenpac.

November 25 th

Task Force 52, less detached units, operating in supporting distance to the southeast of MAKIN.

- 0505 CTG 52.2, with MINNEAPOLIS, SAN FRANCISCO, MAURY and GRIDLEY left disposition enroute Point GEORGE for fuel.
- 1035 Informed Comcenpac that BALTIMORE, HUGHES and HOEL would arrive at Point HICKORY for fuel forenoon, 26th.
- 1225 Directed Rear Admiral WRIGHT, with BALTIMORE, HOEL and HUGHES leave disposition at 0200/26 proceed to Point HICKORY for fuel, to arrive forenoon same day; on completion fueling, proceed to rendezvous with TG 54.10 at 272000 GCT, position 00° 08' N., 178° 28' E., escort that group to APEMAMA, and then rejoin CTF 52.
- 1500 to
- 1800 Several single BOGIES were reported generally to the north and northwest, distances 12 to 20 miles, all reported low. Fighters were vectored out on several occasions, but failed to make contact. It is believed that the BOGIES were Japanese BETTY'S reporting position of and tracking this force.
- 1812 Small BOGIE reported bearing 000° (T), distance 20 miles, low and closing.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1822-
- 1830 Several single BOGIES were reported, distance about 15 miles following and circling disposition. Believed to be Jap "BETTY'S"
- 1832 Formed modified Cruising Disposition 3L2; battleships moving in to 1500 yards and two flanking destroyers dropping back to the rear of the disposition, all destroyers closing to 1500 yards from the nearest heavy ship.
- 1838 Planes closing from various directions simultaneously, dropping flares and float lights. CTF 52 reported that TF 52 was under enemy air attack.
- 1841 Directed all ships to open fire if target closed within 4000 yards and a good solution was obtained. CTF 52 maneuvered disposition by radical emergency turn signals to confuse enemy pilots and dodge attack. Float lights and flares were dropped from time to time but all seemed to be considerable distance from the center of the disposition. Several enemy planes approached near enough to be identified as "BETTY'S" and were taken under fire at distances of 2-3 thousand yards by several ships. Ships ceased fire promptly when planes withdrew and fire discipline was excellent. Maneuvering was continuous until 2015 when all planes finally withdrew. (See Annex "B")
- 2015 CTF 52 reported that enemy planes had withdrawn and that no damage had been sustained. Directed all ships to resume normal positions in disposition and normal conditions of readiness. During above attack, disposition was maneuvered in the general area 02° 52' N., 177° 50' E. It is estimated that from 12 to 14 Japanese aircraft, "BETTY" type, attempted unsuccessful group and coordinated attacks.
- 2055 Received Comcenpac OpPlans CEN6-43 and CEN 7-43 by radio, reorganizing task forces and groups of the FIFTH fleet, preparatory to future offensive operations.
- 2250 Ordered KIMBERLEY, at 0500, 26th, to proceed MAKIN and report to Comdesdiv 4, in MUSTIN, as relief for BURNS.
- 2320 CTG 52.2, with MINNEAPOLIS, SAN FRANCISCO, MAURY and GRIDLEY, rejoined disposition, having completed fueling.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 2322 Ordered BENNES, at 0500, 26th, to depart MAKIN and proceed Point OAK as directed in Comcenpac 260248.
- 2355 Ordered CTG 52.2, with MINNEAPOLIS, SAN FRANCISCO, MAURY and GRIDLEY to accompany BALTIMORE, HOEL and HUGHES to Point HICKORY; when BALTIMORE completes fueling, cruisers, plus MAURY and GRIDLEY, comply with Comcenpac OpPlans Cen 6-43 and Cen 7-43. HOEL and FRANKS, on completion of fueling, proceed as previously directed by CTF 52.

November 26

Task Force 52, less detached units, operating in supporting distance to the southeast of MAKIN.

- 0207 CTG 52.2, with MINNEAPOLIS, SAN FRANCISCO, BALTIMORE, MAURY, GRIDLEY, HOEL and HUGHES left the disposition to proceed as previously directed by CTF 52.
- 0500 KIMBERLEY left disposition to proceed MAKIN as previously directed by CTF 52.
- 0545 Directed CTG 54.8 to submit immediate percentage report of unloading and thereafter to submit daily reports as of 0600.
- 0705 Directed HULL rejoin CTF 52 on completion of fueling, WHITMAN and WILMAN to proceed T.R.P.A as previously directed.
- 1145 KIMBERLEY reported that she bent three blades of starboard propeller entering MAKIN Lagoon, but sustained no other damage; estimated maximum speed to be 15 knots.
- 1151 CTG 54.8 reported percentage progress of unloading as follows:
- | | |
|------------------|-----|
| CAPE SAN MARTIN | 14% |
| CAPE CONSTANTINE | 35% |
| ISLAND MAIL | 27% |
| YOUNG AMERICA | 25% |
- Reported beach conditions improving and estimated that rate of discharge would increase.
- 1555 Small BOGIE reported bearing 200°, distance 10 miles. Fighters vectored out 26 miles but were unable to complete interception. Several single BOGIES were reported to the

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1555 north and northwest, distance 12 to 20 miles, all low.
(cont) Own fighters unable to make interception. Planes believed to be Jap BETTY'S" tracking and shadowing this force as they did the afternoon of the 25th.
- 1818 Radio MAKIN reported 8 BETTY'S went out of sight bearing 200° (T) headed south. Formed Modified Cruising Disposition 3L2, battleships closing to 1500 yards from carriers, flanking destroyers dropping to rear of disposition and all destroyers closing to distance of 1500 yards from nearest heavy ship; prepared to repel aircraft attack.
- 1826 BOGIE reported bearing 300° (T), 15 miles closing. BOGIE sighted bearing 300° (T), appeared to be Jap "BETTY". CTF 52 directed ships to take planes under fire when within four thousand yards, if good solution was obtained.
- 1831 CTF 52 commenced maneuvering disposition radically by emergency turns to avoid attack and dodge torpedoes. Enemy planes dropped flares and float lights at some distance from the disposition and attempted single and coordinated plane approaches from different directions. Attacks were not pressed home and no planes approached within three miles of the disposition.
- 1841 CTF 52 reported that TF 52 was under enemy air attack.
- 1947 CTF 52 reported that enemy planes withdrew without completing attack; number believed to be about eight.
- 2022 Formed Cruising Disposition 3L1.
Reported to Comcenpac that the availability of planes and pilots of Cardiv 24 were as follows:
- VF - 20 planes, 26 pilots.
 - VT - 16 planes, 29 pilots.

November 27

Task Force 52, less detached units, operating in supporting distance southeast of MAKIN.

- 0600 As force was within about 30 miles of Point BUSH, CTF 52 made decision to fuel destroyers from Fueling Group and at 0640 directed FRANKS proceed to Point BUSH for fuel.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

0600

(cont) Task Force, less FRANKS, changed course to the eastward and at 0700, sighted fueling group. Force operated to the northward of the fueling group, fueling two destroyers at a time.

1600 Completed fueling destroyers.

0735 CTG 54.4 reported percentage progress of unloading as of 0600, as follows:

| | |
|------------------|-----|
| CAPE CONSTANTINE | 54% |
| CAPE SAN MARTIN | 52% |
| ISLAND MAIL | 60% |
| YOUNG AMERICA | 78% |

1129 Ordered CTG 52.3 launch 8 VTB and 5 VF combat air patrol at 1400, to form a "Jap Trap" VTB 's directed patrol 45° sectors at distance of 20 miles from center of disposition, altitude 2000 feet or below cloud level, to catch snoopers; VF directed to remain at 8000 feet, in two plane sections on ten mile circle, spaced equal distance, as requested by CTG 53.6

1141 Concenpac directed CTF 52 to transfer VF from CORREGIDOR and CORAL SEA to Cardiv 22.

1710 GRIDLEY left disposition to proceed to a position about 20 miles southeast of TARAWA to transmit radio messages, then to rejoin CTF 52 at 0600, 28th, in a position bearing 120° (T), distance 20 miles from Point OAK. To avoid possible enemy air attack, CTF 52 made decision to steam southeast during the night, reversing course as required to be in position 20 miles bearing 120° (t) from point OAK.

November 28

Task Force 52, less detached units, operating southeast of MAKIN.

0630 HULL rejoined disposition.

0755 GRIDLEY rejoined disposition. BURNS joined disposition and transferred fighter director personnel to PENNSYLVANIA.

ENCLOSURE (A).

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

0840 BURNS left disposition and proceeded to join TG 50.4.

0915 CTG 54.8 reported percentage progress of unloading at 0600 as follows:

| | |
|------------------|-----|
| CAPE CONSTANTINE | 55% |
| CAPE SAN MARTIN | 75% |
| ISLAND MAIL | 80% |
| YOUNG AMERICA | 90% |

Percentage for CONSTANTINE for the 27th should have been 43%. Above report indicated CONSTANTINE will not be ready to depart at daybreak, 29th; CTF 52 directed CTG 54.8 to concentrate on the other three ships as CONSTANTINE would remain at MAKIN until later.

1155 CTG 54.8 reported TG 54.8, less CONSTANTINE, would be ready to depart on schedule.

1331 Issued following orders to CTG 54.8: Fuel DEWEY and KIMBERLEY as practicable; TG, less DEWEY, KIMBERLEY and CONSTANTINE, plus GRIDLEY, and FRANKS, depart MAKIN 291900 GCT rendezvous with CTF 52 position 30 miles east of Point VIOLET at 301900 GCT.

1347 Sighted TG 53.6 to the southeast; changed course into the wind and directed TG 53.6 to turn into the wind when about five miles from TF 52.

1355 HULL left disposition to proceed TARAWA to receive photographs from Comcenpac, in INDIANAPOLIS, for delivery to CTF 52 and further delivery to PEARL.

1430 CTG 54.8 reported that departure of group, less CONSTANTINE, would be delayed until 1200, 29th.

1453 Completed transfer of 13 VF, with pilots, and some small spare parts, from CORREGIDOR and CORAL SEA to Cardiv 22. NASSAU and BARNES joined disposition and reported for duty.

1750 Directed DEWEY, KIMBERLEY and CONSTANTINE, when latter unloaded, depart MAKIN at dawn, unless otherwise directed by CTG 53.8. Proceed PEARL via Route UNITED.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

- 1819 FRANKS and GRIDLEY left disposition, proceeding to MAKIN to arrive at daybreak, 29th, to report to CTG 54.8 as additional escort. HULL rejoined disposition.
- 2100 CTG 54.8 reported a three-hour delay in time of departure from MAKIN; new departure time, 1500, 29th.

November 29

Task Force 52, less detached units, plus BARNES and NASSAU, operating in area near 01° N., 175° 30' E.

- 0430 HULL left disposition proceeding to join TU 53.8.5 at Point WILLOW.
- 0545 Comcenpac directed CTF 52, with fueling group, and CTG 53.8.5 to clear fueling area and proceed southeastward because of threat of enemy air attack.
- 0610 HUGHES received mail from PENNSYLVANIA, then left disposition to proceed to Point WILLOW to join TU 53.8.5.
- 0641 TF52 changed course to 300° (T), speed 17 knots, close fueling group and TU 53.8.5.
- 0656 Directed TU 16.10.3 and 54.8.5 to stop fueling and proceed southeast as best speed to pass about eight miles northeast of APEMAMA.
- 0817 Sighted ships to the northwest, subsequently identified as TUs 53.8.5 and 16.10.3.
- 0817 TF 52 joined these task units and operated five to ten miles to the northwest and north of them, during the day. directed CTG 53.8.5 to continue with fueling at 1300.
- 1500 TG 54.8 departed MAKIN.
- 1745 Directed TUs 53.8.5 and 16.10.3 to proceed as previously directed, TF 52 proceeding northeast to rendezvous with TG 54.8 at 0700, 30th.

ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATIONS

NARRATIVE OF TASK FORCE FIFTY TWO

November 30

Task Force 52, less detached units, plus NASSAU and BARNES, enroute to rendezvous with TG 54.8.

- 0730 Sighted ships bearing 310° (T), distance 17 miles, subsequently identified as TG 54.8.
- 1013 TG 54.8 joined disposition, transports taking station 2180° . Fleet course and axis 075° (T).
Changed fleet speed to 12 knots.
Fueled CALDWELL and MUSTIN from NASSAU and BARNES.
- 1700 Directed CTG 54.8, with YOUNG AMERICA, ISLAND MAIL, CAPE SAN MARTIN, MUSTIN and CALDWELL to proceed along course 075° (T) to Route UNITED, thence via that route to PEARL. Directed Comdesron 47, with HOEL and FRANKS, to proceed Point GEORGE for fuel, thence to TARAWA to report to CTG 53.8 for duty.
- 1730 CTF 52, with PENNSYLVANIA, NEW MEXICO, IDAHO, CORAL SEA, CORREGIDOR, BARNES, NASSAU, PHELPS, MACDONOUGH, MORRIS, GRIDLEY and HURRY proceeding PEARL via direct route, fleet course and axis 053° (T), fleet speed 16.5 knots.

FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER,

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
December 4, 1943.

ENCLOSURE (B)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

MEDICAL REPORT

1. The plan to evacuate all casualties from beaches to transports for treatment worked smoothly.
2. Casualty reporting was slow and in many instances, not according to medical plan (Bed 20 X Total 40 X Dead-2 X 0800), leading to confusion and garbled reports.
3. The evacuation to hospital ships at Funafuti seven hundred miles away during early stages of operation was not practicable. It is my opinion that hospital ships should be brought into the combat area on D plus 3 and 4 for evacuation of the most severe casualties, if the APA's are to be used for removal of combat teams. An ambulance plane (Coronado type) was used for evacuation of casualties from the APA's and support groups at Makin to Funafuti on D plus three. Some difficulty and delay in loading the plane were encountered due to anchorage of the plane in the channel in which boat traffic was heavy. LCP(L)'s which were the only boats suitable for this operation, were not equipped with cleats for stretcher loading thereby cutting down the capacity of the boats and slowing loading operations. The use of a float such as a modified life raft of the square box type used on some AKs' would expedite loading of casualties into an ambulance plane of the Coronado type.
4. The doubling of the medical section of beach parties proved unnecessary on this operation due to the light casualty load and the fact that practically no opposition was encountered on Red Beach. I believe the augmented portion of the medical section should be retained aboard ship until operations show the best location for their utilization. On D plus two the augmented sections of the beach parties were recalled to the transports where their services could be better utilized.
5. Two serious fires aboard the support group emphasized the necessity for carrying adequate supplies of plasma.

FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER.

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
December 4, 1943

ENCLOSURE (B)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

MEDICAL REPORT

6. Casualties were light among landed forces and approximately thirty five per cent of casualties were killed in action apparently due to close fighting and entrenchment of opposing forces. Due to the light casualty load all casualties were loaded on two APA's of the group to aid evacuation at port of debarkation.

7. Medical supplies were adequate, but some difficulty in fixation of compound fractures was encountered aboard APA's. If hospital ships are not to be used in combat zones I believe each Division of APA's should be supplied with one set half pin fixation apparatus such as "Roger Anderson" or "Stader", fracture kits

8. Recommendations-

- A. That one hospital corpsman be trained and detailed in recording and reporting of casualties aboard each AKA and APA.
- B. That each LCP(L) of the force be equipped for handling of stretcher cases for loading of Coronado type ambulance plane.
- C. That Augmented Medical Section of beach party be retained aboard the transport until their best utilization becomes apparent.
- D. That one life raft aboard each AKA be modified to furnish a landing float for use in loading Sea Plane Ambulance.
- E. That the flag ship of each division of APAs' be supplied with pin fixation apparatus for fracture reduction, of "Roger Anderson" or "Stader" type.
- F. That a hospital ship be made available on D plus three and four in combat area for evacuation of casualties from transports.

FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER.

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
December 4, 1943.

ENCLOSURE (C)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. In the preparation of intelligence material for the Galvanic Operation, the principles set forth in FTP 167 were followed as far as practicable. The information disseminated covered, for the most part, only information of naval interest.

2. The Intelligence Plan contained:

- (a) Current information of enemy naval and air dispositions and bases in the theater of operation.
- (b) Information concerning objectives as follows:
 - (1) General subjects.
 - (2) Approaches.
 - (3) Navigational features and lagoon sailing directions.
 - (4) Anchorages, landings and wharves.
 - (5) Unloading conditions.
 - (6) Beaches, fringing reefs and lagoon reefs.
- (c) Meteorologic information as follows:
 - (1) Weather.
 - (2) Currents.
 - (3) Tides.
 - (4) Climate.
 - (5) Tide Tables.
 - (6) Sunrise and sunset tables.
 - (7) Moonrise and moonset tables.
- (d) Special instructions on following subjects:
 - (a) Handling of captured documents.
 - (b) Handling of captured material.
 - (c) Handling of prisoners.
 - (d) Counter intelligence.
 - (e) Press representatives.
- (e) Maps, Charts and Photographs:

3. The preparation of intelligence material for the Galvanic Operation was affected adversely by a number of factors which will effect, and probably to a greater extent, the preparation of such material for future operations in the Central Pacific. These factors were:

- (a) Lack of accurate charts:

The Hydrographic Office Charts of Pacific Islands due principally to lack of recent and accurate surveys, are very misleading. The land contours are inaccurate, soundings are few and unreliable, the orientation of land areas is frequently in error and even the location of the island is often questionable.

ENCLOSURE (3)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(b) Lack of accurate tidal data.

Published Tide Tables list only a few of the Central Pacific Islands and those listed are referred to distant references, such as Valparaiso, Chile and Apia, Samoa. The only other tidal information is the lunitidal interval and tide range given on H.O. charts. Such checks as were available were made on this data and, in the case of MAKIN, considerable error was indicated.

(c) Impracticability of ground reconnaissance:

Due to the small land areas involved and isolated position of the objectives it was considered that effective ground reconnaissance in advance of attack was impracticable.

(d) Difficulty in obtaining aerial photographs:

Vertical coverage of land areas was good, but there was a lack of low altitude oblique photographs, particularly on the lagoon sides of the atolls. The lack of vertical coverage of lagoons and fringing reefs until a late date interfered with the preparation of accurate maps and charts.

4. The difficulties noted in paragraph (3) were overcome to a great extent in this operation by the use of photographs, submarine observations and information received from foreign personnel who had first hand knowledge of the areas concerned. By these means charts and tidal data were corrected and found, by later checks, to be accurate.

5. In the preparation of the Intelligence Plan considerable information and assistance was received from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas: this included aerial photographs; photo interpretations; intelligence reports; reproduction of chart maps and diagrams; supply of charts, etc.

6. Additional valuable information was received from a reconnaissance of the objectives by the submarine U.S.S. NAUTILUS. The NAUTILUS was assigned to this force by the Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet and acted under reconnaissance instructions issued by the Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force. The report submitted by the Commanding Officer included information as to hazards to landings; condition of surf, reefs and beaches; characteristics of lagoon entrances; current data; sound conditions; activities on shore; general tidal data; photographs of radar PPI screen and photographs of shore line. The periscope photographs of the shore line were excellent, and showed details which did not appear in aerial photographs. A panorama of the shore line, which was prepared from over-lapping periscope photographs, was

ENCLOSURE (3)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

of great assistance in guiding landing boats to the proper beaches during the actual landing operation. In addition, the NAUTILUS made a very comprehensive series of observations which were of great assistance in correcting errors which existed in charts of these islands. It is considered that in general submarine reconnaissance is productive of valuable information and that the NAUTILUS, in particular, conducted its operation in an excellent manner.

7. Aerial Reconnaissance, both Army and Navy planes, supplied considerable information both from aerial photographs and from pilot reports of sorties. Due to lack of facilities, long distances to objectives and the difficulty of getting photographs against anti-aircraft gun fire opposition, adequate photographs were not received until a rather late date, and even then the coverage was not as complete as was desired. The difficulties of aerial photography against opposition are well known but the increasing importance of aerial reconnaissance, in view of the lack of other sources of information, makes it imperative that the maximum possible information is obtained. The requirements of amphibious warfare place a new emphasis on areas not previously considered important. To insure the success of an amphibious operation particularly against a coral atoll, it is essential that complete information be obtained concerning landing conditions. Information is necessary concerning fringing and lagoon reefs, beaches, approaches to beaches, navigational obstructions in lagoons, tides, correctness of charts and of any other factors which might have a bearing on the landing of troops ashore in the minimum possible time. Paragraph (11) of this report contains recommendations concerning photographic coverage and other reconnaissance, both air and submarine, for future operation. It is hoped that these can be followed as far as possible. Succeeding operations will be increasingly difficult and there will be fewer sources of information. Photographs will necessarily be the major source of information.

8. An additional and very important source of intelligence information were the foreign personnel who were attached to the staff of Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force during preparation for the Galvanic Operation. This group totaled sixteen in all and included Australian, New Zealand and Fiji Naval Reserve officers, officials of the Western Pacific High Commission, Australian Army Reserve officers and enlisted men and civilians. They were recruited for their intimate knowledge of the islands in question based, in most cases, on long residence and appropriate professional background. They provided information not

ENCLOSURE (C)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

readily available from other sources, on tides, local conditions, sailing directions, reef and beach conditions, surf, weather, and a wide variety of other subjects. One wrote an excellent booklet on treatment of natives, another wrote a propaganda article in Gilbertese for distribution to the natives and another constructed an excellent chart of MAKIN from material he had previously assembled. During the actual Galvanic Operation seven of this group were employed as pilots and five acted as guides and interpreters. It is unfortunate that no similar group will be available for future operations.

9. Every effort was made to provide sufficient maps, charts, photographs, diagrams, etc., to facilitate to the fullest extent possible, the Galvanic Operation, from a naval standpoint. As far as was possible with the information available, the type material listed in paragraph (10) was issued.

10. The following listed material is considered to be essential to any amphibious operation against a coral atoll:

(a) Charts, Maps, Diagrams, etc.

1. Combined chart and Intelligence Map.

This chart should be sufficiently accurate and complete to permit safe navigation of limited off shore areas and within lagoons. It should show location of beaches, nature of approaches to beaches, landmarks, important enemy installations ashore (particularly those near beaches), tracks of mine sweeping and fire support groups within lagoons, transport areas within lagoons and any other information of value to naval personnel operating close off shore, within the lagoon, or ashore. The scale of this chart should be one inch = 1000 yards and the chart should be printed on sufficiently translucent paper to permit its use on D.R.T. screens. Inasmuch as this chart should be of convenient size for use by small craft it cannot include very much off shore area. It is intended principally for use of mine sweeping vessels, lagoon fire support vessels, landing and other small craft, transports and cargo vessels.

2. Offshore Chart.

This chart should be accurate as to position, shape, and orientation of objectives and include principal features such as land marks, lagoon entrances, off shore navigation hazards, etc. It should

ENCLOSURE (C)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

show transport areas, landing craft and ship approach lines, lines of departure, gunfire support areas, location of assault beaches and other information necessary for units operating offshore. It should include offshore areas at least ten miles to seaward of the objective. The scale of the chart should be 1" = 2000 yards and the chart should be printed on paper suitable for use on D.R.T. screens. It is intended principally for use by offshore fire support vessels and transports.

3. Air and Gunnery Target Maps (large).

This map should be of large scale and show all possible enemy installations as well as location of assault beaches. It should show all targets and target areas clearly marked and designated by number or otherwise. It is intended principally for use on board ship or ashore in directing ship and plane bombardment.

4. Air and Gunnery Target Maps (small).

This map should be a small reproduction of item (c) above for use in planes and by shore fire control parties.

5. Beach Diagrams.

These diagrams should show graphically all possible details of assault beaches and approaches, approach lines, lines of departure, obstacles on beaches and offshore, beach defenses, beach exits and other information of value to landing craft to insure their scheduled arrival and disembarkation on designated beaches. In addition to plan views, enlarged contour and detailed sketches should be added if information is available. These diagrams are for use of transports and landing craft.

(b) Photographs.

1. Mosaics (large).

These mosaics should be reproduced in as large a scale as possible consistent with retention of essential details and reasonable convenience in handling. Separate mosaics showing both the principal objectives and also the atoll as a whole should be issued. These mosaics are for use of Group Commanders

ENCLOSURE (3)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Commanding Officers of ships and Gunnery Officers
and also for use on board ships to familiarize
personnel with general features of the objectives.

2. Mosaics (small).

These mosaics, a small reproduction of (1)
above, should be of convenient size for issue to
planes and small craft.

3. Vertical Photographs.

Large scale vertical photographs or mosaics
of landing beach areas should be prepared for issue
to landing craft and transports. They should be
of appropriate size for use in landing craft and
planes.

4. Oblique Photographs (large).

These photographs should be from both high
(30°) and low (5°) angles and show important features
of the shore approach, reefs, beaches and inshore
terrain. They should be of large size, as in the
case of large mosaics, and should be issued to group
commanders and all ships. They are of particular
value to ships engaged in fire support and to carriers
for use in connection with bombardment.

5. Oblique Photographs (small).

These should be conveniently sized reproductions
of (4) above for issue to planes and landing craft.

6. Panoramas.

These should consist of overlapping photographs
of shore line taken from low altitude. They should
show assault beach limits and prominent landing
marks should be indicated. Submarine periscope
photographs have been found to be excellent for this
purpose. Panoramas should be issued to all landing
craft and be of appropriate size. If they can be
enlarged and still retain sufficient clarity of de-
tail they are of value in indoctrination of boat
crews aboard ship.

11. The following recommendations are made for the conduct of
aerial and submarine reconnaissance which, it is believed, will
provide the necessary detailed and accurate intelligence for use
in future amphibious operations:

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A Aerial Reconnaissance.

(1) Photographs.

- (a) Photographs must be taken from angles that will eliminate glare. These photographs should be taken with camera pointed downward; which usually discloses sunken reefs more clearly.

(b) Vertical Photos.

Complete stereo coverage of all reef, land and lagoon areas at different tide stages is a necessity. These sorties must be flown when sun-glare is at a minimum, preferably before 0900 and after 1600 local time. The scale of the photos of the land areas should be between 1:5,000 and 1:10,000, preferably the former. The larger the scale of photos of reefs and beaches, the more valuable they will be, and one stereo coverage of the lagoon and ocean reef at a scale of 1:5,000 or larger, at low tide, is necessary.

Photos covering the entire lagoon are needed for charting channels, shoals, rocks and for locating land areas correctly. These may be at a small scale, around 1:40,000. Photos of large areas such as lagoons are preferred at this scale for reasons of economy and ease of handling.

Certain portions of the lagoons will be designated by Task Force Commanders as Operating Areas and photographs at larger scale, both verticals and obliques, of these areas showing reefs and channels and shoals will be required.

Color photographs have been found valuable in the interpretation of reef and beach conditions, and in estimating relative depths of water in lagoons. At least one sortie at a scale of 1:10,000 is recommended.

ENCLOSURE (3)

COMMANDER FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE REPORT OF GALVANIC OPERATION

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(c) Oblique Photographs.

Vertical photographs have been used as sources of information beyond the limitations of such photographs chiefly because no other sources were available. Underwater depths cannot be measured in vertical photographs. Therefore oblique photographs of ocean and lagoon reefs and beaches at different stages of tides, including a sortie at low tide, are necessary. On many of the islands the stand of palms and other trees is so heavy at the edge of the beach that defenses and beach detail cannot be seen in vertical photographs; their existence can only be suspected and no details can be given. Oblique photographs will be invaluable where such conditions exist.

(1) Low obliques.

Low obliques of ocean and lagoon reefs and beaches are vitally necessary for the study of detail in the selection of landing beaches. These should be made at as close a range and low an altitude as possible consonant with the risk involved. Sorties at different stages of tides, including one at low tide, should be flown. Care must be taken that the outer edges of the reefs are included in the photos. Photographs made with a 12" or longer focal length camera at a range of 4000 feet, at an angle of approximately 5° with the horizontal are recommended. These are to be made of the ocean and lagoon reefs and areas designated by the authority issuing instructions for the reconnaissance.

(2) High obliques.

High obliques taken at an angle of about 30° with the horizontal, showing the approaches to the objectives, are desired. The areas will be designated by the authority issuing instructions for the reconnaissance.

(3) Reconnaissance reports.

A pilots' report of photographic reconnaissance mission containing information regarding visual reconnaissance by pilots and crews, such as weather, wind, direction and velocity, AA fire encountered and estimation as to the source of it, planes and vessels seen

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in area but not shown on photos, etc., is requested.

(4) Labeling of Photographs.

Photos must be carefully labeled with the following information:

- (1) Date and Time. This must be accurate, and labeled either GCT or the Local Time Zone that is used. The derivation of tidal data is dependent on the accuracy of this information.
- (2) Focal Length of the camera.
- (3) Altitude or range.

In order to obtain an accurate scale of the photos, this must be given accurately.

- (4) Name of island or atoll photographed.

B Submarine Reconnaissance.

(1) General.

A complete reconnaissance of the atoll is desired and any evidence of activity should be located, photographed and described. Portions of the atoll believed to contain installations or features of major interest should be clearly designated by the authority issuing instructions for the reconnaissance.

(2) Photographs.

Complete photographic coverage should be made of sections designated in accordance with paragraph (1) above and photographs should be taken so as to form a complete panorama of the area concerned and be taken at maximum periscope height and minimum range consonant with risk of discovery. Views of prominent objects should be taken from several different angles. Wherever possible photographs should be taken from such points as to show the maximum amount of lagoon shoreline detail. The following information should accompany each photograph:

- (a) A general description of the object photographed, with any information gained from visual observation which might aid in understanding the photograph.

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-
- (b) The distance of the submarine offshore, and sufficient simultaneous tangents on nearby islands so that the submarine's position may be plotted with reasonable accuracy.
 - (c) Date and time of taking photograph, carefully noted as either GCT or Local.
 - (d) The true bearing on which the photograph was taken.

The results of visual observation at the time photographs are taken should be reported in detail. Sketches or annotations on maps or charts aid greatly in an understanding of such reports. When locating an object such as a tower, true bearings should be taken from at least two locations, together with sufficient tangents on nearby islands to locate accurately the position of the submarine at the time each bearing was taken. If at all possible, photographs should be developed daily as a check on results being obtained.

(3) Radar Coverage desired.

Any information from the P.P.I. radar equipment aboard would be highly valuable. The radar might be used to secure navigational information and fixes, and the manner in which the radar works for these purposes will furnish most useful information.

Photographs of the radar P.P.I. screen are useful to correlate the appearance of the P.P.I. screen with the position of the ship, so that radar operators approaching the island for the first time may identify blips appearing on the screen. In some cases the islands are low and flat and apparently almost totally lacking in distinctive radar targets. Those that do appear should be identified so far as practicable. Negative information is also desired, i.e., those locations where no identifiable blips appear. If practicable, information is desired regarding the sectors in which each target is visible on the screen and the range at which it fades out. Suggested procedure: During darkness observe island on P.P.I. from as many angles as practicable; record ship positions where no distinctive screen exists; when

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a distinctive screen appears, photograph it and record position of ship. Identification of blips may await later study of charts, aerial photos, etc., but comments or opinions made at the time of photograph should also be recorded. During retirement from the island, record position of ship at which blip disappears. It is recognized that it may not be practicable to do much night work, owing to the necessity for charging batteries.

A radar intercept receiver should be used whenever possible, tuning over the entire radar frequency bands, searching for possible enemy radar signals. A log of signals heard, their frequency, pulse rate and other signal characteristics, and position at which intercepted should be recorded. Whenever possible take photographs of shore radar installations and also note locations, structural details and surrounding terrain.

(4) Items of general interest.

In general, full information including photographs where possible and full description is desired in connection with:

- (a) Beaches and their suitability for landing operations.
- (b) Surf conditions and set and drift of currents around the atoll.
- (c) Passages through the reef.
- (d) Buildings, fortifications, radar, radio, air or seaplane activity or installations, shipping traffic among the islands or any other evidence of activity.
- (e) Tidal data including time of high and low water, amount of water on reefs at various stages of the tide, tidal range, etc. (If possible actual landings should be made on isolated sections of the atoll in question or on a neighboring atoll and actual data determined).
- (f) Check on existing charts. Numerous bearings should be taken and every effort made to determine the accuracy of existing charts

with particular reference to orientation and shape of land areas. A plot or sketch showing which landmarks and islets were used in taking bearings should accompany this report.

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- (e) Vessels in the lagoon at Makin were worked direct on the Task Force common frequency at various times when necessary to clear operational priority traffic. In general the Task Force common frequency worked well and proved indispensable. As far as known the undivided Task Group frequencies were not used. The combination of TBS, Task Force common, and ship to shore, both local and distant, appeared to be adequate.
- (f) As soon as departure time of the remaining units of Task Force 52 had been determined, radio silence was placed in effect and maintained until within 500 miles of Pearl. During the return to Pearl, Radar and TBS exercises were held. A listening watch was maintained on Task Force 53 frequencies until they faded out at a distance of about 250 miles, daylight range.

9. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS FROM OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES

- (a) Only once, from D Day until departure for Pearl, were units of TF 53 heard over fifty miles away on TBS. On D plus One day at about noon CTF 53 and the Colorado were heard faintly for a few minutes while CTF 52 was near Makin. The value of having a common TBS channel was great, the interference nil. On numerous occasions unknown surface units were contacted at night and showed no IFF. A shrewd guess as to the identity of these units and a few calls on the TBS at distances of about fifteen miles established the identity of the units and avoided considerable confusion. IFF was usually turned on in the unknown ships either on request from CTF 52 or after TBS contact. The average range at which TBS contact could normally be established was less than that at which the SG Radar picked up the contact. This consistently limited range of the TBS may have been partly due to the generally poor technical adjustment of the average TBS but is also considered as an indication of the truth of the old standard rule that the normal range at which the TBS can usually be picked up is not over thirty miles. Even when a number of ships were called and relay ships were used, maximum ranges were usually limited. Despite the large number of forces operating in a small area, only once during the entire operation was interference from adjacent forces a problem. This was during a night torpedo

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attack when TF 52 and Task Groups 50.4 and 50.1 were in the same area. For a period of about half an hour, when the forces were about ten miles apart, confusion between maneuvering signals might have resulted had addresses not been plainly stated. None did result, however, and with such large forces at close quarters, the value of each force knowing instantly the movements of the other outweighed the annoyance of the interference. A desirable arrangement would be a separate TBS channel for each TF while all TF and TG Comdr. guarded both the TF TBS channel and a common inter TF TBS channel.

- (b) High frequency circuits between 2000 and 5000 kcs used by TF 53 and Tarawa landing forces were intercepted with little difficulty during the entire operation. It appeared that the Southern Attack Force had considerably more difficulty with communications than did the Northern Attack Force. There was a good deal more calling, testing and unnecessary transmission. It is believed that large power outputs were used on most circuits. Stations apparently within ten or twenty miles of each other at times and on frequencies where no skip distance was possible frequently had great difficulty in establishing and maintaining contact while CTF 52 heard both stations loud and clear. It is believed that the communication difficulties of TF 53 were largely due to untrained personnel, inadequate equipment and an insufficient number of radio technicians to keep the equipment adjusted and in operating condition. Lack of opportunity to train and rehearse personnel in communications and late receipt of the Comm Plan was probably the cause of the generally poor circuit discipline observed.
- (c) After the assault at Tarawa had been completed, and during the consolidation phase when the necessity for plain language had apparently passed, an excessive amount of plain language, which was probably of considerable value to the enemy and which was certainly intercepted by him, was heard on various circuits from the vicinity of Tarawa, such as TF common, TransDiv Warning Net, and Aircraft Control channels. It is probable that TF 52 also made some unnecessary transmissions in plain language but the use of SCR 610 reduced to a minimum the plain language on high frequency channels.

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- (d) Radio Honolulu Jump Fox proved very valuable in reducing load from standard Radio Honolulu fleet Fox, except when Jump Fox signal strength became so weak on all frequencies that messages were missed. Either Jump Fox should be made as reliable as fleet Fox, or important messages should not be placed on Jump Fox during periods of weak signals. Records were kept and graphs made to show signal strength as a function of time for various Jump Fox frequencies. In general the period from 1500 to 1900 Zebra was unreliable while in the vicinity of GALVANIC objectives. This matter will be taken up with CinCPac separately.
- (e) It appears that shore stations in the South Pacific used the 4295 series, 11030, and 13380 kcs for point to point work. Radio Funafuti and Tarawa were heard consistently during latter part of GALVANIC working 7035 in the daytime and 4015 at night. Shore stations at Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama were not heard at all during early part of GALVANIC. Radio Tarawa was heard on only one or two frequencies during the latter part of GALVANIC. It appears that more complete planning and instructions are required to set up shore radio stations at objectives. Each objective should be able to work Radio Honolulu direct to be of immediate value to forces afloat. Relays from island to island introduce unacceptable delays and garbles. Radio Honolulu is the only station now available to act as a clearing house for traffic and should so act until a station equivalent to Radio Noumea can be constructed and effectively operated at some point in the central Pacific which is closer to objectives.

10. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) Communications during GALVANIC between ships and ships, and ships and aircraft, were better than in previous operations.
- (b) Communications between ships and forces ashore at the objectives were not satisfactory, probably because of inadequate training of shore personnel at Makin and strong opposition encountered at Tarawa.

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- (c) Circuit discipline particularly on aircraft channels can and must be improved.
- (d) Early establishment of complete and coordinated communications ashore is vital to the success of the operation and must be more heavily stressed by landing force commanders.
- (e) The Comm Plan should be distributed at an earlier date. More time is required for training and organization of personnel and for calibration and adjustment of equipment.
- (f) Communication equipment for the Northern Attack Force was adequate in numbers but not in quality.
- (g) Communication equipment for the Southern Attack Force was not adequate in either amount or quality.
- (h) A larger number of more skillful radio technicians was needed in both forces, particularly ashore.
- (i) More TBS and VHF equipment is urgently needed. Ships and forces ashore require from two to six equipments depending on mission and should have a selection of several channels.
- (j) The SCR 522 and Navy Model 233A VHF are not satisfactory aboard ship or on the ground for fighter direction. A more powerful and rugged equipment is required.
- (k) Lessons learned in previous operations and needs for personnel and equipment already requested were amply confirmed.
- (l) All vessels require more training in picking up and tracking low flying aircraft.
- (m) Radio Honolulu Jump Fox is valuable to relieve load on fleet Fox but reliability of Jump Fox must be improved.
- (n) VHF, ship to shore channels, are worth a great deal of effort and should be provided for next operation if possible.
- (o) Shipboard installations and aircraft installations of BK equipment are not reliable. Equipment requires tests and adjustment; personnel require instructions.

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- (p) Vessels to be used for headquarters ships must have all transmitters specially lined up, checked and adjusted by expert radio engineers and thoroughly tested to reduce interference among channels to a minimum. Special antenna systems and wave traps may be required. Elimination of interference and reduction of noise level requires time and skill but is most essential to successful exercise of major functions of commands afloat.
- (q) Standard communication publications should be improved and brought up to date in order to reduce size of communication plans required for a specific operation.

11. RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) Prepare and distribute communication plan for next operation as soon as possible.
- (b) Designate Island Base Communication Officers at least two months in advance. Give them special training and have them assemble and train Island Base Communication Parties at least one month in advance. Designate and equip first and second echelons of Island Base Communication Parties to go ashore on D and D plus One Days to establish necessary command communications for Landing Force Commander ashore.
- (c) Provide each vessel, down to and including LST's, with TBS and SCR 610 or equivalent. Accelerate installation of second TBS in all large vessels and TBS AC heating modification in all vessels.
- (d) Provide for more drill, operation, practical use, and calibration of shipboard radio equipment while ships are in rear area.
- (e) Increase number and quantity of training of radio technicians and operators.
- (f) Provide VHF equipment for ship to shore work at outlying bases.

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- (g) Provide infra-Red and portable Radar equipment for use by amphibious forces in next operation.
- (h) Authorize a special Navy Yard project for reduction of noise levels and inter-circuit interference on flagships and headquarters ships.
- (i) Reiterate and renew previous requests for communication personnel and equipment based on recent experience in GALVANIC operation. As stated by ComCenPac, communication personnel and equipment requested have been the minimum required.

C5A/A16-3(3)

Serial 00166

FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
December 4, 1943.

Subject: Air Attack on Task Force FIFTY TWO, evening of
25 November 1943.

1. The employment of infra-red or ultra-violet light; mounted in planes, for recognizing, and following, our own aircraft.
2. Tests to see whether or not the "Black" light from engine exhausts can be made visible to other planes.
3. Tests with various types of "Black" light detectors mounted in our own planes against actual enemy planes at night.

If we could discover their secret (assuming they have one) our night fighters would have a Roman holiday.

(f) Consideration should be given to the usefulness of employing carrier or shore-based aircraft to drop float lights and flares away from friendly forces to deceive and confuse the enemy attacking a aircraft.

(g) Force Commanders and commanding officers of ships should at each attack carefully consider the question as to whether or not to open fire. In this force, standing orders existed to hold fire until range are inside 4000 yards, a good solution is obtained, and it is reasonably certain that the attacking aircraft see our ships.

(h) All ship units should exercise at making radical emergency turns in information at night in obedience to general signals sent by the TBS radio equipment.

R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:

Cominch (adv. copy)

CinCPac (adv. copy)

ComAirPac

One copy with each copy of

COMFIFTHPHIBFOR Serial 00165

H.B. Stark
H.B. STARK,
Flag Secretary.

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 Serial-00166

EXCERPT FROM CTF 52 LOG 25 NOVEMBER 1943.

Task Force 52 cruising in cruising disposition 3L2 modified, fleet axis 110°(T), base course 120°, fleet speed 15 knots, zigzagging according to zig zag plan 6. Ships present PENNSYLVANIA, NEW MEXICO, IDAHO, BALTIMORE, NEW ORLEANS, CORREGIDOR, CORAL SEA, FRANKS, MORRIS, HUGHES, HOEL, KIMBERLY, MACDONOUGH, PHELPS.

- 1810 Flagship went to General Quarters.
 Bogie, small, 000°(T), 20 miles, flyin g low.
- 1822 Bogie at 352°(T), 12 miles.
- 1824 B ogie at 016°(T), 11 miles
- 1826 Bogie at 036° (T), 10 miles, course 135°, speed 140 Kts.
- 1827 Bogie at 046° (T), 10 miles.
- 1830 Bogie at 014° (T), 10 miles.
- 1833 Bogie at 336° (T), 12 miles, New Bogie at 250° (T), 9 miles.
- 1835 Bogie #1 at 305° (T), 11 miles. Bogie #2 at 295° (T), 11 miles.
- 1838 Bogie #1 at 305° (T) 11 miles, Bogie #2 at 263°(T), 5 miles dropped float lights.
- 1841 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "All ships open fire on Bogies at 4,000 yards. Prepare to repel air attack".
- 1843 Bogie #1 at 023° (T), 3 miles, dropped float lights.
- 1844 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency tackline turn four" new course 130° (T).
- 1844½ Bogie #1 at 050° (T), 5 miles.
- 1845½ Bog ie #2 at 000°(T), 5 miles.
- 1846 Bogie #1 at 070°, 5 miles.
- 1847 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Open fire if good solution can be ob tained.
- 1847 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency tackline turn five".
 New course 180°

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 Serial 00166

- 1848 Bogie #1 at 090° (T), 6 miles.
- 1848½ New Bogie at 170° (T), 6 miles.
- 1850½ Attacking planes dropped flares ahead on port bow.
- 1850½ Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency tackline turn 12",
New course 300° (T).
- 1852 Flagship opened fire on bogie bearing 165°(T).
- 1853 Bogies reported at 163° (T), 6 miles.
- 1853½ New bogie at 305°(T), 21 miles.
- 1855 Bogie at 290°(T) 16 miles, closing.
- 1855½ New bogie reported at 061°(T), 7 miles.
- 1855½ Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn 18",
New course 120° (T).
- 1857 CTF 52 broadcast on warning net "AM being attacked by
enemy aircraft".
- 1901 Increased speed to 17 knots.
- 1902½ Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn Four"
New course 160° (T). One ship in disposition opened fire
with heavy anti-aircraft .
- 1906 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Nine Turn",
New course 070°(T).
- 1910 Flares dropped astern.
- 1912 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Three Turn",
New course 040°(T).
- 1914 Flares dropped to port very close to carriers. Signal by
CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn Six" New course
100°(T).
- 1915 BALTIMORE reported two planes overhead and opened fire.
- 1916½ Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Nine Turn"
New course 010° (T).


ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 Serial 00166

- 1917 Group of bogies reported coming in from 266°(T) estimated 12 planes at various ranges.
- 1920 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn Six" New Course 070°(T).
- 1921 Large bogie reported at 095°(T), 5 miles.
- 1921½ Southwest bogie now 220°(T), 7 miles. New group reported at 315°(T), 11 miles.
- 1923 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn Four". New course 110°(T).
- 1923½ Bogie at 220°(T), 4 miles closing. Bogie now on both quarters.
- 1924 Flagship opened fire.
- 1925 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Six Turn", New course 050°(T).
- 1925 Bogie to southwest still closing.
- 1928 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn One Two" New course 170°(T).
- 1929 Bogie to southwest now 280°(T) 2.5 miles passing astern.
- 1930 Bogie to northeastward now 100°(T), 3 miles.
- 1932 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Four Turn", New Course 130°(T).
- 1933½ Bogies astern and on port quarter, 3,000 yards closing.
- 1934 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn SIX", New course 190°(T).
- 1940 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn Six", New course 250°(T).
- 1941 Bogies reported astern closing.
- 1943 Signal by CTF 52 on TB S "Emergency Tackline Nine Turn" New course 160°(T).
- 1947 Signal by CTF 52 on TB S "Emergency Tackline One Two Zero Turn".

ENCLOSURE (A) TO CTF 52 Serial 00166

- 1950 All bogies opening and in fade.
- 1951 $\frac{1}{2}$ Bogies now bear 280°(T), 16 miles. Planes dropping flares on starboard quarter distant 16 miles.
- 1952 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tackline Turn Four" New course 160°(T).
- 1954 Two groups bogies at 284°(T), 18 miles. Flares dropped by these groups.
- 1957 Report received TG 50.2 under attack by enemy aircraft.
- 2000 Signal by CTF 52 on TBS "Emergency Tack line Four Turn" New Course 120°(T).
- 2002 Radar screen clear of all bogies.
- 2000 Position Lat. 2 - 51.5 N
Long 173-44.3 E

[REDACTED]




**AIR ATTACK ON TASK FORCE 52
1823 to 2000, 25 NOVEMBER 1943**

**2000 POSITION: Lat. 2° 51.5' N
Long. 173° 44.3' E**

Enclosure (B)

PRISIC 31206-2

0 1 2 3 4 5 miles



CRUISING DISPOSITION 3L2 (Modified)

Enclosure (C)

PRISIC 31206-2 A