

## FOREWORD

This typescript, the transcribed memoir of General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Retired) results from a series of tape-recorded interviews conducted with him at his home in Warrenton, Virginia on 27 July and 4 August 1966 and in La Jolla, California on 13, 16, and 22 February 1967, for the Marine Corps Oral History Program. As one facet of the Marine Corps historical collection effort, this program obtains by means of tape-recorded interviews, primary source material to augment documentary evidence.

Oral History is essentially spoken history, the oral recall of eyewitness impressions and observations recorded accurately on tape in the course of an interview conducted by an historian or an individual employing historical methodology and possibly the techniques of a journalist. The final product is a verbatim transcript containing historically valuable personal narratives relating to noteworthy professional experiences and observations from active duty, reserve, and retired distinguished Marines.

General Shepherd has read the transcript and made only minor corrections and emendations. The reader is asked to bear in mind, therefore, that he is reading a transcript of the spoken rather than the written word. General Shepherd has placed a restriction of OPEN on the use of both his interview tapes and transcripts. This means that a potential user may read the transcript or audit the recording upon presentation of appropriate credentials.

Copies of this memoir are deposited in the Marine Corps Oral History Collection, Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; Special Collections, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.; Oral History Collection, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md.; the Superintendent, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia; and the Manuscript Collection, Breckinridge Library, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Va. Under terms of their custodianship, none of the above is permitted to reproduce either oral history transcripts or the interview tapes themselves, nor are they permitted to make them available through interlibrary loan. The transcripts must be read only where they are held in collection, while the interview tapes may be audited only at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

(Signed)

E.H. SIMMONS

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GENERAL LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR., USMC (RETIRED)

On 1 October 1959, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., United States Marine Corps, retired from active duty after forty-two years and six months distinguished service to his Corps and country.

Born on February 10, 1896, in Norfolk, Virginia, General Shepherd is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps on April 11, 1917, and, on May 19, reported for active duty at the Marine Barracks, Port Royal, South Carolina.

Less than a month later, Lieutenant Shepherd sailed for France as a member of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, with the first elements of the American Expeditionary Forces. He served in defensive sectors in the vicinity of Verdun and participated in the Aisne-Marne offensive (Chateau-Thierry) where he was twice wounded in action at Belleau Wood during the fighting there in June of 1918. Upon returning to the front in August, he rejoined the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines and saw action in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) offensive where he was wounded for the third time.

For his gallantry in action at Belleau Wood, Lieutenant Shepherd was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Cross, the Navy Cross, the French Croix de Guerre, and was cited in the general orders of the 2nd Infantry Division, American Expeditionary Forces.

After duty with the Army of Occupation in Germany, Captain Shepherd sailed for home in July 1919. In September, he returned to France for duty in connection with the preparation of relief maps of the battlefields over which the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade of Marines had fought.

Upon Captain Shepherd's return to the U.S. in December 1920, he was assigned as Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant and Aide at the White House. In July 1922, he was assigned duty in command of a selected company of Marines at the Brazilian Exposition at Rio de Janeiro.

In June of 1923, Captain Shepherd was ordered to sea duty as Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment, USS Idaho. This tour was followed by duty at the Marine Barracks, Norfolk, Virginia, where he commanded the Sea School. In April 1927, Captain Shepherd sailed for expeditionary duty in China, where he served in the 3d Marine Brigade in Tientsin and Shanghai. Upon returning to the United States in 1929, he attended the Field Officers' Course, Marine Corps Schools. After graduation, Captain Shepherd was assigned overseas again, this time on detached duty with the Garde d'Haiti where he served for four years as a District and Department Commander.

Following the withdrawal of Marines from Haiti in 1934, Major Shepherd was detailed to the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., as Executive Officer and as Registrar of the Marine Corps Institute.

Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1936, he was assigned to the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. Following graduation in May 1937, he commanded the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, part of the newly formed Fleet Marine Force, which was being extensively employed in the development of amphibious tactics and techniques.

In June 1939, he was ordered to the Staff of the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, where he served during the next three years as Director, Correspondence School; Chief of the Tactical Section; Officer in Charge of the Candidates Class, and Assistant Commandant.

In March 1942, four months after this country's entry into World War II, Colonel Shepherd was ordered to command the 9<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment. He organized, trained, and took this unit overseas as part of the 3d Marine Division.

Upon appointment to general officer rank in July 1943, while serving on Guadalcanal, Brigadier General Shepherd was assigned as Assistant Division Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. In this capacity, he participated in the Cape Gloucester operation on New Britain from December 1943 through March 1944, where he was awarded a Legion of Merit for distinguished service in command of the operations in the Borgen Bay area.

In May 1944, General Shepherd assumed command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Provisional Marine Brigade and led this organization in the invasion and subsequent recapture of Guam during July and August of 1944.

For distinguished leadership in this operation, the General received his first Distinguished Service Medal, and was promoted to Major General.

After organizing the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division from the Brigade, Major General Shepherd commanded it throughout the Okinawa Operation and subsequently took the Division to Tsingtao, China. There, on October 25, 1945, he received the surrender of the Japanese forces in this area.

For exceptionally meritorious service as Commanding General of the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division in the assault and occupation of Okinawa (1 April to 21 June 1945) he was awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal. The citation for this decoration reads in part: "Schooled by grim experience in the art of countering Japanese strategies, Major General Shepherd organized a major Marine Corps fighting unit for the second time within a year, planned its commitment into battle with brilliant military acumen . . . and demonstrated a superior ability to use the men and weapons at his command. His indomitable courage and astute judgment were important factors in the success of his division's operations."

Several months later, the General returned to the United States and in March 1946, organized the Troop Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet, at Little Creek, Virginia. On November 1 of the same year, he was ordered to duty as Assistant to the Commandant and Chief-of-Staff of Marine Corps Headquarters. He remained at this post until April 1948, when he was assigned to Quantico, Virginia, where he served as Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools until June, 1950.

When the Korean War erupted, General Shepherd was in command of the Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, with Headquarters at Pearl Harbor. In this capacity, he participated in the landing at Inchon and the evacuation of our forces from Hungnam following the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea in December 1950. On 1 January 1952, he was appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps by the President of the United States.

During General Shepherd's four year appointment as the 20<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps he initiated a number of important policies which resulted in an increased military proficiency of the Corps. He was the first commandant to become a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and upon his retirement on 1 January 1956, he was awarded a third Distinguished Service Medal. President Eisenhower's citation read in part: "His far-sighted understanding of our national objectives, dedicated as they are to the establishment of enduring peace throughout the world, has likewise earned him the keen regard of the most important policy making organizations of this country. This distinguished officer's contribution to the Government of the United States during 39 years of unfaltering devotion in both war and peace, reflects the highest credit up himself and the United States Naval Service."

Two months after his retirement, General Shepherd was recalled to active duty and appointed Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. During the three and a half years of service with this international organization, General Shepherd by his leadership and diplomacy, made substantial contributions towards plans for the defense of the continent and the promotion of military solidarity among the military forces of the Republics of this Hemisphere. Upon the relinquishment of his duties with the Inter-American Defense Board on 15 September 1959, General Shepherd received a commendatory letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which reads in part as follows: "During a period of many world tensions, your dynamic leadership has imparted new vigor to the Inter-American Defense Board. The record lists numerous tangible accomplishments reflecting your superb attainments. Furthermore, there have been splendid achievements of an intangible nature, far-reaching in promoting hemispheric solidarity. As a result of your continuing efforts, the Inter-American Defense Board has maintained a stature unequalled in its history and has become a positive factor in the destiny of the Western Hemisphere."

In addition to the Navy Cross; Distinguished Service Cross; Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars and the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster; his decorations and medals include the Silver Star with two Oak Leaf Clusters, France 1918 and Korea 1950; Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a second Legion of Merit, China 1945;

Bronze Star, China 1945; Purple Heart with two Oak Leaf Clusters, France 1918 and one Gold Star, Okinawa; Presidential Unit Citation with three Bronze Stars, Okinawa and Korea; Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star, Guam and Cape Gloucester; Victory Medal World War I with four Bronze Stars, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, and Defensive Sector Clasp, France 1918; Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star, China 1927-28, Haiti 1930; Yangtze Service Medal, Shanghai, China 1927; American Defense Service medal; American Campaign Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with four Bronze Stars; China Service Medal, 1945; Victory Medal World War II; Navy Occupation Service Medal with two Bronze Stars; United Nations Service Medal; Korean Service Medal with two Bronze Stars; United Nations Service Medal; French Croix de Guerre with Gilt Star, France 1918; French Fourragère, France 1918; Médaille pour la Bravoure Militaire (Monténégro) with crossed swords and palm; Haitian Order of Honor and Merit; Haitian Distinguished Service Medal; Order of the Cloud and Banner, Second Grade, China; Republic of Korea Order of Military Merit Taiguk Medal with Gold Star; Korean Presidential Unit Citation; Bronze Plaque with Diploma Commemorative Especial, Brazil 1922-23; Naval Order of Merit, Grand Officer Argentine 1955; Naval Order of Merit, Grand Officer Brazil 1955; Grand Cross of Naval Merit of Spain 1955; Abdon Calderon, First Class, Republic of Ecuador 1955; Military Order of the Ayacucho, Grand Officer, Peru 1956; Grand Cross, National Order of Merit of Paraguay 1956; Medal of Military Merit of Mexico, First Class 1955; Legion of Honor, Grade of Commander, France 1957; Brazilian Order of Military Merit, Degree of Grand Officer, 1959; Commander of the Order of Couronne, Belgium, 1959; National Order of Military Merit of Paraguay, Grade of Grand Officer, 1959.

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General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Retired) – 20<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps – General Shepherd’s home, Leeton Forest, Warrenton, Virginia – July 27, 1966.

Benis M. Frank – Head, Oral History Unit, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarter Marine Corps.

Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Retired)

Q (Heinl): The Corps never had a better time than when you were Commandant, General.

Shepherd: Well, thanks to the fine staff I had. You boys really supported me. You, Jerry, Brute, and others. I think we did accomplish a great deal for the good of the Corps.

Q (Heinl): The Marine Corps made more progress in those four years, and it’s not back yet where it was before I think, General.

Shepherd: Of course, I always feel that General Cates was the officer who really deserved more credit than anyone else to save the Marine Corps from destruction during the period he was Commandant. He was the one who took the rap and stood up and was counted when President Truman called the Marine Corps a Police Force.

(Irrelevant conversation concerning a diary kept by my grandfather who was a Nantucket Whaling Captain which has prompted me to write the story of my life.)

Q: Before we go one, I’ve got an official duty to perform. This is Tape One, Side One of an interview with General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., United States Marine Corps (Retired). The date is 27 July, 1966. We are interviewing General Shepherd at his home in Leeton Forest, Warrenton, Virginia. The interviewer is Benis M. Frank, Historian, Historical Branch, and accompanying me is Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., United States Marine Corps (Retired). Would you say a few words, Colonel Heinl, so that the transcriber can recognize your voice as opposed to mine?

Q (Heinl): Yes, I will simply explain that my principal involvement in this interview is to talk to General Shepherd a little bit about the Inchon operation in 1950 of which he was a participant, and in which he served as General MacArthur’s amphibious advisor. I will be playing a wholly secondary role in the mainstream of the transcription:

Q: All right. Well, suppose I start off with the earlier things I said I was going to talk about and we’ll lead up to Inchon. The Part VI, which is the concluding part of Volume V, which is the last volume in the five-volume World War II histories, says “Conclusion.” Actually we brought up many matters which had not been dealt with previously in the other four volumes. A wad of new material cropped up, but we tried to give a review

primarily, indicating the development of amphibious doctrine, techniques, based on what had been started in '33.

Now you were aide to General Lejeune, I believe, in 1921, sir. And the so-called Father of Marine strategy in the Pacific was Lieutenant Colonel Earl Ellis, Pete Ellis, whom, as I understand, was very close to Lejeune. Is that correct, sir?

Shepherd: That's right.

Q: Can you tell us anything about Ellis? Was he the one and only, I mean was he the only farsighted individual or were there other people who felt much the same as he did? In other words was Ellis the leading prophet of the importance of the Pacific in a war with Japan.

Shepherd: That is a difficult question. I was a young captain serving as a personal aide to General Lejeune. In those days the aides didn't get into the operational picture so to speak. We looked after the generals social engagements and I rode with him every morning, from the Commandant's house to Headquarters, but the aides were not in on planning or major decisions.

I remember Pete Ellis when he was on duty at headquarters. I believe he was in Naval Intelligence, wasn't he?

Q: Yes sir. He was in ONI working on the Orange Plan.

Shepherd: That's right. And I remember him going in to see the Commandant from time to time but at the time I didn't realize his foresightedness about the Pacific. Of course we all knew that the Pacific probably would be our next battlefield with the Japanese as our enemies. But I, I didn't know at that time that Ellis was a great student of amphibious warfare.

Let me go back a moment. After the fighting was over in World War I I was assigned to the Fourth Brigade Headquarters in Germany as an assistant to Major Barrett, who relieved Pete Ellis as the Operation Officer of the brigade. Am I correct on that?

Q: Yes, sir. Ellis started out as the brigade Adjutant but became engaged in operations.

Shepherd: During the latter part of World War I, Ellis was the Operations Officer for the Fourth Marine Brigade. In those days we didn't have a modern staff, one, two, three, and four. We only had a skeletonized brigade headquarters which Ellis ran. General Neville was the Brigade Commander. But Pete Ellis, as far back as World War I, was known to the rank and file as being a brilliant officer but he had a great weakness as all of you know – for overindulgence in alcoholic beverages.

Q: Yes.

Shepherd: After the war when we were in Germany I was selected, I never knew just why, as one of General Neville's aides.

At that time Pete Ellis was just leaving to return to the United States, so I never had the opportunity to know him personally.

As I recall Pete Ellis at that time had the reputation as being an outstanding tactician. He wrote all the operation orders for the Brigade. I mean the Brigade attack orders for the Champagne and Argonne battles.



Pete Ellis was the officer who did all the one, two, three, and four staff work. Major Barrett succeeded Ellis as the Brigade Chief-of-Staff and also did the one, two, three, and four work. I mean he was the entire Brigade Staff. We had a Captain Galliford who was an aide to General Neville. And I was brought to the Brigade Staff as Barrett's Assistant but at the time there wasn't any tactical work as we were on occupational duty. We came home a couple of months after I was assigned to the Brigade Staff so I really didn't get into any staff planning except in preparing the orders to return to the United States. In those days most orders that came from Division headquarters were simply passed down to the regiments.

Although I never had the opportunity to know Ellis he was highly thought of throughout the Fourth Brigade. To come back to your question, when I was in headquarters in 1921 Ellis' name was legend but I was unaware of any farsighted planning for war in the Pacific that he might have done.

I do recall though that he went out to the Mandated Islands and didn't come back. There was considerable discussion about it. I remember that it was always a question as to whether Pete Ellis was murdered or whether he drank himself to death. I've often heard the question discussed, then and later, as to what occurred. No one will ever know. I remember – it's coming back to me now – I remember General Lejeune tried to get a report from the hospital, the Yokohama Hospital. Their story with which you are familiar was that he had gone out on a reconnaissance of Peleliu. That he was on a secret mission. Of course they didn't bring that out. The last thing that was known of Ellis is that he'd gone out with some fisherman and a case of liquor in his boat, and they never knew what happened to him. There was at that time, a question whether Pete Ellis was really murdered or done away with by the Japanese. Looking back on it now with what I know of the Japanese, I suspect them of skullduggery.

Q: Yes.

Shepherd: The consensus of opinion at the time was that he had –

Q: Drunk himself to death.

Shepherd: Yes, - drunk himself into a stupor and may have died from sunstroke in the heat of the tropics.

Q: Well, I don't know whether you've read –

Shepherd: You agree with me, Bob, on that? I mean, I'm asking Bob, isn't that more or less the story as you know it?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. Actually there is a sequel to the story. Waite Worden, one of our younger officers, I don't know if you know him or not, was the Barracks Commander at Guam right after the war.

Shepherd: Yes.

Q (Heinl): And he made a trip down to the Palaus and turned up some evidence or quasi-evidence which suggest that Ellis was probably fed poisoned liquor. The Japanese observed him for a time and, at a given point, gave him

some, no doubt a bottle of poisoned Suntori. Because of this, he was remembered by a couple of people that Worden talked to, and one of them described the way he was given some liquor by the Japanese and died that night.

Q: You know that to be true?

Shepherd: It's conclusive, then.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Q: John Kaluf, Colonel John Kaluf, a member of the First Division Association was at a board meeting about a year and a half ago. We were talking about this, and he said during the height of the battle on Palau, one of his men came to him with a sign and said, "Colonel, look. I found this sign with Ellis', Earl Ellis' name on it." They were in the midst of fighting a battle and the man disappeared and the sign disappeared.

Shepherd: Speaking of Japanese liquor, I remember when I was making a trip to Japan where I met Mrs. Shepherd in 1927. I was at Tientsin, China. General Butler had given me permission to meet her in Kobe. While returning on a Japanese ship we stopped at Shimonoseki. I went ashore just (to) walk around while the ship stopped there for a couple of hours. I stopped at a liquor store and I looked on a shelf. There were all the brands of whiskey, famous brands, Black Label Scotch, Red Label Scotch, and many others so I purchased several bottles to take aboard ship with me. When I tried some of this whiskey it was God-awful stuff, just Japanese imitation of, Scotch whiskey. It was so bad that I couldn't drink it. And along that line, I recall when we took Saipan, (I wasn't there when we took it, but I went over there a month or so later from Guam) we found a distillery where the Japanese made whiskey from sugarcane. They had a box of labels with every known brand of whiskey, but they put the same damn liquor in each bottle and pasted on a Johnny Walker's Black Label or some other brand name label using the same liquor. I saw with my own eyes a line of cases of whiskey with different brand named labels. All made from rum with different flavorings. Did you ever see that? Were you ever there?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Q: Well, you know when the First Division went up to Tientsin in '45 from Taku Flats –

Shepherd: Were you there in Tientsin in '45?

Q: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Shepherd: Well, that's when I got over there.

Q: Well, we went up, I remember going up on a train. It had Chinese boys selling Black Label, Red Label and famous brands. And a couple of the people going up to Tientsin died or took very sick and later found out what they had done was to take red-hot wires and bore through the bottom of the bottle, withdraw the whiskey in there and put anything you can imagine in instead.

Shepherd: That was a famous stunt of the Chinese.

Q: Let's talk about Ellis' death again.

Shepherd: It may have been some of the poor Japanese liquor, but I don't hold it above the Japanese to have poisoned him. It will always be a question whether Ellis was killed intentionally or whether he just drunk himself to death.

Q: Ellis Zacharias was a Navy Captain.

Shepherd: I knew Zacharias. He was living in Shanghai when I was there.

Q: Well he was a Japanese language expert and student at the time and, I guess, a member of the ONI. And then his book, "Secret Missions" it is, only once or twice. Ellis' mentioned the fact that there was a drunken Marine Lieutenant Colonel out there. Now whether he wrote this book after the war, or whether he based this comment on his memories or what he'd read or whether this was actually the fact is unknown.

Shepherd: Zacharias was up the Yangtze at the time. This was in '27. I was out there in '28 in Shanghai, and his wife lived at the same French pension where Mrs. Shepherd and I boarded. Zacharias' ship was in and out of Shanghai. When it was in port Zacharias stayed at the pension. I remember the name distinctly and later on he became famous as a Japanese expert.

Q: General, what sort of a fellow, aside from his drinking habits was, was Ellis? Just what was he like?

Shepherd: Well as I recall him, he was a rather tall, thin man, with blue-eyes.

Q: Did he look a little bit like Brute in the face?

Shepherd: I wouldn't say that he did.

Q: There's a photograph which gives him the same kind of eyes as Brute, very sharp, bright, alert eyes.

Shepherd: He had sharp, alert, bright eyes, yes. But his height was taller as I remember, and he had a thinner face, as I recall it. But, I never thought of that comparison. Frankly I didn't see him very often. I mean he was in the aides' office only once or twice. Ellis' mission was very hush, hush. There was another officer in the Marine Intelligence Section who claimed to be an authority on Japan by the name of Reynolds. Did you ever hear of Reynolds?

Q: R-E-Y-N-O-L-D-S?

Shepherd: Kidney Foot Reynolds. Dave Barry and I used to call him "Ssh, Ssh," because he wouldn't talk on account of being in ONI. He always whispered. He was a queer old duck and used to come pattering up the stairs, peep in the door to see if anyone was in the office before entering. A super secret fellow – whom Dave and I used to make fun of.

But, Ellis I didn't know very well.

Q: As far as the mystique about him, in fact, I believe he was an enlisted man in about 1907.

Shepherd: I wouldn't know.

Q: Could that have been possible?

Shepherd: No, Well I don't know. I mean I don't think that he could have been an enlisted man and been so brainy. Ellis had this reputation in the Marine Corps as being one of the brainiest men in the Corps on staff work. It had

been said General George Marshall was a brainy Staff Officer during World War I when he was on Pershing's staff. Well Pete Ellis had the same kind of mind. I know they depended on him at Brigade headquarters. Where he was the Chief-of-Staff, G-one, two, three, and four. Even as far down as, the company and platoon, Pete Ellis' name was legend during World War I but I have heard he was a heavy drinker after the fighting in France was over and the Brigade was on occupational duty on the Rhine.

Barrett was picked to take over from Ellis. It was after Ellis had returned to the United States that I was ordered to the Fourth Brigade Headquarters to be Barrett's assistant on the staff. He wanted somebody to help him and I was fortunate to have the opportunity to do so. I earned my staff pay in those days, but I learned a lot. This leads to Barrett's role "in amphibious operations in later years.

In my opinion, Charlie Barrett was, with all due respect to General Holcomb whom I admire, the officer who contributed more than anyone else in the Marine Corps toward the broad concept of amphibious operations. You may not agree with me, and I admit my opinion may be influenced by my great devotion to Charlie Barrett. I knew him personally and discussed amphibious doctrine with him on many occasions. He was closer to me than my father. I mean, I say professionally. My father was a doctor in Norfolk, and I seldom saw him when I was a boy because he was practicing medicine night and day. He had the biggest obstetrical practice in Virginia and was gone all the time. But I grew to know Charlie Barrett intimately especially when we went back to France together after the war to make a relief map of the Belleau Wood Battlefield.

During this period we became close friends. Some years later I was a student in the senior class of the Marine Corps Schools while he was an instructor. Barrett had just come back from the Ecole d'Guerre in France and was well versed in modern warfare. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the amphibious concept. I recall his discussing sending reconnaissance patrols ashore from a submarine. He said: now we send out patrols when we are engaged in combat ashore to determine the strength and location of the enemy. He once said to me, "Why can't we send patrols off a submarine to make a reconnaissance of the hostile shore line and locate the enemy's defenses?" This was the concept, which was often followed during World War II, of making a reconnaissance of the beaches before a landing was made. This is an example of Barrett's forward thinking on amphibious operations for which I believe historians should give him full credit.

Maybe Ellis was the first Marine to foresee the need for the development of amphibious operations to be employed in the Pacific in the event of war with Japan. But Barrett, in my opinion, was the officer who contributed more than anyone else to the development envisioned by Ellis in so far as the doctrine and employment of troops in a landing operation is concerned without detracting from General Holcomb or

General Holland Smith who later carried out the tactical and logistical procedures formulated in the Marine Corps Schools while Barrett was an instructor.

Q: In my own field, in naval gunfire support, I know that Barrett gave Ansel, who was there on the staff of the school in those days, Admiral Ansel, gave Ansel a lot of the initial ideas, a lot of the initial concepts that were later brought forward for example and made practical by Don Weller.

Shepherd: Yes, that is correct.

Q (Heinl): Ansel was rather skeptical about what naval gunfire could do as many naval officers were. Barrett had figures that he had gotten at the Ecole d'Guerre on the amount of saturation that was required to get effective neutralization in an attack against various types of fortified positions, in which the French had had a long and often tragic experience. Barrett sat down and started trying to transpose these calculations into terms of what you could get out of the existing batteries of the various types of ships, and somehow set Ansel on fire, and he remembers it to this day. Barrett, according to Ansel, was the moving force in this achievement, General.

Shepherd: That's right. You are substantiating what I just said.

My first association with Barrett was when I was ordered to the Fourth Brigade Headquarters while I was on occupation duty on the Rhine following the Armistice of World War I. Are you interested?

Q: Yes, sir. Keep right on.

Shepherd: I was ordered to Brigade Headquarters in July, just after the Army of Occupation on the Rhine began its march on Berlin before the Germans signed the peace treaty. You know they wouldn't sign, so we started marching and got up to the border of the occupied zone. This move forced the Germans to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919.

Q: That was when Foch moved?

Shepherd: Yes, moved forward. I had the leading company of the Second Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines which was the advance guard. The battalion was ordered to jump off at nine o'clock at night. We were lined up on the perimeter ready to go at eight o'clock that night when we received word that the Germans had signed and to return to our billets. Upon my return to Segendorf I found orders assigning me to the Staff of the Fourth Marine Brigade. It was very soon after that the Brigade returned to the States. Barrett was the Brigade Chief-of-Staff and I served directly under him so had the opportunity to become well acquainted with him and learned to admire his fine qualities and able mind. Just to show you how the man's brain worked, he had a forward thinking concept about history. He said, now Belleau Woods is the greatest battle in which the Marines have participated in a long time. We should make a relief map of this battlefield. You know he was a great cartographer. That was his specialty. I mean he was an expert in topography which he had taught at the Marine Corps Schools. He said, "I think we ought to go back to Belleau Woods and make a relief map of the area for historical purposes."

In those days there weren't but two relief maps in the United States, one up at Gettysburg and – I forgot where the other one was.

Q: Down in Atlanta, I think, wasn't the other, General?

Shepherd: Maybe so, I really don't know but I think Barrett had gotten the idea from the relief map showing the battlefield at Gettysburg where he had taken classes from the Marine Corps Schools to study this historic battle. During the voyage from France to the United States Barrett said, to me, "I think we ought to make a map of Belleau Woods because it is of great historical significance to the Marine Corps, it's the greatest battle that Marine Corps has ever participated in. If I can arrange to return to France to make a map of Belleau Woods, would you like to go with me?" Since I had studied Civil Engineering at college and was well versed in topography I told Barrett I would like to go with him. Barrett obtained authority to carry out his proposal to make a relief map of Belleau Woods. Upon the disbandment of the Brigade at Quantico we organized a mapping detachment consisting of four officers who were familiar with map making and six enlisted men to be rodmen and automobile drivers. We obtained transits, drawing boards and other engineering equipment from the Marine Corps Schools and within two weeks we sailed back to France.

Q: After arrival in the States?

Shepherd: Yes. I'd been gone over two years and only had time to have a weekend with my parents. We went right back to France, sailing from New York to Brest. The ship on which we obtained passage was the Sol Navis, a war time freighter with very poor accommodations and could travel at a speed of only 12 knots.

Q (Heinl): Were you married then, General?

Shepherd: No.

Q (Heinl): Well then you were a bachelor going back to France.

Shepherd: Yes, that's right.

Q (Heinl): Tell us about the relief map, you were planning to make.

Shepherd: Since Major Barrett was an accomplished Cartographer he envisioned making a topographical map from which a relief map could be reproduced in plaster-of-paris. The scale of the map was 1 to 100 or one inch on the map represented one hundred feet on the ground. Such a large scale map would show ever terrain feature in detail – woods, fields, farms and individual houses in the villages included in the area.

Since the only relief map of any size in existence at the time was the one of the Gettysburg battlefield made many years previously, we became pioneers in the field of relief maps before the project was completed and originated several unique techniques in their construction.

The France Map Detachment, as our unit was officially named, consisted of Major Barrett in command, Captain Cumming operated the transit and I did the sketching. The two enlisted men were used as rodmen. Barrett, with a draftsman, transferred the topographical sketches the two parties made in the field to a master map in his office.

In addition to the sketching parties, Barrett took along an enlisted artist who made colored drawings of the houses platted on the map and a warrant officer by the name of Gustav Broadstrum modeled the houses in clay and painted them to correspond to the original dwellings.

The terrain Major Barrett assigned to be mapped included all of Belleau Wood and an area of equal size to the west which included Hill 142 and Le Mares Farm where the Fifth Marines had stopped the German attack prior to the Fourth Brigade assault on Belleau Wood.

The mapping of the area took about three months. Following our return to Quantico it took six months to complete the relief map which was about sixteen feet square. The map was placed in the National Museum in Washington and received favorable comment by all who viewed it. A Marine who had lost his arm in combat at Belleau Wood was assigned duty at the museum to describe the battle. For years this Marine Corps exhibit provided an excellent public relations media for the Corps. After World War II the Belleau Wood relief map was returned to the Marine Corps and stored at Quantico.

It was while I was assigned to the France Map Detachment that I came to know Major Barrett intimately and I learned to admire his outstanding character and professional ability. Our friendship continued throughout the years and it gave me great pleasure to serve as one of his regimental commanders when he became commanding general of the First Marine Division during the early part of World War II.

Q: Life Magazine recently came out with a fiftieth anniversary of World War I. It showed how the battlefield still was in bad condition, how they were still finding bones, and so on. What was the condition of, say, Belleau Wood when you went back there within less than two years after the battle?

Shepherd: I am sure this was the condition of many of the battlefields which were fought over for several years such as Verdun and Blanc Mont in the Champagne. Belleau Woods was only fought over for a couple of months so it wasn't as bad as some of the others. When I revisited Blanc Mont, where I had also fought in 1918. The trenches were still there. They were quite obvious because the ground was a chalky soil. You know the chalk is a little below the surface of the earth, so everywhere there was a trench dug there was a white line.

There was one instance in the vicinity of Belleau Wood when we were mapping the area that we found, in a well, the skeletons of a Marine and a German or rather the bodies of a Marine and a German; they still had on their uniforms which identified them. Whether they were fighting and fell in the well, I don't know but we recovered their remains and buried them in the cemetery. We also found bodies of Marines and Germans in the grass and thickets where they had died during the battle and their remains not located subsequently. The battle of Belleau Wood was fought in the summer of 1918, and this was the fall of 1919. Just a

year and a half later. So there were still bodies around that nobody had buried while the battle was going on.

Q: Did they have graves registration teams?

Shepherd: They were just beginning to operate and were making the cemetery at Belleau Wood – not making the cemetery but just bringing the bodies there for burial.

Q (Heinl): That's the cemetery where the Army Battle Monument Commission would never let us put a Marine Corps emblem on, if you remember, General.

Shepherd: Not until I became Commandant. You've seen this monument. (Pointing to a photograph of the Marine Monument in Belleau Wood.) You've been there, of course.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. I certainly have.

Shepherd: Do you know how this was accomplished?

Q: That's when you went over, wasn't it sir, to dedicate it at the ceremony?

Shepherd: I was over in France to attend a meeting of NATO while I was Commandant and went to Belleau Woods. The Woods were very beautiful in the spring when I visited the cemetery but there wasn't one single marker anywhere showing that the Marines took Belleau Woods nor that it was named "Bois de Brigade de la Marine."

Q (Heinl): The "Bois de la Brigade de la Marine" was given this name by the French Corps Commander, under which the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade served, in honor of their courageous action there in WWI.

Shepherd: There's a cemetery, yes. And here's a good Marine that fought with the Fifth Regiment during the Battle of Belleau Wood.

Q (Heinl): You couldn't see anything but dead Marines in that cemetery, but there was no Marine emblem anywhere in sight.

Shepherd: There never was one there. There was no marker to show that the Marines were there. And I got very much upset about it not only having fought there but also mapped it. And I came back determined we must do something about this oversight on the Army's part.

I happened to be in Korea right after this trip. I remember so well. We went to the mess of the Sixth Marines, which Tommy Tompkins commanded.

Q: Fifth Marines, sir.

Shepherd: Perhaps it was the Fifth Marines.

Q: I was in Fifth Marines, sir, on the staff –

Shepherd: You were there? Well, we went to luncheon at the regimental mess located at a house with a large porch.

Q: Yes, sir. It was right up on a hill.

Shepherd: During my conversation with a group of officers I told them this story. I said, "You know I just came back from a trip to France and visited Belleau Woods. To my surprise there's nothing to show that Belleau Woods was, captured by the Marines. Of course I know it. You know it, but fifty years from now when my grandchildren visit Belleau Wood they will not know that the Marines captured it from the Germans in WWI." I said,



“There should be something there to identify Belleau Wood by, the official name given it by the French government – “Bois de la Brigade de la Marine.” Colonel Tompkins didn’t say anything but a month later I received a check for around \$1500 with a note saying, “The officers and men of this regiment send you this in memory of our former comrades to help towards putting up some sort of a marker at Belleau Wood.”

Q: Yes, sir.

Shepherd: I think this was a fine thing for Tompkins to have done. I’m a great admirer of Tompkins. He’s a great fellow and he did that on his own. Well that contribution started the fund for the erection of a Marine Monument and marker at Belleau Wood. Since the Army Battle Monuments Commission were apparently not going to do anything about it.

Q (Heinl): You know this came to my attention in 1949. Nancy and I made a trip to Europe my first, and I went with Nancy, I went to Belleau Wood. And when I got back as an individual officer, I wrote a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, yes, sir. And put the Army on the report, then, and said that I felt it was a disgrace to the Marine Corps that this condition existed. I found out later it shook up General Cates. It actually got to his notice. But there were a million bureaucratic reasons imposed, you know the kind, why it would be inopportune, and, it wasn’t the right time for us to talk to the Army about it, and so on, and it finally got filed.

Shepherd: His action was right because that time General Cates had more important things to worry about.

Q (Heinl): Yes, he had bigger battles to fight.

Shepherd: Yes, I mean that it was during the Korean War and the unification of the armed services battle in Washington. I didn’t know about your having written this letter but I was so taken aback that there wasn’t anything there to show that Belleau Woods was captured by Marines that I determined to do something about it. When I returned to Washington I found we didn’t have any fund that could be used for such a project and of course we’d never get an appropriation from Congress for it.

Q: No.

Shepherd: After receiving the donation from Tompkins Fifth Marines, I sent out a plea to the Sixth Marines in an effort to get more money. I’ve forgotten how we got the money together. Then I contacted Felix de Weldon who I had helped in financing the deficit he had incurred in the erection of the Iwo Jima Monument which is now called the Marine Memorial located in Arlington.

Q (Heinl): Hadn’t it just!

Shepherd: You know the Reserves originally undertook to finance this monument but were unable to raise sufficient funds for its erection. When I became CMC I sent out a plea to all officers to contribute a dollar each in an effort to obtain sufficient money for this monument. After a second and third follow-up letter we raised enough money to get Felix out of the hole and

the statue erected. It was a great achievement for de Welden and the Marine Corps. Felix has always been grateful for my help in getting his project off dead center. So I asked Felix to design a small monument on which a suitable plaque would be placed quoting the French General Order renaming Belleau Wood the “Bois de la Brigade de la Marine.” Felix submitted several drawings of a proposed statue and the one I chose is the statue that now stands in Belleau Wood. To my mind it’s a great statue.

Q (Heinl): A splendid thing.

Shepherd: It’s, it’s a bas-relief in bronze on a black granite slab. We had a great deal of difficulty getting the black granite from Sweden into France. Colonel Gordon West, who had been my aide and was on duty in Paris, finally was able to have the granite slab cleared through the French customs and the monument erected just prior to my arrival on the trip I had scheduled to France with several other former World War I Marine Officers for the unveiling. We went over in November just before I retired. It was a wonderful ceremony. And now I think we have something to be proud of at Belleau Wood and I will be grateful forever to Felix de Weldon for this statue.

But we have gotten away from the subject we began discussing – amphibious operations. We started talking about amphibious operations but I got off on this tangent by saying that I think Charlie Barrett had a great vision, especially about the future of amphibious operations. You spoke about his figuring out certain tables on the effect of Naval Gunfire based on figures he had obtained on the destructiveness of artillery fire at the Ecole de Guerre in France. He did that. He came back from France and was an instructor in the Marine Corps Schools when I was a student. After his tour at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, he commanded the brigade stationed there, didn’t he?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: The brigade went down to (the) Caribbean on maneuvers each spring. I was in the First Battalion of the Fifth then.

Q (Heinl): Barrett had the Fifth Regiment in 1937. In fact I was a Second Lieutenant with General Clements in the First Battalion.

Shepherd: I commanded the 2nd Battalion of the Fifth at the time. Our battalions fought like cats and dogs down there. Well, you know how it was.

Q (Heinl): We sure did. (Laughter)

Shepherd: But we had a lot of esprit that was a great thing. Now to return to the amphibious exercises we conducted. It was during that period, Bob, that we developed many of the concepts and much of the equipment that we used in World War II.

Q (Heinl): We made it practical in those days, General.

Shepherd: I remember the list of tests I had to make down there. It seems to me there were thirty-six projects on it. They were laid out – what to do, how to do it, test it out, give a report. I did nothing but write reports and you probably did too.

Q (Heinl): I had a project to fire an 81 millimeter mortar from the bow of a forty-foot motor launch underway toward the beach to see what kind of accuracy we could get.

Shepherd: That was one of Colonel Sammy Harrington's ideas.

Q (Heinl): We sure couldn't get any accuracy off it.

Shepherd: It was Harrington I believe but it may have been Barrett. The idea was to try to use these mortars just like artillery pieces.

Q (Heinl): Of course it was anticipating the LVTA's role of firing during the last part of the run in for close in beach neutralization.

Shepherd: That's right.

Q (Heinl): It didn't work very well.

Shepherd: No, as I remember it didn't. He wanted to control these mortars just like you control heavy artillery.

We had the artillery people there and they argued it wouldn't work. We had all kinds of projects. It's when we first tested the Higgins boats. The first night landing – I had a night landing with my battalion on Puerto Rico.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: The Army was defending the island. That was a regimental landing made by the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines.

Q (Heinl): The Army had a Puerto Rican regiment in there also.

Shepherd: Yes. They had a Puerto Rican regiment in there – and we caught those fellows flat-footed.

Q (Heinl): That was in '39.

Shepherd: '39. That was the year my battalion landed on Puerto Rico in the vicinity of Ponce.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: We made a night landing on the south shore of Puerto Rico. It was the first time it had been done. There was a lot of argument that it couldn't be done. I said, "I am confident we can come in and hit that beach at the right spot." I had studied the beach where we had been ordered to land. There were two wrecks nearby. I had the configuration of the mountains in rear of the beach firmly fixed in my mind. And of course we had made a reconnaissance of the area. I said, "I know if I take a certain compass bearing we will hit that beach." When we came in we hit it within a hundred yards of the point I was looking for. That was pretty darn good to come right in from the sea. And we caught those poor fellows, way off base.

And an interesting sidelight – a General Short was Army Commander and he was the same fellow that was caught off base in Honolulu when the Japs made their air attack there on December 7, 1941.

Q (Heinl): In World War II.

Q: Was Walter Short the Army General's name?

Q (Heinl): Yes.

Q: Walter Short.

Shepherd: I'm sure there was no relation between the two incidents. Short was just unlucky to have been caught off base on both occasions. At Puerto Rico we came in where the Army didn't expect us. We made the landing in the dark. We gobbled up an outpost near by. I remember Cliff Atkinson was one of my Second Lieutenants. He captured three prisoners. We went inland about a hundred or two (hundred) yards and cut the main line of communication. The Puerto Ricans had been in Ponce for the night. And when they went back to join their units the next morning at daylight, we just gobbled them up as prisoners. And they didn't know, Short didn't know until sometime around noon, what in the hell had happened. Isn't that right, Bob?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: In the landing you were on our right, weren't you?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Q: Talking about the development of amphibious doctrine and techniques and equipment, I notice that in '38, August of '38, you made quite a few visits to Indianapolis to the Marmon-Harrington Company. In the development of tanks just exactly what was transpiring at that time?

Shepherd: I was on the Equipment Board which in those days was not a permanent organization. We had a permanent secretary. Each battalion commander was on the board and each of us headed a committee. I happened to have motor transport which included tanks.

And this is an interesting anecdote. The amphibian tractor came up. Somebody had read about it in a magazine and seen a picture of Roebing with this amphibious vehicle.

Q (Heinl): It was in Life.

Shepherd: Yes, Life. You know the story then. It was in some magazine which a member of the Board brought to a meeting. The question arose – was the vehicle a boat or was it a motor vehicle.

Q (Heinl): Who had boats?

Shepherd: I've forgotten who had boats. Well, each one tried to pass the vehicle off on the other committee. I mean we all had so damn much work to do. I was busy testing tanks so I said, "Well that vehicle goes over water. That's a boat." The other committee head said, "Well it's got a motor and it goes on land too. That's a tank." Well, we argued back and forth in a friendly way about the vehicle. I've forgotten the name of the other officer. I thought of it as a boat originally.

But that's an interesting point. I mean, we didn't realize just how important this vehicle was going to be in the future. Everybody was trying to get out of taking on the vehicle for testing. It was just another project, and we were all busy with the ones which had previously assigned to our various committees.

Q (Heinl): Nobody realized for years, even in the middle of the war, why you never could get measures of control which adequately recognized whether the thing was a vehicle or a landing craft. You remember Roi-Namur, in the landings there, why they had all kinds of trouble, primarily because the

concept, the nature of the amtrac was not fully visualized by anybody involved.

Shepherd: Well, Tarawa was the first time it was ever used in a landing operation successfully.

Q: Yes.

Q (Heinl): They were used at Guadalcanal, but not in assault.

Q: No. They used them for supplies primarily, and it wasn't until Guadalcanal that someone thought that maybe they could use them as assault vehicles.

Q (Heinl): This, I think, was Edson who really got hold of the idea of this thing as an assault vehicle.

Shepherd: Well, anyhow, to come back to the question you asked me about Indianapolis – I happened to be the head of the tank and motor transport committee. That included trucks and tanks.

At that time we had one or more projects that we had been directed to develop. Headquarters directed Marmon-Harrington to build a tank for the Marine Corps with a weight not to exceed five tons, as I remember it.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. It was five tons.

Shepherd: It had to be less than five tons.

Q (Heinl): Because of the existing restrictions on the tanks lighters, wasn't it?

Shepherd: On the tank lighters and on the booms of the transports - that is the lifting booms on the masts. Marmon-Harrington got this contract so I made a number of trips to Indianapolis to test the tanks being developed. There was a young officer by the name of Desizas, a First Lieutenant, who was very knowledgeable about tanks. Young Denig was out there on duty as the Marine Corps Representative.

Q (Heinl): He was one of the early tankers.

Shepherd: Yes. Young Desizas was killed by a land mine on Guam. Nice fellow. We made a couple of trips to Indianapolis while working on this tank. But we couldn't get the tank down to a minimum weight of five tons. I mean there were certain specifications as to weight armor, horsepower of the engine, etc. When we went out to test this tank it would break down. It had all kinds of failures. You see, you just can't get everything you want into a tank which weighed only five tons. Our experimental testing went on about a year. All of a sudden it struck me, why who in the hell said it had to be five tons. I went to headquarters, G-3 section. I said, "Who wrote these specifications?" Well I won't mention his name. I had previously made investigations that the booms on the transports, at least one or two of them, were fifteen ton booms. I said, "Why the hell do we have to have a five ton tank with a fifteen ton boom?" Well, he couldn't answer that one - I mean the fellow who wrote the specifications. I said, "Why don't you increase the weight of the tank to seven tons? We can make a good tank weighing seven tons, but we can't get it down to five."

Harry Pickett was in the G-3 section at that time so he changed the specifications to increase the weight of those initial Marmon-Harrington tanks. I think it was seven tons, instead of the five which we had to

struggle so long to try to bring it down to. I don't know where they got the five ton limit from. Probably some one had gone to the Navy and asked, "How much can a boom hold?" - And were told five tons as they didn't want to strain the boom. I said, "Well, if you have a fifteen ton boom on the mast of a ship you can certainly raise a seven ton tank."

Q (Heinl): Yes, fifteen (tons) was the capacity of the boom or something like that.  
Yes, sir.

Shepherd: Well, then we, we went ahead with the production of these Marmon-Harrington tanks which weighed about six tons. At the time the Army was beginning to really get into the tank business - an officer by the name of Jack Christmas headed the tank program in the Army, and had developed an excellent light tank. So I contacted him and asked for a demonstration.

We went over to Camp Holabird where these tanks were being made. They were so far ahead of us in their tank production that I recommended that the Marine Corps purchase the Army tanks because they were within the fifteen ton limitation. However the Marine Corps did buy a few of those Marmon-Harrington tanks and used them for a while.

Q (Heinl): They had five of them.

Shepherd: It was later that we started purchasing Army tanks.

Q: An M-3 I believe, which had a mounted a 37 and a couple of 30's - predecessor.

Shepherd: Well, they were good tanks. The ones we had in the war, World War II, were might good tanks, those Army tanks. They later improved on those first models but in my opinion they were damn good tanks.

Q: You finally went into Okinawa with the flotation gear and everything that the Navy had brought you in, brought the tanks in close enough. I think that in the case of the First Division, one LST captain hadn't had the proper orders and they landed him out. But for the most part flotation gear tanks worked well. They did at Okinawa - you don't agree?

Q (Heinl): I don't agree. I'm thinking of the terrible experiences with flotation gear at Normandy.

Shepherd: Yes.

Q (Heinl): I'll never trust flotation gear on a tank.

Shepherd: They lost heavily over there. I remember all about that. The sea rose up, and they lost over a battalion, didn't they?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. Out of one organization they lost forty out of some sixty tanks. Drowned - went to the bottom of the Channel.

Q: Well of course the nature of the beaches on the shore -

Shepherd: The rough waters -

Q: The rough waters - Okinawa was as smooth as a pond. And Peleliu was about the same. You had the fringing reef of course. You had to use your amtracs to go ashore.

Q (Heinl): Flotation gear is a bad business.

Shepherd: Yes. What did the British call tank flotation gear?

Q (Heinl): They had a funny name for them, General.

Shepherd: I don't remember now.

Q (Heinl): I can't think of it either.

Shepherd: Well, we had a great problem on getting over this fringing reef we were talking about. We had done it in Guam. We had those fringing reefs. I had prepared a study for a landing on Guam at the Naval War College and so I knew the island pretty well. I wrote an estimate of the situation on this island.

At that time the only place you could land without crossing the reef was a Talofoto.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: The other side of the island was the only place you could get through the reef where the fresh water from several rivers had made passages through the reef. It was obviously not a suitable place to land due to the limited width of the passage through the reef and the ease with which their areas could be defended.

But with amphibian tractors able to cross those fringing reefs that changed the whole picture. Unfortunately when we landed on Guam there were only enough amphibian tractors to boat the first few waves. After landing the troops on the beach, the tractors which had not been knocked out by Japanese gun fire returned to the seaward edge of the fringing reef where they met boats from the ships on what was called the "Transfer Line." Here the supporting troops and cargo was transferred to the tractors which re-crossed the fringing reef to the beach. We also used rafts on the Transfer Line on which supplies were placed to await transfer to the tractors as they returned from the beach for additional loads.

Q (Heinl): They were pontoons.

Shepherd: In looking back on the development of amphibious operations, I mean the development of this phase of operations, I don't think a landing of this kind had ever been made before; coming in from transports to a fringing reef by ships' boats, making a transfer to pontoons and then across 500 yards of fringing reef by amphibian tractors to the beach.

Q (Heinl): This is a tribute to our complete fire superiority, Guam had this magnificent preparation.

Shepherd: It's true. On the other hand, Bob, when we got ashore I found it had not done as much damage as we all figured it would. You know our gunfire support ships shelled that place for days.

Q (Heinl): Ten days.

Shepherd: But when we landed we found that our naval gunfire hadn't knocked out those pillboxes on the beach. We lost some good boys – not too many – but there were casualties coming in.

Q (Heinl): The Japs had a block house on Gaan Point, didn't they, General?

Shepherd: Yes, they did.

Q (Heinl): That gun gave the brigade a lot of trouble.

Shepherd: I think it knocked out something like nine boats.

Q (Heinl): Yes.

Shepherd: And one very nice boy whom I personally knew was killed in one of those landing boats, Adams was his name.

The Japs had a gun emplaced on the beach which enfiladed the approach over the reef and knocked out several boats. They also fired from guns located on the Orote Peninsula which had a commanding view of the Brigade landing beaches.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. Where the airstrip was – where the barracks were.

Shepherd: That's right.

Q (Heinl): Yes, that was Orote.

Shepherd: I always admired Admiral Connolly. When we went over the plans for this hazardous operation we didn't know whether we would be able to land over the reef. We thought Guam would be much better defended than it was and that the defenses would be on the shoreline. In discussing Naval gunfire support, Connolly said, "Well I'll give you support. By golly I'll run my flagship on the beaches if necessary." And Admiral Connolly would have done it had it been necessary. He was a fine Naval Officer and a genuine person.

Q (Heinl): Never knew him personally. I ran into him a couple of times, sir.

Shepherd: I had the opportunity to know him well at the Naval War College and admired him greatly. He was a strong Marine supporter and he meant it when he said he'd run his flagship on the beach if necessary. He did put his flagship as close to the reef as possible during the bombardment prior to the landing. And Commodore Reifsnider supported us well also.

Q (Heinl): I liked Reifsnider. He was a great gentleman.

Shepherd: He was. I was with him in his ship. He was my, my –

Q (Heinl): He was your Group Commander, wasn't he?

Shepherd: Yes, Group Commander. In other words, he was my opposite number in the Navy, old Reif. So we became very good friends. He always backed me up right to the hilt during the Guam operation.

Q: That flanking fire from the blockhouse on shore at Guam I suppose was very much like that at Bougainville which knocked the hell out of one battalion on the right in particular. It came from that little island –

Shepherd: Puruata.

Q: Puruata's right. There as a 75-mm gun?

Q (Heinl): Actually the blockhouse wasn't there. There was some fire from Puruata all right, but there was a blockhouse right on the point with a 75 in it.

Shepherd: Many of the casualties in the first waves were caused by Machine gun nests along the shore line. Once we broke through the initial beach defenses we just coasted. When I say coasted, I mean that our plan of attack was to drive right straight through to Mount Alifan.

Q (Heinl): Alifan, yes, sir.

Shepherd: I felt that if we had that piece of high ground we would be all right. My plan of attack worked out very successfully. It was to run the amphibian tractors transporting the initial waves as far inland as possible, that is, around 500 yards before the men disembarked. By so doing they would be behind the beach defenses and could attack them from the rear. I figured that the Japs would believe the amphibians were tanks and take cover,



thus permitting the vehicles to pass over them without injury to the thin-skinned vehicles.

Q: You'd gone through a number of campaigns in the Pacific before Okinawa, and knew of course what the –

Shepherd: Not too many.

Q: In the other campaigns, what were the landings like? How did you feel? What were your impressions on Love Day on Okinawa when we all went in standing up? Surprise you?

Shepherd: I think it did surprise everybody. We had made plans for every contingency but we certainly didn't have any idea that we were going in there standing up. We just couldn't believe it.

I have always been an advocate of a commander getting ashore as soon as practicable. You can't sit back on a ship and just read messages. Nobody's going to say that they're doing badly because nobody wants to admit that. You can't really know the situation until you go forward and talk to the captain, the lieutenant, and the corporal down in the lines. Then you know what the hell is going on. Do you agree with me on that?

Q (Heinl): I certainly do.

Shepherd: In the landings in which I participated, I went in on one of the supporting waves. Fortunately I had no difficulties in getting ashore and establishing my command post near the beach where I was in constant communication with the Naval Commander but was able to be in close contact with my senior troop leaders.

Q (Heinl): I remember a note you made in your Korean journal that you let me see when I was working on "Soldiers of the Sea." You said you visited Lewie Puller. He had his C.P. on a hill where his O.P. ought to be.

Shepherd: Yes, that's right.

Q (Heinl): That was his idea.

Shepherd: I'll tell you how it worked in the case of an officer named Bob Roberts. Did you ever know Bob Roberts?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. I knew him well.

Shepherd: Great fellow.

Q (Heinl): He was – a lot of people didn't like him, but both Nancy and I liked him socially and I liked him professionally. He was kind to me.

Shepherd: He was a good officer and an outstanding troop leader.

Q (Heinl): And he had a lot of decorations.

Shepherd: I gave him a couple of them. He had been a hospital corpsman in World War I and then he transferred to the Marine Corps and became an officer.

Q (Heinl): He was a doctor's son, just as you were.

Shepherd: He was a Britisher, you know. His father was an Englishman.

Q (Heinl): I think his father was a physician, wasn't he, sir?

Shepherd: Are you sure he wasn't a Britisher?

Q (Heinl): Yes. He was a Britisher who had come out, I think, to St. Paul.

Shepherd: Yes. I don't mean that he was born in England – but he certainly looked British. That's why he had that –

Q (Heinl): Moustache and blond hair.

Shepherd: He was a very handsome fellow.  
 He was assigned to the Sixth Division before Okinawa. He had been on staff duty, hadn't he, out in the Pacific during the early part of the war.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. But he got dragged down into the Defense Battalion Program.

Shepherd: That's right. Earlier. I was almost sucked into one of those Defense Battalions myself during the early part of the war when I wanted to get into action at once.

Q (Heinl): I was in the fifteenth Marines, as a captain, when I got dragged into it.

Shepherd: It was a chance to command a battalion on independent duty.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: Great temptation to get a battalion of your own.

Q (Heinl): Big battalion, too.

Shepherd: Yes. Thank God I didn't take it as things turned out. Bob joined the Sixth Marine Division prior to the Okinawa landing.

Q: Pardon me sir. (End of tape no. 1, track No. 1)

(Tape 1, Side 2)

Shepherd: When Bob Roberts joined my Sixth Division I had no job for him at the time. He was a full colonel. I had Alan Shapley and Schneider, and Vic Bleasdale and I didn't want to shift them. So I said, "All right, Bob, I will assign you to my staff until something turns up." Bill Whaling joined the division about that time and I told him the same thing.

Q (Heinl): You had quite a stable full.

Shepherd: Yes, I had a good reserve in these fine officers.  
 I always liked Bill Whaling. He and I had been friends from way back in World War I. And Bob was always a lot of fun too.

Q: You hadn't expected Colonel Whaling to come out at that time?

Shepherd: No. These officers reported to me prior to Okinawa and I had no job for them. Well, they were in a pool at FMFPAC and I think they were sent on to my division in case I needed them during the coming operation.

Q: Sir?

Shepherd: I didn't ask for them.

Q (Heinl): Jordahl just fed them forward from FMFPAC.

Shepherd: Yes. He fed them out as they had an excess of colonels in the pool at Pearl Harbor. Naturally these officers wanted to get into combat. They were all senior colonels. What I needed were junior officers. But FMFPAC didn't have any lieutenants for me.  
 I tried to get a few junior officers from General Turnage when I took command of the Brigade. I needed them desperately to fill essential jobs in the Brigade Headquarters Company and on the Staff. The Brigade was formed of two reinforced regiments but there were no provisions for a Brigade Headquarters Company. You have to have personnel around a command post for housekeeping duties; run the mess, provide security,

etc. I picked up a few castoffs and, on my personal request, General Holland Smith at Pearl Harbor assigned several good officers to my Brigade Headquarters which enabled the newly formed staff to operate but I had to do a great deal of the staff administrative work myself.

Q (Heinl): You had Bob Roberts coming out –

Shepherd: That was later when the Sixth Division was formed. I am talking about the organization of the First Marine Brigade in the spring of 1944. What I needed at the time were several good junior officers for the Brigade Staff and Headquarters Company. I went to General Turnage who was a very good friend of mine and said, “I need a few lieutenants badly.” “I don’t have a sufficient number to command my platoons and you have them stacked up in the Third Division three deep, in every job. Won’t you let me have a few of the boys I trained in the OCC who are with the Third Division?”

Q (Heinl): Not to mention having been a Third Division Regimental Commander.

Shepherd: Yes, as a Third Division Regimental Commander who had organized and trained the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines. I personally knew many of the officers of this Regiment and some of them wanted to join me. I said, “Hal, all I’m asking for is about three or four of you officers to come to the Brigade for my Headquarters Staff and important jobs in my Headquarters Company.” “Oh no,” General Turnage replied, “We might need them when we go into Guam.”

Frankly I was quite annoyed as I knew the Third Division had an excess of officers and the Brigade was under strength. When the Brigade landed on Guam, we were to make a junction with the Third Division at a point called X on the map.

Q (Heinl): It was up –

Shepherd: At the base of the Orote Peninsula.

Q (Heinl): It was back at Piti Navy Yard, I remember.

Shepherd: Piti. Yes somewhere near there.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir, I remember.

Shepherd: Well, no matter where it was I told my leading battalion commander, “You get to that point first. Don’t come back to me if you don’t get there ahead of the Third Division.” (Laughter)

The Brigade captured the ground where point X was on the map, ahead of the timetable. When I arrived there I wrote General Turnage a message; “I am at point X, where in hell are you?” (Laughter) I don’t think he liked it. But I was just that mad about his not letting me have a few of his officers that I could not help but needle him about the Brigade having gotten to this objective before the Third Division.

Q (Heinl): We were in good shape for officers.

Shepherd: You were indeed.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: You had officers stacked up two and three to every job. And I didn’t have enough to fill important billets in my Headquarters.

Q (Heinl): And the division was well shaken down, too –

Shepherd: Yes you were, where as the Brigade had been formed in the field without provision for an adequate Headquarters.

Q (Heinl): At that time.

Shepherd: But to come back to Roberts – when he joined the Sixth Division I kept him temporarily at my Headquarters until I needed him. This occurred when Schneider faltered. He had been in three or four campaigns. He'd gone out to Samoa in the early days of the war in command of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines and had participated in the Kwajalein landing. I think Colonel Schneider had the feeling that this operation might be his last. So he became over-cautions and spent most of his time in his regimental command post established in an Okinawan tomb. I couldn't get him to go up front to see what the hell was going on. It comes back to what I have just been saying; a troop commander must feel the pulse of his advance units and to do so he must go forward which Schneider failed to do. I gave him the devil about it two or three times. Finally I said, "You've got to visit your battalions. I've been up to each battalion and some of their companies. You're a regimental commander. You don't even know where they are."

I finally figured out that he was fatigued, battle fatigue. He'd been through three or four battles and out a long time. I thought it was time for him to go home for a rest. No disgrace. He was a nice fellow, so I pinned a Bronze Star on him and sent him back to the States.

That was when Roberts took over his regiment, the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines. They had been badly mauled at Sugar Loaf Hill. I mean that was a hell of a fight. We lost a lot of people there and I think the regiment's morale was pretty well down. My own cousin, Lt. Col. Cornick Woodhouse, was killed in this battle and a lot of fine boys. So the morale of the regiment was somewhat shaken. To reestablish their confidence, Bob Roberts moved his CP right on the top of a ridge on the front line.

Q (Heinl): He was never afraid of the front, was he?

Shepherd: He wasn't afraid of anything. Bob set up his CP right up on the top of a hill held by his advanced battalion. I mean he was on the reverse slope just below the crest, not in a dugout well to the rear. He was right up with the front line troops of the regiment. I said, "Roberts, what the hell did you come up here for? You'll damn well get shot." He said, "I want to show the men in this regiment that this is where the regimental commander is, so they will follow me in the next attack."

That, to my mind, was a great lesson in psychology, true leadership which immediately reestablished the morale of his faltering troops. Bob said to me, "They need somebody to get them out of their foxholes, get them to move forward." Shortly after Roberts took command, the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines resumed its forward advance in the attack on Naha and on the southern tip of Okinawa. I will always recall my last conversation with Colonel Roberts. We were down at the southern tip of Okinawa on Mezado Ridge and only had a little way to go to complete the seizure of the island in the Sixth Division zone of action. I had gone forward in the

late afternoon to issue orders to Roberts for the next day's attack. I said to Bob, "Tomorrow ought to be the last day of this fight. If everything goes well, we should capture that last ridge of organized Jap resistance. The end is in sight."

Q: It must have been the 17<sup>th</sup> of June because he was killed the next day a couple of hours after General Buckner was killed, wasn't he?

Shepherd: Yes.

Q: And Buckner was killed the 18<sup>th</sup> of June.

Shepherd: Then it was the seventeenth when I saw, last saw him alive. I said to Bob, "The end is in sight – now we have these Japs licked. You just push them down into this lower pocket there, where they can't do anything but surrender or be killed." I further said, "Now, Bob, for God's sake, don't expose yourself unnecessarily. I know you always want to be up there leading your troops in the front line. You've gotten through this war safely so far. Why, you've gotten two Navy Crosses already. For God's sake, use a little discretion, and don't try to lead the leading wave." I was sincere in saying what I did to him. We were very close friends. We sat down on the ground and I showed him on my map my plan for the next day's attack. "This is what we want to do. You capture this ridge (pointing). The Fourth Marines are coming up, leaving early in the morning, and they will be able to leapfrog you tomorrow and carry on to the end. This is really going to be your last day's fighting, because the Fourth Marines are all set to take over from you at four o'clock tomorrow."

The next morning everything was going along fine and the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines were making good progress in their attack against only scattered Jap resistance. During the morning, word that General Buckner was passing through my division zone of action enroute to the 1<sup>st</sup> Division. So I made a dash from my CP to try to catch up with him in order to be with him while he was in my zone. He had to pass through the zone of action of the Sixth Marine Division to reach the Army Division on the left of the III Amphibious Corps.

Q: I was told Buckner wanted to see the Eighth Marines go into action. That was the first day the Eighth Marines were in combat. Wallace had the Eighth Marines. When Buckner made his inspection tour of units in the Tenth Army in January, he visited Saipan, where the Second Division was training and was most impressed by Wallace and the Eighth Marines. C.P. Smith made this comment in his memoirs. This is the reason Buckner went up there.

Shepherd: General Buckner always liked to go up front. He was going through my zone to get over to the zone of action of the Eighth Marines in the First Division.

Q: That's right.

Shepherd: Well, he had to go through my division to get to the Eighth Marines.

Q: That's right. He went up to the CP of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines, which was the best place from which he could watch the Eighth Marines in action.

Shepherd: Maybe that was it.

Q: Yes, sir.

Shepherd: Whatever the reason, Buckner came into my zone of action unexpectedly, and I hot-footed it up there to join him. He was in my territory and I wanted to be there with him. On the way up to the front, I received word General Buckner had been killed. Later they brought his body back to my CP. But I continued on to observe the advance of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines. Before I got up there I heard that Bob Roberts had been killed. It was a terrible shock to me.

Roberts had an orderly with red hair, who was devoted to him. When I arrived at the regimental CP, this fellow was in tears. I learned from him that Bob had done just what I told him not to do. He wanted to lead those troops forward the last day of the war. He was right up in the front line during the attack and a Jap sniper got him. His orderly was with him (I got the story right from people who were there) and he was so mad he took this tommy gun and he went right into this nest of snipers and killed half a dozen of them. Miraculously he wasn't killed himself. When I talked to him he was in tears. I'd known the boy. He was always with Roberts. He said to me, "He was my regimental commander, Colonel Roberts. He was the finest man I have ever known. You know, General, why he got killed? He didn't wax his moustache this morning." (Laughter) He was serious. You know Bob always had a neatly trimmed moustache with its ends waxed.

Q (Heinl): Yes, he did.

Shepherd: Bob's orderly continued, "The night before," he said, "he was working late preparing the order for the attack. And the Colonel didn't have a chance to wax his moustache. And that's why he was killed." (Laughter) That's one for the record.

Q: Yes, sir.

Q (Heinl): He waxed his moustache until his dying day but one.

Shepherd: Exactly. That night he worked so late on his orders that he didn't have a chance to wax his moustache.

Q (Heinl): I remember.

Shepherd: He told me that himself. I love the story.

Q (Heinl): Bob gave a bracelet to Faith, his wife, when he was still a captain. A charm bracelet which was made up entirely of miniature medals of the decorations he held. Of course, he had many more than most of the other officers of his rank.

Shepherd: He won a Navy Cross in World War I and another in Nicaragua I believe.

Q (Heinl): And was an object of considerable jealousy.

Shepherd: He had the Army DSC and other decorations.

Q (Heinl): Navy Cross; DSC; Silver Star, etc. He really had a bank of them. And Faith used to make the other wives so mad wearing his miniatures.

Shepherd: Well, I gave him his last Navy Cross for his outstanding bravery on Okinawa. His death was truly sad because he was such a courageous fellow. As I told you, he picked the morale of that regiment up when he

put his tent up in the front line in plain view of the whole regiment. He was up on a hill just behind the OP. "I want these fellows to see me. Brace 'em up. They scared but I wanted them to know their regimental commander wasn't." With all due respect to Schneider, he spent most of the time in a cave on the seacoast. And it was a most dismal place. No wonder he was depressed, because as you know the Okinawan caves were tombs which were naturally depressing.

I liked Schneider. He was a nice fellow. I think he was just fatigued physically and mentally, combat fatigue they call it.

Q: Do you have any knowledge sir, of –

Shepherd: Before you ask that question, let me tell you one other instance of great leadership. It was during the Cape Gloucester campaign when I was assistant division commander of the First Marine Division. We were fighting in the Borgen Bay area after the landing. You know, I commanded the Borgen Bay operation but I'm not going into that operation, I only wish to relate another instance where the leadership of one individual influenced the moral of a battalion. It was during the advance toward Borgen Bay that the Third Battalion of the Fifth Marines was badly shot up. That was where young McDougal was killed. He and his staff walked into an enemy ambush. It was in the woods, the cover was very thick, and as he walked into a clearing to set up his CP, the Japs killed McDougal and several of his staff. The company that had gone through ahead of him hadn't cleaned out these snipers. As you know the Japs had a way of hiding, letting the first troops get through, and then firing on the next echelon. With the loss of their battalion commander and most of his staff, the morale of the battalion was pretty low. The battalion had had a hard fight and their morale was pretty well shaken. They were wavering and lacked the will to move forward in the attack. I desperately needed a forceful leader to take command of this battalion. I knew the officer I felt could do the job. It was Lew Walt. I'd known Lew in the M.C.S. We were very close friends. So I sent word to Rupertus. "Would you let me have Walt?" When he arrived at my CP I explained the situation to him. I told him that the morale of the battalion was so low that as a combat unit in an attack they were ready to turn around and go the other way. After Lew took command, within 48 hours that battalion resumed the attack with vigor and captured a key position that was the objective of the operation.

Q (Heinl): Aogiri Ridge.

Shepherd: Yes, it was Aogiri Ridge. In our attack through the jungle we had no terrain objective. Our mission was to drive the Japanese to our front toward Borgen Bay.; However in several captured documents the Jap commander had ordered Aogiri Ridge to be held at all costs so we surmised it must be an important terrain feature. We didn't know where Aogiri Ridge was as there was no such name on our map. It was not until Walt's battalion had captured a heavily defended ridge which protected the junction of the main trail inland with the coastal one leading to Borgen

Bay that we realized this was Aogiri Ridge. During the afternoon, prior to the capture of Aogiri Ridge, I went forward to visit Walt as I normally did each day and arrived during a fire fight. Walt was in the front line directing the attack and I worked myself forward to join him. I crawled up beside Walt who was behind a banyan tree. As we were lying close to the ground between the roots of the banyan tree having a look at the fight taking place about forty yards away, all of a sudden, Lew pushed me over. I looked around to see what the hell was going on; Lew didn't say anything. I mean he didn't comment on why his body was suddenly thrust against mine. When there was a lull in the fire fight we crawled down off the ridge and I said, "Lew, what the hell was going on when you thrust your body against mine?" Lew replied, "Well you know, I got a bullet in the back and the force of it knocked me against you." Actually the bullet went between Lew's back and the pack he was wearing. The force of the bullet was sufficient to knock him over against me. It was that night that Lew's battalion captured and held Aogiri Ridge. You know the story. I've told it to you before. During the attack against Aogiri Ridge the battalion was pinned down and was unable to advance or withdraw. Lew ordered his 37 mm gun forward and told the crew to fire grape shot at the Ridge as the battalion advanced. We had found the grape shot very effective in the jungle when you were unable to see the enemy. It was like firing a shot gut into a covey of birds. The gunner would fire several bursts of grape which made the enemy take cover and slacken their machine gun and rifle fire. When this occurred the assault troops would move forward a few yards. In order that the fire of the 37 mm gun be effective, it had to be in the front line. Naturally the Japs concentrated their fire on the gun's crew and they were soon wounded or killed. Lew called for volunteers to move the gun up the Ridge but everybody looked the other way. Then Lew said, "By God, I'll do it myself." And he started up the hill pushing the gun with his bad shoulder. You know, he had to wear a leather brace on his shoulder due to an old football injury. Well of course, the minute the battalion commander began pushing that 37 mm gun, the whole outfit charged up to help. They got the gun up to the top of the ridge and dug in for the night. During the night the Japs made several all-out attacks, yelling "Marines prepare to die." But the Marines held the ridge. The next morning when I went up there, I found Marines and Japs killed within six feet of each other, just as close as that. Their bodies were lying on the ground together.

In my opinion it was the critical battle of the Cape Gloucester campaign. Once we got Aogiri Ridge we found that it protected a trail leading from the other side of the island. All troops and supplies in the mountains, and all back of Cape Gloucester had to feed through this trail junction which this little piece of ground call Aogiri Ridge controlled.

Q (Heinl):

Yes, sir, their MSR.

Shepherd:

Yes, of course it was only a trail not a big MSR as we know them today. But everything had to come through this one point, this road junction



which this little piece of ground protected. Once we captured this vital main trail junction, we were able to bag the Japs withdrawing down the coast toward Rabaul and we killed an awful lot of them. I think about 300.

To me, and I've told this story on a number of occasions, it was the greatest demonstration of leadership I have ever witnessed. It showed how the will of the commander demonstrated by his courageous action can influence a whole battalion. When Lew took command, they were wavering. The companies had lost a lot of men, their battalion commander had been killed and many of the officers wounded. So when Lew took command I told him that the morale of the battalion was at a low ebb. He replied, "Give me 48 hours." I gave him 48 hours to reorganize the battalion and put some fight into his officers and men. Two days later the battalion captured Aogiri Ridge which I later renamed "Walt Ridge" in honor of Lew.

Q: You mentioned Rupertus before, and of course I've heard mixed comments, concerning Rupertus. I think many more unfavorable than favorable. It appears that General Vandegrift was very fond of Rupertus, very close to him.

Shepherd: I don't know.

Will anybody have a cigarette?

Q: No, thank you, General. I have my pipe, thank you, sir.

Shepherd: Oh, you smoke a pipe. Will you have some tobacco?

Q: I think I'll smoke some of your Dunhill, sir.

Shepherd: That's Dunhill's "London Mixture." I've been smoking it for forty years.

I liked Bill Rupertus personally, but I did not care for his Chief-of-Staff named Amor LeRoy Sims.

Q (Heinl): Oh, he was an instructor of mine in Basic School.

Shepherd: I always felt that he influenced Rupertus against me.

Q: Did he have the Fifth Marines initially on Guadalcanal?

Shepherd: I wouldn't know.

Q: I know Puller mentioned someone who had the Fifth Marines in his biography, went ashore in Guadalcanal in dress uniform and dress shoes and socks.

Shepherd: It might have been.

Q: Well, the other question I was going to ask you – something which I haven't had a chance to ask, which General Vandegrift has addressed himself to in his biography with Asprey but still hasn't been completely satisfactorily answered to my mind is, the lack of decision, or decision not to use the Second Division to make a second landing on the southeastern coast of Okinawa when the April 19 attack of the XXIV Corps bogged down. Now if you recall, Vandegrift –

Shepherd: I remember this perfectly.

Q: Vandegrift's biography said that we tried – sir?

Shepherd: What did he say?

Q: He said that, when he and Thomas went out there, they tried to, as a matter of fact he told me this on the phone a couple of weeks ago, that he didn't talk to Geiger or Buckner, but addressed himself directly to Nimitz and to Forrest Sherman and couldn't sell them on it. They said, well, they couldn't get the Second Division there in time, and they needed the Second Division for a reserve, and there was a logistical problem, and the southeastern beaches weren't satisfactory. But, he said, well he didn't put this in the book – he said Nimitz was a very dear friend of his, and he didn't want to do anything to soil his memory. But it was a mistaken decision. It was a poor decision.

Shepherd: That's exactly right. I can substantiate every word General Vandegrift said. I talked to General Buckner on several occasions about making a landing on the southeast coast of Okinawa and for some reason he took a shine to me. We became very good friends. He was a nice fellow.

Q (Heinl): Well they all did. Look at General MacArthur.

Shepherd: I got along well with him also.

Q (Heinl): Yes.

Shepherd: As I was saying, the Tenth Army's attack bogged down soon after landing on Okinawa. I mean that Shuri Castle was a nasty job. The Japs had a strong defensive line across Okinawa and the Tenth Army was unable to penetrate it.

Q: Pardon me, sir. This was before they reached Shuri Castle.

Shepherd: Well, I mean the big plateau, not the Shuri. I mean, the Tenth Army, less the Sixth Marine Division, was stuck there for a month.

Q: Well, they weren't, according again to –

Shepherd: The First Division was losing a lot of men –

Q: That's right. It was before the First Division was committed, sir. It was the middle of April and –

Shepherd: Well was that when –

Q: Yes, sir, because the Army, O.P. Smith commented in his memoirs, wanted to amass a great amount of artillery ammunition on each position. They were firing TOT's and just wasting ammunition all over the place, and were just standing by. They weren't doing anything when General Vandegrift landed on the island. They made preparations for the April 19<sup>th</sup> attack which O.P. Smith said, he felt they weren't really serious about. At the time Vandegrift came they realized that they had reached only the outer core of the Shuri defenses. When Vandegrift and Jerry Thomas landed the Second Division had been sent back to Saipan. It was just sitting there on call, but they were not recalled.

Shepherd: Weren't they still afloat at that time?

Q: No, sir. They had returned to Saipan.

Shepherd: I don't remember.

Q: But you remember you had the Miyakio Shima operation and the other one against Sakishima Jima. But these were cancelled out; because it was obvious they were too tough.

Shepherd: Well in my opinion, the reason no landing was made on the southeast coast of Okinawa was that the Army had never cottoned to amphibious operations. Maybe Nimitz influenced the decision to some degree, but the Army always hesitated to make an amphibious landing. Perhaps it was due to information Buckner had which I was not aware of. But to me it was the obvious thing to do with the Tenth Army held up in the middle of the island.

Q: Yes, sir.

Shepherd: It was an impasse. The Army attack had been stopped for twenty days.

Q: That's right, sir.

Shepherd: And couldn't move forward. My division had initially gone north after crossing the Isthmus. We had a pretty tough fight on the Motobu Peninsula.

Q: Which was probably one of the classic battles of the Marine Corps.

Shepherd: Yes. We went west on the Motobu Peninsula and took that. Fourth Marines lost a lot of men in this battle. Then the division turned north and went all the way to the northern tip of the island. I remember when General Vandegrift came out. He came to my headquarters and we gave him a presentation on the situation. And I said if we could only make a diversionary landing on the southeast coast. You don't have to go far, just go in there and establish a beachhead. The Second Division is embarked on transports off Okinawa with twenty days supplies of food and ammunition aboard.

Q: That's right.

Shepherd: "Go in there and establish a beach head. That will necessitate the Japanese to withdraw forces from their main line to resist this landing over on the other shore." I said, "That will enable the Tenth Army to break this impasse that has existed for twenty days along the Central Plateau of Okinawa." I was told by General Buckner, "Well, it's a big operation. We don't have the ammunition." I said, "The Second Marine and 77<sup>th</sup> Army Divisions are sitting out there aboard ship. They've got three months' supply which is adequate to make this landing. They can do it. I know they can do it." I didn't get very far with my argument.

Q (Heinl): The Second Division was ready, too.

Shepherd: Admiral Spruance came to me. I had known Spruance personally very well. He was an instructor at the Naval War College when I was a student. He liked to swim and he liked to walk as I did, so we used to go over to the beach on the seaward side of Newport and swim and walk together every afternoon.

Q (Heinl): You'd take your cocomac every time, wouldn't you, General?

Shepherd: Yes, he had a cane also. And we became very close friends. I have a great admiration for Spruance. When he came out with Admiral Nimitz he called me aside while Vandegrift and Nimitz were talking. He said, "General, what do you think we should do." I said, "Keep on pushing." You know there was some talk of pulling out. The Army didn't want to

push hard enough to win so the attack was bogged down in the middle of the island.

Q (Heinl): That's right.

Shepherd: I said, "We can win this battle if you make that landing on the other side as the Japs are bound to weaken their defenses in front of Shuri. And that being the case, we can push ahead." But, the Army didn't follow my advice.

Q: Of course, the Japanese had expected the landings to be made in the Minatogawa region. And they initially denuded the Shuri defenses and the Hagushi beaches too. They had their whole Fifth Artillery Brigade, the whole Fifth Artillery Command down there. When we landed at Hagushi then they redeployed, but they still left a sizeable command in the southeast. They finally came up and formed around the Shuri line which, as you realize, -

Shepherd: The Japs held a strong defensive position around Shuri. It was an impasse and we were losing a lot of men. After my division finished their job on the north end of the island, we came down south. And I had asked to be assigned on the western flank because Brute Krulak, the Division G-3, was a naval gunfire expert and I believed the naval gunfire would be of great assistance in our attack. For some reason, I don't think the First Division employed any great amount of naval gunfire – I may be wrong in this.

Q (Heinl): The First Division was never gunfire-minded.

Shepherd: No, I don't believe they were.

Q: Throughout the entire war?

Shepherd: I cannot answer that question as I was only with the First Division during the Cape Gloucester campaign where there was little opportunity to use Naval gunfire.

Q (Heinl): They were in trouble on Peleliu for that, among other things.

Shepherd: Returning to our discussion of the battle for Okinawa; I said, "Brute – with all this naval gunfire, I am confident an attack along the coast will be successful. We will have destroyer and big gun support from the cruisers.

Q (Heinl): And you had battleship fire also.

Shepherd: Yes. We had battleship fire from 12 and 14-inch guns which was very effective. In discussing the entry of the Sixth Marine Division into the battle going on in the central part of Okinawa, I said, to General Geiger, "Let me take the zone of action along the west coast. We'll push right on down until we out-flank Shuri Castle." General Geiger agreed with my proposed plan of action but when I received the Corps operation order it directed the First and Sixth Divisions to attack in line along the Corps front. Since the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was held up in front of Shuri Castle, if the Sixth Marine Division had restricted it's advance to that of the First Division on our left flank I felt the momentum of the Sixth Division attack would soon slow down and the advantage of a flank attack with it's main effort along the coast would be lost. Therefore I went to see General Geiger and told him the Corps order was not in accordance with my

proposed plan of action which he had previously personally approved. I said, "General I wasn't to make my main effort along the coast so that I can get around behind Shuri Castle." And I showed him a picture on a map of what I wanted to do. Geiger turned to his staff G-3 and said, "Why didn't you write the order so that Shepherd could carry out his plan?" The G-3 argued that the Corps must maintain close contact along the front of both divisions. Finally I said, "General, if you let me push down the coast I can flank the Shuri position and get into the southern end of the island." Geiger turned to General Silverthorn and said, "Silver, that's what I told you to do in the first place." (Laughter) "Go and do it." Upon changing the Corps order the Sixth Division attacked southward with its main effort along the coast.

My putting pressure on the right flank, the Sixth Division captured Naha after a tough fight at Sugar Loaf Hill. This caused the withdrawal of the Japanese from the defenses of Shuri where the First Division was held up for a month. As a matter of interest my G-2, Tom Williams, predicted the night the withdrawal would take place.

Q (Heinl): Was it Gregon Williams?

Q: No, Gregon was Naval Intelligence. It was Tom Williams.

Q (Heinl): Tom Williams, sure enough. That's who it was.

Shepherd: Tom was a smart officer.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. Deserved better in life.

Shepherd: He deserved better but he was a little argumentative at times and he made lots of people mad.

Q (Heinl): He had a caustic way with him when he was arguing a point.

Shepherd: That's right but he was a smart officer. He came from the University of Denver.

Q: There was a little conflict between him and the Brute wasn't there?

Shepherd: No, I don't think so.

Q: You don't think so? I thought I saw something that led me to believe they didn't get along well together.

Shepherd: I don't think so. No, our staff worked in closest harmony.

Q: Your G-1 was a fine man.

Shepherd: Overstreet? Yes.

Q: I remember him at FMFPAC.

Shepherd: I'll talk about Breck Overstreet later.

Q (Heinl): Wayne Gardner – E.W. Gardner, was a fine officer and highly qualified in naval gunfire.

Shepherd: Yes, he was. We used naval gunfire support a great deal during the battle for Okinawa. I remember receiving a dispatch from the Navy which stated, "You are the only outfit that used naval gunfire support as it should be used."

Q (Heinl): Naturally it helped you a lot.

Shepherd: But what I was saying about Tom Williams, my G-2, he predicted and he was the first one that did, that the Japs were withdrawing from Shuri Castle. He'd gotten some prisoner information about their pulling out

which he passed on to the Corps G-2 but they didn't believe him. It turned out the Japs began pulling out at night, several days before Shuri finally fell. Williams had predicted that Shuri Castle was going to fall 48 hours before it was evacuated.

Q (Heinl): Right. June 1<sup>st</sup>, I think.

Shepherd: So I always had a great admiration for him. He had an intuitive mind; he was a good G-2. He was one of the best G-2's I've ever known.

Another officer on my staff I thought highly of was Breck Overstreet who had been with me from the time I formed my regiment, he Ninth Marines.

Q: Smart lawyer – one of the best.

Shepherd: And a good solid citizen. We became very close friends during the war. When the Korean War came on and the Reserves were called back, I requested Overstreet be assigned to FMFPAC and made him G-1. I tried my best to persuade him to stay in the Marine Corps but he wanted to practice law. He had an offer of a partnership in a law firm in Minneapolis. Breck had married a lovely girl by the name of Kitty Ann who joined him in Honolulu. Mrs. Shepherd and I saw quite a bit of them while we were stationed there.

Q: Yes, lovely wife and two kids as I remember.

Shepherd: Yes. As G-1 FMFPAC, Breck did his usual good job. We had been together in my regiment, brigade and division and then he ended up in my Headquarters at FMFPAC. I was devoted to Breck. After the war, I went out to Minneapolis to make a talk and met his mother, Mrs. Taylor, who was a lovely lady. I don't think Breck had any idea that he had heart condition. After the Korean War, he went home and several months later dropped dead on the street in Minneapolis.

Q: One daughter tragically died shortly after that of Leukemia. Remember?

Shepherd: I think so.

Q: I also knew his family.

Shepherd: You knew them, did you?

Q: Well, I was on your staff then.

Shepherd: Oh, yes, of course, Ben, forgive me.

Q: Not at all, sir. We had a great staff, General. I don't think that for red-bottomed "Boot Loot" like me, who had never been through Basic School and this was his first assignment as an officer, I could have been gobbled up by tigers - for instance, when I went to Jimmy Ord's wedding. Bill Whittaker and I were staying at the quarters in Makalapa. Bill was talking about some people he knew, and I said, "Well, Colonel, I'm just scared." He said, "You're a Marine aren't you?" I said "Yes, sir." "Then what the hell are you scared of?" And from that time on, I hope I didn't exceed my prerogative as the only "Boot Loot" in the islands. But this is my most happy memory, I would say.

Shepherd: Returning to our discussion of Breck Overstreet. He had gone to the University of Minnesota and gave me the names of some of his classmates who had come into the Marine Corps with him and I was able to get them

assigned to my regiment. I remember Freeman who is the present Secretary of Agriculture was one of my best officers in the 9<sup>th</sup> Marine.

Q (Heinl): Orville Freeman?

Shepherd: Orville Freeman. He got me half a dozen boys that he happened to know at college that came to me and turned out to be outstanding officers. Since you wasn't some reminiscences I will mention another officer who served with me in the Sixth Marine Division who later became famous. Danny Brewster, present Senator from Maryland, who joined the division on Guadalcanal. Had known Dave Brewster, his uncle who was a Marine officer and I had known his aunt Mercer Tolliferro who had attended the dance at VMI when I was a cadet. So when young Danny Brewster reported to the Sixth Division I sent for him and said "I want to put you on my staff here at headquarters. I need a commandant for my headquarters company." Prior to my interview with Brewster, he had been assigned to the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines. Alan Shapley had sent him to me as a likely staff officer. No, I wasn't trying to take care of him but his chances of surviving in division headquarters were a damn site better than they were as a platoon commander. I told Brewster I had known his father, and uncle, and I wanted to put him on my staff and eventually to make him an aide when he had a little experience in combat. "General, he said, "That's a great compliment, and I'd appreciate it very much but it want to remain with my platoon and make the landing. I have developed a certain technique for firing mortars,"- (I think he had a mortar platoon), "and I want to try it out in battle." So I said, "Well, Danny, I never deny an officer an opportunity to fight for his country."

Some senior officers always want to have their best officers on their staff. My opinion is your staff won't do you any good if you haven't got good people in the field. So I let Dan Brewster go back to his regiment. During one of the early days on Okinawa, while we were fighting on the Motobu Peninsula, I was walking down a trail in the woods when who should I bump into but Danny Brewster. I stopped and said, "Danny, how are you doing?" He took off his helmet and said, "Well, General, guess I'm doing all right." He had seven bullet holes through that helmet.

Q (Heinl): He was well ahead.

Shepherd: Apparently the bullets had only grazed his head but there were seven bullet holes in his helmet.

Q: Any relation to David L.S. Brewster?

Shepherd: He was a nephew, I think. They're all the same family. They come from over in Maryland. I told that story when I introduced him several times, as the speaker at the Sixth Division reunion. He is a fine young man, and I've gotten to know him better since the war. I've been to his estate in Maryland. They run the Maryland Hunt Cup Race over his property, you know. We have become good friends and I like to tell that story because it is true.

- Q: Tell me, you were mentioning you G-2 as being well versed in intelligence matters. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey stated that at the start of the Pacific War, our strategic intelligence was highly inadequate, overall war plans and so on. Well, it wasn't good. Apparently this carried on down through tactical intelligence on a division and regimental level. I think it was Omar Bradley in his memoirs who made the comment, and as a former intelligence officer I think it's pertinent, he said, and it relates to the Marine Corps, "The American Army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertaking. Misfits frequently found themselves assigned to intelligence duties. And in some stations, G-2 became a dumping ground for officers ill-suited to line command. Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the Army would have found itself badly pressed for competent intelligence personnel." I made the comment, "In this context, it should be noted that Lieutenant Colonel Edmond J. Buckley, who was a First Division G-2 after Goettge was killed in Guadalcanal, was a Marine Corps reserve Officer." This concept, like you said, Williams presaged the withdrawal of General Ushijima's 32<sup>nd</sup> Army that wasn't believed at Corps level and certainly, probably not at Tenth Army level. No one was aware of it till a spotter plane discovered on that rainy day here's a whole bunch of Japanese pulling back. What is your comment? What was your experience during the time you had the division and earlier than that?
- Shepherd: I have always been acutely aware of front-line intelligence because in World War I so much emphasis was placed on it particularly in trench warfare where ever enemy movement was watched and reported. The two front lines were only a few hundred yards apart and troops manning front line positions were constantly on the alert to guard against a hostile surprise raid or attack.
- Q: You had a whole bunch of periscopes there, didn't you?
- Shepherd: Yes, periscopes were in the observation posts. I attended a Platoon Commanders course in the First Corps School at Gondrecourt, where great emphasis was placed on front line intelligence. The British were good at this. We had a British instructor who placed a great deal of emphasis on observation of enemy movements which were reported back to our Battalion G-2.
- Q: How about capturing a POW?
- Shepherd: Yes, POW's provided an excellent source of information when one was captured. Of course as a platoon commander I never had the opportunity to use combat intelligence to any great extent. But later as a battalion, regimental and division commander in World War II I placed great stress on its use. When I was first assigned to the Marine Corps Schools I was the Director of the Correspondence School and rewrote the text on combat intelligence. In the preparation of this pamphlet I naturally became quite familiar with the subject.
- Q: Marine Corps Institute?



Shepherd: No, I'm talking about the Correspondence Schools which were a part of the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico.

Q (Heinl): What they now call the Extension School.

Shepherd: Yes, Extension Division.

Q (Heinl): It was the Correspondence School.

Shepherd: Yes, it was called that when I was there. I went to the M.C.S. staff in 1938 after my two years in command of a battalion. For a year I headed the Extension School of the M.C.S. I had taken Army extension courses when I was a young captain from the Infantry School at Fort Benning since I missed the Company Officers' School at Quantico. At Benning, they had an excellent Company and Field Officers extension course as you know. Later on in the Marine Corps we developed similar courses and I graduated from both of them.

Q (Heinl): No company officer should ever be without a correspondence course.

Shepherd: Right, I mean you gain a lot from an extension course. When I was ordered to the Marine Corps Schools as an instructor I was made Director of the Correspondence School. At the time in my opinion, a lot of the Pamphlets needed rewriting. So we undertook the job. I had a Les Dessez as an assistant. He was a damn good officer.

Q (Heinl): And a nice fellow.

Shepherd: Dessez was very capable at this type of work. He helped me a great deal. I've forgotten who the others were. McLean was in this section also. We rewrote all the pamphlets in the Correspondence School. A lot of those we were using were Army pamphlets. In rewriting them we included the Marine Corps amphibious development that had taken place during recent years. At the time I can't say I cottoned to the Correspondence School job. I was disappointed I'd been shunted off to the Correspondence School rather than being in the G-2 section where I ended up the next year. But it did me a lot of good because I learned a great deal in rewriting the old pamphlets and bringing them up to date. Each senior member of the staff of the Correspondence School undertook to rewrite a textbook. Mine was on combat intelligence so in later years I was well informed on this subject and its importance in combat. Frankly if you compare staff jobs, I think you -3 is your most important. You've got to have a top -3. Logistics, my opinion, is probably the next. And -1 and -2 are more or less on the same level.

I am not belittling intelligence, but when you're picking a staff you put more emphasis on your operations officer because he's the man who carries the ball, so to speak.

Q (Heinl): Your g-4 is the man who feeds you.

Shepherd: I am fully aware of that. G-4 must be a good officer. General Barrett taught me this while in command of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division and I was one of his regimental commanders.

When I was a student at the Marine Corps Schools little attention was paid by the staff in the detailed preparation of paragraph 4 (Logistics) of an operations order. Normally the phraseology used for this paragraph

was “See Administrative Annex.” The details for the logistic support of an operation are so voluminous they normally require a separate annex. During the school year I wrote many operation orders covering a variety of tactical situations but only a few administrative annexes were prepared. These usually consisted of the time of arrival of the Daily Supply Train, location of Supply and Ammunition Dumps, Water Points and the Motor Transport Pool. The functioning of these logistic operations were seldom worked out in detail, especially regarding combat loading of Supply Ships and their unloading in a ship-to-shore operation.

At the initial landing of the First Marine Division on Guadalcanal, the unloading of supplies was sadly neglected in the haste of the assault elements to go ashore. Consequently, when the Navy withdrew their transports and supply ships, in view of the threat of Japanese air attacks, the troops ashore found themselves without adequate logistic supplies. Am I right on this, Bob?

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: In view of the difficulties experienced by the First Marine Division in obtaining logistic support following the division’s landing on Guadalcanal, General Barrett, when he became Commanding General of the Third Marine Division, studied the reports on this landing with the thought in mind of preparing a “Standard Operating Procedure” to be used by the Third Marine Division in any future landings this Division would make.

During the two week’s voyage from San Diego to Auckland, New Zealand, General Barrett, his Chief-of-Staff, Colonel A.H. Noble, and I reviewed the reports on the Guadalcanal landing and discussed procedures which we believed could be made to improve the debarkation of supplies ashore. From our discussions we wrote a Standard Operating Procedure for the landing of logistic supplies and equipment for the Third Marine Division. Although there were later revisions in the S.O.P., the principles set forth in the document we prepared were subsequently employed in future landing operations in the Pacific during World War II. Many of these procedures are continuing to be followed.

Q (Heinl): In reference to the combat loading of the ships of the First Marine Division in New Zealand, there were several extenuating circumstances such as the trouble experienced with the longshoremen, lack of time to make proper combat loading plans, etc. I wasn’t there but my analysis is that, first of all, there was a fundamental inattention to the problems of moving supplies ashore during our prewar landing exercises.

Shepherd: You are correct regarding our lack of experience in landing supplies over the beach in our prewar amphibious exercises. In the 1930’s when the amphibious doctrine was under development, we did not have the ships, equipment, supplies, and personnel to properly do the job. Consequently the development of a logistic doctrine was never truly tested. It wasn’t anybody’s fault; we just never had had any experience with the logistic requirement for a full strength division landing.

Q (Heinl): In those days we did not have the manpower to provide adequate shore parties.

Shepherd: That is true, Bob, nor did we carry with us on the landing exercises conducted before World War II and where near the amount of supplies and equipment taken ashore in the amphibious operations Marine's subsequently made in the Pacific. Consequently, the detailed operations of Shore and Beach Parties had never been properly tested in the study of amphibious operations in our Marine Corps Schools and Phib Exercises. General Barrett was aware of this deficiency in our Landing Force Doctrine, so in the Third Marine Division Administrative S.O.P. which we wrote, the operation of the Shore and Beach Parties were spelled out in detail. Barrett impressed upon Noble and me the importance of rapidly unloading transports and supply ships and the establishment of well separated concealed dumps inland from the beach with easy access to roads and trails to facilitate movement of supplies under cover of darkness to forward combat units. As I recall, our procedure required all transports to be unloaded completely within six hours, the length of time it was calculated it would take for enemy planes to receive word of a landing and attack our transports.

As I recall, when the Third Division moved from New Zealand to Guadalcanal, the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines (reinforced), which I commanded, completed the unloading of our equipment and supplies within the six hours prescribed in our Administrative Annex. When the Japanese planes came over that night and dropped some bombs on the coconut grove where we were billeted, little or no damage was done to our supply dumps. Furthermore the ships which had brought the Division had been unloaded and put to sea.

From the knowledge I had gained in the preparation of the Third Marine Division Administrative S.O.P. and the experience of getting our supplies ashore on Guadalcanal, I was able to write a similar Administrative S.O.P. for the First Marine Division when I joined this organization a few weeks later in Australia, as the Assistant Division Commander. I confess that I had some difficulty in convincing the staff and senior commanders that an Administrative S.O.P. was necessary as there was a feeling among the officers that, if you had not participated in the First Marine Division landing on Guadalcanal, you didn't know anything about amphibious operations.

Q (Heinl): That is certainly true; it was the attitude of the whole Marine Corps at the time.

Shepherd: I am interest in what you said, Bob. During my initial service with the First Marine Division, I had difficulty in getting some of m subordinates to follow my orders wholeheartedly as I was not a Guadalcanal veteran. By the time the New Britain operation was over, during which I commanded a Task Force in the Borgen Bay area where the main battle took place, I believe I had convinced my subordinate commanders that my ideas were sound.

Q (Heinl): About the Shore Party organization and operation, would you discuss that further?

Shepherd: The Shore Party S.O.P. which we wrote prescribed that the various supply dumps – food, ammunition water, etc., - be well dispersed and that the supplies in each dump separated so that the explosion of a bomb would not destroy the entire dump. Further more, each principal dump was marked by a different colored small flag so as to be easily distinguishable. Of course, today, these things are accepted as routine but it was General Barrett who originate many of these procedures and embodied them into a logistic S.O.P. for his Division's Administrative Order.

While the Third Marine Division was in New Zealand we rehearsed the establishment of a supply area by using trucks to represent ships' boats for the transportation of actual supplies to a designated beach which was indicated by a chalked line on the ground. In my opinion, Barrett was one of the most imaginative and ingenious officers in the Marine Corps and his forward thinking was responsible for many of the concepts of amphibious operations. Frankly, I don't believe General Barrett has ever been given full credit for many of his ideas subsequently incorporated into our amphibious doctrine.

Q: Getting back to logistics in the early days, we usually only simulated logistic support in our landing exercises.

Shepherd: What year do you refer to?

Q: In the 1930's the late 1930's.

Shepherd: You refer to the landing exercises we conducted in Vieques during that period?

Q: Yes, sir. We had a Beach Party and a Beach Master but the Tentative Landing Operations Manual did not stipulate the strength and composition of the Beach and Shore Parties. It only stated that these organizations be composed of working parties from landing force units, such as Medical, Engineer, Q.M., Military Police, etc. Although these various working parties were supposed to cooperate, they usually operated independently. Furthermore, the Manual did not prescribe where these details would come from.

Shepherd: They usually came from the combat troops of assault battalions which was poor planning as these men are the ones who do the fighting.

Q: This probably led to considerable confusion.

Shepherd: You are right, Ben, but it was just that we did not understand the complexity and magnitude of the problem until we got into a fighting war. Furthermore, there were few historical examples in the history of amphibious warfare – not since the days of the Phoenicians had a nation had to make a landing in a hostile country and transport its troops and supplies ashore in sufficient quantities to make the Landing Force self-sufficient for thirty days or more.

Q (Heinl): The buildup from the water, from zero at the waters edge is a good old phrase.

Shepherd: As a matter of interest in this matter, recall the Okinawan landing. During this operation, I got to know General Buckner, the Tenth Army Commander, quite well. During the lard fought battle for Shuri, where the Marine and Army Divisions lost so many men before capturing this important terrain feature, I tried to persuade General Buckner to land the Second Marine Division, which was being held in Army Reserve, on the southeast coast of the island. In my opinion this would have forced the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shuri to defend the beachhead established by 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, thereby weakening the strongly defended enemy line which extended from Conical Hill on the east coast to Sugar Loaf Hill on the west coast. If the Japanese did not contain this proposed landing, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division which was still afloat with its 30-days resupply, would be in a position to attack Shuri from the south. But Buckner did not agree with my concept on the premise the Division could not be supplied. I told General Buckner that a Marine Division always carried with it a thirty day supply of food, ammunition, etc., and once their transports were unloaded, the Division could take care of itself. I felt very strongly that if the Second Division was landed in rear of the Japanese lines, even if it only established and defended a beachhead line, it would require the Japanese to contain it, thereby weakening their main defense line which the remainder of the Tenth Army was having such a difficult time penetrating. But like so many Army officers, General Buckner did not cotton to amphibious operations and failed to see the versatility inherent in a Marine Task Force which is capable of landing at any point on an enemy coast line where the beaches are suitable for landing operations and sustaining itself for a limited period of time.

After the fighting was over and Okinawa declared secured, I made a trip to the particular area I had suggested for the landing of the Second Marine Division and found the beachhead area well suited for defense. If the Second Marine Division had been landed, it could have accomplished the mission of requiring Japanese troops to withdraw from their Shuri defenses and made it easier for the Tenth Army to capture the Shuri Hill mass.

Q: One thing that struck me as very inconsistent in the way the Army backed off from putting the Second Marine Division in there, General, was that the beach you refer to was one considered in the alternate plan for the Second Division to land on. If this beach was good enough to be an alternate landing beach then why in the world did it suddenly become unsatisfactory during the actual battle for Okinawa?

Shepherd: Well, I don't think it was so much the beach that influenced General Buckner as his reluctance to open a new front with the dangers entailed to provide logistic support and reinforcements it required. The Second Marine Division was being held and the Tenth Army reserve and a commander is always reluctant to commit his last reserve when no more are available.

Q: I think Admiral Forrest Sherman who was Admiral Nimitz's Chief-of-Staff, may have considered this beach unsatisfactory from a naval point of view.

There may have been another factor which should be considered. Just east of Buckner Bay lay the Eastern Islands which were garrisoned by the Japanese. That was the Nakagusuku Wan, I believe.

Shepherd: That was on the other side of Okinawa.

Q: Yes, sir, but what we call the Eastern Islands were taken by Jones' Phib Corps Scouts.

Q (Heinl): Reginald Jones brother?

Q: Yes, Jimmy Jones.

Shepherd: There were three islands off the east coast. I do not recall their names.

Q: One regiment from the 77<sup>th</sup> Division was assigned to this landing and it developed into quite a battle. But the Navy, even at the beginning of the planning for Okinawa was quite concerned about the danger to the fleet. And if they were concerned about the danger to the fleet off the western coast, which was one of the reasons they took the Keram Retto, then they would naturally be concerned about the danger to the fleet off the eastern coast. This was quite evident.

Shepherd: The Navy lost a lot of ships off Okinawa by Japanese Kamikaze fliers so they were naturally apprehensive about endangering the fleet unnecessarily.

### *End Session 1, Tape 1*

### *Session 1, Tape 2, Side 1.*

Q: What about the capture of the Okoku Peninsula, General? From my study of this operation, it appears the Sixth Marine Division did a good job in securing the southern part of Okinawa.

Shepherd: This operation in my opinion was one of the best planned and most successful conducted by the Division during the Okinawa Campaign.

The initial plan of the III Corps was to make a river crossing of the Kokuba Estuary as we held its northern shoreline. My staff and I decided that this was exactly what the Japanese thought we would do and had planned their defenses to resist such an attack. Therefore, I proposed to General Geiger that the Division make an amphibious landing on the northwest coast of the peninsula in order to envelop the Japanese defenses from the west. Geiger approved of my proposal which was to land the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines in assault just north of the Naha Airfield, supported by two companies of tanks and followed by the 29<sup>th</sup> Marines. The 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines were to remain in its present position on the north side of the Kokuba Estuary and maintain pressure on the enemy's strong defenses there. The Navy supported the operation by naval gunfire. The landing of the Sixth Marine Division on the Okoku Peninsula was highly successful. The 4<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> Marines pushed forward rapidly and by an encircling movement

drove the enemy northeastward toward the Kokuba Estuary. I then ordered the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines to cross a small tributary of the Estuary well to the east and to attack westward. Within the matter of a week, contact had been made between the 22<sup>nd</sup> and the 29<sup>th</sup> Marines and the three infantry regiments of the Sixth Division pushed forward northward, closing in on the Japanese in the vicinity of the town of Oroku. Since the defenders were unable to escape across the Kokuba Estuary, they were all either killed or taken prisoners in the final assault of our troops on the Japanese Naval Station at Kokuba.

My Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Johnny McQueen and I, watched the final assault from a bluff overlooking the Kokuba Estuary near Naha.

An interesting incident occurred in the last stage of the battle. Several of the Japanese officers committed hari-kari on the beach opposite to where we were observing the final assault. We saw one Japanese officer take off his sword, lay it on top of a rock and blow himself up with a grenade. McQueen said to me, "I want that sword" and left immediately to cross over the Estuary by a bridge we had erected near Naha. By the time Johnny arrived at the spot where the Japanese officer had placed his sword on a rock, the sword had disappeared, apparently taken by one of the men of the attacking troops. The next day McQueen sent out a memorandum to the infantry regiments participating in the attack stating that he would give the man who had found the sword \$100.00 for it. The Marine who found the sword turned it in a few days later and received Johnny's award of \$100.00.

To me, the final phase of this battle was one of the most interesting experiences of my military career. To be able to sit in a grandstand seat and watch the three infantry regiments of my Division attack toward me was a unique experience. Through my field glasses, I could see the men of the assault companies moving forward in their attack on the final Japanese defensive position. As I have previously stated I observed Kokuba Estuary, which at this point was not over a couple of hundred yards wide. One could not help but admire the Japanese, most of whom were Navy personnel from the Naha Naval Base – they fought to the last man for their Emperor.

Following the battle for Oroku and capture of its important airfield, the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division advanced southward along the west coast toward the southern tip of Okinawa.

The Tenth Army had used up an enormous amount of ammunition during the three month campaign and General Buckner had issued an order to conserve the remaining limited supply. I had passed this order down to the regiments of the Sixth Division.

One morning toward the close of the campaign while on a visit to the forward assault elements, I met Colonel Bill Whaling, the Commanding Officer of the 29<sup>th</sup> Marines. Bill said to me, "General, I have been carrying out your order to conserve ammunition – I have just killed two Japanese with one shot!" As you know, Bill Whaling was one

of the Marine Corps' great rifle and pistol marksmen. He was a member of our Rifle Team at Camp Perry for a number of years. Bill was also a great hunter and a marvelous bird shooter with a shotgun.

Bill's tale about killing two Japanese with one shot was as follows: "While I was forward with my assault platoons, I saw two Japanese soldiers jump up from a grass field and start running toward a path that led into a patch of woods. I waited until they were in line and one shot from my carbine killed them both. I am saving ammunition, General."

Q: That's like a story "Toots" Henderson told. One of his corps artillerymen went out to the head to do his early morning's morning. Took his carbine along, and while sitting there, a Jap jumped up. He said he was probably the only one who got a kill in the pants-down position. (laughter)

Q (Heinl): That happened to Lewie Puller's brother, didn't it?

Shepherd: Perhaps it was, I don't know. Lewie's brother Sam, whom I knew personally, had gone to VMI, and was killed on Guam.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: He was Lewie's older brother. I think he was Exec of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir, he was the Regimental Executive Officer.

Shepherd: The last time I saw Sam Fuller was on a visit to the CP of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines during the latter part of the battle for Guam. Sam was sitting on a ration crate making notes on the oral order I was issuing for the next day's attack. Knowing he was a VMI school mate of mine, I went over and sat down beside Sam after I had completed my order and we talked briefly about the Institute. I was told later that following my departure, Sam went out on a reconnaissance and was shot by a Jap sniper.

I've always felt, and Alan Shapley can substantiate this, that Sam was trying to emulate his younger brother Lewie. Have you ever heard that?

Q (Heinl): I don't see how it could have been anything but possible, because Sam followed in Lewie's footsteps at Basic School, he had the same desk in Basic School, and he looked like Lewie and he talked like him.

Shepherd: Sam may have been a little envious of his younger brother who had made a tremendous reputation of being a fearless platoon and patrol leader.

I believe Sam Puller was trying to – I won't say this entirely motivated him, but he was naturally trying to establish reputation in his own name of being a great Marine.

Q: It's been said that news of his death came to Lewie Puller when he was on Peleliu and in the midst of the heavy fighting of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines for Bloody Nose Hill where they were getting pretty badly shot up. And they said that Lewie was quite profoundly affected by his brother's death.

Shepherd: There was great devotion between the two, yes.

Q (Heinl): Well that's fine. You took the words out of my mouth. I was going to ask, when – no, I'm sorry. There are so many other questions I would like to ask.

Shepherd: There's plenty of time for you to ask questions, Bob.



Q (Heinl): General, if we could shift gears just for a few minutes, up to the circumstances surrounding Inchon. I remember, when I was working on Soldiers of the Sea, you let me have access to your journal, and so I feel that I know a great deal of how you felt and your thoughts then, but now that I'm working on this book on Inchon, I have gained a rather different perspective about the operation and quite a different perspective about MacArthur than the old standard Marine Corps perspective that so many of us had a few years ago. I wanted to ask you some questions about some of the people there and about a few transactions. I will begin by saying I think that Inchon was MacArthur's greatest hour.

Shepherd: No question about it.

Q (Heinl): However, it seemed to me that MacArthur, as he often did elsewhere, had people around him who were nowhere near up to his level, and –

Shepherd: Could anybody be up to his level? He was, in my opinion, the greatest military leader of our century. He had a keen mind. He was a great leader. He was a fearless, courageous man. I believed, as all of us did during World War II that MacArthur was a political general – everybody was calling him "Dugout Doug." I don't want to hear that about General MacArthur again – I'm telling you, he had the guts.

Q (Heinl): I had the impression, whenever he had a chance he would head for the front lines. We were talking about that earlier. He really marched to the sound of the guns, I thought, General.

Shepherd: He did! I was with him when he did it. I was with him when – I said, "For God's sake, General, it's dangerous to get too close to the shore –"

Q (Heinl): When he ordered that boat into Red Beach.

Shepherd: Right! He went right in to Red Beach and they were still firing. I was in the boat with Struble and General MacArthur when we went in closer than I think he should be. And I said, "General, you're getting in mighty close to the beach; they're shooting at us." He didn't pay any attention and went right ahead. Then, the next day, when he came ashore, I met him at the dock and rode with him in his jeep on a reconnaissance of the front lines.

Q (Heinl): That was the trip up to the tanks?

Shepherd: Tanks – yes. Well, it may have been that day or the next. The 5<sup>th</sup> Marines were advancing along the road between Inchon and Seoul and had just captured a defile. When we arrived at the front lines there were five enemy tanks still burning which had been destroyed by one bazooka's close range fire.

Q (Heinl): D Company, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines.

Shepherd: There had previously been a big argument with the Army, about the effectiveness of bazooka fire against tanks.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. They said the 2.36-inch bazooka couldn't stop a tank.

Shepherd: Couldn't stop a tank, that was it. The Army stated they had to have a more modern bazooka to penetrate the North Korean Russian-made tanks in order to stop them.

Q: They had the 3.5, which they claimed would just barely do it, but the old 2.36 wouldn't do it.

Shepherd: So, I always felt that, the Army anti-tank personnel just didn't wait until the enemy tanks were close enough. You can't knock a tank out a mile away with a bazooka but if you waited until the tank was close enough to get a well-aimed shot at it, you could knock a tank out. I mean, you must have confidence in the weapon.

Our Marines had confidence in the 2.36 Bazooka, so when these enemy tanks came around the bend of the road leading to the pass, they waited till they could see the whites of their eyes before firing. As a result they knocked five enemy tanks out right there in this pass.

Well, it just so happened that MacArthur had come ashore that morning and I was with him in his jeep when we ran into this fire fight between the advance guard and the enemy tank column. In fact, it was just over when we arrived. The tanks were still smoking. It was that close. I mean, it was within half an hour after the fight took place. There these five tanks lined up on both sides of the road and burning with dead bodies in them. I think they were still picking up prisoners around there. The tanks were leading a column of infantry when the engagement took place. I talked to the young officer in command of the advance guard (I don't recall who it was) and he said, "Well, General, we just waited until we got them lined up with all the bazookas and let them have it. We knocked five of the tanks out and the enemy were soon all killed or taken prisoner." I said to General MacArthur, "Well, General, that proves these 3.2 (sic) bazookas can knock a tank out." Ned Almond, the X Corps commander who was accompanying us said, "You damned Marines! You always seem to be in the right spot at the right time! Hell, we've been fighting this battle with Army troops but MacArthur would arrive just as the Marines had knocked out five enemy tanks!"

I have always laughed at Almond's remark. My reply was, "Well, Ned, we're just doing our job, that's all."

Q (Heinl): Actually, General Wright kind of stuck up for us a little bit on this, didn't he?

Shepherd: Yes, Pinky Wright and I got along well together. I believe he recommended to General Almond that I be given command of the X Corps for the Inchon landing.

Q: General, may I diverge from the topic we have been discussing and ask you about another matter which is of interest to me?

Shepherd: Yes, Ben. What is it?

Q: Do you recall a British Regiment by the name of the "Green Howards" that were in Shanghai while you were serving there with the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines?

Shepherd: Yes, I certainly do. The Green Howards were the ones who taught the field musics of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines how to play the fifes and drums. As you are aware, when the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines went to China in 1927 and participated with the troops of other foreign nations in the defense of the International Settlement of Shanghai, we were thrown in contact with a number of

British Regiments. Among them was the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of the Green Howards. These separate British Battalions had no bands but they all had fife and drum corps. The Commanding Officer of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines at that time was Colonel Harry Davis and he conceived the idea of forming a 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Fife and Drum Corps. We had no fifes so the Municipal Council of Shanghai, as a token of appreciation of our participation in the defense of the city, sent to England and purchased a number of fifes and drums which were presented at a ceremony on the Race Course to the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines. Our fife and drum corps was named the Fessenden Fifes in honor of the Mayor of Shanghai. It was the Drum Major of the Green Howards who taught our field musics to play these instruments. Through this contact, a close liaison was formed between our two regiments. We became very fond of the Green Howards and exchanged mess nights several times. When they left, we marched them down to the Bund and on to their ship with our fife and drum corps.

Q: As I recall the history of the Green Howard records, that for having taught the Marines how to play the fifes and drums, the Marines presented the Green Howards with a fabulous drum major's baton of teak wood entwined with a silver dragon which they still have in the regiment. On a return mess night, the Green Howards presented the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines with a stand, a beautiful stand for the colors, made of teak wood with a silver plaque. And this memento and others presented to the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines have all disappeared. There may be something down at Quantico. We still have photos. But most of these mementos have disappeared. The Green Howards still have the baton. As a matter of fact it was in their mess in Tunisia when I visited it.

Shepherd: As I recall we had a case made in which we placed one of the fifes with a plaque inscribed, "Shanghai gave them to us, the Green Howards taught us to play them."

Q (Heinl): That's right.

Shepherd: The stand they gave us for our colors was kept in the regimental commander's office. The flags were crossed and the staffs fitted into a base. The upper part of the staff was secured by the teak wood and silver holder. It was this type of color stand the Green Howards gave the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines. After the departure of the Green Howards we formed a very close liaison with 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, Scots Guards. When the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion returned to England, they presented the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines with a beautiful miniature Silver Scots Drummer which they had brought out with them from London.

Q (Heinl): We renewed this friendship in Edinburgh. The Scots Guards were in the tattoo with us – and one of their officers dug back in the regimental history and told me of their service with the Marines in Shanghai and we ended up doing a combined turn with the Scots Guards. It was a very fine thing. They gave us some good parties, which we returned. We got on marvelously. In fact our Marine Drum Major is now the Drum Major of the Marine Band. He is the best Drum Major we'd had in the Corps in

years. He was the first non-Guards Drum Major ever to be allowed to take command of the combined bands. They have about five bands in the tattoo, perhaps 300 pieces at least. The formation is so big that they have four or five subordinate Drum Majors, like company commanders, with one Drum Major acting as the Battalion Commander. Traditionally the Guards Drum Major always does this throughout the whole tattoo. Our Drum Major was so good that they let him do it, and he did it so well that from then on for the rest of the tattoo the Guards and the Marine Drum Majors would swap off, watch and watch. This is our present Drum Major in the Marine band. His name is Oser.

Shepherd: Well, that all started back at Shanghai, in 1928-29, when we formed a very close liaison with the Scots Guards. I still correspond with an officer of the Scots Guards named Robertson who was a member of the Battalion there. I was very touched when I went back to London, on one of my trips to England, after I was Commandant, and the former commanding officer of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, whose name escapes me at the moment got together all the remaining officers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the Scots Guards, and had a luncheon for me at the Guards Club. We had port after luncheon, and I remarked that it was excellent port. When I said goodbye they presented me with a bottle of Guards Club port, which I still have in my wine cellar.

Our friendship with the Scots Guards came about like this. The Scots, as you know, don't care much for the British and neither did the Marines in Shanghai, especially the Coldstream Guards. We used to call them "The Cold ream Guards." There were 15,000 British there, you know, with General Duncan in command.

So the Marines teamed up with the Scots, because we both didn't like the British.

Q (Heinl): If you remember, General, in your church history, when the Church of England wouldn't consecrate any American bishops, after the Revolution, we consecrated our first American bishop from the Church of Scotland, the Episcopal Church of Scotland. We had to smuggle our man – he was to be Bishop of Maryland, or he was in Maryland – and he was smuggled over to Scotland in the 1780's and was consecrated by three bishops of the Episcopal Church of Scotland.

Shepherd: I didn't know that.

Q (Heinl): Oh, it was years before the Church of England would lay a hand, would pass on the apostolic succession, to an American bishop. But General, if I could draw you away, and perhaps draw Ben away from the Fessenden Fifes for a moment, and get back to Inchon – it's a rapid change of pace from Scotch (sic) bishops to Inchon, but – one thing that has intrigued me very much is why FMF's Headquarters, your headquarters, was not selected to be the Corps Headquarters for the Inchon-Seoul campaign; I know that General Wright, for example, proposed it, as G-3. It went to Almond. It has been said that MacArthur made the decision, but there's no evidence that he did, and there are some papers in the Army that indicate that Almond turned General Wright's proposal down. There

seems to be some indication that Forrest Sherman was supposed to have pushed it, but didn't really push it as hard as he should and the same for Struble, and I wondered if you could throw some light on it.

Shepherd: What you say is more or less correct. MacArthur told me himself, he said, "Lem, I would like you to command this landing at Inchon. It's a Marine show, and you should be in command. But unfortunately I have promised it to my Chief-of-Staff, Ned Almond." Now, that was from MacArthur's own lips. And he further said, "Since you can't command this Corps landing, I want you to accompany me on my staff as my amphibious advisor." That's how I came to participate in the Inchon landing.

It was only natural in a way. Ned Almond, who happened to be a schoolmate of mine at VMI, was MacArthur's Chief-of-Staff and should I say had the inside track as the General's closest advisor.

Q (Heinl): How close were you with Almond at VMI?

Shepherd: He was two years ahead of me. We were not close friends at all –

Q (Heinl): I mean, I wondered in terms of –

Shepherd: He was a VMI man. I liked him, but I really can't say he was one of my closer friends. But here he was, MacArthur's Chief-of-Staff. He was an amphibious landing, and he wanted to command it. And, being MacArthur's Chief-of-Staff, I'm sure he talked himself into getting the assignment but MacArthur told me himself, "I would like you, I would like to give you this command, but I promised it to my Chief-of-Staff.

Well, I can't blame Almond too seriously for trying to get the command, and in giving it to him, MacArthur was being loyal to his Chief-of-Staff. I always will believe that Sherman didn't push my nomination for this command very strongly.

Q: Sherman was not always a friend of the Marine Corps.

Shepherd: He was not a Marine booster.

Q: To say the least. That goes back to World War II days, too.

Shepherd: I am unable to express an opinion on that.

Q (Heinl): Just about this same time, because from what you've said, I judge that MacArthur told you this during your August visit, which was about the 22<sup>nd</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup> of August – along in the latter part of August –

Shepherd: I believe it was during my second visit to Tokyo.

Q (Heinl): That's the second. You had a July trip, July 9<sup>th</sup> or 10<sup>th</sup>, when you offered the division to MacArthur. Then, when the decision was really being arrived at as to whether we would go into Inchon or not, you recall that a deputation from the Chiefs came out, Sherman and Collins, and they had this showdown conference with MacArthur on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August, you recall, in his headquarters in Tokyo, with Doyle resent and some of the others. What I'm leading up to is this; the conference that I've spoken of was the real time of decision on the operation. It was the one the Chiefs had come to be convinced on, if they were to be convinced. (Crosstalk)

Shepherd: . . . The Chiefs of Staff came out to attend this conference and, as I recall, the Chiefs themselves were not too sold on the operation.

Q (Heinl): Oh, they were anything but sold on it. But the thing that I was going to ask about this conference it's very striking to me that although you were in Tokyo at the time – the 22<sup>nd</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup>, and 24<sup>th</sup>. The day after the conference you had a long session with General MacArthur according to my notes. You were trying to convince him on Pusong-Myong, the alternate landing place, was a more suitable landing area than Inchon. Neither you nor C.P. Smith, who had just arrived on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, were invited to attend MacArthur's conference. The only Marine at that conference shown in the records, which I have, was somebody on Admiral Doyle's Staff, and it seems to me a very strange thing, considering the fact that they had the Attack Force Commander, they had the members of the Chiefs, they had MacArthur, his entourage, and Almond, dealing with a decision of great importance on an amphibious assault, and that the prospective Landing Force Commander, O.P. Smith, who was in town, and the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Commander, who was also in town, were not invited to attend. I wondered if you could shed any light on who set the conference up, and why this omission?

Shepherd: I don't recall the conference. I wasn't there; I believe I was in Korea at the time.

Q (Heinl): You wouldn't really have known about it until afterwards, but in the records of the meeting General, your absence and O.P. Smith's absence just stand out like a sore thumb, and I just wondered if – my only conclusion is that perhaps Almond or somebody didn't want too many Marines around.

Shepherd: That's exactly what I think, looking back on it.

I told you the story, I believe – I don't know whether I told you or not – how my being in Tokyo initially took place. I was in Colorado Springs when the Korean War erupted. I read about it in the morning papers, and said to myself, "Well, that's MacArthur's bailiwick; I won't worry about that one."

I mean, the war was in Korea and we didn't have any Marines there so I continued my trip on up to Yellowstone, with my family. When I got to Cody, the war was getting hot and I thought, I'd better notify Admiral Radford that I would come if he wants me to.

To go back a little - upon my detachment from Quantico, I had assumed command of FMFPAC by dispatch, because my predecessor in FMFPAC was sick and wanted to come home, as a matter of fact he had already one back to the States. So in order to get my three stars, I assumed command by dispatch, upon my detachment from Quantico. With authority from General Cates and Admiral Radford, I was given permission to take a month's leave and travel across the continent by automobile and take a ship from San Diego for Honolulu.

Q (Heinl): Your predecessor hadn't had the best relationship with the CINCPAC headquarters either, if I remember.

Q: Who was that?

Shepherd: Williams. Gregon Williams. . .

Q: Who was he? Williams was Chief-of-Staff FMFPAC for General Tommy Watson.

Q (Heinl): No, that was a bad situation about that time, around CINCPAC, and I remember it well.

Shepherd: Watson had already left Pearl Harbor when I assumed command of FMFPAC. I hadn't had any extended leave since the beginning of World War I. When I got back to the United States in January 1946 I went to Charlottesville for a few days and was then assigned to Headquarters to do a special job following which General Vandegrift told me, "I'm going to send you down to Camp Lejeune to take command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division."

Then I started on a leave. I got as far as Camp Lejeune and looked at the quarters there. I was going on to Charleston, South Carolina when I received a telephone call that my mother had suddenly died and I had to go back to Norfolk. Then there were a lot of things to be done, so I never did get a real vacation. About that time, General Vandegrift said he wasn't going to send me down to relieve General John Marston who was due to retire for age under a new bill they expected would be passed, reducing the age limit for retirement to 62 years of age. Like all service legislation it dragged on and on, so John said, "Why should I leave until I have to?" At that time the retiring age was 64 and Marston was only 63, so General Vandegrift said to me, "I will send you down to Little Creek to Organize TTULANT. Admiral Davis is there and he had a similar command on the West Coast during the war, so he's been putting pressure on me to organize an Amphibious Training Unit to train soldiers and Marines from FMFLANT. I'm going to send you down to Little Creek temporarily. I've got other plans for you in the back of my head, but in the meantime you go down and get this show on the road."

Well, it was about the fourth or fifth organization I'd started from scratch, since I took over my regiment and started it from scratch at the beginning of WW II. When I took over the brigade, I had no staff. When I organized the 6<sup>th</sup> Division I had to scramble and fight to get officers for that staff. And then I came back to the States and had to start all over again organizing a command from scratch. To organize a command from scratch takes an awful lot of work.

So I went down to Little Creek and I was there about six months. Then General Vandegrift brought me up to be Assistant Commandant, which worked out fine. When Cates was appointed Commandant to succeed Vandegrift, I replaced him at Quantico where I commanded the Marine Corps Schools for two years. In June 1950 I was ordered to command FMFPAC with Headquarters at Pearl Harbor. I obtained permission to drive across the continent to San Diego where I had transportation to Honolulu by ship. As I previously stated, upon my detachment from Quantico, I assumed command of FMFPAC by dispatch and sent Admiral Radford a copy of my itinerary for crossing the continent. I had made plans to stop for fishing in Yellowstone Park. I had a letter from the Chief of Fisheries in

Washington, requesting Bill Dunn, *who* an the Fisheries in Yellowstone National Park to assign a VIP cabin and permit me to fish in Lake Peale, where the hatcheries are. Not that I was to fish *in* the hatcheries, but in the lake where they are located which is not open to the public. The day I arrived at Cody (Wyoming) at the entrance to Yellowstone Park, I sent a telegram to Admiral Radford stating that I was proceeding according to my itinerary but if he wished me to cut my leave short I would do so.

The next morning I went down to the telegraph office, and inquired if a telegram had been received for me but was informed none had come in. In the telegram I sent Admiral Radford I had stated, "If you need me, I will come by air rather than by sea." Upon my inquiry at the telegraph office I was told, "No telegrams for you General, so with my Aide, Captain Ord, I got a boat from Bill Dunn and began rowing out on the lake to fish.

Well, I'd just gotten about 100 yards off shore when I saw a little girl come down to the beach waving a telegram.

Q: Oh-oh!

Shepherd: When I saw her I said, "Why, Jimmy, in another ten minutes we would have been out in the middle of the lake and would not have seen the girl from the telegraph office. I had better go back and see what this is." When I arrived back on the beach I opened up the telegram. It was from Admiral Radford but the wording was rather ambiguous. It said, "Prefer that you come by air rather than by transport and take the rest of your leave some other time."

Well, it did not convey any sense of urgency about reporting to Pearl Harbor.

Q (Heinl): No sense of emergency is implied in the wording of that dispatch.

Shepherd: You see if he'd said, "Come at once, I need you right now" or some military term that indicated urgency such as report without delay or immediately there would have been no question in my mind about the necessity of leaving immediately. I read the telegram over again and said to myself, "After all, it doesn't say, come right away but only, take you leave later on and come by air rather than by ship." After thinking it over I decided I had better get on out to Honolulu as soon as possible. So I sent a telegram to Air FMFPAC at El Toro requesting the C.G. to send a plane for me to Salt Lake City the following morning. Mrs. Shepherd and I packed our bags and started for Salt Lake City which was the nearest airport. We did not arrive there until midnight. I also sent a telegram to the C.G. Department of the Pacific at San Francisco requesting reservations on a commercial flight the next day for Honolulu. Upon our arrival in Salt Lake City I spent the night with my good friend Don Hittle, a Marine who had served with me at Headquarters Marine Corps and was on duty at the University of Utah in the Naval ROTC Program. The following morning Don took me to the airport where my Marine Plane was waiting to transport me to San Francisco. We arrived in San Francisco about 2 o'clock, and got a flight out that evening for Honolulu.



When I got off the plane the next morning at 8 o'clock I was handed a dispatch by the Chief-of-Staff which had just been received which directed me to send the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade into Korea.

It took an awful amount of work to get that order out as the staff was not organized in those days, like we are today where we have contingency plans for every conceivable situation. We had no plan for the emergency confronting us and only a small staff with whom I had never worked. Due to the reduction of the Marine Corps after WW II to around 70,000 men, we had difficulty in finding sufficient Marines to form the brigade. It took a lot of doing to get the ships, ammunition, supplies and bodies to mount out a brigade of Marines from the West Coast.

Q (Heinl): Was "Brute" out there?

Shepherd: No, I don't think so, no, Brute was not there at that time. I don't think so.

Q: When was this that you reported, sir?

Shepherd: This was in, I would say, about the 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> of July. It was the Sunday following the Sunday that the North Korean Army began their advance into South Korea.

Q (Heinl): They broke through on the 27<sup>th</sup>, sir –

Shepherd: Didn't that happen on a Sunday, that they began their advance into South Korea? This was the following Sunday, that I arrived there.

Q (Heinl): Sunday, the 25<sup>th</sup>.

Q: What was the 25<sup>th</sup> of June?

Q (Heinl): Yes, the 25<sup>th</sup>, so the succeeding Sunday was the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July. You arrived on that day - on that Sunday?

Shepherd: The following Sunday.

Q (Heinl): The following Sunday. All right, it was the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July then.

Shepherd: I don't think it was. I don't seem to remember.

Q (Heinl): There might have been a dateline difference in dates. Well, I mean between the day, the date – it was 25 June in Korea when they jumped off. That would be –

Q: I think 25 is correct.

Q (Heinl): Well, it's a matter of record.

Shepherd: As I have said, Col. Williams handed me this dispatch upon my arrival in Honolulu. Well, it entailed an awful lot of work to get out the necessary mounting out orders. I didn't know the staff and they didn't know me, but we went to work on dispatch orders to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division at Camp Pendleton immediately. Fortunately Admiral Radford was very fine about it. He put the heat on to get the ships, required for the movement. You know most of the amphibious shipping had been disposed of after World War II.

Q (Heinl): Louis Johnson had been sinking the Amphibious Fleet . . .

Shepherd: Oh, yes, Louis Johnson hadn't helped us along, and the Marine Corps was just about to go out of existence. We only had about 60,000 to 70,000 Marines at that time. To form the brigade took a great deal of effort just to get out the initial orders.

It was a day or two later that Radford said to me, “Tommy Sprague’s coming in today. I think you both had better go out to Korea and see General MacArthur and find out what all this thing’s about. We’re getting a lot of dispatches here which are rather confused. I want somebody to tell me what the situation is out there.”

So he sent us both out to Japan on his plane. When we arrived in Tokyo I had a conference with MacArthur. It was at this time I recommended to General MacArthur that a division of Marines be sent to Korea rather than just a brigade.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: Am I correct about this Bob? It was a division rather than a brigade, wasn’t it?

Q (Heinl): No.

Shepherd: I think my suggestion about sending a division came later. Didn’t that come on the next trip? Did I just go out there and get the situation and report back to Radford? We then got the brigade under way, and when I went out there later I recommended a division. Wasn’t that it?

Q (Heinl): What happened, I think, General, the sequence was this. General Cates offered the brigade to Sherman, and Sherman was very reluctant, very reluctant to take it.

Shepherd: That’s right.

Q (Heinl): I have quite a bit of evidence, on Sherman’s foot-dragging over the thing –

Shepherd: Yes, he dragged his feet on it.

Q (Heinl): And then, finally, however, the situation got so bad – it was any port in a storm for Sherman, so Sherman sent the message to Joy and MacArthur, offering a brigade. Then, as I have it, Radford sent you out about the 9<sup>th</sup> of July with Admiral Sprague.

Q: Yes, that is right.

Q (Heinl): And when you went in to see MacArthur, as I have it, MacArthur said something to this effect – he said that, “I wish I had the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. I would land them at Inchon and cut the lines of communication of the North Korean Army then fighting around Pusan in South Korea.”

Shepherd: You think this all took place on this first trip?

Q (Heinl): I think that the transaction about the division did, sir. I think that when you were taken in to see MacArthur, and he said something like this – “I wish I had the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division with me, as I had at Cape Gloucester during World War II, because I have a job for them to do,” and then –

Shepherd: Yes, that is correct.

Q (Heinl): MacArthur pointed to the map and said, “If I had the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division I would make a landing here at Inchon and reverse the war,” or something to that effect.

Shepherd: That’s correct. I remember the facts very well. It is just a question, which trip it was. On the way out to Tokyo after I had issued the orders for the brigade to mount out, I gave the matter of one Marine Brigade assigned to an Army Division considerable thought. Brute was with me on that second trip, and I talked to him about it. “Brute, we have only a Marine

Brigade in Korea; its identity will be lost among all those Army Divisions. A Brigade does not have the capability for independent duty in the field for an extended period. It would have to be attached to an Army Division which in my opinion would be undesirable. On the other hand, if we can get a Marine Division ordered to Korea it would be a unit of sufficient size to take care of it independently. With a Major General in command, he would not permit his division to be pushed around.”

In other words, a division is an entity. You have your supporting artillery. You have your tanks. You have your air support and all these things. Whereas if you’re just one little brigade in a division, you’re going to be pushed around. I know that as always, if there are any tough jobs to do – “Let the Marines do it!”

So I made up my mind, when I went to see MacArthur that I was going to push for a Marine Division to be sent to Korea. I also based my decision on a report I had received just before I left Pearl Harbor on this trip. One of my aides came up and said, “General, President Truman is going to call in the Marine Reserves.” It was on this premise that I based my decision, because I knew that we had expended everybody on the West Coast, to get the brigade going but with the Reserves being called up we would be able to mount out a full division. I had previously made a trip back to the West Coast to visit the brigade, when they were mounting out. Whether it took place before my visit to MacArthur or on my second trip, I don’t recall but I went back and saw the brigade prior to their departure from the U.S.

Anyhow, I had this feeling, this deep feeling, we must have a division in Korea. We don’t want to go over there with a bobtail brigade attached to an Army division. Although we had taken all the available men on the West Coast to the brigade, I knew that if the Reserves were mobilized, we’d have the Marines to fill up a division.

Consequently, when I arrived in Tokyo I had it all worked out in my mind, it wasn’t just something that popped up on the spur of the moment. I thought, when the opportunity presents itself, I’m going to get a full division ordered to Korea rather than the brigade.

I had known MacArthur in World War II, and at Cape Gloucester, and he knew who I was. His Chief-of-Staff at the time was a VMI man. MacArthur had had several VMI men as his Chief-of-Staff. Dick Marshal was one, and there had been others on his staff that I knew, which gave me an entry with the General. So MacArthur knew who I was.

Q (Heinl): Well, in pint of fact, you had quite a reputation, I gather, from reading Army memoranda around there. They considered you as being one of the few people in the whole theatre that MacArthur though highly of, General.

Shepherd: I did have a number of Army friends in the Far Eastern Headquarters.

Q (Heinl): You always had a big influence with General MacArthur.

Shepherd: I don’t know about that. But, during my two years experience overseas with the Army in World War I, I met a lot of Army people, and I didn’t have the antagonism towards the Army that a lot of Marines did. In other

words, I was trained in an Army school and a number of my schoolmates entered the Army. I am a Marine through and through, but unlike a lot of other Marines who have no damn use for the Army, I think it's damn good. They have a lot of good officers among them, a lot of my classmates. I have many friends in the Army.

So when I called on MacArthur, he knew who I was. We had a lengthy conversation in his office. You know, he always wanted to talk. My god, talk, talk, talk, forty minutes, telling me all his experiences. We talked about Korea, we talked about this and that, and as we got up to go, he, very courteously, he was always very courteous - he got up and went to the door of his office, in the Dai Ichi Building.

Q (Heinl): Dai Ichi?

Shepherd: There was a map of Korea, right beside the door of his office. I can see it, right now. And he said, "Lem, if I had that 1st Marine Division, I'd land here at Inchon." I said, "General, why don't you ask for them?" He said, "Do you think I can get them?" I said, "Well, General, they're under my command, as part of FMFPAC, but I can't order them from the West Coast of the U.S. to the Far East Command without the Joint Chiefs of Staff approval." MacArthur then said, "You sit down and write me up a dispatch to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requesting that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division be sent out to my theatre of command."

Well, I looked at MacArthur's desk - it was a great big desk - and the large chair he wanted me to sit down in while writing a dispatch, which would be difficult to compose to the Joint Chiefs. Well, you know, he was a five star General, and I was just a junior three star one, so I said, "General, this dispatch is going to take a little thought." You can imagine how difficult it would be to write a dispatch to the Joint Chiefs, requesting - recommending the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division be ordered to Korea.

Q (Heinl): And with MacArthur looking over your shoulder all the while.

Shepherd: Yes Bob, I had a feeling that MacArthur would be peering over my shoulder, while I was trying to compose a delicately worded dispatch which would be disconcerting to me. So I said, "Well, General, I will go out to the office of your Chief-of-Staff to draft this message and bring it in to you for approval."

I went out to Almond's office and after writing the message over three or four times, and having Ned Almond go over it, I finally came up with a draft that I believed suitable. It was a delicate dispatch to compose. Here I was, recommending that a Marine Division be sent to Korea, and the Commandant didn't know anything about what I was doing. It was a hell of a spot to be in, but the ball had been dropped in my hands and I felt I must run with it. When I took the dispatch I had worked out into MacArthur, he approved of it and directed Almond to send it off immediately. It took two more dispatches from MacArthur before his request was approved.

Q (Heinl): There were a total of five requests, made from MacArthur's Headquarters before the Joint Chiefs approved sending a Marine Division to Korea.

Shepherd: Well, mine was the first.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. And it was the one that bore the most weight.

Shepherd: I gave a great deal of thought to its preparation.

Q (Heinl): Is there any truth in reports that initially, at any rate General, you got in hot water with General Cates over taking the bit in your teeth?

Shepherd: Yes. I think there was, but there were no hard feelings –

Q (Heinl): No –

Shepherd: Cliff and I were very close. But naturally, he was concerned about my committing so many Marines to Korea. As I have previously stated, the Corps was down to a strength of around 70,000. We had stripped the 1<sup>st</sup> Division to send out the Brigade. He had committed the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to NATO. Cliff was naturally concerned as to where the Marines were coming from to bring the 1<sup>st</sup> Division to its war-time T/O for service in Korea. I went back to Pendleton, or actually, I think it was San Diego; when the Brigade loaded out in order to talk to the officers and men and check on many details that had to be ironed out on the spot. General Cates also came to San Diego for the Brigade's departure which gave me the opportunity to talk to him personally about my conversation with General MacArthur and my reasons for recommending to General MacArthur that he request the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division for the Inchon Landing. I think Cates initially frowned on my actions as he said, "We haven't got the men, we haven't got the men."

So I said, "Clifton, you can't let me down. I have recommended the commitment of a Marine Division to MacArthur for Korea, please back me up." He said, "Well, we've just been assigned a commitment to form a division for NATO, on the East Coast. That's where the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division is going." I said, "Clifton, we're fighting a hot war over there in Korea." NATO is something they're just forming on paper. We belong in the Pacific. The Western Pacific is our theatre. We fought there during World War II, and we should have a division there now," and I went into various reasons why we should have a division in Korea.

He said, "I don't know." There was no anger between us. We were just discussing the problem. I think he was naturally, as I would have been, a little lukewarm, on having one of his subordinates commit a whole division of the Marine Corps to MacArthur. Because at that time, MacArthur was not too popular, as you well know.

Q: Could it have been the possibility that he had been living under such a severe attrition, up until Korea? I mean, the times, his regiments were depleted –

Shepherd: Yes. Regiments had been reduced to battalions. The reinforced battalion or BLT, was formed about that time – the Marine Corps had been reduced to 67,000.

Q: 67,000? The situation was grave. I was down at Lejeune with a Reserve Unit in '48 and the Reserve component had more money than the Regular component. And I think – this is no exaggeration – the Regular people down there were down to two sheets of toilet paper per man per day, and

they came over to the Reserve Unit to borrow brooms and mops and toilet paper. They were hurting.

Shepherd: The Johnson regime was in. They were cutting us down. We were having a fight in Congress at that time for our very existence. The reason I committed the 1<sup>st</sup> Division to Korea, I told you, was when I was handed a dispatch just prior to my departure for Tokyo saying President Truman was going to call out the Reserves.

I forgot to mention, Bob, that when I got back to Honolulu and got off the plane, I was handed another dispatch saying, "President Truman isn't going to call the Reserves." That really shook me up.

Q (Heinl): Oh –

Shepherd: I said to my Chief-of-Staff, "My God, what's going to happen? Here I've committed the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, on the strength of the president's calling the Reserves, and now the President's decided not to call them!"

Q: Well, it was only a temporary thing. I mean, he hadn't called them, actually but stated he intended to.

Q (Heinl): He called them on the 19<sup>th</sup> of July.

Shepherd: Well, during that week I was very unhappy.

Q (Heinl): You had a week to sweat it out.

Shepherd: The information I had been given may have come from a newspaper. Someone may have got it out of a press release – "President intends to call Reserves."

Q: Reportorial assumption.

Shepherd: But when I got back to Pearl Harbor and found out that the President hadn't called the Reserves, I really was sunk! But the President did call the Reserves and they came in, they did a magnificent job. My God, they really did. I went up on the front lines one of those first days at Inchon, and talked to the men. I said, "Where were you this time last month?" He said, "I was in a bank in Chicago." That shows you how rapidly the Reserves responded to the call to duty and they all did a good job.

To return to my first conference with General MacArthur as this is the real beginning of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division's deployment in Korea where they distinguished themselves and added many pages of glorious deeds to the annals of our Corps. I shall never forget – my embarrassment when calling on MacArthur and suggesting to him to request the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division to make the Inchon Landing and the General said, "Sit down at my desk and write me a dispatch to the Joint Chiefs." It really shook me, Bob. You know I just don't work that quickly on a matter of this importance. I had to sit down and write the dispatch out three times. You know, some people are gifted in writing and expressing themselves without difficulty but I had to write the message out three times in order to say diplomatically that I recommended a Marine Division be sent to Korea. It worked all right, and if I may say so, God looks out for you sometimes. It was the best thing that ever happened to the Marine Corps. We were at a very low ebb at the time but the Inchon Landing and our

courageous fight at the Chosin Reservoir saved the Corps from becoming only a ships landing force under Navy control.

Q (Heinl): We had our back to the wall.

Shepherd: We were fighting for our existence. Sherman and the rest of these fellows wanted to keep us seagoing Marines, with a Battalion Landing Team being the largest unit we were supposed to have. That was the story. That was before the enactment of the Public Law which insured the Corps of three divisions and three air wings; as a matter of fact it was our decisive actions in Korea which influenced this law to be passed.

Q (Heinl): General Cates told me that the two greatest things that ever happened to the Marine Corps were getting that division out to Korea and Harry Truman's letter.

Shepherd: Yes, they were.

Q (Heinl): That they were the two things that really saved us.

Shepherd: As I said a while ago, and I wish to repeat this, I think General Cates was one of the greatest Commandants we ever had. He had a tough job. Everybody was against the Marine Corps at that time. Secretary of Defense Johnson, always nagging, Truman hostile, and Cates carried that load all by himself and did it well. He supported me to the limit. When I got over to San Diego and explained to General Cates that Korea was a got war and we had to get into it even if it meant calling our the Reserves, he fully understood the situation and gave me his full backing.

I think I felt sure I was right. There was a war going on in Korea. There may have been a potential war building up in Europe, but there was no fighting going on there at that time.

Q (Heinl): It seems to be pretty potential, because they hadn't had it yet.

Shepherd: Well, at that time, General Cates was committed to Europe, and I think I'd have gotten very much more upset than he did by having to strip the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to fill the 1<sup>st</sup>. And when we got that division over there and made the successful Inchon Landing, it proved I was right. Later, when we began ironing out the details, I learned that MacArthur planned to make the landing at Inchon on the 15<sup>th</sup> of September. It was already August, you know, and I couldn't imagine landing in Korea the 15<sup>th</sup> of September. I mean that was just a month away and we hadn't even formed the division.

When we finally received the order authorizing FMFPAC to form the 1<sup>st</sup> Division less the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, we got the show on the road to meet the target date. Thank God for the Marine Corps support given us in calling out the Reserves that enabled the division to form its regiments and march aboard ship. I went over to San Diego several times during this period to check on the progress being made. It was a big operation to get the division under way with its equipment, ammunition, and supplies. Admiral Radford backed me to the limit in securing shipping for the troops to cross the Pacific with their supporting aircraft.

Q (Heinl): Is my recollection correct, general – speaking of AIRPac or air support – that there was considerable difficulty in getting any support in providing

air lift from the West Coast by MATS, for some Marine units in Camp Pendleton?

Shepherd: Yes.

Q (Heinl): It seems to me that commercial aircraft had to be employed.

Shepherd: I think that came later Bob, after we began suffering casualties during the fighting in Korea. Following the combat of the Brigade on the Nakdong River and after the Inchon landing we were able to get air lift for our casualties coming back to the States.

Q (Heinl): Casualty evacuation?

Shepherd: Yes, there wasn't enough shipping to handle them. There weren't enough ships coming out to transport replacements. I remember going to bat on that one and demanding we have sufficient airlift to transport the replacements we required to keep the division up to strength. I think that came later, though.

Q (Heinl): I remember the dispatches going through headquarters.

Shepherd: We had to airlift replacements – because they just didn't get to Korea fast enough by ship. We were losing people in battle. I remember my first trip to Korea, after the – the brigade arrived. I went down to the Nakdong where there had been some severe fighting. Eddie Craig was there, Commander of the Brigade. Eddie had been Exec in the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines, and I was very, very fond of him. And I always remember a remark he made to me.

You recall we fought a battle on the Nakdong River and took certain objectives of importance. Then we turned them over to an Army. The next day the Army lost the ground we had taken and Eddie had to go back in there with his brigade and recapture the positions he had previously taken. He lost a lot of boys retaking the same damn ground that he'd taken two or three days before.

The Army Division Commander, whose name I don't recall at the moment, went to Eddie, who was a Brigadier and said, "General Craig, I'm horribly embarrassed that you have to do this – my men lost the ground that you took in a severe fight - " And Eddie, in his very gallant manner, said "General, it might have happened to me."

Q (Heinl): That's General Craig all over.

Shepherd: Now, can you imagine a more gracious thing to say? Instead of saying, "Well you damn fool, why couldn't you old it," as I'd have been tempted to say. That's a classic remark, in my opinion, because he had lost a lot of men in the Nakdong Battle. Joe Fegan was wounded there – a lot of boys were wounded and killed.

But they did a great job at Nakdong. I don't know how much history's been written about it, but they had some damn good fighting up there, and those Marines of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade really did a great job.

Q (Heinl): They were the only troops on the whole perimeter that were never beaten.

Shepherd: When I visited the Brigade they were within 20 miles of Pusan on the lower part of the Korean Peninsula. They were that far down. And that's the first time I ever saw a helicopter in action – they used helicopters for



the first time in combat. As you know, Bob, I have always been interested in helicopters.

Q (Heinl): Oh, yes, that's when you wrote the original board recommendations - that helicopters be adopted for use by the Marine Corps.

Shepherd: With the help of a lot of good boys. I simply was the senior officer present on that board, but it struck me as the solution for dispersing ships at sea to avoid their loss by an atomic bomb.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: The Secretary of Defense once said to General Vandegrift, "General what are you going to do when your fleet lands at a place like Iwo Jima and you've got all the ships in a limited landing area, when the atomic bomb's dropped you will lose everything."

General Vandegrift passed the problem on. He appointed a special board to come up with a solution. Bill Twining was the fellow who thought about using helicopters. He was the one who came up with the idea of dispersing the transports and bringing these troops in by helicopter. Well, I was just smart enough to say, "Bill, you've got something there, that really is a great idea."

Q: Do you remember that day at FMFPAC Headquarters, when the Army publication on vertical envelopment came through, and it was the same damn thing that you and Krulak had written?

Shepherd: Yes, I do –

Q: It was the same doctrine, verbatim, put out as an Army publication.

Shepherd: We had a lot of helicopters in Korea, and we wouldn't let the Army use them and that irritated the hell out of them.

Q (Heinl): We had use enough for our own.

Q: General, give me your slant on the two Admirals, Struble and Doyle. What were they like? How did they compare?

Shepherd: Well, Doyle, in my opinion, was one of the greatest Admirals I've known. He was courageous. He took counsel. He had the job of getting the Marines of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, with an assortment of vehicles and supplies, transported from Yokosuka and Kobe to Inchon in the face of a typhoon.

Q: Coordinating the movement of the transports and LSTs south of the island of Kyushu, into the Yellow Sea and up the Han River to Inchon.

Shepherd: Yes, coordinating that whole movement and making this landing, was one heck of a job. He and I fought some battles in getting these ships against some of the other people that didn't want to let us have them.

In my opinion, Doyle was a first rate naval officer. What in my opinion, made him great, occurred during the landing at Inchon. Somebody called for an air strike on a particular spot – or maybe it was for naval gunfire on some spot. I had received a message saying our troops were on this spot. He'd just given the order to put gunfire down there. I went to him and I said, "Admiral, don't do that. The Marines are right there."

His face turned as white as a sheet. You normally don't tell an Admiral in command of his ship, "Don't do that." And he said, "All right.

I won't!" I told that story to Admiral Radford, before his conference of officers in his briefing room, and I said, "To me that was one of the greatest actions of a naval officer that I've ever known to have countermanded his order." And you know, no one likes to countermand an order – especially a naval officer – when they give an order, that's it, you know that. But Doyle countermanded the order he had just given on the bridge of his ship. He turned almost white when I said, "Admiral, please don't do that. Don't do that - . We have either taken the town, or we've got Marines entering it." Without hesitation Doyle said, "Call off the strike. Call off the gunfire." A lot of them would have said, "The heck with you." Don't you agree?

Q (Heinl): Yes, I certainly do.

Shepherd: Right on the bridge of his own ship! He was the boss!

Q (Heinl): Think what Jerry Wright would have done if anyone had said that to him.

Shepherd: Think of anyone. I mean, you tell a naval officer to countermand an order that he's issued, right on the bridge of his ship with all his officers standing around. I wasn't like I had gone to him down in his cabin. Doyle was standing on the bridge during the battle – he'd given an order and everyone was jumping around to expedite it. When I said, "Admiral, for God's sake don't do that!" And he immediately countermanded the order without question. In my book Doyle will always be a great naval officer.

Q: And what about Struble?

Shepherd: He's a friend of mine, in a way. I don't think he's the caliber of Doyle. He's slippery. I wouldn't trust him. He actually misquoted me on one occasion, and put me in a very bad light. I was so damn mad about it, I wrote an official letter asking his apology, but on Radford's recommendation, I tore it up. It was something that occurred on the trip we made around the harbor at Inchon with MacArthur after the landing.

Q: After the initial landing?

Shepherd: After the initial landing, MacArthur wanted to go out and see the beach and what was going on. So we all got in a boat together which took us to Wolmi-Do Island and then to the dock at Inchon to look that over. We then went around to another place where there was a hell of a lot of fighting going on. Shells were falling all around the boat. So I said to Struble, "I don't think it's safe to take General MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief of the theatre, in here and expose him to this occasional rifle and mortar fire."

Well, I think I did right in looking after the safety of my Commander.

Q (Heinl): It wasn't good judgment on the part of the theatre commander to expose himself unnecessarily riding around Inchon harbor in an open boat with the battle going on a few hundred yards away.

Shepherd: No. It was not in keeping with MacArthur's position to be snooping around and sightseeing. There are times you've got to expose yourself, as I did on Okinawa on several occasions, but this was not a time for MacArthur to expose himself within 100 yards of the beach, and the North

Koreans firing machine guns and mortar shells which were hitting around the boat. So I said, "I think we should get the General's boat out of danger."

And damn old Struble said, "Shepherd was scared of getting into the beach." Well, I wasn't scared, it wasn't bothering me, but I felt a certain amount of responsibility of protecting General MacArthur from having a mortar shell hit the boat. So I never had a damn bit of use for Struble after that. When I heard this remark had gotten around, I was so damn mad, I wrote a letter to Struble asking him for an apology.

Q: It was rather an ill conceived remark I would say.

Shepherd: Later Admiral Struble did say he didn't mean to infer I was scared. But I wanted to get the damn thing in writing. I was really mad about it. I was simply doing my duty as a subordinate of General MacArthur. I didn't think it was safe for him to be there, and I still don't think it was safe for him to be there – cruising around – and all he was doing was just sightseeing. There was a battle going on on the beach, two or three hundred yards away, and I didn't think the Commander-in-Chief should be exposing himself that way.

Q (Heinl): There's one thing I noticed about Admiral Struble, or about his actions. You remember that wonderful message that General MacArthur sent – "The Navy and the Marines have never shone more brightly."

Shepherd: Yes, I remember – I was right there when he wrote it!

Q (Heinl): All right. Did you ever see Admiral Struble's reply to that message? The All Hands Message that General MacArthur put out.

Shepherd: Yes, I was right there when MacArthur took his pen, and wrote it.

Q (Heinl): Well, Struble sent an official reply to this message later in the day when he got back on the Rochester. "Your so-and-so. This victory could only have been achieved by the combined action of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force," and left us out. Do you remember that, General?

Shepherd: No, I don't. I don't recall it. But that was Struble. He was that slippery, and he was playing footsie with the Army and Air Force.

Q (Heinl): You can see, when you line up these two messages side by side, that he wanted to look real unified at this moment, and didn't bother to mention the Marines, who did all the fighting.

Shepherd: That's right. Well, that's Struble. That's why I don't like him. My wife says, "Oh, he's a nice fellow." I never liked him after his remark while we were riding around in his barge in Inchon Harbor the morning of the landing. He practically accused me of being yellow because I didn't want the boat to take General MacArthur right into the beach! He was Commander-in-Chief, and the North Koreans were firing all around our boat. I wasn't worrying about myself, but I didn't want General MacArthur to be exposed unnecessarily to shore battery fire. They were firing at our boat with mortars and machine guns. Don't you think I was right?

Q (Heinl): You couldn't have been righter, General. The Commander-in-Chief of a theatre can't get himself killed at the outset of an operation for no good reason.

Shepherd: He was just sightseeing. The Old Man had courage. Later on I rode around with him on shore during that Inchon landing. On several occasions MacArthur exposed himself unnecessarily. I always tried to guide him the other way. He wasn't afraid of anything. I think MacArthur was a great general and diplomat.

Have you ever been in the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk?

Q (Heinl): No, sir. I'm going to go down there when they get the papers opened up. They haven't got them opened yet.

Shepherd: Well, a friend of mine is in charge of the Memorials.

Q (Heinl): Is his name Sam Northern?

Shepherd: Yes, Sam Northern.

Q (Heinl): Well, I only know his name. Is he a friend of yours?

Shepherd: A very dear friend. He and I grew up across the street from each other. He lived on one side of Colonial Avenue in Norfolk and I lived on the other, and we were very good friends. And of course I know this fellow Whitney, he's a blowhard.

Q: Oh, Courtney Whitney?

Shepherd: Yes, Courtney Whitney. He's writing a book about MacArthur.

Q: How about Willoughby?

Shepherd: Well, I like Willoughby. Willoughby's controversial but Willoughby was a damn good G-2. Talk about your G-2's, he really carried it to the nth degree, with his volumes of background information. Each day's report was half-an-inch thick . . . (tape off.)

### *Tape 2, Side 2*

Shepherd: This photograph shows me with General MacArthur. I was with the General every time he came ashore, and we went around together. Courtney Whitney always got himself in every photograph taken of MacArthur when he went ashore. Whitney was a National Guard officer who was on MacArthur's Staff and ingratiated himself with the General. He handled all the publicity. Whitney kept a file of his press releases which he used in writing his book. He sent me a copy when it was published.

Q (Heinl): Pretty sorry book, actually, you know. Getting back to Willoughby again, you considered him as being a good G-2?

Shepherd: I thought he was a damn good G-2, except that maybe he overdid the daily action reports.

Q: Well, wasn't his Intelligence bad on the entry of the CCF, the Chinese Communists? They kept saying that there were no Chinese Communists in Korea.

Shepherd: Well . . . he's been accused of that. But this rumor had gone on from the day after we made the Inchon landing. The first question that General

MacArthur would ask me when he went on deck in the morning was, “Have you seen or heard anything of the Russians or the North Chinese?” I don’t recall whether he used the word ‘Russians’ or whether he used the words ‘North Chinese Communists.’ I guess he must have used ‘North Chinese.’ That was his first question when I talked to MacArthur each morning at breakfast aboard the Mount McKinley. He was conscious of their possible entry into North Korea when we landed at Inchon the 15<sup>th</sup> of September. October had gone by, November came and the Chinese hadn’t showed up yet, so I think that people had cried “Wolf” so long, so nobody paid much attention to rumors that the North Chinese would become involved in the war. I remember well when the North Chinese entered the war. It was while the 1<sup>st</sup> Division was up on the reservoir when the first Chinese hit us there. I was there for a visit to General O.P. Smith and saw some Chinese prisoners. When I returned to Tokyo, I told General MacArthur about them. He’d gotten the word before, of course, but I confirmed the dispatches he’d received. This happened to be the next day that we definitely identified Chinese fighting up there by the reservoir. MacArthur wanted to know the number, how many and was I sure they were North Chinese. I had a long talk with him on the subject, so I think he realized the danger and he just took a chance on their not entering the war.

I don’t blame MacArthur, or Willoughby, too much that they didn’t prophesy that the Chinese were coming in on X day of November, or whatever day it was that they actually made their first sortie. I mean, this thing had been hanging over us for three months, and we just took it as one of the calculated risks of what might take place.

You can have a lot of argument on that. After all, commanders must make decisions, and take appropriate action to carry them out. If you listen to every rumor you hear, you’re going to be timid. You are not going to do anything – just go in your hole and sit there.

Q (Heinl): There are always a million reasons for doing nothing.

Shepherd: Bob, that’s certainly true. You can justify any negative action if you let yourself be influenced by all the theoretical reasons for opposition to it.

Q (Heinl): Now tell me something about General Almond as a Corps Commander in the field.

Shepherd: I considered Almond an excellent Corps Commander. He was energetic, forceful, brave, and in many ways did a good job under most difficult conditions.

Q (Heinl): What you have said is very interesting. You’re the first person I’ve talked to, and I say that I’ve talked at length with General Cates, of course, with Joe Collins, with Admiral Doyle – I’m going to be seeing him next week – and I’ve talked to a lot of other figures connected with the operation, and you are the first person of any consequence who’s had a good word to say for General Almond. And it’s almost fascinating. Of course, I’ve talked with O.P. Smith, who didn’t like him at all –

Shepherd: He and O.P. just didn't get along, from the very first. They're two entirely different personalities. You know, O.P. is a cautious individual, a fine staff officer who carefully considered every contingency before taking action. On the other hand, Almond was aggressive and anxious for the X Corps to push ahead faster than Smith thought his division should. Smith wisely took every precaution to protect his flanks during his division's advance into North Korea which slowed him down considerably. I'm sure, Almond got into Smith's hair – just like I'm sure that I did too.

Q (Heinl): Well, he would never admit it when we talked.

Shepherd: Do you mean Smith?

Q (Heinl): Yes.

Shepherd: He wouldn't – he is too fine an officer to do that, but I am glad to learn that Smith bears me no ill will as I kept urging Smith to push forward more rapidly as he had the North Koreans on the run and when an enemy is retreating is the time to pursue vigorously. I gave Smith my full support in every way especially in arranging for the expeditious arrival of replacements and replenishment of supplies by air, hospitalization of casualties and many other matters which I did not necessarily have to do. I talked to him and said, "O.P., play the game, don't get so mad with Almond. He's trying to do the right thing." And I knew he was. I stayed in Almond's mess when he had the Corps and he was always very courteous to me. Although I've always regretted that he commanded the Corps instead of me that was the way the chips fell. As I've explained before, he naturally wanted this command and he got it.

I think Almond did a pretty good job with the Corps, although he pushed too far into North Korea and he did get out on a limb. He was so anxious to get to the Yalu; you knew he went up on the Yalu himself. He had plenty of courage. He went up to the Yalu, by jeep, I think, but his personality and General Smith's just clashed, which was all there was to it. And I think their differences grew and grew and grew. Smith as you know wanted everything done right by the book.

Q (Heinl): Yes.

Shepherd: And in battle you can't always do things by the book. You've got to take initiative in combat – take chances when the opportunity to gain a victory appears probable. But Smith proved in the end – that he was right in that he went up to the reservoir in an orderly manner and he came back in an orderly manner. So I don't mean to detract from General O.P. Smith's actions in Korea. He is a fine soldier and I had the pleasure of recommending him for a Distinguished Service Medal, which was hard to get in those days. They just didn't pass them out. I gave him my full support and loyalty.

Q (Heinl): "Done with sufficient impetuosity, you can defeat the enemy with a few squads."

Shepherd: That's right.

Q (Heinl): But if the man who is in command of a pursuit is someone who likes to have his ranks dressed all the time, you might just as well not pursue.

Shepherd: You know the situation. They were running away.

Q (Heinl): And every hour was vital –

Shepherd: My idea was to pursue, pursue, and clean up these pockets later. Well, we arrived on the Chosin Plateau in early winter, it turned out we ran into difficulties. We had to make a withdrawal, and the courageous withdrawal the Marine made from the Chosin Reservoir in the dead of winter is a historical epic. Whether we should have gone all the way up there, I won't express an opinion on. I think Almond pushed ahead with the X Corps because the Eighth Army on the other side of the Korean peninsula had bogged down and he wanted to make a name for himself. I can't be critical of Almond for what he did – in pushing aggressively northward to the Yalu to try to overcome the last remnants of the North Korean Army in the zone of action of the X Corps.

And another thing that I would like to touch on in reference to the Inchon landing is the considerable discussion that took place as to whether we should land there or make the landing further south. From the various reports that we had, it appeared that Inchon was a pretty damn tough spot to take. Initially, I was lukewarm about making an amphibious landing in the center of a well-defended city. I was thinking about World War II, and the Japanese, and how they fought from house to house, and it was tough going. I was afraid we would run into similar difficulties at Inchon and that it would cost the lives of many Marines to take the city. I briefly discussed with MacArthur the hazards I envisioned by landing at Inchon. And MacArthur made the decision; "That's where we're going to land." I think he may have had more Intelligence on the Korean defense of Inchon than perhaps the rest of us.

Q (Heinl): Well, unquestionably he did.

Shepherd: He may have had access to Intelligence that we didn't have. To have landed further south, and fight our way up to Seoul would have been quite an operation. So MacArthur was right in his decision. But that was one of the questions we worked over and over, and I wasn't convinced that a landing at Inchon would be successful because we were landing right smack in the center of a town that was hostile to us. I mean, if you set up a situation where a landing would be the most difficult you can imagine, you would have had it at Inchon.

Q (Heinl): Plus the tide situation there.

Shepherd: Yes, that was an important factor. Due to the mud flats in the Han River, we could only land at a certain time. It turned out that the North Koreans didn't put up the fight that the Japanese did at Iwo Jima and Peleliu. If there'd been that kind of a fight – at Inchon – it would have cost us heavy casualties to have taken the city. Besides, we didn't want to destroy the town with gunfire.

Q (Heinl): I'm told, incidentally, that Admiral Struble was one of the people that put the brakes on a more complete gunfire preparation than they had. He changed his mind when his destroyers got shot up.

Shepherd: I don't know about that.

Q (Heinl): This apparently was one of the points of difference between Struble and Doyle –

Shepherd: Inchon was a nice town and you hated like the dickens to blow it all to pieces.

I remember that during the early evening of D-Day I got a boat and went in close to the shore. I don't think General MacArthur was along this trip. The whole town was on fire – it was a spectacular sight.

Q (Heinl): This was the trip to Blue Beach over to the right.

Shepherd: Yes –

Q (Heinl): Where the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines landed in all that smoke.

Shepherd: That's right. We went into that beach, several of us. I've forgotten who was with me at the time. The initial landing had taken place. It was raining and a heavy cloud of smoke covered the shoreline as our boat approached it. I did not disembark but I talked to an officer on the beach and asked him how things were going and was told the landing was successful but a fight was going on a short distance inland. As we skirted along the beach, someone called to us, "Get out of here! Don't you see those mortar shells coming over?" Well, they were hitting all around us so I gave the coxswain the order to return to the ship.

I will always recall with amusement an incident of a personal nature that occurred toward the end of the Inchon Operation which I will relate to you.

Although General MacArthur was aware of the difficulties encountered by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division in its attack on Seoul, he was anxious to capture the city without delay. The victory at Inchon had led him to believe that Seoul would also be captured without great difficulty.

After the crossing of the Han River by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and their attack on Seoul from the north, General MacArthur would ask me at breakfast each morning, "Lem, when are your Marines going to capture Seoul?"

As the days passed it became increasingly difficult for me to answer MacArthur's question. I was in constant personal contact with General Smith and visited his command post daily. I knew the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was making a determined effort to seize the city but were meeting determined resistance by its North Korean defenders which I explained to MacArthur. Finally I decided to answer his question by simply replying, "We will capture Seoul today, General," which seemed to satisfy him.

About midnight on September 28<sup>th</sup>, I received a personal priority dispatch from General Smith over the Marine communication channel stating that troops of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division had captured Seoul. I was naturally elated and jumped out of my bunk and ran down the passageway in my pajamas to MacArthur's cabin with the message in my hands.

Upon knocking, I was told to enter. The General was pacing up and down his cabin smoking his corncob pipe. Without apologizing for



my informal attire, I said, “General, we have captured Seoul. We’ve got it! I told you we would take Seoul today.”

Of course, General MacArthur was delighted to receive this news and invited me to sit down and we talked for quite awhile about the operation. Looking back on this incident I feel some embarrassment at the recollection of my midnight entry into General MacArthur’s cabin clad only in my pajamas.

Q (Heinl): You don’t get the fish eye when you bring tidings of victory.

Shepherd: No, but I am sure you’d be surprised if a subordinate ran into your cabin at 12 o’clock at night in his pajamas.

Q: He was a very proper individual.

Shepherd: And he had a fantastic memory. I have a great respect for him.

Once he remarked to me and you might put this in your book, “You know, Lem,” he said, “I have the reputation of not liking Marines. It is not so. I want you to know that I have the highest admiration for Marines. People accuse me of not liking them. It’s not so.”

Q (Heinl): I am convinced, at this stage of his career, that he was telling you the absolute truth.

Shepherd: I think he was.

Q (Heinl): The operation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division at Inchon and the capture of Seoul convinced him that we were a pretty good outfit. I think he got, I think he really got religion on it.

Shepherd: We pulled him out of the soup in Korea. His army in Korea was defeated until we landed at Inchon. I recall visiting the Eighth Army headquarters and General Walker remarked “I’m just a defeated Confederate general.” That was when – Admiral Radford and I visited his headquarters, in some town in the southern part of South Korea prior to the Inchon landing.

Q (Heinl): Admiral Radford quoted that same phrase, and he said he thought he was with you on a trip you two made over to Korea. He said, “I’m just a defeated Confederate general.”

Shepherd: That’s right. He said that. I was there when he said it.

Q (Heinl): Well, he obviously was.

Shepherd: In looking at it now, in retrospect that Army had a couple of “Makee-learnie” divisions in Japan. It was during the Occupation period. The men were living in the lap of luxury in Japan. They weren’t worrying about any war. A lot of them had come in after World War II, and had no combat experience and – there were very few veterans there.

Q (Heinl): They were not soldiers.

Shepherd: They were not trained soldiers. And then all of a sudden they were thrown into battle against a strong enemy, these North Koreans, they were fighters and had successfully overrun South Korea. I can’t blame or criticize the Army too much. Then we just were not prepared for combat against a determined enemy.

Q: On the other hand, these people joined up to be soldiers. Is there any record of any maneuvers or any exercise or any type of military combat training?

Shepherd: I don't think they had any. They were over there on Occupational duty. I don't think that they ever got out of the barracks for any field maneuvers.

Q: Of course, you recall Army recruiting posters of that time – "Join the Army, be a Military Policeman," or "Go here, go there –"

Shepherd: That's right.

Q: So they weren't prepared for a fighting war.

Shepherd: It was the way of the times, the war was over. World War II was over. Nobody anticipated Korea, and it was just one of those things. They got caught flatfooted.

Now, I'm not saying that the Marines didn't put up a damn sight better fight, which they did, but I can't be too harsh saying, "The Army's no damn good because it ran away or got licked at Seoul, and just dropped back farther as the North Korean Army pushed forward to the South."

Q (Heinl): I was very favorably impressed with the Army both in Santo Domingo and Vietnam, General. I think they've come a long way since Korea.

Shepherd: They took a page out of our book.

Q (Heinl): They've borrowed everything that we ever had.

Shepherd: The old saying is – I hope you will quote it in your book, - "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em." That's just the hell what they've done.

Q: They have –

Shepherd: I've had it quoted to me, by an Army officer (I can't recall who it was) – "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em." That's just what the Army did. They've taken everything we have that was any good.

Q (Heinl): They've copied our uniforms. They adopted an Army battle standard like our battle standard. They have a sergeant major in the Army. They have their in field hats. They adopted the rank of lance corporal. They've got green uniforms.

Shepherd: Even to the uniform.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir. They've got our helmet covers, camouflaged helmet covers, they wear in the field now –

Shepherd: Every single thing (crosstalk)

Q: In newspaper photographs you can't tell whether they are Marines or Army –

Shepherd: You can always tell a Marine. And they, the people of the old Army were very proud of that olive drab, which was an honorable uniform.

Q (Heinl): It certainly was.

Shepherd: It has been the uniform for Army, since the Civil War, hasn't it?

Q (Heinl): No sir, they had to get the same damn uniform as the Marines. Why hey did that, don't know. Who was it started by?

Shepherd: Maxwell Taylor, I believe.

Q (Heinl): Yes, sir.

Shepherd: I think he may have been the one that made that remark to me, "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em."

Q (Heinl): It was certainly in his mind, regardless.

Shepherd: I always like Max Personally. We were good friends.

Q (Heinl): He's a bright fellow.

Shepherd: He's plenty smart.

Q (Heinl): I have only one more question. I've already taken more of your time that I should.

Shepherd: Go ahead; I haven't a thing to do. I don't want to keep you here, but I haven't anything to do. I'm just enjoying reminiscing here. It brings back so many pleasant memories.

Q (Heinl): Do you still have your diary – I mean your journal? Could I have a look at it, General? I took a few notes from it when I was writing Soldiers of the Sea.

Shepherd: What diary do you refer to?

Q (Heinl): The diary you kept in a black hard-backed binder. I sent it back to you some time ago.

Shepherd: For years I kept a personal diary. I long since gave that up. These small notebooks here – would this be it?

Q (Heinl): No, sir. That's a new one. If that is it, I'd sure like to see it.

Shepherd: This is for the year 1937.

Q (Heinl): That goes back a little while.

Shepherd: This one is for 1945.

Q (Heinl): The diary I refer to contained typed transcripts that you evidently dictated to a stenographer at the time and I should say there were probably 40 or 50 pages.

Shepherd: It wasn't in a small book like this?

Q (Heinl): No, sir, it was a bigger, a hard-backed black binder. And I ad originally intended to give more space to Korea than the publisher let me have, so I took some rather extensive notes on it. But I would sure like to get a look at it again, and try to fill in some of the gaps.

Shepherd: I'm not trying to conceal any material from you.

Q (Heinl): No, I'm sure you're not.

Shepherd: Cut this thing off a minute!

Q: Yes, sir.

End Session 1.

Session 2. Interview with General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. – by Benis M. Frank (Q), at Leeton Forest, Warrenton, Virginia, 4 August 1966.

Q: We were talking last time about Part 6, the conclusion of Volume V, and it concerns a round-up, the genesis of amphibious operations and so on. But there's one area in our World War II history where documentation is rather sparse, and that is the role of Headquarters Marine Corps in World War II. I would ask you, from your point of view as a division commander, as a commander in the Pacific, what was your relationship with Headquarters? What were the problems? What did they do for you? What did you expect of them?

Shepherd: Well, once the war began and I was out in the Pacific I didn't have any relationship with Headquarters. I mean, when I was a brigadier I was assigned as the Assistant Commander of the First Marine Division. When I became Commander of the First Marine Brigade, I operated directly under CG, FMFPAC, and when the brigade became the Sixth Marine Division I continued to operate directly under CG, FMFPAC. So I really can't express an opinion on how Headquarters operated during the war. I did have trouble in getting good officers for the brigade, particularly when I was forming it. The Sixth Division was the last unit formed. There weren't too many officers available at that time so I finally had to make a trip to FMFPAC, and personally talk to Colonel Jordahl in order to obtain a few capable officers for the Brigade Staff.

Q: That's Russell Jordahl who was G-1?

Shepherd: Yes. Writing didn't seem to get me anywhere, so I made a trip back to Pearl and saw General Smith. We got things straightened out and I was able to get several good officers for my staff. You need good key officers, good officers in key jobs. As far as I know, things went all right. In regard to supply the division was well taken care of when we went to Okinawa. I cannot express an opinion on Headquarters Marine Corps because I was a long way away from Washington.

Q: What was your relationship with FMFPAC? FMFPAC of course was Headquarters Marine Corps West.

Shepherd: Yes.

Q: You went through the Corps Commander normally.

Shepherd: Yes, through General Geiger, who commanded the III Amphibious Corps. They did the best they could, I'm convinced. I think they did a hell of a good job. Their problems were manifold. They had problems that we never envisioned in peacetime – the tremendous numbers of Marines, 300,000 were operating in the Pacific. I don't recall the exact number but we had six divisions operating there, to say nothing of all the FMF Forces and the various fleet units and so forth. And the supply was particularly difficult. We did have difficulty, when I was at Guadalcanal, in getting in our supplies. It seemed to me that there was a certain bogging down on supply.

Q: At Banika, I think you mentioned such a problem in your report of Okinawa. The had a new field depot there.

Shepherd: Yes, but the people who were there did not always fill our requisitions. We were way behind on many items, and I sent an officer over to Banika to check on my requests. Fortunately my former dear friend with whom I had played polo and raced horses in Haiti many years ago – Colonel Jimmy Pearce, had just taken over the depot. Jimmy turned everything upside down to give us what we needed. Before that and this is no slam at the quartermaster, for many years it appeared that items of supply were better on the shelf than they were in the field. I mean, quartermaster personnel spent their time counting the supplies on the shelves of their storerooms rather than expeditiously filling requisitions from the field. I'm not saying there wasn't an effort made, but we didn't get things at the end of the supply line. And I was at the end of the line on Guadalcanal. But when Colonel Pearce arrived he realized the need to give the troops what they required. He was one of the finest officers I've known. He believed in giving what he had on the shelves to the troops, not keeping it in storehouses. When we left Guadalcanal for Okinawa, we had everything we could possibly need and want. However, initially we did have quite a bit of difficulty in getting our requisitions filled.

Q: Speaking about mounting out and being supplied for Okinawa – part of our troubles stemmed from the various Tables of Organization that the Marine Corps went through. The G Table of Organization, which went into effect for the division as a whole, for the Marine infantry division as a whole. It was published in September, but certain elements of the division, such as the infantry regiments and the artillery regiments, their T/Os went into effect about March, or prior to our departure for Okinawa. For instance, if a half-track mounted with a 75mm gun was lost in an infantry regiment, it was replaced by a Mark-7, a self-propelled vehicle with a 105mm gun. Do you recall the reorganization at this time?

Shepherd: No, I don't recall that but I remember the names of items were often changed, or detached which caused confusion in the submission of requisitions.

Q: There was quite a change. As a matter of fact, I think almost every year following the start of the war a new Table of Organization was published.

Shepherd: There's one thing that I did insist on when I took over command of the brigade, and later the division. The brigade was formed, as you may recall, of two reinforced regiments, the 4<sup>th</sup> and the 22<sup>nd</sup>, both of which had operated as separate task forces during the first year of the war. Naturally their leaders, particularly Alan Shapley, had built up a great esprit in their own organizations; this included their reinforcing units – the artillery, the tanks, and supply units. One of the great problems I had when I took over the brigade was to try to break that down and make the brigade and the division the unit, rather than the reinforced regiments. The CO of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines, for example, he didn't want the 22<sup>nd</sup> Artillery to give support to his regiment. He only wanted the battalion of artillery that had been

attached to him to support his regiment. I said, "Why, Alan, I'm giving you twice as much artillery as you formerly had to support your attack. You are getting your own artillery plus another battalion." It was the same way with his tanks. I had learned in school that the proper use of tanks and artillery was to use them en masse – not just (to) dribble in a battalion. But each regimental commander wanted only his own company of tanks or his own artillery battery in support of his regiment. I said, "You've got to fight this battle as a unit. When you need tanks, I'm going to give you all the tanks in the brigade to support your attack, not just one company at a time," – which I did on Guam. On one occasion when the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines were held up, I called on all our tanks plus some others. I borrowed from the 77<sup>th</sup> Division and we broke the Jap defense line and went right through. It took some time to break down this feeling that each regiment only wanted their own supporting weapon units rather than to use those of the other regiments to assist them in an attack.

Q: But wasn't there a prior problem as far as the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines went, the fact that the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines were formed from Raiders who were unhappy that the Raider organization had broken up.

Shepherd: It is true that initially they were all individualists – that is, each Raider battalion took great pride in their unit. When the Raider battalions were formed into the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines, Headquarters made a very fine choice in assigning Colonel Alan Shapley, who was a great leader, as their commander. In a short period of time Shapley welded those Raider battalions into a fine regiment, one of the best we had in the brigade or the division. He did a magnificent job on that, and they worshipped Shapley. They didn't want to deal with anybody but Shapley. But to get them to have that same feeling about the brigade and later the division was one of my great problems.

As a matter of fact I've found, looking back over the years that the most difficult problem that a commander has is dealing with his subordinate unit commanders. Tactical decisions or strategic planning come automatically. You have a good staff and they work out plans and you change them around as you see fit. The greatest problem of a commander is keeping his subordinates happy and working together. For example back in the Civil War, Stonewall Jackson had trouble with his subordinates. Some liked him, some didn't like him, and they were always quarrelling among themselves. Lee had great difficulty in keeping peace among them. That's why he was a great leader. He was able, by the force of his personal leadership, to make a man like Stonewall Jackson, who had a difficult personality, and inspire him to work with others. Jackson and Longstreet were continually fighting against each other. I had somewhat the same problem to keep my individual commanders all oriented in the right direction and imbue them with the spirit to fight for the division, for the Marine Corps, and not just follow their own individual desires and aims. Looking back over my career, I think it's the greatest problem a commander has, whether in a company, a

battalion, a regiment, or a division, in keeping his subordinates all working towards the same objective and imbuing them with the spirit to win battles rather than just individual engagements.

Q: You're talking about individualism and the fact that the Raiders were individuals. I'd like to ask you about the formation of the Raiders. We're trying to track down what was the basic reason for the Marine Corps, to become involved with Raider units. Why did the Marine Corps form Raider battalions? Do you have any particular knowledge to shed light on this matter?

Shepherd: I can discuss that. I'm not sure of my facts, and I wouldn't want them to be quoted as being authentic. Didn't the Army have something like this in the early part of the War?

Q: No, the British – the British Commandos.

Shepherd: The British Commandos. Now it's coming back to me. The British had the Commandos who had done extremely well and someone thought it a good idea if the Marine Corps formed similar units. Carlson was the individual who originated the idea of Raider Battalions or maybe it was Merritt Edson.

Q: Samuel Griffith and General – then Captain – Wallace Greene had been sent over to England to investigate and observe Commando training. The information I have, which may or may not be true, is that someone sold a bill of goods to President Roosevelt.

Shepherd: It's coming back to me now. Jimmy Roosevelt naturally had an in with his father. Jimmy Roosevelt was a fine Marine. He may have a lot of political projects that he hasn't done too well in, but in my opinion he was a good Marine. Did a fine job on Makin, by the way. But he – where did Carlson come into it?

Q: Well, Carlson was a White House aide, and had known Roosevelt. He had been commander of the Little White House Guard at Warm Springs.

Shepherd: No, that is not correct. Carlson went down to Warm Springs with me on the First Guard to be established there as my Executive Officer. He may have gone back subsequently but I don't think so. As I recall he first met Mr. Roosevelt when he was my Number 2 on the first Marine Guard sent to Warm Springs. I had known Evans over the years. We were in China together in 1927. He went back again in about 1935 as an observer with the 8<sup>th</sup> Chinese Route Army.

Q: Naval Intelligence sent him to China as a language officer.

Shepherd: I know he was with the 8<sup>th</sup> Route Army in China. He came back filled with the idea of individual guerilla type operations.

Q: Gung Ho and that type of thing.

Shepherd: Yes, Gung Ho. He was so imbued with that idea it almost became ridiculous. It was Carlson I think, who originated the First Raider organization. He got Jimmy Roosevelt interested in this type of operation and also the President. Was Carlson the Commander of the First Raider Battalion?

Q: No, he had the Second. Edson had the First. It was taken out of the First Division.

Shepherd: But Carlson, as I recall, was the one who originated the idea of this Gung Ho business. I know, because I went over and watched his training at Camp Elliott, California. Nobody was to be called "Sir" and everybody was to be Tom, Dick, and Harry. We're all together, no rank – or anything – everybody was just "buddy-buddy."

It was after Carlson formed his battalion that General Vandegrift or General Holcomb, or perhaps it was General Smith who said, "Well, the Raider battalion can't do any more than any other Marine battalion." That's when Vandegrift took action and directed that a Raider battalion be organized from the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, commanded by Merritt Edson, and called it "Edson's Raiders." Just to prove that any well-trained Marine battalion could do the same thing without all this fancy trimmings that Carlson was getting. Carlson got everything he requested. I remember he had special wrist watches for all his men. He got every conceivable type of special equipment – all he did was say, "Well, I think we want that," and Jimmy would take it up with Daddy, and they'd get it. But it caused a great deal of resentment and jealousy among other Marine units. They had a specially picked battalion as I recall. I was training the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines at the time, and I had a very fine group of young officers whom I'd personally worked on. They were from the first classes of the Candidates for Commission School at Quantico which I had previously commanded. A number of these fine young officers joined the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines when I organized this regiment and I personally worked with them for several months, weeding out the ones that were not outstanding.

Then this Raider thing came up and a lot these young officers wanted to transfer to Carlson's battalion. Carlson came over and talked to my young lieutenants and a number came to see me and wanted to join the Raiders - some of my best lieutenants. Well, I didn't blame them as they were anxious to get into action as soon as possible. I was upset, naturally – these were some of my best young officers – but I didn't blame them. If I'd been a second lieutenant I would probably done the same thing. Carlson made it appear to be an exciting, adventurous type of combat. I approved all of their requests. I talked to them. I said, "Now, you're going into something special rather than serving in the regular organization." Well, they wanted to go, so I approved all their transfers and that's where Carlson's Raider Battalion got such a fine group of young lieutenants. They were a very fine group of officers and all the enlisted men were specially picked. They all had special training. I remember looking them over. Everybody had to be above average physically and mentally. They were a specially selected group. Well, that may be all right for one individual unit, but you can't just rob every organization in the Marine Corps to form one or two elite battalion. And that's when Carson's Raider Battalion got out of hand which caused



General Vandegrift's comment that "Edson can take one of his battalions and do just as well as Carlson with his fancy ideas."

It did cause a rift among people in the Marine Corps, the way Carlson got this preferential treatment, because Jimmy was his Exec and had a line straight to the President.

Q: Of course, here you have two different schools of guerilla experience – Carlson, with his experience with Chinese guerillas, the 8<sup>th</sup> Route Army, and Edson, who had been down in the jungles of Nicaragua, and had done a great job.

Shepherd: Edson was a great fighter, a very courageous man, as he proved himself to be on Guadalcanal. In regard to the Commando training, I sent four carefully selected NCOs from the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines to the British Command School in England. I picked them very carefully. When they came back and rejoined my regiment they turned out to be well trained in commando tactics. I was very much interested in this particular type of combat. I remember their describing to me how they climbed the walls of an old castle in Scotland, where they were trained to teach them how to climb up a steep cliff using the cracks in the rock wall. They brought back a little piece of rope with a round piece of wood about 6 inches long fastened to it. It was called a "toggle rope." These ropes could be quickly fastened together for use in mountain climbing. When they came back and rejoined my regiment, which at the time was training at Camp Pendleton, we organized schools for this special type training and the NCOs I had sent to England were the instructors. I remember one in particular was on jungle type training, and the NCO in charge did a fine job. I think the whole spirit of that Commando training was excellent. Of course, the Royal Marines had gone into it in a big way. For a small organization it is fine. The Army has recently organized Raider Battalions. I think they call them - ?

Q: Special Forces.

Shepherd: Special Forces – we call ours Raiders?

Q: Ours were Raiders. They had Rangers – in the Army.

Shepherd: Rangers, that's it, Rangers for the Army and we had Raiders. Well, they were all highly trained specialists. You always have to have a number in an organization, physically and mentally alert, trained to the nth degree, for special jobs. So actually, it's historic. There are bound to be special missions – although there weren't too many in the Pacific. Now, in Europe, making raids on the coast, etc. the Commandos could land, blow up a bridge, and return by their canoes to the submarine which had landed them. But in the Pacific there wasn't a need for that type of operation. They did conduct such an operation on Makin. It was questionable how much of a success it was. I won't go into that. I've got the inside story on the Makin raid. Carlson planned it and it turned out to be a flop. As I recall Carlson claimed to have been wounded and separated from his men. Jimmy Roosevelt pulled the Raider battalion together and led them back to

the beach from where they safely embarked for their return aboard their submarine.

Q: You know they left nine behind.

Shepherd: Well, I know it might have been a lot worse if Jimmy hadn't taken command.

Q: This book will have a detailed account on it.

Shepherd: That's one of the chapters in the Marine Corps History that's been glossed over. I don't think Evans Carlson distinguished himself in this operation, so I've been told by people who were there.

Q: We have the record on that one, Sir. It's authenticated.

Shepherd: I think the less said about that, the better. Well, anyhow, there wasn't a need in the Pacific for that type of organization. It was all right to have Raider Battalions, but I'm inclined to believe that any good reconnaissance company, with a division – each division now has its reconnaissance battalion – could do the same thing. After all, that's the kind of thing they did.

Q: Now, here's a very interesting question. You're a student of military history. When President Kennedy came to be President he went all out for counter-insurgency. General Krulak was involved, under Secretary McNamara with this counter-insurgency business. Do you find that our involvement in this guerilla-type operation is anything different than what American military history has proven it to be in the past? For instance, the Indian Wars, our involvements in Central America, or fighting the British in our War for Independence. Don't we have considerable experience and background to draw upon? We're not doing anything new. This isn't something that has only recently been developed.

Shepherd: Well, I don't agree with you on that. This is, in a way, a new type of warfare. Now, there may be similarities between Indian fighting and what some of the Commies are doing, yes, of course, but that goes way back. Certainly I don't think that what we did in Nicaragua, Haiti and those places, resembles it. I became quite interested in this insurgency type of fighting when I was chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, and did some studies and background research on it, and I came to the conclusion (erroneously, perhaps) that the war being fought in Vietnam was maybe a pattern for the future. South America is what I was really interested in at that time – because of my association with the Inter-American Defense Board – that we might very well fight the next war with guerilla tactics. That it wouldn't necessarily be fought by regiments and divisions operating in an orthodox manner. You can't operate in a country like Brazil on the highland or in the central plateau of South America with divisions or corps. You will be operating against irregular forces. They're not going to defend organized positions. Take for example to fighting going on in Vietnam. You can't have a battle with them. They just fade into thin air. And it seems to me – I have a paper on it somewhere if I could find it – it seems to me that you've got to fight that kind of a war in the way that they're waging it on you; to infiltrate into

their villages, and to enlist the local inhabitants to fight back against the irregulars, in the same manner as they're fighting you. Now, a white man can't do it. But if you can get enough of those irregulars, I mean pay local citizens and the local army who are trained in that sort of thing – and get them to fight for you your campaign will be successful. The local natives live in the same conditions; they know how to talk the same language and will fight these groups of Communist-inspired individuals if properly lead.

This sort of thing goes on today in South America. For example, I recall in Colombia, the upper regions near the plateau, the Army was successful in its fight against guerillas, but in the jungle lowlands it was a very serious problem. The guerillas work long the rivers, each little group working individually like the commies did in China, where the war lord bandit chiefs operated against each. If you send a battalion of regulars into the back country, they would be gobbled up because they can't locate the guerillas. So I think there may be in the future, much more of this type of warfare than we've experienced in the past. What use is there for an atomic bomb in a campaign where civilians are operating against each other?

Q: My point was that we're much more involved with it now than we were before. Take as an example Vietnam. Today's problem in Vietnam has a political basis, politically inspired insurgency. It's a revolutionary type of thing.

Shepherd: But the fighting is guerilla-type warfare.

Q: That's right. There are very few battles, and those places where there are set battle, of course the guerillas are decisively defeated. Take the Indians. While they may not have had a political basis, they were fighting

–

Shepherd: They were fighting for their country.

Q: That's right.

Shepherd: And you take the British regulars, when they marched along the frontier trail in Pennsylvania and were defeated in that battle –

Q: Fort Duquesne?

Shepherd: It may have been there, where Braddock was killed. Braddock was a Guardsman leading his column of Redcoats through the woods, and the Indians just zoomed down and gobbled him up. You remember. It was near Pittsburgh, Braddock's last stand, and the Indians killed them all. There's a plaque that marks the spot. I stopped there one time and read it - I believe it's called Fort Necessity.

Q: George Washington –

Shepherd: George Washington was there, and he was the one who kept saying, "You've got to fight these Indians the way they fight in this country." Braddock was all for launching the regulars in a frontal attack and said, "We'll scare them away with our red coats." That was the British idea but Washington, who had been operating during certain phases of the Indian wars, was far more familiar with this type of so-called guerrilla – not guerrilla fighting – but Indian fighting.

Q: Frontier fighting?

Shepherd: Yes, frontier fighting – Indian fighting. When we're fighting in undeveloped countries like that, we may very well pursue that type of fighting. I think a lot of fighting in Vietnam is being conducted on a patrol basis.

Q: Yes, small stuff. You talked earlier about getting the inhabitants, the local citizenry, on your side. Of course you know the Marine Corps is quite active in a Civil Action Program. They are doing a fine job.

Shepherd: Walt did a grand job on that. And that's the thing. You get those people working for you, and gain their sympathy. The guerrillas come in and say, "Well, if you go with those terrible Americans we'll cut your head off." Well, what are they going to do?

Q: Isn't it the same thing that our people did in North America, Central America, in the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century?

Shepherd: Perhaps, to a degree, but I don't think guerrilla warfare was developed down there.

Q: No, not developed, but it was done.

Shepherd: In Haiti we had Charlemagne and his Cacos - somewhat the same thing. But I don't think in Central America the fighting was quite as vicious as it is in Vietnam.

Q: No, but I'm talking from the American point of view, this civic action, getting people on your side – you may not have had a program, but this was a natural American trait. You wanted to help clean up these backward countries.

Shepherd: Yes, clean up, and we wanted to establish law and order. No better example exists than what we did in Santo Domingo and Haiti. We went into those countries and we organized everything. The Garde d'Haiti came first, the gendarmerie, as it came to be called in Haiti, and then there was the sanitation. The Sanitation Corps came in to clean up the mess, and we had the Medical Corps of the Navy who established hospitals and infirmaries all over the country where they treated hundreds of people.

Q: Tax collectors too.

Shepherd: Oh yes, taxes. Then we had the tax people come in, the fiscal directors, who did the fiscal end of it. So when we left Haiti in 1934, that country was in excellent condition. And it just went right down hill once we left there. Graft and corruption – I'm sure plenty of it goes on in this country too, but the point I wish to make is the way local officials operate so often in foreign countries and it doesn't take them long to fall apart.

Q: Talking about special units, Marine Corps units in World War II, I'd like to touch on the Paramarines - the Marine Paratroopers.

Shepherd: Well, that's another specialized unit which has a place in warfare. We had two battalions of paratroopers in WWII I believe.

Q: They went up to regimental size.

Shepherd: Perhaps so. I think it's well to have a few of those fellows around. Of course, now if you go to one of these Army schools, everybody learns to jump. The need for paratroopers in the Pacific was not the same as it was

in Europe. Those islands are so much smaller for their employment, that is the coral islands and you couldn't be sure that the wind wouldn't blow the paratroopers out to sea, if they were coming down in a specific place. And in the jungle-covered areas, in New Guinea, we had a battalion of Army paratroopers attached to the First Marine Division but we didn't use them. They were dying to land at Cape Gloucester. General Rupertus and I finally talked them out of it because of the heavy jungle; if they didn't hit one of the small clearings on the island – they wanted to drop in one of these clearings. “Well, if you miss the clearing, you would land in the jungle. I mean, you would be stuck up in a tree.”

I think that a few of them tried it. I can't remember whether they came down or not. There was another thing, on New Britain these clearings were covered with kunai grass that was six feet high. It was almost impossible to walk through. One of my attacks that I'd planned on Cape Gloucester either started in a kunai patch or crossed a kunai patch and the battalion got lost in the high grass. I mean, it was way over the men's heads and it was very tough grass. I had sharp edges that would cut you. It was also hot as blazes in there, suffocatingly hot. We found we had to go around those kunai patches. They were filled with a lot of rats, too.

Q: The Paramarines – one of the problems that was recognized by the commanders was that we didn't have the aircraft support, transport aircraft support for the paratroop battalions that had been formed.

Shepherd: To take 'em there and drop 'em – and then it isn't always as simple as one would think to make a drop on a particular spot. I can't speak with authority because I'm not a paratrooper, but there was generally a wind blowing which prevented their landing where planned. I've seen demonstrations, of practice landings, because this was a hot subject in the Marine Corps, whether or not to organize paratroop battalions. I think at one time the Army was trying to convince the Defense Department that paratroopers could do everything Marines could do, and in amphibious operations the paratroopers could do it all. You know that song and dance they have. And I watched the Army Paratroopers in this exercise – it wasn't Benning, it was Vieques. They dropped all over the landscape, for four or five miles apart. And they were trying hard. A number were injured. It was during one of those exercises we had in the Caribbean in 1948 – when I was Commandant of the Schools – the Army was trying to horn in on it. When they dropped the wind was blowing and three fourths of them dropped all over the landscape. Several suffered broken legs, and the battalion commander was badly injured – as a matter of fact, I think his whole staff were casualties with one thing or another. The battalion CO didn't have any staff to run the battalion. This demonstration convinced me that a paratroop landing is a delicate operation. It doesn't always work. In other words, you can't just put paratroopers right down like a helicopter does. The real value of a helicopter is that you put your squad, your fire team right down in one spot where you want them which

we could do – but this fight between the Marine Corps and the Army was hot at the time. This demonstration certainly worked to their disadvantage. They started won and the transport planes kept dropping paratroopers but they landed here and there across the landscape – one man here, two men there – and it took some time to get a squad together. They're all supposed to land together, you know. The idea was good, and it was effective in Europe, I admit. But I don't believe it will be effective in an amphibious landing.

Q: From my knowledge, of the landing at Nijmegen in Holland, broke down and they all got lost there on D-Day.

Shepherd: Yes, it was a difficult operation. I don't know too much about it. But the fact that the paratroopers were spread all over the landscape, and could not get together for any kind of unit fight does not appear sound tactics to me. Theoretically, they're all supposed to land together around one corporal, but they may be spread over several hundred yards in all kinds of fields and trees and houses. A helicopter comes in at the spot you planned and disgorges the squad or the platoon, ready to fight. I was right in the middle of this service battle after the war. That's when we pushed for the helicopters. In those days four men were all they (the helicopters) could take, but the Marine Corps had the vision of the helicopter's future potential. I was firmly convinced from a tactical viewpoint, that the helicopter was far more effective than the paratroopers. You put your men right down on the spot, on the ground, where you want them and they are ready to fight.

Q: Of course, the Marine Corps proved that was true, in Korea.

Shepherd: Yes, we proved it in Korea. Of course, once the Army caught onto the idea, they got five times as many helicopters as we had.

Q: Talking about the development of vertical envelopment, the technique and so on, it was during your tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, that this too place, wasn't it?

Shepherd: I think it went back further than that.

Q: Yes, it went back further than that. The Manual, I believe, was written – I recall while I was on your staff, in FMFPAC, the Army would come out with a TM on vertical envelopment. I think Colonel Krulak was quite unhappy. Here they'd taken his manual word for word and incorporated it into their training regulations.

Shepherd: Krulak had a great deal to do with writing that manual. I believe I told you the other day, that by virtue of the fact that I was Assistant Commandant, I was senior member of the board to devise some method to combat the atomic bomb by the dispersion of transports. Forrestal asked Vandegrift to figure some way to prevent the loss of shipping if an atomic bomb was dropped in the transport area during a landing, so he appointed a board and we had some smart boys on it. As I recall, Twining had the idea of using helicopters to transport troops ashore from well dispersed transports. Well, when we sold that to the Secretary, we thought we'd come up with the answer to that problem. We went on with the idea of

developing a troop carrying helicopter and that's when Sikorsky came into the picture. We worked together, at Quantico, and then Piasecki got into the picture with a larger one, but we stayed with Sikorski at the time.

Q: George Herring had the experimental squadron.

Shepherd: Well, this was long before that, way back in 1948 and '49 when I was Commandant of the MCS. We were really working on the project and I think it was then that the manual was written by Krulak and Twining. Twining was intensely interested in the project and had everybody working on it for quite a while. I think he and Krulak, who wrote the book – and as you say, the Army copied it word for word. But the tactics, the fighter planes covering by fire, the helicopter squadrons approach discharging the troops, etc. were initially conceived by the Marine Corps. Of course the big argument against the helicopter at this time was, "Oh, they'll shoot them down. They come in low. Everybody'll shoot 'em down." Later in Korea I saw helicopters come in with a dozen bullet holes in their wings and bodies. Unless they are hit in a vital part, they will continue to fly. Korean combat proved conclusively that they could go in by themselves and rescue downed pilots – they'd zoom right down in the middle of enemy territory and pick up a Marine pilot who had been taken prisoner right from among the North Koreans. Life and Time came out with an article about a naval aviator that was picked up – gave us full credit. I remember the story. One of our aviators, I think it was, that was being escorted by a North Korean guard to a prison camp. The helicopter zoomed down along the road, the guards were all bewildered. They scattered, and the prisoner grabbed the cord that had been lowered and off he went. So there were any numbers of instances where they proved their value.

Q: Well, of course the transport of men to new positions – you remember the test they had, with equipment?

Shepherd: One time when I saw helicopters very effectively used was after the battle of Naktong. The brigade was in a support position north of Masan. It was late in the afternoon and I had supper with the troops. Following the meal, Craig began posting his outposts on the top of those hills by helicopter. The terrain was very steep. It would have taken an hour for the outpost guards to get to the top of the hills surrounding the campsite if they had had to walk. By use of a helicopter, the guards were posted in a matter of minutes. In other words, the complete outpost of the camp was established in 30 minutes rather than 2 hours if the guards had to proceed to their posts on foot. That's the first time I ever saw them used in combat and I was tremendously impressed. Later when we got a squadron to Korea we found them invaluable. Due to the rugged terrain it would have been most difficult to operate in Korea without helicopters. They were a godsend to the Marines.

Q: Of course they tried everything with the – laying wire, resupplying – I remember working on the Jamestown line. . .

Shepherd: All that was the result of the adoption of the helicopter. We, the Marine Corps, were the first to recognize their military value and promoted their use in combat. You should never let the public forget that.

Q: I'd like to address our inquiries and discussion back to World War II, and talk about tactical innovations, tactical developments during the war. You know, we changed the organization of Marine Corps units, size of the rifle squad, infantry tactics hadn't changed. For the most part you senior officers, non-coms, at the beginning of the war – many of them had served in Central America, had some experience, had some idea, their training in small unit tactics and fighting basically stemmed from this experience, it seems to me. I may be wrong here. Now, from Guadalcanal on, what would you say influenced the development of Marine Corps tactics? Of the tank-infantry-artillery teams, tactics –

Shepherd: Well, the tank-infantry team was one of the greatest tactical developments during the war. I was very much sold on the idea, and insisted on considerable tank-infantry training. The tank-infantry team attack on enemy positions was vital to success in combat against a machine gun position. You're lost if you try to take a machine gun in a concrete pit, firing from little apertures, by men only. It's mighty hard to take such a position. But with tanks supporting the advancing infantry it can be done without heavy casualties. I worked on that in every battalion, every company, and every platoon, to accept the tank-infantry doctrine, which we insisted on. We insisted that every unit go through this type of training. My nits became quite proficient in combat. The men followed close behind the tanks with a man in front to look out for mines, and with a – usually an infantry platoon followed each tank in close support. I think that's the most effective way of overcoming a fixed position.

Q: Do you recall where it first appeared, where tank-infantry teams, tank-infantry tactics, were first used?

Shepherd: Perhaps you'll refresh my mind. Were they used in Europe?

Q: Well, no. I think – I know that they started using them in New Georgia.

Shepherd: You must mean Bougainville?

Q: Bougainville and so on.

Shepherd: I wasn't in Bougainville, but I am certain tanks were not employed on the Army's landing in the raid on New Georgia. They really got themselves shot up in this operation. I saw them when they came back. To return to the initial employment of the tank-infantry team – I don't quite remember when it started, but I know we gave instruction in their use while I was in the MCS. As you know I spent three years in the Marine Corps Schools. I was head of the 3-Section before the war and later served as Assistant Commandant and Acting Commandant on occasion. Therefore I was well versed in tactics. I had some of the top officers in the Marine Corps on the Schools staff. I took a great interest in the instruction given and was able to increase my own knowledge of tactics. This tank-infantry team tactics may have started there. I don't recall. But it was something that had great appeal to me, as I had been hit by a couple of machine gun bullets in



WWI. I had a healthy respect for what a machine gun could do. Consequently, I thought that to avoid excessive casualties, the only way to overcome the concrete positions or any fixed positions of a machine gun was to crush it with a tank, and to give the tank the infantry support it had to have. We organized, and I think wrote up doctrine on the effective use of tanks supported by infantry which included a man with satchel charges, and one who shot a charge into the machine gun firing aperture. But this infantry team had to be supported by some vehicle like a tank that could keep the machine gun fire down and thus permit the infantry to advance behind the tank. Of course the use of close air support and artillery fire helped a great deal, but you had to have a tank that could get up close and shoot at the machine gun to effectively silence it.

Q: Well, of course one of the problems you had in the Pacific was the fact that the jungles were too thick to permit tanks to break through. At Munda the Army had a company of Marine tanks which were quite effective.

Shepherd: Was that in Bougainville?

Q: No Sir – Munda. The Army supplied the infantry and the Marines supplied the tanks – in New Georgia, going up through the northern Solomons. Part of Liversedge's Raider regiment was involved.

Shepherd: I think that was the place I referred to a moment ago, here we ran their support.

Q: That's right.

Shepherd: And the Army sent in a battalion that got the hell shot out of them.

Q: Well, it was pretty rugged. I think the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, if I recall, was involved. It was joint Army-Marine Corps operation. It was rugged fighting up there. You were talking about the assault teams, the demolition bazooka teams. By the time of Guam, you had that pretty well under control. I mean, this comes to a point, at this time, '44, when –

Shepherd: I would not say so, because when I took command of the two reinforced regiments on April the 1st, I think it was, or shortly thereafter, I only had a period of a few weeks to make these two reinforced regiments into a unified organization. When I was assigned to the brigade, I was given a very small staff. Well, in order to fight a brigade you have to have a staff and company headquarters from officers I took from the two reinforced regiments. Actually, you don't need a large staff – G's and assistant G's and assistants to assistants and all that. Tactically, a brigadier and a dozen or so staff officers can fight two well-trained regiments. But in the brief period of time, a month or two that I had to get these two regiments organized into a brigade and trained as a combat unit, I found it to be a gigantic task as each reinforced regimental commander had his own ideas on how he thought his regiment should be employed rather than working jointly with the other regiment of the brigade.

Q: You went to Guadalcanal initially to form the brigade?

Shepherd: Yes, it was during April and May that the brigade was formed into a unit for the landing on Guam. We had no time for any brigade training. It was

all left to the regimental commanders. Of course I prescribed the training program, but it wasn't until after Guam, when we returned to Guadalcanal, that we really were able to develop a brigade team first, and then a division organization where we perfected various types of tactical employment. The 29<sup>th</sup> Division joined us about that time, and we had a program that started with squad and went through a platoon, company, battalion and regimental exercises. That was when the development of tank-infantry doctrine was perfected which we used effectively on Okinawa when the Sixth Marine Division was formed from the brigade. I was very fortunate in having a very able staff, able officers – my G-3 was General Krulak and other officers who I had gotten assigned to my staff were very well versed in tactics. We assisted the regiments in their training by close supervision and direction. When we went into Okinawa, the Sixth Marine Division was the best trained organization the Marine Corps ever had, in my opinion.

Q: Well, of course in training for Okinawa you were training for an entirely different type of warfare than any Marine Corps division had ever participated in. You were facing a large population of unknown dimensions.

Shepherd: Okinawa was the largest operation of the war, of course. Previously the operations, as you well know, had been on small islands that you overran in a day, and that's why I had to bear down with the 22<sup>nd</sup>. They'd participated in two or three of these small operations, where they landed on a small island and within 48 hours the island was secure – just a frontal advance and that was it. There wasn't a need for tactical maneuvers. But I have always believed there should be a scheme of maneuver in every attack. You just can't frontal attack and go through. There must be always a flanking movement, to encircle or at least bring pressure against the flank of an enemy position and we worked on this during our period of training before Okinawa.

Q: You had to do a lot of training in street fighting also.

Shepherd: Yes, we did some training in street fighting because we knew we were going into this larger island where there would be cities and towns to overcome. We did perfect that. As I recall, we built a village for training purposes – something similar to this show the Marine Corps puts on today. We had an exercise of this nature on a smaller scale. It's developed since then, but we had a doctrine for attacking a fortified town.

Q: I recall that you trained in defense against paratroopers, for fear the Japanese would send paratroopers, and I think you had one alert when you were up around the airfield – Yontan, I believe it was – when you were heading to the north the first or second or third day ashore at Okinawa. You had one alert.

Shepherd: Yes, we had several alerts. But no paratroops landed in force.

Q: You made a statement about Okinawa being the biggest amphibious assault, and of course it was, it was the ultimate. Everything that we'd prepared for before the war and during the war saw its fruition,

culmination here. I state in my book, "The most complete employment of tank-infantry tactics perhaps best characterized the nature of the fighting on Okinawa. In the rapid drive north which led to the decisive and successful battle for the Motobu Peninsula, 6<sup>th</sup> Division Marines rode the tanks which later provided separate fire support in the heavy fighting to rid northern Okinawa of Japanese. But it was in the southern portion of the island, both on level ground and in the cave-studded draws, that the development of tank-infantry came to reach a climax. Both the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division tanks functioned as a major direct fire support weapon. At all time, III AC (III Amphibious Corps) tanks operated within the limit of observation and control of the infantry." Would you say this was generally true?

Shepherd: It's quite true, and very well expressed. We had, of course, as I just said, perfected the infantry-tank team which we did use effectively. Now, of course, during that period of 21 days, with those horrible rains we had, everything got bogged down, and this limited the effective use of tanks somewhat. But it was the seizure of Sugar Loaf Hill, which was the critical battle of the operation that the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division showed that its training paid off. Sugar Loaf was the western anchor of the Naha-Shuri line just as Conical Hill was on the eastern flank. Sugar Loaf Hill covered the western flank of the central defensive position at Shuri Castle. Tanks were effectively used in the final seizure of that Sugar Loaf Hill. We fought hard for that hill, and we lost a great many people there.

Q: Courtney, I think, as –

Shepherd: Yes, Courtney got almost to the top. He won a Medal of Honor by doing it. But the Japs had burrowed in behind the hill, and they would counterattack whenever our troops gained the crest of the hill.

Q: You were talking about how the Japs had burrowed into the hill.

Shepherd: Well, the Japs had positions behind Sugar Loaf Hill where they had burrowed. They had built dugouts of concrete on the opposite side of the hill, and they would wait until we got some men up on top and then they'd swarm over from the reverse side in large numbers and overrun our Marines.

Q: Tremendous reverse slope defenses.

Shepherd: Sugar Loaf was supported by two hills, which we called Horseshoe and Half-Moon, and these mutually supporting positions were what caused us heavy losses. We'd get on top of the hill and then we'd get fire from Half-Moon on the one side and Horseshoe from the other which made it almost impossible to stay on the slopes of Sugar Loaf. It wasn't until we organized the tank-infantry attack that swung around behind Horseshoe and Half-Moon and came in from that flank that we were finally able to overcome this position. I think it's pretty well covered in the 6<sup>th</sup> Division History. The details of the maneuver escape me at the moment, but I do recall that the tank-infantry attack came in from the east and around behind, as we went up from the other side.

Q: I notice that you also used tanks as direct support weapons firing from hull defilade positions.

Shepherd: Yes. But we normally always withdrew those tanks at night. I think I talked about this the other day. I had been on the Tank Development Board, and had done a great deal of study on the employment of tanks. I had learned that you don't want to use, as some people advocated, the tank as a stationary pillbox on the front line. There was a tendency by certain commanders to put their tanks up in the front line and let them stay. Of course, they make a wonderful pillbox, but you're losing the mobility of this wonderful firepower of the vehicle. Furthermore, a tank, like any mechanical vehicle, needs and requires constant operational servicing. They had to be brought back every night, more or less, to be re-serviced. Maintenance is the word I should use – maintained in the rear. And some commanders didn't do that, but I insisted, at the end of the day's fighting, the tanks come back, except in special cases, come back for re-servicing, so they'd be ready to be employed effectively the next day, because they broke down like everything else breaks down.

Q: What about those M-7s, those self-propelled 105s, which weren't tanks?

Shepherd: They were new weapons. They were used almost like siege guns.

Q: We used them on Okinawa when they were attached to the division as they were supposed to be used as mobile artillery. I think I attached them to the regimental artillery, didn't I?

Q: That's right. Well, no, within the regiment they were part of the Regimental Weapons Company, much as were the 37s. But you used these quite extensively down on the Oroku Peninsula.

Shepherd: Yes. Well, they were quite useful as I recall as close support artillery.

Q: No, they were strictly –

Shepherd: Well, anyway, they could get around, here, there, everywhere.

Q: I think the most important aspect of it was that you used them on Oroku, because you had this concentric concentration of your two regiments down there, when you finally crushed the Oroku Peninsula, and the artillery couldn't fire. The M-7s could get up there and hit the positions where the Japanese were dug in.

Shepherd: Its mobility was like an amphibian tractor with a gun on it.

Q: 75s – you used those too; I think when you first came down, to make a beach defense for the 22<sup>nd</sup>.

Shepherd: Yes, we moved those along the beach, to protect our flank as we moved southward in case of a Jap counterattack on our rear from the sea.

Q: They did this I think, May 4<sup>th</sup>, something like that; there was an amphibious attack. They tried to come out of Naha and attack the flank. That's where you used them. What about flame-throwers? Armored flame-throwers?

Shepherd: Yes, we had flame-throwers, which were part of the infantry assault team. I neglected to mention this weapon when I spoke of the bazookas and the satchel charges. The flame-thrower operator was the man who really put the heat on the pillboxes under the protection of the tanks, of course, and

we used them most effectively. I recall the great supporting value of this weapon. We really used them to perfection. I will relate a very interesting sidelight that occurred in connection with flame throwers. A former schoolmate of mine at VMI named Hardin Mackey, who had been a Marine during World War I – we'd been in the same battalion and were great friends. And in World War II the Marine Corps did not take back a lot of the so-called retreads, you know. Mackey had gotten out of the service, and (when) he tried to get back in the Marine Corps he was told, "We just can't use World War I officers except in a few executive positions."

So Hardin Mackey went in the Army where he was commissioned in the Chemical Corps and was sent to a flame-thrower school. By chance Mackey was sent out with a team to the Western Pacific, to try to convince the Army, and the Marines to use flame-throwers. The flame-thrower was developed by a Colonel Cermacht (sp). He was a senior officer in the Chemical Warfare Corps and I'd known him previously. The Army, for some reason, didn't cotton to the flame-thrower so I was told.

Q: The early ones were very dangerous.

Shepherd: They were dangerous, and somehow they were not being used as effectively as they thought that they should. In other words, they weren't taking full advantage of this weapon. So Mackey was sent with a team to try to sell the use of the flame-throwers to the Army and the Marines.

I had to laugh when he came and said to me, "I've come here to demonstrate how to use a flame-thrower."

I replied, "My God, they are one of the most important weapons of our assault team." And took him out and put on a demonstration that I'm sure was all that he desired.

In the Sixth Marine Division we fully employed flame-throwers. The use of this weapon was the only way to get the Japs out of concrete machine gun nests. Japs don't surrender. The best way to kill them is to button 'em up, and we used flame-throwers effectively all through the war.

Q: Did you have attached to you – I think probably you did – do you recall the Army's flame-thrower tank?

Shepherd: We finally got a few, yes as I recall. All this is recorded in our Division History, that's the best record. What I'm telling you has faded in my memory to some degree. We had, I think, a platoon of flame-thrower tanks which we did use whenever we could, but of course it meant getting them up to where the front line was. I watched one of those flame-thrower tanks in operation when we ran into a machine gun nest – they were wonderful. There wasn't any question about that. But they weren't always right up with the advance unit like these assault teams – the teams that we had in every company. They were a wonderful weapon, no question about it.

Q: How about talking about the spiritual and medical services.

Shepherd: Spiritual services?

Q: Your chaplains and your doctors.

Shepherd: Well, I felt very strongly about the spiritual. I will touch on that first. I felt that we needed the help of the Almighty to carry us on in this war that we were fighting for Christianity. The fact that we had landed on Easter Sunday morning had somewhat of a spiritual effect, and I felt that it was only with God's help that we were able to overcome the adversities with which we were faced. Being a religious man myself, I gave full support in every possible way to my chaplains. I attended services regularly. I always supported my chaplains and addressed a chaplains' convention in Chicago, after the war.

In battle is when men need spiritual help. In combat there is only one person who can help you and that is God. I recall distinctly during the battle for Guam – I think it was near the close of the campaign – when I was returning from a visit with the troops. I came to a gathering of men in a clearing in a clump of woods and I stopped to see what was going on there. The men were from the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines and they were having a service. The men had asked the chaplain if he would conduct this service, to thank Almighty God for the victory they had attained during the past several days. It was near the end of the campaign, up by Ritidian Point, northern tip of Guam. It had just been captured and the battle was more or less over. The men had called the chaplain and asked him if we would conduct services, to thank Almighty God for sparing their lives in the campaign.

So I think the men – took it very simply – I'm sure they derived great spiritual benefit from the chaplains and they helped to win the campaign. I gave my chaplains full support in everything they did – going to church – I'd always go to Sunday services wherever we were stationed for any length of time. I'd see that chapels were built and services conducted. I attended services, at least one or two every Sunday during training periods and also during battles whenever I was able to do so.

Q: Were you generally satisfied with the type of chaplain that served you? Were they prepared for this type of thing?

Shepherd: Well, I'll tell you, some were and some were not always well prepared. For instance whenever a chaplain joined my division, I would task him personally, and I said, "Now, chaplain, I want you to get out with the men in battle. Your job is to be up there with the front line troops and to give the spiritual help that they require whenever possible and with the Romanists to conduct the last rites for the dying and severely wounded. Furthermore you can do a great deal by being with wounded and writing a note to the man's parents saying, "I just talked to your son, he has a wound but he's going to come through it all right. I just want to let you know that your son has been wounded but he's going to get well, and he just asked me to tell you he is all right." I said, "Your place is at the front, not sitting in some headquarters command post." I insisted on their performing not just their religious duties, but a type of, you might call it, Red Cross duty, by being up in the dressing stations, behind the front lines. I didn't actually require them to be on the front line but in the dressing stations, the first aid stations behind the lines, to administer the

last rites in case of the seriously wounded, talk to the men, give them special help and write letters and things of that nature. As I whole, I impressed upon the chaplains to get up there close to the fighting.

I remember one amusing incident. I don't recall the chaplain's name, but we had one when I was training in New Zealand. We had to take 60 mile hikes once a month. This chaplain I don't think liked marching on foot. So we started out – we began one of our hikes on a Saturday, so on Sunday he asked to be excused because he had to attend mass. Roman Catholics are required to go to mass every Sunday. "That's fine, chaplain," I said, "I understand that you have to go to church every Sunday. I will send you in a jeep, if you want to go all the way back to Auckland, to attend mass. The jeep will wait for you and bring you right back to join the column."

That's one who wasn't enthusiastic about marching, but most of them did a pretty good job. I think that the Chaplains Corps and the Medical Corps to some degree learned, during the war, that their doctors and their chaplains had to know something about field duty, and that's why they organized a chaplains' school, where they were sent for field training prior to joining a combat unit. There is a great deal more to being a chaplain than just getting up and conducting a service or preaching a sermon. In combat chaplains have to be with the troops and they must be prepared physically and mentally to adjust themselves to living in the field.

Q: Of course, under combat conditions, they were under the same stresses and strains which could have made or broke them as enlisted men or officers.

Shepherd: A chaplain was just one of the command. Therefore they had to be in physical and mental condition to march and to see men die and to carry on their religious devotions in the field which was foreign to many who had only been in some little parish where all they had to do was to call on their parishioners and preach a sermon.

Q: Of course, going into the medical services aspect, some people say that the corpsmen were as good as Marines, in some cases better, because of the way they exposed themselves and the way they went all out.

Shepherd: Well, I can't say too much in praise of the Navy corpsmen. In World War I where I first saw them in action and in World War II particularly. The combat Navy corpsman has always stood out as one of the finest, most courageous men that I know. Not only did they have to march with the troops but they had to administer medical assistance to those who fell – stop and help them, and then catch up with the column. And in battle, they must always be ready to give medical assistance wherever required. I can recall so well, back in World War I, when a man was hit at night, you'd here that piteous cry, "Corpsman! Corpsman!" The corpsman would go out in the middle of an artillery barrage to give first aid. And they did a magnificent job. Magnificent. Corpsmen and the doctors too,

those with whom I was associated were the finest type of men that you can possibly imagine.

Q: You've seen medical services in three wars. The differences between World War I and World War II of course are vastly different. Now would you depict the difference between World War II and Korea, from your knowledge?

Shepherd: Well, I think as far as the professional services are concerned there's no difference. They were always tops. But I think that the Navy Medical Corps had learned that they had to set up hospitals in the field. They had to have different equipment. I wasn't like serving in a hospital like Bethesda. They had to have field equipment. They had to have their medical battalions trained to be able to carry on just like a Marine in the field. I was very fortunate in having a Captain Donald Knowlton, who was my senior medical officer, and he had a fine assistant whose name was John Cowan, one of the Navy's best medical officers in World War II. Captain Knowlton, the Division medical officer, was a Gung Ho Marine, as well as being a good doctor.

Q: Isn't it interesting how some of those people, like Donabedian or Knowlton –

Shepherd: - yes, Donabedian's another one. But some of the senior medical officers didn't want to open up their medical equipment until the actual battle . . . but I'd say, "Break it out, set it up and use it, we need this training before we actually have to do it in battle." Well, it was a big job, breaking out all this special equipment, all boxed up, and erecting tents, setting up the sickbay, etc. but I insisted at every field exercise that the medical company break out everything they had. They needed the practice in setting up their sick bays, their hospital tents, and organizing the operating teams of which they were very proud. But they had to get out and do it, because I found by experience in the early days of the war, when I was training my regiments, that a lot of the doctors were reserve officers. I remember a reserve doctor, a very fine fellow, but he had been an obstetrician all his life, a wonderful obstetrician, but he didn't know anything about service in the field. His feet – he couldn't walk very much because he had very small feet. But he had courage, and he kept trying, trying. But he had never seen a medical set-up in the field. I made him get his medical equipment off the trucks, set it up, go through all the motions of a first aid or evacuation station. I think the Navy learned a great deal during the early part of the war because later they sent all their doctors to a field medical school.

Q: - At Lejeune they had a field medical school.

Shepherd: - Yes, the field medical school was at Lejeune. The Navy is very progressive. They did a great job in the establishment of their medical school at Camp Lejeune in the form of field expedients, and training in all the things that are so important in battle.

Q: I'm talking about odds and ends. What about war dogs?



Shepherd: Well, I'd like to talk about them. In the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, when I was ADC, we had a platoon of war dogs. They were the German shepherd dogs, and they were well trained and did a very fine job. Their use was limited, I grant you, and whether they're worth the time and effort devoted to them I don't know, but we used them very very effectively on patrol and I know of specific cases where they've scented a Jap, alerted their keepers, and prevented ambushes. They'd scent the Japs and alert the keepers and prevent running into ambushes. I saw these dogs in action and was so enthusiastic that I asked for a platoon to be assigned to my division. But the Marine Corps had Dobermans – not Shepherd dog – and the Doberman wasn't as effective. I had owned a Doberman for a good many years and was very fond of this breed of dog but I don't think the Doberman was as effective as the German shepherd. It's nice to have them but I question whether they're really worth the amount of effort and time that goes into training dogs for combat. They did help us in detecting Japs – Jap patrols. The men liked to have them around and used them. They were particularly effective for sentries on post, where you've got a large area to patrol. It's good companionship to have a dog with you because if you're patrolling a post in an isolated area you get lonesome out there in the boondocks all by yourself. You start seeing all kinds of things. But if you've got a nice dog beside you for a companion and know he's there to sniff and warn you of any intruder it is a great comfort. There's a place for them but it would be a low priority on my list.

Q: Well, they're using them now at Danang.

Shepherd: Oh, I think they're effective. In jungle fighting I think they are very effective. I don't think in a combat situation where large forces are involved that dogs are of great value.

Q: - they're using them to help patrol the air fields.

Shepherd: - yes, that's exactly the place they would be useful - in jungle countries. I think they'll be very effective. Where did the dogs you mention being used in Vietnam? (Sic)

Q: Our dog handlers were first trained by the Army.

Shepherd: I mean at Danang.

Q: Oh, the Air Force. We had Marines training with the Air Force, who were brought in for this purpose.

Shepherd: I think it's all right. But, as you said, in open warfare, moving situations in normal terrain, there's not the same need for them. But on patrol with close cover they do give a warning.

Looking back on it, some units thought they were a help and other units didn't think much of them. I guess it depended upon how interested the battalion commander was in dogs.

Q: Actually I know that they served their purpose. On the other hand, I know a case where the Japanese tried to counterattack, from the East China Sea – you remember, they came up through the cane fields, near Naha and a lot of them were killed at the reef and at the water's edge. Some penetrated up toward the 1<sup>st</sup> Division CP. As a matter of fact we sent our

recon people out and the dogs went out with them, and a person I knew very well was killed by a Japanese who –

Shepherd: The dogs didn't detect the Japs.

Q: No the dogs didn't detect them.

Shepherd: It's a question of how effective they are. It's just one of those fringe benefits. I don't think it's worth our Marine Corps spending money or time to maintain a dog platoon.

Q: - and men –

Shepherd: Yes, it takes men away from combat, and we need them in combat. That's where we need them.

Q: New topic, general. Let's talk about infantry weapons. We had a whole arsenal of them, from the .45 on up. They were all effective, they all killed, if they were employed properly. Do you have any particular favorites?

Shepherd: Well, I think the old M-1 rifle was the weapon that was most effective. Not most effective – the machine gun was the most effective weapon – but the M-1 was a good steady rifle. I understand these new ones we have will fire faster and are more effective. The only question in my mind is that with a greater density of fire from a faster firing weapon will it prove to be as effective as a slower firing well-aimed weapon. A weapon that fires faster does not necessarily kill more of the enemy than a slower firing well-aimed weapon. You have to consider the ammunition expended. A trigger-happy boy can expend a lot of ammunition. Instead of waiting until he can really get a well-aimed shot at the enemy, he will just open up and fire off a clip or two any time he hears a noise in the dark. I think that consideration must be given to a weapon which is automatic, but not entirely so. The M-1 was a good, sturdy weapon. It could be covered with dirt and mud and it still fired, and it fired fast enough when you needed the fire power. I've always believed in the old school of a well-aimed shot was more effective than just firing a weapon automatically when you could not see a definite target.

Q: Were you one of those who mourned the passing of the '03?

Shepherd: Frankly, yes, because I knew the weapon. I have nothing against the new weapon. I've seen it demonstrated. But I just thought that the old M-1 - like the old Springfield – was a first class infantry weapon.

Q: What did you think about the Springfield?

Shepherd: The Springfield was a very effective weapon. It's true that the M-1 gave more volume of fire, but still it was not automatic. A man is prone to shoot up more ammunition than he was really required to use with an automatic weapon.

Q: What about carbines? Do you feel that they were effective?

Shepherd: I didn't like the weapon. I did away with the carbines in my division because they did not prove effective in the field.

Q: Also there have been arguments about issuing revolvers, 38's instead of the 45.

Shepherd: I don't see where you gain anything by that. The 45 has been used for fifty years in the services and as far as I know has been a very effective weapon, and I would rather have it than a revolver.

Q: Just recently the Marine Corps has been issuing the units in Vietnam 60 mm mortars. You know, they phased them out. In your experience were they a worthy weapon?

Shepherd: I think they had a place in the infantry platoon. They were light. They weren't as effective as the 81, but they were part of the infantry fire team – assault team had a couple of light mortars to support it and they were good. The mortar is a very effective weapon. I recall back in the First World War when the first Stokes mortar came out. Of course they have perfected the mortar a great deal since then, but for an infantry weapon they are effective and I think that the 60 mm has a place in an infantry platoon. It is light to carry, and the mortarman goes along with his squad. He is able to go into action rapidly and place a shot. They may not have killed as effective the enemy casualties that and 81 mm does which is a much better weapon, but the 81 is heavy to carry. The 60 mm has its place with an infantry platoon. I don't feel competent to express an opinion as to its military value today in the squad organization. These things change over a period of time. But as far as I was concerned, the 60 was a very effective weapon. It was always a very desirable weapon to have with the infantry team.

Q: Plus the BAR.

Shepherd: Oh, the BAR, that was a weapon! Really that was the finest weapon we had, I think. The old BARs were fine weapons. Of course, the new rifle is supposed to take the place of the BAR but when everybody having automatic firing you run into the ammunition supply problem.

Q: It required tremendous fire discipline.

Shepherd: Yes it does.

Q: Of course you had your machine guns, which were also a very effective weapon.

Shepherd: - They were. The machine gun was a most effective weapon. When you get machine gun barrages down on the enemy, that's what stops them.

Q: It was a technique. It was a fine science, for a machine gun officer to lay down a barrage.

Shepherd: They had to know how to fire overhead or fire what is called indirect fire. Don't they still use it? The machine gun is an effective weapon; there isn't any question about it.

Q: Did you have any experience with the 57 mm recoilless rifle at Okinawa? I know there was a team out from the States demonstrating, and the Army XXIV Corps units to some extent used them. Did you have any?

Shepherd: I don't recall specifically, no.

Q: I think they gave a demonstration to Colonel Snedeker.

Shepherd: I don't recall very much about it one way or the other.

Q: Let's talk about the Japanese and what kind of a foe they were, what kind of an enemy. It's pretty well established that they were good fighters.

Shepherd: Not too Intelligent. The Japs, as you know, would stay and fight till they died for their Emperor. But I don't think that they used their initiative a great deal, I know they didn't nor did they exploit their advantages when they had a chance. I don't think they were imaginative fighters. They are very sturdy. They can live on practically nothing – a little rice. They were good fighters, but I don't think that they were as good as the more intelligent Europeans. They were Phlegmatic. When a Jap was ordered to hold a position he stayed there. There were very few Japanese prisoners ever taken. I think that at the beginning of the war, the Japs made very remarkable advances – down through the Malay Peninsula, Singapore and all through the Southwest Pacific islands – and they built up a reputation of being wonderful jungle fighters. It became somewhat of a bugaboo to all of us. I mean, we just thought Japs could swing from tree to tree in the jungle.

Q: It's a myth.

Shepherd: It's a myth that the Jap was a super jungle fighter. I found in my experience that our Marines were better jungle fighters than the Japs were. We just dispelled this theoretical superiority of the Jap as a jungle fighter. They were cunning. They were determined. And they were painstaking in their digging – you know, they loved to bore, they were always digging and organizing the ground, but they certainly didn't have much imagination, and I don't think that their units were too effective. But they were good fighters; there wasn't any question about that.

Q: We talked about intelligence last time, from prisoners. Was there determination on the part of the Japanese not to give up?

Shepherd: Very few – we took very few prisoners, because they fought to the last.

Q: But there was a feeling on the part of Marines, was there not, after the Goettge patrol, when all those people had been machine-gunned, possibly this feeling went through the Marine Corps that they were not going to take any prisoners. Was it a 50-50 deal – 50 percent you couldn't get prisoners and 50 percent they didn't want to take prisoner?

Shepherd: Perhaps. The Japs seldom gave up, and consequently there was no opportunity to capture large groups of prisoners as there was in Europe. Where the Europeans saw that they were going to be defeated, they gave up. But the Jap was so imbued with the idea that he must never give up, he must fight until his last drop of blood for the Emperor, that the opportunity to take prisoners was non-existent during the early part of the war. Later, I think it was on Guam, we captured some prisoners and on Okinawa we captured more prisoners, as they came around to the idea that they'd save their own skins. I think in order to make men fight to win, you must imbue them with a spirit of combat. Any feeling that they might have about killing a human being must be dispelled. You've got to pound into them that desire to overcome the enemy regardless of anything else. Consequently, when our troops went forward and saw Japs, they shot them. They didn't know whether they were going to be tricked into an ambush or not. I mean, you must instill a hatred of the enemy in order to

get your men to fight. It's a psychological thing. You've got to hate that man and want to kill him or else you won't kill him. Do you agree with me on that?

Q: Yes, I think that's quite valid.

Shepherd: You've got to instill in your men the will to kill the enemy to the point – perhaps because they were heathens, so to speak – that killing a Jap was like killing a rattlesnake. I didn't always have that feeling in Europe, about some poor German family man, but I felt with a Jap is just like killing a rattlesnake.

Q: Of course a lot of literature has come out since the end of the war, a lot of material showing that they had families and so on. Do you feel that they were – that their philosophy and spiritual, mental condition was different; what they wanted to attain, the individual Japanese soldier, was better prepared, say for war and for death and so on, than the American?

Shepherd: I think so, yes. And of course their religion was to die for the Emperor. They glory, theoretically, in death on the battlefield, because that's what's been imbued in the Japanese for centuries, that there was great honor for them to go out and fight and die for their Emperor. So they didn't have the reluctance to be killed that a lot of boys did, who were just courageous but perhaps had a little bit more sense than some of the Japs.

Q: How do you account for the fact that now, today, Japan is one of our closest allies?

Shepherd: Well, we licked them so badly that I think we took all the sting out of them for a while, anyhow, and they are very nice to us, for they know where their bread is buttered. I recall an incident when General Nagano surrendered to me. Did I tell this story on the tape?

Q: No, sir.

Shepherd: I demanded he surrender his sword.

Q: At Tsingtao?

Shepherd: At Tsingtao, yes. He laid his sword down, as the symbol of his defeat. It was a symbol, because the Japanese samurai sword is something they prize and treasure highly – and his staff was required to do the same thing. But he wrote me a letter on the day of the surrender, in which he said, "I hope that you treasure this sword with honor and respect, because it was always been carried in the cause of virtue. It has been in my family 350 years, and it's my most prized possession, and I hope you won't just throw it into the heap with the others, to be disposed of."

I was so touched by this letter that I was all for giving this sword back to him. My staff said, "Oh, you can't do that, General. That's a symbol. If you give it back to him, he'll think 'Oh well, these Americans are too kind.' You have to be forceful with him."

So I wrote him a letter, saying that his sword would always be treasured as a symbol of his service and his family and the fine courageous fight that the Japanese had put up, that although we were enemies in this war, we had fought on the same side in World War I. He was a

professional soldier and I was a professional soldier. I had great respect for my adversary.

Some years later, when Admiral Nimitz returned Admiral Togo's sword, I thought I should do the same thing. I know how much General Nagano treasured his sword. General Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2 had a list of all Japanese officers, so I was able to get Nagano's address. He lived on the Inland Sea. I said, "Years have passed since you surrendered your sword to me. Our countries have become friends. I know how you treasured your sword, and although I have given it to a museum, I would like to get it back from the museum and return it to you, personally."

I received a letter from him saying, "I am now an old man. I recall very vividly my surrender to you, and your kindness to me upon my surrender. But," he said, "I surrendered that sword to you as a soldier. I cannot take it back."

I showed a side of the Japanese that to me was very interesting. And before that several interesting things occurred between Nagano and me. Would you like me to tell you about them?

Q:

Yes.

Shepherd:

I had General Nagano brought to my headquarters prior to signing the surrender document in order for him to read it over and verbally agree to acceptance of the terms.

I had sent word to him, through emissaries, that I wanted to talk to him. We were going to have the surrender at the race course on a certain date, and he and his staff would be required to be there, and also a battalion of Japanese troops just to impress upon them that they lost the war. I had specified a rendezvous with him, where my G-2 was to pick him up in a staff car at a certain crossroads on the outskirts of Tsingtao. It was to be at 12 o'clock. Well, 12 o'clock came and General Nagano had not arrived. My reason for having Nagano met on the outskirts of Tsingtao and escorted with a patrol in jeeps was because I was afraid the Chinese might shoot him coming through the town. This is why I sent an escort for him, in special jeeps, with my official car for the General. When he didn't show up at 12 o'clock I had my communication officer call the radio jeep with the escort and received a message. Another ten minutes went by and I received another message, "Can't find the Jap general." Half an hour went by and no Jap general. I was really worried, because I thought, "If he doesn't show up what'll I do?"

My staff was all assembled in my office. Finally Nagano arrived. He was very much embarrassed. It seemed that there had been a mix-up on the crossroad where the G-2 was to meet him and where he thought he was to be met. In other words he went to the wrong crossroad. When the escort that I'd arranged to meet him didn't show up he got panicky. After 10 or 15 minutes of waiting, Nagano decided to come in his own car to my headquarters. When he showed up there, I was greatly relieved.

He stood in front of me very formally. I had my staff assembled in my office and the Chinese representative there also. General Nagano was

a very fine looking man – quite tall for a Jap. My chief of staff had everything prepared. On my desk was the surrender document written in English and Japanese. After telling Nagano that I'd brought him in so he could read over the terms of the surrender before we had the formal surrender on the race course in order to discuss the document with him.

We went over it paragraph by paragraph through his interpreter. He agreed to all the provisions of his surrender. I naturally hoped everything would be agreed on without any argument about the terms of surrender. The wording of the document which I had gotten from the Corps Commander was that the Japanese troops in the area would be under my command to fight the Chinese communists in the area. I questioned his provision and called General Rockey about it. I said, "The war is over for the Japanese. Why should they go out and get killed fighting for an American general to whom they surrendered?" He said, "Well, that's the way it came down from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and that's the way it's going to be." To this I replied, "If I were to surrender to an enemy commander and become a prisoner and the war is over, why should I go and get killed fighting for him?"

After General Nagano officially surrendered, the following day his chief of staff reported to my chief of staff for orders and I assigned the Japs to the outer defenses of Tsingtao, to fight the Communists. I told my chief of staff, "If anybody's going to get killed fighting Communists, it's not going to be Marines, it'll be Japanese." When General Nagano agreed to the provisions of the surrender without any objections I felt greatly relieved as I was concerned as what to do when he failed to show up at my Headquarters at the appointed hour. So I said, "Now, I want to tell you something, General. You have my me and my staff waiting for 20 minutes. I am very much annoyed. Hereafter you must obey my orders on the minute." I could see he was really was shaken but he was courageous. He just said, "Yes, I will obey your commands." I found later it was a mistake and wasn't his fault. He had gone to where he thought the rendezvous was and my escort had gone to some other point. It was just a mix-up. Continuing my conversation with General Nagano I said, "I will reed them send them rations, since they were going to fight for us, they had to have rice." "You must surrender your sword. I will permit your troops to keep their rifles. I will not permit you to keep your artillery." I didn't want the Japs to have any artillery, only small arms. The junior officers were permitted to keep their swords as a symbol of command. So it was all agreed to and General Nagano went back to his headquarters outside of Tsingtao. A day or two later the surrender ceremony took place. Were you there?

Q: No, I was at Tientsin, Sir.

Shepherd: You were at Tientsin, were you? We had a very good ceremony. We used the race course at Tsingtao. The idea was to impress the Chinese, especially the Chinese Communists, the mass of force that our division had. I turned out every man in the division and every vehicle in the

division in order to show both the Japs and the Communists the strength and fire power of the division. Each regiment was in line and all the artillery. Every vehicle I could muster was turned out on that parade ground as a show of force. I knew that there were hundreds of Communists among the crowd that would be there as well as Japs, because there were a lot of Jap civilians in North China. There were thousands of Japs in North China that hadn't surrendered themselves individually. So we were apprehensive. If they chose to fight on, we'd have really had a battle on our hands.

So I gave this tremendous show of force because I knew the word would get back by the underground what a large force was contained in this particular division.

When the dame came we had a very formal ceremony. General Nagano and his staff stood in front of the reviewing stand. The General came forward and signed the articles of surrender officially which he had previously read over. Then I signed them and I had the local Chinese Commander also sign them. I believe he was Corps Commander. General Keller Rockey and a number of U.S. Admirals were also present. It was really very impressive. Then we paraded the entire division plus our Marine Air Force. The ceremony lasted for several hours. But I feel that it did impress the local population when the word got out that we had this tremendous military force and they'd better damn well be good or else we'd destroy them.

Q: Didn't have too much trouble thereafter, did you?

Shepherd: No, we never had any trouble. But I was leading up to one further point – that my instructions – (end Tape 1, side 2)

### **Tape 2, Side 1**

Q: You were talking about Tsingtao.

Shepherd: Yes. I was describing the surrender at Tsingtao, China, after the war on October the 10<sup>th</sup>. I think it was then that the formal surrender took place. No, I am mistaken. We landed on October 10<sup>th</sup> which the Chinese call double –

Q: - Double-10 Day. (Chinese Nationalist Anniversary).

Shepherd: Yes, Double-10 Day. The surrender took place a couple of weeks later. The point I'm making in the story is to give a brief insight into the character of the Japanese. After General Nagano signed the surrender document, which you had photographs of, he went on back to his headquarter. A few days before I was detached from Tsingtao – it was on Christmas Day of 1945 – a few days before that, I received a message from General Nagano that he would like to call on me before my departure from the area. I arranged an interview and when Nagano arrived he brought me several very fine swords. I had emphasized in a letter to him how I treasured his sword, so he brought me three more swords- (there they are pointing) – one of them is a very, very old sword.



Q: Is this the one, on top of the stand?

Shepherd: No, the one on the bottom. Nagano told me it had been carried by one of his staff officers. The sword had been made by one of the great sword smiths of Japan in 1300 – it's 600 years old. He had forbidden the officer who owned the sword to carry it in the field because it was a museum piece. It should be preserved. But this officer had carried it in the field. When General Nagano presented me with this sword he gave me the brief history of it, who it was made by and so forth, and then he gave me this one in the sheath which is also a very fine sword made about 350 years ago by one of the foremost Japanese sword smiths who was so good that the Emperor had permitted him to stamp the Imperial Japanese Chrysanthemum on this sword. I won't go into the history of Japanese swords, but I'm very much interested in their study. He gave me a book on it, the art of Japanese sword making and how to take care of the finely fired steel blades. Nagano also brought me a set of Japanese armor. It was very touching. I offered him tea and we had a very pleasant chat. He appreciated my courtesy to him so much that when he gave me these swords he wrote me a letter which said, "This gift is in appreciation for you having been benevolent to my men." We had fed them, we had given them rice and ammunition. They'd had some skirmishes with the Communists on the outskirts of Tsingtao. Every few days his chief of staff would come to my headquarters and report telling what they'd done. The Japanese are good soldiers and had carried out the duties I had assigned to them in a commendatory manner. I think I officially told Nagano good-bye at my office after he had made his personal call on me at my home. When we parted I said, "Now, General, you are responsible for the peaceful evacuation of all Japanese in the Tsingtao area." We had already begun to evacuate the Japanese civilians – thousand of Japanese civilians were in the area as well as Japanese soldiers under Nagano's command. I said, "I am personally placing you in charge of the evacuation of your soldiers and your Japanese civilians in the Tsingtao area." Our LSTs were taking them over to Japan every several days. "I am leaving in a few days, but you will continue to command under my successor, General Howard. That's your job."

I thought no more about it but several months later I received a letter from General Nagano. He said, "I am writing you this from my headquarters in the Laoshan Mountains." You know, there are mountains around Tsingtao. He said, "Through the mists of the Laoshan Mountains I can still see your face and remember your orders to me, that I would be held responsible for the evacuation of all the Japanese civilians and the Japanese soldiers in the area. I want you to know that within the hour I will board the last LST. All Japanese civilians and all Japanese soldiers have left the area in accordance with your directives."

To me it was a very touching letter. I have a copy of that letter in my files. It gave me somewhat of a different insight into the Japanese whom I detested. As I have previously said, I'd just as soon kill a Jap as a

rattlesnake during the war. But it showed his moral character that he would sit down and write this letter to me pointing out to me in person that he had carried out my command to him. That I entrusted him with this job of evacuating all these Japs from the Tsingtao area, and he wanted me to know that he had carried it out prior to boarding the last transport. I was really very much touched by this demonstration of loyalty.

Q: Well, this I think was an aspect of the Japanese.

Shepherd: It was a characteristic of the Japanese which we didn't know. I had taken care of him, as I said. I'd provided his men with arms and ammunition to fight against the Communists.

Several years later I wrote to General Nagano and said, "I would like to return your sword to you." In reply he said he would not accept it. As I recall, his words were, "I presented my sword to you in good faith, as one professional soldier to another, and I can not take it back."

Q: Did you ever see him after that?

Shepherd: I never saw him. Furthermore, in my letter to him – it was when I was Commanding General of FMFPAC that I wrote this letter. I said, "I expect to be in Japan some time next month, and if you will honor me by coming to Kyoto, I will return your sword to you. We can have a luncheon together and I'll officially return your sword." He was living on the Inland Sea, not too far from Kyoto and I frankly would have like to have seen him. I'd have like to return his sword to him but his pride would not permit him to accept it. As he stated in his letter, "I can't receive this sword. I surrendered it to you."

There is an interesting anecdote in conclusion of this story. Last year I received a letter from a young man in Norfolk, Virginia, named Norman Wilcox who had served in the Sixth Marine Division during the war. I had known his family there from boyhood. Norman was working in the National City Bank of Commerce, now called Virginia National Bank. In his letter Wilcox said, "I've just had a very interesting experience. In order to promote trade between Norfolk and Japan, the Bank had invited a delegation of Japanese bankers and businessmen to come to Norfolk. At a luncheon, Wilcox noted the banker who seemed to be in charge or one of the leaders of the group, was named Nagano. So he remarked to him, "I remember a General Nagano who was the officer who surrendered to General Shepherd, Commanding General of the Marine Division in which I served during the war. I was present at the ceremony. Are you in any way related to General Nagano, who fought in the Japanese Army and surrendered at Tsingtao to General Shepherd?"

He said, "Oh, yes. I'm his son." He said, "General Shepherd's name is a legend in our family. My father's spoken of him many times. My father's now old and very feeble but he's often spoken of General Shepherd's kindness to him following the surrender." Wasn't that a coincidence? That Nagano's son should come over to this country as a banker and that he should recall my name and say, "Oh yes, I remember General Shepherd, I've heard all about him." Soon after receiving the

- letter from Wilcox I wrote to General Nagano telling him about my friend having met his son. I never heard from General Nagano but his son wrote me a nice letter stating his father was quite aged and feeble.
- Q: I have been reading a lot of books that came out after World War II trying to investigate what motivated Japanese (sic) to provoke a war a war with the United States.
- Shepherd: From what I have read it appears to have been a military group who influenced the Emperor to agree to the Pearl Harbor attack. A very good article came out in the Naval Institute Proceedings.
- Q: Yes, the (Naval) Institute Proceedings?
- Shepherd: I think the Readers' Digest had an abbreviated story of what took place behind the scenes in Tokyo, at the Emperor's palace, and how the Emperor was forced to make the decision. The Army wanted war but I don't think that the Navy wanted to pursue the war into Hawaii. They were reluctant to do so because they realized they didn't have the ships for it.
- Q: They were more realistic.
- Shepherd: More realistic about what they could do. That was it. But the Army put enough pressure on the poor Emperor so that he had to finally go along because an Army military group was running the country. The Emperor finally reluctantly gave his consent to this bombing of Pearl Harbor which brought on the war. Otherwise we might not have gone to war with Japan.
- Q: They have tremendous virtue and honor and moral qualities it seems.
- Shepherd: I think I described this in my account of Nagano's sense of honor about his sword. He would not take his sword back because he had officially surrendered it to me.
- Q: I'd like to ask you about this very ornate sword here.
- Shepherd: That was given me by a Japanese civilian in Tsingtao who was being evacuated, one of the Japanese who was going back to Japan. He was a prominent businessman in Tsingtao who said that because they were required to turn in all arms when they left the country, "This sword would just be confiscated and turned in to the heap." It's not a particularly good blade. The blade is not as good as it might be but it had belonged to a shogun in Japan. His father had brought it or it had been given to him by some relation between them, a cousin of his. It is valuable as a historical ceremonial sword. You can see it's very beautiful and ornate. But it does not have the great value as far as the blade is concerned as compared with these other two. This is the one that is the 750 year-old sword. If you take out this pin, and you see the stamp on the handle of the blade. Not, in a good blade – the Japs' (swords) are all made my hand. They had chromium steel in Japan way back in those days. That's why they made these beautiful blades. There's a certain amount of chromium in the steel. Of course they're beaten and beaten and heated over and beaten again I, until they get this sharp edge, and then they put their wave in it. Each prominent sword smith has his own wave. Can you see the wave in both of these good blades?

Q: Yes. Yes.

Shepherd: Well, each sword smith had his trademark, in that he was a particular wave. You see, this wave goes along the edge of the blade. Some one who didn't know would say, well, that's just where it was worn, but each sword smith has his own identifying wave. Some go in peaks and valleys; there are many different types of waves. The wave is burnt into the steel so that you can identify the sword smith. Then if the sword is really a fine piece of workmanship the sword smith will inscribe his name on the handle. It isn't a perfect blade he won't put his name on the handle.

Q: This one is more of a field sword, isn't it?

Shepherd: You are apparently judging the sword by its plain wooden case. The case means nothing. They make these wooden cases because it preserves the sword better than in a fancy case. That one you are looking at is an excellent sword although it's in a wooden scabbard.

Q: - oh, yes -

Shepherd: Look at this blade, up and down and yet it is also wavy. It was made by a famous sword smith, 350 years ago. He was such a perfectionist that the Emperor permitted him to emboss the royal chrysanthemum on his sword. These two are very fine swords which I still have in my possession. I intend to give them to a museum. I feel rather guilty in a way that I didn't return this very fine one to the Japanese Government several years ago when a Japanese official came to the United States and tried to collect swords which were in possession of U.S. veterans. Well, I debated the question with myself and I said, "Shucks, why should I do it? They were given to me, and I have the letter to prove it, by Nagano, in which he said they were presented in appreciation by the officers of his brigade for the courteous treatment that I had given them by feeding and taking care of them and seeing that they were all evacuated back to Japan." Of course, I supposed the Japanese thought, when they surrendered, that they were all going to be killed. . . I guess they were judging themselves by what they would have done to us if they had won the war. Shall we have a little luncheon?

Q: Love to. (Break)

This is the final question for this afternoon and a sort of broad based question. I'm going to ask you to turn your mind back to the time you first came to the Marine Corps and continue on to your retirement.

Shepherd: The first time I came into the Marine Corps?

Q: Yes, Sir, when you were first commissioned.

Shepherd: Gracious, that goes back to 1917.

Q: Just on the basis of your experience over this period, based on this, you've seen the Marine Corps change considerably over the period of these many years. What do you envision for the future? How do you see the future of the Marine Corps? What do you look forward to it becoming? Will it change drastically - in mission or concept as an elite unit, so to speak?

Shepherd: I can foresee no material change in mission of the Marine Corps in my lifetime. We went through a series of changes over the years but our

objective has always been the same, a landing force unit, highly mobile, air transportable, especially proficient in amphibious operations, which we perfected during WWII. I think that's it.

World War II proved that our concepts were correct. We had a superior elite corps of soldiers of the sea, and we conducted ourselves with great distinction and glory during World War II. Amphibious doctrines were developed by the Marine Corps, you might say, alone. After the war we went through the unification fight, and we came up with an act of Congress establishing the Marine Corps as a regular service of the United States, which insured our position by law, insured us of our strength prescribed by Congress, which I trust will last for a good many years to come. I don't think – I can't foresee any material change in our mission. We're still going to have amphibious operations. We're still going to be fighting wars as are being fought in South Vietnam today. The Navy will continue to provide transports and amphibious shipping as it should be and give close gunfire support to our troops. I can't see any real change. Atomic warfare – we are prepared for that, as demonstrated by the exercises in which we've recently participated, dropping the bomb and the Marine forces landing by helicopter shortly thereafter. Can you suggest any changes yourself?

Q: Well, I don't know. I was thinking now of externals. There are a lot of traditionalists who are unhappy, for instance, that at the end of World War II we didn't go back to Sam Browne belts. We didn't go back to the campaign hat. Then, of course, with this unification and unified supplies, we've gotten rid of the herringbone twill and gone over to black shoes and black socks. Of course, these are only external trappings, but they were a significant part of the Marine Corps. They were a part of the tradition. External trappings aren't what the Marine Corps is composed of, but they were tradition. They may have been good and they may have been bad. I was just wondering whether you think that this had affected the Corps in any way, in the sense of esprit, in the sense of morale? Do you feel that if they're doing any more chipping away along this line they (would) ever get rid of the 'Blues' – which is a distinct possibility - ?

Shepherd: No, I don't think the Corps has (been) hurt materially. Each time we're chipped at we resent it as fight back particularly when they tried to do away with the 'Blues'. They were going to do away with the mess jacket also. I personally went to General Vandegrift and made a serious protest. "Our mess jacket is part of our uniform," I said. "It dates back to the foundation of the Marine Corps." General Vandegrift took the matter up with the Secretary of the Navy and we were able to retain it, which I think was a good tradition. I lived through that period when Johnson was Secretary of Defense. He wanted to have one black tie uniform. You pinned on your tails by a zipper when you were required to wear evening full dress. You pinned on some gold braid around your cuff, too off the gold braid if you're going in civilian clothes. It was the craziest idea I've

ever listened to. Of course he's in his grave now. He resigned before he could enforce any of his cockeyed notions.

We go through these periods, when somebody had the idea of trying to make everybody the same, simply because we have a distinctive uniform. We have a distinctive uniform of which we are all very proud. It's been passed down for many years. Our greens are distinctive and the khaki has always been traditional to the Marines. The Army had olive drab. But as the old saying is, they can't lick us so they join us. What does the Army do? They now have a green uniform that's very similar to our own. They have blues that are more or less similar to our and did away with the Army olive drab. So they have come to us.

However, I think that the Marine Corps, I trust and pray that the Marine Corps will continue to survive as the elite service that it is recognized as not only in this country but all over the world as being the finest fighting service there is in existence today.

Q: Now, you've seen the Marine Corps go from the size it was before, say, World War I, be reduced again in the interwar period, go way down in strength, and then up to 485,000 in World War II. Records prove that Marines always do a good job. We went down again after World War II, built up for Korea, and we finally have some legislation which provides for a floor, rather than a ceiling, on the size of the Marine Corps. You recall times in Marine Corps history when every officer knew almost every other officer, and they knew the men. It was that small a service. Today it's not too easy. I think what we have, something like nearly 200,000 Marines at this time. Do you think that bigness, during normal situations, cold war situations – call this normal – hurts? What would be a practical or optimum size for a Marine Corps?

Shepherd: Well, I'll answer your question in two parts. There was a feeling – I admit that I didn't have the same feeling – but many people said, "During World War II, oh, the Marine Corps is shot to hell, they're getting too big; their efficiency and their morale, their esprit, depends on a small Corps." I've heard that many times. World War II was our greatest day. We conquered the Pacific, and we did it alone, more or less. Our size didn't hurt us as long as we had a nucleus of 20 or 330 thousand to start with. They passed on the spirit to those who followed; there was no lack of Marine Corps spirit in the officers and men that I saw during the war. I'd like to say a word about the draft. We had to take some men in the draft for the Korean War which we opposed, but we didn't have any other source, we had to do it to level ourselves down to the Army. These draftees, I found, turned out to be might good men. Once they got the Marine training, one they were imbued with the Marine spirit and the will to win, they turned out, as far as I could find out, to be just as good as volunteer Marines. So I have no fear of the increased size of the Marine Corps – we are over that issue now. At present we have 200,000 men in the Marine Corps. I don't think we need to worry. We don't want to be an Army. Of course, organizations change, but as I said at the time I was Commandant the

optimum should be 215 or 225, and a minimum of 193 thousand. I think those were the two figures that I desired, for the Marine Corps. And it seems to me that a figure of 205,000 was what I said was the middle course. Now, I may be slightly off on those figures. They were only a rough guide.

So I think the Marine Corps has proven beyond a doubt that we can absorb additional men in time of war, and that we are just as effective as before and I have no fear that if we go to 400,000 again, that we won't be just as good as we were in World War II.

Q: You know, I was just thinking as you were talking, we spoke to Colonel Heinl last week about your visit to General MacArthur when you wrote that telegram to the JCS for him, and General Cates talking about denuding the Second Division. Aren't we facing much the same situation today? The Second Division on the East Coast has been for the past few years, overly committed to so many things in the Caribbean. The Marine Corps has had to organize a Fifth Division and there's one unit of the Fifth Division on its way to Vietnam now.

Shepherd: Frankly, I am not prepared to comment on this, because since my time I have not kept up with what's going on in the Marine Corps. I don't in any way wish to kibbitz on it, because I don't know what the problems are. Ever since I can remember, we've always had to borrow from Peter to pay Paul. In other words, when we were stripped of personnel we had a plan to meet emergency situations. Way back in the 30's – in the 20's – we had a Plan "A" they called it, and when an emergency came, every post was stripped to a corporal's guard. I happened to be in Norfolk in 1927, when we had troops in Nicaragua and we sent a brigade to China. They had it very carefully worked out. There were certain of the jobs on each post that required personnel to be manned all the time. There was the Sea School, which I had, and during that period, I was not only CO of the Sea School but I was Post Quartermaster and Post Exchange officer as well for a short period. So it's always been that way. that in times of stress you had to pull in everybody from all over, reduce the various guard units, cut down posts, to get men to meet the emergency. Now they're so much better organized, we have a two Fleet Marine Force. Of course they vary in strength, it's true. But our posts are cut to a minimum. We've fiddled with those for years, trying to cut out any unnecessary post services and barrack duties. So I am not concerned with the fact that we're always over-committed in plans, the fact that the East Coast Fleet Marine Force, FMFLANT, has more commitments than they can handle. That's as it always has been and always will be. Right at the moment, there's no war going on in Europe. It's true we had a flurry in the Caribbean last year, but I'm not concerned about a paper commitment – if we can't do it one way we'll do it another. We've never failed yet. We never shall.

Q: You mentioned about the two Fleet Marine Forces, Sir – another area which has to be explored further especially the formation of FMFPAC. Now, do you recall the genesis of FMFPAC?

Shepherd: That was formed when I was in the South Western Pacific, another theatre and I frankly know nothing about it.

Q: Well, we hope to get out to talk to General Holland Smith.

Shepherd: He could probably tell you. He fought to establish the Marine Corps on a footing with the Navy, when we were getting pushed around by a staff officer on some naval staff. We are not an entity. We should be able to give orders and tell our troops where to go, what to do.

Q: You must have known Holland Smith in World War I?

Shepherd: He was in the same regiment with me. I think he was in another battalion. But I remember him very distinctly. He was aboard the Henderson with me when the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines went to France in June 1917. I think at that time he had been made the regimental adjutant to Doyen. Initially he had a machine gun company. I've been a very close friend of his for years, and went to see him last year when I was in La Jolla and we had a good talk, together. I think he did a great deal of good in his fight for the Marine Corps. He was a fighter, with the Marine Spirit in him. It was through him largely that we were able to finally establish our proper place in the Naval Establishment, especially in the Pacific during World War II. In my opinion Holland Smith is one of the Marine Corps Greats.

Q: His relationship with General Vandegrift is quite interesting. Of course he was senior to General Vandegrift –

Shepherd: I don't think that all came into it.

Q: No, it didn't, because I've gone through Vandegrift's correspondence and have seen his letters, and that man had a might heavy cross to bear out there. He was harassed terribly by the Army, and constantly fighting with the Navy.

Shepherd: He fought for the Marine Corps, tooth and nail. Unfortunately the Smith-versus-Smith affair stunk. The Army was completely off-base on that. They just made an issue of it because the intensity of feelings between the Army and the Marine Corps as many Army officers were relieved from command when they didn't do what they were supposed to do. General Holland Smith was justified in relieving General Ralph Smith USA when he failed to exercise appropriate command of his division on Saipan.

Q: Well, of course the sly in the ointment there was this General Richardson, the Army Commanding General in the Pacific.

Shepherd: As a matter of fact, Richardson didn't like Marines and he took this occasion to back up his Army man, regardless of the merits or demerits of the case, which is all right to a certain degree, but that's carrying it too far.

Q: General Rogers was saying, when we spoke to him several months ago, one regiment of the 27<sup>th</sup> was the garrison troops on Peleliu, when he was Peleliu island commander, and this Army officer explained that the reason why they didn't attack was that they were waiting for adequate artillery support.

Shepherd: Of course the 27<sup>th</sup> was a National Guard regiment and they never amounted to a hill of beans. They were with me at Okinawa.



Q: No, they were in the line, First Division relieved them in the line, and they were sent up north. They were supposed to clear the north and garrison the area.

Shepherd: I don't think they were worth shucks. A lot of political – politics. . .

Q: Unfortunate. Well, we've explored everything I can think of right now, General.

Shepherd: You have a record of my correspondence with General MacArthur.

Q: Yes, Sir.

Shepherd: Well, I think I went over that with you the other day. Whether you made a recording, I don't know, but I was determined, if possible, in the Korean War, that we would have a division as our unit, not a brigade. Having been with the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade in France I had learned that a Marine unit in an Army Division in not good for the Corps. I wanted a Marine Division that would really support us and have our own Marine air in battle when we needed them. I think that was the greatest thing that I did as CG FMFPAC, when I got the First Marine Division out to Korea, with General MacArthur's support. As it later developed, the outstanding accomplishments of the First Marine Division in Korea aided materially in the passage of the law by Congress making the Corps a separate service with a minimum troop level.

Q: You might be interested to know – an officer just returned from Vietnam. He was an historical officer on General Westmoreland's staff in the historical branch there. He said that the Marines are in good shape as far as relationship with the Army is concerned.

Shepherd: Oh, they recognize us now.

Q: They're recognized, and General Walt's included in the upper councils and General Krulak, of course –

Shepherd: He's fighting for the Corps there now, and doing a good job. For a while I thought we weren't getting proper publicity. You see all this business in the newspapers about the Green Berets, the 1<sup>st</sup> Cav and all these various units but little about the Marines. I spoke to General Greene about it and other people did too. I know the Department of Defense PIO controls the publicity. My own son-in-law Jimmy Ord was in that section and he had a hell of a battle getting anything publicized about the Marines. It wasn't until recently – I think within the last month or two, particularly this "Operation Hastings," that we have gotten our share of the public relations publicity.

Q: You must know a man by the name of Tom Fields? A short, very feisty, very dynamic individual?

Shepherd: Marine?

Q: Marine! Yes, he's a colonel. He was Andy Geer's exec, 2-5, out in Korea – very fine officer.

Shepherd: Andy Geer was a good fellow.

Q: He is now the head of the Combat Information Bureau, 3<sup>rd</sup> MAC, 3<sup>rd</sup> MAF, Marine Corps Command out there. Of course I'm sure they're all

cognizant he's doing a fine job, getting the stuff forwarded. There are many problems, as you said.

Shepherd: It all goes back to the fact that in World War I, at Belleau Wood, they permitted the use of the name 'Marine' to get in the press, and ever since then the Army has guarded against it. But Lord knows they've now gone the other way. The Army is far more public-relations conscious than the Marine Corps ever was. They never miss a trick to get a story or picture in the paper. So you never can say that we are publicity hounds.

Q: No, they've got quite a public relation concept. Well General, I want to thank you very much for this, these two interviews, and as I say, when you are settled out on the West Coast, we hope to see you out there and start way back from the beginning.

Shepherd: I'm delighted to have an opportunity to express my thoughts, and I thank you for your cooperation in asking questions. I will be pleased to express my views on any other subject you may request, for your recording. I take great pride I have in my 42 years that I've spent in the Marine Corps. To me it always will be the greatest organization in the world.

Q: Well, thank you, Sir.

**End of Interview #2.**

### Interview Session 3.

Interview with General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Retired) by Benis M. Frank. 13 February 1967 at La Jolla, CA.

Shepherd: Now, let's get down to real brass tacks – and stop me if I start to ramble. You know, I'm getting old and talk too damned much.

Q: Let me put my introduction on. This is Interview Session #3 with General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Retired), at his home in La Jolla, California. The date is 13 February 1967.

We talked on many things last time, General, and I think what I want to talk about now is your early days. For instance, you were born in Norfolk and your father was a doctor, I believe?

Shepherd: That's correct. My father was a doctor in Norfolk, Virginia. He was a well-known physician. He practiced principally obstetrics, and at one period during several years he delivered more babies in the state of Virginia than any other physician. He had studied at Bellevue Medical School in New York, and then completed his education by attending Medical Schools in Berlin and Vienna for a course of study. He returned home to practice his profession. My mother came from Nantucket, Massachusetts. She had come to Norfolk to teach in a private school in Norfolk by the name of Leach Wood Seminary where my aunt also taught. There she met my father and they were subsequently married in 1894. I grew up as a boy in Norfolk, lived on Freemason Street, which is a lovely old cobblestone street, trees on both sides, and in those days was the center of the residential area of Norfolk. Of course the houses in this area have now all been torn down, but when I was a boy it was the center of the social life of old Norfolk. My home on Freemason Street was right next to the Baptist Church, and across from the Meyers home which is now preserved by the city of Norfolk as a historical type of home that existed during the period of the nineteenth century, 150 years ago.

I was born in a three story brick house with a gabled roof with a nice big back yard and a stable in the rear. My father maintained two horses and buggies for his practice. That's where I first learned to have a love for horses. I believe it was because I was playing in the stable half the time and would often ride the horse my father wasn't using that particular day with his buggy.

In those days, you could get into the country outside of Norfolk in a matter of 20 minutes, where I could jog along the oyster shell roads that existed all around the town of Norfolk, a city at that time of only 50 or 60 thousand people.

Q: When we were visiting you at Leeton Forest last year, I think the first trip I made when Colonel Heinl came down; you had mentioned that you had studied up on the maternal side of your family. Your mother came from Nantucket and you'd been reading something about your Nantucket forebears. How far back do they go?

Shepherd: Well, for many, many years, for some unknown reason, I've been interested in genealogy, and have compiled quite a number of records. I have five volumes of material I've researched. My Shepherd forebears arrived in Tidewater Virginia in 1652, and there are many old county records, both in Princess Anne and Lower Norfolk County concerning their wills, deeds, etc. My progenitors settled in Northampton County and were on Eastern Shore Virginia for two generations before moving across the bay to Princess Anne County.

As far as my mother was concerned, whose name was Cartwright, and old English family which came to America in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, and settled in Nantucket. My forebears in Nantucket were seafaring men. My grandfather was a whaler, captain of a whaling ship that sailed out of New Bedford and Nantucket for many years, during the whaling industry of a hundred years ago. During one of his voyages he was wrecked on a small island just south of Okinawa. I recall that during the period I was fighting on Okinawa the Nantucket Mirror published an article that "General Shepherd is fighting on an island close by where his grandfather was wrecked in 1870."

Q: Was he subsequently rescued?

Shepherd: Yes. It was quite a story. I said 1870 – it may have been later, 1880, I've forgotten. Yes, it was quite an experience. In the fog the ship ran on a reef. They saved everything from the ship and were able to take it ashore. The Japanese were quite friendly. Apparently they hadn't seen any white people before and they were very curious. They kept the ship crew under surveillance most of the time. The captain of the whaler on which my grandfather was first mate took the long boat and sailed off to Hong Kong leaving Grandfather in charge of the crew to wait his return. It was several months before he was finally able to persuade U.S. Consul in Hong Kong to send the USS Wisconsin to rescue my grandfather and crew who were then transported to Hong Kong. This was as far as they'd take them. So then it was a question how to get back to Nantucket, which was a long way away. So my grandfather, having no resources shipped as a mate on a ship that was going to San Francisco. But then he hadn't made enough money to get passage around the Horn. Of course this was before the railroads. So he had to make another trip to Hong Kong and back to make enough money for passage on a ship back to Nantucket. He was gone seven years on that voyage.

Q: Seven years, that's a long time.

Shepherd: Quite a long time to be away from home.

Q: It must have been a great feat of seamanship to sail a small boat from Okinawa to Hong Kong.

Shepherd: It might not have been Hong Kong. I don't recall. Maybe it was Shanghai or somewhere along the China coast, where they were able to get a US battleship to go to Okinawa and transport my grandfather and members of the crew to Hong Kong. During my grandfather Cartwright's voyages to the Pacific, he went up to the Aleutian Islands. They were hardy people.

When you see one of those small whaling vessels you wonder how they made it. I admire them. I always thought that being a whaler was just a matter of sticking a harpoon in a big fish but when you have seen a whaling museum and learn how ferocious whales are, and the intelligence they have and how they attack you and smash your boats, I had a great respect for my grandfather Cartwright. He had a boat smashed several times. To get alongside of a whale, put a harpoon in him and then stay with the whale while they go for miles and dive and that sort of thing – I take my hat off to the courage those old whalers had.

Q: I guess it was pretty rugged. They didn't have the big guns.

Shepherd: No. They had a small gun that they used occasionally to shoot the harpoon in, but I don't think, as I recall it, that they killed the whales by actual gunshot.

Q: They had to go out in long boats and get them.

Shepherd: They came right alongside of a whale and stuck the harpoon into him. They stayed with this whale while he went charging off or would sound, as they call it, go down deep and they'd finally bring him in, back to the ship. Then they'd have to cut him up and put his blubber into pots to boil off the whale oil and put it into barrels. The whale oil in those days was a very valuable commodity. They used it in lamps and for a number of other things. There was a period when it was a very profitable enterprise.

Q: It's died out now.

Shepherd: Oh, yes. They killed off so many of the whales, and of course, electricity has taken the place of oil lamps. Whale oil lamps gave the best light of all oil lamps. That group of old whaling men out of Nantucket and New Bedford were very hardy and courageous men; they were an upstanding group of seafaring individuals. My grandfather lived to his late eighties and never used glasses. My grandmother lived to she was 90-odd years old.

Q: Did you know them both?

Shepherd: Oh, yes. They used to visit us. They came to Norfolk during the winters on occasion, and stayed with my family. Frequently we would go up and spend a month or two in their home in Nantucket in the summer.

Q: Then you're not totally unfamiliar with Nantucket.

Shepherd: No. As a matter of fact, Nantucket is a small island where practically all the families are inter-related. There are the Coffins and the Starbucks and other families on Nantucket to whom I am related. There were some 12 or 15 families that originally came there. My great, great grandfather was one of them, so over a period of a couple of hundred years of intermarriage everybody is related to everybody else.

Q: I imagine it would be very safe to assume, with the long history of the Shepherd side of the family, in Virginia, what some of your forebears fought in the Confederate Army during the "War Between the States."

Shepherd: I should say so! They all fought for the Confederacy. Norfolk was occupied by Union troops a year or two after the war began, and was under federal control. My grandfather Shepherd was a member of

Company I, 15<sup>th</sup> Virginia Cavalry, as was my Uncle Lem, for whom I'm named. He was killed in one of the cavalry skirmishes just before the Battle of Chancellorsville. My grandfather survived the war. He was wounded and invalided home. He was in a hospital in Petersburg. My grandmother ran the blockade through the Union lines and the Dismal Swamp to go to Petersburg to join him when he was in the hospital there. The story that she always told was that when the Union forces were shelling the town of Petersburg a shell went through the house she was in and that caused my father to be born. She was with child at the time and the fright of a cannonball coming through her house caused her to deliver my father.

Q: What part of the family does your middle name, Cornick, come from?

Shepherd: Well, the Cornicks were one of the original families in Princess Anne County, which was then known as Lower Norfolk County. They arrived there in the 1660s, and were one of the prominent families in the county. I'm related to the Cornicks by two or three collateral lines. My direct relationship with the Cornicks through my great-grandmother Frances Cornick who married Smith Shepherd II. Both died at a very early age, within a few months of each other and their infant son Lemuel Cornick was raised by his Uncle Lemuel Cornick at Brood Bay Manor Farm on the Lynnhaven River in Princess Anne County, Virginia. From then on there was a Lemuel Cornick in the family because of this close relationship between the Shepherd family and Lemuel Cornick who raised his nephew. The name has been carried on in the family for three generations. I have a grandson, Lemuel Cornick IV.

The Cornicks had a beautiful old home on Broad Bay, if you're familiar with that part of the country, which is still standing there. It's known as Broad Bay Manor, and it's a very handsome, lovely old home, the first house was built in 1635. It's been added to and improved. It's one of the show places of that particular area.

Q: Tell me, your father was a doctor, would it be safe to assume that you picked up many hints and were involved with a medical type atmosphere – what impelled you to go to VMI, rather than taking up a medical career?

Shepherd: Well, my father was most anxious for me to follow in his footsteps and be a doctor and he put some pressure on me. My mother was opposed to it because my father, a small town doctor was on the go all the time, twenty-four hours a day, particularly an obstetrician as my father was. As week would go by and I wouldn't see my father. He'd be out on calls. Frequently at night – and my mother often said, "Your father's always gone at night. Somebody calls and he feels obligated to answer them."

You see, in those days, people had their children in their homes. They didn't go to a hospital to have a baby. The babies were delivered right in the home in the mothers' bed. Of course, there was a midwife there and a doctor and that was it. The normal fee for looking after an expectant mother for six months before birth and three months after, a

doctor received the great sum of \$25 in those days. I mean, that's just an interesting observation.

My father practiced in Norfolk during the yellow fever epidemic and did some very fine work for which he received commendation. I think it was the yellow fever or perhaps it was the smallpox epidemic around the time of the Spanish-American War. He was one of the older physicians in Norfolk quite well known, and many people have come up to me and said, "Your father was a great man. He delivered me and attended my family. He had a wonderful human touch. He'd listen with sympathy and human understanding" – which was part of being a doctor, listening to people's troubles and trying to iron them out. And then during World War II, with the shortage of doctors –

Q: - he came out of retirement again?

Shepherd: Yes, he was still working then, but during this flu epidemic –

Q: World War I flu epidemic?

Shepherd: World War I, yes, that's right – World I. During this flu epidemic they had during World War I thousands of people died – he just worked himself practically to death during this period trying to look after his patients.

So, seeing the life he lived I just didn't want to be a doctor. I think maybe I would have been a good one. I have inherited a certain amount of his characteristics. But my mother wanted me to be an engineer, a civil engineer or an electrical engineer. I became interested in radio in my early days. I used to be a ham operator way back, 1912, '13, I recall, - when the Titanic went down I got messages from the Titanic about her disaster.

I was very much interested in electricity. It was later after I went to VMI that I switched from electrical engineering to civil engineering because I like the field work and I had a cousin who was a civil engineer who worked down in Nicaragua and Central America. When he came home he told me stories about those countries down there and it whetted my desire to go to Central America and work on similar projects. So that was one of the reasons I went to VMI and studied Civil Engineering.

Q: Do you have any sisters or brothers?

Shepherd: I have two sisters. They're both younger than I am. But to return to the reasons I went to VMI. Another one was that it just happened that a group of my close friends that were at high school with me went to VMI about that time; about a dozen of us. Some had gone the previous year; others were in my own class. It was one of those waves that youngsters get, "Let's go to VMI, you go and I'll go," and we all went up together.

And it's a decision I have never regretted. I had no particular aspirations for the military. When I went up there I wasn't particularly military. I wasn't inspired to be military. At the end of my "Rat Year," my first year, I was made corporal. But the following year, I had a little fracas with some fire crackers we set off on New Year's Eve night. I was caught and was busted. In those days, at VMI you went up there the 1<sup>st</sup> of September and you didn't get back till the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June. It was a long

period with no Christmas leaves, no leaves at all. You had Thanksgiving Day, on which you attended a football game in Roanoke. You had Christmas Day on which you could go downtown and get some waffles at the Dutch Inn; you had Lee's Birthday and Founder's Day, the 15<sup>th</sup> of May. In all, I think there were only five holidays, which was a pretty long siege without a break.

Q: You were speaking about you Rat Year. What influenced you to become a Marine officer upon graduation?

Shepherd: I'll come to that. During my Rat Year I wasn't particularly interested in following a military life but I got along all right. It was in my last year that I was at VMI, what they call the First Class Year when I was rooming with three Norfolk boys. One was the first captain, the highest cadet office in the Corps. He was also president of the class and captain of the football team. His name was Oliver B. Booker. He had come to VMI with the definite purpose in mind of getting a commission in the Army. In those days, only one regular commission to the Army was given the whole graduating class, just one commission. This was long before the Reserves or anything like that. There was one regular officers' second lieutenant commission offered by the Army. Several cadets were bucking for it, but my roommate Booker was the outstanding candidate. He was three years older than the rest of us so he had the edge on us because of his maturity. Another of my roommates was cadet Fielding Robinson, who subsequently became a Major. The third one was Edward Cole who was interested in going to the Army. And there I was the fourth one in this room of three cadet officers and I was just a private first class, because I'd gotten busted in my sophomore year for this firecracker episode on New Year's Eve and happened to be one of the few unfortunate ones that got caught.

Well, I really didn't care as I wasn't bucking for a commission. But, at the end of my second class year, at Commencement Exercise, General George Barnett came to VMI to make an address. He wore his blue uniform and he had a very snappy aide with him. The cadets had never seen Marines before looking like that. I mean, in full dress uniform. General Barnett was a very distinguished officer as you know, and when he made that address and reviewed the Cadet Corps he impressed a lot of cadets.

Well, the following year, in early spring, I think it was about February of 1917, it became obvious that the United States was going to get into war with Germany and the majority of my classmates began to think about getting a commission in the Army.

By that time the Army had given ten appointments to VMI instead of the one and the Marine Corps had also given ten appointments, for members of the graduating class.

Q: This was the first time any VMI graduate had gone into the Marine Corps?

Shepherd: No. There had been one or two in 1916. I think there were several that came in that year during the buildup for the war. Prior to that the only VMI



graduate in the Marine Corps was General William P. Upshur who was in the class of 1909. Perhaps there were several others whom I do not recall.

But because General Barnett apparently had been very much impressed with VMI when he came to Lexington in June of 1916, the following fall when the Marine Corps was given an increase in personnel he assigned ten appointments to VMI. This was in November of 1916 before the U.S. declared war on Germany.

Frankly speaking, there weren't many cadets who were interested in a regular commission in the Armed Services at that time as most VMI students were taking engineering courses in preparation for a career in this field of endeavor. About February, though, when it appeared that the United States might become involved in World War I a number of the cadets in the graduating class requested commissions in the Army and Marine Corps. It was about this time that I became interested in applying for a commission in the Army. So during the latter part of March I went to see the commandant, Colonel Hodges, and told him, "I would like to apply for one of the Army commissions." He said, "I'm terribly sorry Mr. Shepherd, I'd like very much to recommend you for a commission in the Army but I just gave away the last one of the ten appointments to the Army a couple of days ago. We just don't have any more." I said, "What about the Marine Corps?" He replied, "The ten Marine commissions we had were given out last November but all the services are increasing their numbers and you might be able to get a commission in the Marine Corps."

My roommates and I talked it over but I did nothing about it at the time. Coming from Norfolk, I knew that the Marines were part of the Navy and I liked the thought of serving aboard ship. When war was declared on the 7<sup>th</sup> of April, I said to my roommates, "You know, we're going to war, we've got to do something about it," so I typed up a letter requesting an appointment to the Marine Corps and a letter requesting an appointment to the Marine Corps and went over to the Superintendent at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, to deliver it in person to General Nichols. That was the only time a cadet could see the superintendent. I told General Nichols, "I would like to apply for a commission in the Marine Corps, since there's no possibility of getting one in the Army because all those commissions have been given out. Although the ones the Marine Corps have offered also have been filled I know a couple of the cadets who have applied for them and I don't think they'll get through physically." I happened to know that two of my classmates who had applied for Marine commissions had certain physical defects so I said, "I just don't think a couple of these cadets will pass the physical examination. Could I apply as an alternate?" General Nichols said, "Yes, yes, I'd be very glad to recommend you to General Barnett as an alternate for one of the Marine Corps commissions."

Well, I went back to barracks and told my roommates what I'd done. Word got around and the next afternoon about ten of my classmates applied for Marine commissions. So General Nichols sent a telegram to

the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommending us for commissions in the Marine Corps. This was, we'll say about the 8<sup>th</sup> or the 9<sup>th</sup> of April. Shortly thereafter we got an indication that we might receive an appointment. So we started scurrying around trying to get birth certificates and letters of recommendations you had to have. I think it was a birth certificate and two letters of recommendation. Mine arrived the day before we received orders to report immediately to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for examination.

Q: The whole group that had applied?

Shepherd: The whole group, yes. There were about a dozen of us. I didn't have any money so I had to borrow the money to buy a ticket to go to Washington. You know, in those days you didn't have much money but I was able to borrow enough for my fare. We went down to Lynchburg where we learned there was only one train leaving Lynchburg around midnight which arrived in Washington the next morning. Well, the train was crowded and we had to stand up all the way from Lynchburg to Washington, which was a pretty good piece. I was a young fellow then and could take it but it was tiring standing up on this train for six hours. There were six or eight of us I think in the group, when we arrived in Washington the next morning we went down on Pennsylvania Avenue to a hotel, rented a room, washed up and shaved and reported at 9 o'clock to the Marine barracks in Washington, D.C., for examination. We reported to Colonel Doyen, who was the commanding officer of the barracks at the time and was president of the examining board. When we went before the board we were told to report to the sick bay for a physical examination. Well, we had a bull surgeon there by the name of Dessez, and they called him "Bobo."

Q: Same as General Dessez?

Shepherd: Same as General Dessez, a distant cousin of his called Bobo Dessez. He was quite a big fellow.

Q: It was a perfunctory examination?

Shepherd: Yes. We went before the medical examining board, of which this old bull surgeon, Captain Dessez, was the senior member. He was a rough, gruff old seagoing bull. After he looked us over he took our blood pressure and then said to me, "Get down over there and stick up you ass. Have you ever had any piles?" I said, "No, sir." "Turn around. Have you ever had a dose of clap?" "No, sir." "You pass."

Q: They didn't inspect your teeth or your eyes?

Shepherd: Well, I don't recall. It was a pretty perfunctory examination. I'm sure they must have. I was underweight because I think the minimum requirement was 135 for my height and I only weighed 123 pounds. I ran on the track team and I was pretty thin in those days. After we finished our physical examination about noon – we reported before the examining board and Colonel Doyen said, "Well, you young gentlemen have all passed your physical examinations. Your academic qualifications of course depend upon your graduation from VMI which I assume you will

do since you are in your last month of school. With those two qualifications you're eligible for a commission in the Marine Corps. Now, the appointments which you will receive will be for regular commissions, probationary regular officer, but it will take some several months before you commissions as probationary regular officers are confirmed by the Senate. This will take several months. If you would like to be sworn into the Reserve, then you'll be commissioned right away. I have orders to swear you in as officers in the Reserves if you so desire." So we all said, "Yes, sir, we want to be Reserve officers." "Hold up your hands." When we did so we were all sworn in as second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve on the 11<sup>th</sup> of April, 1917, just four days after war was declared.

Well, that was moving fast. When we returned to VMI we were all second lieutenants. It was an interesting experience to be a commissioned officer in the Marine Corps Reserve and still a cadet at VMI.

Well, this was in the middle of April. About a week or ten days later, the superintendent of VMI, General Nichols, received a telegram from the Marine Corps stating, "We'd like our second lieutenants to report to duty as soon as possible. If you can possibly graduate then ahead of time, rather than waiting till June 27<sup>th</sup>, we'd like very much to have them report at once. We need their services."

So it was arranged to have the graduation ceremony on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, 1917, for the ten officers of the Marine Corps. The Superintendent then decided to graduate the cadets who had received Army Reserve commissions, say another 10 in addition to the 10 or 12 going into the Marine Corps. We were declared to have passed our studies and given full credit for our diplomas. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, 1917, we were graduated from VMI. The reason that date sticks in my mind is because it has had great significance for me. It was on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, 1863, that Stonewall Jackson made his flank march at the Battle of Chancellorsville and attacked the Union Army, causing their withdrawal. The Battle of Chancellorsville was a great victory for the Confederacy. Just before the attack, when several VMI men on his staff were standing with him, Stonewall Jackson remarked, "I see that a number of my commanders are VMI men. VMI will be heard from today." Stonewall Jackson had taught at VMI before the Civil War began. He was a local hero. His statue was on the parade ground and he is buried in Lexington. From my cadet days Stonewall Jackson was my great hero.

It was on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 1863, when he said, "VMI will be heard from today." I've always felt VMI would be heard from those of us who graduated on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 1917 and went into the services. After the graduation exercises I went home. That was on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, and I was there for several days, but didn't get any orders.

After about a week my classmate Fielding Robinson who also lived in Norfolk and had been commissioned at the same time and another classmate and close friend by the name of Charlie Nash who lived in West Virginia came home with me, as we expected to leave immediately for

Parris Island. We decided to go to Washington to find out what was going on. So we got on the Washington boat, went up to Headquarters, Marine Corps, and called on Major Thomas Holcomb, the detail officer. When we told Major Holcomb the purpose of our visit he said, "Well, I'm surprised that you haven't gotten orders. I can't understand why." He called in the sergeant major and said, "Write these young gentlemen orders immediately. (That) should have been done." Apparently he didn't realize that we'd been graduated from VMI.

So we walked out of Major Holcomb's office with orders in our hands to report to Parris Island. This we did on May 18<sup>th</sup> and were assigned to the Officers' School of Application. We reported to – no, I think it was Major Messersmith, the Commanding Officer of the School of Application. Well, first thing, before we got into the scholastic end of our Marine Corps education was to shoot on a rifle range. We had arrived on Saturday afternoon, I think it was, and on Monday morning we began our rifle range instruction. I think the course was two weeks. I had one weekend at Parris Island when I went over to Beaufort. The following weekend was May the 30<sup>th</sup>, it was a holiday weekend. Several days before our group completed range instruction, Messersmith called all the young officers into his office. There were some 30 of us who had reported all down together and he said, "We've just gotten a request from the Commandant for volunteers for the Fifth Marines." Well, I didn't know anything about the Fifth Marines, but I said, "I'll volunteer."

To go back a moment; the Saturday afternoon we arrived at Parris Island on the tug which brought us over from Port Royal to the island, as we got off I met a number of my schoolmates on their way to Charleston to go to Santo Domingo. We were all very envious. They were not classmates of mine at VMI but friends who'd graduated from VMI the previous year, and had been commissioned just prior to our group. It just happened that they reported 10 days or two weeks before we did and they were on their way to the tropics – Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua – they told us that was a good deal, "Try to get there if you can." We were very envious of our friends who were off for Santo Domingo.

So when Major Messersmith called for volunteers, we thought, "Well, maybe we can get out of here." Parris Island was a deadly place – "Let's get out of here and go down to Santo Domingo along with our buddies." Robertson, Nash and I volunteered for duty with the Fifth Marines in Philadelphia. None of us knew where we were going but we were glad to receive our orders and be on our way to join a regiment. My god friend Charlie Nash came home with me and we stopped in Norfolk enroute to Philadelphia, and went to see our respective girls who lived there. I don't recall the exact date I reported in at Philadelphia.

Q: It was on 5 June 1917.

Shepherd: Yes it was on the 5<sup>th</sup> of June as we had proceed time. I remember being in Norfolk on the 30<sup>th</sup> of May – it sticks in my mind. We had a weekend in Norfolk before reporting to Headquarters at the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines. We reported

to the regiment and were assigned to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion commanded by Major Frederick M. Wise. Everything was in confusion. We lived in tents. Recruits and old-timers were coming in. They said, “We’re going on an expedition.” We didn’t know where the hell we were going. We had no officers’ uniforms and wore enlisted men’s trousers. Our uniforms were supposed to have been delivered upon graduation, but since we had been graduated ahead of the scheduled time our tailor had not completed them. What was that tailor’s name?

Q: Read, was it?

Shepherd: Jacob Read was one of them but those of us from VMI got ours from another firm in Philadelphia. I’ve forgotten what the name was but they weren’t ready, so we just had to take what was issued to the men and put on officers’ hat cord on our campaign hats. Second Lieutenants wore no rank insignia in those days. Before we sailed I was able to get my uniforms. The first night I stayed up all night long issuing uniforms to men joining the company. I was assigned to the 55<sup>th</sup> Company. They had just recently returned from Cuba where they’d been on duty. We also received some Reserves from Philadelphia. They had a basic training camp there. Our company was brought up from less than 100 men to 250 men during a period of a few days. It was quite a job to assimilate them.

Q: Were some of these people ones who’d been trained by Biddle?

Shepherd: No. Not at this time. He did later on, but I don’t think Biddle was in the Marine Corps at this time. This was just at the beginning of the war. I do remember some of the young men from Philadelphia who joined the regiment. Among them was Sydney Hager who later became quite successful in business and a young man named Percy Glendenning. Both boys came from very prominent Philadelphia families. Later when we had to censor their mail I recall one of them saying, “I want you to take my Stutz out for exercise.” There were four of these socially prominent boys. They were all members of the Racket Club of Philadelphia. We used to call them the Racket Clubbers. It is just an interesting anecdote. These young men – I think they just enlisted in the Corps and were all privates, in this company. They were from the top families of Philadelphia. You can imagine the confusion that took place in trying to get the men of the Fifth Marines formed and aboard the Hancock prior to sailing within five days. By God, that really was something but we did it.

Q: The Hancock sailed on the 13<sup>th</sup> of June, did it not?

Shepherd: Yes. The 13<sup>th</sup> of June, as I recall, but the Hancock only went from Philadelphia to New York. There we joined the other ships in this first convoy going to France. While in New York harbor my battalion was transferred in the middle of the night from the Hancock to the Henderson, the new transport Henderson.

Q: You sailed from Philadelphia on the 11<sup>th</sup> and you transferred to the Henderson on the 13<sup>th</sup>.

Shepherd: On the 13<sup>th</sup> – I believe that was the date.

Q: - and left New York on the 14<sup>th</sup> –

Shepherd: On the 14<sup>th</sup>, we sailed for France.

Q: The first American troops to leave the United States for expeditionary duty in France.

Shepherd: Yes. This was the first convoy. There were the four infantry regiments, which later formed the First Army Division; and one regiment of Marines, the Fifth Marines. I'm sure you're familiar with what a difficult time General Barnett had to get that Marine regiment in the convoy. General Barnett deserves great credit for getting the Marines to France because the Army fought it tooth and nail.

We had a somewhat eventful trip across. The new navy transport Henderson kept breaking down and we had to maintain a watch in the rudder compartment to hand steer the ship when the mechanical transmission didn't work. We had the usual submarine scares. I was on lookout duty for a time, and then I was on a gun crew.

Q: Standard Marine duty.

Shepherd: We were mainly occupied however in getting the company organized. The 55<sup>th</sup> Company composed of some 100 men who had just come back from Cuba to augment the company and 100 recruits were added to bring it up to war strength. Then, because we were detached to the Army, we were ordered to change the drill. The old Army infantry drill was different from the Navy as prescribed in the Navy Landing Force Manual. Fortunately, having been to VMI, I knew the new drill so I was an expert on that. The command "Slope Arms" had to be changed to "Port Arms."

We landed in France on the 27<sup>th</sup> of June. That was the day the remainder of my class, which I had left at VMI graduated from the Institute. I often relate this story to young officers, as an example of how fast things can move in the Marine Corps. I don't say that's the normal situation but it has happened and it can happen again. I was graduated from VMI the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May, reported for duty to Parris Island on the 19<sup>th</sup>, and on June 27<sup>th</sup> landed in France in command of a platoon of Marines. All of this was within a period of three months. That's moving.

Q: I'd say so.

Shepherd: I didn't know what the Marine Corps was all about. I'll always remember a story that I like to relate. In my platoon, the 4<sup>th</sup> platoon of the 55<sup>th</sup> Company, a young private came up to me one morning after quarters and said, "Mr. Shepherd, I'm Private Christenberry and I'd like to be your orderly." I said, "Private Christenberry, I've only been in the Marine Corps a couple of months. What is an orderly supposed to do?" He said, "Well, I'll look after you, sir. I'll look after you and shine your shoes and take care of you." I said, "All right, you look after me and I'll look after you." And this fellow Bob Christenberry attached himself to me. You know who he is now, don't you? President of the Hotel Astor Corporation, not just the Hotel Astor but of the Hotel Astor Corporation. He was also Boxing Commissioner of New York and subsequently Postmaster of New York City. He became a very successful man. Bob

was a boy from Tennessee who made good. I will never forget his remark to me, "I'd like to be your orderly, Mr. Shepherd; I'll take care of you."

Q: You didn't even know what an orderly was?

Shepherd: No, I didn't know, I had an idea.

Q: You still didn't have your uniforms?

Shepherd: No, they came later. We had purchased puttees; we wore puttees in those days. We had puttees and some nice looking shoes. Later we bought green officer uniform material which we had made up by a tailor in France. We just wore khaki shirts; it was summer time, with a pair of khaki trousers. We cut the bottom leg of the trousers and tucked them into the puttees. We must have been awful looking - an enlisted man's campaign hat with an officer's cord on it. Second Lieutenants didn't wear officers' insignia in those days, you know - First Lieutenants wore a silver bar. The gold bar Second Lieutenants wear now was instituted during World War I. Well, when we got to France, we were able to get green uniforms made. I want to change what I just said. We did have khaki uniforms. We didn't have them at Parris Island when we went there but the tailor kept promising we would receive them before our departure from Parris Island. I called at the post office at Parris Island just prior to my departure but there was no box of uniforms for me. Since they hadn't come in the mail for Parris Island I stopped in Yemassee to inquire if they were there. Much to my delight I was given a box with my uniforms which had just arrived in the mail at the Yemassee post office. We put on our new khaki uniforms that evening on our way to Norfolk when we stopped there on our way to Philadelphia.

Q: Boots and all?

Shepherd: Well, we didn't have any boots in those days. We wore puttees. I guess I had previously gotten the puttees. We wore britches in those days. Maybe we got the whole thing from Horsmann, I don't recall specifically. But our uniforms arrived in the nick of time. The day we left we picked them up at the Yemassee post office as the mail hadn't arrived at Parris Island when we left. We put them on the next morning when we got to my home in Norfolk. That was when I put on a Marine uniform for the first time.

An amusing incident occurred while I was in Norfolk. You were asking about my grandmother. She had suffered greatly during the Civil War. During the two days that I was home before I sailed overseas, I went to see my grandmother wearing my khaki uniform. When she saw me she said, "Well, my grandson, I'm so pleased that you came to see me before you went off to war. But I'm further delighted that you wore your khaki rather than your blue uniform." The only Marines she'd seen were Marines in blues. She said, "You know, I never want to see a son of mine wearing a Yankee blue uniform." Her remark has always remained in my memory. I did not have a green uniform at that time. I think they issued us greens in Philadelphia because we went to France in greens, enlisted man's greens. Some of the officers had been able to obtain green

uniforms made at the last minute, but a lot of us didn't have them. The Marine Corps had just adopted green for winter service wear so we took the green enlisted uniforms with the high collar and cut a piece out of the side of the trousers so that they would fit inside our puttees.

Q: Those wrap puttees were hard to roll, weren't they?

Shepherd: We weren't wearing rolled puttees at the time – they were leather puttees. Later on we went to the rolled puttees. You got used to them. I liked them, as a matter of fact. After we arrived in France we were able to get green material from the quartermaster and a local tailor made me a nice green uniform.

Q: You didn't wear Sam Browns till you got over there?

Shepherd: We didn't wear Sam Browns when we went to France. Some time during the summer of 1917, July or August, I believe, was when we were authorized to wear Sam Brown belts. Of course we wore Sam Brown belt as part of our uniform for many years – up until World War II as I recall.

### **End of Side 1, Tape 1.**

### **Side 2, Tape 1.**

Shepherd: One of the last orders I signed as Commandant authorized the Sam Brown belt to be worn with the blue uniform. As a matter of interest I saved the Marine Corps Mess Dress as a Marine Corps uniform while serving as senior member of the Uniform Board while I was assistant to the Commandant in 1946.

Right after World War II – I was Assistant Commandant, and Chief of Staff to General Vandegrift. During that period an effort was made by the Secretary of Defense to put all officers in the armed services in the same uniform. That was when Johnson was Assistant Secretary to Forrestal. I don't know that Forrestal was responsible but Johnson believed all officers should wear the same uniform. It was the beginning of unification.

Q: Same mess dress.

Shepherd: - there wasn't to be any mess dress. For formal evening wear Johnson designed a full dress black coat, with tails and white tie.

Q: Tails?

Shepherd: Yes, with tails, but the idea was that the tails were to be zipped on so they could be removed when a black tie was worn. In other words you would wear tails with a white tie or zip them off if black tie was prescribed. Well, the thing was terrible. The Army, I think, was trying to do away with the gold braid that we used on our mess jacket, the elaborate gold braid on the sleeves and collar of our mess dress uniform.

I happened to be the senior member of this Uniform Board. I didn't want to give up our old mess dress which was a damned handsome uniform.

Q: Also a tremendous investment.



Shepherd: It was a big investment, but many officers had them. I do think there was a little too much gold braid on the mess jacket and as an officer rose in rank more and more gold braid was added. The Marine mess dress was a smart looking uniform so we were loath to make any changes. Harry Elms was the officer at Headquarters who was permanently assigned to the Uniform Board and he contributed a great deal to it. Harry Elms and I kept experimenting with the redesign of the mess dress and finally came up with an alteration which appeared to be a good one – that of making the mess jacket button at the collar. Before the collar was fastened by a loop and the corners of the collar would stick a person in the neck. We also decided to do away with the heavy gold braid on the sleeves and simplify it to what is on the present mess jacket. Officers below the rank of field officer had just one quatrefoil. Similar to the one on the crown of our barracks caps. As an officer rose in rank more gold braid was added. There were only two principal changes as I recall, junior officers wear just the quatrefoil and senior ones have a heavier and more elaborate design in gold braid.

Q: Yes. The senior officers have oak leaves on the sleeves of their mess jackets.

Shepherd: Oak leaves – that's right. There's not too much change in design and it doesn't cost too much. I showed General Vandegrift a sample of the redesigned mess dress and he took it over to Mr. Forrestal. I went with him as assistant commandant. General Vandegrift said to the Secretary – "You know Marines, they are sentimental about their mess dress. They have a big investment in this article of uniform and wish to retain it. We've done away with a great deal of the gold braid but we feel very sincerely that we should be permitted to retain our traditional mess dress which has been part of the Marine uniform for many, many years. We do not wish to wear this monstrosity of a black jacket with a zipper on the tail which has been suggested by Mr. Johnson." And by golly, Secretary Forrestal approved it. We had to fight with Johnson. He was all for putting everybody in the same uniform. You may remember there was considerable discussion on the subject.

Q: Yes, I do.

Shepherd: There was an awful fight over it but we got the mess dress approved, and that's what we wear today.

Q: Same thing –

Shepherd: Yes except for adding the scarlet cummerbund as part of the uniform. I had one made up in Honolulu to wear with my white summer mess jacket. We retained the white vest to be worn for full dress, the cummerbund for normal mess jacket use. We also did away with the formal frock coat that we had and the chapeau and made the blues standard as a dress uniform for officers and enlisted personnel. We also adopted a new and better type of material for our blue uniform for enlisted personnel.

Q: Senior non-coms, staff non-coms, can wear the uniform made out of the same material as officers' uniforms.

Shepherd: It was a good change in the blue uniform. Johnson also wanted to do away with our blues. We did change the pockets. The former enlisted man blues had no pockets. In order to make the officers and men look more or less the same we put pockets on enlisted uniforms.

Q: Since that time the Marine Corps has done away with the old blue Kersey and gone to Elastique for our uniform material.

Shepherd: - Yes, Elastique –

Q: Instead of the old doeskin trousers we now have a lighter weight Elastique.

Shepherd: All these changes have resulted in a smarter looking uniform. We put a great deal of thought and effort on trying to save this mess jacket and get a better looking uniform, which I think we did. I think we now have an excellent uniform. The only thing we were never able to design was a suitable field cap. I worked on that and we tried many types of field caps. I tried the Green Beret. My friends in the Royal Marines wanted us to adopt the Green Beret which they wore. We tried it out but I felt as did my staff, that to wear a green beret as part of our uniform might be a little too jazzy. Now, the Army has adopted it and made a great fuss over the Green Beret. The Royal Marines wore the Green Beret and they wanted us to make it part of our uniform. I have a green beret which was presented me by the Commandant of the Royal Marine Commando's with a major general's insignia embroidered on it. It's always been on my conscience that I should have authorized the Green Beret for our Corps but for a U.S. Marine in our blue uniform I believe our white frame cap looks better.

Q: With the blue uniform the Royal Marines either wear a pith helmet or a frame cap.

Shepherd: Well, the frame cap looks more military with the blue uniform, and the idea was to have one cap frame and have a green, white or you blue cap cover. Of course, we have done away with the blue cap covers now, and just wear the white. We used to have four, khaki, green, blue and white.

Q: Of course, you were quite influential in decisions affecting the unique dress of the detachment at 8<sup>th</sup> and Eye regarding the medals and the Sam Brown belt. I've seen the correspondence and the authorization on that.

Shepherd: I don't think I prescribed medals. That came after I was Commandant.

Q: You permitted them to wear Sam Brown belts.

Shepherd: That was when I was Commandant. I tried for a long time to get the Sam Brown belt adopted as an article of uniform with the blues. It was an extra expense and served no useful purpose. It had to be taken off every time you came in the mess – I think the way it worked out was probably all right. I still think however that when an officer is in dress blues he should wear the Sam Brown belt. Now, I wrote an order, one of the last orders I wrote that when an officer wore his sword he would wear a Sam Brown belt. This order was cancelled or never published after my retirement.

Q: Of course, with both the blues and whites, the sword sling is worn under the blouse.

Shepherd: Yes, you had to wear a sling with whites under the coat for the sword but the order I signed prescribed that the Sam Brown belt be worn with blues. Many of the junior officers wanted the Sam Brown in the worst kind of way but some of the older ones didn't want to be bothered with it.

Q: Wasn't there a shortage of Cordovan from which our Sam Brown belts were made?

Shepherd: Maybe so. A Sam Brown belt would cost you \$25. Nevertheless, I had worn a Sam Brown belt throughout my career and was proud of it. I think General Pate canceled the order after I signed it.

Q: I recall that I went to Boot Camp we all looked forward to being able to wear this Per Bain belt.

Shepherd: Yes, the Peter Bain belts were very smart looking and took a fine polish. Every junior officer wanted to wear one. It was a mark of distinction, and I think Pate made a mistake canceling my order. It should have been retained for dress use. I admit the cloth belt is more convenient but everyone seemed to like wearing the Sam Brown belt.

Q: There's something afoot to go to belt less blouses for the Marine Corps.

Shepherd: Do away with the belt?

Q: Yes, sir, that's what I understand. By the way, we got off on a digression on the uniforms, which is just as well. I think unless there's something unusual about your tour in France, most of it's pretty well covered in Bob Asprey's Belleau Woods.

Shepherd: Well, I might make some remarks concerning our duty in France prior to Belleau Wood. Upon the arrival of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines at St. Nazaire we went into camp. We didn't land the day of our arrival but I remember I was ordered ashore to lay out a camp for the Fifth Marines. I never laid out a camp before but I had a couple of good non-coms and we went to work staking out a campsite, and by the time the regiment disembarked we had completed the job and had erected some of the tents. The camp was near St. Nazaire, several miles out in the country, as I remember. When I arrived at the campsite I found all the canvas dumped on the ground. We had to get the tents erected between 9 o'clock in the morning and 3 o'clock that afternoon when the regiment was due to arrive. We got the camp laid out pretty well although I had never done anything like it before. It just shows what you can do when you have to. We were there for a couple of weeks I think. During the period we were camped near St. Nazaire, we took several marches up to a famous French summer resort called La Boul which was a lovely spot.

During this period we had working parties on the docks unloading the supply ships that had come over with our convoy. One was the Hancock. I remember spending the 4<sup>th</sup> of July, 1917, on the dock unloading the Hancock. A couple of weeks after our arrival at St. Nazaire, we boarded a French troop train and went up to a very small village named Menaucourt which was south of Bar-le-Duc and near a town named Ligny en Barrois. Bar-le-Duc was the rail center for the Verdun front. It was about 15 miles to the south of Verdun and formed an important logistic

point for the French Army. Menaucourt was a small village where the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was billeted. The 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion 5<sup>th</sup> Marines was billeted in a little village further south. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines had been retained in St. Nazaire for Provost Marshal Duty and did not rejoin the regiment until some months later. One of the other of these battalions went to England, as I recall, as MPs during the fall months of 1917. The battalion that remained for a while at St. Nazaire rejoined the regiment during the fall and was billeted at Nai, a small village near Damblain where the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was billeted during the winter of 1917-18. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion was the one who I think went over to England for a while. We all joined up before we went to the front, but in the meantime the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was able to conduct intense training with the French from the time we arrived at Menaucourt in July through that summer. We trained with the 115<sup>th</sup> Battalion Chasseurs Alpine, French Mountain troops. Each company was assigned to a company of the French Chasseurs and we even went so far for a while as to drill in French commands. We were told that we were to learn the French drill, so they took it literally, and we began training with French commands – “Adroit par quatre” – that’s “Squad right;” “Avant,” is the command for “Forward March,” and “Arretez,” is the command for “Halt.”

Well, the word got to Colonel Doyen at regimental headquarters, and he stopped this monkey business. We’d drill American drill. No more French close order drill. But we continued training all this summer with the French Chasseurs. They were fine soldiers. They were called “Blue Devils,” because they wore dark blue uniforms rather than the blue-gray of the regular French army.

Q: Blue smock –

Shepherd: They also wore blue berets with an insignia representing a French horn. They were very proud of their Corps and considered themselves a corps d’elite. The Chasseurs officers with whom we trained invited our officers to luncheon one Sunday soon after arrival and we returned the courtesy by asking them to our mess the following Sunday for dinner. We had some very pleasant associations with the 115<sup>th</sup> Battalion Chasseur Alpine Corps. I remember their commander, A Frenchman names Toussaint. He was from Normandy. Those Normandy French, you know, are big men, many of them blonde. Major Toussaint had a blonde moustache, and reddish hair with his rosy cheeks. But he was quite a good soldier. He’d been decorated a number of times and was quite a hero. He later became one of the top generals in the French army and headed the French Ecole de Guerre after the war. I ran across his name in a service magazine signed to an article he had written, on tactics. It was signed “General Toussaint, 115<sup>th</sup> Chausseurs.”

Q: Later on did you serve as liaison, doing much as General Worton did with other companies? Did you stay at the front with any of these units? Was there any exchange duty, so to speak?

Shepherd: No, I didn't get in on that. No, I didn't have that experience. I did go to a British bayonet school. I also went to a French Platoon Commander's School, which was called "Chef de Section," that is the French for a leader. Every morning at 6:30, several of the officers from my battalion who were assigned to this French Platoon Commander's School would leave Menaucourt by truck for the School which had been established in a small town near Gondrecourt where the Army I Corps School was later established. It was a very interesting experience.

Q: You needed it, didn't you?

Shepherd: None of us had had any combat training at all. All we knew was squads left, squads right and extended order formations. The Landing Force Manual was our text book. The French Platoon Leaders School was run by French officers. They had interpreters but it was a very pleasant experience. We had to get up early as our battalion was at the end of the line. We were transported by truck. They'd pick up students from other organizations on the way to our school which was located somewhere in the vicinity of Gondrecourt. It wasn't Gondrecourt but it was in that area. We'd arrive at 8 o'clock. We'd have classes from 8 to 11. At 11 o'clock all classes were dismissed and we'd go to luncheon, (dejeuner), which lasted from 11 to 1:00 p.m., a wonderful French meal. We had wine and often champagne. When the luncheon was over there was always half an hour rest period, so we'd go over in an old churchyard, a graveyard, lie down and go to sleep among the graves and go back to school again from 2 o'clock to 4. That was my idea of a good detail, to go to school from 8 to 11 and from 2 to 4.

Q: Did they have the offensive spirit at this time?

Shepherd: Yes. Definitely. "En avant," that was the command for "forward." There was a great offensive spirit then. Of course the French were pretty well stymied because they'd been in the lines for three years, but the old French Chasseurs had that fighting spirit. It was a wonderful experience and I learned a great deal from my attendance at this school. The school had various courses. I took a platoon commander's course. Some took a machine gun course. About the first of September our battalion was transferred to a town names Damblain, which was down in the Vosges, further to the south, near Neufchateau. There is where the battalion trained all winter. We never saw the sun shine from October to the following March. Rain, snow, cold – I used to get so sick of the place. The battalion did a great deal of hiking over muddy roads but it hardened us up. We also had a number of battalion and regimental field exercises. In January of 1918 I was assigned to another school, which was called the Army First Corps School, at Gondrecourt. I went there for a period of six weeks while I took another Platoon Leader's course.

Q: Was that the one the British ran?

Shepherd: No, it was not run by the British. It was a U.S. school. Some of the officers went to the British schools. One of my roommates went to the British school. Others were to assignments with the British battalions in

the line. A friend of mine was assigned to the Black Watch, and he liked to talk about the wonderful experiences he had with the British. But I didn't get one of those details. I had these two choice schools. We didn't have any second in command in those days and I was busy with my platoon and various duties.

Q: Who was your company commander?

Shepherd: My company commander during this period was Captain Methof Butler who was the senior captain in the battalion. But there was another company commander from Berryville, Virginia we all loved by the name of Lloyd (Josh) Williams. He was the one who made the famous remark at Belleau Woods when some French officer told him to retreat – he said, “Retreat, hell, we’ve just arrived, we’re not going to retreat.”

Butler was in command of the 55<sup>th</sup> Company during that winter. Later he was promoted to major and went to some other duty. We had an old sergeant major in the company by the name of Blanchfield who had been promoted to a warrant officer at the beginning of the war. When Butler was transferred, Blanchfield was promoted to captain. Warrant officers were promoted fast with the expansion of the Corps. Blanchfield was probably one of the best old sergeant majors, as far as clerical work was concerned, that there was in the Marine Corps. He was noted for being a clerical sergeant major, but he didn't have any leadership. He couldn't read a map, and knew little about infantry tactics. I became his second in command and worked with him as I could read the maps and helped him in field training. Blanchfield was a strict disciplinarian but he didn't know much about field training. The poor old fellow had a premonition he was going to be killed. He made a trip to Ireland just before we went to the front to see his family. He used to talk to me about it once in a while. He didn't want to go to the front as he felt he was going to be killed which he was the first night we were in Belleau Wood when he was hit on the Lucy-Torcy road. I got a message, “Blanchfield has been killed and you take command.” Poor old fellow. Modern warfare was just too fast for him. He was an older man and had spent most of his Marine Corps service in an office with paperwork.

Q: A sergeant major, he must have had a good many years in the Marine Corps.

Shepherd: Yes that is correct. In those days a sergeant major was a desk sergeant major. They didn't have field sergeant majors as we do in the modern Marine Corps. In other words Blanchfield had devoted his life to paperwork and was extremely good at it but he lacked confidence as a leader in the field. Poor fellow, he was severely wounded on the morning of June 7<sup>th</sup> and died a few hours later in route to a hospital.

Q: You got hit on June 3<sup>rd</sup>. “3's” are up for you – May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1917 when you graduated from VMI and June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1918 when you received your first wound.

Shepherd: That's right. I never thought of that before. I was wounded again on June 7<sup>th</sup>.

Q: You were also wounded in the Meuse-Argonne battle in October.  
Shepherd: Yes, I received my third wound in the Meuse-Argonne. I was wounded the 3<sup>rd</sup> and then I was wounded again on the 7<sup>th</sup> of June at Belleau Wood. I was wounded the first time on the 3<sup>rd</sup> by a bullet in the neck. I had placed an outpost in front of our line. Our company had been assigned – I'm sure you have this in the record – to the defense of Les Mare's Farm. The ground was so formed that in order to get a good field of fire and observation I selected a little knoll a couple of hundred yards in front of our lines, which I recognized as an important terrain feature. We couldn't hold it. We couldn't include it in our lines because it was a little too far from where we'd been ordered to establish our main line of resistance. I was Exec of the company at the time and I suggested to Blanchfield that we ought to put an outpost out there, because of the excellent observation this knoll provided. He concurred and I established an outpost out there, with two squads, 14 men, with orders to hold their fire until the enemy was close and then when they were, they were to open fire on the enemy. When the Germans got too close to the outpost the men were to withdraw to our lines.

The day the Germans made their attack on our main line of resistance we could see them advancing several hundred yards away. I was very much concerned about this outpost. They were isolated out there. Since I had put them out there I felt responsible that they all get back to our lines. During the attack I went to see Blanchfield, and said, "Jim, I'm worried about that outpost. I sent them out there and I think I ought to check them."

I must say it was a foolish suggestion because they had their orders to withdraw and probably would have done it at the proper time but I just wanted to go out there to insure that they did. He said, "Yes, I think it would be a good idea," so I started out with my runner and we went right through the German barrage. I recall saying to my orderly, Pat Martin, "If we get through this, we're really going to be lucky." The German barrage preceding their attack, I'll always recall to my dying day, that a shell landed as close to me as I am to you. Luckily it was a dud! I paused for a moment to look at it. It was right there in front of me just 10 feet away when it landed. I saw this shell land along with a lot of others. The dirt went up and I just stood there waiting for the shell to go off. Thank God it was a dud.

We continued on out to this outpost. They were firing at the advancing enemy. We could see the Germans advancing toward us a few hundred yards away. I got behind the brow of the knoll. The outpost was on the forward side of this knoll where they had a good field of fire. There were several trees on top of the knoll and I leaned against one of them where I could look over the top of the little knoll and could direct the fire of the men on the outpost on the advancing Germans. All of a sudden, something hit me in the neck and swung me around, completely around. My first thought was, my God, a bullet's gone through my gullet. I was

gulping like this, you see. Funny what you do. I spit in my hand to see if I was spitting blood but I wasn't spitting blood, so then I felt relieved. We remained in this position till just about dusk when we could safely withdraw as we'd accomplished our mission. We'd held the Germans up and cause several casualties by our well-aimed fire. By nightfall, the Germans were working around our position within a couple of hundred yards of us and we weren't strong enough to hold out there by ourselves all that night, so we withdrew and brought back a couple of the men who had been wounded. We brought them safely back to our lines. I put a dressing on my wound in the neck and that night I went back to the dressing station and had my wound dressed. They wanted to evacuate me but I said, "Hell no, it isn't bad." It just cut a groove through my neck. It just missed my jugular vein by a quarter of an inch. For many years I had a scar. Can't see it now, but it's still there. Another quarter of an inch it would have cut my jugular vein.

This engagement took place on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June. The next day the Germans attacked again but we held Les Mare's Farm. It was a key position, as we realized, and all we had was a thin red line of Marines with a man about every ten feet apart. A Marine with a rifle – that's all in the hell we had, but we held our line. The next day then, they started the attack on Les Mare's Farm. I placed snipers on top of a haystack where they could pick off individual Germans as they advanced. The Germans began their attack about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Instead of jumping off in the morning they attacked in the afternoon. During the following days' attack I went to Les Mare's Farm to see how the men defending it were getting along. I found they were doing all right. The wheat in the field to their front was waist high but we could see the Germans moving in the wheat. One of the Marines on top of the haystack detected a movement in the wheat so I sent a patrol out to investigate the movement. Our patrol surprised the German patrol and killed about a dozen of them. A Sergeant Beaufort, who was a wonderful pistol shot, was in charge of the patrol and he shot seven Germans alone with his automatic. That stopped the infiltration in this area.

But beyond Les Mare's Farm there was a vacant space of several hundred yards between our company and the next battalion in line.

Q: - a gap in the line –

Shepherd: Yes, a gap in the line where I think it was the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion which was located to our left. Naturally we were very much concerned about this 300 yard gap. The French had been withdrawing all the time. The afternoon before, when the Germans actually hit our lines, the last of the French units had passed through our position in their retreat to the rear. The commander of one of these companies reported to me. I said, "All right, now, you fill in that gap." They were colonial troops in khaki uniforms. I assigned them to form a line between the 55<sup>th</sup> Company, which was the left flank company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion to our left.



They were supposed to cover this gap of about 300 yards on the left of Les Mare's Farm.

The next afternoon when the attack started I went to Les Mare's Farm to check on things. I found everything was going well at the farm. The Germans were attacking, we could see them, working around to the left of Les Mare's Farm. I remember calling for an artillery barrage. We'd been impressed with how many hundred thousands of dollars it cost to put down an artillery barrage, so everybody was loath about calling for one, but I said to myself, "This is the time we really need artillery fire" and in a few moments our artillery shells were falling on the advancing enemy.

Then I went over to a few trees that were standing on the other side of the farm, to see how this French platoon was doing that was supposed to cover this gap to which they had been assigned to the left of Les Mare's Farm. But there wasn't anybody there. I leaned up against a tree and started looking around. The Germans were attacking so I jumped behind a tree so as to get away from the German fire. Then all of a sudden this damned French platoon which had withdrawn a couple of hundred yards to the rear started firing, and the bullets started to come from that direction. There I was, jumping from one side of this tree to the other, trying to keep from getting hit by German bullets coming on one side, and the bullets from the French platoon, which was fading into the distance, firing from the other. It was a real hot spot.

The Marine I had with me, a Corporal Califf, I remember his name to this day, who I had taken as a runner – he got hit in the leg by a French bullet.

To come back to the German attack, we held them off again that day. The next night we were withdrawn, to participate in the attack on Belleau Wood. I would like to digress for a moment and return to the fight at the outpost where I had been wounded the previous day. A year later I went to France with Major Charles D. Barrett to make a relief map of Belleau Wood. While sketching this area, I went up to this little knoll where the tree was that I was leaning against when I was wounded. I found it without difficulty as it was the only one on the knoll. The tree was about a foot in diameter and there, in that tree, at the height of my head, I found seven bullet holes. It's an incredible story, and I'll always regret I didn't get a photograph of it. I didn't have a camera in those days. Evidently what had happened was that the Germans had worked a machine gun up to where it could fire on this outpost. I've always figured that the first bullet must have hit my neck and spun me around, out of the line of fire of the other bullets. Of course, they may not all have been fired by the same burst, but there were seven bullet holes in this tree in a space of 18 inches at the height of my head. Others may have been fired by the next burst or the one following. Of course, some of the bullets went on one side or the other of the tree but I actually counted seven bullet

holes in the tree. It was only a little over a year later that I made this discovery.

Q: You told us last time that the battlefield was still there – nothing changed.  
Shepherd: Oh yes, this was within a period – well, from June of '18 until October of '19, so it was only a period of sixteen months. In October 1919 the holes were clearly visible in the tree. I've often thought that I'm a luck man to be alive. Apparently that first bullet swung me out of the line of fire of the next burst which hit the tree I was leaning against. I counted them and I went back there again several times to look at the tree. On my last trip to France in 1955, the tree I leaned against was still there, but of course the bullet holes were covered by the growth of the tree during the subsequent 37 years.

I don't know whether I'm repeating myself, but Les Mare's Farm was the closest spot in a direct line to Paris that the Germans to during WWI. There's a magazine article on this incident. Have you seen it? I have a copy I will show you some time. It was written up by the historical section right after the war and published in the American Legion monthly magazine in 1921. Although Les Mare's Farm was the closest point to Paris reached by their May-June offensive of 1918, I am sure the Germans could have taken this position if they had continued their advance on the Farm. Instead, the Germans shifted the objective of their local attack to Belleau Wood.

Q: They could have taken it had they wanted to?  
Shepherd: The Germans could have taken Les Mare's Farm if they had a major attack on it, I'm sure. They were attacking on a wide front and were temporarily held up at Les Mare's Farm. I think Asprey's book tells the story well.

I don't know if I told you this story or not, but when I went back to France with the mapping detachment, one of the men I took with me had been a cook for 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade headquarters. I've forgotten what his name is now. One afternoon, I was sketching close by one of the farm houses where brigade headquarters had been billeted during the Belleau Wood fighting. After eating our luncheon by the side of the road, I went over to the farmhouse and said, "Madame, my regiment was here during the Battle of Belleau Woods." She said, "Monsieur, we are very grateful for you defending our farm house. We found everything more or less intact when we returned after the battle was over. The only thing missing was our stove. Somebody stole our stove." The Marine road man who was with me said, "Madame, I know where your stove is. When General Neville shifted his headquarters from this farmhouse to another farmhouse a couple of miles away, we took the stove with us. I was one of his cooks and we liked your stove and we took it over to another farmhouse." And sure enough, when we went over there to the other farmhouse there was the stove. Isn't that an interesting story?

Q: Very unusual. Did the owner get the stove back?  
Shepherd: Yes, she got the stove back.

Q: You were wounded a second time at Belleau Wood which required evacuation, weren't you?

Shepherd: Yes, I was wounded first on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June and then on the 7<sup>th</sup> of June. When I was evacuated to a hospital in Paris, I was taken by ambulance to Red Cross Hospital Number One in Neuilly. There was no room for me there so they sent me to Red Cross (Hospital) No. 2, on Rue Pacine in the center of Paris. Finally late that evening I arrived at Red Cross No 2, which was known as Dr. Blake's Hospital. Blake was a very famous Chicago doctor. My second wound was through the leg and my breeches were covered with blood. The first wound I received in the neck had carried away part of my collar. We wore the high collars in those days. We'd been in the lines for ten days and I was completely exhausted. I had a little dog with me named Kiki. I loved that little dog. When I was wounded the second time on the morning of the 7<sup>th</sup> and was lying on the ground, I found my dog Kiki was lying close beside me. He was so quiet I thought he had been killed. I said, "Damn it, they shot little Kiki too," and I picked him up and threw him off of my leg but he jumped up and ran right back to me. I said, "My God, my dog's safe!" Kiki followed me along when I was taken on a stretcher to an aid station near Lucy-le-Bocage. From there I was evacuated to a field hospital located a few miles to the rear and I carried Kiki with me on my stretcher. The field hospital was in a schoolhouse and I can remember to this day, there were the French mathematical figures still on the blackboard where school had been hurriedly dismissed a few days earlier on the approach of the Germans. Then I was sent back to Meaux. As I was lying on my stretcher in a church yard some medical man said, "You can't take that dog with you." I replied, "Either you leave me here, or take my dog." At Meaux I lay in the yard of a church or convent for several hours. I was finally evacuated by ambulance to Paris – Red Cross Hospital Number 2 – as I have previously stated. I was there for several days where I received medical treatment for my wounds. The wounded were coming in in large numbers from Belleau Wood. Colonel Catlin was brought in to a room right across the hall from where I was. He died there a day or two later.

Q: Catlin didn't die. As a matter fact, he lived and wrote that book. He was wounded pretty badly. It took him out of the war.

Shepherd: Yes, I believe you're right, you're right on that. Catlin did survive his wounds and wrote a book. At any rate, he was there, in the hospital with me. After I had been in this hospital for about ten days my doctor told me one morning, "We want to send you to another hospital further in the rear. You don't seem to be suffering too badly. We have to make room for the Marines still coming in." The halls were full of wounded from the Belleau Wood battle. The doctor said, "We want to send you out tonight, this afternoon at 2 o'clock, to Red Cross No. 5 and they'll evacuate you further south." I said, "Dr., I don't have a thing. I lost my musette bag; all I have is this uniform with the collar shot away and my bloody britches. I don't even have a razor." We didn't have the Red Cross kits in those days, as

were given away in World War II. I said, "I'd like to go downtown and buy some toilet articles." He said, "Well, can you walk on crutches?" I said, "Sure, I can walk on crutches." Actually, I'd never been on a crutch in my life. "I'll get you a pair of crutches, and discharge you at 2 o'clock. After your shopping you are to report in to Red Cross No. 5, in the Bois de Boulogne."

I was very grateful for the opportunity to get to a store and purchase much needed personal articles. After luncheon I went to town, hobbling on my crutches, wearing my tin hat, my collar shot away, the pair of britches I was wearing which had blood all over them and were covered with mud. I had my dog on the end of a chain, as I hobbled around the streets of Paris. It must have been a sight. People stopped and looked at me. Well, I went in a store and got an overseas cap, instead of my helmet. They had a uniform, sort of greenish looking color which looked very much like Marines. The tailor of Old England where I purchased the uniform told me, "We can alter it and to come in tomorrow morning." I bought myself a pair of shoes and wrapped puttees. I was getting all fixed up. After my shopping I started to go out to Red Cross Hospital Number 5. As I was walking down the street, who should I bump into but a lieutenant who'd been in my company by the name of Lannigan. He was an Army lieutenant who'd been assigned to the Marines for training. You can't imagine how thrilling it was to meet somebody from my own company, and learn what had happened after I was wounded. Lannigan had been gassed in Belleau Wood. We greeted each other warmly and sat down at a sidewalk café to have a drink, and then we had another drink. Suddenly I remembered I had to be at Red Cross Hospital No. 5 by six o'clock that evening and told Lannigan I had to leave immediately. He said, "Oh hell, nobody checks you in out there, let's have dinner in town. We'll go out later on. I'm a patient there myself." So we had dinner together and then we went to the Folies Berge're. We finally arrived at Red Cross Hospital No. 5 around midnight. By that time the wound in my leg was really hurting me. Red Cross Hospital No. 5 was actually an evacuation hospital from where patients were shipped to hospitals in southern France. Lannigan left the next day and they wanted to ship me out at the same time but I said, "Doctor, I bought a uniform yesterday. It is being altered and I would like to pick it up today. Can't you let me remain over another day?" They were sending patients out every morning at 10 o'clock. The doctor said, "Sure." He was very nice. You know the Red Cross doctors weren't under military command. They were civilian doctors who had volunteered for Red Cross service. So he said, "Certainly, it's perfectly all right for you to go in town and get your uniform. We'll send you out tomorrow morning."

The wound in my leg was not paining me so I went in to town and got my uniform. It fitted me well and I thought I looked sharp in this brand new uniform. I also purchased a pair of puttees, new shoes, and an overseas cap. While hobbling around on my crutches I met a friend from

Lexington, Virginia, who'd gone to Washington and Lee and was a fraternity brother of mine. He said, "Come on and have dinner with me at the University Club." I said, "Fine, why not?" That was in the afternoon. We went to an early dinner during which my leg really started giving me fits. I had to excuse myself before we finished. I said, "I just can't stand this pain anymore. I have to get back to the hospital." So I got a taxi and went out to Red Cross Hospital No. 5 which was in the Bois de Boulogne. The driver dropped me at the gate. I had a heck of a time every making it back to the hospital tent to which I had been assigned. It was quite a walk, a quarter of a mile, from the gate. I was so faint that I had to stop and lean against the fence every few minutes. I finally tottered into my hospital ward and said, "Nurse, I'm sick. There's something wrong with me." She put me to bed and took my temperature. It was 104 degrees. What had happened was that gangrene had started in my leg wound. They sent me that night to the operating room and opened up my leg wound. When I woke up the next morning I was lying on my back with Dakin's Solution tubes in my leg. I had to lie flat on my back. I couldn't turn over because they had seven rubber tubes in my wound which had been opened up so the Dakin Solution could drain through and come out the back side where the bullet had gone through. So I lay there for about two or three weeks. I thought, if I could turn over - if I could only draw my knees up. That was what I wanted to more than anything else - to get my knees up to my chest. Finally, I got better. They had the hardest damn beds in the hospital. We used to complain about them. The nurses would say, "Oh, they're not bad." One night the nurses were quarantined for some reason. The next morning they said, "We apologize for these beds. They are the hardest beds we've ever slept on."

I was in this hospital about three weeks before being evacuated. They were very nice to me at this Red Cross Hospital which was located in the steeplechase course at Auteuil.

On the 4<sup>th</sup> of July, I was feeling well enough to get up. The French had a big parade in Paris, as a courtesy to the United States, a platoon from each battalion of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division which were still in the lines near Chateau Thierry were invited to participate.

Q: Cates was in command of the platoon from his battalion in the Sixth Regiment.

Shepherd: Maybe so, I didn't know Cates in those days. Well, anyhow, each battalion I think sent a platoon. I'm sure they did. They were billeted in the Bois de Boulogne near my hospital. I got permission to go into town to see the parade. I was still on crutches. I found a spot on the Place de la Concorde by the curb where I had a good view of the parade and the parade was going as the troops marched by. All of a sudden I looked up and there was my own platoon from the 55<sup>th</sup> Company 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, marching by! Well, you can imagine how excited I was. I jumped up and joined them marching a matter of 20 yards on my crutches in front of my platoon. That was one of the greatest thrills of my life - to

march with my platoon around the Place de la Concorde in a 4<sup>th</sup> of July Parade. Of course, a lot of my old men weren't there. I don't remember who was in command of the platoon. But it was the remnants of the 4<sup>th</sup> Platoon, 55<sup>th</sup> Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, marching behind me. It was just like old home week. Of course, I just walked a few yards with them and then I hobbled on over to the curb to watch the remainder of the parade. That evening the men were given liberty in Paris. I saw some of my old friends and talked to them about the fighting in Belleau Wood after I was wounded. You can imagine the thrill I got to be with my men again.

It was during the following week that I was evacuated from Red Cross Hospital No. 5 in Paris to an Army Hospital at Savoney near Nantes. I went to Nantes on the 14<sup>th</sup> of July and saw the Bastille Day Parade there. I did not like the Army Hospital at Savoney and my leg wound was healing I requested to be sent to a Red Cross convalescent hotel in Biarritz on the extreme southwest coast of France near the Spanish border. Here I remained for a month. The sunshine and salt water helped to heal my leg wound and I became restless to rejoin my company. There were rumors that the American Army, now under command of General Pershing, was preparing for an attack and I wanted to participate in it.

About the middle of August I obtained my release from the Convalescent Hotel in Biarritz. After passing through several replacement centers I finally rejoined the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines just after they came out of a quiet sector at Point au Musson where the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division had been sent following the Soissons offensive on the 18<sup>th</sup> of July.

Fortunately I was able to get assigned to the 55<sup>th</sup> Company and took over the 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon. Soon thereafter, we began our night marches toward the zone of action of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division for its attack on the St. Mihiel salient. It was raining and cold and the wound in my leg bothered me a great deal as I was not in good physical condition for the long marches we made.

After a forced march in a heavy downpour the night before the St. Mihiel attack, we finally arrived at our jump-off position a few minutes before zero hour. I shall always recall the tremendous artillery barrage that preceded the St. Mihiel attack. Since it was the first all American offensive of the war, every effort was made to insure its success.

The St. Mihiel salient had been a quiet sector since the German armies had overrun this area in 1914. During the four intervening years, miles of trenches had been dug by both the French and German troops who had occupied this sector. For the first several hours of our attack we crossed these trenches with their barbed wire entanglements. It was about noon before we finally got into the open terrain and could make a substantial advance. There had been only minor German resistance. By early afternoon the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion had reached its chief objective and we dug in for the night. The next morning the battalion continued its advance and by noon had secured our part of the division's objective – a terrain feature of strength which overlooked the rolling country to our front. We

organized this position for defense against the German counterattack anticipated, but none developed in our sector. The Sixth Marines on our right repulsed a German counterattack of some magnitude.

An incident occurred during the afternoon which may be of interest. During the St. Mihiel offensive there had been considerable air activity. In the late afternoon I observed a German Fokker plane in pursuit of an American Spad, in which the pilot had been wounded. The German plane was on the tail of the American one as the latter came down a few hundred yards from our position on the ridge. As the German plane circled low to the ground after having shot down the American plane it passed over our lines only a few hundred feet in the air. Every man in the company began firing at the German plane. It was so low that I fired at it with my pistol. Our concentration of fire was effective and the German plane was brought down on the hillside close to our position. The men in my company jumped out of their foxholes and ran over to where the plane had landed. The pilot was dead, apparently having been hit by our small arms fire. Everyone began taking souvenirs. I took the pilot's blood-stained goggles and the altimeter from the plane. Others stripped the fabric from the body of the plane. I managed to obtain a piece of the fabric on which was painted the German Iron Cross and the registered number of the airplane. It was a new Fokker. I sent the plane's number back to the Intelligence section but kept the portion of the fabric on which was painted the German Iron Cross. Subsequently I had it framed. After my retirement, I presented this Iron Cross to the Marine Corps Museum in Quantico. Previously I gave the German aviator's goggles and the altimeter to the VMI Museum in Lexington. Shooting down a German plane by rifle fire was an unusual incident which I have never forgotten.

After holding our front line position for several days, during which we received considerable enemy artillery fire, the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines were relieved by some other American divisions and after several nights' long marches we arrived at a small town by the name of Blenod-les-Toul near the town of Toul. Here we rested for several days and received a number of Marine replacements to bring the company up to its authorized strength.

On an afternoon in late September the battalion received orders to entrain for an unknown destination. After loading all night we left by train heading westward. Our trip was a short one. We detrained at Chalion and marched to a small village nearby where we remained for several days.

On September 29<sup>th</sup> the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion received an order to "Stand by for Camions." At 6:00 p.m. we entrained for a move to the front. About midnight we arrived at the shell-torn village of Somme-Py where we detrucked and were billeted in an old French cantonment nearby.

The campaign front where the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division had been ordered into combat had been the scene of heavy fighting throughout the war. This area between Verdun and Rheims consisted of a high plateau by the name of the Blanc Mont Massive which dominates the surrounding terrain.

During 1916, the Germans had strengthened their defenses by a series of concrete emplacements in depth which they named the "Hindenburg Line."

General John A. Lejeune had succeeded General Harbord in command of the Second Division. In planning his attack on Blanc Mont, his scheme of maneuver called for the Fourth Marine Brigade to assault the German position by a frontal attack while the Third Army Brigade executed a flanking attack from the right. By so doing, General Lejeune hoped to bypass a large portion of the German defenses on Blanc Mont Ridge.

The night before the attack was to take place (October 1<sup>st</sup>), I was called by Regimental Headquarters and informed by Colonel Logan Feland that my platoon would be temporarily detached from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and assigned to Regimental Headquarters as a liaison unit between the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Brigade which, as I have previously stated, were to attack Blanc Mont Ridge from different directions. My task was to advance on the right flank of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines through the area that was to be bypassed and to establish and maintain physical contact with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Brigade and report hourly the progress of both Brigades toward their mutual objective – Blanc Mont Ridge. I confess I was unhappy about this assignment as it required my platoon to advance through the center of the German defenses that the two Brigades were bypassing. Initially I kept fairly close to the zone of action of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion but could observe in the distance the advancing units of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Brigade. About the middle of the morning when we had advanced beyond the front lines of German defenses, I took a squad from my platoon and we worked our way to the right across the area being bypassed without being shot at and I contacted the Commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army Brigade's left flank company. About 4 p.m. the leading elements of the two Brigades established physical contact as they assaulted Blanc Mont Ridge. My mission, having been completed, I rejoined my battalion and participated with my company in the advance. The 55<sup>th</sup> Company was operating on the left of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion which was at the time the assault battalion of the regiment. I found that our left flank was exposed as the French unit to our left was nowhere in sight. I therefore assumed the duty, with my platoon, of establishing physical contact with the French. This I was able to do about dusk and by nightfall both units were tied in the crest of Blanc Mont Ridge and the Regimental Commander was so informed. I was gratified that my liaison duties had been successfully accomplished and that I and my platoon could rejoin our company again. Operating with my platoon alone in enemy territory was rather a hazardous experience.

During the next several days the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines continued their advance against determined German resistance toward St. Etienne, a small village north of Blanc Mont Ridge. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October my company commander was wounded and I assumed command of the 55<sup>th</sup> Company. Our assault on Blanc Mont Ridge and advance toward St. Etienne had



been costly. The company had been reduced in strength to only about 70 men and 2 officers. Casualties in other companies of the regiment were likewise heavy. On October 7<sup>th</sup> the battalion was relieved by a unit of the 35<sup>th</sup> Army Division and withdrawn to a supporting position on the top of Blanc Mont Ridge.

During the late afternoon of October 8<sup>th</sup>, Lieutenant Voss, the only remaining officer in the 55<sup>th</sup> Company, and I were standing just in the rear of the crossroads in rear of Blanc Mont Ridge observing a French artillery battery which was supporting the attack. All of a sudden, an Austrian 77 shell hit close by. Fragments of the shell tore a hole in Voss' stomach and I was hit by a fragment in the leg. We were both evacuated to an Army Field Hospital to our rear where Voss died that night. The next day I was taken by ambulance to Challons where I was placed on an American Hospital train and transported to the town of Blois, southwest of Paris not far from Tours. Here I remained in an Army Hospital until mid December. I was then sent to a replacement camp at Le Mans where I was informed I could return to the United States or rejoin my regiment up its arrival in Germany. While I was in the hospital the Armistice had been signed and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division ordered to occupational duty on the Rhine. I chose to rejoin my outfit which I did on January 2, 1919 and happily was assigned to command my old company, the 55<sup>th</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, which was billeted in the town of Segendorf, about 40 miles west of Coblenz.

In June, I was ordered to Headquarters, 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade, and assigned duty as an assistant to Major Charles D. Barrett, USMC. The Brigade adjutant, as this job was called in those days, is now Chief of Staff. I found my staff duty much more pleasant than a line officer in a battalion. General Neville, the Brigade Commander, was a very fine officer whom I greatly respected. Major Barrett, with whom I worked closely, in my opinion, was an outstanding Marine. I learned a great deal from him about staff procedure and we formed a warm and close friendship which lasted until his unfortunate death during World War II.

In August, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division was ordered back to the United States. During our voyage on the George Washington, Major Barrett conceived the idea of making a relief map of Belleau Wood for historical purposes and asked me if I would return to France with him if the CMC should approve his proposed project. Since I was a graduate Civil Engineer and had specialized in sketching while a cadet at VMI, I gladly accepted the opportunity to return to France with the France Map Detachment.

As I have recorded in previous taped interviews, I returned to France with Major Barrett and a small survey party shortly after the disbandment of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade in Quantico in August 1919.

This, I believe, covers most of the items which you have asked me to discuss in this and previous interviews so I suggest we conclude today's session.

**End of Interview Session 3.**

Interview with General Lemuel C. Shepherd, USMC (Retired), La Jolla, California, by Mr. Benis Frank. February 16, 1967. Interview Session 4.

Q: I'd like to begin here, sir, when you went back to Headquarters Marine Corps in 1920. In Tape #1 we dealt with that mapping expedition you had with Barrett. You went into that considerably. You talked about going back and visiting the battlefields. In December you returned to the United States; were appointed as an aide to General Barnett, is that right.

Shepherd: No, General Lejeune.

Q: That's right, Barnett had been replaced. What went on at headquarters at this time? Was there much reorganization, many changes?

Shepherd: Well, frankly, I was rather surprised when I was appointed aide-de-camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I'd never sought such an assignment, but as it turned out, I found this duty most interesting and I believe beneficial to my subsequent Marine Corps career. On December 20, 1920 I reported to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who at that time was Major General John Archer Lejeune. The following February, I was appointed one of the junior aides at the White House. At that time President Woodrow Wilson was still in office. There were only four aides, the President's military aide and three White House aides, one from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. I was the Marine aide. My first duty as White House aide was to accompany Vice President Marshall to the inauguration of President Harding, who had been elected the previous November. I was with Vice President and Mrs. Marshall on the east porch of the Capitol when President Harding was sworn in.

During the next two years I was personally very close to General Lejeune, whom I consider one of the finest commandants we've ever had in the Marine Corps. You just asked me, was there such reorganization? No, I don't recall any great reorganization of headquarters at the time. General Lejeune was a very easy person to work for. He was a very able officer, with the outstanding reputation as commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army Division, of which the Marine Brigade formed a part, in France during the latter part of the war. It was a great privilege for me, a young captain of three years service, to be associated with an officer of his caliber.

I especially enjoyed my morning rides with General Lejeune. He rode horseback every morning. The horses were delivered to the Commandant's house. The general, Captain Craig who was serving as one of the aides and I rode through the southeast part of Washington, where the National Museum and Smithsonian Institute are located and then around Haines Point, arriving at Headquarters Marine Corps which was then on Constitution Avenue in the old Navy Building exactly at 9 o'clock, after a nice morning's canter. Loving horses, I rode in the afternoon as well. I had my own horse which boarded at the Washington Riding and Hunt Club near the "Q" Street Bridge and took long rides in Rock Creek Park.

I had been on duty at Headquarters when I had an acute case of appendicitis. After an operation I went to Norfolk on sick leave. I had

completed approximately two years at headquarters and felt my time had come to go to other duty. I was asked if I would care to command a company that was being sent to Rio de Janeiro to the International Exposition that was held in this city in the summer of 1922. Naturally I was interested in making this trip to South America. Major Randolph Core was in command of the organization. We had a band and a company from the 6<sup>th</sup> Marines of picked men. They had special uniforms made for them in Philadelphia.

Q: This Special unit was formed in Philadelphia, wasn't it?

Shepherd: Yes. The company was designated as the 83<sup>rd</sup> Company of the 6<sup>th</sup> Marines. Just to give it a designation so we could wear the Fourragere. The company was formed in Philadelphia of specially selected Marines of good height, and we had special uniforms made at the Marine Corps Depot of Supplies. We sailed from Philadelphia for Rio de Janeiro in July of 1922.

Q: What kind of special uniforms were they?

Shepherd: They were regular Marine uniforms but specially tailored for the enlisted men rather than the poor fitting general issue. We all had good blue uniforms as well as white trousers to wear with the blue coat for parades. The men's khaki uniforms were also properly tailored, as well as the officers.

Q: Had the Sam Brown belt come into use in the Marine Corps at that time.

Shepherd: We were still wearing the Sam Brown belt at that time. The Sam Brown belt became an article of our uniform during World War I and it wasn't done away with for some years after World War I, so we were wearing Sam Brown belts at that time.

Q: Who was the senior aide at the White House when you were there? The Marine aide?

Shepherd: Colonel Sherrell was the senior Army aide. Captain Holmes was the senior Navy aide, and I was the Marine aide. That was the way it was set up. When Harding became President he added two more from the Army and Navy. There was no Air Force at that time. I think there were only six White House aides, two Army, two Navy, one Marine, and then the senior aide to the President, who was Colonel Sherrell.

Q: You were pretty lucky to be appointed captain in three years' time, weren't you? Or was that the normal?

Shepherd: At that time – during World War I – the promotion was very rapid.

Q: After the war many officers were reduced in rank, were they not?

Shepherd: They were. That's quite true. I actually was a second lieutenant from the time I came into the Marine Corps in April 1917 until January 1918 because of the delay in commissions being confirmed. I wasn't promoted to first lieutenant until January of 1918. I didn't get my appointment to captain until in mid-summer of the fall of '19. Actually, the time I received the promotion to captain in November of 1918, I was on my way to Nice, from the hospital pending my return to my unit, which was on the march to the Rhine when I stopped in Paris to draw some money from the paymaster. I was officially informed I had been made a captain. I drew a nice sum of

back pay which enabled me to make my trip to Nice. I had been in the hospital at Blois after my third wound which I received at Blanc Mont and was discharged about the time the Armistice was signed. When I reported to the Replacement Center at Le Mans I was informed all replacements would be delayed until the troops actually arrived in Germany. So I remained there until the 1<sup>st</sup> of January with a number of other wounded officers. We rejoined our former organizations in January, 1919. I had the good fortune of being ordered to my old battalion and shortly thereafter I was able to take over my former company, and having been promoted to captain I commanded that company until the following June when I was selected to be an aide to General Neville who commanded the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade. That's when I met Major Charlie Barrett and formed a friendship that lasted until his death. But to return to the Rio de Janeiro assignment – our detachment went down to Rio in the USS Nevada. There were two ships sent to Rio de Janeiro for the Exposition, the Maryland and the Nevada. The Maryland was the flagship and the Nevada carried the Marine detachment. We set up a camp, a model camp, right in the center of Rio de Janeiro. It was a perfect place, an ellipse in a park. Our tents fitted in there exactly. We had four platoons and a small headquarters company, a band, and a supply unit, bakery and so forth. It made an ideal setup. We conducted a formal guard mounting and a parade every day. We marched throughout the city on various occasions and to the Exposition grounds which were nearby and paraded for various officials who visited there. It was an excellent public relations assignment and I think the Marine Corps gained a great deal of prestige from our presence in Rio.

We returned the first part of December to the United States and I was temporarily stationed at the Marine barracks in Norfolk for six months pending assignment to sea duty for two years in the USS Idaho on the West Coast. I was then ordered back to Norfolk to command the East Coast Sea School where I remained for a couple of years. While there the Marine Corps became involved in Nicaragua and I was most anxious to go there. General Feland, the Commander of the troops ordered to Nicaragua, tried to get me assigned to his staff, but I was unable to be relieved as commanding officer of the Sea School as it was a so-called permanent assignment. There were certain key jobs, the Sea School, adjutant, quartermaster and similar jobs that were of a semi-permanent nature and the officers assigned to them could not be relieved until their tour was up. Due to the large number of Marines on foreign duty at the time, those at home assigned to key jobs could not be removed without relief and there was no relief until those out of the States returned home.

So I missed Nicaragua. Later in the spring of 1927 when Marines were sent on expeditionary duty to China I again applied for duty overseas. The 4<sup>th</sup> Marines less one battalion left San Diego in February and the 6<sup>th</sup> Marines less one battalion departed from Quantico in March. In April a temporary regiment was formed under Colonel Henry Davis composed of the third battalions of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Marines plus an artillery battalion,

tanks and an air squadron. Colonel Davis commanded the Marine Barracks at the Norfolk Navy Yard and requested my assignment as his executive officer. We left from the East Coast and sailed from San Diego on April 1<sup>st</sup> embarked in the President Line ship U.S. Grant. Initially we were sent to Olongapo in the Philippines for a month following which we went to Shanghai and then to Tientsin where the designation of the two infantry battalions was changed to the 15<sup>th</sup> Marines. In October Colonel Davis was ordered to Shanghai upon the death of Colonel Hill, C.O. of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines, and he took me there with him as his adjutant so I spent the next two years in Shanghai which was a very interesting experience.

Q: Was this the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade at this time?

Shepherd: Yes. This was the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade. General Smedley Butler commanded the brigade, composed of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> Marines with supporting artillery, tanks and an aircraft squadron all in Tientsin. The 4<sup>th</sup> Marines in Shanghai I believe was a separate command.

Q: Now, the thing that's interesting, on these expeditionary forays, like to Nicaragua and China, they would get these units together and you would be on a special detached duty. You still retained your assignment to the station where you were on duty in the U.S.

Shepherd: Yes, we were on special detached duty, until some months after we were over there. I think it was six months or more. We were checked for quarters which we had been occupying when we left for foreign duty. Of course my wife was permitted to stay in our quarter in Norfolk but when the situation in China quieted down and wives were permitted to rejoin their husbands she came to China I might add at her own expense, commercially. But I was checked for quarter for six or nine months.

Q: Actually you were out in China for a year before you were detached to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade. You left in April.

Shepherd: I left in April. While my regiment, the 15<sup>th</sup> Marines, was in Tientsin we formed part of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade. When Colonel Jumbo Hill, who commanded the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines in Shanghai died in October, Colonel Harry Davis was ordered to Shanghai to replace him and took me with him as his adjutant. I remained as adjutant of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines until February of 1929. When the forces in China were reduced and consolidated in February 1929 one unit was left in Tientsin, although I'm not too sure of that – I think they brought everything down to Shanghai. Colonel Lyman came down to command the 4<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Colonel Harry Davis went home and he took me back with him.

I was very anxious to go to a service school. I hadn't been to a school and I requested to be assigned to the Field Officers' School in Quantico, which I subsequently attended. I entered the Marine Corps Schools in the summer of 1929 and was there for nine months. The following June I went to Haiti. I was assigned to the gendarmerie where I served for the next four years.

Q: Now, you were a captain when you went to the field officers' course. Wasn't that unusual?

Shepherd: Well, in those days the classes were small, and it wasn't particularly unusual. There were other captains there.

Q: There were other captains?

Shepherd: Oh, yes, Captain Noble was one of them. In those years we were captains a long time. I think I was a captain for 17 years. Fortunately I was a senior captain and it didn't bother me too much. Promotion in the Marine Corps following World War I was slow for a period of about 10 years. I remained a captain from 1918 until about 1932, wasn't it?

Q: May of '32.

Shepherd: I was a major in the Gendarmerie of Haiti for 4 years where we had advanced rank with increased pay, but that was only a temporary promotion. While serving in Haiti I received my promotion to major in the Marine Corps. When I returned to the United States in July 1934 I was assigned to the Marine Barracks in Washington. General Russell had just taken over as commandant and directed the CO of the Barracks to make it a more military organization than it had been for a number of years. It was at that time that we got started on what was the foundation of the present ceremonies at the Marine Barracks, the weekly tattoo.

Q: What were your duties like in Haiti?

Shepherd: Well, that was a very interesting period of my life. I first was assigned to the Caserne Dartiguenave, which was the main Haitian battalion billet of troops in Port au Prince. This command included four companies. There was a palace guard company and a police guard company and two companies of special troops at the Caserne Dartiguenave, which handled the rural police in the area for 50 miles around Port au Prince. I was the senior officer and we had a parade for the president every week. It was a tense time. Certain Haitian elements were near revolution. They'd had Caco troubles down south, and political unrest throughout the country. There were several skirmishes. One Marine officer was decorated with a Navy Cross during an engagement down at Ocayes. It was a period of unrest and was recognized by an expeditionary medal in the Marine Corps during that period.

Q: During this time, did an American warship take the President of Haiti and some of his staff up to Washington?

Shepherd: No, not during the period I was there. I came in at the end of President Borno's regime. While I was there, President Vincennes was elected. I think he succeeded Borno, and Vincennes was there while I was there, and of course I often saw him officially, having command of the Caserne Dartiguenave. After a years duty in command of the Caserne I was transferred to command the police company, which was a very interesting assignment. My duties were more political than those of a policeman although I was responsible for the police of the town, but my principal job were to follow closely the activities in the Haitian Congress and Chamber of Deputies, and to keep the ambassador, or the minister he was at that time, Mr. Norman Armour, advised as to when the government was going to fall. Well, that took a lot of intelligence work but we were able to keep

the State Department informed of the internal workings in Haiti at the time. It was part of our job and I enjoyed it.

The last year or so of my duty, I commanded the Department of Port au Prince, which extended all the way from St. Marc on the north across to the other side of Haiti, to Jacmel and then to Ocayes in the south. That was a most interesting duty. I like to get out in the hills. I spent one out of every three months in the hills, riding over the mountains in Haiti and checking on the various Haitian guard stations located in the districts and sub districts of my department. So I covered a lot of that part of Haiti particularly along the Santo Domingo border which extended for many miles. It was important to check those posts along the border.

The four years I was in Haiti were extremely interesting. It was a far larger command that I would have had if I had been on duty in the States. I loved to get out in the country and ride over the hills. It was a very fine experience for a young officer with this increased responsibility, and increased command.

Q: Did you ever run into any voodoo when you were down there?

Shepherd: Oh, yes.

Q: Lots of problems with it?

Shepherd: No, I don't put too much faith in voodoo. It was just a ceremony conducted in the hills. Part of my duty was to stamp it out. Well, every now and then we'd break up a voodoo dance, but we didn't bother the natives as long as they didn't get obstreperous and cause trouble. Voodoo was just a kind of a religion brought over from Africa.

Q: Was the present President of Haiti active at this time – Papa Doc, Duvalier?

Shepherd: Oh, he may have been. I really don't know. I never heard of him until he became president. As a matter of interest, one of the officers who served under me at the Caserne Dartiguenave later became President of Haiti, Magloire I believe his name was. The one before Papa Doc. A number of the officers who were in the Garde d'Haiti when we were there rose in rank and authority. For example, the Haitian ambassador in Washington for a period was an officer named Laraque who was a first lieutenant under my command. So I knew a number of Haitians. I returned to Haiti when I was chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board and they gave me a very warm reception. A number of the officers whom I had known at the time were in State and Defense jobs and they were very gracious to me in their reception. I have a soft spot in my heart for my four years in Haiti.

To return to my duty in Washington when I was ordered to the Marine Barracks in 1934 – General Russell was commandant at the time and he was unhappy with the way things were being run at the barracks. I remember being called in by General Russell and he said, "Now, I want this place straightened out. Make a military garrison of this post. It's the oldest post in the Corps and it should be the best." He gave me a free hand to do more or less as I wished. At that time I was commanding officer of the post for a period of several months before Colonel Moses arrived. When he took over command we became close friends and worked in complete

harmony with each other. I admired Colonel Moses very much and learned a great deal from him.

It was during this period that in order to smarten the men up as General Russell had told me to do, I started having a parade and guard mount every morning. In addition we held an afternoon parade once a week and invited guests to be present at this formation. These parades were the forerunner of the ones held at the Marine Barracks today. Of course they have been modified and improved, but the basic ceremony, less the silent drill we didn't do in those days, is the same ceremony we conducted every morning.

Q: Was that the old squads right drill?

Shepherd: Oh, yes, we were doing the old squads right drill which was prescribed, before World War II. This was in '34 to '36. The old type of squad drill was god disciplinary training for both officers and men. I also turned out the Marine Band to march by for our morning formal guard mounting. In addition I was registrar of the Marine Corps Institute which I found to be an interesting job. This organization conducted correspondence courses to improve the education of enlisted men. I also built up this activity to a marked degree during this period that I was assigned to Warm Springs (Georgia) in command of a guard for President Roosevelt when he went down there each fall. He had received many threatening letters. The "Little White House" was unprotected and there was a possibility of assassination. The Secret Service couldn't handle it all, so Colonel Stallings, the Chief of the Secret Service, requested a detachment of Marines to assist in the President's protection. The CMC ordered me to organize a company of selected Marines to go to Warm Springs for this duty during the fall of 1935. It gave me an opportunity to meet and get to know President Franklin Delano Roosevelt quite well, and I found him a most agreeable person to work for. We covered his activities every day. We had sentries around the so-called "Little Whit House." He spent a great deal of time on an enclosed glassed-in porch in the rear, which was just 150 feet from where there was a wooded hill, so it was an excellent spot for anyone who wished to assassinate the President to get a shot at him. They couldn't have missed.

President Roosevelt swam every morning. We provided an escort for him at the pool. It was a difficult task, as the President didn't want us in his hair all the time. We had to remain in the distance, more or less out of his sight, but still we were responsible for the protection of the President. I'm telling you, when we finally put him on the train for his return to Washington I heaved a great sigh of relief. I took it very seriously – the responsibility for the safety of the President of the United States was on my hands.

After two years at the Marine Barracks, I wished to improve myself professionally so I asked General Russell to send me to the Naval War College, which he kindly did. I was in Newport for a year in 1936 and '37. In June 1937 on the request of General R.P. Williams I was ordered to



Quantico to command the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 5<sup>th</sup> Marines. General Williams, who had been the commandant of the Garde d'Haiti while I was there, was the brigade commander of the Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (East Coast Expeditionary Force?) which was just forming at that time. I joined the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion on the same day, 1<sup>st</sup> of June 1937 as commanding officer of the battalion that I had joined, approximately on the same day in 1917 as a 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant. It was a great pleasure to come back as the commanding officer of the same battalion I joined when I first came to the Marine Corps. Well, the next two years were filled with interesting and vital duties.

Q: Before you discuss them, sir, I want to go back to the first time we came to Warrenton. When we were going down to lunch, you told me a story about the preparation of the manual for drummers, trumpeters and fifers.

Shepherd: Oh, yes. That took place during the period that I was at the Marine Barracks. Did I include it in this?

Q: No, you didn't talk about it, but I recall the story and I wanted to make sure we got it down.

Shepherd: The story was this. During the period that I was in Shanghai, I was very much taken with the Drum and Fife Corps the British regiments had out there so we organized one in Shanghai. They were called the Fessenden Fifes, as the instruments were presented to the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines by the Shanghai Municipal Council of which Mr. Fessenden was President. Our Marine Buglers were taught to play the fifes and drums by the drum master of the Green Howards, a British Regiment also on duty in Shanghai. Since the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines were not permitted outside of Shanghai, once a week we'd march through the city, just on parade. The other units did the same, just to impress the Chinese and give the men something to do, because we were confined to a small area around our billets. Our Drum and Fife Corps to which we added a bugle section made fine marching music for our parades. So when I was the Executive Officer at the Marine Barracks in Washington, I organized a small drum and bugle corps to go along with the band for our morning parade. General McDougal, who was assistant commandant at the time and occupied quarters at the barracks called me one morning and said, "Shepherd, I want you to write a manual on drumming and fifing in the Marine Corps." I said, "General, I don't know anything about music. I can't carry a tune." "Tell Captain Branson (the assistant leader of the band) to write up the music." So I went to work on preparing a drummers, trumpeters and fifers' manual. I didn't realize at the time what a difficult job I had been assigned. It's true that Branson wrote the drum and trumpet parts of the old stand marches, Sousa's marches. I had to see Mrs. Sousa personally in order to get her permission that the book would not be sold, that this manual would be used exclusively by the Marine Corps. I did some research at the library and remembering the way the British drummers used to handle their drum sticks and the fifers their fifes, I wrote a manual for drummers and fifers to be used in the Marine Corps – "Manual for Drummers, Buglers and Fifers," I think it was originally called. It was finally published, and I think it's still in existence. It took a lot of ingenuity

and work to describe how a drummer twirls his sticks and how he crosses them over. I had photographs taken of the various movements which were printed in the manual. It was a great experience for me. The manual is still in existence. It was adopted by the Marine Corps as their official book on drumming and trumpeting.

Q: You were telling me about how when you were writing the chapter on the rudiments-of-music part of it, you'd have about six books on theory in front of you and you took a little from each one.

Shepherd: Yes, that's the story. It was just before the book was going to press – they were being printed in the Government Printing Office – I had previously told Captain Branson, who was the leader of the Marine Band, to write the chapter on the rudiments of music. He said he would but instead of doing it himself he told one of his musicians to write this chapter for my book. That had been some months previous while I was getting the book together, it had been brought forcefully to my attention that you have to be very careful about copyright. This I learned from Mrs. Sousa. I had great difficulty getting permission from her to use parts of her husband's march. I made a trip to Long Island to see Mrs. Sousa and talked to her personally in order to get her personal permission to use the drum and trumpet parts of Sousa's marches. So I was very conscious of this copyright business. I didn't want to go to jail for plagiarism.

So suddenly it occurred to me, "I'd better check the chapter on the 'Rudiments of Music' myself." As a matter of fact, I think I asked Branson, "Where did you get script?" He said, "Well, I told Sergeant So-and-so to prepare it." I said, "Where's the sergeant?" I talked to him and said, "Where did you get it?" "Oh, I copied it from one of the books." "Copy?" I said, "You can't copy something out of a book that has been copyrighted and print it in another published book. That would get me in trouble. They might sue me for plagiarism." I said, "Send me every book you've got on the rudiments of music, over to my quarters." I then laid them out on the floor with the chapter on the rudiments of music in front of me. I read through the chapter on music in one of the books and sure enough, he had copied exactly the wording from one of them on the rudiments of music. Knowing nothing about music, I said to myself, "Well, so long as you don't copy over one paragraph from a book you're all right." So from the first book I took two or three sentences. Then from the second book I picked up the theme and copied a sentence or two followed by a couple of sentences from a third. In that way when I wrote a chapter on the rudiments of music there were no two paragraphs from one book. There was a little bit from one book and little bit from another. I took it to Taylor Branson to review and he said, "That's a good chapter on the rudiments of music, all basic material."

So that's the way the chapter on the 'Rudiments of Music' in the manual was written. I like to tell this story, because I can't whistle a tune and had to write a chapter on the rudiments of music!

Q: They never got you for plagiarism?

Shepherd: No, I never was sued, because there wasn't over one paragraph at the most and generally part of a paragraph copied from any one book. I just took a sentence from one book and a sentence from another book and it read all right after I had tied them all together.

Q: Your interest in the British style of band music led you, when you were Commandant, to have the drum major of the Marine Band, I think it was DeMar, go over to England and study their style of baton work. Is that true?

Shepherd: Yes, that is correct. When I became Commandant, the troops at the Marine Barracks were still doing the parades that I had originated. They were going on more or less along the line it had been previously done and as it's done now. Naturally it's been modified from time to time, especially the addition of the silent drill. I always liked the slow march. We tried it and tried it but the troops were unable to do it correctly. So finally through friends I had in the Royal Marines, I sent DeMar and two or three of the drummers and trumpeters to England to learn properly how to do the slow march and how to handle the tenor and snare drumsticks as they are handled by the British Royal Marines. Since then our drummers have been as good as the British.

Q: To return to your remarks about the period when you were CO for 2/5, this must have been a period of tremendously interesting duty, in '37, '38.

Shepherd: At that time the Fleet Marine Force had just been organized. General Russell had been able to get the Navy to go along with creating the Fleet Marine Force which was a great step forward in getting recognition of a force in readiness in the Marine Corps, on an official basis to work closely with the Navy. The Fleet Marine Force Atlantic at that time only consisted of two battalions of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines. I commanded one, General Turnage commanded the other. We had an artillery battalion and other small supporting units, a brigade headquarters, and that was it. We had a similar organization on the West Coast.

It was just beginning, this great interest in amphibious warfare, which I feel General Barrett had a great deal to do with. He had been a student at the Ecole de Guerre in Paris. The year that I was at the Marine Corps Schools, that is 1936-1937, Barrett had just returned to the Schools and enthusiastically promoted the study of amphibious warfare. We studied the Gallipoli campaign; we studied every amphibious campaign that had ever taken place. Several of my classmates, General Noble for one, were held over by General Barrett – Noble was a captain and Barrett a major at the time – to write the first edition of the present Landing Force Manual.

Q: FTP-167?

Shepherd: Yes, FTP-167. Although I never participated in the preparation of that particular document, I did, along with other members of the class, write studies which were later used when the manual was written. In other words the last couple of months, as I recall, of the time we were in the school, we were employed to work on the genesis of this FTP. Then they took the material that the students had prepared plus other material Barrett, Noble

and several others wrote the first draft of the manual which subsequently became FTP-167.

It was during this period that I was on duty in Haiti. This four year assignment was followed by my duty at the Marine Barracks in Washington and a year at the Naval War College in Newport. By the time I was assigned to command the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 5<sup>th</sup> Marines some ten years later, the Marine Corps Schools staff had gotten along far enough in the preparation of FTP-157 to test out the doctrine and items of amphibious equipment recommended. For instance, I was on the Tank Board. We worked on tanks with the Marmon-Harrington Company trying to get a tank that was light enough to be raised by a ship's boom and could be brought ashore in a lighter. This was before the amphibian tractors were adopted by the Marine Corps. I was on the Equipment Board at Quantico which met once a month and tested various items of equipment for adoption by the Marine Corps. By that time certain principles and tactics (that needed to be considered) had evolved, so during the two years that I had the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, when we went down to Culebra and Vieques, we tested the doctrine and tried out a number of equipment items. As I recall in 1939 we had 37 projects to test, among them whether or not a night landing from boats could be made on a hostile beach. I claimed we could do it. In a battalion exercise we made a landing on Vieques at night and were able to hit the exact spot we wanted to.

It was during this period and the years immediately subsequent that the amphibious doctrine of the Marine Corps was originated, evolved and tested. When war came two or three years later we were able to successfully utilize the tactics and techniques developed at the Marine Corps Schools and tested in the Caribbean during this period.

Q: Do you remember in January '38 they had Fleet Landing Exercise 4, and they had Number 5 January '39. This was during the time the Marine Corps was evolving and testing the amphibious doctrine. So you remember what the problems were, what seemed a problem to bother the expeditionary force commanders or brigade or battalion commanders the most?

Shepherd: Well, boats, for one thing. They were trying to develop a boat that we could get in over the coral reefs. Of course, that was before we had the amphibious tractor, but I remember we tested during 1939, the so-called Higgins boat. It had just been developed. It had a blunt bow. Before that we were landing in the good old Navy cutters – motor-sailers and whaleboats, which were of an entirely different configuration.

Q: You had to debark over the gunwales.

Shepherd: Yes, you jumped over the gunwales when the boat grounded often in water up to a man's shoulders. The first Higgins boats had a solid bow which a man had to climb over but it had a flattish bottom that enabled it to come up on the beach. That was a great step forward.

Then there was the unloading of the equipment, how to get it on the beach, get it across the reefs, and there were the tanks. We were trying

to get some light tanks. I recall when I was on the Tank Board, the directive I received was to try to get Marmon-Harrington to build a tank that was under five or not over six tons, so it could be hoisted aboard a ship. We worked on this specification for a year, but we couldn't get the tank down to the required minimum. We just couldn't do it because of the weight of the armor plate. So finally, I went up to headquarters and said, "Who set these specifications that a tank had to be under six tons?" Nobody seemed to know but I was told it was in order to hoist them aboard ship with a normal ship's boom. Then I went around to the Navy and said, "How much weight can one of the booms on the Henderson take?" They said, "Fifteen tons," so I went back and said, "Why in the hell should we try to build a tank weighing only six tons when a Navy ship's boom will take one of fifteen?"

Apparently nobody had thought about that. They hadn't gone into it. I was then able to have the specifications for the tank raised a ton or so and we were able to turn out a tank that would function within the prescribed limits. But that shows you what happens sometimes.

Q: The Marmon-Harrington was never used?

Shepherd: Oh, yes. We had Marmon-Harrington tanks. We had six or eight of them. We finally developed one that was within the specified limits. But also at this time, the Army – this was '39 = was becoming very much interested in improving their tank. I remember an officer named Jack Christmas who was the head of the Army Tank Board and I contacted him a number of times about what they were doing in tanks. The Marmon-Harrington tank was never satisfactory, and I visited the Army Proving Grounds at Aberdeen Maryland to inspect what they had. Although the Army tank was heavier than the Marmon-Harrington, I strongly recommended that we go to the Army tank. They had the facilities for developing tanks which the Marine Corps did not have. We did the best we could with what we had, but after all, they had the whole of Army Ordnance behind them, and they came up with a fine tank they used in the first part of World War II, and we used it all through World War II.

Q: The M-3.

Shepherd: Basically, it was a good tank.

Q: It was lightweight and it certainly had the capability.

Shepherd: It had the power to drive it anywhere. It had an adequate amount of fire power and armor on it. So it turned out that we gave up on the Marmon-Harrington tanks and adopted the Army M-3. We used them during the war and they were very good. I think the very last of the war we had one with heavier guns.

Q: The M-46, the Sherman.

Shepherd: But that was a very interesting period. We were testing various pieces of equipment, trying to get them ashore, in a new type of boat, and developed an amphibious doctrine.

Another thing that I recall we were testing. Colonel Harrington, who commanded the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment the second year I had the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion

conceived the idea of firing mortars in batteries. In other words, the 81mm mortar was in use as a 75mm gun. We tried to evolve a system whereby you fired mortars in the same manner that you would a battery of artillery. In other words, get them lined in on a certain stake so that you could fire several salvoes of mortars just as though you were firing a battery of artillery. That was one of the things we worked on. The artillery was another. And the naval gunfire – my God, that was when naval gunfire evolved. We fired at Culebra and then the second year we went over to Vieques where we took the eastern end of the island, and used that as a gunnery range to test naval gunfire. There were countless other things. I recall I had a list of 37 different tests we made during the period I was on Vieques, the second year I was there, and had to submit a report on each one of them – give a full report on the tests we had made.

Q: Were the other battalion commanders required to do the same?

Shepherd: Yes. We only had two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion in the FMF at that time.

Q: Each one had a mission to test?

Shepherd: A mission? I don't recall whether we were each doing the same thing or whether each had a different test. Maybe we both did the same thing. Brigade headquarters prepared the directions for the tests in the field and we had to see how they worked. I remember there was a lot of argument whether we could land at night. Well, having worked at night during the First World War to a great extent, because many of our operations in France were at night, I felt confident that we could do these things at night. I learned early in my career the proper way to handle a compass. We had very fine engineers' compasses which we used.

Q: The Lensatic Compass?

Shepherd: Well, it was a regular Army compass. And I said, "I claimed we could follow a compass in a small boat and get over the reef, just as well as we could going across a field in battle."

When we finally made a night landing in Puerto Rico it was successful. We had made a number of landings previously, but we made this final landing the second year I had the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, in '39, against the Army defending Puerto Rico. We landed south of Ponce. The Army had a battalion there and we caught this Puerto Rican defending force completely off-base. Nobody ever suspected that we would come in at night. I hit the beach within a hundred yards of where I wanted to. There was an old wreck there and I was able to come right in on it. We made the landing and established a beachhead across a coastal road. The next morning when the Puerto Ricans defending forces were returning from Ponce to take up their positions – they all knocked off after dark and went into Ponce to their families – so when they returned to their assigned defensive positions we bagged them right there on the road. At that time no one suspected you could make a landing at night. That's when I believe we convinced the authorities that night landings were feasible, and it was then that we started

working on the landing of night patrols, landing from submarines, reconnaissance patrols. That all came along during this period.

There were a number of amphibious projects we tested. I can't recall all of them at the moment, but many were tried during this period. Of course these tests were carried on in subsequent years.

Shortly afterwards, when the war in Europe came on in 1939 – I went from there to the Marine Corps Schools. It was a year or two later that the United States entered World War II.

Q: You were Acting Commandant of the Schools and then later took over the F-3 Section.

Shepherd: When I went to the Schools I was first assigned in charge of the Correspondence School, which was extremely interesting because we were rewriting all the pamphlets that were used in the Marine Corps Correspondence Schools. Many reserve officers were taking these courses. So the CMC wanted the texts brought up to date. We rewrote a number of pamphlets while I was assigned to the Correspondence School. Then I became -3 of the MCS School and for a while I was Acting Commandant. General Torrey was there as Commandant and then General Harrington, and I worked with both of them as Assistant Commandant. By that time we were getting ready for war. World War II had begun, and we were making extensive studies of techniques that were being used and how we could employ them in the Marine Corps. It was really a very, very interesting type of assignment and duty, and I learned a great deal.

I'll always remember the night that war did come – December 7<sup>th</sup>. The next morning I think it was, we received orders to send at once, a number of officers from the school to the East Coast ports of Central and South America as they were afraid the German submarines would land detachments and establish submarine bases. So we had to get those people out. I think it was either the night after war was declared or not later than the following night when many of the student officers received orders to depart by air immediately. They left at daylight by plane the morning of December 8<sup>th</sup>, by commercial planes. They went down to the West Indies, and to the east coast ports of South America and other strategic points along the East Coast of the North American continent and islands. A number went to the West Indies, where they thought that the German submarines might land and establish radio stations.

Q: Did they have any M-Day Plan at the schools?

Shepherd: No. I don't recall any.

Q: No mobilization plans.

Shepherd: No, I don't recall any because the Schools were not the type of unit for it. It wasn't like a regiment or barracks. In all the barracks they had these M-Day Plans and 'A' plans and 'B' plans, but the Schools were a little bit in a different category, because we were stabilized. In other words, everybody stayed there and continued to conduct classes with the remaining students and the influx of Reserve officers who were ordered to active duty.

Q: In '41 you went down as an observer, I think General Worton went down with you too at that time, to observe maneuvers, the Army maneuvers, at Camden, South Carolina.

Shepherd: Yes. That was a very interesting assignment. There were a number of these maneuvers taking place during this period. I went down to one at Virginia Beach but that was a little later. I went to the one in Camden and I attended one in Manassas the summer before. The one in Camden was very instructive. I especially remember the 9<sup>th</sup> Division. I was attached to their staff and worked right with them on their operations.

Q: What did they look like?

Shepherd: What, the maneuvers?

Q: No, the Army.

Shepherd: Well, I learned a lot from them, of course, but I learned that they weren't as hot as I'd originally thought they were. In some situations I thought my solution was better than theirs, but they were doing all right.

Q: Was it at this time they were fighting with wooden rifles and stovepipes instead of regular weapons and mortars?

Shepherd: That was a little later, I think. No, these were regular Army maneuvers. They had a series of them. They had one around Manassas. I remember, which I witnessed as well as one they had at Camden. I think they also had one in Louisiana.

Q: Yes, that was the one that Lear had – that big “Yoo-hoo” business.

Shepherd: Yes, I read about it in the newspaper.

Q: We talked in our previous sessions about your assignment to command of the formation of 9<sup>th</sup> Marines and taking them out to the field in New Zealand, and I don't think we got to the point where you were selected for brigadier general and you were assistant division commander for the 1<sup>st</sup> Division at the New Britain operation.

Shepherd: Oh, yes, I touched on that briefly. Well, to continue my story, I was at the Marine Corps Schools as Assistant Commandant when the United States entered World War II. Naturally I was most anxious to get into it especially when the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division went to Iceland. I was hoping very much to be assigned to a combat organization. General Holcomb was the Commandant of the Marine Corps then. I'd served with General Holcomb in the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade in France during World War I and knew him personally. When he came down to Quantico for the graduation of the Marine Corps Schools in June of 1942 I waited for a proper moment when we were alone together and said, “Couldn't you send me out, General? I am most anxious to join a combat organization and get into war.” General Holcomb's reply was, “Listen, Shepherd, you're going to stay here in the Marine Corps Schools where you are needed to train these young officers whether you like it or not.” That's how far I got. But he didn't forget it, and some months later, in the spring of 1943 I was ordered to Camp Elliot in California to organize and command the 9<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment.

General Worton relieved me as Assistant Commandant of the MCS in March of 1943. He'd just returned from duty in Iceland. When I took



command of the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines we only had one battalion. The regiment was subsequently brought up to strength by reserves and recruits from the MCRD at San Diego but I had very few officers of any experience. I recall having to conduct officers' school for all the officers in the regiment myself, because I didn't have a sufficient number of competent officers initially to properly instruct the enlisted men. It was the same with the training. We had all these recruits coming in and only one competent battalion commander. I found one company commander wanted to do things one way and another trained his men differently. Having just come from the Marine Corps Schools, I was hopped on doing things the right way; many mistakes were being made in training. Everybody was trying to do the right thing, but some just know how to train troops. We had a number of Reserve officers who weren't familiar with modern tactics. So, for a period of two months, I said, "We're going to stop all battalion and company training, and every man in this regiment is going through a prescribed course of basic training under a competent instructor."

I had one officer who was good at machine guns; so I said, "All machine gunners will go to school under whatever the fellow's name was, I can't remember now. Likewise I established a platoon leaders' course, a mortar course, etc. In other words, I took the best officers that I knew, Tony Walker, for example, who was good on the bayonet and under his direction every man in the regiment went through his class of bayonet training. We had another class for BAR men. I had the whole regiment go through basic individual training. The advantage of this method of training was the people who were the top instructors were experts. We had regular classes, a regular program, and they were taught under men who knew their jobs. There was a great deal of objection. Every battalion commander said, "Oh, we can train them ourselves." Well, it isn't always possible. For example, a battalion has the duty. One company goes on guard; another company goes on police work, etc. You miss a day or two's training. By my method the men under training had no other duties while attending the various schools. Every man in the battalion for two weeks took a special course in his specialty by the best instructors we had. It really paid dividends. It's the same sort of thing that goes on in the Corps today when a man finished Parris Island or San Diego he is sent to an Infantry Training Battalion for advanced training.

Q: The Infantry Training Regiment.

Shepherd: Yes, I believe it is now called an Infantry Training Regiment but that's where that idea was generated. When I became Commandant, I started this same type of specialist training for all Marines when they joined FMF units. The idea is to get experts to give them these special types of training and I'm convinced that I was right and I think it paid dividends.

Q: Well, of course, you had the same situation in World War I, when the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Marines went overseas; the officers had to go to specialist schools in France.

Shepherd: Yes, we went to specialist schools in France for training in the various types of weapons being used in WWI and the tactics employed at that time.

Q: Is it possible that you, as commanding officer of the newly organized regiment, were undergoing the same trials and tribulations of the commanding officer of any other newly formed regiment?

Shepherd: Yes, definitely.

Q: The 1<sup>st</sup> Division had all the trained experts at that time, didn't they?

Shepherd: Yes, but they had gone off to war so those of us who were initially left behind had to do the best we could with what we had. In forming new regiments the CMC would order one battalion of a trained regiment to form the nucleus of a new regiment. For instance, they took a battalion of mine, and sent it to the East Coast to form a new regiment being organized at Camp Lejeune. We sent all the officers and non-commissioned officers to form the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines. I think there was another group that went somewhere else to form the nucleus of another regiment. I think it formed the 21<sup>st</sup> Marines. That was the only way the Marine Corps had to form new units. Here we were, a small corps of 20,000 Marines at the beginning of World War II, and we had to organize divisions and corps and all that sort of thing. There just wasn't any other way to do it. It was awfully hard to train a group of officers to the point where they were ready to take them out and have a third of – two-thirds of them taken away from you. For the overall good of the Corps, it was the only thing to do.

But I feel in my training of the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines, when I started from scratch, with only one partially trained battalion when we were formed, the only way to properly train recruits that I received was to conduct schools for all-hands. It was the same with the officers; all they'd had was a candidate's course or the reserve officer's course at Quantico. They were fine young men, the best I've ever seen, but they didn't have much background of military knowledge, so it was a case of my training them individually in the basic weapons and tactics. Each battalion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines under my direct supervision landed right here at Scripps' Pier on an amphibious operation. We had a problem staked out for them, and they went through phase lines. We had a three or four-day war that went from the beach to the San Diego road, and then they went on to Miramar. We ended up two days later at what is now the Miramar Air Station. It was a three days' problem. Every battalion went through this exercise. We had situations that a platoon or company faced when they arrived at a certain point. So every man in the regiment was well trained in all the various basic infantry tactics. Rather than letting each battalion go off on its own, I controlled the individual training of my regiment. The point I wish to make is that due to a lack of fully qualified officers in the battalions of the regiment, to conduct training I took the best qualified officers in type of training and had him organize a training school which every man in the regiment went through. As a result all companies in the regiment were trained alike and when we functioned as a regiment we all did the same thing the same way. One of the schools I organized was in cliff climbing.

We used toggle ropes, climbing cliffs at Pendleton. I marched the regiment from Camp Elliott to Camp Pendleton, a five day march during which we conducted exercises. We went up an unimproved back road, now 395, and conducted exercises in route in advance guard, attach, defense, etc. Each battalion went through a series of combat exercises following which we conducted regimental exercises. When the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines became part of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Division, General Barrett conducted division exercises.

Q: Originally the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines were a component of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, which is something I wanted to ask you.

Shepherd: No, I think the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines were formed from scratch at Camp Elliott.

Q: That Marine Corps Base, Naval Operating Base, Sand Diego, Headquarters and Service Company, 9<sup>th</sup> Marines, 2<sup>nd</sup> Division.

Shepherd: Perhaps the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines were part of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division initially or were just attached to this organization.

Q: It was 2<sup>nd</sup> Division from March of '42 until September, '42. Beginning in September when you made the 4-day route march to Pendleton, on September 8 you were the advance echelon of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division.

Shepherd: The 2<sup>nd</sup> Division sailed about this time for the Western Pacific and went to New Zealand prior to going to Guadalcanal to relieve the First Marine Division.

Q: The 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines went to Samoa prior to joining the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division in New Zealand.

Shepherd: About this time the Marine Corps formed the Defense Battalions for deployment on various key islands in the Western Pacific. I had a chance to command one of these battalions. I turned it down. The hardest decision I had to make was when General Marston asked me if I would like to be the regimental commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> Marines which was leaving for New Zealand. It was a great, great temptation because the 6<sup>th</sup> Marines was a formed regiment ready to go out. I've forgotten what happened to the commander at the time. But I reluctantly said, "No, General, I can't do it. I've organized the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines from scratch. I've worked with the officers; I've worked with the men. I can't let them down. I can't just walk out on this fine group of officers and enlisted men with whom I have worked so hard, who believe in me. I can't do it." I was dedicated tot these young men who had responded to my training wholeheartedly. We had worked up a regimental spirit, a battalion spirit, and I did not feel that I should walk off and leave them. I'd trained that regiment and I wanted to fight them in combat.

The 9<sup>th</sup> Marines was a very fine organization and I have always been proud to have commanded it. We left the States during the first part of January, '44.

Q: No, January '43.

Shepherd: That is correct; it was in January of '43 when we sailed from San Diego. By that time the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division had been formed with the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines as the basic unit. I mean before General Barrett joined and commanded the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division in November 1943.

- Q: I want to know, what was the reaction to, the Marines reaction here, when they head about Guadalcanal?
- Shepherd: Oh, they were thrilled. I remember Bob Hunt's wife first telling me about it as he husband commanded the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marines. The news came out in the newspapers that the Marines had landed on Guadalcanal. That was a great thing for the Marine Corps. It was the first offensive move during the war, and it was a wonderful thing for the Marine Corps. I mean it was a wonderful asset to the Marine Corps to be able to lead the first offensive in the Pacific.

**Tape 1, Side 2.**

Shepherd: As I have just stated, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was formed at Camp Pendleton in the fall of '42, and in January '43 we sailed for Auckland, New Zealand. General Barrett commanded the division and I was on the ship with him - the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines and other units too. I think one of the regiments of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division came from Samoa, and joined the division in New Zealand. The other infantry regiment of the division was formed at Camp Lejeune before coming to Pendleton.

Q: The 33<sup>rd</sup> Marines had been formed on the East Coast and first went to Samoa.

Shepherd: Perhaps you are right, but they joined the division in New Zealand.

Q: They were trained there and then joined.

Shepherd: As I recall, the 21<sup>st</sup> was formed from other units before joining the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. Anyhow, we all assembled in Auckland after a very nice trip across. We went over on the Mt. Vernon, and the captain of the ship was an old friend of mine - Paulus Powell. An interesting thing happened during that trip that I think should be made a matter of record. As recorded in history, the 1<sup>st</sup> Division had had trouble in getting supplies ashore at Guadalcanal. They had a scare that the ships would be bombed and they all left before unloading was completed, leaving the 1<sup>st</sup> Division without the proper amount of food.

Q: This was a bad aspect, something that never was fully developed.

Shepherd: They thought the Jap fleet was approaching so they all shoved off and left the 1<sup>st</sup> Division ashore without their supplies. General Barrett was keenly aware of this. He had gotten together all the material he could find on the unloading of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, the mistakes that had been made in their landing on Guadalcanal. I don't mean to be critical, but everybody was anxious to get ashore and get in the fight, and nobody worried about supplies coming in so they were a little short there. When the transports sailed away the 1<sup>st</sup> Division was short of rations.

General Barrett was very cognizant of it, and with his background of schooling, he said, "We're going to write an SOP on the supply part of the landing."

So Colonel Noble, who was his chief of staff, and myself and General Barrett worked all the way across on an SOP for the unloading of

supplies – in other words, just how it was to be done from ship to shore - the proper use of boats, well separated dumps ashore, so that one bomb would not destroy all the ammunition or all the food supplies – to separate each of these into smaller groups. And what is now doctrine in the Marine Corps, we initially worked out at this time under General Barrett's direction, which impressed upon us the importance of proper logistic support – I think he set an optimum of nine hours for unloading supplies. A ship had to be unloaded in nine hours; 30 days rations, ammunition, fuel, and so forth, had to be gotten ashore. And we worked out an SOP that proved very beneficial throughout the Marine Corps and I think it is the basis of the present doctrine that's employed today.

We spent most of our trip across doing work on this SOP. When we landed in Auckland, we were billeted in various areas. The division was in the Auckland area, the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines were near the town of Pukukuli. We conducted a number of exercises in the field. Of course there was difficulty because it was farming country and the farmers didn't want extensive maneuvers conducted over their cultivated land. However, they were happy to see us in New Zealand because at that time they were under an imagined threat of a Japanese landing. They were very much afraid that the Japanese might land in New Zealand, and they welcomed us with open arms. We had great difficulty conducting any large-scale maneuvers. We had several training areas and we worked hard. We also did a great deal of hiking down there. I remember one thing that General Barrett was hipped on – this matter of rations. He said, "We have too large rations, too much overhead. If the Japs can live on rice, why, we can also live on rice." I remember we made 50-mile marches in three days living on reduced rations. We had several of those conducted marches while in New Zealand. While we were making this march, each man was issued a sock of rice with a piece of bacon, some hard tack, and some raisins. We cooked our rice, because that was easy to cook in a mess pan with water. You could boil the water, put your rice in, and then fry your piece of bacon. We subsisted on that and it worked out fine. We also had some hard tack. This was our ration during these marches and it was a good experience. It proved that you don't have to have a whole lot of different kinds of rations. That was before the days they developed prepared rations. They were just beginning to develop the A-ration and B-ration and all those various canned foods they had during the war.

Q: The 10-in-1 and Charlie ration –

Shepherd: Yes, that's right. The idea was to get away from having to have a mess cook with a whole mess line and fresh food. We lived off what we carried on every man's person. It was a very fine test and it proved satisfactory.

We were down in New Zealand from the 1<sup>st</sup> of February until the following May when the division sailed for Guadalcanal. We landed on Guadalcanal near Henderson Field. We were billeted in that big coconut grove near Henderson Field; we conducted a number of other prolonged

exercises. Actually, then we made several landings as if there were still Japs on the island.

Q: Actually your division arrived in July.

Shepherd: No, it wasn't July – it was June. Yes, we arrived at Guadalcanal in June. We had been training in New Zealand from January when we arrived until the latter part of June. Then we went to Guadalcanal.

Q: At this time you were appointed brigadier general.

Shepherd: There were still Japs on the island, and it gave us an incentive for active patrolling, which we conducted searching for Japs. And we occasionally found one. It was very interesting and instructive training.

It was while I was on Guadalcanal that I received my promotion to Brigadier General. I remember going to General Barrett and saying, "General, it's wonderful to be made a Brigadier, but the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines – I just love this outfit and I want to lead them in combat."

We were making plans at that time to go to Bougainville. He said, "You'd better take it. You've been promoted. You'd better take it now." So with great reluctance I left the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines – turned the regiment over to Eddie Craig who'd been my executive officer – a very fine officer of the highest type. I first went to Noumea, and then by plane to Melbourne, Australia where the 1<sup>st</sup> Division was recuperating from their fighting on Guadalcanal. I joined them at Melbourne.

While attached to Headquarters, I wrote an SOP for the division similar to the one I had worked on with General Barrett for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. General Rupertus had just taken over command of the division, had he not?

Q: Yes, Vandegrift had been relieved by Major General Bill Rupertus.

Q: He'd been promoted, so you had relieved no one, actually.

Shepherd: No. I took over as Assistant Division Commander. Rupertus had relieved Vandegrift. I've been told that I was scheduled to take over the division when Rupertus returned to the United States. I would become the Division Commander after I'd served a period of indoctrination as Assistant Division Commander. Rupertus was supposed to go home after the Cape Gloucester operation but Admiral Halsey was very fond of Rupertus, so I've been told, and at Halsey's request he was held on for the Peleliu operation in April 1944. After the Cape Gloucester-Borgen Bay operation I was ordered to assume command of the newly formed 1<sup>st</sup> Brigand, composed of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines (reinforced). To return to the Cape Gloucester operation – the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine division was much rested and well trained during our sojourn in Australia. I was originally assigned command of a task force to land at Gasmata on the south coast of New Britain but they called that off at the last minute and I went in with the division on their landing at Cape Gloucester and I was assigned to command the beachhead area. General Rupertus went with one regiment up to Cape Gloucester. I stayed in the landing area, in charge of getting the supplies ashore and to organize a defense of that area. Following the seizure of the Jap airfield at Cape Gloucester, General Rupertus assigned the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines (reinforced) to me and directed that I conduct operations in the Borgen Bay area to clear it of

the enemy. It turned out to be the major battle on New Britain. In order to clear the Japanese from the beachhead area, I ordered the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines to make a flanking attack from the east across the beachhead perimeter toward Borgen Bay. At the time I did not know the Japanese forces, from Cape Gloucester and the other side of the island were withdrawing toward the southwest.

Q: Towards Rabaul.

Shepherd: Yes, towards Rabaul. But in order for the troops to reach Rabaul they had to pass through a crossroads inland that was called Aogiri – Aogiri Ridge, where these two trails met, and that was a critical point for the Japanese. Captured Japanese documents stated that Aogiri Ridge must be held at all costs, but we didn't know where Aogiri Ridge was. We had no maps of the island. The name meant nothing to us.

In preparing for this cleanup operation I had devised a plan that where I took command of the forces in that area, the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines and part of the 7<sup>th</sup>, (or was it the 7<sup>th</sup> and one battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup>), that I would hold the perimeter and make a sweeping flank movement right in front of the perimeter with the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines. That's when we bumped into quite a big fight on Suicide Creek that we had difficulty getting across. Later, we had quite a fight at Aogiri Ridge which we had a heck of a time taking. I was up there in the afternoon to personally observe the attack. I was lying beside Lew Walt, who had taken over a battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines. We were behind banyan tree and the Japs were only about 40 yards away. They kept firing and we kept behind this banyan tree. I recall distinctly being nudged by Lt. Colonel Walt and I looked at him with the thought, "Why are you nudging me?" I didn't say anything to him, but was surprised that he was nudging me with his shoulder against mine. When I got out of this fire fight I found Walt had been hit in the back with a bullet, the force of which had pushed him against me. Later that night the Japs attacked in force in an endeavor to retake this ridge which we learned later was Aogiri Ridge – which controlled the trail junction leading to Rabaul. It was during our attack on Aogiri Ridge that we used a 37mm gun with grapeshot effectively. We had found the 37mm gun with grapeshot was a most effective weapon because of the spread of the grape in the jungle where you were unable to see the enemy. The Marine battalion was having a hell of a fight to capture Aogiri Ridge and Walt ordered a 37mm gun with grape to support the advancing battalion which was receiving heavy casualties but nobody moved. Finally Walt called for volunteers to move that gun up. Still, nobody moved so Lew Walt said, "I'll move it myself," and he started dragging this 37mm gun up the hill by himself. Well, of course, when the men saw the Battalion Commander pushing the 37mm gun up the hill they all joined him in pushing the gun forward and finally secured the ridge. That night the Japs attacked that ridge with everything they had. They sang songs – "Marines, prepare to die, Marines prepare to die." Apparently the Japs had been given a shot of Saki to help their morale. It was a bitter battle but the Marines held the ridge. The next morning I went up to Aogiri

Ridge to look over the battlefield. There were dead Marines and Japs in the same foxhole. It was a very tense fight. And it turned out later that this was Aogiri Ridge. This was the point that the Japs had orders they must hold at all costs, because it was where the two trails met that permitted them to retreat from this end of the island.

When I learned that this was Aogiri Ridge, I said, "We'll change its name and call it Walt's Ridge," and that was what it was called. It was named after Colonel Lew Walt who did a magnificent job in capturing this important terrain feature. I think I recommended him for the Medal of Honor. Walt got a Navy Cross out of it for his personal bravery and leadership in advancing up Aogiri Ridge under fire, dragging a 37mm gun by himself. It was the capture of this ridge that I feel caused the collapse of the fighting at that end of the island because we had blocked their withdrawal route towards Rabaul. We started pursuing those that had begun withdrawing before we captured Aogiri Ridge.

Q: Puller started pursuing them, didn't he?

Shepherd: No, it wasn't Puller; it was Colonel Selden in command of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines who I ordered to pursue. I sent Selden along the coast with the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, pushing the Japs towards Rabaul. Puller had commanded one of Colonel Frisbie's battalions - the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion, I think it was - and he did a very fine job. After the Borgen Battle, Puller was assigned command of a task force which pushed inland towards another big hill mass to our front, where we thought the Japs were defending, but it was Colonel Selden of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines that I sent on down the coast toward Rabaul. A company was sent by boat for several miles and would land and intercept the coastal trail. We kept pushing south by sending in strong patrols to block the coastal trail and pressed them from the road. The poor Japs were half dead as they had no rations so we mopped up on them when they stopped to fight. I've been told that only about 350 of that entire army of Matsuda's finally made their escape to Rabaul. We had another battle on the Willaumez Peninsula where there was an airfield. We didn't go any further than this peninsula but sent patrols to the airfield - Hoskins I think it was called - but by that time the few that were left had gone on to Rabaul. I don't think there were more than 350 of them out of this entire force on the island commanded by General Matsuda that escaped alive.

Q: Didn't O.P. Smith take part in this operation.

Shepherd: General O.P. Smith joined the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division during the campaign and became Chief of Staff of the division. After the fighting was over, Selden went up to chief of staff or ADC in the division, and O.P. Smith took over the command of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines.

Q: What about Talasea?

Shepherd: Yes, Talasea was on the Willaumez Peninsula and I went there with the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines during their operation to capture this Peninsula. The Cape Gloucester was a hard fought campaign, which I feel has never really had the recognition that it probably should. It may have now, but initially it didn't. I mean, it was shortly followed by Tarawa, which was a very fierce



fight which overshadowed the New Britain campaign. In New Britain we were fighting in a jungle where we had no maps. We didn't know where the enemy was. Along the coast of New Britain was a swamp 100 yards behind the shoreline. The shoreline was covered by reefs – very difficult for navigation. You couldn't come in just any way, only in certain spots. To get tanks through the swamp and move our artillery inland we had to build corduroy roads across the swamp. In other words, we were restricted to a beach only 100 yards wide in spots. We were constantly afraid of being bombed by aircraft, or that the Jap fleet would sail in and bombard us. I've always compared the New Britain campaign to Grant's fight through the Wilderness, in the Civil War. We were fighting in unknown territory, deep jungle, swamps, and in some cases mountains or very high hills – Conical Hill – that General Buse took – that was quite a fight. It went right straight up in the air. The soil was volcanic ash which the engineers used to build roads. Thank God for the Seabees; they built our roads without which we would not have been able to operate especially the corduroy ones that crossed in swamp along the coastline.

It was an extremely hard fought campaign in many ways. The weather added to our difficulties. The day after our landing we had a 21-day typhoon that pretty well messed things up, there was no such thing as living in tents. We had jungle hammocks. I remember when General Krueger came over to visit my command post. The water was a foot deep in my tent where the Old Man slept. It was an extremely interesting campaign, from a tactical point of view; the way we pushed the Japs from behind and then went forward ahead of them to block their retreat. It was just what the Japs had done to the British in Malaya, when they were fighting in that part of the war in Malaya during their withdrawal to Singapore – push them from behind and jump ahead of them by sea to block their retreat. And that's just what we did to the Japs on New Britain. I believe the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was under control of MacArthur.

Q:

Shepherd: That's right.

Q:

As I recall, he took some tanks from the division for another operation.

Shepherd:

Yes, MacArthur detached a company of tanks for a landing on Arawe. That was part of the initial plan. I think they were employed to land at Arawe. Initially I was assigned a force to land at a place called Gasmata, which was on the other side of the island, but it was called off at the last minute, but we did make a landing at Arawe with a small task force from the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division.

Q:

What was the relationship with the Army? I joined after Gloucester and there was a lot of unhappiness about being associated with the Army.

Shepherd:

There was some ill feeling Ben, but I didn't feel it was justified. Of course there's always been this feeling of service jealousy between the Army and the Marines, which goes back to World War I, and I think General Rupertus was a very naval-minded person. He wanted no part of it and General Pollock didn't like the Army either. Some of the Army officers from the Corps staff, we were with the Alamo Force under General Krueger,

criticized our plans for landing, which didn't please us and there was other minor service friction. It got to a point where MacArthur had to settle it himself. As I recall, he came down, before we left Australia, when we were arguing about the landing plans, whether we were going to land here or land there, and it had gotten to quite a hassle which MacArthur had to straighten out. I wasn't present when he and General Rupertus discussed the plans for landing but they did straighten it out, and we were able to get more ships. As I recall, our scheme of maneuver was finally approved before we left Australia and went to a place called Goodenough Island to stage for New Britain. I think all this took place on Goodenough Island.

Q: That's where the division staged?

Shepherd: Yes we staged from there. But there was a difference of opinion about our plans for landing and subsequent operations. Of course there was a feeling at that time about General MacArthur which all of us shared. Later when I got to know MacArthur he said to me one day, "I know you Marines don't like me, but I can assure you they're our finest fighting force, the best division I had during World War II." And I know he tried his best to hold the 1<sup>st</sup> Division in the Southwest Pacific Command. We were his prime division, to spearhead his amphibious operations up the coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines. He was most anxious to keep us under his command. He said, "You will be my shock troops, my best division."

Q: Of course, the accusation was that he was trying to fight the 1<sup>st</sup> Division to its death.

Shepherd: Yes, that's true, but I don't think he did. We were MacArthur's best trained and seasoned amphibious division and he used us to the best advantage to win the war.

Q: What about Rupertus?

Shepherd: I don't recall his discussing the matter with me.

Q: That's what troops are for; to win the war.

Shepherd: That's what they're for. I do know however that General Rupertus was most anxious to get back under Navy and Marine command, I know that. I didn't feel as strongly about it as he did, but I recall he once said, "Thank God we'll be back under the Navy." He was rejoicing that we were going back to the Navy, which is natural. That was the Marines' place rather than being detached for service with the Army. Who was it; Geiger took over about that time?

Q: Yes, General Geiger took over. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps was formed from IMAC.

Shepherd: 3<sup>rd</sup> Corps, that's right.

Q: When you were detached from the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, you took over the 1<sup>st</sup> Provision Marine Brigade, I believe.

Shepherd: Yes. It was on Cape Gloucester on Easter morning, 1944 that I received orders to return to Pearl Harbor. I'd been told I was to take over the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, which I was really looking forward to doing, when I got orders to go back to Pearl Harbor to command the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade. When I received these orders I was really sunk. I had a hard moment. I hated to leave the 1<sup>st</sup> Division. I'd grown to become very fond of the division. I

think they respected me. So it was with tears that I left the airfield at Cape Gloucester to fly to Australia and then on across to Pearl Harbor. Upon arrival I was told by General Smith that I'd been assigned to command the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade, consisting of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines, which had seen combat in the Central Pacific, at Kwajalein. After a few days in Honolulu I sailed with the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines (reinforced) for Guadalcanal where the brigade was formed when joined by the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines (reinforced). The 4<sup>th</sup> Marines was formed from the Raider Battalions and re-designated the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines so that they would have the old regimental number as the original 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment on Corregidor. Upon landing on Guadalcanal I was assigned to the western end of the island, which was a very good training area, ten miles or more beyond Henderson Field – Tetere, I believe the area was called. It was at the extreme western end of Guadalcanal, and the training area was excellent. We had three beautiful cul de sacs where we could conduct three battalion maneuvers at the same time, with hills between us, and could actually conduct firing exercises at the same time. That's where we formed the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade. We were training for Guam, and in due time we made the landing with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division on Guam. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division landed on one side of the Orote Peninsula and we were on the other.

Q: Orote Point?

Shepherd: Yes, south of Orote is where we landed. We captured the old Marine Barracks at Agana.

Q: you landed below it, as a matter of fact. We talked about that last time.

Shepherd: We had a pretty good fight for a couple of weeks before Guam was secured. The brigade did the job of a division in the Guam Campaign.

Q: You had your 15<sup>th</sup> Marines and artillery.

Shepherd: We had a bobtail division. We had two reinforced infantry regiments, the 22<sup>nd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup>. When I formed the brigade, the reinforcing elements of the infantry regiment were taken over under brigade command. We first took Agat, and then pushed on down to the southern end of the island. We then turned north and took Orote Point, so we went from the western tip, the southern part of Guam, to the extreme northeastern one with the brigade. I said we did the same amount of work that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division did in their operations on Guam.

Q: You were talking about the problems you had getting a headquarters staff, officers, how you fought your brigade, and you got to a point where you were supposed to make a rendezvous ahead of time. Noble had the division, I think

Shepherd: No, Turnage had the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division.

Q: I have been told the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade were told to establish contact at a point near the base of the Orote Peninsula but that the brigade got there first.

Shepherd: Yes, we beat them to the rendezvous. We had this designated point where the two units would meet. I was determined to get there first because I had tried to get some officers from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division for my staff and Headquarters Company, since no allowance had been made for and Brigade

Headquarters personnel when the brigade was formed. I knew the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was over strength in officers and requested several be transferred to the brigade. The reply was negative. "Can't do it, can't spare a man" so when I sent this message, "I am here, where are you?" – that was just a little friendly rivalry but I felt hurt when Turnage had turned down my request for the transfer of several officers from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to the brigade when I needed them desperately.

Let me see, where were we? The fight on Guam – I think the brigade did a very fine job on Guam. Following the Guam operation the brigade returned to Guadalcanal for rehabilitation. Shortly thereafter the brigade became the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division by the augmentation of the 29<sup>th</sup> Marines (reinforced) and several other divisional units.

Q: Was the brigade and 3<sup>rd</sup> corps Headquarters returned to Guadalcanal after Guam?

Shepherd: Yes. It was during this period that the designation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade was changed to the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division and they sent us out some very fine noncommissioned officers. I believe they stripped the only non-coms from the recruit depots, and sent them out to join us. They formed the 29<sup>th</sup> by stripping the two Recruit Depots. The 29<sup>th</sup> Marines got some excellent seasoned noncommissioned officers and some very fine officers when they joined the 6<sup>th</sup> Division. Colonel Victor Bleasdale commanded the regiment at the time they joined the 6<sup>th</sup> Division. That gave us our full three infantry regiment division.

Q: You had the 15<sup>th</sup> Marines?

Shepherd: The 15<sup>th</sup> formed our artillery regiment. Colonel Bob Luckey who'd been with me in the 1<sup>st</sup> Division commanded the regiment. I'd known Bob for a number of years and I was very happy to have him. Colonel Johnny McQueen was my chief of staff. I'd known him in the MC Schools. I had Lieutenant Colonel Krulak as the G-3 and a fine operations officer he turned out to be.

Q: Where did he come from – did he come in from Headquarters Marine Corps?

Shepherd: No, I don't think so. Krulak had commanded the Parachute Battalion that landed on Choiseul during the Bougainville Operation.

Q: But he went back to the States – he was wounded, wasn't he?

Shepherd: Yes, that's right; he had been wounded on Choiseul. When he was released from the hospital he came out and joined the 6<sup>th</sup> Division on Guadalcanal. Krulak is one of the outstanding officers in the Marine Corps. He is one of the ablest officers I think I've ever known. He was my G-3. I had an officer named Williams who was my G-2 and Breck Overstreet, who had served as my adjutant in the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines and also the brigade, became the G-1 of the division. He was a very fine officer. I had Gus Larson as my G-4. Gus had served as a company commander with me in the old 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup>, so I knew him to be an officer of great ability. Some of the others I had were Brigadier General Clement who'd been a schoolmate of mine at VMI. He was my assistant division commander. All the staff

was a very fine group of officers. Colonel Schneider had the 22<sup>nd</sup> Marines, which had come, as I said, from the mid-Pacific. I had Alan Shapley, who had the 4<sup>th</sup> Marines, an outstanding officer of great ability and great leadership. The 29<sup>th</sup> was the regiment Bleasdale brought out from the States. With it, and several units of special troops, we formed the 6<sup>th</sup> Division and got its parts working together. We were able to conduct a thorough program of training before we got our orders to Okinawa. I think the 6<sup>th</sup> Division was beautifully trained and had an excellent staff with these professionals I had with me – we were well prepared for our landing on Okinawa which took place on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April, 1945.

Q: Now, to save you some problems reminiscing, because we discussed this in our first two sessions back at Warrenton, I think what we ought to do is skip ahead in time here, sir, and go to when you were relieved as division commander in Tsingtao and returned to the States.

Shepherd: Upon my detachment from command of the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division in Tsingtao, on December 26, 1945, I returned to the States. I arrived in Washington on December 30<sup>th</sup>. Upon reporting to General Vandegrift, he told me that after a month's leave he intended sending me to take command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division at Camp Lejeune. At the time, General Marston was in command of the division at Camp Lejeune, but he expected Marston to retire upon passage of a bill that was before Congress reducing the forced retirement age from 65 to 62, but the bill didn't pass Congress in January as he had anticipated. Pending passage of this bill, I took leave and started down for Florida. I went down to Lejeune and looked over the quarters, but General Marston said, "Well, I'm not going to retire until they make me."

Enroute to Florida, my mother died and I had to return to Norfolk so my trip down to southern Florida did not materialize. Shortly thereafter General Vandegrift changed my orders and I went up to headquarters on a special assignment for several months.

Q: Yes, you were at headquarters February and March.

Shepherd: Yes, for February and March. My wife was living in Charlottesville, and I commuted from Washington to spend the weekends there with her. I can't remember just what I was doing at Headquarters but I believe it was writing up a history of my activities in the Pacific during World War II. About the first of March, General Vandegrift called me into his office and said, "I have a request from Admiral Ralph Davis at Norfolk to form a troop training unit on the East Coast similar to the one he commanded on the West Coast during World War II. I'm going to send you down there. I want to bring you back here as Assistant Commandant, but I've got to get this organization straightened out, organized. Davis insists he wants an officer well-versed in amphibious operations. I'm going to send you down there for some months till you get that going; then I'll bring you back up here to headquarters."

As Norfolk was my home town I was very pleased to go there. I think I went down to Little Creek in March to organize TTULant. It was the third unit I had organized from scratch. I organized the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines

from scratch; I organized the brigade from scratch; then I was sent down there to organize the TTULant from scratch. When I reported to Admiral Davis, he assigned me to the Marine troop training unit. Admiral Fred Curtland was the naval commander. In the beginning he sat at one end of a room, I sat at the other end of the room and we had one yeoman between us. That's what I call starting from scratch. That's all we had. Headquarters didn't give me any suitable officers so after a couple of weeks I went to Washington to see General Vandegrift; asked him if we couldn't get somebody down there to help me get this thing going. So he called in his detail officer and said, "You give General Shepherd what he needs within reason." I was able to get Colonel McQueen, who'd been my former chief of staff and Williams, my former G-2 as well as several other officers who'd been on my staff in the 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Division that had returned to the States and we were able to get the show on the road. It turned out to be a very fine organization which is still going strong. But it was a struggle, starting from scratch.

Q: What was your mission? What were you to do?

Shepherd: Well, we were to pattern TTULant after TTU Pacific which had been successful on the Pacific Coast during the latter part of WWII, giving amphibious training to Army and Marine units for the Fleet Marine Force. The idea was that we were to train Army troops for amphibious operations. At that time the Army was trying to get into amphibious warfare and was sending their units to Little Creek for training. The Marines at Camp Lejeune were also sent to TTULant but they didn't cotton to it. They said, "We'll train our own people down here." I personally believed it was much better to train them at TTU where they could give them specialists' training, just as I did when I trained my regiment at Camp Pendleton with a group of specialists that were the top men in whatever particular type of training was required. We did the same thing with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division. For instance, they came up to TTULant battalion by battalion. We had instructors, officers and enlisted men, who were experts in each phase of amphibious training, and they put the battalions through courses on instruction which we had developed. We made initial landings at Camp Pendleton. Camp Pendleton, which is just below Virginia Beach, is the Virginia National Guard Rifle Range. We got permission to go down there for our ship-to-shore landings. We had the rehearsal landings at Little Creek. Then we progressed to full-scale exercises at Camp Pendleton. I'd planned on a three months course with final landings at Vieques. Since the armed services had returned to a peacetime organization everything was reduced. There were not enough Navy ships to go to Vieques so that part of the program fell through. In time of war that's what we planned to do, so we made the Camp Pendleton, Virginia landing the final exercise. I think the troops were at Little Creek for three weeks.

Q: When you talked about being assigned to Camp Lejeune, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division hadn't arrived back? Marston was base commander?

Shepherd: No, they hadn't arrived back at that time but returned there in the early spring. In the meantime I was to command the base.

Q: Robinson had the division, which he brought back?

Shepherd: I think he did. He brought it back, but I had been told that I was to take over the base and command the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division when it returned to the United States. But this emergency of getting an officer with amphibious experience to organize TTU at Little Creek is when I went down there, and I think it worked out very well.

Q: FMFLANT had not been organized yet. Probably '46, '47?

Shepherd: No, I don't think so. As I recall there was no FMFLANT. Maybe it was all together down at Lejeune. I wasn't at Norfolk then, because I think that Rockey came down there during this period. Yes, he came in there just about that time. While I was there at Little Creek I think was when they organized FMFLANT and Rockey came to the Naval Base where he established his headquarters. I had known Rockey before, he'd been out in China, we were great friends, and I helped him get straightened out. Being there ahead of him and knowing more about the ground, I was able to help Rockey find a suitable place to set up FMFLANT. I was able to get a Navy camp that was not in use, and that's where General Rockey formed up the headquarters for FMFLANT. All that took place while I was there. I believe it was Camp Davis which is between Little Creek and the Naval Base, where headquarters was established. Rockey preferred, and I can understand how he would, to be a little closer to the commander at the Norfolk Naval Base, so he moved his headquarters to the Norfolk Naval Base at a later date. I think for some years we retained Camp Davis where we kept the headquarters troops. It is between Little Creek and the Naval Base. I don't think we still have it, but we had it for a while. At the time we were unable to billet all the headquarters staff and FMF troops, at the Naval Base at Norfolk. There just wasn't enough room for them so we had this other camp. The base had the FMF troops, the Corps troops, Marine troops and we kept the TTULant troops at Little Creek.

Q: Of course, it got so big; Force troops had to go down to Lejeune.

Shepherd: Yes, they probably did. Yes, later on they went down there. I suppose we don't have Camp Davis any more. But that was the way it was originally set up. I was at TTULant from February to November. Then I was ordered to headquarters to become Assistant Commandant, where I served for the next two years with General Vandegrift. It was during this period that he directed that, instead of being just Assistant Commandant or assistant to the Commandant, that I be designated Chief of Staff and Assistant Commandant. I don't know whether that still exists or not.

Q: Now they have Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff – two separate jobs.

Shepherd: When I was on duty at Headquarters Marine Corps in 1946 I was both Chief of Staff and Assistant Commandant. General Thomas was there at the time, and I think it was his idea that the chief of staff be the senior officer.

Q: Making the Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff into two billets?

Shepherd: No. General Vandegrift made it into one billet.

Q: Oh, really? Then it went back afterwards, to two billets.

Shepherd: Yes, it went back afterwards to two separate billets but the idea was to make the chief of staff the Number 2 man to the Commandant, give him full authority as chief of staff as well as being assistant commandant.

Q: It's like an old story that Alben Barkley told when he was Vice President, about a woman who had two sons. One went to sea, became a sea captain and was lost in a storm. The other son became Vice President and was never heard of again either. It seems to me that the Assistant Commandant's function as it is now, a separate function if purely –

Shepherd: - It's a standby for the Commandant. When the Commandant was away, I signed the mail. That's about what it amounted to.

Q: The Chief of Staff was the real operating job.

Shepherd: Yes, that's why General Thomas, and he's a very able staff officer, recommended the two jobs be combined into one. Prior to the time I went there the Assistant Commandant didn't do much, he was just a standby for the Commandant and when the Commandant went away, he signed the Commandant's mail. I don't think the Assistant Commandant had any specific duties or responsibilities in the organization of Headquarters Marine Corps. They did not have the general staff system and each division at headquarters worked separately. They were not tied in. Each one had its own function and more or less operated directly under the Commandant of the Marine Corps. It was General Thomas's idea that the Number 2 to the Commandant would be the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps. In other words, the Assistant to the Commandant as Chief of Staff had the authority to make decisions in the name of the Commandant.

Q: What was General Thomas' function at this time?

Shepherd: General Thomas, at the time, was in charge of operations Division of Headquarters. It was called Plans and Policies.

Q: Del Valle became Inspector General, didn't he?

Shepherd: Yes, I think so, or was he Director of the Personnel Division? Each of these sections functioned separately, more or less. And it was when I came there as Commandant, having had this experience as Assistant Commandant that I inaugurated the general staff system. I'll go back a minute. After I'd served as Assistant Commandant, General Cates was made Commandant, and we exchanged jobs. He came to Headquarters as Commandant; I went down to command the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. From Quantico I went out to command FMFPAC. Two years later I was made Commandant and came back to Washington. When I came back there in '52 to be Commandant, I asked General Thomas if he'd come to Washington with me as my Chief of Staff. General Krulak also came back to Headquarters as Staff Secretary. The three of us were close friends and we worked closely together. It was then that we instituted the general staff system as it exists today – in other words, where the Chief of Staff has the authority to run the Marine Corps under direction of the



Commandant, or function for the Commandant in his absence. We brought the various departments – Personnel, Quartermaster, and the others that were more or less little empires of their own in line as subordinate units to the General Staff.

Q: They were special staff.

Shepherd: They were special staff, and it's the best way for an organization the size of the Marine Corps to effectively operate. I feel that I made a contribution to the Marine Corps by putting the general staff system into effect. I don't take credit for all the originality that went into it, because General Thomas, General Krulak and others worked out the details of the plan, but it fell upon me to place the general staff system into operation and I feel that I made a contribution to the Marine Corps in doing so.

Q: Let me go back to when you were Assistant Commandant. This was in the days of the unification fight. How much did you get involved with it?

Shepherd: Quite a bit. General Vandegrift fought it and of course I did also as his assistant. We brought in the most able officers in the Marine Corps and put them on a committee to come up with ideas – the Edson Board. We called it the Edson Board. We were afraid that the Marine Corps would be gobbled up by the Army. At that time the Army was all for doing away with the Marine Corps, as you well know. The Army wanted to absorb us, and they would have absorbed us, I feel, if we hadn't fought them right down to the line. People like Paul Douglas and others whose names escape me at the moment fought for the Marine Corps in Congress, and we finally were able to get a law passed, making the Marine Corps a permanent organization. I think that was when I was Commandant, the law passed whereby the Marine Corps from then on would be a separate entity within the Department of the Navy.

Q: Now, down at Quantico, Twining and a group were working too. In other words, you had the Edson Board at headquarters and –

Shepherd: I think Twining's group was moved to Quantico from Washington because they were building up in numbers. We were restricted in the number of officers we could have in Washington. For a while, Twining's group was in Henderson Hall initially. We moved a number of units down to Quantico where they could work and not be right under the gun from Washington.

Q: It's my understanding from what I've heard that not everybody in the Marine Corps was aware of the danger to the Corps, and that not every general officer was devoted to fighting for the Corps politically. Is this correct?

Shepherd: Yes, it is, definitely. No, I don't think people were conscious of the threat that the Marine Corps came very nearly to being merged into the Army. They made every effort to take us over and make us an amphibious corps of the Army. That was the idea, you see. We'd have lost our independence; we would have lost a great deal. We would eventually have been washed out of the picture.

Q: Now, without digging up too much dirt, it appears that when you trace the history of some of the people that were involved with Chowder, as you know-

Shepherd: - with what?

Q: With Chowder, the Little Men's Marching and Chowder Society – the Marine Corps' fight on unification later became known as Chowder –

Shepherd: - that's right, I do recall.

Q: Krulak being the Little Man, Chowder being the code name for the group – some of the people who were most deeply involved later suffered career-wise because of this.

Shepherd: Well, who, for example?

Q: Well, Murray, Schatzel –

Shepherd: You mean Jim Murray? Oh, I don't think purposely.

Q: Schatzel later and Twining felt very –

Shepherd: As far as I recall, there was no – that was not planned. I mean, whether they were promoted or selected or not. I don't know, but I don't think there was any, I never heard of anything directly that knocked them out. I remember Schatzel. He might not have been selected, but I don't think it had anything to do with this fight. No, I do not. No, Ben (interruption) – I don't recall that at all. Schatzel was an able man; Twining was an extremely able man.

(Off-tape discussion)

Shepherd: Well, there was a great deal of controversy, and we came in for considerable criticism and so forth, and there were those perhaps who were willing to sacrifice, knuckle down to the Navy.

Q: Worton, for instance, must have been hurt by this.

Shepherd: I don't think so, necessarily. Worton, unfortunately – he's a very, very dear friend of mine and a fine Marine, but he never saw any combat during World War II. Unfortunately when he was chief of staff of the 5<sup>th</sup> Division, he was participating in a practice landing, and broke his ankle in jumping from a boat. That invalidated him home and he never got into combat. I think this kept him from being promoted to major general when he came up for selection, with a group who had all seen combat service in the Pacific.

Q: He was being transferred. They were having a conference for Iwo Jima, and Erskine never like to fly, didn't like to make these long trips. So he sent Worton to supervise the division's landing exercises. It was on one of these that Worton broke his ankle.

Shepherd: Well, anyway, that kept him from making the landing at Iwo Jima. Besides, a great deal of Worton's service had been with the fleet landing the Marine Corps Schools as well as a Chinese language student. I don't think General Worton ever got in combat during World War II. I think that's what hurt him. He came up with a group of officers that had had considerable combat experience and I think that's why he was not selected.

Q: Of course, he also had this big run-in with Forrestal, when he relieved Edson, I think, as liaison officer.

Shepherd: I don't think he had a run-in.

Q: Not Forrestal, with Forrest Sherman.

Shepherd: Well, yes, that's true. Forrest Sherman was not in favor of the Marine Corps becoming a separate entity in the Navy, and he fought this tooth and nail. I was in a very delicate position, when I took over as Commandant because I could not become too involved officially and be loyal to my superiors. I knew what was going on unofficially, but I could not, as Commandant, direct the activities of those working for separation of the Marine Corps from the naval establishment.

Q: When you were Commandant, the Marine Corps was in pretty good shape.

Shepherd: Yes, when I was Commandant, the Corps was in excellent shape. Due to the Korean War we had called back to active duty a number of World War II veterans in the Reserve who made possible the initial success we attained at Inchon.

Q: You were made a member of the JCS while CMC. Do you have any comment on this?

Shepherd: General Omar Bradley was chairman when I was made a member of the JCS. Although he had opposed the bill making me a member of this body for Marine Corps matters only, we got along very well together officially. When Admiral Radford was made chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff my relationship with the Chiefs greatly improved due to my close association with Radford while I was serving directly under his command as CGFMFPAC. When he became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff we had a heart-to-heart talk. He said, "You are on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Marine Corps matters only. I want to make that perfectly clear but because of my confidence in you as a field soldier I intend to call on you for your opinions when other matters are under discussion," so I did not always withdraw when matters other than Marine Corps affairs were being discussed. Often, when I would ask to be excused after the completion of Marine Corps matters, Radford would say, "Lem, I want you to stay and listen to this discussion." I didn't take part in them but after the meeting was over Radford would say, "What do you think of the matter we were discussing?" and I would give him my thoughts on the subject. It was a very fine relationship and I feel did a great deal to establish the CMC in a firm position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Q: What about the trip you made to Sea Island, Georgia, to speak at the meeting of the powerful Business Men's Association?

Shepherd: I was invited down to Sea Island, Georgia, to make a talk to the members of this organization. It was shortly after I became Commandant. It was the first year, I think because I'd just come back from Korea. It was at their fall meeting just after Eisenhower had been elected President. One of the executives in this group, I think his name was Phelan, whose son had been killed in Korea, was present and I was able to tell about this boy's courage in combat. He was recommended for a Medal of Honor, which he received

posthumously, during this meeting, just after Eisenhower's election. Several of the men were asked to serve in his cabinet. I was sitting on the terrace of the club Sunday morning talking with Mr. Charlie Wilson and he asked me if I wanted a swim. I said, "Yes, I like to swim, Mr. Wilson." So he said, "Come on, let's go swimming." While we were out there swimming off Sea Island, Bob Stephens, who was the secretary of the group came out on the beach and called Mr. Wilson in as he was wanted on the telephone. It turned out later that the call was from Mr. Eisenhower who asked Mr. Wilson to be his Secretary of Defense. As it turned out, Bob Stephens became Secretary of War, Harold Talbot who was there became Secretary of the Air Force, and George Humphrey became Secretary of the Treasury. During the three days I was with this group I had gotten to know them quite well. We'd been wining and dining together. I remember after midnight one night making scrambled eggs in the kitchen with the group who later became the principal members of President Eisenhower's Cabinet. So when they came to Washington, I knew them on a first hand basis. Bob Stephens is still a very good friend of mine, Harold Talbot, whom I got to know when he became Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Wilson, Secretary of Defense – so I had the advantage of knowing them personally before they came to Washington. It made a very nice relationship officially as I could go into any one of their offices and immediately be recognized and warmly greeted.

Q: You could talk to them man to man?

Shepherd: Yes, talk to them man to man. Bob Anderson came to Washington as Secretary of the Navy and we became good friends. Francis Whitehair became Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He'd been a Marine and we formed a warm friendship. It was through this friendship with Anderson and Whitehair, Anderson particularly, that we were able to get General Order No. 10, or whatever the number is, (Note: No. 5), put into effect which really gave the Marine Corps its autonomy. Although the law had been passed, the law was not specific in just delineating just exactly the missions of the Marine Corps and the Commandant's relationship with the Navy Chief of Naval Operations. These were set forth in writing as we had written them, by Bob Anderson thanks to my personal friendship with him. I can remember so well, when I went over to Mr. Anderson with the proposed order. Wasn't it General Order No. 10? I don't remember which it was. Anyhow, he said, "Well, Lem, I'd like to take this home this weekend and study it," and he spent the entire weekend studying over it, and he came back Monday morning and sent for me and said, "I think you Marines have got a good point here – legally;" he was a lawyer. "I think you're absolutely right in your claims."

And it was based on this study my staff had prepared that we were able to get General Order No. 10 (sic) placed into effect, which gave us our independent status without question. Sherman had been fighting this thing all along but had died in Spain with a heart attack and Fechteler came in as the new CNO. Fechteler and I got along fine. I'd known him before, we

became good friends, and then Carney followed after him. I was on a very close and intimate first name basis with both Fechteler and Carney. We were able to accomplish many things which we wouldn't perhaps have been able to have done otherwise.

Q: I want to get back – or maybe in our next session we'll talk about it – the choice of Vandegrift's successor – I understand that both you and Cates were told that both of you were under consideration to succeed General Vandegrift.

Shepherd: Yes, that's right. We were both considered and the decision was made by President Truman in person. He called Cates and me to the White House and said, "You both have excellent records. Cates is senior and three years older. I am going to make him Commandant this time and will make you CMC after Cates."

Q: It's 12:00 and the tape has run out. Shall we call it a day?

**End Session #4.**

***Interview with General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Ret.)***

La Jolla, California, by Mr. Benis M. Frank

Interview #5, 22 February 1967

Q: During our first session when Colonel Heinl came down with us to Warrenton, we discussed you taking over as commanding general of FMFPAC and the involvements concerning Korea. As you recall, he discussed that with you and you discussed it with him in considerable depth. Since that's on the tape and on the record, I don't want to go over that, but I'd like to discuss other matters concerning your tenure as commanding general of FMFPAC, such as the situation with FMFPAC troops, Air FMFPAC, and the garrisons in the Pacific Ocean areas, and other matters that came under your cognizance, other decisions that were made while you were at Pearl.

Shepherd: Of course, when I took over FMFPAC, we had a very small force of Marines. It was during that very low ebb of the Johnson administration when he was Secretary of Defense. The Marine Corps and all the services had been reduced to a very minimum. I think General Vandegrift said that he'd be happy if we were able to obtain a personnel strength of 60,000 or 70,000. When Korea broke, we had to call in the Reserves. Every corporal's guard was reduced by 50 percent. By so doing, we were able to muster first a brigade and then the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division for duty in Korea. But that very nearly stripped the Marine Corps as far as personnel for regular duty assignments were concerned. You were asking about Force Troops. I don't think we had any Force Troops in those days.

Q: I think General Twining had the Training Replacement Command which later became Force Troops.

Shepherd: Well, maybe so, but Force Troops as they are known today – we certainly didn't have anything like that. They were more or less a paper organization. I don't recall any specific Force Troops. My recollection is not clear on that point. But we didn't have them in being. We had a small number of Force Troops in Honolulu at my headquarters, yes, but not in Korea.

Q: I mean at Pendleton.

Shepherd: At Pendleton, oh yes, we had a limited Force Troops organization there. You had to have some sort of basic organization. There was an organization of Force Troops at Pendleton and Lejeune but they were not large. When we formed the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division we stripped the bulk of the personnel in Force Troops to bring the Division up to its war strength tables of organization. It became obvious to me, after I'd gotten over the first flush of Inchon and gotten back to my headquarters and was able to look around, that my staff was totally inadequate to take care of the tremendous work load of personnel and supplies that were being shipped out to Korea. We worked 12 hours a day practically, from 8 in the morning to 7 o'clock at night. My staff worked on Sundays, a seven day week. Thank heavens they were very proficient at their duties, and we were able to turn the work

out, but the tremendous job of handling the replacement of troops, and supplies was one of great magnitude. I felt it was my responsibility to insure that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division received its replacements of personnel and supplies. I'd gotten the troops out to Korea and turned them over to General O.P. Smith, but I felt responsible for their resupply and replacement for casualties sustained. Anything to do with Korea I felt was my responsibility.

So we went to work on that. In my job at FMFPAC there had been, as I recall, no deputy commander or commander of the Marines regularly on duty at posts in the Pacific, aside from the Fleet Marine Forces. Pacific Ocean area – they were the garrison troops?

Q:

Shepherd: Yes, the garrison troops.

Q:

And you had a headquarters, I think Roise, Paul Sherman was the CO.

Shepherd:

But there was very little attention paid to them. I visited a number of these isolated stations and came to the conclusion that all of the Marines in the Pacific should be under the command of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific.

Q:

That's right. They were the Garrison Forces Pacific.

Shepherd:

But they were not part of the Fleet Marine Force.

Q:

They were part of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Shepherd:

Yes, this was a separate command, but they were Marines and it was my responsibility as the senior Marine commander in the Pacific to inspect them. There was another commander for them, I've forgotten who it was, but I felt that every Marine in the Pacific should be directly under the command of the Fleet Marine Force Commander and I was able to convince General Cates of this. We discussed it, and made several staff studies on it. Finally during my administration, it became a fair accomplishment, that the CG FMFPAC commands all Marines in the Pacific. I visited all the posts where Marines were stationed. Guam, Philippines, Japan, Alaska, etc., and was able to personally discuss with the various naval commanders the problems that existed and to talk to the commanding officers of the various detachments. They all had their problems. In that way I believe I was able to help the Marine Corps, which is as it should be.

To come back a minute to the logistic support of troops in the Far East during the Korean War – I don't recall whether I touched on this in my first session with you or not, so I will do so now. It became obvious to me from my frequent trips to Korea that there was a considerable loss of personnel due to the evacuation to the United States of men with minor wounds who, with a month's rest could return to their units. The feeling at the time was, "Back to the States," when a man was wounded. With the scarcity of replacements, we were flying what few were available out by air to get them to Korea to fill the ranks of the depleted forces in combat. I felt that we couldn't afford, just because a man had a minor wound, to let him go back to the States. We'd probably never see him again. So I instituted a Rest and Rehabilitation Camp near Kyoto, I think it was.

Q:

There was one at Itami.

Shepherd: Itami, yes, I guess that was it.

Q: There was an air facility there.

Shepherd: Yes, those names get away from me. The one I am referring to was near Kyoto. We were able to get a large hotel, that our occupational troops in Japan were not using, and I organized a regular R-and-R center there. In other words, a man came out of the hospital with mild wounds; he would go down there for rehabilitation, and spend a month or whatever time necessary to get back on his feet, and from there, back to duty in Korea as replacements.

It's the same sort of thing that I had experienced in France in World War I, when I was sent from the hospital down to Biarritz for a month where I was able to get my strength back, have a little recreation, and then back to the lines again. I think I saved a tremendous amount of transportation of personnel back and forth across the sea, because we had doctors in the R-and-R camp who were able to determine when a patient could return to duty. The R-and-R camp was for those with minor wound or for battle fatigue. A number of my officers, I think one of my aides, Joe Fegan, went back to an R-and-R camp for a while.

Q: Of course they didn't have R-and-R in World War II. Perhaps it would have made a lot of difference, as far as keeping up the strength and the morale of personnel as far as divisions were concerned.

Shepherd: That's right. You go back somewhere where you can get a little break and then come back to your unit refreshed and it takes a big load off the manpower pipeline as it took a month or more for a shipload of replacements to join combat organizations in Korea after leaving the States.

Q: - a major accomplishment -

Shepherd: It was a big step in the right direction, as far as the Korean War was concerned. This supply problem was our greatest difficulty. We had to fly replacements out by commercial air. General MacArthur chartered planes, commercial planes, to fly his replacements across the Pacific, which was quite a flight in those days. But troops were needed so badly that it required action of this nature.

Q: While you had FMFPAC I was on your staff as assistant force historical officer and I saw it all first hand.

Shepherd: Yes, I remember that you did a good job.

Q: As a matter of fact, to get this on the record, I wrote up the FMFPAC War Diary each month. I could see what was going on. Now, you had cognizance over this whole personnel and logistical situation. Do you recall that there were any particular shortages, any particular problems, individual problems which cropped up regarding supply or logistics? Was the division ever short of anything?

Shepherd: Not to my knowledge. Do you recall any that you could refresh my mind on?

Q: No. The only major problem that I recall, and I wasn't to discuss this with you, as far as Korea was concerned - this was something that you into with both feet - was this Joint Operations Center, this air support problem. I



think you sent Lieutenant Colonel Hewitt out at that time to make an investigation why the division was not getting all the air support it wanted, and I think it was the 5<sup>th</sup> Air force that had full control of this joint operation center at Seoul, and the tremendous lag between the time the infantry unit requested air support to the time it got it, and it never always got Marine air support.

Shepherd: You're quite right. What you have just said is so true. The battle was still going on at that time between the Air Force and the Army and we were in the picture. The Air Force, I believe, was still part of the Army then, wasn't it? I think so. Anyhow, we Marines had become trained to a high degree of perfection in close air support which was developed by the Marine Corps in Nicaragua and we used it effectively in World War II. Having just come out of the Marine Corps Schools, I was cognizant of the capabilities of close air support as we Marines used it. But the Army didn't understand our procedure and the Air Force refused to follow it because they claimed it endangered their planes, when they came down close to the ground. They wanted to use only high level bombing where their planes wouldn't get close to the ground. But we used it so effectively at Inchon that we convinced General MacArthur and General Almond, his chief of staff, that our system was the best. We showed the great firepower capabilities of a battalion commander being able to call a plane in on a target within a matter of minutes. The Army was enthusiastic but the Air Force didn't cotton to it. We did make progress in convincing the Army our close air support system worked and they organized this Joint Communications Center, as you call it. I believe there was another name for it.

Q: Joint Operations Center.

Shepherd: Yes. The JOC was a step forward but that was as far as the Air Force would go at the time. The Air Force generals at the Far Eastern Command Headquarters would not accept the Marine SOP for close air support in its entirety.

Q: Partridge I think was the Air Force General on MacArthur's staff.

Shepherd: Partridge? Yes, but there were other Air Force generals and they wouldn't give. They did organize this JOC but it took too long to get a plane on target. I had example after example where a call would come in from a front line battalion for air support. It would go back to regiment, it would be monitored there, then it would go back to the division to be monitored there, then it would go back to this Air Force organization –

Q: - JOC-

Shepherd: Yes, JOC – and then to the Air Force to decide whether or not they would authorize the strike. Well, by the time they'd made all these decisions an hour later, the plane would arrive but it was too late. That was one of the biggest bugaboos we had out there, convincing the Air Force we had to have these planes overhead during combat, not on an airfield well to the rear. But it was the old argument that had gone on for years, in the difference between what we knew as close air support, where the battalion

or regimental or division commander on the ground had his aviation officer right with him and when he called for air support, the planes that were circling overhead were under his command and came down on the designated target at once. Of course the aviator on the ground, the forward observer as he is called, would decide whether it was practical to call for a strike on the target the battalion commander desired. The point is, they were under one command and this, the Air Force would not acknowledge. That's why they wouldn't accept our close support doctrine. The Air Force insisted they had to decide whether it was necessary to honor the ground commander's request for air support and not the commander on the ground. That was the great point of difference between the two.

Q: At that time the Air Force was using all its planes to bomb the lines of communications and supplies coming in and using the tactical air, that is, fighter aircraft for these missions. You'll recall one of the problems was to get Marine planes to support Marine ground troops.

Shepherd: That's right. We had great difficulty doing that. When I was in Tokyo I attended the excellent briefing that was given every morning in General MacArthur's headquarters. The Air Force briefing officer would get up and recount all the targets that had been bombed. "We hit this bridge, we hit that bridge, we bombed that rail center," and so forth, and it went on for some time. They claimed they were knocking out all these targets. They called it "Operation Strangle." They stated their planes strangled everything coming down from North Korea.

Well, I personally smelled a nigger in the woodpile. It didn't look feasible to me. The truck traffic was still coming south; the railroads were still running so how in the heck were they knocking them out as they claimed? After we made our Inchon landing, we found the bridges the Air Force claimed they had knocked out, intact. It was a lot of baloney. I think they may have thought they were hitting them. I don't say they were purposely making false statements. But on the other hand, they did not hit a lot of the targets that they had claimed that they had hit. So you never knew just what had been destroyed. We found the electric plants they claimed had been knocked out, still running. It was always a question in my own mind how effective their bombing was. They might have dropped their bombs from 20,000 feet on what they thought was the target, but they were not hitting it; they may have hit some of the targets. But it was an entirely different situation from Europe in World War II. In Europe they had wonderful maps and they had plenty of bombers, and they were able to do saturation bombing, but in Korea it was pinpoint bombing which, frankly, I don't think they were able to do – satisfactorily, anyhow.

Q: When the Marines had to withdraw from the Chosin Reservoir you and General (then Colonel) Krulak made a number of trips to Korea. Did you get up to the Hagaru-ri where they had a strip?

Shepherd: Yes, I was up at Hagaru-ri. I was at the reservoir.

Q: You were on the reservoir?

Shepherd: Oh, yes. I went up to the reservoir during the fighting there.

Q: It was very cold.

Shepherd: It was extremely cold. Didn't I touch on that before?

Q: No, sir. We didn't deal with that.

Shepherd: Well, to refresh your memory; following Inchon, General MacArthur conceived the idea of sending the Marines who were part of the 10<sup>th</sup> Corps, around to the east coast of Korea and make a landing at Wonsan. He hoped to get in rear of the North Korean Army as he had done by his landing at Inchon.

Q: Hungnam?

Shepherd: Hungnam was where we came out. It was Wonsan where we landed. It was MacArthur's plan to initiate an offensive on the east side of Korea. We made a tactical landing at Wonsan; I think General Puller's regiment landed at Wonsan. There was very little if any resistance. Then we started marching north. This was in October I believe. The tactical concept was to go to the Yalu which was supposed to be the northern boundary of North Korea.

Q: You had no orders to cross the Yalu into Manchuria?

Shepherd: No, definitely not. As a matter of fact, General MacArthur had a great deal of difficulty getting permission to cross the 45<sup>th</sup> Parallel which divided North and South Korea;

Q: 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

Shepherd: Yes, it was the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. MacArthur had great difficulty in getting permission from the President and Joint Chiefs to cross this parallel. The delay gave the North Koreans an opportunity to re-organize their forces but we had no great difficulty in making the Wonsan landing as there was no organized resistance in this area. General Smith brought in the division and began his advance northward. He did a superb job in covering his flanks all the way up to Chosin Reservoir. I wish I had a map here. It's hard to remember just where these places are.

General Almond, who commanded the 10<sup>th</sup> Corps, having been a schoolmate of mine at VMI always made me welcome at his headquarters, and he treated me with the greatest courtesy. I made several trips to Korea during this period, first when they landed at Wonsan and then after the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division had marched up to the reservoir.

When reports came back that the cold weather had set in and they weren't able to make the Yalu River and things began falling apart, Admiral Radford sent me out to Korea with orders, I think they came from the Chief of Naval Operations on the recommendation of Admiral Joy, that was to take charge of the evacuation of the Marines from Hungnam. Although there was a conflict of command because Almond was actually in command of the 10<sup>th</sup> Corps, I was charged specifically to supervise the evacuation of the naval forces (Marines) from Hungnam. With the situation as it was, Admiral Joy did not want another Dunkirk. When I first arrived, they were still up on the reservoir. Naturally I wanted to get up there myself and see what it was like. So I got a plane and flew up there. It was very cold. We were about halfway up to the reservoir. I saw a little smoke

coming from the cockpit where I was seated. It looked to me like something was burning in the plane so I sent a not to the aviator, "I think something's on fire back there." When we returned to the airfield the pilot discovered a small fire which had started from a defective battery which was smoking. I've often thought what would have happened if we had conked out up there on the reservoir. After the battery had been replaced we started again and flew up to the landing strip at Koto-ri after circling over the reservoir area where the Marines had been fighting which I wished to look over, especially Hagaru-ri.

Q: I want to ask a question at this point. This is a matter of controversy and conjecture -. The division going up to the reservoir at the end of November – reports had been sent back that they were in contact with Chinese Communist troops who appeared to have entered the war. As I recall this was being pooh-poohed by Willoughby and by MacArthur's headquarters as not so. Yet this of course was the indication that China had entered the war, so-called Chinese Peoples Volunteers – and that the Marines were fighting a new breed of cats.

Shepherd: That is correct. There was a period of controversy on this point as to whether the Chinese Communists were actually entering the war. I remember very well when I was on one of those trips up into North Korea. I believe it was before the cold weather had set in, we captured several Chinese prisoners. I personally saw them and spoke with the officer-in-charge of the prisoner camp who identified them definitely as Chinese. When I returned to Tokyo I told General MacArthur about seeing these Chinese soldiers and he seemed extremely interested. "Are you sure they were Chinese?" MacArthur asked. "Yes, I personally saw these Chinese prisoners and the intelligence officer who had talked to them stated definitely they were Chinese. There were six of them I think it was."

The Chinese Communists were getting into the war all right; there wasn't any question about it. But it wasn't too long a period from the time the 1<sup>st</sup> Division first encountered the Chinese until the withdrawal began.

Q: That's right.

Shepherd: It didn't go on for any extended period.

Q: It was near the end, because I had reported in to Headquarters Marine Corps on December 1<sup>st</sup>, and Colonel Krulak was back at Headquarters at that time for some reason, and he took off like a big bird.

Shepherd: I sent for him.

Q: That's right, because at this time is when –

Shepherd: - things began to fall apart.

Q: That's right, and the withdrawal from the reservoir began.

Shepherd: That's when they sent me up to Hungnam, and I flew up to the reservoir. To continue my story – when we finally got up to the reservoir, where General Smith was, I visited his headquarters, and spent some time, an hour or so with him.

Q: Was he concerned about the situation?

Shepherd: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, he had orders to withdraw at that time and all preparations had been made for the march down to Hungnam.

To go back a little bit – in flying up to the reservoir I told the pilot to circle the Hagaru-ri area at a low altitude as I wished to look over this defensive position where the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines had quite a battle and did a great job in resisting a number of attacks by the North Korean and Chinese forces.

Q: That's where they tried to cut off the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines from the remainder of the division which was at Koto-ri.

Shepherd: Yes, that's right, that had all taken place and at the time I was fully cognizant of what had taken place from reports I had received. I wanted to see just where these operations took place.

Colonel Litzenberg commanded the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines and did a great job. I also talked to Jim Murray about the 5<sup>th</sup>. They also did a great job.

Q: Ray Murray had the 5<sup>th</sup>.

Shepherd: Ray Murray, yes, he did a wonderful job in this fight. I think that was the trip before that last one, as I remember it.

Q: Probably it was the last trip after the decision had been made to begin the withdrawal.

Shepherd: No, I think it was before that last trip. It doesn't make any great difference. It is all a little vague now. The point is that I flew over and around this area. I wanted to see the ground where the Marines had fought so valiantly almost up to the Yalu. I got a good picture of the whole area in which the fighting had taken place. I then landed at Koto-ri and visited General Smith's headquarters. This was on my last trip to North Korea.

Q: Yes, this was probably just before the division withdrew.

Shepherd: Yes, the division had orders to withdraw. I went up to the reservoir to march down with them. That was the purpose of my going up there. I wanted to march down with General Smith and his division. They had orders to withdraw, the plans had been made, they were to leave that day, and that was the last flight of a plane to Koto-ri.

Q: This strip was where they were evacuating the wounded, wasn't it?

Shepherd: Yes, Koto-ri. I spent some time with General Smith and his staff, going over the situation. The plans had already been made to begin their march down early the next morning. I expressed the desire to march down with the column, but General Smith didn't cotton to the idea and I don't blame him. He didn't want me, his overall commander, in his hair. I can fully understand that.

Q: I think perhaps he was more concerned about your safety.

Shepherd: Well, perhaps that was it.

Q: It was very rough.

Shepherd: I believed I could take care of myself, but it was not appropriate that I be in his hair, so to speak, on that march down, although my heart was there. That's what I went up there for, to march down with the troops. I'd been there when they landed at Inchon and I wanted to be there when they withdrew from this position. I grant you, it was not the place for an overall

commander. It was with regret however, when I left the division, I told Smith goodbye, wished him luck, and went back to the strip to embark in my plane. As the plane was warming up, Colonel Puller came up to me holding Maggie Higgins by her hand and said, "General Smith says, "Take this woman out of his hair and see that she goes out on your plane! Will you please do that for him? He does not wish her to march down with the troops, as she wishes to do." Well, I'd met Maggie before as she had landed with the troops at Inchon and I had talked to her several times during this operation. I said, "Maggie, it's too bad, I wanted to march down took and General Smith objected to my doing so. I can see how he doesn't want another burden on his chest during this withdrawal." It was just about dusk when the plane was ready to take off. We placed the last of the wounded aboard this C-47, and taxied to one end of the strip. The North Koreans and Chinese held the other end of the airstrip. When the pilot had gotten the plane warmed up, the Marines holding one end of the strip put down a mortar barrage to make the North Koreans on the other end of the airstrip take cover. As we took off, I was sitting in the radio operator's seat just behind the pilot and Maggie was sitting just opposite me in the navigator's seat. As we taxied down the runway and slowly gained altitude I could see the tracer machine gun bullets crossing over and under our plane. It was tense moment and I said to Maggie, "If we get hit, we will die in each other's arms." We were that close together facing each other.

Fortunately the plane was not hit and we landed safely at the airfield at Hungnam. It was an experience I have never forgotten. After the war, Maggie married an Air Force general named Bill Hall and they bought a home near Warrenton which I lived after retiring from the Marine Corps. I saw the Halls occasionally and Maggie and I would enjoy telling this story to our friends.

Q: Of course, there's been a lot of conjecture and a lot of argument about Maggie's being with the Marines. Do you think that the front line was any place for a woman, even if she is a newspaper reporter?

Shepherd: I can't see any great difference myself between a woman like Maggie Higgins and this other reporter, Dickey Chappelle, who were physically capable of living in the field, who wore the same dungarees that the Marines were wearing. You could hardly tell them apart. They didn't bother anybody. They didn't get in anybody's hair. Some of the senior commanders didn't like them but they were writing a story and telling a story to the American public. I'll go a step further; Maggie Higgins had been with the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines during the Inchon landing. She had come off the ramp with the first waves there and was shot at. Fortunately she wasn't hit. But she inspired the men. The fact that there was a woman with them gave them a lift. I don't think it did any harm. As a matter of fact, I think Maggie became sort of a Jean d'Arc. He men worshipped her, the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines and they were disappointed when she was not permitted to go down from the reservoir with them. It was General Smith's decision. He was concerned for her safety. I do not criticize him for that, but I do not

think it would have hurt anyone if she had been able to march down from the reservoir with the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division just like any other reporter. I don't think it would have done any harm and it might have inspired the column. I grant you, it was no place for a woman. It was a hard decision to make. I wouldn't have let her do anything a man reporter wasn't permitted to do, but on the other hand I think I'd let her do what a man reporter would do. I can't see differentiating between the two. If reporters want to stick their necks out – a newspaperman – there's no reason to stop them. Carl Mydans was up there; David Duncan was getting pictures up there; why shouldn't she be up there also? She didn't bother anybody. I don't know how she handled her private affairs, but there wasn't any difference between them as far as their job as newspaper reporters was concerned.

Q: Getting back to helicopter operations – the use of the helicopter.

Shepherd: We brought a squadron of helicopters with us to Korea you know. We had developed a technique in using our helicopter. They didn't have any at that time. They were very much sought after and they did a magnificent job, particularly in rescuing a downed aviator. What they're doing today was begun in Korea. That was the first time they were employed in combat operations.

Q: The helicopter was used in laying wire, wasn't it?

Shepherd: Yes, and various other things. They were extremely useful to get right up to the front lines. Why, some of those precipitous mountains in Korea where CPs were located – it would have taken days or hours at least to get up to them if we had to go by jeeps and on foot. In a helicopter we could fly right up to a CP and land on a 20 foot square pad where we could see what was going on without all day's trek up a steep mountainside.

Q: Also while you were FMFPAC, there was an increased emphasis on naval gunfire and naval gunfire training of all elements of the Pacific fleet, including the Canadian and other allied ships. I think it was under the aegis of FMFPAC headquarters that naval gunfire training was conducted at Kahoolawe. Now, had that been done before you got out there or was it something that your staff developed? I remember you had a lieutenant commander naval gunfire officer, I forget his name.

Shepherd: Well, Ben, I can't say specifically whether it had been done before or not.

Q: I recall it had been done in World War II.

Shepherd: I will say this, that I became very enthusiastic about the use of naval gunfire. To go back to the days when I was in the Marine Corps Schools, when we developed the techniques of naval gunfire support. It was at Culebra and Vieques that we made the first tests, the first firing with live ammunition. It was another one of General Barrett's projects that I mentioned in a previous interview. Due to the success obtained, I was very conscious of the effectiveness of naval gunfire and familiar with the techniques of its use, as I was in an observation post on Vieques and watched the first firing that was conducted by Navy destroyers on the east end of Vieques. It was the year I conducted the defense of Vieques – 1939 – I believe it was, so I was thoroughly aware of the effectiveness of naval

gunfire. Then in World War II we used it. General Krulak, who at that time was my G-3 in the Sixth Marine Division, was very well informed on the effectiveness of naval gunfire and we had used it during the Okinawa operation with considerable success.

- Q: Yes, I am aware that you employed naval gunfire whenever possible.
- Shepherd: It was because my division was on the coast, which made it possible to use naval gunfire a great deal. I learned how effective it could be, so when Korea came along, we did the same thing there. We had a naval gunfire school in Honolulu for ships on their way to the Far East. I am not going to go on record to say that we were able to influence the Navy to conduct this training there, but we certainly put a great deal of pressure on CINCPAC Fleet to put the crews of all Navy combatant ships through a uniform system of training. We had a very fine officer in control of this section, and I did everything I could to promote the use of naval gunfire and instruct the Navy in its use.
- Q: It was during your tour as CG FMFPAC, as I recall, that the 1<sup>st</sup> ANGLICO was brought to Pearl Harbor, the pilots and the naval gunfire spotters that had been in Korea. I think they'd been on TAD from Camp Lejeune. Upon their rotation back to the States, the unit as a whole was brought out to Pearl, as you may recall. Parker Colmer, I think, was the office-in-charge of this unit.
- Shepherd: To the best of my recollection that is true. Of course, all those things had been used to a limited extent in World War II – we had used naval gunfire but it was between World War II and Korea that we perfected the techniques which had been earlier developed.
- Q: You had the JASCOs and ASCOs.
- Shepherd: Yes. After the war we gathered all the information we could find together and formed an organization which perfected the techniques. I'll put it this way: which we had used naval gunfire support and the JASCO during World War II, but we improved on the communications especially. So we did have a very effective use of naval gunfire during the Korean War.
- Q: Now, it was during your tenure at FMFPAC that the construction was begun on Kaneohe for an air-ground team.
- Shepherd: That is true. There was a definite need at that time for establishing a force in readiness in the Pacific. I can't recall exactly why we wanted to base this force at Honolulu other than that it was with the foresight that when the Korean War was over the Marine Corps should maintain a force in readiness, and air-ground force somewhere in the Pacific where it could be immediately used for employment where needed, in an emergency such as Korea. And after considering a number of bases it seemed desirable that it be established in the Hawaiian area. We looked at several places; the Parker Ranch was one we considered. It happened that Admiral Radford said to me one day, "Why don't you look at the naval air facility at Kaneohe?" I said, "I certainly will," so I went over there with some of my staff and when we looked over this naval air facility, which I had no idea that the Navy would ever turn loose of, I came to the conclusion that



Kaneohe was a very desirable place to establish this command. We were able to get another smaller airfield a little further down the coast. I don't recall its name. It had been an Air Force field. We were able to get that and another training area on the north side of the island where troops could conduct firing exercises.

So Admiral Radford went to work on it, and we were able to get the Navy to release Kaneohe. The Island government resisted to a degree. They hoped to get it themselves for the people on the island of Oahu. But we were able to get Kaneohe and some money to fix it up. It turned out to be a very fine base for our Fleet Marine Forces in the Pacific.

Q: Wasn't there a deep water port where aircraft carriers could go right up?

Shepherd: Yes, ships could come right into the base, and unload their supplies. It's a marvelous, marvelous base.

Q: Now, your relationships with Admiral Radford were pretty close all the time, were they not?

Shepherd: Very close. I had not know Admiral Radford before I went to the Pacific, but we became close friends while I was serving under him.

Q: Hadn't there been a problem – in relations between FMFPAC and CINCPAC before you took over - they were not of the best?

Shepherd: Well, perhaps they weren't as close as I was able to establish between the two headquarters, I'll put it that way. Since I was working directly under Admiral Radford in the Korean War, that's what really drew us together, and we each respected the other and we became very close friends, as well as working very closely together during this entire period, which later became of considerable value to the Marine Corps when Radford became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because we were on a very close, friendly relationship. I have great admiration for Admiral Radford, his sound judgment, and the way he carried the Korean War forward as far as the Navy and Marines were concerned during the period that he was out there. When at Pearl Harbor, I made it a point to attend the CINCPAC daily conferences, and briefings each morning, which kept me fully informed of everything that went on. I provided his staff with some of the best officers I had. As Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Pacific, I had to work in the closest harmony and cooperation with the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, because if I hadn't, we wouldn't have gotten the job done. He naturally was dependent on us for carrying on the war in Korea, so it was a very fortunate arrangement that the two of us saw eye-to-eye and were able to work so closely together. I was very happy to be able to work with Radford. There was no feeling of jealousy. We had the utmost confidence in each other, and I certainly feel that we had an ideal relationship.

Q: Now, as we ended last time, you were telling me, and I think I want to put it on the record now if you're willing, the conversation you had earlier over your selection as Commandant, the choice between you and Cates.

Shepherd: Well, I was Assistant Commandant under General Vandegrift in the fall of 1946, wasn't it?

Q: 1947, I believe.

Shepherd: The Fall of '47, that's right. I was General Vandegrift's Chief of Staff and Assistant Commandant. General Cates was on duty at Quantico in command of the Marine Corps Schools when the question came up about the selection of a new Commandant. General Cates and I had been friends over many, many years, and frankly neither one of us particularly cottoned to having to become involved in the great responsibilities of the Commandant as the unification fight was going on at the time. Naturally we both would like to become Commandant, but neither of us made any unusual effort to become Commandant.

One morning we were both called to the Secretary of the Navy's office and had lunch with Secretary John Sullivan who was Secretary of the Navy at the time. Both of our names had been sent with several others to the Secretary who, in turn, took our records to the President for his decision as to who would become the new Commandant. That afternoon Mr. Truman – I think this was a commendable thing for him to do – sent for both Cates and me and the Secretary of the Navy, to come to the White House. The President, Mr. Truman, said, "I have gone over both of your military records. You both have had distinguished careers. You're both, in my opinion, well qualified to become Commandant of your Corps." Then he said, "General Shepherd, I've been a military man myself. I've always believed in seniority. General Cates is senior to you, and he's older than you are. I'm going to make him Commandant this year, and I trust that I'll be able to have you follow him four years from now." I think it was a very fine thing for the President of the United States to call us in and tell us personally why he had selected one over the other. And I might add that four years later, when I was out in the Pacific and General Cates' four years as Commandant were drawing to a close and he did not choose to be re-appointed. General Cates went to the President and said, "You recall, you promised General Shepherd that he would follow me when you appoint the next Commandant," and that's what Truman did.

Q: Now, what was the legislation regarding the tenure of the Commandant? Was it for four years or two years?

Shepherd: As I recall there was a law that had been in effect for some time that the Commandant would be appointed for a four-year term. You should be able to tell me when that law was passed.

Q: I don't recall. (Editor's note: The law was passed in 1913.)

Shepherd: All other appointments, Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman, Chief of Staff, Army, were for two years, but it was written in the law that the appointment of the Commandant would be for four years.

Q: Because this matter came up when Pate was selected, he was only selected for two years, was he not? Wasn't there some problem?

Shepherd: Yes, that is correct. He was appointed for two years. It was when Johnson came in as Secretary of Defense, I believe. He didn't wasn't to have an officer on his hands for four years, as head of any of the armed forces, so he violated the law.

Q: It was after Johnson. It was during the Eisenhower Administration that this matter came up. It was either Wilson or –

Shepherd: - no, it wasn't Wilson. Wilson was gone by then.

Q: Who was this man who was with Proctor and Gamble?

Shepherd: Not McNamara.

Q: No, before that – Neil something or other. (Editor's note: McElroy)

Shepherd: Yes, well, that's the one, I think it was, that tried to break down the appointment and said, "Regardless of the law, I'm only going to appoint you for two years." Maybe that was it. But he was violating the law, for the law was written; a four year appointment, which I think it should be.

Q: Now, when was your appointment made definite? As I recall, General Thomas told me, you went out on one of your trips to Korea when General Thomas had the division and asked him if he would like to be your Chief of Staff.

Shepherd: Yes, that is correct.

Q: And you wanted General Thomas to come with you to Headquarters.

Shepherd: - As my chief of staff. Well, after I'd been called back and told I had been selected to succeed Cates as CMC I think I told you a story the other day that we were on such friendly terms that when Cates and I were being considered to succeed Vandegrift, he – General Cates – called me on the telephone one day and said, "Lem, if you're made Commandant will you let me stay at Quantico?" I said, "All right, Clifton, I will promise you that I will do so. I'll ask you, though, if you're made Commandant, to let me go to Quantico." He said, "I will," and that's the way it was. When he became Commandant I went to Quantico. We both loved the station.

I wish to emphasize again that I think General Cates is an outstanding officer, very fair in every respect and very considerate. Neither he no I did any politicking to be made Commandant.

Q: There was some politicking elsewhere, though.

Shepherd: Well, I would rather not discuss that. No comment. Of course both Cates and I were naturally anxious to be Commandant, and I was cognizant some of my friends were putting pressure in various places, but I made no personal effort to promote my selection. When I was called back in, we'll say October 1961 and told by the Secretary of the Navy that I would be made Commandant; I went back to FMF and began to make plans for who I would want for my staff at headquarters. I've always admired General Thomas. He is a very outstanding staff officer and a very close personal friend of mine. On one of my trips out to Korea I asked him if he would like to come back with me to Washington to be my chief of staff. I think I asked General Krulak at that time if he would come back as G-3.

Q: He couldn't have been G-3 because he was only a colonel. He came back as your military secretary. He was G-3 of the division at the time.

Shepherd: You're right, he was my military secretary. General Thomas was Chief of Staff. When they returned to Washington they both went to work on a plan which I initiated when I became CMC on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1952, to put into effect in Headquarters Marine Corps the general staff system. Before

that they'd had the Plans and Policies division and other divisions at Headquarters, but they had never actually placed into full effect the general staff system, as it is known in the services, with a chief of staff. General Thomas became Chief of Staff with the -1, -2, -3, and -4 Sections under him and the Quartermaster, Director of Personnel and other special staff agencies at headquarters. My I say in all modesty, that it had been talked about for years. It wasn't originally necessary, but the time was opportune, and I was able to put it in, against the forces that always object to everything you do. But I feel that was a major contribution to the Marine Corps.

Q: Now, you had, as I recall a tremendous fight on setting up a Fiscal Director and dividing up the responsibilities of Fiscal and Quartermaster, is that correct?

Shepherd: That is correct. Heretofore the Quartermaster General had handled all fiscal matters, and General Hill was a personal friend of mine, since we were young officers together in Washington, in 1921. He was an outstanding officer of the highest caliber, but he had been Quartermaster General for, I think, three terms.

Q: He'd been there for some time, since World War II.

Shepherd: He came in as General Williams' (?) assistant and had at least two terms in this job. General Hill was extremely able and handled his job with great perfection. But I felt, after discussing this matter at great length with several members of my staff, that Pete Hill couldn't live forever and if anything happened to him, fiscal matters in the Marine Corps would be in a bad way. Hill had the figures in his head but he didn't let anybody else know what they were. That's the way he worked. I wanted to have a fiscal director as his assistant. We had received an order to appoint one from the Department of Defense. We were ordered to divide the two jobs up, to have a Quartermaster and a Fiscal Director. They should not be the same person, but Hill just dragged his feet on executing the order. The time came when we had to do something about it. I was getting pressed from the Department of Defense. I talked to General Thomas and my staff who felt strongly that the two jobs should be separated. Finally I brought General Shoup in to take over the fiscal duties at Headquarters. He was under General Hill's instruction for a period of some months and then took over the duties as Fiscal Director, Headquarters, Marine Corps. This eventually led to his becoming Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Q: What about your role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Shepherd: I was in my first year as Commandant as I recall when the law was passed by Congress authorizing the Commandant of the Marine Corps to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters concerning the Marine Corps. I was very fortunate in having Admiral Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the latter part of my term as Commandant. As I've said we had formed a very close friendship. So not only was I welcomed on the staff, but Admiral Radford insisted on my remaining

during all discussions and participating as I deemed appropriate on any decisions that were being made by the other members of the Joint Chiefs.

I might add that I became a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while General Bradley was chairman before Admiral Radford was appointed. This was under the Truman Administration, before Eisenhower took over.

Q: That's right. Eisenhower took over in '53.

Shepherd: Yes. I was there a year before Admiral Radford, the Republican appointee, became chairman. General Omar Bradley was Chairman when I became Commandant. It was in 1952, I believe, that we finally got the law passed authorizing the Commandant to sit on the Joint Chiefs. Before attending my first meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I went to see Bradley and informed him I intended to carry out the provisions of the new law. He said he opposed it himself but not that I was authorized to sit with the Joint Chiefs according to the law; he welcomed me to the staff. Subsequently we became quite good personal friends.

*Tape 1, Side 2.*

Shepherd: While I was Commandant it was a very interesting period. Many things happened, and many important decisions were made at that time which I don't necessarily take full credit for, because I had a very fine staff which gave me counsel on many questions. I am very grateful for the advice which they gave me and which I had sense enough, in many cases, to follow.

Q: What were some of the matters that were discussed on the JCS pertaining to Marines? Of course, Korea was uppermost at this time. Do you recall any of the other matters that were paramount; that were of great concern. . .?

Shepherd: No, frankly, I don't recall any questions of great concern to the Marine Corps, Ben. At the moment recall any specific matter on which we had great discussions. I am sure that there were plenty which came up, but I don't recall them at this late date.

Q: How about some of the decisions you had to make as Commandant? In what way did the Corps change; were matters different at this time?

Shepherd: Gosh, I don't know. I spoke about the forming of the general staff. That was one of the very important things that happened under my administration. I tried to get our uniforms straightened out. I took a great interest in the uniforms that were being worn. Major Harry Elms was a very able officer who worked continuously on improvements and I took a personal interest in that. Although we had a Uniform Board who submitted recommendations, I took a personal interest in their actions and passed on all changes in the uniform. Having served on the Uniform Board as assistant commandant, as I told you previously, I saved the mess jacket and I think we developed a very good set of uniforms for our officers and enlisted men particularly.

Q: How about new bases, new training areas? I think that Twenty-nine Palms was perhaps one of the training areas you established.

Shepherd: Oh yes, I was very keen on having the several training areas on the West Coast which I considered extremely important; the recruit Depot, first for basic indoctrination, and Camp Pendleton for the advanced infantry training. Twenty-nine Palms was where we conducted our training in so-called desert warfare, which we might be called upon to perform and also for the air-ground operations that we were able to conduct there. But Pickle Meadows was one thing that I felt was extremely important. Following that terribly cold winter in northern Korea, where so many men suffered from frostbite, I felt that there was a definite need that we have cold weather training for our troops going to Korea and we acquired the Pickle Meadows area and set up a training camp there under Buck Schmuck. I think he was the first officer assigned to conduct training there.

Q: Yes, I think that he was the first commander.

Shepherd: Well, whoever the first commander was, he did an outstanding job. You'd better check on that name; I'm not sure that Buck was the first one or not.

Q: I know that he was there when I went to Pickle Meadows in '52.

Shepherd: Well, then it was Buck. He had a wonderful training program. My own son, who went through there, said it was of tremendous value to him and obviously all troops went through this training. I thought that it was extremely important that all Marines get cold weather training. Recruits should have, first, the infantry training; going through the infantry training center at Camp Pendleton including schooling in weapons, then the training in cold weather and finally, in desert warfare that you get at Twenty-nine Palms. When I was Commandant, Mr. John Sullivan, former Secretary of the Navy, offered the Marine Corps a place up near Dartmouth where we could do our cold weather training on the east coast, which we did for a while. But I think we've given that up now. I don't know whether we still have that training area or not. I don't think so. But we were given a tract near Dartmouth for cold weather training. We used it for a while for east coast troops but I think it's all done on the west coast now.

Q: What about the public relations of the Corps during your tenure as Commandant? Were we in good standing?

Shepherd: Yes. I think I realized the importance of public relations. Yes, I fully realized the necessity of good public relations. It's very important in any organization. I selected my former chief of staff of the division, General McQueen, John McQueen, to be my PIO and he did an outstanding job during part of the period I was there.

Q: He was the Director of the Division of Public Information, under General Cates' tenure and he stayed on when you came into office.

Shepherd: Was he there with Cates?

Q: Yes, I believe so.

Shepherd: McQueen had been my chief of staff in the Sixth Marine Division. After completing his duty at headquarters, I sent him out to San Diego, where he did a good job also.

Q: Now, at the end of your four years, was there an opportunity to remain as Commandant?

Shepherd: Well, I was approached as to whether I would consider staying on; asked if I would consider a re-appointment. I'm not at all sure that I would have been reappointed. I felt, and I still feel that four years as Commandant, when you've given your best efforts to it is long enough. I know in the olden days Commandants stayed on longer, but I think in a job of that nature, four years as Commandant – and you've just about expended all your efforts and ideas. It is a grueling life that goes on in Washington; fatiguing mentally and physically to every Commandant. At the end of four years I was very glad to relinquish my duties to General Pate.

Q: Now, General Cates, as I recall, could not retire because he had not reached the statutory retirement age.

Shepherd: At that time, yes. Congress had enacted a law that an officer had to stay in the service until he was 62 years of age. General Cates was only 60 when he stepped down as Commandant, so he had two more years to serve before he could retire. He asked to go to Quantico and I naturally sent him there. It was an embarrassing situation, but because of past friendships with General Cates, never once did any matter come up that became an issue between the two of us. As a matter fact, in the early days of my administration, I frequently called General Cates and consulted him on matters affecting decisions in the Marine Corps. Whether those same close and friendly relations would have taken place with other officers, I can't say. But I'm very grateful and shall always be grateful to General Cates for his cooperation with me, as was shown – when he proposed my name to Mr. Truman for appointment as Commandant as his successor. We worked together in closest harmony until his final retirement two years later.

Q: Congress subsequently passed a law at the time you were Commandant that you could retire after being Commandant, or was it that you had reached retirement age?

Shepherd: I think I'd reached retirement age. I'm not sure. General Cates stayed on, as I recall, for several years, though.

Q: He stayed on until retirement age.

Shepherd: I think it was about four years later when he really retired, wasn't it?

Q: Marines could retire at 62. When Cates retired, I forget whether it was in 1954 or 1953.

Shepherd: Well, whenever it was, Cates remained at Quantico until he retired.

Q: But when it came time for you to step down, how old were you then?

Shepherd: I had another two years to do before reaching retirement age as I recall it. In other words, I was 60 years of age when I retired from the Marine Corps after a four year appointment as Commandant.

Q: You retired in '55.

Shepherd: I retired December 31<sup>st</sup>, 1955. I still had another two years before reaching forced retirement age. I was born in 1896. Figure that one out. But I was eligible to stay on at least two more years, I believe. But I felt that the time had come to make a change, and I had the opportunity to become chairman

of the Inter-American Defense Board, and I was very pleased to accept this job after retirement. I was on that duty for three years and eight months.

Q: During – two matters came up, within a couple of years of each other that affected the Marine Corps image to a certain degree. One, of course, during General Pate’s tenure, dealt with Ribbon Creek and the death of several Marine recruits, and this became a matter of considerable discussion in the newspapers in this country. During your tenure there was this matter of Colonel Schwable, who had been a POW. Now, how did you feel about this situation, this Schwable matter particularly? How did you feel it should be handled?

Shepherd: My decision regarding Colonel Schwable was one of the most difficult tasks I think I ever had to perform. I personally informed Colonel Schwable that I felt that there should be a board of investigation of his case.

I’d known Schwable, and I’d known his wife and her family, Dr. and Mrs. Bev Pollard. I think I attended the Schwable’s wedding. They were married in Haiti, as I recall. We all served together in Haiti and I was very fond of the Pollards. Dr. Pollard was a captain in the Navy Medical Corps. When Colonel Schwable was shot down behind the lines in Korea, I had the unpleasant duty of going to his wife and informing her – which I did in person – that her husband was shot down and was a prisoner-of-war in Korea.

After the Korean War was over and the prisoners released, the question arose whether those who had not resisted the Communist pressure to admit the United States was fighting a war of aggression should be punished. Schwable had even gone so far as to say the United States was using germ warfare gas and to agree to other things which were untrue. I felt that he had overstepped the bound of propriety and that some disciplinary action had to be taken. It was a very difficult thing to do, but nevertheless I felt it my duty as Commandant to impress upon all Marines that Marines don’t talk when they’re prisoners.

Schwable and I were friends, and I called him into my office and talked to him. I said, “I know I might very well have done the same thing that you did, but nevertheless we must uphold certain standards,” and that I regretted I would have to have his case investigated. There was a great deal of criticism, of course, that I had made an issue of Schwable’s case. I recall when this matter was being discussed with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense that the Air Force did not wish to take any action on the officers that were coming back who talked too much. I think O’Donnell was Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force at the time. I think that was what his name was, and he wanted to brush the whole matter under the rug. But I held out that we should uphold certain principles of integrity in dealing with prisoners-of-war.

The result of this incident was the appointment of a board, a Prisoner-of-War Board, which General Edson headed. I think for a while I sat on that board. The board recommended and the Secretary of Defense



approved, "The Code of Conduct for Prisoners-of-War," which I think was a very fine thing for the armed services.

Q: Marines, generally speaking, who'd been taken prisoner, came out quite well did they not?

Shepherd: Quite well. I felt that since it was necessary, I won't say to punish, but to take cognizance of those that had not upheld the traditions of the Corps to a degree that I felt that they should, and that those who had resisted the North Koreans should be rewarded. For this reason I recommended that they receive decorations for their resistance to pressures by the enemy. Is that correct?

Q: Yes, that is correct. There were several.

Shepherd: There were several that were awarded decorations, as I recall, and were complimented and exonerated completely. I felt very sorry that I had to order a Board of Inquiry to officially determine the extent of Colonel Schwable's actions while he was a POW. I bore him no personal malice, but as Commandant I felt that I must uphold the standards of the Marine Corps and the code of an officer. He had given aid and comfort to the enemy which is a serious offence in war, even if it was under pressure, under great force. I mean, I think the North Koreans put poor Schwable in a hole and kept him there on bread and water. They put him under the glare of lights and I think when he signed certain statements, which I believe he finally admitted doing, it was done under great stress which was unfair to him. I don't think the boy would have done it in his right mind, but I think great pressure was put on him to admit certain things that were not true.

Q: There's always been a certain amount of conflict between Marine aviation and Marine ground. In combat we depended to a very large extent on air support. Aviators are a different breed of cat, and while they wore Marine uniforms, their attitudes in many cases, I'm sure you will agree, was quite different. Would you care to comment on this, sir?

Shepherd: That is quite true. I recall that while I was Assistant Commandant, the CMC issued an order that before going into naval aviation, those that were accepted must have served at least two years with the line. I felt that this was very important; that an officer who had just graduated from the Naval Academy and become a Marine Corps aviator, where he was under the influence of naval aviation should at least have a taste of what it was like to be a Marine ground officer. If he was to work with the ground forces, he should have had some experience with them.

So I insisted that they should have experience as a ground officer two years before they went to aviation. Of course, the aviators wanted to get prospective aviators as soon as possible. They needed more officers, and they wanted young officers as soon as they could obtain them.

Yes, there were certain disagreements between the Aviation Section of the Marine Corps and the Commandant, which I endeavored in every way to overcome. I made General Harris my Assistant Commandant for Air. I did everything I could to bring Marine aviation and Marine ground officers together so there would not be any friction. How well I

succeeded, I don't know. There will probably always be certain differences of opinion between the two.

Q: Now, what makes them so different, outside of the fact that they fight with a different weapon?

Shepherd: Well, let's approach it from this angle. Two-thirds of the Marine Corps are ground forces, and only 30 percent aviation?

Q: Something like that.

Shepherd: Therefore I thought that a ground officer, at that time at least, was more competent for commanding ground troops than an aviator. I think that's been somewhat changed now, that there are certain cases where aviators of distinction have been placed in command of ground troops, but it's mighty hard for a person that's served the majority of his service as a flier to grasp the different conditions experienced by a ground officer. They have a different approach to problems. A ground officer, who'd become a platoon leader, a commander of a battalion, and on up is better qualified in the duties of a ground officer that was an aviator who had never faced the same problems. I will say a ground officer couldn't go over and command an air squadron because he hadn't grown up in aviation.

Q: Then, is it conceivable that there may never be an aviation general becoming Commandant? Or put it the other way; do you think there'll ever be an instance where an aviation general will become Commandant?

Shepherd: Well, I wouldn't want to prophesy that. That's really going further that I feel competent to comment on. I felt that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be a ground officer under conditions that existed when I was Commandant, or as they exist today, because the bulk of the Marine Corps are ground officers and I think that a ground officer should be commandant so long as condition as are as they have been in the past. But as to the future of the Marine Corps - I am naturally not going to speculate on.

Q: Another controversial point concerns women Marines, who of course have done a fine job in many assignments to which they've been given. We now have a situation where the head of the Women Marines is a full colonel. There's been some talk recently about making flag and general rank among women's services. What do you think of that?

Shepherd: I hadn't heard about this situation.

Q: What do you think of a woman becoming a general?

Shepherd: Well, you've thrown one at me that I haven't even thought of or considered before. Do the Women Marines want that? I would hate to be in a position where I had to pass on that one officially. I frankly can't envision there being a woman Marine general in the Marine Corps.

Q: As I recall, they would make the head of each of the Women's Services - for instance, the head of the Women in the Navy, the head of the WACS - brigadiers or rear admirals.

Shepherd: Well, I suppose it's all right. Why not? After all, you have a colonel as head of the women Marines and I think the Army has the same thing; I really would pose not objection to their being a brigadier general. If the other services did it, we'd have to follow suit. The Women Marines do

perform many duties in the Corps that would have to be performed by men. I feel the Women Marines have always been a great asset to the Corps in certain jobs. The women Marines are a very fine organization. On second thought, I see no reason why there shouldn't be a brigadier general head of the Women Marines. It's a decision similar to the one General Holcomb had to face when he first authorized the organization of Women Marines. I'm sure that was a much tougher decision. You have heard the famous story when he said at dinner one night; I've just made the decision which I'm sure will make General Henderson turn over in his grave if he knew I've authorized women in the Marine Corps." At that moment General Henderson's portrait which hung in the dining room fell to the floor. I've asked General Holcomb about this story and he swears that's true.

Be that as it may, I think that decision was of far greater importance than whether we should have additional rank for Women Marines. And since you've brought it up and I've given a moment's thought to it, I say, why not? I'd never initiate it, but if the Army and Air Force adopt this policy we certainly want our head of Women Marines to be of equal rank with them.

Q: It's just the question of giving a woman the rank of general.

Shepherd: We gave one the rank of colonel. What's the difference?

Q: Don't the British services have the directors of their various women components serve without a rank?

Shepherd: I don't know. Maybe they do.

Q: Assign a woman to a service job without rank.

Shepherd: I know what you mean. It's incongruous with any other nation in the world. I can't imagine the French or the British doing it.

Q: A colonel is a colonel. I don't want to insert my opinion –

Shepherd: I know what you're trying to say.

Q: - to have a woman who's a major or a lieutenant colonel comparable in rank, pay and privileges to a man. A man who is a lieutenant colonel has a battalion or the colonel has a regiment with certain responsibilities. But that's neither her nor there, it was just a question.

Shepherd: You would say, that a colonel of a regiment has, around 5,000 troops under his command?

Q: Well, 3,000 plus.

Shepherd: - 3,000 plus, if he commands a reinforced regiment.

Q: - pretty close to 5,000.

Shepherd: I think that's what I had when I commanded the 9<sup>th</sup> Marines (reinforced). Are there many Women Marines in the Marine Corps who have commanded this number of Marines?

Q: I don't think there are that many.

Shepherd: Frankly, I think we ought to hold back on the further promotion of women for the time being. I don't see any reason to get involved in that. I think the Director of Women Marines should be the Director. It would be better if they had no rank, because I think women normally take their rank more seriously than men do; academic question.

Q: I thought I'd throw one to you from left field, General, to see what your feelings were. I now wish to ask you about your tenure as head of the Inter-American Defense Board. You were there for about two years or more, weren't you, sir?

Shepherd: Three years and eight months. I was appointed to the chairmanship of the Inter-American Defense Board in February 1957. It's normally a two-year appointment and is passed around to the different services. In other words, the Army has it a two year term, the Navy has it a two year term and the Air Force has it a two year term. When this job came up, I was sitting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it was the Navy's turn. The question came up before Admiral Burke; he was Chief of Naval Operations at that time, about whether the Navy wanted it. He showed no great interest in this job. South America has always intrigued me. I was down there as a young officer and I've always had a great interest in the countries. I went to Admiral Burke after the meeting and I said, "There wasn't any great interest shown in the appointment of a naval officer for the chairmanship of the Inter-American Board there. I'd like to be considered as your appointee for that job when it comes up." I think the job became vacant in February of the year following my appointment as Commandant; in other words, two months after I retired. Admiral Burke said, "Well, I see no reason why not." He thought it would be a very fine appointment and said he would be very happy to nominate me. Subsequently I was nominated and made Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. I could have taken office on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January, but I wanted a little breather between the time I relinquished my duties as Commandant before I took over and assumed these new duties as Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. So I did not take over my new job until February.

I assumed my duties I believe on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February and I found it an extremely interesting job. There was a great deal to be done. It is, in my opinion, a very important assignment. I don't think it's ever been given the amount of emphasis that it warrants. The State Department frowns on anything military, but I found those Latinos were eager to try to get something done. The mission of the Board was to form a general defense plan for all the countries of South America and Central America. All 21 nations that belong to the Organization of American States had military representatives on the Inter-American Defense Board at that time. I tried to put new life into the Board, and I believe I succeeded. They had been having a meeting every two weeks. Well, I started with at least two meetings a week and we got additional officers for the staff. I feel that during my tenure of office, about three years eight months that I contributed materially towards the advancement of friendly relations and the unification of Central and South American countries with the United States.

When the Navy's term of two years ran out, it became the Army's turn to appoint a new Chairman, but I was re-appointed for another two years in place of an Army officer. The Army very graciously gave me their

turn; permitted me to remain on for another two years in place of an Army officer.

Following my second appointment, I could have stayed another year, I believe. I was asked if I wouldn't consider staying on another year. But I felt that I didn't want to deprive the appointment of an Army or Air Force officer again. In other words the Army had been very kind and insisted I stay on and take their place, but I didn't want to continue to assume their prerogatives.

Q: What was the nature of your duties?

Shepherd: Well, the staff worked on certain problems that were brought before the delegates. Each of the 21 nations had one or more delegates there. Some of the larger countries had as many as three delegates. Our mission was to promote harmony and military solidification between the countries of Central and South America and the United States. It was started during World War II with the idea of unifying the Latin American countries against attack by the Germans or the Communists who were beginning to become active in this area. We had a general plan for the overall defense of America. We tried to standardize equipment, tactics, and techniques of the services and to promote friendly relations between the countries of this hemisphere. There were many problems which were considered and discussed and batted around. The Latinos are very slow about making decisions and they would argue over minutia. A comma would take half an hour of discussion, whether there should be a comma after a word or not. But we got things done eventually. During the period I was there it was very refreshing duty. It gave me an opportunity to visit all the Central and South American countries, several times, on various missions and I believe I contributed towards bringing the nations of this hemisphere into a close military relationship than they had been before.

It you want to enlarge on the activities of the IADB there's a booklet – I don't have a copy now – that gives specifically the duties of the Inter-American Defense Board; how it was formed and other background material.

Q: No, I just wanted to get this in your own words. We've covered a number of things. We've covered many things, and this is your fifth session, General. We've covered your 37 years with the Marine Corps, plus your period as Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. Is there anything that occurred during your career in the Marine Corps, any decision, and action you took, that you wish could have been done differently, or would you just have done things as they were (done); if you had an opportunity to do them over again?

Shepherd: That's kind of an overall question which is difficult to specifically answer.

Q: This has been an interesting group of sessions, General. I think your recollections and reminiscences and the matters we've discussed will be most important to present and future officers and to the historical records of the Marine Corps, and I want to thank you for the very enjoyable and interesting hours we've spent together. Having been on your staff at

FMFPAC and having had an association with you at various times during my brief career in the Marine Corps, and since being with the Historical Branch, it's been of extreme value and I've enjoyed it immensely. I want to thank you.

Shepherd: Thank you, Ben. May I say that I think this project that General Greene has initiated with the advice, of course, of the Historical Section is a very worthwhile one. I think you have in the record the impressions and decisions and reasons for some of the decisions that have been made over the years by former senior officers of the Marine Corps. In making these recordings, perhaps in some cases I haven't gotten names exactly straight or mixed up, but unfortunately in my declining years, my recollections are not always as vivid on certain details as they might be. I say this because there may be certain things that I've stated in my conversation with you which may not be exactly correct.

Q: - well, the records will corroborate.

Shepherd: In other words, I may have mentioned the wrong name in some places so I wish you and those who proof-read the recordings to feel free, where there's an obvious error, to correct the manuscript. I have no pride of authorship.

Q: Yes, sir.

Shepherd: As I get older and particularly since I had this unfortunate accident two years ago when I was severely injured by my horse falling in the hunting field and was kicked in the head which gave me a brain concussion, I just don't remember things the way that I was able to do before. Therefore, I may have made certain errors but I assure you I've tried to tell my story to the best of my recollection and belief on matters that you've questioned me and others that I may have talked to you about. I have no objection to your using these recordings for historical purposes.

Q: The utmost discretion will be used, and of course any restrictions that you wish to place on these will be observed. Again, I want to thank you.

Shepherd: It's been fine to talk to you. I've reminisced a great deal and I think I may have told a lot of stories that don't bear on this subject. On the other hand it may be of interest to some historian in future years.

Q: Well, this is what General Greene has called a living history, and I think that this certainly has been a part of the Marine Corps Living History, and again I want to thank you, sir.

Shepherd: In concluding this final session of your interviews Ben, I would like to discuss an item which I feel should be regarded in my historical memoirs of the Marine Corps.

This concerns the valuable services contributed to the Marine Corps by Mr. Felix De Weldon.

In 1947, while I was serving as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, I met Mr. De Weldon who at the time was working on a monument which was a reproduction in bronze of the Iwo Jima flag raising by Marines. This monument was to be a memorial to the Marines who gave their lives in the service of their country during World War II.

The Marine Reserve Officers Association had entered into a contract with Mr. De Weldon for this statue which was estimated would cost about \$350,000. The Reserve Officers Association had planned to raise the sum by contributions from former Marines who had served in the Corps during World War II and had initiated a fund raising campaign for this purpose.

During this period, Mr. De Weldon invited me to his studio to view the plaster-of-paris mold he had made of the statue and I was greatly impressed by the model of the proposed monument.

Following my transfer to Quantico where I served as Commanding General of this Marine Corps Base from 1948 to 1950, I got in touch with Felix De Weldon and asked him if he would sculpture in sandstone, a smaller size reproduction of the Marine Memorial he was working on for erection in Washington. This he agreed to do for a modest sum which I was able to pay for from an unofficial slush-fund I had on hand.

Upon the completion of this statue by De Weldon, it was erected at the entrance gates to Quantico in the fall of 1949 or the spring of 1950 and dedicated at an impressive ceremony.

Upon my return to Washington in 1952 as Commandant following my duty at Pear Harbor as Command General FMFPAC, I contacted Mr. De Weldon to inquire about the progress he had made toward the erection of the bronze statue of the Iwo Jima flag raising. De Weldon informed me that he had completed the plaster-of-paris mold of the statue but that the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association had failed to provide him with the sum they had guaranteed and that he did not have sufficient money to finance the molding of the bronze statue.

On checking into the situation I found that the contributions that the Marine Reserve Officers Association had received in their drive for funds for this project was some \$150,000 less than the 350,000 that had been obligated to De Weldon for this project and they did not believe they could obtain further donations.

Remembering my favorable impression of the plaster-of-paris model of the statue which De Weldon had shown me and because of my desire to erect a suitable memorial in Washington to honor the memory of the Marines who had made the supreme sacrifice for the Corps in World War II and the current Korean conflict, I decided that the Marine Corps should officially take over this project and raise the additional funds required to complete the monument.

I figured if every officer in the Corps would contribute one to five dollars toward the statue, it would be sufficient to make up the deficit. Therefore I wrote a personal letter to all active duty and retired Marine officers asking for contributions for the monument.

Since the response to my letter had brought in only about half the sum required, I sent out a follow-up letter requesting those who had not previously made a donation to please do so as I considered the erection of this memorial statue a vital Corps project. With the additional donations

made by active duty Marine officers and larger sums from some of the more affluent reserve and retired officers, we finally raised the \$150,000 required for De Weldon to make the bronze casting of the statue.

Since the castings had to be molded in a foundry in New Jersey, their transportation on large flat-bottomed trailer trucks posed a problem for De Weldon. Due to the size of the bronze castings, the New Jersey-Maryland highway officials would only permit the trucks to move at night under a traffic escort which caused further delay in assembling and welding them into the statue.

By De Weldon's personal energy and determination, he finally was able to complete the welding of the various bronze pieces together and finish the statue on the site for its erection in Arlington.

The selection and acquisition of a suitable piece of land on which to mount the statue was another difficult problem. Various sites in the city of Washington were considered but none available were deemed suitable for a monument the size of the Iwo Jima statue which required a large open area around it for proper display. The site De Weldon and I decided would be most suitable was a piece of land across the Potomac River close to Arlington Cemetery known as the "Nevis Tract" which was owned by the Government. It took months of discussion and pressure by friends of the Marine Corps close to the White House to acquire the "Nevis Tract" and then approval of the proportions and design of the statue itself had to be given by the District of Columbia Fine Arts Commission.

These obstacles were finally surmounted and the impressive Marine Memorial Statue was erected on its present site on the south side of the Potomac River, facing the city of Washington. The monument was dedicated at an impressive ceremony attended by the President of the United States and a number of government officials in Washington as well as a number of Marine officers and civilian supporters of the Corps. I gave the dedication address and Mr. Nixon, then Vice President, responded accepting the statue for the Government. It was truly a gala day for Felix De Weldon and for the United States Marine Corps. The Marine Memorial Statue has become one of the greatest tourist attractions in Washington, visited by thousands of people yearly.

Naturally De Weldon was grateful to me for the moral and financial support I had given him in the erection of the Marine Memorial, so some months later when I called on him for assistance in the design of a Marine Corps Seal he willingly agreed to give his help to this project without compensation. Although the Marine ornament is the hallmark of our Corps, I had felt for many years that there should be an official Marine Corps Seal. I had made sketches of a design for a seal, these embodied the Marine Corps ornament on a shield on which was inscribed "U.S. Marine Corps" but I was not enthusiastic about any of them. As I have recorded in a previous interview, it was during my administration as Commandant that the Marine Corps had obtained official recognition by Congress as a separate entity within the Department of the Navy, directly responsible on



administrative matters to the Secretary of the Navy rather than to the Chief of Naval Operations as had previously been the case. For this reason I wished to include "Department of the Navy" on the Marine Corps Seal.

In order to obtain artistic assistance in the design of the proposed Marine Corps seal, I requested De Weldon's advice which resulted in our present seal – A Marine Corps ornament in a circular background with the words "Department of the Navy" above the ornament. The outside perimeter of the circular background is a corded piece of rope symbolic of the Corps' seagoing service.

After the final drawings had been completed and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, De Weldon made a female mold of the design from which he cast several sample plaster-of-paris seals which we both thought were excellent. In order to make the seal official, I took one of the plaster-of-paris models which had been colored in red and gold, to the President for approval. Mr. Eisenhower stated he liked the design and gave his approval for its official use by inscribing it with his signature. Upon my retirement from the Marine Corps, this particular seal was left in the Commandant's office. From the original die a number of bronze castings were made for distribution to posts and stations throughout the Corps.

While working on the final designs of the seal, I asked De Weldon to make an accurate drawing of an American eagle for the ornament. De Weldon made a thorough study of the American eagle which is somewhat different from European ones and reproduced it on the Marine Corps emblem on the official Marine Corps Seal. I also directed that a replica of the American eagle be used on all Marine ornaments worn on the uniform. Previously, many uniform ornament manufacturers had used their own design for the eagle on our ornament.

During the period I was Commandant of the Marine Corps, I went to Paris each year to attend the NATO conference and War Games conducted at NATO Headquarters by Field Marshal Montgomery, Deputy Commander under General Eisenhower of the NATO armies.

On one of these trips I visited Belleau Wood and was distressed to observe that there was no sign nor marker to indicate that Marines had captured Belleau Wood and that the name "Belleau Wood" had officially been changed by the French government to "Bois de Brigade de Marines" (Woods of the Marine Brigade) in honor of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade who had fought there so courageously in June 1918. The Marine victory at Belleau Wood had been referred to in subsequent history as the turning point of World War I. Based on my observation, I decided that a Marine monument with an appropriately worded plaque should be erected at Belleau Wood.

In order to provide the design for a monument, I again called on Felix De Weldon for his assistance and he graciously designed a handsome bronze bas relief figure of a Marine charging with a fixed bayonet. This figure is about 10 feet in height on black granite shaft. I prepared a brief inscription listing the units of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade which had participated in this battle and a notation that the name "Belleau Wood" had officially

been changed by the French government to “Bois de Brigade de Marine.” This inscription was placed beneath the bas relief figure and included in the casting of the bronze plaque. Upon its completion, the plaque was shipped to Paris where Colonel Gordon West, USMC, was on duty and placed in charge of the construction of the monument.

De Weldon insisted that the stone shaft and base of the monument be of Swedish black granite and it was ordered to be shipped directly from Sweden to France and thence to Belleau Wood. Due to certain restrictions imposed by the French Customs officials, Colonel West had a most difficult time to get this block of Swedish granite released from Customs. This he finally succeeded in doing and the monument with the bronze plaque attached was erected at the entrance to Belleau Wood.

In November, 1955, a month before my retirement from the Marine Corps, I took over to France several former officers of the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade who had fought at Belleau Wood together with Felix De Weldon. An impressive dedication ceremony was held attended by several senior officers of the French Army and Navy and the Mayor of Chateau Thierry.

In later years I have looked back with pride on having initiated and accomplished the erection of a suitable monument at Belleau Wood to commemorate the memory of the brave Marines who had fought there in this decisive battle of World War I. Future generations of American and French tourists who visit Belleau Wood yearly will be appropriately informed that Belleau Wood was captured by the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Brigade and the official name of this historic spot is “Bois de Brigade de Marine.”

I am therefore pleased to have this opportunity to officially record the valued services contributed by Mr. Felix De Weldon to the Marine Corps. I might add that Mr. De Weldon was reimbursed for the expenses incurred in the erection of the Belleau Wood monument from contributions made by the officers and men currently serving in the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Regiments which now form an element of our Fleet Marine Forces.

With the addition of the foregoing pages to interview number 5 which I have proof-read and am returning herewith, I conclude my series of historical interviews conducted by Mr. Ben Frank. Thank you, Ben, for your indulgence in listening to the reminiscences of an old Marine.

**End of Session #5.**

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