

ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT

General Charles C. Krulak

U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)



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Interviewer

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2003


FOREWARD

This volume is the transcribed oral history of General Charles C. Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps. It is the result of a recorded twenty-session interview, conducted in Washington, D.C. by Dr. David B. Crist on behalf of the Marine Corps Oral History Program. As one facet of the Marine Corps historical collection effort, the Program obtains primary source material to augment other official documentary records.

Oral history is essentially spoken history, the oral recall of eyewitness impressions and observations, accurately recorded in the course of an interview conducted by an historian employing historical methodology. The final product is a bound verbatim transcript like this one, containing historically valuable personal narratives relating to noteworthy professional experiences and observations of distinguished Marines.

While General Krulak has reviewed and made minor amendments to the transcript, the reader is asked to bear in mind that he or she is reading a transcript of the spoken rather than the written word. General Krulak has placed no restriction on the use of this transcript. Accordingly, it may be read by anyone upon presentation of appropriate credentials.


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A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "John W. Ripley". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "J" and "R".

J.W. RIPLEY

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums



GENERAL CHARLES C. KRULAK

General Krulak was born on March 4, 1942, in Quantico, Virginia. After graduating from The Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, New Hampshire, he attended the United States Naval Academy, graduating in 1964. General Krulak also holds a master's degree in labor relations from The George Washington University (1973). He is a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School (1968), the Army Command and General Staff College (1976), and the National War College (1982).

After his commissioning and graduation from The Basic School at Quantico, General Krulak held a variety of command and staff positions. His command positions included commanding officer of a platoon and two rifle companies during two tours of duty in Vietnam; Commanding Officer, Special Training Branch and Recruit Series at MCRD, San Diego, California (1966-1968), Commanding Officer, Counter-Guerilla Warfare School, NTA, Okinawa (1970), Company Officer, United States Naval Academy (1970-1973), Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Naval Air Station, North Island, California (1973-1976), and Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines (1983-1985).

General Krulak's staff assignments included Operations Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (1977-1978), Chief of the Combat Arms Monitor Section at Headquarters Marine Corps, in Washington, DC (1978-1979), Executive Assistant to the Director of Personnel Management, at Headquarters Marine Corps (1979-1981), Plans Officer, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii (1982-1983), Executive Officer of the 3rd Marines, 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Assistant Chief of Staff, Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, 1st MEB, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, 1st MEB, and Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

While Deputy Director of the White House Military Office, in November 1988, he was selected for promotion to brigadier general. He was then Commanding General, 10th MEB/Assistant Division Commander, 2nd Marine Division. In June 1990, he assumed duties as the Commanding General, 2nd Force Service Support Group/Commanding General, 6th MEB, FMF Atlantic and commanded the 2nd FSSG during the Gulf War. He was subsequently the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for

Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Personnel Management/Personnel Procurement), Headquarters Marine Corps. He was advanced to the grade of major general in March 1992. General Krulak was next the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, and was promoted to lieutenant general in September 1992. In July 1994, he was assigned as Commander of Marine Forces Pacific/Commanding General, FMF Pacific, and in March 1995 was nominated to serve as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. On June 29 he was promoted to General and became the 31st Commandant on June 30, 1995.

General Krulak retired from active duty on June 30, 1999.

General Krulak's decorations and medals include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; Distinguished Service Medal; Silver Star Medal; Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and two gold stars; Purple Heart with gold star; Meritorious Service Medal; Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal; Combat Action Ribbon; Presidential Unit Citation with bronze star; National Defense Service Medal with one bronze star; Vietnam Service Medal with silver star and two bronze stars; Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars; Sea Service Deployment Ribbon; Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry; Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Color); Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Civil Actions Color, 1st Class); the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal; and the Kuwait Liberation Medal.

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DR. CRIST: The date is 12 August 1999 at the Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington, D.C. For the record, you were born 4 March 1942 in Quantico, Virginia, at the Naval Hospital at Quantico?

GEN KRULAK: At the hospital annex in Quantico, which was the only hospital. The Annex was located where the current Communications School is located; where we currently conduct the Command, Control, Systems Course and the Basic Communication Officer's Course. This is the long two-story building down by the Potomac River. That used to be the location of the Quantico Annex of the U.S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda.

DR. CRIST: Your father was stationed at Quantico at the time, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I believe he was an instructor at what was then called the Junior School; today the Amphibious Warfare School.

DR. CRIST: Did you have the typical military family lifestyle growing up, moving around every two to three years?

GEN KRULAK: My father fought in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Being born in 1942, with my father going to the Pacific, our family moved to Washington, D.C., where my mother's parents lived. Their name was Chandler. Her father was a Navy officer. He was the commander of the USS *North Hampton*, which gained some fame in the book *War and Remembrance*, by Herman Wouk. Pug Henry, who was the star of that book, you recall, was the CO of the *North Hampton*, and so when Herman Wouk was writing the story he interviewed my grandfather at length and tailored a lot of the wartime story of Pug Henry after him. Anyhow, that's where my mother and the family went, during both World War II and then Korea.

Whenever my father went overseas, for the most part, we came back to Washington. When we weren't in Washington, he was principally a West Coast--WestPac Marine. A lot of people that I met as Commandant used to say, "I served under your father when he had the 2d Marine Division." But the truth is my dad never served in Camp Lejeune, never served at MCRD, Parris Island. When he wasn't in Washington, D.C., he was either at Camp Pendleton, MCRD San Diego, Hawaii, or Okinawa.

Much of my time as a service junior was spent in Hawaii. I went to elementary school, intermediate school, and some high school there. We stayed in Hawaii when my dad went to Okinawa -- like when he went there to be the Assistant Division Commander of the 3d Marine Division. Rather than go home, we stayed in Hawaii. We also lived at Camp Pendleton, California. So, our life was spent between Washington, Camp Pendleton, and Hawaii.

DR. CRIST: Must have been quite a strain on your mother?

GEN KRULAK: She is a remarkable lady and in fact raised three boys by herself during the early formative stages of their lives -- during World War II and Korea, and then also during the separation when my father went overseas. She was very strong and continues to be a very strong woman.

DR. CRIST: Did you have a very religious upbringing?

GEN KRULAK: No. My parents were Episcopalian. My father was Jewish. So I am half Jewish. But we never practiced that religion. Ever. Never even -- I mean, I didn't even know I was part Jew until I was a teenager. We were Episcopalians, and every Sunday we'd go to church. Every Sunday. The boys would get up on Sunday morning, get into our suits. As an example, in

Quantico I can remember plain as day – the three of us would walk in single file down to the church, the little chapel down by where the dental clinic and the fire house is right now, right down by the underpass at Quantico. After we got there my parents would drive up and we'd all go to church together. Then my parents would get in the car and drive back home and we would get back in single file and march back up the hill. We did that every Sunday. So a religious foundation was obviously there, but there was not an evangelical-type religion in the house. It is interesting that both of my brothers ended up as Episcopal priests. But I don't think that necessarily came from our upbringing.

DR. CRIST: Perhaps planted there but not realized until later in life.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Was your father raised Episcopalian as well?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Was Holland M. Smith your godfather?

GEN KRULAK: H. M. Smith was my godfather. My dad was his aide, and it was during the time that my dad served with or around "Howling Mad" Smith that they developed a good friendship, and so when I was born my father asked Gen Smith to be my godfather and he said, "Yes." We had an off-and-on relationship during my youth, and in fact when I came back from Vietnam and went to MCRD San Diego, we didn't have a place to live for a while, and, and we literally went to La Jolla and stayed with my godfather. He was a great, great person. He had the reputation of being this hard man and he was a hard man-- but he was also very, very gentle and loved life. He liked to, jokingly, chase my wife. He'd tease all the time. I mean, he was just a great person. But he was also a very solid mentor, and particularly for somebody who was just a lieutenant or captain to have somebody like "Howling Mad" Smith to talk too. It was very valuable.

DR. CRIST: Does anything stand out in your mind about some advice that he might have given you?

GEN KRULAK: Well, he talked a lot about the importance of the individual Marine, the distrust that he had of the Navy. He would say that although we were "shipmates," you need to

understand that when the chips are down they have their view of the world and the Marine Corps has its view of the world.

Obviously, his view was impacted by his experiences as a corps commander. He talked a lot about the ethos of the Corps-- integrity, values and standards, and what it was to be a Marine-- and how our strength really rested on our relationship with the American people. If we ever lost that we were in trouble--we weren't the Army and we weren't the Navy and we didn't have this big constituency and we had to really be careful that we not lose the love of the American people.

DR. CRIST: One thing interesting about you is who you grew up around, "Howling Mad" Smith, your father Gen Krulak, and the others. You really grew up around the "Old Corps" as we like to say

GEN KRULAK: Well, my father was Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd's G-3 during the Okinawa campaign and during Korea. He was a great, great man and would be at our house two or three times a year for dinner. And after he retired, I had the opportunity to meet with him several times. I think the most interesting stories that I heard from him had to do with Korea and the Inchon landing. Basically, how he was wrong about Inchon and how, in fact, most Marines were wrong about Inchon. That Inchon was a case where we as an institution almost got into the position of taking counsel of our own fears, the fear of a gradient that would not permit amphibious assault, the movement of the tides. Gen Shepherd did not believe in his heart that it was wise to make the landing at Inchon. My father did not think it was wise to make the landing at Inchon. They both told me on several occasions that they had, in fact, recommended to Douglas MacArthur not to make that landing. They said that MacArthur, in fact, did what the books say, he walked over to a battle map and said we will land, and we will land here, and we will be victorious-- and he put his hand down on the west coast of the Korean Peninsula in the vicinity of Inchon. Once the decision was made, my father was tasked to help plan the operation, and did so.

It's interesting that during my first visit to Korea as a Commander of Marine Forces Pacific and the Commander of Combined Marine Forces Command, Korea, I visited all the Korean corps commanders and they all had their maps upon the wall. The 5027 Operation Plan has the Marines landing at Wonsan. One of the big efforts I made as commander, Marine Corps Pacific and as the Commandant, was to change that landing location. The fact of the matter is the landing at Wonsan is

ludicrous. It's right into the teeth of the enemy. You go cross-compartment if you want to get the west coast. It's not deep enough to unhinge any kind of defenses. There's no operational reason to land at Wonsan. That's just where people said they're going to land. So Gen Luck, the CinC in Korea, and I, thought back to MacArthur. I started saying, we need to attack on the west coast, just like we did during the Korean War. We need to attack deeper, because that's where the fighting's going to be. That's what the plan is now, and the Marine Corps drove the change in that plan and the real 5027, the one that is highly, highly classified, involves an attack on the west coast of Korea.

I visited the Korean corps commanders and with each one of them I'd walk up to the wall and I'd say, "We are going to land here." And I'd put my hand on the West Coast of Korea, and their eyes would get as big as saucers and they'd get big smiles on their faces and they were really excited. That was one of the reasons why the Marine Corps' is so highly respected by the Koreans, it is because they know that we're now going to go back to the West coast, which they knew all along was the only way to attack. With the use of the LCAC, it would be much more easier to carry out.

The point of the whole lesson is that it was fun for me, in my own historic mind set, to be able to reckon back to a Marine like Lemuel C. Shepherd and to my father and their thoughts on a west coast landing, when they realized they were wrong. Then to be over there 40 years later and put my hand on a map in front of every one of the four-star corps of commanders of the ROK Marines and Army, and say, we will land here.

So, Shepherd was somebody that I saw a lot of. Probably one of the smartest, unsung heroes of the Marine Corps was a general by the name of Bobby [Robert E.] Hogaboom, who was famous for the Hogaboom board. Gen Hogaboom was a dear friend of my father. His daughter, Gretchen Hogaboom, used to baby sit for us, and we used to see the Hogabooms almost every weekend. Again, it's hard to think about specific instances where Gen Hogaboom made a difference. It's just that here is the forerunner of men like Lou Wilson or Robert Barrow. It was this gentleman who exuded the confidence of what a Marine general should be -- tall, thin, good looking, just a great mind, did a lot of work on the Chowder Society. I mean, he was just a real winner.

Gerald C. Thomas -- Gen Thomas -- the first person I ever went hunting with. He took me into the woods overnight. I am not even sure now how I got involved to go with him. It was just a great time with this Marine general. To see him as a

human, and not as a general, not some automaton, that was really impressive.

Colonel [Robert D.] Heinl used to come over to the house on my father's birthday and drink fish house punch and tell stories. From an early age I knew all about the Marine Corps. I can remember just asking questions about Korea and about World War II, and he'd just sit there and pick at the turkey and drink fish house punch and talk about Marine history.

Dave [David M.] Shoup, I can remember, on one of my father's birthdays, had a little bit too much fish house punch to drink.

DR. CRIST: What is fish house punch?

GEN KRULAK: It's a very, very potent drink that - just the fumes will put you under. Well, I can remember Gen Shoup taking an entire turkey. He'd gone into one of our clothes closets downstairs where we hung our coats and sat there with the lights out drinking fish house punch and eating turkey. My mother came by and couldn't find the turkey that was suppose to be sitting on the table and wondered where the turkey had gone. None of the people who were helping knew where the turkey was, so we all were out searching for the turkey and, I think it was my brother, opened up the closet door and here was the future Commandant of the Marine Corps eating turkey in our closet!

The Twinings. A great military family. He was another real smart Marine who could easily have been a Commandant. All of that crew that could have been the Commandant. Just tremendous people. So they were coming in and out of our lives a lot during the time of the Chowder Society. My dad would come home sometimes late at night and, when we'd wake up in the morning, there would be all these guys still working the issues that eventually resulted in the National Security Act of 1947 and the amendment to the Security Act of 47 and 52. They would work on these issues all night in our house.

It's hard to say or remember any specific words of wisdom or, great input that changed my life. What I think was of most importance was just watching real professionals. They were absolutely selfless people. I mean, these guys had the chance to be Commandant. They didn't make it. It didn't make any difference. They continued to serve their Corps. They were not afraid to take chances. They absolutely thought out of a box. They were not afraid of failure. When they did screw it up they admitted it. I mean, my father and Shepherd had no problem saying, you know, we were wrong on Inchon. Today we as a Corps look to the Inchon

landing as one of the great moments in our history, but if you go to the books you'll see two of the key players there said, "Don't do it," and they were both Marines. So I think what I got out of the people that I grew up with was just an understanding of what a professional was and how important, you know, keeping your hand on the touchstone is to the Corps.

DR. CRIST: From an early age, did you have an interest in the Marine Corps? Did you know that's what you wanted to do?

GEN KRULAK: I think the first time I really said, this looks like something I want to do," was as a result of something my father did, and I'm sure he had absolutely no inkling of the impact he had when he did it. He was in Korea, and for some reason he sent me a 1:50,000 map of a sector of Korea, and on it he annotated the Marine positions and the enemy positions, and explained that this had been a battle that we fought. He just sent it as kind of a souvenir for his son. Well, I took that map and I pretended like I was the Marine general and then I drew arrows and positions all over it as how I'd fight the enemy. I guess they were either Chinese or North Koreans. Then I sent it back to my dad. I was just a young kid. I, I was eight years old, maybe, nine. Well, my dad sent a letter back and said, he got my map and he had studied what I had done, and he was really proud because he thought that I had a great scheme of maneuver. Well, I was thinking I'm the next Clausewitz or Sun Tzu. Here I am nine years old and I'm solving warfare by long-distance air mail! Now that I think back on it, it was a battle that had already been fought. He was just sending me something as a souvenir. But he took the time to critique what I had done, and instead of saying it was lousy he said it was great. At that point I thought maybe what I'm cut out to be is a United States Marine. So, that was the beginning of my desire to go into the Marine Corps.

I went to a lot of schools and ended up at the Phillips Exeter Academy. They put me back a year because of the caliber of schools I'd been going to as I grew up. Not that I hadn't gone to some good schools, but I'd also gone to some bad ones. They just thought it was better if I went back a grade. So I repeated my sophomore year. After I finished my junior year, I had enough credits, as it turned out, that I was only about one class short of graduating. I was going to come back as a senior at Exeter, but really had very little to do, so at the end of my junior year I applied for several colleges, including the Naval Academy and Princeton, and I got

accepted to them. I got a nomination to the Naval Academy and they accepted me. So I had an opportunity to go to Princeton or the Naval Academy. At Exeter, everybody was telling me to go to Princeton. That was the school at that time. It wasn't Harvard; it wasn't Yale. Princeton was the place to go. I remember turning down Princeton and accepting the Naval Academy, and went there because by then I said, "I'm going to be a Marine."

Until my first-class cruise at the Naval Academy, I was set on going into the Corps. I went on a diesel submarine, the USS *Bang*. SS- 385. I loved it. It was the most unbelievable event of my life till that time. I just fell in love with the wardroom. I fell in love with the camaraderie. I mean, the CO of the ship -- they called him CO, the executive officer, they called XO. Everybody ate at the same time in the wardroom. They played dice, and cards, and I just thought this is what it's all about. This is what the band of brothers is really about. This is camaraderie.

Well, at the end of first half of the cruise, I remember getting off the submarine at New London, going to the end of the pier, calling up my father, and saying, "Dad, I'm going submarines. I know I've always wanted to go Marine Corps, but I'll tell you, I just had the most unbelievable experience, and if you'd been there you'd approve of this. This is a good thing." He said, "Chuck, whatever you want to do. It sounds like a great thing. Go ahead and do it. You're going to love it. You know, put your heart into it. Don't worry about me, you're not disappointing me at all. I'm proud of you no matter what you do."

DR. CRIST: He never tried to steer you into the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: No. Never even tried to steer me into the Naval Academy. My dad never encouraged us to go to the Naval Academy. Both of my brothers went. Vic had to leave at the end of plebe summer for a medical problem, but both of them went. My other brother, Bill, graduated in 1962, and I graduated in '64. Although all of us went, we never felt any real pressure to go from my dad.

So, the next part of the cruise was on board the USS *Nautilus*, the first nuclear-powered submarine. Within 24 hours I realized this is not what I want, and, unfortunately, that was what the submarine world was becoming. A very pristine environment; very, very cautious, highly intelligent officers; but none of the camaraderie I saw on the diesel sub. They were all a bunch of egghead nuclear physicists who were running a ship, and it

didn't even seem like a warship. I realized, that this was the future. The future is nuclear power, not diesel. So I decided to go Marine Corps. Called my dad back up and told him why and he said, "Good call," and I went into the Marine Corps, and that was it.

DR. CRIST: The Hyman Rickover effect on the officers on the submarine --

GEN KRULAK: I really saw that in spades when I went back to the Naval Academy to become a company officer. I mean, he was something else.

DR. CRIST: What do you recall about your plebe year?

GEN KRULAK: I really liked plebe year. I loved the challenges, and so plebe year to me was, in retrospect, the best year I had at the Naval Academy. There were upper classmen that really gave me a rough time. I was in the toughest company in the Brigade of midshipmen. At that time there were 24 companies in the Brigade and I was in the 10th Company. Our nickname was "Terrible Ten" or "Caesar's 10th Legion." It was really hard. We were "braced up" until graduation day. There was no other company in the Brigade that was still "braced up" on graduation. It was real tough. But there was a lot of pride in the company, which may have played a role later on when we started looking at the Crucible because we were a breed apart. People avoided getting into the 10th Company area. They would walk out of their way to keep from having to go through the 10th Company. My plebe year was a very positive one. I did well there. I was the 4th Class company commander, the highest-ranking midshipman in my class, in my company, as a plebe, -- it was not a hard year for me. It was a challenging and an exciting one.

DR. CRIST: Were there any classmates that you were particularly close friends with that you maintained contact with over the years?

GEN KRULAK: Well, there were two people who came from Exeter with me, a man by the name of Bob Johnson and a man by the name of Walt Kessler. Walt Kessler is famous at the Naval Academy now. He, to this day, holds the record for the highest academic average at the Naval Academy. He had a 4.2-something out of a 4.0. I mean this man was unbelievable, and he was brilliant at Exeter, too. He was a Brigade six-striper. He was the number one man in our class,

and he was the first of my class to get command. He commanded a nuclear power submarine. Then he left the Navy at about the 10 year mark -- to become a minister.

Bob Johnson was an athlete at the Naval Academy. He wanted to play lacrosse. Great guy. Neither one was in my company, but I kept close contact with them. Within my company, my roommate was a mid by the name of Bill Wright from Las Vegas, Nevada. He went on to become an admiral. I guess he was really my closest friend at the Naval Academy.

My Naval Academy career, so to speak, ended on somewhat of a sour note. It kind of goes to my whole philosophy about integrity and honor. At the end of each year there's something called June Week; now they call it Graduation Week. I was the acting company commander for my company during June Week at the end of my Second Class year. As a result, I was in charge of the accountability of the entire company, "firsties" on down to 4th Class.

The 4th Class served as what are called the mates of the deck. At taps they did the accountability, and they would bring the company commanders cards that said everybody was present. They would sign them in front of me, and I'd tell them to take them down to the battalion office. Well, on the second night of June Week, this 4th Class midshipman mate of the deck came to me and I said, "Is everybody here?" He had all the cards and said, "Yes, sir, except for these three classmates of yours who are down in the T.V. room in the basement. They told me they were going down there and so I checked them as present." I said, "Well, are you sure they're down there?" He said, "Well, sir, that's what they told me." I said, "But did you see them?" He said, "No, no I didn't." He had already checked them in and signed the card so I said, "Listen, I'll take it from here. You go hit the rack. I'll finish this up and take it down to the battalion office." So I had this muster sheet that reported everybody was all secure. But, three of my own classmates had told the person taking the muster that they would be down in the T.V. room. I thought well, I'd better go down there and get a visual, because that's what was required and this kid was on the carpet right then. I went down to the TV room and they weren't there. I went back upstairs and I started checking around and I couldn't find them anywhere until one of my classmates said, "Hey, I think they went out to see their girlfriends."

Their girls were in Annapolis for June week. We had a curfew, which required everybody to come in. These three waited for the curfew, the

taps report to be taken, and then they went over the wall. So I initialed where the young plebe had signed that they were in, and noted that they weren't and then instead of the plebe signing it I signed it, thereby turning in three of my own classmates; more importantly, three of my company mates.

When they came back the officer of the day was waiting for them and put them on report. They received what's called a Class A. They were convicted of a Class A offense, which is the most demerits you can get as a midshipman, and their punishment was to lose the rest of their June Week plus all of their summer leave. So I started my senior year, which should have been my very best year, as the member of 10th Company who had ratted on his own classmates and turned them in. I think that over the period of the year, the issue sort of went away for most of my classmates. I mean they realized that I did the right thing. We had a plebe that was open for an honor offense if I had submitted that report, and it wasn't really his fault. But for the first three or four months, it was bad with everybody blaming me for turning in my own classmates. Two of them were starters on the Naval Academy football team.

The point is I believed in my heart I was doing the right thing. Given a similar situation, I would have done the same thing again. The fact of the matter is it was the right thing to do. I think my Naval Academy career started on a high with the plebe year, but it ended a little bit lower with the First Class year, again, based upon a value system. I was willing to take the heat to do something I thought was right.

DR. CRIST: Was there a Bulldog program or something similar to familiarize the midshipmen with the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: No, there was a period of time during your second class cruise where you got to go down to Little Creek and do some Marine things, but I stayed at the Naval Academy my Second Class summer as a member of the what was called the plebe detail. I basically instructed the plebes, and I loved that. I did it my first class year, too, and I did it after graduation for a short period of time. So, I enjoyed the leadership challenge in working with the young plebes. I did not go to the Marine indoctrination. I didn't think I really needed it after living it for 20 plus years.

DR. CRIST: You must have a good sense of what the Marine Corps was all about?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What sports did you play?

GEN KRULAK: I wrestled, and I played lacrosse at the Naval Academy. I wrestled in high school, and I wrestled at the Naval Academy for two years and then at the end of the second year I got a pretty bad back injury that put me in the hospital for a while, and when I came back I was never really at the level I wanted to be.

When I was a freshman, I was up in the wrestling room and the coach of the lacrosse team, a man by the name of Willis Bilderback -- Bildie, for short -- came up in the wrestling loft looking for a lacrosse goalie. This was during plebe summer. He watched me wrestle and he said, you're really quick and you've got good hand-to-eye coordination. What you ought to do is be a lacrosse goalie. Well, I had played lacrosse in high school and so I went out and made the lacrosse team as a goalie. As a plebe I played on the plebe lacrosse team. At that time you could not play varsity as a plebe. The next year I went up on the varsity team and then they recruited a man by the name of Denny Wedakind, who was a phenomenal goalie. I mean, he was a three-time all-American. So my lacrosse days were numbered. But I ended up playing two sports at the Naval Academy, wrestling and lacrosse, and, you know, enjoyed it, but never really excelled.

DR. CRIST: You injured your back wrestling, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Injured my back in the wrestling loft. I wrestled either at 118 or 126 and I was wrestling a 134-pounder and I think he was just too heavy.

DR. CRIST: What was your major?

GEN KRULAK: We all majored in the same thing. I received a general degree in electrical engineering. I did very well in those subjects that were not in the engineering arena. Very well. I, I earned A's in English, foreign language, history, you name it. Math, I was a B student, and if it had anything to do with "E," as in engineering, I was a C student. My overall average was about a 3.0 on a 4.0 scale. At that time the Academy was very much an engineering school, so you could get A's in English and A's in Spanish and A's in history, but you had a lot of engineering courses and you're getting C's in those and you ended up with a lower cumulative grade point average.

DR. CRIST: Right. Mostly you just didn't have an interest in that. I get a sense you were much more interested in liberal arts rather than the hard science.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, although I did well in math. It's just that I wasn't interested in Math. I'd grind away. But I didn't go to the Naval Academy for an Engineering degree. I was looking for the overall whole man part of the Naval Academy, not the academic. I knew I was going to have a little trouble because I was going there without a senior year. Although I had a lot of credits and the maturity of a senior year, I realized that the Academy would be tough, and it was. I wasn't a dummy. I just wasn't a star man.

DR. CRIST: That brings a question. Did you actually graduate from Philip Exeter?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: By one credit short?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was an interesting issue. I did not graduate from high school. You know, here I am the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I never graduated from high school. I used that a lot in my speeches to young Marines. I'd say, "How many of you have graduated from high school?" I would be talking about setting their sights high, shooting for the top, so to speak. I'd say, "How many of you have completed high school? Everybody here who did not complete high school raise your right hand." SgtMaj [Lewis G.] Lee and I would stand up there and we'd raise our right hands, and then maybe one or two other people would raise theirs. I'd say, "Look around you. Look at your Commandant, look at your Sergeant Major. Neither one of us are high school graduates and yet look where we are." "You can do anything you put your mind to."

The fact of the matter is I didn't graduate from high school. That put a lot of pressure on me going to the Naval Academy because if I had trouble at the Naval Academy, I'd be without a high school diploma. So, when I finished the Naval Academy, I wrote Exeter telling them that I just finished the Naval Academy. Could I get a diploma? They wrote back and said, no, write again later and let's see how you do in life. So, I went to Vietnam got wounded, came back, wrote them a letter. I said, "Okay, now I've now been to Vietnam, served my country, shed blood for my country, how about a diploma?" They said, "No." So I went back to Vietnam a second time, got wounded a second

time. By now I was a captain, came back, said, "Okay, I'm now a captain, it's been five years since I got out. How about a diploma?" They said, "No." So I then went to George Washington University, got a master's degree, Master of Science in industrial personnel relations. Went back to Exeter and I said, "Look I did two tours in Vietnam, wounded twice, here's my medals, and here's my Masters Degree." Exeter gave me a diploma.

DR. CRIST: At some point, you met your future wife, Zandra L. Meyers of Annapolis, Maryland. Did you meet her at the Naval Academy?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. My uncle was the head of the engineering department at the Naval Academy. He had a daughter by the name of Dee. His name was Captain Reigart, Jack Reigart, He was my mother's brother-in-law. Dee Reigart was a student AT Annapolis High School. One of her classmates was a girl by the name of Zandi Meyers. I was dating a girl that I had known since I was at Quantico Post High School, and she was going to Ohio State University and I was going to the Naval Academy. I was a 3d Class midshipman when I first saw Zandi, who was younger than me. She was still in high school. She was going to go to the Army-Navy game with my cousin, and my cousin had gotten them two dates, both of them plebes.

Well, the plebes could not ride what's called the drag bus, which was the bus that brought the girls back to the Naval Academy. All midshipmen had to go up by a regular bus that took midshipmen up, but after the game if you were a 3d Class or above -- if you were a sophomore, junior, senior -- you could ride the drag bus home with your date. If you didn't, then the girls had to get on this bus alone and ride to the Academy. So my cousin said, would you mind taking Zandi Meyers home on the drag bus? And so I did and all the way we just talked.

I really wasn't interested in her. She had a boyfriend. She had just gone to the Army-Navy game because she wanted to see what an Army-Navy game is like. So she had a boyfriend and I had a girlfriend and we weren't interested in each other. Then over the next year or so we saw more and more of each other until my 2d Class summer, the summer between my sophomore and junior years -- my cousin asked if I would take Zandi to June Week. She had never been to June Week. So I said, yes. By then I had broken up with my girlfriend, but Zandi was still dating her boyfriend and so we went through June Week and finally at the end I thought, "Wait a minute, I'm not so sure that I'm not beginning to get interested in this girl."

She had always said to me that she would never date a midshipman for real. "I just will not date them. They always have girlfriends back home and I'm not going to get involved in that."

Well, eventually we started dating and then a year later we got engaged and got married on the 27th of June. We graduated on the third of June and we waited all of 24 days. So I really had to pursue her because she was absolutely not interested in midshipmen.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything about your time at the Naval Academy that I didn't touch on?

GEN KRULAK: No, I think that's about it. I mean, the Naval Academy was an integral part of my life and I loved the academy and I still do. I have a love-hate relationship with it right now because I'm in some ways disappointed in how they're operating. But the fact of the matter is I've been a great supporter of the Naval Academy and I'm glad I went there.

DR. CRIST: At the time you received a regular commission, which has changed since then. Was it a good idea to have reserve commissions vice the regular commission coming in to Marine Corps, do you think?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. For the Marine Corps, it was a good thing because it allows the Marine Corps to pick its future leaders. Every year it gets to extend or to augment those who really want to stay and who the Corps wants to keep. Before there had been a "chosen few" that came in through the academies or ROTC who were made Regulars automatically. Now all must compete for regular commissions. So, from the Marine Corps standpoint it is good. I'm not so sure it is good from the nation's standpoint. I think that if you're going to invest the types of monies you invest in for people to go to the service academies, they ought to come here with a regular commission, not a reserve one.

DR. CRIST: Your next assignment was to The Basic School, sir, in Quantico, Virginia. What do you recall about TBS? Was there a focus to the training at the time? Was there a sense Vietnam was on the horizon and had to get lieutenants ready for that?

GEN KRULAK: I would say without a shadow of a doubt the focus was on this amorphous thing called Vietnam, called counterinsurgency, called

guerilla warfare. There was a strong emphasis on scouting and patrolling. Platoon tactics. Platoon ambushes. Without a shadow of a doubt, in the back of every lieutenant's mind was that we'd probably be going to war, and in many instances there was a concern that the war was going to end before we got there. The joke was, well, Bob Hope will have had a show there before we get there and then it'll all be over.

From a personal standpoint, it was the beginning of an understanding that I was Brute Krulak's son and that this was not going to always be a good thing. People either loved my father or they hated him. I mean, there was no in-between. For everyone that I met who loved him, there were those who hated him. Now it's totally different because they recognize what a wonderful person he is, what a brilliant man he has and what he did for the Corps. But he was also a very, very abrasive, tough cookie, and so he stepped on a lot of people's toes. It's the first time that, I had to deal with being the Brute's son and all that entailed. People saying, "Well, he's got that because he's Krulak's son," or, "we're not going to let him have it because it'll look like favoritism." I always felt like I was walking this fine line between I don't want to be his son, but I'm proud of him. I didn't want to get the crap but I also didn't want to get the benefits either. I just wanted to be Chuck Krulak. That's what I wanted.

The beauty of Vietnam coming as quickly as it did was that it allowed me to be Chuck Krulak. I mean, your dad can't be out in the foxhole -- your dad couldn't be out on patrol. The fact that I was in infantry battalions during both of my tours and I never served above the battalion level, it showed that I was not ducking anything, and the fact that I was wounded twice and the fact that both my of my brothers were over there and, every one of us was decorated, I think did a lot to mitigate against any sense that I or my brothers received any special treatment.

Then, obviously, he retired in '68, which was only four years after I became a Marine officer, so I was able to get out from underneath his shadow. It was interesting that there were other Marine generals sons who came in my basic class with me. Len Chapman, Buzz Buse, Chuck Krulak, Pete Van Ryzin. So, there were several Marine generals' sons there. So, I wasn't the only one suffering, I'll tell you that.

DR. CRIST: You feel like you're a bit more on the skyline at that rank then you may have wanted.

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. Throughout the early part, even up until major people would say, "Well, it's Krulak's son." But that went away after awhile.

SESSION II

Duty as a Lieutenant and a Year in Vietnam

Preparation for the FMF . . . Platoon Commander in Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines . . . Embarkation School . . . Operation Silver Lance . . . Special Landing Force, 7th Fleet . . . Deployment to Vietnam . . . Dagger Thrust Operations . . . First Experiences in Combat . . . Operation Harvest Moon . . . Operation New York . . . First Purple Heart . . . Discussions with his father on the military strategy in Vietnam . . . Civil Affairs Program . . . Task Force Hotel . . . Operation Hastings . . . Impressions of the North Vietnamese Army . . . Return to the United States . . . A job interview with Ryder Rental Trucks . . . Series Commander in San Diego . . . Director, Special Training Branch . . . Impact on future views of Recruit Training

DR. CRIST: You finished TBS in January 1965 and then went to your first assignment, which was Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines at Camp Pendleton. You were platoon commander. Did you believe TBS prepared you adequately for the Fleet?

GEN KRULAK: I thought The Basic School did a good job of preparing me for my trade, and one of the things that was really good for us is that when we came out we were assigned to units alphabetically. So, I went to G/2/1 and I was Krulak. A good friend of mine that shared a locker with me at TBS was named Listerman. He came to the same company with me. So -- I mean, it was almost a little of cohesion right there. It made things a lot easier.

My regiment was the 1st Marine regiment. The commander was Col. Carl W. Hoffman, who went on to become a major general. He was a trumpet player with Red Nickle and Five Pennies. He was one of the Five Pennies--a very interesting officer. You talk about characters, he was a heck of a character. I remember the day I reported in they were holding a regimental gathering, and so we went to the San Mateo officer's club. We were sitting there and they had a stage with a curtain drawn over it, and sitting in front of the curtain was a Victrola. An officer walked up to the Victrola and put a 78 rpm on and it played a beautiful rendition of "Cherry Pink and Apple Blossom White." It was a trumpet solo that was spectacular, and everybody was captivated. Then, all of a sudden, the curtain parted and you realized that it was really Col. Hoffman playing for real.

The battalion commander was a lieutenant colonel by the name of Robert. T. Hanifin, Bob Hanifin. What was interesting is this was during

the transplacement era. 2/1 transplaced to Okinawa as 3/3. Hanifin was the XO of 2/1 before it transplaced -- he then got promoted to lieutenant colonel. He became the CO when the battalion transplaced under a new CO. My brother was in 2/1. Just before I got there he transplaced to be 3/3 and I came in and fell on top of him. So, the Krulaks were in 2/1 together for about one day. Then during my second tour of Vietnam, I went to 3/3, and then later in life commanded 3/3. So, it's interesting this relationship between the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and the Krulak family.

I commanded the 2nd Platoon of G/2/1 and I was blessed to have as my platoon sergeant a staff sergeant by the name of Robert E. Clemens. Clemens had been awarded the silver star in Korea, and he had what looked like 50 rows of ribbons. I thought to myself I've died and gone to heaven. I've got the world's greatest platoon sergeant. In fact, he was phenomenal.

In those days and hopefully continuing on today, it was in the mind of that platoon sergeant that his job was to make "his lieutenant" the best in the battalion and the best in the regiment. SSgt Clemens really worked hard with me. He had poor material to work with, but he did a hell of a job.

As we prepared to go to Vietnam, I was sent to a couple of schools, one of them was Embarkation School, which was the first sensing of logistics that I received, and it was a real "eye opener". Then I went to the Counter-guerilla Warfare School, where one of the instructors was a gunnery sergeant by the name of Jimmy E. Howard, who went on to win a Medal of Honor and is famous for Howard's Hill. From the day I reported in to the Counter-Guerilla Warfare School, for some reason or another, he

always called me "little fellow." He never called me lieutenant; he never called Mr. Krulak. He always called me "the little fella." To this day-- I was a general and he was a Medal of Honor winner, before he died, he still used to call me "the little fellow." But those are the types of staff NCOs that I was blessed to be around. I mean, you always talk about who the officers you were around. Well, SNCOs like Clemens and Jimmy Howard really gave me an idea of what it was to be a staff NCO.

My company commander was a captain by the name of Andy Jack Sibley from Crump, Tennessee. Jack Sibley and his wife were great friends of Chuck and Zandi Krulak. They befriended us -- they befriended all the lieutenants in the company. He and his wife were the first we saw, other than my parents, who tried to make you feel like a family. The trouble was that Jack Sibley wasn't a very good company commander. I think everybody loved him to death, but tactically he was not very good. As a result, he didn't stay company commander once we got to Vietnam. He just didn't do very well and he retired as a major. That doesn't take anything away from him as a person. He just -- when it came down to the job of a rifle company commander, he wasn't as good as some of the others. But he was a great man. He would have given his life for any one of us. You learn a lot of things from various people, and Jack Sibley taught us a lot. He taught Zandi and I a lot and the first lesson was how to treat your officers. He never claimed to be Sun Tzu or Genghis Kahn. He was just an average company commander. I served as his XO. I was dual-hatted as platoon commander and XO, because we were short-handed.

DR. CRIST: What can you tell me about your load-out for Vietnam. Did you know you were headed to Vietnam when you left leaving Camp Pendleton? You arrived off the coast of Vietnam in September as part of the special landing force for 7th Fleet.

GEN KRULAK: First off, during the time I was at Pendleton we were blessed to participate in an operation called Silver Lance, which was my father's operation when he was the commander of FMFPac. He put together the largest Marine exercise on the West Coast since World War II. It was a counterinsurgency exercise. My father was brilliant. He stole a march on what was to come and built his forces to fight it. It was a multiple-day exercise that ran the division, wing and the logistics force through a guerilla insurgency type of conflict. When that was over, we went back to San Mateo. We knew something was going to happen; we saw

other battalions leave to go straight to Vietnam. Then one evening I was at home and I got a phone call and it said, "Come on back, we are being recalled." They recalled the entire battalion and when we got back to the Battalion area, they had big tables laid out with jungle utilities. We drew our gear and the next thing we knew we were on our way down to San Diego. We got on board shipping and we were on our way to Okinawa. We spent a week or so there and I remember running into one of my Basic School classmates who had already been to Vietnam and back and been wounded and was wearing a Purple Heart. That was sobering to all of the new officers in our Battalion. We ended up doing multiple landings as part of the special landing force, and then in December we landed for Operation Harvest Moon and never left.

DR. CRIST: Was it a fairly tight group of officers in your company?

GEN KRULAK: The company was very tight. There was myself, John Listerman, Bill Blaha, and Jim Panther. Bill Blaha was a Naval Academy classmate of mine. He used to call himself Buffer Go Bill Blaha. I mean, he was a PT fanatic, stud bolt, again, one of those who didn't exactly tear it up in combat and ended up retiring, I think as a lieutenant colonel. Jim Panther got himself in trouble in Vietnam after he had moved to a different battalion.

John Listerman was the best of us all by far. One of the finest officers I've ever known. He was terribly wounded on the second day of Harvest Moon. He was the 1st Platoon commander and he was moving his platoon down a trail that had a hill mass on the left flank. On the right flank was a rice paddy and then a tree line. I was the XO of the company, moving up in the front. Capt Sibley was in the back. We came around this bend walked right into an ambush. The kickoff of the ambush was a 50-caliber machine gun across the rice paddy. The first rounds hit Listerman in the knee, right on the kneecap, and it made this loud bang, and it was a bullet hitting his kneecap and it just picked him up off the ground and literally flipped him up, and as he was coming down with his head coming to the ground, he took another round right above the heart that went in sideways. It went through his pectoral muscle and out his back.

We all hit the deck. About that time, the NVA on the hill above us started throwing grenades and that's how I got wounded in the arm, from a grenade fragment. We assaulted and cleared that position, cleared the ambush, I went up to John

Listerman and his knee was almost blown off. We held it back it on. We called in a medivac bird. I thought he was dead, or going to die.

The bird landed, and it was Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt. He had come down because we were in contact, and by then the battalion had moved up to continue the contact. So, John Listerman was evacuated on the task force commander's helicopter very quickly, which probably did save his life, because the medevac bird was still 15 or 20 minutes out.

DR. CRIST: As part of the Special Landing Force, you participated in numerous exercises called Dagger Thrusts. What stands out in your mind about these operations?

GEN KRULAK: Some of the realities of war. The very first one, the XO of our battalion, honest to God, got on the 1MC on D-Day about one hour before we were to land. You're getting ready to get in the boats or helicopters, and this voice came over and said, "Attention all members of the landing force. Attention all members of the landing force." Very dramatic, and he says, "This is your executive officer speaking. Today we go into combat." This big pause, "and for some of you, this will be your first time. All I can say is, good luck, God speed, see you on the beach." Then there was a big pause and then honest to goodness you heard, "And I don't want any of you fucking second lieutenants bringing your cameras ashore." I mean, I sat there and said, "Are you kidding me?" We're going to war with this guy and he's worried about us bringing cameras ashore. Amazing! There are two other incidents that were kind of humorous, but also brought home this sense of a different kind of war which played a role later on when we started looking at 21st Century conflict. We landed at a place called Vung Mu, and my company -- again, I was the XO and platoon commander--was with another company and my platoon was tied in with them. As we moved inland we came across a village. The company commander of the other company was one of these real gung-ho, almost frighteningly gung-ho officers. He came into this village and said, "This could be a VC village, be careful!" So we got about three paces into it and there was one of those caves that were all over, they looked like little bomb shelters. I heard this captain yell out, "We got a fighting hole here! Be careful! Be careful!" When I moved up, my platoon was right on the flank about 20 yards away. He says, "Give me a grenade." He pulls the pin, and throws the grenade in this hole. He yells, "Fire in the hole."

Fire in the hole." We wait and we wait and we wait.

About 30 seconds later the grenade hadn't gone off and all of a sudden out of the shelter comes this old, old papa san, beard down to his knees, followed by a mama san and about three little kids, and in his hand was the grenade with the tape still around the handle. I mean, the captain was such an idiot, he forgot to take the tape off of it! More importantly, it wasn't a fighting a hole; it was the same kind of root cellar that every Vietnamese family had -- he just didn't know it. We almost killed these people. I never forgot that. Although it was very traumatic then, it's kind of been a joke. It became such a ludicrous sign of lack of preparation that we used to jokingly say in the battalion "stand for he fought at Vung Mu." Well, we didn't do anything at Vung Mu but almost kill an old papa san and a mama san and some young kids. An important lesson.

The final lesson was in the last of the series of dagger thrusts. We made a landing and one of our bulldozers got stuck in the surf and we couldn't get it started, couldn't get it moved. We had nothing big enough to haul it back to the ship. There was just nothing that we could do, and the battalion commander, LtCol Robert T. Hanifin, Jr., was just having fits. No matter what we tried, we could not get this thing out of the sand. The commodore pushed for us to back-load because Harvest Moon was coming up. We didn't know it, but there was a real world battle raging and we had to get going. The bottom line is I watched Hanifin basically get angrier and angrier and angrier, chewing everybody out, and then finally we ended up having to blow this tractor in place. You know, just poor planning on what to do if you had an incident like that. Hard lessons--negative lessons--but all of them worthwhile.

DR. CRIST: What was your opinion of Hanifin as a battalion commander?

GEN KRULAK: Hanifin was a really nice guy, and I liked him. But he had -- he had some personality issues that made it difficult. I mean, his value system was different from mine. Let's just leave it at that.

DR. CRIST: I have given you copies of your battalion's Command Chronologies relations to Operation Harvest Moon. Do they bring back any memories of your experiences?

GEN KRULAK: First, let me say a little bit about the documented history. I hope we're doing better

now. Because what I have read was stuff written by people who were obviously in the rear, and in many cases, it is inaccurate. Most of this is written at a fairly high level. Here's a good example of what I mean. This document mentions about the day 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was committed and I quote:

OPERATIONS D plus 2, 10 December, at 9:45H Company F (-), BLT 2/1 and elements of Command Group "A" were helo-lifted and came under heavy small arms and motor fire. The remaining elements of Company F and Company G were landed via helicopters from the USS Valley Forge [at a different LZ]. Company G and Company E, 2d Battalion 7th Marines covered the withdrawal of Company F (-) from the initial landing zone. By 1900 enemy contact was broken.¹

That was an understatement! You read that statement and it just says, "came under some fire." Let me tell you something: that was bad news. At the time, I was then with the Command Group "A". I was still with G Company, but I went in with the Alpha Command Group because we were going to have to use guides from the two companies, who would go in first and then guide their companies when they landed into their positions. I was the officer tasked to do that for my company. When we helo-lifted in, we came under heavy small arms and mortar fire. Company F and the Command Group landed right below a North Vietnamese regimental headquarters. It was really bad. We had a lot of people killed. The F Company commander, a superb officer, lay in a rice paddy all night long, terribly wounded. We couldn't evacuate anyone. You couldn't get a helicopter in because the fire was so heavy. That report said we were under heavy small arms and mortar attack. It was direct fire! We laid in a damned rice paddy behind a dike, getting the crap kicked out of us with people dying all around. It was bad. That was my first experience. We went in to the proverbial hot zone, and couldn't get out. Not only couldn't we get out, but we couldn't evacuate our wounded.

Col. Hanifin and the rest of that battalion landed several kilometers away. That was the only place they could get in. Then they moved to relieve us. They didn't beat the enemy back. I mean, they

got there and night was falling and the enemy withdrew. I mean, we didn't beat them. They beat the crap out of us. It was a bad scene. There were lots of people I had trained with, killed. There were only four captains in that battalion that I ever had anything to do with, and those were the rifle company commanders. We lost one of them there, he hadn't been on the ground for 20 minutes and he was really hit bad.

So, that was my baptism of fire. What surprised me was how random the casualties seemed to be. I mean, you would have thought that if they could get one guy here, then they could just shift and get the guy next to him without effort. But it wasn't that way. I mean, people all over the place were becoming casualties, but it wasn't as if the fire discipline of the bad guys was such that they were taking them out in rows. To this day, I don't know whether it was because, from where they were, they could only observe these people or what. But I felt like I was standing right out in the middle of the damned "V" ring, and yet nothing hit me. But all around people were getting hurt or killed.

What makes me mad about these chronologies is that they were written at a level that really, I guess, captured some things considered important. But I'll tell you, one has to keep on looking at where's the lessons learned are from Harvest Moon. And there were some lessons to be learned. It was a disaster. We landed in the wrong landing zone and yet none of that shows up in the chronology. The official documents just don't tell the story. That's Hanifin's fault. I mean, how can you have 15 Marines killed, 55 wounded, two of which went on and died of their wounds, have 200 VC killed, those kinds of casualties with only a couple of companies engaged and not even outline what happened.

DR. CRIST: Not really document . . .

GEN KRULAK: It did not document what happened. I mean, the battalion strength was 500 and some, and the battalion lost, killed and wounded, almost a hundred. This report is eight pages long and not even one paragraph is devoted to it. Give me a break. You can't -- I mean, that's what we did during Vietnam because we were so busy that there wasn't anybody who took the time to document -- not necessarily the blood and guts of what happened-- what really happened. I'm a little disappointed about this, and I just hope that we -- that other battalions and other regiments did a better job, and I hope we did a better job in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

¹ Task Force Delta AAR Operation Harvest Moon, dtd 28 Dec, p.6.

DR. CRIST: Anything else about Harvest Moon, which was your first major operation in-country?

GEN KRULAK: Well, a couple of things. I'm not sure that this is historically correct. I can only tell you what we were told at the time. It was the first time they had an arc light strike, B52s, in conjunction with ground operations. We had, as a battalion, moved to the top of a ridge line overlooking a valley. The battalion commander got a very cryptic message that said go back down off of that ridge line and move back several thousand meters. So we turned right around after getting to the top of this high ridge line and moved back down. We were told to dig in. We dug in. Then after waiting for several hours, we heard this unbelievable roar on the other side of the ridge line. It was the impact of the bombs from the B52s. We then went over the ridge and into the valley where the bombs had landed. It looked like a moonscape. There were just so many craters--very deep. We saw no North Vietnamese or VC casualties, but we saw a lot of cows and water buffalo that were either blown up or over pressure had gotten to them. It was just a remarkable sight. Later we heard it was, in fact, B52s. We were told it was the first arc light flown in support of Marine forces.

DR. CRIST: How was your fire support in general, sir? Fairly responsive via air and artillery? Or were there communications problems and delays?

GEN KRULAK: At my level, as a platoon commander or company XO, supporting arms that belong to the company were extremely responsive. As an SLF battalion, we had our own artillery battery and that was responsive. Air was fairly responsive, but I had nothing to measure it against. I didn't know what responsive was. I was a second lieutenant trying to survive and nothing was responsive enough really! I mean, if you're in a fire fight, you want it right then and there. But I would say that it was responsive.

There was always the joke about helicopter pilots. We always felt Marine fixed wing pilots were the best there were. I mean, they flew low and put the bombs where you wanted them. There was some sense that the Army helicopter pilots, particularly the "dust-off" and medevac people, were more willing to come into hot zones than the Marines. I think that was baloney, but you'd hear that every once in a while, some people would say that because Army pilots were warrant officers, they'd fly into this soup when the Marine helo pilots wouldn't. I never saw that. Marine medevac birds came into very tough zones. But I mention that

only because you could hear those rumors at the time.

During Harvest Moon, I was eventually evacuated out of the field. My arm wound from the mortar fragment was getting infected. So they sent me back when we had two more days to go. I recall the sense that we started with such a battle and ended up with just walking for miles without any real contact. It became obvious that our enemy was very capable and that they would fight us when he had an advantage and only when he had an advantage. Our ability to search and destroy was not good. We did a lot of searching and very little destroying. When the enemy chose to fight, they would fight and fight extremely well and extremely courageously. But they picked the time and the place. It was normally not when we picked the fight.

DR. CRIST: So the question over -- the debate over strategy in Vietnam was whether the enclave strategy that your father advocated in the CAP program seemed to be more successful way of doing it than say Westmoreland's big search and destroy operations?

GEN KRULAK: My dad once said that you cannot defeat an idea by bullets. You can only defeat an idea by having a better idea. His point was that we were fighting a conflict of ideas in Vietnam. One of them being democracy and the other being communism. The communists were down there in South Vietnam offering things such as land and a collective partnership of the people and none of these crooked governments, et cetera. That was their idea. His point was we tried to fight that idea with bullets. He said you're never going to win. So you had to give them a better idea. That would have been, in his mind, found through enclaves and protection of people and their economic well being. And we just never did that. Later on in my first tour, I had the pleasure of having Moshe Dyan travel with me for about a week. We were up north along the DMZ and I remember him sitting down eating, a little heat tab going, and we were warming up our meal and some coffee. He was sitting there rubbing Vaseline into the socket where his eye had been. He looked at me and he said, "Why are you all up here in the mountains and the jungles?" I replied, "What do you mean?" He said, "What are you doing up here? This isn't where your fight is." He was right.

DR. CRIST: Did you ever, during this period, talk to your father about Vietnam and his views,

particularly, say, after you came back from your first tour?

GEN KRULAK: I talked to him several times. I think that the time that I talked to him most passionately was -- I think it was after Operation New York. I did that because it was just a very bitterly fought battle. We, being the friendlies, were moving from south to north. The NVA had occupied a village and were very well dug in along a tree line that was right at the edge of a village. We had another Marine force coming down from the north. So the bad guys were caught in between us.

Our battalion was moving with the two companies forward, Golf Company on the right and I think it was Fox Company on the left. We got to this rice paddy and started across it. We got about halfway across. Then they just opened on us. I mean, it was really bad. To be honest, my company, I was again the XO of that company, did the wrong thing. The fire got so great and we were taking so many casualties, that we hit the deck instead of just assaulting on. So we hit the deck out in the middle of the rice paddy. Whereas, Fox Company kept moving. They probably didn't have as much resistance, but they were still meeting resistance. But they did the right thing. They moved. I mean, you can't stop in a killing zone just because it's bad. You have to keep pushing. Well, they kept pushing. They made the tree line and held up. We were out in the rice paddy. Right to the rear of the rice paddy was a graveyard. The graves looked like doughnuts. You had a raised outer ring, then a depression and then an inner ring that would have been where the doughnut hole was except it was solid. It raised up a little nipple type of thing.

Well, I moved back into one of those with parts of the command group, talking to the company commander who was further back saying, "Hey, we've got to get moving. We've got to get some air in here to get this thing going." So he said, "Okay, we'll get some air in." We had F4s that were flying in support. We marked the enemy with smoke and these Phantoms came streaming in but they weren't going parallel to our front lines. They were coming from south to north going right over our heads. So I said, "Okay, pick your ordinances." It turned out that their ordinance was napalm. The napalm came off of the first section of Phantoms. You think of bombs going straight down. Well the napalm canisters sort of floated. It was just uncontrolled wobbling. You could see it coming and it was coming right at our location. Sure enough, the canisters, one fell short, one fell long. But, I mean,

it was so close that you could literally feel the heat. The napalm jelly was all over. I had jumped into this grave so that I was in between the outer part of the doughnut and the inner nipple thing, keeping myself down. It was frightened. The company commander waved the planes off, saying, "Hey, you're killing our own people!" They finally got on the right paths and went east and west instead of south to north.

By this time it was dusk. The sun went down. It was dark. You could hear people out in the rice paddy. You know, the wounded were really hurting. So I called back to the battalion commander and I said, "Let me take a team out there." We had one platoon that we basically separated from the rest of the company. I said, "Let me go out there and get the platoon." He said, "No. You all are going to get killed. We've got enough problems. Let's not get part of your command group tied down." I said, "Well, you know, it's dark. We ought to be able to make it." So he finally gave me permission. I took myself and about two or three other Marines out there. We went out and we found the dead and the wounded. We found the separated platoon and brought them back to the company area. All the while, I was scared to death. I mean, out there in the middle of the night. I didn't know whether my own Marines would shoot at us. There was still NVA in the tree line. But the bottom line is we got everybody back.

The next morning, we prepped the tree line. By then Fox Company had started to roll down the tree line. But there were no NVA. So we moved up and moved across the rice paddy. The NVA slipped out during the night. Not only slipped out from us, but slipped out from the attacking force in the north.

So I saw my dad just a couple of days later. I mean I was still really shook up about this. Shook up because of a close call with the air, shook up because of going out there at night. I'm not saying I'm a coward, but I was scared to death. Also I was just furious at the fact that we didn't push through the killing zone. The company commander held us up. The kids would have moved. The Marines would have gone, but he stopped us. I just said to my dad -- the enemy won. They killed Marines. I'm sure we killed some of them, but they escaped. I told my dad that we have people back at the division and I'm sure even at FMFPac level who just saw it as nothing more than so many Marines, KIA, so many NVA, KIA, so much trench line destroyed. so many weapons captured etc. I said, "You don't even know what the hell happened. You don't know about people dying. You don't know about tactics that didn't work. I mean, what

the hell are we doing?" I was really upset. I said, "I almost got killed by my own aviation. Then, we almost got killed out there in the middle of the night looking for a platoon to bring them back." He didn't say much.

I got the Bronze Star that night. I later on got a Silver Star for another action. Probably they were reversed. I should have gotten the Silver Star for the first action. Courage wise, the greatest act of courage that Chuck Krulak did in two tours in Vietnam was to go out into that rice paddy in the middle of the night trying to find a lost platoon. Forget about me. Those two or three Marines that went out there with me are probably thinking what the hell, this lieutenant is crazier than a hoot owl. But they went out with me. I mean, it was scary. But that's kind of the way things go.

That was the only time I really had a big discussion with my father. It came more from frustration than anything else. I did share with him the conversation I had with Moshe Dyan. But my dad was in agreement. He knew that we were in the wrong place and fighting the wrong way.

DR. CRIST: There's an interesting note, your Bronze Star citation was signed by V.H. Krulak.

GEN KRULAK: Let me see that. Yes this is the one, "Heavily armed battalion strength positioned in a tree line. . . Marines became casualties falling in an open rice paddy which offered no cover convenient for rescuers. One of the company platoons was cut off. Realizing energy and contacting and moving into a more tenable defense position for the night, First Lieutenant Krulak volunteered to lead a four-man party to locate the platoon and evacuate the dead and wounded . . . While proceeding into the hazardous rice paddies, he and his men were detected by the Vietcong and taken under vicious small arms and mortar fire. . ." It was a bad day.

DR. CRIST: Did you have much contact with the South Vietnamese Army or their Marines?

GEN KRULAK: No. I only did really one operation of any significance with them. I can't even remember the name of it. But it was up in the northwestern part of the country. We were with something called the Hac Boa, which is Vietnamese for Black Panther. It was the Hac Bao Battalion or Company out of Hue City. They were very good. They were a very specialized force. I do remember that the head of the Hac Boa was about six feet tall. He was the biggest Vietnamese officer I'd ever seen. They were good.

DR. CRIST: What was the reaction of the populace to you?

GEN KRULAK: In 1966 and in 1969, when I went back, we saw few civilian Vietnamese. We were up in Northern I Corps. The vast majority of my time was spent really north of Dong Ha. There just really weren't that many civilians.

DR. CRIST: On that first tour, your battalion spent a lot of time around Phu Bai securing the airfield and supporting the CAP program there. While there, you volunteered for Task Force Hotel. Which was a rapid reaction force?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Our battalion ended up providing a force to different battalions. I didn't like Phu Bai. I didn't like sitting on a runway. So whenever possible, I would encourage our unit to let us go. As a result, I fought with some interesting people like "Ding Dong" Bell and "Big" Ernie Defazio and guys like that.

DR. CRIST: You participated in numerous operations such as New York another one of the hammer and anvil operations?

GEN KRULAK: Yeah, the old anvil and hammer trick never worked.

DR. CRIST: It looks great on paper. What's the big problem with it?

GEN KRULAK: Well, to make it work required a lot of coordination. Normally, the more coordination you had, the more opportunity for the bad guys to find out what was going on.

DR. CRIST: It's too slow for an elusive enemy?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What do you recall about Operation Hastings. Hastings being the first direct invasion of the south, with the fighting very close to the DMZ and with a very good North Vietnamese unit.

GEN KRULAK: Yes it was my first experience against the North Vietnamese soldier. Hastings was probably the most significant battle in 1966. It marked the first direct invasion of the south by the north using the 324B Army Division, North Vietnamese Army. They were well equipped. They had great 782 gear. They fought well. The Marine Corps moved multiple battalions up along the DMZ, artillery battalions, air, you name it, to blunt

this attack. This was not a bunch of bums, the 324 B was an excellent division. They spearheaded the defeat of the French in 1954. This was a good outfit.

I was a first lieutenant. My company commander was a captain by the name of Ray E. Lavan, Jr. He had taken over from Captain Andy Jack Sibley. Lavan was a better company commander tactically. Our company was designated as called the Bald Eagle/Sparrow Hawk for the task force. It was kind of the rapid reaction force. If they called out the Bald Eagle, that was the entire company. If they called out a Sparrow Hawk, that was a platoon.

Well, at the beginning of Hastings, a rifle company, K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines got themselves in a real fight. So much so that two Medals of Honor were given for an action on the same day by this same company. One was the company commander, Robert J. Modrzejewski. Captain Lavan and I were told to come up to the task force headquarters because they were going to activate the Bald Eagle. As we were walking up to the headquarters, the radio operator gave Captain Lavan a message that said, "You've been selected to go to Comm school. You're to report to Quantico by such and such a date. Your flight date is such and such a date." We were looking at this thing and that meant that he had to get going fairly soon, within a day or so. So we get up to the headquarters and there's the "3" of the task force. It was a major by the name of Donald J. Fulham who eventually became a two star general in the Marine Corps. Again, the task force headquarters was really buzzing. They had this helluva contact going on. Fulham said "Come on in here." He's up in front of the map. He said, "Here's the location of the enemy. Here's the location of friendlies. They're holding this hilltop. You're going to have to move up here. We're going to land you so that we don't get you into the fight in the zone. We don't want to put you into where you'll have to fight to get off of the aircraft. We'll drop you here and you move up this streambed." Fine. About that time, Lavan says, "I just got this message to go back to Comm school." I'll never forget it. Old Don Fulham, he looks at me and said, "Are you the company XO?" I said, "Yes sir." He said, "Well, you're now the company commander." That was the first time I got to command a company. The next thing I know, we're down on the airfield at Dong Ha and get on these birds. We were inserted into the LZ. We went up a stream bed to try to get to this company that was so shot up. They had fought their way up this same stream bed to get to some defensible position, and they left their dead along the way.

They left their dead all along the stream bed, and they'd tried to cover the bodies by scraping helmets full of sand on them. Somebody had taken their helmets and scraped out some of the sand and rocks and just threw it on top of the Marines. I don't know why they even took the time to do that if they were going to leave them there. But, we found our way to this unit by the dead bodies. Finally got up to where the fight was. We hit the NVA on the flank and fought through. We ended up relieving this company. We then went down and moved into a location that was to the northeast of a place called the Rock Pile where we again got in several fights. We ended up attached to a regiment that I didn't know was in country. I remember tying into an outfit from the 26th Marines. What the hell is the 26th Marines? I didn't even know that they were there. Then moving back down to the Rock Pile where I joined my battalion again. We operated kind of like the orphan rifle company.

I guess what impressed me the most is, I can remember being up on the hilltop. Beneath us was a valley. I watched because I was waiting for the air and artillery we had called. I watched this NVA unit operate just as if they were Marines. I mean, snooping and pooping, squad and fire team rushes across the open ground, crossing danger areas the way we were taught. I mean, they were really good soldiers. I can remember in my mind thinking that these aren't some damn guys in pajamas. These guys are pros.

Marines would kill an NVA and the first thing they'd take off the NVA was their pack. The NVA had good packs. Understand we were still carrying the damn things from Korea. These guys had a kind of ruc-sack that would carry a lot more gear and that was much more easier on your back. So Marines would get a dead North Vietnamese soldier and they immediately throw away their own pack, take the NVA's pack and wear that. The same with the NVA belt. The NVA had this very nice web belt that had a buckle that you buckled and was smooth, so that if you were on your stomach, you weren't always being caught up by this little thing that stuck out. This buckle was flat. It had a little communist star on it. I had one. I probably could still find it somewhere back in my gear, in my footlocker. But I wore that throughout the rest of my tour. They just had good 782 gear.

DR. CRIST: I'm trying to remember but you have told a story about a radio operator. I think it was an African American Marine . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yeah, that was during Hastings when we went into fight, as I talked about going up

that stream. It's just the story of a Marine whose unit was pinned down. He attacked an enemy machine gun and gave his life for his fellow Marines. The reason I use the story is not just his bravery, but probably more importantly is at that time, it was 1966 and the ability of a black anybody to get a hamburger in his own hometown south of the Mason Dixon line, which is where this kid was born, was slim and none. And yet, he gave his life for his fellow Marines. At no time did he look back and say, "Gee, I wonder if they're white or black or what is their religion." He just did it. The point being that when you're a Marine, you take care of your fellow Marines.

DR. CRIST: Somebody told me once that they got much greater satisfaction out of fighting the NVA because at the end of the day you felt like you had really beat somebody rather than the frustration of dealing with snipers and booby-traps such as further south.

GEN KRULAK: Well, we didn't always beat them. But, yes, I really didn't like fighting down south. We spent a short period of time down in the DaNang area. That was a terrible time because of all the mines. Every time a patrol went out, somebody was stepping on a mine. Somebody was losing a leg, somebody was getting killed. It got so bad that it became a massive leadership job. It ended up with my platoon commanders, the officers, going out with every patrol. I would go out with one in every three patrols. The kids were just petrified. So the officers went out with them...even on squad-size patrols. You just had to do it.

DR. CRIST: You rotated back in October '66 from your first tour in Vietnam and went to be a Series Commander at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego. Your first exposure to recruit training for which as Commandant you made a number of dramatic changes. What do you recall about that?

GEN KRULAK: First let me tell you an interesting story. I can remember coming back from Vietnam after the first tour and having been wounded and my wife was concerned. I didn't get the duty station I wanted. I get word that they've got this junior officer recruiting firm looking for people who are getting out of the service. This outfit called Lendman and Associates. They were recruiting young officers. So they had a job fair down in Mission Valley in San Diego. I went to it. Zandi was saying, "Look, I'm not sure I like you getting

shot. You're going to go out there again. I'm a little scared. Do me a favor and at least go look."

I remember going there and I interviewed with two companies. One of them was Corning Glass. They offered me a job to be some kind of a management trainee. Then I met with a man at a little desk. He wanted me to be the regional director of his new company. I would have the western region, from the Mississippi River all the way to the west coast. He would be the president of the company and take everything to the east. But he wanted somebody to take the west. I'd be vice president. He had this idea. It was the stupidest idea I'd ever heard. The idea was this. He was going to get a bank to back him in buying some trucks. Then he'd take these trucks and he would rent them to people to make moves. I thought to myself, this guy is crazy. Who in the world would ever rent a truck. The guy's name, his company, is called Ryder. I could have been the number two person in Ryder Rents Trucks and I thought it was a dumb idea! So I ended up not going with Ryder, not going with Corning and staying in the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: No regrets?

GEN KRULAK: No regrets at all. But I just think it's funny how things happen. Corning Glass. Unbelievable organization. Turns out that a Congressman by the name of Ames Houghton owns Corning Glass. I ended up being a friend of his. He helped the Marine Corps out when I was the Commandant. Ryder Rent Trucks went on to become a multi-million dollar corporation.

As for my assignment to MCRD, San Diego Well, I recall first and foremost I didn't want to go there. I wanted to go teach at The Basic School. I felt that coming out of Vietnam I had had all of this unbelievable experience as a platoon commander, as a company XO, as a company commander, as an adjutant, that I really had something to give to the kids at the Basic School. As it turned out, I went to MCRD, San Diego instead. That was a great tour and would have a major impact on me later on when I became the Commandant. Because that was during the time when McNamara and the President started their Project 100,000. We were enlisting mental group fours . . . a poorer quality Marines.

I was a Series officer and then was sent over to be the director of the Special Training Branch. The Special Training Branch was established in order to help get recruits who were having difficulties back into regular platoons to graduate. It was made up of something called the Medical Rehabilitation Platoon. That's for the kid who had shin splints or

broke his arm or something like that. Instead of discharging him, we brought him into medical rehab where there were doctors to take care of him as best they could. Part of the Medical Rehab Platoon was something called the Neuro Psychiatric Unit. Those were the crazies. Those were the people who, drank Brasso or ate glass. All of this is true. I mean, they'd drink Brasso. They'd eat Duroglit. They'd eat glass. They'd eat brillo pads and have people punch them in the stomach to cut their stomachs up. Crazy kids. Then there was a Motivation Platoon. A Motivation Platoon was for two types of recruits, a passive/aggressive and a passive/dependent. We had psychiatrists who were associated with the Motivation Platoon and would put the recruits into either the passive/aggressive side of the house or the passive/dependent. You treated them differently. Then there was the Physical Conditioning Platoon. This was for the kids that were grossly overweight or grossly weak. Then there was an Academic Proficiency Platoon that we started when I was there. That was to take these mental group fours who were just not smart enough to be able to hack it and give them academic help in order to get them ready to go back to recruit training and be able to absorb what was being taught. Then you had the Correctional Custody Platoon. And that was for the kids that did something wrong but not bad enough to throw out. You wanted to rehabilitate them.

The bottom line was that it was a really hard job. I had great drill instructors, but it was a hard job. We started putting up pictures of the recruits who had gone through any one of our platoons and went back to recruit training and got to be platoon or series honor men, or were meritoriously promoted. By the end of the time that I was there, we had a pretty good gallery of Marines that actually came to the special training branch and went back to recruit training and did well. So there was a sense that we did something good.

At the same time, there were some real bums, overweight slugs, mental group fours, criminals almost. So I saw the problems of recruiting good Marines into our Corps, first hand. It stuck with me that the answer was to never lower your standards. I don't care how hard it was to recruit. Later on, when I became Commandant, I used to say if I've got to go down to my driver and myself, then that is what I will do before we'll lower standards. I saw what lowered standards did to the Corps and the answer was, "never again." So being at the recruit depot had some impact on my future views of recruit training.

DR. CRIST: Was it a much different Boot Camp than when you were Commandant some thirty years later?

GEN KRULAK: Boot Camp now is obviously longer. I think it is, in many ways, tougher. The only thing I think that might have been different then was there was probably some maltreatment going on in this '66 timeframe. That's not to say it was condoned, because it wasn't. But now there's a lot more positive leadership than I think existed back then.

DR. CRIST: Do you think some of that was the nature of the recruits you were recruiting then versus today?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, they just frustrated the drill instructors, terribly. As a result, they took out their frustrations.

DR. CRIST: Anything else about that, sir, that you recall about that tour, which lasted from October of 1966 to July of 1968.

GEN KRULAK: Other than the absolute knowledge that I was going back to war and that these Marines were going to be there. So in my mind, it was always make sure you get the right people through Boot Camp. Don't put a slug in.

SESSION III

Duty as a Captain and a Return to Vietnam

Amphibious Warfare School . . . Alfred M. Gray and the Young Turks . . . Maneuver Warfare . . . A second tour in Vietnam . . . Commander, Company L, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines . . . Richard C. "Dutch" Schulze . . . Oliver North . . . Cam Lo . . . Combat Tactics . . . Operation Virginia Ridge . . . Silver Star Award . . . Second Purple Heart and his refusal to leave Lima Company . . . A brief tour in Division G-3 . . . Operation Leatherneck Square . . . Withdrawal from Vietnam . . . Return to Okinawa . . . Officer in Charge, Counter Guerilla Warfare School, Northern Training Area . . . Use of dogs in mine detection

DR. CRIST: Following this, you're now a captain, Captain Krulak. You went to AWS, Amphibious Warfare School, which I think is in the same building today as it was then.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was a really important six months. It was six months long. The school then, like it is now is in my opinion, was one of the real jewels of the Marine Corps. I think the Marine Corps has three jewels. One of them is MAWTS at Yuma. One of them is Amphibious Warfare School. One of them is IOC at TBS. I think those are great, great schools. As the Commandant, I tried to make all schools great. I think we made great strides. Certainly, one that's right up there now is the Command And Control Systems Course. But the three I mentioned were really top notch schools as well. AWS was top notch when I went there.

I went there with some great, great Marines that would have an influence throughout the rest of my life. Perhaps the one that -- although I'd known him before as a midshipman who became absolutely the best friend in the world to me was Captain Tom Draude, Thomas Valentine Draude. He was at AWS with me and we became fast friends. We studied together. We just became like brothers, probably stronger than brothers. Other people were individuals like Mac Radcliff, Don Robinson, just good, good officers who I would run into from then on in my career. When I came out of AWS, I stood number two in the class. And I really felt that I could command a rifle company in combat. That's what AWS was for during that six months and during Vietnam. It was to develop people to fight and win against the North Vietnamese. When I came out, the difference between me being a rifle company commander as a first lieutenant and me being a rifle company

commander as a captain was like night and day. I mean, I really felt I had my act together and I wanted to command a rifle company. I was anxious to get to Vietnam to be a rifle company commander. I got my wish.

DR. CRIST: What specifically in the course did they concentrate on that you felt really worked?

GEN KRULAK: It was the tactics. It was the coordination of combined arms, coordination of supporting arms. It was rifle company tactics. It was patrolling. We had a lot of amphibious courses but the bottom line was it always ended up in close terrain and jungles and how to fight a rifle company. It was war-fighting. Everything else was cut. It wasn't a year long course. It was five or six months. You did one thing and one thing only, learn how to fight.

DR. CRIST: I assume most of your counterparts had been to Vietnam?

GEN KRULAK: They were either on the way to Vietnam or just coming back. That's what it was. There wasn't anybody there that wasn't just back from Vietnam, or on their way to Vietnam after school.

DR. CRIST: AWS, certainly must have been a great learning environment, just the experience of your fellow officers.

GEN KRULAK: It was. There was a great camaraderie. It was during this period of time that I ran into a major by the name of Al [Alfred M.] Gray. General Gray used to get a bunch of what we call "young Turks together." We would meet up at

Harry Lee Hall and we would talk about war fighting and warfare. It was during this time that I think the first thoughts of maneuver warfare were beginning to be bantered around, certainly by us, the Marine Corps. Gray was a major and we were all captains. And, as you know, Al Gray has this kind of a magnetism about him. We used to meet up there once a week and discuss war fighting.

I can remember one night we went up there and after the meeting, our wives met us. Major Gray was there. There was a Marine who had been seriously wounded in Vietnam by the name of Ed Bush [Edward J. Bush Jr.]. As a matter of fact, he had been wounded in the head. This probably affected his thinking. I can remember this one night in particular he went up and bit Major Gray on the forehead. Bit him. He went to kiss him and he bit him. Gray had blood streaming down his face. I was wearing a blazer with a Naval Academy insignia on the pocket and the same officer came up and ripped my pocket off. Then the final blow was Capt Bush crawling on his hands and knees. He bit Sandi Draude, General [Thomas V.] Draude's wife, on the butt. And I'll never forget it. Draude saw his wife squeal as Ed Bush was biting her on the rear end. Tom Draude took the side of his hand in a karate chop and whacked Bush on the back of the neck and basically knocked him out.

Those are "old Corps" stories...but true. There were some strange things that went on. But I think it's interesting that a group of people would get with Major Gray once a week and talk about war fighting. One of the men that was there at that time was an officer by the name of Mike Riley. I think Mike Myatt went once in a while. So these were people that ended up being known later on in the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: What do you recall about these early discussions on maneuver warfare?

GEN KRULAK: Talking about maneuver, not from the standpoint of maneuver of forces and mobility and agility and all of that, but the soul of maneuver warfare. This was thinking about how intent, the commander's intent and how would you really work that through. What would a five-paragraph order look like? In those days one of the AWS exams was to write a five-paragraph order with all the attachments... the whole shooting match. Well, here we were talking about a five-paragraph order that had intent in it as the key concept. What's the commander's intent and what did that mean? So those kinds of discussions. The philosophy behind it. It ended up taking from John Boyd and the oda hoop and things along that line.

DR. CRIST: That's interesting. The next tour was right back in Vietnam as the company commander for Company L, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.

GEN KRULAK: The finest fighting organization the world has ever seen. The lions in their den trembled at our approach! It was just the greatest experience of my career. 3/3 was, in fact, a phenomenal infantry battalion. We had the world's greatest infantry battalion commander.

DR. CRIST: Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Schulze?

GEN KRULAK: Dick Schulze, who went on to become a Major General, was wonderful. He had the greatest company commanders you'd ever want. I was probably the worst of them. I mean, he just had great, great company commanders, great platoon commanders. Some of them went onto be very famous, Ollie North as an example. These are all guys that fought in 3/3.

I joined the battalion at Cam Lo, literally flew in by helicopter. They threw me off and pointed the way to the battalion commander and I went there. Here was this battalion commander, Dutch Schulze, with a bandana around his neck, a cowboy bandanna. Then came Paul Goodwin and he had a bandanna. John Trott had a bandana. I'm sitting there saying what the hell is all this about? It was just kind of "Dutch" Schulze...one of the tricks of his leadership style that set his battalion apart. I can remember him giving me a red bandana and I wore it with pride.

The day I got there, Paul Goodwin and his company had just come in from killing a bunch of NVA and I met this platoon commander, a very cocky kid, who led that particular fight. His name was Ollie North. Well, I had known Paul Goodwin from AWS. I said, "Hey, looks like you all went out there and killed a bunch of woodcutters." I said that in front of Schulze and he died laughing. I accused Ollie North of hiding enemy grenades under the bodies so he could say he got a body count. So that was the kind of good-natured banter that took place in the battalion.

"Dutch" Schulze then sent me down to where I picked up my company which was right down from Cam Lo, a place called Cam Lo Bridge, which was the bridge that went across the Cam Lo River. Right in front of you was the Rock Pile. Then you went down to Camp Carroll. What was interesting to me is that just a couple of years prior, I had left Vietnam to go back to the United States in the helicopter and picked me up about 100 meters from the Cam Lo Bridge. So here I was back in Vietnam

and we had gotten nowhere. I mean, it was a real rude awakening.

When I got there, a first lieutenant was commanding the company. I got there and he spent about a day there introducing me to people and then he was gone and I had the company. Just a great, great outfit. We had a lot of fights, a lot of good contact. They were very courageous. It was just a good outfit. The battalion was great and Colonel Schulze was the ultimate leader. He truly cared about his people. He was tactically and technically proficient. He inspired people. If you had to go to war, that was the way to do it, surrounded by great people, led by a great man.

DR. CRIST: Far different than the battalion on your first tour in 1966?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. It was like night and day. I mean, we would have followed Dutch Schulze anywhere.

DR. CRIST: Did you notice a big difference? You mentioned a sense that almost two years later nothing in the war had changed. Did you detect a difference in the Marines you were commanding from your first tour?

GEN KRULAK: The Marines were far more professional. They were there to do the job. All of the debate that was going on back in the United States certainly wouldn't affect Lima Company, 3/3. At one stretch of time, we spent over 100 days in the bush, never going back to the rear, never getting a shower, never getting a change of clothes, just 100 days of eating C-Rations and living out in the bush. The enemy was all North Vietnamese and when you fought them, it was always a good fight. They were very capable. It wasn't a given when we fought them whether we'd win or not. Just a great foe.

DR. CRIST: So you got no sense as you were there, you arrived in February of '69, this is post Tet, was there a sense of a draw-down, people knowing the end was in sight and not --

GEN KRULAK: Not when I got there. Eventually, we were part of the 3d Division that pulled out. But even the day we left, it was very professional.

There were some racial tensions that were seen even at the infantry battalion level. Very little drugs though. I know that when we eventually would go back to the rear, you'd have drugs. There were drugs in the rear. But out in the front line, the Marines were serious.

DR. CRIST: The next question, you had said you came out of AWS, you felt that you were at the top of your game as far as company tactics . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I think my Marines really felt I was competent. I, I went in there exuding confidence. I said, "Hey, we're going to do well." I took most, many of my lessons learned from AWS and used them. Simple stuff that for many reasons the kids would tell me, "we never did it this way before."

As an example, if you were going from one ridge-line to another instead of moving an entire company from that ridge line to the next one, you would do it by leapfrogging. We'd push out one platoon. That platoon would secure a particular area and move the rest of the company and push a platoon through that, and go to the next part. So it was almost like a leapfrog. We'd always be successful because the vast combat power of the rifle company was always right behind.

It was like the idea I implemented as Commandant of the MEF Forward. What's important about the name is not that it took the place of a brigade, but that we said a MEF Forward. We worked to send a signal that there's a helluva lot of combat power that's right behind it. Well, that's the way we operated the company. You'd send out the first platoon. The rest of the company would be poised ready to kick butt when they ran into something.

I had confidence in my ability to call in artillery. I had confidence in how to talk to lieutenants and get the best out of them. I spent a lot of time--later on as a general it was called kicking boxes--going from one position to another sitting there talking to my Marines. So, yes. I felt very comfortable.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned some of your lessons learned, anything else you might want to pass on to future company grade officers who might find themselves in a similar situation?

GEN KRULAK: I think that one of the things that is probably most difficult for a leader to do in combat, whether it's a platoon commander, a company commander, or a fire-team leader is to convince Marines to not, what we used to call, bunch up. The reality is in combat there's a natural tendency to get close together because it's through the closeness that you gain strength, you gain some amount of courage from being around your fellow Marines. That's well and good. But the danger to that is simply that one round gets more than one person. So you need to constantly be on your

people to keep spread out, keep a good distance, separation between individuals. This is particularly important in my opinion in combat that's involved in close terrain, whether it's woods or jungles or urban areas. Spreading out is important.

Another thing that's obviously important that in a fire fight, is the last thing you want to do is hit the deck. But there is a natural tendency to hit the deck. But when you're getting shot at, you need to move. You need to attack through. You need to push the attack. Once you lose the momentum, the second thing you lose is going to be your fire superiority. When you lose fire superiority, you're finished.

Another is just the idea of marksmanship. Fire superiority does not come from spraying rounds around indiscriminately. Fire superiority comes from the well-placed round by the individual Marine. So those who would encourage the Marine Corps to step away from every Marine a rifleman and step away from marksmanship training needs to understand that superiority of the Marine rifleman is critical. This was first seen vividly by the German foot soldier at Belleau Wood when the Marines were knocking them off at 500 yards. And we need that capability today. We need to be able to shoot.

Another lesson learned is the importance of, when you have the opportunity, telling your people the why of their actions. Because there will be times when you will demand instantaneous obedience. If they have known you to be a person who explains why you're going to do something when you have the time, then, when the time comes that you tell them to move, they're going to move because they know if you had the time you'd tell them. But you tell them to move now and they'll do it; they trust you. You need to be able to articulate in very clear terms, not just to your officers, but more importantly to your staff NCOs and to your NCOs what it is you want them to do. In the maneuver sense, we call it intent. It cannot be articulated in pure militaristic terms. It must make sense to the corporal. It has got to be intent that it's understood by the people who are going to have to execute. That certainly in the 21st century is the strategic corporal and the strategic lieutenant. Those are some of the things that I would just off the top of my head say that I learned during two tours in Vietnam.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned that the first instance of a lot of people is to hit the deck when they need to be pushing forward. Is that something you can do through training to change this?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, you do it through training. You hope to make it just an action that's taken almost without thought, that they just do it. But the fact of the matter is when the first round goes over your head, there's a tendency to want to get into what you think is a secure position. So it becomes incumbent upon the leader, whether it's the fire team leader or lieutenant or captain, to set the example and get up and move.

Motivating Marines is not a magic trick. Motivating Marines and motivating people to do what you want them to do is basically the same as it's always been. You set the example. You're not asking them to do anything that you aren't willing to do. They see you standing tall with them. I'm reading a book called *The Gates of Fire* right now, the Battle of Thermopylae. It tells the story of the battle at Thermopylae and the Spartan king Leonidas. He's out there. Every single time the Spartans fought, he was there with them. This was a king. That still needs to be part of our ethos. That's why no matter how much you talk about technology and ability to have perfect battlefield awareness back in enhance combat operation centered onboard a ship, sooner or later, you better have your leadership out there with your troops for battlefield awareness and also so that your Marines know that their leadership is with them.

DR. CRIST: Most of your fighting during your second tour was along the DMZ. There were one of on 3 June in which you won your Silver Star. This was during Operation Virginia Ridge. What do you recall about that?

GEN KRULAK: Virginia Ridge. There were two operations that took place around that timeframe, Virginia Ridge and Leatherneck Square. Virginia Ridge was one of those operations that was just bad. I mean, it was poorly planned and poorly executed. My company was given the mission of moving up onto a ridge-line very close to a place called Multer's Ridge, and moving down that ridge line to a position that overlooked the entrance to a couple of valleys. It was the tip of a finger and there were two valleys running off of it. Going up on this ridge was always a fight. Anybody who went up on the ridge-line, you knew you were going to encounter the bad guys.

When I did my map reconnaissance, I saw that the place that they wanted to setup my company position was within 500 meters from the boundary line that separated my battalion's boundary from another battalion. I felt like I was going to be constricted if anything happened. Anything that happened 500 meters to the east of me, I would

have been required to coordinate with an entire other battalion. So, I asked for more territory. Lieutenant Colonel Schulze saw it too. He tried to get a change in the boundaries. But, for some reason, they didn't change the boundaries. I thought this was a bad call.

First off, there wasn't a place on that ridge that wasn't already registered by enemy artillery and mortars. I mean, they could hit anything and hit it quickly. Once I realized I wasn't going to get any extension of my boundaries and I knew that it was a bad place to be and I knew that if they saw us they could put mortars down just about whenever they wanted to, I went to Colonel Schulze and said I wanted to go up at night. So he gave us permission.

We went up onto this ridge-line at night and moved the length of the ridge with minimal contact. Got to the location where we were supposed to be, dug in deep with overhead cover. So that when first light came, we were really dug in deep and concealed and in a good position. I was still very uncomfortable. I thought we had gotten there and managed to hold our position and were fairly well hidden from the North Vietnamese.

Well, later on, for whatever reason, a chaplain came and landed in an LZ very close to our position and came up and wanted to give services. But in doing so, he gave our position away. I said to him, "Look, I appreciate your coming out here, but you need to go." And he pulled out.

Within 30 minutes we just got pounded. The first couple of mortar rounds fell right into one of my 60 millimeter mortar pits killing every member of the crew right out. It also hit two of the packs that these kids were wearing that had CS grenades on them. So the CS went off and it just kind of swept over the top of this ridge line. You know, gas fills in depressions, so it was going into the fighting holes. The rounds were coming from right over the boundary.

When I tried to shoot back, I had to go through the other battalion to get permission. Everything we said was going to happen, happened. I jumped in a hole and tried to command and control from under cover. Because rounds were landing all over the hilltop, my radio operator, the company gunny and one other person jumped in this hole too and jumped on top of my 782 gear. I had my helmet and flak jacket on. But my gas mask was down at the bottom of this hole. This CS gas started coming in. My radio operator, God bless him, shared his gas mask with me until I could find my own. The wind was pretty strong, so the CS went away fairly rapidly. But we didn't realize that it was from our own grenades. We thought the NVA were to

follow up their mortar barrage and gas with ground attack. So everybody was really on their toes.

I soon realized there was no way I was going to be able to command and control from this foxhole. So I got out of the hole and moved up on top of the ridge into a more open position, but a hole nonetheless. As I was moving to that position, a mortar round landed and I got hit in my shoulder, under my arm and in my stomach.

At that point in time, I was talking to the battalion commander and I was keeping him informed of what was going on. My radio operator was on the horn with the battalion commander before I got there. As I got there, he was saying that the company commander, Lima 6, had been hit. So Dutch Schulze got really concerned. He said, "Chuck are you hit?" I said, "Sir, I'm hit. But it is nothing that's going to cause me to leave here."

We ended up getting the permission to do cross boundary fires and put a lot of fire down on them. We sent troops out. We basically destroyed the enemy positions. But by then, we were pounded and had many good Marines killed and wounded. We evacuated our dead and wounded. But by then, we were ground zero for any North Vietnamese indirect fire weapon within the vicinity. So I told Dutch Schulze, "We need to pull back. We need to get to some better defensible terrain. They know where we are." He gave us another area to go to.

By that time, it was dark. We moved the company back along this finger. Then, of course, the NVA knew where we were. So as we moved back, we had constant contact. But as the sun rose we were basically in a far better position. But by that time, I was hurting. I mean, I was beginning to really hurt. I was laying on the ground. The company XO called Colonel Schulze and said, "We're okay now. We're in a good defensive position. We've got to get the CO out of here." So they medevaced me back to one of the med collection and clearing outfits.

The assistant division commander came, and obviously, he had received word that the former commanding general of the FMPac's son had been wounded. It turned out to be a little worse than what was initially thought. The wound was not in my shoulder. It was underneath my armpit, which caused more problems. But the ADC, this general was there and he said, "That's it for you." I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "This is the second time you've been wounded. There's not going to be a third time. We're bringing you back to the division."

DR. CRIST: Was that a standard sort of thing with people with two purple hearts?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. So I said, "Please don't do that." He said, "This isn't favoritism. This is just what happens." I said, "Sir, don't do this to me." So they didn't.

I got operated on. They took the shrapnel out. I went back to Dong Ha. I guess it was Dong Ha. They put me in the division rear working as in G-3 or something like that until I'd somewhat recovered. Then I went back and took part in the operation at Leatherneck Square.

DR. CRIST: Back with your same company?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I went back to Dong Ha and after a period of recuperation, I went back to the company rear area. I was a frustrated puppy and they put a 292 antennae outside of the CP tent. I could sometimes talk to the company. I can remember my XO at one time saying, "Look, I've got it. Stay off the net." But anyhow, that was Virginia Ridge.

The lesson learned there is something you'd think would be so simple and that is don't restrict one of your units by a boundary. If you have a mission that you've assigned a unit within the Marine Corps, give them not just the weapons and the numbers and the stuff to accomplish the mission, but give them the space they need to accomplish it also.

DR. CRIST: The next operation you say you got back in time after recovering from your wound for Leatherneck Square.

GEN KRULAK: Leatherneck Square was a great operation. We had received intelligence that at a North Vietnamese battalion, maybe larger, had come across the Ben Hai River and we had actually pinpointed their location. I remember the battalion got on trucks in the middle of the night and drove up the "Street With No Joy." It drove right up through Dong Ha and up north towards the Ben Hai River. We got to a location on the side of the road and everybody got out of the trucks and we started moving towards the west. We got part way there, and ran into a NVA sapper battalion. I'm not sure what their destination was but they obviously didn't know we were there. The two forces came together right in the middle of the night. Had a helluva fight with nobody knowing where anybody was. You talk about chaos on the battlefield. It was pure confusion.

I remember being in a bomb crater with my command group when the sun came up. Right in front of us, probably 100 meters out, was an NVA platoon. They didn't know we were there because

they had their RPGs and rifles slung over their shoulders. They looked like they were on a Sunday stroll. Obviously, after this massive battle, they figured it was all over. Well, they were coming right at our bomb crater. Everybody in the crater was either an officer or a communicator. All we had was pistols. I thought my God, we're in trouble. We heard a Huey gunship. I thought man, here we are! We got a hold of the Huey. By that time, the bad guys hit the deck and the gunship had swung around and started coming right down towards us. I said, "They're shooting at us." Sure enough, they shot at us until they saw what was happening. They quickly turned and went back and took the enemy under fire.

It was a heck of a battle. Very confusing. It was during that fight that some of the bravery of individual Marines was really highlighted, particularly those that were with Colonel Schulze. His battalion command group really got into it. The communicators and the runners and the staff NCOs, all became Marine infantrymen. I can remember Colonel Schulze really giving great credit to the "rear echelon pogues" so to speak who fought that night out at Leatherneck Square. Again, Marines fought really well. The battalion fought well. Here was a very successful night movement to contact. It ended up a good victory for the U.S. and for the Marines.

What's interesting is Schulze was kind of a renaissance man. He was a poet. After Vietnam, he wrote a book of poems. They were really good poems. The book was entitled "Leatherneck Square".

DR. CRIST: Does Idaho Canyon stand out in your mind?

GEN KRULAK: No. In many ways, a lot of those were, as we used to call them, a walk in the sun. I mean, there would be contact. But the contact at Hastings, at Leatherneck Square, at Virginia Ridge, was contact in the way you might think of World War II or Korea. People look at Vietnam and they say, well Vietnam was nothing from the standpoint of World War II or Korea. But there were individual fights at company and battalion level that rival them. Every regiment, at one time or another, got involved in a fight that was just as vicious and just as deadly as what I watched in "Saving Private Ryan". I can remember seeing the first part of "Saving Private Ryan" and turning to my wife and saying I can remember days when the bullets were flying that fast. The weapon systems were the same. You had machine guns and mortar and artillery. You talk to somebody who fought in the

A Shau Valley, during Hue City, or during Hastings. Those were helluva fights. We were losing hundreds of people a week. You'd watch the T.V. and the body count was everything. And there would be several hundred Americans killed every week. If you're a rifle company and you've got 130 people in it and you lose 15 people or 17 people, you've lost over a tenth of your strength and that's just in a matter of minutes. That doesn't count the wounded.

DR. CRIST: It's an interesting statistic. If you look, say from a battalion commander, the number of casualties were the same as in Korea or World War II but rather than being inflicted they were in onesies and twosies--all the time. But by the end of a year that battalion's losses were probably even greater in Vietnam than they had been in Korea.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, it was just a very, very nasty war because of many things. But one of the deciding factors was just the quality of the enemy. The NVA won. That wasn't a victory parade off of the roof of the Saigon embassy. They won because they fought well. They had the support of the people. Not that they beat the Marine Corps. Man for man, we were as good or better. But, boy, I'll tell you they were good.

DR. CRIST: They weren't the Iraqis. That's for sure.

GEN KRULAK: You better believe it. It's a damn good thing there were not North Vietnamese in the Iraqi trench lines. I said that to Walt Boomer after it was all over.

DR. CRIST: There have been a lot of discussion, especially after Desert Storm, that the officers of your generation, who were junior in Vietnam, vowed that those mistakes of Vietnam would never happen again.

GEN KRULAK: I have great respect for officers who fought in Vietnam, one, two, three tours, and did not get out of the Marine Corps. Those are the Zinni's and the Ron Christmas's and Ray Smith's and the people like that. They went through the agony of Vietnam, came back home each time knowing that they were going back over. Then when they finally came home for good, they came home to a Marine Corps that was full of drug addicts, racial problems, mental group fours, and just poor performers. They gutted through that time and helped bring the Corps back up to where it is today. Then went through the poverty times of the

'70s and then the good times of the '80s. Then again, the poverty of the '90s. Most of those people, in order to do that, were idealist to the Nth degree. Today I'm still an idealist. You couldn't have stayed in without believing that there's something very precious about the Marine Corps. So when people talk about politically correct and all of that, I just kind of laugh at it. I mean, give me a break. We didn't go through all of this to be politically correct. You do what's right for the country. I think that's what these generals are doing now. These sergeants major. I think we're a better Corps because a bunch of people decide to stay in. It was easier to get out than to stay in.

DR. CRIST: A couple of other incidents just before we move on past Vietnam. During your first tour. On 20 August 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Evans assumed the command of the battalion replacing Lieutenant Colonel Schulze. Do you recall Evans at all?

GEN KRULAK: Evans. I can recall one thing about Triple E. He told me to take my company up onto Mutter Ridge and to take two 106 recoilless rifles with us. I said to him, "What!?" He said, "I want you to take these recoilless rifles up on Mutter Ridge." I said, "You want me to hump 106 recoilless rifles up on top of that ridge?" He said, "Yes." I replied, "You haven't been out here long, have you, sir?" And he said, "What are you talking about?" I said, "The second you start up Mutter Ridge, you're in a fight. You're going to fight all the way up there. You're going to fight when you get there. Do you know how much a 106 recoilless rifle weighs? Do you know how much the ammunition weighs? Do you know what Mutter Ridge looks like? What do you expect to shoot a 106 recoilless rifle at on Mutter Ridge?" The colonel was one of those commanders that came out there, thought he knew what he was doing and it took awhile for him to get his act together.

DR. CRIST: He didn't take the time to listen to people who'd been out there?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: One incident mentioned at some length in your battalion's Command Chronology was the Ho Chi Minh death cease fire? Do you recall this?

GEN KRULAK: No. One of the things that might be of interest occurred when I was back in the rear as the G-3 "Zulu" of the Division. They put me

there after being wounded. The G-3 of the Division was an officer by the name of [William E.] Barrineau, Colonel Barrineau. Great, great guy. A very hard man. I was a watch officer down in the COC, which was underground. One day I was getting ready to get off watch and there had been a helluva fight up along the DMZ where a fire support base had received some incoming that had hit one of the ammo bunkers and blew sky high. Literally, blew the top off of the mountain. I'm sitting down there just turning over the watch to somebody when Col Barrineau and the division commander came down. The map showed where this fire support base was and the location of the nearest infantry company. They were afraid that the NVA were going to follow-up with an infantry attack on this fire support base. We had this artillery unit that had been hit hard by the explosion. We had an infantry unit somewhat distant from the hilltop where the artillery unit was located. The discussion between the G-3, my boss, a lieutenant colonel in operations, who was a comptroller by trade, and the CG was, "Can this infantry unit get there in time?" There was low-lying fog. It was bad weather and they couldn't get helicopters in. My boss, the LtCol OpsO, said there's no way we'll be able to get that company up to that fire support base because of the jungle. He said it was triple canopy jungle and that the company was never going to be able to get through it.

I'm sitting there, listening to that. At that point, I look up and saw where the friendly unit was, the infantry unit. Then I looked at where the artillery fire support base was. I said, "Sir, excuse me." Col Barrineau looked over and he said, "What's up skipper?" I said, "Well, I've operated in that area. There's a high speed trail that goes right from that company position up to that fire support base. They can make it in 45 minutes if they push." My boss, the OpsO, said "Sir, that's not correct. This is heavy jungle. I flew over it just the other day and I'm telling you this is thick jungle. They're not going to be able to get in." I said, "General, with all due respect to the lieutenant colonel, there's a big difference between flying over it and walking under that canopy. There's a high speed trail and they can make it."

At that time the CG turned to Col Barrineau and said get a hold of that company, move them immediately up to the fire support base. The general and Col Barrineau then did an about face and walked out of the Combat Operation Center leaving me with the lieutenant colonel. He chewed my butt. He said, "You humiliated me. You made me look bad!"

My wounds healed and I was leaving to go back to 3/3. The OpsO wrote me a fitness report. Gave me a "be glad to have in combat." Be glad to have! It went up to Colonel Barrineau and he signed off on it. I'm sure he didn't even look at it...he probably signed hundreds of fit reps. I didn't know that I was given a "be glad to have" report. I got back to Washington and it's now 1970. I'm at the Naval Academy. Somebody tells me I should go down to HQMC and check my record book. So I go down and check my record book. And here's this fitness report that says "be glad to have in combat." I said, "This is not too good."

I was down at Quantico at the club and Colonel Barrineau was there. So I went up to him that time and said, "Sir, did you know that I got a be glad to have from Lieutenant Colonel—" and I won't mention his name. Barrineau said, "No way, no way." I said, "Yes sir. You signed off on it." He said, "Well, send it down to me and I'll fix that for you." So I went home and I thought about it for a while. And I thought, no, I'm not going to go down there and get this damn thing changed. One, that's what the lieutenant colonel thought. For whatever reason, that's what he thought. Two, the colonel signed it. I'm not going to have him change it a year later. Also, in the back of my mind, was the issue of getting "special compensation" because I was Gen Krulak's son. I said to myself—no way.

To this day, you can break open my microfiche and you can see the "be glad to have" is still in my OQR. It turns out the lieutenant colonel was medically retired from the Marine Corps for mental problems. So there was multiple ways I could have gotten rid of that be glad to have report but I just never chose to do it. Eventually, it became a great point of pride that the Commandant got a "be glad to have" fitness report.

What was really interesting is I ended up being deep selected to major with that "be glad to have" in there. Every time I got career counseling or anything like that, people always looked at that report. People always looked at that be glad to have and they just said how the hell did you get promoted with that report in your OQR?

DR. CRIST: In mid-September, official word came down, 16 September actually, that you were going to be withdrawing, your battalion, which actually withdrew on 1 October 1969. Do you have any recollections about the withdrawal from Vietnam?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, we went back to Okinawa. We met on an LST. It was then that I realized that it was great to be the CO of a Navy ship because the CO of that LST, was a Navy lieutenant. We

had a lieutenant colonel on board. I don't even know what the unit was that we went back with. It was kind of a gaggle of people. I can remember going down to the wardroom one night. They were going to show a movie. The movie projector was all setup. The lieutenant colonel came in and sat down. There was this yeoman or whatever. He turned to the yeoman and he said, "Okay, son, roll it." The yeoman said, "No sir." The lieutenant colonel said, "What do you mean, no sir?" The sailor said, "Well, the skipper's not here yet." The lieutenant colonel said, "Son, I'm a lieutenant colonel. Roll that movie." The sailor said, "Sir, The skipper's not here." About 20 seconds later, the door opened and in came this Navy lieutenant. He sat down, said "Good evening, gentleman." Turned to the sailor and said, "Roll it." That kid hit the button and rolled it. The skipper of the ship was a Navy lieutenant. I just thought to myself, good on you. Good on you.

We got back to Okinawa and I was assigned as the OIC of the counter guerilla warfare school in the Northern Training Area. So I went up there. There I met and had the opportunity to serve with two great officers. One of them I'd served with in Vietnam and his name was Ollie North. Ollie came up as my chief instructor. The other was a kid by the name of Bob McPhearson, who ended up in the G-3 shop when I was CG MarForPac. Ollie and Bob McPhearson and I worked up at the Northern Training Area for the entire rest of my tour. There had been a school up in the Northern Training Area prior to that time, but as we built up for Vietnam, we saw people being taken out of the school systems on Okinawa to be used as replacements and being sent to Vietnam. The school that existed in the Northern Training Area was known as The Amphibious Raid School, and it had been diminished to such an extent, that when I went up there, it was almost in a caretaker's status.

When I got up there we reactivated the school as a training ground for Vietnam. We built a Vietnam village which would enable units who were coming over to Okinawa and then moving on to Vietnam, the opportunity to train in the environment that they would see in Vietnam. They would learn how to clear village, how to surround and effectively clear a village. That mission was somewhat overtaken by this massive effort with mine dogs.

About a third of the way through that tour, I got an encoded message that we were going to get a group of civilians, contractors, and I was to do all of my power to help them. So I said, "Fine. What are they doing?" They wouldn't tell us. They told us to start cutting trails. We had to cut miles and

miles of trails up in the NTA. We didn't know what they were for, but they were very specific as to how long. So we did all of that. Then one night a couple of helicopters, 53s, landed. Out came this young man with a Fu Manchu mustache and long hair and this very attractive young woman, blonde with long hair, followed by crate after crate of dogs. This was a group of civilians who were trying to train mine detecting dogs to be used by the 1st Marine Division. They were still down in DaNang and having a great deal of trouble with mines. So these dogs were going to learn how to detect mines. So for the next several months, we trained dogs. It was very interesting. Pretty secretive. We had trouble with the troops because of this girl. She was really a hippie but very attractive. She wore bikini panties. She used to hang those panties out on a little clothesline that she had put outside her tent. Well, the Marines would steal her panties. So she'd call me and say, "Chuck, I'm running out of panties. Every time I hang them up, they're stolen." I said, "Quit hanging them up outside." But it was just a funny -- we became good friends, this couple.

I went down to see them when I got back and they got back. I went down to see them once in North Carolina where they had their little business. Then once I saw them up in Syracuse, New York.

DR. CRIST: Were they successful with these dogs?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. As a matter of fact, when I became Commandant one of the issues that I worked on with the Israelis was the use of dogs to sniff out mines. I related my experience to the Israeli Defense Force officer who was taking me around. So when we talked about the use of dogs in detecting mines, I was, as a four-star General in the Marine Corps, very attuned to the use of dogs to detect mines. This knowledge surprised the Israelis. It impressed them. And again, it did a lot for the Marine Corps because here's the Commandant of the Marine Corps and he could talk at the tactical level of how to operate with mine dogs.

DR. CRIST: Did you ever-- this is an aside, but as Commandant, did you ever look at implementing any additional program along those lines?

GEN KRULAK: Not for us. I mean, we knew how to do it. But it takes a lot of energy, it takes a lot of personnel and it takes resources and we really did not face that threat. Additionally there were other organizations who use that technology-- a good example is the Secret Service, FBI-- that if we ever faced a threat with mines, we could always go with them and get the assets that we needed.

DR. CRIST: You were close with Ollie North?

GEN KRULAK: I first met Ollie North when he was a platoon commander. I was in Lima Company and he was in Kilo working for Paul Goodwin. I had a great platoon commander that worked for me. Paul Goodman had two great ones that worked for him. We used to have a little bit of good natured competition. Bottom line is Ollie came up to work for me in the Northern Training Area and was a great instructor. He was a charismatic type of officer. He then went back to the Basic School and I went to the Naval Academy. We were suffering in our recruiting at the Naval Academy. A lieutenant colonel who was the senior Marine officer put me in charge of Marine recruiting, recruiting midshipmen to go into the Marine Corps. I got a hold of Ollie and we put together a summer program that Ollie ran. Then during the academic year, Ollie would come up and do briefings. So we had contact for three years.

Of course, Ollie was very much a part of this 3d Bn, 3d Marines family of which Dutch Schulze was the father. When I eventually ended up as Schulze's admin assistant when he was the Director of Personnel Management Division, they were seeking an individual to go over to the National Security Council and be on the NSC staff. I recommended to Dutch that we send Ollie over because we knew what kind of dynamic, hard charging Marine he was. So we thought it'd be a great idea. It turned out, once again, to prove my judgment is not always that great. Ollie went over there and ended up getting in trouble. But, yes. I know Ollie North very well.

DR. CRIST: Do you still stay in touch?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. As a matter of fact, I was just reading a document that Ollie North wrote.¹ I don't know whether you saw it. It was an editorial when I retired and Ollie --

DR. CRIST: I did read that.

GEN KRULAK: A little bit hard hitting, but with friends like that, who needs enemies? But anyhow, yes.

DR. CRIST: With your emphasis on integrity-- you could almost say Krulak equals integrity--you must have had problems with the whole Iran Contra thing?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. Absolutely. I was very upset with him. He knows it and knows it to this day. Ollie was a good Marine. Ollie is a good person. Ollie is a good Christian man. Ollie North has one unbelievably large ego. He is an ego maniac. He believes everything he says. He is a revisionist history type of guy. His ego got him into trouble and that trouble involved integrity.

Do I think that he's an evil person? Do I think that he set out to do evil things? No, I don't. I think that Ollie North is just Ollie North. He got wrapped up in this unbelievable power game and succumbed to it. But do I like Ollie North? Yes. Does he have some unbelievably great qualities? Yes. Does he have a remarkable family? Yes. Does he have a magnificent wife? Yes. There's a lot of good to Ollie North. He is not a bad man. He has a weakness. I think we all have weaknesses. His is ego. Mine, I'm sure I've got a helluva an ego too. I think most Marines have egos. His got him in trouble.

DR. CRIST: You had just returned from Vietnam. Was there anything from your experiences there that you used to change in the curriculum?

GEN KRULAK: No. I had to basically build a new curriculum because the school, as I have indicated, was almost dead. And so we built a curriculum that was centered around small unit leadership, and practical issues at the platoon level about operating in Vietnam.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything about your time up in the Northern Training Area that, either, might be of use for future officers establishing similar courses?

GEN KRULAK: I wish I could say there were, but I don't think so. I think that for me, that was a decompression period. Coming out of Vietnam for the second tour, where I had been wounded again, transferred up to this run-down location known at the NT. It was a place to decompress, while placing my energies into reconstructing and building upon an existing curriculum which had deteriorated.

¹ Oliver North editorial, *Washington Times*, 28 June 1999. See below.

OLIVER NORTH

Semper
Fidelis
sentinel

One recent morning an invitation arrived in the mail. It was to a retirement ceremony at the Marine Barracks here in our nation's capital.

I've probably been to more than a hundred of these rites of passage since I joined the Corps more than three decades ago. I won't be able to attend and had to send my sincere regrets for the invitation was to the retirement ceremony for a friend — Gen. Charles C. Krulak, the 31st commandant of the Marine Corps.

Now, Marine lieutenant colonels, even those of us no longer on active service, aren't in the habit of referring to generals as friends — particularly when the general in question is the top Marine. And we sure don't offer a public critique of his performance as commandant of all Marines. It just isn't done.

But in this case, somebody needs to do it. Because when Chuck Krulak takes off his Dress Blues with those four stars on the shoulders for the last time as he will at the end of this month, the conscience of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have

retired. And in this town, that kind of moral authority is going to be missed more than most people realize.

For four years, Chuck Krulak has been "the general who tells it like it is" — in public and in private. Whether in testimony on Capitol Hill, in the Pentagon's "tink" where the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet, or at the White House, Chuck Krulak could be counted upon to tell the truth — whether they wanted to hear it or not. His reputation for integrity in a city that too little values this virtue is unparalleled — and a credit to the Corps of Marines he has led through some of the most

tumultuous events in our history. His steadfast devotion to his 174,000 Marines is evident in all that he has said and done as commandant. And very little of it endeared him to an administration hell-bent on downsizing, feminizing and de-"moralizing" America's Armed Forces.

When Gen. Krulak was appointed commandant in 1995, the Clinton White House was busy taking an ax to America's defense establishment. By the time these draconian cuts were done, the Army would lose eight active combat divisions. The Air Force and Navy would lose 20 air wings — and 2,000 combat aircraft. Another 232 strategic bombers, 13 ballistic missile submarines, four aircraft carriers, all our battleships and more than 100 other combat vessels would be sent to the boneyard. Only the Marine Corps was able to withstand Commander-in-Chief Clinton's quest for a mothballed military.

And it didn't stop there. The Marines were badgered to make their boot camps co-ed. Gen. Krulak said no. The Corps was told that

it should put women in ground combat assignments in their expeditionary forces. Again, the top Marine said no. When the Pentagon started talking about relaxing the standard on sexual misconduct, Chuck Krulak just said no. And when a Clinton political appointee responsible for "feminizing" the military decried the Marines as "extremists," the commandant fired back a blistering response that yes, they were, "extremely fit, extremely faithful and extremely patriotic." In every case he was right.

And he didn't give an inch when the reputed Clinton "National Security Team" acted as though the Marines had done so much for so long with so little that they could continue to do everything with nothing forever. Faced with unprecedented global commitments and the prospect of declining readiness, Gen. Krulak pulled no punches. He told the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the Marines were ready to perform Mission Impossible — but that they needed to be better armed and equipped. He got what he wanted.

While the other branches of our Armed Forces struggle to meet recruiting and retention goals, lower their entrance standards, ease training requirements and try to make military service less "military" — the Corps has done exactly the opposite. Gen. Krulak extended boot camp — adding his "Crucible Training" to the already rigorous initiation into the Corps. His Marines loved him for it, and the Corps has thrived.

The power brokers in Washington, who favor "yes men" over honest men, probably won't miss Chuck Krulak very much. But his Marines will. And I will — mostly because I remember him as a young captain of Infantry, 30 years ago, when we served together in a corner of hell called Vietnam. He was then, as he is today, a warrior and a man of principle, integrity and character. He embodied then, as he does today, the guiding ethos of the Marines: Semper Fidelis — Always Faithful.

Oliver North is a nationally syndicated columnist.

SESSION IV

Mid-Career Assignments

Return to Annapolis . . . First taste of Recruiting . . . Company Officer . . . Developing leadership in midshipmen . . . "The night the lights went out" and humorous anecdotes about Naval Academy life . . . Master's degree from George Washington University . . . Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, North Island, California . . . Bob Murphy and the Human Relations Program . . . Integrity and an IG Inspection . . . Assignment to the Army's Command and General Staff College . . . Life at Ft. Leavenworth . . . Coming to Christ . . . Operations Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines . . . Okinawa . . . Deployments to Fuji and Korea . . . Assignment to Headquarters Marine Corps . . . MMEA . . . Learning Manpower . . . EA for MajGen Schulze . . . Gen Schulze's comment on the Corps will break your heart.

DR. CRIST: This is an interview with General Charles C. Krulak. The date is 12 September 2000; the interview is being held at the General's office in Wilmington, Delaware. Sir, when we last left off, you had returned from your second tour in Vietnam, we had discussed your duty in the NTA, Northern Training Area in Okinawa. We had discussed your relationship with Oliver North, who you had met in Vietnam when he was a platoon commander for a Kilo Company. And you had left off with a sort of fascinating story about some hippies with their dogs and mine detection. In March 1970, you headed back to the United States from Okinawa for your next duty station. This time it was back to familiar grounds at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. Did you request the Naval Academy as your next assignment, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I requested The Basic School. What is interesting is in my entire Marine Corps career, I never received my first choice of a duty station. That should say a lot about the monitors. They obviously were a lot smarter than I! But it also should say a lot to the young officers in the Marine Corps that the monitor does have a good view of your overall career and the needs of the Marine Corps, and I always accepted the orders I was given. I was happy to go to the Naval Academy, although I thought I could do more for the Corps at The Basic School. Obviously the monitors thought otherwise. As it turned out, like everything else, it was a great experience and I think a benefit to me.

DR. CRIST: It had been six years since you had been to the Naval Academy. Did you notice any changes in the school?

GEN KRULAK: Most people would like me to say yes, I saw it had gone to hell in a hand-basket, [laughs] but no. I found that the midshipmen that we were bringing in were probably better than when I was there. It's interesting that my first year at the Naval Academy was spent in candidate guidance where I was a recruiter, which was my first interface with any kind of recruiting. It gave me a good appreciation for recruiting that I used later on in my career. We started to bring in nominations at a number that were unheard of for service academies before then. We ended the year, with over 7,000 people fully qualified to come to the Naval Academy. Normally, it was around 3,000, so we more than doubled our number. Those candidates were fully qualified, and when I say fully qualified, I'm talking about really super candidates. With me in candidate guidance was a Lieutenant Commander by the name of Tom Lynch who went on to become an vice admiral and Superintendent of the Naval Academy. He had been captain and middle linebacker and All-American on the Naval Academy football team. Also, with me was a young African American naval officer who went on to be the founder of the NNOA, which is an organization that is primarily supportive of minorities in the naval services. All together, I spent one year in candidate guidance and two years as a company officer with the 5th Company.

DR. CRIST: Do any of the midshipmen you had under your charge stand out in your mind?

GEN KRULAK: Well, it was a very interesting tour of duty. Normally the tour of duty for a company officer is three years. I had great success getting the midshipmen to go into the Marines. I was there two years. In my first year, there were 21 graduates in my

company and out of those, 19 went into the Marine Corps. The next year, of 20 graduates, 18 went Marine Corps. So the Navy was glad to get rid of me because we were really raking in some very talented people! Oh by the way, 90% of the starters on the wrestling team went into the Marine Corps. I served as a coach for the wrestling team. One was General John Sattler.

DR. CRIST: I've heard from other people that graduates of the Naval Academy return with some strong ideas of what they want to do, i.e. how midshipmen should be treated. In light of your last year where you turned in two of your classmates in order to save a plebe from inadvertently committing an honor violation, did you take any of those experiences with you as a company commander?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. When I came back from Vietnam the second time, I had a very firm understanding of what I thought was needed from the graduates of the Naval Academy and where their education was letting them down. I think we expected them to walk out of the Naval Academy and have a lightning bolt strike them on the head and give them all the wisdom they needed to be successful junior officers in either the Navy or the Marine Corps, to be able to run a division on board a ship or a platoon in the Marine Corps. The reality is, there is no lightning bolt. Leadership must be developed.

When I went back to the Naval Academy, I let the first-class midshipmen run my company. I got them all together and I said, "Listen, I'm going to let you do everything from running the classes underneath you to running yourselves. Discipline, accountability, you name it, you've got it. I'm not going to tell you when you can go on weekends. You go when you want. You can ride the elevator when you want. You can do all of these things that you're not supposed to do, but you're going to be held accountable. I'm going to treat you like a junior officer. And you are going to have to stand up and you are going to have to measure up." The bottom line is they took to it like fish to water. I mean, they really took the responsibility and the accountability seriously. I think one of the reasons that I was able to bring so many midshipmen into the Marine Corps is that they were taken in by this willingness to let them stretch their wings.

However, some of the more senior officers at the Naval Academy initially looked askance at what I was doing and even tried to say it violated the rules. I replied that we're not violating rules. We were giving them more responsibility. But believe me, they are being held accountable--probably more so than

anybody else in the brigade. The end result was that I think most people thought it was a good thing to be doing. Interesting, the Senior Marine at that time was a Lieutenant Colonel by the name of Bruce Ogden who commanded the 3d Battalion. And in his battalion was then Captain Tom Draude [Thomas V.], now a retired brigadier general. Colonel Ogden, after the end of my first year as a company officer, saw the success we were having in recruiting Marines from my company, and placed me in charge of the overall recruiting of Marine from the Naval Academy. We had not made our quota of 16 2/3% in years. And that year we not only made the quota, but we had 35 standing in line wanting to be Marines. So the bottom line is that recruiting has always been in my blood. I had great help. Earlier, we mentioned Ollie North. We would bring Ollie North up to the Naval Academy. He was a very motivational speaker. We brought enlisted Marines with their weapons up and just placed them around the yard and around Bancroft Hall. The best salesman ever is that young Marine, and they'd talk to these midshipmen and just captivate them. And by the end, like I said, we did very well.

DR. CRIST: You had mentioned in one of the earlier sessions about the Hyman Rickover effect on the Navy?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. And the reality was everything I was doing was counter to what Rickover was looking for. I believe the reason I left at the end of two years in Bancroft Hall was that, well, I don't think, I know, a commander by the name of Jack Renard, who was the Senior Submarine Officer in the Naval Academy went to administration through Admiral Rickover and said, "Get that Marine out of Bancroft Hall."

DR. CRIST: While you were at the Naval Academy, you received your Master of Science degree from George Washington University.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: In Personnel Management with a Major in Labor Relations, is that correct, sir?

GEN KRULAK: That's correct. Yes.

DR. CRIST: Why that field?

GEN KRULAK: Because I felt that it was something that would help me as a leader. I thought that the issue of labor relations has a lot to do with

negotiating, getting people on two sides to come to a common goal, two sides that are diametrically opposed. If you could be successful in understanding how to work effective labor relations, then you ought to be effective in your leadership within the Marine Corps. Equally, if not more important, as you got more senior, you should be more effective in your relationships with the other services. So that's why I did it.

DR. CRIST: Did you find that too be true, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes it did. It's helping me now in my civilian position.

DR. CRIST: Some senior Marines at the Academy didn't want their officers to get additional degrees because he thought it was taking away from their responsibility primarily of getting midshipmen into the Marine Corps. With your success I suppose this wasn't an issue?

GEN KRULAK: No. In fact, Colonel Ogden encouraged his Marines to get advanced degrees. Just about every Marine who was assigned at the Naval Academy during the time I was there ended up getting advanced degrees.

DR. CRIST: That's interesting. You encouraged this as well when you were a Commandant.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I believed that enabling our officers to further their education can only enhance their value to the Marine Corps. One, it's obviously valuable to the young man or woman, but in addition, it's going to pay dividends to the Marine Corps. And I had no difficulty whether they went to a formal course or they did it on their own. The fact that they're doing it is what made the difference.

DR. CRIST: Your three years at Annapolis, anything particularly humorous stand out in your mind? Scandalous?

GEN KRULAK: One evening, as a matter of fact it's known by the classes of '73, '74, '75 and '76, as "The Night the Lights Went Out." There had been a big electrical storm at the Naval Academy and it blew out every single generator so there was absolutely no electrical power. I was the officer that day and being a school full of young men full of vim and vigor, these mids really took it upon themselves to have some fun. And they, somehow, found a whole lot of pyrotechnics, firecrackers, Roman candles. They made tennis ball cannons--hollowing out tennis ball

can—with the can top on one end, a little hole in the end, some lighter fluid in that hole, a tennis ball down the canister and light the lighter fluid and it would literally explode the tennis ball out in flames. And so, we had warfare between the two regiments, the 1st and 2d regiments. And this thing went on for about an hour and a half where it literally sounded like a war! I mean, cherry bombs, firecrackers, so much so that the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, an Admiral by the name of Max Morris, who was fairly excitable anyhow, came screaming into the hall and, we literally had to carry him out, screaming and kicking because the mids had gotten out of control. The bottom line is they were college kids having a ball. However, I took a lot of joking. The Academy has a magazine they put out called "The Log," and that month "The Log" had multiple pictures of Captain Charles C. Krulak in dress blues, Sam Brown belt and sword, dodging firecrackers and cherry bombs and these cannons [laughs]! So that was probably the most interesting evening I had at the Naval Academy.

DR. CRIST: You also taught wrestling?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was a major effort. I wrestled at the Naval Academy. When I went back there, I became the officer rep of the Naval Academy and then went on to help coach. The bottom line, we had a magnificent wrestling team. As I mentioned, all of them went into the Marine Corps. We're talking about people like Lloyd Keaser who went on to get a silver medal in the Olympics, Tom Schuler who was runner-up in the nationals, Dan Muthler who won the nationals. These were great kids who came into the Marine Corps and wrestled for the Marine Corps, made great officers, made names for themselves, were used in recruiting posters, and then at the end of their time, went out of the Marine Corps. John F. Sattler, of course, was also on that team. He stayed in and ended up a General. So I did a lot of recruiting through my interface with the wrestling team and the midshipmen that I met at the sports environment.

DR. CRIST: Where did you live when you were in Annapolis, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I lived in the base quarters, L-6. Lima 6, which was very interesting because I had been Lima 6, or the CO of Lima Company, 3/3.

DR. CRIST: It must have been a good tour for your wife, Zandi.

GEN KRULAK: She loved it. That's when she started to run. She became, as we talked before, a magnificent athlete in her own right and was known to be seen all over the Naval Academy running. She used to run about eight miles a day at the Naval Academy.

DR. CRIST: Anything else in the Naval Academy, sir?

GEN KRULAK: No. Great tour, learned a lot about recruiting, learned a lot about young men and what motivated them.

DR. CRIST: In June 1973, you left the East Coast and headed out West for a duty as the Commanding Officer of the Marine barracks in the Naval Air Station in North Island, California.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Since you already answered the question about did you specifically request this, having never gotten any of your first choices, did you want to at least go out West?

GEN KRULAK: I wanted to go The Basic School. I wanted to teach at The Basic School. But the offer to command was great. It was a good barracks because it had a real world mission. At that time, Naval Air Station North Island was the holding point for all the nuclear weapons for the West Coast carriers. They were held at North Island, and so we had a PRP, Personal Reliability Program, because of our mission to safeguard the nuclear weapons. Plus, we did all the rearming, refueling, et cetera, of the aircraft carriers that were assigned to North Island. And so, it was a very, very busy time, and one that was exciting, and I enjoyed the command. A lot of interesting things happened there.

DR. CRIST: What specifically might stand out in your mind about it, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Probably the first time that I came to grips with this issue of integrity . . . where I really found myself having to put it all on the line for something that I believed was right. During the years that I was at North Island, the Marine Corps was deeply involved in a program called Human Relations. The head facilitator of Human Relations was a man by the name of Bob Humphrey. Bob Humphrey lived in Southern California--San Diego. His program, as used by the Marine Corps, was not the program he wanted the Marine Corps to use. He

wanted the Marine Corps to use a program that had a physical dimension to it. He believed that if you really were going to make a change in the individual Marine, you couldn't just teach theory, you had to tie that to some kind of physical activity. In his case, he believed it should be boxing. So he came to me and asked whether I would be willing to utilize my barracks as an experiment for this physical dimension to the Human Relations program.

The head of the Human Relations program was a colonel located at MCRD, San Diego. So I went to that colonel and asked if I could do this. He went back to Headquarters, Marine Corps and they agreed. So we embarked on a yearlong program that saw us holding our Human Relations classes, but tied to each one of those classes was a physical dimension. We taught elements of Judo. We taught wrestling since I was a wrestler. We taught boxing because Bob Humphrey was a boxer. It was very physical. We'd sit around in this little circle and talk about the Human Relations aspect of our relationship as Marines, and then we'd take it one step further and go onto the physical aspect.

The results were remarkable. Our disciplinary rate fell dramatically, by about 50 percent. Our reenlistment rate went up 100 percent, and duty station option of choice for everyone of them was to remain at the Marine Barracks Naval Air Station, North Island, for an additional year. So for whatever reason, this linkage of the physical aspect to the moral development was very powerful. Hopefully you understand that that was some of the basis of the Crucible.

DR. CRIST: That was going to be my next question.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was the first time I realized that if you make something really tough physically, it can make a difference if you're trying to teach a moral imperative.

Well, at the end of my second year, at the end of all of this effort, we had an IG inspection. The Inspector General came out and inspected us; everything looked great. The IG went back to HQMC and two months later, I got the inspection report. And the inspection report was glowing--except in the area of leadership. And it just took us apart saying that the staff non-commissioned officers were very much against the Human Relations program, that it wasn't working. The report said that the NCOs were down on the Human Relations program; it wasn't working, and didn't do what it needed to do. It stated there were problems because of the Human Relations Program.

I received this reporter and it really took me aback. It was such a surprise that I called back to the IG and I said, "Look, I got this. Are you sure that this is Naval Air Station North Island you're talking about?" And the IG's people said, "Yes it was." So I said, "Well, This doesn't jibe with anything that we're seeing coming out of our statistics." So I called in my staff NCO's and I said, "Listen. Here's what the report says. Believe me, this is no harm, no foul. If you feel this way, I need to know it because, as the commanding officer, I need to be able to take care of it. You need to be open with me and nobody's going to get hurt." They too were taken aback by the comments. They replied, "Sir, you've got to be kidding us. That's 180 out from what we said. 180 out. We think the program is absolutely magnificent and we think it ought to be Marine Corps wide. And we told the inspector that." The NCO's as well said, "Sir, we don't know where the IG's coming from. That's not what we said."

So I called the Inspector General of the Marine Corps and I said here's what your report says. Here's what your inspecting officer wrote. The officer who inspected was a colonel. What your colonel said and what my people say are not the same. There's a disconnect and I need somebody to take care of this. I'm not going to have this report submitted in its final form with those comments on it. And the IG said, "Major Krulak, we sent our inspector out there, this is what he came back with. We can't go against it just because the command doesn't like it. That's the way it is." And I said, "General, I'm calling the Commandant of the Marine Corps."

So I called the Office of the Commandant. And I got, eventually, I think the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps. And I said, "This is Major Krulak, CO of the Marine Barracks, Naval Air Station, North Island . . ." and I explained the whole issue to him. I told him that I had purchased a roundtrip ticket for myself to Washington, D.C., I had bought roundtrip tickets for my senior enlisted, for two of my Staff NCO's, my guard staff NCO, my guard officer, and two non-commissioned officers. I have the tickets in my hand right now--and I did. I said, "I'm coming back and I'm requesting Mast with the Commandant of the Marine Corps because this IG report is not true. This is absolutely false and either I get a re-inspection or I request Mast of the Commandant. I said I don't care you can come out and hold a complete re-inspection, but this report isn't going to stand!" They were taken aback!

The next thing I know, they sent out another colonel and they interviewed all our people, and went back to HQMC. It turns out that the Colonel who had come out and inspected us had a vendetta against the

HumRel program of the Marine Corps. It ended up that there were other complaints against him, including having a sergeant major in another barracks stripped down to his skivvies in order to see whether the skivvies he was wearing were in fact marked. He had to strip down in front of his Marines. The Colonel eventually went UA and was thrown out of the Marine Corps, medically. Bottom line, he was crazy. Turns out, by standing up for something that I believed in, and we were proven right. But it was a very emotional time for me, an emotional time for all the Marines at Marine Barracks, North Island and when it was all over, there was a great deal of pride that the Barracks was willing to stand up and say, this is wrong, this is not true and we want a recount. We wanted to be reevaluated. And as it turned out, it was a good ending for everybody but this colonel.

DR. CRIST: I wonder how many other units he had to do this too?

GEN KRULAK: Well, that was very interesting. They went back and he had, in fact, abused other barracks and had done very strange things at those barracks. The stripping down of the sergeant major is but one example.

DR. CRIST: When you called the Chief of Staff up, what was his reaction to this? Was he initially dismissive or attentive?

GEN KRULAK: I will be honest and upfront with you. I was a Krulak. Although my father had retired some five or six years earlier, the name Krulak still rang a bell. So my talking to him had an impact. But what I think swayed him was the fact that I had already bought seven roundtrip tickets out of my own pocket and was coming back with these people to stand in front of the Commandant if we could get in front of him. I think that impressed him. And when I laid out all the facts, he took notice.

DR. CRIST: You certainly weren't hiding anything if you're bringing the Marines themselves, the enlisted Marines.

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely.

DR. CRIST: Just for the future, you mentioned, we talked a bit about the Human Relations or Bob Humphrey's program, what, for the record, what was it? What did it entail?

GEN KRULAK: The Human Relations program came out of all the problems that we had in the

Marine Corps during and after Vietnam. The fact was that there were racial problems. I mean, people were literally being killed, fragged, just terrible things happening. Not only race relations, but drugs and alcohol were problems, and so one of the initiatives that the Marine Corps went towards was this human relations effort under the auspices of a program established by Bob Humphrey. Too many people called it a sensitivity program. It wasn't a sensitivity program. It was trying to make people understand why they thought and acted the way they did. It was a good program, but was doomed to fail because it wasn't tied to anything that made Marines feel like Marines. Marines, as we all know, are hard-charging, and like to be challenged physically, mentally, morally, and the HumRel program did not give them the physical challenge. And so they thought it was namby-pamby, wimp stuff and it never did really get off the ground. The sad part is Bob Humphrey knew that and continued to try to push to get a physical element, but could never get it started because people were worried about someone getting hurt. Well, I ran it for a year with boxing, judo and wrestling and we never had an injury.

DR. CRIST: I've heard some of the criticism of it was people were concerned it was breaking down rank structure too much by having different ranks sitting around talking about something about in a big circle . . ."

GEN KRULAK: Yes, but you have to be confident enough in your leadership style that such a thing will not happen. And in fact, whether I was the Commandant sitting around with lance corporals, or with Marine mail or whatever, that's always been my style. It's never been threatening to me. I would hope that it wouldn't threaten our good leaders. Good leaders aren't threatened by communications.

DR. CRIST: While there, you reported to a Navy Captain, I assume?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: How was your working relationship?

GEN KRULAK: Great relationship. A captain by the name of Koval. He had a bald head and we called him Kojak. Absolute supporter of the Marines. When this IG issue was ongoing, he was kept fully aware and was supporting me.

DR. CRIST: Being the nature of what you were guarding, I assume that the Marines you had were

very carefully screened?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. They were members of the Personal Reliability Program, so they were good Marines. That's not to say that we didn't have our problems, but when we had our problems, we would take quick action because they were in a very sensitive position.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything about your day-to-day routine you want on the record?

GEN KRULAK: It was, day-to-day, very unglamorous, but it was exciting from the standpoint that you had a real world mission. I was there when the one of the aircraft carriers came in with a big race riot right there on the pier. Again, that was an example of why this Human Relations Program worked with the physical aspect of it, because that riot could have spilled over easily onto the base. But because my people went down there, they were able to control it. In many cases we had black Marines controlling other blacks and whites—no problem. The Marines did their duty.

DR. CRIST: That instance on the carrier what was your observations of that?

GEN KRULAK: A breakdown in leadership, a breakdown in leadership.

DR. CRIST: Did you approve of what Admiral Zumwalt was trying to make to mitigate these problems?

GEN KRULAK: No. I think that Admiral Zumwalt did a lot of things right, but again, he took too soft of an approach to what was a human relations problem. Those sailors were no different than our Marines. They were seeking discipline; they were seeking accountability; they were seeking responsibility. And when they weren't getting it within their own chain of command, they built their own chain and it was called gangs.

DR. CRIST: You were promoted to Major while you were there?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I was deep-selected to Major by two years. I was selected while I was at the Naval Academy. My Battalion Commander in Vietnam was, as I mentioned earlier, Lieutenant Colonel "Dutch" Shulze. He was, at that time, the Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. While I was at Naval Academy, I got a phone call from him one

day. I picked up the phone and said, "This is Captain Krulak." And he said, "Congratulations, Major." I said, "Sir?" And he said, "Congratulations, Major." I said, "I have no idea what you're talking about." And he said, "Come on, Chuck. You've been selected for Major." And I said, "Colonel Shultz, I appreciate this phone call more than you could ever imagine, but you've got the wrong Krulak. You're talking about my brother, Bill. I'm class of '64, he's '62. He is in zone. I'm not. I'm two years out of zone." And he said, "Chuck, are you telling me that I don't know who Lima-Six is?" Then he said, "Does 224-54-7364 ring a bell with you?" And I said, "Yes, that's my social security number." And he said, "Do you know who Charles Chandler Krulak is?" I said, "Yes, sir, I do." And he said, "Well, look, I'm going to call you up again. Let's start this communication one more time." He hung up on me. So I hung up. And the phone rang about 20 seconds later and I said, "Captain Krulak speaking." He said, "Congratulations, Major." And I replied, "Thank you very much, sir."

DR. CRIST: Just out of curiosity, did you even submit a package for that promotion?

GEN KRULAK: No, no, absolutely not. It was interesting, I think there were eight captains deep-selected to Major at that time and many of them went on to become senior officers in the Marine Corps. I think at least four out of the eight went on to be generals. But no, I had absolutely no idea. And like I said, I thought it was my brother.

DR. CRIST: A couple other things. April 1975, Saigon fell while you were there. Having spent two tours there, did you have any thoughts on it at the time?

GEN KRULAK: I just recall being sad, but it wasn't unexpected at that time.

DR. CRIST: You lived close to your parent's house, I assume?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, it was great. We lived literally two blocks away from them. It was wonderful. We spent at least one day a weekend with them. It was great for the grandkids. It was good to be near home. And my dad participated in some of the events that we had at the Barracks where he could, you know, talk to the troops.

DR. CRIST: Birthday Balls, that sort of thing, sir?

GEN KRULAK: No, the first Birthday Ball that he ever attended with me was when I was the Commandant.

DR. CRIST: Moving on with your career, following the Naval Air Station at North Island, California, you went out to Leavenworth for the Army Command and General Staff College. This was June 1976, for your intermediate level school. Why an Army school and not the Marine Command and Staff? Just the way it happened?

GEN KRULAK: Just the way it happened. Just the way it happened.

DR. CRIST: This was your first real exposure to the Army. What were your impressions?

GEN KRULAK: Very positive. They brought all the foreign students and all of the other service students to Leavenworth for what we affectionately termed preschool, where all of us were indoctrinated in Army terminology and Army instructions. It was a very professional four-week course before the school actually began, so that when we hit the deck we'd at least have a basic knowledge of Army terminology and the way their divisions were formed, support units were formed etc. The school itself was unbelievably rigorous. Compared to what my fellow Marines were going through at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, it was like a Ph.D. program. I think that the shortfall in our Command and Staff College has since been rectified. But I mean it was very tough. I studied until midnight every night but Friday night as long as I was there. Friday night I would take off, but Saturday night, Sunday night, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, at least till midnight. It was very difficult and very rigorous. Everything you presented, everything you did was literally presented in front of your contemporaries and your instructor and they would rip it apart. Very stimulating, a lot of concepts that were unfamiliar to me in the larger scope at the operational level of war. It was just a great, great experience.

I met great people that's where I came to Christ. I became a Christian at Leavenworth. And so, if you want to talk about a real change in life, that year at Leavenworth was one of those that was very special. They had a kind of slogan there, "Leavenworth, the best year of your life." It's supposed to be a joke because they work your butt off. It turned out to be one of the best years of my life. Both Zandi and I had a great time, our kids

had a great time, worked hard, but it was very rewarding.

DR. CRIST: The focus of the course was operational levels, primarily, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, how to be the operations officer of a regiment and brigade. It was very, very much focused on the large-scale conflicts. But gave you an opportunity at the last half of the year to take electives. One of the electives I took, through either good luck or the good Lord looking after me, was Logistics for Commanders. It talked about time-distance factors and logistics. It talked about trans shipment points. It talked about dual handling. It talked about inspecting equipment—it ran the gambit of logistics. Well, it helped me out as a battalion commander, but again, some of the key aspects of that course played a major role during Desert Shield and Desert Storm particularly the issues of time-distance factors, double handling of equipment and things along that line.

DR. CRIST: You had mentioned coming to Christ. How did that come about?

GEN KRULAK: Well, my testimony's too long for this tape, but the bottom line is at Leavenworth I ran into an officer who was most impressive, probably about six foot four, 240 pounds, former All-American football player at West Point, All-American wrestler, two tours in Vietnam, highly decorated, cigar-smoking, hard-talking officer that had the respect of everybody in the class. His name was Curry Vaughn. The strange thing about Curry Vaughn— he was a chaplain. And I was really captivated by this officer. He was just selected for lieutenant colonel; I was a major. To see this one time an infantry officer and a very, very good one at that, who had gone into the Chaplain Corps, he was just very impressive to me. We started talking and over a period of time, he was not only going to school but also conducting services and I started going to his services and started going to Bible study and by the end of the first semester, I was really interested in what he had been saying. Then during the February-March time frame, I went to a Bible study and there, I gave my life over to Christ.

DR. CRIST: You came from an Episcopalian background. Had you been a regular churchgoer up until then?

GEN KRULAK: No, not really. I had joined the church as a young boy, but had not— my wife always wanted to go to church and she wanted the kids to go

to church and that's part of the testimony. And I was kind of a stumbling block. But the bottom line is I do not consider myself an Episcopalian now. I think I am a Christian and I go to a church that feeds me and that teaches the gospel. I've gone to a Church of the Nazarene, Baptist, Lutheran, you name it. I just go where the minister best feeds my needs.

DR. CRIST: Overall what was your impression of your Army counterparts?

GEN KRULAK: They were tremendous. I was impressed by their professionalism. I was impressed by their dedication to the Army. I was impressed by how hard they worked. I was impressed by their accountability. I can remember that at the end of the first semester, moving vans would come up and you'd lose your neighbor two doors down because they flunked out. I'm talking about an awful lot of people. I mean, not one or two, probably 15 or 20 people didn't make it. And they just left. I had a great deal of respect for my classmates. And I continue to have a great deal of respect for the Army. I mean, I think it's a very professional outfit.

DR. CRIST: Did you stay in touch with any of your Army counterparts over the years?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I do. Obviously Curry Vaughn and some of the others.

DR. CRIST: Anything else about Leavenworth, sir?

GEN KRULAK: There were a couple of humor issues. The number one academic award there is called the Marshall Award. And by the end of the first semester, I was in the running for the Marshall Award. They posted the results of every test, so by the end of the first semester, everybody knew who was hitting a homerun and who wasn't. And everyone joked about that. You know, "Joe, he's pushing for the Marshall Award. Or here comes Krulak, Marshall Award candidate. That kind of good natured humor. So one evening, there was a party and some of my classmates broke into my basement. Each person at Leavenworth was issued a big folding briefcase, not a suitcase, but one of those pouch-like briefcases. They took that briefcase and laminated it in white so that it was this big white bag. And on the side they took lettering like you use to put your name on your mailbox or something, and they put Marshall Award Candidate on this thing. And so I got home that night and they didn't say anything. But the next day was Sunday, and it was time for me to study. I went down to my study and

here was this briefcase. And I said, "Holy mackerel! These guys have really done a job on me." I carried that briefcase for the whole rest of the year. And I'd stick it right up on the front of my desk. And I mean the professors just cracked up! They thought it was the funniest thing in the world. I ended up number two in the class and I think I ended up with the respect of just about every Army officer there. I think they liked me and liked Zandi and all of the Marines. But I think that what they appreciated about me was the willingness to take all the jokes.

On the Marine Birthday, we held a cake-cutting ceremony in my classroom for the 100 plus people in my section. I got dressed up in my uniform, my greens and got up in front of the class and said, I want to take a few minutes to tell you about the Marine Corps. And after my talk, I said, "I'd like to ask a special Marine to bring in the birthday cake." The door opens up and in comes Zandi. She's wearing my dress blues. I mean, the place went crazy! And I said the best Marine in the Krulak family is standing beside me right now and she was wearing 2d lieutenant bars.

DR. CRIST: How many Marines were there at the time?

GEN KRULAK: There were ten. Tom Draude had been in the class before. We had a lot of people that made Colonel but I think I was the only one that made General out of my class.

DR. CRIST: Next you headed back to the FMF. You went to 2d Battalion, 9th Marines in Okinawa.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, finally, finally.

DR. CRIST: I assume this was an unaccompanied tour, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Where did your family go while you went?

GEN KRULAK: My family went to San Diego.

DR. CRIST: You became the S-3, operations officer, of the battalion?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Just before I got to Okinawa, I was told I was going to XO of an infantry battalion. I arrived at Okinawa late in the evening and was met by Maj [Gerald F.] Jerry Huml and LtCol [Marcel J.] "Mac" Dube. They met me and as we were driving

up to Camp Schwab late at night, I was told I was going to be the "3" of the battalion. I was ecstatic. I didn't want to be the XO, I wanted to be the operations officer. I had come out of Leavenworth. I really felt I had my act together. I wanted to be the operations officer of that battalion. I told LtCol Dube, "Sir, you could not have given me better news. He replied, "Now, we gotta make sure that this goes. First you've got to pass muster with the regiment commander." And I said, "Well, I can do that." And he said, "Well, you better be ready because tomorrow morning at six o'clock, you're going on a run with him." Well, that was only four hours away. I mean, you can imagine coming from a very temperate climate like San Diego to Okinawa. It's hot and humid and the regiment commander was a guy named Thompson, who was famous in the Marine Corps for physical fitness!

So at six o'clock in the morning I showed up at the regimental CP and there was Colonel Thompson, and he looked like a gazelle. And we took off, and I mean to tell you, I almost died. As we started, he said, "Tell me the history of your life from the day you were born." In other words, "You talk. I'm going to listen." And we got about four miles out and I thought I was going to die. At the six mile mark, I wished I was dead. But I managed to gut it out and I don't think I've ever hurt as bad in my life physically as that beating that Colonel Thompson gave me. But at the end, he said, "You're going down to be the S-3 of 2/9." It was a great, great tour.

DR. CRIST: The Battalion Commander was Lieutenant Colonel Marcel J. Dube. Did you know him prior to your arrival?

GEN KRULAK: No, I didn't. Hardest man I think I have ever worked with. I mean, this guy is tougher than a woodpecker beak-a very hard officer. He treated his officers very hard and he demanded a lot--rough, real hard. But he treated his troops magnificently. They loved him. They loved him. The officers had a love-hate relationship. I had a great deal of respect for Dube. Tremendous officer. But he gave me fits. I mean, he really, really put it on me--often. One time, I remember, as I was coming into my office, he was swearing at me. You know, calling me a blankety-blank, blankety-blank, and I got up and walked around to where he was standing and I shut the door. And I said, "Colonel Dube, if you ever talk to me like that again, you better find yourself another S-3 because I'm not going to put up with it. When I'm wrong, all you need to do is come in and tell me I'm wrong and I'll correct it. But don't you ever use those words with me again." And he looked at me

for about two seconds and just hugged me. And he said, "Come on, Chuck, you know I'm just funning with you." Strange guy, but a great leader. He had a great battalion. Garry L. Parks was there and now he's a two star general. Jerry Huml went on to be one of our great Colonels in the Corps. Colonel Ed [Edward L.] Green, the one who took over the battalion from LtCol Dube, one of our great African-American Marines. So the bottom line is that time with "Mac" Dube was very tough, but very educational. He knew tactics and he knew weapon systems and it was a very, very good tour.

DR. CRIST: Judging by your battalion's Command Chronology, which was put together by Charles Krulak in the S-3 shop, you seem to have a pretty full schedule--to Fuji twice for training, an operation in Korea. I might add for the record that I've read a lot of Command Chronologies and this was one of the best peacetime Command Chronologies I've seen. It was very comprehensive.

GEN KRULAK: Well, thank you. I appreciate it. The bottom line is we were gone an awful lot. I mean, we were moving, shooting, and communicating. The operation in Korea was a battalion size landing at Pohang. We moved inland, linking up with the Korean Marines and continuing to move both to inland and to the North. Very good operation. The battalion did extremely well.

An interesting thing happened there. We were in a little hill mass right to the west of Pohang where the battalion put in for the first night. And while we were there a bunch of little kids came up and we brought them into the area and, you know, tried to be friendly. The next morning, we woke up and Colonel Dube was missing his uniform. Somebody stole it. And so we thought who would have done this, and the answer was likely one of those kids. So we called in the Korean exchange officer who was with us and he told us he'd find out. The next thing we knew, about an hour and a half later, up comes three vehicles from the Korean Marines and a big low-bed with a bulldozer on it. The liaison officer asked LtCol Dube and the XO and myself down to the village of Tok Sok Ri. And so we went down to the village. They had pulled this bulldozer off of this low boy and the mayor of the village came out and they were talking to him in Korean. Next thing you know a Korean Marine gets in this bulldozer just starts driving through the town, knocking down houses! I mean, just leveling a portion of the town. And the mayor's going crazy. Well they finally stop. Then the next thing you know, out comes LtCol Dube's uniform. It's a great indication of what it was like

during that time frame in Korea. They are a serious group and their face had been lost. Somebody had stolen from their brother Marines and they were going to take care of it and they bulldozed part of that town. And the last thing we saw was they grabbed the mayor, threw him in the back of a truck and that was the last we saw him. So I mean tough.

The operation itself was a good one. We did a lot of work with the Koreans. We did a lot of coordination of combined arms and all those things that are tied into amphibious landings, and it was good.

DR. CRIST: Two trips to Fuji?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What were the facilities like on Fuji?

GEN KRULAK: Fuji, at that time, was rustic. We were all in quansot huts. We spent almost all the time in the field. I had a ball. This is exactly what I wanted. We were in the field almost every single day. We ran a major force-on-force exercise against a Marine officer named Sadler. He ran the tank outfit that was permanently stationed at Fuji. Sadler went on to be a great tanker in the Marine Corps. "Mac" Dube was banged up with a bad back during that entire force-on-force and allowed me to command the battalion. He kept the XO home and said they were both "casualties" and he let me run the battalion. And so I did the force-on-force. It was very instructive. I will confess, Sadler ate my lunch for the first couple of days. They were a determined outfit up there, and I mean, they were just magnificent. I learned a great deal about anti-armor operations and about the whole idea of time-distance factors in warfare. It really was an eye-opener. So I learned a lot on both trips to Fuji. It ingrained in me the importance of Fuji. It was constantly occupied when I was Commandant.

DR. CRIST: You raise a couple of questions, sir. First of all, what training could you do on Okinawa then?

GEN KRULAK: We could do just about all training that you would want. There were no restrictions on artillery or tanks, small or large bore, no problem. Not the restrictions that you see right now.

DR. CRIST: This was your first time back to Okinawa since it had reverted to Japanese control.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Big change in the way the islands were governed from when you were there in 1970?

GEN KRULAK: Not apparent to a young major. Still doing everything that needed doing. I was so far up north that we were called the "Huns from the north." I mean, I think I got own to Camp Foster maybe two times. Most of the time we spent in the field.

DR. CRIST: Did you get any leave there, sir?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: Relations between the Marine Corps and Okinawa were not strained at the time?

GEN KRULAK: No. We had great relationships. For me, this was just a great opportunity to be back with Marines and be able to concentrate on being a Marine. There were positives and negatives about being away from your family and the negatives are all too obvious. The positive is, that when you did it, I mean to tell you that you could concentrate on being a Marine and doing your job. There's some intangibles about that. Being with your fellow Marines and being able to concentrate 24 hours a day, seven days a week on this magnificent organization that we call the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: Certainly. And at the Camp Schwab, there's nothing else to do but be a Marine.

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: You left-- you were in Okinawa from 31 July 1977 to 31 January 1978. Following this...

GEN KRULAK: I also spent part of my tour down at the Division where I worked in the G-3, running leadership training for the Division, trying to build a leadership program that concentrated on the noncommissioned officers, staff noncommissioned officers and new officers. As you recall, we lost a large chunk of our staff noncommissioned officers to the commissioning program during Vietnam. We had a gap there and we wanted to build a program that would challenge our young officers, our staff noncommissioned officers starting to fill that gap. To not only fill it, but to fill it with quality people. And so we spent a lot time developing courses to reinforce this.

DR. CRIST: Was this in conjunction with a NCO school and that or was this a whole separate program?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, no. It was taking those schools and getting down to the basics of what it is to be a leader. Getting away from the drill field stuff and teaching them about basic leadership, combat leadership. A lot of warriors who had fought in the Vietnam were leaders and we used them to develop case studies talking about combat, talking about challenges in combat and then and these warriors teach the classes.

DR. CRIST: You put the focus on small unit leadership in combat?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that's right. It turned out to be very effective. People were excited about it. I mean, they enjoyed it. They enjoyed using real life examples. They enjoyed the stories. They enjoyed hearing a war story and then having to think through a similar problem. It's very interesting that, later on you see the *Marine Corps Gazette* printing similar sort of case studies and asking their readers to solve them. We were doing that well before and it was very effective way of teaching.

DR. CRIST: Following your year in Okinawa, sir, the summer of 1978 you came back to the States, to Washington, D.C., for your first tour at Headquarters Marine Corps.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I did not look forward to it, but as it turned out, like everything else, it was a tremendous experience. It was where I first came to understand the manpower system, which is the most difficult system to understand in the Marine Corps. So that was a great tour.

DR. CRIST: How was manpower organized at the time, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, basically the same way it is now. The two major entities were--well, there were three major entities: Personnel Management Division, MP Division, and the Recruiters Division.

DR. CRIST: And you were assigned to combat arms' monitor section?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I worked in MMEA—Enlisted Assignments. I headed up the combat arms section. I worked for a lieutenant colonel by the name of [Patrick G.] Pat Collins, Patty Collins, a legend in his own time. A great Marine, and then, above him I worked for a colonel by the name of Hugh T. Kerr. I worked in MMEA for a

year. My right-hand man was a major by the name of John R. Todd, a great officer.

Then, I was selected to Lieutenant Colonel and asked to come up and be the EA to the Director of the Personal Management Division, which at that time was a brigadier general by the name of Robert E. Haebel. His deputy was a colonel by the name of Fred [Fredrick P.] Anthony who's now the head of Medals and Decorations section at HQMC. That was a wonderful experience. General Haebel was a leader, an unbelievable people person. Colonel Anthony was great officer. Should have been a general. He was a reserve officer, so he was not going to make it, but I tell you, he should have been a general. He was brilliant in his understanding of manpower. So, I went up there and worked with him, and when General Haebel left, General "Dutch" Shulze came in. So it was a great tour of duty where I became emerged in the Personal Management Division side of manpower. Because I was the EA, I also had a lot of interface with MP and MR. So, bottom line, it was a great growth experience and one where I became pretty knowledgeable about manpower.

DR. CRIST: What were the big issues about manpower at the time?

GEN KRULAK: Same issues as there are right now. Finding the right faces to put in the right spaces. Making sure that we were recruiting the right types of people and ensuring that the manpower plan itself, the staffing goal models, were in sync with the recruiting and the assignment progress. Just a lot of very, very difficult issues that the Marine Corps takes for granted. The attempt to treat each individual whether an officer or enlisted as a Marine and not just a number and not just somebody to shuffle around. But at the same time, making sure that the needs of the Corps were taken care of, making sure that there's no favoritism or "bubbaism" going on. A lot of things that were very important and continue to be very important for the Corps.

DR. CRIST: Was Mr. Marsh there at the time? Or was this pre-Marsh?

GEN KRULAK: I'm not sure. Jim Marsh may have been there, but I don't recall. One individual who was there that turned out to have a major impact on me was a major by the name of Russ Appleton, who was running career counseling for the Marine Corps. And my first introduction to Russ was when I went down to get "career counseling" and I ran into this major who really impressed me. A very detailed,

very thoughtful officer, and from that short meeting we had, I watched him grow and blossom and I became close friends with him and eventually he ended up being my MilSec and is now working for me again as a civilian.

One of the things that occurred during this time was the move of Ollie North over to the National Security Council. Dutch Shulze was the head of Manpower and I was his EA, so we got the request for an officer to go to the National Security Council. A bunch of names came up, stacks of OQRs arrived on my desk and I went through them and found some talented people. But one name was not in there that I thought would be a good fit. I told Gen Schulze that there's one that you may want to think about. He's got the energy, the mind, etc., and that would be Ollie North, and General Shulze said, "You're right. That'd be a good job for Ollie." And Ollie went to the National Security Council.

Also while serving as the EA for Gen Schulze, we were looking for a new CO for Marine Barracks, Washington. And again the monitors sent a bunch of folks up, real good colonels. Tom Draude was working down in PP&O for a colonel that he just loved. All he used to talk about was how good this colonel was and that I had to meet him. So one day, I went down to meet him and in fact, he was a great leader. He was just a wonderful, thoughtful leader. So when the OQRs came across my desk for the new CO of the Marine Barracks, I called down to the colonels' monitor and asked him to send me another book. It came in and they all went in together. And after a while, out came General Shulze's recommendation, and it was that colonel for whom my friend Tom Draude was working. His name was Orlo K. Steele, O.K. Steele, who ended up being a two-star general in the Marines. He ended up as one of the greatest CO's of the Barracks there ever was. He went on to be a legislative assistant and the man did a magnificent job there and he did a magnificent job as a division commander. Did we talk about Gen Schultz's comment about sooner or later the Corps will break your heart?

DR. CRIST: No.

GEN KRULAK: Well, General Shulze told the truth. I called him the conscience of the Marine Corps during his time. He was constantly telling the Commandant the truth. Normally, it wasn't good news. And so, at one point in time, he told me, "I think the Commandant has lost confidence in me." And I said, "Sir, I don't think so." He replied, "No, I think so." And then one day he was called down to see the Commandant. He was down there for about

an hour and then came back upstairs. I could see he was visibly shaken. He walked into his office, so after a while I went in to his office and said, "Sir, are you all right?" He said, "Well, something very interesting just happened." I said, "What's that?" He said, "The Commandant offered me three stars." I said, "My goodness, that's wonderful." And he answered, "Well, I turned him down." I said, "What? You turned down three stars?" And he said, "Yes." By that time I was in for a dime, in for a dollar, so I asked, "Why did you turn him down?" He gave me some personal information about his family and how it was just something that, at this time, he could not do. And because of that, because he had turned down this promotion, he said he was going to retire.

All I could say was "please don't." I mean I loved him, so I was walking out and was almost to the door, and he said, "Chuck, come here for a minute." I turned around and I walked back and he said, "You need to understand that sooner or later, the Marine Corps is going to break your heart." I said, "What do you mean by that?" He said, "Just that. That sooner or later it's going to break your heart. If you're a captain and don't get selected to major, this precious institution is going to tell you to go home. If you're a major and don't make lieutenant colonel, this precious institution at the twenty-year mark is going to tell you to go home. If you're a lieutenant colonel at twenty-six years or a colonel at thirty, even if you're the Commandant of the Marine Corps, sooner or later the institution is going to tell you to go home. Now, if during all of the time you're a Marine, you show your family, both in word and more important in action, that they are number one, that your career is not the most important thing but your family is the most important, then when the time comes that you need to put Marine Corps first because there's an IG inspection coming up or because you've got to work ten hours to get ready or because you've got to go to Okinawa or you've got to go to war, your family's going to be supportive because all along they've known that they are number one to you. More importantly, when the time comes for the Marine Corps to break your heart and you walk out that door, you can look to your left and your wife is going to be there with you. You can hold her hand and walk off into the sunset knowing that you put part of your life behind you, but you're going ahead. However, if, for whatever reason, you've put the Marine Corps in front of your family, then when you ask for the extra sacrifice of the family, you're going to get some problems from your family. But more importantly, when it comes time for you to leave because the Marine Corps has, "broke your heart," you will look

to your left and your wife may be there physically, but don't expect her to be there emotionally."

They were very powerful words and I've never forgotten them. And I often related that story as Commandant. I would normally tell that story to send signals to my officers, my enlisted, that the family comes first. That those people who are successful in their married life are going to be great Marines. Those who have problems in their married life normally are the ones who end up having difficulty in the Marines. If you've got a well-oiled machine operating in the family side, you're going to have a well-oiled machine in the Marine side as well. It was a great lesson I learned from the conscience of the Marines.

DR. CRIST: So hence you as Commandant, you never had a problem with married Marines?

GEN KRULAK: Of course we had trouble, but as you know my wife and I dedicated ourselves to helping our Marines keep strong families. The fact of the matter is we found that at the very lowest rank, being married was a struggle. But when they made corporal -- if you looked at the corporals who were married and those that weren't, the married corporal had higher pro/con marks. When they made sergeant, they got better fitness reports. It's the stability that's so important. If you understand that the family readiness is part of combat readiness, you're going to have a better outfit. And that's what Zandi and I and the rest of the general officers would try to do with the Marine Corps Community Service. Build this concept that family readiness was inextricably linked to combat readiness and vice versa.

DR. CRIST: It's a simple concept but it makes a lot of sense.

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: You touched on something. We might want to put this later, but did you do agree with General Mundy's desire to prevent first term enlisted for being married?

GEN KRULAK: I think that that was an impossible dream. But there is no question that a young Marine, a PFC coming in with a 17 or a 16 year old wife is bound to have difficulty. Give me that Marine at 22 or 23 or 24 years old—a Marine Sergeant—with that same wife, and I would love him to death. I mean, I just think that maturity is so important.

DR. CRIST: Very Interesting. What were some of your other duties and responsibilities working for Gen Schulze?

GEN KRULAK: Well, I served kind as the eyes and the ears for General Schulze in the manpower arena and outside the manpower arena. I used to spend a lot of time on the phone with officers around the Marine Corps trying to take the temperature of morale issues and so I would say I spent 30 percent of my time doing that. Another 30 percent of the time, I was the Marine Corps' go between the Corps and the Board for Correction of Naval Records. I signed all of the Board of Correction of Naval Records documents. I would sign the Marine Corps' opinion to the BCNR cases, which was very interesting and served me well because it helped me understand a lot about the fitness report system. This knowledge led to some of the changes we made when I became Commandant. I learned how inflated the fitness report was and how open it was to tampering. Finally, the remainder of my time was spent doing the normal administrative business associated with being the EA to a Marine general.

DR. CRIST: Anything particularly memorable about those three years in Manpower that we have not covered?

GEN KRULAK: I think we touched on just about everything. I spent a great deal of time learning the soul of Manpower and the interface between Recruiting, Manpower, Plans and Policy and Manpower Management. It was a tremendous education that served me well from then on, not just when I was a general but as a lieutenant colonel and colonel as well. The manpower process is the most difficult process in all of the Marine Corps and to be able to understand it was key to a lot of things that I did in the future, particularly when we got into the Force Structure Planning Group effort.

DR. CRIST: This was Pre-Pass era?

GEN KRULAK: It was right about the beginning of the Pre-Pass and it was right around that time.

DR. CRIST: Were you involved in its development?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, a little bit, but it was under way when I got there.

SESSION V

Lieutenant Colonel Assignments and Battalion Command

National Defense University . . . Assignment to G-5, FMFPac . . . Changing the Marine Corps' role in the Pacific theater War Plans . . . Building MPS Brigade . . . Rourke's Drift Society . . . Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines . . . Thinking 3/3 . . . Working up for a WestPac deployment with 31st MAU . . . Operation Beach Guard on Iwo Jima . . . Exercises in Thailand and Kenya . . . Origin of America's Battalion . . . G-3, 1st Marine Brigade . . . Developing Maritime Prepositioning for 1st Brigade

DR. CRIST: The date is 26 September, the year 2000. The place is in General Krulak's office in Wilmington, Delaware. When we left off, you were at Manpower, Headquarters Marine Corps, in 1978. You talked about how you were brought up as the Executive Assistant for your old battalion commander, Doug Schultz, and you finished with a story about how he gave Ollie North his chance at NSC.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: From Manpower, you headed to the War College at National Defense University at Ft McNair. Did you have to apply for this?

GEN KRULAK: They had a top level school board. It was a selection—this was the beginning of the idea that you had to go through certain wickets to continue on with your career. This was one of the wickets. In many ways, percentage-wise, it was more difficult to get selected to top level school than it was to make brigadier general. People used to make the comment that if you didn't get to top level school, you couldn't make colonel, and so people would push hard for it. You know, "Oh, I want to go to top level school. I need that in order to continue on and make colonel," and so forth. What they failed to understand is that it was not top level school that you needed to have to make colonel. It was the record book that would get you selected to top level school that would get you selected to colonel. Big difference.

DR. CRIST: What stands out in your mind, what did you take away from the War College? How do you think it enhanced you as an officer?

GEN KRULAK: It was a good year. I had spent a lot of time doing a lot of hard work, putting in a lot of

hours. The National War College, although it was not a restful time, it was certainly nowhere near as stressful as what I'd been doing. I was there with my dearest friend Tom Draude and so it was just a great time. I had the time to train for and run the Marine Corps marathon. Was it mind-expanding? Did I become totally aware of geo-politics and the National Defense Strategy and where the POM fits in with the future years' Defense plan and fit in with all of the Joint Strategic Documents etcetera? No. I mean we got that, but the reality was it was just like most schools, an opportunity to learn from your classmates, to be around people who you will run into later on in your career and just trying to relax.

DR. CRIST: Does anyone, other than General Draude, any of the classmates stand out in your mind?

GEN KRULAK: Well, there were Marines who went on to make general officer. You know, I have trouble recalling who they are, to be honest with you, right now. I run into people all the time who say, "Gee, I was in your War College class." And I say, "Well, that's great." But I don't remember them.

DR. CRIST: One quick question on the War College, did you find any of the information there helped you for when you later went up to the White House and up to your first Joint billets a few years later?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned the Marine Corps marathon. Was that the first marathon you had run?

GEN KRULAK: No. I've run three marathons. I've run three marathons but that was my best marathon. I think I ran a 3:23. But I was never in better shape

than I was at the War College. I think every Marine would say the same thing. We went there, we got in shape and we did well.

DR. CRIST: After your year there, sir, you headed to Hawaii for duty with the G-5 FMFPac in June 1982.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Let me give you a story that I think is of interest. I mentioned that my best friend, Tom Draude went to the War College with me. While we were at the War College, the Commandant of the Marine Corps established a new policy that everybody who graduated from the War College had to go to a staff billet. Everyone. It didn't make any difference how long the officer had been out of the FMF. You had to go to a staff billet. Well, I had been out of the FMF for the last part of being a major and a part of my time as lieutenant colonel and it was obvious to me that I was going to spend my entire lieutenant colonelcy out of the FMF. That was personally of concern, but nowhere near as much concern as I looked at my classmates and saw that many of them had not been in the FMF since they were captains. I felt this was wrong.

So Tom Draude and I decided to do something about it, and we wrote a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps saying we think this is a bad move and here's why. We laid it out in great detail. In order to ensure that it did not look like we were doing this for our own benefit, we waited until our orders were cut and we had the orders in hand. As soon as we had the orders cut and in hand, we submitted the letter to then Lieutenant General Dwayne Gray who was the head of Personnel Management Division. He called up and said, "You two guys are crazy. You're cutting your throats. This is the Commandant's policy. Who are you to challenge the Commandant's policy? And secondly," he said, "This is going to look bad because obviously you're one of the people affected." And we said, "No, it shouldn't look bad. We've got our orders. We're executing." Our household goods have already gone to Hawaii. We said, "We're trying to do this for those people who will follow on after us." We heard nothing from the Commandant, so about six months after getting to FMFPac, I called back to LtGen Dwayne Gray, and said, "Sir, what was the Commandant's response to our letter?" And he says, "You mean the letter that's in my desk drawer?" He had not send it.

DR. CRIST: Did he agree with you, do you think?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, because the policy eventually changed. Our point was that if these officers are in fact the best lieutenant colonels we've got, don't our

young Marines deserve to be led by the best lieutenant colonels in the Marine Corps?

I had no idea that I was going to the G-5 when I first got to FMFPac. What was very interesting is Tom Draude went to the G-3. I went to the G-5. And we were the first two top level school graduates to arrive at FMFPac in years. It was in many ways a sleepy hollow when we got there and, by the time we left, it was pretty vibrant, not just because of us but because more top level school graduates started showing up and a lot of energy was developed.

DR. CRIST: Interesting. Who was the G-5 when you were out there? Do you remember, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. A colonel by the name of [Joe L.] Gregorcyk.

DR. CRIST: The CG FMFPac was General J. K. Davis.

GEN KRULAK: J. K. Davis.

DR. CRIST: What I gathered from General Davis's oral history, FMFPac focused heavily on exercising the MPF at the time. He mentioned some problems with artillery ammunition going bad . . .

GEN KRULAK: There were much bigger issues ongoing. During the time that I was in the G-5, three major events took place. The first one was we came out of the war plans for Alaska. The Marine Corps was given the mission to retake the Aleutian Islands under the 5000 Series war plan. In a general war in the Pacific, the Marine Corps was to land and retake the Aleutians. My belief was that that was an absolutely terrible role for the Marine Corps and a terrible role for amphibious forces. Who held the Aleutians may have a value from the standpoint that it's American territory but so far as impacting a war-winning strategy, he who has the Aleutians, has nothing.

DR. CRIST: As the Japanese showed in World War II.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and so I didn't want us in the Aleutians. My job was the general war planner for the Pacific, and so I went to Colonel Gregorcyk, and said, "This is bad. We need to get out of here." That was a very big shock because having a mission is important, and I was advocating to walk away from our mission. I believed that our ability to be a flexible response force for the Pacific was impacted by being tied down in the Aleutians. That was not where we

should be. After much deliberation with Col Gregorcyk, including LtGen Davis, the Marine Corps decided to attempt to move away from our Aleutian mission and take a more flexible role. I was tasked to go to CinCPacFleet and brief Admiral Sylvester R. Foley Jr. on this new change in the 5000 Series plan, and eventually to CinCPac. The end result of all of this effort was the Marine Corps was taken out of the 5000 Series plan as force to be used in the Aleutians and was designated to be used in landings where it made some difference . . . in the Vladivostok area. So we got involved as more of a strategic reserve . . . a quick strike force instead of land warfare in a backwater theater.

The second major change that took place was to move the amphibious, at that time, Marine Amphibious Unit, the MAU, from Hawaii to the West Coast. Prior to that time, the MAU sailed out of Hawaii with the battalion coming out of the 3d Marine Regiment and all the attachments coming from the West Coast so that they never saw the shipping. They never got to work up with their ships. So it was decided to basically move everything except for the battalion itself to the West coast and then use the ships to spin up the West Coast forces, get them ready to go. Then they would then come to the Pacific and we would spend 30 days or so doing exercises to coordinate all of the forces and then deploy. This concept had to be sold all the way to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and we did that. The Commandant came out to FMFPac I briefed him. He approved the new concept. That was the second big change.

The third big change was, as General Davis mentioned, in the area of MPF. There was no MPF tied to FMFPac forces other than 7th MEB. We built a plan at FMFPac that would make the 3d Marine Regiment and BSSG-1 the organization that took the new proposed ships and build an MPS brigade on Hawaii. What was interesting is after we built that plan, I went over to the 1st Marine Brigade and executed the plan when I became a colonel. I went over to the other side of the island as a lieutenant colonel and took a battalion and then by the time I left the battalion, the ships had been built, the concept had been fleshed out, and I became the head of MPS for 1st Marine Brigade. So there are those major areas that General Davis didn't mention but in fact had a lasting impact on the Corps.

Tom Draude and I also established something called the Rorke's Drift Society named after the Battle of Rorke's Drift from the movie "Zulu." The idea of the Rorke's Drift Society was that it was a society of second lieutenants through lieutenant colonels who would meet to talk about something new or

innovative or something that needed to be improved. We got in a lot of trouble over the Rorke's Drift Society because many colonels thought that we were a bunch of young Turks trying to upset the apple cart. It came to a head when we sent out our first flyer on the meeting of the Rorke's Drift Society. We decided to talk about close air support, and the guest speaker was General J. K. Davis and none of the colonels were invited. I mean they really got upset and Colonel Gregorcyk cornered me and said, "What are you guys doing, you and Draude? You come here from the War College and here you are making a union of the lieutenant colonels!" We said, "No, we're just trying to instill some professionalism and that's not to say that the colonels shouldn't participate. You're going to all be asked to "teach." We will want your views just as we want the view of Gen Davis on CAS. Colonel Gregorcyk recognized the value of the effort and calmed the rest of the colonels down.

DR. CRIST: What did General Davis say in that meeting?

GEN KRULAK: He basically said that the idea of the pop-up type of close air support where you come in low, pop up and go high, then turn over and come down, he said the ability to acquire the target, particularly in close terrain, is going to be very hard and sooner or later Marine pilots will need to go low and get down there where the troops can see them and they can see the troops.

DR. CRIST: Just on the plans aspect, sir, on Korea --

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Were the Marines still slated to land over at Wonsan?

GEN KRULAK: Yes we were. I did not have the 5027 plan.

DR. CRIST: You were primarily focused on 5000 Series?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: In the event of a general war with the Soviets, where did you think the Marine Corps would likely have been used?

GEN KRULAK: Well, we would have probably been used somewhere around Vladivostok to make a difference. But what we wanted to do was not be tied down anywhere. We wanted to be used where

required, not locked into the Aleutians or anywhere else. We wanted to use the agility of the Fleet Marine Forces.

DR. CRIST: What was the Navy's response to these changes?

GEN KRULAK: Very positive. I think 7th Fleet was excited. They didn't like to get stuck up there in the Aleutians. Again, it was one of those things where it was obvious to everybody but nobody had gone after it. Colonel Gregorcyk and General Davis allowed us to do just that—go after it.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on that period, sir, before we talk about your battalion command?

GEN KRULAK: Well, just how I got to the battalion command. The first year that I arrived at FMFPac, I arrived just before the budget cycle, so it was at that point in time when the CinCs started to participate in the development of the integrated priority list for the development of the budget. The year before, FMFPac had briefed their, "POM," their budget and their recommendations for the integrated priority list and had done a very bad job. And, in fact, General Davis had been criticized for it. I saw the document. The briefing document had some really nasty comments on top of it. So I was in the G-5 shop and I got a phone call to come up and see General Davis and I went up to see him and he said, "I want you to brief our POM submission. I want you to develop it and brief it." I didn't know anything about the POM! I had never done any budget work. But, of course, I said, "I'll do it." I called back to Headquarters Marine Corps and started getting spun up on the POM process and ended up doing the brief. Not bragging or anything, but it was a home run. In the briefing itself, the CinC said, "This briefing should be the template for all the other components in the Pacific Command." Well, General Davis was pumped. He said, "Thank you. Thank you. Thank you."

Well another six months went by and I'm watching my opportunity to do anything in the FMF slip away. So I decided to send an AA-form to Headquarters Marine Corps requesting to be sent over to the other side of the island to the 1st Marine Brigade. I essentially wrote that I and not been in the FMF since 1977 and I was a Marine. I want mud on my boots. This is what I came in the Corps to do. I love the infantry. I'd like to have the opportunity. I had called up HQMC and told them I was going to send this and they told me not to waste my time, but I said "Well, I'm going to send it anyhow." So I gave it to Colonel Gregorcyk and he forwarded it Gen Davis.

Well, about two months later we were getting ready to go into the budget cycle again, and Gen Davis called me up again and said, "I want you build and give the POM briefing again." I said, "Fine." He then said, "By the way, I got your AA-form in my hand." I said, "Oh, okay, sir." And he said, "Well, if you do a good job again, I might actually forward it." So I said, "I'm going to do a good job."

Well J. K. Davis was selected to be the Assistant Commandant and Lieutenant General Charlie Cooper, who had been Manpower, came out to be CG, FMFPac. So I'm sitting there and I'm now doing the POM brief for Charlie Cooper. Davis told him that we had gotten blitzed two years ago on this thing but did well last year. And the guy who made it happen was Lieutenant Colonel Krulak. And, of course, Charlie Cooper said, "Well, we just turned down his request to go over to the 1st Brigade. One of my last things I did as Manpower was to turn down his request to go to the other side of the island." And Davis said, "Well, that's fine. But that may not be the smart thing to do. You ought to take a look at what he does . . ." He kind of walked him through it and the bottom line is we had the POM brief. It went very well and the next thing I know I got a set of orders to go to the other side of the island. And that's kind of how it went.

Interestingly, some might see that as a violation of the Commandant's dictum that everybody who went from top level school would go to a staff billet. As it turned out, by the time I went to the 3d Marine Regiment, about 70 percent of my classmates had already been into the FMF. It became very obvious to General Barrow that this policy was not a smart thing to do. He had great people who ought to be doing some time on the staff and then go to the FMF.

DR. CRIST: What were the major issues you addressed in your POM brief?

GEN KRULAK: The same things we are still concerned about. Flight hours, smart weapons, ammunition. Also, buying out MPS, buying the LAVs and things along that line.

DR. CRIST: You reported to the regiment first?

GEN KRULAK: I reported to the CG. At that time it was Jacob W. Moore. He further transferred me down to the 3rd Marine Regiment to be the Executive Officer, working for Colonel "Mac" [Henry J.] Radcliffe who was an AWS classmate of mine. It was a great time. "Mac" Radcliffe was a wonderful, wonderful commander. He went on to be the CO of AWS. He cared about his people. Was concerned

about his people. Was innovative. A fine officer. I worked for him and then I watched battalion commander positions open up, always with my eye on my precious 3/3. And the time came when they announced who the next CO of 3/3/ was going to be, and it was going to be me.

At that point in time, the vast majority of the battalion officer were going to rotate to include the S-3 and the XO. Regiment went around first to find out who wanted to be the S-3 and everybody wanted to be battalion XO. Nobody wanted to be the S-3. At that point in time, there was a young captain working for me, an artillery officer by the name of Edward J. Lesnowicz, Jr. I went down to Ed and I said, "Ed, how would you like to be the S-3 of an infantry battalion?" And he said, "I would love it." And so I took Captain Lesnowicz to be my S-3.

I then started looking for an XO and again, a lot of people wanted to be a battalion XO, but when you went to them and asked, suddenly, something would come up that would cause them to "beg off." So I went and asked another captain by the name of Peter T. Fairclough whether he wanted to be the S-3 and Ed Lesnowicz would be the XO. And Pete said yes. So then I went back to Ed and I said, "Ed, I've love you to be the 3 but how'd you like to be the XO of an infantry battalion?" He said, "Yes, I'd love that, too." So I ended up with two captains.

We were all set to take command when the Beirut tragedy took place. The battalion, which was supposed to come home from the western Pacific, sailed to the Mediterranean and so I had to wait two or three months to take command. But when I eventually took command, I took command with a captain as the XO and a captain as the S-3. it was a great battalion!

DR. CRIST: You took over on 3 December relieving Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Earl.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: An interesting character in his own right.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Bob Earl is a brilliant officer. He was not a great leader of men. He's a good leader but I mean his style was more distant and so you had a battalion that had been commanded by this brilliant officer, who was rather distant, and a battalion that had been deployed for a pretty long time. So when they came back, were they pumped? No! I think they were ready for a change in leadership. And that's not being critical of Bob Earl. I just think that

they were tired. They came back and when I got there, they were ready for a new leader.

DR. CRIST: So you came down with your own XO and "3."

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Did the others rotate out? The other two?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: It looked, judging by the Command Chronologies, your first six months as battalion commander was occupied with work up for the your West Pac as the BLT for 31st MAU?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Let me talk a bit about some of the things that I would like young officers to know. Very similar to when I became Commandant, I had taken the time before I became CO of 3/3 to write down a planning guidance, the Commander's intent. On the day I assumed command, during the actual change of command ceremony, I had officers placing on the pillow of each one of my Marines a letter from me, whether they were a private or a captain. Every single member of that battalion got a personal letter from the battalion commander saying here's who I am, here's what I want to do as a battalion. We're in this thing together. You're going to be seeing a lot of me. I'm not spying on you. I'm with you. And I then laid out the goals. I wanted a certain percentage on the MCCRES. I wanted a certain percentage for retention, for disciplinary actions, etcetera, etcetera. And laid out, this is where we're going. Get on board or get out. Get on board or get out. After the change of command ceremony, the Marines went back, turned in their weapons and went to go on liberty and there was a letter from their new battalion commander.

On the day of my assumption of command, I asked my battalion sergeant major—a superb Marine by the name of Pete Ross—to pick me up a pair of coveralls. Then, on the first day of my command, SgtMaj Ross and I showed up at the battalion motor pool at 0600. There were only one or two Marines at the motor pool at 0600. They wouldn't let us in. I finally said, "Look, I'm the new Battalion Commander." They couldn't believe it. But I said, "I'm the new Battalion Commander" and they let me in. Using much of the knowledge I gained at Leavenworth in the course entitled "Logistics for Commanders" I began to inspect our rolling stock. By about 7:00 in the morning, I probably had 10 lance

corporals and below following me and Sergeant Major Ross around, probably thinking we were crazy. By 7:30 we had several staff NCOs, the motor transport officer of the battalion, and the S-4 of the battalion and the maintenance management officer of the battalion all watching the Battalion Commander literally going through every bit of rolling stock. We were down there from about 6:00 in the morning until around 1400 in the afternoon and inspected every single vehicle, every trailer, everything. By about 8:30 in the morning, the word was out throughout that battalion that the Battalion Commander was down there in coveralls, by this time filthy dirty, along with the Battalion Sergeant Major, pulling PM and inspections on all the vehicles. From then on, it set the stage for what I wrote in that letter about "being with you and around the area." From then on, we would go to the armories, go out in the field, etcetera, trying to get the morale up, and the troops just loved it.

The other thing we did religiously, was every Friday morning we would get the entire battalion -- I mean everybody -- out on the road and we'd go for a big battalion run. We'd run all over Kaneohe. We would stop halfway through that run at a point where the Battalion least expected it. We'd be running along and they just knew it was going to happen but they didn't know when. They would come around a corner or up a hill and they would start hearing loud music playing the theme to "Rocky." The troops loved it... all of them dancing like Rocky with their hands up in the air. I mean they were really pumped. Then we'd sit them all down and I would teach a class. It would always be on tactics and it would always be related to combat leadership. I would take them through Hue City. I would take them through combat in the jungle. I would take them through thoughts on Korea. I would always use real world examples. The Marines loved it. Then I would always end the class with a safety lesson telling them to drive safely, don't get into trouble, watch your drinking, etcetera, etcetera. I would close my talk with the saying, "Tonight when you go to bed, I don't care whether you're with your girl friend, whether you're alone or whether you're with your wife, after you've kissed them good night or after you've said your prayers, I want you to go to bed with one thing on your mind." Then I'd point to my head and I'd say, "Think 3/3. Think 3/3." And that became kind of our motto. I'd pass people in the passage way and they'd say, "Sir, I'm thinking 3/3." As the Commandant, I would run into gunnery sergeants who were PFCs in 3/3 and they'd come up to me and say, "Sir, I'm still thinking 3/3. I mean they remembered things like that.

Bottom line--we had a great battalion. Morale was high. They wanted to do well. I had tremendous staff noncommissioned officers. Tremendous officers. Great support. So that when we started into getting ready for our deployment as the BLT with 31st MAU, instead of the troops saying, "We just got back and we had this very long deployment and now we're going back again." They were pretty excited.

DR. CRIST: I wonder if you could just describe what work up procedures were like for the MAU. This was a couple of years before special operation designation came in for the MAU/MEU?

GEN KRULAK: You started off with the old troops and so you spent the first month or two figuring out who was going to be the new leaders, you know, squad leader and fire team leader and platoon commander level. Then you started getting your new people, your new officers, your new staff NCOs, your new NCOs, and then you started building up your expertise at fire team leader, squad leader, platoon commander. I gave a lot of time to my platoon commanders and company commanders to run their platoons and companies.

I would build no notice drills for them. I would get the Intel Officer at the regiment and at the brigade to come down with an Intel package. I would then arrange for a squadron to be in support of us, both fixed wing and rotary wing. I'd get the BSSG all ready to go and then I would call in the company commander at 2000 and say, "Here's a package. Here's some photo Intel. Here's your mission. Here's who's going to be supporting you. You're going to have this slice out of the BSSG. You're going to have this det as air support. Here's your Intel capability. You put it all together. You build a package. It executes at 1000 tomorrow morning. So the commander had to go do all of the coordinating, all of the planning and have to execute. We would have evaluators out there that were from other battalions to evaluate how they did. All of this very hush-hush.

So those types of things got our people ready to go for the MCCRES and then their final exercise before we went afloat. We did very well on the MCCRES. We did some live fire exercises on Pohakuloa where Lieutenant Colonel Tim Roberts, who had the 1st Battalion 12th Marines, myself, and a lieutenant colonel by the name of J.J. Barta who had a fixed wing squadron, put together a CAX. The first time they'd ever run a CAX out at Pohakuloa training area. Live fire. Once we'd cross the line of departure, everything was live fire. Very exciting. General Steele was the commanding general then. He came out to watch it. He loved it. I had a new regimental

commander then, Colonel Richard H. Esau, Jr. He came out and saw it. I mean it was really a tremendous exercise that nobody had ever done before.

Then we did our final exercise for the MAU deployment on another island. Once we hit the beach, we started firing and did live fire all the way. We were accused of shooting up three battalions' worth of ammunition while we were preparing for our deployment, and that was not an inaccurate statement. The other two battalions had declared how much live fire they were going to do for the year and I just went to the regimental S-4 and said any excess ammo we'd like to have. My belief was the more live ammunition you put in the hands of your Marines, the better off you'd be. A lot of that came from my first tour in Vietnam when we had a lot of accidental discharges. I believe Marines must feel confident in knowing how to use live ammo.

DR. CRIST: That's interesting because that was a time when the Marine Corps as an institution was relieving people for accidental discharges.

GEN KRULAK: And my belief was you don't stop letting them use it. You, in fact, make them comfortable in using it and understand the lethality.

DR. CRIST: You did a number of exercises during this deployment. A couple of the interesting ones, I thought, were in June 1984 Bell Volcano and Beach Guard 84-2 which was on Iwo Jima. Both of these were a NEO or Noncombatant Evaluation Operation scenarios which is interesting as this, while common today, was not so at the time.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Again, that was General Steele and Colonel Esau's belief that in all probability the most likely use of Marines was to be in some kind of evacuation mission and so that's what we did. At Iwo Jima, Beach Guard, we were the first battalion to land in battalion strength on Iwo Jima since the war, and it was a very emotional event.

I made a terrible mistake at Beach Guard that almost cost the life of one of my Marines. We had left Hawaii and had been traveling to the Pacific and, although we were doing a lot of PT on board the ship, it's never the same as the reality of being on the ground and humping gear, etcetera. So we had landed on Iwo Jima and did the exercise and it was very successful and I had my Marines stack arms and then called the MAU commander and asked him if he would let me take the battalion to the top of Mt. Suribachi. We had come all the way to Iwo Jima and it would have been a crime not to go on Suribachi. He

said, "Yes, go." We started moving to Suribachi. It was a hot day and they don't call it the sulphur island for nothing. I mean it has active sulphur vents and the island itself is hot. I did a lousy map recon, because as the crow flies from the airfield to Suribachi is nothing, but to get there you do a twist and turn to get on to the main beach road and you get little hills and not so little hills. We hadn't been using enough water so that when we got to the top of Mt. Suribachi, we had a heat casualty that almost died and, in fact, we had to medevac him off the top of Mt. Suribachi itself. At the time, I thought he was dead. And I don't think I've ever felt worse about anything. I was not worried about my career, but about my absolute lack of sensitivity to time, distance, heat, and the lack of water. I was so focused on this battalion's opportunity to climb to the top of Mt. Suribachi and to give each one of my Marines that unbelievable experience, that I almost cost a Marine's life. Most of the Marines didn't even know it happened, so they were just emotionally touched by being on Suribachi and tears flowing and all that. But the reality is, we almost killed a Marine because I had done poor planning and forgetting many of the basics. On the way back we took it very slowly. We settled into our camp, spent the night there and evacuated off the next day and, at that point, found out that the Marine was going to be okay. You're a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps and you're still making PFC mistakes. A lesson to be learned here is you need to really understand what ship board life is like and the impact it has on the physical condition of your people. You can never forget the basics.

DR. CRIST: That's highly unusual, not only the battalion landing but the fact that the Japanese let you spend the night out there.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We honored them by planting wreaths up there and we were very careful not to get in their way and they were kind to us.

DR. CRIST: From some of the messages I read on the exercise, it was very successful.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What do you recall of the next exercise in Thailand.

GEN KRULAK: We were the first ones to literally go deep inland. We crossed the main north/south railroad track. People said we couldn't do that because the trains were about 15 minutes apart and how are you going to build a bridge to get across

those tracks that would be substantial enough to carry Amtracs and tanks without tearing the tracks up. We said we could do it and, sure enough, our engineers built a portable bridge that would cross the railroad tracks and, as soon as one train would go by, the Marines would come up and put the bridge and the tanks would cross the tracks, and it worked very well.

General [Harold G.] Glasgow was the Division Commander who was running Cobra Gold at the time. We came across the beach and assaulted. It was really one of those typical landings where there are thousands of civilians and dignitaries watching the Marine and Thai marine assault. It was kind of a show and tell. We landed on the beach and went inland and it was all well and good. But then I just stopped the battalion and said, that was great, but now about face. We went back to the beach, got back in our track vehicles. We turned around and went out about 20 yards, turned around again and did a real assault. We did it the way we would do it in a real world scenario. That kind of caught General Glasgow by surprise. He loved it. He said, "That's great. Don't waste training. Do it for the film crews and then let's get out there and do it right."

Then he wanted to come see my CP and, I gave him the coordinates and he flew over it several times and finally radioed me and said, "You gave me lousy coordinates. You're not there." I replied, "We are there." He said, "No, you're not there. You're not there." I said, "Sir, look for my mirror flash," and I flashed a mirror. He landed and he said, "You know, your camouflage was great. I couldn't see you. You have a battalion of Marines here. I did not see one of them!" He was pleased.

DR. CRIST: After this, you headed out to Kenya September 1984 for Valiant Usher.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was a great exercise. It lasted three weeks. We literally went out into the bush. We trained with 1st Kenyan Rifle. Great, great soldiers at the small unit level. They were magnificent. Taught us a lot about scouting and patrolling. We had a great exercise with them. I still have a 1st Kenyan Rifle tie that they gave me plus a 1st Kenyan Rifle bush hat. They've got a lot of our gear. It was just a great exercise. A lot of fire and maneuver. You could do it there. There was nobody worrying about the red-headed booby or anything like that. I mean there was no snail darters that they were worried about. It was let's get out here and shoot and move.

Interesting story on Pete Fairclough and Ed Lesnowicz. When we got ready to get on board ship to deploy, literally right before we went on board the

ship, these two were still captains and anybody who knows anything about the Navy knows that field grade in the Navy--the difference between a lieutenant and lieutenant commander is like night and day. I did not want my 3 and my XO to go afloat with their contemporaries all being senior to them. So just before going aboard, I took Ed Lesnowicz and Pete Fairclough behind a Dempsey-dumpster and put oak leaves on their collars. Understand that Ed Lesnowicz had been selected to major but no frocking permission had been received, and Pete Fairclough hadn't even come in the zone. They went up that gangplank as field grade officers. We steam out of the harbor. We have an engine casualty and bring the ship back. General Steele says, "Hey, the ship's back. I think I'll go pay another call on the battalion." I get the word General Steele is on his way and wants to meet with all the officers one more time. I get them all together. General Steele comes in, talks to all my Marine officers, gives them another pep talk. He's a great officer himself and very motivating. And then he gets ready to go. He said, "Chuck, can I see you in your stateroom?" And so I go in the stateroom and he says, "Were my eyes deceiving me or did I see Captain Lesnowicz and Captain Fairclough wearing gold oak leaves?" And I said, "Sir, they were wearing gold oak leaves." He said, "Do you have flocking authority for Lesnowicz?" And I said, "No, sir." And he says, "And Pete Fairclough, I didn't even know he had been selected." I said, "Sir, he hasn't been selected." He says, "Let me see if I understand this, you promoted one man who wasn't even in zone and you frocked another man without authorization?" And I said, "Yes, sir, but let me tell you why I did it," and went over it. And he says, "Chuck, I understand why you did it but you don't have the right to do it." And I said, "Aye, aye, sir. And he said, "Well, you know, to take it off now would be even worse, so go ahead and leave them on." I'll get frocking permission for Ed Lesnowicz and you're just going to have to hold on with Pete Fairclough and just hope like hell nobody besides me finds out about it." And then my next fitness support he dinged me in "judgment," which was an honest ding.

Would I do it over again? Yes. I'd have done it over again because I think it would have impacted on our overall float. These were great officers. Dealing with the Navy as a captain as 3 of the battalion, he would have been at a great disadvantage. Absolutely as the XO you would have been at a great disadvantage. The point here is you take your chances, you pay the price. And I paid the price on the fitness report for it.

DR. CRIST: He may have dinged you in judgment but I noticed in the Section C he rated you as his best battalion commander.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Anything else memorable from that deployment, sir?

GEN KRULAK: No. It was a great deployment, great time with great Marines. They called it the Baptist Landing Team.

DR. CRIST: Was that the first time that term had been used?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. And they called it that because before I took them out, I got all of my married officers together and all my married staff noncommissioned officers and I said, "There may be in some of your minds the belief that when you cross the international dateline either physically or emotionally your wedding band comes off, and you may have even experienced that in previous floats. But if you think that I'm going to tolerate that on this float, you're dead wrong and if I so much as see you in a compromising position with a member of the opposite sex, you'd better get the finest writer in the world because he's going to have to write your Board for Correction of Naval Records petition because I'm going to bash you on your fitness report."

The wives loved me. The wives thought I was the greatest thing in the world. But some of the people really didn't like that. Tough. The reality was our people behaved themselves and they didn't get in trouble and because their wives knew it, they didn't get in trouble back home and we had a very, very happy group of women and men. My wife had started what eventually became the key volunteers. The wives knew what was going on and the men knew where they stood. I liked that.

Halfway through the float when we were pulling out of the Philippines, I noticed people were working out with t-shirts that had our battalion logo on the back but instead of saying Battalion Landing Team 3/3, it said Baptist Landing Team 3/3. So be it.

DR. CRIST: 3/3 had an unofficial motto of America's Battalion?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that's an interesting story. At that time, the Dallas Cowboys were renowned and they were called "America's team;" so as part of the idea of instilling a sense of motivation in the individual Marine to understand his unit and to take

pride in it, I started calling 3/3 America's Battalion. That kind of caught on in the regiment although the other two battalions didn't like it very much. The regimental intelligence officer was a Marine captain by the name of Mark Pillar. He went on to be the backfield coach for the University of Hawaii Rainbow football team. Mark and I used to talk a lot about what was going on in Lebanon at the time . . . particularly the various tribes and clans and militias. The head of the Druze Militia was an individual by the name of Walid Jumblatt and Mark Pillar had done a study on Walid Jumblatt. He indicated to me on more than one occasion that we were in for more trouble in that neck of the woods—Lebanon--than we might have expected. He turned out to be right. When we deployed, Mark Pillar mailed me a letter addressed to CO America's Battalion. The return address was Walid Jumblatt and since it didn't require a stamp, that was all that was on the envelope. Well, sure enough the letter caught up with me in Diego Garcia. I got this letter to CO America's Battalion from Walid Jumblatt. I got all the battalion together on the hanger deck of the ship and I told them about the movie "The Miracle on 34th Street." This was a movie that told the story about a man who claimed he was Kris Kringle, and the way he eventually proved that he was "Kris Kringle." He went on trial and during the trial, the US Postal Service delivered bags and bags of mail and dumped it on the desk of the judge. They were all addressed to Santa Claus or Kris Kringle in care of the North Pole and they were delivered to this gent who said he was Kris Kringle. My point to my Marines was that if the US Post Office said that we are America's Battalion, by God we were America's Battalion. The Marines went crazy and from then on we really believed we were America's Battalion. That's how the name came about.

DR. CRIST: Any last comments, observations of your battalion command?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It was absolutely one of the high points of my Marine Corps career. Battalion command is the only command in the Marine Corps where it's still small enough that you can get to know every single person in the battalion, but, at the same time, big enough to have an influence on a group of Marines and their families. It was a high point for me, but it was a high point for my wife as she really began to formulate in her own mind how to take care of Marine families, little suspecting that years later she would use that in her efforts in establishing a lot of the family programs for the Marine Corps. So it was a great time. Finally, obviously, it was significant

to me personally being able to command the battalion that I fought with in Vietnam.

DR. CRIST: One thing I wanted to ask you had mentioned how you had put a letter on each of the Marine's racks –

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Where did that idea come from? You've done something similar to that in very command you've had.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I'm not sure where that idea came from other than the belief that it is important as a leader to let your people know what is expected of them and what they could expect from me and so I tried to do that in every location that I've gone to. I've been named to be the next Chairman and CEO of MBNA Europe. Well, right now I'm formulating a Chairman/CEO planning guidance for MBNA Europe. I just think it's important to let people know where they stand and where you stand.

DR. CRIST: Who did you turn your battalion over to, sir?

GEN KRULAK: LtCol Hank Reed, an African American and a superior officer. It was a very good turnover. There were good feelings I had for Hank and Hank had for me. We were good friends.

DR. CRIST: After this you went back up to the Brigade Staff?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The first thing I did was the "3," the G-3. I relieved Col "Mac" Radcliffe. I took some leave, and on the first day of leave and I was out washing my car when General O.K. Steele drove by and stopped his car and got out. He said, "Hey, I know you're on leave, but I'd like for you to do something for us. We have just been tabbed as an MPS brigade. We're getting the brand new AMSEA ships and we need to get on with getting ourselves ready for that." I came off of leave and for the next several months, I put together the MPS brigade portion of the MEB's mission to include all the load plans for the ships, the types of systems we were going to need, the establishment of all of the intricate command structure that goes around an MPS brigade to include all of the logistics portions. I worked very closely with the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade back at Twenty-nine Palms to make several trips back there to get some input from them and worked very closely with their G-4 and G-3, a lot of work with the

wing commander and the BSSG commander in order to make this all come about. All of this was helpful for me later on when I went into Desert Storm, as the FSSG Commander.

DR. CRIST: Where was your brigade designated for? I assume there is a breakdown and based upon which contingency plan had been implemented?

GEN KRULAK: The initial was designation was obviously Northeast Asia, Korea and that area. Secondly was Southeast Asia. The Marine Corps, at that point in time, was just beginning to come to grips with this tremendous capability called a Maritime Preposition Force and so just selling the concept to the Joint Staff was a difficult task. It turned out to be a magnificent capability, but at that point in time it was still kind of an unknown.

DR. CRIST: Was there much resistance on MPF or was it more from uncertainty.

GEN KRULAK: It was uncertainty. Lots of people, to include some Marines, weren't sure that the solution was to take all this brand new equipment and stick it on board a ship and just keep it as floating POMCUS as some people would say. Our earlier experiences with the Near Term Preposition Force was not that good because of the lack of climate control on the ships, the ammunition deteriorated, the batteries deteriorated on the vehicles, and so there are some real problems. A lot of that was solved with the use of climate controlled ships, a better understanding of such things as batteries and ammunition and how to maintain them.

DR. CRIST: There had been some debate within the Marine Corps on this whole preposition concept that it was risky marrying up with your equipment in a potentially hostile area.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's why with Maritime Propositioned Force one of the baseline premises is that you are going into a secure environment. As it turned out, when we went into Desert Shield/Desert Storm that's exactly what we did do and it became key to our success. If you had tried to do it in a hostile environment, you would be in real trouble.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on this assignment, sir?

GEN KRULAK: It was a very challenging assignment and one that gave me my first

introduction into logistics and it would prove to be very beneficial to me later on in my career.

SESSION VI

From Colonel to Brigadier General

Assignment to Washington . . . Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control and Communications, Donald Latham . . . Strategic Defense Initiative . . . Establishment of The Under Secretary for Defense Acquisition . . . Deputy Director, White House Military Office . . . Continuity of the Government responsibilities . . . Observations about President Reagan . . . The Easter Bunny . . . Wise Men Panel . . . Differences between President Reagan and Bush's administrations . . . Selection to brigadier general . . . Duty as Assistant Division Commander, 2d Marine Division and Commanding General, 10th MEB . . . Assignment as Commanding General, 2d Field Service Support Group.

DR. CRIST: The date is 10 October, 2000. The interview is taking place in the General's office in Wilmington, Delaware. The interviewer is David Crist. We were finishing up last time with your command of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and your assignment as G-3 1st Brigade. After Hawaii you headed back to Washington, in 1986, to serve in the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Defense for Command Control Communications C3-1. It was then a Donald C. Latham. What do you recall about the assignment, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, first, I was in Hawaii. I knew my tour was basically up. I had already been there a year longer than I was supposed to be and the monitor called and said, "You're coming back to Washington" and I said, "Well, what job do you have for me?" He said, "Oh, we've got some great jobs. Your name is in the hat for a whole bunch of jobs" and I said, "Well, like what?" They said, "Well, we don't have them nailed down now, but believe me you're in there for a whole bunch of jobs."

DR. CRIST: And you'd been selected for colonel?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. So I thought to myself here we go again. I've never had my first choice and now they can't even tell me what jobs they're thinking of putting me in. So about two weeks later I got a phone call from the monitor and he asked me to submit some paperwork, . . . know, background of what I had done throughout my career. I thought that was kind strange because they had my record book, but I went ahead and put a package together. Then I got word that my name was being floated to be the military assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy, then military assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense, and then military assistant to the

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. None of them panned out. I mean nobody even asked to interview me which says a lot about the way I appeared on paper. I didn't engender any excitement at all for a personal interview! So I returned to our home in Northern Virginia still without a job, and told the monitor, "I'm here to do whatever the Corps wants me to do." The monitor finally said, "Well, look. Why don't you call me every Tuesday and every Thursday and we ought to have something for you pretty soon."

Well, I didn't want to be on leave. I had had enough leave and I said, "Look. I'll come in and do whatever you want, but I don't want to be on leave. I don't want to burn up leave because there is no assignment for me." The monitor said, "Oh, no. This won't be your leave. You just need to call in twice a week," That went on for almost three weeks. Finally I was told to go interview with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence, (C3-1), I was to interview with two individuals, Dr. Bertapelli and Dr. Quinn, both of them within the Command, Control and Communications part of C31. So I put on my uniform and I went in and I met with Dr. Bertapelli who was in Strategic Systems. We sat down and within ten nanoseconds it became obvious that there was absolutely no fit. I mean they were talking in terms of space communications, things of which I had absolutely no understanding. I could tell he was a little embarrassed but was very polite and certainly did a good job of interviewing. I was very up front with him. I knew very little about strategic communications. He then asked, "Do you know anything about the acquisition cycle and procurement?" I said, "Not a whole lot about that either." Next thing I know he sent me over to meet with Dr. Quinn. He was the head of all of Command,

Control and Communications of which strategic was a part. I sat down with Dr. Quinn and what a wonderful man he was. He went through the same questions and it became obvious to him that there wasn't a real good fit.

My final interview was with Don Latham. Don Latham should have been a Marine. Don Latham was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control and Communications for over seven years. Longer than any C3-I in the history of the business. Brilliant man, hard driving, very tough, very, very sharp. I went in to see him, sat down, and by that time I had reached a frustration level regarding my fit into this organization and I said, "I don't want to take up your time. You're an important man and I don't want to take your time. I don't think there's a fit. I've interviewed with Dr. Bertapelli; I've interviewed with Dr. Quinn. What they're talking about is something that is not in my portfolio of talent." Don Latham immediately shut me down and said, "Listen. General Kelley says that you're the man for the job I'm thinking about and he is very high on you. That's good enough for me. What I want you to be is the Battle Management Command and Control Communications Officer for the Strategic Defense Initiative, Star Wars." I said, "Pardon me?" He said, "I want you to be the expert on the battle management C3 for Star Wars" and I said, "You have got the wrong man. I could no more do that than be a nuclear physicist." He described to me that it would be battle management, it would be conducted outside the Earth's atmosphere. It would be done from satellites and he explained this unbelievably complex capability that the country was trying to put up and I just said, "You've got the wrong man." He replied, "You missed the whole point, colonel. Quit telling me that I've got the wrong man. That's my decision, not yours. What I want you to do is be Napoleon's corporal. I want you to come in and tell me if the common sense equation doesn't fit with what you're hearing from General Abramson. LtGen Abramson was in charge of the Strategic Defense Initiative. So for the next several months I went to every single meeting that General Abramson had and would come back and report personally to Mr. Latham about what I felt vis-a-vis the Strategic Defense Initiative. Very interesting, very interesting time. I very rarely saw Dr. Bertapelli or Dr. Quinn. It was all one on one with Don Latham.

Then a big event took place that had a major impact on my career. Don Latham was a bachelor and he was dating a young woman who was interested in reptiles. She was a scientist and so Latham called me in one day and said, "Look, what can you tell me about crocodiles and alligators in Vietnam and in China?" I said, "Well, I don't know

what I can tell you. Why?" He said, "Well, I'm dating this girl. I want to impress her. I want to put together a little package and then I'd like to take her to the Smithsonian and take her through some of the displays there as kind of a date." I said that I'd look into it. I literally I put together a book report on reptiles in Asia. Typical Marine, you're asked to do something by your boss and you do it. Then I called up the Smithsonian. I said, "Look, I'd like to do something special. Is there a way to have a special tour for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control and Communications and Intelligence and a young lady after hours?" They said yes. So when I gave Mr. Latham the report, he loved it.

Next thing I know, he brings me up to his front office. I said good-bye to Mr. Bertapelli, I said good-bye to Dr. Quinn. At that very moment in time, the Department of Defense was reorganizing itself by establishing an acquisition czar, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition. DepSecDef asked Don Latham, because of his experience in the Pentagon, to help put together that organization. So he went full-time down to an office right beside the Undersecretary of Defense's office and he took me down there to help put this new organization together. I worked almost 18 hours a day seven days a week for Mr. Latham in that position. We just worked ourselves to death, but in the end, we built the whole office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition to include all the acquisition plans, the infrastructure. It was a tremendous, tremendous undertaking.

While this was going on, Mr. Latham was very friendly with the people over in the White House. There was a problem with an army officer who was a deputy to the White House Military Office. He got caught up with an integrity problem and was fired. The White House was looking for an officer to take that job. There was no Marine anywhere in the White House or the National Security Council because of the issue with Ollie North. There was a sense that it was time to bring a Marine back into the White House. The request came in to the Department of Defense. Mr. Latham called the new Commandant, General Al Gray and said, "What do you think about Colonel Chuck Krulak going over to the White House?" I knew nothing about it. General Gray said yes and so Don Latham recommended my name to a Mr. Rhett Dawson who headed the Administration for the Reagan White House. That began my time at the White House. As you can tell, it was a very interesting year for me in the Pentagon. I went from not even having a job coming out of Hawaii to a year later being in the White House.

People always talk about being in the right place at the right time. Again I go back to my religion. I just think the good Lord had a plan and that plan worked out. Because I'm a Marine officer when I was asked to do something that most officers that didn't wear a Marine uniform would have thought was ridiculous, do a book report or a staff study on reptiles in Asia and help put together a date, most officers would think that was beneath them. For a Marine that was just a mission. I mean your boss asks you to do it and you do it. The end result was a move from a job with the Strategic Defense Initiative into the office with Mr. Latham who then went down to work on establishing the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition. He saw how I performed there and when the White House opened up, I was nominated. So that's my year in DOD, a tremendous experience. Again met a lot of people. Met a lot of people at the professional defense level, not the appointees but the professionals who later on proved very helpful to me as a Commandant.

DR. CRIST: Two issues you brought up, sir. You mentioned you played Napoleon's corporal on SDI. What was your opinion? What were you taking away from these meetings with General Abramson?

GEN KRULAK: I was shocked at the ability of technology to solve some very, very difficult problems. Right now the country is debating another defense shield and one of the big issues is the comments that we're not technologically ready to do it. It all depends on how you want to do it, whether you want to do it at the initial phase, whether you want to do it at the reentry phase, whether you want to do it during the time that the weapon itself is out of the earth's atmosphere, still in space or before it has let go of its multiple reentry vehicles. There are difficult technological problems, but they are not insurmountable and, in fact, we can do it. The cost is great. It's going to cost a lot of money. Secondly, there was concern about man in the loop. Although you have a battle management capability in space it is critical that you always have a man in the loop and there are those who would question whether you're going to be able to do that. That was a very interesting time for me.

DR. CRIST: The other issue on developing the Acquisitions office, was this a by-product of Goldwater/Nichols?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: An acquisition czar for all the DOD?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. There was no one in that position nor anyone who knew how to do it and so they brought the most experienced man in the department to come down there and work through those issues and that was Don Latham. It was a very, very difficult time. Latham wanted the job but knew he couldn't get it. So he wanted to be the principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and he didn't get that either. The first Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition was a man by the name of Dick Godwin and we briefed him many, many times, but Godwin and Latham never hit it off well so Latham never became the principal Deputy Undersecretary.

Around the time I was leaving to go to the White House, Mr. Latham got married and I turned out to be a member of the wedding party. We went from a senior/subordinate to become very good friends.

DR. CRIST: You next went to the White House, working as the Deputy Director of the White House Military Office. What were the major issues you worked on? What were your duties and responsibilities there, sir?

GEN KRULAK: The White House Military Office has what is called a "white world" and a "black world." The white world mission involved cognizance over anything military that supported the White House. It was the White House Communications Agency, WHCA. It was HMX-1, Marine Helicopter Squadron, Air Force One the plane that transported the President and Vice-President plus all the other planes. It included the medical and dental portions of the White House. It included the White House mess, the feeding of the President. It included the transportation, the cars, the buses, trucks. All of those fell under the white world portion of support to the presidency.

The "black world" portion was something called Continuity of the Government. It was the guaranteed security of our democratic process. Guaranteed through multiple ways. The rapid evacuation of the President and his White House staff to locations where they would be safe, the rapid evacuation of the Congress of the United States, the rapid evacuation of the Cabinet. It also entailed the functioning of that Government in locations spread around the United States not just the functioning of the presidency but the ability to tie into State, into Defense, you name it. All of that was a very, very difficult challenge and under very high security.

DR. CRIST: The alternate command post in Maryland, for example, all of that falls underneath?

GEN KRULAK: That's correct. That's just the tip of the iceberg. It includes the National Airborne Command Center. It includes secret sites all around this country. It goes to mobile capability. The Deputy Director of the White House Military Office, my position, was responsible for all the black-world while still having his hand in the white side too. The Director of the Military Office, a civilian, normally did a lot of the white side because he just didn't have the understanding of the black world.

The person I worked under during the Reagan administration was a man named James McKinney who came to the White House from the FCC. Mr. McKinney should have been a Marine. He didn't look like it. He looked like Casper milk toast. He wore glasses and chain smoked but he was brilliant and a real hard man and he turned out to be a great boss. He was relieved when Bush came in by an individual by the name of Lopez who was not very good.

Wherever the President went, I went. The President took an aide with him and the aide carried the football which had the nuclear codes, but I carried with me the understanding of what the codes meant. I carried with me the location of where he'd have to go. Everything that had to do with the continuity of the Government went with me and so every trip the President went on, I went on. I don't care where he went, to Moscow, to Missouri, I was there. Every vacation he went on I went on. For two years I never had a vacation at home. For two years I basically never spent a weekend at home. I was either at Camp David or up at Kennebunkport or the western White House. So it was a very, very long, hard two years. Zandi would tell you that that was kind of the beginning of the end of our life together. Beginning with those two years, I was away from home a great deal. But I cannot minimize the importance of the job of the Deputy Director of the White House Military Office, a very key position. At the same time there are a lot of pitfalls. You saw the sign on my desk. A scarlet background with gold letters embroidered on it. The word "integrity." That was needle pointed by my mother-in-law after the second week at the White House Military Office when I came home and said, "This job is filled with landmines." Those landmines surrounded the power the position contained. If you wanted to take a plane to Las Vegas for the weekend . . . the plane, the hotel bill, the food bills, everything covered. You could do it. Nobody would question you. If you wanted a new TV, you could have one. Nobody would have questioned it. It was just unbelievable and the reality was the army officer before me was relieved because of a lack of integrity. He, in fact, did take the plane to Las Vegas and was caught and turned in by one of his own people. So it

was a very, very dangerous area from the standpoint that you could really get caught up in the aura of the White House. So I had her needlepoint this "integrity" sign so every time I walked into my office I'd see it.

DR. CRIST: You had mentioned integrity, in your personal papers dealing with the White House military Office are two documents which are not explained. One is a Department of the Treasury Record of Security violation.¹

GEN KRULAK: This is the Department of the Treasury Record of Security Violations. A violation by an army major, by the name of Charlotte Coker. Charlotte worked for me in the new Executive Office Building which was up the street from where my office was. My office, by the way, was literally in the East Wing of the White House right next to the First Lady's. Anyhow, Charlotte had left her safe open and the problem with that obviously was that the safes in her area, the minimum classification, minimum, was Top Secret and so this was a bad, bad thing and Charlotte was called in and counseled and took a hit on her fitness report. It didn't hurt her too much because she went on to be a colonel and did a great job in command in the Army, but all this indicates is that there were constant checks on all our offices because of the importance of it.

DR. CRIST: I was just curious why all the things you saved whether that had some significance?

GEN KRULAK: No, I'm not sure why I kept it. I might add that it's important to note that the job of the White House Military Office was on the personal staff of the President. This was not an NSC job. We weren't in the old Executive Office Building, the new Executive Office Building or anything. We were literally on the President's personal staff. We were with him every day and there is a big difference. You see people wearing the presidential service badge and you can earn that in many ways. You can earn it on the National Security Council and yet not have much contact at all with the President, but the White House Military Office was literally in the White House in the East Wing and had day to day contact with the White House staff and the President.

DR. CRIST: What was your personal observations of President Reagan?

¹ Report of Security Violation, Box 83, Gen Charles C. Krulak papers, Marine Corps Research Center Archives, Quantico, Virginia.

GEN KRULAK: He was bigger than life. Everything that you've heard about him that's good is true and probably not to the magnitude that it should be. He was a wonderful man, a great human, surrounded himself with absolutely top-notch people. He had a tremendous ability to use his own understanding of the American people, his own understanding of foreign affairs, his own good judgment to the greatest benefit of the nation and so I was very impressed with him.

His wife was very tough. Some of us called her the dragon lady. She was tough because she wanted to protect her husband. I mean she was tough for all the reasons that you'd want your wife to be tough. She saw him almost killed and she wasn't going to let that happen again. So she was very protective.

DR. CRIST: With President Reagan's announcement in 1994 that had Alzheimer's, there has been speculation in the press that he started to suffer from this while President. As you were with him constantly, was there any evidence of this?

GEN KRULAK: No. I didn't see any of that. I maintained a friendship with him well after he left office and he did not start to really suffer until much later. He was like anybody else, if he ate a good lunch, he would get tired. Instead of trying to fight to keep his eyes open sometimes he just let them droop. He surrounded himself with such talented people that when it came time to make a decision he'd ask the right people and then take all of their thoughts and then meld them together with his own good judgment and his own geo-political sense and he would come up with the right decision. You cannot question his success.

DR. CRIST: I've heard that he took advice but when it came time to make a decision it was his own decision. There was no . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Yes. There was no question who was in charge. Let there be no question who the President was and the Commander-in-Chief.

DR. CRIST: Was he personally very charismatic and friendly?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. When I had finally gone through all the interview process for this job I was told to go up to a particular place because I had one more interview and so I went up to this location and the next thing I know in walks the President and he just wanted to say hello and welcome me aboard. It was just his kindness. It was his kindness. He took a picture of our meeting and sent it to my dad saying,

look who just joined me in the White House. That was very kind. Then when I was eventually selected to brigadier general he surprised me in my office as soon as he signed the actual forwarding endorsement to the Congress. He set up a ceremony and had a color detail from Marine Barracks 8th and I come over plus a trumpeter. The President walked me over to the East Wing of the White House to my office. As we walked up the stairs and we got to the head of the stairs a trumpet sounded attention. As we marched down the hall they played the Marines Hymn and the colors were there along with the one star flag. We walked into my office. It was filled with all of my relatives, my wife, my children, and they had my father on the phone. So it was just a great event. The point is that's the kind of person he was. President Reagan really cared about people.

There was so much going on in those days and I was able to be part of history. I was the one who carried the treaty to Moscow for President Reagan. I carried it in a briefcase. I saw the transition between the two presidents. I saw movement from one kind of presidency to another, one that was a little more rigid in the Reagan years to a more fluid presidency in the Bush years. I saw the difference between being Vice-President and a President. When I started riding the plane with President Bush, his Chief-of-Staff came to me and said, "Why are you always on this plane?" I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Well, I don't understand why you are always on this plane and up at Kennebunkport?" I said, "Well, are you aware of the Continuity of the Government issues and what we do?" He said "No." I said, "What?" So I can remember him sitting on a bench outside the President's cabin onboard Air Force One and I was down on one knee with him and his assistant and I explained to them the "black world" associated with Continuity of the Government. I also had the aide come up and explain to them what we were doing and why we were so important to the President. It was quite a surprise to them.

DR. CRIST: And something you would think you would know, but if they're not clued in.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Well, it was so classified that very, very few people who knew what was going on.

DR. CRIST: What sense or observation did you have -- that was a period of the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union and their role in East Europe. Did you have a sense of that happening at the time?

GEN KRULAK: Every time we went to Russia and we went there several times we saw nothing but the finest. The military would be spit-shined to a fare-

thee-well. The vehicles all ran, the helicopters all ran. The roads we went on were manicured. All the railroads we saw were top notch, but, of course, the intelligence we were getting was that things were not quite that good. So I think there was a sense that the Soviet Union was beginning to deteriorate and that if we just kept the pressure on it would collapse under its own weight. There is no question that one of the reasons why we went with Star Wars and the budget buildup was to put so much pressure on the Soviet Union that they would spend themselves into oblivion and that's basically what they did. The way to win a war without fighting.

DR. CRIST: Okay, sir. You touched on one issue which was the transition from Reagan to Bush and you mentioned there was a noticeable difference in the style between the two men.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I guess if I can use a personal example as a difference between the two and the way they looked at the White House. Each year the White House puts on the White House Easter egg roll. Up until the Bush Presidency the individuals who played the Easter Bunny and Mrs. Bunny were members of the Cabinet. You have the Secretary of Defense as the bunny, Mrs. Secretary of Defense as the assistant bunny or the woman bunny and they would do it for an hour and then they'd bring in another Cabinet member and they'd do it and that's kind of how things went. It was very formal, aristocratic and the Reagans did that very well. When the Bush people came in they said this is the people's presidency and the reality was he'd sneak out to get a pizza at the pizza parlor.

DR. CRIST: The President himself would go out in town for Pizza?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, yes. Didn't want a bunch of Secret Service people up in Kennebunkport, etc., etc. Well, when it came time for the Easter egg roll he said, "We're not going to have Cabinet members. This is the people's presidency. We're going to have just people from the White House doing it. So we're going to have a contest and we're going to nominate people to be the Easter Bunny and we'll draw a name out of the hat and that person will be the Easter Bunny." Well, my secretary along with the secretaries over with the First Lady, by that time had developed a good rapport. So they, unbeknownst to me, submitted my name to be the Easter Bunny. Mrs. Bush rigged pulling it from the hat. She palmed it, she palmed the piece of paper so my name was pulled. So I was selected along with my wife to be the Easter Bunny and only one bunny was going to

go the whole distance. Here, Al Gray is the Commandant. I'm a little worried about this, you know, playing the Easter Bunny. So I asked if my bunny head would ever have to come off. I was told no. So I said, "Okay." Sure enough on the day of the Easter egg rolls Zandi and I went out there in these crazy costumes and stayed out there for four hours. We nearly died of heat exhaustion. But the bottom line is we did the rolling with the kids, we did Willard's weather four times. I never had to take off my hat, never was identified. So I felt pretty good. The next morning on the front page of the style section of the *Washington Post* was a big article on the Easter egg roll and on this new President and the way he ran the Easter egg roll. And in the *Post* article it stated that the Easter Bunny this year was Colonel Charles C. Krulak, United States Marine Corps. Well, I got to work about 6:30. About 6:35 the phone rang. I picked it up and it was General Gray on the other end of the line and he said, "Krulak, I didn't send you over to the White House to be some f---ing Easter Bunny." And then hung up. The bottom line is that story tells the difference between the Presidents.

DR. CRIST: In your papers there is a White House memorandum dated 23 December 1988, on the subject, "Membership of the 'Wise Man Panel.'" What was this panel?²

GEN KRULAK: This memo, dated 23 December 1988, is signed by both Colin Powell and Rhett Dawson; the subject, "Membership of the Wise Man Panel." The Chairmen was Jim Schlesinger with Lou Allen, Bobby Inman, Ed Muskie and Phil O' Deen as members of the Wise Men. The group met first in early to mid-January of 1989. This was a critical, critical panel. Colin Powell was the National Security Advisor. Rhett Dawson was the Deputy to the Chief of Staff of the White House. Schlesinger, Allen, Inman, Muskie and O'Deen were, at the time, some of the most powerful men in our nation. This panel was to review the viability of continuing to have the full range of continuity of the Government projects that existed at that time. As I indicated earlier, it was not just, a mountain that had been hollowed out and made an alternate command post. All around our country, to this day, were locations known only to the President, the National Security Advisor and to the White House Military Office, where people would go in case of a real tragedy. This coordinating group was to determine whether or not the multiple systems that had been established for continuity of the

² White House memorandum, "Membership of the 'Wise Man Panel,'" 23 Dec 1988, Box 83, Krulak papers.

Government were still required because we were spending literally billions of dollars in the continuity of the Government effort. This panel worked for about six months researching to determine whether the requirement for all this still existed and what the future requirements would be. The end result of the Wise Men Panel was a briefing to the President and members of Congress which resulted in a decommission of the multiple layers of continuity of the Government. I was the staff director of this panel and worked very closely with Schlesinger, Allen, Inman, Muskie and O'Deen, Powell and Dawson and all of these people became very dear friends of mine because I spent so much time with them. We would meet in the basement of the White House.

It's interesting that when I was being confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Committee for Commandant I was pulled into a one on one meeting with the staff director of the SASC, a man by the name of Arnold J. Punaro. Arnold ended up being a major general in the Marine Corps Reserve. He asked many questions on this "Wise Men" effort because there were those who disagreed with the requirement to close down some of the continuity of the Government efforts. Mr. Punaro never told me why they disagreed, but they knew I played a major role in it so we're trying to determine where my head was on this whole issue. This was very heady business. You're dealing with leaders in this country of tremendous importance and to serve as a staff director on that panel was a very special time.

DR. CRIST: I guess this was the panel that led to the closing down of the one out in West Virginia, under the hotel which is now a tourist attraction.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The whole issue of continuity of the Government is key to our democratic process. I mean the reality is you see a movie, like "Deep Impact" and you understand that something could happen either from a non-military standpoint like a meteor hitting into the country or a military standpoint that you have to continue to have a government that works so you don't have chaos. Therefore the issue of continuity of the Government is vitally important. I would only say that I think the American people would absolutely be taken aback if they knew the extent to which this country prepares for that kind of tragedy to take place.

DR. CRIST: And it's not only preserving individuals but it's the documents --

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely.

DR. CRIST: Did any of this tie into issues that the Reagan Administration addressed on how the Nation could better survive a nuclear war?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, yes. They had a lot to do with it. They had a lot to do with it. I mean the whole issue of electoral magnetic pulse, of the hardening of communications, all of that leading edge thought and technology was found in the White House Military Office in the White House Communications Agency, WHCA. Today we're just seeing things that we had in WHCA years ago. I mean the whole idea of very small cellular communications instead of carrying around the "brick" you used to see, well, WHCA had digital type communications earlier than most high-tech companies.

DR. CRIST: Well before anybody else?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Well before anybody else. What kept the V-22 alive, was our efforts in the White House Military Office and continuity of Government, the ability to get a plane that could come land on the White House lawn and take off and go fast enough to beat the bursting radius of a Soviet weapon landing with the bulls eye on the Washington Monument. That's a major reason we were able to keep the program alive. The first model of a V-22 was found in the White House Military Office. We sat there and tried to convince people that this was the way to do it. This was the way to evacuate the President and the leadership of the country off of the White House lawn and the Tidal Basin and get them out of bursting radius.

DR. CRIST: Well before anybody thought of Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

GEN KRULAK: Well before that.

DR. CRIST: I would like to just read for the record regarding your fitness report from this tour is the reviewing officer's comments addressed to General Gray. It says and I quote, "Without question Chuck is a superb manager, a very thoughtful and perceptive planner and above all a dynamic and forceful leader. He is an extremely talented individual and it is a pleasure to have him in the White House. I recommend his promotion to brigadier general at the earliest opportunity." The reviewing officer was Ronald Reagan.

DR. CRIST: That brings us to the next thing, your selection of brigadier general which happened while you were working at the White House.

GEN KRULAK: And I kind of told that story.

DR. CRIST: Yes, sir.

GEN KRULAK: I mean I knew I was up for brigadier general, but brigadier general selection is pretty much a crap shoot. I used to tell people that there is a board that will select any colonel to brigadier general. The key is getting that board to meet, getting that special make-up of the board to meet. I was blessed by having this special make-up of the board meet for me and so I was selected to brigadier general. It was very special because of the way I was notified which I told you, and also because on that same list was my dearest friend Tom Draude. It was interesting that when the President came in and announced my selection, Tom was there because he's my dearest friend. The President had given me the list and I saw Tom's name on it. In direct violation of everything, I said, "It was wonderful to be selected for brigadier general in the United States Marine Corps and it was a great honor, but the greatest honor of all was to be selected with my dearest friend, Colonel Tom Draude." His jaw almost fell on the floor because he had been passed over the year before. So he was above zone and he had made it. It was just a very special time.

DR. CRIST: That was in November 1988.

GEN KRULAK: Because of my job, I was gone all the time. I wasn't able to go to the General Officer Selection Orientation Course. I'm probably one of the few generals who never was able to go to that, but there was one event in that week, on the Friday that I just told my boss, "I have got to go to this because it is the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Gray giving his commander's intent to his new breed of generals." and I said, "I must go there. Unless we're at war, unless the President is personally saying I need Chuck Krulak at my side I need to go to this." So we went and it was very good and it lasted for four hours. You know, General Gray can really talk and he was waxing eloquently, but at the end he said, "And now I'm going to hand out your assignments." He went around the room handing out assignments and he got to me and said, "And Chuck, we're going to get some mud on your boots." Those were his exact words, "mud on your boots. You're going to go down and be the Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Marine Division." Well, there was only one ADC slot available and I got it and I was just ecstatic.

At the end when we were leaving he said, "Hey, I want to see you," and so he called me in to his office and he said, "Look, I want you to do something else for me. I want you to establish the 10th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade" and I said, "What is that?" He said, "I want a brigade that is ready to go anywhere, South America, Middle East, anywhere in the world but also a brigade that I can use for experimenting or testing out new thoughts and concepts," and I said, "Fine." So I went down and everybody else, you know, poo-pooed the 10th MEB. But I had received direction from the Commandant himself. Although it never was a standing MEB, it was an organization and we did go to the field and have some major exercises. I was a very happy man . . . as ADC of the 2d Marine Division and CG 10th MEB.

As the ADC of the 2d Division I was united with a good friend and superior leader--General O.K. Steele. He did a tremendous favor for me. He sent me a letter articulating exactly what he expected of me as the Assistant Division Commander, kind of commander's intent. He basically assigned me with the task of improving the quality of the training of the Division. It was wonderful and I spent almost every day as the ADC out in the field with some unit observing training.

DR. CRIST: What were your observations?

GEN KRULAK: Great Division, great leader. General Steele is a magnificent leader and he had great regimental commanders. He had Tim Roberts commanding the 10th Marines; John Ripley had 2d Marines; soon to be General Sutton had the 6th Marines; General Livingston ended up having the 8th Marines. Just a great, great Division.

DR. CRIST: At the time, sir, 8th Marines was the unit designated to do all the Mediterranean deployments. They had four battalions. This was controversial.

GEN KRULAK: I didn't like it. I thought people joined the Marine Corps to be challenged, to have the opportunities to do many things and I felt that assigning specific tasks to specific regiments was not the way to go.

DR. CRIST: As CO of 10th MEB, you participated in Combined Arms Operation 90, CO-90.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I went up against Ray Smith. Ray Smith had a regiment and I had a MEB and it was a fight that literally went from Camp Lejeune up to Fort Pickett. We fought all the way up. I had a motorized mechanized force and Ray was more on foot. He did a heck of a job. Ray was a great field commander and for the first three or four days he kicked our butts. He got us into very close terrain

where our tanks couldn't move, where all of our supporting arms were pretty much negated and just handled us. It was not until the fourth, fifth and sixth days that we started to really to make effective use of our combined arms and do the types of things we should have been doing all along that put him into a trick and finally we beat him. Interestingly, this operation carried over into future thinking about how vulnerable you are in close terrain. It doesn't make any difference how much technology you have, you're vulnerable. This crystallized in my mind the value of close terrain. Also it put me up against probably the best tactical commander in the Marine Corps and taught me that losing isn't fun!

At the end of the exercise we had a day-long critique which was moderated by a man who was an academic who fell in and out of favor with the Marine Corps, Bill Lind. Bill Lind came down and spent several days with us. He conducted a very thorough critique, a battle study, where we went over every decision and it was painful. A lot of people probably had their feelings hurt, but bottom line it was very valuable.

DR. CRIST: What was your opinion of Bill Lind, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I have always had a love/hate relationship with Bill Lind. I think that Bill Lind is extremely valuable to the Marine Corps because he looks critically at what we're doing. The trouble with Bill Lind is he often comes in with a pre-conceived and you can't sway him from that no matter what you do. With Bill Lind, nothing is ever right. I mean there has got to be something right about the Marine Corps but nothing is ever right to him.

DR. CRIST: Moving on, sir, 4 June 1990 you assumed the command of 2d FSSG.

GEN KRULAK: The previous commander was Marty L. Brandtner. Marty Brandtner was a great hero of mine and a great hero of the Marine Corps . . . a recipient of two Navy Crosses. Marty told me that the commander of the 2d FSSG was the best command he ever had. When I got the phone call from General Gray saying, "You're going to go take command of the 2d FSSG." I was concerned because I could hardly spell "logistics." But Marty told me that the people made it easy and he was correct.

I had great commanders. My Chief-of-Staff was a colonel by the name of John Woodhead who was just a brilliant operational logistician. I regret he never made general, but he was tremendous. I had Tom Woodson at 8th Motor Transport, Chuck Skipper as CO of 8th Engineers Support Battalion,

Grant Sparks had Supply Battalion. All were just great, great people. It turned out to be one of the most remarkable jobs I ever had because shortly after assuming command this madman by the name of Saddam Hussein decided to kick up his heels.

DR. CRIST: Being an infantry officer do you think you approached things differently than maybe a logistician commander would have? The reason I ask the question I've heard when Desert Storm came you approached logistics with more of a view of what is the field commander going to need perhaps what would I need if I were in their place?

GEN KRULAK: I think that that's true. I tried very hard to understand logistics, but understand them in the context of the maneuver battalion. And so, yes, I would imagine that that's an accurate statement.

Basically when I assumed command, got all my staff together and laid out what I expected of them, and basically said to them. One, don't be afraid to take chances; two, don't be afraid to fail; three, I don't like surprises. The idea that unlike wine, bad news doesn't get any better with age; four, I will not tolerate any kind of moral turpitude on or off the job. Finally I alerted them that I'd be out and about, hands-on, what I called "kicking boxes". I don't think there's a system in the FSSG today that I have not driven, whether it's a road grader, a bulldozer, forklift, backhoe, or a truck. You name it, I've driven it.

DR. CRIST: Yea, and again that's in keeping with the, something that you would really do as Commandant which is this idea of laying out your plan, and no doubt on where you stand on issues.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Absolutely.

SESSION VII

Desert Storm

7th MEB, deployment and employment problems . . . The lack of Command, Control and Communications in 1st FSSG . . . Gen Gray's desire to keep "light" . . . Merging two FSSGs . . . Formation of the Direct Support and General Support Commands. . . . Establishment of Kibrit . . . Saudi Motors . . . Beginning of the Air War . . . Battle of Khafji and the threat the Kibrit . . . Changing the plan to a two division breach . . . The building of Khanjar and the Khanjar Expressway . . . A flood of prisoners . . . Leading from the front . . . Establishment of the transfer point at Al Jaber . . . The Marine Corps "shame" . . . Reconstituting the MPF . . . Observations about the Reserves . . . Commander, Marine Forces Southwest Asia . . . Origin of the Marine Logistics Command.

DR CRIST: The date is 17 October, 2000, the place is General Krulak's office in Wilmington, Delaware. Just a little over, almost two months after you'd assumed command of the FSSG, the Iraqis invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The first unit sent was one you certainly were familiar with, the Seventh Marine Brigade out of Camp Pendleton and their support from BSSG 7. What do you recall about the Iraqi invasion and the first month or so following? The first Marines out of the 2d Division, was 4th MEB which were actually supposed to go to Norway.

GEN KRULAK: When the 4th MEB went and then 1 MEF and 1st FSSG was tapped, we were in a backup role and did very little. I watched that with an aching heart because, I wanted to go, my unit wanted to go. All Marines wanted to go. And so we watched 1 MEF go and wished them well, we love them to death but we also wished we were there with them.

An incident took place early on in Desert Storm that had a major impact on force structure and decisions that General Mundy and, then I made. This related to the MEB concept. When 4th MEB got to Saudi Arabia, one of the first things the MEB Commander did was call back to the 1 MEF Commander and ask for all the command, control and communications capability from the 1st Marine Division. The reality was that the MEB was a deployment organization, not an employment organization. The MEB could deploy but it couldn't fight because it didn't have the staff nor the command, control and communications capability to

run a fight. Then Brigadier General Myatt was the division commander. He replied that providing the Division's C3 made no sense at all. If you need all that, then bring the Division over. There was a big discussion early on in the conflict about who was going to go and who wasn't. But the right decision was made and the 1st Division went over. But it certainly proved what, to this day: Having MEBs make us feel good as a Marine Corps, but it is smoke and mirrors. It is intellectual dishonesty because a MEB can only deploy. The way it's configured today, it's not an employment capability.

You were correct, the first Camp Lejeune Marines to head to SWA was the 4th Brigade. They were on their way to Norway. We got word that they weren't going to Norway, they were going to Southwest Asia. They were all packed and ready to go with their camouflage gear, their vehicles all cold weather treated, everybody was focused on, heavy sleeping bags, Mickey Mouse boots, skis, etc. and 96 hours later they were on their way to Southwest Asia. The CO was Col James J. Doyle, Jr. and he did a magnificent job of getting his people ready to go. He was BSSG-4's commander, and I can't say enough about him. I mean he did a great job. We had to bring all the division's gear, everything back, repack it for the desert and reissue them with desert gear. Additionally, we had to get the air wing ready to go. Overall, it was a massive effort.

DR CRIST: General Brabham was the Commanding General, 1st FSSG, arrived in Saudi Arabia. However, upon arriving one of his first

tasks was actually to establish a MarCent Headquarters for which he was well qualified having been the Deputy J-4 at CentCom in '87- '88' timeframe. Did you have indication that as he was now being pulled away from logistics to do some other things that this might impact on 2d FSSG?

GEN KRULAK: No. Let me first say Jim Brabham is a great Marine officer and a great logistician and I have nothing but the highest regard for him. When I was the Commandant I asked him, upon his retirement, to be part of the MAGTF staff training organization. He's just a great man. General Boomer made an excellent decision when he told Brabham to get over there quickly and put his flag in the ground as MarCent Headquarters. This was brilliant because he put his flag in the ground at the Port of al-Jubayl, which locked that great port facility for the Marine Corps. It was the absolute best move that Boomer could have made and most people don't recognize that.

DR. CRIST: During the Fall of 1990, you conducted a number of exercises in CONUS based upon conversations you were having with General Brabham. One of the key things you saw was the limited Command and Control assets in 1st FSSG at the time. What do recall about those exercises'?

GEN KRULAK: Well basically most people understood if the war didn't break out over a period of time that there would be a relief in place with II MEF forces taking over from I MEF forces. Because of that, I began to dialogue with Jim Brabham and asked him for the location of all of his forces on a template. I took that template and laid it over North Carolina and Southern Virginia and ran exercises at those distances. It became very obvious that if we just went with the capability that Jim Brabham had, there was no way we could go to war and cover the distances required. Jim could do what he was doing in the defensive but there was no way he could operate in the offensive. He didn't have his headquarters and he didn't have any of his Battalion headquarters with him. He had a mismatch, an amalgamation of forces but they weren't there with a controlling headquarters nor the command and control that comes with the such a headquarters.

As we ran these exercises I became more and more concerned and I started to raise that concern with anybody that would hear me. The problem was that General Gray used 1st FSSG as his example of the way to do it. They went light; they deployed and got there quickly. He was concerned that often

units were too worried about command, control, radios, people, and staff. That they were too heavy, too much head and not enough tail. And so everybody was reluctant to tell General Gray, that it's all well and good to go in "light," but the reality is that you need some "weight" to be effective. I started to tell people that. I told my boss, General Mundy. I told General [Robert J.] Winglass. He came down to visit me at my headquarters and I can remember sitting on two rickety chairs in a hallway and just saying, "Sir, I've got to tell you the truth. I've got to tell you what all of my exercises are telling me. I applaud Jim Brabham . . . but he's got a defensive organization. If we have to go on the offensive he's going to be in real trouble and you need to understand that and you need to take the message back to the Commandant."

DR. CRIST: The original concept before the decision was made by the President to take an offensive posture, was the 2d Division, 2d FSSG would deploy, was a rotation . . .

GEN KRULAK: That's correct.

DR. CRIST: Which you would replace 1st FSSG. In early November, in your conversation with General Winglass, he seemed concern for the ceiling of forces imposed by CinCCent?

GEN KRULAK: I think the ceiling in the forces was an issue, but also the belief that General Gray continued to stroke General Brabham to keep his numbers down, that was really the way to do it. And General Gray was right at that time, but the reality was, if you went on the offensive he would have been wrong.

DR. CRIST: The whole issue about the replacement was rendered null and void with the decision to reinforce the Gulf. On 5 November 1990, you sent a message, which had been drafted by Colonel Woodhead, to General Brabham outlining the options for integrating 1st and 2d FSSG which you would later state, and I quote, "The most important thing that transpired was how do you get these two FSSGs to fight as one?" In this letter you recommended the formation of a direct support and general support FSSG concept. How did this decision come about? I find this one of the most fascinating aspects to Desert Storm.

GEN KRULAK: Well I had a brilliant Chief of Staff. You can be mediocre, but if you surround yourself with brilliant people things come out well

and my Chief of Staff was brilliant. His name was John Woodhead. We sat down together and talked through the various ways to structure the command relationship and he came up with the three ways we mentioned in the message. We sent it to all concerned and then I got on the phone with Jim Brabham and I said, "I really think this is the way to go." Then I added that I had no preconceived notion of which FSSG would do which mission I told Jim that he had been there the longest, "pick which one you want to do." Jim did the right thing. He said he would take the general support command. He was already in the port, he knew the port, he knew the people. He knew my expertise was infantry and that my knowledge would probably make me better suited to supporting the two divisions as they attacked forward. So we didn't talk long about it. We just thought that this made good sense. Then it was just matter of selling it to our bosses, selling to General Gray, selling it to General Boomer.

DR. CRIST: The general support command providing the general logistics, port management, that thing . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes. They took care of the supply and maintenance. I took care of Engineer Support Battalion, the Motor Transport Battalion, the Landing Support Battalion, all of the people that were going to support the forces up forward would go with me.

DR CRIST: Was this doctrinal?

GEN KRULAK: No, this was, again out of the mind of John Woodhead. And then once John had roughed it out, Jim Brabham and I said here's whose going to go with whom. It was very interesting because initially Brabham had more people. Then as we got closer to the war the size of the direct support command doubled. And then after the war our size was reduced to its original size. It was just a good relationship. Jim was the senior logistician in country and I had no problem with that. He had no problem with that. Although we were both one-stars I knew how to salute if we ever had a real difference of opinion. If we ever had a difference of opinion, I wouldn't have gone to General Boomer. If we couldn't have worked it out amongst ourselves shame on us. As it turned out we didn't have any differences of opinion and we got along very well. We're dear friends to this day.

DR CRIST: Just as an aside was there any discussion during this period about deploying II

MEF and essentially having two MEFs in theater with the two FSSGs supporting their respective MEF?

GEN KRULAK: At the very highest levels, obviously that's what General Mundy would have liked to have done, but it didn't happen and wasn't going to happen. The key was you needed a FSSG to run the ports and the general logistics and a FSSG to do the direct support function.

DR CRIST: You mentioned the need to sell it to your higher-ups, Generals Gray, Mundy and Boomer. You had an interesting meeting with the Commandant on this issue in the VIP Lounge at Andrew's Air Force Base around Thanksgiving. What do you recall about that meeting?

GEN KRULAK: Well I was on the plane ready to go on a liaison trip to Saudi Arabia and I got the word that General Gray was in the VIP Lounge and wanted to talk to me. I went into the VIP Lounge and Gen Gray was in civilian cloths wearing some kind of a baseball jacket. He was there with General Winglass. I figured this was my one opportunity and I sat down with the Commandant and I said, "Sir, this is what we need to do. We need to go with the direct support command and the general support command. We need to get the battalion headquarters over there. I understand your concerns but we need to get the C3 over there." When I walked away he said, "Fine, tell General Boomer we're going to do it that way." I went to General Boomer and of course General Boomer had already decided we were going to do it that way. His only issue was he wanted one senior logistician in country. I told General Boomer I had absolutely no problem with that.

DR CRIST: Right. Later on, particularly as the war came closer, did it cause some problems because the MEF had to talk through 1st FSSG, from Brabham's headquarters, to get to you their direct support logistics?

GEN KRULAK: That was fixed very quickly by having me added as an addressee on all message traffic. It wasn't just problems with 1st FSSG, it was problems with understanding what the divisions were doing and what the wing was doing. But it was not a problem with Jim Brabham turning around and keeping me informed. It was a problem of the speed of which events moved and when every second was valuable. But I mean it was not a big deal.

DR CRIST: I assume Gen Boomer's concerns about the merger to the two FSSGs was that he wanted to preserve unity of command with his logistics?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's exactly right. I think he wanted to be able to pin the responsibility on one person and that person was, the senior officer. In the case of Jim Brabham; he was two or three numbers senior to me. Also, he was obviously comfortable with Jim because Jim fought in his MEF. But it was never an issue with me and certainly not an issue with Jim Brabham.

DR CRIST: On 30 November, sir, you briefed General Mundy on your view of what I MEF's logistics.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. But it was not a brief on what I MEF was doing logistically. It was as a result of my trip to SWA where I went over to talk about logistics, but had the opportunity to take a look at the entire MEF. I went all over the MEF not just in Saudi Arabia, but in other countries as well. I took a look at how the FSSG was set up to support the MEF. I was able to make some observations on what I thought were the preparations for combat of the I Marine Expeditionary Force. When I came back, I made some notes to myself and then called General Mundy on the phone and provided him my quick look. I talked about the moral of the troops, the eagerness for the arrival of II MEF forces. General Boomer was obviously saying that he was going to do everything to make the integration of the two MEFs a success. He had told all of his people to pull out all the stops to make it a success. I remarked on the tremendous training that was taking place both at the GCE and the ACE level, but also indicated that I was a little bit concerned regarding the equipment and how much maintenance was being done. I did not want to run the MPF equipment into the ground before we even started the fight. Because, remember, you only had parts of the 1st FSSG there, so that the maintenance capability was not that great. They were breaking gear and not able to get it repaired. I was very honest about problem areas I saw. Again, it was one man's opinion, but it was based on my years of experience as a Marine officer.

Additionally, I said that the I MEF staff was too small to be involved in 24 hour a day, seven days a week operations in combat. They were just too small. It had weakness at key points. Here I was not talking about weakness in numbers, but

weakness in personalities. There was an obvious friction between the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the 1st Marine Division and the MEF--friction between the "MEF-sters" and the "MEB-sters." Because of the lack of numbers on the staffs they weren't able to keep a focus on the issues. They had built a large number of camps and a large amount of infrastructure. Many little commands had their own camps that they had built and needed an infrastructure and people to run the camps. As a result, they were slowly but surely draining the manpower by having these far flung semi-autonomous organizations. I was very concerned about the air wing. Anybody who looked at their facilities and then thought back to the days of Pearl Harbor would have shuddered because there were no revetments for the aircraft, no revetments for ordnance, fuel farms were outside the perimeter, just basic security issues that I think needed to be taken care of. I was concerned about the maneuver battalions and where they could train. I mentioned the engineer equipment needed for breaching and how much of an effort that was going to be and how I think they really needed to start concentrating on that

Finally, I went back to the whole issue of what an FSSG is supposed to do. There was lack of spare parts, lack of battalion supply, no SASSY Management Unit, nobody knew where the gear was. There was no way to track it because the SMU wasn't in country. Essentially, the Marines had been over there for months and nothing had taken place in those areas. The rationale for not taking place was what I articulated earlier. General Gray kept on saying what a great thing it was to have such a small footprint with the 1st FSSG. What wasn't realized was that the price paid for that small footprint was lack of command and control and lack of basic capabilities that an FSSG should have, ie. maintenance and a SASSY Management Unit

Well, I gave this all to General Mundy and the next thing I know he called me back and said. "Call General Gray." So I called General Gray and told him the same thing. He had a sense for it, I think and he thanked me and then within the next month or two he went over there to take a look for himself.

DR. CRIST: He came to the same conclusions?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR CRIST: By this time or shortly thereafter, the decision was made that it wouldn't be a one for one

swap with 2d FSSG replacing 1st FSSG. I assume with the development of a General Support Command/Direct Support Command, you went in with General Brabham with the intention that you wouldn't have penny packets of 7th MEB here, 1 MEF there, the division here. You would start the unity of the logistics effort?

GEN KRULAK: And that's what we did. We sat down around a table. Our staffs would come up with their recommendations and then Jim and I would agree or disagree on the organization of our two commands. There was absolutely no rancor. I cannot think of one thing that we did not agree on. To us, we were down at the tactical/operational level of war. We knew what we had to do. We knew I was going to be supporting the maneuver battalions. We knew that Jim was going to be providing the general support. And once we came to a meeting of the minds on how we were going to do it, then the allocation of forces was very simple and it flowed. During the time of buildup to the actual conflict, 1st FSSG had the majority of the people because they needed the trucks to move people forward. When it came time to execute, all of those assets came to me and remained with me until we started back-loading and then they went back to the General Support Command. I'm sure that people would imagine there were some personality conflicts, but they were very, very minimal and the reality was that what had happened with the 7th MEB and the hard feelings that were between 7th MEB and 1 MEF had so ingrained itself into the minds of Jim Brabham and Chuck Krulak that we were determined not to repeat that and worked hard to insure an excellent working relationship.

DR CRIST: I noticed in some of the message traffic there was a lot of concern by Colonel Woodhead and others of taking units out of their historical parent and merging them with different units, but from what I could tell that was never a problem.

GEN KRULAK: That's because one of the real key issues was who would command these multiple battalion size units. Who would command 8th Engineer Support Battalion when 8th Engineer Support Battalion had 7th and 6th Engineers integrated? So we took some of the commanders who were from 1 MEF, some from 11 MEF, some were Reserves and we spread out the opportunities for command and we spread out the missions. So that there was no sense that either 1st or 2nd FSSG was predominant in any role. We had good people,

put those good people in critical jobs and then let them work it out. Plus from my standpoint, and I think Jim did the same thing, we went out of our way to make sure that they understood we were home to them, that we didn't want to take their identity and they carried their identity with them. However, the bottom line was they were Direct Support Command and early on they realized that they we're going to be the ones that were going to be up front. We were going to be the warriors of the FSSGs and so they took a lot of pride in it. And what happened was when we did, in fact, go in front of the two divisions, when we went to Kibrit, it was the FSSGs one hundred kilometers in front of any "war fighter." A great deal of pride was derived from that. When we looked to our front the only people who were in front of us were a screen of troops from Qatar and the Iraqi army. So I mean the Direct Support Command was the point for the MEF for a long period of time.

DR CRIST: Well, that is symbolic of some of the comments you made after the war that this was really a war of logistics.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Who won logistics, won the war.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I have said that ten years after the war people would look at it for lessons learned from logistics not from the ground combat or the ACE side.

DR. CRIST: When you arrived permanently in Saudi Arabia, what was your impression of the degree of planning for the ground war and the logistics situation that you would be faced with? Were you fairly well satisfied with the way things were going so far?

GEN KRULAK: Well, the reality was that from the FSSG standpoint, they hadn't done much for an offensive at all. They were in pretty much permanent locations and so we had a lot of planning to do as we went into the offensive. More importantly the MEF hadn't decided how they were going to fight and that was after months of ongoing tabletop exercises, debates and arguments.

DR CRIST: What was your opinion of the original plan that one division would go in followed by a second division through the same breach?

GEN KRULAK: It had the potential of being a

disaster. You would have had one division opening the hole and holding the flanks while the other division passed through. You can imagine 60,000 troops, all in one location? What a target! There was grave concern that this was not the way to do it.

DR. CRIST: I had read that one of the things driving the two divisions through the same breach was the shortage of engineering mine clearing equipment. Is that true, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes There was not enough mine breaching equipment to outfit two divisions. So efforts at Quantico resulted in fast-forwarding a lot of mine clearing equipment out to the MEF. Other efforts were under taken such as building armored bulldozers that were made out of makeshift armor-plating in order to give the capability to go through the mine fields with the drivers protected.

DR. CRIST: From your point and the logistics aspect of it, could you have supported two divisions simultaneously or it really didn't matter to you, whichever way they wanted to go you could support it?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Whichever way they wanted to go. We were going to put a transfer point up along the Kuwaiti border about 30 kilometers north of Kibrit and we had already scouted it out and we had already determined how it was going to work. It probably would have been a lot simpler than what we ended up doing because you would have had about a day to a day and a half of supplies at the transfer point. Then you would have Kibrit with seven days of supply and then the rest of the supplies at the port of Mishab. So you would have had a very short distance to funnel this gear. Literally the funnel would be from Mishab to Kibrit to the transfer point up along the border. As it turned out, because we went to Khanjar, we had to move 14 days of supply at that location and then built the transfer point in Kuwait. We had to wait until we invaded Kuwait to start moving a transfer point up into that country. So it was much more difficult the way we went.

DR CRIST: At your level, were you aware about the disagreement between General Neal and General Boomer over--General Boomer who was the Marine Component Commander and also the MEF Commander--being forward deployed and not back in Riyadh? General Neal feeling that there needed to be a Marine there for planning and

representation at the CinC's staff. Did you have an opinion on that either at the time or later, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I think that at the time I was far more concerned with my mission as a Direct Support Commander and getting prepared than I was trying to figure out whether Walt Boomer was in the right location or not. In hindsight, I believe that we probably needed somebody at the table. Whether it was Walt Boomer, I'm not sure. I think that in many ways the Marine Corps was looked at as an afterthought, a supporting attack. We probably could have been helped by having somebody permanently in Riyadh. We didn't. The bottom line it didn't change the war. It didn't change the results. But, as an example, it would have given us more warning when we lost the British Desert Rats and got the Tiger Brigade. That was kind of a fait accompli. You've lost the Desert Rats. General Boomer got into a debate but after the fact instead of being part of the decision making process. But again, you had Marines on the CentCom staff and you certainly had Butch Neal there. Walt Boomer could get on a helicopter or get on a plane and go to Riyadh very fast if need be. And I think he tried to do that It's just very tough to be the operational commander and a component commander at the same time.

DR CRIST: You had mentioned the British Armor Brigade that was assigned to the Marine sector initially. From the Direct Support logistics side did you have responsibility for them?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We would have helped with their logistics too. We lost them early enough so that most of my planning was done with the Tiger Brigade and one of the beauties of the Tiger Brigade is it came with a lot of gear that helped us. I mean refuelers, weapons carriers, you name it. So there is no question that the Army has a lot of gear and that a lot of support is inherent in their organizations, but it's heavy, it's very heavy.

DR CRIST: Did you have any difficulties merging your logistics efforts with the Tiger Brigade's?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR CRIST: What about the selection of Ras al Mishab as a port facility? That was primarily your major port facility. Correct?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Once the decision was made to move the Direct Support Command north, and

once we realized that we were going to need to be extremely flexible to meet the various offensive options being considered, the location of Ras al Mishab became key.

The real gutsball play was the move to Kibrit. In early December, both the 1st and 2d Divisions, were still located very close to the port of Jubayl. General Boomer called me in and said, "We need to think about logistic support for our forces going through this single breach." I replied that we were going to need to find a support base. We took about six people and two vehicles and just drove up the road to Ras al Mishab. We took a left at the port and just started crossing the desert. We knew there was a little place called Kibrit, which looked like an abandoned airfield and an old oil site, and we thought it would be a good support base. So we went to where we thought Kibrit was supposed to be--understanding that you're in the desert and there are no landmarks at all. We got to where we thought it should be and there were no roads or anything. We went up on a little hill mass and looked over the hill and you could see just a faint outline of an airstrip and what looked like three wells. They turned out to be water wells. I went back and told General Boomer that we found a site and he said, "Okay. We're going to start moving our support base up there." I said, "Whoa!" Because there were no US troops along the boarder, only some Qatar forces. Gen Boomer said he was willing to take the chance and he told me to move to Kibrit. We started moving gear up using our own trucks and an outfit called Saudi Motors. We brought it from Jubayl to Mishab and then from Mishab almost forty kilometers to Kibrit. Then we put one or two ships along the pier at Mishab, offloaded ammunition and by early January we had seven days of supply located at Kibrit.

DR CRIST: And the plan was to get 15 days worth of supplies there. Correct?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It was monstrous. Kibrit was spread over 40 square kilometers, had a 73-cell ammunition supply point. We improved a 3000 foot airstrip, put in a 18 million gallon fuel dump on the ground, a half million gallons of water, two field hospitals, just a massive effort with everybody thinking this was where the attack was going to originate from.

DR CRIST: The thing that astounds me was the amount of gear it took to move. I mean somewhere there was a 12 or so lane improvised highway made just by transporting . . .

GEN KRULAK: By transporting. The highway looked like three or four interstates with people moving constantly up and down there. Because we were in front of our friendly troops, not just in front of them by a little bit, but in front of them by a lot, every single position was dug in and bermed, every single one. Every tent where people lived was dug in and bermed. The command post was dug in, bermed and given overhead cover so that from the air or from an other observation, it was impossible to see the CP. The CP was entirely underground. The construction of Kibrit was a massive effort and a testament to the work ethic of our Marines.

DR CRIST: Early on you took advantage of Seabees which you believed had been underutilized?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR CRIST: And you pulled them in into the DSC?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. They all became part of the family and they helped with road construction. By using them to do road construction, I was able to use all of our dozers to dig in the fuel cells, dig in the ammo storage areas and dig in the troops.

DR CRIST: Was it all powered off generators or did you run electricity out there?

GEN KRULAK: No. It was all generators. Remember, Kibrit was literally in the middle of the desert. I was literally in no man's land.

DR CRIST: Who actually laid it out, sir, decided the fuel is going over here, command post is going here?

GEN KRULAK: For Kibrit it was done by three people, Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Skipper who was the CO of 8th Engineer Support Battalion, by Colonel John Woodhead, Chief of Staff of the DSC, and by Brigadier General Chuck Krulak. We literally sat in a tent and did it. Forty square kilometers is an awful big area. Nothing like that had ever been built before.

DR CRIST: You mentioned the Saudi Motors. This was a hodge-podge of vehicles which you contracted from the Saudi government?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I wish I could take credit for it, but it was Jim Brabham. We were short of the

vehicles needed to do the time/distance effort that we needed to do, and so Jim went to various contractors and contracted Mercedes trucks and heavy haulers. At one time, we had over 1000 trucks using Pakistani and third world nationals who drove the trucks. Although they were paid, we would augment their pay with C rations and video games and video TV movies running off of little VHS players powered by cigarette lighters in the cabs of their trucks. It was a ragtag group. You'd start a convoy of 100 trucks going up the road and if you got 80 of them through you were really doing well. They'd stop and sleep for a day. I'm sure some of them just drove off into the desert and kept the gear that was on the vehicles.

DR. CRIST: How long did it take to drive from say Ras al Mishab out to Kibrit, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Three hours by LVS; Saudi Motors took forever. I mean those trucks went about 30 kilometers an hour, but once they turned on to that desert, it was slow going.

DR CRIST: You organized underneath you two direct support groups?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR CRIST: DSG-1 commanded by Colonel Alexander W Powell.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR CRIST: Which supported the 1st Division, and Direct Support Group 2, commanded by Colonel Thomas B Donnely Jr., supported 2d Division. What do you recall about the formation of these two commands?

GEN KRULAK: Well, I wanted each one of them to fit the comfort level of the command they would support. Alex Powell had developed a great relationship with Mike Myatt. Mike wanted one big command that had all the gear needed within that command to do what had to be done, a little bit more cumbersome, not as agile, but if they needed something they knew exactly where to go. Because Bill Keys had the largest mechanized force in the history of the Marine Corps, he wanted people who could move with him. He wanted mobile CSSDs and so DSG-2 went with the mobile CSSD concept. These mobile CSSDs used transfer points and support from the main DSC location.

DR CRIST: And each one would have been tailored based upon the division's assets?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: None of this was doctrinal?

GEN KRULAK: No. None of it was in a manual and so it was all done on the fly. One of the positive of having an infantry background was that I continuously kept in my mind some very simple "infantryman's" questions. "What will Bill Keys need? What will those regimental commanders need?" What will the battalion commanders need?" We tried to give it to them.

DR CRIST: On 17 January Operation Desert Storm begins, the air war portion of it. What do you recall about the beginning of the air war, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, I knew when it was going to happen but my troops didn't. So on the day that it was going to take place, I put them in bunkers and said, "Keep your heads down." It was almost anticlimactic because that first day they did a lot of deep strikes and so we didn't hear anything. The only thing that was of concern was the sense that we were going to hit them and if they were going to respond with chemical or biological agents, now would be the time. Sure enough, about 2:00 in the morning, I had finally hit the rack and had been asleep for about 30 minutes when our early detection siren started going off which meant getting into MOPP-4. That was a scary moment. You get up out of your rack. You've been asleep for 30 minutes and you know that the siren means you're being gassed. You hold your breath and try to put on your entire MOPP suit. It was just unbelievable. It turned out to be a false alarm. But I'll tell you everybody in Kibrit was in MOPP-4. I rushed to the CP and everybody was in the CP was in MOPP-4 and we stayed that way for several hours. Finally, we saw a little dog that was kind of a unit pet, and that dog just kept on running around. A young Marine remarked that if that dog could make it, we can sure make it. It turned out to be a false alarm.

DR CRIST: I also wanted to ask how far you were from any Iraqi forces, sir, in Kibrit?

GEN KRULAK: Well, we were about 30 kilometers from the border and they were across the border by about 2 kilometers.

DR. CRIST: So they were right there?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. They were right there. They were a lot closer than the friendly forces. I'll tell you that.

DR. CRIST: That begs my next question, sir. It must have been on your mind when that air was started that, "Okay, we're going to hit them. If they come south in retaliation . . ."

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Well, you know, we had our troops. I knew we had to protect was the ammo depot. If the ammo was destroyed, it would have really set us back. All the rest you could move. Ammo is very hard to move and so we put all of our FSSG security around the ammo depot and just held on.

DR. CRIST: Including women too?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Absolutely. Let me just add something about General Gray's comments on no women in the Gulf. When I was preparing to go, General Gray had an edict out saying there would be no women going over. I called General Mundy and I said, "There is absolutely no way I can go to the desert without my women. They are an integral part of the 2d FSSG. They are interspersed throughout. I've got to take them if I'm going to be effective." General Mundy went up to General Gray and said, "Here's what my commander is telling me and I support him." So General Gray lifted the ban on women in combat for the FSSGs and I took 201 women over there, to include my G-2 and my G-1. The women Marines did a super job.

DR. CRIST: Did you have a problem with women not being able to make the deployment or coming back early?

GEN KRULAK: I took 201 with me. We were the last Marines back to the US, we came back in July of 1991. We took 201 over and 201 returned. I did not have a single woman go back home for any reason. The first Marine awarded a decoration by the MEF Commander for actions during Desert Storm was to a woman Marine. She was a lance corporal from the Direct Support Command who drove a truck through the mine fields five times bringing enemy prisoners of war out of the front lines. She was going through the minefields before some of the assault division got through. The women did a great job. We had no pregnancies or anything like that. They pulled their weight and

performed magnificently.

DR. CRIST: Yes. This is an aside, in your personal papers collection shortly after Desert Storm you wrote essentially arguing the Marine Corps needed to really rethink the issue of women in the military.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. They just did a phenomenal job. I'm not for putting them on point. I'm not for a direct combat role, but I mean the reality of life is a large part of our Corps, a significant part of the Corps, are women and we need to understand that and be prepared to do what has to be done to accommodate their capabilities.

DR. CRIST: 29 January 1991, the Iraqi army conducted a three prong attack which became known as Battle of Kafji.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Two of these prongs went to the west and one actually appeared to be aimed straight at your facility at Kibrit.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What do you recall about this attack?

GEN KRULAK: Well, to this day I believe that one of their thoughts was to hit Kibrit. I mean Kafji is important, but Kibrit was the crown jewel. You knock out Kibrit you have stopped the capability of the Marines to move forward.

DR. CRIST: Did you have a sense, sir, that they had an idea that you were there?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, absolutely. They couldn't have missed us. By then you've got an eight lane highway leading to Kibrit. I mean there was no question. It was like a big arrow.

When they started breaking through there was a prisoner of war camp that had been established a little bit to the east of us and there was an organization out there from 1st FSSG. Well, they started sounding the alarm. They heard things coming. I got on the phone and got a hold of my good friend, Bill Keys, who by that time had come up a little bit closer to us and I said, "Bill, we got something out in front and we need some help." We were hearing that it was armor coming. He dispatched a tank unit that swept right across the front of Kibrit. Although they did not engage the enemy, they certainly would have helped if we had

had any real problems. The issue was serious enough that the Marines at the prisoner of war compound, actually evacuated back into my area and evacuated so fast that they piled all their weapons into one pile and blew them all up! When people say it was nothing, once again, you had to have been there before you start saying it was nothing. People were very concerned. We were out there. We had no real anti-tank capability. This 1st FSSG outfit knew they were in trouble. They had too much gear to carry so they blew it up and came on in through our lines at 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning.

DR CRIST: Yes, I had heard you were not too pleased with that commander, though.

GEN KRULAK: No I was not, but again, never shoot on another man's target.

DR CRIST: Yes, sir. Was that the first night you met a then major by the name of Paul McHale?

GEN KRULAK: I don't recall when I met Paul McHale, but it turns out he was very important to us because he provided security to our DSC. Later on, he became a congressman and was very close to me during my time as Commandant and was a tremendous help both to me and to General Mundy.

DR CRIST: On 4 February you happened to stop by the 2d Division CP where you found General Boomer and he was discussing a possible change to the plan to two simultaneous division assaults. What do you recall about this meeting, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I had been down visiting one of my mobile CSSDs. By then, the 2d Division had moved up. Still we were well in front of them. It took me an hour to get to their location. I had driven down to see one of our CSSDs. As I was driving back, I thought I'd swing by to see my friend Bill Keys. As you recall, I was his ADC for a period of time. When I got to his CP, I saw a helicopter on the pad. It turned out to be General Boomer. I walked into the tent where General Boomer, his G-3 Colonel Billy C. Steed, and General Keys were leaning over a map. As I walked in General Boomer looked up and he said, "What do you think about a two division attack versus the one division?" I said, "I think it's absolutely the right thing to do." I, along with Bill Keys, Mike Myatt and other generals, had been thinking about this for a long time. We discussed it, but this was the first time that I had an opportunity to discuss this option with the MEF Commander.

So I said, "It makes all the sense in the world and here's why . . ." and I went through all the rationale of how dangerous that one division breach was going to be. He then said, "Okay. What about it taking place here?" And he pointed at a location 120 kilometers around on the western side of Kuwait. I said, "Well, I think that will be good." And he says, "Can you support that?" I looked at it and it was just one of those times where you just kind of hearken back to General Shepherd who was asked, "How long would it take for you to put a brigade of Marines and accompanying air forces at San Diego in order to go to the Pusan perimeter?" Without even asking anybody he said, "24 hours." Well, this was a similar kind of the thing I was asked by the commander, "Can you do it?" And the answer was "Yes." He went back and all of his logisticians said there is no way we were going to be able to do it. There was no way we could move 120 kilometers, move seven days to ten days of supply and then add four more days on it and build another Kibrit, no way. I went back to see the MEF G-4, and I said, "Don't shoot on my target. If we say we can do it, we can do it." I then got hold of Jim Brabham and said, "We're going to need everything you got. Forget about keeping LVSs to yourself, forget about Saudi Motors. They all have got to come directly under my control." And Jim said, "Absolutely."

So I went back to my CP and I talked to my people and said, "Okay. Here's what we're thinking of doing." We did a recon of where this new support base might be located. We narrowed it down to two locations one of them was a place called Al Quarrah and another one was much farther to the northwest, called the Gravel Plains. Al Quarrah would have been a good place to go because we had already started to build a simulated logistic support base there in order to be part of the deception plan being put together by Tom Draude. It would have been an easy place to go, but the problem with Al Quarrah was that it wasn't far enough to the northwest. So we sent out a recon team to the Gravel Plains. By this time, I had been given another colonel who turned out to be very key to the Direct Support Command and to the war effort. This colonel was a "loner" from 11 MEF Headquarters. General Mundy sent him over and his name was Gary S. McKissock. He, along with Chuck Skipper, went out to look at the Gravel Plain. They came back from this reconnaissance and said, "If we really want to do this right, we ought to go to the Gravel Plain. It's the best support location, it is the right distance from the border, and there is enough area to spread out. The only problem is there is no water there, but we can start

drilling if we get going soon enough." I asked, "How long would it take you to build this base?" And they replied about ten days.

I knew we had a meeting down at the MEF CP and so prior to that meeting, I had all of the lowboys lined up along the desert road, and I had all the bulldozers and other supplies needed to build the CSA loaded on the trucks. I went down to the meeting where we discussed a lot of things. The meeting went on all morning just discussing little bits and pieces of preparations to go to war. Bill Keys was there and Mike Myatt and Jim Brabham and all the staffs were there. I'm sitting there with all of these trucks and everything ready to go but no decision was made about the two-division breach. We talked around it, but no decision was made. So when we broke at noontime, I was very frustrated. General Boomer was walking out of the tent and I got in front of him and I said, "Sir, I've got to know what you want to do. I've got Marines and trucks and everything ready to go, but I need to know whether or not you're going to do the two division breach because if you are going to do it, I need to start moving people and every minute counts. Forget about every hour, every minute counts." He said, "Chuck, we're going to do the two division breach. Move them to the Gravel Plain." My aide was sitting outside the tent. He was in radio contact with Gary McKissock and I gave him the thumbs up and he set in motion, with that one radio call, this entire massive effort that resulted in us moving from Kibrit to Khanjar, which was the name given to the Gravel Plains. It stands for the small dagger that each Saudi boy receives when he becomes a "man." The person who spearheaded that whole effort was then Colonel Gary McKissock now Lieutenant General Gary McKissock.

Who set up Khanjar, how it was set up, where things were placed, all was done by Gary McKissock. He first did the plan on butcher paper. I eventually got that butcher paper framed for him and gave it to him with deep appreciation for the magnificent job he did. If you looked at a satellite photo of Khanjar, you could see the layout that Gary had put together. When you look at Kibrit and how massive Kibrit was and then compare it to Khanjar, Khanjar was far bigger. Khanjar had a field hospital with 14 operating rooms. It was the third largest hospital in the Navy hospital system, Bethesda, San Diego, Khanjar. It had an airstrip. The forward ammunition supply point itself covered almost 800 acres. Now, think about that. That's just the ammo dump. The entire complex was over 11,000 acres. It was monstrous and when General Boomer came up to see it he said it was the

most remarkable effort of the entire war. Khanjar had "Lonesome Dove" on one flank. It had a big C-130 capable airstrip that we built. It was not like Kibrit where you had one already there. We had to build this thing. It was a miracle that our troops were able to do it. Our LVs, our dump trucks, our bulldozers, you name it, ran 24 hours a day seven days a week. We just shifted the people, but we never turned the engines off. It was amazing. When I was CG of Marine Forces Pacific, I went back out there and Khanjar was still there. I mean those berms are still there. It just was a remarkable engineering feat I had pictures that were framed, three and four feet long, two feet high, of the ammo dumps and the berms at Khanjar. They hung in the 2d FSSG Headquarters for several years and then for whatever reason, they were taken down. As Commandant, I went down and saw that they were down and asked, "Where are those pictures?" They had them stuck in some closet. I took the pictures and I have them now. They're huge overhead photographs of this massive facility and the people who put that together were young lance corporals and PFCs, male and female. They were just remarkable.

DR CRIST: Was there anything left at Kibrit when you were done?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, but just a shell.

DR CRIST: All that was completed by 20 February?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR CRIST: You were set up with 15 days of supply?

GEN KRULAK: Yes and I mean that's more than just spare parts, that's spare tanks, spare artillery, the float was up there. It was just remarkable.

DR CRIST: And the so called "Khanjar Expressway" was your supply route to the two divisions?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. The Khanjar Expressway. You not only had to build the road up to Khanjar but then to the border itself.

DR CRIST: By the time this was set up what were your thoughts going through your mind at the outset of the ground war?

GEN KRULAK: We were so ready it wasn't funny.

I mean we were ready to go. The one thing that we didn't anticipate was the number of enemy prisoners of war. That shocked everybody. I guess we should have known better, but the number of EPWs were in the thousands and when the war began and the 2d Division and the 1st Division broke through the mine barriers, the Iraqi soldier was so unnerved and we had done such a job of unhinging his entire defenses, that their cohesion collapsed and they started surrendering in groups of hundreds. So many that it started to impede the advance of the attacking forces. We had not planned for that number and had intended that all of the collection and all of the confinement would be done by 1st FSSG because 2d FSSG would still be pushing forward. Well, I got a phone call halfway through the first day from General Boomer and he said, "We've got major problems. Can you help?" I didn't know what he was talking about. I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "Prisoners of war. We are really in trouble. We need you to send vehicles up to get them. 1st FSSG is helping, but there is no way they are able to do it all." I had just sent the first major resupply out to both DSG 1 and DSG 2. I had almost all of my major haulers on the road and all of my drivers. I put out a "Frost Call" to all of the people in the DSC that basically said anybody with a truck license get down to the Engineer Support Battalion Motor Pool. We were going to get as many drivers as we could and match them up to whatever trucks we had, most of which were stake bed trucks and dump trucks from the Engineer Battalion. Well, I went down to the motor pool to pump up to troops and to be there when the G-3 gave them their mission. We probably had 100 drivers and I'd say 60 of them were women. They all had their North Carolina driver's licenses and they drove pickup trucks not dump trucks! But, by that time, we had no choice, so we threw those women into those trucks and gave them a 30 second class on how to drive a dump truck and then out they went. Like I said before, even before some of the regiments were through the minefields, we had these trucks going up and picking up the EPWs.

Now, the problem is we had to put them somewhere. We either had to drive them all the way back to CSSD 91 (near Kibrit) or build an EPW compound at Khanjar. That is what we did. Right outside the northern berm, we built a massive EPW compound and we started bringing thousands of enemy prisoners of war back to that compound. I can remember going out to the EPW compound and seeing a truck, come driving up. It had this young woman Marine driving it and on the back was a Marine lance corporal with a shotgun. I walked up

and the lance corporal said, "Hey, General Krulak watch this." I said, "Watch what?" He said, "You'll see, you'll see." And honest to goodness, he stood up and he went, "Old McDonald had a farm," and then he pointed at the EPWs and they all went "e-i-e-i-o." So on the way down he had taught these EPWs how to sing "Old McDonald had a Farm"[laughs]. But I'm real proud of what those Marines did. It shows the flexibility that is the hallmark of the individual Marines.

DR CRIST: Does that mean that the feeding and providing water now fell to you as well for these thousands of additional bodies?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR CRIST: Just to get your observations, I heard General Keys say after the war that the Iraqis sure weren't the North Vietnamese.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. If the Iraqis had been the North Vietnamese, we would have been in deep trouble. We would have been in deep trouble. At the same time I don't want to take away from the bravery of our Marines. At 04:00 on the morning of D-Day, I was at the mine field and I was in full MOPP-4 because we thought we were going to get gassed. I remember hearing this clank, clank, clank. The day was . . . it was nighttime but it was very dark because of the oil fires, there was a slight drizzle and I heard this sound. The Engineer Support Battalion, under my command, who was supporting the combat engineers was already there and I saw this massive armored column come out of the dark and it was Bill Keys and his mechanized division. Everybody was in MOPP gear. Nobody knew that the Iraqis were going to surrender. We thought we were going to go into a firestorm from artillery and that we were going to get gassed, but these Marines didn't miss a beat. They went out into that minefield and they blew the line charges and they started bulldozing mines. Some of those bulldozers blew up. We called them Ninja Dozers. Dozers that we had prefabbed. They blew up. The drivers got out of one and picked up another one. We had drivers and engineers picking up mines in their hands and transporting them. Unbelievable bravery that's forgotten because four days later it was over. It turned out to be a piece of cake and the Iraqis surrendered and very few rounds were fired in anger, but that does not detract from the tremendous heroism it took to cross those minefields.

DR CRIST: The bravery you saw there was every bit of what you saw in Southeast Asia when you were there?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Or to that of a Marine storming the beaches at Iwo Jima. As you're sitting in that "Papa" boat you don't know what's going to happen. Well, let me tell you they sat in those bulldozers. They didn't know what was going to happen so it was a very harrowing moment.

DR CRIST: What are your views of some of the post war observations, General Trainor, for example, in *The Generals War*, states that everybody should have known the Iraqis weren't going to fight after Khafji?

GEN KRULAK: General Trainor is a smart man, but in this instance, he's off the mark. You don't go into conflict thinking that it's going to be easy. You go in planning for the worst case. Did we think that we were going to whip them? Absolutely. Did we think it was going to be as easy as it was? Probably not. Should we have? Maybe so. Would it have made a difference in the way I trained and prepared my Marines? Absolutely not. We had them fired up. They believed. They looked to their commanders, they looked at Billy Keys, they looked at me, they saw us in our MOPP gear and they knew we were serious and they were serious. It is easy to sit back from the hallowed halls of Harvard and shoot on a person's target, but, no, I do not agree with him.

DR CRIST: One thing, this is an observation about General Krulak. You certainly lead from the front. Every time I turn around wherever the action was you were there.

GEN KRULAK: I had such great people operating behind me, particularly John Woodhead, that I believe that my greatest value would be up front motivating my Marines and feeding back to John observations that would make him, as a pure logistician, able to translate my infantry language into logistics language and produce what we needed get done. So in order to support the two divisions the way, I would have wanted to be supported, I had to get up there and see what they were doing. So I spent just about 90 percent of the day up forward with either a CSSD or sometimes with one of the DSGs, but normally with a CSSD. On the second day, I literally moved up into Kuwait myself at the transfer point. It was a benefit. I think John Woodhead, the professional he is, was able to

literally translate what I was seeing into action for the FSSG.

DR CRIST: Yes. There are a number of cases where potential problems were solved just by you showing up at a CSSD, intervening before it became critical with the EPWs or a POL shortage.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Following the seizure of MEF Objective Alpha, which is Al Jaber airfield, you established this as your transfer point?

GEN KRULAK: We put the transfer point at Al Jaber right outside the air base and it was the pits. It was under a cloud of smoke the entire time. It was like night the whole time we were up there. The very dense smoke left an oil residue on your skin. It was just bad. But we believed that with the speed that the two divisions were moving, we had to get supplies up the road. So we moved the transfer point and kept about a day to two days of supplies at that transfer point.

DR. CRIST: Because of the speed that the divisions were going out did that change any of your timetable at all?

GEN KRULAK: It probably moved it up because we thought we were going to be fighting for a while. As it turned out, Bill Keys and his division could have been in Kuwait City by nightfall on day 1. If he had wanted to unleash the Tiger Brigade, it would have all been over. But that would have left his flank uncovered because the 1st Division was encountering a bit more resistant and were slowed up. It would have not been the thing to do. I realized we were not going to be able to support both divisions with the round trip from Khanjar. We needed to get up closer and that's why we moved to Al Jaber.

DR CRIST: What was going through your mind during the last two days of the war--to the ceasefire 28 February?

GEN KRULAK: I just knew we were going to win, and win it sooner than later. My people were pushing hard and doing great and their morale was sky high. As an example, the most senior Iraqi officer captured by U.S. forces was captured by one of my CSSDs. That made us feel pretty good.

DR. CRIST: The war ends and you are faced with

an equally difficult task of back loading the equipment. You were quoted after the war of calling this the 'Marine Corps shame,' which referred to the amount of gear that had just been dumped and now fell to your Marines to clean that up.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The shame was not equipment dumped at the port or anything like that. The shame was the equipment that was left in the desert and there was a lot of equipment left in the desert. At one point we literally found a tank sitting in the bottom of a hole and we sent a mechanic in to see if he could repair it. He got in there and hit the ignition and the tank started up and he just drove it out. It was a perfectly good tank that was just left in the hole. Trucks were left in the desert. Tons of ammunition were left in the desert. The shame was the treatment of the MPF equipment. It was not taken care of. It was not the way Marines normally deal with equipment and I think that the problem was the Marines didn't accept ownership of the equipment. It was off of the ship; it was going back to the ship. It wasn't their gear and so they treated it poorly. As an example, in order to get drain holes for the water as they washed down the vehicles, they took axes and literally knocked holes in the bottom of the beds of our trucks and in the beds of our HUMMVEEs. These were just terrible things. You might say that Marines don't do that but there seemed to be an attitude that said the war is over and we're going home. The quicker we can go home the better. We lost a lot of our discipline, the discipline that you expect of Marines. Marines should have cared about their equipment and should have wanted to make sure that it got back on the ships. We spent a lot of money repairing equipment as a result of the treatment it received upon the end of the war not during the war. When we made sweeps up through the two division areas, we needed literally truck after truck after truck to haul back all the gear that was left in various locations. So that was the shame and my point when I spoke of it in lectures to the Logistics Academies and AWS, and Command and Staff. I was not trying to stick my finger in anybody's eye, but to learn from this. It was the first time MPF had ever been used at that level and to understand that we need to get into the minds of the individual Marine and in their leadership that MPF gear isn't just a freebie. It is Marine gear. We paid for it and we've got to keep it up.

DR CRIST: And we may need it again.

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. Yes.

DR CRIST: I've heard that one of the problems concerned artillery ammunition, where they had dropped artillery ammunition at predetermined spots, it was never used and left there?

GEN KRULAK: Well, that is true and it was fine if the divisions had said, "You've got ammunition at these locations." They didn't say anything, and as a matter of fact, reported through their chain of command that they had evacuated everything. So what we did was just take a cursory sweep by helicopter of the battlefield expecting to see it cleared. We looked down and there was material everywhere. That's when we got on the ground and started our legitimate sweep.

DR CRIST: And it required the Marines being sent back over to augment you?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR CRIST: After all your efforts we didn't leave much back there, did we?

GEN KRULAK: Like I said I went back to Khanjar several years later and the only things that were left was sandbags that were deteriorating and old pieces of wood. Remarkable.

DR CRIST: You had some interesting observations about the use of Reserves in Desert Storm?

GEN KRULAK: I guess like most Marines two personnel issues surprised me. One was the performance of our women and the other was the performance of the Reserves. The reality was 30 seconds after getting to the Direct Support Command you couldn't tell the difference. I mean they were absolutely phenomenal. They knew their job. The leadership was, for the most part, strong. The staff non-commissioned officer leadership was very strong. The young corporals, the NCOs were magnificent. The young enlisted Marines, the young enlisted women and men just extremely dedicated. No fumbling around, no sense that they were second class citizens. They were very, very good and, in fact, some of them were better in some ways than their counterparts because of their thought processes and their capabilities.

The best example of that was the warrant officer who came and ran the ammo depot dump at Khanjar. In the civilian world he owned multiple lumber yards. When he got to Khanjar, after two

days of trying to organize this 700+ acre ammo dump, he got a hold of me and he said, "This is crazy. This is crazy. I could do a better job organizing a lumber yard than I can this. I need some computers." I told him I would try to get them for him but that it would take awhile. Well, this warrant officer was a very wealthy man and somehow he FedExed his computer programs and computers from wherever he lived in Tennessee to Riyadh. The next thing I know, he has computers and a program that tells him where 2x4s are, 4x8s, you name it. He translated that program into a 2x4 as a 155 rounds and other ammunition and all of a sudden he organized the entire ammo depot using his lumberyard software. It was unbelievable. He also busted my chops. He said, "General Krulak, do you know what I drive around in my lumber yard?" I said, "No, what's that?" He said, "A Mercedes. A Mercedes and you can't give me one damn HUMMVEE?" He didn't have a HUMMVEE, so I said, "Okay. I'll get you a HUMVEE." Great people, great capability and when I became Commandant, because of that insight into the capability of the Reserves, I said, "You can have individual reservists, but we're not going to have Reserve units. Those are total force Marine outfits that are absolutely critical to our winning wars."

DR CRIST: I read that you had some trouble with some of the senior Reserve officers, you were somewhat critical of some of their competence?

GEN KRULAK: I would hesitate to say that I had trouble with senior officers in the Reserve. I had problems with senior officers including active duty. I relieved Colonel Tom Donnely. He did not perform and I had to make a change. I had, I think, one incident where I was unhappy with a Reserve lieutenant colonel.

DR. CRIST: On 11 June 1991 e-mail to General Milligan in which you mentioned that you'd completed loading your 26th-ship, the last of the I and II MEF supplies, and in it you mentioned that your crews were loading 450 short tons a day, which is no small achievement.

GEN KRULAK: It's interesting to note that I e-mailed General Milligan. As Marine forces pulled out of Southwest Asia and as the generals went home, the title of Commander Marine Forces, Southwest Asia went down the pecking order until finally the mantle rested on my shoulders. As Commander Marine Forces, Southwest Asia, I reported in theater to an Army lieutenant general

who had taken General Schwarzkopf's position. His name was General William G. "Gus" Pagonis who was the head interestingly enough of the logistics effort for the Army in Southwest Asia. Because I was no longer CG, 2d FSSG reporting to Mundy, but ComMarForSWA, my reporting lines went through MarForPac. And so all of a sudden, I started reporting to this lieutenant general by the name of Milligan who I had no dealings with at all during Southwest Asia. I would like to note that General Milligan was an absolutely phenomenal officer and tremendously supportive of our efforts and didn't miss a beat when I began reporting to him.

We, in fact, loaded all the combat equipment and supplies in a very short period of time. We did it with the most phenomenal young men and women that I have ever had the honor of serving with. I mention women. I mean we had hundreds of women working their hearts out 24 hours a day, seven days a week. I think I mentioned earlier, but I would not send one of them, not one home early. They stayed and they produced. All of the concerns about pregnancies--none of that happened with our Marines. And we ought to be proud of that.

DR. CRIST: Just to elaborate on that, at the time, particularly in Congress, they were talking about one of the Navy supply vessels and were calling it the "love boat" because so many of the crew had come back early for pregnancy. What did the Marines do differently that the Navy didn't?

GEN KRULAK: Well, first, we had the obvious discipline of being a United States Marine, and that discipline went a long way in helping to ease the raging hormones. I'd be naive to say that we didn't take a few other steps. We absolutely forbade any kind of mixed billeting within tents or within the tent cities. There would be areas where the women slept that were within the major tent city, but blocked in one end or the other so that you could control who was going into what tents. All the head facilities were all not just separate, but separated by distance. We had military police, fire watches, you name it, walking though the area. But the reality is you had well disciplined Marines who for the most part were working so hard that their urges were probably blunted a bit.

DR. CRIST: Any last comments, observations on Desert Storm, your role in it, logistics? We will talk a lot more about some of this later.

GEN KRULAK: I honestly believe that history will

treat Desert Storm as the great logistics war. What the logistics organizations did, what the 1st and 2d FSSG's did during that conflict to ensure victory, was nothing less than miraculous. The Corps ought to be proud of those logisticians because they were phenomenal, and the reality was, they were the first on the ground, they were the last to leave, they were the furthest forward, and they were the last to roll back. It was a tremendous effort by tremendous young men and women. And the Corps ought to be proud of them.

DR. CRIST: One last question, did the Desert Storm experience impact on the development of the Marine Corps Logistics Command later?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I wish I could take credit for the idea of Marine Logistics Command, but the credit goes to Lieutenant General Jim Brabham. I'm sure that he had thought of it well before Desert Storm, but I can remember an incident where I think it was driven home to both Jim and myself with a sledgehammer. I had come back to the Port of Jubayl to discuss with General Brabham a problem we were having with axles breaking on some of our trucks. Commanders in the field came to me as the CG for the Direct Support Command for help. I went to Jim Brabham. Jim explained to me that when this first started happening, he called the Systems Command and asked for help. The Systems Command said they didn't do axles. They indicated that Albany was responsible for axles. So he called down to Albany and the folks at Albany told him that that was a Systems Command problem. Here we were in the middle of preparations for war, we got a major problem, and nobody knew how to solve it because nobody had any ownership in it. There was no clear-cut cradle to grave owner of Marine Corps systems. The System Command brought the system aboard, and at some point in time in its life cycle, they'd throw it over an imaginary wall and hopefully on the other side of the wall would be an individual from Albany who would catch it and become responsible. But you never could figure out when that time was and how it worked. So Jim said, "What we really need is to have one single individual responsible for the life cycle of a system," and that would be the Materiel Command.

When we got back, I think that we were all overtaken by our normal day-to-day business, and so Jim Brabham lost a little opportunity and steam in that effort, and I certainly did because I was no longer a logistician. But when I became the Commandant, Jim and I revisited that conversation

in Jubayl. And the end result was a study group chaired by a superb colonel by the name of John A. O'Donovan, who had served for Jim Brabham before and was my G-3 OPS in the desert. O'Donovan headed the study that brought about what Jim and I envisioned as the Materiel Command. Unfortunately, it is not what currently exists. Upon my departure as Commandant, the pressure for a true Materiel Command dissipated, and instead of having a three-star located at Albany controlling the focus of Marine logistics, with one foot in Albany, one in Blunt Island and one in Quantico with Systems Command, we ended up with a lesser organization that looked like the old I&L organization.

SESSION VIII

1991 Force Structure Planning Group

Leaving 2d FSSG . . . Speaking about combat leadership . . . Debate about the need for MEBs . . . Assignment as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs . . . Opening MOSs to Women . . . Procurment versus Manpower issues. . . . Developing ideas about the 21st Century Marine Corps . . . General Mundy's assignment to head the Force Structure Planning Group . . . Russ Appleton and the best and brightest . . . Planning to reduce the Corps to 159,100 . . . Senator Inouye . . . Developing the warfighting MEF . . . Building a Corps for the future . . . The need for a 177, 000 strong Marine Corps . . . The unassailable sale . . . Problems with the Navy's Force Structure Planning.

DR. CRIST: The date is 29 November 2000. The place is Wilmington, Delaware. When we last left off, we had finished talking about Desert Storm. I assume you took some well-deserved leave when you got back from the desert?

GEN KRULAK: No. While I was in the desert, I got a phone call from LtGen Mundy who had been nominated to be the next Commandant of the Marine Corps, and he asked me to come up and be the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel Management Division. The position was held by a major general by the name of Jack Sheehan. I got home in early July and called up Jack Sheehan. He indicated that he needed to get to his next duty station quickly. And so I did not take any leave. I had a change of command on the 9th of July, and I reported to Headquarters, Marine Corps shortly thereafter.

DR. CRIST: So you had a very simple, quick change of command?

GEN KRULAK: My change of command was done in the back area of the headquarters building at Camp Lejeune. I didn't want to put the troops through the harassment of a change of command, because we had just come back from Southwest Asia a week before. What we did instead was invite the troops to be the guests at the ceremony. So all of the troops from all of the different battalions sat in the stands and watched their officers, the CO and XO of each of their battalions with one guide-on bearer, represent the troops. Instead of a big formation, you just had the guide-ons and the officers of the FSSG on parade with the troops, who had done all the work, in the stands. It was exciting.

DR. CRIST: There's a couple of things I noticed going through the *Marine Corps Gazette* and *Navy Times* of the period. I noticed before Desert Storm, there wasn't a whole lot written about you or by you. After Desert Storm you start seeing a lot more of General Krulak and, for example, you seem to do a lot more speeches. There was a very good article you wrote in the *Marine Corps Gazette*.¹ You appear to be in constant demand. Would you say it's a fair characterization that what you did and what FSSG did in Desert Storm really started making the Marine Corps aware of a rising brigadier general by the name of Krulak who was going places in our Corps?

GEN KRULAK: That's a very interesting question. I never even thought of that. That may an accurate statement. The flip side was I spent a good chunk of my career on the West Coast and in the Pacific. I had never had a tour of duty prior to that at Camp Lejeune, and never taught at The Basic School.

DR. CRIST: Despite . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Despite many attempts. I did not go to Command and Staff College with Marines. I went to the Army's Command and General Staff College. I had the tour in the White House which kind of kept me out of the mainstream. So, you may be right. This was not a publicity machine. I didn't all of a sudden start generating press. I think that there were those who

¹ "CSS in the Desert," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1991) pp. 22-31. See Also "A War of Logistics: an interview with Brigadier General Charles C. Krulak," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 1991) pp. 55-57.

were very impressed with what happened in the desert. I think most people understood that it took a major effort. It's unfortunate that they attributed the success to Jim Brabham and Chuck Krulak, and not to the troops who made it happen. But that's life. If it had fallen through we would have been blamed so I guess that's okay.

DR. CRIST: On the issue of speeches you started giving, although from what I now know of you, you've always given a lot of motivational talks.

GEN KRIJLAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: You gave some very interesting speeches which are in your personal papers, one of the best examples being before the Naval Academy's 1994 leadership forum on 6 January 1993. The topic of your speeches was combat leadership and specifically the linkage between integrity, moral courage and accountability, themes that would become very prominent as Commandant. You seemed to see a real honing of these ideas in your speeches during this period.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I think that in many ways it goes back to my father and my own upbringing, but unlike many of the generals of his time, and certainly unlike the majority of the people even today, he and I never believed that the success of the Corps depended on our ability to fight and win every battle. Rather, it depended on the character of the Marine; if you are highly disciplined, totally professional, men and women of character whose integrity is unquestionable, who will stand up and be held accountable when they do something wrong, that ethos would solve just about any problem in execution; that you could, in the case of during my tenure, rape an Okinawan girl or fly a plane through a line holding up a gondola in Italy. You could do these terrible, terrible things, and if America looked at the Corps in the light of what I just described, we would survive; and that the key to our survival was not just that we were warriors, that we would hear the nation's call, march to the sound of the guns and the smell of cordite, fight, and win. But we did all of that and still were men and women of character.

DR. CRIST: One of the early issues you addressed in this, sir, focused on MEBs, and from the very outset you were a strong proponent of eliminating MEBs. In a memo from you to General Mundy, right after Desert Storm, in which you comment on Marine Corps Order 3120.8A, you wrote some strong opinions on why you felt this.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The Marine Corps Order 3120.8A, was basically drafted in PP&O. The Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Division in PP&O circulated a position paper that said MEB structure had been repeatedly validated and we need to continue on with MEBs. My memorandum to General Mundy was in response to the SO/LIC position paper. Basically I told the Commandant that it was vital that this order reflect the Commandant's thoughts and intent because that order would be the document that we would then use to describe the Marine Corps, not only to the Joint Staff, but more importantly, to the warfighting CinC. I talked about the cliché "deploys MEBs, employs MEFs." Underlying that comment was the fact that you really didn't fight as a MEB. You only deployed as a MEB, and that was absolutely proven when the 7th MEB went to Southwest Asia, got on the ground, and within seven days, it called back and asked for all the Command and Control of the 1st Division to be sent to SWA because they didn't have the Command and Control assets to fight. Secondly, they asked for a massive influx of officers and staff noncommissioned officers because they didn't have enough people on the MEB staff to run a 7 day/24 hour organization. It was, in my opinion, absolutely incorrect to talk about a MEB as a war fighting capability because it would be entered into the TPFDDs and the CinC that received that MEB would, in their own mind, believe that he was getting a warfighting capability within the lift that was allocated. I thought that was an absolutely improper thing for the Marine Corps to do, and it was not good for the nation and our national security.

Our problem was that the MEB had become a measure for the war fighting CinC as well as the Navy and so they started talking about amphibious lift in terms of MEBs. I believed and still do that it is wrong to articulate lift capability based upon an organization that can't fight. So you either change the organization so it can fight, which we don't have the manpower or the equipment to do, or we're up front and say what the MEB really . . . is the tip of the massive broad sword called the MEF. That is why we began to talk about the MEF forward, articulating, not only to the CinCs, but to our enemy, that when the MEF forward comes it means just that. Guess what's coming behind? A sledgehammer to knock you stiff. And so the bottom line is get rid of the MEB and understand that the totality of the Marine Corps is a reservoir of combat capability, and we would flow to the fight with whatever we needed. We would be task organized like we always have done.

In my entire four years as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, nobody ever talked to me in terms of MEBs or MEFs or MEUs. What we talked about was what capability we needed. When we said we were going to go to Kosovo, we talked about what kind of capability needed. When we knew what was needed, we tailored the force and gave it to the CinC. If you think that a CinC or the Joint Staff knows what's in a Marine Corps MEB or what's in a Marine Corps MEF, they don't. All they do is ask the Service Chief "I need the following capability" and it's up to the Service Chief to give it to him through the component commander.

Yet today, we've had a retrenchment back into the old days. We've gone back to the MEB. It's all smoke and mirrors. We did not build anything new. There is no MEB out there. There's a name for something, but all it is it's a capability that's imbedded in the division, wing, FSSG. If the whistle blows, I'm going to tell you right now, the MEB will go and within a week they'll be on the phone asking for more help. Again, it does not do justice to national defense, and shame on us for employing the smoke and mirrors to bring back something whose death knell was seen by not just General Krulak, but General Mundy. Mundy was the one that did away with the MEBs.

DR. CRIST: On the lift issue, I found during this period the Navy was always talking about how much amphibious shipping we needed was in terms of 2.5 MEBs or 3.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and since we don't fight as MEBs. they had us over a real hurdle. That's why when you look at my battles over amphibious issues it has always centered around square footage--space for rolling stock.

DR. CRIST: dealing with the Navy, it was the hard, fast numbers of what actual capability you can transport?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. Capability.

DR. CRIST: On to your next assignment, sir.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: As you mentioned, General Mundy called you up to be Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, basically the Director of Personnel Management, Personnel Procurement. It seems -- I can understand why General Mundy might have chosen you -- it seems

a rather natural fit based upon your interest and background?

GEN KRULAK: I don't know if I was a natural fit, but there is no question that if had to go to Headquarters, that was a good place to go. I took over a well-oiled machine. General Sheehan had a strong manpower background and had done a fine job. I took over at a time when it was running well. It was like putting on a glove that you had worn before. It fit well.

DR. CRIST: And it was the same issues you had been addressing?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, yes.

DR. CRIST: The timelessness issues of manpower?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Soon after your appointment, the issue of women in combat came up in the public discourse post Desert Storm. According to General Mundy, he had tasked you and the Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve Affairs to look at expanding MOSs open to women, something that in your private e-mails before this, you had already been discussing in some of your brainstorming correspondence with other general officers.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. As I've shared earlier, my whole view of women in the Marine Corps was turned upside down with my time in Southwest Asia and the performance of the women in the Direct Support Command. I became an advocate for expanding MOSs to women, and some people may regret that I ever took that tact, but I did. I was never supportive of women in direct combat. I never supported putting women in tanks, putting women in artillery, putting women in the infantry where there's the possibility of direct contact with the enemy. I was absolutely open for them in MOSs that had been previously closed because I had seen them and their performance of duty in the desert. I felt that they were a combat multiplier and we needed them. We got great, young women who are smart, articulate, and capable, and we ought to take advantage of them.

DR. CRIST: Was this a contentious issue at the time within the Marine Corps itself?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I think it was, but it was also at a time when the wind of change was fast approaching. The bottom-up review had said you

can have a 159,100 person Marine Corps, and that was going against the expanding of the MOSs, and so there was a lot of questioning about whether we were going in the right direction.

DR. CRIST: What about opening up the cockpits to women, sir'?

GEN KRULAK: I was not in favor of opening up the cockpit to women because, unlike perhaps some of my ground compadres, I believe if a pilot is doing their job, they're in direct contact with the enemy. To me a pilot is as much a warrior as the grunt, and so I was concerned about it and I expressed my concern. I was thanked for my input, and women in the cockpit became a reality. I will say that like they did in the desert, they've done a magnificent job for the Marine Corps. But I remain concerned about direct combat.

DR. CRIST: While these issues, expanding roles of women in the service dominated your plate particularly early on, by far the largest effort you would take over the next year centered around the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG). Before we get into your role and the events of the Force Structure Planning Group in 1991, I wonder if you could briefly discuss the development of the Bush's administration's base force, their initial bottom-up review?

GEN KRULAK: Okay. Well, the reality was initially I was on the outskirts of the development of the Bush administration's base force and our addressing of those issues because I was a one-star general. At the time I wasn't watching that. We had a commandant. We had people like Hank Stackpole and Ernie Cook and Walt Boomer . . . really talented people watching this. So I really didn't get involved in how it developed. I can tell you that there was no rigor on how the 159.1 number was arrived at. There was no study of roles, missions, or functions of the United States Marine Corps vis-a-vis the national security strategy and whether we could meet those roles, missions, and functions at 159.1. It was an arbitrary number that was driven by fiscal constraints, and anyone that would tell you differently needs to go see General Mundy, go see Hank Stackpole, go see General Gray, and perhaps go see General Colin Powell because the bottom line was it was fiscally constrained.

DR. CRIST: Essentially a cutout of each service?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and we had to -- you know, you even heard the term "the Marine Corps needs

to bleed some."

DR. CRIST: Once you had mentioned during a walk in Santa Barbara in December 1988 that you had gotten wind of manpower cuts-- I guess it was during the Bush transition period?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I was still at the White House. As the transition between the Reagan and Bush administration was taking place, we would go out to Reagan's ranch in the hills above Santa Barbara. All of the Reagan staff and the Bush staff would stay down in the City of Santa Barbara. During one of the visits, I was walking along the beach slightly behind some of the senior leaders in the Bush and Reagan administration, to include General Powell and others, and as that walk took place, they started talking about national defense and where national defense would eventually have to go because of the balance between discretionary spending and nondiscretionary spending as a nation. Their bottom line was that the force structure would have to be cut.

DR. CRIST: In some comments you made later for General Mundy's oral history, you also mentioned that General Gray had maintained the end strength essentially by trading procurement O&M dollars to pay for the manpower account, and you say that had this continued out, essentially couldn't continue without completely hollowing out, mortgaging our future.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Again, that is not a criticism of General Gray, and the reality is if he hadn't done that, we probably would have been in worse shape in Desert Storm because when we went to Desert Storm we had the gear, but more importantly, we had the people to man the gear. But the bottom line is General Gray, like General Mundy, like myself, like Commandants before and after us, was faced with a mismatch between our resources and the national military strategy. He had to make a choice of what he was going to do. General Gray said he was going to keep end strength up. He was going to keep fighting to keep strength up even if it meant not buying new gear, not maintaining fully what we had and not doing a lot of the operation and maintenance and construction and rehabbing on our facilities, et cetera, et cetera. So he did that. When we rolled into Desert Storm, we had full up foxholes and fairly good equipment. My point was he did that. You can't continue to do that or you hollow out your force within the area of research and development, O&M, and modernization. That's what General Mundy was faced with.

DR. CRIST: It's appears clear immediately after that Desert Storm and perhaps before, in your own mind, you were already looking for what type of force would the Marine Corps need in the post Cold War world. For example, you have an e-mail focused on the future of armor and that after Desert Storm you're going to need speed because you can't build enough armor to defeat the anti-tank weapon systems of the future. So speed is a necessity for the vehicles of the future.

GEN KRULAK: I don't know why my mind works the way it does. I think I spoke earlier in this interview process about, having the Meyers-Briggs test and coming out of INFP, which is kind of an off-the-wall thinker, and maybe that's why some of the issues that really tugged at me professionally came to my mind. I guess I used to think about the inter-war years a lot and wonder, where are our Ellises. How are we going to take the next step? What's the next Culebra for us? I used the example of the tank. At the end of World War I, the tank had just come into being, and the French looked at that tank, and they saw it as a phenomenal system. It has this turret, spins around and can fire this large projectile; it's a great weapon system. So we're going to dig holes and stick these tanks in the ground, and we'll put them in front of our enemy and connect them with communications, and, they will be unable to be breached. We will call it the Maginot Line. The Germans looked at the same weapon system, and instead of seeing the turret and its tremendous firepower, saw the tracks on it that gave it mobility, that moved the firepower to where they wanted to move it. Their view of the tank resulted in maneuver, a concept of war that almost defeated the world. It was a different way to look at something. When we came out of Desert Storm, it was obvious to me that our enemies would never allow us to fight like that again, and that we had better come up with a better way to address an enemy who is going to hit us asymmetrically and not symmetrically.

DR. CRIST: About that time is the first time that term "asymmetrical," which you certainly embraced as the Commandant, kind of comes in the discourse.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: One last question just before we get into the heart of the FSPG 1991, I get a sense that the other services were still focused on a force structure based upon the Cold War, and not were not looking at what force they would need to fight

the next war. Is that an accurate observation at the time?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I think so. And as the Berlin wall came down, it left the other services having to justify their existence, and they justified it in a way that was comfortable to them. We, as I had mentioned before, we were never orientated toward the Soviet Union. So we were for more agile and able to move in the direction that we all felt we needed to move.

DR. CRIST: And that segues right into the next thing I wanted to ask you, sir. We are talking five months after Desert Storm, this huge conventional victory — the Marine Corps was undertaking a study, FSPG 91, not only how do we justify, our force level for the national military strategy, but more importantly, what do we need for ten years down?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Well, as you know, right at that time, the bottom-up review was going on, and the handwriting was on the wall. General Mundy and his three-stars, his Politburo, were wise and recognized what were happening, and so they took the step that hadn't been taken for years--to dedicate their very finest young officers to studying the future and what the Corps would look like in that future. That's why FSPG '91 was so important, because of the support from the Commandant and his three-stars and, in my opinion, the way it was run, the way we as a group of officers conducted the study.

DR. CRIST: Shortly after General Mundy took over, he had sent out letters to his generals and a few select retired officers asking for insight on the very questions you just raised. What do we want from the Marine Corps? How should it be organized? And then on 2 August he had a meeting with his three-stars to discuss, as you said, the future of the Corps. Were you privy to any of this, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I was not privy to what happened at Camp Lejeune. I knew he went down there. Everybody knew he went down there. The first time that I knew anything about it was probably the day after they got back. My former boss, General Bill Keys called me up, and if you've never gotten a phone call from General Keys, you're lucky because you can't understand what he says. But basically what he grunted to me was, "Has he told you yet?" And I said, "Has who told me what?" He said, "Have you talked to the Commandant?" And I

said, "No, I haven't." He replied, "You will," and then just hung up. Probably 30 minutes later I got a phone call from the Commandant, who called me down to his office and described the need to do a force structure planning group effort. He gave me some very, very general guidance, and part of that guidance was to get the right people and draft a charter, and so that's what we did.

DR. CRIST: I think it's worth noting for the historical record the transcripts of some of this are in your personal papers on this meeting at Camp Lejeune--the generals' off site. There was a debate about who should run the FSPG. Your name came up fairly quickly.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, me or Jack Sheehan. Jack had done several of these before and had done a good job, but never was able to get anything nailed down.

DR. CRIST: Right. One of the things General Mundy mentioned in your initial briefing was he wanted fresh faces, new people. I guess the previous effort had been General Gray's Balance Fleet Marine Force Study Group in 1988. He mentioned specifically he chose you because, one, he said jokingly you worked right above his office, but more important, and I quote from General Mundy, "he's a man of enormous vision and energy and comprehension, far more than many I have known in my career. He truly understands what makes the division work, what makes the force service support group work, or what makes a wing work."² Did you get that sense when you talked to General Mundy that he chose you specifically because you had not been part of an earlier effort?

GEN KRULAK: No, he never mentioned that to me. Most people think I knew General Mundy before. I had not known General Mundy. I had actually been in his presence as the 2d FSSG commander, I think, three times. I did not know General Mundy. When I got the phone call to come to Headquarters, I was happy if I had to go to HQMC to go to Personnel Management Division, but I really didn't know General Mundy that well. When I went down to see General Mundy, he basically told me to get the right people, write your own charter based on the following guidance. His basic guidance was twofold: build a Corps of 159,100, in other words, meet the BUR force. Make it as good a force as you can and then take that

force and evaluate it against the national military strategy in the world that you see coming. If that force will not meet the requirements as you see them, build the force up until you reach that level and be able to justify that force, with great rigor. You need to be able to justify every single cut you made and every single person you added because we are going to have to do some justifying. That was basically the guidance that I got from the Commandant.

DR. CRIST: You drafted the charter?

GEN KRULAK: That's correct. I then went and searched out the smartest people I knew in the Marine Corps and the most talented. I went back up to my office. I don't know what time it was; probably two o'clock in the afternoon, and the first person I called was the commanding officer of the training camp at Mount Fuji, a young colonel by the name of Russ Appleton. It was two o'clock or three o'clock in the morning his time and he answered the phone. I said, "This is General Krulak," and I asked what he was doing? He said he was asleep. I laughed, and I told him I'd be placing a call to his MEF Commander and asking him to give Russ to me for the next six months because we had a big job to do. That was the first call I made. The second call I made was to one of the great minds in the Marine Corps and certainly one of the great orators and great communicators, and that was General Tom Wilkerson, then Colonel Tom Wilkerson. Then slowly but surely we picked up folks like Marty Steele, God bless him. Marty ran the whole CE portion of the MAGTF. I just went out and got the best minds in the Corps. I didn't know all of them but I got recommendations from other officers and got orders cut for the best and brightest.

We reserved, from a logistics standpoint, rooms in Liversedge Hall, all on one floor, all basically together, and then we went down to the Marine Corps Association and got a very nice room there. I got support from MCCTCA in the way of computers and clerks, and we built basically an 18 to 20 hour a day, seven day a week working area. We all slept together, ate together. Nobody went home. I lived literally 30 miles up the road, and I never went home.

DR. CRIST: I think for nine weeks it was 16 hours a day, seven days a week.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It was very rigorous.

DR. CRIST: How, as you're pulling these people

²General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Oral History, Oral history Unit, History and Museums Division, p.281.

together, how in your mind would you dissect this problem and put this plan together?

GEN KRULAK: When I started bringing them together, I had no idea. I would think about that after I had solved what I thought was going to be the largest problem, and that was getting the *crème de la crème* to be released by their commanding generals to do this study. It speaks volumes of our general officer corps that I encountered very little problem in that area. I thought I'd have problems. The reality was I think most of the generals knew that we had to get in front of this BUR and had to get something that was worthwhile going. They supported it 100 percent. Getting the people was not that difficult.

DR. CRIST: It seems at least from what I've gathered it was the focus and main effort for the Marine Corps at that moment'?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and the way we paid them back was to make it an open process. The entire Marine Corps, in my opinion, certainly at the colonel and above level got involved in the FSPG. We were putting out a report every day that Russ Appleton would put together. We had e-mail addresses for all the generals and their chiefs of staff. We sent out on email a daily report. In that email, I would articulate what we had done that day, the issues that we were wrestling with, and then it was open dialogue. The next morning and for the next half a day we'd be getting input from the generals, queries, and phone calls saying, "Hey, before you do this, think of that." So that everybody felt that they were playing a role.

DR. CRIST: You essentially organized the FSPG working groups along the MEF lines, command element . . . ACE . . . FSSG . . . etc?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: And then also formed separate working groups that looked at other issues such as base realignment issues?

GEN KRULAK: Yes and we brought in experts in those areas for a period of time. As an example, in the FSSG area we brought in the John Woodheads, the John O'Donovans, the Gary McKissocks. They would come in and out. The same in all other areas. We got a great help from manpower. But the soul of the FSPG were those young officers that were there the whole time.

We started off with me standing up and giving

a little talk and describing the walk on the beach and how important this was going to be to their Corps. They were going to have to shed their parochialism. They had to build the finest warfighting organization in the world . . . a balanced MAGTF. Everybody was going to have to give and the quicker they realized that the better off they'd be. They would not be responding to their commanding general or to the DCS/Aviation or the DCS/I&L. They were responding to the troop in the foxhole or flying the airplane or responding to their nation. It took very little time for them to lose their parochialism and really get in there and start doing the things that had to be done.

DR. CRIST: In your mind were you building for a Marine Corps of 159.1 or were you thinking we'll build to this, but really we want a higher end strength?

GEN KRULAK: No, no. My guidance was clear. Go to 159.1 and then if you can't meet the national military strategy, build up. As we got to 159.1 it became obvious we weren't going to be able to meet the national military strategy and so the issue then became developing the case to add end-strength. We needed the rigor to convince DOD, the President and Congress. We did the job right and we got the rigor and the number—177K.

DR. CRIST: One of your early tasks was to examine a draft copy of the future national military.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: And then, having that, then you know what kind of force we're going to need? Figure out what the nation needs and then develop the Marine force for that need?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's basically it. We took the national military strategy and said: okay. What do we do?

DR. CRIST: What did you see as the threat of the future of the next ten years?

GEN KRULAK: What we're seeing now, a world of chaos, no major nation-state rising up against us; a lot of what we would call the brush fire wars; a lot of operations other than war assume fire warfare, terrorism and threats of war. We still needed the ability to mass and to fight alongside our brothers in arms, the Army, but the reality is we'd be doing a lot of other things.

DR. CRIST: The numbers seemed to have been a challenge—even trying to get an handle on who we actually have in the FMF.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It was very interesting. Even Headquarters, Marine Corps, didn't know what we had. We had so many people in the T2/P2 line. There were so many people that were literally not in the foxholes but were on external assignments. We didn't have a handle on our personnel. The first thing we realized was we may have a Corps of 196,700 or 198,000, but we didn't know the exact count or where they were. We needed to find out what ground truth was so that we'd have something to work with.

DR. CRIST: There are some things that jump out from your initial cut particularly on the non-FMF strength. One, I think, was 13,500 Marine in national support?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Outside of the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Which we can't touch or you couldn't touch.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: The other was this T2/P2.

GEN KRULAK: T2/P2.

DR. CRIST: The training and transit/patients and prisoners. 16,000-17,000 or roughly 15 to 18 percent of the Marine Corps is in that limbo state.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and not really known even by the Marine Corps. I mean, nobody had really questioned that we had a large percentage of the Marine Corps not doing much for our warfighting capability. What's interesting is in 1991, some of the things that we held inviolate, such Marine detachments on board ships, were eventually done away with during my Commandancy . . . trying to put more troops into foxholes.

DR. CRIST: So this FSPG results carried on with you as the Commandant? And that's the elimination of the shipboard debt was a continuation of that?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Did you identify those when you did FSPG?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, yes. We could not and did not get permission to cut them.

DR. CRIST: One of the central issues centered around base closings that you had to deal with, and we'll get into the FMF issues here in a second, sir. Specifically, the issue of Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station in Hawaii.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: If the Marine Corps went to 159.1, it was going to go away?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: This must have been a hot issue with Senator Inouye, certainly a politically sensitive issue?

GEN KRULAK: It was a very hot issue because the reality was, as you said, if the Marines went to 159.1, you would have to close, K-Bay. General Mundy asked that I go see Senator Inouye. His military assistant, his EA, was a man by the name of Richard Collins. I had dated Richard Collins' wife when I was a teenager in Hawaii. So we had relationship; we knew each other, but not well. I went to see Richard to run our "problem" by him. Richard went through the roof and said, "There is absolutely no way you're taking the Marines out of K. Bay. Let me just tell you that right now. There's not enough fight in the dog for you to pull that off." He said, "Before you take a Marine out of K. Bay, all of the Marines will come back from Japan." That was absolutely counter to the role we saw for our Corps in the national military strategy of forward deployed forces . . . so we could not afford to leave Japan.

DR. CRIST: And the treaty requirements, correct, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Although the treaty requirements were very important, that was something that the government could change. I did not put that beyond the scope of Senator Inouye's impact. And so to use treaty requirements as an excuse was not sound rationale for Senator Inouye at that time. And so I went back and told General Mundy that the reception was not good. I then went back with Richard Collins and talked to Senator Inouye. Senator Inouye was absolutely a wonderful

gentleman. He was smart, and he just said, "I think that you're not going to leave Hawaii. We just can't allow that, and if you're talking about national military strategy, I don't see how you're going to leave Japan either. So I suggest, young man, that you start looking at the second part of your mission, which is to build a Corps that can meet the national military strategy." Obviously we were already doing that, but what this did was to start gaining the support of some of the powerful people in the Congress of the United States. It also began my relationship with Richard Collins and Senator Inouye which ended up with the Senator introducing me to the Senate Armed Services Committee before my confirmation hearings for Commandant of the Marine Corps. He was not a member of the SASC but came over and introduced me in front of the SASC.

DR. CRIST: And also it must have been paving the way for "we can't do both. I mean, we can't keep troops in Hawaii and Japan and still meet the national military strategy at 159. We just don't have money to stretch everywhere."

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that's what I mean. So that was why we did it, so that we would get the first person in Congress to understand that if you really believe in the national military strategy, 159 was too low for the Marine Corps because you either took them out of Hawaii or you took them out of Okinawa. If you took them out of Hawaii, Inouye would have gone crazy. If you take them out of Okinawa, we would not be meeting our mission.

DR. CRIST: There were some other issues debated, sir, particularly on the issue of closing down the bases.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: One of the major ones to go if you go to 159 was MCRD, San Diego?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: And Bridgeport?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We were looking at closing down MCRD, San Diego and looking at what it would take to do all of our recruit training at Parris Island. We also looked at closing both San Diego and Parris Island and taking over one of the bases that were closed by the Army in Texas and have just one recruit training center centrally located in the United States. The weather is good and it

would be ideally located for recruiting purposes. We really looked hard at many tough issues. We looked hard at moving recruit training up to Camp Pendleton, up to Camp Lejeune and combining the Schools of Infantry. All of those things weren't just pie in the sky. Somebody was studying the options, getting the numbers, getting the costs, getting the figures, putting the rigor behind it because we knew that when it came time to do the fighting, we'd have to have all of the numbers add up.

DR. CRIST: What was the final recommendation at the number of 159? Was it to close San Diego, or was it to keep both of the Recruit Depots open?

GEN KRULAK: At 159 we were to close them both.

DR. CRIST: And go to Texas?

GEN KRULAK: And go to Texas. It was interesting that one of the options that we came close to doing was cutting boot camp by a week in order to get to the T2/P2 issue. You'd have saved a lot of Marines. Interestingly, we said we're not going to do that. That's the soul of the Corps--recruit training. I can remember sitting in that room and people saying recruit training is too short as it is. Putting it in the back of my head and four years later, when I became Commandant, extending Boot Camp by a week. So all of this is tied together.

DR. CRIST: Is it fair to say that this your role in the FSPG '91 effort was one of the reasons you were able to hit the ground running so hard with the Commandant's Planning Guidance in 1995?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, there's no question about it. I came out of the FSPG without question, and this is not bragging or ego, the most knowledgeable general in the Marine Corps about the Marine Corps. But I lived and breathed the guts of the Marine Corps, the business of the business of the Marine Corps for all that time and had to understand it, and on top of that, put in my time as an FSSG Commander, put in my time as an ADC, put in my time as Manpower, and it just gave me an unbelievable sense of what the Corps was all about. Plus, just my own history of being with the Marine Corps for all of my life. And so I'm not embarrassed to say that there wasn't a general who knew more about the Marines. Now, there were people who knew more about specific items in the Marine Corps than I did by far, but I'm talking about the totality of the business of the business of our Corps. And that's not because of me. It was

because of this great opportunity I had. Equally, if not more important, the officers who worked on the FSPG also gained great knowledge. This was extremely important as many of them went on to become generals and leaders of our Corps.

DR. CRIST: On the FMF side, you approached it by first taking a look at the MEF and the four major components of the MEF, building each of those segments ground, air, support, and headquarters, and then once you came up with the to the strength of each of those, and the MEF, would essentially times two and a half and get the FMF strength of the Corps. It very much was a bottom up process.

GEN KRULAK: That's exactly how it was. We built a MEF. The term "the warfighter," "the warfighting MEF." Those are FSPG terms. That's where the MEF really gained strength. We came out of the FSPG and started articulating the importance of the warfighting MEF. If you don't have a warfighting MEF, you don't have a Marine Corps. What in the heck do you have a Marine Corps for if it isn't going to fight? So we built one warfighting MEF. We gave it what it needed to fight and win on a modern battlefield across the spectrum of conflict, and then we said we need two of them and a portion of the third.

DR. CRIST: Yeah, that gets to one of the interesting aspects to this, sir. I was hoping you could address this, is the idea of the-- this may tie into the MEB issue -- the MEF forward.

GEN KRULAK: Well, what we believe was that you didn't want to put too much out in the Pacific because you didn't have the lift to get them anywhere. In many ways, although we were forward deployed on Okinawa, we were also held captive by Okinawa. In times of crises we would not expect the Air Force or the Navy to deadhead ships or airplanes out to Okinawa to pick up that MEF. What we wanted to do was keep the force on Okinawa strong enough and big enough to do the job as the initial door kicker opener, and at the same time not be so dependent on external lift. So as long as the Navy kept amphibious ships out there, as long as the Air Force had some planes, and as long as we kept the 130s in theater, we felt that we could build III MEF to a size that could do what needed to be done.

DR. CRIST: How did you see the employment of III MEF?

GEN KRULAK: I envisioned them moving

forward followed up by their forces on Hawaii, followed up by I MEF. I never saw III MEF being committed alone. It would always have one of the other MEFs with it.

DR. CRIST: Yes, sir.

GEN KRULAK: Unless it was just something minor.

DR. CRIST: Yes, sir. A couple of other issues before we move on to the ground side, sir. One is one of the requirements--the idea that a MEF had to also serve as a joint headquarters or component headquarters. Was that possibility had to be included as part of a MEF structure?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I wanted to do that because I believed that we were moving towards a joint world. Goldwater-Nichols was a reality. That's how we were going to fight. If we as a Corps wanted to get in front of the bow wave, then we ought to build within the MEF the capability to be a joint task force headquarters.

DR. CRIST: At the same time, while we're talking about cutting the size of the force, in your FSPG report you advocated an increase of C3I within each MEF's headquarters, which you saw as a deficiency.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Marty Steele was the man who did most of the work on the C3I issues. He kept coming up against the brick wall formed by the lack of lack of command and control, and he just said, "We've got to do something about it. We're in the World War II mode when we need to be closer to Star Wars." He really drove those priorities in the FSPG.

DR. CRIST: One other minor issue, but I found it interesting, you went and looked at the 18th Airborne headquarters T/O. Find anything of interest in that visit?

GEN KRULAK: Well, certainly the way their intelligence was made an integral part of that headquarters--raised the intelligence officer to the level that we talk about, the "2," "3" and how important the "2" is. In the 18th Airborne Corps, you know, the "3" and the "2" are basically co-equal in many ways. And so the flow of intelligence and the kinds of equipment that were available is just one example. The FSPG ushered in widespread SatCom capability to the Marine Corps as a specific example of what came out of this

effort. Without the FSPG, you would not have much of the SatCom equipment we've got, nor the types and numbers of radios and the numbers of Com vehicles we have today. What you have now didn't just miraculously appear, and it certainly wasn't like this before the FSPG. The FSPG brought the Corps to this level of equipment.

DR. CRIST: Moving the Marine Corps really beyond WWMCCS to GCCS?

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: On the ground, the GC, the ground combat element of the MEF, there were some radical changes in the division structure examined, reducing it from 18,000 to 14,000, eliminating one regiment, infantry regiment, and standing up a combined arms regiment, cutting the number of tanks and this sort of thing, a large increase in the number of LAVs, for example. I wonder if you could just address the thought process on these?

GEN KRULAK: Well, it all goes back to this idea of the uncertainty of warfare in the 21st Century and the role of the Marine Corps in that world. Let's look at the role of tanks. Marty Steele is a tanker and was the only tanker ever to reach the rank of lieutenant general. We had the ultimate tank proponent working in the FSPG and he led the evaluation of our tank capability. The M-60A1 tank has certain capabilities; the M-1 has other capabilities. Could we trade two for one? We believed we could. The end result was the FSPG recommended that we cut 50 percent of the tanks in the Marine Corps. We then looked at our infantry regiments, and we realized that in good measure, the greatest protection we could give our troops was not better flack jackets and helmets, but agility and mobility, and that that would become even more important as warfare became more lethal. And so the idea of putting them into a regiment that could move, shoot, and communicate very quickly over extended distances, keeping you from having to go into the tooth of the enemy, but having a regiment that could move many kilometers in a very short period of time was critical. So we looked at the combined arms regiment as a way to bring Marines to the fight safely, make the enemy deal with more options and situations and just open up our ability and capacity to operate across the spectrum of conflict. We increased reconnaissance at the regimental level for the same reason. Everybody wanted battalion recon, and we were telling them they needed get above thinking about fighting as battalions. We were going to be fighting

in the joint and combined world, and we need to be able to give eyes and ears, not just to the battalion, but more importantly, the regimental, division, and MEF levels. We needed to use our people efficiently.

DR. CRIST: And I guess the combined arms regiment, while it had a lot more vehicles, had a lot fewer people than, say, the other two straight infantry regiments?

GEN KRULAK: But you had enough that you could mix and match, You'd be task-organizing. We had moved away as a Marine Corps from what makes us so special, and that's task organizing. We always thought of task organizing in the MAGTF. You'd take a mix of the FSSG, a unit of infantry, aviation, and some command and control and that's task organization. The FSPG went one step further and said you can task organize *within* an element of the MAGTF. As in Desert Storm where the 2d FSSG and the 1st FSSG were task organized into a Direct Support Command, and the General Support Command. Why can't we take a combined arms regiment and a regular regiment and task organize them to accomplish a mission? And that's what the combined arms regiment gave us.

DR. CRIST: Why -- since we're on the combined arms regiment, did it never come to fruition?

GEN KRULAK: No, because of the cost of the systems. We believed in it. We wanted it to happen. The Corps couldn't fund it. You are watching the United States Army go to a combined arms regiment now.

DR. CRIST: Four billion dollars worth of LAVs which they just purchased.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and they're going to do it, and it's too bad because we didn't.

DR. CRIST: On artillery, one of the interesting things was the idea of reducing the general support battalion within each regiment.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and the FSPG took away all of the mechanized artillery.

DR. CRIST: Yes, sir.

GEN KRULAK: Basically got rid of the general support artillery.

DR. CRIST: But advocated a MLRS battalion?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Which would be essentially a Marine Corps wide general support artillery?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Again, the MLRS battalion. Unfortunately the costs were overwhelming. The FSPG said, "You're missing the point. We don't care who gives it to us." Our view was we get it from the Army, and the Army was willing to do just that. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps stiffed them, and once the end game played out and the Army got cut and they were unwilling to give us the MLRS. It's interesting that, again, we're now going to rocket artillery. The beauty of the FSPG is it's all being validated. It took ten years, but look at what's being built. Whether it's being built in the Army or in the Marine Corps, we are going to have a FSPG Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: The study was sound.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: The ACE side was a reduction of fixed wing by 26 percent.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That caused a lot of heartburn. It reduced some squadrons, both rotary and fixed wing. We had to be very careful because by cutting the artillery, we put an extra burden on our aviation. It served as our flying artillery and so we had to be very careful about cutting our fixed wing aviation. It turns out that maintaining additional fixed wing aviation was probably a very smart thing to do. We ended up being able to put Marine aircraft squadrons on Navy ships, thereby assuring that during future cuts, Marine air would survive. Putting our air on Navy carriers also ensured that our aviation assets were forward deployed.

DR. CRIST: And on the OV-10 issue, I think you personally stated in one of the messages to General Mundy that, as proven in Desert Storm, the technology is only getting better with the RPV, the remote piloted vehicle. Which was going to give you the eyes the OV10 used to.

GEN KRULAK: That's right. The problem with doing away with the OV-10 was, for the first time in the history of the Marine Corps, we did away with an entire type, model, series, and all the people that went with it. What do you do with the Bronco pilot? What do you do with the Bronco engine mechanic? That was a massive personnel problem.

As we were drafting these recommendations, personnel were working on how to retrain all the people who would lose their jobs as a result of the FSPG.

DR. CRIST: You touch on something that I remember reading in your discussions with Admiral Owens, the idea that one of the smart byproducts of FSPG, eliminate OV-10s as the cost of Marine Corps aviation was reduced because we only had really a few airframes doing multiple missions.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that's right. It is the same concept that we're doing with the Joint Strike Fighter. Coming out of the FSPG was something called the neck down strategy. We wanted to reduce our aircraft to as few a type, model, and series as we could. Eventually this would result in the Hornet necking down to the Joint Strike Fighter, and the CH-53 and the 46 necking down to the V-22.

DR. CRIST: One last issue on the ACE. sir, before we move on, the Hawk batteries.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, Probably one of the most contentious, if not the most contentious issues because the Hawk community went crazy. We were going to eliminate them all, which we eventually did over time. We didn't during the FSPG because of the belief that the Corps would not get that kind of air defense from anyplace else. Desert Storm proved that there was a need for Hawk, and as it was so close to Desert Storm, it was difficult to argue. But no Hawk missile has ever been fired in anger. In today's TPFFDs, generated by the CinCs, there are no Hawk. With those two as a reality, the Corps eventually eliminated the Hawk.

There were a lot of other reasons why Hawk fell into the too difficult category. One of them was the military-industrial complex associated with Hawk. Hawk was the missile of choice for many of our NATO allies. So if we dropped out of Hawk, the I-Hawk would not be built. That would destroy the Hawk industry. The Secretary of Defense himself said you can't cut Hawk. That was it. . we kept Hawk until my Commandancy.

DR. CRIST: Service support, this must have been something you knew quite a bit about from your very recent experience. Did you see the concept as a DSC/GSC as something you could institute Corps-wide?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The bottom line was we felt that we could cut in some areas of the FSSG, but

we needed to “beef” up in motor transport, engineers and certain other areas. That was a result of studying the battlefield of the future. We needed to be agile and mobile. In order to insure agility and mobility, we needed engineers. So we talked about building up our engineers and direct motor transport assets and making cuts in other areas. Again, the idea that you could always bring the FSSGs together.

The over arching concept coming out of the FSPG needs to be understood. We looked at the Marine Corps as a “reservoir of capability.” There was no longer a I MEF, II MEF, and III MEF. It was a Marine Corps, and that if required, we would take from one MEF and task organized into another MEF. One of the slides on the FSPG brief was a reservoir , , , that reservoir was to indicate that all the Marine Corps could be utilized to meet a contingency. All we needed to understand is that task-organization would become a way of life. When a MEF is committed, a reservoir of capability backed it up. Quit worrying about I MEF, quit worrying about II MEF, quit worrying about III MEF. If you want six squadrons of F/A-18s, you are going to get them. We’re going to give them to you because they don’t belong to 3d MAW. They belong to the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: You would discuss the issue of task organizing within the MAGTF. Now, you’re taking a step further looking at tasks organizing the MEFs?

GEN KRULAK: That’s right. That’s right, and that’s what was the baseline concept behind the FSPG.

DR. CRIST: On the issue of the national military strategy, was the policy at the time that you were working with still to fight two major theater wars or was it to hold one and fight another?

GEN KRULAK: No, it was two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies, which didn’t drive the size of the Marine Corps. The size driver of the Marine Corps was the forward deployed forces--Okinawa and the MEUs. That was the driver. You had to have units out there, one just coming back and one getting ready to go. So it was a three for one.

DR. CRIST: One of interesting examples of the detail you got into with the FSPG was the size of the Marine Corps bands and the manpower savings by consolidation of bands.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: You have been a pioneer in the Marine Corps with your use of e-mail. By sending out your daily e-mail to general officers, you were able to get the entire senior leadership briefed daily on your work. This was the first time anything like that had been done.

GEN KRULAK: It was very interesting. The Marine Corps was not the most technologically advanced organization, and not a whole lot of generals were into the Internet and into e-mail. The first thing we had to do was provide each general officer something that he probably had not seen before and that was an e-mail address. Some of them were Internet savvy, others weren’t. Once we got them all on the same sheet of music, we started to send out daily updates. That proved to be critical because at the general officer symposium, when we finally got briefed the FSPG, there were no real surprises.

That general officer symposium was probably the best general officer symposium I ever went to. That’s insulting Chuck Krulak since I had the opportunity to run four of them. But I confess that particular general office symposium was absolutely the best. The first day of the symposium we met in the Rocking Chair Theater at Headquarters, Marine Corps, with the entire general officer corps of the Marine Corps. I made a very short introduction of the Force Structure Planning Effort, and then the talking head, better known as Tom Wilkerson got up and briefed USMC 2001, a concept for the employment of Marine Corps into the 21st Century, better known as the FSPG. That briefing lasted for a day, including questions and answers. The next day we broke down into groups and went to Bolling Air Force Base O’Club. There all of the generals broke into assigned groups . . . with each group was four members of the actual FSPG team . . . somebody from the GCE, ACE, CSE, and CE. The generals discussed the FSPG, what they liked, what they didn’t like and at the end of each day, we discussed their comments, and most of the time, they understood our answers. We made very, very few changes. The last day we were down at Quantico in the Marine Security Guard Battalion conference room with all of the generals. Each of the four groups of generals briefed out on what they felt about the FSPG.

We took all of their input, went back, and wrote the final report, which is about an inch thick. It was titled “The Marine Corps Force Structure Plan, the Final Report of the Force Structure Planning Group,” and it went to the Commandant. I

submitted it on the 1st of November to the Secretary of the General Staff. It went out of the Secretary of the General Staffs office three days later, on the 4th. It left the Chief of Staff/ACMC's office on the 5th, and General Mundy signed it on the 16th. I put a hand note on the report that said, "In addition to the concurrence of the co-chairman of the Executive Steering Committee, this document has also received concurrence, from Deputy Chief of Staff, M&RA for all manpower issues, Deputy Chief of Staff, I&L, Deputy Chief of Staff/Aviation. All concur." What we included in the report was detailed troop lists of exactly what the Corps would look like. Gen Mundy signed off on it, and with that sign off, we then built the manpower plan to achieve it. It was submitted to I&L, R&P. and everybody to start funding it. We had ourselves an executable plan. We then had to sell it external to the Corps.

DR. CRIST: You determined the number of Marines required was not 159.1 but 177?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: One thing that's unclear in the historical record is really what that additional 18,000 Marines--what we got for 177 that we didn't get at 159.

GEN KRULAK: Well, one thing you got K- Bay. We bought back capability. We had battalions that were gone. We were able to buy back some of the things that we had sold off. We helped in the Reserves. We bought back Reserves. All we did was incrementally buy back combat capability. We bought very little headquarters. We bought muscle back.

DR. CRIST: It was all FMF forces?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Is it true, that if we had gone to 159, we were talking about having to have rather than one year unaccompanied tour in Okinawa, maybe two years unaccompanied. With a 17% increase in an individuals deployments?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's correct, and all of those figures you just mentioned were ones that we used in the fight on the Hill. What was always interesting to me was I recall my dad and their efforts on the Hill, and the reality is the efforts that we put forth to selling the FSPG was in many ways similar to the effort that was offered by my father

and others during the National Security Act of 1947, and in the amendment to the Security Act in 1952 fights. And I'm sure that at times SecDef probably said, "Get those Marines off the Hill." because we really did go after it.

DR. CRIST: Yeah. But because you had done the rigor, the Marine Corps was far ahead of the other three services on this issue?

GEN KRULAK: They weren't even in the ballpark. They didn't know what hit them. Gen Mundy was right on when he commissioned the FSPG, and I'll tell you if he hadn't, we'd be operating from 159.1. We wouldn't be on Okinawa.

DR. CRIST: In fact, I had heard rumors that, you know, if the Marine Corps hadn't done a good job with this, we may not have bottomed out at 159?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. People don't understand how important this was and why General Mundy needs to be applauded for putting this thing together. Nobody else thought they were in trouble. We came out of Desert Storm. We won. It was great and I don't think General Mundy has received the credit he deserves.

DR. CRIST: You and General Wilkerson became the point men for the selling of this?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I don't know how many times I briefed the FSPG. In the hundreds. If I could get two people to listen, I'd brief them. I briefed it on the Hill almost every day for four or five months. I met with reporters. You name it. We just went out and talked. The bottom line was that years later John Shalikashvili said, "I was told two things when I took over as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from General Powell, and one of those things was don't fool with the Marine Corps." I remember giving the FSPG brief in the Chairman's briefing room in the tank and Colin Powell was impressed. Gen Mundy said to the Chairman, "I don't need you to approve this. I need your support to take it to SecDef and to the Hill." And Powell said, "You all did a magnificent job here. Do it!" And from then on it was Katie bar the door.

DR. CRIST: One thing we haven't discussed was the Reserve Force Structure Planning Group, headed by Major General John F. Cronin, and a Recruiting Force Structure Planning Group. I assumed these were linked to your FSPG?

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. But the three were not simultaneous. The RFSPG was formed after the FSPG. It was formed as a result of the FSPG. We realized that if the end state was going to be a Corps of 159.1 then we needed to also look at a total force Corps. Some of the capability that would be deleted from the regular Marine Corps would have to be filled by the Reserves in their role of augmenting the active duty. Additionally, we realized that the reductions anticipated would impact on Reserve so we needed to look at that also. We asked Gen Mundy for those two additional studies go, one of them looking at recruiting issues and the other at Reserve issues. Both of those went at the same time. The key to these three studies is that at the end, we were able to meld the results into a "ready relevant Corps" at 159.1K and the National Military Strategy capable force at 177K.

DR. CRIST: How was the 1991 FSPG was this initially received, particularly by the other services and the DoD?

GENERAL KRULAK: Well, they didn't know about it. We didn't articulate that on the 16th of December. We started building the articulation of the 177K force, and that process was what ended up being a sales job for a ready, relevant Corps of the 21st Century. The first thing we had to do was build the brief. The FSPG had a brief, a very detailed brief that took about an hour and a half to go through. So we had a brief. What we didn't have was what General Mundy called "the unassailable sale." He wanted an unassailable sale, one that would be hard hitting, would take anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour to give, depending on who audience. It had to be logical and based on rigor. And so we went about building that brief. When I say, "We went about building that brief," the principal architect was the Commandant himself, General Mundy. We went down to him with the full FSPG brief and took those portions of that brief that he gave a thumbs up to and with that as a start point, we started to build the unassailable sale. We would do that during the day.

In the evening, we would put our thoughts into slide format, and then the next day we would go down, and General Mundy would go through each slide. For the first few times, he'd just throw slides out and say, "No, I don't like that slide. Here. Let's change this." But slowly, we began to close in on a briefing that the Commandant would be satisfied with to take to the Hill, to the news media, to DoD or anyone. He would talk through each slide so that by the end, he was absolutely comfortable with the briefing and could give it in his sleep. Likewise, all

of us could. The bottom line was that over a period of many days and many hours we built this brief. The driver was the Commandant, General Mundy, and that the script writers were a general by the name of Krulak, and a colonel by the name of Wilkerson. We had a couple of other colonels, John LaHockey and Pete Metzger who helped us. But General Mundy did much of the work.

DR. CRIST: The briefings went well—unassailable?

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. It was an unassailable sale. At the end of every brief that I gave, whether it was to Department of Defense officials, the news media, staffers on the Hill, or the principals on the Hill, I never had a single person say, "Well, wait a minute. You know, this doesn't make sense," or, "I think you're asking for too much." Even Colin Powell, who was one of the authors of the bottom-up review, the 159,100 number said, "You make a tight pitch. I cannot do more than 159,100 because that's what the President directed, but I can promise you the Marine Corps will not go below 159.1." He said that because the brief was so persuasive.

DR. CRIST: So privately he agreed with the 177 number?

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Even with this, there was an approximate 20,000-man cut, with the 177 figure. Most of this came out of MidPac and WestPac units including Kaneohe Bay?

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Was that a hard sell to Senator Inouye that we're still going to have to draw down some in the Pacific?

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. Sen Inouye was really concerned about a conflict in the Far East, and so telling him about the importance of a capable Marine Corps was not that difficult. Inouye, in fact, turned out to be a great friend because he has always believed, like I do, that our future is in the Pacific. And so he was very supportive of our efforts. What we had to worry about was the treaty we have with Japan that says we won't go below a certain personnel level. As I indicated, the FSPG had to meet the national military strategy. Well, part of the national military strategy had to do with the force levels in Asia. So as we took cuts in Asia, we had to stay above the floor that had been

established by treaty. That caused us to take more forces out of MidPac then WestPac.

DR. CRIST: The 1st Brigade in Hawaii survived until 1994. Was the brigade in Hawaii part of that initial brigade headquarters elimination?

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. There was nothing secretive or hidden about that. It was just a matter of timing. We were going to take them down but not all at once. I would imagine that if truth be told, our discussions with Sen Inouye and his Executive Assistant Richard Collins led us to make that the last one to go, but the bottom line is it was always going to go.

DR. CRIST: I read that when General Mundy took over and he started looking at FY 91 POM, that under General Gray the end strength had already dropped down to the 170s, but they had just come out of the "pool" and it hadn't been a constructed or intentional draw down. True?

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. My grave concern, particularly after going through this tremendous rigor and knowing that if you went below 177, you would really start to fracture the Corps, was that we not continue the draw down and just go past 177. The key was to get the FSPG approved and get everybody on board and make sure that our manpower plan didn't go below the 177. That was critical. We probably were not entirely successful. I think we were unable to turn the ship quite as fast as we wanted to, and I think that we went down around 172,174 before we were able to stop the draw down.

DR. CRIST: That explains things that were happening at the time. For example 5th Battalion, 10th Marines was habitually C-3 in personnel the SORTS report.

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. You had the structure. The structure had not been taken out of the Corps, and so the staffing goal to fill that structure was at a percentage that made it impossible to man the Marine Corps properly.

DR. CRIST: How did the Marine Corps get reduced to 174?

GENERAL KRULAK: By January 1993, we were firm at 177. General Mundy came under intense pressure, and for a lot of good reasons, gave up 3,000 Marines. Perhaps the overriding reason was that most newspapers, and most other services kept

saying the Marine Corps won, the Marine Corps won. So there was some bad PR that the Marine Corps didn't "bleed enough."

DR. CRIST: When the Clinton administration came in, the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, ordered a bottom-up review. From what I've read, he patterned this effort very much after the one that the Marine Corps had pieced together because he had been so impressed with it as a member of Congress.

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. I had presented the FSPG brief to Aspin. He couldn't help but be impressed with it. General Mundy, in his wonderful manner, had fashioned this unassailable sale, and it was unassailable. Sen Aspin responded well to it. When he came in, I think he was looking for that from the other services and didn't get it. At some point in time, General Mundy was either approached by Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Navy to bleed a little bit more, and he accepted 174,000 for the Marine Corps.

In retrospect, that was a bad, thing to do, but I don't blame Gen Mundy. I'm just saying in retrospect -- I'm sure he feels the same way -- it was a bad thing to do. First off, it lost, to a degree the support of the Congress who had stuck with us at 177. The Congress had said, "You don't have to cut anything. We believe you. You've convinced us, 177," and they basically put it into law. We then stuck it to them by agreeing to 174. It turns out that the 174 put a tremendous squeeze on the Corps as the Cold War evaporated. Chaos began to reign around the world, and our deployments tripled. We knew we could do it at 177, but we didn't have 177. We had 174, and those 3,000 Marines ended up being desperately needed. This was one of the reasons, why several months before I left as the Commandant, I asked for another FSPG just to see if the numbers were what I thought they would be, which is 177. This FSPG also arrived at the 177 number. I gave this FSPG to my successor, General Jones. It was a document with the rigor to say 177 is the number for the Corps. I used it in my last testimony before Congress. I said we are short three to 5,000 Marines, and I need your help, Congress, to get them back. The response from the Congress was very positive. They recognized our problem. But they were also saying we told you so. We told you eight years ago.

DR. CRIST: If we could switch gears to the Navy, as I was going through your correspondence, the Navy seemed to have difficulties when they tried the same sort of FSPG at your and Gen Mundy's

urging. Was this due to the internal rice bowls within the Navy?

GENERAL KRULAK: It could be a couple of things. First, Gen Mundy had me go speak to the Navy about the FSPG and give them the full FSPG brief and tell them how we put it together and urge them to do the same thing. Gen Mundy and I both felt that we could really have a powerful Navy-Marine Corps team if we could get them, with the same kind of rigor, to build the Navy they needed to meet the national military strategy. The reality is that the Chief of Naval Operations is not like the Commandant. As a matter of fact, no service chief is like the Commandant of the Marines. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is far more powerful than the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Air Force, or the Chief of Naval Operations . . . quantum leaps more powerful. This is primarily because of our ethos and the way we are as Marines, our discipline, our belief in the chain of command, our absolute loyalty to the institution. Second, because no matter who the Commandant is, that individual realizes that he is just a person occupying a seat. The position deserves the respect and honor. The individual is just a Marine. Third, the simple fact that we're smaller and that the Commandant, when he articulates something, is articulating it to a smaller force. The word gets out quicker, and with more sting to it. And last, if not least, we don't have communities that are fiefdoms in their own right. Unlike the other services, Marines are Marines first. The Air Force has pilot and missilemen, the Navy has surface, and air, its Army has infantry, artillery, tanks etc. We just don't have those fiefdoms. We don't have multiple generals at the same rank within the Corps as the Commandant. Bottom line, the Navy just could not put it together. They couldn't put it together because of the fiefdoms. They couldn't put it together because the Chief of Naval Operations was not strong enough, and they couldn't put it together because they didn't see and have a sense of urgency. They didn't see themselves going down. They've always had a kind of conceit about themselves. They have this kind of conceit about themselves that says nobody else can do what we can do, so they're going to have a Navy no matter what. In many ways they're right. However, it's how big a Navy that counts.

DR. CRIST: It appears that during this period Admiral Kelso and the Navy seemed to be fighting change, fighting the idea of operating the littorals, not the blue water, and adjusting to the new

paradigm that they weren't going to be fighting the Soviet navy.

GENERAL KRULAK: Yes. And that was all because of the fiefdoms. If you are not going to fight the Soviet navy, then why do you need submarines? If you're not going to fly against the Backfire bomber and the Flogger, why do you need so many fighter squadrons. It is all tied into required capabilities for a war that wasn't going to be fought, and so they had a tough time coming to grips with that.

SESSION IX

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

From one-star to three-stars . . . Selection for Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command . . . Energizing Quantico . . . The Combat Development Process . . . Concept Based Requirements System . . . Commandant's Planning Guidance . . . Concerns over Values . . . UDP versus PCS . . . Relationship with Admiral Bill Owens . . . A-Z Seminars . . . Rethinking the Navy and Marine Corps for the 21st Century Combat Development Process . . . From the Sea . . . Operational Maneuver from the Sea . . . Culebra exercises . . . MPF 2000 . . . Modeling and Simulation for the Marine Corps . . . Disposition Authority for Tailhook . . . MAGTF Staff Training Program . . . John Dalton . . . "Trip to Hell" . . . Force structure and end-strength issues . . . Changes to Marine Corps Schools . . . Commander's Course . . . Total Quality Leadership.

DR CRIST: This is Session IX of an interview with General Charles Krulak. The date is 7 December 2000 and the location remains in the Generals office in Wilmington, Delaware. In June 1992, you were informed that you would be the new commanding general, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, a three-star billet. You were still a one-star at this time?

GEN KRULAK: I had been selected for two, but I was wearing one star. A general by the name of Royal N. Moore Jr. got into trouble, and as a result some decisions about who would take his place at FMFPac had to be made immediately. At that same time, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Joseph R. Dailey had received a tremendous job offer in the civilian world, and he was thinking of leaving.

As the Director of Personnel Management Division, I ran the general officer slate for the Commandant. So Gen Mundy asked me to build a slate that had a fill for FMFPac and a fill for MCCDC, because Gen Mundy was going to take the Commanding General, MCCDC, Gen Walter E. Boomer and make him the Assistant Commandant. I worked up a slate of options that had several generals moving. I ran the slate past my boss, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Lieutenant General Terry Cooper. I then went down to the Commandant and presented him four options. He sat at his desk and looked at all of these options while I stood there ready to take notes. He went through them all, and he said, "You're missing one option." That hurt me a bit because I felt we had looked at every viable option there was. I said,

"Well I apologize, if you can give me a name or names, I'll build that one for you." He said, "Well, you missed the obvious option." I replied, "What's that?" And he said, "General Krulak for CG, MCCDC." I said, "General Mundy, General Krulak is a one-star. CG MCCDC is a three-star billet. Unless you want to make it to two-stars, that isn't an option. And my recommendation, General Mundy, is with what you're trying to do at MCCDC, the absolute worst thing you could do would be to take the CG to two-stars." Gen Mundy said, "I could not agree more. I am deeply involved in building MCCDC into the Combat Development Command it should and must remain a three-star command." Then he added, "I still say you're missing the option, and that option is General Krulak." So I went upstairs and made out another option and took it into General Cooper. He said, "That's the best option I've seen." I then took it down to the Commandant, and the next thing I knew, I was a three-star general. I don't know whether my rapid promotion angered anybody or not. All I know is that a lot of people came up to me and congratulated me, and all of them said it was a natural choice, and so that's how I became CG, MCCDC.

DR. CRIST: And you were probably the most surprised person in the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: Nobody was more surprised than me. I absolutely did not anticipate that promotion. My belief was that there were other options; and I presented them. The Krulak option never entered my mind.

DR. CRIST: The confirmation hearings for promotion to three-star were in August 1992. Anything stand out in your mind about them? You were asked a number of questions relating to amphib shipping and MEBs.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. amphibious ship issues played a major role. I was very frustrated because we were back to talking MEB equivalence and not talking about capability. When I got to MCCDC, I worked very hard to do away with the idea of MEBs and talk in terms of MEFs or, in the case of amphibious, how much square and cube you needed. That drove the number of ships, not MEB equivalents, and so while in the confirmation hearings, I press for "three MEB's worth," in my mind I was really thinking about the amount of square and cube needed to transport that type of capability.

DR. CRIST: Which was three MEBs or really a MEF equivalent.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: On 24 August 1992, you pinned on the three-stars.

GEN KRULAK: The only thing I would say about that day was that my mom and dad were at the ceremony. It was a phenomenal feeling to be promoted to the same rank that my dad had held, and to be assuming command at Quantico, Virginia, where I was born. It was a very special day.

DR. CRIST: Any specific guidance from the Commandant on what he wanted to you to do down at MCCDC? You seem to me to have already been working a lot of these issues already.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. His guidance was typically General Mundy, "Go down and make MCCDC work." In order to make MCCDC work, you had to bring to MCCDC the sense that they were going to be the change agents for the Marine Corps. MCCDC was going to become, once again, the soul of the Marine Corps. More than the crossroads, it was going to be the soul of the Marine Corps. The place where the Marine Corps looked for doctrinal solutions, for tactical solutions, for operational solutions, for manpower solutions, for organizational solutions, for equipment solutions, for training solutions, educational solutions. Marines would look towards the soul of the Corps, which is MCCDC.

The first day at work I brought all of the

officers at Quantico into the theater. I explained to them the vision for MCCDC, and that they had an unbelievable opportunity to be a part of something very special. They were about to see the officer strength of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command increase by a third, and that MCCDC was going to really be a vibrant place. Instead of saying, "Oh, this is Sleepy Hollow. Let's go out and play golf," MCCDC was really going to be a fast moving train, and that I wanted them to get onboard. Then I dismissed all of the officers but the colonels, and asked them to move to the front of the theater. They came down in the front row, and I said, "You all are the Senate of the Marine Corps. You are like the senators. This train that I mentioned is rolling down the tracks, and by tomorrow it'll be going 50 miles an hour. The day after tomorrow, it's going to be going 90 miles an hour. You're either going to be on the train or not. There will be no harm and no foul if, in the next 24 hours, you drop me a note that says: one, I'd like to retire or, two, I'd like PCS orders. I promise you, you can either retire or you can take the PCS orders and I will do everything in my power to get you to the duty station you want to go to. But you need to understand that there is no place at Quantico for a colonel who is unwilling to work as hard as a PFC, a staff sergeant, a captain at The Basic School, a major at AWS or Command and Staff. I'm going to expect that of you will be leaders. I'm not going to get in your way. You're going to have an unbelievable opportunity. But if you are tired, if you are at the end of your career and Quantico was the place you were coming to take off your pack then this will be pure misery for you. So you've got 24 hours. Give me your resignations if that's what you want, your retirement if that's what you want, or your request for orders."

The next morning at 06:30, I went out to the main gate in Quantico, Virginia and waved traffic with the troops on the gate and stayed there till 08:30 in the morning. That afternoon, starting at 16:00, I went to the back gate and waved cars out and watched, and I did that for the next week.

DR. CRIST: Every morning?

GEN KRULAK: Every morning and every evening, and it got to the point that you would see cars making U turns to get to the other gate because they didn't want to be seen leaving MCCDC early. Finally, people realized that this little guy is serious. The train is going. Some left, some retired, but most stayed and were magnificent. These colonels really got on board and did superb jobs. The bar was set high and they all got over the bar.

DR. CRIST: So you did not bring in your own people to help build this?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: You worked with people that you had?

GEN KRULAK: I made it a point it throughout my career, of not bringing my own people with me to do a job. If I brought anybody, it would only be one person, and everybody knew who that would be.

DR. CRIST: Colonel Russ Appleton.

GEN KRULAK: Colonel Russ Appleton. For whatever reason, he and I have a Vulcan mind meld. He knows what I'm thinking, and he is not afraid to tell me when I'm wrong. He's a man of great integrity, and I trust him implicitly.

DR. CRIST: The Marine Corps Campaign Plan went away and was replaced by the Marine Corps Combat Development Process, which you spearheaded its development. What was the Combat Development Process?

GEN KRULAK: I wish I could take credit for the Combat Development Process, CDP, but the true brains behind the CDP was a colonel by the name of Marty Steele. Col Steele ended up as a lieutenant general in the Marine Corps. Col Steele, with a little help from his friends, built the process that integrates doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and the supporting establishment. Let me give you an example. A tank. The Marine Corps decides we're going to have a M-1 tank. How do you insure that, on day one, when that tank is introduced into the FMF there is a doctrine that tells how to take advantage of the unbelievable leap in capability that comes with that tank? How do you organize tank units? Because of the tank's greater capability, do you need as many as the current M-60A1? How do you insure that you've identified, recruited, and trained the individuals to operate this brand new system? How do you identify the amount and numbers to support equipment that maybe needed, the spare parts that are needed. Who ensures that the operating manuals are written? Who writes the tactical manuals or how to employ the new tanks? And finally, how do you coordinate the hard-stand, the concrete base, the building that this new, bigger tank is going to go into. How do you ensure that when the tank finally hits the FMF, you don't have this beautiful piece of equipment, but no doctrine, no training for the people, no spare parts? How do you do that? At the time, the Marine

Corps had no way. The Marine Corps way was called luck and that luck normally turned out to be bad luck. We weren't doing it. It was terrible.

The Combat Development Process was intended to take DOTES, doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support, and coordinate those elements and integrate them so that when a new system was introduced everything was ready. Additionally, it went beyond equipment. If you had a requirement, could that requirement be met by changing doctrine or tactics? Could that need be filled by more people or people trained differently? Were there other ways to skin the cat, so to speak? That's what the Combat Development Process did.

The central point of the Combat Development Process is that it fit within something called the Concept Based Requirement System, CBRS. Every requirement that would drive the Combat Development Process to generate doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support had to be based on a concept. Our concept is the concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea. This was a major undertaking because it meant that requirements had to come to Quantico: aviation requirements; ground requirements; CSSE requirements; command element requirements; the POM process, all of those things.

DR. CRIST: The PPBS fit down there?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Came down to MCCDC, and so MCCDC became a very complex place to work, an unbelievably difficult job. It was difficult to work because the span of effort was so great, but it was made more difficult because of our own little barons who hated giving up some of their influence, whether it was aviation, ground, CSSE. They were always saying to Gen Mundy, "You're giving up too much to MCCDC."

DR. CRIST: This would be up at Headquarters, Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Of all the jobs I had in the Marine Corps, without question, CG, MCCDC was the most difficult. I worked seven days a week. I'd put in 16 hours a day during the week, Saturday probably eight or nine, and then on Sunday, maybe four or five. I must have gone up and down I-95 between Washington and Quantico ten times a week. I averaged over one trip a day. It was very exhausting.

Plus, I had to keep Gen Mundy totally in the loop to protect him from the barons who were saying, "Hey, you're giving too much to MCCDC." So every Sunday night I would sit down and type

him an e-mail which eventually became known as MCCDC updates. I'd say, "Here's what we've done." He was the Commandant. Chuck Krulak was one of his lieutenants. I didn't run the Marine Corps. MCCDC didn't run the Marine Corps. The Commandant ran the Marine Corps. I just was helping him just like any other of his major supporting commanders out there. Nobody looked at FMFLant and said, "Hey, CG, FMFLant is running the Marine Corps," or FMFPac. The point was, Carl Mundy ran the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: This is a real paradigm shift in the way the Marine Corps did business, trying to tie this all together.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The term that Marty Steele used was "holistic." It was a holistic look at the business of the business of the Marine Corps. At the center of this holistic effort was the integrator, and the integrator was an organization at MCCDC called WDID, the Warfighting Development Integration Division. It was headed by Mary Steele as a colonel. All the other leaders of the various organizations were colonels too, but Marty had 1.1 votes. As the integrator, he broke all ties. His office was right down the hall from mine, and so I was intimately involved in all of his efforts. My deputy was General Zinni, Major General Tony Zinni. He would have been great as a Deputy because he had been at MCCDC and knew MCCDC. But Tony kept getting pulled away to go to Somalia and other places. To compound this problem, I was without a President of the Marine Corps University, General Pete Pace, for months because he also went to Somalia. So in the midst of trying to put MCCDC and the CDP together, I was without my right hand, Tony Zinni, and without the President of the Marine Corps University. These two "loses" caused an increase in span of control that needed to be addressed.

DR. CRIST: Which I'm sure impacted when you became Commandant on your push to increase the number of general officers?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely.

DR. CRIST: How did the Navy fit into the Combat Development Process?

GEN KRULAK: Just like we tried to do with the FSPG, we tried to get the Navy to come along with us and build the same kind of process. Their initial problem was that to have a concept based requirement system, you needed to have an

operational concept. They didn't have it. Today they still don't have an operational concept. They have nothing that is akin to Operational Maneuver From the Sea. So they had no way to build a CDP, and their CNO was not interested in doing it. The Under Secretary of the Navy at that time was a gentleman by the name of Richard Danzig. Mr. Danzig later became the Secretary of the Navy. He understood and appreciated the concept base requirement system and the Combat Development Process. The DepSecDep, John Deutsche, understood and appreciated the concept based requirement system and the Combat Development Process, but getting any other service or getting anybody else to employ it was a nonstarter.

DR. CRIST: It seems like a common sense approach?

GEN KRULAK: Well, today under General Jones we see a dismantling of MCCDC. For whatever reason, requirements have moved back up to Headquarters, Marine Corps. The barons are back up at Headquarters Marine Corps with DC/S AIR as the ACE sponsor and PP&O as the GCE sponsor. So the soul of the Combat Development Process no longer exists. WDID himself is dual hatted. He has an office at Headquarters and an office at MCCDC. So, the logic of General Gray, who first saw the vision of MCCDC; General Mundy, who translated the vision into reality; and myself as the CG of MCCDC and then at the Commandant, trying to move the vision forward, has come to a halt. I'm not sure why.

But the power of the process was phenomenal. I think that in many ways it was just never fully understood by the Marine Corps and was looked upon as a threat to some of the MATGF elements. Additionally, I think that many did not feel MCCDC was responsive. You kept on hearing that "it takes too long; it's not responsive." People did not understand that it wasn't intended to be responsive. It was intended to bring together and integrate warfighting capability for the FMF in a manner that had never been done before. If they didn't think that it was important to have the ability to put mine clearing equipment into the hands of the Marines during Desert Storm or to build CBIRF or to bring new boots and new body armor, to our Marines, at the time, in the right quantities and to the right place, then they missed the power and the rationale of MCCDC.

DR. CRIST: Why was it seen as a threat to the MAGTF?

GEN KRULAK: Because they lost their "sponsors." The sponsor became the commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, not the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation or the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installation and Logistics or the Deputy Chief of Staff for PP&O. So they didn't feel like they had somebody that they could go to whose total focus was on them. That's well and good. It made them feel good. Unfortunately that's why we've paid an absolutely terrible price in every war, and in every training evolution, without having a coordinated effort bringing along doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support.

DR. CRIST: And you end up like the other services ...

GEN KRULAK: That's exactly where we are today.

DR. CRIST: Interesting. You mentioned in one of your updates for General Mundy on 7 August 1993 e-mail that for "the first time, all of the elements of the Combat Development Process came into focus" regarding the development of a new anti-armor concept. I wonder if you could discuss that, as an example of how the CDP worked in reality?

GEN KRULAK: Again, I gave the example of the tank. As I mentioned, Marty Steele was armor officer, and he said "Look. We've got some anti-armor capability; we've got the TOW missile, and the LAW, but no real anti-tank operational concept. We need to develop that concept to ensure we have identified our requirements in that critical area." So they wrote an anti-armor concept, and out of that came the idea of the HAW/MAW/LAW . . . the long-range, medium-range, and the short-range missile. They then described the capabilities and requirements to meet the concept needed and what systems might fill those requirements. They then looked at the money available, where we could buy the system, and how much of each system was needed. Next we started writing the doctrine and tactics for employing the concept. We started training people. We were going to have a new system called the Javelin. We would need to recruit people into that MOS or train current Marines for the new system. We were going to need to have simulators for them. All of that came together, and we built it. It was proof positive of what could happen if the CBRS and CDP were allowed to work. We were able to get funding for these systems because we were able to show the Congress how it all fit together. It was a perfect

example of the CPD in action.

DR. CRIST: And the AAAV and the V-22?

GEN KRULAK: Unfortunately, we went with the V-22 before we had a concept for employment. I was very uncomfortable with that. I believed that we needed to first articulate a concept, but the requirement for the V-22 was laid out years before. The concept we finally articulated Operational Maneuver from the Sea . . . over the horizon, don't hit the enemy where he is but hit him where he isn't. To do this the Corps needed a long-range capability, both lift, surface and air. As you started to build new concepts, it would automatically drive doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support. With a concept, you could then successfully articulate to Congress why you needed this V-22.

DR. CRIST: You'd mentioned that you used MCCDC and the Combat Development Process to push the Marine Corps towards the 21st Century.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. As we looked at the new and changing environment which was driving our new and changing concepts, we believed this would eventually take us into the 21st Century.

DR. CRIST: One of the baseline documents that you had called for in 1993 was the Commandant's Planning Guidance, which you thought should be written by every new commandant within his first six months. How did this differ from the Campaign Plans the Marine Corps had produced? How did this then fit into the Combat Development Process?

GEN KRULAK: Well, the Commandant's Planning Guidance was intended to be the driver of The Concept Based Requirement System. It would be the intent of the Commandant for the Marine Corps during that Commandant's four years. It would be specific enough in the area of DOTES (doctrine, organization, training, equipment and support) that it would help guide the combat developers, the concept writers to achieve the end state that the Commandant wanted for the Marine Corps. The campaign plan was something that was important, but should be derived from the commander's intent, not precede the commander's intent. My own belief was that zero to six months was too long; as I indicated earlier, you only have one year to get it going. So you'd better have it ready when you hit the street. That's why I published mine on 1 July 1995.

DR. CRIST: Right. General Mundy never really produced one, did he?

GEN KRULAK: No. Both General Boomer and I tried to get one for him. When I took over MCCDC, I was called up to the ACMC's office and sat down with General Boomer to draft an outline for a CPG to be issued by Gen Mundy. Unfortunately, it was already too late in his tenure. We, in fact, wrote one, and General Mundy, the gentleman that he is, said, "Gee, that's a nice job."

DR. CRIST: I have heard some comment that Gen Mundy provided you with broad guidance, but that General Krulak drove the agenda, again noting that you did all this with the Commandant's approval?

GEN KRULAK: That does a disservice to General Mundy. I was probably General Mundy's Russ Appleton. I think that he and I had a Vulcan mind meld, that he was very comfortable with giving me commander's intent. It was my responsibility to go back to him regularly and tell him what I was doing to carry out his guidance. He was comfortable with that arrangement. I doubt if any Commandant has ever gotten weekly feedback from one of his generals. There were times when he would pick up the phone and say, "Go slow here or speed up there." Most of the time there would be some comment like, "Keep on whirling, young Dervish!" Sometimes I would not hear back from him, and on occasion he would e-mail to me, "I know you think I'm probably not reading these. I am. Silence is consent."

DR. CRIST: Yes I noticed many of his replies to your e-mail updates ended with "Press on, young Whirling Dervish."

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The term "Whirling Dervish" was given to me by Tom Wilkerson in front of General Mundy. I guess a Dervish that whirled is probably more like the Tasmanian devil. I don't know, but it stuck with me.

DR. CRIST: In General Mundy's oral history he mentioned a particular mess night at The Basic School, where he saw some skits which he found objectionable, and it raised questions in his mind about the state of values and ethics in the Marine Corps. The next day he e-mailed you asking what should the Corps do about this. Your reply was very interesting in light of your initiatives on this as Commandant on strengthen ethics. In this case you said, "teach the lieutenants the value of being an officer and a gentleman." Do you recall this?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. This was just before I became GG, MCCDC. General Mundy went down to a mess night at TBS. Apparently they had started a routine that, after the mess night, the officers would retire to various classrooms where skits would take place. These skits became more and more professional in nature. By that I mean they were accompanied by videotapes and music. Well he visited one of the skits. It started off talking about the infantry . . . that the infantry is that place in the Marine Corps where the rubber meets the road. They had projected on a movie screen, a picture of a road with white broken lines going down the center of the road. Slowly the camera honed in on a prophylactic laying across the white line, "where the rubber meets the road." There were young women lieutenants present, as well as males, and it really got General Mundy upset. The skits went downhill from there. He called me up and told me what happened and asked me "What do we do?" This incident reinforced in my mind the idea that some of the negative aspects of contemporary society were creeping into the Marine Corps, and that we, as a Corps, needed to insure accountability of our people. Although we couldn't change society and the values that came with society, we could, in fact, laminate our values on our officers and on our enlisted and hold those officers and enlisted accountable. When I got down to MCCDC, a lot of things changed at The Basic School.

DR CRIST: You developed the mentoring program for lieutenants?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and my wife started having tea at the house. Some people scoffed at the idea of a tea, but every wife of a lieutenant would come to our house, and my wife would serve tea, and afterward, she would hold school. She would teach about the responsibility of being the wife of an officer and a gentleman. So there was a lot of effort going on multiple fronts. It sounds anachronistic. It wasn't. It was futuristic. It was the understanding of my father's comment about, being "a breed apart." At a time when the other services were going in one direction, we went in another. We took a hard line and stuck to our ethos and stuck to our twin touchstones of valor and values. We didn't lose; we won.

DR. CRIST: Essentially you did with the officers what you would later do with the enlisted with the Crucible.

GEN KRULAK: That's correct.

DR. CRIST: Another one of the offshoots of all your efforts during this period, at MCCDG and even before with the FSPG, was the unit deployment program (UDP) and permanent change of station study, which you headed at CG, MCCDC. This focused on UDP versus PCS, permanent change of station for those stationed in Japan, resulted in at least one squadron being permanently moved to Futenma. What were the issues involved as far as the UDP versus a permanently PCS of Marines in Okinawa, Japan?

GEN KRULAK: That's a good question because the reality was that by doing so, we went against the rigor and methodology of the FSPG. The FSPG based our 177K on the requirements for UDP, the rotation of forces. Everybody was concerned, to include General Mundy, that we were making a mistake. That walking down this road, we were on a slippery slope that would eventually end up with people saying, we didn't need 177. You need to remember that we weren't at 177. We were at 174, and we were beginning to show major strain, particularly in the aviation community. I asked the Commandant to do a study of UDP versus PCS to see what kind of savings we could get if we took selected units and PCS them to WestPac. The answer was the op tempo/pers tempo ratio of certain units, particularly helicopter and fixed wing, had jumped because of the cut from 177 to 174. Even with the PCS we were just barely able to get the op temp/pers tempo ratio back to where we were at the end of the FSPG. So what we did by PCSing people to WestPac was to expand the base of available people to man our squadrons, both fixed wing and rotary wing, and it worked. It did not cause us to lose any end strength, and it was a good thing to do.

DR. CRIST: Change gears a bit, sir. You had an interesting relationship with the N8, Admiral Bill Owens. You were the first Commanding General, MCCDC to have a close working relationship with your counterpart N8. In this case it was Admiral Owens, then Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources and Programs. From October 1992 to May of 1993, you had a series of off-line meetings which became known as the Owens-Krulak seminars which were important in coordinating the Navy's agenda with the Marine Corps to make up for some of these problems that you've illuminated before.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The Owens-Krulak seminars. We called them the A to Z seminars because we covered everything from A to Z. First let me say

something about Bill Owens. Bill Owens is brilliant. Bill Owens is morally courageous. Bill Owens was a prophet that was not recognized in his own land. He was disliked. Bill Owens was not real popular within his own service at some levels because of his "out-of-the-box" thinking, and because the N8 had subsumed the stovepipes of naval aviation and submarines, et cetera. So just like Marines were worried about the CG, MCCDC having too much power, the Navy was worried that the N8 had too much power. Couple that power with the strength of Owens' mind and his relationships with members of the OSD staff and the joint staff and the Hill, and he scared some of the more traditional admirals.

My role at MCCDC, as I indicated, was not just the head of the Combat Development Process, but also requirements and programs came under me. So I was Owens' counterpart, and it didn't take long to realize: (1) that he was a formidable individual, and (2) in many ways, he and I saw the future the same. We both realized that if we wanted to make an impact on DOD policy, we could best make it with a united Navy/MC front. Even in the tank with the four Joint Chiefs voting, if the CMC and the CNO had concurrence on something, that was two votes out of the four right there. So what we tried to do was build consensus on some of the very tough issues that were facing the Navy and the Marine Corps. Those issues included the lack of an operational concept for the Navy at the high end of the spectrum, to things such as Marine aircraft on Navy carriers.

We kept minutes. Normally in attendance were Owens and myself, and then representatives from various communities, but always aviation, both Navy and Marine Corps. Others might move in and out as needed, whether it was manpower or the equivalent of our programmers.

DR. CRIST: It seems you had dealings with Admiral Owens beyond these formal meetings?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I would go up once or twice a week and have breakfast with Bill around six o'clock in the morning. So you can imagine what time I'd leave Quantico in order to get up there. I would try to schedule some of my meetings up in Washington around that time, but often I would find myself driving back down to Quantico only to turn around in the afternoon and drive back up to Washington for some other meetings.

DR. CRIST: You had hit on a couple of issues you discussed. I wonder if we could just go through a few of them. First of all, integration of Navy and

Marine Corps aviation, that centered on Marine Corps F/A-18s on the carriers?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The Navy desperately wanted the Marine Corps to put F/A-18s on the big decks of the Navy carriers. The Marine Corps didn't want to do that because they felt they would lose control over those aircraft. I was one who believed that we ought to put them on the aircraft carrier, and my rationale was probably quite different than anybody else's. My rationale was you were saving Marine aviation by putting them on the carrier. . . that, in fact, the carrier would be the first thing committed, and nothing would be better for the Marine Corps than to have pictures of Marine aircraft flying first strike missions against the enemy. I harkened back to history, where in Korea and in World War II, the way we got our air to the fight was on carriers, not flight ferrying them over. They went on small deck carriers, and that appealed to me. I wanted to make sure we did it and that when it came time to cut aviation, which I felt was a good possibility, I wanted Marine aviation being actively employed. The only way you could assure that was to put our F/A-18s on carriers. General Mundy agreed, and so we started putting our aircraft on Navy ships.

One of the things I really wanted to do, but couldn't accomplish was to get the Navy to agree that if we put F/A-18 on their carriers, they would let us command the carrier air group. Bill Owens was for doing that. But that was a bridge too far for the Navy. The bottom line was we put Marine air on Navy ships and it turned out to be a very good thing. We protected our squadrons. In fact, our squadrons did great work in the crises that emerged later.

DR. CRIST: Was there an agreement also, that in the event of a conflict, those Marine aircraft would be designated to close air support?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Part of the agreement was that if and when you got into a major fight, a Desert Storm type fight, and the Marine Corps needed the aircraft, that they would either be dedicated or they would come ashore and the Navy would backfill the deck.

DR. CRIST: One of the interesting issues debated during these A-Z meetings was the merging of the two services' PME schools--Command and Staff and the Naval War College.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We looked at a whole host of training issues to include merging the Boot Camps.

Nothing was sacred; nothing was off the table. Once it got on the table, you could shoot at it, but it was allowed to get to the table.

DR. CRIST: Naval Doctrine Command.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Did that emerge from some of these discussions?

GEN KRULAK: No. That was something that first arose under Acting Secretary or Interim Secretary, Sean O'Keefe. The fact of the matter is there was no Navy MCCDC. The Navy's answer to MCCDC was to form Naval Doctrine Command and ask the Marine Corps play in the Naval Doctrine Command. So we put some colonels down at the command, but it never really was effective. It never had the confidence of the Navy. We played with them and tried to support them, but it was a nonstarter from the beginning. Admiral Jay L. Johnson killed it.

DR. CRIST: One of the things that came out of your meetings with Adm Owens was discussion on the Navy's linkage of 11 carrier battle groups as the equivalent of 159,000 strength Marine Corps. What was this about, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, Bill Owens came into one of the A to Z meetings trying to equate their 11 carrier battle groups with our hard line stance regarding our end strength. He said, "Look, you guys have put a stake in the sand on your end strength. We're going to do that on the carriers." My only point to Bill was a point of caution. When we went to Desert Storm we deployed almost 90 percent of the FMF in either Saudi Arabia or managing instability around the globe. In case of the Navy, even at the worst stage, they only had 45 percent of the Navy carriers being employed. So I said, "Be careful . . ." and here I was going to the issue of rigor of your analysis . . . "Be careful because you go up on the Hill and haven't done a rigorous analysis, i.e., a FSPG type of analysis, you're not going to have the numbers to back up your claim, and they're going to destroy you." Instead of having 11 they could say, "Well, you're right. The percentage is 43 percent, and therefore, you should only have six." I said, "Is that what you want to do, Bill?" And he said no.

DR. CRIST: That tied into the whole problem of the Navy as an institution not having done the rigor themselves at the time.

GEN KRULAK: That's correct.

DR. CRIST: Another issue raised in your meetings with Adm Owens was the flexible MEU option. What was that?

GEN KRULAK: This was an idea that not only Bill Owens pushed, but I pushed. Instead of looking at the centerpiece of the Navy being just the carrier, suppose you looked at the centerpiece of a battle group also being a big deck amphib; that if you could have 11 or 12 carries and 11 or 12 big deck amphib., you would have, for the 21st Century, 24 battle groups that had within them fixed wing and rotary wing. The LHDs having first the AV-8, to be followed by the VSTOL version of the Joint Strike Fighter. You would have a deck, maybe not as big as the *Kennedy* or the *Truman*, but big enough to carry a squadron's worth of aircraft. That squadron would fight in most initial battles until another carrier could steam to the hot spot. So have 24 battle groups all over the world. The only hang-up was that Owens, in his study, had a MEU of about 1,200 Marines. That was not big enough. It is an issue that was pursued long after Bill Owens went down to be the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact, their briefings when I was the Commandant would talk about different ways to look at the big deck amphib and what kind of capability it was going to bring to the nation.

DR. CRIST: Because then you'd have aircraft on the amphib with the same capabilities as the ones on the aircraft carrier?

GEN KRULAK: And with the stealth to do first strike missions.

DR. CRIST: Did the issue of the F-18 E/F versus the Joint Strike Fighter come up in these meetings or was that later?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that was later.

DR. CRIST: One other issue that I noticed revamping of the AV-8B?

GEN KRULAK: The AV-8B remanufacture program was to give an upgrade in the wings, computer systems, radar, and cockpit configuration. It was very expensive but very necessary. If you're going to get the AV-8B to fly into the 21st Century and allow us to hold on until we got the Joint Strike Fighter, you had to do something to make the AV-8 a more capable war fighting system. This involved not only the radar, but also its night/day capability.

So the AV-8B upgrade was critical. We did it at some consternation to the Navy because it cost money out of the aviation portion of the Department of Navy budget. The trouble with the AV-8 was that early on in the program there was not enough money to really make the AV-8 a first rate strike warfighter. Additionally, the engines built by Rolls Royce were a problem. Throughout my commandancy those engines and other malfunctions caused me a lot of heartache because we lost a number of Marines flying the aircraft.

DR. CRIST: The date is 14 December 2000 and we continue our session with General Krulak's about his period as CG, MCCDC. Sir, before we move on any additional thoughts about what we have discussed thus far?

GEN KRULAK: Well, I've already mentioned that the Combat Development Process was a very difficult process for the Corps to understand. It is important to note that this was true for the leadership of the Corps. On numerous occasions, to include General Officers' Symposiums, when Marty Steele would brief the CDP, people would kid him. People used to say that the best time to get any sleep during GOs' symposium was during the CDP brief. Unfortunately, because it was so difficult to understand and so complex, a lot of people didn't have faith that it would work. The reality, it would. In many ways it set us apart from the other services. I think I mentioned before, when the new administration came in, when John Deutsche and Secretary Parry and Secretary Dalton and Under Secretary Danzig joined the department, all of them came down to MCCDC, and all were tremendously impressed with what was going on. General Steele used to mention that sometimes he felt--like Jesus being a prophet in his own land. Everybody else understood exactly what he was trying to do, and yet the Marine Corps didn't. The bottom line is that the CDP is a very complex and difficult system, but one if given the opportunity, can make a major difference for our Corps. Unfortunately, the new CMC has turned his back on the CDP.

DR. CRIST: Was their opposition against it based upon the complexity of it and their failure to understand it, or was it more just bureaucratic intransigence?

GEN KRULAK: It was a combination of the two. Perhaps the complexity and the lack of understanding were used as an excuse for the bureaucratic intransigence. The idea of having aviation requirements or logistic requirements down at

Quantico vice up at Headquarters probably didn't sit well with the barons in those particular areas.

DR. CRIST: Let's move on to the concept of "From the Sea," Later called "Forward from the Sea."

GEN KRULAK: Yes

DR. CRIST: On 28 September 1992, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of the Navy signed a joint Navy-Marine Corps white paper entitled "From the Sea" which would have evolved into the concepts I just mentioned and serve as the guide for the Marine Corps, out to 2015, essentially the next 20 years or over 20 years from that point. You took a leading role in developing this concept and writing it and implementing it as Commandant. I wonder if you could give a history of how this idea came about and your role in pushing it within the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: Well, "From the Sea" really came out of an effort by Sean O'Keefe and Danzig and a bunch of other people to develop a naval vision of warfare in the 21st century. That was in the '92 time frame. Part of why it was developed was the FSPG. In that effort we looked at the national military strategy, looked at what the future was going to bring. It made us realize that as the bipolar world went away, the requirement for fighting massive Soviet fleets had basically gone away. In reality we saw that the future was the dirty little wars that we're seeing right now along the littorals of the world. Somehow we had to come to grips with that; more importantly, have the Navy come to grips with it. So what we got from the Navy secretariat, the Department of the Navy, was the encouragement, with support from General Mundy and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Kelso, to go ahead and put a group together that would draft a naval strategy that looked at the littorals as the battle space. That group was put together and on a day-to-day basis; the head Marine in the project there was Tom Wilkerson. Tom was one of the great thinkers in our Corps. By then he had achieved flag rank. He was a brigadier general.

We used, in many ways, the same methodologies as FSPG. I mention that because instead of locking everybody up at Quantico, we locked them all up at CNA. They very quickly became a close-knit group who worked daily for long hours. We wanted to develop the same sense of camaraderie and mission orientation that we had in the FSPG. If we got that, then the parochialism, not just Navy-Marine Corps, but subs, surface, air would go away. I went up early in the deliberation and gave the FSPG pitch, to

include how we built the FSPG so that they could understand that they were not breaking new ground; that people had done this and had been successful at this kind of non-parochial thinking; and that by dint of the fact that they were supported by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, that they should feel comfortable in change. The end result was "From the Sea," which was a sea state change for the Navy. It took them from blue water to brown water. People thought, we'd never be able to pull that off, and the reality is we did. The Marine Corps, because we believed in the concept based requirement system and the Combat Development Process, immediately developed a concept out of From the Sea. That concept was "Operational Maneuver from the Sea."

Many people have said, "Hey, you got it wrong. You had the V-22. You had the AAV, and they were already on the drawing boards before you had this concept. So you don't have a concept based requirement system." And there's some truth to that. The flip side though is a far more powerful truth. That is neither the V-22, the Osprey, or the AAV was getting anywhere, and the reason they weren't getting anywhere was that the Marine Corps and the Navy could not articulate those weapon systems in the context of how they would be used operationally in a 21st century force. Once we had "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" and people saw the context of those two systems, the third leg of the triad being the LCAC, then people realized that these are valued systems. The end result was far greater support for the V-22 and for the AAV.

Again, my belief is that much of that support came from the successful development of Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

DR. CRIST: How long did they meet at CNA as they were developing this, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I would say 90 days, but I can't be perfectly sure. I remember it was a pretty long time. It was, again, the belief that like the FSPG, if you could isolate people, keep them away from their day-to-day work and give them a sense of doing what was right for the Department of the Navy, you could come to closure fairly rapidly. That's what happened.

DR CRIST: Was any of these ideas, focusing on the littorals or the Forward from the Sea, bandied about, before Desert Storm, or was this something that really developed in the consciousness after people were looking at a post Cold War world?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, it happened after Desert Storm, and in fact, Desert Storm was in some way a

hindrance to this type of thing because everybody was focused on massive land and air warfare and the use of carrier battle groups and the sea lines of communications and everything. People would say, "How can you be talking about brown water when we had all of this maritime shipping and supplies and sea lines of communications and carrier battle groups involved in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. So rather than being an aid to futuristic thinking, it was the opposite. It was proof that you still needed massive carrier battle groups.

DR. CRIST: What about the idea of maneuver warfare? How did that impact the development of Operational Maneuver from the Sea?

GEN KRULAK: Well, maneuver warfare had a major impact. Going back to General Gray and his belief in the concepts and tenets of maneuver warfare. It is more than just movement, but maneuver warfare is a thought process, a way of thinking about conflict. The sense that it was not units, whether at sea or on the ground, moving at a rapid pace, but rather, the thought processes that, combined with the agility of the systems, would allow you to succeed on the modern battlefield. And so maneuver warfare played a major role in Operational Maneuver from the Sea. It played a major role in future thinking about how you train. The training required the strategic corporal--to be able to fight and win in an environment that had commander's intent as the driving factor. It played a major role.

DR. CRIST: Those must have been difficult concepts to get across to the Navy, I would think.

GEN KRULAK: Very difficult, and to say that we were successful would be a very large overstatement. Their view of maneuver warfare had more to do with battle space and the ability to expand areas to attack, et cetera, vice equally, if not more importantly, the issue of commander's intent and a mindset of agility in maneuver. At the end, I was very, very happy and proud of the Navy, and certainly the members of the From the Sea working group that bought into our concept of maneuver.

DR. CRIST: From what I gather, Admiral Kelso seemed to pay some lip service From the Sea, but it really wasn't until a successor, Admiral Boorda, came along that the Navy really started to embrace this. Is that a fair assessment, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I think that's a pretty fair assessment. I think what happened was that lessons from the bottom-up review, the ever-increasing

tightness of the budget caused Admiral Boorda and the Navy to realize they had to do something different. I will say that during my time at MCCDC and during the time that I had a relationship with Bill Owens, about once a month Owens and I would go to dinner. That dinner would normally be established or set up by some lobbyists in Washington. At those dinners would be Senators, whether it was John Warner or some people off of the Senate Armed Services Committee or a Trent Lott, people like that who had a very big interest in the Navy. We would eat dinner with them, and we would talk about the future and talk about From the Sea. It was a very informal way to gain support on the Hill for a Navy-Marine Corps team. So even as we were trying to sell the 177,000 Marine Corps, we were also engaged in selling a future Navy and Marine Corps.

This interview is the first time anybody will have heard about those meetings. We had about seven of them with some very senior members of the Congress of the United States, particularly in the Senate. Those dinners would be spent with Bill and I taking about five minutes to describe where we were as the Navy and as the Marine Corps." Then we'd discuss "From the Sea." We wanted to show that we were thinking about the future. Trying to get the idea that the staid old Navy and the staid old Marine Corps were really going to lead the charge into the 21st century. Those proved to be very successful dinners and were forerunners of what I did as the Commandant with my congressional breakfasts. Except instead of having three or four Senators, I'd have them one at a time. After the five or ten-minute introduction that Bill and I would give, then all of the rest of the time would be question and answer from the Senators.

DR. CRIST: What was their reaction to these meetings?

GEN KRULAK: They enjoyed it. They liked having that kind of relationship with two people who were not service chiefs, but were right below, and spoke with candor. It would all be off the record. So they would use facts and figures that we would give them at their hearings and to their own benefit. The idea of 12-carrier battle groups and 12 Amphibious Ready Groups; those words were planted and reinforced every time we met. People used to say that we'd never get 12 big decks. Yet when I became the Commandant, and Bill Owens went down to be the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, there was never any real fight over the need for 12 big deck amphibians. It was almost a given. It was almost a given because of all the groundwork that had been done during the time that we held those dinners.

DR. CRIST: So you were able to use this to advance not only From the Sea as an agenda, but also dovetailed nicely into maintaining the 177 . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Is it also fair to say that Operational Maneuver from the Sea helped save the AAV and particularly the V-22?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Operational Maneuver from the Sea gave us a concept on which to run a series of war games and a series of computer runs on how quickly we could build forces ashore to execute sustained operation ashore or a deep strike and pull out. How fast we could build up forces, how deep we could go, how expanded the battle space could be. We had none of that in a statistical format to prove the thesis that we needed this aircraft called the V-22 or this amphibian called the advanced amphibious assault vehicle. OMFTS and the war games gave us that rigor. With the rigor that came from the multiple runs and calculations, we were able to sell the need and the requirement. And once we had the requirement and we had the concept, the rest was history.

DR. CRIST: That's right. These war games you mentioned, I suppose the most important of them would have been your Culebra exercises?

GEN KRULAK: Yes

DR. CRIST: Was that the first cut at this?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Culebra came from the concept that was used years and years ago in the inter war years where the Marine Corps developed the concept behind amphibious warfare. What I wanted to do was put a name onto the series of war games that would inspire the Marine Corps to reach back into their history and do the same thing for that 21st century that was done after World War I. Culebra was the name we used, and in many ways I think it achieved what we wanted it to achieve.

DR. CRIST: You ran the Culebra series of war games from 29 November to 4 December 1992. Was there a specific aspect of Operational Maneuver from the Sea you focused on in those or was it testing the . . .

GEN KRULAK: Testing the whole. Once again, trying to find out where the long poles in the tent were. We came up with some of the more obvious problems, one of them being naval surface fire support, and another was in the area of logistics.

Marines love to be warriors and love to fight. Yet one of the things that benefited me as the Second Force Service Support Group CG during Desert Storm was this deep understanding of the role of logistics in war fighting. And so my biggest concern coming out of Culebra had nothing to do with can we fight and win on the modern battlefield, but can we sustain the fight. As a result, it drove us towards looking at maritime prepositioning forces not only as currently envisioned, but more importantly MPF 2000 and what we were going to look like in the next century.

DR. CRIST: Could you describe MPF 2000?

GEN KRULAK: This was the thought that as you introduce forces into a theater, you had to have tremendous agility. So you would have new equipment. The first thing needed was to take the available shipping we have right now and make sure that we had a MEU set and MEF forward set, identified and loaded on the MPF. In the long term we needed a very fast, 40 or 50-knot MPF ship or ships followed by a kind of mother ship that would sit over the horizon and be able to sustain in a large-scale. That's MPF 2000 in a nutshell.

DR. CRIST: Well, the concern on logistics was being able to support these long distances?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What about the idea of how much of a footprint you have ashore, sir, as far as logistics goes?

GEN KRULAK: Well, you wanted, whenever possible, to not put too large a footprint ashore. General Tony Zinni, during Somalia, was very effective in that, keeping his logistics offshore. He called logistics on shore "a self-licking ice cream cone." In other words, as you put your logistics on shore, a large portion of that logistics effort was self-consuming as you supported the people who had to defend it. So if you didn't put a lot on shore, you didn't have to worry about defending it. Using assets to defend your assets. "A self-licking ice cream cone." This was part of the thought process behind sea borne logistics.

DR. CRIST: When you're looking at the next iteration of MPF, and we discussed this before, MPF under the present configuration has to be a pretty benign environment?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: It can't be a forcible entry?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Were you looking at changing that at all?

GEN KRULAK: Not really. I mean, I always thought that MPF, if done in Operational Maneuver from the Sea, would move fairly quickly with forces, but the off-load would always require a benign environment. Our point was, hopefully in the year 2015, the idea of having to have a pier would go away because the ships that we would have would be ones that would be easily off-loaded in stream.

DR. CRIST: Where did you undertake the Culebra experience? Was it at Ellis Hall?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, Ellis Hall. I thought that was very appropriate because Ellis was such a thinker. Those war games were critical. At the end we had all the Navy flags and Marine flags get together for the final session. We really had some good dialogue about the strengths and the weaknesses of From the Sea and the Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Then we went into executive session and, again, got great support from Admiral Kelso and General Mundy; got great support from Bill Owens. The Director of these war games was Brigadier General Zinni who had a great mind, and did a super job.

I will tell you that I took very much of a back seat during the executive sessions. Although I sat at the head table as the CG at MCCDC, I deferred almost 100 percent to General Mundy, General Boomer, and to Admiral Kelso, and even Bill Owens. Bill played a major role. I did that for many reasons. Perhaps the most important was the idea that has proven so successful for the Marine Corps. That idea is that the Marine Corps speaks with the one voice, and that voice is the Commandant. So when the Commandant is in the room, that's the guy who leads the Corps, and General Mundy did a super job.

DR. CRIST: You e-mailed General Mundy weekly during this time?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: In fact, I think forced him to get on e-mail.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It's interesting that if you go back through those series of e-mails to General Mundy they reflect my thought processes. I was maturing as a general. As I sat down at the computer

to write those, I would do a lot of thinking about how I wanted to articulate to General Mundy what we were doing and in some cases why because, again, I think his leadership style was very much "do what needs to be done and keep me informed." That's what the e-mails were all about. When people say General Krulak came into the commandancy and immediately started taking , it was not really true. The reality was I knew where I wanted to go because, on a weekly basis, I had sent those e-mails to Gen Mundy. I had thought many of the issues through.

What was interesting is none of it was done thinking that I was going to be the Commandant. As I indicated, I did not think that was going to be the case.

DR. CRIST: A couple of last things that I don't want to beat the Operational Maneuver from the Sea to death, but there's a bit of a dearth in the historical record.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: So I think this interview will be important to try to fill those holes for future historians and planners. Was there a joint aspect to Operational Maneuver from the Sea? And what was the joint community's reaction to this move by the Navy and Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: There was an obvious sense that we would fight in a joint/combined arena. That was a recognized issue and one that did, in fact, play in Operational Maneuver from the Sea and drove capabilities that were required to fight and win in the joint environment. One of those would be the JTF enabler. JTF enabler is the command and control package that allows the forward deployed commander to immediately assume the role of the JTF commander and hold that role or pass it off when the theater matured a bit. JTF enabler is a good example of what I'm talking about. Another example is an effort spearheaded by Gen Steele when he was PP&O. Gen Steel developed the concept that we would have specialists, foreign area officer specialists, who would be very well attuned to certain areas of the world with both their thinking and their language. Those officers would be developed to work within the headquarters of the Marine Corps for deployed forces and serve in the joint combined capacity. So there was an obvious understanding that there would be a joint side and a combined side to Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

DR. CRIST: Was Operational Maneuver from the Sea envisioned solely as ship to shore and an

amphibious doctrine or did you view it as a doctrine for operations on the land, sir?

GEN KRULAK: People who look at Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and think of it primarily as ship to shore just haven't read the document. Operational Maneuver from the Sea is not--I say again *not* a ship to shore document. It is an umbrella document that takes into account movement from the port of embarkation across the sea lines of communication into the littorals. It talks about fighting in the littorals, avoiding the concentrations of the enemy. It talks about the obvious requirement at times to do sustained operations ashore. It talks about building temporary facilities ashore. The idea that you would build an expeditionary airfield as an example. That was always anticipated under Operational Maneuver from the Sea. The whole idea in Operational Maneuver From the Sea was to have the capability to strike in depth and to unhinge the enemy, to provide the force to kick in the door and allow for follow on forces. I think that those who somehow are inventing in their minds or on paper a different view of what Operational Maneuver from the Sea are missing the point of OMFTS. I read the article printed in the, December 8, 2000 edition of *Navy-Marine Corps Times* where they raised that issue and had two of our general officers talking about Operational Maneuver from the Sea in the context that it was strictly ship to shore. I was very surprised by who were making the comments because they knew better. I mean, John Goodman, for crying out loud was the head of the MSTP and knew Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and so what he was saying was 180 out from what he knew. And then Bill Whitlow knew better than that. Again, I'm not sure why they articulated OMFTS in the way they did, but the bottom line is it was never envisioned as a mono-line method of war fighting. OMFTS had multiple concepts that ran the gamut of warfare.

DR. CRIST: Here is an e-mail you wrote on 22 April 1994, in it you discussed the use of modeling and simulation to validate Operational Maneuver from the Sea and other concepts you were working on at MCCDC. It jumps ahead a little bit in our time line, but I wonder if you could just talk a bit about the issues addressed in that e-mail, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I was trying to rally support around the use of modeling and simulation for the Marine Corps, not just in the context that one normally thinks of modeling and simulation, but also what modeling and simulation might bring to the Marine Corps in the way of decision tools as we move into a different command and control scenario, as envisioned by

some of the experimentation we did during Hunter Warrior and Urban Warrior. The idea to command and control forces in the 21st century with "reach-back" capability. Most of the modeling and simulation system could be used in training and, if needed, could be taken to sea or brought on shore to assist in developing schemes of maneuver for the individual commander. That was one portion of that e-mail.

The second part of the e-mail was to gain support from the Congress of the United States and the Department of Defense and to some extent the joint arena, to show them that, we were not second-class citizens. As a matter of fact, except for perhaps the Army, we were the strongest players in M&S, and if we really pushed it, and if we had the types of resources the Army had, we'd be number one. And so we used a lot of the M&S briefings to staffers on the Hill in order to leverage dollars out of the Hill and also out of the Department of Defense. The bottom line was we were very successful in doing that. Again, whereas the Army had a two-star general doing their M&S effort, we had a young colonel, a colonel by the name of John Kline. I knew John Kline well because he served as one of the helicopter commanders for HMX-1 when I was in the White House. John used to fly President Reagan and President Bush. I knew what caliber of person he was and what kind of mind he had. So when he came to Quantico, he took over M&S and did a magnificent job. He was absolutely general officer quality, absolutely general officer quality. Regrettably, he didn't get selected and left the Corps. He then ran for Congress from the State of Minnesota on two occasions in a very, very Democratic district. He lost by about 1,000 votes. I believe that years from now John Kline will be a congressman with a great understanding of the Marine Corps. It will be positive for us.

DR. CRIST: Switching gears a bit, sir, 14 December 1992, you were designated as the disposition authority for any allegations against Marine Corps officers arising from the Department of Defense IG investigation into the 1991 Tailhook Association symposium in Las Vegas--the infamous Tailhook convention. From what I gather from the documents, this would occupy a tremendous amount of your time over the next year. I wonder what do you recall about this--let's start off with your appointment as the point man for the Marine Corps on dealing with the allegations against 22 Marine Corps officers.

GEN KRULAK: Obviously Tailhook was very much in the news. It was a black eye for the Navy and a black eye for the Marine Corps. I believe that

my relationship with the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant had given me the deserved or undeserved reputation as being a straight arrow and someone who would not be questioned as to fairness, integrity or candor. I was appointed the "central disposition authority," the CDA. I absolutely could have done without this one! I was already very, very busy, working both as a CG MCCDC and running P&R for the Marine Corps. I was traveling from Quantico to Washington seven to ten times a week! This was something I did not need on my plate. So when General Mundy called up and asked me to do it, I said, "Aye-aye, sir, I'll do it," but I told him, "We're busy." And he said, "I know you're busy, but this is important."

Once I took the responsibility as the CDA, I decided to go 180° from the way my Navy counterpart, at that time Vice Admiral Paul J. Reason, handled it for the Navy. He went after those officers who were closest to the fire. His first investigations, his first interviews, his first dispositions were aimed at the junior officers. My belief was and I know it was shared with General Mundy--was that if we were to deal with this in a professional way, we needed to address the leadership first. We needed to address the colonels and lieutenant colonels before we looked at the young lieutenant and captains. So my focus went immediately to the senior officers who were involved in Tailhook. That remained my focus the whole time. If one were to look back at the people who were held accountable in the Marine Corps, they were the group and squadron commanders. In the simplest of terms those leaders who were culpable were called in front of me, given their non-punitive letter of caution that basically told them, "You need to resign." We lost some great, great officers. All of them were promotable. One of them, unbeknownst to anybody, had already been selected to BG. He lost his generalship and left the Marine Corps. All of them paid a terrible price. That was not necessarily known to everybody but was known to the hierarchy of the Marine Corps. So it had a very sobering effect. I think our actions were looked on favorably by the American people and by the Department of Defense.

The one person who really was of grave concern was an individual by the name of Gregory J. Bonam. He was the only officer to literally be tabbed as a person who assaulted somebody. In this case, he was tagged as the person who assaulted Paula Coughlin. He denied it. There was very little evidence against him other than her statements, and they were a bit fuzzy. So I decided that the only way to substantiate the innocence of this officer was to take this one all the way to an Article 32. All along he bitterly denied the allegation and said, "I need to clear myself." And I said, "Okay. We're going to give you an Article 32,

but you need to understand that I'm going to make that public. It is going to be a public, and it's going to be hard. So if there's something you want to tell me, you'd best tell me now because this thing is going to be played out in front of the American people because I want them to know that we are open, and above board. Integrity is the watchword of our Corps." And he said, "I understand that." The bottom line was in the Article 32, evidence came out that proved Greg Bonam innocent.

I then called Paula and asked her to come see me at Quantico. I had her up to my office. She arrived and was very thankful that I had invited her up. I sat her down, and said, "I want to be the one to look you in the eye to tell you that early next week I am going to announce to the media and provide to the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps my decision vis-à-vis the Article 32 on Greg Bonam, and that decision is that I am going to dismiss the charges. I then told her, "This in no way lessens what happened to you and my disgust over what happened and the disgust of the Marine Corps and the Navy over what happened." It is our belief though that it was not Greg Bonham. She cried. She broke down and cried. I'm sure from frustration that she couldn't get some kind of closure on this. She was glad that an innocent officer didn't get in trouble. At the end, she was thankful. That was kind of the culminating point for Tailhook.

DR. CRIST: She seemed convinced that it was Captain Bonham. What was the evidence that led the Article 32 hearing and you that it wasn't Bonham?

GEN KRULAK: Because she described the assailant and exactly what he was wearing. As fortune would have it, Bonham was photographed several times during that evening, and when we took her description of her assailant and matched it up against the photographs of Bonham, he was not wearing what she had identified he'd be wearing, down to and including his watch. That plus his adamant denial saying "Look" I wasn't there. I was not in the gauntlet. I was at this location," and other people had spotted him and talked to him at the time in question. But the key was her own description of the person who did this to her. It just didn't fit him. It may have fitted his physical features, but a lot of people could fit the physical features. But the distinctive clothes that he was wearing vis-à-vis what she claimed just didn't fit.

DR. CRIST: In the press there were a lot of rumors spread about Lieutenant Coughlin. She had been drinking that night, had engaged in leg shaving,

What's your observation on those, sir? First of all, were those rumors even true?

GEN KRULAK: Nothing could excuse what was done to her. I believe she probably had been drinking but nothing excuses what took place. In talking points to her, I recognized her role in Tailhook but also her moral courage and perseverance in seeing this thing to the end. I mean she could have folded, but she believed she had been maltreated. If she had her legs shaved, that doesn't give anybody the right to grab her breast or grab her crotch. I've got to tell you I was impressed with her. I mean, she was a solid citizen and had a lot of moral courage and a lot of guts.

DR. CRIST: When you first started looking at Tailhook were you shocked by what you found, what had happened there?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, it was gross. It was gross, and there's no excuse for officers in the United States Marine Corps or in the Navy to conduct themselves in the way that they did. At the same time, as I made my decisions, I had to put them in the context of not post Tailhook, but in the context of the environment at the time. There was a lot of drinking at Tailhook. There were women dancing bare-breasted. But that was something that was done in O. Clubs and E. Clubs around the Navy and the Marine Corps. That's just the way things were, at that time. You could not judge somebody post Tailhook by a post Tailhook criteria without at least taking into account what the environment was pre-Tailhook and during Tailhook. And so that was the fine line I was walking. The world was disgusted with the conduct, and it was easy to be a Monday morning quarterback. However, I couldn't afford to do that. That caused difficulties in my dealings with both General Mundy and the Secretary of the Navy. I had to ensure that both understood that I just didn't bring these Marine officers in and talk about what happened at Tailhook, but also what was the environment before Tailhook and what was the environment during Tailhook. What actions did you think you should have taken then? Then ask what actions do you think would take now? All of those things came into play when I made my decisions.

DR. CRIST: What do you think was the causes that led up to this sort of behavior? They had been institutional behavior for some time.

GEN KRULAK: I believe you probably could trace the cause back to coming out of the Vietnam conflict and dealing with a different type of individual,

somebody that got into the military, fought in the war, and may not have been the sharpest or shiniest button in the box. He stayed in the Marine Corps and influenced succeeding generation of officers. Then we had Desert Storm. Our aviation community was very successful. They punished the enemy with very few losses. Feeling invincible, they rolled out of that war to Tailhook . . . it was an incident waiting to happen.

DR. CRIST: What was the main failure of the senior leadership that you went after?

GEN KRULAK: The failure of the senior leadership was to preside over activities that, even in that day, should have raised their eyebrows. I mean, these were married men for the most part, and to be in rooms where there was strippers and people putting squadron stickers on breasts and buttocks and paying for oral sex . . . any commander should have known that was wrong and taken action. No matter how much fun you were having at Tailhook, you're a Marine Corps officer. These actions should have sounded some warning bells in their minds. That was the biggest disappointment I saw.

DR. CRIST: You must have been in a pretty tight spot. On one hand you have people under political pressure and demanding that somebody get hung for this. On the other aspect you have, particularly with the junior officers of the Marine Corps saying, "Hey senior officers have been doing this. Why are you dragging these young lieutenants and captains in?"

GEN KRULAK: I know this might sound surprising, but neither one of those cases bothered me. The pressure from above absolutely didn't bother me, and I think that Secretary Dalton and General Mundy realized it wouldn't. I very rarely heard from them. And the pressure from below, the young officer saying, "Boy, there's a witch hunt." I went back to my father's thoughts on why we have a Corps. We have one because the American people believe in us and believe in us in an almost mystical way. Yes, my actions might cause some problems with the junior offices, but the bigger problem would come if we ever lost the confidence of the American people.

DR. CRIST: You spent, I read in your papers, four to five hours with each one of these officers?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What did you take away from those meetings?

GEN KRULAK: A couple of things. One, a sense of how far we had fallen. A sense of how an alarm bell should have sounded. Unfortunately we had become desensitized by our environment. You cross the international dateline; you take off your wedding band. It was a shock to me that we had let things slip as far as we had. So that was the first thing that hit me on an individual basis. Then the second was the widespread sense that this was really not that bad; that even as you read the Tailhook report, a lot of people in the Navy and the Marine Corps said, "So what?" That disturbed me. However, on the flip side was the willingness of our officer corps, once it happened, to be held accountable. I didn't have any captains or lieutenants or lieutenant colonels or colonels whining. They weren't looking for excuses. They were prepared to accept their punishment, and those that lost their star or eagle and ended up retiring, those who had their careers shortened did so because they believed that they needed to do that in order to make the Corps healthy. Those I charged to go back and tell their story, in fact, did just that and were very effective in their wings and squadrons. So there were some good things to come out of it, as well as the bad. What it did helped me to do, again, was to realize that, although General Mundy had already started to take steps towards reinstituting the ethos of the Corps, we had continued to move forward.

DR CRIST: So this really reinforced your notion we need to reemphasize values?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: We may want to cut this out of the draft, but there was some criticism leveled at the Navy and Marine Corps that it was okay for this to be done in the Philippines but when it was done in the States against American women, somehow the military had a problem with that. Do you recall any of that?

GEN KRULAK: No. I don't recall that, although that goes to the international dateline and the wedding band issue. The attitude was that Tailhook was somehow immune to what was socially acceptable. Those who attended Tailhook were vaccinated against proper conduct of an officer and a gentleman.

DR. CRIST: Yes, in fact, in one of your letters to Secretary Dalton, you even pointed out that a lot of these officers deliberately left their wives at home, and that's with the notion that we're going to Tailhook, and it's okay to have adultery and essentially do everything that Marine Corps knows is wrong.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Is it true that a couple of years after you closed the investigation on Tailhook, that two of the officers that had been found acquitted of any wrongdoing but had been initially implicated, were selected for promotion but had their names removed off the list by the Secretary of the Navy, and you, called the Secretary of the Navy and said this is wrong? Is that a true story, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. There was a system of flags that were put up at both the Department of Defense and at the Senate Armed Services Committee. If you attended Tailhook, this flag came up and it was an automatic removal from the promotion list. We had two officers pulled off the list. To me that was unfair. It put the Marine Corps and the central disposition authority, in this case myself, in the untenable situation of having somebody question our integrity and question the Corps' integrity. Once the Marine Corps decided this was the way we were going to handle it, I believed it was wrong to then go back and pull these people off the list basically to add to the punishment.

So when I heard that had happened, I called Secretary Dalton and with very little emotion told him that I could not remain on active duty with this happening. Such action basically said that he and the Congress had no faith in my judgment and that I had somehow made the wrong call. I said, "I'm prepared retire before I'll have one of these Marines taken off the list. So if that's what you want. If you want me to retire, I will, but you know, I can't sit idly by and watch these people taking off the list." And he said, "Okay." I don't want you to retire." We talked at great length, and he restored the two officers to the list.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on Tailhook?

GEN KRULAK: It was a long, long, arduous experience that took a lot of preparation. Again, kudos go out to Colonel Dave Hague, who was my Staff Judge Advocate. He was my right-hand man during Tailhook and just did a magnificent job.

DR. CRIST: Okay, sir. On 29 December 1992, General Mundy released his green letter 3-92, MAGTF Staff Training Program, which grew out of some initiatives you were taking in Quantico at the time. What was the MAGTF Staff Training Program, sir?

GEN KRULAK: The MSTP was a tool to teach and educate the MEF staff on war fighting. It was taken

from a program that the Army had instituted called the BCTP. We shamelessly stole the idea from the Army and built the MSTP. The sole purpose was to educate the MEF commander and his staff on how to fight the MEF. We hired a retired lieutenant general by the name of Ernie Cheatham to serve as the "gray beard" for the MSTP. Subsequently retired generals such as Ron Christmas, Norm Ehlert and Jim Brabham all came to work as representatives of the MAGTF. It was a scenario driven, staff planning effort that had an evaluation of the action of the commander and his staff. It did not produce a report card--rather, it was an educational experience. The MSTP first went to the MEF, did the education, then ran an exercise, and that was Phase 1. Then they would go back for Phase 2 and a Phase 3. It was a very good method of honing the war fighting skills at the MEF level.

DR. CRIST: One of the other issues you addressed while Commanding General, MCCDC, was the decision to deploy Marine FA-18 aircraft on the carriers, on Navy carriers. How did this come about?

GEN KRULAK: Well that came about from the A to Z meetings with Bill Owens. The Navy was losing squadrons, and they didn't want to leave their decks uncovered because if you uncovered the decks, then the carrier itself came up for grabs. If we could get Marine aircraft on the decks, then we'd be able to hold onto the carriers. The Marine Corps was not enthralled about the idea. Again, they were concerned that by putting our planes on the decks, if we did sustain combat operations ashore, our aircraft would be on Navy ships and we could not use them. I addressed the issue from a historical context. If you want to be known as a war fighter, you've got to be there when the fight begins. The best way to do that is to be there with amphibious forces and with air forces. The way to get our air into the fight, just like we did at Guadalcanal or in Korea, is on Navy shipping. So neither Gen Mundy nor I had any trouble with putting Marine squadrons aboard carriers. We did so with the guarantee that if we went ashore for a sustained period of time, the air would come with us. It protected our aircraft. It gave our pilots a skill that they didn't normally acquire, carrier landings. As it turned out, the Navy really loved us on board the ship and our Marines had a good time. So it turned out to be a good thing.

DR. CRIST: In April 1993, you learned that John Dalton would be appointed the next Secretary of the Navy. Was he a Naval Academy classmate of yours?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, he was my classmate. I didn't know him very well because the brigade of

midshipmen was divided into two regiments, a first regiment and a second regiment. He was in the second regiment. I was in the first. So we rarely saw each other. But I did know him. He was a very smart midshipman; fairly athletic, a soccer player; religious, he was in the Officer Christian Fellowship at the Naval Academy. I remembered him as a smart, well liked and admired midshipman.

DR. CRIST: Effective Secretary of the Navy do you think, sir?

GEN KRULAK: John Dalton in many ways was a misunderstood Secretary of the Navy because of all the issues that he faced during his tenure. He faced all of the social issues, whether it was women in the military or Tailhook or a number of other issues. What people didn't know and understand about John Dalton was that he is a man of great integrity, and what they saw as bending to the political will was John Dalton's belief in doing what he felt was right. I mean he did believe in women in the military. He did believe in accountability. He did want to hold people accountable. He did not like sexual harassment. He did not see the Navy or the Marine Corps as an old boys club, and he stuck to his guns. We in the Marine Corps may not like everything he did, but as the CG of MCCDC and then the CG MarForPac and then the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I liked knowing that he was constant in his basic beliefs. You knew where he stood, and I admired his principles. Lots of people thought that he and I were great friends and Naval Academy classmates and I was a "shoe in" for the commandancy because of that.

The reality is, as I mentioned, I hardly knew the man. I didn't always agree with what he had to say and what he did, but I believed his heart was in the right place. He was a political animal, no question about that. I mean he was a political animal, but most appointees are. That's to be expected, and you just deal with that.

DR. CRIST: During your time at MCCDC, one of the things that struck me going through your papers was the number of VIP visits, from staffers to principles from the Senate Armed Services and House Armed Services Committee. Was this a deliberate plan to pull them down to Quantico in order to show them what the Corps was doing?

GEN KRULAK: Well, I think it was an attempt by General Mundy to use Quantico as a training base that only took a half a day to visit. You could literally get members or staffers to see a MAGTF exercise in just a few hours, particularly if you flew them down

by helicopter. No other service had that ability. In order to go see the Army you had to go down to Fort Benning. That was a two-day evolution. Well, you can't take people out of Congress for two days. This way we could.

We had interesting things to show them. We had OCS. We had The Basic School. We had all of our schools. We had MAGTF exercises that we could put on, and we had the Combat Development Process to show them. So Quantico offered a great deal to General Mundy from a show and tell standpoint. Yes, we did a lot of VIP tours.

DR. CRIST: Yes, you seem to be the point man for a lot of that.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The most enjoyable VIP tours though were the two or three times when General Mundy himself would come down on a weekend. I'd be in the office on a Saturday and there'd be a knock at the swinging door. The door would open up, and it would be General Mundy, and he'd be down getting a haircut or something like that. He'd come in, and for an hour it would be an opportunity to sit down and really talk over where he wanted us to go and let me have an opportunity to update him without being surrounded by a whole bunch of the headquarters staff or my staff. Although the VIP visits were important, the most important visits to me were these ad hoc visits by General Mundy.

DR. CRIST: Speaking of General Mundy, on May 15th, 1993, you e-mailed General Mundy about your French Army staff meetings that had been held in Quantico. What was the purpose of this sir? How did this rapprochement with the French come about?

GEN KRULAK: Well, it's kind of interesting because I read an article that General Jones sent out just a short while ago saying that he had been successful in opening training back up in France. That was interesting to me because, unless it just closed down, we had been opening up training with the French since General Mundy's initiatives with the French staff talks! The reality is that we never stopped training. I think that Pete Pace would be somewhat taken aback to hear that we hadn't been training because as CG, MarForLant, he had done training in France. So I'm not sure what Gen Jones was talking about. The French are important people on the continent. They may not be the best loved by some but they are important. They're important to America. They've always been important to America from our Revolutionary War to the current time. We started having these talks that eventually grew into a very, very close relationship between the French and

the United States Marine Corp. I think that is continuing with General Jones.

During my commandancy, I went to France every year. I was the first individual outside of France, and literally outside of a field marshal, to be made an honorary corporal of the French Army. I was asked to lay a wreath at the Arch de Triomphe on Veterans Day. I had a warm relationship with the Chief of Staff of the French Army and because of that relationship, I was awarded the French Legion of Honor by the President of France. This was not because of who I am but because of the position I held (CMC) and the respect the French have for our Corps.

DR. CRIST: What was the French looking at as far as the Marine Corps? What were they hoping to glean from it?

GEN KRULAK: They looked at our change. They looked at the type of change we were making, the agility, the ability to move rapidly, the whole mindset of maneuver warfare, and they knew they had to change. This time they wanted to be ahead of the Germans, not behind them. They wanted to find a force that they could tailor their forces after, and after looking around the world, they decided not on the U.S. Army, but on the U.S. Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: They've had a bent recently towards expeditionary warfare.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: In May 1993, a three-star meeting was held at Quantico. One of the main topics centered on a deployable component headquarters to be located at MCCDC. I wonder if you could describe what this concept was, sir?

GEN KRULAK: It had everything to do with if we went to 159K. If we went to 159K would we not have the ability to have a headquarters at MarForLant or MarForPac that would be able to pick up and go to a major regional contingency as a component headquarter. At 159K, we would not be able to do that. One of the ideas that the FSPG looked at was to build a deployable component headquarters, and have it at MCCDC. Have that headquarter spend all their time studying the regions and building expertise. Both MarForLant and MarForPac could see some wisdom in that at 159K, but not at 177K. We built the concept and it was later played a role in my thought process as we built the Joint Task Force Headquarters at Camp Lejeune.

DR. CRIST: If you had executed this at 159K, what would happen to MarForLant and Pac? What would their primary responsibility have been?

GEN KRULAK: Support. They'd be like the Lant for I MEF during Desert Storm. They became the supporting headquarters.

DR. CRIST: And this one component would interface with both Pac and Lant?

GEN KRULAK: And the CinCs.

DR. CRIST: The next thing, sir, on 26 June 1993, you came back from a whirl-wind journey to which you described as your "trip to hell," 17 hours of travel for four hours' worth of briefings. What were those meetings about, and what was the purpose?

GEN KRULAK: After the N-8 and MCCDC and P&R built the POM and budget we would conduct a briefing on the results of that effort. Then Bill Owens and I would take that budget out to the various CinCdoms and have them take a look at what we had done and adjust it for their input and their priorities. It was a method that Bill Owens and I felt could best achieve our program goals with buy-in from everybody. The brief you refer to is one where we went out and briefed Admiral Boorda and CinCUSNavEur. We were on the runway ready to take off in a Gulf Stream when Owens gets a phone call telling him to stay back for a meeting with the Secretary of Defense for Policy. Bill turned to me and said, "You take the trip. So we went to England and back in 17 hours. It was just unbelievable. It was the first time I met Mike Boorda, and he was impressive.

DR. CRIST: In 1993, there is a major debate between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps over distribution of M-1A1 tanks vis-à-vis for the Marine Corps Reserve or the Army National Guard. Were you involved in this, and what was your observation?

GEN KRULAK: I was not involved with it very much. This was a battle that was fought up in Washington D.C. by the Commandant and Terry Paul and John Sattler. They were the Senate and House liaison officers. I played a supporting role. It ended up that was one where we won the battle and lost the war. I mean we really expended a lot of currency on that issue for something that turned out to be not worth the fight. It caused unbelievable heartburn with the Army and unbelievable heartburn with some of the people in Congress. It became almost a manhood issue. We wanted those tanks, and we

expended a lot of capital to get them. Interestingly enough, during my nomination hearings for Commandant, Senator Bob Smith from New Hampshire crushed Denny Reimer on the tank issue. And poor Denny wasn't involved in it and I wasn't involved in it. It was bad. There was a lot of pride in the Marine Corps about winning "the tank battle." I'll tell you, for the next five years we suffered because of that win.

DR. CRIST: 9 September 1993, you held an executive steering group meeting with the main topic of MarForPac force structure and the forces to be kept in a Kaneohe Bay. I assume this grew out of the force reductions?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: -- based upon the new 174 number?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The bottom line was that we meant to try to hit the numbers that we felt we needed to have a ready, relevant, and capable force at 174,000. Remember we gave up 3,000. We had to take some more cuts to get 174K, and those cuts were going to have to come out of several areas. One of those locations was K-Bay. How were we going to do that? At the same time, Hank Stackpole was saying, "Look, if I'm going to be a deployable component to headquarters, I'm going to need some more people." And so we had to figure out how to cut in some areas and add in others. At the same time, we needed to keep Senator Inouye happy. It was a very important meeting and one that proved to be a success. The bottom line was we met the requirements we needed to meet, built the headquarters Hank needed to have built, and solved the itch that Senator Inouye had. It went okay.

DR. CRIST: Where did the bodies go? Was it distribution of people from . . . ?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, distribution of people. You know, as an example, the MAW is a very, very large organization. Since we took fixed-wing aircraft out of K-Bay, the MAW was able to be reduced greatly. The size of the MAG, headquarters, reduced. Issues like that we attacked and solved.

DR. CRIST: That same meeting, there was an agenda on the 31st MEU and whether it needed to be special operations capable.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: How did at that time 31st MEU differ from the other MEUs?

GEN KRULAK: It didn't. The only question was whether it would cease being special operations capable. The result was, we felt that we needed to keep it SOC capable. It wasn't a hard decision.

DR. CRIST: I guess the only difference is it's out in Okinawa.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: On 15 October 1993 you were tasked to convene a Marine Corps study effort to explore the long-term requirements for the Marine Corps, and out of this came Vision 2015, another major, major effort down at MCCDC.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. This issue was to come to grips with the cost of the Marine Corps, an issue that was to haunt the Marine Corps for a long time. How do you fund the 174,000-person Marine Corps, and at the same time modernize it. Where do you get the funds to do that? You can't be additive. Something has to give. This effort was to come to grips with a couple of methodologies, one of them being the divestiture of capability and systems. The other methodology was to institute what we called the neck-down strategy on certain organizations. An example of the divestitures would be doing away with the 9th Marine Regiment. We eliminated the MLRS battalion we wanted to have. We eliminated the Hawk. We eliminated the procurement of the F-18 E/F. We realigned the function of Barstow. We closed an air station. Under the neck-down actions, we streamlined the civilian personnel end strength, reorganized the Marine air control group, took the bridge companies and put them in the Reserve, streamlined the anti-tank platoons, and did other things along this line. It was a very draconian effort. The bottom line is it allowed General Mundy the flexibility to put money where we needed it . . . whether it was infrastructure, pay and allowance or modernization. I conducted a similar study at the end of my tenure as CMC and was able to provide money for Gen Jones to use as he began his tenure and faced his QDR.

DR. CRIST: This is a money driven, not an end-strength driven?

GEN KRULAK: That's correct.

DR. CRIST: A couple of issues you hit on, sir, that struck me as important. One is the issue of the F-18 E/F.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Which the Navy wanted desperately.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I think the only two people that wanted to give up the E/F were General Mundy and myself. The E&F, in my opinion, was not the aircraft for the Marine Corps. It's a 1980s technology aircraft that was going to have fight in the early 21st century. It's a non-Stealthy aircraft. It happens to have long-loiter time, but who wants to loiter if you're seen. I was not an E&F fan and worked hard with General Mundy to: (a) convince Marine aviation that we shouldn't have the E&F, and (b) to do battle with the Navy.

DR. CRIST: Did this come up in your meetings with Admiral Owens, sir, the E&F?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: And he was taking the Navy party line on that?

GEN KRULAK: He agreed with me, but was absolutely overpowered by the Navy aviation barons on that issue.

DR. CRIST: The other issue you raised was the MLRS, which under the plan that grew out of the FSPG was the Marine Corps would have one battalion of this Twenty-nine Palms.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Why did you oppose it?

GEN KRULAK: We couldn't afford it. Therefore, we cut a deal with the Army when we required MCRS for combat. We signed a MOU that if we needed it, we would get it. It has a big footprint; its a heavy unit and very expensive. The rounds are very expensive. We just couldn't afford it from a cost and mobility standpoint.

DR. CRIST: But in the event we would need it in Desert Storm II?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We had an MOU with the Army, and they would give it to us.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on that, sir?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: Okay. On 3 January 1994, Admiral Joe Lopez came down to MCCDC for the afternoon, as you described, for a Marine Corps 101 course.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Was he Admiral Owens' replacement, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: How did the meeting go, and how was your relationship with Admiral Lopez?

GEN KRULAK: Joe Lopez is a good man. He was not as bright as Admiral Owens, but bright enough. He recognized what it was like to follow a Bill Owens, to have the barons ready, willing, and able to take this new guy on instead of having to deal with Owens and all the power that Owens had. I think that Joe was looking for a friend, and he found one in me. He also liked the Marine Corps. He was well served by the Marine Corps when he was CinCUSNavEur and so he came in very much a Marine supporter. He was very interested in what we were doing and how we did business. I think he was very impressed with the Combat Development Process and the Concept Base Requirement System. He got a real dose of reality when he went back and started his job. It was not long before he found himself battling to keep the alligators away from his rear end. The alligators being the resurgence of the barons, the sub people, the aviators, the surface warriors. He is a good man, and did a great job as an N8. But he never had the power or the influence that Bill Owens had.

DR. CRIST: On 24 February 1994 General Mundy informed you that you had been slated for MarForPac. What do you recall of this? Did you know you were even being contemplated for that position, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, first off, it's important to know that at a three-star off site held in California some months before Gen Mundy had told me that I was going to MarForLant. He even tasked me with some initiatives that he wanted to start at MarForLant. One of them was, in fact, to look about the viability of moving the Lant headquarters to Camp Lejeune. So I was going to Lant, not to Pac. Then I got a phone call from General Mundy saying, "I changed my mind. I'm going to send you to MarForPac," He did it because General Mundy is, in many ways, a very sentimental person. In the back of

his mind was this idea of Chuck Krulak going back to his father's command. He felt this would be an emotional, sentimental, and historical event. At the same time, Lieutenant General Bill Keys, who was in some ways a mentor to me, had been talking to General Mundy. He told Gen Mundy not to send me to PAC. I think Bill Keys wanted me to be the Commandant, and he felt that MarForPac would be the kiss of death. We hadn't had a CMC from PAC in 20 years. Lou Wilson was the last one. When I got the phone call from Gen Mundy, I went home and talked to Zandi and talked to my parents. Zandi was kind of focused to the east and now she had to be re-focused to the west, but she's so talented that she was ready to go in any direction. My parents were ecstatic.

I can't over emphasize that I wasn't thinking of being the Commandant. I was a very junior three-star. I was deep selected over 25 generals for the three stars. So the idea that I was going to be the player for the Commandant was ridiculous. We had Hank Stackpole, Walt Boomer, and Bob Johnston, just to name a few. These were the people that I looked up to and believed would provide the next Commandant.

I was excited about going to MarForPac. I was excited about having the opportunity to command two-thirds of the operational Marine Corps and to hold the command my father once held. I went out to Hawaii fully anticipating to retire out of MarForPac. I called Bill Keys and told him to quit worrying about me. I told him that anyone who goes to a duty station because he thinks it might help his chances for promotion is not the kind of person we want in the Corps . . . certainly not the person we want to lead the Corps. I told him to quit worrying about it.

DR. CRIST: One issue I wanted to discuss, and I sort of saved this towards the end because it transcended all two years of you at MCCDC, was your changes to the Marine Corps schools, something you continued to do as Commandant. First, what were your observations of the state of the Marine Corps' professional education? And then when we get that, we'll address each school in turn, if we could, sir.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I think that General Gray did a magnificent job of bringing back a sense of education and training to the Marine Corps. His work in this area proved its value during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. I think that over time some of his objectives has been lost as a focus.

DR. CRIST: First, let's start at the Office Candidate School, OCS. From what I gather, you had concern

about the very high attrition rates at OCS. I think it was about 50 percent.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I thought that OCS was taking its "screening" role to an unwarranted degree. We had OSOs doing as good a job as possible to get the type of people we wanted in our Corps. We were bringing them in and then, in many ways, breaking them. Much of the attrition was not because they weren't good Marine candidates, but because the physical training was driving them into the ground. Secondly, we had an OCS commander who was a bit eccentric in his view of physical fitness, tattoos. As an example, those people with tattoos found themselves out of OCS after a short period of time. I thought we needed to reevaluate what was the role of OCS. We needed to take a hard look at the way we were doing physical training and insure that we didn't break people. We needed to understand that if you had a lot of good work going on at the front end of the recruiting cycle, we needed to be careful not to wash people out because of the idiosyncrasies of the commander.

DR. CRIST: What did you look at changing, sir?

GEN KRULAK: One, the physical fitness program. I asked them to look hard at the overall PT programs. So instead of spending all of your time running around in boots, start putting packs on their backs and hiking them. Instead of spending all of your time running around in boots, work on upper body strength one day, running the next day, hiking the next day, upper body strength, then running. I told them to make use of all muscle groups, not just a few. Secondly, I wanted them to, make it more than just a screening process, but also an education process. I worked to ensure that when the new lieutenants got to The Basic School, we weren't beginning the education process; that they actually learned something about the Marine Corps while at OCS. I wanted them to stress leadership. This is not just a boot camp. I didn't want the candidate to just be scared or traumatized. I was looking for people who would make good majors, not just good lieutenants. And so we brought in Pete Osmond, who did a magnificent job of doing just that.

DR. CRIST: What about the TBS? Before I get to the integration of gender platoons, one of the things you did was establish a mentoring program.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, but General Mundy was a big driver. He was trying to get The Basic School back to being the soul of the officer corps. You didn't go to The Basic School to become a Cro-Magnon man.

You went to The Basic School to learn how to be a leader of men, an officer of Marines, a thinker, a doer, and not just a PT machine, shaved head, Cro-Magnon man. And so Jim Conway went down there with that direction in mind and did a magnificent job, not only Jim, but also his wife Annette. That was where my wife Zandi started playing a big role. We were making them officers and gentlemen, as well as warriors.

DR. CRIST: She, your wife, took on the wives as well to teach them how to be ladies essentially.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What about the gender integrated platoons? That was a controversial issue at the time.

GEN KRULAK: Well, at that point in time the decision was made that we were opening up some MOSs that were heretofore not open to women. We could either continue to play the naive game of separating the women lieutenants from the male lieutenants and have them come under fire when they got to the FMF or bite the bullet and say these are officers, and Marines, and need to operate effectively together. We are talking about TBS, not OCS. We've separated them at OCS. This is like our recruits. We have separate recruit training, but when you get into your MOS training you begin to integrate and that's what we did at TBS. There were some very big concerns about whether the women would get a fair shake in MOS selection and in competing on fitness reports. My feeling was that they're going to have to compete against their male counterparts when they get to the FMF. Why shouldn't they compete now, fitness report-wise, physical fitness-wise, you name it. So that's what we did. We integrated them. When I became the Commandant, I took this a step further by making the physical fitness test the same for male and female. This was to further indicate that we all had to be measured up. We raised the standard, not lowered it.

DR. CRIST: During this period General Mundy appeared on "60 Minutes," where he was asked questions about minority attrition at OCS and TBS and test scores. In the interview his words were taken completely out of context but it created quite a stir in the media. What do you recall of this?

GEN KRULAK: I recall that it was a bad time. General Mundy, God bless him, is probably as articulate as man as you'll ever meet. He got himself well prepared for that interview. But like all of us who believe in honesty and integrity and being up

front, we sometimes get caught by people who don't necessarily believe the way we do. They will use what to them appears to be naiveté to hurt us, and that's what happened to General Mundy. The reality is we did have difficulties at OCS and The Basic School with retention of minorities, primarily African American. We had trouble recruiting them. We had trouble giving them the opportunities that they deserved. We had a perception problem with the minority community in the Marine Corps and the minority community outside the Marine Corps, and so General Mundy's comments, skewed as they were, really didn't help things out. We had a lot of work to do. We increased recruiting at the enlisted level and the officer level. We kept our standard high but we expanded the areas where we recruited to historically black colleges and universities. We expanded the role of mentoring to make sure that when these young men and women came into the Marine Corps they had not just white, Anglo-Saxon role models, but they also had African Americans or Hispanics that they could look up to and talk with. We did all of these things to bring into the Marine Corps something that was very important, which was diversity. We have a diverse nation that demands that in institutions like the Marine Corps we have the same level of diversity.

DR. CRIST: One last thing on TBS, sir. You used to brief every graduation class from TBS?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I went out to The Basic School about three times a week. I would get in my car with an aide and the sergeant major, and we would drive to The Basic School and get there right at reveille, and I would just walk down the hall knocking on doors and sticking my head in. I must have surprised enough--I mean people still tell "you came into my room when I was a lieutenant at The Basic School." And then I'd eat breakfast with the lieutenants. I did that because I really wanted to keep my hand on the pulse. I also addressed each graduating class, trying to share with them some thoughts on leadership, but more importantly, thoughts on their responsibility as officers in the greater context of the ethos of the Corps.

DR. CRIST: On Command and Staff College. from your e-mails, I got the impression you weren't overly impressed with the quality of Command and Staff when you first got to MCCDC.

GEN KRULAK: I think that came from my time at the Army Command and General Staff College where it was a very rigorous course that was oriented on warfighting. When I got to Quantico and looked at the Command and Staff College I was concerned by

its lack of focus on warfighting. It appeared that there was too much emphasis on the theory of war and not enough on the execution. I was concerned about turning out battalion commanders and staff officers, who were not steeped in warfighting. I tried to get the school back on course. I wanted the school to concentrate on the things that Marines do during combat, not on what people did 200 years ago. It was not that such study wasn't important; I just felt there needed to be more on warfighting itself.

DR. CRIST: Out of this came a renewed emphasis particularly on a final exercise for Command and Staff...

GEN KRULAK: Yes. What we wanted to do was not only bring a final exercise into Command and Staff College but to tie that into the Command and Control Systems course, and into the Amphibious Warfare School.

DR. CRIST: What about the distance-learning program for the Command and Staff? You made some major changes in its content.

GEN KRULAK: Well, because you have resident schools that can only be attended by a small percentage of all officers, two unfortunate things resulted. One, the officers that don't get to go are not getting the strength of education that those who were going to the resident course receive. The big losers are not just the officers but also obviously the troops that they lead in combat. The second problem was the sense that we had the haves and the have-nots. We have a selection process that selects people to go to the resident course and all of a sudden it "anoints" young officers as leaders for the future both at the company grade level and at the field grade levels. The reality is nothing can be further from the truth. Some officers can't go to the school because they happened to be in the middle of a tour and it wouldn't make sense to short tour them. What we did was build a school system that would not be reliant on receiving education in a particular classroom at Quantico but that would be available for people across the United States and those overseas. So the non-resident school program came into being. We had several officers who were dedicated to building that course and its reputation. We put into the precepts of our selection boards the fact that there would be no distinction between resident and non-resident. We ensured that on each major base there was the potential for our officers to get together so that they'd still have that same camaraderie that comes from the resident school; and the same learning process that comes from dealing with

students who are in varying MOS's. Finally we made it so that when an officer graduates from the non-resident course, his/her diploma looked exactly like the resident course diploma. In fact, we invited the non-resident officers to walk across the stage at Little Hall in Quantico with the other graduates so that everybody felt like they were on the same sheet of music. No one was knighted for being sent to a resident course or classified a serf because they went to the non-resident. Both in selection boards as well as in education, the resident and non-resident were approximately the same. Now you'll never make it exactly the same because of the staff of instructors and the ability to focus 100 percent of your time when you're at the resident course. But we had great instructors in the non-resident course and we did think that we approximated what the resident course offered.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned the Command and Control Systems course. I wonder if you could address its development. It was quite a major change from the old Communication school.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The Command and Control Systems course is, if not the best, certainly one of the top two educational courses in the Marine Corps today. It came from the realization that the Command and Control systems at the MEF level or below are very technically oriented and very difficult to establish without having someone watch over the building of that system. We took the old Comm school and made it into the Command and Control Systems course that taught officers how to put together the systems that would allow our Commander to fight their forces.

I knew we had done a great job when I went out to Yuma. I MEF was running a major MEF size exercise and I visited the ACE portion of the MEF in Yuma. I met with then Brigadier General, Charlie [Charles F.] Bolden Jr. I walked into his command post and he said he wanted to introduce me to the most important officer in his command. I expected to see the Chief of Staff or the G3. Instead, he introduced me to a captain who was a recent graduate of the Command and Control Systems course. Bolden said, "Without this individual I could not command and control." It is a great course that turned out what I believe were some of the most important officers of the future. I see the day when Command and Control Officer will be an MOS. There will be a Command and Control officer on every staff. He/she will be capable of fixing computer/information systems and communication systems. They would be all operating at the command level.

DR. CRIST: The course itself received very high praise from the other services. Both the Army and Navy were begging to send more people to this course.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, very interesting. When I first went there, when we first started it, the other services would send one or two people. By the time I left as the Commandant, they were asking for more spaces. The Air Force would send ten people to our school. It was a very good course.

DR. CRIST: What about the Commander's Course. What was that and what was its significance sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well I wish I could say I initiated it, but General Mundy did. After we went to Command Screening, he and I sat down and asked if there was something more we should do. Out of that discussion came the idea that we ought to look at an education program for them. At that point in time, I sat down with several of the officers at Quantico, Pete Pace being one, and put together the Commander's Course. We had no template for it. We literally had to build every course and every class. Once we had the course developed, we realized we have to get people to it. So we needed the funding to do that and we went to Headquarters and General Mundy funded all of the new commanders to come to that course. It was basically two weeks in duration.

As this was going my wife Zandi said, "This is not just about commanders, this is about commander's spouses too. This is team effort. You don't have just the Commander. The spouse is also going to play an important role in supporting the Commander." So she went to Linda Mundy and proposed adding a spouse's workshop. She got Linda's support for that and then she and a couple other women literally put this whole course together. She then went to General Mundy and pointed out that we were paying for the commander's to come, why not the spouses. So the wives now come for one week of the two-week course. It turned out to be a tremendous, initiative. One, it made for better commands because the spouses were really in tune with what the Commander were going to have to do. Second, it sent a tremendous signal to the spouses of the Marine Corps that they have a critical role to play in their husbands' or wives' success and that we were going to ensure that they had the training and the education they needed. The Marine Corps valued the spouses. It was a great initiative. I would say that the spouse's workshop was better than the Commander's Course for the first four or five iterations because the women really put together a tremendous program. I think the Commander's Course finally caught up with

them but never surpassed them.

DR. CRIST: What was the focus of the Commander's Course?

GEN KRULAK: Well it was very interesting. The focus was on command obviously. In order to focus on all the duties of a commander, we would bring down from Headquarters Marine Corps the principal staff officers of the Commandant. They would bring all of the new commanders up to speed on issues within their particular area of responsibility. We would also have breakout groups where the officers would get together in their own MOS's. All the logisticians would get together, all the aviators and so on, and talk about MOS specific issues. Then you'd get all people from I MEF together, all people from II MEF together to talk about MEF issues. The Commandant went down. I spoke three times at each course. I kicked it off and ended it; and I spoke to the spouse's workshop. We had panels with both former commanders and current commanders. We ended up with a three-day warfighting course for all the new commanders presented by the MSTP. The whole idea was to get everybody on the same sheet of music regarding command. The course also taught about Marine Corps Community Services and how to deal with problems running the gamut from indebtedness to alcoholism. It was just an overall view of what it was like to command in the Marine Corps in the 21st century.

DR. CRIST: It must have given you a tremendous input on what was going on in the FMF?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. You got a tremendous amount of information. The Commander's Course provided me a thumb on the pulse of the FMF and I think that I was able to feed to General Mundy a real sense of what his officers were thinking about. Obviously when I became Commandant the ability to go down there was critical. As I said, I went down three times during the course. It was very good, not only to listen and hear what they were saying about the FMF but also to give me an opportunity to talk to my officers and let them know where we were going as a Corps. I would use that time to update these officers where I thought the Marine Corps was going and how much I needed their help.

DR. CRIST: I've heard from, other general officers that when they were junior officers at AWS or Command and Staff that they had a sense of a huge disconnect between the senior leadership of the Marine Corps and what was going on down in the FMF. Did you have a similar sense when you were a

junior officer? Did you make a conscious decision not to make that mistake when you were a senior officer as CG, MCCDC or CMC?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I will tell you, when I was an officer coming up through the ranks I never saw the Commandant, ever. I think the first Commandant I ever saw that talked to anybody, was P.X. Kelley when he attended one of the schools and spoke to the students. I was never called into a theater to listen to the Commandant speak. Absolutely never called into a theater and had the Commandant stand up and give an hour and a half lecture and then, with the Sergeant Major, take questions for another hour. Sgt Maj Lee and I would spend three hours talking to officers and staff NCO's and NCO's and below. I spent a tremendous amount of time trying to educate the Corps on where we believed the Corps should go. I think that part of the reason why I felt this was so important was that nobody ever did it for me. Additionally, because I felt I was a transition Commandant as we moved into the 21st century, I needed to do a lot educating. We had many new programs and concepts underway and we needed the majority of the Marine Corps onboard.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned one issue, command screening which came about during this period in your career. Were you in favor of command screening?

GEN KRULAK: Command screening came out of the three-star offsite that General Mundy held right after becoming Commandant. A lot of things came out of that, foremost being the FSPG. But the idea of command screening also came out of that offsite. I confess that I was not for command screening because I felt that the officers Corps was too small. I was concerned that command screening would set out one group of people as the "haves," and the others as the "have-nots." These haves and have-nots would end up hurting the Corps vice helping it. I was probably wrong there, although I do think it still separates the haves and have-nots. I think the value of having tremendous leaders leading our young Marines has made a difference, and so when all is said and done, General Mundy was right in doing it.

I was the Director of Personnel at that time and actually wrote the order. We built the command-screening program and executed it during the time that I was the Director of Personnel. It was very traumatic time when the first couple of lists came out and some officers were on it and others weren't. There was some real strong debate that took place in the *Marine Corps Gazette* over whether we ought to have it.

DR. CRIST: One other issue comes up in your papers that people in the future may not be aware of, and that's TQL (Total Quality Leadership). Could you describe what it was?

GEN KRULAK: I'm the last person in the world to be describing TQL. It started out as TQM (Total Quality Management). Some people called it a fad. I don't think it was a fad. It was a method of looking at management and leadership in a holistic view. You could make an entity or an institution a quality institution by looking at various elements of it and making those various elements quality. We went overboard with TQM. The Department of the Navy set up a major TQM office headed up by two women and then had offices in both the Marine Corps and the Navy. We ended up calling it TQL (Total Quality Leadership). I think it had a place, but it absolutely was just a tool in the tool kit of leadership. Unfortunately some people saw it as the end-all and the be-all of leadership. My view was simply that it was another tool that can be helpful, but it is not going to be the foremost leadership methodology in the Marine Corps. The seven effective habits of Covey is another example of a certain philosophy of leadership that came along that some people embraced deeply. My view was that TQL, Covey these types of things, helped make you a better leader, but they certainly were not the end-all and the be-all.

SESSION X

Commanding General, Marine Forces Pacific

Command Relations . . . Changing War plans for Korea . . . Central Command and Joint Land Component Commander . . . Operation Vigilant Warrior . . . Withdrawal of UN from Somalia . . . Mobile Offshore Basing . . . Engagement Initiatives . . . Force Apportionment . . . Gas attack in Tokyo Subway .

DR. CRIST: The date is 26 December 2000. Place is Wilmington, Delaware. What I'd like to talk about is your time as CG, MarForPac. On 24 February 1994, General Mundy informed you that you had been slated for MarForPac. Is there anything about your confirmation for three stars, or for that position that you think is of significance?

GEN KRULAK: No, I talked a little with Senator Inouye and some of his people, but the bottom line was I spent so much time in the Pacific that there wasn't a real need to understand or spend a lot of time on the political side of what went on in Hawaii and further West.

DR. CRIST: 22 July 1994 you assumed command of Marine Forces Pacific some 30 odd years after your father commanded it. You relieved Lieutenant General Stackpole.

GEN KRULAK: Hank Stackpole.

DR. CRIST: What do you recall about that day?

GEN KRULAK: It was just an amazing day because I had served out in the Pacific. I'd been there when my father was CG of MarForPac, or at that time FMFPac. I was there as a lieutenant colonel and a colonel. To go back and actually become the commander was very special. We flew out there with General Mundy. When we landed at Kaneohe Bay, Gen Mundy directed me to leave the plane first. I told him that he was Commandant and he should go first. He said, "No, I want you to go first." An example of the class act called Gen Mundy.

DR. CRIST: Could you describe a bit of the multiple hats you wore at the time as MarForPac, particularly your command relations?

GEN KRULAK: I served in multiple positions. I was the Commander of Marine Forces Pacific and under that hat I reported to CinCPac (Commander-in-Chief Pacific), an admiral by the name of Dick [Richard C.] Macke. That is a story in itself. Dick Macke was relieved of command eventually. I was the Commanding General Fleet Marine Forces Pacific. And under that hat I worked for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I was also Commander Marine Forces Korea for execution of OpPlan 5027, the defense of Korea. There I reported to the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, a General by the name of Gary Luck who was a great warrior. And I also served as Commander Marine Forces Central Command where I served under the Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command, General Binny [J. H. Binford] Peay. I basically wore four hats and was the only officer of any service to serve as the component commander for two warfighting CinCs. I was the Marine component for the two most likely major regional contingencies, Korea and Southwest Asia.

DR. CRIST: From 18 to 23 July near the time you assumed command, there was an amphibious exercise entitled "Cooperation from the Sea" that was held with the Russian Navy. This is the first time both navies had conducted a joint exercise, actually the first time they'd conducted a joint exercise since the Cold War. What do you recall about this? Was it a significant event?

GEN KRULAK: It was a significant event from the standpoint of the news media, but as an exercise it was really nothing more than a PR exercise. There was a lot of toasting and very little exercising. The two things I do remember clearly is that the Soviet Naval Infantry wasn't very good and two, the fleet was really run down. The communications equipment onboard a Soviet ship was probably World War II vintage.

DR. CRIST: Shortly after your arrival at MarForPac the change of command was held for CinCPacFlt. Admiral Ronald J. Zlatoper.

GEN KRULAK: Zap was a great guy. We liked him a lot, but he was no mental giant. He had a good staff, but as a strategic thinker he didn't have the real strength of thinking that one needed at that time in the Pacific. He was a very engaging individual who won a lot of friends for the United States in the Pacific and spent a lot of time out in the Western Pacific engaging the various countries navies and leadership of those countries. But he wasn't a strategic thinker.

DR. CRIST: What about Admiral Macke?

GEN KRULAK: Admiral Macke was very smart, very tough. He had an ego, a very big ego. He got in trouble because he was fooling around with a Marine officer, female, and he was married. As a result of this issue, he retired from the Navy, not as a four-star but as a two-star. He absolutely let the job go to his head and didn't use good judgment at all. He set a bad example for his command and eventually embarrassed himself and the Navy.

DR. CRIST: What was your opinion of the U.S. military posture in the Pacific in 1994 when you came? What did you see as areas of improvement, where improvement needed to be made or changed?

GEN KRULAK: Well from a strategic standpoint I didn't think there were enough amphibious ships out there. That should not surprise Marines. They certainly could have used another carrier battlegroup. I thought that our focus towards Northeast Asia was to the detriment of Southeast Asia, particularly the growing giant of China. The importance of Indonesia, Straits of Malacca, and our relationships with Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and India seemed to be lost on many. Our relationship with the Philippines had basically gone in the tank. We had made no overtures towards Vietnam. Australia was looked upon as a distant cousin. Our war plans in Korea had not changed in years. There were a lot of issues that I thought needed some help.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned when you were Commandant you saw that so much of the focus was on Europe and not on the Pacific. Yet, you knew that the future really was with the Pacific at least for economic reasons.

GEN KRULAK: Well, much of that sense as the Commandant came from my time as MarForPac. It almost felt like we were an economy of force theater and yet PacCom is the largest theater in our defense structure.

DR. CRIST: The end of August 1994 you departed for Korea, staying there until 5 September, taking part in Uchi Focus Lens '94. What do you recall about this, which was your first major exercise as MarForPac.

GEN KRULAK: The first thing I recall is that we had very little time to prepare. I took over command on the 22d of July and we were gone a month later. And so to get a major headquarters ready to fight and do the types of things we wanted to do took a lot of effort. When I said do the things we wanted to do, that was the beginning of the effort to change the landing from the East to the West Coast of Korea. That was almost a heretical thought. What we had to do was: (1) be very good during UFL. UFL is a very tough exercise. You're basically fighting a computer. It's a computer war game where you get graded by a computer. The computer takes all the moves that you've made and all the moves that the red team have made and weigh them out and say who's won and who is lost. (2) We wanted to convince the CinC that he needed to change his entire war plan. Instead of giving the Army the main offensive role, he ought to be thinking about giving the Marine Corps that role. This would entail placing Army forces under the operational control of the Marine commander. You can imagine the difficulty encountered in doing that. But we were very fortunate because the Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea was an officer by the name of Gary Luck. Gen Luck was a phenomenal officer. He was as good a warfighter as I've ever seen and probably as good a patriot and good a commander as I have ever seen. Gary Luck's a great, great officer.

DR. CRIST: So it wasn't a hard sell?

GEN KRULAK: It was an extremely hard sell. Before we even got to Gary Luck, I think I shared with you I went around and talked to the various commanders of the Korean forces. Not the Korean Marine Corps, but Korean Army and Air Force, and actually met with the Minister of Defense. I think I told you the story of going up to his map and as he was talking about Uchi Focus Lens and the Marines role in the landing at Wonsan. I said, "You know, we may land at Wonsan in this exercise but we're not going to land in Wonsan for the real thing."

And he said, "Where do you think your going to land?" And I took my hand and I pounded down on a location on the West Coast and I said, "We will land here and we will smash the enemy." I mean he went crazy. After I had made that comment his eyes lit up like a Christmas tree and the next thing I knew he was signaling his aide. His aide then came out with a very nice engraved Rosewood box. My comment made it around the the Republic of Korea in about six nanoseconds and got to Gary Luck about two nanoseconds after that. When I went back to Gen Luck's headquarters he was furious – he wanted to know why I told the MDD we would attack on the West Coast. I told him that an attack on the West Coast was the only effective use of his Marines. That if we really wanted to unhinge the enemy, we needed to attack deep and attack where it would hurt. Wonsan would do neither. So we built a plan and then next year we gave it a test in UFL and it was successful. The eventual result was a new role for the Marine Corps in the Korean war plan – a role that would see the Army's 18th Airborne Corps under the OpCon of the Marine Corps for sustained operations ashore. None of this would have happened without a very forward thinking and receptive CinC.

DR. CRIST: What was the status of the North Korean threat in '94 and '95?

GEN KRULAK: There were thousands and thousands of artillery pieces, thousands of tanks right up along the border. There were threats from guerillas and special ops forces coming down from the North to the South. If the battle had been joined it would have become very bloody very quickly because there was just so many weapons systems opposing each other at such close range.

DR. CRIST: Was the issue of a North Korean famine around at the time?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We looked at the famine as destabilizing.

DR. CRIST: That may have caused them do something pro-active.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: You were also the Marine component of Central Command. On 5 August, General J.H. Binford Peay, United States Army became the fifth CinC of Central Command. He had command of the 101st Airborne Division during the Gulf War. What do you recall about this new CinC and did he

implement any major changes to his AOR that you would have been involved with sir?

GEN KRULAK: Binny Peay was a great commander. The only major change that he put out was the concept of a Joint Land Forces Commander. Basically, instead of having the Marine Corps fight like they did in Desert Storm as a separate entity, separate and distinct from other ground forces, Binny Peay put together the Joint Land Force Component Commander, very similar to the JFAC. All ground forces would come under the Joint Land Force Commander. We tried to fight this change. We tried to make him see that this may not be the most effective way to utilize Marines. The agility of the Marine Corps, the speed with which we moved, the flexibility that we gave him as a Marine air-ground task force might be degraded by placing it under this Joint Land Forces Component Commander. But Peay was the CinC and it was a perfect example of the power of Goldwater/Nichols and how Goldwater/Nichols impacts on a service prerogative. I asked General Mundy to engage in the tank on this issue but the bottom line was that Gen Peay was the CinC and he can fight the fight the way he wanted. As we got into it, I confess that Gen Peay was probably right. I mean the CinC ought to be able to fight the way he wants to fight.

DR. CRIST: So did he implement that command Sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes he did. He appointed an Army lieutenant general by the name of Arnold to that position.

DR. CRIST: What was Arnold's position Sir?

GEN KRULAK: He was 5th Corps.

DR. CRIST: The Marine Corps doesn't fit neatly into either, under a Land Component Commander or under a Naval Joint Naval Command because we operate in both areas. How did that impact your relationship with the Navy?

GEN KRULAK: Well, we then took the Joint Land Force Component Command concept and tried to use it against the Navy. We described the role of the JLFCC and the Naval equivalent, the Joint Naval Force Component Commander. We stated that only one service had a foot on the land and a foot in the water and that was the Marine Corps. We then went on to state that when we executed our landing, and the Joint Naval Force Component

Commander went ashore we, the Corps, should put on that hat – that we should become the Joint Naval Force Component Commander. We'd be out from underneath the Joint Land Force Component Commander because we'd be our own equal component. The idea had potential but the Army and Navy saw through it and said no way. It made for an exciting two weeks as the Navy realized what we were trying to do and went to General Quarters. Unfortunately they solicited and received help from the Army who also saw the Marines getting out of the box again.

DR. CRIST: Did that issues of the Joint Land Forces Commander, did that survive past General Peay?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, oh yes. It's now used in just about every CinCdom.

DR. CRIST: One last question. How robust was NavCent at that time?

GEN KRULAK: Not robust at all.

DR. CRIST: On 9 August you e-mailed General Mundy concerning a conference with the State Department and 1 MEF on Peacekeeping Humanitarian Operations. What was the background behind this and what came from it?

GEN KRULAK: When General Hoar was at CentCom and before I took over as MarForPac, he started looking at lessons coming out of Somalia. He was very interested in peacekeeping operations, and asked the Marine Corps to put on a series of exercises that were to become known as Emerald Express. I tasked 1 MEF to do it since the MEF CG, LtGen Tony Zinni, had so much experience in humanitarian operations. Tony put this exercise together in California. He called together some good people. His right-hand man in this effort was a former Ambassador by the name of Robert Oakley. Emerald Express became a landmark exercise and we ran it every year that I was at MarForPac, and during the years I was the Commandant. We ended up getting great play from the State Department. We had ambassadors, and diplomats from other nations. It was a really good exercise. It was not a warfighting exercise. It was a seminar type of exercise where people got together and talked about the issues.

DR. CRIST: 30 August you sent a letter to General Luck about the concept of a functional Marine component commander. I assume this is tied into

the issues going on at CentCom at the time?

GEN KRULAK: The Marine forces during OpPlan 5027 operate as something called the Combined Marine Forces Command. Combined Marine Forces Command was comprised of forces from both the ROK and U.S. Marine Corps. As the Commander Marine Forces Pacific, Commander Marine Forces Korea, I was Commander Combined Marine Forces Command. With that title, I attempted to build a Marine Component Command organization to rank up there with the Joint Land Forces Component Commander. Again, this was the same issue I tried to fight in CENTCOM. I wanted to become the MCC (Maritime Component Commander) and separate the Corps from its use of the Joint Land Force Component Command. I was not successful.

DR. CRIST: This was the foundation of Marine Forces Korea as a command though, am I correct sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes that's correct.

DR. CRIST: We've already gone over this. Anything else you felt needed change on the Marine's posture?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: On 14 September you sent an e-mail to General Van Riper concerning a disagreement you seemed to have on command and control issues in Marine Forces Pacific and I as wondering if you could comment on what was behind that issue?

GEN KRULAK: The issue here was really at two levels, the tactical and the strategic level. At the tactical level there was a comm company located in Hawaii that was supporting MarForPac. Headquarters Marine Corps wanted that comm company to redeploy back to the West Coast and be absorbed in the comm battalion. The rationale for the move was the manpower considerations of manning positions in Hawaii and also duplicating equipment. HQMC felt they could save on manning and equipment. I went to C4I, General Van Riper, asking for help on this. He'd been out to Hawaii and knew the difficulties associated with being a component commander to two warfighting CinCs. Now HQMC was talking about taking our command and control from us. It just didn't make any sense. He came back in a letter to me and said, I understand your concern but, we at Headquarters are in the policy business, we're not here to

advocate one way or another. I sent an e-mail back to him that basically said if you're only in the policy business who is the advocate for command and control. What is the role of C4I? The bottom line was during the time that I was CGMarForPac we kept the comm company in Hawaii. When I became the Commandant, I ensured that it stayed in Hawaii. MarForPac needed their own deployable comm assets. That became very obvious when Vigilant Warrior took place.

DR. CRIST: One, just before we move on to Vigilant Warrior, one more quick question. Because you did wear multiple hats, and particularly in the two most likely areas for a major regional conflicts, what would have happened if you had two contingencies? Say something happened in CentCom and in Korea simultaneously. Would your deputy assume the component commander for one of the CinCs?

GEN KRULAK: MarForLant would have gone.

DR. CRIST: Would have gone to assume one of them?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The same thing that would have happened if another MRC took place at the time of Desert Storm. We only have two component commanders and they'd both be very busy.

DR. CRIST: One last question. During Desert Storm I MEF was the Marine component for CentCom. That had changed to MarForPac prior to your arrival out there?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The warfighting MEF for CentCom was still I MEF but the component commander and the person that did the coordinating and planning was our headquarters.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned Vigilant Warrior. On 7 October 1994 U.S. Intelligence detected a significant move by Iraqi forces to the Kuwait border and CentCom initiated Operation Vigilant Warrior. What do you recall about this Sir?

GEN KRULAK: When Vigilant Warrior went down, Binney Peay got a hold of me and said, "I want the headquarters out there immediately." So I went back to Headquarters, Marine Corps and we put our headquarters into the TPFDD. We did not make out very well. We couldn't get in the TPFDD early because they were sending the warfighters out. That was right to do. We got in the TPFDD but it would get us to SWA late. I wanted to beat

the CinC to the theater. I thought it would be critical for the first-to-fight force, the United States Marine Corps, to have their headquarters out there before anybody else. And so I went back to General Mundy and asked if he could get us some planes. However, it was going to take three or four days for him to get some planes out to Hawaii. So I went and bought 30 commercial tickets and took 30 of my headquarters staff to include the comm gear and myself. We boarded a Northwest Orient Airlines and flew into Japan. Then we took a flight from Japan to Indonesia. To get out of Indonesia we took the Saudi Arabia airline. We were dressed in our camouflage utilities with our helmets and our weapons stowed in the bellies of the airplane. We went to war on civilian airliners. We beat the CinC out there and we were established and had our headquarters up and running when he arrived in country. It really impressed him.

At that point in time we also started looking hard at the employment of the MPF. A big fight took place as to when to send the SLRP, when to send the OPP and when to send the ships. We had to, once again, educate the CinC on what the MPF could bring to the fight and why it was necessary to get people onboard the ships prior to arriving in SWA. We did just that and ended up in far better shape than any other service. We made the Army look sad. When our MPF arrived in SWA, all of our gear was up and running and when the ships docked, we just drove our equipment off. At the Port of Dhahran, the Army literally had to go onboard the Army ships with tractors and bulldozers and haul their vehicles off because they were broken down and hadn't been prepared for combat. We were off the ships and ready to fight within three days. It took the Army over a week just to get their rolling stock off the ships. It was a good time to be a Marine.

DR. CRIST: Where did you go into Sir?

GEN KRULAK: We went into a small containment area. I think it was called Eskon Village right outside of Riyadh.

DR. CRIST: Did part of I MEF come over?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We had the headquarters and people.

DR. CRIST: By the end of October the U.S. had deployed, I think up to 28,000 troops, aircraft, and equipment. What were the Iraqis up to do you think Sir? Was it just a demonstration?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, just a demonstration . . . just to see what we'd do, just to jerk us around a little bit. It was exciting. People thought they were going to war. It wasn't a drill.

One of the great side benefits was the ability to go look at where I fought several years before. I got to Kabrit and Khanjar and drove down the Khanjar expressway. It looked just the same. Everything we put in was still there. It was amazing.

DR. CRIST: What did the Marine Corps learn from this?

GEN KRULAK: We learned a lot more about the TPFDD process. We relearned a lot about MPF and how important the offload preparation party was. We obviously confirmed in the minds of our fellow services how agile we are and how flexible and how quick we can react. We also learned that a Marine Corps without internal aviation to haul people around is bad and so we need to go for the KC-130J's to give us our own, not just refueling capability, but passenger movement capability. But the bottom line is we didn't learn anything that we didn't know already. It just reconfirmed it.

DR. CRIST: It didn't impact the issue of the Joint Forces Land Component Commander did it Sir?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on Vigilant Warrior for the record?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: Shortly after the conclusion of Vigilant Warrior the U.S. was again involved in Somalia, this time to cover the forces of withdrawal of UNOSOM II in accordance with the UN decision to pull out forces out of that troubled country. Before we get to the pullout, following the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in March 1994 we had left. . . .

GEN KRULAK: A FAST Platoon.

DR. CRIST: And what was their function?

GEN KRULAK: They were there to maintain security around what little forces were left. The withdrawal of UNSOM II again was a perfect example of how the Marines do things, vis-à-vis how the Army does things. As long as the Marine Corps was in control, the Somalis kept their

distance and acted as responsibly as Somalis could act. Whenever the Marines weren't there you had problems. We had a good plan. The plan was executed professionally and the Marine Corps did their role. Once again the Ambassador at that time (Ambassador Oakley) had nothing but the highest praise for Marines.

DR. CRIST: United Shield was the operation that finally withdrew it from the end of February with 1,800 Marines and some Italian Marines too. General Zinni who commanded I MEF at the time, did some innovative stuff about keeping the size of the footprint small ashore during this operation.

GEN KRULAK: General Zinni was probably one of the great operational commanders in the Marine Corps. General Zinni is a brilliant officer, had spent a lot of time in his career at Quantico teaching, so he had a very, very firm foundation on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare. He had spent a great deal of time looking at and observing and understanding operations other than war. He was comfortable in that environment. And so I tried to keep out of his way and let him . He was very effective. I let him run the show and he did a magnificent job.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on Somalia?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: On 16 December, you sent an e-mail to your old friend, Admiral Owens. In this you brought up a concept of the Mobile Offshore Base. What was this concept?

GEN KRULAK: Early on Bill Owens and I had looked at a way to maintain sovereignty, American territory so to speak, anywhere in the world. One way to do that is with ships and another way to do that is with some kind of offshore base. Somebody could say an aircraft carrier is an offshore base, or an amphib is an offshore base. In fact they are. But here we were talking about something that was not necessarily designed as a warfighting capability but more as a place for people to live and to sustain themselves for long periods of time. Such a capability would keep from putting infrastructure up on somebody else's territory. The Australians, the Thai's, the Philippines, they weren't interested in having a major U.S. base on their territory. They were interested in training with us. One way to do both was to have a mobile offshore base where people could train and live, at the same time, use as a launch pad to move ashore and train. I just went

back to Bill and essentially said I'd been out in PaCom for almost a year and still believed this to be a good idea. I thought that all of the countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia would welcome the concept; and we ought to think about doing it. Unfortunately there was very little desire on the Navy's part because it looked too much like an aircraft carrier to them and they wanted carriers. They didn't want oil platforms.

DR. CRIST: What would be stationed on these?

GEN KRULAK: Well you could put anything from a company to a regiment. It depends on how big it is.

DR. CRIST: Sort of a modular system Sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, yes.

DR. CRIST: And with, ammunition could be stored on it.

GEN KRULAK: It could be very similar to an MPF capability. People were saying the enemy could sink them. You can't sink one of these things. They survive in the North Sea and in unbelievably harsh weather. If you chopped off one leg it would just ballast itself to the right height. It's almost indestructible.

DR. CRIST: So the design was based on an offshore drilling platform?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. Multiple decks so you can store gear, have playing fields and gymnasiums and swimming pools. You could make it really nice. It would have engines that would move it to wherever you wanted it to go.

DR. CRIST: So you could pull it from Singapore to Australia, wherever we wanted to train?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: As CG, MarForPac, and later as CMC, you worked to develop mutual training with the countries of the Pacific Rim. You mentioned at the offset the Australians, for example, were seen as a distant cousin. What steps did you take to solidify training in areas that the U.S. hadn't been trained for some time?

GEN KRULAK: I believed and still believe that the future of the United States in a geopolitical sense as well as an economic sense rests in Asia. For many years we have been focused on Europe.

Whether Bosnia or Kosovo or the crashing of the Berlin Wall . . . these events kept drawing our attention to Europe. The reality is our health and well-being is going to be found in Asia, and we have neglected our relationships there. As for MarForPac and CMC, I believed that the best way to build those relationships were by military to military. My rationale was simple: the leadership from most of the Asian countries came from the military. It is a fact of life that the Presidents of most of those countries were generals in their individual armies or admirals in their navies. Many of these men had gone to Army Command and General Staff College or the Navy War College or the Marine Command and Staff College. I knew many of them because they had served at some time in the United States. My belief was if we could go over and open up military to military contacts with them, starting with simple training exercises it would help bring a focus back towards Asia and certainly make the people of Asia more receptive to the United States. Not as if we were some occupying force, but as if we were friends. Friends who didn't want to put infrastructure on their land but wanted to help and train with them. Friends who wanted to bring stability, not only to their countries, but also to their entire region. The way to do that was to initiate military to military relationships. No organization was better fit to do that than the Navy/Marine Corps team because again, we could stand off their coast, without putting a great deal of equipment and tents and permanent structures on land because we'd come from the sea. I spent a lot of time both at MarForPac and also as the Commandant, trying to stress the importance of this kind of relationship.

DR. CRIST: Was the State Department in favor of this?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: So that State Department backed this initiative Sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Sir, we discussed Australia. What other countries did you focused on?

GEN KRULAK: Thailand. Thai's are great people. Thai's have a great Marine Corps and we worked very closely with them.

Indonesia. We had a good relationship with the Indonesian Marine Corps. One of the finest Marine Corps I ran into was the Indonesian Marine

Corps. They wore a maroon beret. During the problems in Indonesia a couple of years ago the only part of the Armed Forces that was respected by the Indonesian people were the Indonesian Marines. It was a big feather in their cap. The government would not allow the Army, Air Force or the Navy out on the streets. The only Service that was allowed on the streets was the Marines and they were very distinctive with their maroon berets. The Indonesian Marine Corps honored me. I became an honorary Commandant of the Indonesian Marine Corps, the only foreigner to ever receive that honor. At their Headquarters Marine Corps they have the wall of the Commandants just like we have at the Pentagon. You can walk down and you see all of their Commandants and when you get to 1997 to 1999, you will see my picture along with General Suharto, the real Commandant of the Indonesian Marine Corps.

We worked with opening up the Philippines. We had small units training in the Philippines. So there was lots of activity.

DR. CRIST: And that's as you say, it's a way to get inroads into these countries. What about Taiwan?

GEN KRULAK: We had no contact with Taiwan. It's not legal. We could not make visits, could not do anything with them. I had been invited over to Taiwan many, many times and the State Department wouldn't let me go.

DR. CRIST: Is there any sort of joint defensive planning done?

GEN KRULAK: Yea there is but only at the very highest level. When we sent the carriers to the Taiwan Strait, it was coordinated but not operationally like you would like to see an operation done.

DR. CRIST: What, did you see China as a growing threat in '94/'95?

GEN KRULAK: I saw China as a growing opportunity. I think that China could be a great economic partner or a great enemy, and it's going to depend on how we as a nation treat them. But China is like the United States. Does China spy on the United States? Yes. Does China try to gain favor with groups in the United States? Yes. Do we spy on China? You better believe it. Do we try to gain favor with groups in China? You better believe it. That's geopolitics. The day you start getting angry with somebody because they are

spying on you, you better look at your own house. You cannot take in account the way they treat their people and the humanitarian issues involved in China because their view of people, their view of life is different than ours. And so you've got to be very careful laminating the U.S. view of life on to China.

DR. CRIST: Did you do much with Pakistan?

GEN KRULAK: Nothing.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on those sorts of issues Sir that I haven't hit on?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: 7 January 1995 you met with Admiral Macke concerning Force Apportionment and the Marine Corps. What were the issues involved in this meeting Sir? You also mentioned Nimble Dancer, what was Nimble Dancer?

GEN KRULAK: Nimble Dancer was an exercise that was driven by the Joint Staff in Washington that tried to come to grips with the results of the Bottom-Up Review. One of the fall outs from the BUR was the allocation of forces to the two major regional contingencies. Admiral Macke, like every CinC, wanted his own forces specifically designated to him. Forces that would never go to another CinC. Well every CinC wanted that. The problem was the Marine Corps was too small to be assigned to a specific CinC. I MEF, as our major warfighter, was allocated to two warfighting CinCs. Macke wanted them under him but that couldn't happen. We had difficult discussions with him as the result of what the 174,000 person Marine Corps meant to our ability to fight in two major regional contingencies. If Korea exploded, the spigot would turn on Korea and Macke would be a happy. If SWA exploded, the spigot would be turned on to Binney Peay and Macke would be unhappy. He'd still have III MEF but those were the only Marines who could be really tied to PaCom.

DR. CRIST: So is, during your tenure was I MEF apportioned or assigned to any one of them?

GEN KRULAK: I MEF was assigned to both.

DR. CRIST: Assigned to both.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That made both Peay and Macke unhappy but that was the reality of life. This idea to specifically tailor or assign forces to the various CinCs was supported by the Joint Staff.

Marines such as Jack Sheehan supported that. People who just didn't understand that the Marine Corps was not large enough to be apportioned evenly to two CINCs. We were not a two MRC force and I said that as the CG, MARFORPAC and CMC. My views were not popular with some.

DR. CRIST: The reason I harp on this is it strikes me as a real change in the mindset of Unified Commanders ...

GEN KRULAK: Again this issue of Goldwater/Nichols, what's mine is mine and what's yours is debatable.

DR. CRIST: Moving back to CentCom, 16 January you attended a two-day Component's Conference in Tampa for CentCom. What do you recall about this conference, did anything significant come from it?

GEN KRULAK: We discussed the development of something called the Marine Logistics Command which we wanted to have . . . a command that directly supported the warfighter. The second issue was making sure that Binney Peay prepositional some Class 5 and some ammunition for our aviation. Both of those went okay. The conference was not a big deal. I went to similar ones for Macke, Luck and Peay.

DR. CRIST: In 1995, North Korea removed the spent fuel rods from the nuclear reactors which created a major crisis on the issue of nuclear weapons and whether North Korea was developing nuclear weapons.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, but for us it was a nothing. I know that CinCPac was worried about it too but for the Marine Corps it was not a significant issue.

DR. CRIST: Around this time was the gassing attack in the Tokyo subway.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I heard about it from our Command Center but didn't really understand the implication until I got to work that morning and saw the front page of the *Honolulu Advertiser*. It had a very poignant picture of people lying on the ground. It was a color picture, and they had blood coming out of their eyes, noses and ears. I went down to Dick Macke and I asked him if we had anything that could help in this situation. Adm Macke said, no. I started looking into the types of organizations we had to turn victims into patients, victims of chemical/biological incidents into

patients and there was nothing. And that was the beginning of my thought process regarding a Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything on your period at MarForPac I haven't asked?

GEN KRULAK: My change of command. The officer who became CG MarForPac and Commander Marine Forces Pacific was a Lieutenant General, at that time a Major General by the name of Jefferson Davis Howell, better known as the "Beak." Beak Howell was my Deputy at MarForPac. Because of the time it takes to get somebody nominated and confirmed, the change of command took place without anybody to turn the command over because Gen Howell had not yet been confirmed. I basically made a comment that I was not passing the command, I was just leaving and that the Deputy would hold the job pending the arrival of the new Commander. I then said that, "If you watch real closely at the time of the Pass and Review you may get a major hint as to who the next Commander will be." Then right before the troops Passed in Review, I asked Gen Howell to come up and stand next to me. Everybody figured it out pretty quickly. The point was that an officer may not "presume" he/she will be confirmed so great care had to be taken not to irritate the Congress.

DR. CRIST: Your tenor at MarForPac coincided with a number of the commemorative events of World War II.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We did a lot of preparation to get ready to welcome people to such islands as Saipan and Tinian. It was an exciting time.

DR. CRIST: President Clinton came through Hawaii during this time.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. He arrived in Hawaii after a trip to Japan. This was before I was nominated to become the Commandant. The President and Mrs. Clinton came to dinner at Dicke Macke's house and it just so happened that Zandi sat next to him. The rumors were flying back in Washington after that dinner. "General Krulak and his wife had dinner with President Clinton and it looks like he's going to be the Commandant." It was just ridiculous. Again I was just out there doing my job. The President came through. It wasn't a dinner that I had with the President. It was a dinner with the CinC and there were probably 30 other people at that dinner. Gary Luck came all the way from

Korea to attend the dinner. Unfortunately the rumors were flying after that dinner.

DR. CRIST: Was this the first time you've met President Clinton Sir?

GEN KRULAK: No, I had met him before at Quantico. I really did not know the man. I had no relationship at all with him. He obviously knew me or I would have not have been nominated as CMC. But my views were very much different than his – in many ways.

DR. CRIST: Anything else sir on your period in MarFor Pacific that we didn't touch on? We've talked a lot about the transition for Commandant already.

GEN KRULAK: No, other than in many ways it was a time of relaxation for Zandi and for me. Although we were busy as ever, we were mentally relaxed coming out of the job at MCCDC. That was absolutely the toughest job I'd ever had. Coming to MarForPac, I was with the troops again and had a great staff and great people. It was relaxing. We went there with no sense of becoming the Commandant so it was really as if a load had been taken off our shoulders. We were just out there doing Marine things . . . working with great people and surrounded by great officers and staff non-commissioned officers and NCOs and enlisted Marines. It was great. We were able to forget about all the politics going on back in D.C.

Like I've said many times, Zandi and I went to MarForPac believing in our hearts and souls that we were not going to be the Commandant and the First Lady. We loved Hawaii. Anybody who seeks the Commandancy isn't the person that should be the Commandant. So when all the rumors started flying, we were oblivious to them because we were so far away. We weren't in the "intrigue" of what was taking place back in Washington. But when the rumors did get out to us we laughed at them. The one that gave us the biggest chuckle was this "intimate dinner" we had with the President.

SESSION XI

Nomination for 31st Commandant and the Transition

Meeting with Secretary Dalton . . . Announcement on Iwo Jima . . . Russ Appleton and forming the transition team . . . Transitional Commandant . . . Role of the commandant and the unified commanders . . . Confirmation hearing . . . A chance meeting with Representative Patrick Kennedy . . . Seeking advice from former commandants . . . Strategic vision for the 21st Century . . . Observations about the Navy and OMFTS . . . View of the Marine Corps and warfighting in the next century . . . Barbara Lane Brown . . . Observations about Gen Krulak's personality.

DR. CRIST: The date is 12 July 1999. The location is the Commandant's transition office in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Last session we covered your time at MarForPac. On 18 January 1995, you had a meeting with Secretary of the Navy John Dalton—an interview for possible selection as the 31st Commandant. Prior to this meeting, General Carl E. Mundy e-mailed you suggesting to be prepared to articulate a vision of the Corps, your perceptions of the joint world, and how the Marine Corps fits within the naval service. Do you recall this?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Secretary Dalton, in order to ensure a sense of fairness about the selection process, interviewed all of the individuals who both General Mundy and John Dalton believed would be good candidates to be the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I was one of those. It was an interesting meeting. I went in there and he had his Marine aide present. I'm being interviewed by the Secretary of the Navy for the position as Commandant of the Marine Corps, and a Marine colonel is in the room. Personally, that didn't faze me. I knew the colonel, and it was not a big deal. But I thought to myself, "That's a strange way to conduct an interview for the next Commandant. Does this mean the colonel here gets a vote?" It was just very interesting. The interview lasted probably an hour. It was over lunch. I didn't get much lunch. He is not a free flowing, freethinker. Every question he had was written down on a piece of paper that he kept in his lap. He would basically make notes on what I said, or perhaps didn't say. Later on, I was to learn that he did the same thing with all the other candidates. Later when I was Commandant, I learned that he rarely met with me, or the CNO, that it wasn't well-scripted on cards.

The questions he asked were essentially some of the ones that Carl Mundy spoke with me about.

But he didn't ask anything that I wasn't prepared to handle: "How do you see the Marine Corps in the 21st century?" "What about Navy-Marine Corps relationships, both operationally and within the building?" "What are my suggestions on how to do the POM process?" The money. Gender issues. "What did I think about women in combat, gays in the military?" "Would I be willing to move headquarters Marine Corps down to the Pentagon?" Those were the types of questions he asked. Then, if not Chuck Krulak, who? That's kind of how it went.

DR. CRIST: You have been thinking about these issues, the Marine Corps of the 21st century, for a number of years now.

GEN KRULAK: On the vision for the 21st century, you're right. I had been giving a lot of thought to that, particularly when I was CG MCCDC. On the Navy-Marine Corps relationships, I told them they were basically very strong, out in the fleet and in the Fleet Marine Corps. That is, as the commander of Marine Forces in the Pacific; I dealt with the Seventh Fleet, the Third Fleet, CinCPac Fleet. I said the warfighting capability of the Navy-Marine Corps team was strong and getting stronger. We saw that in some of the contingency plans for Korea, as I've discussed previously, where for the first time we were talking not just landing on the east coast, but the west coast, using of LCACs, a lot of real innovative thought into the Korean campaign. I said, "You had no problem outside of the Beltway. However, inside of the Beltway, it is not getting better; it's probably getting worse." There were a lot of reasons for that. As money gets tighter, you automatically start to strain the relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps. You automatically have a little bit of a strain, as one individual is leaving, i.e., the

Commandant. In that case, add to it Mike Boorda, who was himself still new. Carl Mundy was leaving. There's always a little natural head-banging there. But that was not to be unexpected, because the driving factor is always money.

On the gender issues, I told him I had absolutely no problem with the situation that we found ourselves in at that time, and that was, the opening up of multiple MOS's to women. But that I drew the line on women in close combat, and I drew the line on any attempt to change the law regarding women in combat. I said, "I base that on my own experience with women in Desert Storm, where they did a magnificent job in the combat service support area. But I did not see one of them who was eager to go through the mine fields as a ground lance corporal." "Secondly," I said, "I think the mothers and fathers of America aren't ready for it." I would not support that, and if he was looking for somebody to support it, that was the end of the interview.

We then talked about gays in the military, and I just said, "No," and if he had a problem with that, we ought to end the interview, because I would not support that, and would be very vocal against it.

I talked a little bit about Congressional relationships and how I thought that the Navy and the Marine Corps could improve in that area. We talked about the importance of the family. That as the Secretary of the Navy, he ought to be looking at the spouse, because the spouse was going to play a major role.

Then he asked whom would I pick, if not me? I told him that, although he would probably run into some conflict from ground officers, I thought Rich Hearney would make a good Commandant and he would be the first aviator Commandant. If he were interested in doing a first, I know President Clinton is often interested in firsts, here's one he might want to think about. He said, "Thank you very much," and that was it. There was very little feedback from him. It was just one question after another.

DR. CRIST: Did he ask the same questions to each of the candidates?

GEN KRULAK: I'm convinced he asked the same questions to each individual.

DR. CRIST: Any idea of the deliberation process? Did Secretary Dalton make the decision on who it would be?

GEN KRULAK: As I understand it, General Mundy provided to Secretary Dalton several nominations, as if each were the individual to be

Commandant. In other words, he wrote up a series of people as if they were the candidate to be the nominee, then provided those to Secretary Dalton, then they talked through each one of those nominees. Secretary Dalton then did the interviews, and then I think he went down to Secretary Perry, and to Chairman Shalikashvili. They talked it over, and then went to the President, and made a nomination there.

DR. CRIST: Did you have much of a working relationship with Secretary Perry or Shalikashvili before becoming Commandant?

GEN KRULAK: Very little.

DR. CRIST: Did your Naval Academy days come up in your meeting with Dalton?

GEN KRULAK: No. As I mentioned earlier, he was in the Naval Academy when I went through, but we had 24 companies divided into two regiments. A 1st regiment, a 2d regiment. I was in the first regiment; he was in the second. I rarely saw him.

DR. CRIST: When did you first hear that you had been selected?

GEN KRULAK: I guess it was around 1st, 2d, 3d of March, sometime in that timeframe. But, I learned long ago that until the President of the United States nominates you, all the rest is baloney. When people say, when did I find out, I found out on board an aircraft right off Mount Suribachi. Although General Mundy had written me a letter saying congratulations, we're so proud of you prior to the actual nomination, I preferred to wait for the official nomination by the President. Let me tell you, the same thing had happened to my mother and father. My dad was told by the Secretary of the Navy, you're the next Commandant. It didn't happen. I love Carl Mundy to death, but when Carl Mundy sent me this real nice note, I just said, "Thank you very much," and put it in my memory locker, and said, "If needed, I'll break this thing out." But it's got to be the President. It's the President's nomination, not the Secretary of the Navy, or Secretary of Defense. I'm sure General Mundy believed in his heart of hearts it was a done deed. As it turned out, it was. But when anybody asked me when I found out, it was not on the 3rd of March.

DR. CRIST: After your nomination General Mundy sent an e-mail to you. In it he mentions the

Commandant's free season Redskin tickets and a number of other things for you to think about.

GEN KRULAK: He laid out all of these things that I needed to be thinking about, and the fact of the matter was, I wrote him back and thanked him.

DR. CRIST: On 14 March, at Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, Secretary of the Navy Dalton announced your nomination as the 31st Commandant. Why that location? What were your feelings at the time?

GEN KRULAK: I think it was chosen for a lot of reasons. One, obviously, was just the plain historical value to the Corps of this great island called Iwo Jima, and the tremendous battle that took place there. I think that was a beautiful backdrop too. We were in the midst of the 50th anniversary of the battle. It was even more special because a lot of the warriors who fought during the battle were there. Also, there was a great family connection in that my godfather, as we discussed, was H. M. Smith. I think what Dalton was trying to do was tie the famous Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, standing next to Smith, pointing up on Suribachi, seeing the flag raised, and saying, "The raising the flag on Suribachi guarantees the Marine Corps for the next 500 years." And fifty years later, the Secretary of the Navy is telling "Howling Mad" Smith's godson, "you are the Commandant." So, there was all of that. I think that's kind of why Suribachi and Iwo Jima.

But again, although we were going there, there was not, in my mind, a defining sense that this was when it was going to happen. We only found out circling Suribachi on a plane. The communicator came out of the front cabin with a yellow message that was given to Mundy. He looked at the message, gave it to my wife. My wife took the message, opened it up, started crying, and she handed it to me. The message read, "The President of the United States announces that he has nominated General Charles C. Krulak." When people ask, "When did you find out?" I found out on that plane.

DR. CRIST: Pretty dramatic.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, it was. Very dramatic.

DR. CRIST: Any idea of who Gen Mundy advocated? You two had a close working relationship since the 1991 FSPG.

GEN KRULAK: I think General Mundy was honest in his desire to give General Hearney as

ACMC and everyone of his three-stars a shot at being the Commandant. I don't think he set out to sponsor Bob Johnston, or Chuck Krulak, or Rich Hearney, or anybody. I think in his own mind, as he started looking at the potential candidates, that in all probability, he felt I would do the best job. They were great candidates. Tony Zinni, Charlie Wilhelm, Bob Johnston, Rich Hearney; they're really great. But I think when he looked in totality, he probably thought I was the best person for the job, as a team, as a command team: Zandi Krulak and Chuck Krulak. In my heart of hearts, I don't believe he ever reached the point of saying to the Secretary of the Navy, "Here's the guy I think you ought to select. At the same time, we were very close, and are very close.

Although I've mentioned this before, it worth repeating, I had never served with Carl Mundy until I was a one-star general. When I was a one-star general, I think I saw him a total of four times. This is not a case of bubba-ism; I didn't know the officer. I became his MM, Manpower Management, Personnel Management Division, and had a lot of contact with him on general officer slating, on the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG), and all of that. When I became a three-star, I went down to MCCDC. I went down there kind of with the charge to make MCCDC work, or tell him that it doesn't work. As we've talked about at some length, for two years, I had an unbelievably close relationship with him.

General Mundy was very good at the day-to-day in fighting, and articulating the Corps, but what he was articulating was normally the result of a lot of hard work by a lot of people, of which I was one. Nobody can do a better job, once given the pitch, than General Mundy. I'm not knocking him; he's very smart. But once he gave an over-arching idea of where he wanted to go, we were the ones at MCCDC that put the flesh on it, then built the briefs, and did a lot of work for them. I think at that point in time, a very close relationship developed.

DR. CRIST: Earlier you described yourself as Mundy's Russ Appleton.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's about it. I'm sure he would say, I was his right-hand man, his go-to guy. There's nothing wrong with that. If somebody were to ask me who was my Chuck Krulak, the answer would be, I had two; I had a colonel, and three-star general. I had Colonel Russ Appleton, and Marty Steele. One of them was my chief of staff. One of them was the warfighting development and integrator. That same team that worked the hard issues at MCCDC as we were

building the concept-based requirement system and the combat development process, they were the same people who ended up at my side during the 31st commandancy.

DR. CRIST: That segues into my next question, about your transition team, and the team that would put together the Commandant's Planning Guidance. How did you go about selecting them? It sounds like you tapped innovators from your MCCDC days?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. While at MCCDC, we had the "road warriors." As I think I've mentioned, they got the term road warrior from going up and down Interstate 95, taking information to General Mundy in Washington. I had Russ Appleton running that for me until he became chief of staff at MCCDC. I knew Russ was going to be my MilSec. Then we started seeing John D. LeHockey and some other people that did some of the work. I said to Russ, that I wanted him and would want John LeHockey." Then I told him to bring to me, through our network, the best and the brightest he could find. He knew what I meant. Our network was people that we had been tapping into over the years. The end result is, he came up with a list of people. We sat down and picked the ones we thought would do the best job, figuring that each one of them, could, at best last, a year.

DR. CRIST: Did you had in your mind from the outset that your commandancy would be a transitional period; the Marine Corps of the next century would not be the same as the past?

GEN KRULAK: What I believed then and believe now is that we're in the midst of what I call a "strategic inflection point." A strategic inflection point is that point in time for the military where technology, coupled with an agile mindset, could substantially alter and increase combat capability. That's where I saw this country and that's where I saw the Marine Corps--very similar to right after World War I. You had to somehow jump-start that type of thinking. I knew in my heart that if I were the Commandant, I would do that. I would jump start it. I knew it was going to be a shock to the system, so I started calling myself a transitional Commandant. I said, "I'm going to be a transitional Commandant." I was trying to condition my senior generals that things were going to happen during this time, and it was not about me, it was about getting to the 21st century. When they saw me, whether laying down definitive deadlines for generals, developing planning guidance, or heard

me talking on the stump, it was not about Chuck Krulak. It was the institution trying to get us into the 21st century.

When I first introduced the term transitional Commandant -- it was on the 29th of June 1995, when I talked to all my generals. I said, "The best thing that could possibly happen is that no one remember me two Commandants from now. If I've done my job, and you've done your job, and we've all done our jobs together, then who started the transition should not be remembered. You're not going to see the bridge built. You may be the quarterback, but you're not going to see the touchdown pass go into the guy's arms. I'm sorry about that. If you're interested in seeing that, you're in the wrong outfit, because we're not going to do that. What we are going to do is take a leap forward." The term I used was "steal a march on the future," and that's what we did.

DR. CRIST: You alluded to post-World War I being a transitional period, the development of armor, aircraft, all these things, and a lot of the visionaries of that period ran against a bureaucratic resistance to the change. Did you anticipate that sort of potential problems, either from the Marine Corps, or the DoD?

GEN KRULAK: I will be very honest with you. I did not think I would run into the problems I did. I thought the Marine Corps, because of its reputation, and because of all that I read, was very innovative in its mindset. That innovation came naturally. We were ready to move. Unfortunately, that was not true. The Marine Corps is tremendously attached to tradition, and its hand, as I term it, is always on the touchstones of the Corps. When I became the Commandant, and put out the Planning Guidance and started talking the way I was talking, I think it caught many Marines by surprise. As an example, the Warfighting Lab, caught people by surprise. They could read about the Warfighting Laboratory, but then to really see that we were going to experiment, and we were going to do a lot of things differently, in order to see how we were going to operate in the 21st century, I think that took them back a little bit. They were concerned that we were going too fast, that we didn't have a method to our madness, so to speak.

When I realized that, and I realized it very early on, we went on a major campaign to tell the Corps what we were doing: sell the program to the Marine Corps. That campaign lasted for four years. Now, you go to any Marine base, talk to a sergeant, he can tell you what making Marines and winning battles is all about. He can tell you about a Hunter

Warrior and Urban Warrior. It's just phenomenal how much they know. But at the beginning, as an example, the Warfighting Lab was, in their minds, Marines, running around in black pajamas, with throwing stars like ninja's. They didn't even understand that the Warfighting Lab was a conduit for innovation, a way to develop new warfighting concepts, take new concepts, and flesh them out. At the beginning, I did not understand the resistance that I would face, but I found it out very quickly. Within a week, it became obvious there were some aspects that were going to cause some angst among my senior officers. I never had a problem with the young staff sergeants, and below, and the captains. They were ready to go, because I think they're far more attuned to that kind of a role.

DR. CRIST: One of your first tasks as the Commandant-designate was developing a new general officers slate. General Mundy notified you of its approval on 23 March 1995.

GEN KRULAK: General Mundy was very kind in saying that my slate was approved. He gave me his best shot, in what he thought the slate ought to be. He would call me up and say, "I'm thinking about this." There were very minimal changes, and most of the changes that took place were as a result of a three-star general, or somebody that was nominated for three stars not getting the job. Major General [Bertie D.] Don Lynch was nominated to be the Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and was not given the job because of an issue between he and the Secretary of the Navy. When Don Lynch didn't get it, there was a big change. Ron Christmas, who was going to go out to take over Marine Force Pacific, to be my relief, ended up being manpower. My relief turned out to be my deputy, General [Jefferson D., Jr.] Howell. The slate had some minor tweaking, but the bottom line was, it was a pretty solid slate. It was one that General Mundy's GOMO recommended to him. General Mundy got it, gave it to me. I made a few minor changes, but I had basically said to myself, "I'm not coming in with a bunch of strap hangers and bubba's." I played the cards that were dealt me like I always did. General Mundy developed a good slate. As a matter of fact, that's what I did with General Jones. I gave him my best shot, and said, "whatever you think." He made a couple of changes and in it went. That's kind of the way it goes when a new Commandant comes in.

DR. CRIST: I noticed in your correspondence with General Mundy and others, you discussed the changing role of the Commandant in the post-

Goldwater-Nichols world. You mentioned a few times that the CinC's were beginning to act as though they owned the forces assigned to them. In 1995, or at the beginning of your commandancy, what was your view of the unified commanders and the service chiefs?

GEN KRULAK: I went into the job vowing that I would do all in my power to walk the dog back, or swing the pendulum away from the CinC's back to where it rightfully belongs, and that's to the services. The reality is, having been a component commander, my belief was that Goldwater-Nichols did not intend for the CinC's to become the powerhouse they were becoming. I thought the pendulum had swung too far. I thought there was great danger in, for the simple reason that a CinC, for the most part, is paid to concentrate on today and tomorrow. They have an area that they have to watch over, be concerned about, and if necessary, actually conduct combat operations. Therefore, they should devote their attention to that. The service chief looks at today, tomorrow, but more importantly, the day after tomorrow. The service chief is responsible for making sure the people that they're going to give to the CinC's are trained, and equipped, and ready to fight. They must look across the whole spectrum of what it takes to build the Marine, or the soldier, or the sailor, or the airman, to give to that CinC. If the CinC gets too involved in the service chief's business, you're going to break what has made us great.

I started working very hard in my tour as the Commandant to pull that back. One of the things I used to say is, if you put General "X," CinCEur, this tremendously powerful man, up alongside Chuck Krulak, the Commandant of a 172,800-person Marine Corps, and fired guns in salute, that CinC would sit down at seventeen guns. The Commandant stands for another two guns. That has got to count for something. That's the signal which says the service chief outranks any CinC. It's that way for a reason. Goldwater-Nichols didn't change that for a reason. The reason was that Goldwater-Nichols understood the importance that the service chief plays in building the war fighting capability. Likewise, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also gets nineteen. He doesn't get twenty-one; he gets nineteen. He is the principle advisor to the national command authority, but he is not in a position where he should be stiffing the service chief. Fortunately, I worked for two very good Chairmen, Shali, and Hugh Shelton. Both of them understood very well the role the service chiefs should play. As a matter of fact, I was probably the

most outspoken of the services on trying to maintain the prerogative of the service chief.

As I walked out, there is a major difference between the role of the CinC and the role of the service chief now. That pendulum has swung back, and is now far more in line with what it ought to be, vice where it had been. I think we saw that during Kosovo, where the CinC briefed the Joint Chiefs twice a week via teleconference as to what was going on, because we played a role in that. We made decisions of who was going to get forces and when. Were they going to employ the Apache helicopters or not. That wasn't the CinC's decision. We were recommending to the President, don't do it. The CinC wanted to employ them. We were recommending, don't do it. We didn't, which gives you an idea of where the power of the service chiefs ended up in June of 1999, versus June of 1995.

DR. CRIST: At the outset in 1995, do you think it's a fair characterization to say that the CinC's were really getting into the business of looking at the theater, identifying what they needed from the Marine Corps and say, I want this or that specifically?

GEN KRULAK: More importantly, you never saw a CinC that said no. The CinC wrote checks on the service chief's checkbook. If you had the opportunity to write on somebody else's checkbook, you'd write all day. All I'm saying is, those days had to stop. I think we were very successful in stopping it. I'm not taking full credit, but I'll tell you, if you went to the Joint Chiefs and asked who played the major role or not, they'd tell you that it was the little guy!

DR. CRIST: What do you recall about your confirmation?

GEN KRULAK: There was a great deal of effort to get, "smart" on all Marine Corps issues, not just Pacific issues. I was MarForPac. I knew those, but there were a lot of issues that were bubbling back here in Washington that I was not privy too. The Commandant doesn't normally come from MarForPac. When I went out there, I literally did not go out there thinking I was going to be the Commandant. I thought that it was a signal that I wasn't going to be the Commandant. I was going out there to retire in the same position my father had last occupied. That's not bad; I was pretty excited about it! But when people say, "Krulak was going to be the Commandant," Krulak didn't think so. There hadn't been a Commandant out of Pac since Lou Wilson 20 years earlier. My first

thought was, "Okay, I've got to learn about the entire Marine Corps, because I made a decision that I would go into the confirmation hearing with no back-up; I would do it all myself. I took that through to my commandancy. I never went with a bag-boy to any hearing on the Hill, ever. There was never anybody back there passing me pieces of paper. I had to really know my business.

The second biggest was getting the planning guidance written in time enough to release it at 0001 on 1 July. One of the things that I got from my dad when I had gone and visited him was, four years may seem like a long time, but in reality, it is very short. If you think of the Marine Corps like a big ocean-going vessel, and you're the CO of that vessel, and you say, right full rudder, you start that rudder turning, that ship doesn't turn for a long, long time. If it's a big oil tanker, it just takes forever to turn. That's, the way the Marine Corps is. If you think that you can turn on a dime, you're crazy. What you need to do is make every single decision you're going to make, of substance, in the first year, because you will need the next three to institutionalize them.

With that in mind, I knew that I could not afford to wait six months, or three months, to publish my guidance. I knew I was going to make the ship turn in many areas. I wanted it ready to go the minute I became the Commandant. The real minute anybody becomes the Commandant is at 0001 on the 1st of July. The major challenge then was to build the apparatus, my group, my transition team, in such a manner to be able to achieve that goal. At the same time, achieve it with that document, having the buy-in of my generals. That meant not only did I have to have it produced and ready to go on 1 July, but I had to have it in good enough shape to be able to let them have a couple of whacks at it before 1 July. It was a heck of an effort; a heck of an effort.

DR. CRIST: 2 May 1995 was your confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Who introduced you to the Senate?

GEN KRULAK: The individual who introduced me was Senator Daniel Inouye from Hawaii. I was his grasshopper. If you've ever seen the T.V. show "Kung Fu," Grasshopper is the person who sat at the foot of the teacher. Inouye was my Congressional teacher and I was his grasshopper. That stemmed from a relationship we had developed while I was MarForPac. He knew my dad, obviously, from Hawaii, also. I asked him to introduce me, and he did. The hearing itself was held jointly with General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief

of Staff of the Army--designate. The questions were fairly simple, to be very honest. The only thing that was a surprise at all was a senator by the name of Bob Smith, Republican from New Hampshire, who really jumped on Reimer about tanks and the Army's reluctance to give the Marine tanks during and after Desert Storm. That came as a shock to me. It came as a shock to Reimer. I had to eventually write a letter to Reimer apologizing to him saying, "I didn't know this was going to happen." But it was a very, very venom-filled comment by Smith, saying, "I thought we were all in the same armed forces, and yet, you all were unwilling to give up your excess tanks, the Marine could have lost lives," et cetera.

The hearing, the testimony itself, went very well. It was great because I had my family there. My kids were able to be introduced and my wife was introduced. It was, for all the effort, and all the sweat that I went through, including the efforts of Headquarters Marine Corps to get Chuck Krulak "up to speed," pretty anti-climatic. At first it might have appeared as all that effort was wasted time. The reality is the preparation gave me an unbelievable primer on the Marine Corps. The only better preparation was the job of CG, MCCDC. If you want to know how to be Commandant, you need to be CG, MCCDC. I had been away for a year, so it was very helpful to me.

DR. CRIST: During this time, you made an interesting call on Congressman Patrick Kennedy from Rhode Island.

GEN KRULAK: It turned out to be a really important call for the individual Marine. I went to see Patrick Kennedy, who was on the House National Security Committee then, now called the House Armed Service Committee; absolutely not what you'd call a military type of individual. He's interested in the military, but not in the warfighting part; far more interested in the personnel issues, et cetera. I'm not even sure why I went to pay a call on him. I think we were just kind of walking by his office and there he was. We went in and he came out and we talked for a little bit. Then, like they all do, he say, "Okay, now, what can I do for the Marine Corps?"

I remember at that point in time, just as clear as day, a memory of me back in March standing on a pier in Pohang, Korea after I had been nominated to be the Commandant. It was cold. It was about 33 degrees and raining. In other words, it was almost snowing. I had a lance corporal on my left and a PFC on my right. We were standing there in our typical Marine foul-weather gear, our field jacket,

my cover on my head, all the starch out of my cover, water pouring down over the brim of my utility cover, running down my nose and my chin. My jacket was soaked. These two Marines sitting next to me, one on each side, were soaked. They kind of were looking at me. I knew in their minds they were saying, "What the hell are we doing? We are standing here with a three-star general designated to be the next Commandant." We were all standing out in the rain getting soaked!

So when Pat Kennedy said, "What do you need," I said, "Gortex rain gear." He went, "What?" I said, "Well, I got to tell you . . ." and I related the story to him. I said, "I'll tell you what I'd like for my Marines some Gortex rain gear." He looked at me and said, "General, you've got it. I will ensure you have \$10 million in this year's budget for Gortex rain gear." I walked out of his office. My OLA at that time was a general by the name of Mike Ryan. The House liaison officer was a colonel by the name of John F. Sattler who went on to become Brigadier General, and he'll go higher. They both looked at me and said, "Are you crazy? Sir, you're going to be the Commandant. When they ask you a question like that, tell them V-22, AAV." I said, "I'm sorry but its what I thought of," and it turned out to be one of the best things that ever happened. First off, the word got around Capitol Hill quicker than anybody could imagine that the Commandant of the Marine Corps was asked what the Corps needed and he gave a \$10 million figure for something to take care of the troops. I'm telling you, from that day, for the next four years, we averaged \$30 million for personal equipment for the troops. We got Gortex rain gear. We got the "bivy" sacks. We got the new load bearing system. We got the boots. All of that because this naive Chuck Krulak was stupid enough to ask for a \$10 million item instead of a \$100 million. But it turned out to be a good thing, so we've equipped the Marine Corps with a lot of individual equipment based on that one call. Not real important in the overall history of the Marine Corps, but it does go to show that sometimes if you aren't an insider politically but your heart tells you what to say and it may turn out to be a good deal.

DR. CRIST: Which has much more dramatic impact on the Marines themselves.

GEN KRULAK: Oh, yes. They won't remember me. They don't care about the Command's Planning Guidance (CPG). What they remember is the guy that got them the Gortex, the new boots, the bivy sacks, et cetera.

DR. CRIST: Some of this equipment, sleeping bags, was the first new ones we've bought in probably 40 years.

GEN KRULAK: The new dome tent, replacing the shelter half. The shelter half was brought into the Marine Corps in 1918. First time in 80 years, think of that, my friend, 80 years! All thanks to guys like Pat Kennedy on the House side and Senator Bob Smith and Dirk Kempthorn and people like that on the Senate side.

DR. CRIST: You met with General Krulak Sr., on 29 March 1995, but you also actively solicited the opinions of a number of retired general officers, Commandants. What stands out in your mind as advice that they gave you, what was really helpful?

GEN KRULAK: I went to see, or call on every living commandant. I met with numerous other general officers, three-stars and above, former assistant commandants, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, former Manpower, all of them with the intent of trying to pick their brains, asking them: "What did they do right?" "What did they do wrong?" "Where were the land mines?" "What do you wish you had known before you became Commandant?" That type of thing. The second reason for doing it was to build family, try to get people to buy in with this new Commandant.

There were three people that were really most helpful to me. One was my dad. The most profound comment he made was, "You've got one year to do it in." He gave me a lot of other advice, but that really turned out to be tremendous advice. He was very helpful. The second person, who was tremendously helpful, which I was surprised by, was Lou Wilson. Lou Wilson not only helped me before becoming Commandant, but I talked to him during my commandancy whenever things were really tough. He was remarkable in two areas. One, his knowledge of the Marine Corps. He never disengaged. He's followed the Marine Corps. He's followed national security issues. He's a brilliant man and was able to talk to me at any time I called him, whether before, during the transition, or afterwards, and I didn't have to bring him up to speed, because he knew it, and could give me good advice. That was helpful. The one thing he really helped me on was the idea that, as the Commandant, you have something that no other service chief has; the aura of being Commandant. The trappings that go with it, i.e., your house, and Marine barracks, 8th and I. If you want to really win the grass roots of America, if you really want to win the Congress, you have got to use those to

the best of your ability. He was right on. During my commandancy, we'd host lunches and breakfasts. We took the parades and used them in different manners, all of it trying to develop a strength of support with the American people, and the Congress of the United States. That was Lou Wilson saying, look, who else has the Marine Barracks at 8th and I? Who else has the oldest, continuously occupied home in the City of Washington? It's the Commandant, not the chief of staff of the Air Force, that's for darned sure. He was very, very helpful in that area. The third person, obviously, was General Mundy. General Mundy was dealing with the issues of today, and with the ones that I would carry into tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow.

I spoke to a lot of aviators, because I entered the job with the aviation community somewhat afraid of me because of what happened in the FSPG, where we cut aviation quite a bit. As I mentioned, we cut attack squadrons, we cut OV-10's totally, we cut helicopter squadrons. So some believed that I didn't like aviation. So I met with a bunch of the aviator generals and picked their minds, and tried to tell them, "You're never going to have a bigger friend than Chuck Krulak." I think the end game will prove that out. If you look at where we were, as an example, with the number of V-22's before I became Commandant, and now, and how many we're building, and the buy rate, if you look at the build and buy rate of the AV-8B, if you look at the build and buy rate of the C-130's, all of it has increased dramatically since my commandancy. Not to pat myself on the back, just saying we proved the aviators who were concerned about me, were wrong.

The second area, I think, is that they obviously believed that Rich Hearney had a shot at being the first aviator Commandant. Interesting that I was the guy who recommended that if it weren't me, I'd vote for Rich Hearney. It was kind of always a little bit strange to me that somehow they looked at me as the devil, when in reality the devil turned out to be a very good friend of theirs. But more importantly, this devil would have voted for the first Marine aviator to be the Commandant.

DR. CRIST: Certainly, under your commandancy, Marine aviation really has proved itself to National command Authority, I think to the nation. With the F-18, the Marine squadrons, EA-6B's, which are critical everywhere.

GEN KRULAK: There's no doubt about it. Marine air has been a success story for the national command authority, for the joint staff. Like you

say, the EA-6B is a national asset. The role of the F-18 and the AV-8's in Kosovo was very important. It went well.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned this already, but if you could talk a bit about your view of the Navy and its current doctrine and as you approached your commandancy, did they have as clear of view of the future as you?

GEN KRULAK: My concern with the Navy was that they had not operationalized their side of Forward from the Sea. We had taken Forward from the Sea as an overarching Naval concept, a strategy. Out of that, we developed Operational Maneuver from the Sea. We operationalized the Marine Corps' portion of the Navy-Marine Corps' strategic vision. My argument was the Navy did not do the same thing; they still haven't. Why is that important? It's important because the Marine Corps has a concept-based requirement system. All of our requirements, whether it's a V-22 or AAV, or whether it's a new rifle, or whether it's a new truck, all of those requirements are driven by our operational concept--Operational Maneuver from the Sea. The fact that you need to come from over the horizon, deep inland, drove the requirement for V-22, drove our communications requirements. The Navy, unfortunately has not used Forward from the Sea. Their requirements for how many ships, how many carriers, how many what have you, it isn't there. When you talk about Naval surface fire support, of course they're having trouble with that, because they don't have an operational concept. They don't have an operational concept that's driving the requirements. The problem is, they still don't.

As I have mentioned earlier, they don't understand. They are in stove pipes. A submarine officer, versus a carrier guy, versus a black shoe, versus a mine guy, they just have trouble putting it together. For us it's very simple. We fight as MAGTF. Everybody understands it. One officer runs the Marine Corps; it's the Commandant. The Chief of Naval Operations does not have the same standing within the Navy as Commandant has within the Marine Corps. The CNO has a CinCPac Fleet, CinCLant Fleet. Then they've got the fleet commanders at Third fleet, Seventh fleet, you name it. They just have trouble getting their act together. The CNO has a very difficult time getting them all to do what needs to be done. From the standpoint of the navy versus the Marine Corps, that's probably the major difference and biggest problem that exists, particularly in trying to come to grips with an operational concept.

A lot of my fellow Marines claim that we're being stiffed by the Navy. I'm saying, no, follow the money. Every single one of our amphibious ships is either in the POM, where we put them, or have been accelerated. When I came in 1995, there wasn't any LHD-7, and there certainly wasn't any LHD-8. Nobody was talking about them. We now have LHD-7 and we've now got LHD-8. Every single one of our ARGs are fully funded in the POM. They're putting in the money and increasing our money--last year by over half a billion dollars. If you follow the dollars, that tells whether they're with you, or not. The money would say that they're with us.

DR. CRIST: I noticed, as I walked in here this morning, your were looking at the "31 Book," which is the book covering your transition.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The fact that there even was a "31 Book," I think is instructive. We took the time to plan in such detail that you'd have a book that at the end is four or five inches thick, full of planning that took place to make the transition more effective, and therefore, the commandancy more effective.

DR. CRIST: I noticed the e-mails and also from conversations with Colonel Appleton, when the rumors were flying in January of '95 of who it might be the next Commandant, he started putting together some thoughts and ideas, just in anticipation you might be the nominee.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I did not know he was doing that. Again, when I went out to MarForPac, I did not go out there thinking that I would return as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I thought I was going out there and serve the Corps and then retire. As I mentioned before, it had been 20 years since a Commandant had come out of MarForPac. Russ Appleton was serving as the deputy director of OPA in the Department of the Navy, working under the Secretariat. He probably had his ear closer to the rail so to speak than anybody and could hear the train coming. I didn't hear the train coming. He started working on some thoughts for transition. What's interesting is, he never called me and said, "I think there's a possibility it might be you." The first time I saw the 31 book was in the mail!

DR. CRIST: Would you say that it is a fair characterization that Sea Dragon and the subsidiary exercises of Sea Dragon, that his was done as a building block approach, each related to the other and all looking to what the Marine Corps needed

for the 21st century? What was Krulak's philosophy toward warfighting in the next century?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I think that's a good characterization of what was going on in my mind, and not just during the transition, but far more importantly, from the time I was at MCCDC; using MCCDC and the Combat Development Process to push the Corps towards the 21st century. I did not know it at the time, but what I was doing was solidifying my own views that I would eventually end up incorporating into the CPG. The idea that the battlefield is going to change; that chaos was going to reign and not crisis. The idea that the Marine Corps does windows and is not pointed toward the Soviet bear; nor is it just oriented at the lower end of the spectrum, but that we have to be prepared to do everything, to move out on a moment's notice, fight, and win.

You say, isn't that what we've always done? The answer is yes, but not in a century like we're about to enter, and certainly not with the kinds of leaps in technology that we are seeing. Every 18 months your computers became obsolete. That's changing the way you have to think about war fighting. It changes the way you think about procurement. It changes the way you think about command and control. All of that was foremost on my scope and it started at MCCDC.

DR. CRIST: Perhaps, I think you mentioned, with your work on the 91 FSPG.

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. In building back a Corps of 177, you had to look at the national military strategy, you had to look at what the future was bringing, and you had to build a Corps that you thought could fight and win in that future. So it started the thinking. MCCDC, of course, crystallized it, and then during the transition phase, it really came into focus.

DR. CRIST: When you were looking at this and developing these plans during the transition, what did you see as the Marine Corp's main role for the national military strategy?

GEN KRULAK: I saw at least the first quarter of the 21st century as a time of chaos versus a time of crisis. The difference between the two is simply that a crises involves nation states and it involves state actors. The best example would be the Cuban missile crisis. A state against a state. There were state actors: the President of the United States and Fidel Castro. When the crisis came to a head, there was the ability of the President to pick up the

phone, call Castro and say, "Look it, if you persist in what you're doing, we're going to take action." Castro blustered a bit, but then backed down. Kennedy was also talking to the Soviet Union. That's a crisis; far easier to deal with than chaos, which is where we are right now. Somalia is a good example. The President couldn't pick up the phone and talk to Aideed; he wouldn't answer the phone. He knew that if he answered the phone, we'd pinpoint him; we could come after him. It had nothing to do with state actor against state actor or nation state against nation state. It had everything to do with cultural, religious, ethnic conflict. That's where we're going. When I looked at that, I said, okay, that's really our niche, that is what the Corps does, managing that kind of instability. We aren't war winners; we're battle fighters. That was the beginning of this idea of making Marines to win battles. The realization that although the Marine Corps fought side by side with the Army on land in Vietnam and in Korea and in Saudi Arabia, the reality is 90 percent of our time is spent out in the world, in the hinterlands, so to speak, managing instability. We're a certain force for an uncertain world. If we could build a Corps that could do that, be the nation's 911 force, really be the ones to be the premiere crisis response force, then we would assure ourselves relevance in the 21st century. That's what we had to do.

DR. CRIST: In 1995, there weren't a lot of people within the DoD, thinking that far down.

GEN KRULAK: I like to say they were thinking of fighting the son of Desert Storm instead of the stepchild of Chechnya. All you have to do is look at the systems that were being bought, and still are being bought, to realize that we're not serious about fighting in chaos. We're serious about fighting the son of Desert Storm. Unfortunately, our enemies will not allow us to do that, as we're going to find out. What we saw in Kosovo was a perfect example. The Serbs did not play our game. People think we won. We didn't win anything. It isn't over yet; won't be over for years.

DR. CRIST: Along these philosophical lines, on May 1995, Andrew Marshall, who was the Director of Net Assessment OSD, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, on the subject of the revolution of military affairs, which was a hot buzz word in 1995. First of all, did you agree with his premises that we're involved in a military technology revolution now? Did his views and statements, or the whole idea of revolution of

military affairs as a concept, fall in line with your thinking of future war fighting needs? It appeared to reinforce your ideas?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, Andy Marshall and I are good friends. In fact, if you asked him what service in the last five or six years has been most innovative, there would be no question; he would say the Marine Corps hands down. He thinks we've done it right. I knew Andy Marshall. During the two years I was at MCCDC, he came down or I went up to participate in games with him. He was a good friend of mine, he met with Bill Owens and I on multiple occasions.

The only place where Andy Marshall and I disagreed was the idea of the role of technology in modern warfare. I believe that you should equip the man. Andy, to some degree, believed in manning the equipment. In other words, he said technology laminated on equipment is going to make the difference. My point is, technology has to make the man more effective, not the equipment more effective. The bottom line is, I believe there still is a revolution in military affairs. I would rather go with Andy Groves' comment about strategic inflection point than RMA. I think it is technology, coupled with the agile mind-set, coupled with the man or the woman, that makes the revolution. It is not technology alone.

DR. CRIST: There's an exchange of e-mails between yourself and General Mundy that followed the Vision 21 meeting in 1995. Essentially, what you're arguing is that the days of traditional armor engagements are over, that mobility, precision-guided weapons, lighter vehicles, are the future. Mundy argued that it could be a risky strategy because the Marine Corps could be written out of war plans or given reduced capability for what we have. But both of you agreed that light armor might be the direction for the Marine Corps to go in. It's a contrast to the Army's maintaining heavy brigades. What do you recall of this?

GEN KRULAK: Isn't it interesting that that was over four years ago and what is the new Chief of Staff of the Army, Eric K. Shinseki, saying right now, "We've got to lighten up; we've got to be more agile; we've got to be able to respond." What didn't work? Moving heavy armor, moving the MLRS. The bottom line is strategic mobility and agility is going to be what's going to win in the future, not heavy armor. Am I ready or would I have been ready to do away with tanks right now? Absolutely not. Because of the very things we're talking about. You still need that punch. There is

no replacement for armor. But I'm going to tell you right now, if I were the 32nd or 33rd Commandant, I'd have the developers looking very hard at a light vehicle that is armed with the capability to kill other armor, but is very agile.

The problem with tanks is that the only way to make them capable of withstanding a hit by an anti-tank system is to put more armor on them. Armor weighs, whether you're talking about composite steel or reactive armor, whatever, it still weighs. It's much cheaper to build a tank killer than it is to build a tank. Sooner or later, you're going to be killed. My point is what a tank gives you fire and shock power. Whether it's 60 tons or 6,000 pounds, if you've got the fire power, you've got the shock. What we need to do is concentrate on what is required, not on such things as armor. Agility will be protection. Nothing's going to protect a tank on the 21st century battlefield other than speed and agility. You just are not going to build an armor thick enough to withstand something that somebody is going to come up with, whether it's a laser system or who knows what it's going to be. The only thing that will save it is agility.

My argument with General Mundy -- his was a today and tomorrow argument -- my argument was the day after tomorrow. What's interesting is the very people that we were worried about, the Army, is now swinging toward my views of five years ago! The bottom line is the handwriting's on the wall and you can look at it and know this is where the world's going. Whether we knew it five years ago, Gen Mundy or I, the reality is that's where we're going now.

DR. CRIST: You certainly, in your responses to General Mundy, brought up the Desert Storm example several times. The armor formations by the Iraqis, couldn't withstand the precision guided weapon systems.

GEN KRULAK: Can you imagine anybody fighting us again like that, laying their artillery out in straight lines and tanks, hundreds of them, after watching Desert Storm, or even after watching Kosovo, and the lethality of precision weapons? They're not going to do that. They're going to fight us asymmetrically. If we line up our stuff, they'll take it out.

DR. CRIST: Yes, and that idea comes out in a lot of your early correspondence. I think, as far as if anyone looks back on this period and what our thought processes were for the future, it's an interesting observation.

GEN KRULAK: It's interesting that my successor, General Jones, was asked about tanks in his confirmation hearing. He said he didn't think it was time to get rid of tanks. Again, people missed the point. I'm not saying to get rid of tanks now; I'm saying you're not going to have them in the future. Big difference.

DR. CRIST: Certainly the need for strategic mobility . . .

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: One of the interesting items I noted as I was going through your papers was you hired what was called a "speech coach" prior to becoming Commandant, who in fact served a much larger role. How did that go and what was the genesis of this?

GEN KRULAK: The speech coach is really not the role or the function that this woman played. Her name is Barbara Lane Brown. The first time I met Barbara Lane Brown was in 1993, '94 timeframe, when I was CG MCCDC and Bill Owens was the N8 on the Navy staff. General Mundy had made me the interface between the Marine Corps and the N8. Today, you have the Deputy Chief of Staff for P&R, a three-star general. It was General Oster, now General Williams, who filled that role. In my time at MCCDC, we did it. I was up and down the road. I used to move up and back from Headquarters in the Marine Corps, probably an average of seven or eight times a week from Quantico, just to keep in touch with Owens and what was happening in the N-8 shop, because I was also responsible for the programming for the Marine Corps with then Major General Oster working for me. In all of this effort to try to bring MCCDC and the N-8 together, the then Undersecretary of the Navy, a man by the name of Richard Danzig, who is now the Secretary, had working for him, a woman by the name of Barbara Lane Brown.

She was more than a speech coach; she was a facilitator for putting ideas in focus and establishing guidelines to build upon relationships. She worked very closely with Owens and Krulak to build relationships within the Navy side and the Marine side. She also worked with me at MCCDC and with Marty Steele and Russ Appleton in trying to help us get focused at MCCDC. Helping me to understand why MCCDC and General Krulak were seen as trying to swallow the rest of the Marine Corps. The joke was that the real center of the Marine Corps was at Quantico, not at Headquarters

Marine Corps. I didn't agree with that. We were always in direct support of Headquarters Marine Corps, but the perception was that power rested at MCCDC. So Barbara Lane Brown was down there trying to help us kind of put a basket over our candles, so to speak.

When I became nominated to be the Commandant, I realized that there may be value in having Barbara Lane Brown come out to Hawaii. One, to talk about who I am as she saw me and how others saw me, two, how I might capitalize on my strengths, and minimize my weaknesses, and three to talk about actual speeches and presentations. The bottom line is, she was very, very helpful. She laid out how I came across to people and then gave me advice as to how to best use that and how to minimize the bad parts of it. Finally, she looked at a lot of the tapes of presentations I have made and made some fairly good comments about how I could improve. Her role was one of an external source looking at Chuck Krulak the man, and at Zandi Krulak, and figuring out where the strengths were, where the weaknesses were, how to capitalize on the strengths, minimize the weaknesses and how to put that all together in a presentation. She was very helpful.

If there was ever a major impact Barbara Lane Brown had, it took place when she came out to Hawaii right before I came back to Washington for good. We believed early on that there would be a requirement, particularly as we started to see the CPG take shape that there was obviously going to be a requirement to do a lot of communicating. We brought to Hawaii Colonel Appleton, who was the designated MilSec, and Barbara Lane Brown, and a few others, and we went to a beach house at Barber's Point. At that beach house, we sat down and went through three iterations of the planning guidance. Each one of us looking at it, making changes, coming back, looking at it again, making more changes. At one point in time, we were tired and bored from doing that and I decided to go for a walk on the beach and Barbara Lane Brown came with me. As we went on this walk, we talked about Chuck Krulak, the person's strengths and weaknesses. One of the weaknesses was my personality type.

In the 1990s, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Jack Dailey, believed in the Meyers-Briggs personality profile and had all of the general officers take the test. He believed it would help bring the general officer corps closer together, but at minimum, allow each of us to understand where the other was coming from. It was very interesting because on the day that they read the test results, there were just two people out of this entire

group that were different from the standpoint of what is "the successful military leader." Those two people were myself and another individual by the name of Tom Draude, who turns out to be my very best friend. We were the only two that were off in a corner all by ourselves. But the bottom line is, for what it's worth, Meyers Briggs identified a problem that Barbara Lane Brown helped to solve. In the Meyers-Briggs Inventory Test, I am called an INFP, which is 180 degrees out from any other successful military officer. Basically, it says I'm an intuitive, feeling type of an individual and I have trouble in giving bad news. I have a difficult time coming up and saying to somebody, "You're not doing what I want you to do," or "it's time for you to retire." Those things are very difficult for me. On this walk on the beach, she said, "Listen, you've got to quit thinking about yourself as an individual or even as the Commandant." She said, "You're the institution. When you take a stiff action against somebody, divorce yourself from saying it's you doing it. It isn't you, it's the institution. If you think of yourself as the institution, you'll always be able to do the right thing and it will be less painful than if you take it on as an individual act."

She turned out to be very sanguine in that area, because later on in my commandancy, I had to ask several general officers to leave the Marine Corps for numerous reasons, some of them because they didn't do the job or they did something they shouldn't have done. It became easier, because when I did it, I did it with the institution in mind and not thinking as an individual. She was very valuable.

DR. CRIST: One thing that stood out about some of her observations, and I bring this up mostly for people in the future, to kind of get a sense of Krulak the person, as opposed to policies and that sort of thing; she had some interesting observations about you. You had a great sense of humor and you had a gift to pull audiences in with you as you spoke; you have tremendous energy that sometimes you needed to reign in or control; and you function better in the morning than in the evening. She even noted that you tended to look tired in the afternoon. Would you say those were fair comments?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Going from the last to the first, I am a morning person, not an evening person. I function better in the morning, although, I found that as I got into the commandancy, I didn't have the luxury of functioning better in the morning than in the afternoon. So I found myself going 90 miles an hour the whole time and just sucking it up; it takes

a tremendous amount of energy to do that. I do have a great deal of energy; that's been kind of a hallmark of mine. They used to call me the whirling dervish, and I think anybody who knows me knows I've got a tremendous amount of energy. That's all a result of adrenaline pumping because of my Meyers-Briggs type; I'm an INFP. I'm an introvert and an intuitive, feeling type of individual that doesn't normally feel comfortable up in front of groups of people, et cetera. In order to do that, it takes a high degree of adrenaline and a lot of energy; so she's right on there.

The third point about the sense of humor; I hope I have a sense of humor. I think I've got one, but I don't know whether others think it.

When I give an address somewhere, some of the comments that are always given as feedback are, "you could tell he believed what he was talking about, believed deeply in the Marine Corps, et cetera, et cetera." That's just my own emotion coming through. One of the things that she also noted had to do with what we first saw at MCCDC, even during the transition, was this issue of almost a bright glow around me, this glow that she referred to as the Cinderella and the ugly stepsisters effect. She kept on cautioning me, you need to understand that you do have all of this energy, that you are so kinetic in what you're doing that sometimes people around you are turned off because they see you under a kind of light and they're kind of in the dark. You need to make sure that the light falls onto them and doesn't fall on you. That was very helpful. A lot of effort was made to develop a sense of oneness with the CPG, a sense of oneness with the Corps, that it's not Chuck Krulak; it's the institution, it's the Corps that's important, that if you start worrying about who gets the credit, then you've really lost the bubble. She was very helpful in that area too.

SESSION XII

Building the Commandant's Planning Guidance

Background to the CPG . . . Vision 21 . . . The push for completion by 1 July 1995 . . . Emphasizing 'making Marines and winning battles' . . . total force . . . Generation X and Next . . . The Five Pillars: warfighting; people; Corps values; education; naval character . . . Building support with the senior leadership for the CPG . . . SgtMaj Lewis G. Lee . . . Promotion to General . . . Change of Command.

DR. CRIST: Sir, Last session we discussed your nomination, your philosophy approaching your commandancy and the beginning of your transition. I'd like to focus on the development of the Commandant's Planning Guidance. As you mentioned earlier, this goes back to your days at MCCDC. You were the first Commandant to issue such a document. Could you talk me through its development.

GEN KRULAK: We covered this earlier, but the Marine Corps Combat Development Process order of '93 was an attempt to institutionalize the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and its prime mission, which is to develop combat capability for the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The idea behind the Combat Development Process was to take a concept and out of that concept bring requirements. What the order says is that there has to be several documents that drive this entire process. One of the driving, baseline documents for that, according to this order, was going to be something called the Commandant's Planning Guidance. It would be the touchstone. It would be written every four years within the first six months of the Commandant taking his command. It could be updated multiple times throughout the tenure of the Commandant, but it would be written within the first six months. It is bigger than the campaign plan. It is the linchpin. It is the engine to the process. It's what jump starts the process every four years. If you read my planning guidance, somewhere early on, it talks about how this is not a one-Commandant guidance. It is intended to push the process forward. My guidance, was important, because it was the first one written as a result of the change in the MCO.

As I discussed in covering my command at MCCDC, we tried to get General Mundy to write one. But General Mundy never liked the idea of being very specific and saying, "Hey, here's where

we need to go." So bottom line is, it was never published. The first one that was published was done by me. The second one that just came out was done by Jim Jones.

DR. CRIST: Yours appeared to have had far more specifics or details as opposed to just a philosophical statement.

GEN KRULAK: I took a more detailed approach because of what my dad told me, "You can philosophize all you want, but you have one year to make something happen." I believe Jim is going to do that. I think he's just doing it in a different way. I'm sure General Mundy said the same thing; you have one year to make change. I wanted my people to know exactly where the change was going to take place. I had to ensure in my own mind that it was going to get done. If you look at the end game of every one of those tasks, you will see that none of them overlap from 1 July 1995 to '96. It took longer to institutionalize them, but they started, all of them, in that first year.

DR. CRIST: 26-28 March 1995 of the final Vision 21 meeting was held out at Camp Pendleton. Vision 21 was headed by the ACMC and designed to develop a plan for future Marine Corps war fighting. First of all, what was your role in the Vision 21 plan? How did it fit into your Commandant's Planning Guidance?

GEN KRULAK: This will probably raise some eyebrows regarding Vision 21 and the role it played in the Marine Corps. I'll talk you through why it will. Vision 21, I'm not sure whether it was General Mundy's idea or General Hearney's idea, I really am not. I think they probably both got together. I think General Mundy was trying to make for a good transition and trying to get us looking towards the future of our Corps. General Hearney, I believe,

was far more into the total quality leadership and process re-engineering and he saw Vision 21 as a means to do that. Vision 21 began well before March, April. I don't know whether it was December or in the Fall or January, February timeframe. But the bottom line was it was a facilitated effort by civilians. It had in my opinion, too many flavors. Everybody that was possibly going to be running for Commandant was in there, which was probably a good idea, plus some two-stars and a couple of one-stars. It got unwieldy. Vision 21 ended up having very little to do with the CPG, very little.

I used one part of Vision 21 for the CPG. I'll tell you exactly which part. It's paragraph four of the CPG, which has seven subparagraphs. It's the only part that came out of Vision 21; "We will be prepared to handle a variety of missions; trained and equipped to defeat any enemy. The Marine Corps will be recognized, not just in the United States, but globally as a premiere crisis response force . . ." That's all that came out of Vision 21. Why is that? Because Vision 21 had too many people there. You couldn't get consensus. To get a consensus on the vision of the future Marine Corps was almost impossible. Some people said, "We want to be just crisis response and crisis response in this instance would be at the lower end of the spectrum." Others said, "No. We've got to be able to fight on the Northern Flank in NATO." Still others said, "We've got to be able to do windows."

What I used Vision 21 for was as a hook to hang the CPG on--for buy-in purposes. We all sat down. We spent six months talking about the Marine Corps. We came to some basic conclusions about what the Marine Corps of the future would look like, what it had to do to be relevant. Out of those four or five paragraphs, we built a CPG to try to get to that future. Vision 21 gave us an end state where we'd like to be to remain relevant. What was helpful from Vision 21 is that we all met and we agreed on the future of the Corps. But the reality is, its impact was minimal, except for those four paragraphs.

What it did allow me to do was provide those those generals copies of the CPG. They were then able to relate back to Vision 21 and give good comments on the CPG. That was the value of Vision 21. Did we need the facilitators and all that? There were a lot of people who said we could have thrown the facilitators out and gotten more done. What's interesting is the person who probably has sold Vision 21 more than anybody was the Commandant, but I did it for a different reason. I did it to ensure we had buy-in across the board for

the CPG, which I knew was going to be a fairly controversial document.

DR. CRIST: You and General Zinni had some complaints about Vision 21 especially about warfighting, as you said, and this is a direct quote, "It did not excite the captains at AWS."

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The bottom line, as I said in the CPG, we do two things for our nation: We make Marines; we win battles. Making Marines, most people didn't even know what I was talking about there. They sure as hell knew what winning battles entailed. Vision 21 didn't talk about winning battles, didn't talk about putting on our helmet and flakjacket and marching to the sound of the guns fighting and winning and guaranteeing a win. It wasn't touchy-feely; but it didn't strike to the soul of who we are, which is warriors. The concern that Tony and I had was, sooner or later, we needed to get away from all of this ethereal vision and get into how do you translate that into war fighting? The CPG was this attempt to translate the vision into warfighting.

DR. CRIST: You were adamant from the beginning that you wanted your CPG to hit the streets your first day as Commandant. Any concerns that might be difficult to accomplish?

GEN KRULAK: You better believe it. To get that CPG out and have it ready to go and vetted through the general officer corps, and vetted through some other people like General Mundy and my father and others was a massive undertaking. It took hours upon hours, late night, early morning, weekends, turn after turn after turn in order to get it to where we wanted it to be. It was tough. It was hard. It was demanding. You had to have your head in the game. It wasn't something that you just picked up and made a few comments. Every single sentence had to mean something. How do you determine due dates? The due dates had to make sense. You had to matrix everything. Once you wrote what you wanted to have done, then you had to matrix who was in charge, who was the primary person, and who was in direct support? All of that was very hard to do. You're talking about 18, 20 hours a day, seven days a week.

DR. CRIST: Would you say Colonel Appleton was your right hand man with the developing of this?

GEN KRULAK: Early on it was Colonel Russell E. Appleton. Then Lieutenant Colonel John D. LeHockey. Then we quickly brought in a couple of

other people. A young female major by the name of Tracy [Patricia F.] Warren, a young major by the name of Pat [George P.] Garrett; they also helped. They were kind of in the Commandant's staff. But we sat right here. We're sitting in the oral history office of the Marine Corps Historical Center. This is the same room in which we worked to develop the CPG. I'm sitting in the same office I sat in when I was in transition. I'm now in transition going out. Those desks out there were filled with Russ Appleton, John LeHockey, Tracy Warren, Pat Garrett. The lights were on early in the morning and late at night. The CPG was done with a lot of back and forth and meet dialog. It was hard work.

DR. CRIST: The CPG went through at least 14 different drafts.

GEN KRULAK: At least. Those were formal drafts. Some of them would be done, turned right in here and never see the light of day.

DR. CRIST: One of the first major changes, at your insistence, early on, was to move warfighting to the forefront. You wanted that your first item. Why?

GEN KRULAK: For a couple of reasons. It goes back to the making of Marines to win battles. Our ethos is founded in our twin touchstones: the touchstone of valor and the touchstone of values. I wanted that touchstone of valor, that sense that we are warriors. We have a warrior ethos. Nothing is more important than our ability to fight our nation's battles and to win them. I just thought it was important. We had a very strong emphasis on war fighting under General Gray. Under General Mundy, there were different battles to fight, primarily battles involving end strength. What I was trying to do was say, okay, we are always going to fight the end-strength battle, so let's get back to war fighting.

DR. CRIST: You added several specific items you wanted included in CPG. One was "total force." You made a conscious effort to ensure that that was included into the CPG.

GEN KRULAK: Because of the nature of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I had a large group of reserves that actually went to war with me. After observing how professional they were, how absolutely magnificent they performed, it was important to me signify to the Marine Corps that there was no difference between regulars and reserves. One of the first things I did was take the "R" as a designator off of any Marine unit, because I didn't

think that was right. What I wanted to do was to get the rest of the Marine Corps to look at the reserves in the same way as the regulars. Yes, there are individual reservist, enlisted and officers. You can't get away from that. But when you talk about a unit, I didn't want people thinking, well, that's the Sixth Engineer Support Battalion (R). That's the Sixth Engineer Support Battalion period. That battalion is going to go with you to fight and win wherever you go. It's down in Central America fixing storm damage. It was in Desert Storm building Khanjar. It will be wherever the next war is going to be. It is going to be part and parcel to the Marine Corps. We are a total force. We are one Marine Corps; we are not two. I wanted to ensure that the Marine Corps understood that. The one way to do that, to give credibility and relevance, certainly during the term of the 31st, Commandant was to put the total force concept into in the CPG. If it's in the CPG, it's got to be important.

DR. CRIST: Why did you want to emphasize the uniqueness of the Marine Corps? You said in the CPG, "It's [Marine Corps] not a second land Army. Neither are we a fourth Air Force."

GEN KRULAK: Basically that goes back to the roles and missions argument. I wanted to make sure that in everything we said and did that we did not get trapped into losing our expeditionary mind-set. If we lost that, then we would become a second Army or a fourth Air Force. What sets us apart from any other service is that we're expeditionary in nature, truly expeditionary. Not expeditionary in that you can pick up and move from point A to point B, but that our mind-set is moving from point A to point B also. If you go into a battalion commander's office or a squadron commander's office in the Fleet Marine Force, they don't have bookshelves; they have mount out boxes. That's where their pubs are. They're ready to go at a moment's notice. It's just so important that the Marine Corps understand that you lose expeditionary, you become another Army or Air Force. We can't afford to do that. The idea was to stress our expeditionary nature.

DR. CRIST: From the very beginning?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: In the development of the CPG, I got a sense that you outlined to your transition team your vision, they put the meat on the bones, including building an elaborate matrix of milestones, then you reviewing each issue,

providing guidance as necessary. Is that a fair assessment of the process?

GEN KRULAK: I think that someone once said of my style and my mind and my leadership -- I don't intend this to be an ego type of thing. I didn't say this; somebody else said it -- that Krulak is Michelangelo and other people build the scaffolding on which he stands to paint. That's not a bad description of the way I operate. I know what the painting's going to look like. I'm ready to paint. I'm a lousy scaffolding guy; I'm not a great detailed scaffolding person. I would sit down and they'd say, let's talk about manpower. I would take manpower and I'd say, here's kind of what I see, what I envision. I envision a manpower system that's fair and impartial to everybody. I see a manpower system that selects, and evaluates fairly. I don't think the fitness report does that. We need to add something about that. I see a manpower system that gives everybody the freedom to fail in certain areas, but there are certain areas that are inviolate. I sat there and said, this is what I'm thinking about. They would come in and say, now you addressed evaluations, here's the fitness report section; what do you think about this? I'd tweak it and say, yes, that looks good or you're getting there, but it needs to be stronger here. I might have written some paragraphs and specific sentences, but what I was looking at was the Sistine Chapel roof. I already knew what the roof looked like; I just didn't know how to get there. I needed some people to build the scaffolding to help me get there. That's what these great, great Marines did. When you go back to people like Pete Ellis, these were majors doing it. When people say, there's no room in the Marine Corps for the Ellis's of the world, I say baloney. My whole last year as a Commandant, I spent going around talking about Pete Ellis and about the roles of the Tracy Warrens and the Pat Garretts, saying you have to do the same thing. We can't ever lose the iron majors making a difference in the Corps. These people, when you get down to it wrote the CPG. Chuck Krulak didn't write it. It was written by young majors and lieutenant colonels and colonels who used my vision and my sense of what the end state was to look like, and then built the document.

DR. CRIST: There's one quote of yours that will certainly be synonymous with Charles C. Krulak, "The Marine Corps is making Marines and winning battles." You've addressed the warfighting aspect of the CPG. What about the making of Marines aspect?

GEN KRULAK: When I say making Marines, what I meant from the beginning is the special quality that has the Corps going into the streets of our cities and towns and to the farms, all over, and finding young men and women of character, the best that there are to be had. We bring them in. We either send them to Quantico, or we send them to Parris Island or San Diego. We put them through OCS or through Boot Camp. There we work a kind of a magic on them, a magic that basically transforms that young man or woman into what we call a United States Marine. We then take that Marine and we train them, educate them to be the world's finest warrior, then at the end of four years or 30 years, we give those same people back to America better for having been a United States Marine. That's making Marines.

In making that Marine, there's more than just the recruiting and the recruit training. There was the cohesion, sustainment. There was all the manpower processes. There were all of the changes to the schools. There were all the changes to the training. It was the change in MCI, change in school administration, change in Boot Camp. All of that was built around making a Marine that can fight on the battlefield of the 21st century. Marines from Generation X and Generation Next. It's a very, very difficult job, very difficult.

One of the very first meetings I had was with some psychologists and psychiatrists who I asked to tell me about Generation X and Generation Next. Who are they. What are their characteristics? They basically said that they have six characteristics. The first characteristic is they want to know the boundaries. They want to know where the playing field is that they can operate on. They want to know where the fence is. If you leave a hole in the fence, they just go out of that hole. They're going to pick your pocket and sneak back in. Two, if you give the boundaries, they're willing to be held accountable. Three, they don't mind being followers. They will observe and watch your leadership traits, and learn from you. Four, they want to be leaders. They don't mind being a follower if they can eventually be a leader. Five, they want to be something that is easily recognizable to their peers and that holds a challenge to them and that provides them something of value, not monetarily, but a "noble" income. Sixth, they believe in some overarching faith. They don't know it's religion, but that's what it is. As a result, according to my visitors, what these people are doing, this Generation X and Generation Next, is they're joining gangs. They're the Bloods or the Crips. They're the skinheads. They're the "trench coat" Mafia. Or they're cliques,

fraternities, sororities. Why? Because American society isn't giving them what they want. Society isn't giving them boundaries. Society isn't holding them accountable. Society isn't allowing them to be followers or leaders. Society gives them very little of their needs, so they go where they can find them. Once we as an institution realize that, we changed the way we made Marines. It's no good if you have a black box that has an input and an output and you want the output to stay the same, winning battles for the Marine Corps. You have an input of Generation X or Generation Next that's not like the input 20 years ago or ten years ago. You have to do something in the black box; you have to change that.

What we did was ask the questions, "What do we have to do to make these kids the same as our old Marines coming out?" The answer was, you had to change what's in the box. What are the kids looking for? They were looking for challenge; they're looking for boundaries; they're looking for accountability. That's what we did. We made Boot Camp longer. We made boot camp harder. We put in the Crucible. We said you're going to have our values. We're not going to change the value system of an 18-year-old. No way. We're going to give them our value system. We did. We called it honor, courage, and commitment, our Corps values. Then we said, you are going to be accountable for them. As long as you're accountable, and as long as you maintain our Corps values, you can wear the eagle, globe, and anchor. The second you violate our Corps values, you aren't going to wear the eagle, globe, and anchor. You're out of here.

DR. CRIST: Which are boundaries.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's making Marines.

DR. CRIST: What is it that causes -- I get the sense you've done a lot of thinking about this -- within society to change the type of recruit we're getting?

GEN KRULAK: Let me first start by saying that I believe, as you probably heard me say before, that the mothers and fathers of America are knocking themselves out to raise sons and daughters of character. There is absolutely no parent who wants to raise a bum. I don't know of a single mother who wants to have a son or daughter that is not a person of character. I believe in my heart and soul that the schools are working very hard. Nobody goes through college and becomes a teacher to turn out poor students. They're trying real hard. The churches and the synagogues, they are working very hard to produce and help build men and

women of character. What you and I didn't experience, though, is what these kids are experiencing. They are bombarded day in and day out with sex, alcohol, drugs, violence, and unbelievable peer pressure. I can tell you right now, I never had to experienced what an 18-year-old experiences today.

The Marine Corps made a very simple decision. We're going to join in the fight. We're not going to just stand by and accept kids and do whatever we can with them and hope that they do all right. We said, no; we're going to get in the fight with the moms and dads. That's why we changed recruit training and why we went to cohesion and sustainment. What's happened is the American people, the mothers and fathers, have wakened up to the fact that there is one service that's supporting them.

The reason we're making recruiting and nobody else is, is because: (1) we're selling a helluva good product, but (2) those mothers and fathers are now saying, we know where one service hasn't lowered its standards. In fact, they have raised their standards. We find ourselves being rewarded for that by the American people, by the Congress.

DR. CRIST: That's very interesting, your view of Generation X and wanting the challenges and that sort of thing. The Army in '99 is 8,000 or so short of their goals.

GEN KRULAK: Far more than that. I just gave an hour-long interview on NPR and the vast majority of the questions were on just what we're talking about. Then, when the calls came in, you could not imagine; every single call was positive, all of them positive about the Marine Corps. The American people understand what's going on.

DR. CRIST: On Saturday, April 1, 1995, you e-mailed Colonel Appleton outlining your five pillars. The five pillars, at the time you called them five areas of focus. They included: *warfighting; people; Corps values; education; and the naval character*. You have articulated the warfighting and the people, and well get to the Corps values issue, what about the educational aspect naval character. I wonder if you could elaborate on those two pillars?

GEN KRULAK: The education I think is key because early on so the idea of developing what became known as the Strategic Corporal. You can't take a young Marine, officer or enlisted, male or female, into the types of situations we're talking about in the 21st century without having them

extremely well trained and extremely well educated. The amount of time and effort that we were going to spend on making that Marine in the area of training and education was going to be huge. In the planning guidance, I talk about how we, as a Corps, need to ensure that our people are not only well trained, but also well educated. They would need both to succeed in future conflicts.

The naval character issue was very simple. We were having some problems with the Navy. They were going one way and we wanted to go another way. My point was, listen, we are inextricably linked to the Navy, inextricably. They are not an anchor around our neck; nor are we an anchor around their neck. Together, we have the synergy to do just about anything, afloat in war fighting, but also anything within the beltway. If we vote together, we have two votes. There are only six votes on the Joint Chiefs; we've got two of them if we're together. The idea of naval character was to send the signal that, we have to be one with the Navy. I don't want to fight with them; I want to work with them. That was the rationale.

DR. CRIST: One of the things that I think will leap out at people in the future as they look at your Commandant's Planning Guidance is the numerous taskings, nearly 40 specific due dates, none of them minor issues. Were you concerned that institution couldn't adopt to all these changes so quickly? Or was this a deliberate desire of yours to really shake up the institution, as you said, to turn hard on the rudder of the supertanker to the left or right and get them to start moving?

GEN KRULAK: I absolutely did it on purpose. I think there are about 47 of them. We made due dates and we specified who was going to be accountable to act on them. Going back to my father, understood that if we didn't get the changes going, we'd never make it. I felt that to be the transition Commandant, to do what needed to be done, those things had to happen in a timely manner. I saw them as a requirement from my time at MCCDC. I saw them as a requirement during my time in manpower. I certainly saw them as a requirement during my time as Commandant. If you look at the end of the CPG, I did prioritize. At the end, it says here are the things that are near and dear that I'm going to be tracking closely. I gave everybody things to do. For those people who say, we have no direction, I said, here are the ones you need to really get on.

DR. CRIST: 29 June 1995, you addressed a mini-general officer symposium at Henderson Hall in

which you outlined the CPG and your five pillars. What do you recall of that meeting?

GEN KRULAK: If I had to do it all over again, I would have done it after I assumed command. I think now, in retrospect, that was being presumptuous of me and I should not have done that to General Mundy. He was the Commandant; I wasn't the Commandant. I shouldn't have been up there briefing my CPG. I don't think anybody thought it was strange at the time, but now, as a person, I wish I hadn't done it that way. If I had it to do over again, I would not step on General Mundy's toes. I don't think he thought I was, but now I feel a little guilty about it.

I used that time for a couple of reasons. I wanted to have an opportunity to gain at least a modicum of consensus on what was about to happen. I recall we talked about Vision 21. I recall that I had most of the Vision 21 people at that meeting. Certainly my three stars were there and had already seen multiple copies of the CPG. What I was trying to do and get was use this as an opportunity to stand up in front of all the general officers and get them on board. This was the first time I used Vision 21 as a kind of a wedge or a hook. I said as a result of Vision 21 and the great work done by the senior generals of the Marine Corps, named the people that were there, we have generated this planning guidance. I had a copy for each one of them. I said, this is still a rough document. I am going to publish it, but it is certainly open for any corrections or any comments or additions that you would like to make. It's now the 29th, in the morning. You have until the end of the 30th of June. You have over 24 hours to provide some input. It was a pretty detailed brief. We went into great detail, the areas, the pillars and what we were trying to do. The sense in everybody's mind was that sounds good, looks good, looks like we're on the way. People had bought into it. They had no idea what it was going to be from the standpoint of the detail until they took that document home that night. There were some minor additions and deletions, but for the most part they bought into it.

By buying in to then, and by having consensus built with the senior leadership all along, it did not hit the Marine Corps leadership, with the impact it hit the civilian population and the entire Marine Corps. That's why the stand down, because I needed to give the Marine Corps time to understand what I was saying, what it was all about, and to give feedback. That's what the stand down was all about.

DR. CRIST: From the outset it appears as though you carefully planned how to sell the CPG or how to get the Marine Corps onboard. You concentrated on internal methods, ALMARS, briefings, the stand down, as well as external, which included an elaborate detailed media plan. Did that come about after your realization that there was going to be hard sell? Or was that in the back of your mind all the time that you needed to work to make sure the word got out?

GEN KRULAK: No, this campaign plan was part of the transition. We always knew there was going to be an effort required. We just didn't know that it was going to take as much of an effort as it did. It was a shock to the entire Department of Defense community. It was a shock to Washington, D.C. We were on the front page of the *Washington Post* because of the CPG. We had all of the major news media doing interviews. Certainly, the defense people went apoplectic. They had never seen anything like it. As an example, CBIRF, the Chemical biological Incident Response Force -- I literally had a reporter say, "Who the hell do you think you are? That's not your job; that's the Army's. Oh, by the way, the Army already has a unit that does that." I said, "what is that unit?" They said, "The Technical Escort Unit, the TEU." I said, "No, the TEU doesn't do what CBIRF does." Some said, "They have a black program." I said, "No, that doesn't do it. CBIRF is designed so that if an incident takes place, you can minimize the casualties?" Other would say, "What do you think you're talking about, a standing joint task force?" What is that? What are you talking about? We had interesting saying, "I've got a copy of your planning guidance." It was a real stake in the ground.

We had a lot of educating to do in a very short period of time. As it turned out, the first swing throughout the Corps wasn't enough. Every year that it was the Commandant, we've made two swings through the entire Marine Corps . . . every year, twice a year. In each one of those, I would present, at minimum, an hour and a half pitch to as many Marines as I could jam into football stadiums, into theaters, into gyms. I would say here's where we are, here's where we are going. To this day, one of the things I get, e-mails from the troops, is not thanking me for being Commandant or anything like that, but thanking me for keeping them informed. They know where we are and where we're going, every single one of them. I traveled over 750,000 miles as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. There is nobody who's done that. We talked to a lot of Marines. The whole idea was to help keep them behind us because it

was the Marines who made the CPG. If they didn't execute, we'd get nowhere. That guy down in the bowels of the manpower department wasn't just working on cohesion, he was working with the G-1s at the divisions to synchronize the unit deployments. That's just one thing, one minuscule slice of the CPG. They had to make it work. They had to understand why it was important. The only person who could articulate that was the Commandant.

DR. CRIST: We skipped over too quickly the five pillars. It has quality about it; it's a philosophy as much as it is a structure for accomplishing things. I wonder what was your thought process behind it?

GEN KRULAK: Very simple. The more complicated things are, the more you have to remember, the more difficult your job is. As an example, we took the entire ethos of the Marine Corps and broke it down into four words: making Marines, winning battles. If you can't count on one hand, if you have to go to a second hand, you're in trouble. Five pillars, five fingers. Everybody can remember what the pillars are. Everybody knew that those five pillars supported making Marines and winning battles. Simplicity. Keep it simple. Keep driving it home. What do we do? We make Marines. We win battles. What are our core values? Three: honor, courage, commitment. What are the pillars? Five. Nothing over five. If you go to six, you're on two hands and you're in deep trouble!

DR. CRIST: Your three-day stand down in July, specifically to allow units to . . .

GEN KRULAK: Three days for them to concentrate on the CPG, concentrate on where their unit was vis-a-vis the CPG, make any changes, make any input. It was wonderful. We got great feedback on the CPG. It was the beginning of the sense that everybody was part of this. Right after the standdown I went around the Marine Corps. I went to WestPac, back East, back to the West Coast and briefed the CPG in each one of those areas. Each briefing lasted over two hours. It was a long, hard effort.

DR. CRIST: Anything else on the development of the CPG you'd like to bring out before I move onto some other transitional issues?

GEN KRULAK: Just the role that the youngsters played. They were magnificent, worked very hard. The attempt to put all the philosophy up front and

then end with the last paragraph that really ended with the bottom line of being able to fight and win, at any time, any place. The fact that we expected and believed and that we were going to accomplish all this. This was not a case that we were going to throw these up on bulkhead and hope some of them stick. I believed in my heart and soul that every single one of them was going to be done and they were going to be done on time. But they were going to be done in the first year, and I think that if you had gone into it with any other mind set, we would have been in trouble.

We had great support from the leadership of the Corps Rich Hearney and all the DCS's. They got on board and they made it happen. My real tip of the hat goes to those generals. You need to remember the vast majority of them were competing to be the Commandant. All of a sudden they select one officer and they all immediately line up and we all march off in the same direction in a massive undertaking that is going to really stir the Corps up. Yet, they were with me the whole time. It was very positive.

I think that's a real tribute and testimony to the way the Marine Corps thinks. Unlike any other service, there is a Commandant. What the Commandant says is what we're going to do and we all get behind. Just like we all got behind General Mundy, we all get behind General Jones. We may not individually agree with everything that Chuck Krulak thinks or Carl Mundy or Jim Jones or Al Gray; that's not important. What is important is the institution. The day the Marine Corps has people who start thinking, and don't need to follow the head of the institution, is the day we become like any other service.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned the problems the Navy has had in making institutional changes: they're branch -- to use an Army term -- specific.

GEN KRULAK: That's right. Here are our officers, circle the wagons and we went off and did what needed to be done. Everybody external to the Marine Corps said you'll never do it. I can remember having editorial boards where people said after the board was over, good luck, but no way, not in this environment.

DR. CRIST: What was the reaction amongst the other service chiefs to this?

GEN KRULAK: They were taken by surprise. It really caught them short. They immediately got copies and read it all, got those areas where they felt we would be dueling with them. CBIRF is a

perfect example. Standing joint task force is a perfect example where they circled wagons.

DR. CRIST: On 29 June 1995, Sergeant Major Lewis G. Lee was sworn in as the 13th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. How did you go about selecting your Sergeant Major? What were you looking for? How did you arrive on Sergeant Major Lee?

GEN KRULAK: First, they held a board that selected, I think, five people as potential sergeants major, a full board established by General Mundy at Headquarters Marine Corps. So I got the names. I narrowed the names down to two people. One of them I knew very well. The other one I didn't know that well, but had an opportunity to talk with and interview. I also had the opportunity to talk to a lot of people that served with him. I had served with Sergeant Major Lee before. He was our senior enlisted at manpower and he was also an individual who was my sergeant major at MarForPac. I knew several things about him; one, that he was brilliant, not smart, brilliant. I don't know what his IQ is, but it's got to be in the 160s. I don't care what he tested at; this man is brilliant. Two, he is a phenomenal writer. He writes like a colonel would write. Three, he knew the Marine Corps manpower system better than most generals, certainly better than any other person I can imagine. Four, he was a warrior par excellence. He had fought and shed his blood. He was highly decorated. Five, no nonsense; hard worker; didn't put up with a lot of petty ante stuff and told it like it was. Six, came across as just your typical average Marine, spoke in ain'ts. His grammar is not the greatest. You put that all together and you've got yourself a great team member; that's what he was. He was a vital part of the 31st Commandant. He ended up, as I indicated at my change of command, a friend. He was more than the Sergeant Major Marine Corps; he was a friend. He knew what I was thinking; I knew what he was thinking. We never went anywhere that we didn't go together. Every briefing we gave, he was there with the officers, with the enlisted. Just a superb individual. The other sergeant major was also equally good, but wasn't the complete package that Lee was. As it turned out, Lee was better than I thought.

DR. CRIST: How did you plan on using your sergeant major?

GEN KRULAK: Like I've used sergeant majors throughout my career. He's the eyes and ears of the commander; the mouthpiece for the enlisted; a

anity check; a sounding board. He served all of those purposes. Also, as a disciple, telling the Marine Corps story wherever he could. Which he did. He's a great, great man. I don't think that there's ever been a Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps who did as much as Gary Lee, who knew as much as Gary Lee, who was as capable. He made sergeant major in 14 years. There hasn't been anything like that in the Marine Corps in the modern era; served in all elements of the MAGTF; two tours of duty on the drill field; was in the recruiting business at the Citadel. You name it, he's done it. Brilliant. Every single manpower document that I received, I ran through Gary Lee. I don't care if it had to do with officer or enlisted, if it was making Marines, he got a chop on it and his chop was valuable. He was a very, very important person.

DR. CRIST: What advice stands out in your mind most of those manpower issues?

GEN KRULAK: Ouch!

DR. CRIST: Too many to count?

GEN KRULAK: So many. You've got to be kidding me. The whole idea of making Marines, the recruiting, the recruit training, the boot camp, the cohesion, MCT, School of Infantry; all of the changes, he played a major role in all of them. Been there, done that and got the t-shirt. He knew everything. It was such that General Osman, when he was MM, would call Sergeant Major Lee and ask his advice. Russ Appleton would run papers through Sergeant Major Lee. When Russ Appleton starts running papers through somebody, you better believe that individual's got a mind. Lee is a smart cookie, very good.

DR. CRIST: 15:00, 30 June 1995. Change of command, Marine Barracks, Washington, 8th and Eye. What do you recall of that event, your change of command?

GEN KRULAK: One, the graciousness of General Mundy and Linda Mundy. They were just wonderful. We had breakfast with the Mundys. I guess it started off early in the morning, 6:00 or so. General Mundy and I left the Navy Yard where we were both at the visiting officers quarters, walked down 8th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue, took a left on Pennsylvania and walked down to the Capitol. We talked the whole way down. We stood at the western end of the Capitol, looking across the Washington Monument to the Lincoln Memorial. We tried to look and see the Marine Memorial. It

was just a special time. He was winding down and I was about to become the Commandant, and just some last-minute talking about what was important and what wasn't; a lot of personal things; how pleased he was about his performance, which was very good; how he was going to support me in anything I needed. Then we went back and he had a breakfast with my parents and myself and he and our two ladies. At that point in time, he presented to me, nicely framed, my appointment as the Commandant, signed by the President of the United States. It was just nice. He gave my wife, Zandi, a nice little bud vase. Wrapped around the bud vase were four stars. The day started off real well. It was just a very nice time.

The change or the passage of command itself was your typical Marine passage of command. It was very similar to the one that Jim Jones and I conducted: General Mundy's remarks talked about many things, thanked a lot of people, talked about jointness. When it came time for my remarks, I was very brief. My basic remarks were, "General Mundy's done a superb job, continue to march." That was it. General Mundy and Linda walked off down center walk and walked off into the garden reception. I really liked that, so Zandi and I did the same thing four years later. General Mundy wanted to make the reception just the Krulaks'. The Krulaks said, "No way, you need to come!" He was very, very insistent that he not come, that he had his family here and he wanted time to be with them. He was going to have his retirement ceremony that evening. So he was saying, please. I said, look, you don't have to be there for long, but you have to be there. For no other reason, then we don't want anybody thinking that we had a problem. That convinced him and he came and he stayed for about an hour and a half. Then he went off and that evening was his retirement ceremony. A beautiful retirement ceremony up at the Marine War Memorial. That night, we went back to the home of the Commandant. My family was there and we slept at the home of the Commandant on the 30th of June 1995.

I had never been up upstairs. I had no idea where the bedroom was. That wasn't important to me. While the rest of the family was down there still rejoicing and having a great time, I was beat. So I went up and I remember trying to find the master bedroom and found it and went to sleep. That was it.

DR. CRIST: You were actually promoted to General several days before, correct?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was done at the White House. In attendance were my wife, my mother, my father, my two sons, General Mundy, and Secretary Dalton. It was done in the Oval Office. The President had some very nice words to say about General Mundy, some nice words to say about my father and myself. As we were preparing to put on the stars, my mother went into her purse and brought out a set of stars for the collar that apparently she had purchased years and years ago at the time when they thought my father was going to be the Commandant. As I indicated, he had been nominated by the Secretary of the Navy. She went out and got these stars, unbeknownst to him. Didn't happen; he didn't get nominated by the President. When it came time to put on the collar emblems, my mother reached into her pocket and brought them out. It was a pretty emotional moment for my father. The ceremony was very nice, very short. What was important were the stars that had been purchased in 1968 for my father, and now his son then wore them.

DR. CRIST: Absolutely. Your father must have been –

GEN KRULAK: He was pumped. He was pumped. They were both pumped and remained pumped the whole time.

DR. CRIST: That must have been quite a moment, I'm certain.

GEN KRULAK: It was.

DR. CRIST: In your father's mind, a certain sense of fulfilling at least family destiny.

GEN KRULAK: I think he was very proud. He never ever let onto anybody in the family that he was disappointed he not making Commandant. He was just happy for his son.

SESSION XIII

Significant Events: 1995

Three-day stand down . . . First meeting with the Secretary of the Navy . . . Continuing fallout from Tailhook . . . First JCS meeting in the "Tank" . . . Scott O'Grady rescue . . . Marine Mail . . . F/A-18s on carriers . . . Moving HQMC to the Pentagon . . . Addressing the Naval Academy . . . Standing up the Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) . . . Commander's Course . . . Okinawan rape case . . . Saving US/Japanese relations . . . Twenty-one talks to III MEF . . . Undercutting Governor Ota . . . Beginning the Marine Recruiter of the Year award . . . Socials and congressional breakfasts.

DR. CRIST: What I'd like to do is talk about some specifics of your first six months in office. In July, one of your first actions was to issue a three-day stand down, of the entire Marine Corps to take a look at the Commandant's Planning Guidance. You did it two years later for all organizations, to take a hard look at the way they're doing business, make sure it fits in with Making Marines and Winning Battles.

GEN KRULAK: When we produced the planning guidance and developed the brief to brief the planning guidance, it became obvious that the CPG was very complicated. The planning guidance is difficult. It's wide ranging and sweeping, so it was hard to articulate. Plus, the "why" of it was hard to articulate. What we decided to do was to have a stand down and provided a videotape of me giving the CPG presentation. The intent was for everybody to see that videotape, hear it from the horse's mouth, the Commandant, then have the commanders step-by-step go through the planning guidance and talk about it in relation to their command. It was not to be a time to do wills or get your dental work done. It was a time to devote to the future of our Corps. This was hard work, three days, then tied it to a long weekend so that they would do the three days and then the troops would get a long weekend for all their effort. It went very well. We got lots of good input.

DR. CRIST: Specifically, anything come to your mind?

GEN KRULAK: Just issues of individual concerns, as well as concerns about manning and Op tempo and Pers tempo and what we might do about them. The first indications of concern over

the fitness reports, over inflation, over schools, over how much time is available for PME, all of these things started heading up as a result of the CPG stand down.

DR. CRIST: One other things, very early. Your first meeting with the Secretary of the Navy in the afternoon of 6 July, one of the topics was the continuing fallout of Tailhook. In this case, specifically four officers and a MAG CO under whom, 100% of the officers involved in offenses were in his command. The four officer's names were withdrawn from the promotion list. Did you think that was justified that their names be withdrawn in those specific cases, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. One of the officers involved was the MAG CO who had been selected for brigadier general. He was pulled off the list and retired. Another officer was the squadron CO who was a top level school selection. He was a brigade captain at the Naval Academy. We're talking about a water walker. He was pulled off the list and subsequently retired. The other two were also right in that same chain of command. As the central disposition authority, you had two ways to go in my opinion. My counterpart in the Navy was an admiral name Paul Reason. He started with the most junior people and worked his way up. My view was, if we're going to have this thing stick, if we're going to be the Marine Corps that we've always been and always want to be, there's always been one rule and one rule only. That is the leader needs to be held accountable. In this case, you had the group CO and the squadron CO's, each one of them, were in the room watching all of this take place and doing nothing about it. The fact that a Marine captain or first lieutenant is picking dollar

bills out of the vagina of a naked stripper dancing over his face is bad enough. But to have that taking place while the group CO and the squadron CO are encouraging them on, to me that is unsat leadership. They did not get promoted.

DR. CRIST: I noticed from your calendar, that you used to meet weekly with the CNO and SecNav?

GEN KRULAK: Every week, the Commandant and the Chief of Naval Operations met with the Secretary of the Navy, together, so that it was the Commandant and CNO, sitting there. We'd have what was called leadership meetings where we would discuss issues of importance to the Navy and the Marine Corps and to the Department. Then, once a week, there would also be a one-on-one between the Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy. Under Secretary Dalton, these were very much scripted. I knew the exact questions he was going to ask. I would have my staff writing the answers and there would be very little dialogue. He'd sit down and he'd have this card and he'd say now, well what about --how's it look with the V-22? I'd go down to Tab Three which is V-22 and I'd say, sir, here's the scoop. It was kind of phony. He could have sent me the questions; I would have sent him the answers. The CNO felt the same way. But every once in a while there were some meaty issues and you could get into it. Even the one-on-one meetings were scripted. The only difference there is I had the opportunity to raise issues that I thought were important.

Normally when I did that though, they would ask, send me the Commandant's issues before the meeting so that the staff could do some work on them because it would be very difficult to get Secretary Dalton to make any kind of a decision without massive staff work. It always went back to a bunch of other people looking at it. Danzig, much more free wheeling. Very little real agenda and you just went out there and hooked and jabbed.

DR. CRIST: Was this just the three of you, Sir?

GEN KRULAK: One meeting a week with four people, CNO, CMC, SecNav and UnSecNav. One meeting, once a week, two people, CMC and SecNav.

DR. CRIST: These were, there wasn't a lot of additional staff members, it was just you guys.

GEN KRULAK: No, no.

DR. CRIST: One of the first briefings you got in the tank upon becoming Commandant had to do with the Scott O'Grady shoot down which turned out to be another great windfall for the Marine Corps because of our rescue of him a few days later. I wonder if I could get your comment on what might have been briefed about the O'Grady shoot down and his rescue?

GEN KRULAK: That was the first tank I went to which was kind of interesting because a lot of people talk about how much I knew about the joint world and working in DoD. Are you an inside the beltway Marine or out? That was the first time I had ever been in the spaces of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ever. I had no idea where the tank was. I was told I had a tank meeting. I didn't know where the tank was. I had no idea where I sat in the tank, no idea. When they said you've got a tank meeting at, at 16:00, I got a hold of one of my young Marines, a young corporal. I said, "Look, how about taking me down and showing me where the tank is?" This corporal took me down about three hours before the meeting and walked me in and showed me where the tank was. I said, I don't even know where to sit. There were no signs out there, so he didn't know either. There was nobody there. So for the 1600 tank meeting, I got there at 16:01 just as the doors were being closed and went to the only open chair. By that time, they had put my name plate out. That's how naive the new Commandant was! He didn't even know where the tank was and he didn't know where he sat.

It turns out the Commandant of the Marine Corps sits in the very best seat in the tank. For whatever reason, the table is a rectangle. At one end of the rectangle is a big screen, where all the displays and everything are projected. The other end of the table, the head of the table, looking directly at the screen is where the Commandant of the Marine Corps sits. The Chairman and the Secretary of Defense sit on his left in the middle of the table having to look sideways at the screen. Don't ask why. That's always struck me as interesting. The bottom line is here I go. I'm the newest guy on the block, and I didn't even know how to get there, and didn't know where to sit.

The entire tank heard the story of how great the Marine Corps did in the rescue of Scott O'Grady and what a wonderful thing it was. The whole briefing was on the Marine's rescue. I'm sitting there thinking, this being the Commandant's a pretty good job. This is wonderful! The tank sessions got a little worse than that later on in my commandancy. But it was just a great way to start. You had these tremendous Marines operating out in

a Marine Expeditionary Unit. They had to be commended. They did a great job. They came back, no casualties, got the downed pilot. Then to come in on your first official tank and have the whole thing dedicated to the Marine Corps; just doesn't get any better than that.

DR. CRIST: I can imagine it wouldn't. Is there normally an itinerary for these tank meetings set in advance?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Normally, there's a series of agenda items that are covered first by people called the DepOpsDep, in our case the planner. Right now a Brigadier General by the name of Chris Cortez is the Marine planner. The OpsDep of the Marine Corps is the deputy chief of staff for PP&O. For the majority of my time, it was General Steele. General Blades, General Jones, and General Ray Ayers also held the job. You had all of the issues vetted by the DepOpsDep and the OpsDep. If they couldn't come to some resolution, the issue would go to the tank and the chiefs. But, yes. There is an agenda.

DR. CRIST: It's the final determination in addition to the information?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What was the Air Force Chief of Staff's reaction?

GEN KRULAK: Very good. The chief of staff of the Air Force was a great guy, Ron Fogleman. As a matter of fact, probably of all the joint chiefs, he and I got along the best. He is a good, good officer. He was very happy and happy with the Marine Corps. He loved it.

DR. CRIST: I know there were some questions raised at the time of the O'Grady mission that the MEU commander and all went on the TRAP mission. Was that an issue of concern for you or not?

GEN KRULAK: I think it was an issue of concern in that there was a debate among the leadership of the Marine Corps as to whether that was a good call. Once again, I don't like to shoot on another man's target. The MEU commander is out there. He has a situational awareness of what is going on, what the stakes are. He made the call. I would never shoot on his target. I would tell you based on my own experience, and again I wasn't there, but based on my own experience, I thought it was over

kill. I would not have expected the MEU commander to go on that kind of mission. I certainly wouldn't have expected him to take his MEU sergeant major. I wouldn't have expected the BLT commander to go either. But it was successful. You can't argue with success. I think that there is enough debate afterwards that perhaps if it was done again, it would have been done differently. But again, that's the commander's call. The commander made it. If you start to second guess your commanders, particularly when it was successful, you've got some problems.

DR. CRIST: On the 26th of July, you had your first Congressional Breakfast.

GEN KRULAK: Yes these were important in gaining congressional support for our initiatives. At that particular one, we had Chairman Spence of the House National Security Committee, later be called the House Armed Service Committee, and then one day later we had Senator Bob Smith of the Senate Arms Service Committee. From there on, we tried to have these breakfast meetings just as often as possible.

DR. CRIST: On 1 August 95, Marine Mail came on line. By November 1998, it had received 64,000 e-mails on Marine Mail. Why did you start Marine Mail?

GEN KRULAK: I was trying to open up a line of communications from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Corps, not necessarily to the private but to the entire Marine Corps. I wanted to mine the broad knowledge of people in the Corps, knowledge that would answer three basic questions. The questions were: (1) what are we doing now that we should not be doing at all, (2) what are we not doing that we should be doing? and (3) what are we doing now that we could be doing better? I later added a fourth question that said, (4) what new concept, idea, or piece of equipment should the Marine Corps investigate to improve its war fighting capability? If the individual sent in an e-mail that did not address these questions, they got a very terse reply back that said, "Read the CPG. Go see your first sergeant."

I realized that there would be a concern that Marine Mail would circumvent the chain of command. I was unable, in my opinion, to fully get the Marine Corps to understand that this didn't violate the chain of command. It's sad because the reality is Marine Mail has been tremendously valuable and we did not allow it to interfere with the chain of command. E-mail after e-mail was

turned right around to "Lance Corporal Banatz" saying answer the three questions or go see your first sergeant.

But I will tell you the amount of change that came out of this program was worth all of the remarks and behind-the-back comments regarding Marine Mail. It was tremendously valuable. You couldn't even begin to count the number of things that came out of Marine Mail that were positive for the Corps. Multiple inputs to changing the Marine Corps fitness report came from Marine Mail. Issues of manpower changed by Marine Mail. Issues regarding the PFT and the desire of the women to run three miles from Marine Mail. The riggers belt for the utilities, from Marine Mail.

I gave a Navy Achievement Medal to a young lance corporal from CSSG-3 out in Hawaii. She wrote in and she said, "I'm about ready to get promoted to corporal. I'm going to be required to sew corporal stripes on my white shirt that goes under my blues coat. I don't understand why I do that, since the Marine Corps order says you can never take your blue coat off and wear just the shirt. Additionally she commented that "if you did sew on the chevron and washed the blouse, the chevron colors would run and ruin the blouse. The end result is that a WM ends up buying a new shirt and new set of chevrons. It just doesn't make any sense to me." I got this through Marine Mail and I said well, I can't believe this is true. Are you telling me that we're making them put chevrons on a shirt that is never seen? No way, that's foolish, and I went out to my outer office where I had two women marines and I asked them. "Is this true?" And they said, "Yes, sir, we've been doing it since we made PFC, and you never take your jacket off." I said, "You have got to be kidding me."

I got this e-mail about 6:00 o'clock in the morning. It was on my screen when I came in. So I said, "Okay, by 1600 tonight I want the uniform board to have met, to have changed that uniform regulation. I want the change to the regulation in place today. I took the original of the message I sent, the uniform change message, and I took a Navy achievement medal and I wrapped the medal in the message and Fed Ex'ed it to the Marine so that she had it the next morning.

People who say that Marine Mail wasn't worth it just don't understand how important communication is. The sense that people had ownership in the Marine Corps, ownership in decisions, had an ability to input, to make a difference, that's really valuable. What we've got here is the ability of a captain to recommend a war fighting improvement in equipment. We need a new boot or a dome tent. Why don't we get a whole

pack that can be segmented so that you don't have to put the whole pack on but you can just put the ass pack on? All those things coming through Marine Mail. How can that be bad? It isn't. The Marine Corps just needed to understand that when we got the ones that by-passed the chain of command or failed to answer the three questions posed in the CPG, those Marines did not get an answer from the Commandant. I would turn it right around to the Marine and say, "Go see your first sergeant."

DR. CRIST: You held the first executive offsite from 1-3 August 1995?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I wanted to see the three stars, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps, before the upcoming General Officer Symposium. We focused on discussing the Commandant's Planning Guidance and really nailing it down. I wanted to make sure everybody was on top of it, and we were all headed in the same direction. It was important from that perspective.

DR. CRIST: One of the early issues you faced as the Commandant, was the ongoing issue of deploying Marine F-18s on Navy carriers. You had dealt with this at great length when CG, MCCDC, working with Adm Owens.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Admiral Owens and I, General Wills and a Navy Admiral by the name of Riley Mixon. My feelings regarding Marine air on carriers goes back to my belief in history being a great instructor. Marine aviation has gotten to the fight normally on carriers. We did it during World War II. We did it during Korea. We did it during Vietnam. I think it is good to have Marine aircraft on carriers. Certainly as we go through the transition from F-18s and AV-8s to the Joint Strike Fighter. It may have been almost Machiavellian, but what I was trying to do was to hold force structure. If you put aircraft on carriers, you held force structure because we were helping both our aircraft and Marines. It built a rotation base that was required to rotate on those carriers. Although many of the aviators were worried about it, I think after a while they realized the rationale behind what we was trying to do and they came on board. Again, the rationale was (1) to save force structure for when we went to the joint strike fighter; (2) to get our people to the fight; and (3), to make ourselves relevant, not just within the Department of Navy, but to the National Command Authority. There was never any problem with the Navy in this. We were helping them out as they drew down. Our

problem was with the Navy. Our problem was with the Marine Corps saying, "We don't want to go onboard a carrier!"

DR. CRIST: There's an interesting outgrowth that was the need for the Marines to be integrated in the training and work up for the carriers, which is why the Navy F-18 squadrons are going to be stationed in Beaufort under the overall command of a Marine.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, more importantly is by doing this we've drawn the Navy into close air support, not just lip service, but they now train. They're at 29 Palms doing close air support. Their F-18 is doing close air support. It's very important.

DR. CRIST: In your first six months as Commandant, you initiated the move of headquarters out of the Navy Annex to the Pentagon. Why did you see the move as necessary?

GEN KRULAK: The first issue of the Pentagon move came up when I was CG, MCCDC. The best example was at the end of a very important discussion where I thought we had won a decision. We walk out of the room where the decision was made. General Mundy and I started to walk down the stairs to get in the car to go up to Henderson Hall. I watched Mike Boorda walk into the Secretary's office. The next day, we heard that there was a change in the decision, never attributed to Boorda, but I'm convinced that's what happened. We were thinking, both General Mundy and I, about the move down. But General Mundy felt you can't go down there as the head without the body. General Mundy believed that we needed to get to the Pentagon, but it had to be done as the whole headquarters. He advocated the entire Marine headquarters to the Pentagon. My philosophy was get whatever you could get in there and fight like hell for the rest!

When I was interviewed for the job of the Commandant, I was asked about moving to the Pentagon. I said I was fully for it. When I went around and asked and talked to all the former Commandants, I asked them about it, from General Wilson on, they all agreed that going to the Pentagon was the right thing to do. One reason, you're a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the idea of getting a phone call from the Chairman saying, "Hey, we've got a quick meeting down in my office," and waiting five to ten minutes before we could get down there. By that time, the rest of the chiefs were already into the meeting, it was just unsat.

We went to the Secretary of the Navy and I told him that we'd love to come down, we'd love to come down as soon as possible. We needed to get some important people down there. I couldn't just have myself down there. He said, "Who are the important people?" I said, "I need myself. I need my assistant Commandant. I need the director of the Marine Corps staff. I need to get P&R, my resources people. I need to get my aviation down here. I need to get my legal, my counsel, my sergeant major." They freed the space. We got it from the Navy. The Navy had to give it up. They moved out to Crystal City and other places and we got the space. Slowly but surely, we've expanded our space in the Pentagon. It turned out to be a great thing. I can't imagine it ever being any other way. Now I can walk right next door to SecNav, CNO, all the ASNs, all the ASDs. You're there for the critical tank meetings. I can't imagine it being any other way.

An important note is that we got the office of the Commandant through the selfless sacrifice of Richard Danzig who was the Undersecretary of the Navy. He gave up his office and all of his office space in order for the Commandant of the Marine Corps to have it. He moved way down the passageway. Mr. Danzig went on to be the Secretary of Navy. That's the kind of sacrifice that made me admire many of our civilian leadership. They understood how important it was for us to be down at the Pentagon. Dalton supported us, gave us a space. Then Danzig gave up his own office. Not bad.

DR. CRIST: This coincides with a whole shakeup of Headquarters, Marine Corps. Manpower, for example, has during your tenure, moved to Quantico.

GEN KRULAK: That's correct. The whole idea was to get as much into the Pentagon as possible and then put the rest down at Quantico so you have only two locations. Before that, we had Marines in Crystal City, Rosslyn, Arlington, the Pentagon and Quantico. We were all over the place. What I was trying to do was bring together and centralize as best I could the functions of the headquarters.

DR. CRIST: Was there a concern in your mind that all your three-star's were going to be in Quantico?

GEN KRULAK: No, never a concern. The world's changing. I can VTC with them. I can use the phone. The days of worrying about the generals being right next to the Commandant. office are

over. For me, that doesn't matter at all. Virtual is the key. It's only going to get better, not worse.

DR. CRIST: How was this move received by the Navy that had to give up the space?

GEN KRULAK: Not good. But that's life.

DR. CRIST: On 16 August, you addressed the Naval Academy, Class of 1999.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, at the onset of their Plebe year. From then on, I addressed every single Naval Academy class at least once a year and at graduation. I mentioned that only because, you know, I had some touch and go times with the Naval Academy. I didn't always agree with what they were doing, was concerned about their graduates. Not just Marines but all officers in the Naval service.

DR. CRIST: What specifically did you have concerns about?

GEN KRULAK: I saw too many things happening, lying, cheating and stealing. I saw drugs busts, car rings, murders, sex, you name it.

DR. CRIST: One of your achievements as Commandant was to increase the number of Marines options from the Naval Academy.

GEN KRULAK: We were at 16 and two-thirds percent and yet, Marine officers made up almost 25 percent of all the officers in the Naval service. I believed we needed to get more than that. I think next year we're going to 18 percent and then to 20 and then to 24. I feel pretty good about that.

DR. CRIST: On 13 September, you presented, along with CG, MCCDC, the CBIRF concept to the Under Secretary of the Navy, Secretary Danzig. We will cover this earlier in more detail. This it only took a little over two months from tasking to concept development.

GEN KRULAK: Now, think about that. There was no such thing as a CBIRF, and then this great institution of ours, the Marine Corps on 30 June, decided the nation needed a CBIRF. On the 13th of September we briefed the concept and how it was going to work to the Under Secretary to get his approval, to stand it up. We didn't have any money. We had to go to Congress to get the money to do it. But the bottom line, it was operational, just a couple of months later. That was important.

DR. CRIST: On 23 September, you spoke to the Marine Corps Aviation Association on the "Importance of 'A' in MAGTF and to Naval Expeditionary Capability."

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I spoke as a guest of honor at the Marine Aviation Association Dinner. I mentioned that because, as I mentioned earlier, the aviation community was a little worried about me coming in and so, this was the beginning of what turned out to be a four year commitment, to be really engaged with the aviation community and with our senior retired aviators. That, I think that was important.

DR. CRIST: The first of four commander courses and spouses workshops were conducted from 9-18 October at Quantico. You gave a speech on 12 October on "Taking Care of Your Own." What do you recall of this?

GEN KRULAK: There was already a commander's course and a spouses workshop but they were totally revamped and included direct participation by every single deputy chief of staff at the Headquarters and normally a force commander so that these new commanders and their ladies really got an indoctrination as what was expected of them as a commander. The Commandant spoke to each commander's course two times and spoke to the spouses once. Mrs. Krulak spoke to the spouses twice. So, a lot of effort went into the course, and we continued to improve upon it every year. Ran two courses a year for four years and had great support from the Marines at Headquarter Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: What was the main changes you made to it, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Just extended it. We not only looked into just the policy issues but also a lot more. We broke it down so that officers who were going to command logistic units would have an opportunity to talk logistics issues. We had them by MEF and by division, so that all of the commanders going to the first division would get to know each other there. We'd talk about particular issues that were important to the west coast forces . . . and the same of east coast and WestPac. We made it far more tailored to the commands that the people were going to.

DR. CRIST: One of the first challenges you had as Commandant was the arrest and trial of three

servicemen in Okinawa for abduction and rape of a Japanese girl, two of those being Marines, on 4 September 1995. They ended up getting convicted on 6 March 1996, the two Marines getting 6.5 years. Later that year, U.S./Japanese officials signed an agreement to reduce the size of the American military on Okinawa and eventually turn over some additional acreage. You made an unscheduled trip to Okinawa from 3-6 October 1995. What was the purpose of this visit? What was the impact of this trial on the Marine status in Okinawa and the DoD status in Okinawa? What did you personally do to try to mitigate the consequences of this unfortunate incident and what its impact was on the U.S./Japanese relations and our future on Okinawa?

GEN KRULAK: I think I mentioned before that when this took place, I made the statement that it was going to be a defining moment in not just the Marine Corps, but the entire U.S. relationship with Japan and more importantly with Okinawa. This rape had given Governor Ota all that he needed to achieve some sort of attention or recognition by the GOJ, the Government of Japan. I think what people fail to understand is that before this rape, the Okinawa government and the people of Okinawa were looked at with little respect by the people on mainland Japan. As a matter of fact, they looked at Okinawans as something less than Japanese. That came as a result of World War II and how the Japanese treated the Okinawan people during that war. Up until the rape, the Government of Japan kept Okinawa at arm's length. Although Governor Ota had been complaining about the U.S. presence on Okinawa for some time, it was not until the rape that he was able to leverage the anger of the Okinawan people to finally get the Japanese government focused on what he called the Okinawan problem. The Okinawan problem simply was the result of the vast percentage of foreign military presence in Japan was really to be found on the island of Okinawa. The great preponderance of military presence was located in just one area and that area was Okinawa.

It was a defining moment because it caused a couple of things to happen. All of them turned out to be fairly positive. It caused the U.S. and the Japanese to step back a few paces. It caused the U.S. and Japanese to re-evaluate what each one of them brought to the mutual treaty. It caused a great deal of dialogue between the U.S. State and Defense officials and their Japanese counterparts. Eventually, it brought about a redefinition of the Military and State Department relationship with the Government of Japan. The mutual defense treaty

that was signed after the rape was a far more important document than existed before the rape. It made clear how and what we could expect from the Japanese government in case of conflict in Asia, whether it was Korea or China or another location. The bottom line was the rape had a major impact on DoD, DOS, Marine Corps and overall the U.S. relationships with Japan. It was a defining moment.

As I indicated, when the rape took place, I felt it was going to be a defining moment and I went to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, specifically in the area of Asian policy, and asked permission to go to Okinawa, because I felt that it had to be done. Action had to be taken immediately or people would think we weren't serious. I was told no, you can't go, that it was a bad idea. Things were so volatile over there that it would cause things to get worse, not better. I then went down and saw the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who also encouraged me not to go. I then went to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Perry, who also understood the Asian mind. I said, "Look, we need to get over there right away at the highest levels and show our regret at this terrible tragedy and to offer our condolences." He agreed. I did took a flight crew, had them fly to Alaska. Once I got the approval, I boarded a plane, our Gulfstream, and flew up to Alaska, changed flight crews, so that we wouldn't violate crew day, and flew on into Okinawa, arriving on the flight line Futenma at sometime shortly after 7:00 in the morning.

DR. CRIST: That would have been 3 October 1995.

GEN KRULAK: That's correct. That was on 3 October. I had sent instructions to the MEF commander that I wanted to talk to every single Marine and sailor in III MEF. I hit the deck and I was immediately walked down to a helicopter hangar at Futenma and there was a squadron of Marines, some 150 people. I turned to the MEF commander and said, "You've got to be kidding me? I want to talk to every single Marine in this MEF. If I do it in 150-person groups, I'm going to be here forever. I don't have that time. I've got one day to do this, so I want you to get the Marines and sailors together in large groups, in chapels and theaters and gymnasiums, every single Marine in the MEF. I'm going to talk for about 35 minutes, because I had timed what I was going to say down to the minute. I'm just now beginning with this one little tiny group. You've got 35 minutes to change whatever you're going to do and start packing people into wherever you can get them. They did that.

In that one day, I gave twenty-one 35-minute speeches. By the end, I was taking throat lozenges like they were going out of style and pumping liquid. I could barely talk. But I spoke to every Marine in that MEF and ended up with my last address to every hospital corpsman at the Navy hospital on Okinawa. In those twenty-one talks, I spoke at every camp in theaters and chapels, in gymnasiums. With me was the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, SgtMaj Gary Lee. At the end, I literally staggered back to the Awasi house and laid down for 30 minutes, having flown nonstop from Washington, D.C. to Okinawa. I laid down for 30 minutes, got back up, went back out to Futenma, caught the same airplane and flew nonstop back to Washington, again going through Alaska where I picked up a new crew. That trip was affectionately called the "trip from hell" for the rest of my commandancy! It was an unbelievable effort for all those who were involved in arranging the trip.

The Okinawan Japanese governments were flabbergasted that we would make a trip like that. Probably saved the day or we would have been in deep trouble. Less than three days later, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Japanese Self Defense Force -- the equivalent of then General John Shalikashvili-- came to the United States. I asked General Shali if I could meet with this Japanese general. I met him in our office located in the joint staff area. Before the Commandant moved down to the Pentagon itself, we had an office. That office was located down in the joint staff area. I asked to meet the general down there. I dressed in my blues with medals and sat in that office. When the general arrived, he was escorted in. I stood up, came around the desk and he shook my hand and appeared very friendly. I stopped him and I said, "I asked you to come down here and I got dressed up in my dress uniform to officially offer my personal apology for the tragedy that took place on Okinawa. I want you to know that I say this as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the institution that those two Marines belong to, that I take it as my personal failure and wanted you to know that. I basically gave up face to the Chairman of the Japanese Self Defense Force. He was flabbergasted that a United States officer would go to that length. From then on, the relationship between the Marine Corps, the Japanese Self Defense Force, the Marine Corps and the Japanese Minister of Defense and their equivalent to the Department of State, really took a turn for the better in that we were given the benefit of the doubt all the way through. We then went and turned the Marines over to the police, and opened up everything to the public.

The Marines eventually received 6.5 year sentences.

The bottom line is my own experience with the Asian mindset drove much of what I did during that timeframe to include going all the way to the Secretary of Defense to get permission to fly over there. My formal apology to the senior ranking military officer in the Japanese Self Defense Force was also a result of understanding the Asian mind after all my time in the Pacific.

DR. CRIST: When you went to Okinawa on your trip from hell as you described it, did you meet with any Japanese government officials?

GEN KRULAK: No.

DR. CRIST: Did you meet with Ota himself?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, but not on this trip. Governor Ota is a very outspoken, tough guy who wanted to embarrass, wanted to make life miserable for us. The first meeting I had with him, he invited me up to his office and did not tell me that he was going to have the press there. I got off the elevator and turned and started walking down the passageway and I saw hundreds of media from both Japan and Okinawa, written press, radio and television. I knew things could get way out of hand. When Governor Ota came up to me and extended his hand, instead of taking his hand with my right hand, I took his arm with my left and pulled him into me and I hugged him, which pissed him off big time. But from that point on, he was dead. Because that was the picture that was all over the press. What was supposed to be an hour-long meeting took about ten minutes. He was just flabbergasted. I tried to see him every time I went out to Okinawa and he always was very careful about how he dealt with General Krulak from that time on.

It's interesting to note that the female interpreter who had been and continues to be the interpreter for U.S. Forces, Japan and for the III MEF, said she'd never seen anything like that. It totally diffused Ota, which was good.

DR. CRIST: What was the State Department's reaction to not only your trip over there, but to your formal apology?

GEN KRULAK: As it turns out, they were very appreciative. After all was said and done, they said you did the right thing.

DR. CRIST: What about training on the island after this happened?

GEN KRULAK: As a result of the rape, we got involved in something called SACO. Through the SACO process, we returned acreage back to the Okinawan people in the northern training area. We wrestled with the issues surrounding the return of Futenma. We wrestled with the issues of parachute jumping. We wrestled with the issues of the firing of artillery over Route 104 and the eventual movement of artillery firing to mainland Japan. We wrestled over environmental issues. The bottom line is SACO turned out to be a good thing. A very precise method of dealing with some of the critical issues that we had to deal with as a result of our agreements after the rape. Many of the Japanese land owners did not want us to take the land back. The vast majority of the Okinawan people love Marines and love the United States military and make a good part of their living from us. Although Ota was very vocal, there were many Okinawans people who didn't want to give up the land and have suffered because they did give it up, because they lost rental income. The land wasn't a gift. We rented from the landowners. When it went back, they lost money.

DR. CRIST: On 13 October of 1995, you presented the first Marine Recruiter of the Year award?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and followed that up in 1996 with the first Marine Drill Instructor of the Year award. Each year we would have a major event where we would bring the Recruiter, six of them in, with their wives, treat them to four or five days of Washington, dinner, tours, the Kennedy Center, and end up with selecting the Recruiter of the Year and immediately promoting that individual on the spot and giving them all a Navy Commendation Medal. Likewise to the Drill Instructor of the Year.

DR. CRIST: On 9 December 1995 you held the first breakfast for the senior retired general offices in the general officer mess at the Navy Annex. What was these designed for?

GEN KRULAK: We had a series of these breakfast meetings. They were designed to seek input from the what I called the "gray beards" of our Corps and to keep them informed on key issues and initiatives. We also sought to solicit their assistance, advice

and support, trying to build a tie between the senior retired leadership of the Marine Corps, and the current leadership. I loved it. They loved it. They were so excited about being brought back into the fold. It was very good. They were very, very helpful.

DR. CRIST: On 9 and 12 December of 1995 you held the first of your Christmas socials and dinners?

GEN KRULAK: This was the first time we tried to bring people that we didn't even know into our home and we were very pleasantly surprised by the numbers of people that came and the response.

DR. CRIST: Was that targeted at, as you mentioned, with the parades and others . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes it was. We ended up having the president's and CEO's of major companies, president's and CEO's of major news media, you name it. People that we had never met before we invited and, it was always hairy because -- the table would take 20 people-- you'd invite 30 because you knew some wouldn't come. But people started accepting and at the end, we -- you'd invite 20 people and 20 people would come. It was really interesting.

DR. CRIST: How do you think that paid dividends for the Marine Corps? What do you see as they . . .

GEN KRULAK: They started coming to the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation dinners, they started coming to many events. They're very helpful. Lord knows how much they help in just paving the way for good will when we had some bad things happen. I don't know whether or not these people helped us in, say, the Aviano tragedy, but I can rest assured that some of those people that sat around that table, whether it was George Will or, someone like Archie Dunham helped somehow to mitigate some of the bad news.

DR. CRIST: We'll cover some of the social aspects in more detail later, especially in the session with Mrs. Krulak.

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. You definitely need to talk with her.

SESSION XIV

The Warfighting Laboratory and Advanced Warfighting Experiments

Green Dragon . . . Importance of Colonel Anthony A. Wood . . . The Warfighting Lab as an umbrella for experimentation . . . Relationship to Combat Development Process . . . Sea Dragon . . . Standing up the Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory . . . Experimenting to failure . . . Congressional interest . . . Fast track acquisition process . . . Executive agent for non-lethals . . . Lack of innovation by the Army and Navy . . . Trader's Game . . . Looking at the Marine Corps squad . . . Role of technology . . . Dragon Drone, Dragon Fire and other innovations for the Lab . . . Naval Battlefield Experiments . . . IT-21 . . . The evolution of the Warfighting Lab . . . Hunter Warrior . . . Smart Cards and other innovations . . . Uninformed criticism by Bill Lind . . . Urban Warrior . . . New thinking about Urban warfare . . . An asymmetric threat—tree huggers . . . Moving from San Francisco to Oakland . . . Planning for Capable Warrior.

DR. CRIST: Sir, what I'd like to do is cover some of the major items that came out of the CPG. These spanned your entire four years as Commandant, and rather than break them up, I'd like to cover each thematically. First, I'd like to focus on the Warfighting Lab which served as the umbrella for the Advanced Warfare Experiments (AWE). This including: Sea Dragon and those items which flowed from it, Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, Capable Warrior. Then move on to some other items.

GEN KRULAK: Ok.

DR. CRIST: First, a definition. The term Green Dragon, what's the origin of that?

GEN KRULAK: Let's go back to my time at MCCDC, where I tried to leverage off of our history of innovation to get the Marine Corps to think into the 21st century. As I've mentioned, we ran a series of war games and called them Culebra. We weren't interested in making relevance for today; we were looking for the future. Green Dragon was part of the Culebra series of exercises. It was the forerunner of what became known as

Hunter Warrior and the Warfighting Laboratory. Green Dragon is nothing more than the premise that you can, with small teams of Marines equipped with technology that provided them near instantaneous access to fire support means, that those teams could significantly increase combat capability and influence the battlefield in far greater respects than one might originally think.

So Green Dragon was the first step in what turned out to be Hunter Warrior. In Green Dragon we experimented on the floor of Ellis Hall. We ran a series of experiments using the Desert Storm and the Korean scenarios, using instead of major forces flowing ashore, first putting these hunter killer teams in and managing the battle space using technology and rapid response of over-head weapon systems. That's Green Dragon. It was the brainchild of a colonel by the name of Tony Wood [Anthony A.] who worked as the Chief of Staff, MarForPac and then went out to be the senior Marine officer at Fort Leavenworth. Even though he was not assigned to MCCDC, I used him extensively in the development of the concept of the Warfighting Laboratory during the transition and then brought him back to be the first director of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. He is a brilliant officer, very smart.

DR. CRIST: What was the thought process behind the small teams?

GEN KRULAK: We felt that warfare was becoming very lethal and that a potential enemy would not allow us to prosecute conflict the way we did in Desert Storm. If it gets to the point where lethality keeps you from driving around in motorized, mechanized regiments and divisions, maybe we ought to find a way to fight with small teams and determine whether they would be effective. The only way to do that was to experiment. That's where it came from.

DR. CRIST: The idea of Sea Dragon . . .

GEN KRULAK: Let me first emphasize something for those reading this in the future. When you talk about Sea Dragon and the Warfighting Laboratory, Sea Dragon is a subset, not the whole. The overarching umbrella is the Warfighting Laboratory. The planning guidance states it very clearly. The Warfighting Lab shall be responsible for development, field-testing, and implementation of future operational and functional concepts in potential doctrine, organization, training, education, and support solutions. Concepts which are validated, will be entered into the Combat Development Process. The Lab was to be the focal point for refining war fighting concepts. That's the large umbrella. Under this large umbrella was a look at education and training, a look at support facilities, and a look at concepts and how we could organize ourselves and use technology, et cetera, et cetera. In order to get to that we had to have a vehicle. That's Sea Dragon. Sea Dragon is a levels of experiments very similar to Culebra after World War I.

So, when you look at the Warfighting Laboratory, underneath the Warfighting Laboratory were a lot of various handles holding up this umbrella. One of the handles and a very key one was Sea Dragon, but it was not stand-alone and it did not drive the Warfighting Laboratory. The Warfighting Laboratory drove the requirement for Sea Dragon, which drove the requirement for the special-purpose MAGTF, which drove the series of AWEs and lesser operational experiments. It became Urban Warrior, Hunter Warrior, and Capable Warrior. The origin of the term "Sea Dragon" was very simple. Tony Wood and I got together and said, "This cannot be a Marine-only program. If it's a Marine-only program we'll never get our ship mates to buy into it, and without their

buy-in well never get the operational concepts we need; you never get the ships to do the experimentation, et cetera, et cetera." So we said one of the things that absolutely will drive them bonkers is if you call these series of experiments Green Dragon because it's green and it's a green machine. What's the answer? Sea Dragon. And we came up with the logo of the Sea Dragon coming out of the ocean. There were always ships and Navy aircraft involved. The idea of Sea Dragon was very simple, get the Navy on board. So we tried to develop a series of experiments which we ended up calling Sea Dragon and put them into a format or a context that would support the combat development process which looks at DOTES, doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support. We came up with the idea of a laboratory, and we called it the Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory.

It may have been a mistake to call it that. I called it that because I wanted everyone to know it had the Commandant's personal interest. In some ways it probably did not do what I wanted it to because then it became too personalized and the reality is I never wanted anything to be Chuck Krulak. I wanted it to be the institution. And that's why you saw me change the name. I changed it to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory because the term "Commandant" may have been a distraction. Everybody knew that this was good for the Corps, and, I wanted to diffuse the idea that this was a one-person event.

DR. CRIST: The Warfighting Lab first stood up on 1 October 1995. You had a rather interesting dedication/open house on 19 December '95 where you had the large military-academic interested community and gave them a talk on what you wanted to accomplish in the Warfighting Lab. What do you recall of that, sir?

GEN KRULAK: There are different types of experimentation. If you really talk about experimentation in its truest sense, you start with the fact that failure is okay. It is okay to fail. That, in the mind-set of the Marine Corps, was one of the very hard hurdles to overcome because Marines don't like to fail. My point was if you don't push the experimentation to failure, if you don't know where it's broken, then you really have not gained anything from the experiment. That came to me from the first look at Culebra where there was failure. The experimental force didn't win. They did not succeed. The "old style force" did, and so you had to continue to work to find the experimental force that would win.

So the idea of an experiment is you push it till failure. There is absolutely no set result you're looking at. We had some criticism of the lab. People claimed that we had a hypothesis that we had a concept that we were trying to push. That was totally specious. The fact of the matter is we wanted failure; secondly, we had no concept that we thought was the way to go. We were trying to find a concept that would work, and that's what experimentation's all about. And so it became obvious that if you're going to have a series of experiments you would need things to experiment with, technology to experiment with, technology to man or to provide to the man. If you're going to equip the man you had to have the technology to do so in order to run the experiments. Going back to Culebra, they had different types of amphibious landing craft, they had simulated track vehicles and other equipment. All of it was experimental. Well, we needed that type of thing to really experiment across the gamut of war fighting. We didn't have the money to do that, so we held an open house at Quantico, and we invited industry, to come down to help kick off the opening of the laboratory.

We sent out hundreds of invitations. We expected maybe 200 people to come. We filled the theater at Quantico. It was chockablock. We were flabbergasted. I introduced the session with a talk on war fighting, the personal experience of battle, and fighting in Vietnam and how I wished that perhaps there had been some experimentation before that conflict because good people died using tactics that weren't effective in the jungle, and that's just at the tactical level. I talked about the introduction of a rifle, the M-16, and how that caused problems because they hadn't experimented with it. We talked about command, control and communications. Then we had Tony Wood brief the attendees on the five-year experimentation plan and what we were trying to do and why it was different and why it was unlike any other battle lab that the Army was running. I then got back up and said, "We want to be partners with you in industry. We want to do what we can to make the lab a success and make you all a part of that success. You're going to have to be a partner and you're going to have to pony up with systems that we can experiment with, and don't expect us to pay for them." The end result was a great deal of excitement. That was the kick-off. Understand we had not one red cent. I vowed to my general officers that we would not take any of their precious resources, the force commanders' resources, in order to build the laboratory or to fund

the experiments, and so we had to go to industry and to the Hill to get that money.

DR. CRIST: So you got a plus up for the Lab?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and thank God for the House and the Senate of the United States. We went up on the hill and said here's what we're trying to do. You don't know me, but trust me. Give me 20, 30, 40 million dollars and let me do this, and I will come back twice a year and report to you on our progress. And thank goodness they trusted the Marine Corps, and they were captivated by the type of experimentation we were going to do so they gave us the money. They put it into a plus-up into the bill. I hadn't even submitted the budget. For four years they supported the Warfighting Laboratory, and, as I indicated, we did not use a cent of green dollars.

DR. CRIST: Was it the vision and the type of things you wanted to do that captivated Congress?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. They could not believe that we were going to do true experimentation, that we were going to team with industry, that we were going to try, if we found promising technology, to immediately get it into the Fleet Marine Force. They were very supportive.

DR. CRIST: A couple of issues you hit on. One strikes me about the Warfighting Lab, this merger between industry and the government and to examine technology. How you were able to pull that off as far as . . .

GEN KRULAK: Because of simple economics. They figured that if they could produce something that we could experiment and work with that they would have a good chance of avoiding the 5000-series DoD regulations on acquisition and we could do rapid acquisition and they would make out and we'd make out. Basically they wanted to sell something, we had a way to buy and circumvent some of the acquisition regulations, and if they had the item and we had a way to circumvent, this would be a great deal.

DR. CRIST: And it was a situation open to any company--

GEN KRULAK: Yes. There were a lot of command and control companies, a lot of computer companies, a lot of weapons like Dragon Fire, artillery. We had vehicles, we had drones, you

name it. Goretex, you name it. We experimented with everything. If we were going to go out in the desert and run an experiment and somebody had a boot that they said was better than the boot we were, we'd say okay, give us 100 pair, and they'd give you 100 pair.

DR. CRIST: They were forthcoming without . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes. They understood that the deal was to compete. The pay off's big if they won.

DR. CRIST: You had mentioned the fast track acquisition process to take advantage of the success of the experimentation to get it funded. How did that work?

GEN KRULAK: The fast-track acquisition came from Desert Shield and Desert Storm when not only the Marine Corps, but the Army required rapid purchase of equipment. For us it was mine plows and flails for our bulldozers. We saw that you could do it if you had the support of the Congress. And so we basically said to the Congress, if we find something that's really important and we think it can make a difference we need your permission, with the support of DoD, to go after it. We were able to do some pretty good things. New hand-held radios as an example, as well as Dragon Drones.

DR. CRIST: How did this fit in with the joint role? Specifically, what was the reaction of the other services?

GEN KRULAK: The other services didn't understand what we were doing. They thought we were just copying the Army's Louisiana maneuvers, battle lab concept. I don't think they ever really figured out that wasn't it. We were not laminating new technology on old concepts but in fact were taking and looking at new concepts. Seeing how equipping the man could allow that man to effectively fight these new concepts. Failure was not only welcome but it was a requirement. I don't think they ever understood that, probably still don't, and yet we've briefed it time and time again. I just think they don't understand. I don't think the Army, Navy, or Air Force was ever threatened by our program. I do think that they're very jealous of the response by the Congress of the United States to this kind of experimentation.

DR. CRIST: Did any of the experimentation that came out of the Warfighting Lab assign the Marine Corps as a DoD test bed?

GEN KRULAK: Well, the Congress and DoD made the Marine corps the executive agent in three areas, (1) for non-lethals, (2) military operations other than war, and (3) military operations in urban terrain. A lot of that, I think, came from the confidence that was borne of the Warfighting Laboratory. One of the things that I think is really positive for the Marine Corps is that if you believe that warfare in the 21st century is going to be one of chaos and it's going to be a three-block war scenario, and then you take a look at what the Marine Corp's been made lead and executive agent for, non-lethal weapons, military operations other than war, and urban warfare . . . you got to feel good.

You basically are saying that the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States have made this very small, the smallest of all the services, the lead executive agent of the future. I mean, we are the lead/executive agent of the 21st century!

Even my Marines, many of them don't understand that. Even many of my generals didn't understand that until the very end. By stealing the march on the 21st century, the Corps was recognized by the Congress and the Department of Defense . . . they made us the lead and executive agent of war fighting in the 21st century. That's a powerful, powerful statement and our Marines ought to be very proud of themselves.

DR. CRIST: If you look at the history of the Marine Corps, for a small service you look at a lot of the major tactical or operational innovations have come from. I mean to talk about vertical involvement, amphibious doctrine . . .

GEN KRULAK: Close air support. A lot of the innovations that have come out of not only the Warfighting Lab but recruit training are now being copied by the other services. They say the greatest form of flattery is copying what you're doing. I think it's more than that. I think that the Marine Corps has had a tradition of innovation and that, although we were sometimes reluctant to innovate, once we start doing it, we do it very well. Additionally, we articulate why we are doing it very well; and, we put it into action. And I think all of that paid off over the past four years as we slowly but surely stole a march on the future and in fact stole the march on the other services in the niche market of what the war is going to be like in the 21st century.

DR. CRIST: You made an interesting statement on this. You said, "The Corps of the future must move

from fire-and-maneuver to maneuver-and-fire." What did you mean by that, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, fire-and-maneuver was basically the way the Corps has fought since its inception. The use of covering fires allowed the maneuver of the forces to get in position to take and destroy the enemy. And my point is in the battlefield as lethal as it is today there will be times when you maneuver in order to fire. You will maneuver in order to cause the enemy to react to your maneuver, to open them up to your weapons systems, and then you can take them under fire, particularly in an area where you have the technology that makes you more capable than your enemy. Your maneuver uncovers him, makes him move, and exposes him to your weapons. Then you fire: maneuver-and-fire verses fire-and-maneuver.

DR. CRIST: One of the first actions taken by the Commandant's Warfighting Lab was early December 1995 when they went up to the New York Mercantile Exchange. What was the purpose of that, and what did you learn from it?

GEN KRULAK: It's a series called the Trader's Game. If you're going to maneuver in order to get the enemy to move so that you can fire, if you're going to think in a chaotic battlefield, if you're going to have a strategic corporal, you're going to need to be able to make decisions almost instantaneously. We were looking for people who makes instantaneous decisions that are of value where each decision has an impact. We started looking and the answer came up, the stock market. Traders have to make decisions. They may not be life and death, but they certainly are of value. How do the successful ones make the decision? How do they know when to decide? The only way to find that out was to go up and ask them. To try to get into their mind set and see whether there's any applicability to the Marine Corps.

Well, what we found out is that successful traders basically saw fluctuations in prices and in the market in an almost cognitive thinking. They see and understand patterns of price fluctuation. They've seen it so often, that when it gets to a point where they know what's happening, then they make their decision. It's based on a pattern of recognition. Being able to sit back and say yes, I haven't seen this exact thing before, but I've certainly seen the pattern of it. That's the way that stock traders do it. They're in the pit, they're yelling and screaming, and they're doing it based on a sensing. The flip side of that for the military is

that you can't always get into combat so how are you going to prepare for it? Well, that drove the gaming that we're doing. For example, the squad leader, combat squad leader, you put them into scenarios time after time after time. They work their way through those scenarios, and sooner or later they become very effective.

Why? Not because they know how to do each individual action but because they'd seen something like that before and can make a decision. That's why you find the team leader or the patrol leader in his eighth month in Vietnam far more effective than the one in the first month. Why? Because he's more experienced, he's seen more, and he can make instantaneous decisions at the right time based on not necessarily that exact event that's taking place, but on the pattern of that event. You don't have to go through the fire-fight to learn. You can learn through multiple training exercises that have to do with different types of fire fights so that when you get to the real one you may not know the exact answer but you come pretty darn close because you've trained in so many scenarios.

DR. CRIST: Much of this focused on the squad.

GEN KRULAK: Early on in Hunter Warrior we realized that not just the squad leader but every Marine out there was far more capable than we'd given him credit for. Our training system didn't take into account how good our Marines were, and we found that out by taking lance corporals, teaching them across two or three different MOS's up to the rank of gunnery sergeant . . . in other words, laterally and upwards. These kids could do everything.

We had the lance corporals who could take a radio apart, who could change a clutch, and could fire a machine gun. And they could do it with an experience level of a gunnery sergeant, and it didn't take long for them to pick it up. So we realized, we're not challenging our kids hard enough and that's why some of those changes in training came about.

For the squad leader we build a combat squad leader's course, which in fact takes a squad leader, puts him in front of a video screen, has a higher headquarters and his own squad underneath him, and he's got to, watching the TV screen, fight his squad. We used actual footage from combat or from movies like "Full Metal Jacket" and we put the squad leader into an urban terrain or into the jungle or into the woods or into the desert, and they fight event after event after event. They had to make multiple decisions based on what was happening on the screen and based on what the

platoon commander or platoon sergeant was screaming at him from above and what the fire team leaders are screaming at him from below. It's very strenuous. Within 15 minutes the squad leader was soaking in sweat because it is very hard. Again, this idea of trying to put them in multiple situations so that when the real one comes they'll at have had some experience akin to what they are experiencing in combat.

DR. CRIST: You said off-mike that you discovered through these experiments that the Marines of today, the young Marines, are not afraid of technology. In fact, they embrace it; they're used to it, much more so than the senior leadership.

GEN KRULAK: I think one of the frustrations of the young officer and the young enlisted Marine is that we old fogies are computer illiterate and that we are concerned and worried about technology. The fact of the matter is the 31st Commandant was the first virtual Commandant. I am the first Commandant to have a computer in my office in the home of the Commandant! I use it all the time. I average about 150 e-mails a day, talking to Marines, talking to civilians, talking to academia, bouncing ideas off of my generals, getting ideas from my generals, getting my ideas from privates. And so there is no question that the junior officer and junior enlisted felt far more comfortable in the computer age than did the more senior enlisted and officers.

DR. CRIST: Is it a good counter to some of the criticism of the Warfighting Lab was too reliant on technology that people that criticized you are not nearly as familiar with technology as the young servicemen who are using it today and will into the future?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I think the criticism on the use of technology in all the experiments was, just a lack of understanding of what really was happening in the experiments. That's probably my fault. But the experiments were not technology-based in too. They were based on doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support, and whatever could be done to enhance those was going to be done. And so people who said it was too technologically oriented, I just don't agree with them. I do believe that the part of the experimentation that really was tied to technology, particularly the command and control, in some instances concerned or worried some of the senior staff NCOs and senior officers. What they never really realized is that the Commandant and the

senior officers in the Marine Corps recognized that you could not put all your eggs in one basket. You can't just say we're going to be a virtual commander fighting a battle from over the horizon. The commander eventually goes forward and fights his command. We're not getting away from that.

DR. CRIST: One of the issues looked at extensively in the Warfighting Lab was Force Structure. One of the things they examined was maybe we need a lighter infantry battalion, say 500 men vice the 700-800 or so that it is now.

GEN KRULAK: First of all, the Lab was not interested in force structure. The Lab experiment was structured. I mean, can a squad equipped with the right technology and supported by the right weapons system, can they in effect manage and control a greater amount of battle space, than a platoon can without those assets? And so we experimented with that. We had a 12-man squad, 8-man squads, 14-, you name it. We built, we experimented. Can a squad that operates in open terrain at the size of 8 people or 12 be equally effective in close terrain, in urban area? We experimented. We found out very quickly that it's far more lethal in close terrain than it is in open terrain, far more lethal. You suffer far more casualties, so the answer was no.

But people got the wrong idea that experiments drove structure. It didn't. The experiments were used to help look at structure and help the Force Structure Planning Group in their deliberations, and they provided hard data as to fighting in cities versus fighting in open area. It was never the intent of the Lab to drive the actual structure and of the Marine Corps.

And the fact of the matter is if we had stopped with Hunter Warrior the answer might have been a 500-man battalion, but you didn't stop at Hunter Warrior. You went to Urban Warrior, and there we saw how the heavy casualties are in the urban environment. In that environment, you're going to need people and, so you're looking at a 800-900-man battalion. So, to believe that one of the goals of the Warfighting Laboratory was to structure the Marine Corps is inaccurate.

DR. CRIST: Some of the new innovations that came out of the Warfighting Lab were actually fielded within the Marine Corps in very short time. One of the first was the Dragon Drone, which actually was deployed with the 15 MEU in 1998 or so. And another concept that had a lot of promise was Dragon Fire.

GEN KRULAK: There's plenty of them. The Dragon Drone was an example of how Marine Corps innovation and ingenuity backed by support from the Congress can make a success. Dragon Drone is nothing more than the old x-drone, UAV, that were canned by the Navy and the Army years ago. As a matter of fact, we found them in a warehouse. We took the x-drone and we started to experiment with that UAV with a payload of non-lethal weapon dispensers and with optics that would allow you to see visually over the next hill.

It was a very basic operation that, a group of manufacturers decided to help us with. We tested it in Hunter Warrior and found, that it could fly off of a ship, be controlled from the ship until it got to land where a lance corporal with a joy stick, could pick it up, fly it 150 miles inland 100+ miles an hour at 12,000 feet. We could use it as a reconnaissance means and then fly it back, hand it off to the person at the shore line who directed it onto the ship. And it worked.

We then said, that we ought to improve the payload. We ought to go to industry and say, okay, give us a night vision capability, give us targeting capability. Slowly but surely they built it. And so now we have a good tactical UAV. Is it perfect? No. It costs \$70,000, and nobody can beat that, and we put it afloat. The reviews were for the most part good. There were some problems with it obviously, but I'll tell you the grunts loved it. Now, the air boss on board the ship didn't like it because they had to suspend some operations in order to get it off and recovered, but that can be worked around. The issue was does the payload work, does it give real-time data to the guy on the ground. The answer is yes.

So that was a real success story. The Dragon Fire is the box mortar. It's the unattended mortar. It's a 120-millimeter mortar. It can be operated either manually by a crew. It can be put deep inland and unattended. It has its own self-loading capability and its own magazine of mortar rounds and it can actually take calls for fire from remote distances and put steel on target. A very great system, again something that was proven to be very successful.

The hand-held a radio. We're buying 2,000 of those right now because they proved so successful. The flak jacket, where we put the handle on the back of the flak jacket to help people be pulled through windows and over ledges . . . that was done. A lot of things that were of benefit across the MAGTF have come into the Corps as a result of the Warfighting Laboratory, even to the extent of the marriage of the Warfighting Laboratory with Systems Command for individual equipment. The

dome tent was experimented with. The combat boot was experimented with. Body armor was experimented with. The whole load-bearing system was experimented with. So the Warfighting Laboratory and Sea Dragon provided a great place to experiment with individual equipment.

DR. CRIST: The hand-held radio's, the Newton-Erickson, the leatherneck system as they call that --

GEN KRULAK: That's a computer system. Newton- Erickson was part of it, but the hand-held is one that came out of Urban Warrior. Because of the urban canyons and how chopped up the urban area is, whether it's slums or cities, you needed to be able to communicate across streets and through buildings and from the basement to the top floor. We needed a hand-held radio at the squad level and we came up with one, and it's a very good one.

DR. CRIST: How did your experiments tie in with the Navy's Naval Battlefield Experiments? You said, in a 27 February 1998 in an e-mail from you to Col Anthony A. Wood, "The advanced warfare experiments will be closely coordinated with the naval battlefield experiments, must be designed to produce statements of requirements as a result of new emerging concepts by MCCDC which will lead to acceleration of war fighting enhancements." How were they linked to the innovations being done in your war fighting labs?

GEN KRULAK: That quote that you just read was a set-up deal between Tony Wood and myself. Tony was having great difficulty with the Navy not taking a real firm stance in experimentation and certainly not trying to tie their fleet battle experiments in with the Marine Corps experiments. This was seen primarily in their reluctance to really join us in Urban Warrior and the experiments up in Monterrey and in San Francisco. He asked me to give him a message, and in fact he helped write it. I took that message and infoed some of my Marine generals. He then went to them and said I need you to help me on this," and that's what we did. It was a back door play. Now you say well, why didn't you just go to the generals and tell them? Well, because I didn't want to be the Commandant directing the Lab, so to speak, and directing issues of the Lab. The Lab belonged to CG, MCCDC and I wanted MCCDC to do it, and so by info'ing MCCDC on the e-mail I sent to Tony, it gave validity to the fact that we're not getting much support from the fleet battle experiments and we need to get moving on that, and that's exactly what happened.

Machiavellian, but the idea was to not go around one of my generals. The idea was to use the general, and I didn't want to stick anybody in the eye and so that e-mail went to Tony and info'd other people and they said, that's right, and then when Tony came to them they were already on board and they were already working it, and the end result was a very successful exercise out on the West Coast and a very good tie-in with the fleet battle experiments.

The problem was the Navy wasn't experimenting. If you think the Navy was out there, talking about, the 21st century battle and talking about different types of battle groups and different types of comm infrastructure, they weren't. You had Archie Clemens in the Pacific doing IT-21; you had Paul Reason on the East Coast trying to rapidly move from the 18th to the 19th century. They weren't interested in this. Somehow we had to bring them on board and the way to bring them on board was to tie the two experiments together. Why was that important? Because if we didn't, it would start being directed by DoD and by USACOM and so what we wanted was to get ahead of the ball game. Don't come in to try to dictate to us because we're already working in this joint environment.

DR. CRIST: Do you think you were successful?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I mean, look what happened. I think the proof of the pudding was Urban Warrior and the fleet battle experiments off of Coronado and off of San Francisco. The fact that they took the top deck of their command and control ship and made it into an ECOC, an enhanced command operations center, where we operated from in conjunction with the Navy's own Op center, I'd say it was a massive success.

How you get there is not as important as what the end state is. It goes to the whole idea that I keep on trying to drive. We don't care who gets the credit. It isn't who gets the credit for doing something. It's did it get done? And so, having an e-mail to Tony Wood and using that to be a wedge to get this thing going turned out to be a good thing.

DR. CRIST: Very successful.

GEN KRULAK: It didn't get anybody angry. I mean, the first time now that anybody's known that it was between Wood and me is right now and it's old history.

DR. CRIST: Going back to the experimentation. There have been a number of dicta from the joint world that things need to meet certain joint requirements and joint capabilities for equipment that's purchased. Did that need for joint requirements impact anything being done on the warfare lab work? Did the equipment and ideas developed in the Lab set the joint standard because no one else was doing it?

GEN KRULAK: That's what happened. In other words, we had stolen a march to such a degree that there was no other service was experimenting the way that we were experimenting or achieving the results we were achieving. Certainly the joint experimenter, ACOM, Atlantic Command, was nowhere near. They were light years behind us, and so we were able to hold our own because we were so far ahead. When it came time to buy a hand-held radio we became the standard. We had proven that technology is moving so rapidly that the old acquisition process for such things as command and control equipment is worthless. Boyle's law states that computer power will double every 18 months and in fact it is doubling every 10 to 12 months. Same with radios. If you wait to go MilSpec and then build it, you're six or seven years. We can't afford that and so we are doing commercial off-the-shelf with a lot of this equipment, and DoD acknowledges it.

DR. CRIST: That's the whole procurement process, which is a slow, ponderous thing . . .

GEN KRULAK: That's right. We have gone on beyond that.

DR. CRIST: On 8 June 1998 Col Wood was relieved by BGen (Select) Timothy E. Donovan. I wonder if you could just comment briefly about both these officers? First of all, why did you choose Col Wood to head up the Warfighting Lab?

GEN KRULAK: I had known Tony Wood for some time, certainly from my MCCDC days. He's brilliant. Tony Wood is brilliant. He does have a very high IQ. He's tremendously innovative, a great thinker. I loved the guy. He was, at the same time, unbelievably obnoxious, angered many, many of the generals. That's the result of his personality, very forceful, powerful personality, working for the CG, MCCDC and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He didn't take no for an answer. And so he torqued people off. Great driver, great doer, accomplished the mission, would have made a remarkable general, would have been a different

kind of general, that's for sure. He would have been a niche general but would have made a good general. But he would never make general because he had too many enemies.

Bgen Tim Donovan also very, very smart. He had already served prior to coming to the Warfighting Laboratory as the head of the MAGTF staff training program. He was well known by the general officer corps and well respected by the general officer corps. He still had many of the same characteristics as Wood insofar as intellect, drive, innovation, don't take no for an answer, and yet, he had a personality that was far more acceptable.

So I wanted to do two things to really institutionalize the lab. One of them was by saying it's important enough to have one of our general officers in charge. But it had to be the right general officer. It had to be one who was into experimentation, understood what it really meant but, also had the support of the general officer corps. Tim Donovan's done that and done it with great aplomb. He is well respected and has been very effective.

Tony Wood was the man for the job at the beginning, the guy who would build the scaffolding and really do what has to be done and had the vision. He was on board and did the driving, and was, in many ways, like Pete Ellis. Colonel Pete Ellis was not a prophet in his own land. I mean, he was not recognized for his brilliance within the Marine Corps. He was disliked within the Marine Corps, like Tony Wood, and yet I believe that history will treat Tony Wood very, very positively. He was a driver and was a thinker and was an innovator and in fact helped change the face of the Marine Corps. Tim will do the same thing.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything to be read into the fact that you now would bring a general in charge of the Warfighting Lab instead of a colonel?

GEN KRULAK: If you're going to institutionalize it, the one way to do that is to send the signal. Generals are precious to the Marine Corps. Generals are precious commodities. We have more slots for generals than we have generals. To take one of those precious commodities and put it in the Warfighting Lab says a very important thing.

DR. CRIST: Yes, sir. The relationship of the Warfighting Lab and MCCDC, very early on in your commandancy you appointed to General Paul Van Riper as CG, MCCDC. For instance, the Warfighting Lab falls underneath MCCDC from

inception as of today. Is MCCDC very much a conduit for the ideas coming out of . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes, the CG MCCDC is my executive agent for the lab, and the reason we put the lab under MCCDC is simply because the results of the experiments should and must be incorporated into the combat development process. So, in order to be effective as a lab, you've got to have a conduit to put these ideas and concepts into the Corps, and the way to do that was with MCCDC. That's why it went over there.

DR. CRIST: And under whom doctrine, schools, everything falls?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support all come under the combat development process.

DR. CRIST: So, by doing you assured it was not to be a separate, standard-alone organization?

GEN KRULAK: That is why we changed the name from the Commandant's Warfighting Lab because it began to be seen in the field as a stand-alone. That's not what I wanted. I didn't want the Marine Corps to think that. This is their Warfighting Laboratory. It's not Chuck Krulak's. It is not about a personality. It never has been, it never should be. This is the institution's lab, and therefore we changed the name. And, again, I confess to probably making a mistake by saying it was the Commandant's Warfighting Lab. It never was about Chuck Krulak; it was about the institution.

DR. CRIST: On the other hand, early on it that name showed that it was an area where the Commandant has emphasized.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and that's correct. I realize that there were negatives associated with the name the Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory. Early on the positive impact of the Commandant's personal attention in this outweighed the negatives but a year and a half into it, it was time to change and make it what it is, which is the institution's.

DR. CRIST: On 5 January 1999, The Warfighting Lab gave a demo on the Hill, after which you wrote a congratulatory e-mail to Gen Donovan on its performance.

GEN KRULAK: Although we had been holding the same kind of thing for the Congress twice a year, we normally just got the staffers who were

really interested. This time the LOEs were basically finished and we were getting ready to go the AWE. We had a lot of info that came out of Urban Warrior. We had all of Hunter Warrior, we had all the things that industry had been working with us, and we wanted to show the Congress that, this is real. We did what we told you we were going to do. You can trust the Marine Corps. And so we brought up to the Congress of the United States a massive display of what we were doing. We brought young Marines who had worked on the equipment. I wrote letters and invited members and their key staffers to come, and it was a real good turnout.

We had members of the Senate Armed Service Committee, members of the House Armed Service Committee. The SAC and the HAC. We had people from industry come and it was just a great success. I got letters from Congressmen and Senators saying thank God you did what you said. The Marine Corps told the truth. They were going to do pure experimentation. We were going to get not just equipment solutions, but tactics, techniques, procedures. You name it. And so it was a very good day.

DR. CRIST: Did anyone in Congress stand out in your mind as a particularly strong proponent of what you were doing?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, sure. On the Senate side, Senator Bob Smith, who's running for President; Senator Chuck Robb; Senator Carl Levin; Senator Lieberman; Senator Dirk Kempthorn; Dan Coates; Olympia Snow. And on the House side, Ike Skelton, Paul McHale, Chairman Spence, Chairman Young. Great support. I think that Senator Robb probably spent 45 minutes up there. It was amazing. If you get 45 minutes from a senator you're really doing something.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything else you wanted to bring up on the Warfighting Lab?

GEN KRULAK: No, I don't think so other than to say that the value of anything is judged by results, and the bottom line is we've gotten multiple, probably 12 to 14 published tactics, techniques, and procedures as a spin-off on all the areas of the experimentation coming out of the lab. We have Dragon Drone, we have Dragon Fire, we have the hand-held radio, we have the night-vision laboratory, we have the combat squad leaders course, we have a lot of things that were a direct result of the lab. It's proven to be very successful.

Great people making it work at very minimal cost to the FMF or to the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: The first of the Advanced Warfighting Experiments which came out of your lab was Hunter Warrior, which was held, at least the highlight of it, at 29 Palms and in Camp Pendleton from 28 February to 15 March 1997. Why did you chose this type of an exercise as your first experiment?

GEN KRULAK: In Hunter Warrior, we wanted to use something that we were familiar with and we were familiar with Green Dragon. The premise behind Green Dragon was that small hunter-killer teams could dominate a battle space. Since we were familiar with that and had already worked at MCCDC on that concept, we decided that the first of the war fighting experiments, a major one, would be the use of small teams equipped with technology to manage a battle space. It was basically a comfort-level thing. We knew where we had been, we knew that this is something that could be an experiment of value, and so that's what we decided to start with.

DR. CRIST: And it was seen as a building block approach, too?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, the five-year experimentation plan had three experiments: Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, Capable Warrior, and they'd all build on each other. Hunter Warrior was for the open terrain, and it was a maximum use of indirect fires vs maneuver. It was teams using fires to rain death and destruction over a battle space.

DR. CRIST: And you had a clear desire of this, as you stated, to focus on command and control of small dispersed teams, situational awareness, and improve fire support?

GEN KRULAK: And how do you resupply? How do handle logistics on a widely dispersed battlefield? We got all of that by doing Hunter Warrior.

DR. CRIST: A *Marine Corps Gazette* article during this time said that the Stingray operations in Vietnam had influenced the thinking behind Hunter Warrior?

GEN KRULAK: Well, I think there's no question that Stingray influenced Green Dragon, which

influenced Hunter Warrior. The difference in Hunter Warrior and in Green Dragon is the tremendous infrastructure of command and control that allowed the teams to know where they were and where the enemy was. It also allowed the commanders to provide a direct link between the team and the fire support assets that were available. The use of overhead systems to provide intelligence. It's just took the Stingray and took it onto a whole different plain.

DR. CRIST: You went out to look at Hunter Warrior in early March. What were your observations of it?

GEN KRULAK: That we were not yet to the stage with technology to achieve the kind of battlefield awareness and battle space awareness that we wanted. That the first generation computers on the chest and command and control and target designation and unit location was not where we would want it to be if we were really going to do this in real time and that we had to do some work in that area.

I think the star of Hunter Warrior turned out to be something called CSS Enterprise, which was the name given to the combat service support element of the special-purpose MAGTF that fought Hunter Warrior. They used CSS Enterprise as a kind of a logo, the Starship Enterprise, and you'd see the kids wearing their green shirts and in the heat of the day they'd take off their uniform utility blouse and they'd be wearing their Starship Enterprise t-shirts. A lot of camaraderie and high morale.

But the bottom line coming out of CSS Enterprise was that many of the things that we're doing now in the Marine Corps came out of the experiment. The use of systems to push logistics forward that we've never even looked at before, . . . using parafoils to deliver supplies, using the sky hook to deliver multiple lifts of resupply. Using the Dragon Drone to help with resupply, spotting clear areas, using electronic sensors on engines that would tell you whether you're running out of oil or water.

All of these things were experiments. The first time I saw the Smart Card was in Hunter Warrior at CSS Enterprise.

DR. CRIST: What is the Smart Card, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Smart Card is technology that is just now being introduced in 1999 into the military, and it looks like a charge card and yet it has a chip on it, a memory chip on it. In the case of Hunter Warrior, we were running manifests for all

helicopter lifts, manifests for all resupply. All medical data would be on this little chip on an individual card that would be carried by an individual marine. You could make a manifest in a matter of seconds by just swiping the Smart Card. You could tell how much ammunition or water or food would be taken as you swiped your card. You could say, I'm taking 30 pounds of MREs out to resupply this one particular unit. You'd swipe it through and it'd automatically deduct it from your overall stock status, also tell you where it was going, time, distance factors taken into account.

All of this came out of Hunter Warrior. So, when people say not much came out of Hunter Warrior, a lot came out of Hunter Warrior. Again, the issue is to push the experiment to failure and we did that, particularly in the communications area.

DR. CRIST: The logistics side was in your Commandant's Planning Guidance in which you said you had the concern that our current logistics abilities didn't support Operational Maneuver From The Sea.

GEN KRULAK: That's exactly right.

DR. CRIST: Trying to correct that carried into Hunter Warrior?

GEN KRULAK: Well, Hunter Warrior was a direct carryover. I mean, Operational Maneuver From The Sea says you're going to come from a maneuver space called the sea and you are not going to stop at the shore line, but you're going to move deep inland to an objective that will impact the enemy's center of gravity. Well, if you're going deep inland, you're going to have to resupply. We used to put the gear on the beach and you'd operate out of a force beachhead that had supply stocks in that force beachhead. Well, you're not going to have that any more, so it poses a real problem insofar as beans, bullets, and band-aids going to the troops.

DR. CRIST: There are some interesting things on logistic support for Hunter Warrior—the parafoil.

GEN KRULAK: On the parafoil, people, laughed at that and they said we'd never be able to do that. When you put GPS capability on the parafoil, it came very successful. In my mind was a success. It helped drop the gear to a position where the team could move to, and then move on. The parafoil wouldn't identify the team's location.

The same type of thing as the sky hook, which was the first attempt to be able to deliver multiple drops of resupply hanging from a helicopter. This helped in deception, too, because you could land or it comes very close to the ground in multiple locations. It looks like you doing something but in fact you didn't drop the gear. The sky hook would carry three resupplies in one helicopter lift, and as you dropped one of the three packages, it would self-adjust the balance so you wouldn't pull the aircraft out of sync and crash it.

So some real good things came out of Hunter Warriors. The use of monitoring devices in trucks. We looked at what some of the major truck rental organizations did, "Ryder Rents Trucks." Well, the way they work is they have these monitors that tell whether you've got enough oil, whether it's overheating, whether the batteries are going bad. And so, we were saying, if Ryder trucks can do this and it's effective, why can't we? So we did. And we would monitor literally from the CSS Enterprise located near the FSSG Headquarters in Camp Pendleton to vehicular traffic out at 29 Palms. Lots of good things came from Hunter Warrior.

DR. CRIST: What about on the fire support aspects? Certainly the bread and butter of this was the ability to get fire where you needed it without masking your own forces. Did the fire support as currently in the inventory as of 1997 get air, naval gunfire, artillery, have the ability to effectively to do what you wanted, and if it didn't what work and steps were taken to rectify that?

GEN KRULAK: We ran various scenarios. If you had the objective area within naval surface fire support range of your teams, and you had artillery, and air, it was very effective. As you alter the scenario and the experiment -- again, we were constantly trying to find failure -- when you got outside of the naval surface fire support area, the ability to react became more difficult. Then you turned to the most efficient and effective fire support for that scenario--air and artillery. The further the battlefield becomes from your naval gunfire, you have problems. The current naval gunfire just can't range the enemy, but more importantly, as we experimented and pushed out the surface ships to 150, 200 kilometers, the problem increased exponentially. There was no system that could support forces from those distances. When you modeled the various systems, and the time of flight of the system was such that if the target was moving at all you had real problems hitting it. Lessons were learned and they were applied both within the concept base requirement

system and the Combat Development Process, but also were used to feed N-85 to help us in the OpNav staff in getting the right types of naval surface fire support. The experimentation we did was good for a host of reasons relating to OMFTS.

DR. CRIST: An N-85 is the expeditionary warfare?

GEN KRULAK: N-85 is the expeditionary warfare portion of the Navy's N-8, which is the resources.

DR. CRIST: Yes, sir. 25 January 1997 Admiral Clemens, who was CinCPacFleet at that time, was briefed on Hunter Warrior. Was the Navy supportive of the objectives?

GEN KRULAK: Admiral Archie Clemens was and is a very forward thinking naval officer, far more attuned to the technology aspects of war fighting than most naval officers. As a matter of fact, one might say that he was overly dependent on technology. The whole idea of IT-21, Information Technology-21, and the amount of effort the Navy's expended over the past couple of years with IT-21 could be attributed to Archie. Archie was impressed with the experimentation. And he was impressed with the technology and the ECOC. The ECOC was located down at Delmar and Camp Pendleton, but it resembled what would be put on a ship, and he liked the technology and he liked the reach of the video and the teleconferencing capabilities.

It didn't scare him. Most people who went out there and looked at it were a little bit frightened by all the technology they saw, to include some of my Marines. Their sense was that you're taking the leader, the commander, away from the forces. Like Stingray, there ought to be an officer out there with the platoons. The issue was experimenting with distance technology, doing something to minimize distance through battle space awareness. Where the troops were. Where the enemy was. Where the fire support means were. Nobody every said and nobody has ever intended that technology take the place of feet on the ground for the leader. Once people realized that, they understood and were not so paranoid about it.

DR. CRIST: There were some critics of Hunter Warrior. Bill Lind comes to mind and others who thought they were going to turn the MEU into nothing more than a bunch of forward observers. How would you respond to their criticism?

GEN KRULAK: I welcome informed criticism. Bill Lind was not informed. Bill Lind loves to hear himself talk. He can be a great help to the Marine Corps. My predecessor, Gen Mundy basically said no more Bill Lind. When I became Commandant, although I didn't necessarily agree with all that Bill Lind had to say, I thought that the debate he engendered was useful. And so I invited him back to Quantico. He taught at the schools, he lectured, he had free rein. I let him come out to see Hunter Warrior. The problem with Bill Lind is that once his mind is made up don't bother him with facts, don't bother him with the truth. And so he just did not understand the experiment. Bill Lind's complaint was he thought we had a concept that we were trying to validate. Like I've already indicated, we shifted the scenario multiple times, changing the concept multiple times, trying to get failure. Bill Lind thought we were looking for support for an answer we already had. That was absolutely not true. I think that if he took the time to read the reams upon reams of data that came out of Hunter Warrior, he would have realized that he was 180 out. I don't know whether he ever took time to read it. He lost great credibility with the experimenting community, whether it was Andy Marshall in net assessments or the Army, Navy, Air Force, or the Marine Corps. He just blew his credibility because he obviously didn't understand experimentation.

The other critics based their criticism on the idea that what we were really doing was sending Ninjas out into the desert with throwing stars and nun-chucks. That somehow the lab was trying to take the Marine Corps and bust it up into these hunter killer teams. Again, that was probably my fault in not articulating what we were trying to do. I was ultimately in charge of it, but we just didn't do a good job of articulating to the Marine Corps what we were trying to do.

The reality is, once the Marine Corps saw what we were doing, they jumped in with both feet. They loved it. That's what happened in Urban Warrior II. It went to Lejeune and all of a sudden they loved it. They were getting great training. Then it went back out to California. Those that didn't get involved with experimentation are a little bit more sanguine about it. Now those days are over where people question it. It's got great support across the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: There are some parallels to when the Marine Corps adopted the special operations capable designate for the MEUs. Everybody

thought we would turn them into commandos but the Marines actually got much better training.

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned that the major problem was you could have advertised it better or framed the debate better?

GEN KRULAK: And as the Commandant, I'm the ultimate individual responsible for that and I fault myself. I had a messenger, Tony Wood, but I did not do the job.

DR. CRIST: There was a lot of people who didn't want to listen. They came in with the idea of, "Oh, Gen Krulak has a new doctrine and this is a way of validating it," and they didn't get the whole idea of pushing to failure.

GEN KRULAK: That's right. And, again, that's my fault, not theirs. I think, if they had read the planning guidance a little closer, they would have understood.

DR. CRIST: The next major experiment was Urban Warrior, which was concluded this past March 1999. Why the urban environment as the next phase of this experimentation?

GEN KRULAK: As a result of all the study that the Marine Corps has done on future conflict and as a result of the QDR and the National Defense Panel view of the future, it became obvious that conflict was going to be very close to the littorals, and in urban areas. Our enemy could not, in fact, fight us in open terrain and expect to win. They had to somehow make use of their strengths and negate ours, and the way to do that is close terrain.

The proof of the pudding is that if you look at war fighting since Desert Storm it has all been in urban areas or urban slum. Whether it's Mogadishu, whether it's Grozny and Chechnya, whether it's the little villages in Bosnia or in Kosovo, or whether it's in Africa, We are going to fight in cities. Our enemies have watched CNN. They learned how strong we are from a technology stand point. They must minimize our technological advantage. With that in mind we looked at the lessons coming out of Hue City, and we looked at the lessons coming out of Grozny and we saw how deadly the urban environment can be. The best example I can give is the battle for Grozny, where a Russian parachute brigade from St. Petersburg in Russia fought. That parachute brigade, reinforced with armor and reinforced with attack helicopters and fixed-wing

aircraft -- sounds kind of like a MAGTF -- went into Grozny. In a two-week period that parachute brigade lost in excess of 80 pieces of armor, had 11 attack helicopters shot out of the air, one fixed-wing jet, and they went home with their tails between their legs. Who beat them? A rebel.

My point is if they could do that to a Russian Brigade, and I'm not saying that that Russian brigade is as good as the Marine Corps, but think of what it would do, to us. The point was how can you be effective and yet minimize your casualties? Can technology help? Can new organizations help? Can new tactics, techniques, and procedures help? Can new equipment help? And so we decided to conduct a series of lesser operational experiments and then culminate it with an advanced war fighting experiment. We took almost two years, a year and a half, of experimentation to come to the fruition of the AWE that took place out in San Francisco Bay.

DR. CRIST: And the concept was, again, a building block approach with Urban Warrior?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, We went to Chicago, to New York City, to Wilmington, North Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida. Whether it was looking at power grids, operating in sewers, doing cross canyon work (if you have high rises, the street goes between the high rises forms what we call an urban canyon.) Is there a role for UAVs, how do you run close air support? What kind of weapons systems do you arm your aircraft with? Do you rubble or not; what's the impact of rubble? What kind of uniform do you want; how do you keep from scarring up your knees and your hands because most of the time you're going to be crawling? That last question resulted in with the same protection pads that are used by roller bladers. We went out and got a whole bunch of them. We came up with the handle on the back of the flak jacket. We had trouble getting through windows. You never want to go through the door because you're probably going to hit a booby trap so you go through the windows. Well, trying to get over the window sill with a flak jacket is hard. You put a handle on the back of the flak jacket and you can pull the person through. A lot of things that came into play in Urban Warrior.

DR. CRIST: Did you validate or dispel any of the common concepts in MOUT, such as don't reduce a city to rubble or you always want to clear a building from the top down?

GEN KRULAK: Well, we validated many of them. The fact of the matter is that as we sit here in July, there are still reams of data being evaluated. We literally did this on instrumented ranges, so we know exactly the impact, how many people were killed, how many were wounded, and we'd run this scenario 10, 15 times. We will have solid data. One of the beauties of Urban Warrior is we will have fact. You will increase or decrease your casualties by taking this action or not taking this action. Tremendously valuable.

DR. CRIST: As you went out and looked at the civilian city of Chicago, Jacksonville, et cetera, what stands out in your mind of some real lessons that maybe we hadn't thought of as we do our normal training?

GEN KRULAK: Do you take down an entire power grid? Can you take down a part of it? Can you disable a power grid with carbon fiber and still maintain the power grid for when you're going to need it? Do you destroy bridges or not? Do you destroy sewer systems or not? All of those things. As you went around to various cities, you would have the opportunity to pick the brains of fire fighters or electricians or sewer workers. People could give you the impact of actions you take without ever having to take the action itself. And, so, it was just a great value.

DR. CRIST: Any conclusions thus far on those issues you just brought up?

GEN KRULAK: Again it's all dependent on METT-T, mission, enemy, terrain, troops in time available. We saw a little of it during the bombing in Kosovo. So, again, it's METT-T dependent. What we do know is how long you can take them down, what the impact will be. We do know those types of things so that when the commander is faced with it, he'll have the resource to say yes, okay, let's take a look at this because it's all going to be in documents. They'll be in manual format. We're already building those.

DR. CRIST: There was an interview a year or two ago when a spin-up of Urban Warrior was going, probably in *Marine Times*, and a Marine lieutenant colonel, I believe, was talking about one of the things that has never been looked at in urban warfare training were skyscrapers and how do you deal in a modern city with clearing a skyscraper. How do you clear them? Do you blow up the whole skyscraper? Do you take a whole battalion and try to clean it out? He said that Urban Warrior had

emphasized in his mind how manpower-intensive this type of warfare is.

GEN KRULAK: Those are the types of issues that Urban Warrior wrestled with, and that data was provided to the planning group in the spring of '99 to help them come to grips with what's the optimum size, of a division or an infantry battalion and do we have enough of them. Those are all key questions and key experimental results that came out of Urban Warrior. People can question whether we should have run the experiment. The reality is, that's where we're going to fight. That's where the enemy's going to get us. Why wouldn't you want to experiment? Why wouldn't you want to learn what type of tactic to use? Do you use swarm tactics? Do you just segment, just go for a corner of a block? What are you going to do? And Urban Warrior helped get us those answers.

DR. CRIST: In the Warfighting Lab's mind was there a thought that fighting in urban terrain is manpower intensive, but technology could alleviate the need for so many human beings? You could use surveillance in this kind of environment?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's one of the things we examined, as well as using non-lethal agents. We looked at it all. The test results of Urban Warrior, would more than fill this room from the floor to the ceiling! This is not experimentation the way Marines might think of experimentation. This was instrumented battlefield, multiple runs, multiple formations, to get data. We're now in the process of analyzing the data. We're probably a year away from making any major conclusions, so it was a big deal.

DR. CRIST: The operation from 16 to 20 March 1999 actually went part of it in Monterrey and then went up to Oakland. It was originally planned to go to San Francisco, and that fell through. What were the issues with change?

GEN KRULAK: An asymmetric enemy--the tree huggers. The political power in San Francisco is Willie Brown. Political power of the Democratic party in the United States may well be Willie Brown. He's a very powerful guy. We had gone up a year before and started working with Willie Brown and with the city government of San Francisco to pave the way for the use of the Presidio in San Francisco as part of Urban Warrior. We would also use some of the piers and some of the city itself. Four months before, Willie Brown gave us the thumbs up. He said, "You have met

everything that we required, all of the environmental impact, all of that has been done. You've shown us everything. You have permission." Then, about a month before the experiment, the environmentalists went to the barricades, over the issue of environmental impact on the city of San Francisco, and particularly the Presidio. We started to compromise. We won't land on the beach, we'll land over a boat ramp. We'll do this, we'll do that. And they still kept on trying to narrow it and narrow it.

I wrote an editorial to the *San Francisco Examiner* and basically said, we're not going to run the experiment in San Francisco. We're going to do it someplace else. The City of Oakland jumped on it and supported us and so we were able to conduct the exercise.

The important point was our "enemy" was the environmentalist groups. We had beaten tried to deal with them in a symmetric manner. We had gone to the political power, we had gone through the steps that were outlined as the way to do it. They came around and attacked us asymmetrically and they won.

The first lesson of Urban Warrior took place before the AWE began, and it wasn't lost on anybody. It certainly wasn't lost on the Marine Corps. We got beat before we started by an environmental group who doesn't even play a role in the military, and yet it's one of the elements of national power and it, in fact, won. So, lesson learned.

DR. CRIST: If you were going to do it again, how would you have done it differently, sir?

GEN KRULAK: We would have tried to team with the environmentalists. We would say we want you on our team. We want you to be part of our planning cell to ensure that we don't do anything wrong. Get them to feel like they're part of the experiment. Once you get somebody to feel they're part of the experiment they really get buy-in.

DR. CRIST: What was the reaction of the civilian population in Oakland? The press reports seem very favorable.

GEN KRULAK: Once we got going I think people really understood and got on board. Certainly all the supporting actors, the firemen, the policemen, the city fathers, were very supportive. We put on static displays and an air show. We brought one to three million dollars worth of money into their economy, so they were pretty happy. Good press came out of Urban Warrior.

DR. CRIST: What about the U.S. Army?

GEN KRULAK: They take a whole different approach to experimentation. They laminate technology on old concepts. They man the equipment, we equip the man. Their Louisiana maneuvers, their battle labs, are taking what they have right now and trying to improve it by putting technology on it. A good example is a digitized battlefield. Putting technology onto their armored vehicles, trucks, but not changing their tactics. Does this make teams more effective? My point is who says you'll even have a tank in the 21st century so why are you even wasting time on that? What you ought to be doing is trying to determine how you're going to fight on the modern battlefield and what the requirements will be. What capability will you need? So, we connect where we can, but their philosophy is different than ours.

DR. CRIST: Any last thoughts about Urban Warrior?

GEN KRULAK: Urban Warrior caught the imagination of the Department of Defense and the Congress and in many cases the American people because it was the first time that the three-block war really got articulated. It was the first time that they could tie the reality of the day-to-day operations going on in Bosnia and Kosovo with an organization that was actually trying to understand it. And so it was very beneficial to the Marine Corps to have the type of publicity we got. We got a tremendous amount of publicity. As a matter of fact, in many ways the issue with the tree huggers, the environmentalists, played to the Marine Corps' advantage because it kept us on the front page of the major newspapers and in the press, in the national news. The Department of Defense and the Congress were impressed with what we did.

DR. CRIST: The follow-on exercise to Urban Warrior is Capable Warrior, which hasn't begun yet, but what do you hope to accomplish in this next series of exercises?

GEN KRULAK: It doesn't belong to me, but the intent was to bring together the lessons learned from Hunter Warrior and Urban Warrior and apply them to operational maneuver from the sea with the Navy as a partner and a shipmate in that effort. It was to in fact bring experimentation to the totality of OMFTS.

DR. CRIST: Is planning underway for that?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, absolutely. Planning for Capable Warrior began shortly after Hunter Warrior. I might add that the first returns coming out of Urban Warrior showed a battlefield that was so lethal that we're going back and rerunning some of the experimentations on the instrument ranges and try to come up with tactics that may cut down the number of casualties. We're moving forward with Capable Warrior, but I asked to have some branch experimentation to pick up off of Urban Warrior to see if there is some way we could cut down the number of casualties.

DR. CRIST: And that's ongoing?

GEN KRULAK: That's ongoing right now.

DR. CRIST: For the new launcher, any last thoughts about these total advanced warfare experiments, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and this whole issue of experimentation we haven't covered or hit on?

GEN KRULAK: I don't think so other than to reemphasize that change is very hard, even with the service that prides itself on being innovative. The biggest problems involved with the Warfighting Lab were ones that I probably generated more than anybody. Naming it the Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory. I had a very good reason to do that but perhaps I should have changed it sooner. The articulation of the lab and what the experiments were about, I spent over a year going around the Marine Corps trying to say what we were doing but obviously didn't do the job I wanted to do. You only have so much time to do the best you can . . . so do your best and let the cards fall.

DR. CRIST: Part of that is to tie in to my question here. The educational effort took a lot of time but at least today, as of 1999, do you feel there's a sense that a lot of these things have now been institutionalized?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It took a tremendous amount of effort. I told you we traveled 750,000 miles. I think there is no question that people understand the value of the lab now. Units clamor to be part of the special-purpose MAGTF. It is great training and it is an opportunity to use new and advanced equipment.

DR. CRIST: Marines being Marines.

GEN KRULAK: That's right. Plus it's great training. Tremendous training.

SESSION XV

Beginning the Transformation

The Executive Steering Group . . . Changing the focus of HQMC . . . The Standing Joint Task Force . . . Linking concepts to DOTES . . . Chemical, Biological, Incident Response Force (CBIRF) . . . Changing to recruit training . . . Development of the Crucible . . . Cohesion . . . Three Block War . . . Strategic Corporal . . . Joint Strike Fighter and a new look at Aviation . . .

DR. CRIST: The date is 16 July 1999 at the Washington Navy Yard. I'd like to cover some specific issues, which originated with your Commandant's Planning Guidance, and were initiated over the first two years of your commandancy. In the CPG, You devoted considerable attention to force structure issues. Specifically, you stated, "that the Marine Corps must be resourced to meet the requirements of the national military strategy, that the service chief is responsible for providing the proper forces, which the unified commanders need to fight." In short, you asked the question in the CPG was the Marine Corps properly organized? Was the Marine Corps' force structure organized adequately to meet the national military strategy and the various CinC's requirements, plus the PPBS, JROC, CinCs integrated priority list? What came from these various taskings you outlined in the CPG? Specifically, You task the Assistant Commandant, by 1 September 1999, to develop a strategy that ensures effective lines of communication between the CMC, Headquarters Marine Corps and commander of Marine forces.

GEN KRULAK: First off, if you look at the CPG and look at the section on focus, we started off with saying the cure will be an active participant in the decision-making process at Headquarters Marine Corps. We then said that the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps has been asked to develop an executive decision body within the next 30 days. That was a result of what we felt was a disconnect between the deputy chiefs of staff within the headquarters and those at MCCDC, particularly CG, MCCDC. That was a result of my own experience at MCCDC where I didn't think that we were working with the headquarters as well as we should. What I wanted was a more

participatory event, so I tasked the ACMC to develop it.

He came up with what's called the Executive Steering Group. Whenever a 40-weight issue was developed within the Marine Corps, anyplace -- it could be at MCCDC, it could be at Headquarters Marine Corps or often in the Fleet Marine Force -- it would come before the ESG. The Director of the Marine Corps Staff would farm it out to the action officers. They would work on it. They would build the options, build the framework around what the issue was and then farm that out to the three stars of the Marine Corps.

At that point in time, I would be briefed up on it by the principal who was raising it along with Russ Appleton. After I got my head into the ball game, the ESG would meet. We would have it as a VTC so that all the force commands would be there. All my three stars would be there. Normally Peter Murphy would also be part of the ESG, sometimes Systems Command, it just depended on what the subject was. We would discuss the issue in front of us. Every time the ESG met, it was a decision meeting. Everybody had been spun up, everybody knew what the issue was. Now we were meeting, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps, and we were going to decide. Early on in my commandancy, the first year or so, we probably had an ESG meeting just about every month. They then backed off because we had taken care of the vast majority of the big decisions. We were into the institutionalizing phase at that point. That was a very key thing that most people didn't understand. The ESG was very important.

The next issue was to get organized to ensure we're effective in the PPBS system. The deliberations that take place within the Marine Corps, the Department of Navy, the Joint Staff, chairman, et cetera, et cetera. The Assistant

Commandant had been asked to develop a plan to organize Headquarters, Marine Corps and MCCDC to be more effective in the way that saves structure. This got right to the issue that I had when I was CG, MCCDC, that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources was a two star. The N8 was a three-star, so the throw-weight of the Marine Corps in the resource arena was in favor of the Navy, unless CG, MCCDC drove up and down that road a zillion times a week. I became very familiar with the resource and program side of the house and not just the requirements, determination. I knew in the back of my mind what the answer to that question was before it even took place. The answer to the question was to give three stars to P&R. That's what happened. What we did was give three stars to P&R. It didn't really save much structure, but allowed MCCDC the luxury to be involved solely in the Combat Development Process and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Under warfighting, the idea here came from my experience as commander of Marine Forces Pacific. Trying to ensure that the requirements of that MarFors were fully understood by the headquarters. The frustration was that General Mundy had won the component battle outside of the Marine Corps. We became the component. As an example, when I was in MarForPac, I was ComMarForK, Commander Marine Forces Korea. I was ComCMFCK, Commander Combined Marine Forces Command in Korea. I was Commander ComMarCent, Commander Marine Central Command. I had all of these hats. My CinCs understood them, my USMC headquarters didn't. They did not understand what being a component brought to the table in the way of requirements for me to act, to have communications, to have a staff that could handle the commander Marine Forces role. What I asked ACMC to do was to get me a way to ensure the lines of communications are in place and understood.

DR. CRIST: How did you achieve that?

GEN KRULAK: That was the ESG; it filled both roles. For the first time, the force commanders could sit at a table video teleconference and have everybody there all spun up. We're going to decide about the communications suite for the Commander Marine Forces Pacific who has to deal in multiple contingencies. What are you going to do about their communications? Are you going to mirror image MarForLant, and MarForPac? MarForLant is not a force commander for any warfighting CinC. MarForPac is for two. Are we going to mirror

image that? No. How do you determined that? We fight it out in the ESG. That was what it was for.

DR. CRIST: You had mentioned a little bit about how you thought things were out of balance, between the service chiefs and the unified commanders?

GEN KRULAK: What I was trying to do was get the service chief and his staff spun up to date on what the problems were. Most had no idea what componenty meant from the standpoint of requirements of the force commander. This was a great way to drive it home.

DR. CRIST: What other issues jump out in your mind as having been addressed and resolved in the ESG, especially that first year?

GEN KRULAK: Do you give a three-star to P&R? We don't have three-stars to hand out. Who loses the third star? The answer to that was Installations and Logistics. That's just one example. The role of Systems Command. The role of Material Command. Are we going to do Material Command? Cohesion. How are we going to do that? All of those are 40-weight questions.

DR. CRIST: What was the issue of Systems Command, sir?

GEN KRULAK: That was tied up in the Material Command. When you form Material Command, there are losers. One of the losers was the System Command. They lost people and some of their clout in certain areas. It wasn't a big deal. But it had to get a buy in. The ESG allowed you to get buy in. Plus, it gave the Commandant a great sounding board for ideas, but more importantly a great input from my generals either to tell me their ideas or to tell me that I was all wet.

DR. CRIST: That's interesting. You had mentioned in the CPG that the Corps needed to provide a fully capable joint task force headquarters, and expressed your desire to have it ready by 30 September 1995. Why did you want a standing JTF?

GEN KRULAK: It stemmed from the realization that in the future we would, in all likelihood, fight with a joint task force. Our exercises that we've been conducting, both our own and in the joint force arena, showed very clearly that at the troop level jointness was no problem. The level where jointness normally became a problem was in the

command and control area. What I was trying to do here was to cease ad hoc'ing the one area that shouldn't be ad hoc'd, which is command and control. If you look at how we fought, whether it was in Desert Shield, Desert Storm or Somalia, it was pickup sticks-- Marine Corps, you give us the CG, Army, you give us the J-3, Air Force, you give us the chief of staff. These people never saw each other before, never had any idea of how to operate with each other, didn't know whether they had compatible equipment or not. It's a disgrace. What we said was we'll build a headquarters at Camp Lejeune. We will staff some of it with Marines, but open up the vast majority of billets to the joint community. We'll give them housing at Camp Lejeune. We're ready to go.

We stood it up just like I said we were going to stand it up. The trouble was, here was a case where "you build it and they didn't come." I attribute that directly to parochialism. The idea of the Marine Corps having a standing joint task force at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was too much for the other services to accept, so they didn't give us any people. Likewise, the CinCs felt they would lose some control over this and they didn't support it. They didn't think they could control the standing joint task force. My point all along was we're not going to command it. We don't care who commands it. We are trying to do this for the good of the country. For the good of the country, you can't ad hoc war fighting and that's what you're trying to do.

What is very interesting is two years into the game, we got no support, so I went down and closed them. A short while later, we were looking at Bosnia and trying to put together a joint task force. The joint staff briefed how everything was coming together except for the joint task force because they'd never practiced together, had never done anything together. I said, "Let me tell you something, you all missed the greatest opportunity you had, but nobody wanted to play." At that point in time, General Shelton said, "Maybe we ought to rethink this one because I think Chuck's right." They're in the process of looking at it right now, but it's too late. We should have done it four years ago. We had it four years ago. That standing joint task force in fact did do planning for Southern Command. It got involved in some minor operations; one of them was the movement of some nuclear fuel from the former Soviet Union to, I think it was Norway. But the bottom line is, it was basically Marine-led. Other services didn't want to play.

DR. CRIST: Under whom would your standing joint task force have fallen? Under the JCS command?

GEN KRULAK: JCS or ACom. But the important issue was to avoid ad hoc'ing. I was talking about was a standing headquarters that was joint, that was not Marine, but was joint. I could have been commanded by a sailor, soldier or airman.

DR. CRIST: Depending on who had the majority of the forces under the command?

GEN KRULAK: Not depending on who had the majority of the forces, depending on who wanted the command. It didn't depend on majority of the forces, because it wasn't dependent on Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. It was joint and it was standing.

DR. CRIST: The Chairman would decide who would be the commander?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Let me go back to MCCDC. You appointed CG, MCCDC as your lead agency for doctrine development, saying in a message, "our concepts are not well linked to tactics, techniques and procedures." I wonder if you could elaborate on what you saw that was the disconnect with our doctrine versus tactics and procedures and what you did to rectify that.

GEN KRULAK: The concept based requirement system and Combat Development Process are supposed to tie DOTES together -- Doctrine Organization Training Equipment and Support. If they're not well linked, if they're not tied in, you're going to have problems. I was saying, you've got to do this. We've got to be able to literally see the linkages, seamlessly, between DOTES. Tactics, techniques and procedures. I'm trying to think of the changes that took place to spur that to happen. I don't think there was any specific changes that I could point to other than to say that as we got our overarching concept down, "Operational Maneuver from the Sea," then it, in fact, began to drive all DOTES.

DR. CRIST: I'd like to move onto CBIRF, sir, Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, which was mentioned in the Commandant's Planning Guidance. You've talked about this during your session at FMFPac, before you're considered for Commandant. For the record, it stood up I

February 1996, and went online so to speak 1 April 1996. Its first operational deployment was the Atlanta Olympics in 1996. I wonder if you could talk me through why you felt it was necessary and how you saw CBIRF fitting in as a national resource.

GEN KRULAK: As I stated earlier in this interview, CBIRF really had its birth when I was CG MarForPac, and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. I came into work the day that attack took place and looked at the front page of the Honolulu Advertiser. It was in color. It showed men and women, children, Japanese, laying on the ground with blood coming out of their ears, blood coming out of their eyes, obviously, in real trouble. I had heard about the attack through the command center. The CinCPac at that time was an admiral by the name of Dick Mackie. I went down to Admiral Mackie and I said, "there must be something we can do for these people. What can we do to help?" The answer was there's no way we can help them. So I started looking into this. It turned out that the Army has some organizations and units, both open and in the black world, that handled chemical, biological, nuclear issues, but not if they've taken place, not if there's actually been an incident.

When I became the Commandant, I said, we're going to do something about this. I had support from the then Undersecretary of the Navy who was Richard Danzig. He introduced me to a Nobel laureate by the name of Josh Lederberg. When I talked to Lederberg about this, he got very excited. He said, "Look, I will give you the capability to reach back to a group of scientists and doctors who can help you diagnose when you go into an area where an incident has taken place." We built this Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force around the reach back capability that was given to us inherently by Josh Lederberg and his advisory group. We literally took the people out of hide. We went to the Congress and got them to fund the CBIRF so that it wouldn't again take away from our precious O&M and from our procurement dollars. We built it. All along the Department of Defense, certainly the Army, and most of the media scoffed at us. They said, "This is an Army issue. You guys are lightweights in this area."

The bottom line is we stood it up in the timeframe we said we would. It was deployed to the Olympics. When the little bomb was detonated in the Olympic square the first people on the scene there were CBIRF. People didn't know that, that we were first on the scene. We analyze the air and knew it wasn't chemical or biological

and let the police and the FBI and everybody else come in. We've been at every economic summit. We've been at every State of the Union. We've been at the inaugural. We were even with the Pope out in St. Louis. It's just a national asset now. It's an unbelievable capability that's a national asset. Again, if we had followed what everybody else said, it would never have happened. We said build it and they will come. It's the "Field of Dreams" philosophy, the 80 percent solution philosophy. We got the 80 percent solution. My philosophy is 80 percent. If you can get 80 percent, you're going to win. Imagine a baseball player batting 800. That's just phenomenal. I said to the Marine Corps and to my generals, quit worrying about being perfect. Get the 80 percent solution. Then you start working up from there. We got an 80 percent solution on CBIRF. Now we're really into bio-detection where we didn't have that before. We started off with Ryder rental trucks. Now we have our own trucks paid for by the Congress that are state-of-the-art. The reach back that I talked about, now each member of our reach back team has a computer that has video capability. They can analyze the mucous in a person's nose from 5,000 miles. It's just unbelievable. Here's something that everybody said you all will never be able to pull it off. CBIRF is a great success story.

DR. CRIST: Who controls CBIRF now? Is it still under Marine Corps command?

GEN KRULAK: The Marine Corps has never commanded CBIRF. It's normally the National Security Council who calls them up. We never cared about who got the credit. You worry about who got the credit, we might as well hang it up. It's like the standing joint task force. I said I don't care who commands it. It's what's good for the nation that counts.

DR. CRIST: The Army has tried to duplicate a CBIRF from what I understand.

GEN KRULAK: It was my intent, that as soon as the Army was there, we'd turn CBIRF over to them. The bottom line is CBIRF eats a lot of people that I could use. The Army ought to be doing it. They just didn't.

DR. CRIST: Was there any discussion of turning this into a Joint Chemical Biological Incident Response Force?

GEN KRULAK: No, I was not going to run down that rabbit hole again. I went that way with a

standing joint task force. I wasn't going to try that again.

DR. CRIST: One of the things that I noticed about CBIRF, when they were up here for President Clinton's second inaugural in January 1997, was a tremendous innovation and experimentation with new equipment. It appeared to be inline with your whole philosophy of pushing it to see if it fails because that's exactly what was being done there.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and that was because nobody had worked on the incident portion of chem-bio. There were no classic decontamination for chemical/ biological. This isn't like nuclear. This isn't like getting rid of mustard gas for God's sake. These are for bugs. How do you kill or decon bugs? There was unbelievable experimentation. You're right. Some worked, some didn't. If you look at it, it's a military operation. It's isolation of the battlefield. We took typical Marine tactics and applied them to fighting a different kind of enemy. This enemy is chem/bio.

DR. CRIST: Was there ever any question of using military forces for these sorts of civil issues?

GEN KRULAK: Not for chem/bio. As a matter of fact, we've been the darlings of FEMA and organizations like that as we've gone around and taught other agencies to fight this. We absolutely have found ourselves in difficulty with something such as the drug interdiction along the border where the Marine Corps has been providing Marines and equipment to fight the drug fight along the border. We had the tragedy of the shooting down on the border. We were put on hold. But that, in my mind, never alleviated what I think is the requirement of the military to participate in that type of operation when there's no other option. The oath of office says "I, Charles C. Krulak, do solemnly swear or affirm that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, both foreign and domestic." Drugs are a domestic enemy. If you can stop them, we need to do it. We'd love to say that's the responsibility of the border patrol. Yes, it is. But if they don't have the people or the equipment, do we just let drugs destroy our society? The biggest problem facing the youth of America is drugs. So why wouldn't we use our capability to fight those drugs? That's got me at great odds with the Secretary of Defense, who doesn't believe we ought to do it. Doesn't bother me at all being at odds with him. I believe it's the right thing to do.

DR. CRIST: You stated earlier how you needed to alter boot camp in order to adapt to the new generation, if we wanted to keep producing the same recruit out to boot camp. From this came the Development of the Crucible. Was it looking at society and realizing that we need to make a change if we're going to get the same Marine? Or was it looking at the Marines and saying, we need to do something in boot camp to get them more in line with the way we have traditionally thought of Marines? Was it the output or the input that first caught your eye to make you want to make changes?

GEN KRULAK: We have talked about this already, but it is critical that people understand transformation because transformation as you said was one of the good things that our Corps did in the last four years. Transformation has four parts. Transformation has recruiting, recruit training, cohesion and sustainment. If you go all the way back to the beginning and say what the planning guidance said in chapter one: intent. The two most important things the Marine Corps does for the nation are (1) to make Marines and (2) win battles. The real reason for transformation was the environment of the battle. The chaotic battlefield in the 21st century was going to demand a Marine that could fight and win that battle, the strategic corporal. Transformation was driven by the realization that if the environment was changing on the backside, the backside of the closed process, and you had a different input, you had to do something with the process itself. The kids were Generation X and Generation Next. I've told this story so many times, but let me tell it again.

On 30 June I become the Commandant. 1 July is a Saturday. 2 July is a Sunday. I come to work on the 3d of July, my first working day as a Commandant. There was no one there but me and my driver. There was no one there because it was a long weekend. That's how eager I was. In fact, we had scheduled a group of psychiatrists and psychologists to come to HQMC. They describe six characteristics of Generation X and Generation Next. The characteristics were they wanted to know the boundaries. They wanted to know the playing field, what was expected of them. The boundaries of their conduct. If they knew the boundaries of their conduct, they would be willing to be held accountable for everything within those boundaries. If you let them get outside the boundaries, they'd pick your pocket. But inside the boundary, they want to be held accountable. Three, they didn't mind being a follower. They'd find the leaders and they'd mirror image what they saw. If

you were a bad leader or a bad role model, you were going to have a bad Marine. Four, they didn't mind being a follower as long as they could be a leader. Five, they wanted to be part of something easily recognizable by their peers that was challenging and that was something of value, not necessarily monetarily of value, but of value in self-esteem and self-respect. Six, they believed in something called faith. They didn't know it was faith, but it was there nonetheless. As a result, they were joining gangs. They were the Bloods, the Crips, the Skinheads. They were sororities, fraternities, clicks. What the psychiatrists and psychologists said was we've got to make it tougher. If you want to get to these kids, you've got to make it tougher. You've got to make it challenging. You've got to expect more from them. You can't expect less.

With that in mind, the first part of transformation was recruiting. We raised the standards. DoD standards for a high school graduate is 90 percent, nine out of ten. We said 95 percent. DoD says you drug test them once before they go to boot camp. We do it three times. We strip them down. If they have a tattoo that's gang-related or neo Nazi, they don't become a Marine. We did air with all ads that said anything about we'll give you \$50,000 for an education or we're going to teach you a skill. We basically said if you want to be challenged physically, mentally and morally, join the Marines. You'll be changed and the change will be forever. Then to make it even worse, we extended the length boot camp. To extend boot camp, you have to go to Congress to do that.

I held a breakfast at the home of Commandants and invited all the personnel subcommittees of the HASC and the SASC, briefed them all on what we wanted to do and asked their permission to extend boot camp by ten days. They gave it to us. We put in the Crucible. Not only did we extend boot camp, but we returned 100 hours back to the DI. We put in the Crucible, and made life miserable for the recruits. Everybody said you guys are going to die on the vine. You're never going to be able to recruit. You can't raise the standards. You can't make it tougher. You'll never do it.

As we sit here, we're into the 49th straight month, 48th months, of meeting or exceeding our mission. High school diploma average over those 48 months, almost 97 percent. A phenomenal job, phenomenal job.

The Crucible came from my own experience as a wrestler. The idea that although you are a team, there are times when even as a team the individual

struggles. I wanted every Marine to have some kind of struggle that combined teamwork and individuality. I thought back to the days of being a wrestler, when you go out there and it's a team sport. But sooner or later, they call your weight class. Somebody gets up. In my case, I was 126 pounds. I got up on one side of that circle on the mat. The opposing team's 126-pound guy got up on his side of the circle. A referee came between us, looked at me, looked at the other wrestler, asked the simple question, "Ready to wrestle?" You nod and he blows the whistle and you're at it. I wanted them to experience that. The psychiatrists said it was valuable because we were not building a new value system in Marines. With eighteen year olds, you're not going to build a new value system. What you can do for Generation X/Generation next is to say we're going to give you our values. We're going to give you the core values of our Corps. Those are honor, courage and commitment. We're going to give these to you. We're going to inculcate them into you during recruit training. Then you're going to live them during the Crucible and we're going to hold you accountable after the Crucible. If you maintain our core values of honor, courage and commitment, you will stay a Marine. If you violate them, you will not be a Marine. We have had Marines who have violated them, two star generals down to privates, and they did not remain Marines. We've been true to our vow that you will maintain our core values. We did that with the Crucible.

We then had to find a way to capitalize on the recruiting and recruit training effort. The solution was team integrity, the cohesion concept. Think how great it would be if you could take these kids that you've recruited, take them through boot camp, take them through the Crucible. If you could then put them into units and keep those units together, through the school of infantry, through their formal schools and send them to the Fleet Marine Forces unit to stay together for their entire first enlistment, wouldn't that make a difference? The answer was pretty obvious. Of course, it would. It would make a difference in what we call peer pressure. Normally peer pressure is negative. This would have been very positive peer pressure because they'd been together. They knew what was important. They knew about the core values. If somebody tried to step out of line, their own team would hold them accountable.

By 1 June of 1999, 82% of the MOS's in the Marine Corps were into cohesion. The other 18% percent, you'll just never get it because they're too small. They're electro-optic repair people. You get one or two of those a year. You're not going to

"cohere" them. We now have infantry battalions where the Marines arrive together and they don't break up. The battalions deploy full up with their cohesion Marines. Nobody gets transferred without headquarters Marine Corps authorization. Very important.

That brings us to the fourth element of transformation, which is sustainment. All of this effort has to be sustained in the fleet. We have to have the young corporal sergeant, lieutenant, captain, gunny and first sergeant, major and colonel, all of them on board sustaining. That was very difficult because all of a sudden you started hearing the term, "Oh, he's a Crucible Marine." It's just something different. It began to be the haves and have nots. I went through the Crucible, no, I didn't. You had to get through that, get beyond that. That's not what this is about. It's not whether you're a Crucible or non-Crucible. It was giving Generation X and Generation Next what they need and what they want.

The issue was hold them accountable. Hold them accountable. Don't let them slack off. These kids do not want to play "hug a Marine." They want to be held accountable. The elements of transformation have been an unbelievable success. That's in a nutshell, transformation.

When we stated the Crucible the following people met at MCCDC: the CG, MCCDC, the CG, MCRC, the two MCRD commanders, the Director, T&E, the DC/S M&RA, and the CO, OCS. We said here's what we need to do. We need to standardize the depots. I don't want a Hollywood Marine and a Parris Island Marine. I want both depots to be identical as best you can make them. They weren't. They had many differences, but I want them all the same, because I want one Marine. If you're going to have cohesion and everything, you need to have people who are familiar with what the other guy did, whether he graduated from boot camp in San Diego or Parris Island. I sat down there and said here's what I want. Come back in a month and tell me how you're going to do it. They came back. They described boot camp and they described the Crucible. At the end of their description, I said, either I failed to communicate or you failed to hear me. Chances are I failed to communicate, but you missed the boat. You didn't make it hard enough. You didn't make it long enough. You didn't challenge the recruit enough. Go back there and here's what I want. I want them to move from self-discipline in the 11 weeks of boot camp to selflessness in the Crucible. The only way you're going to get that is to crush them. I said, I want it at least 48 hours. It ended up at 54 hours. I don't want them eating. I don't want them

sleeping. I want them challenged physically. I want them challenged mentally. I want them challenged morally. I want you to stress teamwork over the individual, but at the same time I want each individual to be exhausted. Therefore, you've got to physically crush them. You've got to march them until they drop. I want to see nothing but blisters. I want it to be a gut check. Are there any question? I want you to get doctors in on this. I want you to get psychiatrists in on this. I want you to get nutritionists in on this. I want you to get people who are expert at obstacles in on this. I want you to build the Crucible. They came back a month later and said here it is. I said build it. We gave them the money to do it and they built the Crucible.

Then I told them we had to leave the recruits on the most emotional high possible. I want it to be the state finals. You go out and guess what? You win them. I want their hand raised in the middle of that circle, as the Oklahoma State wrestling champion 4A at 126 pounds! That resulted in the emblem ceremony. We built it. Exactly how it was going to run to include the kind of prayer to give, to include the song to sing, "Proud to be an American", to include how that eagle, globe and anchor is handed out, to include the fact that the drill instructor just doesn't go down and hand it to him/her. They spend time with each individual recruit, giving them the EGA, putting it in their hand, telling them how proud they are, focus on the Marine, talk about the success of making it. Followed by a warrior breakfast. You will feed them steaks. They will come through the Crucible as warriors. Men and women, they are warriors. They will eat a warrior breakfast. They will have steaks, sirloin. They will have eggs. They will have French toast. They will have whatever they want. We'll top it off with ice cream. Then they will go to bed. When they wake up, they'd be shown a video. I'm going to make it. The Commandant's going to make that video. I'm going to personalize it. It is going to be their Commandant talking to them about their moral compass and what I expect of them. Not I as Chuck Krulak, but I as the Commandant, the institution. Here's what we expect of you: To be a breed apart; to hold dear to you, honor, courage and commitment. That's the Crucible. There's going to be a lot of revisionist history about how it came about, but that's how it came about.

DR. CRIST: From General Krulak?

GEN KRULAK: The people who made it happen, God bless them, were Brigadier General Jerry Humble, Brigadier General Garry Parks, and

Brigadier General Jack Klimp. Mark my words, before it's all over, we already know Klimp's a three star. Both Osmond and Parks will wear three stars. They are magnificent officers.

If you haven't ever seen the Crucible, the emblem ceremony is the most emotional thing you'll ever see in the Marine Corps. I've seen it 15 times and I still weep everytime I see it. So do the drill instructors and so do the new Marines. You will see after the emblem ceremony people collapsing. They will hold themselves together until they get that emblem and then they collapse from fatigue. I've seen women stand there and when they march off, their footprints are where filled with blood. I've seen women with the belt suspender straps on their packs literally cut them so badly that their utilities are bloody. The women carry the same pack as the men, march the same distance, go through the same Crucible.

DR. CRIST: One thing that gets overlooked, particularly amongst the critics, is you've added 100 extra hours with the drill instructor.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Everybody said, "Well, maybe you made it soft." I don't know where that came from. First off, on all the quantifiables, it's gotten tougher. They march longer, run more, PT more, drill more, more pugil sticks and all that. We gave 100 hours back to the drill instructor. That's drill instructor time. The drill instructor can take them out and do even more PT, do even more marches, do even more instructing. It's tough.

I scoff at people who say it's easier. My answer to that is, okay, let's go. Go on out there. I'll just let you do the Crucible. Forget the about other 11 weeks, let's just see you do the Crucible.

DR. CRIST: Where do you think that notion came from, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Marines are -- it's never as hard as yesterday. The old Corps was always tougher.

DR. CRIST: Even though the old Corps might have been a week prior to that?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that's right. That's it. That answers the question.

DR. CRIST: In order to fit this in, you had to add an extra week?

GEN KRULAK: Ten days.

DR. CRIST: Ten days for the Crucible. One of the other things after the Crucible last week or the 12th week, the DIs act more as mentors than they are disciplinarians. Why was that done?

GEN KRULAK: Because they become Marines on the hill. At the end of the Crucible, they become Marines. What we were trying to do is show that new Marine the ultimate in leadership. That's John A. Lejeune leadership, teacher to scholar, parent to child. They needed to see that. That's also the week that we bring in the former Marines, the former heroes, the former senior staff NCOs and officers who are now the grandfathers of the Corps. They come in and have breakfast with the new Marines. They bring them into the fold so to speak.

DR. CRIST: The synchronization of cohesion and upcoming deployments etc. must have been a pretty daunting manpower problem?

GEN KRULAK: Unbelievable. We did it as I indicated in order to build the idea of positive peer pressure. We also did it because Marines went up to the top of Mount Surabachi and raised that flag, not because of love of country, but because of love of their fellow Marine. They didn't want to let them down. That love was built over time and that's what I wanted cohesion to do. But as a manpower guy -- I spent a lot of my time in manpower in the Marine Corps -- I know that is an unbelievably hard thing to do. The credit for that goes to the three areas. One of them is recruiting. They had to recruit. They had to make the recruiting numbers. If they didn't, cohesion would not get off the ground.. Two, MP, Manpower Plans (MP), then Manpower Management (MM), two divisions under M&RA, plus, the magnificent support from the schools of infantry and the Fleet Marine Force. All of those together, working hard, made it happen. The Marine Corps owes them all a great debt because I doubt if there's ever been a more daunting manpower task than doing that.

The results from cohesion are remarkable. Disciplinary problems have gone down. The evaluators' comments, like during MCRES, are all positive saying, "these Marines are really good." There's just a lot of good things that have come about.

DR. CRIST: Was there ever a plan, or has it been done, that the FMF unit who's going to receive these Marines would actually send a NCO to go through the Crucible with them?

GEN KRULAK: No. But if it's an FMF unit, say an infantry battalion, when the new Marines go through their final exercise and have a graduation at the school of infantry, the FMF unit literally go out, pick them up, and drive them back to their headquarters. Normally they have some kind of a cookout, bring the families in if their family's are there, give them their assignment, and their mentor. It's a tremendous leadership effort that goes on and makes the new Marine feel very much at home and stresses very positively all the things that are important.

DR. CRIST: It also stresses a theme that you've had on almost everything we've discussed in your commandancy of emphasizing small leadership development.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: First, I'd like to get on the record a couple of definitions that are tied to the Krulak commandancy and your view of future conflict, and were important to the changes you made in the Marine Corps. You'd mentioned last session about the three-block war. What is the three-block war, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, the three-block war is the concept that in a moment in time a Marine will find himself with a young child in their hands and wrap that child in swaddling clothes, feed it, care for it and it's called "humanitarian assistance." We do that all the time. We did it in Mogadishu, we're doing it in Kosovo. At the next moment in time, that same Marine will be placed in the position where he's got his hands out stretched, he's got a weapon with him, and he's keeping two warring factions apart, and it's called "peacekeeping." We're doing that right now in Kosovo. At the third moment in time you'll find that same Marine involved in mid-intensity, highly lethal combat. The difference between today, the 20th/21st century conflict, and before that is that in today's environment those three periods will take place within 24 hours and within three city blocks and it's going to be seamless.

The best example I can give is the Marine who a week ago was at Camp Hope in Albania taking care of refugees. The next moment that same Marine is in Kosovo at a roadblock trying to keep the peace between the Serbs and the KLA. The next moment, that same marine is taking sniper fire from a bunch of snipers up in a building. Now, you say well, sniper fire, that's not mid-intensity conflict. Well, it may not be mid-intensity to

Chuck Krulak, but let me tell you something, to the kid that's getting fired at and returning fire, it's mid-intensity conflict. He's gone from humanitarian assistance to combat in a very short period of time, and, more importantly, he will move back and forth, back and forth between these various states of conflict. It really takes a special kind of Marine to be able to do that. We won't get into it now, but when you say winning battles, and making Marines to win those battles, how do you make the Marine to win those battles? How do you do that? And so that's the three-block war.¹

DR. CRIST: And it puts a much greater strain on small unit leadership?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. That's the strategic corporal.

DR. CRIST: What is a strategic corporal?

GEN KRULAK: The strategic corporal is the person that's going to fight the three-block war, and he's going to fight it having to understand how to fight that battle across the entire spectrum of conflict. He will have CNN on his right shoulder, and every time he takes an action it could in fact have strategic implications. In World War II, the Marine crossing the beach on Iwo Jima had absolutely no strategic impact at all on the way the war was to be fought. He was at the tactical level, slugging it out. Probably the only time in World War II, Korea, or maybe even Vietnam -- that there was any kind of tactical relationship to the strategic-level war was the raising of the flag on Mount Suribachi. That became an icon for the war effort. Those Marines and that sailor became, at the tactical level, something very important for the nation at the strategic level.

Well, in the three-block war, that young Marine's decisions, because he's got CNN over his right shoulder, are going to absolutely have strategic implications. If you think back to Mogadishu and you see a bunch of tribesmen moving towards you and interspersed amongst the tribesmen are women and children and the tribesmen are armed, the question is does that corporal tell his fire team to start shooting or not? He's got a tough decision to make and it's got to be a split-second one. He's got to make the right one because it's going to have strategic

¹ See also Gen Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 3 January 1999, pp 18-22.

implications. And that's what's meant by the strategic corporal.

DR. CRIST: One thing I would like to hit on, sir, is aviation. There were a lot of aviation issues during your commandancy, the issues of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-18 E/F. I wonder if you could touch on what you thought needed to be done vis-a-vis aviation and what you pushed for as Commandant?

GEN KRULAK: I think we've already talked about my initial standing with the aviation, didn't we?

DR. CRIST: Yes, you did. You said you were viewed with suspicion?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, which caused some difficulty as we dealt with some issues. But I think that very quickly the aviation community began to realize that I was not trying to do away with aviation. I really believe in my heart and soul that the A in MAGTF is critical. If we took the A out of MAGTF, you don't have a Marine Air Ground Task Force. You don't have a Marine Corps. The first issue was the issue of whether you buy the F-18E/F. I think everybody realizes we decided we weren't going to buy the E/F. We decided that because we felt that it would jeopardize the Joint Strike Fighter, the V/STOL variant. If you ever lost that, then in my opinion, you were very close to losing fixed wing aviation.

That may sound strange, but the thought process is this: the value of Marine aviation, the thing that makes us unique in the capability side is V/STOL. The ability to get close up behind the attacking units, have a very rapid response, and be able to generate more sorties than anybody else. If you all of a sudden, said, well, we really don't need the joint strike fighter, the V/STOL variant, we're going to go with the E/F, then your AV-8s start to leave the inventory. By the year 2008, 2010, you are an all FA-18 E/F force which is nothing different than what the Navy has or what the Air Force has. You are just like them. You are very vulnerable.

My point to my aviators was, whether you like it or not, the carrier is key to our existence, your existence as an air arm. If you lose that AV-8 you're finished, because sometime around the year 2008, when your AV-8s are basically leaving the inventory, you've got nothing to follow along. You become just the third Air Force.

You need the STOVL and you need it to be stealthy. The E/F has no stealth and to fly in the first strikes you need to have stealth. A CinC will not use non-stealthy aircraft. If we go with the E/F,

we get nothing of value. It does not have V/STOL capability, no expeditionary airfield capability, no rapid turnaround, and no stealth. We have nothing and we risk losing our fixed wing aircraft! It didn't take too long for them to understand it. They have been supportive from that point on. This did not make the Navy happy. Nor did it make the Secretary of the Navy happy because both of them wanted us to buy the F-18E/F. I said "No." I'm still glad I did.

DR. CRIST: The Marine Corps is not planning to buy the E/F. As it turns out from the headlines of July 1999, the Air Force may not get their F-22.

GEN KRULAK: That's very interesting to me. I wouldn't have bought a whole bunch of them, but I would have certainly kept the line going to get all the technology I could out of that aircraft. Again, I think buying E/F is a mistake. The E/F is nothing more than a bridge to the future. The F22 is a leap to the future. The Joint Strike Fighter's a leap to the future. I believe that that's what we ought to be doing, not taking bridges to the future. The E/F is nothing more than a C/D version that's got longer legs.

DR. CRIST: Why is the Navy so high on it?

GEN KRULAK: Because they lost every other aircraft they've tried to come up with, the last one being the A-12 and they needed a victory. They needed to get an aircraft, so that was it.

DR. CRIST: The procurement for the joint strike fighter, wasn't that a uniquely streamlined process? It was described to me that they were able to take pieces of technology from the different companies which the DoD's already paid for and put it together in the JSF streamline the procurement process and R&D.

GEN KRULAK: There's been a lot of money put into the R&D. The issue of R&D is that we've got two aircraft and we are basically going to down to one. The propulsion system for the V/STOL variant are different. One of them is a fan type. One of them is a nozzle directed engine. We're pushing to keep testing the two systems and secondly, keep testing two engines. Don't just go to one company and give them the contract. We need two companies building those engines. If you have just one manufacturer of an engine and it goes down, the whole shooting match goes down. We've discovered that with the Harrier and Rolls Royce. We are having trouble with the Rolls Royce engine.

Every time you have trouble, you have to red stripe
the whole fleet. It's just unsat.

SESSION XVI

Touchstone of Values: Morality and Ethics

Two touchstones . . . Decline in ethical behavior within society and the Corps . . . Accountability . . . Tailhook and sexual harassment . . . Adultery . . . Fighting Secretary Cohen and a change in the UCMJ . . . Removing pornography from the Exchanges . . . President Clinton . . . Taking an oath to the Constitution . . . "Blood pinning" incident . . . MajGen Ryan's e-mails . . . Holding senior officers accountable . . . Value Cards.

DR CRIST: The date is 22 July 1999. Sir, I wanted to go into something you addressed in the CPG and which was certainly a major theme to your commandancy. That's moral and ethical issues. You stated in the CPG, "I do not intend for honor, courage and commitment to be just words. I expect them to frame the way that we live and act as Marines." This issue was a major theme not only in your personal correspondence, but also a key element to many of your initiatives, the Crucible, core values card, and how you handled some of the crisis's such as the rape in Okinawa, which we covered earlier.

GEN KRULAK: I think that people like to attribute this view to my religion. Jokes about Krulak and the "Baptist landing team" instead of a battalion landing team were made from when I was a lieutenant colonel on up to where we are today. I think that really does an injustice to the Corps and to me because the reality was that my faith was not driving this. What was driving this issue goes back to what I call the touchstones that are central to our core. The touchstone of valor, which is what most Marines think about it. It's our warfighting ethos. It's what got us through the wheat fields at Belleau Wood, which took our Marines to the top of Suribachi, which allowed us to fight our way out of the Chosin Reservoir and to cross through the minefields into Kuwait. That's the touchstone of valor.

But we have this other touchstone and that touchstone is the touchstone of values. It's this concept that is central in making Marines and winning battles. The American people look to us as the keepers of the flame so to speak for standards. So much so that when you talk about a Marine, you're really talking about a man or woman of character or a man or woman of integrity. I believed, just like we talked about Generation X and Generation Next, that if we didn't start focusing back on this touchstone, it would get away from us.

We had seen chinks in our armor already. Whether it was the Okinawa rape case or blood pinning, we were seeing chinks in the armor. We were seeing chinks in the armor with the general officer corps. When I was at MCCDC, I saw General Mundy wrestling with some issues with the general officers. We saw it with Tailhook. All of these things were attacking the very ethos of who we are as Marines. Marines are men and women of character. What I set out to do was bring back into focus the twin touchstones. We said, look, one of our concerns is the zero defect mentality. What we're going to say is that Marines can make all the mistakes in the world so long as they don't involve moral turpitude. If it's a moral turpitude issue we don't need you. There's no need to keep a Marine who can't keep his/her word. Whether it our word in lying, cheating or stealing. We were just not going to put up with it.

What happened was the number of reported cases of moral turpitude, adultery, sexual harassment, stealing, cheating, went up dramatically. When I came in as CMC, I think there were 58 cases a year that were reported. It went up to almost 200 a year. Then slowly but surely came back down. This spike included officer misconduct. It just wasn't being reported previously. It wasn't being considered a big issue. Now I think people realize that part of why we're relevant, part of why we're important to America is because of our high standards and holding to our standards.

That's why I'm concerned whenever I read in the paper something that says we're going to do away with zero defects. The new Commandant has written that several times. I think that General Gray, General Mundy, General Krulak, and every other Commandant has tried to get away from the zero defects mentality. At the same time, we can't walk away from the concept that there are certain values and standards that the Marine Corps expects of their officers and enlisted. If they don't meet

them, they're going to go. Zero defects is not all bad . . . some things must *never* be tolerated! If we ever move away from those high standards, we will not last as a Corps.

DR CRIST: I went back and looked at some comments made by earlier Commandants and almost everyone emphasized, to some to degree, as you the importance of moral characteristics-- in fact, the earliest one is from General Shepherd in 1921--where he's talked about how integrity is the key to what we as Marines do.

GEN KRULAK: I did not see that I was doing anything new. What I think was new was the accountability aspect. For the first time in a while, we were walking our talk. It didn't make any difference whether you were a general or a private. If you violated the touchstone of values, you weren't long with the Marine Corps. We saw that happening in promotions. We saw that happening up and down the ranks. If somebody did something that violated our core values, they'd better seek employment elsewhere.

DR CRIST: Your commandancy was in the post Tailhook environment. I noticed that you emphasized a number of times in your messages, your ALMARs and also in private e-mails, a zero tolerance for sexual harassment. In fact, in one e-mail, 1 January 1997, you wrote to General Richard, "Marines get negative information about females in recruit training. That transformation needs to get at this type of macho talk." Could you comment on this?

GEN KRULAK: No matter what people think happened at Tailhook, the reality is that commissioned officers in the naval service went way beyond the bounds of what is expected in the actions of a commissioned officer. I don't care whether people say, it was going on like this before. That doesn't make it right. Most people will say that Tailhook '91 is probably as bad as it's ever happened. It was a disgrace. Some very, very fine Marines ended up losing their careers as a result of Tailhook. Some of them were dear friends of mine. They are no longer in the Marine Corps as a result of their participation in Tailhook. A lot of press has been written about Tailhook and about how, it wasn't that bad. Let me tell you, if you read the investigation like I did, if you talk to the people involved like I did, it was bad. Because it was bad, I wanted to do something about it and the way to do it was by treating every Marine, male or female, with respect and dignity. Sexual harassment is all

an issue of respect and dignity. It's how you treat your fellow Marine. I was saying we have to start treating people, whether male or female, with respect and great dignity.

DR CRIST: A lot of the issues, particularly as far as misconduct, officer misconduct, seem to be with aviators. That's the perception, having gone through your papers. There's always been a perception that aviators are bit more rowdy. Did you find that there was more of a problem in the aviation community with this or no?

GEN KRULAK: No, I didn't. I found that the largest percentage problem was within the warrant officers, for a lot of reasons: How we pick our warrant officers, where they come from, an transition they've got to make. It's very difficult. Early on I stopped looking at officers as aviators or non-aviators. I looked at them as officers. Every two weeks, I got what we called the black book. It was a disciplinary report that was a three- or four-inch thick binder with each officer case and where they stood and how many days they've been running. The largest single offense was adultery, followed quickly by some kind of sexual harassment. The problems do continue to exist and they did exist and we need to get a handle on them.

DR CRIST: Adultery was a big issue across the Department of Defense in the 1990s. The Kelly Flynn case brought it to the public forefront. From what I can tell, the new DoD regulations that went into affect have basically adopted the Marine Corps standard.

GEN KRULAK: One of the big, big battles that the Marine Corps fought in the 1998 timeframe was the desire of the Department of Defense to change the Uniform Code of Military Justice regarding adultery, the offense of adultery. They wanted to add a simple sentence. The sentence would read, "Not every act of adultery is punishable under this article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice." That's what they wanted to add! The first hint of this change came during the general officers symposium when Secretary Cohen first addressed the GOS as the Secretary of Defense. At the end of his address, he started talking about officer misconduct. He got into a discussion of General Joe Ralston, who had been nominated to be the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. His nomination was withdrawn because of his admitting to adultery some 10 to 15 years before. The secretary got up in front of my general officers and in front of my general officers' spouses and

made some comment to the effect that you've got to be careful about how tough we are on adultery, depending on how long ago it was or did it involve the chain of command, or was it just a one night stand. I really got upset.

That evening, we had a social event and I had several women come up to me, general officers' wives, fit to be tied, saying that Cohen's remarks were a disgrace. "Are you telling me it's okay for my husband to go out and have a one night stand so long as the woman isn't in his chain of command?" I said, don't worry, don't worry. This isn't going to happen. That was in, I think, 1997. We didn't hear anything until 1998 when a trial balloon was floated in *The Washington Times* on this change to the regulation. I got a phone call from both *The Washington Post* and *The Washington Times* reporters who said here's what is happening. What do you think? I said, "I think it's a disgrace. I can tell you right now that the Marine Corps will never, never accept that definition under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I may be stepping out of bounds when I say the Marine Corps won't accept it. I won't accept it. If they want to fire me, they can." The Secretary of Defense was on a trip, so I had my counselor go down and talk to Judy A. Miller, the DoD counselor, and say "General Krulak's never going to buy off on this." Because of my comments to *The Washington Post* and *The Washington Times*, it became a front page issue. They had a service chief at odds with the Secretary of Defense. This was picked up by Senator Byrd of West Virginia. He went onto the Senate floor and in a speech took Cohen and the Department of Defense to task, basically saying why would you ever lower the standards for adultery? He ended up his floor speech by saying I salute the Marine Corps. God Bless the Marine Corps for taking a stand.

The next thing you knew, Secretary Cohen was saying, "Hey, we never were going to do this. I don't know how that got out. I never approved that . . .," dah, dah, dah, dah. He was very angry with me, very angry with me. I went down to see the DepSecDef, John J. Hamre. I said, "John, let me tell you something, I don't want the Secretary to be mad at me. But the reality is, this was a suggestion by the Secretary. It was going to be the policy. They were going to ask him to sign it. I got called about it. Nobody had asked us about it. Nobody had asked any of the service chiefs about it. You all were just going to do this without notifying us. At that point in time, I got the call, I'm going to tell the truth. I'll never not tell the truth." Hamre said, "I agree with you. I think it's bad too." The bottom line is they then put together a panel under

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Reserve Affairs, Rudy DeLeon and Judy Miller, the counsel. I gave them General Butch Neal, the ACMC to help. The end result was General Neal just kept on pushing them and pushing them, saying, no we're not going to back away from this. The Marine Corps will not back away from this. The end result was they did away with the proposed change and the change they put in was really more restrictive, not less restrictive. So, it was a big win for us, big win.

DR CRIST: Did this change originated with Cohen do you think?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I think Cohen wanted to take a hard look at easing up on adultery.

DR CRIST: You think that was because of Ralston?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, I think he felt that Ralston should have been the Chairman and something that happened ten years ago shouldn't have had an impact on that. The fact that the Marine Corps stood tall on this was a big, big deal. The reality is I had trouble making phone calls for about a week after that with the number of phone calls we were getting from all around the country. My e-mail, I had to cut it off at home because the little beep every time you get mail was driving us crazy at night. We were getting thousands of e-mails, letters, you name it, and phone calls from Americans all over the country saying, "Good on you, don't relax, don't relax." Once again, this idea that there are a great number of people out in the United States who really do respect the Marine Corps for what they're doing.

The adultery fight was followed in close order by the fight on pornography in the PX. As you know, the Congress of the United States passed a law that said there would be no pornography in the PX's. When that law was signed, I called up MWR, and I said "get all the Penthouse, Playboy, all the pornography off of the shelves now. You've got 24 hours to get rid of it." Penthouse heard that I was doing it and sued us. They called the law unconstitutional. I had Peter Murphy go down to Judy Miller and say, "We have a suit, an injunction, we have to fight this, we have to go to court over this." Judy Miller said, "You've got to be kidding me? You can't win it." We said what do you mean we can't win it? We have Congress. We have a law. Judy Miller said, "This is a first amendment right. You can't win this." Peter Murphy came back and said to me, "I don't think you can win this, neither does Judy Miller. At that point in time, it

became a question of do we walk our talk? Do we send a signal to the Marine Corps that the Marine Corps is serious about this? Even if we lose, at least we've walked our talk.

I had Peter Murphy go back down to Judy Miller and say, look, we really want to do this and here's why. She said, "Well, there's no way we can win, but if you're willing to give us a couple of lawyers to help, we'll go to the circuit court." We took it to the circuit court and won in the circuit court. Most of all couldn't believe it. I get back on the phone to MWR get that pornography off the shelves. Boom, another injunction. This time to go to the Supreme Court of the United States of America. We go back down to Judy Miller. We said, "Judy, we need to go after this." This time she says, "You're not going to win in the Supreme Court. Absolutely no way we're going to win in the Supreme Court." But by then, she knew we were doing the right thing. She said "Let us have your two lawyers again and we'll do it." It goes up. The Supreme Court refuses to hear the case, upholds the lower court decision and we take all the porno off the magazine shelves at the PX. Let's think about that. Once again, this is the Marine Corps. Everybody else had rolled over. Everybody. To include the Department of Defense. The Marine Corps said we're going to take them on. We took them on in the lower court. We were prepared to go to the Supreme Court. Our argument in the Supreme Court was such that they didn't even hear the case. We're now with all that porn off of our shelves.

There was a segment, a percentage of the Marine Corps who was really upset about that, saying, what do you mean we can't read sex books? We can go die for our country, but we can't read sex books. They're missing the whole point. Again, this isn't the Baptist landing team issue. This is an issue of the Constitution. The Congress had made a law. The Constitution gives them the authority to do that. The law is a legal law. Obey the law. It has nothing to do with the Baptist landing team. It had everything to do with support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. So, yes, we've taken a few stands.

DR CRIST: You mentioned the adultery issue and this whole issue of moral and ethics. It must have been quite the challenge for you considering what happened with the President, who was impeached over an adulterous affair and trying to cover it up. You heard rumblings of this in the press that, well, the President's doing this, yet, it's against the UCMJ.

GEN KRULAK: It was never hard for me. There were people who said, the Commandant's going to retire over this. That was never an issue with me. It was very simple and I explained it to my Marines. We took an oath to the Constitution, not to a person. Our oath is to the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution represents the people. The people are the strength of the Constitution. The people elect the Congress. The Congress wrote the Constitution. Out of the Constitution came the Articles of War. Out of the Articles of War came the Uniform Code of Military Justice. If you can't live with military justice, how can you live with the Constitution? You say so help me God. I'm going to support and defend so help me God. You can't pick and choose what part of the Constitution you're going to support and defend. If you cannot agree with what came out of the Constitution, then you have only one option. You quit. I could never see how you could violate that oath by complaining about the President. He's just an individual. After all, you didn't say I swear to and support and defend the President or the Commander in Chief. None of that.

I think that President Clinton termed his own conduct the way I would. The President's words were, "It was despicable." Well, by God, it was despicable. What was beautiful though is that it showed -- and what the American people ought to be very proud of and I kept on telling my Marines they ought to be proud of -- it showed our Constitution in action. Think about it. You had one member of the government, the Executive Branch, do something bad. You had the Legislative Branch say we think you did something bad, so we're going to investigate it. They did an investigation. Out of that investigation, they came up with what you and I would call a grand jury indictment. It's called impeachment. They voted. They being the House of Representatives, voted the Articles of Impeachment. It went over to the Senate. The Judicial Branch comes into the Senate in the form of -- the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to oversee the jury. All of this taking place, the impeachment, the Supreme Court Justice coming over, the jury taking place. What happened? Was there rioting in the streets? No. Was there concern for the democratic way of government? No. This government we have, this unbelievable way of life, this unbelievable Constitution, all providing stability to our. No other country in the world could do this but America. Why? Because of the strength of our Constitution. In my opinion, if you started speaking out against the President and saying bad things, you were violating the very

instrument that gives such strength to this nation. I wasn't going to do it and I wasn't going to tolerate our Marines doing it.

DR CRIST: That became a bit of an issue. Major Shane Sellers, wrote an article in the *Navy Times* very critical about the President. There was another major who wrote something similar.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We convened investigations on them for that very reason. You can't just talk the talk. You've got to walk it. When you have somebody violate the law, you have to do something about it. It's called responsibility and with responsibility comes accountability. The punishment could and should fit the crime. In these cases neither one of them were thrown out of the Marine Corps, although, Sellers eventually left. The bottom line is accountability.

DR CRIST: From a personal standpoint, it must have been quite a leadership challenge for you during this period because although a lot of people didn't comment on it, there's no doubt I think if you took a poll, most of the Marine Corps officers were not big fans of President Clinton, particularly after what he was impeached for. Was it a big challenge for you as the Commandant?

GEN KRULAK: It wasn't that big a challenge. I asked the Assistant Commandant to put out an e-mail and he did. I went around the Marine Corps. I talked about this at everyplace I went in the Marine Corps. I said let me tell you where I come down. I explained to them about the Constitution and their oath. How do you pick and choose? You just can't do that. I said this isn't about a person. You have to divorce yourself from the person. The person is not who you swore allegiance too.

DR CRIST: One other major issue that ties into this topic broke in early February, 1997, was the blood winging incident, which was -- in fact, the 1991 incident that was recorded on VCR and ABC broke it on "20/20." While it happened six years earlier, the ramifications of it were on your watch. What do you recall about that blood pinning/winging incident?

GEN KRULAK: It was a real, real tough time for me and for the Marine Corps. It was a tough time for me because a lot of the Marine Corps didn't understand why I got so angry. It was difficult, because I didn't feel like I had a whole lot of support up and down the chain because people thought, well, this has been going on for years. I

tried to tell them, no, we haven't done it for years. The first type of that kind of macho hazing probably started in 1965, '66, '67 when we started getting the "mental group four" recruits and you couldn't get them to do anything. You couldn't instruct them. You couldn't motivate them. People started using other methods.

I think I shared with you the story that my father commanded a parachute battalion in World War II. He got a phone call. I think there were only about five people that were still alive in his parachute battalion. He called me the night this played. He said, "Chuck I just got a phone call from five members of my battalion. All of them had seen this thing on T.V. and were flabbergasted and just could not understand." "When did Marine parachuters start beating Marine parachuters?" It was a disgrace." It was interesting that the old Corps recognized how dangerous this was, but the new Corps had trouble.

On 4 February of 1997, I sent an open letter to the Corps. In it I stated that this has been a tough couple of days for all of us. It's not over. There will be more to come. My concern, like yours is for the institution. I appreciate the calls and messages regarding my own personal well being. Believe me, I'm in the fight. This issue of how we as Marines treat each other has been the core of our efforts in the area of making Marines. Each of us has committed to the concept that there is no room for treating Marines in any manner other than with respect and dignity. We've been banging on that since 1 July 1995. My predecessor hit it hard before his departure. The fact that this event, the "winging," took place in September of 1991 meant nothing to the American people. The fact that it involved the Marine Corps meant everything. They expected us to set the highest of standards and to maintain those standards, and to hold accountable those who do not. Toward the end of that open letter, I said, "These actions are anathema to our core values of honor, courage, and commitment, and those who cannot live these basic moral tenets do not deserve to wear the Eagle, Globe and Anchor. I will not allow them to tarnish the sacred trust between you and one of America's most dependable steadfast institutions . . . the United States Marine Corps."¹

My head is not in the sand. I cannot say that hazing has ceased in the Marine Corps. I do believe that the atrocities shown on the videotape

¹ General Charles C. Krulak, "An Open Letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Mothers and Fathers of America, dated 4 February 1997. See also the *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 1997) pp.18-19.

are no longer happening, but my head is not in the sand. We know our rules and understand the Marine Corps policy on hazing. We know that our Marines understand that it is not tolerated. We also know that there are Marines who are willing to disregard that policy because of some misguided sense of tradition or machoness. Those Marines must either change their thinking or leave the Corps. There is no gray area. The treatment of Marines in any manner, other than with dignity or respect, sexual harassment, discrimination, hazing will not be tolerated. Those who violate this basic foundation of our Corps must be held accountable, no matter what the rank, no matter how much the time in, no matter how good they are in military skills. Do I think we're nearing the point when the Corps will quickly disappear? No. Do I think that the publicity we receive from situations such as this and others in the recent past draw on reservoir of good faith that our countrymen and women place in us? Yes. They will continue to support us as long as they see us as an institution that is trying to set and meet what my father called high almost spiritual standards. As my father stated in his famous quote: "We exist today--We flourish today—not because of what we know we are, or what we know we can do, but because of what the grassroots of our country believes we are and believes we can do."¹

We are doing that now. We must continue to do that. This is what transformation is all about. This is what cohesion is all about. This is what winning battles is all about. We must not lose sight of where we are going. We all need to articulate how making Marines and winning battles fits into the concept of a Corps of Marines that belongs to the American people. 1991 is not 1997. We have new Marines, new NCOs, new staff NCOs, new commanders and new commanding generals. We have a Corps that is moving out at flank speed towards the 21st century with a well-defined goal in sight. I have total faith in my officers and the Marine Corps under their charge. We just need to reiterate to all Marines that our standards are unwavering and that we will not bend to the actions of a few.

The end result of that was bringing an Article 32 against everybody involved in blood winging and holding them accountable. Every time another incident came up, hold those involved accountable. Marines left the Corps because of it. People had trouble understanding why I was upset.

¹ Victor H. Krulak, Lieutenant General USMC (Ret.), *First to Fight: An Inside view of the Marine Corps* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984) p. xiv.

If you read the quote, "we exist today, we flourish today," and you understand how important standards are in the Marine Corps, you'll understand how blood winging could have been a disaster. It was bad enough. But it could have been really bad. By getting out in front of, by going on T.V., by expressing disgust, the American people stuck with their Corps.

DR CRIST: There was no long-term ramification?

GEN KRULAK: No. It could have been a disaster. Like the rape. We stood up to the media. We told it like it was. We opened up all this for a look by the American people and by being open and honest, they realized that we were going to keep our standards.

DR CRIST: How would you respond to those who were not upset about the blood winging? Those who countered that for the last 30 years, there was an understanding that when you got your gold jump wings you get blood wing too. Everybody's done it up to at least the last 30 years. There's colonels and generals walking around--

GEN KRULAK: If you're given evidence of a crime and you turn your back on that crime, you're as guilty as anybody else. Those tapes were hard evidence, not of blood winging, but of unbelievable abuse. When that tape came out, it was right before one of my three-star off sites. I took that tape in and made every one of my three-star generals watch the full thing. Most of them had just seen what was on "Nightline." I made them watch the whole thing. I made them watch the kids being forced to drink alcohol until they threw up all over themselves, saw them getting beat with coat hangars. It was a disgrace. I said, "So this is okay?" This is a blood winging? This is getting my jump wings? This is macho? No, this is abuse. This is assault and battery. This is assault consummated by battery. Don't tell me that this is just macho man stuff. They got the picture.

DR CRIST: There was an interesting exchange of e-mails in your 1997 correspondence with Major General Michael D. Ryan. While he agreed with your comments on ethics, morality and, he believed it was coming out like preaching and you needed to talk about leadership and not ethics. It was an interesting series of e-mails. What are your comments on Gen Ryan's views?

GEN KRULAK: When I got an e-mail about that, and I got plenty of them about a lot of things, it

always made me feel good. I was trying to open up that kind of discussion with my general officers. They, along with their Commandant, are the corporate body of the Marine Corps. You have to have a free wheeling dialogue. It can't be, "the Commandant says and therefore" it just doesn't work that way. Mike Ryan was giving me a caution that whether I liked it or not, I was coming across as, the a preacher. I think I went back and agreed with him on that, but finished by saying that if you aren't up front about what the issue is then you water it down. Sooner or later, people need to understand that what we're talking about is adultery. What we're talking about is moral turpitude. Whether you put it in terms of ethics or whether you call that leadership, I'm not sure. Probably the answer is in between.

General Ryan was very helpful in "telling the Emperor he didn't wear any pants." General Ryan and I eventually came to agree to disagree on a lot of subjects. His view of these hard issues, the moral issues, the touchstone of values, was a little bit different than mine. I think he came to recognize that and he eventually retired as a two star. He didn't have to retire. He just decided to retire. One of the reasons was that he felt that he and I were not necessarily on the same sheet of music all the time. I had a great deal of respect for him. And I think he respected me. It's just that we didn't see eye-to-eye on these hard moral issues.

Dr Crist: At the time that the values card first came in, people were arguing the same thing. It's leadership; it's not this ethics business. But if you look through the leadership, principles and traits which every Marine has learned at OCS for years and years, I can't think of a single one that's not essentially and ethical or moral based value and the same as the values card.

GEN KRULAK: The point is people kept wanting to attribute it to Chuck Krulak. But like you said earlier, every Commandant we've had has understood how important values and standards are. What I think had happened was over a period of time, we had just taken it for granted when all of a sudden the world had changed. Woodstock had come and gone.

DR CRIST: There needed to be some tightening and holding onto the standards that exist?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's right.

DR CRIST: Another general, this is a reserve general by the name of [Larry S.] Taylor, went far

beyond General Ryan's. In some emails he had written, it appeared as though he openly challenging what you were saying and doing. Is that a correct interpretation?

GEN KRULAK: General Taylor had sent an e-mail in which he talked about adultery and the moral standard. In it, he basically stated that he himself was not married and saw as one of his goals to go out and screw every woman he could. This issue of married or not really didn't play in the ball game. It went even further on blood winging and hazing. He thought it was okay. Very disturbing to me.

Like I did with other generals, when I had something that was really at odds with where I wanted the Corps to go, I got hold of Peter Murphy. Peter Murphy looked at the e-mail, gave me some talking points on the legality of what was written. I then had a request for retirement typed up for General Taylor. Then summoned General Taylor up. Brought him in, sat him down on my right hand side, had Peter Murphy on the left. I said, okay, here's what you wrote. Here is Making Marines and Winning Battles. Here's the Corps standards. I can't have one of my generals going around writing e-mails about doing what you're doing. Either sign this request for retirement or tell me that you are going to live by the values and the standards that are inherent in Making Marines and Winning Battles and that famous quote from my father. He was taken aback. His jaw bounced off the table. He tried to make some excuses. I said, "Look, all I need to know is are these sentences accurate? Is it your goal to go 'screw' every woman you can possibly screw?" Is it true that you believe that blood winging is okay. That assault and battery is okay?" He basically could not convince me that he did not believe that. We had a meeting of the minds and he retired from the Marine Corps. It's called accountability.

DR CRIST: Be it PFC or a general officer?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. That's right. There were more than one.

DR CRIST: Any others for the record, sir?

GEN KRULAK: There was a general by the name of Barnes who was the commanding general of the 2d Force Service Support Group and then went on to be the commanding general of Marine Corps Logistic Base, Albany. He was selected for two stars by the Selection Board. As he was selected for two stars and his name was moving forward, we had two investigations running. One investigation

had to do with abuse of power at 2nd FSSG, having to do with financial matters. Then an investigation on accusations of sexual harassment at Albany. Although both investigations proved non-judicial, in other words, there was nothing there that you would take him to court, in both instances, there was obviously very poor judgment. I called him in, went through the same thing with Peter Murphy and asked him to retire. He lost his promotion to two star. Since he had not fulfilled his total obligation as a one star, he retired as a colonel. Here you had somebody who went from two stars to colonel. Again the issue of accountability, no matter what the rank. He had not acted like an officer and a gentleman.

DR CRIST: Since we're on this distasteful subject, there's one that you have quite a bit of correspondence on and that's Colonel Young, the CO of the 31st MEU who you relieved.

GEN KRULAK: Came to my attention that this new commander had been carrying on cybersex with a married woman. Col Young was also married.

DR CRIST: This was on a government computer?

Gen Krulak: On a government computer. It was very bad. I saw the diagrams. I saw the words. I saw the letters. You cannot even put into words how unprofessional this was. I've been around the Marine Corps for 57 years and there's not much I haven't heard or seen, . . . but this was very bad. He was a new commander. We started hearing word of this through the grapevine. I called out to III MAF and asked, "What was going on?" They said, "Well, Colonel Young's married and he's been having some tough times in his family. His mother-in-law or one of his relatives died and they had to go back for emergency leave. It's just a tough time. His wife has been sick. Besides that, he's a new commander and we've got a real world mission down in Indonesia. They're getting ready to mount out. We just felt that the best thing to do was to go ahead and let him deploy and give him a verbal butt chewing and get on with life." I said, "Let me just kind of paint this picture for you . . ." I went through all the what he'd done, use of government computer, pedophilia, all the stuff that was really sick. I said, "Do you really think that the correct signal we should be sending our precious institution is that a commander should be allowed to get away with actions like that?" I said, "This guy's gone. He's relieved. Oh, by the way, I want to see the two generals in the chain of command

who made the decision to allow him to remain in command." Both generals were recalled to Washington, D.C. I again had Peter Murphy in there and I went over in great detail what was wrong with their judgment. The basic issue was not seeing the forest for the trees. They're down there so interested in doing what was right for the individual, taking care of their Marine, instead of taking one step back and saying okay, what does our action mean for the institution?

DR CRIST: Colonel Young got discovered by a young captain accidentally tripping over it because he didn't delete it off his files off his computer and then reported to a major. You took some concern to make sure there wasn't retribution against these officers.

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. What I sent back was I understand you don't like this, but don't go after these young officers. They did a great job. Everybody who brought this to light did the right thing until it got to the general officer level. Then the general officers basically used poor judgment.

DR CRIST: Did the idea of the values card come from?

GEN KRULAK: The first time we discussed the Crucible, we talked about how we might "laminate our core values on top of the values recruits held prior to joining the Corps. How do we articulate our values in a meaningful way. A Brigadier General by the name of Rusty Blackman and his group at the Marine Corps University came up with the idea of the core value card. I thought it was going to be was a paper card, but they came up with the plastic card. You'd be shocked at how many Marines carry that core values card. It is a big deal to them. When I go out Marines ask me for my coin, the Commandant's coin, I'd say sure. Let me see your core values card. They always have them.

DR CRIST: It was a subtle way of constantly reinforcing it, as everytime you casually looked through your wallet, you pull it out or you see it next to a credit card or whatever. It reinforces it constantly, sometimes when you least expect it.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, it's a very good idea. I credit Rusty Blackman with that.

DR CRIST: Anything on this type of subject, sir?

GEN KRULAK: No. The hardest problem in this area was getting them to understand it had

everything to do with our relevance and very little to do with religion.

DR CRIST: Tom Ricks's book, *Making of the Corps*, which in general was very flattering of the Marine Corps, he touched on that. That was his one thing that he thought was of concern was that religion was getting too mixed up in the Marine Corps.

GEN KRULAK: First off, coming into the commandancy, everyone knew that I was a Christian. Everybody knew I had devotions in the morning, all of that. There was no question. I've never hidden it. I've always been up front that I'm a Christian so that people understand where my thought process is coming from. But I never allowed my own faith to get in between my running of the Marine Corps. I tried to do what was right based on the institution.

DR CRIST: I notice in some of your e-mails early in your commandancy that you specifically pointed out, that you were not forcing this on anyone.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Absolutely.

SESSION XVII

Significant Events: 1996

Out briefing of Promotion Boards . . . Speeches at Annapolis . . . CPG initiatives . . . Unified Commanders' Conferences . . . Closer ties with the Japanese Army . . . Av-8B remanufacture and Harrier Review Panel . . . Non-lethals and the Warfighting Lab . . . Nomination of Carol Mutter for three stars . . . Gulf War syndrome . . . Operation Assured Response . . . A tragedy in Camp Lejeune . . . Suicide of Admiral Boorda . . . Executive off-site . . . An Effy Award for the Marine Corps . . . Operation Joint Endeavor and the Balkans . . . Combating non-EAS attrition . . . Changing the PFT . . . AAV . . . Increasing general officer authorization . . . Induction into the American Academy of Achievement . . . Khobar Towers and General Fogleman's retirement . . . Observations about falling on your sword . . . Selection of new Assistant Commandant . . . Authorizing female drill instructors to wear the "Smoky Bear" covers . . . A new Secretary of Defense . . . Working relationship with William Cohen . . . The Marine Corps as the conscience of the JCS . . . Developing new ties with South America . . . the Riverene training . . . Key Volunteer Program.

DR. CRIST: The date is 27 July 1999. The location continues to be the Washington Navy Yard. I want to move on to 1996, your first full year as Commandant. On 2 January, you listened to the out brief of the colonel selection board. Why did you do this and what did you learn?

GEN KRULAK: It was a non-general officer board. What I tried to do throughout my commandancy was to take the out briefs of all command screening boards and the promotion boards for lieutenant colonels and above. The reason I did that was two-fold: 1) To obviously send the signal that I was interested; 2) it was a place to get feedback. Here we had great officers sitting on the boards, and they could tell me how they saw the health and welfare of the officer corps. They just finished reviewing the books of many of our officers. What did they look like? Tell me how we're doing. Tell me what your contemporaries are thinking. It was just a wonderful, opportunity to get feedback on the officer corps of the Marine Corps from our officer corps. It was very helpful. Each time you got some kind of feedback. Whether it was concern over diversity in the Marine Corps or concern over the inflation of the fitness reports or concern over the microfiche system, their concerns spanned the gambit. The important point was that, as the example of the fitness report, those briefings really clarified in my mind the necessity to do something about the fitness report. . . . What

the board members told me was it didn't make any difference what was on the front of the fitness report. All that counted was the rankings on the back. That's bad. That's not what a Marine Corps needed to be. The fitness report had to tell the story about that Marine, and it should not boil down to a numerical rank on the back of it. So we changed that.

DR. CRIST: You gave a speech at the Naval Academy Leadership Conference on 5 January 1996. The subject was leadership by example and how setting the example can have far reaching consequences. You cited a couple of stories of Staff Sergeant Shaw, Major Henderson and Michael Curtain, who was a former Marine at the federal building in Oklahoma. Do you recall this speech? I thought it was a good example of the type of speeches that you gave where you have historical examples tied in with the theme that you're trying to drive home.

GEN KRULAK: As I mentioned before, I had been talking at the Academy since I was at MCCDC. My first address to the Naval Academy as the Commandant was immediately after becoming the Commandant. Sometime in the July/August timeframe of each year, I would talk to the plebes. I would give a speech I called "Moral Leadership." The speech you're talking about, I did that for four years. I presented at the Leadership Conference, a

conference held annually at the Naval Academy. It's audience was all the senior leaders at each of the service academies, to include the Coast Guard.. I don't recall much about that speech other than it was the first one at that Leadership Conference as Commandant.

I need what I call "a hook." If I'm going to give a speech, I always look for a hook. Normally, it's of an historical nature. I use that historical fact as an attention gainer, but I also use it as a way to drive the lessons home. You'll see this when I retired people or when I promoted people. I normally tied that individual to a historical figure or incident. I don't recall much about that particular speech, other than the three people. It should be fairly obvious their importance and what I was saying about them.

My relationship with the Naval Academy was a love/hate relationship, but it was a good relationship nonetheless. My relationship with the other service academies was very high. Not a year went by that I was not asked or invited to speak at each one of the academies. As a matter of fact, here I am retired, and I've been asked to go out to speak to the leadership conference at the Air Force Academy next spring.

DR. CRIST: On 30 January 1996, you were briefed on the career issue of the 782 gear.

GEN KRULAK: That was a key CPG initiative which involved a lot of fiscal and Congressional effort to implement. The fact of the matter is we did implement it. Congress did help us fund the buy the initial issue and it was very important.

DR. CRIST: Is that another issue where it was going through OLA and the Congress to get the funding?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely.

DR. CRIST: Just for the record, I think it's important to note, this is the first real change to the basic 782 gear in at least three decades.

GEN KRULAK: Well, the tent, shelter half, that we had been using was introduced after World War I!

DR. CRIST: First CinCs conference, unified commanders conference of that year was held 13 January to 1 February. It appears judging from the schedule and the document it's a quarterly type meeting. Anything stand out in your mind specifically about those CinCs conferences? What were the issue of the day?

GEN KRULAK: In a general sense, the CinCs conference, from the first one I had less than two weeks after becoming Commandant, to the very last one, were much ado about nothing. They were an opportunity to stroke the CinCs, to bring them in, let them have a sense of what was going on in Washington, let them give us a sense of what was happening out in their CinCdoms. We had dinner at the White House and an outing with SecDef or the Chairman. Very, very rarely did anything of importance come out of a CinCs' conference. The one thing you can count on in the CinCs conference is that we would do something about the Unified Command Plan, the UCP. I was always mindful of the fact that CinCUSACom wanted to get a hold of our West Coast forces, the desire to have I MEF and Third Fleet report to him. That was the sort of battle that I had to be prepared to fight. But nothing of substance came out of the CinCs conferences until 1998, when we met twice with the President on readiness and those two conferences were important as we drove home the readiness issue. But my view of the CinCs conferences were that they were nothing more than social events where the CinCs got face time with the Secretary of Defense and the President.

DR. CRIST: So nothing constructive?

GEN KRULAK: No, very little.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned USACom trying to get control of I MEF and Third Fleet. What was that about? Was this the Atlantic Command in search of a new post Cold War mission?

GEN KRULAK: USACom had been given the control of all Continental US based forces. They obviously looked out to the West Coast and they saw I MEF and Third Fleet and thought that they should belong to them. CinCPac, of course, was saying, wait a minute, they're my forces and I need them. While at the same time, CinCCent was saying that he needed them too. Because we believed that we should not relinquish our forces to USACom we always sided with CinCPac. As you know today, the Third Fleet and I MEF still belong to CinCPac.

DR. CRIST: This is that problem you talked about earlier, the componency problem where you have dual masters for the same units.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and we just need to be more delicate in the way we set that out to make sure

that we don't torque everybody off. It's going to be tough, but we'll win.

DR. CRIST: On 25 January to 2 February 1996, Exercise Keen Edge '96, took place with the Japanese Self Defense Force. That sounds like it had been based upon your initiatives earlier with them. Did the exercise go well?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, it went very well. As a matter of fact, our relationship with the Japanese Self Defense Force really took a turn for the better. On my third or fourth trip to Japan, instead of being hosted by the Japanese equivalent of the Chief of Naval Operations, I was hosted by the equivalent of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Ground Self - Defense Force. This was a major turning point for the Marine Corps in the Pacific. It was one that we saw throughout the 31st commandancy as we started to make major inroads into the armies of the countries around the world, particularly those countries that didn't have what you and I call a Marine Corps. Countries such as Japan and France are the two that jump out at me. The bottom line is that we became counterparts with the army of those two countries, not with the navy, a major change of events.

DR. CRIST: What's the significance of that?

GEN KRULAK: The significance is that the Japanese Navy does nothing for the Marine Corps. There is no Japanese Marine Corps. We were always being treated like second-class citizens. All of a sudden, we were in the big leagues. As a matter of fact, we were in a bigger league than the U.S. Army. We had more exercises with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force than the U.S. Army did. We certainly had more exercises with the French Army than the US Army. By the way, the same thing is taking place with the Israeli Army now. All of these armed forces want to work with the Marine Corps because they know who we are, what we do and they like what they see.

DR. CRIST: That was a conscious effort from the outset of your commandancy?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely a conscious effort and a focus of what we were doing.

DR. CRIST: In February, sir, the first of 73 remanufacture AV-8s arrived in Cherry Point. This modification was an increased night radar attack capability. Was it a greatly enhanced capability for the AV-8?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. First off, if it was a fight, both as the Commandant and when I was at MCCDC. Nobody in the Navy wanted to remanufacture the AV-8s. It was my belief that if we were going to fly the AV-8 until we received the Joint Strike Fighter, we needed a fully capable aircraft and that it had to be one that the CinCs would want. We really pushed for the night radar attack capability. It required considerable effort to get them built quickly. It was a big deal. We did it. In my first year as Commandant, four aircraft were budgeted. We pushed hard and got that up to 12 aircraft a year. We pushed the issue very hard. When I left, we were still remanufacturing aircraft, but it was almost finished.

DR. CRIST: Was this another issue where you went to Congress for the additional funding?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We had four in the President's Budget (PRESBUD) and we doubled that outside the PRESBUD, getting eight more from the Congress for a total of 12. Once again, the Congress was the savior.

DR. CRIST: From 26 February to 12 March 1996, Exercise Battle Griffin '96 was held in Norway with a brigade size unit, 4,200 Marines, many of them reservists. Why heavy use of Reserves? In your view, was this exercise in Norway still needed considering the world situation? What does the Marine Corps get out of training there?

GEN KRULAK: First off, there were a lot of Reserves in there because we had some real world contingency operations underway that drew away active duty units. But equally if not more important, I saw it as a great opportunity. I had been preaching all along about the Total Force. I said, "Okay, we're going to run this exercise by Reserves and they will do a bang up job." The went up to Fort Drum and received cold weather training. It was commanded by a Reserve general, the CG, II MEF Augmentation Command Element (MACE) Force, and was run by reservists. There were some active duty there, but they fell under the reservists. The bottom line was that they did a magnificent job. It proved to not only the Marine Corps, but to our NATO allies too. I do believe that we should still be drilling in Norway for a lot of reasons, not the least being it's great training for our Marines. It's a great cold weather environment that we don't normally get here in the US. It gives us an opportunity to do joint combined training, joint combined planning, which we don't do very often,

and it just made for a great relationship with the Norwegians.

DR. CRIST: This is one of many exercises that have gone on during your commandancy with the reserves. It must have really been kind of the proof in the pudding of the total force concept?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, they loved it. Reserves were unbelievably pumped and really felt good about themselves. From that exercise on, the idea of Reserve versus regular pretty much went away.

DR. CRIST: In March, sir, Dr. Paul G. Kaminsky, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, appointed you, the CMC, as the executive agent in the DoD for the coordination of non-lethal weapons requirements. What did this tasking require on your part and on the Marine Corps' part? Was it something that easily fit into what you were doing in the War Fighting Lab at the time?

GEN KRULAK: The background on this was the role of the Marine Corps in Somalia. Our commander during that operation was Tony Zinni. His desire was to have some kind of non-lethal capability to help him do his job in Somalia. The bottom line is there was very little in the way of non-lethals, so we started talking it up on the Hill saying, look, this is a capability that we're going to need in the 21st century. The Hill, responded positively with some money that went into the War Fighting Laboratory. They also started beating on DoD saying how come you all aren't getting involved in non-lethals? DoD's response was to look around and ask, who is? There we were, the Marine Corps. So Kaminsky, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, appointed the Marine Corps as the lead and executive agent for non-lethal warfare, non-lethal weapons. Unbelievable achievement for the Marine Corps.

If you look at the future warfighting environment, not just the one the Marine Corps is painting, but most think tanks are predicting, this environment of chaos, the three-block war and all of that, then you look at the task that the Marine Corps has been given. They've been given lead or executive agent in military operations other than war, military operations in urban terrain and the development of non-lethal weapons. Basically Congress and the Department of Defense have given to the smallest service--172,800 person service -- lead or executive agents of the future, the future of warfare. Certainly in the first quarter of

the 21st century. That's a big deal. I don't think many Marines understand the importance of that, but it's the recognition of who we are and what we've done. That is a big deal!

I think the fact that we devoted so much energy towards getting us to the 21st century with the Lab and with thinking at MCCDC and thinking outside the box that in many ways we did steal march on the future and certainly stole march on the other services. Because to this day, they're still sitting there saying how come the Marine Corps is the lead or executive agent on all the concepts for the future that are very important to us.

DR. CRIST: That same month, 6 March, you gave the go ahead for the Harriers to fly again after a five day stand down following two recent crashes. Twenty days later, you called a halt to all non-essential flights after the loss of six other types of aircraft and five crewmen. Then again in October 1996, there would be another safety stand down for the Harriers. This seemed to be a major issue for much 1996--aviation safety. From your view, was it a run of bad luck, something were there systemic problems that needed to be fixed?

GEN KRULAK: Overall, I think it was a run of bad luck, except for the Harrier. I think the Harrier had been a neglected aircraft in the Marine Corps arsenal for years. It didn't have the ability of the F-18 C or D. We were fighting to get the Osprey. The AV-8 was kind of the odd "person" out. As a result, the efforts to upgrade its capability in warfighting as well as its capability in safety was put on the back burner. Out of this came the Harrier Review Panel (HaRP). The HaRP was an outgrowth of all the accidents we had and we established it to get to the heart of problems we were having with the AV-8. The HaRP came up with some great recommendations that have been fully funded in our Program Objective Memorandum. The next Commandant will see an upgraded Harrier and we'll all be much better off transitioning to the STOVL, JSF.

DR. CRIST: What was the problem? What did the Harrier Review Panel recommend?

GEN KRULAK: A number of things. The bottom line is there was no single fix. It's fix is in training of pilots, speeding up the training, more flight hours, more maintenance time, more spares, things along that line.

DR. CRIST: You must have been the hero of the Harrier community?

GEN KRULAK: I could have run for President in the Harrier community! I'm not sure about any other community, but I think they did understand that we were working hard.

DR. CRIST: Your rationale was that's our link to the joint V/STOL . . .

GEN KRULAK: The whole idea was if you don't have the "A" in MAGTF, you don't have a Marine Corps and so aviation is key. What sets us apart from any other service is the ability to do the quick turns that we get out of the Harrier and we needed to get some kind of STOVL strike fighter. The only way to do that was to maintain a STOVL capability until the Joint Strike Fighter arrived. That capability was found in the Harrier.

DR. CRIST: Later in the month on 27 March 1996, Major General Carol A. Mutter was nominated for appointment to rank of lieutenant general to serve as Director, Manpower and Reserve Affairs. I wonder if you could comment on the groundbreaking appointment?

GEN KRULAK: As I indicated, in each of the general officer symposiums, I would take my three stars off for about three hours at breakfast and we would talk about who the next crop of three stars would be. In the symposium before that nomination, when we had our side meeting, Carol Mutter's name came up. She got resounding support from all the three stars present. We would vote on and assign a numerical ranking for each. Carol Mutter came in at number two. That time, number one was Carl Fulford. The number two was Carol Mutter. She ranked before . . . I think the number five person was General James L. Jones, who went onto become the Commandant. General Mutter's nomination was not a political thing. She was voted on by her seniors, who ranked her the number two, two-star in the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: Highly respected amongst the general officers.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. At that time, she was highly respected.

DR. CRIST: There was no pressure by the administration or DACOWITS?

GEN KRULAK: None. They had no idea that we were even doing it. No idea. As a matter of fact, when I went and told Secretary Dalton, he was

shocked that the Marine Corps was going to nominate General Mutter. It turns out we were the first service to nominate a woman to three stars. She wasn't the first to put them on. The Navy beat us to that. But we were the first to nominate.

DR. CRIST: She had a lot of experience at manpower and computerization, which you had mentioned earlier, was needed. Since we're on women in the Corps, on 18 April 1996 the Marine Corps hosted the 45th annual meeting of DACOWITS, a hosting that rotates amongst the services, but since this was their anniversary, it received more notice than others. What do you recall about this conference?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, we made it a big deal. We knew what DACOWITS thought of the Marine Corps, which wasn't very positive and we wanted to change that. We put our best foot forward. I attended as much as I could. The bottom line was throughout my tenure as the Commandant, DACOWITS and the Marine Corps had a mixed relationship. I think they respected us, but they didn't like our stance on many, many things, the biggest one being gender integrated versus gender segregated training. I was kind of the guy they loved to hate. My last speech in front of DACOWITS, just a month or so before retirement, was on transformation. I really hit on gender segregated training, still trying to tell them why it's important that we do training that way.

DR. CRIST: They had a grudging respect for you I suppose?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Earlier that month, 2 April, DoD released the largest study ever on Gulf War Syndrome, which studied over 18,000 deaths and it cost the DoD \$80 million. Throughout your commandancy, Gulf War Syndrome was a major veterans' issue. What was your view on Gulf War Syndrome and the way the DoD handled it?

GEN KRULAK: I think the DoD effort on the Gulf War Syndrome is very similar to the DoD effort on inoculations for anthrax. It was a publicity nightmare. DoD played it too close to the vest on Gulf War Syndrome, waited until they had everything in what they thought was the box. Then they'd run it out and find out that the box had some holes in it. Instead of trying to co-op public opinion, they went up against public opinion and made it very difficult. The bottom line is I think

Bernie Rostker and his people did the best they could do. I don't think they were trying to cover up or anything like that. I think they were inept in the public relations aspect. As a result, they never got beyond the eight ball. I don't think there were bugs that caused the Gulf War Syndrome. I'm not sure what did, but they're going to find out. I just hope they're honest and up front when they do. The impact on the Corps was minimal.

DR. CRIST: On 20 April 1996, Operation Assured Response took place, in which Marines from the 22d MEU secured and evacuated well over 2,000 people out of the Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. One of the many NEOs during your four years. But this is the first one since 1990 in Liberia and it was the beginning of a series of them in Africa.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It was important to us because it came at a great time from the standpoint of articulating the Marine Corps' role in national security. It was in April. It dragged out so we could capitalize on it during our visits on the Hill. It was very well done, very professionally done. I literally went down to Camp Lejeune and met with the 22d MEU when they came back and thanked them for their service. They did a great job for the nation. They did a great job for the Department of State. But in many ways they did a magnificent job for the ability of the Commandant and the senior leadership of the Marine Corps to articulate the relevance of the Corps in the 21st century.

DR. CRIST: If you happen to be in the middle of your testifying before Congress?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: On 2 April, 1996, the CO of the 26th MEU(SOC) presented a post deployment briefing.

Krulak: Yes, to the Headquarters staff and to the Department of the Navy and selected OSD officials. This was the first time that had ever happened. We had them in the Headquarters before but my point was look, we need to educate the Department of the Navy and OSD what these little things called a MEU are really capable. This was a very important one because it was participating in all kinds of things that were happening all over the globe. It blew them away. It was remarkable particularly at the OSD level. From then on, we averaged one MEU debrief a year to OSD just to keep them focused on the MEU capability.

That same day, 2 April, I was briefed on my first mid-year review. That's the opportunity

traditionally for the Fleet Marine Force and the supporting establishment, as well as the Headquarters to identify deficiencies in funding and to request additional money from the Commandant as the Fiscal Director evaluates the fiscal year expenditures to date. We were in deep trouble money wise. So I set a precedent that I held throughout my four years. There would be no mid-year monies available. The Corps should plan to live within the monies allocated to them at the beginning of the FY and to not depend on some windfall in the middle of the year. The intent was to add discipline to the fiscal business of the Marine Corps. What was happening was the FMF would submit their budgets believing that they'd get a windfall at mid-year. They would build a budget that was unrealistic and spend most of their money in the first six months of the fiscal year. Then they would come in at mid-year saying we don't have any money left, we're broke. It would force the Marine Corps to shift monies around and take whatever was left over and give to the FMF and supporting establishment. So we said, here's your money. This is it. You pace yourself because there's not going to be any mid-year supplements. Then at mid-year, I was able to direct mid year funds to those areas that were most critical to the overall health of the Corps.

DR. CRIST: Were you able to target those in the programs that were trying to fund, such as CBIRF for example?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Absolutely. We plussed up, as an example, recruiting every year. We attacked the short fall in monies to put new furniture into the barracks. We used it to build up the infrastructure for command and control at the bases and stations, trying to upgrade them. But what it did was give me more flexibility.

DR. CRIST: Sir, on 16 April you addressed the annual recruiting Course and Speed Conference. What was this?

GEN KRULAK: Again, I wanted to explain to them why I had raised the standards, why we had taken off all the commercials that talked about "\$50,000 for a college education" and "we're going to teach you a skill," just trying to make them understand why we're doing what we're doing.

DR. CRIST: On 10 May 1996, there's a tragic accident down at Camp Lejeune during a night exercise when a CH-46 collided with a AH-1W

Cobra killing 14 Marines. What do you recall of this?

GEN KRULAK: It was a terrible, terrible tragedy. We were involved in a joint and combined exercise. I'm not sure what the name of it was, but it was with the British and the Dutch. I can remember getting called at home and told that we had lost two helicopters and 14 Marines, plus one Army soldier. A Huey Cobra doing close air support and escort duty for the CH-46, at night, ran into the CH-46 and took it out of the air. One of the great stories, which occasionally come out of tragedies like these, was of a young captain by the name of Chuck Johnson. He was the copilot of the CH-46. He was crushed in the crash and they didn't think he was going to live. His parents, who were very strong Christians, had a whole bunch of people praying for this young officer. He pulled through and is flying today.

The death of those Marines added a lot to my cards. When I became the Commandant, I made a 5x8 card for the spouse of each Marine killed in training related accidents. I would use these cards when I called the families and tried to call each family once a month. Unfortunately, most of these were aircraft accidents or mishaps. Sadly, I had to get a large number of new cards as a result of this accident because we lost so many Marines. It was a very tragic time and a very sad time. I was heartened and warmed by the number of fellow members of the military of other services who wrote or called and expressed their regret, but it was a sad time.

DR. CRIST: Just six days later, the CNO, Admiral Boorda, committed suicide at the Washington Navy Yard. What's your recollection of that tragedy?

GEN KRULAK: First off, Admiral Boorda, was a worthy adversary. Admiral Boorda was a short guy like me, a bantam rooster, a great communicator, particularly with his enlisted sailors. They loved him on the Hill. Deep down he was insecure. I am not saying that in a negative way. It's just the way he was. It's a reality of life. I was a friend of Mike Boorda. The evening before this suicide, we participated in the end game of our budget cycle. It was a very successful one. We both worked very hard to not have a fight . . . to keep our two services together. Although money was very tight, we managed to do it. I remember walking out and literally doing a "high five" with Boorda. The next morning, I came in and there was going to be an arrival ceremony thrown by the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense, for a visiting

dignitary. We normally go out on the mall entrance of the Pentagon to have these arrival ceremonies. Mike and I were due to go out there and I saw the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. I said, "How are things going?" He replied, "I've got to go to this arrival ceremony. Mike Boorda had to go home for something." I said, "Okay." I go do what has to be done and I'm back in my office. I get a phone call. The phone call is from Colonel David G. Dotterer, commanding officer of the Marine Barracks. He says, "Sir, there's been a shooting down at the Navy Yard. Admiral Boorda's been shot and they've called for Marines to come down there to help seal the area to get the murderer." He had received this word from the Marine gate guard. So I said, "Okay, send the quick reaction platoon down there ASAP." I ran into Secretary Dalton's office. I said, "Sir, have you heard anything about Admiral Boorda being shot?" He said "No." I said, "I just got a phone call saying he was shot." He said, "No, I haven't heard anything about it." I said, "I'm going to go down to his office and see what they have." I ran into the back office where his MilSec was. He was on the phone and he saw me coming in and he hung up. I said, "Have you got any word that Admiral Boorda's been shot?" He said, "No, I don't know anything about it. As a matter of fact, I was just talking to his senior steward in his quarters. Didn't say anything about it." I said, "We got the word from the gate guard. I've got people going down there to try to seal the area off and the police are on their way." He said, "No way. This can't be happening, but I'll call again just to make sure." As he picked up the phone, another phone rang. He picked that one up and it was the Marine aide to the CNO who said Admiral Boorda was dead. I walked down and told SecNav that he was dead. They couldn't believe it. I then went down and briefed Richard Danzig. Danzig said, "My God, I hope he didn't commit suicide." I said, "I hope so too." The reason he said that was I had briefed him that the Marines who got on the scene said there was nobody around. They couldn't find anybody. The pistol was laying at his feet. Five minutes later in came the counsel, SecNav's counsel, and said "I think we've got a problem." The Undersecretary of the Navy said, "What's that?" He said, "We think he committed suicide." The end result was they didn't find an assailant and it was suicide. We lost a great friend and a superb officer.

A lot of people ask the question why did he commit suicide? I think there were a lot of things that led up to it. The pressure of being a service chief is unbelievable. Until you are service chief, particularly in this day and age, people have no idea how tough it is. It's very tough. Boorda

was an insecure man. He always joked about his height. He used to joke with me about seeing eye-to-eye. But he wasn't joking. I think he regretted not being tall. He regretted not being a Naval Academy graduate. Although he talked with great pride of being "street to fleet" and "deck plate to CNO," I think he felt that he could never really relate to a lot of the other admirals because he didn't have the ring. Finally there was the whole controversy over his ribbons raised by *Newseek*. Unless you know Mike Boorda, you wouldn't understand why that would be such an important thing to him. But he was going to be embarrassed in front of the only people he really cared about and that was his sailors. He believed he was going to be shown, in his mind to be a farce. He was insecure and that would have killed him. Then, on the same day, or maybe the day before, the *Navy Times* printed an unsigned letter that took Boorda to the cleaners saying you aren't liked, people don't like you, get out, etc. All of that came together. He knew that *Newsweek* magazine was going to publish an article, destroy him insofar as his relationship to his precious sailors. That was it. He killed himself.

DR. CRIST: Adding to the pressure, and, that *Navy Times* article alluded to it, there was a minor revolt against him by his own admirals, particularly amongst retired admirals. I think James Web had given an unflattering speech about what Boorda was doing at the Naval Academy that created a lot of controversy. Did you see any of that, any of those internal workings within the Navy that might have contributed?

GEN KRULAK: No, I didn't see a much of an "insurrection" going on. Again, the only way you could hurt Mike Boorda was to get at his insecurity. If he wasn't loved, he was insecure. It wasn't a case of being liked; he had to be loved. If he wasn't loved, he became very insecure. What you saw over a very short period of time was the loss of love. That was devastating to him.

DR. CRIST: How did his death affect what you were working on with the Navy?

GEN KRULAK: Well I really worked hard to support the Navy. They were literally without a CNO and so I spent a lot of time on Capitol Hill pushing Navy programs, such as the DD-21, the next carrier, the new attack submarine, you name it. There wasn't anybody else there to do it.

DR. CRIST: Your next executive off site meeting was held at Fort McNair from 19-21 May 1996. In your opening remarks, you stress that this one would focus on making Marines, whereas previous ones had talked about warfighting. What do you recall of this meeting? This was the first time I had seen any discussion of changing the fitness report system.

GEN KRULAK: This off site was basically just a continuation and a repeat of ones we'd had before and ones we were going to have after. It was an attempt to take the CPG and make sure that we were all still behind it and on track. It was consensus building. It was saying, here's where we are, making Marines, winning battles. We talked about making Marines and we talked about winning battles. Now, we're back to talking about making Marines.

I had already said in the CPG that we were going to have to do something about the fitness report. I wanted them to take the first look at possible solutions. This offsite was the first, quick, look at where were going and what we were thinking of. Senator McCain's paper, again, this was the first issue where people started talking about tiered readiness and things like that. Is that the way we wanted to go? But the bottom line focus was to update the Corps senior leadership on recruit training and the Crucible. To make sure that everybody was still on board. The value of all those off sites was to give everybody an opportunity to say no, to say I don't agree, to say I think we ought to only go this far or that far.

DR. CRIST: How did you actually run your off site?

GEN KRULAK: The Special Project Director administratively supported them. The key players at the off sites would be the Director of the Marine Corps Staff, who would help build the agenda along with me. We would start formulating our agenda for the next offsite immediately after the conclusion of the current offsite. I would tell the DMCS what I wanted to talk about and then we would ask for input from the FMF and HQMC staff. We would get back their ideas, cut that down and fit it into what I would to talk about. We would then send it back out and say here is the agenda. Get the point papers drafted and send those out so that everybody came to the offsites knowing the agenda. When we came together, we were all educated and ready to talk. We had briefings from Headquarters Marine Corps, and the Force Commander's. The MilSec, Colonel Appleton, would be there and provide the

day-to-day wrap-up. As we went through every topic, he'd make up minutes so that at the end of each day of the off site, we'd hand out the minutes, make sure that everybody agreed and went on from there. They were very helpful.

Each one of these offsites started with me, giving kind of a once around the Corps. Essentially updating. Then we would have individual briefings that would define where we were in the CPG. Everybody would either give a thumbs up or thumbs down, or thumbs sideways and then we would discuss their concerns and questions. We always came away with consensus. . . . I didn't want this to be something we were doing just because the Commandant said so. I wanted it done because the leadership said so. That off site was no different than any other one.

DR. CRIST: On 5 June 1996, the Marine Corps won an Effy award for minority and diversity advertising and won first place for its efforts at recruiting women. Do you recall that?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Was it something we pushed for?

GEN KRULAK: Making Marines. Making Marines. We can't have an all white Marine Corps. We can't have an all male Marine Corps. We have to have a diverse Marine Corps if you're going to lead diverse troops. Inclusion is important. This was a tremendous effort by the Marine Corps and by the J. Walter Thompson Advertising group. Yes, we set out to do it and we did it. The Effys are the Oscars for the advertising world and we won them. If you look at us since that time, we've won them every year since, not just for this category, but for overall advertising. The most successful advertising campaign in America has been Marine Corps recruiting. You can go down to the J.W. Marsh Manpower Center and see all the awards in cabinet. They look like Oscars.

DR. CRIST: Who developed the advertising themes?

GEN KRULAK: J. Walter Thompson would bring them to the Director of Recruiting, and the commanding general of Recruiting Command would bring them to me. They would produce five or six options. We'd sit down and narrow it down to two or three. Then I'd go out in the passageway of Headquarters, and bring in the first Marines I saw and say, "Which one do you think? You're a

young kid. Which ones appeals to you?" For the most part, our Marines picked the ones that J. Walter Thompson thought were the best. It was pretty successful.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything you tried to do differently in the advertising campaign than had been done previously?

GEN KRULAK: I'm sure you've seen the ones for the women and men where we had this idea of standing out, standing out in a crowd. The idea here was self-fulfillment, self-discipline, self-challenge, all of the "self," so that at the end it's like Generation X. Like the psychiatrists told us, they want to be something easily recognizable to their peers, a feeling of self-worth and value. As one example for our Women Marines, you'd see the women just kind of fuzzy, but a very bright gal in the uniform or a bright gal in the utilities sitting in amongst other women . . . standout, outstanding.

DR. CRIST: That same month on 12 June the Marine Corps deployed the first unmanned aerial squadron support for Task Force Eagle, which is the U.S. contingent assigned to NATO's Operation Joint Endeavor. That by itself may not have been a big deal, but that it was in conjunction with the Marine F-18s and the EA-6Bs operating out of Aviano, Italy. What are your observations about Marine support of Bosnia during your commandancy?

GEN KRULAK: The great unsung heroes of the Bosnian operation were the Marine aviators. Although the Army and Air Force got most of the press, the reality was if you talk to the warfighting CinC, the aircraft they wanted the most was the F-18D . . . just a tremendous capability. When the other aircraft returned home, the F-15s and 16s, the CinC wanted the F-18s to stay, so we left them there. Likewise, as I have mentioned before, the EA-6s were a national asset, so they played heavily. The bottom line is that Marine aviation flying out of Aviano was key during the Bosnian effort as well as the Kosovo effort. The F/A 18D is an unbelievable aircraft. It may not be very apparent to the layman, but to the warfighter, if given the option to have any aircraft out there, that warfighter would have taken the F-18D. The Marine Corps did a magnificent job. They just didn't get the recognition they should have and deserved. But that's life. If you spend too much time worrying about who gets the credit, you're wasting your time.

DR. CRIST: What about from your view, of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia during your four years as Commandant?

GEN KRULAK: I think Bosnia followed by Kosovo proved conclusively that we had no long-term strategy for the Balkans. As a result, we are in trouble to this day. You cannot look at the Balkans by looking at its various states. You can't look at Bosnia. You can't look at Kosovo. You can't look at Macedonia. You can't look at Albania. It's all one Central European problem. The fact that we had no coherent policy caused great angst to the 31st Commandant and will prove great angst for the next Commandant.

DR. CRIST: For somebody who may be studying this in the future, your view having been on the JCS, and seeing the way the Bosnian policy was handled, at least from 1995 to 1999, what insights you could add?

GEN KRULAK: The Clinton administration went into Bosnia without a coherent strategy and without an end game. The military objective was achieved in a matter of months. The Department of State part of the operation, the economic and political objectives are still lagging way behind because nobody's put any effort into it. It goes back to the elements of national power and the fact that when we decided to do this, we used only two elements. We used the military and the diplomatic and we forgot about all the others. When it comes to rebuilding whether it's infrastructure, police, or schools, none of the other elements are being addressed. There was never any real detailed plan as to what were our measures of effectiveness. We found ourselves involved in Kosovo as one small situation within the larger context of the Balkans. How anybody in their right mind could have been concerned about Bosnia and not thought about Kosovo is beyond me. No one was questioning the well meaning efforts of the Department of State and the administration. They thought the solution was the military. I think we all know that's not the answer, that's just a part of it. As a result, we are all now immersed in Bosnia and Kosovo at a cost to the government of over \$2 billion a year. Think what that \$2 billion could be used for. It could make a big difference. The Air Force right now would like \$1.2 billion of it because that's how much the F-22 program was cut. The point is, a good portion of our national treasury is going into Bosnia and Kosovo, money that could be used for other critical items. . . . both military and nonmilitary.

By the way, anybody whose into history and is reading this should know that as the Commandant, I spoke out on this at the Senate Armed Services hearing on readiness and on Kosovo on the 18 of September, 1998. I got myself, in trouble with the administration by simply pointing out the very same things I've just stated on this tape. There was absolutely no strategic thinking going on vis-a-vis the Balkans. The end result was our military action in Kososo "stuck" the Russians in the eye and we "stuck" the Chinese in the eye. We have turned an ethnic, religious and cultural conflict into a nation state conflict, which it isn't. I believed we were in real trouble and would continue to be in trouble until we figure out what to do.

DR. CRIST: Was your view a common held belief among the service chiefs, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: That put them at odds with Cohen?

GEN KRULAK: No, we were all of a like mind. The difference is only one of them was saying it publicly.

DR. CRIST: On 13 June 1996, you received a brief on non-EAS attrition.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That proved to be one of the CPG tasks to which the Corps responded too literally. In the CPG, I said that non-EAS attrition was "a sea anchor on a Marine Corps moving at battle speed" and that we had to decrease it. Unfortunately, I failed to realize the old saying that the "Commandant says" and when the Commandant "says" everybody does. The Commandant said reduce non-EAS attrition. So what happened? We started to keep bums. For a period of six months we were keeping people who we would normally throw out. I started seeing waivers for, drug use and you name it. So I went back and said time out. Knock it off. Get rid of these bums.

DR. CRIST: I had personal knowledge of that when a Reserve unit tried to process a Marine out for "popping positive" on a drug test, and MarForRes came back and said, "Can't you rehabilitate him?" No one could understand why the Marine Corps was trying to keep this guy.

GEN KRULAK: That's right, exactly. That was my fault. I published that we wanted to reduce attrition and didn't realize that our Marines would

just take that and run with it! But it only went for about six months and we went back and policed up. We got it fixed.

DR. CRIST: On 17 June, ALMAR 070/96 was issued announcing the major changes to the PFT in years. Women would now run three-miles, dead-hang pull-ups with no kiping, and changing the situps.

GEN KRULAK: This was all tied to warfighting and all tied to making Marines. I didn't think we'd ever get beyond women Marines as anything other than women Marines instead of team mates, if when you went out to run the PFT, the 1.5 mile mark, the women stopped and the men kept on running. I ran the PFT and I listened to Marines hooting and hollering at the women who were standing by at the 1.5 mile mark. I said this is baloney. These women can run as well as men. They're going to run the 3 miles.

I did away with the kip because as we were beginning to do some of the experiments for Urban Warrior, we realized you can't kip up against a window sill to get into a room. You need to have upper body strength to go over walls, to get through windows, et cetera, et cetera. Try kiping against a wall; you can't do it. So why would you test somebody physically for an evolution that you're not going to do in combat? So we changed that.

We changed the situps because the doctors had been telling the Marine Corps for years that the kind of situps we were doing were disastrous for backs. We asked the doctors what's the best way to do it and they told us about the crunch. We made the change and that's why.

DR. CRIST: Were there any thoughts or discussions to go to a sort of a CRT or Combat Readiness Test?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. As a matter of fact, if I had stayed as the Commandant for three more months, we would have gone to a new PFT/PRT program. For the Marines in the FMF you would do the regular physical fitness test for the first semi annual test. And the next semi annual test would be the physical readiness test. I just ran out of time.

DR. CRIST: The same day that the ALMAR came out, you made opening remarks at the AAV contract signing ceremony, at I&L in Arlington, Virginia. What do you recall about this?

GEN KRULAK: The AAV signing ceremony was extremely important to the Marine Corps. The

AAV was our number one ground modernization program and the signing ceremony was the real beginning of the "nuts and bolts" part of the program. Just three years later, we saw the "roll out" of the AAV in a big ceremony in Quantico.

DR. CRIST: On 27 June 1996, you frocked to lieutenant general Jeffrey W. Oster.

GEN KRULAK: That was a big deal. That was as a result of our ability to increase the general officer authorization for the Corps from 68 to 80.

DR. CRIST: We mentioned the increase in general officers earlier, but did not get into details . . .

GEN KRULAK: Well, that was a big deal. When I became the Commandant, there were no assistant division commanders, no assistant wing commanders. We had billets vacant; there were Joint Staff jobs that I wanted but we couldn't get because of our inability to staff the positions. The reason was we were only authorized 68 generals. We were, percentage-wise, lower than any other service when it came to the number of general officers authorized. So I pushed for a plus up. Everybody told me there was no way we were going to induce the SecNav and the other services chiefs. The only people that believed that we could get a plus up was then Col Terry Paul (Senate) and BGen Randy West, (OLA) and John Kelly (House). They said we think we can do it. We think we have got justification and we ought to try it. I tried to get the Chairman and the other service chiefs to support us but they said no. They didn't think this was the time to go for it. That in the midst of downsizing to come in and ask for generals was going to be the kiss of death. We did a study on how many generals we needed and concluded we needed twelve generals. If we got twelve, one of those would be a new three star, and so we started going after them.

We did take a few hits in the news media. Why is the Marine Corps doing this? We had two major opponents. One of them was a Senator by the name of Charles E. Grassley who really didn't want it to happen and I had to personally go see him and personally brief him where each one of the added generals would go. I made a vow that they would go the FMF and not to some staff somewhere. The other person was a Congressman by the name of Steve Buyer. He was head of the Personnel Subcommittee of the House. Congressman Buyer really liked me and, really liked the Marine Corps, but he didn't like this. We had to get past these two powerful people. The bottom line was we did it. We

went from 68 to 80 Marine generals and it's made all the difference in the world. We did just what we said we were going to do. We put them into the FMF.

DR. CRIST: Did anyone raise the question on this issue in the Congress that the problem is the other services have to many generals?

GEN KRULAK: No. Never. We never attacked the other services. We went after it on the merits of our own argument. It was a big deal and very important to our Corps.

DR. CRIST: On the 28th and 29th of June, you were inducted into the American Academy of Achievement. What was this and its significance?

GEN KRULAK: The American Academy of Achievement is a well-kept secret. It is made up of distinguished Americans . . . I'm not sure how I fit in there . . . who give three days a year to a gathering of bright young American college freshman. We discuss issues with the students one on one and in small groups. The Academy is made up of CEOs, Nobel laureates, athletes, government officials etc. Because these were "high-powered" people, this became an important part of our grass-roots campaign. As one example, one of the members of the American Academy of Achievement is Tom Clancy. Through that relationship, we got Clancy to write the book on the Marines.¹

DR. CRIST: On 25 June 1996, terrorist bomb exploded outside the Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. What do you recall about this?

GEN KRULAK: Obviously, it was a terrible tragedy. Several things came out of this. One was the recognition of the Marine FAST as the premier anti-terrorist force in the United States. This was one of the written results of the Downing Report--the investigation of the Kobar Towers bombing by former CinCSOC General Wayne Downing, United States Army. He had a lot of very complementary things to say about the Marine Corps and the FAST platoons. The second thing that came out of it was the unbelievable emphasis made by the administration and the Secretary of Defense on counter terrorism. In fact, within the Joint Staff, the J-3, they established a directorate for counter terrorism. The first director of that staff section

was a Marine brigadier general. Our role in this whole area was very important as highlighted in the report of the investigation of the bombing.

I think in my own mind the saddest part of the 25 June terrorist bombing of the Kobar Towers, aside from the loss of the young soldiers and airmen, was the demise of Ron Fogleman as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. As the blame for the Kobar Tower bombing was being assessed, one of the people who was held accountable by the Secretary of Defense was a Air Force general, whose name was up for selection to two stars. Ron Fogleman, believed in accountability, but did not believe that this general should be held accountable. He got into several arguments with the Secretary of Defense over this. When the Secretary made his final decision that the general would be removed from the two star general list, General Fogleman retired. That was very instructive, I think, to many of us because he retired and there was a big splash in the next day's paper. The day after there was absolutely nothing in the paper and there hasn't been since. The general didn't get his two stars.

You always hear the question, "What do you fall on your sword for?" You better fall on your sword for something that counts. Or you better make sure that when you fall on your sword, people understand why. I won't debate whether Gen Fogleman's retirement counted. I will only say that if it had been a Marine commandant doing it, it would have been done on Capitol Hill. There would have been a formal meeting in the Senate Armed Services Committee. It would have been a "bended knee" speech. No Marine commandant would have just tended his resignation and walked out the door.

My own personal opinion is that Ron Fogleman was very tired. I told you how tough it is to be a service chief. Until you've sat in the seat, you have no idea how tough it is. But the bottom line is I know that Ron Fogelman was tired. I think that in some ways this gave him the option and the opportunity to pack it in. I wouldn't put words in his mouth. I think he did a very heroic and upstanding thing, but I think that he was tempered by a lack of good judgment brought about by just working himself to death. I know that his wife, Ms. Jane, was happy that he left. Again, this was not that long after Mike Boorda's death and they were tough times.

DR. CRIST: That's an interesting comment you made about what's worth falling on your sword and making sure if you do it, that it's for something meaningful.

¹ Tom Clancy, *Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit* (New York: Berkley Books, 1996).

GEN KRULAK: I decided in my own mind that I would submit my retirement over only three issues. The first one was gender integrated recruit training. If the Secretary of Defense had required gender integrated training. I would have tendered my retirement papers. I would have retired from the commandancy if they had forced the Marine Corps to go to gender integrated Boot Camp. I would have retired from the Marine Corps if they had changed the rules on adultery or fraternization to read as they had first indicated they were going to read. Some people would have thought I was an idiot to do that, but that would have just been me. I would have had to do that. The third one was fought not too long ago with the Aviano tragedy where the Secretary of Defense had indicated that he was going to bring an outside agent, a retired Army General, to investigate the Marines handling of the Aviano matter. I just said, "You do that and I'll resign." Nobody was going to shoot on our target. We did an open, honest, above board investigation. I wasn't going to let that investigation be questioned by anybody. I told that to Secretary Cohen, so he didn't do it. If any of those had come to pass, I certainly wouldn't have just handed him my resignation. To just hand in your resignation is like taking your hand and sticking it in a bucket of water and pulling your hand out. There's a hole in the water for a nanosecond and then it goes away. If you're going to make that kind of sacrifice, you have to do it in a very public way so that it has some sticking power. So that you've gotten something of value out of it. Not for you as an individual, but for the institution.

DR. CRIST: In September you chose a new Assistant Commandant, General Richard I. Neal. How did you go about selecting your Assistant Commandant? Why General Neal?

GEN KRULAK: That was the best personnel decision I made as the Commandant other than when I brought Russell Appleton in . . . but I brought Russ in before I was the Commandant. I didn't know General Butch Neal very well. In 1993 we were both young generals in the Manpower Department. At the time, as we discussed, I was the Director of Personnel Management and a two star select. He was the Director of Manpower Policy as a one star. I always thought he was a cocky bantam rooster. I knew he was smart. I didn't know whether we'd get along very well. He seemed to me, whenever I was around him, as kind of flip. As I looked at potential relief for Rich Hearney, I wanted to move people on, so it couldn't be a Christmas or a Blades. I looked at the aviators

and the ground as well as my desire to get an additional CinC position. I knew we had two great players for CinCs, Butch Neal and Tony Zinni. I asked Russ Appleton to go down to visit Butch Neal at Central Command and talk about Chuck Krulak and about Butch Neal and about our relationship. Russ was very up front. He relayed to Gen Neal my concerns that we had always had a kind of a friendly rivalry during our careers. I was concerned that this might carry over into the CMC/ACMC relationship. General Neal said, "He's misread me; I'm as loyal as anybody could ever be. If you question that, ask several of my bosses." I got a hold of Benny Peay [J.H. Binford], who was CinCCent at that time, and Peay said, "Butch Neal is the greatest thing since sliced bread. You'll love him to death." So we brought him up and everything that everybody ever said about Butch Neal was true. In fact, they didn't say enough. Butch Neal was a magnificent Marine, just a great Marine officer, a magnificent leader, smart as a whip, unbelievable moral courage. He could have been the Commandant or could have been the CinC for US Central Command. He could have been the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is that talented. He became an unbelievable strong right arm. He became like, I'm sure, Stonewall Jackson was to Robert E Lee. He just was everything that an Assistant Commandant could be to a Commandant. He fought some of the really tough fights. He's fought the fraternization fight. He fought the adultery fight. He helped fight the gender integrated recruit training fight. He sat on the JROC. He dominated the JROC. He outsmarted everybody. He helped me by supporting me at our off sites. He helped me behind the scenes by smoothing rough feelings that I might have made with my generals. His loyalty was unquestioned . . . in a good way, in every good way you could expect. He pumped me up when I was feeling down. He befriended me and my wife. His wife befriended us. Any crappy little job he'd do. He expected no grandiose accolades, medals. He did it for the good of the Marine Corps.

One of the great disappointments for Butch was not making CinCCent. That would have crushed most people, but not Butch. It hurt him for about a day. The next day, he came in 110 percent, just the same way as he always did. Butch Neal was as much a part of the 31st commandancy as anybody. He was just a phenomenal general officer. When he departed, after two years as the Assistant Commandant, he did so, once again, sacrificing because he knew that if he didn't leave, we wouldn't get the upward movement of the aviators that we needed. So he stepped down. Until the very end, he

was the ultimate in selflessness. His retirement was a great, great loss. I just can't say enough about him.

DR. CRIST: How did you use him?

GEN KRULAK: Unlike Rich Hearney, who only worked in places he was comfortable, Butch Neal was truly the Assistant Commandant. He did whatever I wanted him to do across the whole spectrum of the Marine Corps. He got involved with the War Fighting Laboratory. He got involved with MCCDC. He got involved in personnel. He got involved with everything because he was smart. He was well rounded. He had breadth and he had depth. He is phenomenal. Butch Neal, phenomenal.

DR. CRIST: From 23 to 27 September you had the 1996 General Officer Symposium in Henderson Hall. Does anything stand out in your mind about that particular symposium?

GEN KRULAK: Each one of the symposiums that we held was very much oriented towards the decision-making process. As I've indicated, we held the three star off sites four times a year and the symposium provided us the opportunity to lay out to all the general officers those issues that the three stars had developed a consensus on. The symposiums were very important to us. Each symposium would be personally tailored by my wife and myself. We would lay out what we wanted to cover as a "team." The Assistant Commandant and the Force commanders and the Headquarters Marine Corps staff all played a huge role in the symposium. The symposium always had a kickoff session where the Commandant would address both the men and the women together. It was not your typical welcome, although there is a welcome aboard associated with it. We always tried to lay out the brief that I would be taking around to the Marine Corps in the next year. Each symposium had an over-arching theme and always the first brief was the Commandant getting up and not only welcoming everybody, but also providing the dominant theme. I would also talk to the wives alone and to the generals alone. It normally was three full presentations by the Commandant at each symposium.

In the three star off sites, we tried to get all of the hard "40-weight" issues nailed down so that the senior leadership was united. We briefed the other generals at the symposiums, and then they could see that the issues had really been worked on. Normally they had seen all the issues because

during . . . if you recall, the prep for the three star off sites, those generals would be responsible in using the brain cells of their subordinate generals. It really assured a buy in across the board.

DR. CRIST: On 26 September 1996, after a number of years of debate, the Uniform Board authorized the wearing of the "Smoky Bear" covers by female DI's, putting them in the same uniform and distinctive cover as the men. How did this change develop?

GEN KRULAK: The Uniform Board did it because I asked them to evaluate it. I thought it was strange that the women got special duty assignment pay for being a drill instructor. For years, women who served as primary marksmanship instructors were authorized to wear Smoky Bears. But the drill instructor, who actually pushed the recruits down on the depot, could not wear it. Instead they wore a little "cheesy" red cord around their shoulders. I thought there was something terribly wrong about this. It absolutely did nothing towards helping women Marines become part and parcel of our Corps. So from the very beginning, I wanted to change that.

I talked at length to Sergeant Major Lee who had great experience on the drill field and he believed the change ought to be made. I talked to Lieutenant Colonel Angie Salinas, who was the C.O. of the 4th Recruit Training Battalion, who polled all her women Marine Drill Instructors. They all thought it would be a great thing. We talked to the drill instructor school at Parris Island and asked them. They felt it was the right thing to do. We talked to the CG's. Everybody felt it was the thing to do, so, we did it.

We had a ceremony down at Parris Island that both Sergeant Major Lee and I went to, and in attendance was the oldest living female drill instructor. She, along with myself and Sergeant Major Lee and the C.O. of the 4th Recruit Training battalion and the sergeant major of 4th Recruit Training battalion, literally put the Smokey Bear hat on every single one of the women Marine drill instructors. It was a great day. Today no one even questions it. It's like it's always been that way.

DR. CRIST: It's one of things, when you look back on it, you can't figure out why it wasn't done years ago?

GEN KRULAK: That's right, particularly when it's not as if women Marines weren't already wearing the Smokey Bear hat. Drill instructors would literally go out to the rifle range, they'd be wearing

their red cord and the female that was doing the instructing of the recruits would be wearing a Smokey the Bear. It didn't make any sense.

DR. CRIST: 9 November 1996, you attended a Headquarters Marine Corps Birthday Ball here in Washington, celebrating the 221st anniversary of the Marine Corps. Your guest of honor was your father, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak. What do you recall of this evening?

GEN KRULAK: It was really a very emotional event. The oldest Marine present was former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Chapman. My dad got a piece of the cake because he was the guest of honor and he gave General Chapman a piece of cake. It was just an amazing time. There were a lot of people who said that it was probably the best Marine Ball they had ever seen. My brother, the Navy chaplain, gave the grace. My father gave the talk. He stood out in the middle of the stage -- he was 83 or 84 years old -- without a single note. He talked for 20 minutes and received a thunderous ovation. It just went on and on and on. It was a great, great ball, and one that I think will be remembered for a long time. The program had his bio and my bio, and he and I spent almost all night signing both programs because it had our pictures and our bios. It became a real collector's item. It was a special night.

DR. CRIST: Was this one of the first functions of this sort that you and your father had been together?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The only other time we had been together was when I became Commandant. He attended the ceremony. In my entire career he had never come to one of my birthday balls. This was the first time we had ever been at a formal gathering such as that.

DR. CRIST: On 19 December 1996, you briefed the new Secretary of Defense designate, former Senator William S. Cohen of Maine. You gave him his basic in brief on the Marine Corps. First of all, any comments on the meeting, and how did you get along with Secretary Cohen?

GEN KRULAK: I think that that particular briefing went extremely well. Senator, now Secretary Cohen, had a great deal of knowledge about the Marine Corps. He had that knowledge because of his relationship with the now 32d Commandant Gen Jim Jones. Jim had known him for the eight years or so that Jim was associated with Capitol Hill and being the aide to the

Commandant and the MilSec. They had a very, very close relationship, and during all of that time, Jim had done a good job of telling this guy what the Marine Corps is all about. When we had the brief, there wasn't a great deal of need to educate him. He knew about the Marine Corps and was very positive towards the institution and had nice things to say about the brief and about the briefers. There were multiple briefers and the feedback we got was that we really hit a home run.

As for Cohen himself, to be fair, I can only compare him to one other SecDef who I served under as the Commandant and that was Secretary Perry. Cohen is no Bill Perry. Secretary Cohen has great intellect and has a lot of things going for him, but he made, in my opinion and certainly I know in the opinion of my fellow service chiefs who served during my tenure, some major mistakes. First and foremost he surrounded himself by a very close coterie of advisers, and the ability for anyone to get near the man was very difficult. Although he would say "if you need to come see me or call me, please do," the reality was getting through the palace guard was very difficult. They would much rather solve the problem than let you have a one-on-one with Cohen. That was a problem. Secondly, he was very political. He came to the job as a politician and remained a politician until the day I left the commandancy. I don't know what he'll be like after I left, but almost everything was done with the idea of how is this going to read in the *Washington Post*? How will this look in Peoria? How is this going to play? What's the President going to think? What's the Congress going to think? A great deal of emphasis on perceptions, what people are going to think, and not enough on, on what's right for the Department of Defense and what's right for the nation. Third, he did not ask advice. He was primarily in the transmit mode and not in the receive mode. Secretary Perry was far more interested in what the Joint Chiefs had to say. I will say that this changed a little bit near the end of my tour of duty as the Commandant. I think Secretary Cohen played a very positive role in the readiness debates of late 1998, and early 1999. He played a major role in the pay differential and the compensation for our young soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and played a pretty important role in the Kosovo operation. There he listened to the service chiefs. But my overall impression was that he wasn't interested in hearing what we had to say. The fourth difficulty as far as the Marine Corps was concerned, was his knowledge about the Marine Corps turned out to be detrimental because we couldn't get him to visit Marines. I don't know how many times he was scheduled to come down and

visit, as an example II MEF, and we'd get everybody spun up that he's coming down and then General Jones or somebody else would call up and tell us that the Secretary can't make it. After a while, we just stopped flapping around. I can remember General Jones calling me up and saying "The Secretary is going to be there," and I said, "Jim, call me two days before. Call me one day before. Tell me what you want and we'll be ready, but I am not going to put out a major alert and have everybody sweating grenades that the Secretary of Defense is going to come down only to be told at the last moment that he isn't." As I left the commandancy, he still hasn't visited Marines. In the entire time he was the Secretary and I was the Commandant, he never made a trip to visit Marines, and he's been to every other service. Just amazing.

Obviously, he and I went round and round on other issues, whether it was gender-integrated recruit training, fraternization, adultery or dealing with the Hill. I think that we started off very good together, and it's probably my fault, not his, we ended up going our separate ways. I never felt like he was the go-to guy for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If I had to go to somebody, I went to John Hamre, who was the DepSecDef. My fault. I've been around the services long enough to know that it's the junior's responsibility to make peace with the senior, but we just never hit it off.

DR. CRIST: You had mentioned earlier about the adultery issue and how the DoD wanted to change the UCMJ, essentially watering down that prohibition. Is it fair to say that on these issues Cohen took a look at the how they were playing in the press, and you specifically, and perhaps some of the other service chiefs, had to work behind the scenes to pull him back in the proper direction?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The Marine Corps, without any support from the other services, on several of the major issues, went it alone at great cost. It's not that I didn't ever hear from Secretary Cohen; it was just normally unpleasant for me! It's not that I don't like the guy. I think he's a patriot. He served in the House of Representatives. He served in the Senate. He's served as the Secretary of Defense. He obviously is a patriot. It's just that I think he went into this job the same way he went into the Senate, with two or three people around him, very unapproachable, very single-minded, and very difficult to communicate with. To communicate with Bill Cohen you had to go through the palace guards and in many cases it wasn't worth it. His decisions were often based upon the whims of *The*

Washington Post and *The Washington Times* and the Congress or the administration.

DR. CRIST: Without much consulting of the service chiefs?

GEN KRULAK: No, very little.

DR. CRIST: You've mentioned a number of times that one of the major lessons somebody is going to glean from this interview, certainly somebody who may be a Commandant in the future, is a strength of the Marine Corps is its ability to deal with the Congress and get things through Congress.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Did you find yourself doing more of that once Cohen came into office?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I think that you had very little maneuver room with Cohen. You were never able to really explain your position to him, and when you got to see him it was never a one-on-one. You didn't sit down with Cohen like you sat down with Perry or with the Secretary of the Navy. You might have wanted a one-on-one meeting, but one or two of his staff from his days in the Senate were always in the room with you. The ability to have real gut-level discussions or hash out some of these major issues. . . a good example would be the adultery or fraternization or the budget . . . you never got a chance to sit down with your boss. You can imagine what it's like to have a boss that you never got a chance to sit down with. It's amazing.

DR. CRIST: Secretary Perry wasn't like that--much more approachable?

GEN KRULAK: He was much more approachable. Perry would often attend meetings in the tank. Cohen started off coming to the tank, but then very rarely showed up.

DR. CRIST: Did you get a sense, you didn't mention Cohen as a political animal, that a lot of these political decisions were his own or that he was just executing the administration's views?

GEN KRULAK: I think it was partly both. I think that he was his own man. He was a Republican in a Democratic administration. But at the same time, he went with the president an awful lot.

DR. CRIST: Did you find it useful to have General Jones as his senior aid? Was it another way you

could get Marine Corps positions floated to the Secretary of Defense?

GEN KRULAK: I think overall it was helpful. I think that we all thought it was going to be more helpful than it turned out to be. But Lord knows where we would have been if we hadn't had Jim there. I think that if you surrounded Cohen . . . if he was the center of the solar system and you had two planets that were revolving around very close, they would be like . . . I don't have to give their names; I think you know who they are. That would be one ring of planets, and then Jim Jones would be in the next ring. Jim normally talked to one of those two guys first.

DR. CRIST: I think we discussed the Secretary of Defense, but since we're on this train of thought, what about the Chairman? How was your working relationship with, first, Gen John M. Shalikashvili and followed by Gen Henry H. Shelton?

GEN KRULAK: The working relationship was good with both of them. Shali, of course, was the Chairman when I came in. He was a very knowledgeable guy, smart, respected by the administration. I think when Cohen came in, Shali's power was decreased markedly because of the relationship of Cohen to his two close-in planets, as well as Jones. Shali felt like he was eased out a little bit. But John Shali was just a wonderful officer and brilliant and did a very good job as Chairman. We all had a great deal of respect and trust for him. Hugh Shelton, God love him, is a good man. Hugh Shelton tells it like it is. Hugh Shelton is absolutely *not* a political animal. Although he gets sucked into political decisions sometimes, the reality is he's a really good guy and did a great job.

The Marine Corps served as kind of a conscience for the Joint Chiefs during Hugh Shelton's initial couple of years. We were fighting some of these hard issues and the Marine Corps said here's what we're going to do, and eventually that's the way, in many instances, the Joint Chiefs voted. I'm not sure it was the Commandant making the difference. More accurately it was the Marine Corps and one ethos that made the difference. Both of them did a good job at getting to the Chairman.

DR. CRIST: That's an interesting observation about the Marine Corps as the conscience of JCS, because as you mentioned, almost every one of these cases it was the Marine Corps toeing the line and holding the line and eventually the whole DoD went to its position.

GEN KRULAK: Let's take the readiness issue. The Marine Corps, starting with Carl Mundy, was saying the problem is not near-term readiness, it's long-term readiness, and I took Carl Mundy's words and continued to hammer on them. The bottom line is, finally in late 1998 and early 1999, they, being the other service chiefs, jumped on board and that was a very important thing to have happen. Obviously the Chairman and the Vice Chairman jumped on board too.

Another example was the effort by DoD to alter the UCMJ article on adultery. The Marine Corps was the only service who spoke out against this change. It was a tough fight that caused a strain on the relationship between the Marine Corps represented by the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant and the Secretary of Defense. If it were not for the support of the Congress, who knows what might have happened. If the readers of this oral history have not watched the floor speech of Senator Robert Byrd on this issue, they ought to watch it. Senator Byrd, in no uncertain terms, spoke of the Marine Corps as the *only* service to hold the line in a period of political correctness. The result of that speech was overwhelming support for the Marine Corps and underwhelming support for anybody else. You can imagine what it was like. Monica Lewinsky and all of that hit, and here's this one service standing tall and having somebody on the floor of the Senate of the United States stopping everything to give that speech. Cohen didn't like it. Nobody liked it in the administration, and certainly nobody liked it in the Pentagon. But once again, it was the Marine Corps taking a very tough stand in a tough environment and ending up winning. This goes back to where we gain our strength. Our strength comes from the Congress; it does not come from the President or the Secretary of Defense.

DR. CRIST: 22-29 April 1996, you took a trip to Latin America, Southern Command's AOR. There are a couple of issues seem to dominate this trip. One was U.S. support for the region in general, and the other one was U.S. Marine Corps support for the riverine operations, particularly in Colombia and other places.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that was a very important trip for the Marine Corps. We had determined early on, in the three-star off sites and while we were at MCCDC, that the United States Marine Corps could have great relevance in several areas of the world of ours. One of them being Asia, the other in South America. The concept was that there are two geographical areas on the globe that we feel

belong to us. One is Asia, and the other is South America. Over a period of years, we had eased out of South America and so we looked at opportunities there. There were tremendous opportunities because the Army and the Air Force were pulling out of Panama and leaving this vacuum. This raised the question of who was going manage instability there? The Navy/MarineCorps team! We started to mend all the relationships we could in South America. We held a counterpart's visit from all of the South America CMCs. We may have held that first or we may have held it afterwards, but we also took a trip to South America where we hit all these countries and met not only with their Commandants, but with their CNOs and with their ministers of defense. We said we're here to help. We're here to work with issues you want to work. We look like you from the standpoint of our service. We're small. We're mobile. We work the rivers. It's an environment that we're familiar with. We ended up getting many requests for Marines to come work in South America. Because the Army was leaving, the then CinC, General Wes Clark, jumped on the Marine Corps bandwagon and welcomed the Marine Corps down there with open arms. The CG of MarForLant at that time was Charlie Wilhelm, who became very involved in South America and very supportive of Wes Clark. When it came time for Wes Clark to go to his next job, which was in Europe, we nominated Charlie Wilhelm and Wes Clark supported Wilhelm over his own service. He did so because, one, the Marine Corps had been so helpful to him; and, two, Charlie was so familiar with SouthCom's AOR, and so it was a win-win.

As it is right now [1999], we are the only people working the rivers down in South America. We're a major supporter of the drug interdiction effort. We're into South America and Central America with relief operations, with engineers and you name it. I've had two visits to South America, and had most of the South American commandants visit me. It's been a real positive effort that's paid off in spades for the Marine Corps, not only in getting us the CinC, but more importantly, we are the preeminent force of choice in South America right now. You may say who cares, what's going on in South America? Quit looking at the year 1999 and start look at the year 2010. South America is going to be very important. Brazil, massively important. We're going to bear the fruits of a lot of effort by a lot of Marine generals to include General Steele, who went on many trips down there and General Wilhelm. Many of our Hispanic-speaking generals have been down there, and certainly the Commandant has been down there

twice and entertained counterpart visits back here. At each one of those counterpart visits we got a Legion of Merit signed by the President of the United States to be presented at a ceremony at Marine Barracks 8th and I. We literally got all the U.S. Marine Corps Generals possible in attendance and we would hold a mini parade and decorate the visiting commandant and put the Legion of Merit on him signed by the President of the United States. They loved us for it.

DR. CRIST: As far as the Riverene Center, is it training or is an operational function?

GEN KRULAK: It's primarily a training center but assists in some operations in the drug area. It's good training for the South American militaries and good training for us. As you know, a spinoff of all of this was the CinC at SouthCom designating the Marine Corps as the lead agent for riverene warfare in Central and South America. In fact, we built the Riverene Center of Excellence at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, for just that reason.

DR. CRIST: A couple last questions before we move on to 1997, sir. One, Green Letter 06/96, you mentioned the importance of the "Key Volunteer Program to promote unit cohesion and quality of life." What exactly is this program and how do you see it supporting both unit cohesion and quality of life issues?

GEN KRULAK: Key Volunteer Program had existed for some time. It's a program established at the squadron and battalion level, although companies are members of the Key Volunteer Program. It's a network, really, of spouses with official sanction from the Marine Corps that serves to alert the commander to problems, to serve as a conduit for communications from the spouses and the Marines to their commander and eventually to the Headquarters, Marine Corps. It is a self-support system for the spouse. It is a volunteer organization that has paid workers at the major support and command level and at the headquarters level, and it's a tremendous resource for the spouses of our Marines, particularly when the spouse's unit has been deployed. This is the support group that keeps small problems in the rear from becoming bigger ones and causing the Marine to have to return back to take care of them.

DR. CRIST: The Key Wives Program used to be a lot more informal?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. What we decided to do was give it formal stature. With that formal stature came support at the small-unit level as well as the major support and command level. It came with funds so that computers could be purchased to allow the Marines to be able to communicate if they were deployed over the Wide Area Net and E-mails. It provided office space for the head of the volunteer network. It acknowledged the fact that volunteers are critical to the Marine Corps, and it went over very well.

DR. CRIST: Did your wife play a role in that?

GEN KRULAK: She played a major role. Zandi played a major role in just about all of the family programs that we have. The fact of the matter is, she played a major role in what used to be the Key Wives Program. She was a major player there, and that was in the early 1980s. She's done a great deal. Her love and concern for the Marine family is well documented.

SESSION XVIII

Significant Events: 1997

Joint Wargames . . . Rethinking CATF/CLF . . . Riddick Bowe . . . Opening new training opportunities in Australia . . . Building expeditionary camps in Asia . . . Split Amphibious Group operations . . . New lightweight howitzer . . . Danzig and the military/civilian "gap" . . . Ross Perot and the Leftwich Trophy . . . The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review . . . A Plus up for the V-22 and a fight with the Navy over the F-18/E&F . . . Closer ties with the French Army . . . Touchstones of Valor: Belleau and Iwo Jima . . . Concepts behind the CMC Birthday videos . . . The search for a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs . . . Eurocentric view by the DoD . . . a New variant of the LAV . . . Two new Marine unified commanders . . . The Air Force war memorial at Arlington . . . Marine air at Miramar . . . Life issue of 782 gear . . . Comments by Sara Lister . . . "hitting" skills at Boot Camp . . . Opposing a treaty to ban land mines..

DR. CRIST: The day is 3 August 1999, in the Washington Navy Yard. I'd like to focus on events that happened in 1997, your second full years as Commandant. After the January CinCs' conference, you wrote in an e-mail for all of your general officers that you mentioned that the JCSAP war game "provided me a superb rigor to back up my efforts to bring amphib to the forefront of the CinCs' conference."

GEN KRULAK: The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan War Game. They ran a war game right prior to the CinCs' conference, and we, the Marine Corps, basically ran it. We talked about how the various CinCs would fight in their theater, and the results of that war game showed that the strength of America, in both Korea and Southwest Asia, was the early arrival of forces and that the best and most capable of those early arriving forces were the Marines, either through amphibious or through MPF. We were able to use those statistics at the CinCs' conference to say we need to move up the call of MPF and amphib forces because they give you great flexibility. The CinCs all bought into that and changed some of their TPFDS to reflect that flow. It was a very good thing to have happen.

DR. CRIST: On logistics support for operations, the Marine Corps really didn't have the ability, or the Navy as well. Was most of that fed into the war games?

GEN KRULAK: Most of it was derived from the war games. The war games, again, were used not to justify an action or a decision. The war games resulted in an action or decision. When you looked at what was required to execute the war plans, it was very simple. You needed more than the 2.5 MEB's left. You can't be reallocating, and switching midstream. You ought to be able to put enough war fighting capability onboard ship to get three MEBs. Unfortunately, three MEBs was fiscally not in the cards. That doesn't mean that the requirement has gone away though. We continue to push to get the three brigade lift. We did pretty good. Like I said earlier, no one ever expected us to get LHD7. We not only got LHD-7, we got LHD-8. I feel pretty good about it.

DR. CRIST: That was in spite of the Navy though wasn't it?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. Nobody was supporting us.

DR. CRIST: You've got an interesting saying along these lines, "If the Marine Corps wants to get something done, the Secretary of the Navy and the Defense are not the ones to go to; it's Congress."

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: Very early into 1997, 9 to 11 January, you had your executive off site in Tampa, Florida. A number of issues were discussed. Sexual harassment was one. Two other issues jump out. One was the issue of out-sourcing and privatization within the Marine Corps, and in the broader sense the DoD. The other one was the command relations in amphibious operations. You seemed to be a grappling of how to fit the traditional commander relations for amphibious operations, CATF/CLF, into the joint arena, and whether the definition should change or whether the command relationship should change. I wonder if you could comment on both of those, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Let's take the command relationship in amphibious operations first. That remains an ongoing battle. It has not been resolved. The final recommendation presented at the off-site was a recommendation signed Rip Van Riper, CG, MCCDC. It recommended we retain CATF/CLF title; maintain the CATF/CLF co-equal status during planning; allow command relations between them to be transitional in any phase of an amphibious operation, and expand command authority operations available in an amphibious operation by including support TACON, along with the present CLF OPCON, CATF. That was the position taken by Van Riper and supported to a degree by Tony Zinni. It was in essence to hold the status quo. That position, in my opinion and in the opinion of people like Marty Steele, was probably the way to go. The fact of the matter is we're not going to fight solely in a Marine or Navy environment. We're going to fight in a joint environment. The joint task force commander doesn't understand CATF/CLF. You start saying, I'm the CATF or I'm the CLIF and we're co-equal at this time. The joint world doesn't understand that kind of configuration. What they do understand is supporting, supported. That's how they fight. That's what they understand.

I did not accept this recommendation, but sent them back to the drawing boards to come to grips with the 21st century fight, not the 19th or 20th century fight. Forget about what we used to do. Start thinking about what's going to be effective in the 21st century. We used to pooh-pooh the JFAC. You know, it'll never work. Well, the JFAC is here. We're going to do it. It's something that's going to take place and you can't back away from it. Likewise, you can't back away from supporting and supported. They're now working with the Navy, put the final touches on amphibious command relationships using terminology that will be understandable to the joint community.

DR. CRIST: This whole role of the way we used to do things, the CATF/CLF versus the joint task force was certainly a major issue the '96 NEO in Liberia, when the Marine MEU commander was appointed the joint task force commander, and as the JTF commander, he started directing Navy ships around, which upset the Navy because he was thinking joint and the Navy still was not.

GEN KRULAK: We were right and they were wrong. We were right, they were wrong. When it became a joint issue, the resolution went supporting and supported. You're a joint task force commander. JTF commander, like the CinC, is empowered to take control of the forces within that joint task force.

The issue of out-sourcing and privatization, came from the basic fact that in 1996 we realized that we could neither afford the Corps we have today nor the one we wanted tomorrow. We had to find a way to resource the Marine Corps. You can do this in one of two ways. You could get an increase in the top line, which in '95-'96 looked like a very difficult thing to do, or you could try to achieve some efficiencies. Some of the ways to achieve the efficiencies is through out-sourcing and privatization. You take a requirement and sell Marines to buy the money to out-source it. The Marines cost more than the out-sourcing, so you save money. A Marine costs \$30,000 a year to do a job, to be a corporal or a sergeant. The worker who does his job costs the Marine Corps \$12,000. So, you sell a Marine and you can buy three workers. Basically you're trading off Marines for money and parts of Marines for money. That's what out-sourcing is all about. It's just a way to get money to resource the Corps.

DR. CRIST: Then you're not tying your manpower on things like in chow halls where you don't necessarily need them?

GEN KRULAK: Right. But the thing that most Marines didn't understand was if you're talking about a contract for mess halls, and you out-source the dining facility, you don't save those Marines. That doesn't mean, I can take all the 50 Marines that were working in the mess hall and make them infantrymen and increase the manning in the Marine Corps. That's what all the Marine Corps thought. How do you pay for the out-sourcing? You were getting the chow prepared for "free" by Marines. Now you take the Marines out and bring civilians in. How do you pay the civilians? Your budget hasn't increased. The only way you can do it

is you sell back a portion of those Marines. You get rid of a portion, a third of them, and you take the money that you would normally pay those third of Marines and you put it against the money it costs to out-source food preparation. You don't free a Marine to fight. You free two-thirds of a Marine to fight.

DR. CRIST: Was there also a thought by out-sourcing we actually have more control over the people? If we need to draw down or if functions needs to be eliminated, it's a question of getting rid of the contractor rather than having this overhead of civil servants?

Krulak: Yes, but it wasn't done with malice. It was just the reality that you couldn't just look at the Marine Corps. You had to look at the civilian side of the Marine Corps too.

DR. CRIST: Why Tampa, just out of curiosity? You have had several off sites there?

GEN KRULAK: BGen Tom Draude, UMSC (Ret) and my dearest friend is the president of USAA Southern Region located in Tampa Bay. He arranged to give us the use of his facilities for free.

DR. CRIST: That's a good deal.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: On 4 February 1997, you attended the State of Union speech by President Clinton. Anything you recall about this particular evening?

GEN KRULAK: Every State of the Union speech was important to attend for one reason and one reason only—they sent a clear signal about how little the administration cared about the status of the military. Normally those speeches would drone on and on. Out of an hour and a half speech, the Commander in Chief would spend maybe 30 seconds on the military. This was certainly a powerful signal to us. To me it said, again, where is your support found? It's found in the Congress; it's not found in the administration.

DR. CRIST: On 8 February of 1997, you observed the Crucible at MRCB San Diego. Was this the first time you had seen it in practice?

GEN KRULAK: No. I'd seen one at Parris Island. This is the first one at San Diego and it was good because it allowed me to insure that the two depots

were in sync with each other, that there is no difference between east and west coast.

DR. CRIST: On 10 February, six days after the State of the Union, one of the stranger things happened in the history of Marine Corps recruit training, Riddick Bowe, the former Heavyweight champion, reported to Parris Island to go to Boot Camp. He lasted all of about 10 days.

GEN KRULAK: He didn't last that long. Let me tell you the story behind Riddick Bowe. I got a phone call from the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, General Jack Klump, saying that about a month ago Riddick Bowe had approached the Marine recruiter saying he wanted to enlist in the Marine Corps. The recruiter, in no uncertain terms, said no. Riddick Bowe was very, very insistent that he be allowed to come into the Marine Corps and the recruiter was just as insistent that he not. This went on for about two weeks, and then finally the recruiter said, "Okay, you can see my RS, CO." So the Major met with Riddick Bowe and said, "Look, this really isn't for you. We're going to have to give you a waiver because of your family." Bowe laughed at that. He said, "I got millions of dollars. You don't have to worry about me being able to support my family." But the recruiter said no. Finally, Bowe appealed to the district director. This time the district director called General Klump and said, "This has been going on now for almost 30 days. This guy really says he wants to go." General Klump said, "Okay, I'm going to send my sergeant major to see Riddick Bowe at his house." The sergeant major goes down to Bowe's house and sits down with Bowe and his mother and his wife and tell them what boot camp is all about. "You absolutely don't want to go. It's really hard." Bowe said, "I can do it. I'm ready. I'm ready." About that time Klump called me and said, "I've sent down my head recruiter . . . He still wants to do it." I said, "Send him down to Parris Island to look at the training. Just take him down and we'll let him see it." They took him down there and watched at 2:00 in the morning, when the buses roll in to Parris Island and the drill instructors beating on the side of the bus, goes on and gets the kids out--all of that. Bowe watched the whole thing and said, "I can do this." I want it." The mother, by then, was saying, "I'd be so proud of him." Bowe said, "We'll come in on the buddy system. I'll even bring in another person who has kind of been my assistant manager." So we let him join, and Bowe went down to Parris Island, and within 24 or 48 hours he was already saying I want out of here.

We discharged him and people started badmouthing us saying that it was a publicity stunt. It absolutely wasn't a publicity stunt because we tried to talk him out of coming in. Secondly, there is nothing wrong with discharging him. We do that all the time. People leave the first day. So there was no special treatment given Riddick Bowe.

What was really interesting is about 30 days later, I had been at work on a Saturday and I had driven my own car down to the home of the Commandant. I opened up my garage door, came through the garage and was walking around back and I see this monstrous gentleman being escorted by one of our Marines. He came walking up and I looked at him, and it was Riddick Bowe. This young Marine introduced me to Riddick Bowe and said to Riddick Bowe this is the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Right then and there Bowe said, "Sir, is there any way I could get another shot at going back to Boot Camp?" I said, "Mr. Bowe, there is absolutely no way you're going to get another shot. We thank you for your interest in your nation and serving it, but not in the Marine Corps." That's the end of the Riddick Bowe saga.

DR.CRIST: In March 1997 Marines and Australians participated in Tandem Thrust '97, which was the largest of these exercises thus far. You as Commandant pushed very hard for increasing exercises in Australia.

GEN KRULAK: First its important to mention that Australia was never intended to be a replacement for Okinawa. We looked at Australia because of what we called the lifeline of the world economy. That life line is oil and it comes out of the Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca, up into southeast and northeast Asia. If you look at that lifeline, there's a fulcrum--the fulcrum rests at the Straits of Malacca. What country is close to the Straits of Malacca, speaks our language and we have some kind of relationship? It is Australia. Our goal was to establish a relationship in Australia that would allow Marines to train in Darwin. Put a footprint in Darwin and be in position to control the Straits of Malacca if necessary.

It goes back to our view of the world in the 2010 to 2020 time frame. Although right now people are worried about the economy in Asia, I can tell you that every economic guru in this country and abroad will tell you that by the year 2010 to 2015, eight of the top ten economies in the world will be located in Asia. The number one economic power in the world will be China, not the United States. It'll be China. If that's the case, then

you will have Thailand and India and Indonesia and Japan and South Korea and all of these growing economic giants interacting. We needed to insure that in this new emerging environment, no one arose who could threaten the world's economy. We needed to be there to manage instability, to keep this area from becoming a flash point.

When I got to FMFPac in 1994 and saw the economic situation blooming in southeast Asia and the instability in northeast Asia, I began to think that what we needed to do was get some Marines positioned down where they could respond without having to sally forth from Okinawa.

When I got back to the Pentagon as the Commandant, I continued with this thought process. I spoke at length with then Under Secretary Danzig about it. He too believed that there was a great role for Naval forces in all of Asia but particularly in southeast Asia. So, the Corps built a briefing and presented it to Secretary Perry. On 22 May 1997, I went down and briefed Secretary Perry, who is very much an Asia expert, and explained to him what we wanted to do. He really liked it. The briefing was given around the time of the incident in Okinawa. There was a sense of urgency about relieving the pressure on Okinawa by doing some off island training.

Then we had the Minister of Defense from Australia plus their Chief of Defense, and Ambassador come to this country. I was invited down to a luncheon for them. Right in the middle of the luncheon, Secretary Perry said, "Now I'd like GEN KRULAK to brief an initiative on training in Australia. Well, I didn't know I was suppose to do that. They had forgotten to tell me! I should have known it because I was invited but they didn't say you're going to be giving a brief. So thank goodness I had done enough thinking about it and already held one briefing with Secretary Perry. I went over exactly what we were thinking about doing.

The Australians thought that it was a good idea and so did the State Department. However, the Australians worried about a permanent presence. They did not want a permanent presence and they wanted to concentrate on training vice exercises. They didn't want artificial "dog and pony" events and they didn't want to be shown to be inferior in communications and equipment. So they said let's train and not have major exercises. I said that's exactly what we wanted to do--training vice exercises. So, they gave us their approval and we moved forward on this initiative. The end result was that we now conduct MPF exercises, amphibious exercises, and have permission to build a semi-permanent expeditionary camp in the

Darwin area to train. Tandem Thrust was the first indicator that we were successful, and it was a major, training event.

What the reader needs to understand is that while this was ongoing in Australia, the Marine Corps had similar initiatives ongoing in Thailand, in Indonesia and in the Philippines. Opening up these places for what used to exist in the MEU camps at Subic Bay in the Philippines and currently exist in the expeditionary camp in Pohang. Those are the kind of camps we wanted in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Australia. Not to stay forever, but to be able to move Marines in and out with amphibious shipping; keeping them positioned in the right locations as this massive growth in the Asian economy takes place. We would have our Marines in the places where they can react quickly, with agility. This was one of the biggest initiatives and least known of the 31st commandancy, the issue of South America and Asia and positioning Marines to be relevant in the 21st century in those areas.

What you need to understand, from 1995 to 1999, the Mediterranean and the Balkans were really the focus of most people's eyes and efforts. But the economic environment of the 21st century is going to make Asia and South America key locations. It was our intent to put the Marine Corps into position to steal a march on the 21st Century by being the force of choice in two very important locations in the world, Asia and South America. Additionally, I knew that our presence on Okinawa would diminish and we needed to have areas to train and operate from. These new friendships would allow us to do just that. They allowed us to have what I called "lily pads," to move around Asia, and those "lily pads" were expeditionary camps. What would, in all probability, support those "lily pads" would be the equivalent of a mobile offshore base or some kind of large ship similar in size to the Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth II. It would serve as a home base and the Marines would then sail to Australia, off-load 5,000 Marines, and they'd spend three months in Darwin training and honing their skills; then to get back on the boat and go to Thailand or another "lily pad." The fact of the matter is, we've already built the camp in Thailand. We've got the slabs down for the camp in Australia, and we're supporting a treaty with the Philippines to allow us to get back in there. All of this was supported strongly by then Secretary Perry. One of the lesser known activities that the Marine Corps did during 1995 to 1999 was to position themselves in Asia and South America, as the relevant force, the force of choice. It was not until 1999 time frame that some of my fellow

service chiefs figured out what was going on. They saw the big vote being taken in the Philippine Senate in order to authorize a rewrite of the memorandum of understanding and they said why is that going on? It turned out that the Marines wanted to go in there and train.

DR. CRIST: Did you have rationale for this "lily pad" concept of not putting all the eggs in one basket – to avoid another Subic Bay complex, where you have a government change and lose it all?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's exactly why. Plus, I wanted to have the strategic reach that's given to us by operating in those areas. All of them surround the Straits of Malacca. The Straits of Malacca are the key. The Straits of Malacca is the jugular vein. You control the Straits of Malacca, you win. We wanted to be very close to that.

DR. CRIST: Was the Navy was on board with this idea as well?

GEN KRULAK: The Navy was on board because it was Navy, Marine Corps. It had showed the relevance of the Navy. CinCPac was a little more hesitant because it did not originate with him and he didn't like it. But, the concept got a momentum that was unbelievable. We had the Secretary of Defense, the Ambassador from Australia and the Ambassador to Australia, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Defense, all agreeing and it was a done deal before CinCPac couldn't blink his eyes. Here we are now. We have training with every MEU that goes out there. We've had air, we've had ground, we had logistics, we have an exchange program, we've literally got slabs down where we can erect our tents. We get support from the Australian Defense Force. They love us. We love them. It's only going to get better, it's not going to get worse.

DR. CRIST: These are on their existing training facilities aren't they?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Press accounts at the time wrote that the Japanese might have been willing to pay for the building of these new expeditionary camps. True?

GEN KRULAK: They are not paying for the building. We have not approached them to pay. My intent was that someday, we would go to the Japanese and say, "We'll make a deal that you can't

refuse. We will take 5,000 people off of Okinawa if you'll build us a facility down in Australia that we can rotate in and out of." The Australians won't mind it. They just don't want you there permanently. So that's why I say, you can build a temporary facility, not a permanent one. The Japanese would just have to understand that the benefit of this plan would be thousands of people off Okinawa for long periods of time.

DR. CRIST: Is the facility envisioned down there like . . .

GEN KRULAK: It looks like the MEU camp at Pohang. MECP. Marine Expeditionary at Camp, Pohang.

DR. CRIST: Did you give some thought to going back in to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam?

GEN KRULAK: Well, there was thought. That was part of the overall plan. Cam Ranh Bay is a great facility with great training areas. Why didn't I go to Vietnam? I tried to make that an initiative. That didn't get very far. The United States is not ready to go that far. Neither is Vietnam although they're more likely to go that far than we are.

DR. CRIST: The 26 MEU, in March 1997, executed Operation Silver Wake in Albania. That MEU ended up splitting with part of it going down to the Central African Republic. Any observations from your perspective as Commandant on those NEOs and the splitting of the ARG?

GEN KRULAK: The first thing you need to do is look at the dates. There could not have been a better time for the Marine Corps to have this happen, and it seemed like the good Lord was always blessing us because this was right at testimony time on the Hill. It was wonderful to go on the Hill and show the relevance of Marine forward presence in action. We drove this home with not just my testimony, but with every single general that went up and testified. The fact that we were able to operate not just in the Adriatic and do a magnificent job and do the evacuation, but as you indicated, to also be in the Central African Republic, thousands of miles away. Still being able to command and control, still having an impact. It just shows the remarkable flexibility of the Marine Corps, flexibility and agility to do things that nobody else can do. You can talk all you want about the Army, the Air Force, the Navy. You can talk about Special Forces. Yes, a search and rescue team can get in there, but they can't get in and stay. They can't get in and

provide the capability that we can. It was proven in spades in those two areas. The flexibility of the Navy and Marine Corps team was really proven by the agility and reach of the 26 MEU.

DR. CRIST: This MEU was one of the first with the joint task force enabler in it. Also this idea of splitting the Amphibious Ready Group used to be verboten, but now its excepted.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Early on it became obvious that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the chaos that came from that was going to require more and more from our MEUs. The reality is we started building a MOU for split ARG Ops early on that was the reason why we increased the communications capability with each MEU. My point to my Force Commanders was don't be afraid of this. Capitalize on it. It's a great capability. Would you rather be together? Absolutely. But don't be afraid of operating separately.

DR. CRIST: What was the Navy view?

GEN KRULAK: Now they feel the same way, both the CNO and I agree on this.

DR. CRIST: On 17 March, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army were awarded the contract the new lightweight 155 Howitzer to replace the M-198 that we've had in the inventory since the early eighties.

GEN KRULAK: This effort really started when I was CG MCCDC. When the operational concept was being drafted for operational maneuvering from the sea, it became obvious that the artillery piece that we currently have, the M-198, just wasn't going to hack it. The reality is, it has serious limitations for the Marines. It is just heavy and difficult to move. You can't get it over most beaches with its prime mover. You need a tank or an AAV or something. Its not really transportable by helicopter. The bottom line is, although it fired a good round and it was very accurate, the M198 was just way too heavy and lacked mobility and agility. We went to the lightweight 155, which is an interim step, in my opinion, for what is eventually going to be a combination of lightweight 155 and some kind of rocket artillery. What we needed was to get rid of anything that's slow, get rid of anything that isn't agile, and bring on something that can put rounds down range at the range of a 155 and beyond and do it rapidly and in mass when necessary. To me, that means probably a 120 mortar for closer in, but with a good kill capability, the lightweight 155, and

then some kind of rocket artillery. When we have all of that, then we're going to be where we want to be and that's where we're going right now. If you read the FSPG, one of the things they've built within that is a new organization that will man the rocket artillery that we're going to buy. It will not be MLRS, it will not be some second-rate rocket. It will be good, agile, highly mobile rocket artillery that is not burdened with the heavy rounds and the resultant impact on the supply chain. These will be much lighter and smaller but still have the same punch that we need. A lightweight 155 is important, but it is only one piece on the chessboard.

DR. CRIST: On 24 March you signed a joint Navy/Marine Corps order that called for implementation of operational risk management or ORM in all Navy and Marine Corps activities. What is the ORM and what are its implications for the future military?

GEN KRULAK: ORM is something that the Air Force has been doing for quite some time. It is more of a rigorous analysis of whatever operation you're going to take. It looks at risk in a very analytical nature. Marines, of course, initially did not like this. What about our own judgment. All of that. The bottom line is, it doesn't obviate the judgment of the commander. He or she can override ORM at any time and not worry about losing their oak leaves. What it does though, is give you the ability to quantify certain issues that ought to raise a flag if you see them come up. I think it's going to have minimal implications for future military operations because that's not what it was intended for; certainly not by the Navy and Marine Corps. It was truly intended for training evolutions, and more importantly than anything, to try to cut down on some of the aircraft accidents we were been having.

DR. CRIST: On 27 March you responded to a draft paper by then Under Secretary of Navy Danzig entitled "The Big Three: our Biggest Security Risks and How to Address Them." In your response to this, you agreed with his goals of modernization, but strongly disagreed with some of the social views that he expressed in this in the sense that the military was a white man's milieu and had a attitude out of touch with society; its officer's corps weren't coming from broad society; these sorts of things. I wonder if you could comment on that. Were these views expressed by Danzig prevalent on the civilian side of the Navy during your commandancy?

GEN KRULAK: This letter by the then Under Secretary of the Navy was a surprise to me. He had talked before about his views on the social issue of the military, but as I indicated in my letter back to him, I was really shocked, and in many ways disappointed over his evaluation of the role of the military in the civilian society. I would strongly recommend that the readers of this oral history take the time to read the draft paper and then my 27 March 1997 response to see how strongly I responded to it! I tried my best to drive a stake through the "heart" of this attitude of Danzig's, or at least tell him that he was really on the wrong track. I just went over it again myself and I questioned my own sanity in hammering him as hard as I did. Danzig still believes that there is a disconnect to some extent between the military and civilian society, and perhaps there is. What I've tried to say is wherever that disconnect is, in all probability it is something that is good, not bad. I do not think that Danzig's views are prevalent on the civilian side of DoD; possibly on the administration side. The only problem is that Tom Ricks' book, *The Making of Marines* supports Danzig's thesis. My point to both of them is that I think they're misreading what the Marines or the military is saying, and also misreading what the civilian people are saying. The military is saying, "We do have different standards. That's not bad." The civilian society is saying, "We understand you have different standards, and we respect that." I don't think there's a disconnect, and we've talked about that earlier in this oral history. I don't think there's a disconnect between society and us. I think that where we do differ, society is happy with it.

DR. CRIST: On 31 March, you approved the selection of Captain Jeffrey J. Kenny as the recipient of the Leftwich Trophy. What's your view on the importance of the Leftwich Trophy and what was your selection criteria for it?

GEN KRULAK: The selection criteria is established in a Marine Corps order and the selection made by a panel of highly talented Marines. They make the choice. All I do is approve it and award the trophy. Jeff Kenny was 39 years old. Very old for a captain in the Marine Corps. Matter of fact, when I awarded it to him he had already put on his gold oak leaves. He was old because he had been an enlisted Marine and moved all the way up to the rank of staff sergeant and then became a 2d Lieutenant. Great leader of Marines.

It's important to note that Kenny, as well as two out of the next three Leftwich Trophy winners,

all went immediately to recruiting duty. This was the first time a Leftwich Trophy winner had ever been in recruiting, and we put three out of the last four into recruiting. They're doing a bang-up job as the head of RS's. Going back to making Marines, you have to be willing to send your very finest to find the finest. So we're taking Leftwich Trophy winners and putting them out there on recruiting duty and they're doing a great job. The Leftwich Trophy is a critically important award. I think it is recognized throughout the Marine Corps as being special. It is given to that company grade officer in the combat arms that is the finest leader, and we've had great ones, from people like John Allen to Jeff Kenny. My belief is that the Leftwich Trophy is oriented exactly at the people it ought to be oriented towards. People have asked me don't you think we ought to expand it, open it up to others? I say no. It's named after a great, great Marine. The Leftwich Trophy represents: Bill Leftwich and his sacrifice for his Marines. The trophy was presented to the Marine Corps. It was purchased by Ross Perot--a great friend of Bill Leftwich--his roommate at the Naval Academy. When Leftwich died, Perot wanted to do something and commissioned Felix DeWeldon, the person who sculpted the Marine War Memorial, to do the Leftwich Trophy.

It should be noted that the second to the last parade that I hosted as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the guest of honor was Ross Perot, and one of the guests he invited was Bill Leftwich's wife. For the first and only time in the history of the Leftwich Trophy, we presented two trophies in one year. We presented one to Ross Perot. It's interesting that as we were looking for that trophy we found out that we were at the end of the trophies. We didn't have any more; Ross Perot got the last one. He turned around and said I'll buy another 20 years' worth. We went to get 20 more trophies made, and people had lost the mold, so they had to recast a whole new mold and remake them. Perot probably spent \$500,000 just to do this for us. The Leftwich Trophy was that important to him. It is just as important to the Marine Corps. It represents our ethos. It's what makes us different.

DR. CRIST: What I'd like to get into now, at least for the next few questions, is to discuss the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the QDR, which was begun by the Secretary of Defense on 7 November of '96 when he requested this as mandated by Congress. The report of the QDR came out in May of 1997, after a six-month process. First and foremost, how did you view the QDR when it was

first proposed, specifically on total force issues, modernization? How did you organize headquarters Marine Corps to participate in this and work within the QDR process?

GEN KRULAK: As you stated, the QDR was a congressionally-mandated process that continues to this day. This was the first one, so I think each service chief approached it very seriously. For the Marine Corps, we began organizing for battle fully six months before it began, shortly after I became the Commandant. We established working groups in PP&O, as well at MCCDC pointing towards the QDR process. We realized that relevance was what was going to count. If you would be relevant in the QDR final report, then you would be in good shape. What we built was this idea of relevance in the 21st century. We did this through, not only the actions of the Fleet Marine Force, and their operational performance in a chaotic world, but we also did it through numerous articles and speeches. The bottom line is we realized that if we could influence the way the world was painted as the backdrop for the QDR, we could guarantee the relevance we needed.

The first major effort we targeted was not the QDR, but the key strategy document that supported the QDR process, the Joint Strategic Review (JSR). We participated in every single group that looked at the world in the 21st century, and tried to articulate the Marine Corps view of that world, which is "chaos in the littorals."

As it turned out, we were very effective in driving that process, whether it was the ACMC, CG, MCCDC or the Deputy Chief of Staff for PP&O, or the Commandant himself. The four of us did most of the talking as they formulated the JSR which was going to be the foundation of the QDR. No other service put that kind of horsepower against that document, because no other service understood that it would underpin and drive the QDR process. When this document came out, it *actually* used the specific wording that we had been saying in our speeches and articles in the previous four to six months. The document essentially painted the same picture that we had articulated earlier in this oral history: a world of chaos; a world where conflict will be the step-child of Chechnya, not the son at Desert Storm; a world of instability; a world where forward presence will mean a great deal; a world that will demand what General Mundy called "a certain force for an uncertain world." That became the backdrop. It became the strategy piece that underpinned the QDR. Once we saw that written, we knew we were going to win this thing. As it turned out, because we had

organized for combat early on, and we had picked the Joint Strategic Review as the key entry to the QDR, and we had committed the highest leaders of the Marine Corps to that process, we eventually influenced the QDR battlefield in a way which would best help the Marine Corps' position. The fact that it was also correct for the Nation's security as well was of course, ultimately most important. We weren't just doing this because we wanted to protect the Marine Corps. We were doing this because we believed we were right, and it turned out we were.

DR. CRIST: The other services weren't as quick to realize that?

GEN KRULAK: No, no. They were not.

DR. CRIST: It was going to drive the QDR, not the QDR as a separate review?

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: In my interview with Gen Neal, he mentioned that one of the early problems with the QDR was that the level of people --with all the services -- that they did not have the senior leadership within the services to make the decisions that the QDR was asking people to make, so it had to be bumped up to the service chief level. In this case, you had Neal as your point man from the beginning?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The bottom line is Butch Neal, knew he could make decisions if they needed to be made at the time. He certainly could articulate, in my stead, the Marine Corps position. I had tremendous faith in him. He did just that. We ended up with only two major issues. One of them was a cut in the overall number of V-22s to get an increase in the buy rate of the V-22. In other words, were we willing to cut the overall numbers that we required if it meant that we could get the V-22s sooner. I said, "Yes, we are willing to do that; anything to get that system in the fleet sooner." Why did I do that? I did it for two reasons. One, the CH-46 was getting very old, and even though we had done something called the DCUP, the dynamic component upgrade, I knew we weren't going to have enough money to do a service-like extension program on the CH-46. We needed to get the V-22 into the program as fast as possible.

Here I had the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, saying, if you'll cut your total buy of the V-22, I'll increase your buy rate so that you get that aircraft sooner. I said absolutely. I told you

one reason why I said absolutely. The second reason was far more Machiavellian and devious. The reality is once they start building that aircraft, we are going to get our requirement no matter what. I'll be gone, Cohen will be gone, but industry won't be gone. The industry will be in place and would help us get the number we need. In my mind, it was a win/win.

The other contentious issue was a reduction, a requirement to reduce the Marine Corps by 6,000 spaces, both military active and reserve and civilian. I absolutely did not agree with that cut and wrote a very strong summation of our QDR actions to the Secretary of Defense saying that we were already past the muscle, and we were literally cutting into the bone. I did not concur. He came back and said he understood I did not concur, so we will not take any Marines out of your trigger pullers. I want all Marines to come out of headquarters or staff positions. We eventually agreed to do that, only because we would be forced to do it no matter what.

One thing I think the readers need to be aware of is that when I sat down and questioned the Secretary of Defense on this or other issues -- it was never one on one. He always had his -- coterie of sycophants around him. In this case, the answer, basically boiled down to the other services are bleeding, you can't walk away without taking some type of cut. You have to show "pain." We took 6,000 people across the board. We cut the active force by about 2,800, and they came out of the supporting establishment. The rest came from the Reserves and from our civilian Marines. This mandated cut to "show your pain" to the other services is an example of how political and how lacking in strategic vision was SecDef. He would cut the Marine Corps solely the rest of the services were bleeding. When you are dealing with that kind of mentality, it is very difficult to make much headway.

Another very key point to come out of this reduction in end-strength was that we got to keep the money. I told Secretary Cohen that I could not support or agree to a reduction in end-strength without being allowed to keep the money caused by that reduction. In other words, without keeping the money for other priorities, I had no incentive to cut people. We won that trade off—not only for the Marine Corps, but for each of the other Services as well.

There was a period of time when Butch Neal and I discussed if this was an issue worth falling on our swords over. After thinking about it, our answer was "no" because we felt that we would eventually, with rigor behind an analysis, win it

back in the Congress. That was what FSPG '99 was all about. We will not only recover what we lost in the QDR but we will recover what we lost in 1993, when we went from 177,000 to 174,000. We're going to get back to 177,000 active duty Marines. The bottom line on the QDR was it was a victory for the Marine Corps; a reaffirmation of who we are, what we are, our relevance, our value to the nation. We were the only service to get a plus up. We got plussed up by some half a billion dollars just in V-22 increased buy rate. The reality is it was a victory for the Marine Corps. The other services looked at it as the Marine Corps winning again. The newspapers, *The Washington Post*, *The Washington Times*, and *Marine/Navy Times* all recognized it for what it was a big victory for the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: A couple of issues. From what I understand of the original QDR recommendation, the Marine Corps would take no cuts in personnel, but Cohen made the decision that every service should take some cuts?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that's right. That's what I am saying. That's why if you hear a little disdain in my voice for Secretary Cohen, that's the reason why. These were political decisions, not decisions made on military or analytical merit. The important point to remember is in my own mind we were going to win when we needed to win. We took our QDR cuts. They were going to be spread out over a period of years. We took our QDR cuts all in one year, and have recouped every single dollar that we got from the QDR cuts, have invested it in the Marine Corps, and now we are about ready to go back up to 177,000. What we did in this short three-year period of time was pick up almost \$1.5 billion from QDR cuts, plus increase the buy-rate of the V-22. Next we are going to get 177,000 active duty Marines. We just out-fought them and out-maneuvered them, and won.

DR. CRIST: Immediately after the QDR, you came out with an ALMAR168-97, which outlined the personnel reductions where you are going to take out the QDR . . .

GEN KRULAK: We put out the ALMAR so that the Marine Corps would understand what happened. I wanted to maintain what we had already been trying to do . . . communicate from the generals down to the PFCs what the Corps was doing. As soon as the QDR was approved, I immediately went out and said here is what we did, here is what the end result was. If your readers will

review that ALMAR, they'll see that it was put in the context of how we did and how relevant the Marine Corps was in the minds of the QDR. It was a very positive ALMAR. We wanted to make sure that everybody understood where the personnel cuts were going to come from and why, and to not worry about them.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned the active duty cuts were minimal, and the reserve cuts, targeted primarily the ARs and the IMAs, where, I was told, there was some fat in there to begin with?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. There was fat. But more importantly, that was real money. A reserve who is not on active duty costs about one-quarter of what an active duty member costs. Understand, they are not talking about 2,000 Marines. They are talking about the money that the Marines represent. When it says that we cut by 6,000, we cut 6,000 man-years of dollars. That didn't necessarily equate to 6,000 people. All I was challenged to do was give them the dollars associated with 6,000 man-years. We did it, and ended up making money.

DR. CRIST: In your response to Secretary Cohen, you had a very convincing argument that in the late '80s to the early '90s, the Marine Corps took a hard look internally, and eliminated 100 percent of our self-propelled artillery. It was an effective counter stating that the Marine Corps had already done some of our internal restructuring that you are now asking the rest of the DoD to do.

GEN KRULAK: We had eliminated self-propelled artillery in the Marine Corps in the 1980s. We addressed the issue of previous capability reductions in the 1991 FSPG--overall a third of our artillery, 50 percent of our tanks, a third of our fixed wing aircraft, and a third of our combat service support capability. We were already down. We were past the fat, we were into the muscle, and now he want to take us into the bone.

DR. CRIST: The QDR is an ongoing process. In fact, you spelled that out in your ALMAR, that it is a continuing process. Do you think, in general, that this is putting the U.S. military on the right track? Was it a worthwhile?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I do think the QDR was worthwhile. I thought that the Joint Strategic Review was by far the most worthwhile portion of it because it defined the environment that the services are going to face, certainly in the first quarter of the next century. I think that the QDR

did not reach the level it should because of all of the pet rocks that were defended and the fact that much of the money savings was going to be dependent on the base realignment and closure commission work, the BRAC. The reality is no BRAC came. A good proportion of the money was based upon BRAC savings that never showed.

I think it is important to discuss the Reserve and Active Force Structure Review Groups. That was a big deal. The Reserve and Active Force Structure Review Groups were an attempt to help ourselves by divesting unnecessary force structure and to either reinvest dollars or personnel savings into the Marine Corps. So, the Reserves and the active duty got together and, over a period of several months, reviewed all the structure in the Marine Corps and cut about 11,000 structure spaces. Those translated, eventually, after all the gives and takes, to a savings of about 5,000 actual Marines. We took about 1,800 of those and paid our QDR bill with them and took the remainder and reinvested them into the Marine Corps. For the first time *ever*, we raised the manning of the fleet Marine Force to 90 percent! So it was a big deal.

DR. CRIST: That was an issue that started completely separate from the QDR or was the QDR. . . .

GEN KRULAK: No, this was started before the QDR but we knew we were going to want to be prepared if they hit us.

DR. CRIST: That explains how so soon after the QDR we were able to implement it?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. We were way ahead of the game.

DR. CRIST: Where did you find the most savings, the most areas that could be cut?

GEN KRULAK: We cut Marine barracks, Marine security guard, Marine detachments on board ships, some of the logistics areas, combined some of the air wing units . . . We found a lot of efficiencies.

DR. CRIST: Of course, that also ties into what you testified on a couple of occasions before Congress, of a concern that you were trying to pay for the current operations on the back of personnel savings. At some point you run out.

GEN KRULAK: That's right, that's right.

DR. CRIST: In May 1997, you had a disagreement with Admiral Prueher over the F/A-18E/F cuts, and the V-22, plus ups that you mentioned. He believed that you had worked behind the Navy's back to cut the funding for the F/A-18E/F in favor of the V-22, which you denied. I wonder if you could comment on that, sir.

GEN KRULAK: First, we need to talk a little bit about the cost of the F/A-18E&F. When its cost was first estimated by the Department of the Navy, they figured it out based upon the United States Marine Corps also buying the E&F. We decided not to buy the E&F. We decided this for several reasons. One, the way the buy was set up, we would see the first E&F in the Marine Corps sometime in the year 2007. The Joint Strike Fighter is due to arrive somewhere between early 2008 and late 2010. We would be putting a whole lot of money into an airplane, the E&F, one year before we fielded the plane we really wanted, the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter. That didn't make any sense to me. It just didn't make any sense to me to buy the E&F because we were looking for a STOVL capability, not something like the E&F. Additionally, the E&F is, at best, 1980s technology. It is not a new airplane. It is a model in an aircraft series that we already have. It is really just an improved Revision of the F-18 C&D. As later tests would prove, in many ways the C&D is a more effective airplane than the E&F. My question was why would the Marine Corps sink a whole lot of money into an airplane that isn't a leap in technology, that is truly just a 1980s aircraft.

We decided not to buy the E&F and stick with our Cs and Ds until the Joint Strike Fighter was available. That really made the Navy mad. If it were up to me, the Navy wouldn't have bought the E&F either. It is a waste of money. It is buying a bridge to the future instead of taking a leap. There is nobody out there that can beat us. There is no other airplane out there that can really effectively out-fly the C&D when it is piloted by a naval aviator. Why would you want to buy this other aircraft at a cost of \$80 billion? We didn't get into the buy. That upset the Navy. Then during the QDR, the Navy saw their E&Fs get cut and the buy rate get cut. But the Marines V-22 buy rate get accelerated. Some thought, "Boy, Krulak screwed us. He somehow got behind our back and got with the Secretary of Defense and traded the E&F for the buy rate increase of the V-22." I have already said you don't get in to see the Secretary of Defense alone. There were always three or four people in there with him. If I had done what the Navy said I did, it would have been all over the Pentagon in a

heartbeat. I didn't do that. Joe Prueher is a dear friend of mine. Joe was a classmate of mine at the Naval Academy. As he looked at this thing, he said, "Ah-ha, we get cut, the Marine Corps gets plussed up. Krulak did it." I would like to take credit for it, but I can't. It was done because obviously somebody else saw it as the right thing to do. Why buy a whole bunch of these E&Fs early when we are going to try to get the Joint Strike Fighter? Did they use E&F money to buy the V-22? I have no idea. Probably did.

DR. CRIST: That was a DoD decision?

GEN KRULAK: That's right.

DR. CRIST: What was Congress's reaction to the QDR results?

GEN KRULAK: Congress didn't think that the QDR was far reaching enough nor did it do what they wanted. They then commissioned something called the NDP, the National Defense Panel, to try to get at the tough nut of really reorganizing the Department of Defense. It is interesting to note that the National Defense Panel didn't do much better than the QDR. It is very tough to make changes in the Department of Defense for the future when you still have to worry about the day to day fight. In other words, it is great to think about making a leap to the future, but that doesn't help the CinC who is fighting in Bosnia or Kosovo today. He is not worried about what it is going to look like in the year 2010. He has got a problem today. It is hard for the Congress to understand that.

DR. CRIST: On May 20, Esequiel Hernandez Jr., was shot and killed by Marines who believed that he was shooting at them. The Marines were part of Joint Task Force 6, which is the counter drug mission in the southwest. What was your view of that incident? What happened?

GEN KRULAK: The Marine Corps did a magnificent job of bringing to the American people the reality of accountability. We made the investigation very open. It was a hard-hitting investigation. The bottom line is three grand juries and four or five investigations all said the same thing, the four Marines were innocent. For whatever reason this kid fired at least two rounds at the Marines. His movement was the movement of somebody who had perhaps something nefarious on his mind. Did the Marines do everything right? No. Could we, as an institution, have done better? Yes. The results of that were non-judicial punishments

against some people, up to and including lawyers at the very highest levels, and a general also.

DR. CRIST: For what, sir?

GEN KRULAK: For failure to understand and appreciate the difficulty of the mission. It became good training. That's not to knock the generals. That's just reality. It was fully funded by JTF-6. You could send people down for great small unit leadership and training. People got down there and not enough focus was on the fact that this was a real world mission. In the case of the unit in question, they were briefed by the intelligence folks that often smugglers sent in armed scouts forward followed by men on horse back.

On that day in question, the look-out, the OP, was out there and they saw a horse across the river. They had an immediate alert. Then the next thing they saw was somebody on their side of the river carrying a rifle. They report we may have something. Then the individual fires two rounds at them. At that point in time, you're into the three-block war. In this case, they're in contact and they ended up killing him. It turned out to be shepherd. Why the shepherd was firing at the Marines, I'll never know. No one will ever know.

DR. CRIST: There was some talk at the time the Texas Rangers were -- the State of Texas--were thinking of prosecuting the Marines. That's when it went before the grand jury and they rejected it.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, and rejected.

DR. CRIST: One of the debates was whether the Marines have the right to use deadly force.

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. It was fully articulated in the rules of engagement, that if fired upon, you will take those necessary steps to protect yourself. The first thing they did was not fire. They kept the kid in sight and moving. Although they were under fire twice, they were moving parallel to him, getting closer and closer. Then finally, one of our Marines got up and was moving to a new position. Hernandez gets up, lines up to shoot the Marine and the squad leader killed him because his Marine was in danger.

DR. CRIST: On 23-27 May you traveled to Belleau Wood to attend the annual ceremony there, and while you were there you filmed your 1997 birthday video. What do you recall about this?

GEN KRULAK: I went to Belleau Wood every year of my commandancy. Belleau Wood, in many ways, is one of the real touchstones of the Corps. Before Belleau Wood, we as a Corps were nothing more than a gendarmerie. We had never fought above the company level. We were a tiny police force. After Belleau Wood, we were a different force. It changed the Marine Corps. You can talk about all of the different battles that had an impact on the Marine Corps, but none more so than Belleau Wood. From then on we were a major fighting organization, never to return to the gendarmerie. We suffered more casualties at Belleau Wood than we had suffered during the entire history of the Marine Corps up to that point. In that one battle we had more casualties than the entire history of the Marine Corps from 1775 until 1918.

I also went there because it was an opportunity to continue to make inroads with the French in the relationship between the French Army and the Marine Corps. This became one of my efforts, along with a similar effort in Asia, to woo some of our more powerful allies towards the Marine Corps. Particularly those countries that didn't have a Marine Corps of their own. Two examples, France and Israel. At the end of 1999, both France and Israel were "stiff-arming" the United States Army and trying to embrace the United States Marine Corps. We spent a lot of time talking to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the French army in developing our ties. Our relationship with the French Army reached a crescendo in 1998, when I was asked to lay a wreath for the United States at the base of the Arc De Triumphe. French veterans surrounded the monument. It was an amazing event! It was put on the news in Paris. On that same trip in 1998, I was honored with a medal from the Chief of Staff and Chief of Defense of France. When I went back in '99 for my final visit and to sign the memorandum of understanding between the Marine Corps and the French army, we had dinner at Les Invalides. At the end of the dinner, I was surprised by another award ceremony. This time I was awarded the Legion of Honor, and it is signed by President Chirac. It was an emotional event. Both Gen Messier, who was the Chief of Staff of the French Army in 1998, and his successor, Gen Crene, both committed to me that they would reinforce and strengthen the ties with the United States Marine Corps, even if it meant breaking some of the ties with the United States Army. When I received the Legion of Honor, both Crene and Messier were in attendance. We did, in fact, sign a memorandum of understanding that increased 1,000 percent the

participation with the French army, their Ninth Division, which is the closest thing they have got to a Marine Corps. As I left my commandancy, we were having exchanges of units, French to the U.S., the U.S. to France.

DR. CRIST: I read in one of your 1998 E-mails which you sent out to all your general officers, you mentioned that the French Chief of Staff, Crene, had the CPG translated in French and on his desk, and had a better understanding of where you were driving than many of the American general officers did.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Gen Crene, as well as Messier, as well the Chief of the Japanese Self Defense Force, as well as the chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, all had the CPG translated into their language. Yes, they knew what we were doing.

DR. CRIST: All three of those countries -- their armies specifically looked to the Marine Corps -- that is where they saw the innovation versus what they saw in the U.S. Army?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Plus, they saw us as the model that they had to go to. There was not going to be enough money for the French to have this massive mechanized army like the U.S. Army. There was none of that for the Japanese. There wasn't that for the Israelis. What they needed was a light, agile force, and they were going to tailor it after the U.S. Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: As an aside, in your CMC Birthday messages, Iwo Jima, Belleau Wood, the ones that jump out at me, had historical themes to them. I have never seen any other Commandant's Birthday messages where these themes seemed so deliberate.

GEN KRULAK: In each of the Birthday videos, I wanted to address making Marines and winning battles. The first video was done at the Marine Corps Historical Center. The overarching idea I was trying to show in that video was the historical perspective of who we are and what we are so that subsequent videos would have an impact. The next video was "Making Marines," and it was done at MCRD San Diego. It talked about transforming this precious young man or woman of character into a Marine. The next two had to do with winning battles. I wanted to stress our warrior ethos, but I wanted to do it in an historical context. I picked Belleau Wood, first, because it was the changing point of the Marine Corps. It changed us and it was critical that our people understood that.

Then, I picked Iwo Jima for two reasons: One, because of its historical significance and how it really tied the two, Making Marines And Winning Battles, together; and secondly, because it was during this time that we were in the battle with the Air Force over the Marine war memorial. I wanted to have something that I could use for the war memorial fight that showed why we fought for Iwo Jima and why so many Marines died. We captured Iwo Jima to help the Army Air Corps and now they ought to help us. This was the subtle undercurrent in that last one. But, yes, each one of them had a purpose. The Iwo Jima video had to be done as well as we could possibly make it because at my last Ball, we had no guest of honor. We used that film as the guest of honor. The oldest Marine was my father, but there was no guest of honor. When it came to the point in the program where the Commandant would normally introduce the guest of honor, I just said, "Instead of introducing a guest of honor, allow me to introduce our touch stone of valor." At that time, on came the Iwo video.

DR. CRIST: On 3 June 1997, you met with Secretary of Defense Cohen. In this meeting, you mentioned to him, that since the debate was on for the next Chairman, you thought Gen Ralston would be a good candidate and he would be your recommendation. You also mentioned that you thought Lieutenant General Jim Jones would be a good candidate for the next Vice Chairman. Do you recall this meeting?

GEN KRULAK: I do recall it. That was before all of the stuff on Joe Ralston came out. I believe there was no better candidate for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than Gen Joe Ralston, a man of great courage, a man who was, in fact, purple, a man who understood all of the issues on the joint staff, a man who had the rapport with his fellow service chiefs and certainly the trust and confidence of those across the river. I just thought he would make a great choice. My recommendation of Jim Jones as the next Vice Chairman was because I believed he would have been a good Vice Chairman. He could have provided the same kind of advice to the Secretary that Joe Ralston had, and it would put him in a good position to bring sanity to the Joint Staff and support to Joe Ralston. It would also put General Jones in position to fleet up to become Chairman. It would open up the commandancy to some of our other superbly qualified general officers, specifically, people like Gens Fulford or Pace, and whoever the ACMC would be at that time. We had so many great generals that here was a way to move

them up. Yes, I remember the meeting. I remember saying it. As usual, I received a non-committal reception.

DR. CRIST: What is your view, sir, of the whole Ralston affair which broke shortly after this meeting? He was announced as the next Chairman but ended up not becoming Chairman because an adulterous affair he had.

GEN KRULAK: It shouldn't be too hard for anybody reading this oral history to know where I came down on this issue. The bottom line is you can't have the senior military officer an admitted adulterer and expect to uphold the articles of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, specifically the one that had to do with fraternization and adultery. Although I love Joe Ralston, and he knows I love him (his wife Deedee Ralston is just a precious jewel) and there were so many extenuating circumstances around why and what Joe did, the bottom line was, I could not support him at that point in time. The sweepstakes for the Chairman opened up again.

DR. CRIST: Gen Shelton ended up getting the nod. Had you worked with him, or did you know him prior?

GEN KRULAK: I didn't know him at all. Following the situation with Joe Ralston, I got a phone call from Gen Shalikashvili, who said he wanted to talk to me. I said, "Sure. I'll be down in just a minute." He said, "No, no, I'll come up, I'll come up." Shali came up and he said, "I want you to throw your name in the ring to be the Chairman." I had, already, told the Secretary of Defense that I didn't want to be the Chairman when he was initially looking for people to nominate. I told him not to put me in the "pool." I told Cohen, "I don't want it; I want to be the Commandant not the Chairman." Shali knew that was my feeling and he had conveyed that to the SecDef. But Ralston's problem had changed all of that. So Shali was coming back up to me and saying, "I think now you need to put your name back in the ring. The nation is now in a little different situation. We had a good guy, Ralston. He was the Vice Chairman. He would have done a great job. You even agreed to it. Now he is gone. We don't know who to get. At least put your name in the ring."

DR. CRIST: Your ethical reputation was impeccable.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. They knew there wasn't going to be a problem in that area. I prayed on it and talked to my father and talked to some other people and some of the general officers in the Marine Corps and said, "Okay." I met again with Shali and said, "Okay, put my name in the ring, but clearly understand that I would be doing this for the good of the nation and that my heart would not really be in it." Shali passed that word to Cohen. A few weeks later, I started getting phone calls from members of the Congress of the United States, senators and congressmen, all saying, we really want to support you. I kept on saying I am not going to say no, but here is where my heart is.

Then I was called down to the Secretary of Defense for an interview. I went in and, of course, his circle of people were present. I was questioned extensively on my views regarding the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, et cetera, et cetera. At the end, I was asked again about whether I wanted to be the chairman. I gave him the answer I had been giving everybody else. I would become the Chairman if that was what he, the Secretary of Defense, and he, the President of the United States, wanted, but that if asked my druthers, I would rather remain as the Commandant. I was finishing my second year. I thought we were really moving in a good, positive direction, building on the efforts of my predecessors. I thought what better job is there in the military than being the Commandant of the Marine Corps. It certainly was not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who commands nobody but his own staff. As it turned out, they selected Hugh Shelton, and I'm happy about that, and happier than anybody could ever imagine because I didn't want to be the Chairman.

DR. CRIST: From 10-24 July Exercise, Baltic Challenge '97, occurred and was an outgrowth of the Partnership for Peace, which was a big issue by administration, during this period in which Marines participated in. Were you a supporter of this Partnership for Peace? The follow-on with that would be to get your views on the expansion of NATO which happened.

GEN KRULAK: I think Partnership for Peace was important in bringing NATO into some basic level of competency across all of the countries. I certainly approved of the expansion of NATO. I think I approved of the way the Congress looked at it, which was to go slowly but surely.

My problem during my tenure as a Commandant had to do with what I called a Eurocentric view of the world. If you looked at the background of the service chiefs, the Chairman, and

Vice Chairman during my time as a Commandant, there was not one of those individuals who you would consider having spent any quality time in Asia. All of them, whether it was John Shalikashvili or Joe Ralston or Hugh Shelton or Mike Ryan, Ron Fogleman, Jay Johnson, Mike Boorda, Denny Reimer, all of them had major command time in Europe, and almost none had ever served a day in Asia. Ralston, I think, was there, Jay Johnson at a young age, but all of them were Eurocentric. What disturbed me was this fixation on NATO and the fixation on Europe. What will surprise your reader is that in the entire four years that I was the Commandant of the Marine Corps, we only had two tank sessions where Asia was mentioned at all. I don't mean a whole tank session on Asia. I am talking about where Asia even occupied a portion of the tank session. That was during the Taiwan Straits issue. We are talking about people who were so fixated with Europe that the health of our nation, the economic health of our nation ebbed and flowed based upon the Congress of the United States and the administration and not on any kind of strategic military thought. The only service thinking about Asia, was the United States Marine Corps. The reason the Marine Corps was able to make such inroads, as we have mentioned earlier, in China, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam, was because we were the only ones that were doing anything out there. It is just sad that you could get so myopic in your views.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned the Taiwan Straits issue in 1997. What do you recall of that?

GEN KRULAK: The only debate in the tank was do we send amphibis, do we send troops, do we send a carrier? What do we do? The decision was the carrier.

DR. CRIST: No plans . . .

GEN KRULAK: No. They were not interested in Asia.

DR. CRIST: In August of that year, 1997, the Marine Corps took delivery of the first of its 17 LAV air defense variants, which the Marine Corps had been debating internally over for a few years. With your commandancy, the Marine Corps finally got them.

GEN KRULAK: The LAV/AD is a tremendously capable system. Initially, the Marine Corps didn't want them. But when we cut the Hawk it became

apparent that we needed something that could get out there and move and shoot and communicate. The only thing we had was the LAV/AD. We had a senator who was more than willing to support us because they were built in his state. With the help of that senator, the Marine Corps was basically given 17 LAVs, which we put in general support of the Corps. If the whistle blows, they go. But they are not assigned to any single unit.

DR. CRIST: Which senator was this, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Senator Patrick Leahy.

DR. CRIST: Was he a friend of the Marine Corps, too?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: On 24 September, Gen Anthony Zinni took the helm of U.S. Central Command as the third Marine unified commander in Tampa. During your commandancy, was the only time to date when we had two Marine unified commanders. There was a brief overlap where you had both Gens Sheehan down at ACom and Zinni at CentCom, and then Sheehan retired and then you got Gen Wilhelm at SouthCom. Could you comment, on, these appointments, and specifically how you have been so successful in getting two of the major operational commands as Marines?

GEN KRULAK: Central Command was pretty easy because it had been rotating between the Army and the Marines. We had the two most qualified officers. We had Gen Neal, who had served there during the Gulf War and then had been the Deputy CinC. We had Zinni, who was at that time the Deputy CinC. We had two players that nobody else could really compete with. I felt comfortable that one or the other was going to get it.

Wilhelm was an entirely different matter. Nobody thought the Marine Corps was going to get SouthCom. Charlie Wilhelm was going to retire from the Marine Corps. His wife had been ill, and in a trip I made to II MEF in the spring, Charlie told me he was going to retire. I said, "Charlie, don't retire. Would you consider staying on if you were offered a CinC?" He said, "You've got to be kidding me? No way are we going to get two CinCs." I said, "That's not the question I asked you. I asked you would you be willing to stay on if you became a CinC." He said, "I have to talk to Valerie," his wife. A little while later, he called me up, and he said, "If I were selected to be a CinC, I would stay on."

Charlie Wilhelm had built up great capital with Wes Clark, who was the sitting CinC because of his support of all the things going on in SouthCom. The Marine Corps had built up great capital with Wes Clark because of our support of the Southern Command. I called Wes Clark, and said, "Wes, I would like to nominate Charlie Wilhelm for SouthCom. I don't want you telling anybody. I want to know whether you would support me on that?" Wes Clark said, "Yes, I would. I think he is the best man for the job." I then wrote his nomination up and went to the Secretary of the Navy and said a lot of people are going to be vying for this job. What we don't need is to have a Navy/Marine Corps. I want you to know that this is the guy for the job. He is well respected. The SecNav said, "Okay, obviously we are going to submit a Navy nom and a Marine nom, but if asked, I will support the Marine nom." We nominated him. They all were interviewed by SecDef. Afterwards, I asked Charlie how his interview went? Charlie said, "I think it went well. I think it went well." I went down to see Shali. I said, "I really think that Charlie Wilhelm is the guy for this job." Shali was very non-committal. But I heard, after the fact, that Shali went into SecDef with his recommendation and said, "There is only one person who is really qualified to take this job, and that person is . . ." and then he gave the name of the Army nominee. Apparently Cohen said, "I happen to think there are two people qualified, the Army guy and Gen Wilhelm. To be honest, I think it ought to be Wilhelm." That's the name that went forward. What I think happened was first we had a great nominee in Charlie Wilhelm. He is smart, talented, warrior/scholar, great guy. Second, we outfought them by going and getting the sitting CinC to support the Marine Corps nom. Third, I think that they didn't expect that Wilhelm would hit the home run he did in his interview.

DR. CRIST: One thing that people may not realize, particularly considering you are very focused on the Marine Corps as the Commandant, but you have been very successful getting Marines into key Joint billets. Gen Fulford is the most recent one as Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. [In 2000, he was selected for the Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command.]

GEN KRULAK: When I was the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel Management Division at Headquarters Marine Corps as a one star, I would look at each staff of the CinCs and then the Joint Staff. I saw that we did not have any representation. I made it a goal when I became the

Commandant that we, as an institution, would get people in the right places. By the third year of my commandancy, we held in every CinCdom -- except for EuCom, the CinC, the J-3, or the J-5. The two most powerful positions other than the CinC are the J-3 and the J-5. Except for in ACom, whose mission is not operational, but to train and equip. Here we had the J-7, which was the trainer. On the Joint Staff, we fluctuated between the J-3 and the Director, Joint Staff. We went for a period of time when we had no three star on the Joint Staff, but we were willing to do that because one, I felt confident in my personal interaction in the joint arena, and two, we had Marty Steele as our PP&O. Nobody could out step Marty Steele. He was the best Operations Deputy the Marine Corps has had in years. The bottom line was we had our generals in key spots. It was a great reflection not on me but on the quality of the general officer corps of the Marine Corps. When we put our people up against everybody else, our guy would get picked.

DR. CRIST: On 18 August, the Air Force Memorial Foundation had a dedication for their proposed Air Force memorial. The site they want to build it on, as of August 1999, is right next to the Marine Corps war memorial over in Arlington, Virginia. You have been a critic of this site due to its close location to the Marine Corps war memorial. How was the Air Force able to get approval for this site? What steps did you take to prevent it?

GEN KRULAK: The first thing is how did the Air Force get to where they are? I would encourage the reader to go back and see what Gen Mundy, the 30th Commandant, had to say about this. But the bottom line was, when the proposal first came up, it came up through Marine Corps channels under Gen Mundy. It arrived on the desk of the Assistant Commandant, Gen Boomer, via the Director of the Historical Division, Brig. Gen Ed Simmons. It did not talk in any specifics vis-a-vis the location or what this memorial would look like. It just said we want to build one in the vicinity of the Marine war memorial, and that it would be aesthetically pleasing. Boomer sent a note to the Commandant saying here is what we got, and basically asked, "What do you want to do about it?" Gen Mundy put a note on the memo which essentially read let's be as helpful as we can, or words to that effect. I'm sure Gen Mundy has that note. The Air Force took that as thumbs up from the Marine Corps. They didn't need to get approval from the Marine Corps, but they now use that exchange to bludgeon us, saying, "We let the Marine Corps

know what we were doing." The fact of the matter is they only let us know where it *might* be and *not* what it would look like. When we found out that this thing was going to look grotesque, and it was going to be far larger than the war memorial, to include a visitor's center and museum, we went to general quarters.

On November 10th of this same year, after all the celebrations, I took my wife down to the site. We stood literally on the center mark of the site dedication for the Air Force Memorial. I walked in a straight line from the center of that dedication marker and touched the black granite of our Marine war memorial. It was 100 plus paces. That was from the center of where the memorial was to be built. At that point in time, I almost got sick to my stomach!

I tried to take steps to keep it from becoming an inter-service squabble. I told my general officers that I didn't want them going to the media or writing letters. But it was going to be an inter-service squabble. We got our legal people involved, and the Air Force got their legal people involved. There have been suits and counter suits. To say it isn't an inter-service squabble would be incorrect. What hasn't occurred is the Commandant of the Marine Corps has not challenged the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to a knock-down drag-out fight, winner take all! But it has been a hell of an issue, and it will remain a hell of an issue. I will tell you right now that when people open this oral history up in about ten years, there will not be an Air Force memorial on Arlington Ridge! Mark my words, this is the Commandant of the Marine Corps. It is now the 3d of August 1999. There will not be an Air Force memorial on Arlington Ridge! It will probably be located where the Headquarters of the Marine Corps used to be, and that's up on Henderson Hall. See if I'm right. It's like a time capsule!

DR. CRIST: I know there are some Congressional moves to try to stop this . . .

GEN KRULAK: We are going to win it.

DR. CRIST: On 1 October, the Navy relinquished control of Miramar Air Station to the Marine Corps. Any comment on this move and these realignments of bases?

GEN KRULAK: It was the end game of the base realignment closure that saw the demise of El Toro and Tustin. It brought helicopters from Tustin to both Camp Pendleton and Miramar. It brought all the fixed wing to Miramar. It caused great hate and

discontent with an outfit called the March Committee, which was asking for us to move our helicopters to March Air Force base in California. It was a major fight. We won it, although we are still, on a daily basis, encountering some complaints. We put over \$600 million of new construction into the Marine Corps Air Station Miramar. It will be a showcase. It was a victory. It was a long, hard fight. I wish we didn't give up Tustin. I wish we didn't give up El Toro, but we did. If we had to, we certainly got the best of the deal.

DR. CRIST: That same month, October, a major change took place in the issue of 782 gear. For the first time Marines were issued a lifetime issue as opposed to issuing an individual his gear when you checked in the unit, and then you had to give it all back when you left.

GEN KRULAK: We did that for a lot of reasons. A couple of the principal ones are, one, by avoiding the requirement for multiple issue points at every battalion and every regiment and every division, you could do away with all of that overhead, do away with the cost of inventory, and do away with the requirement for Marines to oversee the multiple issue points and warehouses. It was a way to take excess manpower, feed it back into the fleet Marine force, and to lower the cost of the inventory that we were holding on the shelf.

Secondly, it does away with the administration involved in missing, lost and stolen reports. When a Marine goes to the field and loses his helmet or his canteen, he comes back and he submits a missing, lost, stolen gear statement. That statement goes to the platoon sergeant and the platoon commander, and the company commander, who has to sign it. It then goes to the battalion commander. The battalion commander makes a decision and sends it over to the issue point. The issue point absorbs the cost and then has to issue a new helmet or canteen. It is a bureaucratic, costly, manpower-intensive process. If you just said, here is your issue, you are now a brand new PFC, here is your sea-bag. It has everything you are required to have as a Marine. It is your responsibility to maintain it. We will inspect it. You will maintain that sea-bag full of gear. If you lose any of it, don't talk to me about a missing, lost, or stolen gear statements. You just go down and buy yourself a replacement because you are responsible for it. By the way, at the end of your enlistment or at the end of your time in the Marine Corps, you will give us all of this gear back, and if it is in good shape, we'll reissue it. It's as simple as that. It was all about,

saving money, saving inventory, saving manpower, instilling accountability in the individual Marine.

DR. CRIST: The following month, 14 November, Sara E. Lister, who was Undersecretary of the Army, made a speech in which she called the Marines "extremist" and a number of other disparaging remarks about the Marine Corps, which became a very big issue in the media. What do you recall of her comments and this issue, sir?

GEN KRULAK: I first got wind of this from a *The Washington Times* reporter by the name of Rowan Scarborough. He called me and asked me what I thought of Sara Lister's comments. I said, "I don't know what you are talking about." He started to quote some things. I said, "I don't know what you are talking about. Let me see and I'll get back to you." I called up my public affairs officer, a major by the name of Betsy Judge. At that time, her name was Aarons. She subsequently got married and became Judge. But I called up Maj Aarons and I said, "What do you know about this?" She replied, "I don't know but let me check into it." She checked around, and she called back and said, "Yes, apparently she made these comments, and the comments you can find in the files." But I said, "Do we know this for sure?" She said, "Yes, but I have got the tape coming over." I went down and I asked to see the Secretary of the Army Togo West. I went in to Secretary West and I said, "Look, I just got a phone call from Rowan Scarborough." Here is what he said Sara Lister said. Here is what my PAO said she said. I'm really concerned about this. This is bad. We have got to do something about it. He said, "Let me tell you, Chuck, Sara Lister would never say that. But if she did, it would have been taken out of context. If it was, and if she did, I'd be really disappointed, and I'll say something to her. But I can tell you, it didn't happen. But I am going to look into it for you." I said "Fine."

I went back up to my office. At that point in time, Betsy Aarons came into my office with a tape, and she said, here it is. I played this tape. No sooner did I turn the tape off, then the phone rang. It was Sara Lister. Sara Lister said, "Gen Krulak, this is the Assistant Secretary of the Army Sara Lister. I heard that you have gotten wind that I had made some comments. I want you to know I didn't make them." I said, "Pardon me?" She said, "I did not make those comments." I had, by that time, gotten the direct quotes and listened to the tape. I said, "Now let me make sure I understand this, you are telling me that you did not say the following," and I gave the quote. She said, "That's correct, whatever was said was taken out of context. I

would never say that. I have the utmost respect for the Marines." I just said, "Ms. Lister, I have the tape in my hand of exactly what you said, and you said everything that has been reported. I am going to ensure that the Secretary of the Army knows that." I hung up. I then went down to the Secretary of the Army, and I said, "Here is the tape, yours for action."

I then got another phone call from Rowan Scarborough, then *The Washington Post* and several other papers. My answer every time was, I'm not going to say anything. I am going to just write a letter. I wrote a letter to the editor of the *Washington Times* that basically took the high ground. I did get a phone call from the Secretary of Defense saying this thing is bad enough. We are going to take care of her. Please don't pole axe the Army." I said, "This has nothing to do with the Army." My letter was very mild. It talked about the Marine Corps not the Army.

About 48 hours later, the phone rang. When I picked it up my receptionist said, "You have the White House operator on the line." I said, "What?" She said, "You have the White House operator on the line." I picked up the phone, and it was the White House operator. They said, "The President would like to speak to you." I said, "Fine." President Clinton said, "Gen Krulak?" I said, "Yes, sir." He said, "I want you to know how upset I am about the comments made about your Marine Corps. It has taken longer than I would have wanted, but Ms. Lister is gone." I said, "Thank you, sir," and I hung up. They turned on the news out in the outer office, and the CNN report showed Lister had been asked to leave. That's the real story on Sara Lister.

DR. CRIST: To change subjects rather dramatically, 1997, was a record year for Toys for Tots. Do you have any comments on why 1997 was so successful or the program in general?

GEN KRULAK: Nothing other than Toys for Tots was a major part of our overall grassroots campaign of trying to get people interested in the Marine Corps. Every year we would host a reception and parade for the major donors of Toys for Tots. The parade wouldn't honor them, but they would be invited to the parade, and we would hold a reception in the band hall. Retired LtGen Terry Cooper would be the host and I would be the guest, and I would come in and talk. What we saw is an increase each year of the number of dollars and toys collected for young children. As a matter of fact,

the last one, the 1998 campaign, was the largest we ever had. It is an important part of grassroots.

DR. CRIST: On 9 December, you announced a major overhaul of the close combat training program at boot camp.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Specifically, eliminated boxing and other hitting evolutions.

GEN KRULAK: We stopped the hitting skills. This is embarrassing to say, but neither I nor the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, SgtMaj Lee, knew that there was such a thing as hitting skills. We had been down to the recruit depot . . . I made 11 trips to the recruit depot. I had watched pugil sticks. I had watched hand to hand and all of that. But I had never seen something called hitting skills, and I didn't even know what it was. It came to light when we had a tragedy down there, where somebody was hit so hard that -- well, it was just a tragedy, a tragedy. I started looking into it. I didn't even know what they were talking about. What happened is sometime in the late '80s, early '90s, they put in hitting skills. You talk to most Marines today, and they think it has been going on for years. It hadn't even been eight years. They put our recruits in boxing gloves and protectors and put them in a little pit that was just nothing more than almost a wooded foxhole. They would box for about five to ten seconds. The first time a recruit got his nose punched, that was it. The idea was these recruits are so "soft" that they need to know what it is like to be hit. My point on this was, it was just a tremendous waste of time. If you are going to teach somebody how to fight when on a battlefield, teach him how to fight *when* on a battlefield. Nobody is going to go into combat with a set of ten-ounce gloves tied to their war belt, wearing headgear and a groin protector. I want them to learn how to use an entrenching tool to kill somebody, or how to use a bayonet to kill somebody, or how to use a piece of stick to kill somebody.

We did away with hitting skills and put back in to boot camp a course on how you take a foreign object or a piece of your personal equipment like a E-tool, and use it to kill somebody. We taught how you use a bayonet to kill somebody, not how do you learn to take a bump on the nose. So we did away with it. There were those who said we were softening up boot camp. That this is in response to the tragedy with the hitting skills. The only tie-in at

all between the tragedy and hitting skills was that it awakened the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the fact that we were doing this. I didn't even know we were doing it.

DR. CRIST: You replaced it with really more realistic training?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, yes.

DR. CRIST: One of the issues of 1997, not a major one, was the issue of the land mine ban. That was of a treaty that the UN was pushing to outlaw anti-personnel land mine and the U.S. has partially signed onto it with some exceptions. As of a month or two ago, all of the land mines are out of Guantanamo Bay as part of this.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What was your view on this issue, which was debated by the JCS?

GEN KRULAK: It is interesting that you would raise this issue because this is another one where the Marine Corps took the lead. When the land mine treaty first was discussed in the Tank and at the OpSecDef level, all the services except for the Marine Corps agreed that we ought to sign the treaty. When it got down to the service chiefs, I had taken time to go see Gen Denny Reimer, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army. I said to Denny, "Your the DepOpSecDef and OpsDef" are saying they want to sign up for this treaty. Do you know that?" He said, "No, I didn't know that they were doing that." I said, "Well, they are!" I then asked him if he had given any thought to Korea . . . what taking the mines off the demilitarized zone would mean? Not just for the safety of our own troops, but for the safety of South Korea and our relationship with the South Koreans. Had anybody thought this through? Had anybody thought through what that means to a Claymore mine, what it means to the personnel protection and defense of Marines or soldiers in the field? When the issue got down to the Tank, after a lot of heavy discussion, the chiefs stuck together and said, no, we do not recommend signing it. We recommend the President not sign it. There are too many unintended consequences that would come from signing this treaty. The end result is that we didn't sign the treaty. The President took a lot of heat from it, but he made the right call.

DR. CRIST: If memory serves me from the press accounts at the time, you took some heat for your

stance, with some proponents of this treaty writing to you asking you to reconsider "for the children . . ."

GEN KRULAK: Oh, yes. That was another one where it became obvious that the Marine Corps, and therefore the Commandant, were leading the charge on not signing the land mine treaty. So, yes, I got some nasty e-mail and nasty letters. But the issue in my mind had nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of mines. I think we all agree that mines are terrible. In fact, the United States of America had done more to disarm land mines than anybody else. You mentioned getting them out of Guantanamo Bay under the 31st Commandant. We started and removed all of the land mines out of Gitmo. So it is not as though I didn't abhor land mines. My point is there are many countries who are not signatories to the land mine treaty. We would be at a disadvantage. We needed some way to canalize the enemy and to protect ourselves. Certainly, where we were face to face with the enemy, like Korea, we needed some help. I did not see myself as a service chief, as an advisor to the President, giving him wrong advice. So I gave him the best advice I could.

DR. CRIST: On the Guantanamo Bay issue, do you feel comfortable being able to pull them out of there because Cuba is not the threat it once was?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We felt we could pull them out of Guantanamo Bay because the threat was slim to none. Unfortunately, all those mines were doing was getting people killed, Cubans and sometimes Americans. Because of the rain and the gully washes the mines would end up not being where you thought they were. I thought they should come out, and we pulled them out. Equally, if not more important, as a result of our stand, the issue of non-lethals and the solution on how to deal with land mines in the future was given to the Marine Corps. We were tasked to lead the effort to come up with alternatives to land mines.

DR. CRIST: That was then sent down into the War Fighting Lab for action?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, that's right. They are working it right now.

DR. CRIST: On 12 December 1997, you and your wife went down to the keel laying of the USS *Iwo Jima* in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was appropriate because my wife was named the sponsor of the ship, which is very exciting for her.

SESSION XIX

Significant Events: 1998

Impeachment of the President . . . The Heritage Center . . . A new DACOWITS report . . . Standing down ships' Marine detachments . . . The Aviano gondola tragedy . . . Problems with Saddam Hussein . . . A trip to Iwo Jima . . . Bringing together the former Commandants . . . Issues in Pacific Command . . . Manpower to Quantico . . . AAV . . . Operational Maneuver from the Sea Working Group . . . Embassy bombings and military retaliation . . . General Dake as a new Assistant Commandant . . . Standing up Material Command . . . Closer ties with the Israeli military . . . A memorable Senate hearing on military readiness . . . Officer retention . . . Minority officer recruitment . . . Observations about Secretaries Dalton and Danzig . . . Operation Desert Fox.

DR. CRIST: Forging ahead to 1998, sir. The year opened with a major news story, the Monica Lewinsky issue, which would dominate the news for the next year through impeachment in 1999. Do you have any observations or any comment that that you think is pertinent to the historical record on this?

GEN KRULAK: Obviously, within the military, the Marine Corps became a focal point because the media knew what was being reported really went counter to the standards of the Marine Corps. When it came up, there was thought that maybe, in this case, the Commandant of the Marine Corps would come out against the Commander-in-Chief. I go back to the comments I made before about our oath. You are not swearing your allegiance to the President or the Commander-in-Chief. You are swearing to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States." The UCMJ and its strength is derived from the Constitution of the United States. You either obey the Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which tells you how to relate to the Commander-in-Chief, or you don't. It became very simple to me. I don't think you pick and choose what regulations you obey and what regulations you don't. I abhor what he did. I said that in many, many interviews. I said his behavior was despicable. But I never said that he was despicable or disparaged him. Some people have said I should have resigned. I said no. I remind those people of my oath, that I gave to the Constitution and to the oath of office that I took as the Commandant. Although it played a major role in the year and a half that it took, it was never one that caused me as much angst as people thought it was going to cause me.

We did have some officers speak out who many people said showed a lot of moral courage. I say that they were absolutely 180 degrees out. They showed no moral courage. If they had moral courage and they really believed that they could not stand by their oath then they should have quit. They should have resigned. But they didn't have the moral courage to do that. All they had the moral courage to do was to yap about it in the newspaper and then complain when we held them accountable.

DR. CRIST: Certainly people talked about it at the time, particularly with your strong moral stands and personal ethics, but did you ever think in your mind, "I just can't work for this guy?"

GEN KRULAK: No, because I wasn't working for him.

DR. CRIST: You were working for the Constitution?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. . . . I just believe that the oath is written the way it is on purpose. What the oath does is take away personality. It doesn't say, "I solemnly swear or affirm that I will support and defend the Commander-in-Chief." It says "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic." The Constitution was at work. I couldn't go against it. Where else but America could the average person watch their governing document at work? Look what happened. The House of Representatives did an investigation, same as in Article 32, on the action of the President. They then voted, and they voted to impeach him through the articles of impeachment. That's like the grand jury or an

Article 32 saying, yes, there is enough evidence here to take this individual to trial. That's what the articles of impeachment were. It then went over on the other side of the Congress, to the Senate. In walks the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and we had a trial. The President was found innocent. Do I think he is innocent? No. But he was found innocent. It was done under the Constitution of the United States. No other country could have done that. There would have been rioting in the streets. Your oath is to the Constitution, not to the man, so I was able to separate the two. When asked the question, I was always very upfront. He was a despicable act, I abhorred it.

DR. CRIST: This may seem like a bit of an odd question, but with some of the statements made about Richard Nixon during his "troubles" in 1974 in some recent books, did you have any concern that President Clinton might do something irregular to keep from getting impeached or thrown out of office?

GEN KRULAK: No. He was in deep trouble and was keeping the lowest of low profiles.

DR. CRIST: Moving on to Marine Corps specific issues. On 1 January the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, which is a not-for-profit organization designed to support the historical efforts of the Marine Corps, changed its name to the Heritage Foundation as part of a plan to concentrate on doing the Heritage Center on Quantico. You wrote a strong statement in support of it. What was the genesis of this concept, the Heritage Center? Why did you believe it was necessary?

GEN KRULAK: The Heritage Center concept was fathered by Gen Mundy and raised through infancy by him. The idea was there should be, there must be, some place that serves as a repository for the "soul" of the Corps. Where any Marine, former Marine or civilian could actually go and touch who we are and what we have been and what we will be. We don't have that now. It certainly isn't in the current museum building. The American people can't come here and experience Iwo Jima or Belleau Wood. They can look at a little diorama and see something. But, there is nothing here that really captures you. It is nowhere. It is not even big enough to allow that kind of audience. The second point is there is absolutely no reservoir of history anywhere in the Marine Corps where you can go and really do research. You certainly can't say it is at the Washington Navy Yard.

What we were looking for, and what we believe we ought to have, is just what the name implies, a Heritage Center. A single location where the heritage of our precious Corps, the soul of it, would reside, and that people could come from all around the country and all around the world to visit. If they wanted to know what it was like to be a Marine, this is the place to go. It would have archives, it would have things like this oral history. It would have objects to view. But it would also have a state-of-the-art interactive capability so that somebody could not just see Tarawa, but could land in the first wave at Tarawa and really understand what it was to be a Marine. At the same time, a place where students could come and literally go into the archives and find the document they want.

I think the driving factor that impacted Gen Mundy was something that probably even the Historical Division doesn't know. Linda Mundy came over here for a tour of the Historical Division around the 1993-94 time frame. As she toured through the storage area there was a window that was broken so that water and rain and sun could come in. She looked and she could see the direct sunlight hitting a flag -- the flag that was raised over Mount Suribachi. She went and told Gen Mundy, and he went high and to the right. He got a hold of me at MCCDC and told me the story. I said, "Sir, we have got to do something about this." I wrote a letter that essentially said we have got to start moving critical items down to the research center, holding them there until we get something else. Gen Mundy called it a Heritage Center. That idea was fought tooth and nail by the people up here at the museum. They said, "If we go down to Quantico, nobody is going to be able to conduct research here in DC and how are we going to support the Commandant?" I just said to Gen Mundy, "Ask them how many people research are here a week? Ask how many people come here to see our display as opposed to how many come to the Navy museum or how many go to see the museum in Quantico?" We are talking about 100 times more. This isn't even on the bus tour. It is a disgrace. That put me at loggerheads with the Historical Division, and certainly at loggerheads with the then director, Gen Simmons. When I became the Commandant, that loggerhead came to a climax. It ended up with me saying maybe it is time for you to retire, and he did. The Heritage Center will do good things.

DR. CRIST: The Heritage Center concept puts the Marine Corps a step of the rest of the DoD. It would be a way of using history to develop internal perceptions and external perceptions about the

Corps. You could bring staffers from Congress or the Secretary of the Navy, who knew nothing about the Marine Corps, and educate them about the Marine Corps in dramatic way no other service could do.

GEN KRULAK: That is exactly what this is about. That is exactly what it was about.

DR. CRIST: On 20 January, a new report was issued by DACOWITS, as a counter to the Kassebaum-Baker report, which stated that, "Most service members from every service believe that more gender integration of training was needed." Any comment on this?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I called on the Chair of the DACOWITS and basically threw the report on the table and said, this is a disgrace. Here is why it was disgrace, because DACOWITS never went and talked to the Marine Corps. Do you understand that the women who wrote this DACOWITS report never went to MCRD Parris Island. They never talked to any Marine women at Parris Island. It was just an absolute bald face lie, and I told her that. I said it is disgrace. They came back in writing and apologized, and in fact corrected the record, saying, we did not go to the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: You probably put an end to that debate, at least for the foreseeable future?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: On 31 January, the Marine Corps began standing down its ships' detachments. This was a major issue, especially when you think of the naval heritage of the Marine Corps.

GEN KRULAK: It was one of the few things I did that did not have the support of some of the earlier Commandants, to include Gen Mundy. They believed that taking Marines off of Navy ships would damage the relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps. That it was part of our tradition. All very good and strong arguments. My point was simply that the world has changed. First, we're not at an end-strength of 198,000. We're not at 174,000. We were at a QDR level of a 172,800 active duty Marines. We had cut, as I have indicated, beyond the fat, beyond the muscle. We were now into the bone. To have Marines standing duty on a Navy ship that carried no special weapons -- these Marines had no job. They were not guarding nuclear weapons. There was not a validated security post on any Marine det on board

a ship. Our Marines stood outside the captain of the ship's stateroom and his office. They manned the rails when the ship came into port and went out of port. They did mini-parades and silent drill when they were in port. They stood at the brow. But there were no real jobs for them.

DR. CRIST: Purely ceremonial?

GEN KRULAK: Purely ceremonial. Their strength had dropped from 50 to 25. You have one officer and 25 enlisted, times ten, you have 10 officers, 10 or 20 staff non-commissioned officers, and 250 troops. That is a good portion of an infantry battalion that we were putting on board these ships. At the same time, every report coming out of every counter-terrorist study being done was singing the praises of something called, the FAST companies. What we did was take these Marines and give them to the Fleet CinC as a FAST outfit. The Chief of Naval Operations was very much against this. But the Secretary of the Navy had also read the results of the counter-terrorist studies, said we ought to try to do this. More importantly, the CinCs loved it. They saw the Marines standing on board a carrier as nothing -- they weren't specially trained, whereas the FAST companies were very, very well trained. They wanted something that was relevant. The Secretary of the Navy, combined with these positive reports from the counter-terrorist studies, plus the strength of the Fleet CinCs, allowed us to eventually get the Marines off of the Navy shipping. Is it too bad? Is it the end of a tradition? Yes. Is it so bad that it obviates the tremendous benefits that come from a FAST company? No. We did it, and I'm glad we did it.

DR. CRIST: In February, the Okinawa government, Governor Oto, announced his opposition to a proposed floating sea base facility in Oro Bay. What was this floating sea base? Is it still a concept in development?

GEN KRULAK: This all was tied to the Japanese and U.S. governments' efforts to move Futenma to another location. One of the proposals was a floating sea base facility. I wasn't for it or against it. The Marine Corps and the United States government had a very specific statement they made. We don't care what kind of facility we get so long as it has all of the requirements that we have articulated that the new facility must have. We cannot have a lesser capability. If you want to go to a floating sea base, do it. If you want to go to a landfill, do it. We don't care what you do. That's your decision. It just must have the right capability.

But Oto didn't want anything. Oto wants the Marines off the island.

DR. CRIST: So this would have been something the government of Japan would have built.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: Was there any movement on this floating base?

GEN KRULAK: I think they are still debating this. Again, we don't care. We are not even in the debate. We want the full capability of a Futenma. Whether it goes afloat or goes semi-afloat or goes part on-shore, part offshore, we don't care. It just has to have the right capability.

DR. CRIST: The next thing to get to, sir, is the incident that happened on 3 February 1998, when a Marine A-6B prowler accidentally cut a cable holding a ski gondola, which plummeted, killing 20 Italians. The A-6B was flying out of Aviano, Italy. The pilot and navigator, Capt Richard J. Ashby and Joseph P. Sweitzer faced court marshal, had an Article 32 hearing, and were brought up on charges: manslaughter and obstruction of justice. What are your recollections of this tragic event?

GEN KRULAK: First off, this was one of the most difficult issues that the Marine Corps had to face during my tenure as a Marine Commandant. An issue that wasn't associated with warfighting or the budget. It was just a very tough time because it lasted for months. It would have been a lot worse had we not from the very beginning made it totally open to everybody. The greatest example of that, I think, was the Article 32 investigation and the court marshal itself. There were hundreds of news media there on the first day of the Article 32 and the first day of the first court marshal. Hundreds, foreign and domestic. We made a conscious decision that this would be the most open hearing ever been held by any service. We believed that the only way that we could come out of this tragedy would be if we, as a Marine Corps, said we were going to give you, whether you are an Italian press or a U.S. press, total visibility on everything that is happening. You can judge whether the United States Marine Corps does the right thing. We went to the extent that we opened up the hearing room to the press. Overflow press were placed in a tent where we fed in live video and sound of what was going on in the hearing room. We put in the tent and in the hearing room, a public affairs officer who was also a lawyer. If the press had any questions they

reviewed hard data from a lawyer who could speak with some authority.

DR. CRIST: So if they didn't know what was going on in the proceeding, he could explain it to them?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. The lawyer would explain what was going on. It made a major difference. On the first day there were hundreds of people. By the end of the third day, there were only about five or six. The press, which could have just been devastating to the Marine Corps, was in fact pretty fair. We would have spikes every time a decision was made, and there would be those who would be unhappy with a specific decision but the bottom line was, it was completely open to the public.

Were they flying recklessly? The court said no. I'm not the court. I say when you are flying 150 miles an hour above the speed limit, when you are flying and you hit a cable that is 1700 feet below your minimum altitude, and you had just done a barrel roll within two minutes of hitting that cable, yes, I would say they were flying recklessly.

DR. CRIST: Any idea for why the acquittal? Was it just better lawyers . . .

GEN KRULAK: Better lawyers, better lawyers. The government has got to prove them guilty. They put in a lot of things: their radar altimeter; the testimony of the pilots; the fact that the gondola wasn't on the map. All of these things, though not central to the argument, caused enough doubt so that the pilots were found not guilty of manslaughter. The fact that the radar altimeter didn't work -- again, the reality was we tested it and it did work. But even if it didn't work, the rules stated that if an altimeter was faulty, the aircraft was to immediately climb to 2,000 feet. The pilots claimed that they thought that the height restriction was 1,000 versus 2,000 feet. The reality is different. For in the cockpit itself they found documentation that said 2,000 feet. There are just a lot of things. But there was so much controversy swirling that the defense made a good case. That's the way the Uniform Code of Military Justice and our legal system works. You are innocent until you are proven guilty.

My thrust all along, and you can probably tell it by some of the e-mails, was that these men were Marines, they were Marine officers, and they were innocent until proven guilty. They would be treated like Marine officers and we would support their families, we would support their spouses. That's what we tried to do.

DR. CRIST: You said that almost verbatim in a letter to Sweitzer's mother. It was obvious from the gist of your e-mails that first and foremost you wanted to make sure they were treated fairly, they weren't going to get railroaded. Was this one of the reasons why you wanted them out of Italy as quick as possible to come back to the US to face any charges?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. My belief was that these were Marine officers, and that I believed it was a Marine Corps issue and certainly a United States issue. I was concerned that they were over in Italy away from their support system, and I wanted them back here. I did everything in my power to get them back here. It became even more important when, for safety reasons, they were restricted to Aviano Air Base. My point to the Department of State was that if safety was such a concern that they be restricted to base, than I wanted them brought home.

DR. CRIST: One of the unfortunate asides of this, which led to the obstruction of justice issue, was the destruction of the videotape taken in the cockpit. Wasn't another CO relieved for doing something similar at Aviano?

GEN KRULAK: You are talking about the relief of LtCol "Muddy" Waters several months after the gondola tragedy. LtCol Waters basically inferred to his officers that if they had any tapes taken when they were in Aviano to destroy them. That took place here in the United States. That was a completely different squadron. The squadron CO of the squadron that Ashby and Sweitzer, were in was a great officer who I had tremendous respect for. He stood by his people, but absolutely would not have said anything like that. He was very hurt when he found out that there had been a tape and that it had been destroyed.

DR. CRIST: That was done completely without his knowledge?

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely, completely without his knowledge.

DR. CRIST: But news of what LtCol Water's said broke because of the Aviano incident?

GEN KRULAK: That's correct.

DR. CRIST: The last thing, just for the record, did you feel any pressure from the Department of State or the Italians to come down hard on the pilots?

GEN KRULAK: I absolutely felt no pressure from the President of the United States, from the Secretary of State, from the Secretary of Defense, from the Secretary of the Navy, absolutely zero pressure. If I had felt pressure, I think my track record would have shown that I would have told them to get stuffed! My entire effort was to find out what really happened and have justice be done. Do the right thing. The bottom line is when the first press came out on the trial, the lead article in *The Washington Post*, the most liberal of all papers, applauded the Marine Corps' handling of this case. People may disagree with the verdicts. People disagree with verdict in many cases. That's not the issue. The issue is was it done right? Was there a trial? Was all the evidence made available? Yes! Did we try to cover up anything? The answer was no!

DR. CRIST: The Italians were satisfied too?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: In your papers, you received some very strange e-mails from a Richard McPherson on the Aviano tragedy. They may not be that important, but they "jump out" at you when going through your personal papers.

GEN KRULAK: First of all, you need to know I was getting e-mails every day, lots of them, saying one, I was bad, and the Marines were bad for whitewashing this terrible tragedy, or two the Marine Corps was bad and I was bad for prosecuting and persecuting these poor, innocent aviators. There were two different sides of the spectrum. McPherson's first e-mail to me was very professionally done, asking some very good questions and so I made the mistake of answering it. It turns out that Richard McPherson is crazier than a hoot owl and ended up going to the trial and is writing a book on it. He was chastised in the court by the judge. He was an outcast in the news room. They just think he is a buffoon. If you read him, he is insulting. He is real bad. But he is more than strange, and his e-mails are more than strange. They are bad.

DR. CRIST: Changing subjects sir. In February, the U.S. was hours from launching an air attack on Iraq until Saddam Hussein made a deal with Kofi Annan to allow UN inspectors back in to Iraq, a

continuing saga of post-Desert Storm. First, I like to get your views on Iraq during this time?

GEN KRULAK: This was a big deal. When you say massive, we were going to put it to them. We had several options that were briefed to us on multiple occasions by Gen Zinni, Commander of Central Command. The options went from a pin prick all the way to a sledge hammer. The one that was eventually chosen was probably more like a ball peen hammer. But it would have been much more powerful than any aerial attack we had done since the Gulf War.

We were again being backed into a corner by Iraq. My view was like that of Gen Zinni: the administrations' view of conflict resolution was "launch Madeleine or launch the Tomahawk." That was our foreign policy, send in Madeleine or send in a Tomahawk, thus wasting the other elements of national power. The other elements that make us great. So I think both Gen Zinni and I felt that we made no real attempt to use psychological operations, no real attempt to use our economic strength in conjunction with the Gulf Coast countries. What we were about ready to do, if we had carried out that attack, would be to basically end our relationship in the Gulf. We were going to this because Saddam Hussein had stonewalled us. We were about ready to sever our relationship with all of the coalition countries because they weren't going to put up with the size of our attack. We weren't going to be able to fly out of Saudi Arabia. We had no support from any of the Gulf Coast countries. If we did the attack, it would be almost totally unilateral. The British would be with us, but no other coalition country.

I was very concerned and articulated those concerns in the Tank. So did Tony Zinni. At the end game, we were going to do it with as much support as we could and a lot of conversation. I think that one of the things is that Saddam Hussein, because we had talked with so many people, knew this thing was coming and knew it wasn't going to be a pinprick. So he went and accepted Kofi Annan's proposal.

DR. CRIST: The Clinton administration was in a hurry to do that operation, They were still flying in the aircraft, which was supposed to be part of the operation, as it attack was about to begin.

GEN KRULAK: That is exactly what was going to happen. Part of the problem was the timing between Ramadan. We were only going to have a very small window to do it.

DR. CRIST: A former Marine major by the name of Scott Ritter, who later would write a book, *The End Game*, resigned from the UN over the administration's and the UN's policies. Any thoughts of Ritter or his claims?

GEN KRULAK: I didn't know anything about him. The fact that he was a former Marine didn't play in the Tank and didn't play in my thinking--he wasn't on my scope.

DR. CRIST: From 31 March-18 April you went on your WestPac trip. Anything stand out in your mind about this?

GEN KRULAK: I went to the Island of Iwo Jima and filmed the birthday video for the 223d birthday of the Corps. What was interesting on that trip, we took the family of the Corpsman who helped raised the flag on Iwo Jima. One of the six who participated in that historic event. We took the mother and all the brothers back there. It was a really emotional time. I think it bled over into the video because I had a tough time with that. I got emotional on the video but it was as a result of the trip with the Bradley family.

DR. CRIST: You've been to Iwo Jima a number of times, it seems to be a touchstone for Charles Krulak?

GEN KRULAK: It's just so small an island and so dominated by Suribachi that you just have to ask yourself, how in the world did we ever take it? The answer was the unbelievable courage and sacrifice by Marines. On one colored beach they lost a thousand people in 24 hours. The only battle in the history of the Marine Corps when we lost more than our enemy. Over a quarter of the medals of honor earned by a Marine were earned right there. It is just a phenomenal place.

DR. CRIST: On 7-8 May, five former Commandants joined you at 8th and I in the first such gathering of all the former Commandants. Only two couldn't attend, Gen Greene because of health and Gen Gray said he had a schedule conflict. What do you recall about this historic meeting? Why did you set it up in the first place? You mentioned in an e-mail to Col. Appleton about two items that stood out in your mind, Gen Barrow saying that he pushed for Gen Johnston for CMC over you, and Gen Kelley talking about the deaths in Beirut?

GEN KRULAK: I set it up in the first place because of my love for the Marine Corps and my love of history and my love for my Commandants and what they had done for the Corps. It is interesting that not all Commandants love each other. I mean, they are not all great friends. Not that they hate each other, but that circumstances cause them, for whatever reason, to fall out of favor with each other or to have hard feelings.. I felt that each Commandant played a very special role in the growth of our Corps. That each brought a special talent to the Commandancy. That each were "perfect" for their time because each of them are magnificent men in their own right and who did wonderful things for the Corps, they ought to be together. We invited them to a two-day event that included -- a briefing by members of my staff, bringing them up to speed on the Corps thru a dinner. At the dinner, I was able to place one of the former Commandants at each of the tables occupied by our newly selected brigadier generals. It was wonderful. We had a parade in their honor, where they all stood up and received honors. Gen Greene did not make it because of his illness. Gen Gray did not make it because he was out of town. That's a story unto itself, because by not coming, he caused some ill will. I believe it was instrumental in getting him to come the next time we all got together, which was the day of the passage of command from myself to Gen Jones. At that time we had Gen Greene, Gen Chapman, Gen Wilson, Gen Barrow, Gen Kelley, Gen Gray, Gen Mundy, Gen Krulak, and Gen Jones, nine Commandants. You'll never see that again. You'll never see that again.

Right before the parade, Gen Barrow asked to see me alone. We went off, and he said, "Look, Chuck, I want you to know that I supported Bob Johnston to be the 31st Commandant. You need to know that up front. I supported him. But," he said, "You also need to know that I do not believe that he could have done the job any better than you have done. I just wanted you to know how proud I am of you." I was very taken aback. What he was basically saying was he didn't want any friction between us. So he was saying, I am being up front with you. I supported Bob Johnston. But the fact of the matter is, he could not have done a better job than you have done. I support you and you can count on me. I count him a dear friend, and he was a great supporter to me as a Commandant.

The Gen Kelly issue was very important. We were having a roundtable discussion up in the H. M. Smith conference room in the Pentagon, and LtGen Marty Steele, was briefing the asymmetric threat of the 21st century. Gen Kelley interrupted

and said, "This is a very key point, what Gen Steele is saying about an asymmetric enemy . . ." He added about needing to understand the threat, because "I lost Marines" -- he then talked about Beirut -- "because I" -- being Kelley -- "did not fully understand." It stopped everything dead in its tracks, and we all took a breath. We continued to talk. But it was P.X. Kelley, probably for the first time in his life, in front of all of these people that had been important to him-- the former Commandants -- advise him he did not fully understand what was happening in Beirut. The fact is, none of us did at that time. He basically said, you know, mea culpa. A powerful impact on all of the rest of the Commandants. After the parade was over, we started escorting people out. I was escorting Gen Barrow out. Gen Kelly was still out on the parade deck talking to some people. We got about half way out of the barracks when Gen Barrow said, wait a minute. He turned around and he walked back up. P.X. Kelley was talking to somebody. He tapped P.X. Kelley on the shoulder, and Kelley turned around, and Barrow hugged him. It was a powerful thing to see. From that day on, Gen Kelley came to anything that I asked him to attend. Gen Kelley, since the day he stopped being Commandant, rarely went to anything. He showed up at a Marine birthday party for the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation. If I asked him to come to something, he'd come. So this was a big deal. This former Commandants' gathering was a good one. It was a very healing time. I'm not saying it happened because of me. I think it happened because they all realized how important they were to each other and how each one of them had done such great things for the Marine Corps. It was very important.

DR. CRIST: To get into Gen Krulak's personality a bit, I think it would have been hard for this healing to have taken place with Gen Kelley without your personality and your propensity of "bringing together."

GEN KRULAK: On this one, I knew this was either going to be a disaster or it was going to be great, and it turned out to be great. It turned out to be great not because of me, but because these are great men. Each one of them in their own right is a great man. Chapman is a great man, Wilson and Barrow. Those two were magnificent Commandants. Kelley had a very tough incident in his commandancy, but if you look at what he accomplished, he is the guy who brought all the gear to the Marine Corps. He is the guy who gave

us the Humvee. He refurbished the Corps. These are great people.

DR. CRIST: In May 1998, you sent an e-mail to Gen Fulford about an Adm Denny Blair who would be the next CinCPac, warning him to be careful about him, even going so far as to mention, the politics behind him were amazing. What were the issues behind Denny Blair?

GEN KRULAK: The issue behind Denny Blair was his role as the Director of the Joint Staff. The Marine nominee for CinCPac was LtGen Marty Steele. There was absolutely no one better qualified than Marty Steele. Marty Steele had served in III MEF and he knew that theater. Marty Steele had served in the J-3 in Korea and knew the area well. Marty Steele had served as the J-5 at CinCPac and was highly respected. Had spent a large portion of his career in the Pacific, knew all of the heads of state, all of the ministers of defense, of all the countries in the area. He was the guy. There was no better person to do it.

Denny Blair had no qualifications. Denny Blair had spent one small portion of his career in the Pacific. But Denny Blair was the Director of the Joint Staff and had been seen in the White House. It was just politics. If there was ever a case of the best person being so obvious it wasn't funny. That best person was Marty Steele. Picking somebody who was not a warfighter and absolutely didn't have the qualifications that Marty Steele did, was strictly politics. It was just sad. Denny Blair was not a great friend of the Marine Corps, nor was he a great enemy. But I just said to Carl, you need to understand what is coming out there, not as somebody you have got to worry about, but somebody you have to educate. You are going to have to do a lot of educating for this chap.

DR. CRIST: The following month -- you also sent an e-mail to Gen Fulford essentially saying to watch out for the Army, they are in search of missions, and specifically in the NEO mission. What was this about?

GEN KRULAK: The Army, after almost three years, realized what we were doing in the Pacific. They saw that all of a sudden we had basing capability in Thailand, in the Philippines, Australia and Malaysia and Indonesia. We were in Japan, Korea. They were saying what has happened here? They realized that they needed to get active. The one area that they felt they could jump into right away, was evacuation of non-combatants, NEOs. I was just saying to Fulford, be careful. Don't let

these folks back in. We have done a good job of articulating the Marine Corps relevance in the Pacific. We are the most relevant, with the Navy and the Marine Corps team as shipmates. Nobody could beat us, so don't let anybody try. Don't even open the door for them.

DR. CRIST: On 29 May, sir, you mentioned your initiatives with the French, which were quite extraordinary. On 29 May, when you were out there for the 80th anniversary of Belleau Wood, you were made an honorary corporal in the French army, which from what I understand, is a very rare event?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Understand that this is an honorary corporal in something called the 9th Dima of the French army, which is an elite force, basically field marshals. It was an honor given to me at a fort on the French coast, upon the ramparts. I sewed that chevron onto my dress blue uniform and I wore that chevron on my dress blues to the 80th anniversary of Belleau Wood. As we walked across the cemetery in a long line with all of the distinguished guests, you could see the French people and the French military doing multiple double takes as the Marine Commandant crossed the parade deck with a French army corporal chevron on his dress blue tunic. They took a picture of me, and it appeared in *Leatherneck* magazine. I had to answer a lot of young PFC's questions as to what the heck that was on my shoulder! From then on, whenever I went to France, I would sew the chevron onto my greens or on to my blues.

DR. CRIST: On 11 June 1998 you were briefed on the move of Manpower to Quantico?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I got briefed on the move of the Manpower Reserve Affairs Department, from the Navy Annex, to their new building at Quantico. We decided to name the building after a retired Marine colonel and former SES. Deputy Chief of Staff for M&RA, Jim Marsh. The building was dedicated on the sixth of August with his wife in attendance. It was a pretty emotional time. Jim Marsh was known and loved by everybody.

DR. CRIST: This is one of the first, it was the first building in the Marine Corps named after a guy primarily who is a civilian?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. But Jim Marsh was not primarily a "civilian." He spent 30 years as an officer of Marines and had served in combat in

Korea and Vietnam. He was an infantryman and a warrior.

DR. CRIST: In July, the Marine Corps approved a new design of the AAV and it moved into production, had the first prototype I guess out last year. You were instrumental in getting the program started while down at MCCDC.¹

GEN KRULAK: The AAV is the future of a Marine Corps, is a fighting vehicle and ship to shore vehicle. It is part of the triad of capability needed to execute Operational Maneuver from the Sea. It goes through the water at 27 knots. It has a overland mobility of an M1A2 tank. It has a nuclear, biological, and chemical over-pressure system, not only for the crew but for all of the people in the back, all of the infantry. It has the finest 30-millimeter gun in existence as its main armament. It has composite armor. It is an unbelievable weapons system. This was a significant event because this said we were moving into the 21st Century. It was a big deal.

DR. CRIST: Moving on to the next generation, not just talking about it?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: That same month, you received a brief by the Operational Maneuver from the Sea Working Group.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was headed by MajGen Pat [Patrick G.] Howard. The idea of the OMFTS Working Group was to apply the tenants of Operation Maneuver from the Sea to the operational concepts and equipment requirements of the Marine Corps in the 21st century. To serve as the springboard for the Force Structure Planning Group, which we convened in 1999. The OMFTS Working Group was really important because it was the first time in the Marine Corps sat down and said okay, we've got this concept called OMFTS. It's driving requirements. Now let's get specific. Do we have the operational concepts? Do we have the equipment? Do we have the people in the numbers necessary? What is the OMFTS concept going to look like? Give me a ball park figure of what the Corps would look like. When will we be able to execute OMFTS? When we answered these questions through the OMFTSWG, effort, we were

able to use that as the foundation for the FSPG '99 which was another key effort. You can see what we were trying to do. We started with the Commandant's Planning Guidance in an effort to get our Corps focused on the 21st century. We got halfway through the commandancy and began to get change institutionalized. Now we needed to put the doctrine, organization, training, equipment and support into a clearly defined requirement to turn our vision into a reality. The first thing we did was the Force Structure Planning Group efforts to free up the people to make the initial investment back into the Fleet Marine Force. Then came the OMFTS Working Group's effort that said here is where we are and here is where we need to go and here is what the organization will look like. We worked the Corps to be in a position that when I turned over the reins to the 32d Commandant, he would be in position to initiate the changes necessary to get OMFTS going. To give the 32d Commandant the ability to "pick and choose" from a study that was rigorous and truly accepted by his Corps. If he needed or desired to make changes, he would do so off an established plan. Budgets change—world events change, so the new commandant needed/must have the ability to make changes. This effort would give him a baseline from which to make changes.

DR. CRIST: On 7 August the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam, were bombed, killing over 250 people, including one of the Marine sergeants on MSG duty. What are your recollections of this?

GEN KRULAK: The bottom line is you had the two embassies destroyed, great loss of life. In both instances the first question that came to my mind was "were any of my Marines hurt or killed in the tragedy?" As you know, we had one killed, several injured, to include the wife of the Det OIC. She had a sliver of glass enter her eye, and she had to be medevaced. The second question was, "How did they perform their duties?" They were magnificent. They did a superb job, great heroism, great reaction. At the time, or shortly thereafter, there was an initial hue and cry that the Marines were not helping the indigenous people recover bodies, . . . that we were not taking the humanitarian action that was expected. The reality was the Marines were doing everything in their power to help everybody. They were not picking out U.S. citizens versus Kenyan citizens. Most importantly, what was interpreted as callousness was really them doing their job, making sure that security was taken. After a period of time, the reports came back very

¹ For more information on this, see Interview with Col Blake Robertson USMC, 22, 26 June 2001, Marine Corps Oral History Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

positive about how courageous and how attentive to their duties our Marines were. Certainly through the State Department chain we were getting nothing but rave reviews about their performance. We were sad to lose a Marine, but he gave his life going back to rescue a fellow Marine.

DR. CRIST: Shortly after this, on 20 August, the U.S. retaliated for this with a Tomahawk missile strike in Afghanistan at Osama bin Laden's Training Camp and a pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan. The attack on the Sudanese factory was controversial. I'd just like to get your view on the retaliation. There were a number of reports in the press at the time that the service chiefs were left out of the loop, not even informed it was going to happen until the last minute. True?

GEN KRULAK: That's not true. I was on leave at the time. But the Assistant Commandant and OpsDep were both kept in the loop, particularly the Assistant Commandant. It is kind of interesting that normally -- and I think I may have shared this earlier -- normally in Tank sessions, you have the service chiefs, the Chairmen, the Vice Chairmen, and then a bunch of strap hangers, the Director, Joint Staff, the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff, the Assistant the chairman, perhaps some intel people. They sit along the outside ring. If the Secretary of Defense is there, they have his assistants to include the military assistant. Well, for all of the discussions involving the retaliatory attacks in the Sudan they were held in a closed session with no strap hangers, none whatsoever. So there were no leaks, and therefore, the press didn't get wind of it. So the press was surprised. One of the rumors going around was that not only was the press surprised, but the Joint Chiefs were surprised. That this was done without their knowledge. That is not accurate. What was accurate was the timing. Normally the chiefs participate in discussion closer to the actual incident, no later than a week or two away. Well, this time we were a couple of days away. I was driving back up to Washington with my wife in the car watching my watch. I had the radio on to one of the all day news channels. I told my wife, "In the next five minutes, we should have an exciting newscast." I didn't tell her what it was going to be. Five minutes later, they started talking about the strike. The reason I knew it was because I had been talking to the Assistant Commandant and he had alerted me this was going to take place and the time it was to take place. So for people to say we didn't know about it was incorrect.

DR. CRIST: Had the service chiefs been in the decision loop, or was this from Gen Zinni as CinC Central Command to the JCS, with some information to the service chiefs?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, no. We were in the loop. Zinni came up to brief the JCS. I wear two hats. I'm the Commandant of the Marine Corps, which is a service chief, and I'm a sitting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A CinC doesn't do something without talking to the Joint Chiefs. The point is the service chief sits as a member of the Joint Chiefs. The day the service chief allows a CinC to bypass the Joint Chiefs will be the day that service chief ought to quit. So, should the Chairman! We hold the CinC pretty well accountable as a member of the Joint Chiefs. My problem with the service chief/CinC relationship, was a single one. The CinC wrote checks on my checkbook. Whether it was for money, whether it was for people, whether it was for high demand/low density pieces of equipment, it didn't make any difference. I just didn't like them writing checks on my checkbook without me playing in the decision, and me playing in it, not only as a member of the joint chiefs, but also as a service chief.

DR. CRIST: On 26 August, Gen Terence R. Dake assumed the position as your new Assistant Commandant, replacing Gen Neal.

GEN KRULAK: The first reason I picked Gen Dake is that he had a great wealth of experience. I had seen him in Desert Storm, where I thought he was truly one of the unsung heroes of Desert Storm. While at Desert Storm, he had suffered some kind of a medical problem that caused the whole side of his face to collapse. He was encouraged him to go home. But he stayed as the G3 of the air wing and just did a magnificent job. So I watched him there and saw his great physical courage and strength of the man, and was impressed. I then saw him as a wing commander where he did a great job. I saw him as Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, where he was doing a great job. I watched him as the deputy CG at MCCDC. All of these things helped to make him more of a rounded Marine and not just an "aviator." So when it came time to pick Butch Neal's relief, I picked Terry.

At the same time, it was good to get an aviator back into the position. I had Rich Hearnsey to begin with, and when Rich left I brought in Butch Neal. I'm not saying that the aviation community had problems with Butch. But they have always thought that it is they were not going to have a commandant, they wanted the assistant

commandant. So it was good to get an aviator back into that position. Also, he brought a great wife. Sue Dake is a wonderful lady, just like Kathy Neal, who had been there, done that, and got the t-shirt on all of the spousal issues. So it was just great to have her as part of the team. It was a very positive day and I was very happy to have Terry as the Assistant Commandant. He did a magnificent job carrying out some very difficult tasks. I'm sure that a year from now, when he retires, Jim Jones will say the same thing about him, that he did just a magnificent job.

DR. CRIST: Did you plan on using him the same way you did Gen Neal?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Used him exactly the same way. The days of tasking the Assistant Commandant to handle one segment of the Marine Corps is over. To be effective, the Assistant Commandant has got to be working the very issues that the Commandant is working. Terry did it and did it very well.

DR. CRIST: In the past, some viewed an aviator ACMC as almost a "super" DCS/Air.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I think those days are gone. They certainly were under my commandancy. The ACMC served, literally, as the number two man, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. I did a lot of traveling, so the ACMC played a major role.

DR. CRIST: Next month, on 1 September, the Marine Corps Material Command was established in Albany, Georgia. You mentioned at earlier that the idea for this command was really driven home during your experiences during Desert Storm

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It was established because of a problem that was highlighted in Desert Storm, but was known by most logisticians before that. As I mentioned, the problem was simply that there was no single entity that watched over the life cycle of ground equipment in the Marine Corps. You had the program managers at Marine Corps Systems Command responsible for the programs up to a certain point. At a certain point, they would take that program and throw it over a brick wall, and the people at Albany would catch that program and deal with it for the rest of its life. The trouble is there was no specifics as to when the program managers were to throw the program over this brick wall. No matter how many tweaks we made to the system, you still couldn't tell. I think I already

recounted the story of when this came to a head during Desert Storm. The nine-ton trucks that we had started having problems in the desert with their axles breaking?

DR. CRIST: Yes, sir.

GEN KRULAK: After the war, Jim Brabham and I and a few others sat down to do a post-mortem, and out of that post-mortem came the idea that, there was no cradle to grave for ground equipment. We are the only service that didn't have it. That resulted in a working group put together and headed by a Colonel John O'Donovan. The result of that study was a recommendation that we have a Material Command. That came to Brabham, I&L and then the Commandant. I was the brand new Commandant. We looked at it and said it was a good thing. We briefed it at a three-star off site and we briefed it at a general officer's symposium. We got buy-in.

The only issue was where was it going to be located. Would it be located in Washington, D.C. or would it be located in Albany? The I&L folks, the System Command folks, wanted it to be located either in Washington or at Quantico. Albany, of course, wanted it in Albany. Jim Brabham and I looked at this issue and got our operations people involved. The bottom line is we felt that the Material Command ought to go to Albany, and that the three star logistician general ought to be at Albany. Now why would you want to do that? Well, because one of our long-term visions is to build a true synergy between the Blount Island Command and the logistics base in Albany. Right now, Blount Island and Albany work hand in hand because of the MPF. What I wanted to do was build Blount Island Command and work very hard with the Congress of the United States, specifically Congresswoman Tilly Fowler to buy Blount Island. In fact, as I walk out of the commandancy, we are well on the way to buying it. If you could buy Blount Island and all that goes with it, and tie that together with Albany, you would have unquestionably perhaps the greatest logistics organization of any of the services. Here you have the way we fight, logistics-wise, tied to the MPF. By having a Material Command at Albany and by acquiring Blount Island, we would have a single general controlling the life cycle of everything that is on the MPF ships as well as everything that was out in the FMF on a day-to-day basis. To me, great synergy could be derived from such a "marriage."

Another reason for having it down in Albany was the politics. There is no question who comes from Georgia. Not just the former chairman Sam

Nunn, you have Max Cleland, you have all of these people who are key members of multiple committees. The Floyd Spence's of the world.

The problem was I had no three star to put down there. Why didn't I have a three star to put down there? Because Jim Jones, when he went to be the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, took the 3 stars with him. His position with Secretary Cohen was not exempted head space. His job was really a one star job. Jim was a three star when he went there, but he was filling a one star T/O. Secretary Cohen wanted Jim Jones. When I went to Secretary Cohen and asked for an exemption for Jim, he replied that he was reluctant to go to Congress and ask them to approve an exemption. I believed that it was important for Jim and the Corps to have the job so we let him go. In doing so, lost a 3 star position within the Corps. When Jim Brabham retired, his 3 star position went to Jim Jones. We went through my entire commandancy with I&L as a two star and with the CG Material Command as a two star. If I had that third star, I would have put it down at Albany.

DR. CRIST: I&L would have remained a two star?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. As it turns out, I understand that Jim Jones is making I&L the 3 star and Material Command the two star. I have told him that is a bad idea. He wants the 3 star up at I&L because he is uncomfortable with having his three star out of Washington. I told him I went for three years without a three star at all in the logistics community. Believe me, the two star can do the job of I&L. Jim felt uncomfortable with his senior logistician being so far away. Technology has made it so there is no distance problem. It should not be an issue. I'm not the Commandant, Jim Jones is the Commandant. He has chosen to do it his way. The problem that is caused by this decision is that we have restricted the CG, Material Command. He does not have the horsepower to manage the day-to-day life cycle of such a large part of the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: Doesn't that defeat the purpose for the Material Command?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. But the bottom line is Material Command will continue, and it is a good thing. It will be very positive for the Marine Corps. Like anything else, it is going to take a while to get going. But when it does, it will prove to be a very positive thing.

DR. CRIST: Just for the record, the Blount Island Command is what, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Well, Blount Island Command is where we do all of our maintenance and upgrading of the MPS equipment. It is where the MPS ship comes in, gets its gear refurbished, it gets the ammunition exchanged, it gets the batteries exchanged. It is the home base for MPF ships and equipment.

DR. CRIST: So Material Command would track the weapons system from development all the way through to the war fighters?

GEN KRULAK: That's right. Everybody knows where to go. It is the life cycle management from cradle to grave.

DR. CRIST: On 28 August to 8 September, you traveled to both Israel and the UK.

GEN KRULAK: I was the first Commandant to go to Israel in years. I was trying to open up the Israeli Defense Force to a relationship with the Marine Corps. They had minimal relationship with the Marine Corps. We trained in Israel, and sometimes we did a little cross training, but normally at a very, low level. I wanted to become their counterpart. I wanted them to understand that we, the Marine Corps, were more like the Israeli Defense Force than the Army, and that if they really wanted to get in bed with a U.S. military service, they ought to get in bed with the Marine Corps. So I spent a great deal of time talking with generals from the Israeli Defense Force, air force, and army. I visited multiple units, spent time on the Golan Heights, down with the division commanders and took part in many special ceremonies. One ceremony was when they commissioned their tank officers. They do it in a beautiful ceremony, and I was invited to attend it, which was quite an honor.

For me, one of the greatest parts of that visit was when we traveled to Masada. We used that visit as a tie between the ethos of the IDF and the ethos of the Marines. We took Marines from the security guard detachment with us. I re-enlisted the OIC of that detachment on top of Masada. He was Jewish himself. That was a very emotional event. Of course the Israelis loved it. We went up there in utilities. We took the Marine color and the national flag, our stars and stripes, and we did the reenlistment right on top of Masada. It was just a great event.

Bottom line, we had multiple meetings that ended up in an Memorandum of Understanding

between the Israeli Defense Force and the United States Marine Corps, that basically said we're with you, not with the U.S. Army. As a result, I sent LtGen Marty Steele over there. I sent the Assistant Commandant over there. We have had general after general going over to continue to build on our relationship. Now we have major exercises, training exercises, with the Israelis, both air and ground. It was very positive.

DR. CRIST: What were the politics, particularly with State on this? There has always been unique relationship with Israel, very close politically, but distant militarily.

GEN KRULAK: Well, the State Department was concerned. As you recall, there was concern about Osama bin Laden. We had just hit them, and everybody was worried about security, including my own office. They were worried about whether I should I go or not. We ended up going, and I took my wife. It was a great trip. I went there as a military officer, spoke like a military officer, talked military issues. If I talked on a political issue, I was very up front and honest with them. That kind of took people by surprise, to include our own State Department. I think they appreciated it. The Israelis were very excited about us coming. We were over there exercising within two months after I left, to include air as well as ground.

DR. CRIST: What do you think the Marine Corps has gained or did gain from training with the Israelis?

GEN KRULAK: Combined exercises. Great live fire, great exposure to different types of leadership, different types of weapons systems, different terrain. We don't have a monopoly on how to fight. So anything that we can do to learn how to fight better is good.

DR. CRIST: It ties in with what you said about your issues with the French and how in fact in we are closer in size than the Army.

GEN KRULAK: That was our selling point with all of the countries we visited. I would tell them that if they wanted to tailor themselves after a service for the 21st century, pick the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: You found the Israelis equally attuned as the French?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, absolutely. They had the CPG translated. They knew about the Three Block

War. They had been watching. They sent observers to Hunter and Urban Warrior. There wasn't anybody -- the Dutch, the French, the Israelis, the New Zealanders, the Brits, the Australians, who weren't watching the Marine Corps.

DR. CRIST: This jumps back a bit, on 5 February, you, the CNO, and SecNav briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee on Readiness and Defense Posture on readiness issues. You made it clear that the Marine Corps needed \$500 million in new additional funding. You said, "we have been in very dire straits in our procurement account." On 15 and 29 September, you and the other service chiefs went back and testified again for the Senate Arms Service Committee and said, we're in trouble and if we don't get more funding, the readiness is going to suffer. Senator McCain pushed the services on why they had not mentioned this in February. During that 29 September testimony you gave a line that made headlines where you said, "all I have is my integrity . . ." Essentially, I am not lying to you, Senator. What do you recall of this and how did it develop?

GEN KRULAK: That goes way back before February. It goes back to Carl E. Mundy, who started beating the drum regarding the health of the Corps versus the wellness of the Corps. We were healthy, but we were healthy at the expense of wellness. We were healthy readiness-wise because we were using our procurement money to maintain near term readiness.

My first hearing before the House and the Senate I continued to beat that drum. That is why, as I think I have already articulated, I got myself in trouble. From the very beginning, I took Gen Mundy's theme and went even further. I didn't just talk about procurement. I said that the budget, the President's budget, was inadequate to maintain a relevant Marine Corps. I never stopped saying that till the day I left. So after the QDR and after everybody had taken all of their cuts we still did not have enough money to have a relevant Marine Corps, or a relevant Army, Navy or Air Force. But the other service chiefs weren't saying that. Only one was saying it, and it was the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Finally, we had a meeting with the SecDef at a CinC's conference where the Joint Chiefs and the CinCs all complained that the budget was too low. That was the first time any of the other services had said anything to the SecDef about it. He was taken aback. So he said, "I'll tell you what, we are going to meet with the President at the next CinC's conference. I want you to tell the

President what you told me." So we went in on 15 September and basically we did the same thing . . . told the President of the United States that we were under-funded. Gen Shelton said we were like a plane that is nosing over and is going to start diving into the ground. I used the cancer analogy with the President. So he said, "I want you to go on the Hill and tell the Hill this." So we went over to the Hill and told the Hill. They started asking the right questions and started getting the truth. The senators started taking everyone to task.

I had been sitting there taking this crap for about an hour, being lumped in with all of the other service chiefs. So when Senator Kempthorn mentioned my name, he meant it to be in a positive light. But it didn't come out in a positive light. I had finally had it. So when he finished and was about ready to go on. I said, "Time out." I told them that I had been telling the truth about readiness since the day I became the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I had been "getting my butt chewed for it." I had told the truth to his committee every time I had been here. I said that you need to understand, you have got the CSPAN recording this hearing. My Marines are listening to what you are saying. I said it doesn't bother me as an individual. But it bothers me as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I said "all I have got left is my integrity, don't take that from me." I think Kempthorn was taken aback. Senator Bob Smith and several other senators then spoke up and pointed out that this criticism wasn't aimed at the Marine Corps. The same kind of thing went on in the House, where the House was very derogatory to all the service chiefs. At the end, I went up to see Congressman Floyd Spence, and I said, "You need to know that I take great offense at what you said in the hearing room today. I have told you the truth ever time I have come in front of this committee, and I am insulted by what you said." At which time Ike Skelton came up, and I said the same thing to him. I said, "I have known you for quite some time. We have gotten along well, but I take great offense to you say saying that the Commandant of the Marine Corps has not been telling you the truth. I have been telling you the truth since the day I became the Commandant. I almost got fired because of it. I think it is unconscionable that you would do what you just did." Both of them apologized. Both of them wrote me lengthy letters saying that they were sorry. I must have had ten staffers come up to me and say, you know, you didn't deserve that. I am going to talk to my boss. You are the only one that has had the courage to stand and tell the truth.

So that got us through the 29th, and the pressure was on the President. Later on, we went to the White House, to the Cabinet room, where the President was deliberating on how much money to give to the services. He was ready to give some \$12 billion to plus up the defense budget. He was looking for some data, some hard data, as to how he could articulate this to OMB and to the American people. He was having trouble. All the service chiefs were trying to give some examples. Well, for some reason I had built a couple of briefing charts that showed our ground equipment and aviation equipment, their age. Showing a picture of a piece of junk generator that was supposed to last for ten years that was now 30 years old. Showing the CH-46 helicopter that was already well beyond its service life, the truck, the Humvee, the KC-130. I had these all on paper. So I said, "Sir, I have got some specifics, and I'd like to show them to you." I got up from my chair, walked around, and literally stood behind him, my arm on the back of his chair, and put these pictures in front of him where he could literally see the age and condition of our equipment and when replacements were scheduled. Well, the SecDef almost turned apoplectic. After it was all over, the President turned to me, and said, "This was tremendously helpful. Thank you very much. I really appreciate it. Can I keep these copies?" I said, "Yes, sir. I have some others." The director of OMB said, "Can I have a copy?" The national security advisor wanted a copy. Well, I walked out the door and out to the West Wing of the White House, and there was Secretary Cohen and the Chairman standing there. I mean Cohen was pissed. He said, "My God, the least you could have done was give me a copy of the slides you were going to show the President of the United States." I was taken aback. I said, "Well, sir, I did give you copies." He said, "What?" I said, "I tried to get in to you yesterday to tell you what I was going to brief, but I was unable to get in. So I saw the DepSecDef. I gave my slides to the DepSecDef, and asked him to provide them to you. If that didn't happen, sir, that's not my fault." At which time he calmed down a little bit.

But the bottom line was, once again, this inability to sit down with the Secretary of Defense and talk caused problems. You are going to see the President and I wanted to see the SecDef prior to that Presidential event. I wanted to discuss the issues that were Marine Corps specific—to tell him what I was going to tell the President. I couldn't get to him. Amazing! So I had to go to the DepSecDef, Secretary Hamre, and talk to him and provide him my slides and talking points. For whatever reason, Hamre couldn't get in to see him

either. So the first time the SecDef saw these slides was when the President did. I'm sorry, but the end result was they were very important slides because they showed very clearly how one service was suffering because of the lack in the budget. That's the story.

DR. CRIST: The Marine Corps ended up with a \$1.4 billion plus up from Congress in FY99?

GEN KRULAK: I think the Congress finally said, this little guy is leaving. He has taken it on the chin for the last four years. We are going to take care of him and the Corps. Yes, absolutely.

DR. CRIST: The slides and the President had nothing to do . . .

GEN KRULAK: No, no. The slides and the President had nothing to do with that. The slides had everything to do with the President's plussing up the budget, the DoD budget.

DR. CRIST: On 29 October, you went down to Cape Canaveral to view the launch of Senator John Glenn aboard the space shuttle. Senator Glenn, a former Marine, and first man to orbit the earth. Do you recall this?

GEN KRULAK: Sure. I was invited down by the former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Jack [Joseph R.] Dailey, who was at one time my brigade commander in the First Marine Brigade. He is the number two man in NASA. We went down with a group of other people on their Gulfstream jet; Zandi went with us. It was a really great event. We went to a special stand where we watched the launch. I had never seen anything like it. It was remarkable, and very, very powerful. I looked over right after the launch. You could still see the smoke and hear the noise. Ted Williams was there in a wheelchair. Ted Williams couldn't walk, so I got down and went over to see him. Ted Williams was sitting there, and all of a sudden he put his hands on the arms of his wheelchair and literally pushed himself to attention and stood there at attention while the rocket disappeared into the heavens. He turned to me and he said, "That's my friend up there. That's John Glenn. He is a Marine." Very emotional. So it was a great day.

DR. CRIST: Changing subjects to one of officer retention. You issued three Green Letters in 1998, 01, 04, 09, each dealing with this issue of officer retention. In these, you mentioned that there was, in fact, not a retention problem but the economy was

good, and civilians were recruiting Marine Corps officers and that it was up to the commanders to work on convincing their junior officers to stay in the Marine Corps as a viable career path. Could you address this issue of officer retention?

GEN KRULAK: Well, like I said, there was no true officer retention problem. One of the biggest frustration I had was I couldn't convince the Marine Corps there wasn't an officer retention problem. The Commandant of the Marine Corps could give every statistic in the world, but some officer, a young captain sitting in a head could have a slip of paper given to him under that stall that said we have a retention problem, and he'd automatically forget about what the Commandant said. He'd believe that slip of paper that was shoveled to him under a stall. It was just mind boggling to me. The bottom line is we had no officer retention problem. The only difficulty we had was in aviator retention. We still have enough aviators to do the job. You have a retention problem when you are down, like the Air Force or the Navy, and you don't have enough aviators to fill the cockpits. In 1996, 137 aviators resigned their commission. In 1997, that number was 107. In 1998, it was 88. In 1999, it looks like it is going to project out to somewhere below 80. There is a great effort being made to keep our aviators. The problem is we'd like to keep the resignations to about 30 to 40. So we're not keeping the numbers we'd like, but it is not something that is anywhere near like the other services.

What I was trying to do in these letters was to, one, say, don't listen to all of the negative stories that you hear about officer retention. What I would like you to do is understand, that there is a good economy out there, that there are great jobs being offered these young Marine officers. What we need to do is what we have always done, demonstrate good caring and concerned leadership. Tell them we love them. Go after the real good ones and tell them don't get out, we need you. If they are thinking about getting out, go to them and encourage them to stay.

As it turns out, it has worked well. If you recall, the service academies and NROTC stopped giving regular commissions. Everybody is a reserve now. We were in a wonderful position of being able to literally pick the individuals to be our officer corps of the 21st century. Before, a portion of that officer corps was automatically regulars. Now they are all reserves, and here we have the chance to pick the officer corps to fight and win the first battle of the next war. Well, I wanted to get the very best. So it wasn't necessarily just retention, it

was retaining the very best and the brightest we wanted to do. That is what those ALMARs were all about. They were also to ease the sense of an officer corps that was somehow hemorrhaging and losing people, which we weren't. The bottom line is to this day, people are standing in line to be Marines, to be retained as Marines. Whether they are officer or they are enlisted, they stand in line to stay Marine Corps. There is no retention problem.

DR. CRIST: Do you have any idea what was the cause of these rumors?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. A great Marine lieutenant or captain has a fellow company commander who gets out. In another battalion two company commanders get out. They are great kids, and people just say, "wow" people are getting out all over the place. Well, they have been doing that forever, forever. I mean, it has always been that way. In reality, in 1998, we retained more than we had in the previous six years. It is the way we are. If it is not retention, it is re-enlistment. If it is not retention and re-enlistment, it is recruiting. If it is not retention, re-enlistment, and recruiting, it is we are getting soft in some aspect of our Corps. It is just Marines. Whenever they stop complaining, we have got a problem.

DR. CRIST: You initiated the "grow your own program." In some of the OCS classes, nearly 50 percent of the incoming class are prior enlisted of some form or another. Could just comment on that program?

GEN KRULAK: We are running around the country competing very hard to get young men and women of character to become Marines. That takes a lot of people's time and a lot of people's effort and a lot of money. Right within our own force we have tremendously qualified people who already have their degrees, who are already proven. Why aren't we going after them? Why aren't we growing our own? The greatest example I can think of is today, this morning, 8:30 on August 9, 1999, I had the honor of telling Sgt [Trisha D.] Myler, who works right here in the transition office, that she had been selected for the enlisted commissioning program. She has got an associate's degree from the University of Maryland, and she is an enlisted woman. She has done a great job as an enlisted Marine. She has been meritoriously promoted to every single rank in the Marine Corps but one. She has run marathons. She is smart as a whip. She has been a leader in every sense of the word. She applied for and is now going to be a commissioned

officer. Now ask yourself what makes a University of Maryland graduate who has never gone through any of that any better than a University of Maryland graduate who has done it all? She is only 23 years old. Here is a talented, talented young woman who is going to be a great Marine. It is called "growing your own."

DR. CRIST: Along these lines, in 1998 the press reported the Marine Corps had a plan for specific quotas for minority officers--12-12-5. What do you recall of this?

GEN KRULAK: Once again, you have the press reconstructing history. When Richard Danzig was the Undersecretary of the Navy and John Dalton was the Secretary and Carl Mundy was the Commandant and Ron Christmas was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, you had the big flap on minorities and all the problems that came out of Gen Mundy's "60 Minutes" interview. Richard Danzig felt that we ought to try to mirror the percentages of minorities that are found in civilian life. Mirror that within the Department of the Navy. So Secretary Danzig convinced Secretary Dalton that we should go 12-12-5. In fact, the Marine Corps put out a document to go for the 12-12-5.

When I became Commandant, I put out a letter on equal opportunity. With that letter, I said we are going to treat everybody fairly, et cetera, et cetera. I also told my recruiting command, to get the best Marines. In my mind, we had no quotas. We had no 12-12-5. The truth behind the story was the Marine Corps order that was put out by Ron Christmas was never canceled. It kept on going. So there were people down at the worker level hooking and jabbing trying for 12-12-5, whereas the people at the highest levels just wanted great Marines. So when that story and controversy came to the forefront, I came out and said, we have no specific quotas. What we were looking for was the ability to reach every man or woman of character, no matter what race, religion or creed or color. What we were doing was getting ourselves into schools that we were previously unable to get into. We managed to do that. For officers, we set up a board at the Headquarters, Marine Corps that selected people from the Recruiting Command, who were best qualified to become officers. That board had no access as to whether this candidate was a minority -- We did all of it strictly by quality. We have been running this board for about a year now, and because we are now into the better schools that were providing these top quality minorities to IBM, to law firms, et cetera, we are now playing in the

same schools. We found that our percentages are very close to what used to be a requirement or a quota of 12-12-5.

Much ado about nothing. Marines are going to pick the best people to be Marines. What we need to understand is there are great minorities who make great Marines. All you have got to do is look at the Charlie Bolden's, the Leo Williams, the Chris Cortezes, and the Cliff Stanley's. Minorities are part and parcel of who we are. The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps is a minority. Nobody says, is the Sergeant Major black or not? He is a Marine. He happens to have a different skin color, but he is a Marine, and that's what is important.

DR. CRIST: On 3 October 1998, you promoted Col Tim Donovan [Timothy E.] to Brigadier General . .

GEN KRULAK: And he took over the Warfighting Laboratory. This was part of the effort to help institutionalize the lab and give it more clout among other services, industry, and the academic community.

DR. CRIST: On 16 November, Richard Danzig replaced Dalton as Secretary of the Navy. I'd like to get your observations on -- we haven't talked much about Dalton. But Danzig, certainly as undersecretary, was supportive of your efforts.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: I wanted to get your observations on these two. Anything for the record you would like to mention?

GEN KRULAK: Well, both of them are very good men. Dalton was a man of great honor and courage and commitment, a man who had a strong value system, was a Christian, made decisions based upon that character. Lots of times they were unpopular with my predecessor, Gen Mundy, for numerous reasons. Sometimes I would not agree with all he had to say regarding people. The reality is he made the calls based on the highest of standards. I think he was pretty much on the mark. I mean, he held a very high standard. He was not charismatic. He was not the world's greatest speaker. He was not a great, original thinker. But at the same time, he loved being the Secretary of the Navy. He loved the Navy. He loved the Marine Corps. He wanted the best for us. So he has gotten a bum rap in many ways. The reality is he tried to do his very best. His wife was a spectacular first lady of the Naval Services, and spent hours and hours on the road

working family issues. I thought they made a good team. I think John Dalton will go down as a good Secretary of the Navy. He certainly had the job longer than most.

Part of the problem is the difference in personalities between Danzig and Dalton. Danzig is very outgoing, whereas Dalton was more inward. Danzig is a brilliant orator, where Dalton was not. Danzig has this energy that is a bright light around him that Dalton didn't have. There is always a comparison about the individuals, which is often unfair because, it is the individual that counts. It is what the individual accomplishes that counts even more. Both of them, I think, are going to go down as very effective Secretaries. Danzig is far more innovative. A far more out of the box thinker than John Dalton was. At the same time, Danzig's view is much more a liberal view than Dalton. Dalton had been there, done that, and got the t-shirt. He had been a nuclear powered submariner. He had been in the Navy. He knew a little bit more about the ethos of both the Navy and the Marine Corps, whereas Danzig was more open to a new way of doing things that may or may not be good for the services. I found, myself debating Danzig much more than I ever debated Dalton. But that was fun, too, because -- you learned something from Danzig every time you debated with him. We literally debated. There was a great learning experience on both sides. Both of them good people. Both of them will go down as good Secretaries of the Navy.

DR. CRIST: Did you notice a change in the way Danzig did business from Undersecretary to Secretary of the Navy, or did he continue with the same views and actions?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, same views and actions.

DR. CRIST: Later that month, the month of November 1998, you had to face one more challenge in Okinawa when a Marine hit a 17-year-old Japanese girl, the Marine being a drunk driver. Following this, you noted in an e-mail, that the NSC wanted a "rundown" of what the Marine Corps was doing to minimize these incidents. You also noted that this might be a great opportunity to tell the NSC how much we have been doing in the area of discipline in Okinawa. I wanted to get your observations on this and how you tried to turn this unfortunate incident into an opportunity to tell the NSC and the administration what the Marine Corps was doing positively?

GEN KRULAK: Well, like everything else, the NSC was just responding to State Department,

probably some back channel State Department traffic. We probably have less incidents on Okinawa than on any other Marine base. For that matter, any other service base. The bottom line was we had minimal incidents in Okinawa. We had taken so many steps to control any kind of bad behavior, starting at boot camp with the extended boot camp and the Crucible and transformation all the way to steps on Okinawa where we put out curfews, raised the drinking age, mentors and buddy system, you name it, we were doing it. So I said, let's go on the attack. I'm tired of having somebody shoot on our target. Let's tell them what we're doing. If they have got any advice on anything more that we should do, please tell us. If not, you know, keep your cards and letters to yourself. The bottom line is both the Japanese government how we were working hard in this area and the incident did not become a big deal. You are going to have a problem. You can't expect things to be totally sterile. So we did our best.

DR. CRIST: It appears to me that this incident, which could have gotten blown out of proportion was minimized, due mainly to your earlier proactive initiatives?

GEN KRULAK: Oh, yes. The whole point is we had been working so hard that I think people just said, hey, this is one of those bad incidents that, you know, we are sorry.

DR. CRIST: On 16 December, sir, Operation Desert Fox began. The air strikes on Iraq for their obstructing the UN inspectors. The day it began, you sent an e-mail to Col Appleton, "The Butler letter left absolutely no recourse. There was no other alternative than to literally tuck our tails between our legs and go home." What do you recall about this and Operation Desert Fox?

GEN KRULAK: The Butler letter was the letter from Butler to the National Security Council, the President, and everybody else saying look, Iraq has not complied and is not complying. At that point in time, we had only two alternatives, strike or go home with our tail between our legs. The Butler letter said that Saddam Hussein wasn't complying, so we had no recourse. There was no viable alternative other than to bomb. The only other alternative was to leave, and we weren't going to do that. Did the Joint Chiefs think that striking was the right thing to do in the long term? The answer was no. But was there anything else to do? Again, the answer there was no. Why wasn't it the right thing to do in the long term? Because by bombing

we were infuriating the Gulf sheiks and all of our supporters in the area. The bottom line is they didn't want us flying out of their bases. They didn't want us using their air space. They didn't want this, they didn't want that. We were further weakening our role as the head of the Gulf coalition. Every time we took action and were unable to get everybody behind us, it further fragmented the coalition.

I would have rather used all of the elements of national power instead of just the two. We were prepared to use Madeline or weapons. I can remember getting asked by a senator, "You have talked about the five elements of national power. How would the elements work in this case?"

I just offered up off the top of my head that one way you could have handled this situation if you had gotten hold of it before it started, would have been to say okay, Saddam Hussein, is attacking us asymmetrically. He is jerking our chain. He knows how to get at us. He is not challenging us. He is bringing tanks south. What he is doing is he denies access. He is illuminating our aircraft. He is shifting his people all around. He is hiding them. Asymmetric thought process. Why don't we attack him asymmetrically? Why don't we do that? Well, what is the big issue? What is he complaining about, he being Saddam Hussein? Well, he is complaining about his own sovereignty. But more importantly, he is using as his trump card the health of his people. He is saying that the Arab people, the Muslim people, are being denied food and being denied medical stuffs because of the embargo. So I said what if we decided to go to our coalition partners and say we want to take care of the Muslim people. We want to be the ones that help you solve this. So we are going to bring some ships into the Gulf and we'll transport foodstuffs and we'll transport medicine and we'll help. We won't do this in our own name, we'll do it in the name of the coalition, and so get the Saudis and the Bahrainis and the Qataris and everybody to get foodstuff and medicine and doctors and literally tell Saddam Hussein that we are going to be sailing into a port, offloading this, making convoys, taking them up to the people. All we are asking is for him to allow us to send food and medical aid into the hinterlands and make sure that the poor, starving Muslims get it. Oh, by the way Mr. Hussein, as a gesture of your good will, because this is what you have been complaining about, how about you opening up your inspection. We'd turn the tables on him. We would use his own religion, his own people, the coalition to force him to do what we wanted him to do by attacking him asymmetrically; doing something he would never expect. That's

what I mean by the elements of national power that we didn't use.

DR. CRIST: That would have played well in the Arab world, too.

GEN KRULAK: Oh, they would have loved it. They would have loved it. But we didn't do it. We still haven't done it. We could have done something like that in Kosovo. We could have done something like that in Bosnia. But what do we do? We send Madeleine or we sent the Tomahawk.

DR. CRIST: The battle-ax or the Tomahawk is what I have heard it referred to.

GEN KRULAK: Okay, the battle-ax [laughing].

DR. CRIST: Why wasn't the US using the other elements of National power in these foreign policy crises?

GEN KRULAK: I have no idea. I gave the same very rough rundown on the elements of national power on a news show called the "Lehrer Hour." I received about 150 letters from people all around the country applauding the concept of the "elements of National power." The American people understand that what makes this country strong is not just -- I mean the strength of our country truly comes from its economic power, from its industry, from the depth and breadth of its people, from its ability to communicate, equally if not more than from its military and from its diplomatic efforts.

DR. CRIST: We fired more Tomahawks or T-LANS in this than they had in all of Desert Storm. Was their concern about our inventory of our precision-guided weapons? Was that an issue at all?

GEN KRULAK: Well, it was -- people have talked about it. But we weren't going to limit because of inventory problems. I mean, we can always make some more if need be. It costs money.

DR. CRIST: That's it for '98, sir.

SESSION XX

Significant Events: 1999

Success in recruiting goals . . . Final off site . . . Gen James L. Jones selection for 32d Commandant . . . Final visits to the FMF . . . Operation Allied Force and Kosovo . . . The role of the JCS in the war . . . Task Force Hawk . . . Pushing to use the AV-8Bs . . . Kosovo as an example of the Three Block War . . . 1999 Force Structure Planning Group . . . Budget plus ups . . . Gaining back the QDR cuts . . . Kicking Boxes . . . CMC cuff links , tie bars and Sam Donaldson and George Will . . . Last Mess Night at The Basic School . . . Passing the Color and The Change Of Command.

DR. CRIST: I'll start off with a very positive issue for 1999, sir. In January you sent an e-mail to Gen Garry L. Parks, the CG, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, congratulating him for 43 months in a row of meeting the Marine Corps' recruiting goal.

These were not good years for the other services in recruiting, and the Marines are the only ones that have consistently hit their recruiting goal. What has enabled the Marine Corps to be so successful and the other services to falter?

GEN KRULAK: Well, first we completed 48 straight months on June 30, 1999, which was my last day as the Commandant. Then Gen Jones has just now seen the 49th month. So it has been a remarkable, remarkable record, one that is unmatched in the modern times of the Marine Corps, and certainly unmatched by any of the other services. The Navy is in deep trouble. The Army is in even worse trouble. For the first time in their history, the Air Force is not meeting their recruiting goal. Yet the Marine Corps continues to meet theirs while exceeding the standards established for DoD in the area of mental group one, two, and three and in the area of high school graduates.

After watching it for so long, I think there are several reasons why we are making it and the others aren't. First, our recruiters work harder than anybody else's. That's not Chuck Krulak saying it. The DoD ran a study on the number of hours a week that the individual services' recruiters work. Our recruiters work in excess of 63 hours a week, which is between 15 and 20 percent more than any of the other services. So first and foremost, our recruiters are working harder. Secondly, we have put the cream of the crop into recruiting. The very best people we can find, staff NCOs, NCOs and officers, are picked to go on recruiting. Every district CO and RSCO must be approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. So I literally

signed off on every officer that went on recruiting duty. The Director of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command approved every enlisted. We really put our very best in there. The best example I can give is that we have three Leftwich trophy winners who are now out on recruiting duty and doing a bang-up job. Recruiting is leadership to the nth degree. Recruiters are the only people in the Marine Corps today who are in "contact" 24 hours a day, seven days a week, with the mission, so to speak. Even those people who are afloat with our MEUs are not under the day to day contact with the enemy, so to speak, that our recruiters are under. Three, they are supported by the Marine Corps. You go on recruiting duty, we increase the number of meritorious promotions you can get. We have instituted the recruiter of the year to ensure that there is recognition for recruiters. For recruiters who successfully complete recruiting duty, they have the duty station of their choice to go to. If you are an officer, you can have the duty station of your choice, or you can automatically go to school. So there are great benefits in successfully completing recruiting duty. Four, there is tremendous support throughout the Marine Corps for recruiters. As the Commandant, I would try to call five recruiters a day, just pick up the phone, dial an RSS or a PCS and say hey, just calling to wish you good luck, tell you we are behind you, tell you we care about what you are doing and how important it is. Likewise, I encouraged my three and four star generals to make those same kind of calls once a week. So they were doing it. Plus I told any Marine that was on official business to look up the nearest recruiting station and go down, even if it was only for 15 or 20 minutes. So you had a tremendous support apparatus going for the recruiters. Then fifth, and probably most important, we have a hell of a product to sell. It is called the United States Marine Corps. There a lot of people who claim that we

were operating in a niche market, that there are just a certain percentage of people who will always want to go Marine Corps. I think that is all baloney. If you call a niche market men and women of character who are high school graduates who are great leaders in their high school and who are physically fit and morally strong, then I guess we are in a niche market. But I think that is what everybody is looking for. The difference is we are getting them.

Also, there are a lot of things appealing to youngsters and their parents. The fact that we toughened boot camp, the fact that we made the Crucible so much a part of recruit training. I think both the youngsters and the parents approved of the challenges associated with the Corps. I think the stands we took that were so public and got so much press ended up helping us with the mothers and fathers because they wanted their kids to be associated with an outfit that stood for something, and we obviously stood for something. We appealed to Generation X and Generation Next in that we gave them some boundaries. We told them we were going to hold them accountable for our core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Then we did challenge them. We gave them just what they were looking for with our power down program, giving the NCOs more of a role to play. They found early on that they could make a difference in the Marine Corps. People scoffed at Marine mail. But the fact that they could actually have a role in improving the Marine Corps I think meant something to them. These things all ended up making the Marine Corps more attractive.

DR. CRIST: That was at a time when the Army and Navy boot camps were actually loosening up their rigor?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. When the Navy had their little time out cards that if the recruit was under stress he could hold up a blue card, and the drill instructor was required to send him to his barracks where he would sit on his bed for two hours decompressing. I mean, unbelievable!

DR. CRIST: On 21, 23 January you had another one of your three star off sites back in Tampa. The same USAA facilities down there, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: What do you recall about this, your final off site?

GEN KRULAK: The off site was an important one because we knew that on June 30, 1999, we were going to have a new Commandant. We didn't know who it was, but we knew that there was going to be one. So I set as a couple of goals, one, to make sure that my generals knew that I knew I was leaving and that they didn't need to walk on eggshells as it got closer to 30 June. Two, wanted them to act like Marine generals. What I asked each of them, and later I asked all of the generals in the Corps, to not pick sides as to who was going to be the next Commandant. They could have their own favorite, and there was nothing wrong with that, but to not get caught up in bad-mouthing somebody else. If they got a phone call from somebody that asked what do you think about Carl Fulford, and they happened to like Pete Pace or Jim Jones, to not knock down Carl Fulford. They should have nothing but good things to say about all Marines. Tell the truth. If you happened to like one better, say my choice would be so and so. But in saying that, don't ever badmouth somebody else. Then I shared with them how I intended to help the Secretary of the Navy come to grips with who the next Commandant would be.

Basically, I used the same pattern that Gen Mundy did. I provided to Secretary Danzig a list of those people that I thought he ought to interview. I gave him a document that talked about each one of them from a comparative standpoint. I gave him a document that would be how I would write the nomination if that were to be the person being nominated to the President. I gave him all of that, and encouraged him to please interview everybody and to encourage the Secretary of Defense to interview everybody. I told all of this to my generals at the off site. Everybody knew what I was going to do. I also took the time to reiterate the information found in the green letter on when a Marine general should retire. We had several generals who were on the cusp. I said I think it is important that we determine whether we were going to ask any of these to stay because if we are, if any of you who may be a Commandant wants one of these to stay, then I won't ask them go. But if we all believe that they should go, I should be the one to tell them to go. I don't want to leave it for the new CMC to come in and say, "Gen Blank, you're out of here." So we did that. The off site was much more than what we normally did. This one centered around making sure we had our act together when we went into what we called the sweepstakes.

One issue discussed was the homeland defense—the National Defense Panel recommendation. I commented that, for the first

time, our Reserves would be the supported command and the regular supporting if we found ourselves in the homeland defense role. I thought we might well find ourselves in that role. I was trying to encourage them to think ahead. We will eventually have a "homeland defense mission," and that that mission should be given to the reserves, not to the regulars, and the reserves be supported by the regulars.

DR. CRIST: Did you have a recommendation on whom the 32d Commandant should be?

GEN KRULAK: This was a very strange run for the roses, so to speak, because I don't think there was any question in anybody's mind that the odds on favorite was Gen Jones. My concern was that it would be unfair to Gen Jones and unfair to the Marine Corps as a whole if the Corps ever thought that there was only one option, and that one option was Jim Jones. I shared that with the Secretary of the Navy and asked him to share it with the Secretary of Defense. It was because of that feeling that I thought it was necessary to identify and interview everyone who was a real potential candidate. Not somebody that just made three stars, like a Jack Klump or a Frank Libutti.. The legitimate players were the ACMC, MarForLant, MarForPac, CG I MEF, Gen Steele, CG, MCCDC, and Gen Jones, with a quick look at the CinCs. It all boiled down to Pace, Fulford, Jones, Steele, and Dake. They were the ones that eventually got interviewed and the ones that I wrote up nomination packages for and gave to the Secretary of the Navy. He never asked me, okay, sit down and give me your recommendation because he basically had what I thought about each one of them in the comparison papers that I put together and in my nomination packages. In addition, Mr Danzig knew each of them very well. I then asked him to please ensure that the SecDef interview at least three. The four that I wanted him to interview were Pace, Fulford, Steele, and Jones. I didn't think that Terry Dake was a real player for a lot of reasons. He had only been the ACMC for one year, and I just didn't think that was going to happen. I encouraged Danzig to talk to the SecDef because I thought it was the only way that the Marine Corps could come away without comments that Jones got it because he knew Cohen. So Secretary Danzig went down and met with Cohen on two occasions urging that he interview all candidates. On the second occasion, Danzig came back and said I don't think it is going to happen. The reality was Secretary Cohen did not interview any of our Marine generals, nor did he ask me for my

recommendation. He never even had the courtesy to pick up the phone and say, "I'd like your input." The fact was that the second he became Secretary of Defense, he had picked the 32d Commandant, and that was Jim Jones. The end result is headlines like the one I am holding in my hand right now from *The Charlotte Observer* of 1 July 1999. Associated Press Robert Vernes is the reporter, "Long Time Cohen Associate Takes Command of Corps." Now to me, that is not good for the Marine Corps. That is not good for Jim Jones. The reporter writes two and a half paragraphs about Gen Krulak. Then they write of Gen Jones, "Jones has been Cohen's personal military aide until President Clinton nominated him to be the Commandant." "Personal military aide." Cohen's friendship with Jones began in the early 1980s, when Cohen was a senator from Maine and Jones was the Marine liaison office to the Senate. When Cohen became Defense Secretary in January 1997, he made Jones, then the Marines Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Policies and Operations, his senior military assistant. My point is that is not good for the Marine Corps. It is not good for Jim Jones. Nobody else got talked about. It was Jones, Jones, Jones. I think it was played poorly by Cohen.

DR. CRIST: As you read that article, there is nothing about Jones' accomplishments or what he brings to the Corps.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. The only thing it says about Jones' accomplishments are, and I quote, "Jones, 55, is a native of Kansas City, Missouri, but spent his formative years in France. He returned to the United States to attend the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in 1966." That's it, that's it. Again, there are times when I just couldn't fathom Cohen and why he did what he did. He is supposed to be a politician, but he often lacked any kind of political sense. The relief of Wes Clark is a perfect example of just having no concept of taking care of people and how you deal with people. I mean, how do you think Gen Fulford, Gen Pace, or Gen Steele felt to not even be given the courtesy of being interviewed. They were unable to yes, I looked the Secretary of Defense in the face and made my case, and I wasn't chosen. In my mind, it was totally unsatisfactory and unprofessional.

Now, I had no real disagreement with Jim Jones becoming the Commandant. I had a big disagreement with the way it took place. I think Jim deserved to go head to head like all Commandants, for the most part, have done, and that he deserved to stand on his own merits and not

be camouflaged by what that headline articulates, "Long Time Cohen Associate Takes Command of the Marine Corps." He deserves better than that. I am not anti-Jones. I am anti the way his selection and his nomination was done. I don't know whether I am going to agree or disagree with what Jim is going to do because it is too early in the ball game. I think that each Commandant brings to the commandancy their own certain perspective on life, and Jim is going to do that. I certainly did that. I can't imagine what Carl Mundy thought when on 1 July out came the Planning Guidance. I would hope he didn't think badly because he had seen it multiple times. I think Carl Mundy did a magnificent job and left me a real solid Marine Corps. The Planning Guidance was not an attack at the Mundy era. It was an attack at the 21st century.

DR. CRIST: Of course each Commandant brings new energy--that is why you change Commandants every four years rather than having another Archibald Henderson.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We all get tired. Jim will do a good job. I think that there are people who will probably say that I wasn't as close to Jim Jones as I was to some of the other candidates. That's true. I didn't have the close relationship with Jim Jones that I had with, say, a Carl Fulford or Pete Pace or Marty Steele. I don't think anybody will question that. But there was certainly no animosity. I can't speak for Jim Jones. But on my level, there was no animosity. A Commandant doesn't have the luxury of being too close with individuals. They have an institution to worry about. My worry about Jim Jones was from the institution's sake. If Jim was going to be the Commandant, and obviously he was, then as an institution we should never see a headline like the one I just read you.

DR. CRIST: Yes. That compounds the internal perception problems and the fact that Gen Jones is not well known within the Marine Corps, unlike yourself coming from FMFPac and MCCDC before that. You were a well known individual within the rank and file Marine Corps. Gen Jones doesn't have that. So saddling him with the way that -- the association with Cohen --

GEN KRULAK: That's why he has got to get out and be seen. He is a good speaker, and he'll do well. It is just too bad that it happened that way. You know, it is too bad for the institution. It is too bad for Jim Jones. It is too bad for Marty Steele and Pete Pace, Carl Fulford and Terry Dake. They deserve better than that.

DR. CRIST: You get a sense that Cohen, and you mentioned he was a politician, he focuses only on the politics level of him or his seniors, but doesn't care a whole lot about his subordinates?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I see no real understanding of what it is to be a steward, and he is the steward of the Department of Defense. He is not acting like one.

DR. CRIST: Far different from Perry?

GEN KRULAK: Yes, far different from Perry, far different from just about anybody that has been in that position.

DR. CRIST: Did Danzig interview them, do you know, sir?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Danzig interviewed everybody. Danzig even spoke with people who weren't even in the running, like Frank Libutti, who just made three stars. He literally called him on the phone. He said, "I don't want to bring you all the way back from Okinawa, but could you talk to me about the candidates."

DR. CRIST: The next couple of questions deal with your final visits to the Marine Corps, the FMF. On 28 January to 4 February, you made your final command visit to the East Coast, Camp Lejeune and that area. Any recollections of this trip, anything stand out in your mind?

GEN KRULAK: Well, any trip is always great. I mean, that's when I was happiest. As I indicated earlier, I always gave a speech or a kind of an update on the Corps every place I traveled. The FSPG the first year, Making Marines, Winning Battles the next year etc. This time it was a recap of where we had been and where we were going all tied to a story about Earl Pete Ellis and why we needed the Pete Ellises. We were always reading and talking about the zero defects mentality, yet my whole last year was spent going around and talking about Pete Ellis, who was truly the ultimate freedom to fail type of Marine, and asking the Corps, to be like Ellis. These trips were very good, a opportunity to say good-bye. The CG of II MEF held a dinner for Zandi and me. It was held at his quarters, and all of the generals and their ladies came, and we had a great time. At the end they presented me a gift, and it was a gift of an Indian warrior riding on a horse. It was a bronze. It was very meaningful. The entire visit was great.

Nothing really stands out in my mind other than the warmth that I found from the Marines.

DR. CRIST: In your final trips to the MEFs, II MEF which we discussed, III MEF from 18 to 24 March. When you looked at the state of the Marine Corps, you must have been pleased with what you saw and the changes made over the last four years?

GEN KRULAK: After four years of traveling 750,000 miles and talking with officers and Marines, could I see a difference? Absolutely. They all could tell me about making Marines and winning battles and why this was important. They understood why we were doing what we were doing. I think they knew I loved them. Without any question, I think they knew I loved them. When we left Futenma, it was a remarkable scene. We were leaving at -- I think it was 8 o'clock in the morning or 9 o'clock in the morning. We got there a little early. By the time I left, as I was walking out, there were over 1,000 Marines, lance corporals and corporals and staff NCOs and junior officers, all just standing there, had just come out, and Lord knows where they had come from, but literally covered the whole tarmac. They were not there in any official capacity. They just wanted to be there to say goodbye. It was very emotional. We stayed there for probably an extra 90 minutes, spent an hour and a half taking pictures, individual pictures with Marines, gave out every coin I had. When we left, they were cheering. I think that they understood the effort that was put out over four years, and they were just appreciative of it, just like they were appreciative of P.X. and Al Gray and Carl Mundy. You know, you're so busy you don't understand that they are appreciative until the very end, and then it comes home.

DR. CRIST: You attended the seventh annual Salute to Freedom award on your trip?

GEN KRULAK: Well, the fact that that was the last time that Zach Fisher was really up and about. He played such a major role in the military over the years. It was just sad that he had deteriorated so much. But he was there. Hugh Shelton got the award, which was kind of interesting. I mean, they could have given it to a lot of people, and they gave it to Hugh. But it was a real special evening.

DR. CRIST: Yes. It struck me unusual . . .

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was kind of a surprise that Hugh got it. But, I mean, I think it was good that he got it, not bad. It was good.

DR. CRIST: On 24 March 1999 Operation Allied Force began--the U.S. began its largest air campaign since the Gulf War in 1991. I wanted to get your observations on this, particularly form within the tank and the JCS, over launching this operation.

GEN KRULAK: The JCS, for the most part, were not in favor of operations in Kosovo. They were not in favor of it because of several reasons. One, they did not see any kind of strategic thought behind the effort, other than the obvious importance to NATO. No one wanted to see Milosevic thumb his nose at us or a continuation of the ethnic cleansing and the tragedy posed by that. But there was no strategic thought that was really apparent to the JCS. Secondly, there had been no, absolutely no, debate over the issue within the Congress of the United States and certainly among the American people. We felt that until you had the American people understanding what was going on, we were very reluctant, to commit American troops on the ground.

This concern was expressed to the national command authority through the Secretary of Defense. It was also mentioned by me in a hearing in front of the Senate Armed Service Committee earlier in March when they were talking about whether we should bomb or not and would we lose any planes if we did bomb. I basically said, "Senators, you are asking the wrong question. You ought to be asking what is the strategic interest here. What is the end game? What are the measures of effectiveness?" You know, those types of questions. That got a whole lot of press and got me in trouble. But the bottom line is we didn't do very well. Here it is, the 9th of August 1999 and it isn't over by a long shot.

DR. CRIST: NATO seemed very unprepared to deal with the Serb expulsion of, a million Albanians and surprised that the Serbs didn't capitulate at the outset of the bombing. It seemed like that was a premise that they were operating under. Is that true?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Both Madeleine Albright and Gen Wes Clark believed that Milosevic would capitulate either at the onset or after a day or two of bombing. They based that belief on his capitulation during the Bosnia campaign, totally failing to recognize that Milosevic's capitulation then was due to ground force pressure provided by the Croats. NATO was unprepared for the humanitarian problem for the very reasons that I just articulated. There was no strategic thought going on. There

was no "what ifs." So it was very sad. But the Joint Chiefs don't plan, the CinC plans. I mean, we had our feelings. We were articulating them. Everybody else said this thing would be over in two days, but none of the Joint Chiefs thought it would be over in two days, but none of them. We kept on saying it wouldn't. But they weren't listening.

DR. CRIST: Was Gen Clark saying the same thing, or was he --

GEN KRULAK: No. Clark thought it would be over in two days. Clark and Albright were the ones selling the two-day scenario.

DR. CRIST: Task Force Hawk, was something you were expressing very strong opinions on. On 31 March, you wrote an e-mail that you did not concur with EuCom's proposed use of Task Force Hawk, that being the Apache helicopters and MLRS, which were deployed in Albania and designed to go after the Serb tanks. Why were you so opposed to the use of Task Force Hawk, and why were Gen Clark and EuCom pushing this option so strongly?

GEN KRULAK: Well, my opposition was at multiple levels. At the tactical level, it made absolutely no sense. We had trouble identifying targets. They would not commit Hawk unless they had some targets identified, so if you identified them, why send in Hawk if you could send in a fixed wing. The problem was not the ability to kill targets once they had been identified. The problem was identifying the targets. If the targets could be identified, why would you send a slow flying, low flying vehicle like a helicopter? My second concern was also tactical. Helicopters fly low and slow. We knew that there was still in existence a very robust anti-air warfare system, integrated air defense, and there were some 7,000 shoulder-launched air defense weapons in the hands of the Serbs. We were going to fly low, slow aircraft into that? To do what, to plink tanks? The most tanks we ever saw in one location was three tanks. That probably was a bogus number because now we can only find three tank hulks in the entire Kosovo area. So that was bogus. You are going to send Apache helicopters after that? It made no sense, no tactical sense. Equally, if not more important, I couldn't see a tie between the tactical and the operational and the operational and the strategic level of war. I didn't see where plinking one or two tanks and losing three or four helicopters to do it was going to gain us anything at the operational or strategic level. More likely it would have cost us.

To move MLRS into Montenegro or into Bosnia to fire into Serbia would have caused great problems with the Russians, with the Serbs, with the relationship within the entire Balkans. It just made no sense at all. Bad. None, and I mean none, of the Joint Chiefs concurred with the use of Task Force Hawk. Not one individual. The only one that said anything positive was Gen Ryan, and he said, "I don't think it is the right thing to do, but I hate telling the CinC no." Secretary Cohen didn't agree with it. DepSecDef didn't agree with it. The Chairman didn't agree with it. The Vice Chairman didn't agree, and none of the service chiefs.

DR. CRIST: You had mentioned earlier in this interview that in Kosovo you saw very much the service chiefs interjecting themselves back into the decision process at least.

GEN KRULAK: I think that by the time Kosovo came down, the service chiefs were frustrated. We had, as I had indicated, passed out the book written as a result of Vietnam by McMasters, *Dereliction of Duty*. I gave a copy to everyone of the chiefs and the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, and I said read this damn thing. I think we all went into the Kosovo debate with the clear sense that we were going to give our honest opinion and by God, they are going to listen. So we demanded that Wes Clark continue to brief us, and we got briefed just about every other day on what was going on. We didn't interfere with his operational requirement. But when it came down to committing Americans and service resources, we had a say, and we made that very well known. The bottom line is, as the example of Hawk, we were right. I mean, it would have been a disaster to put those helicopters in there. We would have lost American men for no reason . . . tactical, operational, or strategic.

DR. CRIST: What about the use of ground troops, sir? The press reported that there was a drop-dead date of 14 June 1999 for U.S. forces. If we were going to make the ground option since the air campaign didn't seem to be working, 14 June was a drop dead from deploying -- having the forces in place to launch by 1 September, which then as you voiced would carry us into a winter campaign in the Balkans.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I think that it was a mistake not to -- I mean it was a mistake to take ground forces off of the table as an option. But I think it would have been a disaster, a disaster, if we had committed ground troops without a clear cut mandate from the American people. We did not

have a mandate. We had not had any debate. So I think all of the service chiefs were pretty reluctant to commit forces without having some kind of consensus by the American people and the Congress.

DR. CRIST: On 6 to 14 April, you made another travel to Italy and France, an official call. While there you visited 24 MEU. What do recall of your trip, your observations on the operation, which would have been in early April of -- just a few weeks into the operation?

GEN KRULAK: Well, every place I went, there was the same concern about the end game, the end state, where was this all going to end, what was NATO's basic end state, where did Italy or where did France see this thing ending. None of them could really say. They had varying feelings on the bombing campaign, certainly varying feelings on the use of ground forces. CinC South, Adm Ellis, when the history is written, will end up being one of the great heroes of an Allied Force because of his willingness to stand up to Gen Clark. Gen Clark, as he got frustrated with the air campaign, would ask more and more of them and ask them to do things that might not make much sense. It was Ellis who continuously stood up to him and said, "Hey, you'd better think that through again."

One of the things that I asked CinC South to help me on was the use of the A-V8Bs in the operation. We had a detachment of AV-8Bs on the big deck amphib. They had been sitting on that deck not participating in the air raids. Yet here they were closer than anybody else, much less reaction time, great operational capability. They weren't being used. When I got out to the MEU I visited each ship. I met some very frustrated people, but none more so than the pilots on board the big deck amphib, particularly the AV-8 pilots.

So I came off of the ship, flew into Thessaloniki and then flew out of there back to Italy. It was a Saturday evening. I called Adm Ellis. I said, Look, this is bad. I mean, this is stupid. It is bad for the morale of these people. Here we are in a war, you have a whole service that is not playing. I said that is wrong. Secondly, I said, They have got a capability that nobody else can touch, and that is called the ability to react rapidly. Let's get them to make use of that capability. He said he agreed, and he would talk to Gen Clark. At the same time, I went through the ACMC and the Joint Staff to have pressure coming from Washington . . . pressure on Clark and the air component commander.

The next day was a Sunday. I had gone out for a ride along the Amalfi coast just to sightsee. We were sitting in a plaza, nice little fountain area, and I decided to call Ellis and see how we were doing, put some more pressure on him. I called him up, and Jim Ellis said that he had talked to the CinC, and that they were going to move the MEU shipping off the coast of Albania and fly the airplanes. Sure enough, 24 hours, 48 hours later, Marines were flying and doing a superior job. Their moral was ski-high!

DR. CRIST: The AV-8s did well out there.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. They were the only aircraft that didn't need to be refueled to reach the objective area, and they were very accurate and did a great job.

DR. CRIST: One other issue came up on your visit up there to -- when you visited the Marines on 24 MEU. You addressed the AV-8 issue. There was also some confusion by the CinC, on how to use the MEU and how to employ them.

GEN KRULAK: The idea was that it was an air/ground/logistics team, and they could do a lot of things for them in the logistics area if they would just let them. I don't know how many times we talked to the various CinCs about what makes up a MAGTF. But it is awful difficult to get them to understand.

DR. CRIST: On 29 May you testified again before the Senate Armed Service Committee about this time specifically Kosovo and the impact on readiness costs by the operation. You mentioned specifically the op tempo's impact on the EA-6Bs. I think you even said, "We're flying their wings off."

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Well, the EA-6B -- is a low density, high demand aircraft. It is a national asset. The Air Force, as much as I love them, don't understand how to employ the EA-6. Every Air Force air package took two EA-6s to fly with. Every time an Air Force airplane went out, they had two EA-6s with it. Well, you can imagine, we literally did fly the wings off. We decreased the life expectancy of EA-6s by a matter of years just by the way they were employed by the Air Force.

So, yes, I was very concerned about the op tempo on the EA-6B and told that to the SASC. Sooner or later my successor or his successor is going to have to go to the Congress and get money to either replace the E-6Bs or upgrade the ones we have.

DR. CRIST: Did your voicing concern put any pressure on the Air Force to maybe --

GEN KRULAK: No. The Air Force had disbanded all of their electronic birds. They understood the problem, and they were going to try to do something about it. The Navy was suffering. All of us were suffering.

DR. CRIST: On 3 June, you had a briefing with the President. The minutes of this meeting, in your personal papers, highlight your opposition to the use of Task Force Hawk. You voiced concern about the long term damage in our relations with the Russians, the Chinese, what this might do to NATO stability. What do you recall of this meeting and the President's reaction to your concerns? You thought there should be a renewal of the diplomatic effort?

GEN KRULAK: Well, we went to the White House ostensibly to give him an update on how the war was going. Most reporters thought we were going there to decide on the ground war. That wasn't it at all. It was in fact an update on the war. I didn't change my feelings at all. My concern was, again, this idea of a short-term view at the expense of the long-term resolution. We, in one fell swoop, had angered both the Russians and the Chinese, the two nations that will probably mean the most and have the most impact on the United States of America in the first half of the 21st century. Yet within a matter of a couple of weeks, we had just completely alienated them. The unity of NATO, although it looked tight, wasn't. There were countries who wouldn't even let their planes fly. It was across the gamut. I was concerned that we were not doing the type of thinking, certainly at the strategic level, that we should be doing.

I think two things that I said during that meeting actually registered. One of them because they did start talking a little bit about introduction of ground forces and the timing of it. I said that we may get ourselves in trouble because if we start introducing ground troops into Albania, it is going to end up another Hawk debacle. People will say, "Well, they are there, why aren't you using them." I said, "Mr. President, there is a big difference here because the troops -- the first troops you need to introduce are your logistics troops to build the infrastructure. The roads going through Albania couldn't even carry a tank." They weren't big enough, wide enough, the tunnels weren't wide enough, the bridges weren't strong enough. So there was a whole lot of engineer work to be done before you could move ground troops anywhere. So

my suggestion to him was why don't you put the engineers in and start building the infrastructure now. It will send a signal to Milosevic that we are getting ready to do something. But if you don't do it, you are still going to need that infrastructure built for the refugees when the winter comes. So it is a win/win for you. He really liked that, and so did Madeline Albright and Sandy Berger. So that was a very interesting point.

The next interesting point was the President asked if we do get a peace, how long will it take the Marines to move from their ship to the border of Kosovo. He didn't ask it of me. He asked it of Hugh Shelton. Hugh Shelton said 72 hours, 72 hours. Well, that was a shock to me. So I made the "time out" sign. The President looked over because I didn't say anything, I just gave the time out sign. The President looked over at me and he said, "General Krulak?" I said, "Sir, with all due respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we will be in there in 24 hours from the moment you say go. We will be fully ready at the border between Macedonia and Kosovo in 24 hours." There was this audible inhale of air from both General Shelton and the President, and the President said, "Thank you very much." The interesting point is just a few days later we got the peace. The President said go. And 19 hours later, the Marines were ready to go into Kosovo, less than 24 hours. That is what makes us different. That is what makes us a breed apart. I often wondered whether the President thought back to that conversation we had had in the Cabinet room. I know that Hugh Shelton has.

DR. CRIST: From your papers you were very honest with the President.

GEN KRULAK: I think the response from the President was positive. Our response from the Secretary of Defense was positive. I think by this time I was, with Denny Reimer, by far the most senior of the Joint Chiefs to include even the Chairman. I would say I was the most outspoken of the Service Chiefs. I think that my comments didn't catch anybody by surprise. I think they just expected them. There goes Krulak again. Sometimes I made sense, sometimes I probably didn't. In this case I think the issues that I raised were ones that made sense and so there was no problem.

DR. CRIST: It seemed the longer the war dragged on, the more cracks were exacerbated within NATO. It appeared that time was on Serbia's side

and some were concerned about fighting in the winter.

GEN KRULAK: First off, I was never that concerned about the winter. I mean, we can fight and win in the winter. That wasn't a problem. The problem was the logistics movement during the winter with the mud and the slush and everything. So it was never a case of winter is coming. We are going to be able to fight in winter. It was winter is coming and that it is going to exacerbate the difficulties of logistics. The time was on the Serb side simply because of that and because the longer we banded away the more resolve they had and the more fractured NATO became. Milosevic gave in to our demands very simply because he had achieved his. I mean, he achieved his goal. He had taken Kosovo. He had cleansed Kosovo. He saw us beginning to look like we were going to do a land campaign. We already had the Kosovars rebels doing a land campaign. So he cut his losses and made out like a champ. The guy did well. He was inside our OODA LOOP. He was able to observe, orient, decide, and act faster than we were. Why? Because we were doing a war by committee and doing it with the petty cash. The committee was the 19 NATO countries and the petty cash was the fact that we had no money allocated for this. So every dime that was being spent was coming right out of the DoD budget. He had everything going for him. When he saw the potential for a ground conflict and all of that coming, he looked at where he was and he said, my mission was to do the following. I have accomplished it, pull out.

DR. CRIST: How would you sum up the air campaign?

GEN KRULAK: I think the air campaign was a mixed success. It was flown by very brave Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots, and they did a heck of a job. But was it a success? I think only now we are beginning to hear the truth. They found three tank hulks. What does that mean? How many days of bombing?

DR. CRIST: 74.

GEN KRULAK: Three tank hulks? I don't know how many artillery pieces, but it was minuscule, very few people killed. What ended this one was the air campaign that was striking strategic hard target, taking down those bridges, taking down the news network, and targets like that. Also, the actual ground conflict of the Kosovars and the potential for ground conflict, that Milosevic knew would

cause him to lose not just Kosovo, but Belgrade. He knew he was going to lose everything. But if you look at what his goals were, he had accomplished them. It wasn't the air war that ended this. The Congress is not going to do away with the Army and the Marine Corps and the Navy and say all we need is an Air Force. They realize, as much as anybody, how this thing turned out.

DR. CRIST: So you would say that Warden and the air power theorists still haven't found their victory yet?

GEN KRULAK: No. They haven't found their victory, and they were searching mightily. They will attempt to reconstruct one, but it won't work. The trouble is, truth is against them. The truth is the success of the air campaign was minimal.

DR. CRIST: Yes. It appears that essentially what you are having as of this 19 August 1999 is almost a reverse ethnic cleansing where some 80% of the Serb populations had fled.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. What the Joint Chiefs told the President and told the Secretary of Defense was there are no good guys. They are all thugs. Before Milosevic went into Kosovo, the Kosovars were cutting heads off, cutting ears off, and raping Serbian women and men. Milosevic went in to save his own people. There are no good guys. They are all thugs.

DR. CRIST: The service chief's opposition, with you at the forefront, was one of the main reasons why Task Force Hawk was never employed?

GEN KRULAK: That's correct. That's correct.

DR. CRIST: If, the Serb's hadn't given in and agreed to the Rambouille accords, would there have been a ground offensive?

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: How detailed was the planning for this?

GEN KRULAK: The planning for the ground offensive was being conducted at EuCom. It was not to the detail that was executable, you know, within the next week or two. But they were doing planning. My belief is it was a combination of things that stopped the conflict. It was the air campaign, it was our campaign out of Albania. It was the obvious threat of a ground campaign that

would lead all the way to Belgrade. It was the fact that Milosevic basically accomplishes his aims that caused the end of the crisis.

DR. CRIST: With the cease-fire, the Serbs pull out and the multinational forces enter as part of Operation Joint Guardian, with the Marines of 26 MEU being one of the very first in, in only 19 hours. First of all there were some problems with their getting authorization initially in Greece?

GEN KRULAK: Well, we wanted to offload at Thessaloniki because it would have been simpler at the piers. The Greeks didn't want us to do that but they offered us a beach very close to Thessaloniki which would have been harder but it was still close enough to make our off load extremely quick. As it turned, that beach was denied and we had to go some 50 kilometers away and had to make a longer motor march. It just slowed us down but again, 19 hours isn't bad. It demonstrated to the National Command Authority and to the American people the, the agility of a Marine Air Ground Task Force. In fact, with only 2,200 people, there is enough combat power to have an immediate impact. One of the things that happened shortly after we got in to Kosovo itself was that we found a check point under sniper fire and our response was very definite and very quick. The second we started taking fire, we returned fire and assaulted through the position, killing three of the enemy. At first there was some comments about the Marines being trigger happy, et cetera. Very shortly people realized that that was a very important event because what it said was although we're peace keeper and we're here to help everybody, the reality is if you fool with us you're going to pay the price. Slowly but surely, the other countries all came along to the same realization.

The bottom line is that in peace keeping you must be prepared to go into the third block of the three block war. Kosovo is the classic three block war. At one moment in time we were at Camp Hope in Albania doing refugee relief and the next moment we're in Kosovo doing peace keeping. Then the next moment in time we were in mid-intensity conflict getting fired at by snipers. Now, there are some people who would say that's not mid-intensity conflict, that's sniper fire. But to the young Marine getting shot at, don't tell him he isn't in mid-intensity conflict. The point is, we were able to do that seamlessly and to be very effective in each evolution. I think that's a tribute to Marine training and to the ethos of our Corps.

DR. CRIST: The Marines performed well in Joint Guardian, especially with the uncertainty—moving

from a humanitarian operation to a mid-intensity conflict. We were much better at adapting to this than did some of the NATO allies. Would you ascribe this to the Marine Corps focus on training for the three block war?

GEN KRULAK: That's right and we've been working on it now for several years. That effort made a big difference.

DR. CRIST: On 24 June 1999 you appeared on the "Lehrer News Hour." You mention that as you conduct these types of operations, if the other side believes that it can inflict casualties on you and take pots at you at random, you will rapidly lose control . . .

GEN KRULAK: And that's what we've told our Marines. We've said, look you're in there as peace keeper but you're not there to absorb bullets and if somebody shots at you, you need to shoot back, more than just to protect yourself. You shoot back to send the message that people do not fire on American servicemen and get away with it.

DR. CRIST: Just two more questions on Kosovo. Was it your intention or the intention the Marines would be pulled out as quickly as possible out of Kosovo? Were you pressured to keep them in there to share the burden?

GEN KRULAK: My comments in the tank were that it would not be an effective use of Marines to keep them in Kosovo for any great length of time. That our value was as a rapid, agile force capable of not only making a difference in Kosovo but around the perimeter of the Balkans. A very effective reserve force. So I urged that after 30 or 45 days they ought to relieve the Marines in place, bring them back on board ship and provide that kind of flexibility to the combatant commanders. They did that.

DR. CRIST: You resisted throughout your commandancy the pressure for the Marines to get permanently stationed in the Balkans.

GEN KRULAK: Yes, for that very reason. I wanted us to be used in the more classic role of Marines . . . as the fire brigade that we saw during the Korean War to make use of our ability to make an impact and then get back out. Don't get bogged down in land warfare.

DR. CRIST: What do you think the implications of Noble Anvil/Allied Force of this are going to be on future conflicts?

GEN KRULAK: I noticed today the President, for the first time, said that air did not win the war alone. I thought that it was interesting that he's finally coming to the realization. I just think that this is the face of war in the 21st century. I think that, as I've said so many times before, it is not nation state against nation state, it's not state actor against state actor. It's tribal, it's religious, it's cultural, it's chaos and we're just going to see more of it not less and we got to be prepared to handle it and nobody's better prepared than the United States Marine Corps. We just need to keep focused on doing what we do. We win battles. The reason you don't want to stay in Bosnia, the reason you don't want to stay in Kosovo is that gets you into the war. We win battles. We don't win wars. We manage instability. We try to keep from getting to war by winning the battles. If we are placed into the situation of being the second land army we can do that effectively. We showed that in Korea and Vietnam. Every 20 years we're going to get involved in a big one where we fight side-by-side with our brothers in arms, the United States Army. But during the other 19 years, we need to be winning battles. Focused on doing what Marines do best and that's managing instability. A certain force for an uncertain world.

DR. CRIST: On the 27 April 1999, you received a brief from the Force Structure Planning Group. What did this entail?

GEN KRULAK: The charter of that group was to determine the Corps optimum force structure and to present recommendations for the Corps force structure in 2015. This was to be done in "bite size" 2005, 2010, 2015. In many ways, it was the culmination of almost eight years of trying to get back to the 177,000, which we lost. It's going to be important to the Corps. The rigor is there, all the data that Gen Jones needs. All he has to do is go to the Congress. He will not get support from the DoD. He needs to go to the Hill and sell 177. Before I left, I spoke with the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee. Both of them are supportive of the Marine Corps going to 177. I mean, we cannot miss -- this is in the bag if we don't screw it up. The only way we could screw it up is to get involved with DoD because I can tell you there's going to be no desire on DoD's part for us to get a plus up. So this is one

where Gen Jones is going to have to part the sheets between his old boss. By the time they open up this historical record, they'll know whether he did it or not. I hope and pray that he does it because the skids are greased to do it. I've been promised 177 by the two people that make that call. All we have to do is ask for it. General Jones needs but to ask. To do this, he will need to go against his old boss.

DR. CRIST: Where do you see those additional 5,000 Marine Corps -- FMF?

GEN KRULAK: FMF. We're going to probably bring back two infantry battalions, probably two more squadrons and some will go, to reserves as part of Total Force.

DR. CRIST: Is this something all the services are doing essentially going straight to Congress, or just the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: The Marine Corps does it more than anybody. Although, we are beginning to see far more willingness to do it by the other services. There was never an intent of circumventing the DoD. I never went to Congress that I didn't tell the Secretary I was doing it. I would first go to the Secretary and through him to the President and say and here's what I need. Here are my requirements. They'd say here's the best I can do for you. At that point in time I'd say okay, thank you very much. With your permission, we'll be going to Congress. They'd always say do what you think is right.

DR. CRIST: Yeah. What I really want to spell out there was that this was not an end around

GEN KRULAK: No. It wasn't an end around at all. I mean, they always knew I was doing this.

DR. CRIST: 6 May you made an unannounced visit to the Fourth Marine Corps District in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Is there a specific reason or is this part of your kicking boxes mode that you like to do?

GEN KRULAK: It's part of kicking boxes but it raises a pretty good issue and that's the concept of the unannounced visits. I did that a lot. As an example, on this visit, I sent my driver up to Harrisburg the day before. He drove a four wheel drive vehicle up there with no military plates on it. He reconnoitered where the District Headquarters was. He then met us at the airport outside of Harrisburg where we flew in. We had flown out of Washington about six o'clock in the morning. So

we showed up bright and early at the District Headquarters. There was no requirement for the Marines to hold field day because the Commandant was coming or get briefings ready for the Commandant or paint rocks because the Commandant was coming. What they got was their Commandant with them, unannounced and unexpected. They got the opportunity to talk with their Commandant without having to get all prepared. As a matter of fact, the District Director wasn't even there. He was in Washington meeting with Recruiting Command. So it was just a great opportunity to one, talk to the Marines of the District and two, talk to the -- RS there in Harrisburg. We did these unannounced visits all the time.

The first unannounced visit was to Cherry Point. We started to fly in and my pilot was afraid that they would know who we were. I said to just tell them you're a C130 needing fuel. So they did. They told the tower that it was a C130 and we landed the Gulf Stream and taxied right up to one of the AV-8 hangers and the door came down and I jumped out and spent the whole day talking to Marines, both officers and enlisted. The Wing Commander and the squadron commander and the Group Commander had no idea I was on the ground for about 45 minutes. They knew who I was as soon I hit the ground but I was moving so fast they had trouble finding me. The point was not to harass my officers but to make it so that nobody had to prepare for my visit. I'd get a chance to see them and it would be without all of the hoopla that goes with the Commandant's visit.

I remember a visit to Barstow. No other Commandant had been to Barstow in years. I sent the driver out. He had to land in Orange County where he rented a vehicle. We then flew into this little airport outside of Barstow and as we drove through the gate at about 7:30 in the morning, I looked over to my left and there was a parade deck and it was filled with Marines. They were having a practice parade for a change of command. Just about every Marine at Barstow was out on that parade deck. We parked behind this formation and I just walked up through the formation towards the commander and his staff. I got about half way through between the commander and his staff and the formation and the sergeant major of Barstow yelled, "What the hell are you doing on the parade deck? Get out of here!" I just kept on walking and all of a sudden they realized that there were four stars on my shoulder. We stopped the parade practice and got everybody around and I was able to talk for about an hour to the officers, staff and NCO's and enlisted Marines of Barstow. IT was

great and it was very beneficial. These are just a few examples of what I did all throughout my commandancy.

DR. CRIST: In addition to avoiding wasting Marines time by "painting rocks," did you do this as a way of gaining a real sense of what was really going on in the Corps?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That was the whole point. I could see it the way it really was. It was real valuable. I think an important part to note is I never discovered, in all of that time, something that really disturbed me. They were out there doing what Marines do, doing a great job. For the most part, they were doing exactly what the Commandant would have wanted them do. It reinforced my belief that the Corps was on the right track and the FMF and others were doing just what they should be doing. It was very positive. Plus it gave Marines' stories to tell which is good also for the Marine Corps. It is good to have a lance corporal be able to say, "I was sitting at my desk and all of a sudden the Commandant of the Marine Corps came walking in and we spent five minutes talking about how hard it was to get brake shoes ordered for the motor pool!"

DR. CRIST: These stories are legendary in the Marine Corps. I've heard a number of them preparing for this. I noticed in schedules, especially towards the latter half of your commandancy, almost half your time down was set aside for "kicking boxes." That's what it actually said in the calendar.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I didn't feel I needed command briefs or dog and pony shows, or demonstrations. I just don't think the Commandant needs that. The Commandant has a pretty good idea what's happening in the command. What is valuable to a Commandant is the opportunity to talk to the young officers, talk to the staff non-commissioned officers, talk to the colonels, the commanders and talk to the troops. The best way to do that is do it in their spaces on their time.

DR. CRIST: On the 13th of May, you recognized the Marine Corps Institute Graduate of the year. Was this new?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. It was part of our effort to put an emphasis on the education of Marines and so we -- just like we did the Recruiter of the Year, we had the MCI Graduate of the Year.

DR. CRIST: Following the 25 May show, "This Week," the ABC Sunday morning news show, you wrote an E-mail saying how pleased you were that both Sam Donaldson and George Will were wearing a Marine Corps tie bar. What do you recall of this interesting side bar?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We use to hold dinners at the home of the Commandant. They were intended to bring the grass roots of America into a broader understanding of the Marine Corps. I'd invite people to these dinners that I'd never even met before. Heads of industries, heads of entertainment, authors, members of the arts, you name it. We'd hold them primarily during the winter but also held some during the spring. At one of them in the spring, two of the people we invited were Sam Donaldson and his wife and George Will and his wife. Well, George Will had a son that was in the Marine Corps, an officer. He had been to the house several times. At these events, we would give a gift to everybody that came. My wife always gave a Jefferson cup and on the Jefferson cup would be an engraving of the home of the Commandants. It was the signature gift of the First Lady of the Marine Corps. She gave that cup to everybody. As for the cuff link and tie bar, I got made through the good auspices of the Marine shop, Harry Elms and Steve Elms. The idea of cuff links and a tie bar with the CMC flag on it came from a painting—the official painting of Gen Chapman. In the painting, Gen Chapman's wearing dress blues and his white shirt and his cuffs are showing. His cuff links were red cufflinks. I got a magnifying glass and I put it up to the cuff links and the painter had actually painted cuff links made of the Commandant's flag. So I talked to Major Harry Elms, the owner of the Marine shop and his son Steve Elms who owned The Officers Equipment Company and I said, "Do you know what that is?" Maj Elms said, "Yes. A long time ago they use to have Commandant cufflinks." I said, "Can you make some?" So they made a bunch of them. They became a gift that I gave at these parties. I gave a pair to both Sam and George and I didn't want them to just put them away after the dinner. I told them I wanted to see them wear them sometimes. George Will said, "Well I'll tell you, this weekend I'll wear mine on Sunday's show if Sam wears his." Sure enough, on the 25th of May, throughout that entire show, George Will and Sam Donaldson wearing their Commandant's tie clasp.

DR. CRIST: Was it cufflinks or --

GEN KRULAK: What they did was they wore the tie clasp. We got many phone calls into my office asking if that was that the Commandant's flag on Sam and George's tie? Not a whole lot, maybe ten or fifteen. But what really happened was the news stations got a lot of calls saying what were those tie clasps that Sam and George were wearing? They didn't say the Commandant flag, they said the Marine Corps tie clasps. So we got a great deal of free advertisement for the Marine Corps just because of that one incident.

DR. CRIST: 29 May-5 June 1999 was your final trip as Commandant out to the West Coast. What do you recall of this, your last trip to the FMF as Commandant?

GEN KRULAK: Well, it was a great trip. I guess the most important thing was, again, the opportunity to talk to Marines. One thing that I did do, I took one other trip after that one, not to the FMF but MCRD in Parris Island for the Crucible. So, those two trips kind of were the ends of my travels and certainly the last viewing of the Crucible as the Commandant. It might be of value to know that when I finally finished my travels we had gone about 750,000 miles.

DR. CRIST: It equates to 30 trips around the world. Something close to that.

GEN KRULAK: That's a long, long way. In perspective I think that Gen Gray and Gen Mundy in their eight years went about 500,000 miles total, together. So you can see that it's a long, long way. That's not saying they should have or they shouldn't have traveled more. That's not the issue. The issue is that's how I chose to do it.

DR. CRIST: One of your other last major successes was again on the budget and manpower issues. You were able to get a 1.4 billion dollar increase and your active duty in strength increased by 5,000 back to the 177 mark. This eliminated the 1997 QDR cuts.

GEN KRULAK: I think that the 1.4 billion dollars plus up was a compliment to the Marine Corps and what they had done for the nation over the past year. We averaged about 1.2 billion dollars plus up each year for the budget in '96 through this 2000 budget. This last one was around 1.4 billion. It could be higher than that. They still haven't totaled it up yet. I think that these congressional plus ups are a great testimony to the individual Marine and his or her ability to do what the nation asks of them.

As I mentioned in my retirement speech, the individual Marine, when called upon, will don their helmet and flack jacket, they'll march to the sound of the guns, they'll fight and they'll win. They'll guarantee that. Well, the American people appreciate that and so does the Congress. I think that this 1.4 billion plus up along with those from the years before was a recognition of this great institution called the Marine Corps. I also think it was a recognition that Marines told the truth every time they went up on the Hill. We may have suffered because of it inside the Pentagon and inside the White House. But we told the truth and I think that paid off in the support of the members of congress for our Corps. As for Danzig and the end-strength, I think that there was not much selling that had to be done. Danzig is a smart, smart guy and he got out and kicked some boxes himself and found that we were hard pressed to do what we had to do. Are Marines meeting themselves coming and going? He was there when the first FSPG came in 1991, which said 177.

As you know, we just did another FSPG. You know, that was one of my last acts was to establish a Force Structure Planning Group 99 and to have them report out to me and to Gen Jones. The result of that study was a requirement for a 177,000 Marine Corps. So we had the '91 FSPG and all the historical data between 91 and now as to the increase in op tempo and deployment tempo. Now with the 1999 FSPG we had the rigor of a brand new force planning group effort. They came up with the same number. Mr. Danzig had no wiggle room; he had so he supported it. The 99-Force Structure Planning Group effort was a real win. It's going to make a big difference to the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps has always had two problems, I call them the M&M's, manpower and money. The money problem I think we have pretty well solved. We've been plused up along the way. We've gone from \$9.5 billion to 11 billion in our yearly budget and then have been plused up by 1.2 billion above that for the last four years. So we're making major in-roads on the money. So that left one other thing. The other "M" which is manpower and the 1999 Force Structure Planning Group effort attacked that and it gave us the rigor to go and say we need 5,000 people. We need that 177. You wait and see. Within the next year or two we'll get end-strength at 177,000 and you'll then have money and you'll have manpower. You'll have a great Corps. At the very beginning of this oral history, I talked about being a transitional Commandant. As I said, I was not going to be the Quarterback. I wasn't going to throw the touchdown pass. That was never the intent and I wasn't looking for that. I was going to

be one of the linemen building the architecture to allow the quarterback to throw the touchdown pass. It's like someone building a building. I never intended to be CMC when the final stone was placed on the arch. It just wasn't going to happen. If I did my job, we'd have the stone to put in the arch. I think that is exactly where we are now thanks to the blood, sweat and tears of a hell of a lot of great Marines. Not Chuck Krulak but PFCs, lance corporals, SNCOs, and great officers like Marty Steele, Jeff Oster, Mike Williams, Carl Fulford, and Pete Pace. We are there because all of these people who have been toiling in the yards trying to make the planning guidance into reality. BGen Rusty Blackman took three months out of his life . . . seven days a week, eighteen hours a day to head the FSPG 1999. Pat Howard devoted himself to the Operational Maneuver from the Sea Working Group. All of the Marines participating in Urban Warrior and Hunter Warrior. All of those people enabled the M&M's to get fixed and I believe they are fixed. It's going to make it a heck of a Corps. It's going to make a big difference.

DR. CRIST: Did you ever think in the back of your mind that if I only had a couple of more years or so?

GEN KRULAK: No. On the day I retired, I was exhausted. My wife was exhausted. I'm still tired. It's a hard, hard job. There may be some who will have the energy and have the strength and have the desire to go for a fifth or sixth year. One, I didn't have that strength. Two, I didn't have the desire. Three, I don't think it would be good for the Marine Corps because the days of Archibald Henderson are over and thank God they are. The Commandant needs to focus, keeps his eyes on the prize, drive as hard as he can for four years and then turn it over. Each Commandant brings something new to the Corps with their talents and ideas and thoughts. We need to get Jim Jones in there and bring these ideas to the forefront. I'm sure Carl Mundy felt the same way about me. That's good for the Corps not bad.

DR. CRIST: On 8 June you were the guest of honor at a Basic School Mess Night. What are your recollections of the evening? Here you are at the end of your career as a four star general, looking back, looking at lieutenants at the very beginning of their career where you were 35 years earlier.

GEN KRULAK: That was a great night. First off, it's interesting that it was a Bravo Company. That was my company when I was at TBS. Secondly, I was surprised because they brought some people

down for that mess night that I didn't know were going to be there. A Marine first lieutenant by the name of Al Lerner who is the CEO of MBNA Corporation and owner of the Cleveland Browns. He is just a great, great guy and for whom I will work for retirement. Well, I didn't know he was coming and he flew in as a surprise. Pete Haas, who at one time owned a position on the U.S. Stock Exchange, a former sergeant major in the Marine Corps. A long time friend. The co-founder of the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation was there, Dick Torykin, the "Field Marshal" as he calls himself. People that I had no idea were going to come. They honored me at the Mess night. Normally they give you a plaque or a knife or something like that. Well, what they did was they literally put a bronze plaque on the bulkhead at the main entrance of O'Bannon Hall. The plaque had the Chinese character of chaos on it . . . very similar to the same plaque that I have in my office. There is a saying, "Chaos is where brilliant dreams are born." In addition, it says, Before a person can be truly brilliant, he or she must look foolish to the crowd." So, they put that up on the bulkhead for me and dedicated it to me. Maybe I looked foolish to the crowd!

DR. CRIST: In fact another thing I hadn't touched on but since you mentioned The Basic School, you pushed to redo the Hawkins Room and that entire central area of O'Bannon Hall for the first time in years.

GEN KRULAK: We redid the Hawkins Room, we did a complete renovation of most of the rooms in the Basic School. The officers and Marines that we are bringing in are first rate – our facilities ought to be first rate.

DR. CRIST: On the 23 June, you attended the Marine Corps in Amphibious Technology ceremony at Quantico.

GEN KRULAK: That ceremony highlighted the triad of amphibious technology. The V-22, the prototype of the AAHV and the LCAC. On 1 June the first V-22 training squadron had stood up, followed by the 23d of June with the first roll out of the AAHV. So that was a real special time and important for the Corps future.

DR. CRIST: That gets us to 30 June, sir, when you passed the color to Gen Jones.

GEN KRULAK: Well, the day started the way 30 June 1995 started, and that is I called Gen Mundy

and asked him if he'd like to go for a walk. So at six o'clock Gen Mundy met me at the home of the Commandant's and we walked out the front door and walked down to Pennsylvania Avenue and walked down to the Capitol and stood at the Capitol overlooking the Mall, the Washington Monument and on down to the Lincoln Memorial and kind of talked about the past four years. Since he and I had done the same thing the day I became the Commandant it was a poignant time. We went back to the Home of the Commandants' and I fixed him some coffee and then he left. I spent the rest of the day making sure that my uniform was okay and that all the last minute things that were taking place out in the barracks were set to go.

Then, about an hour -- thirty minutes to an hour before the ceremony was to begin which was at 1500, we had all the former Commandant's that were alive come to the house. We had Gens Greene, Chapman, Wilson, Barrow, Kelley, Gray, Mundy, and Gen Jones, all there. We had some pictures taken and I gave each one of them a lapel pin with the Commandant's flag on it. Mrs. Cushman also came to have her picture taken too and we gave her a little pin. They all were escorted to their seats at the parade. After they were seated, my wife and Diane Jones were escorted to their seats and then Gen Krulak and Gen Jones, went down, took their seats. The ceremony was pretty long. It lasted for almost an hour and 45 minutes. It started with three songs played by the "Commandant's Own." It played "America the Beautiful," "Just a Closer Walk with Thee" and "the Battle Hymn of the Republic." Both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Danzig spoke and my wife was given a wonderful tribute. She was given both the Department of Defense distinguished service medal but also the Navy equivalent for her work with families. She had done a magnificent job. Then I was given the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. I got a chance to speak. Jim Jones got a chance to speak. Pass in review. Zandi and I walked off the parade deck. We had a reception line. We put a thousand people into the garden. The most ever. Then about 45 minutes into the reception line, we broke the line down. It was my belief that at that point in time it was not Chuck Krulak's day it was Jim Jones day and he deserved to have that day to himself. So Zandi and I worked our way back into the Home of the Commandant's where we had a last box or two that we carried out the front door, stuck in our car and drove down to the Navy Yard where we had a room there in the VIP quarters. We invited people that were dear to us, my two sons and their daughters, my grandchildren, my mother-in-law, my brother Vic

and Russ and Beth Appleton. That kind of extended-family. We had pizza and beer and then a bottle that Pete Haas had sent me for the occasion--very expensive Champaign. We uncorked it and gave a toast to the Marine Corps. We went to bed at around 2200 and I slept like a baby. No regrets. We were just very happy. Great day, no sadness. It was just a very positive event.

DR. CRIST: A sense of relief?

GEN KRULAK: No. It was more a sense that Zandi and I had done our best. We served as best we could—following God's will. The organization called the Marine Corps was now led by Gen Jim Jones.

SESSION XXI

Retirement and Final Comments on the Commandancy

A new position with MBNA . . . Co-Chair of Veterans for Bush . . . Views of retired military and politics . . . Laura Stern and the official portrait of the 31st Commandant . . . Living at the House of the Commandants . . . The virtual Commandant . . . Use of themes . . . Maintaining institutional focus . . . Dealing with adversity and the media . . . Keeping in touch with the Corps . . . OLA and the importance of Congress . . . Civilian Marines . . . the Wirling Dervish as Commandant . . . Importance of his wife . . . Accomplishments over four years . . . Importance of values and faith .

DR. CRIST: Sir, last session, we covered your last days as the 31st Commandant and your change of command on 30 June 1999. What did you see yourself doing upon retirement?

GEN KRULAK: Upon retirement from the Marine Corps I had the opportunity to do several things. I was approached before I retired to head the Red Cross. I was approached by a technology firm called 3GI to be the Chairman and CEO of that company. I was approached by multiple defense industry organizations. I was approached to run for public office and I was approached to sit on nine boards. So I had a lot of opportunities and had to make a decision what I wanted to do. As a former Commandant you can basically do one of three things. You can retire and just do nothing. That would have driven us insane. We like to stay active. The second is you can do consulting work and sit on a couple of boards. That's a real option and I could have done that. Finally, you can take on a "real" job . . . A 12-hours a day, 5 days a week job.

I received an offer to go to work for a financial institution called MBNA. The Chairman of MBNA is Mr. Al Lerner who was a first lieutenant in the Marine Corps; the President of MBNA is a Mr. Charlie Cawley, both very good men. Lerner is the owner of the Cleveland Browns aside from being the major shareholder in MBNA. Anyhow, they asked me to come to work and basically run all of their personnel and administration; all their compensation and benefits; all their facilities maintenance currently built and constructed; all their medical and dental efforts, their fleet, planes, and cars. And I did that up until 1 January 2001.

On 1 Jan 01, I became the Chairman and CEO of MBNA Europe. I will stay in that job for probably two or three years and then come back here and maybe think of slowing down a bit.

DR. CRIST: One thing did you after retirement involved the Presidential Campaign of 2000. You were the co-chair of the Veterans for Bush Committee and took a strong public stance that became a controversy in the press about whether retired active duty officers should take such a political stance.

GEN KRULAK: Well, as you know, I served with President Bush, the elder, in the White House and knew him well. I knew Governor, now President Elect Bush, soon to be President George W. Bush fairly well. When he won the nomination of the Republican Party he called me and asked me whether I would be willing to co-chair the Veterans for Bush/Cheney Committee. My co-Chairman was a Democratic former congressman by the name of Sonny Montgomery who gained a great deal of fame with the Montgomery GI Bill. Both Sonny and I said "Yes," We went about gaining other supporters to join our team. We ended up with about 120 former generals, admirals, sergeants major, corporals, former and active congressmen and senators, Democrat and Republican, 17 Medal of Honor recipients, men, women, you name it. All who were willing to put their name on the line and say we support Governor George W. Bush for President and here's the reasons why. When that was announced in the news I came under a lot of fire. Not only did I, but several of my fellow generals and admirals. As an example, General

Tony Zinni was a member. Admiral Jay Johnson was a member. We were all taken to task and the issue had to do with the propriety of a former service chief or high official in the military taking a

stand. Some believed that our actions were in violation of civilian control of the military.

While I was on active duty nobody bit their tongue more than Chuck Krulak because of my belief regarding civilian control of the military. But as a retired officer I believed in my heart and soul that civilian control of the military no longer stood. When you're in the military, active duty, you willingly give up many of your rights. You give up the right to live where you want to live. You execute your orders and go where people want you to go. You give up your right to not get shot at. You give up your right to speak out on political issues. You give up your right to campaign and you do that freely. But when you retire after having fought for and served the Constitution of the United States, you pick up the rights you so willingly put aside. I never felt bad about it. As a matter of fact, I question those who would watch their country and their military have the opportunity to choose between two people, one of them who represented eight years of degrading of the military combat effectiveness and another who said I'm going to reverse that degradation and not speak up. To me it was a lack of moral courage and a lack of doing what is right for the nation. When you're on active duty you keep your council to yourself. But when you're retired, not only do you have the right but also you need to execute that right.

When the firestorm came up it was very surprising. But if you thought about who was raising the firestorm it was, for the most part, the Democrats. They really generated a lot of the heat. Interestingly, they're the same people who had the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral William Crowe speak out for President Clinton during his first campaign in 1992. Nobody complained about that. What was sad is the Democrats managed to tap into some retired military and some active duty that took exception to what the coalition was doing. That was sad but to be expected. There are some people who just have trouble putting into perspective the issues involving the right of American citizens. Those people were unable to separate the requirement of active duty service members and those that are retired.

DR. CRIST: One thing I remember was the issue some people were floating around that military officers shouldn't even have the right to vote.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I willingly kept my mouth shut during my military services. I honestly believe

in civilian control of the military. But in this instance, I was retired. I had a clear choice as to who to support—Al Gore who had presided with Clinton over the demise of the military—or Governor Bush who had articulated in clear and succinct terms what he was going to do to restore our military. I felt it was my duty, as did my fellow retired generals and admirals. I could not sit by and watch Mr. Gore continue the policies of President Clinton.

Our man won. President Bush called me up and said he believed that it was the United States military who won the election for him. Over 65 percent of every active duty and every retired and every veteran voted for Governor Bush. He got a large number of votes from our efforts.

DR. CRIST: Anything on your retirement that you think needs to be noted for the record? I think that last part was important to get on the record.

GEN KRULAK: No. Many people thought that when I retired I'd slit my wrists and jump off a bridge. The reality is both Zandi and I have just had a great time as civilians. I don't regret leaving the Marine Corps. I mean I miss my Marines, but I don't necessarily miss the Marine Corps. I don't go to Washington. I don't go to parades. I don't do all of that. I am very content to be a former Commandant of the Marine Corps. If somebody needs something from me, if somebody wants my opinion, I give it to them, but I certainly am not beating on the doors offering it.

DR. CRIST: What I'd like to do now is cover a few issues that are more reflective and provide more of an overview of your commandancy and you as the 31st Commandant.

GEN KRULAK: Sure.

DR. CRIST: While certainly not of significance of what we talked about earlier, but since no other Commandant's ever commented on their official painting about why they chose the pose or any of this and it comes up periodically.

GEN KRULAK: Sure. That's a very interesting story. The artist was a woman; the first time a Commandant had ever used a woman. Her name was Laurel Stern, now Laurel Stern Bach. Zandi and I like artists who do real life detailed paintings.

We wanted a painting that really looked like me. We looked at many artist portfolios and really believed that Laurel did the type of work we wanted for the painting. We asked her if she would do the painting and she said yes. Everybody wanted me to wear Blues, but I said there had not been a picture of a Commandant in his Greens since General Vandegrift fifty years earlier. I felt it was time for a Commandant to be painted in his Greens.

I really like it. You can see the Bible in the lower left-hand corner of the painting. People ask me why I put the Bible in my official portrait. I guess the answer to that goes back to the "Baptist Landing Team." That was part of who I was as the Commandant. That's part of who I am as a man. That's part of who we are as a family. That's my bedrock belief. So I wanted the Bible in the picture with me because if there was ever strength during my commandancy it was my relationship with Jesus Christ and God. So it's part and parcel of my official portrait.

DR. CRIST: Yes Sir. Was it taken from a photo initially?

GEN KRULAK: No. Laurel said, "I can't paint you unless I know you." And so she spent a day with me at the Pentagon walking around and getting acquainted. Then, I had her to a parade. She stayed that weekend in the Home of the Commandants. Later she returned to Washington and took six hundred pictures of me in various poses with pictures of my hand and pictures of my face . . . very detailed pictures. Eventually we picked the pose, then picked the hands we wanted, etc. and she painted the portrait.

DR. CRIST: Yea, it's a very good likeness and it's interesting that the Naval Academy Ring is prominently displayed.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: We talked a little bit about the importance of the Commandant's house and how 8th and I is a great tool to bring in people for the Commandant. We really didn't really talk too much about the changes you made to the house itself.

GEN KRULAK: Well Mrs. Krulak will talk in great length of that, but the reality is she didn't do a lot inside the house. We didn't want to spend a lot of money inside the house. But what she did that I think was really important was she found the original landscape drawings for the home. She then

raised some money and reproduced the backyard and garden. That beautiful garden is an exact replica of the Garden circa early 1900's. She did a super job. When the Garden was dedicated, it was dedicated as the "Marine Corps Family Garden" in her name.

DR. CRIST: What about life there, actually living in that house, 8th and I?

GEN KRULAK: We basically lived in three rooms. We lived in the kitchen. We ate most of our meals there. That's where the family gathered. It was just nice and warm and bright. We lived in our offices. We spent many hours there. And we lived in the bedroom. But the place that we spent the most time would be our offices. I would come home at 1930, get a quick bite to eat and then go up and work till 2200 or 2300. I basically did that every day and also worked on Saturdays and Sundays. I used the weekend to do much of my thinking and writing. I'd use that time to call families of deceased Marines. I'd call their wives during the weekend. I'd call Reserve units because they'd be working on the weekends.

DR. CRIST: We've talked about this at some length, you were the first Commandant to install a computer in the House of the Commandants.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. I had a computer in my office. I averaged about 150 e-mails a day, so I would answer many of them on the weekend. I'd also use that time to communicate with my Generals.

DR. CRIST: I noticed most of your e-mails are all caps. Was that to simplify and to speed the...

GEN KRULAK: Yes, speed. I didn't even know until later that "THAT" meant that I was shouting [laughs].

DR. CRIST: I think it is fair to say that you, the 31st Commandant, were the first "E" Commandant.

GEN KRULAK: I was probably the first virtual Commandant. I was the first Commandant to have a computer installed in the Commandant's study. Gen Mundy had one in the small office off the kitchen but he didn't use it that much. On my trips, my comm team presented instant multi-spectral communication anywhere in the world. I was able to VTC if I needed to. I was on the computer at all times. I was obviously on comms. I had a lap top and a modem wherever I went. We had satellite

communications that was hand held that we "shot" right out of the window of the airplane so that we could communicate. Although all of our planes had comms, they would sometimes go in and out. With this hand held mini satellite receiver, we were able to communicate wherever we went. The Marine Corps didn't have to know exactly where I was but they always knew they could get a hold of me because wherever I went, I had a computer with me. I was tied in electronically. It made a big, big difference.

DR. CRIST: You were the first to use your e-mail extensively too. It was a part of your communication with your general officers and staff.

GEN KRULAK: Absolutely. I averaged around 140 to 160 e-mails a day that were personal and I worked. Now you might say that this tied me up. But no! Normally, I did them at night. I would go home and I would clean my screen at night. That's when the dialogues would take place. It was very helpful to me.

DR. CRIST: Did you find that it gave you a chance -- unlike just picking up the phone and calling somebody, it gave you a chance to think about your ideas as you put them down?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. More importantly to info other people. If you're having a phone conversation and you get on something that is really important, then you have to write it down to remember it for others. With the computer, I could always "add" names so that others would know what was transpiring. I could info Marty Steele. I could info John Rhodes and do it all easily.

DR. CRIST: We discussed you as the first virtual Commandant. Is it fair to say you're also the first video Commandant too? The best example that comes to mind is, when the changes of the new fitness report were made, and this was not the only time you did it, you'd send out a videotape of you so every Marine knew exactly what the Commandant's intent was for this new report.

GEN KRULAK: Yes.

DR. CRIST: It struck me as an effective way of mass communicating?

GEN KRULAK: Yes

DR. CRIST: That's a theme that's run through your career. Pushing the ability to communicate across,

so things are not stove piped.

GEN KRULAK: That's right. The whole idea was to not stove pipe people. People accused computer geeks of stove piping. I disagree. I think the computer, if you use the "copy to" line, you can really get a dialogue going. That's what we did.

DR. CRIST: What about your organizational style?

GEN KRULAK: In some ways, I'm the opposite of what is normally thought of as the traditional military mind and approach. As I shared with you earlier, when Gen Dailey was the Assistant Commandant, he had all of the general officers take the Meyers-Briggs test. When they displayed the Meyers-Briggs test up on the bulkhead and they were reading it, the person who administered, the MBTI pointed out two people and said these two men can not be generals in the Marine Corps. There must be a mistake in the system because they would never be a Marine general. It turned out that the two people were me and Tom Draude. That's why Draude and I get along so well. We have the same personality types which is called an INFP. Most military organizations are very hierarchical; most leaders are hierarchical in their thought process. Very judgmental from the standpoint of knowing exactly where they want to go, how they want to do it. My thought process really don't work that way. I have much more ability to see across the spectrum. My problem is once I see it, being able to focus and put steel on target, and so, somebody with my thinking process needs other people around them that are far more detailed. A good example is my wife, a good example would be Russ Appleton. My style caused some discomfort. I believe in balance, that it served the Marine Corps well during my tenure.

DR. CRIST: Do you think that an item like the Commandant's Planning Guidance, it's a blueprint for the commandancy, could have come out if you didn't have that personality trait?

GEN KRULAK: Probably not. Not as widespread, not touching so many different aspects of the Marine Corps. The fact that there were times and dates set against taskers . . . that was new.

DR. CRIST: That's an interesting observation for anyone listening to this. It appeared to me going through your Commandant's Planning Guidance, that you provided broad guidance. This is where I want to go. Then the staff would come back with an iteration of the CPG. You would then take a

look at it, refine it, and they would fill in the details, again and again and again.

GEN KRULAK: That's exactly right.

DR. CRIST: Beginning with the Commandant's Planning Guidance much of your commandancy seemed well planned. Even your Birthday Balls were tied to reinforcing your themes, such as Making Marines and Winning Battles.

GEN KRULAK: Well each Birthday Ball had a theme, with a specifically selected guest of honor. A detailed routine that we thoroughly planned and rehearsed. A CMC letter and a birthday video that we would produce and distribute it to the Corps. More than that, to those friends of the Corps, and when I mean friends I mean members of Congress that were Marines or that really helped out the Marine Corps, members of industry, members of the news media, you name it. I would have a folder made, very similar to the red folders with the Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Seal on the front that we give for awards and on one side would be my Commandant's message. The other side would be a thank you letter from me to that individual thanking them for their support over that year. They'd get that folder plus their own personal copy of the birthday video. As an example, for this last one, Touchstones of Valor, the Iwo Jima video, we probably mailed out 250.

DR. CRIST: One thing that strikes anyone going through your personal papers is the sheer amount of issues you were required to deal with—some major policy issues, such as we have discussed in this oral history others people asking for things, other just routine business which required your personal attention. I would think it would have been difficult for you staying focused on the important items such as outlined in the CPG?

GEN KRULAK: That raises a good point that we have touched around but haven't touched on--the idea of an institutional focus. There are all kinds of tugs on the Commandant. There are internal tugs, there are external tugs, there are personal tugs, all of these things have to be played out as you go through being a Commandant. For me and for Zandi, all of the actions that we tried to take, first and foremost, had to consider what was called the best interest of the institution. So, I use to urge my generals and my commanders and certainly urged myself, that as we made decisions, that first, we needed to take into account the individual that you might be impacting or group of individuals. But

normally the tough decisions involved individuals. As an example, extending the tour of duty of a drill instructor from two years to three years. Knowing that it's really tough to put three years on the drill field. Just before you make the final decision, take on step back and say okay, now let's forget about looking at the individual and look at the institution. Is this the right decision for the institution? Normally the two married up but sometimes they didn't. So we made it a basic fact that the institution would hold sway.

Sometimes people would misunderstand and say we were being politically correct or expedient. A good example was that blood winging incident. On the surface it looked like I was upset because it caused political heat. That was not it at all. You had to take one step back and say, "What about the institution?" The situation in reality was the institution was hurting because of what had happened. That, yes, there's a *small* segment which probably thought this type of behavior was okay, but you just can't, as an institution, treat your people like that!

DR. CRIST: There were a number unfortunate events which could have been major blows to the Marine Corps during your commandancy. The rape in Okinawa, the blood pinning incident you just mentioned, the A-6B and ski gondola accident. Any one of these could have seriously damaged the image of the Marine Corps had it not for the actions you personally took. In fact, through your efforts, they may have actually reinforced the American public's good feelings toward the Marine Corps.

GEN KRULAK: There was a great amount of thought that went in to how to handle each one of those issues. When I started out, to be very honest, the advice I would normally get from the Staff Judge Advocate and from my Public Affairs people, tended not to be the advice I took. Normally the advice was don't offer up anything if it's in the public affairs area, don't offer up the opportunity for the story to have multiple "bounces" in the media. The issue breaks and you have a spike. Then nothing happens and your answer comes in and that just spikes it up again and then nothing happens and the media answers. PA would say, "Look, take the hit one time and just be done with it." Or the SJA would say, "Let's hope that this trial goes away, you know, very quietly."

We had made such a stand early on even in the CPG about what we meant to the American people and what the American people meant to us. I found myself in the first year basically going 180 against my own Staff Judge Advocate and my own Public

Affairs people. When we had an issue, I hit it head on and if somebody said something about the Marine Corps that I didn't agree with, I immediately would go back with a letter to the editor. I never let them off the hook. Even if it caused the issue to bounce again. I wanted the Marine Corps position on the record. As it turned out, I had many newspaper people come up to me half way through my commandancy and say, "You're doing it right. You don't let our editors, you don't let us get away with anything. We enjoy sparring with you." I ended up getting letters into *USA Today*, the *New York Times*, the *L.A. Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*. Forget about the *Washington Post* and the *Washington Times*. I mean we were in major newspapers in this nation because they had this guy willing to talk about bad things as well as good. I think it did make a difference.

DR. CRIST: You didn't shrink away from bad news, you address it head on?

GEN KRULAK: I think that paid off. By the end of the first year, my Staff Judge Advocate and my Public Affairs folks had really gotten on board. The Public Affairs staff, particularly, and they really became very, very helpful. An individual who understood from the beginning was the counsel to the Commandant, Peter Murphy. Peter Murphy understood from the get-go what we were trying to do and really did a superb job. He was great.

Another thing that I don't think, come across to the degree that it ought to and was one of our real goals was resourcing the Corps. It wasn't just, we need to get more money for the budget. It was a campaign. We were going out after more money. We were going after an increase in our overall TOA that we got out of the President and we were going after more money from the Congress. There was a very, very well articulated plan to do that supported by the Office of Legislative Affairs. You tailored their plan in coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff for P&R. Those organizations pulled together to, to resource the Marine Corps.

It started off, as I mentioned before, with the elevation of the Deputy Chief of Staff of P&R with three stars. It sent a very visible signal that we believed that resourcing was key. Before it had always been a two star, it's now a three star. It's on the same level as the N-8 for the Navy and it was important. LtGen Jeff Oster was the first one and he did a great job. The campaign also took on the blush of working with the Congress to reinforce the fact that the Congress raises Armies and maintains the Navy. It is not the President and DoD. If there was a choice between keeping the President and

DoD happy or the Congress happy, our survival rests with the Congress. So we really went after that and again, we had a campaign planned every year. Every year I had OLA produce a Legislative Affairs Campaign Plan that not only came to me but equally if not more importantly went to every Marine general. We briefed it normally at the General Officers Symposium so that everybody could speak with one voice and that voice would be the Commandant.

When I spoke candidly on the Hill, there is no question that I got "whacked" for my candor by both the Department of Defense and the Administration. But even that, even that whacking enhanced our credibility on the Hill and so it was worthwhile. That credibility and reputation with the members and their staffers was worth the butt chewings I use to get.

DR. CRIST: You even said earlier that it was that that honesty with the Congress, while you had your "butt chewed," it also kept your job.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. That's right

DR. CRIST: One thing that strikes me about your commandancy, be it "kicking boxes" or traveling 750,000 miles in four years, was the effort you made to stay in touch with FMF and the Corps outside of Washington.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. We had a commitment from the very beginning that we were going to maintain close contact with the Marines. In order to do that, we would sit down at the beginning of each year and literally block out on the calendar time to visit the FMF, and each major Marine base or station, twice a year. During those visits we would have a personal briefing by the Commandant. We would call recruiters, at least five recruiters every week, we would visit a recruiting station anywhere in the country at least once a month. I would call a ready-room of a flying squadron in the Marine Corps once a week just to talk to the pilots and tell them we love them. We did this because of the pilot retention problem and wanting them to sense that their Commandant was concerned about them. Marine mail, the informal travel itinerary for making surprise visits were all done to enhance communication.

Additionally there was the contact with the general officers and the key personnel at Headquarters, Marine Corps. In order to do that, I set up a series of meetings to try to get the idea of participation by everybody. Every week, on Monday morning, I would start off at 630 or 645

with a meeting with the Director of OLA and the House and the Senate liaison officers. They would come in with an informal schedule for the week, what they expected to accomplish themselves and what they wanted me to do. Did they want me to pay a visit? Where there any phone calls to make? Did we have anything in the future we wanted to concentrate on? An example would be who did we want at our next breakfast? So, that would happen every Monday morning.

Right after that we'd have something called the special staff update. That's when all of the special staff to the Commandant would come in. From the officer interested in the minority affairs for the Marine Corps up to and including the Director of the Marine Corps Staff, PA, the Staff Judge Advocate. They would come. There would be no agenda. They'd just say, here's where we are, here's what we see coming up here, some things we need to look at. It was to get the Commandant's head into the game.

Then we'd have a three star meeting. Every Monday all the three stars in the Headquarters would come and sit in my office, again no agenda. Just a discussion of where we were at the beginning of the week, and where did we want to be at the end of the week. A lot of sharing there. Then, Tuesday morning, Ops/Intel with the full staff. There would be formal briefings by PP&O and Intelligence and then on Thursday morning we would have a CMC staff breakfast that would have all the three stars. So I'd meet with the three stars twice a week, the special staff at least once a week, a special meeting with OLA and then on a quarterly bases, three star off-sites. I'd go down once a quarter to Quantico for what we call the MCCDC day. I would go down and listen to the hot projects that they were working on and give them rudder. We use to call them "rudder sessions." That whole effort was designed to reinforce the key role that MCCDC had in keeping the Marine Corps on track. An out growth of this was I also went to the Marine Corps Systems Command and got briefed on there as well once a quarter.

I'd hold breakfasts and lunches with just the brigadier generals in the headquarters or just the brigadier generals from out of town. The whole idea was to try to keep the lines of communications open because things were moving at a pretty fast pace and I wanted to make sure everybody was still with us.

DR. CRIST: And all of this helped, of course, you keep track of the major issues within the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Absolutely.

DR. CRIST: You mentioned your legislative assistants. I assume since, as you've stated repeatedly, "The health of the Marine Corps is found in Congress," that you placed a high value on OLA?

GEN KRULAK: My legislative assistants were key. They worked for me, no one else. That probably sounds like a "no brainer" to most people but I mean, they worked for me. They worked for the Commandant. Nothing took place on the Hill that I didn't know about and nothing was initiated without me giving a go ahead. Here, I'm talking specifically about policy issues. I wanted to know who was on the Hill and what they were talking about. I didn't have any problems with generals going on the Hill but they had to be speaking the party line so the liaison officers were really key to that. I'm very proud of them.

DR. CRIST: So of that, your OLA initiatives, did you find that necessary just because of the increasing number of Senators and Congressman who never served in the military period or was ...

GEN KRULAK: Well, I just, I just thought we needed to speak with one voice.

DR. CRIST: Did you notice from 1995 to 1999, a noticeable change in the attitude of Congress toward the Marine Corps?

GEN KRULAK: I think we lucked out in many ways. I think one of the reasons why we lucked out was because the other services went, for one reason or another, with the DoD party line all the time. I mean, it was just amazing to me, how you could have service chiefs stand up in front of Congress and say that we're fully funded. That they're ready to go and it's never been better than it is right now. I use to say if that's the case, give me some of your budget. That's what I told the Congress. If they're not complaining and we are, they're obviously doing well and we aren't and so you need to help us.

DR. CRIST: This is not a major issue, but I found it interesting. One term that I heard you use extensively during your four years as Commandant was "civilian Marines," when discussing the civilian employee portion of total force.

GEN KRULAK: Well that is important. Because we were so lean in our fiscal and personnel resources, each civilian working for the Marine Corps were called civilian Marines. Some people didn't like that. They said Marine is an honorable term, you have to earn the title Marine. Well, I said, "That's if you think of Marine as an individual. This is a title, civilian Marine. I thought that it was important that we recognize them. Likewise the same for the SES's. Those are general offices in my opinion. When we had a General Officer Symposium, our SES's came. When we had a new brigadier generals' orientation, we had new SES's attend. They received honors. They got the "last round fired" trophies. They got every thing that the general officer did because I wanted them to feel like they were really a part of the Corps. The responsibility for hiring SESers I gave to the Assistant Commandant. It use to be way down the chain of command but I viewed it as a promotion board-similar to the selection of general officers.

DR. CRIST: Since were on the subject of SESers, Peter Murphy seemed to be very much your right hand man through your commandancy?

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Absolutely. You need to understand, he was more than just the Counsel to the Commandant. I really used him. He was in my office two or three times a day. I don't know how many times I'd called him at home. He was a stalwart for me personally and professionally.

DR. CRIST: One aspect of your commandancy, which you have discussed in the oral history, I don't this is widely know was your efforts to expand the Marine Corps ties with foreign militaries, especially their armies. You had mentioned the work you did with the French, Israelis, Japanese, South American countries just to name a few.

GEN KRULAK: Yes. Those visits to and from my counterparts in foreign countries took a substantial investment in time and energy. I conducted 17 counterpart visits overseas and hosted eleven counterparts in the Home of the Commandant. So that's 28 counterpart visits. That's a lot of counterparts! But, again, it was of great value.

DR. CRIST: Very interesting. To change subject a bit, sir, we have talked about your high energy level earlier, but you have quite a reputation for your work ethic. I've heard some of your staff say, "I don't know when this guy sleeps!"

GEN KRULAK: Well, I was nicknamed by Gen Mundy, "the Whirling Dervish." MajGen Tom Wilkerson, who worked with me on FSPG-91, probably was the first one that used the term "Whirling Dervish." For those who did not know me very well or didn't take time to analyze what I was doing and I probably did look like a "Whirling Dervish." I mean, some people would even use the phrase to describe me as "a B-B in a bottle." That was because I was able to move very quickly and cover a lot of area, keep a lot of balls in the air. I'm not sure that the ability to do that or to have that kind of talent was a blessing or not because it caused a great deal of energy to be expended every day for those four years. It also tied into my father's belief that the harder you work the luckier you get; if you work real hard, then as the head of the institution, the luckier the institution would get.

So from the start, both Zandi and I literally made a commitment that we were going to push as hard as we could for the four years. In fact, we did that. We worked very, very hard and, and made it almost a crusade for the institution. She worked absolutely as hard as I did and at the end of the four years, both of us were pretty tired. I'm sure that other Commandants and their ladies were also tired but I'm not sure that any of them ever sat down and really had a long discussion about what they we're going to do during their commandancy. That this is what it's going to take to do a good job. Zandi was a key part of the 31st Commandancy from day one.

DR. CRIST: Could you elaborate on that? You mentioned your wife a number of times and about the amount of work she did.

GEN KRULAK: Her, concerns for the most part had to do with the family, the Marine family. So, during the same time that we were working on the Commandant's Planning Guidance, we were talking about how to more effectively institutionalize family programs within the Marine Corps, not just to keep on appearing that we're interested in families-- but also getting at how do you really take a young PFC's wife or a young lieutenant's wife and give them the knowledge and the skills required to be able to do what needed to be done when their husbands' are deployed-- more than just making sure that the car kept on running. How could they become effective participants in the Marine Corps community? How could they, in fact, help their husbands by being more active and strong when their husbands were deployed? That was the birth of the LINKS Program, the birth of the Sponsor Leadership Program, all of those things literally had their geneses earlier on before my commandancy.

All I'm saying is that we actually sat down and said these are some of the things we're going to try to accomplish. Here's the Planning Guidance in its early stages. Here's what Zandi and I were thinking. How do we tie in what Zandi is thinking? We had this tremendous home called the Home of the Commandant-- how could we best use that home to help the institution? Out of that came the idea that we wanted to use luncheons and breakfast and dinners to get the right types of people in and inject them with the scarlet and gold of our Corps. Zandi went so far as to take a look at the house and say okay, this is on the National Historic Registry and yet the house itself doesn't look nice especially the grounds. So she did the research to find out what the original gardens were to look like. She literally found the original architectural drawings that were done of the gardens. She went out and raised the money to build the gardens. No military or government funds were used. It was all done by private donations. Those things didn't just happen. There was some great thought behind it. Zandi put in most of that thinking.

DR. CRIST: That is a big difference. The entertainment side has always been there and obviously a wife plays a big role, especially in your commandancy where you made it systematic from the very beginning.

GEN KRULAK: It was like recruiting. It was systematic recruiting, it as systematic grass roots building.

DR. CRIST: Along these lines, we've talked about your out reach efforts with the larger Marine community on board with you objectives, was the retired generals' news letter, which you initiated, part of this outreach program?

GEN KRULAK: That was an imitative by the Division of Public Affairs. They produced a newsletter that was sent out to all retired generals. Again, I was not only trying to not just keep the active duty involved but the retired generals too. Each news letter would have a personal greeting from me.

DR. CRIST: As you look back on your commandancy, what is your proudest accomplishment?

GEN KRULAK: I don't think there's any single thing that I'm most proud of. I think people will look at my commandancy in kind of segments. Some people will remember the emphasis on

values. Others will remember the Crucible. Others will remember the Warfighting Laboratory. Others will remember changes in the cohesion effort and the manpower initiatives. Or they may remember the changes to fitness report system. I mean, there's so many things.

I got a letter from Gen [Henry] Peter Osman. It was an interesting letter. He wrote, "Dear General Krulak," this was written on the 29th of June and hand delivered to me. "Dear General Krulak, over the past few months, I have often reflected back over the past four years and given thought to the incredible successes of your tenure as Commandant. The short list below represents just the tip of the iceberg of the many accomplishments that bare the Krulak mark." Then he just lists: "Defining what we do; Making Marines and Winning Battles; Transformation; Crucible; cohesion; recruiting success; performance evaluation system; Warfighting Lab; CBIRF, general officer plus up from 68 to '0; recruit training and standardization; Marine mail; move to the Pentagon; Material Command; captured Congress and the American people; Marine Corps Community Services; three block war; a new boot; a new found sense of integrity; and values;" These were kind words and he articulated some of what the Corps has accomplished over the past four years . . . but it was the Corps *not* Krulak. It was Marines that make it happen.

I guess the thing I'm proudest of is that the Marines, whether it's a general, a captain, or a PFC, took this thing called a Planning Guidance and all that was in it, and turned it from just words into reality. Well, that's an amazing thing when in four years they did all that. I'll tell you, it's amazing. These aren't just minor changes. These are major changes as we move into the 21st century. It's the Marines that did it. I guess the thing I'm proudest of is just the simple fact that we belong to an institution where a leader can come in and lay down some guidelines . . . just say here's where we're going . . . and that the institution has this remarkable ability to pick up the baton and carry it until it crosses the finish line.

DR. CRIST: Would you be satisfied if, in the future, you look at issues like the Crucible, the fitness report, War Fighting Lab, the V-22 is flying above your home, these sorts of issues are not -- people consciously don't say those are Krulak's, but they have been institutionalized within the Marine Corps. Would you say that's quite a success or you've done your job well?

GEN KRULAK: I'd be very happy. It goes back to my father's advice to me. You have only one year to make change, three years to institutionalize it. I don't know whether we've institutionalized them or not. I hope so. But, yes, I think that would be great. I go back to this whole idea of the transitional Commandant. I'm not looking for any credit. Any Commandant that looks for credit has got a problem. What would be good in my opinion is that if these initiatives turn out to be a benefit to the Marine Corps. If there are some that are not, they need to be done away with. Nobody will hurt my feelings nor any of the people who worked hard on them if two years from now people say, "Well, this Warfighting Laboratory is a bad idea. We're going to get rid of it." I think it would be a mistake. But if there's rationale behind it, if there's rigor behind that decision, then so be it.

DR. CRIST: That goes to your philosophy from the very beginning. Try things differently and be willing to fail.

GEN KRULAK: That's right. That's right. Don't worry who gets the credit. I mean, if you worry about who gets the credit, nothing will ever get done.

DR. CRIST: The flip side of the coin is, as you look back on your four years and if there's one thing you could have done differently what would that be?

GEN KRULAK: I was, in many ways, unable to fully articulate the issue of the values and standards and why they were important. You know, my father's quote of 50 years, "We exist today . . ." and all of that. To be able to separate that from the sense of my own faith in Christianity and that somehow this was the Commandant, this was Chuck Krulak evangelizing to the Marine Corps. Turning it into a Baptist landing team instead of a battalion landing team. People recognized that I was a Christian and therefore thought the reason he's emphasizing values was because he's such a goody, goody two shoes Christian. That was absolutely not the case. I was very up front that I was a Christian and very up front, you know, that I held devotions everyday and all of that. But the issue of standards and values of the Marine Corps were not unique to Chuck Krulak. It is unique to this ethos of our Corps. We've always had two touchstones. One of them is the touchstone of valor and one has been the touchstone of values. I was trying to reinforce both of those because I felt that in this day and age, the touchstone of values needed reinforcing because society was making it harder to

keep that touchstone alive. So that's what it was all about. Yet, to this day, there are Marines who still don't get it. Who don't realize that our support from the American people comes, *not* just from our warfighting skill, but from our values and standards as well. That's not their fault; that's my fault. I obviously did not articulate what I was trying to do. The majority of the Marine Corps got it, but there were enough that didn't, that it was a disappointment.

DR. CRIST: Is there anything in hindsight you could have done differently to change that perception?

GEN KRULAK: Not that I would have done. Obviously I could have just stopped standing up there and telling the Marine Corps that I was a Christian. How about that for a start? Somewhere in each one of my talks, I would, at some point, refer to my own Christianity. Not wearing it as a badge of honor, but in a different context. We could be talking about a war and I would say, "You know, to me, war is a terrible thing and you need great strength to get through it. When Marines are dying in your arms, you need strength and, for me, I happen to have God. I've been a Christian and so God helped me. Each of you needs to have something." For the most part, it didn't make anybody uncomfortable. There were some that it did. Or often I used my father's quote about a "high, almost spiritual standard." People thought I wrote that. Well, my dad wrote it fifty years ago. Transformation. You know, the idea that there's something religious sounding about that. It sounds religious. Well, that's baloney. It had nothing to do with religion. It had everything to do with making Marines so that those Marines could win battles.

DR. CRIST: This is a hypothetical question, but I wondered if it wasn't for your own personal faith, whether you would have recognized that the values issues needed to be addressed?

GEN KRULAK: I don't know. I do know that rereading the book *First to Fight*, and reading my father's quote had a major impact on me. The quote came from the question why do you have a Marine Corps? My father's answer was there is no reason to have a Marine Corps. You have a Marine Corps because the American people want one. Why does the American people want one? Well, they want one because we are ready to fight and win at a drop of a hat. But they also want one because of one word, standards—"high, almost spiritual standards."

Now, if somebody went into *First to Fight* and tried to find that quote, they wouldn't find it. You probably didn't know that. The entire Marine Corps thinks that is a direct quote out of the book *First to Fight*. The reality is that I took a bunch of my father's words throughout the first chapter where he talks about why a Marine Corps. I glued them together to make that quote. You can't find that quote in the book. You could find those words but not the direct quote. I knew what he meant because I talked with him. He was my father. So all I did was take the words that he had written and built on them. As a matter of fact, I've still kept it. Like I think I've told you before, I wrote it on Saturday, September 13, 1997. I can remember sitting down in my office at home and writing that. I wrote, "On October, 1957, Gen Pate asked my father a simple question, 'Why does the U.S. need a Marine Corps?' You all know what my father said, 'That the U.S. does not need a Marine Corps.' And he went on to say . . ." and that's when I quoted "we exist today . . ." If you read that, you cannot find that in that book. But you can find every single sentence throughout the book!

DR. CRIST: I think that covers the last of the "saved rounds" General. That is it. I think we covered it all.

GEN KRULAK: Great.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:

CMC
31 Aug 1997

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: COMMANDANT'S PLANNING GUIDANCE (CPG) FRAG ORDER

Ref: (a) CMC ltr of 1 July 1995 (Commandant's Planning Guidance)
(b) MCO P3900.15 (Marine Corps Combat Development Process)

1. INFORMATION. In July of 1995, we published reference (a), a comprehensive document known as the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG was designed to share with all Marines, and those who serve with us, a vector for the future ... a strategic direction to guide us in building the Corps our nation will need in the 21st Century. While the CPG was a mandate for change, it was constructed upon a bedrock of tradition and enduring values. The first of these is that making Marines and winning battles are the most important things the Marine Corps does for our nation. Second, the Marine Corps of the future will be built upon our five traditional pillars of strength: warfighting, people, core values, education and training, and our naval character. Lastly, as it always has been, the Marine Corps must continue to be the military force that is the most ready, when the nation is least ready.

2. FOCUS. In order to create the agile, adaptable, combined arms force the nation needs for the 21st Century, the Marine Corps is focusing its efforts on three areas: Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), Innovation, and the Individual Marine; framed within the construct of the Combat Development System (CDS) and our Concept Based Requirement System (CBRS).

a. OMFTS. The strategic and operational environment of the 21st Century was the rationale for the generation and development of OMFTS. This is the Marine Corps' operational concept, and it will drive our doctrine, organization, training & education, and equipment strategies for the next century. Making the Marines who will conduct OMFTS and equipping them with the tools with which to do so and win, constitute the Corps' focus of effort.

b. Innovation. To win in the 21st century, the Corps must "steal a march" on global change. How do we do this? By institutionalizing innovation and focusing our efforts on creating a Marine Corps whose material and human assets are versatile, agile, and adaptable to a wide range of operating environments. The Marine Corps must embrace the winds of change, make them our ally, and make them our force multiplier. We must be a forward-thinking, learning organization that strives, day in and day out, to improve our efficiency, to improve our effectiveness, and to challenge the status quo.

c. The Individual Marine. The Marine Corps' number one modernization and product improvement program will continue to be the individual Marine. Ultimately, people -- not machines -- determine our success in war.

3. CPG FRAG ORDER. Reference (b) calls for a CPG to be published within the first 6 months of every Commandant's tour as part of the CDS. A dynamic document, the CPG should be modified/updated as required during the tenure of the Commandant. In the case of the 31st Commandant's CPG, it is time to institutionalize, to clarify, to focus, and to capitalize on the gains made to date in the following CPG initiatives:

a. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). In operation since October 1995, this laboratory serves as the conduit for operational reform in the Corps. It is responsible for investigating new and potential technologies and evaluating their impact on how we organize, equip, educate, and train to fight in the future.

(1) Status. In February 1997, the MCWL conducted the first in a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), Hunter Warrior. Like any experiment, Hunter Warrior had successes and failures. The lessons learned from Hunter Warrior are being compiled, and the early results are being fed into the CDS. The MCWL is actively preparing for its next AWE, Urban Warrior (Fall 1998), in which we will look for new solutions to the future urban battlefield. Urban Warrior will be followed by a third AWE, Capable Warrior (Fall 1999).

(2) Future direction. I want MCCDC and MARCORSYSCOM to institutionalize the Marine Corps' innovation process. We must capitalize on the innovative momentum generated by the MCWL and the AWEs. We will do this by ensuring the advanced concepts, organization, tactics, and equipment identified by the MCWL, through the AWEs, are fed into the CDS for institutional testing, development, and possible implementation or procurement. Additionally, we must improve the feed lines that allow the FMF to input its innovative concepts, tactics, and equipment to the MCWL for assessment. By 1 November 1997, I want a briefing that details the organizational linkages between the MCWL and the FMF, the CDS, MCCDC, MARCORSYSCOM, and HQMC, to include the management of R&D funds.

b. Chemical, Biological, Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The CPG called for the development of a strategic organization -- manned, trained, and equipped -- to manage the consequence of the growing chemical- biological threat. The Chemical, Biological, Incident Response Force (CBIRF), activated in April of 1996, grew from that initiative.

(1) Status. The CBIRF has deployed to support the Olympic Games in Atlanta, the Presidential Inauguration, and the Summit of Eight in Denver, Colorado.

(2) Future direction. The CBIRF must continue to forge ahead developing the concepts, doctrine, organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures to remain the nation's premier incident response force. This includes seeking out new detection and resolution technologies. Additionally, I would like the CBIRF to focus their efforts in two areas. First, on developing countermeasure and force-protection training and equipment support packages for deploying MEU(SOC)s. Second, on assisting federal, state, and local response forces in developing their own training programs on how to manage the consequences of a chemical or biological incident.

c. Transformation. The 21st Century battlefield will require our Marines to be trained to the highest standard, ready for any challenge, worthy of the trust of the people of this great nation of ours. To prevail on this battlefield, our Marines must have individual warrior skills second to none,

they must have absolute faith in the integrity of their unit -- their team -- and they must be men and women of character. It was with the requirements of this warfighting environment in mind that we improved the process by which we turn young men and women into Marines, a process we call *Transformation*. The transformation occurs in four phases: recruiting, recruit training, cohesion, and sustainment.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps formally instituted the transformation program in October 1996. The recruiting and recruit training portions of the transformation program are on track and have been institutionalized in our Recruiting Command and at both of our recruit depots.

(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on the gains and strengthen the new opportunities uncovered by the cohesion and sustainment portions of the Transformation program. Therefore, I want DC/S M&RA to continue to re-craft our manpower practices, to the maximum extent possible, to facilitate team-building and unit cohesion across all MOSSs. By 1 February 1998, I want a briefing that details our progress in the cohesion initiative and our plan for institutionalizing it throughout all MOSSs.

d. Education. The CPG stated that education is central to all Marines -- not just for a select few, but for all. It is imperative that we extend the opportunity to each and every Marine to expand their minds, giving them the intellectual agility essential for combat decision making. To do this, we must leverage technology to extend the classroom to each and every Marine, regardless of duty station. Additionally, we must take steps to ensure our PME curricula serve not only to build the leaders, thinkers, and warriors of tomorrow, but allow our non-resident students to complete their courses in a reasonable amount of time.

(1) Status. We have fielded Area Learning Centers at Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Camp Butler that serve as computerized classrooms for taking multimedia classes, conducting low-level simulations, accessing the Internet, and for video teleconferences. Additionally, we are progressing steadily toward our goal of making the majority of our MCI courses available "on-line." The MCU has spent the last year working to improve our non-resident PME curricula to ensure our officers and staff noncommissioned officers can complete their required courses without detracting from their primary billet responsibilities.

(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on the successes to date and exploit new opportunities. I want our education system to focus on creating the flexible, thinking warriors who are the trademark of a learning organization. Additionally, our education curricula, processes, and institutions must focus on and support our operational concept -- OMFTS. Just as we did in the 1920s and 1930s with amphibious warfare, we need our best and brightest to concentrate their efforts on developing the doctrine, tactics, and procedures that will make OMFTS a reality in the 21st Century. Just as we are exploring a new operational concept, we also need to explore new educational methods and procedures. New interactive technology offers us the opportunity to make learning our profession more rapid and user friendly. By 1 April 1998, I want a briefing from the President of the MCU that details how our educational processes can better support this goal.

e. Training. The CPG stated that training must be focused on winning in combat ... progressive and practical ... we must make the most of every [training] opportunity before we go to the field. The complexity and speed of combat operations on the decentralized, lethal, urban battlefield of the

21st Century mandate that we improve the standard and efficiency of our training -- across the MAGTF -- top to bottom.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps has aggressively instituted new and improved training programs during the last two years. We have added the Crucible to recruit training; we improved the syllabus at Marine Combat Training (MCT) and the School of Infantry (SOI); the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) is giving our warfighting staffs the training they need to fight their MAGTFs more effectively; and we have a new Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP) that improves how we train in aviation. Additionally, the Marine Corps is applying new concepts and technologies in modeling to develop the simulators and simulations that will make our training as realistic as possible.

(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on the gains realized through our new training initiatives and exploit the opportunities resident in modeling and simulation to increase our warfighting efficiency and effectiveness. Most importantly, we must ensure our training programs develop warriors with the right tools for warfighting in the 21st Century. I want to ensure our training is realistic, aggressive, and of the highest quality. *Train like you fight -- fight like you train* must be the rule of the day. Accordingly, by 1 April 1998, I want a briefing from the Director T&E Division (in conjunction with CG MCCDC and DC/S Aviation) on how we can most effectively and efficiently achieve this goal. An update on the Marine Corps Modeling and Simulation Program shall be included in this brief, detailing our progress to date and the extent to which we can improve and integrate all of our simulators.

f. Structure. The challenges associated with warfighting in the 21st Century mandate that the Marine Corps reassess, and if necessary redesign, our structure and organization. As such, the CPG called for a comprehensive review of the Marine Corps' structure. As the military force that must be the most ready when the nation is least ready, we must ensure the Corps' structure is optimized for OMFTS and success on the battlefield.

(1) Status. In the wake of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), we chartered two Force Structure Reviews: the Active Force Structure Review (AFSR) and the Reserve Force Structure Review (RFSR). While these reviews were conducted separately -- they were coordinated. The purpose of these reviews was to define the most effective, capable, relevant, and realistically attainable force structure for the Total Force Marine Corps today. These reviews identify structure that, when cut, will allow us to reallocate Marines to, and increase manning in, our operating forces. The reviews delivered their findings on 2 August 1997.

(2) Future direction. By 1 June 1998, I want DC/S PP&O, CG MCCDC, President of the MCU, and the MCWL to create an OMFTS Working Group responsible for developing a framework for what an OMFTS force should look like in the 21st Century. In the Spring of 1999, following the Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), the Corps will establish a Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG). This review group will utilize the framework developed from the OMFTS working group, and the lessons learned from the Hunter Warrior and Urban Warrior AWEs, to ensure we are structured to conduct OMFTS in the 21st Century. The goal is to publish a Troop List for a 21st Century Marine Corps in the Spring of 1999.

g. Doctrine. The CPG identified several deficiencies in Marine Corps doctrinal publications -- they were not fully linked to tactics, techniques, and procedures, and they were not being updated in a timely manner.

(1) Status. The MCCDC Doctrine Division and MCU, assisted by the FMF and the Naval Doctrine Command, initiated an aggressive overhaul of our doctrine and its development process. Nine keystone doctrinal publications flowed from this overhaul: Warfighting (MCDP 1), Strategy (MCDP 1-1), Campaigning (MCDP 1-2), Tactics (MCDP 1-3), Intelligence (MCDP 2), Expeditionary Operations (MCDP 3), Logistics (MCDP 4), Planning (MCDP 5), and Command and Control (MCDP 6). All of these new doctrinal publications will be published by January 1998.

(2) Future direction. Since doctrine is the foundation for our tactics, training, and education, it is imperative each and every Marine understand these new doctrinal publications. I want CG MCCDC and the President of the MCU to ensure our resident and non-resident PME curricula support this new doctrine. Additionally, our curricula must explain how this new doctrine relates to the conduct of OMFTS. In conjunction with the Education briefing due by 1 April 1998, I want a briefing that details our strategy to attain these goals.

h. Logistics. The CPG challenged us to identify "potential opportunities for streamlining, eliminating duplication, and improving efficiency through organizational change to provide fully integrated logistics support to the Marine Corps."

(1) Status. In order to meet this goal, the Marine Corps has completely reviewed its logistics and acquisition strategies, looking for ways to improve our efficiency and responsiveness. We have identified several new concepts that will help us to achieve this goal, ultimately increasing the Marine Corps' warfighting potential.

(2) Future direction. Two of the concepts we identified -- precision logistics and activity-based costing -- offer significant advantages and shall be implemented immediately. By 1 December 1997, I want a briefing from DC/S I&L that details our plan for institutionalizing the precision logistics concept, to include measures of effectiveness for equipment readiness, material costs, order ship time, and repair cycle time. Additionally, by 1 January 1998, I want a briefing from DC/S I&L and DC/S P&R that provides a plan of action for expanding the implementation of activity-based costing throughout the Corps.

i. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). The CPG stated that to prevail in the 21st Century, the Marine Corps must be able to "reach and execute effective decisions faster than our adversaries, in any conflict, on any scale." In order to accomplish this, our C4I system must be of the highest quality, designed from day one for joint interoperability, and operated by warriors trained to the highest standard.

(1) Status. We have made tremendous progress in developing systems, concepts, and policies that will improve our C4I capability. The Enhanced COC developed by the MSTP and the MCWL, and the restructuring of the Intelligence Officer community are just a few examples of our progress in this area. But, we need a higher degree of C4I cohesion to field an OMFTS force for the 21st Century.

(2) Future direction. It is time to coordinate, synchronize, and standardize the Marine Corps' C4I efforts. AC/S C4I, in conjunction with CG MCCDC and CG MARCORSYSCOM, shall develop a plan to improve upon, coordinate, synchronize, and standardize our command and control efforts in order to achieve a completely DOTES integrated Marine Corps C4I system by 2006. By 1 April 1998, I want a briefing that details this plan. Additionally, in conjunction with this brief, I want an update on the Marine Corps' Intelligence Plan.

j. Aviation. The CPG called for the Corps to enhance Marine aviation's expeditionary utility by reducing the type/model/series of the aircraft we operate, obtaining an all short-takeoff/landing (STOVL) capability, and improving the efficiency of our operations.

(1) Status

(a) We are making steady progress in reducing (necking-down) the number of different type, model, series aircraft we fly in order to better execute OMFTS in the 21st Century. The V-22 will replace our CH-46 and CH-53D, and the ASTOVL JSF will replace the FA-18 and AV-8. The AH-1 and UH-1 will be upgraded and eventually replaced by a follow-on aircraft in the 2015 time frame. The CH-53E and EA-6B will receive upgrades and remain in service. Especially critical, are aircraft such as the V-22 and the ASTOVL JSF. The advanced warfighting capability, operational agility, and basing flexibility of these platforms are tailor made for OMFTS operations.

(b) As critical as Marine aviation is to OMFTS, we need to ensure that when it comes time to fight, our aircraft, our aviators, and those who support them are in the highest possible state of readiness. The Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP) was designed to do just that. The MACP, implemented in October 1996, concentrates on improving the way Marine aviation operates in ten areas: unit manning, material condition, time to train and retention, training efficiency, unit capabilities, sortie-based flying program, simulation, readiness reporting, TEEP management, and OPTEMPO reduction.

(2) Future direction. The Marine Corps will continue our neck-down strategy. The MACP, like any plan, is a dynamic one and should be reviewed periodically to ensure it is meeting its objectives, and to offer improvements or modifications as necessary. By 1 March 1998, I want a briefing from DC/S Aviation detailing the progress of, recommended changes to, and our plans for institutionalizing the MACP.

k. Individual Warfighting Equipment. The CPG called for the Corps to improve both the quality and the way we procure our Marines' personal warfighting equipment.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps has implemented a one-time 782 gear issue. The Reserve Force completed its one-time issue on 31 July 1997, and the Active Forces are scheduled to begin their one-time issue on 1 October 1997, to be complete by 1 October 1998. Additionally, the Corps changed the way we procured individual warfighting equipment. We can go directly to industry, find gear that is already in production, and, if necessary, modify it for our use, test it to our standards, and get it to the fleet in the shortest amount of time. This program has already borne fruit. The new infantry combat boot will be included as a sea bag issue item on 1 October 1997; the entire Corps will have new Gortex parkas and trousers by December 1998 (35,000 sets have been issued already); a new bivy sack has been fielded throughout the Corps; a new combat tent is in source selection; and a new modular load system and modular body armor are currently being

tested. This new strategy has shaved a significant amount of time off the old procurement cycle -- saving the taxpayers money -- and, more importantly, giving our warriors the best gear possible.

(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on our success in off-the-shelf procurement practices and exploit new opportunities to equip our Marines with the most up to date -- and highest quality -- warfighting equipment. By 1 March 1998, I want a briefing that details our progress on the one-time 782 gear issue and a plan for institutionalizing this program throughout the Corps.

1. Fitness Report. One of the priorities listed in the CPG was to ensure that ... our manpower management processes and policies are fair to our Marines and to the Marine Corps. The CPG identified the Fitness Report as a notable shortcoming in this area and tasked DC/S M&RA to fix the problem.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps developed a completely new Fitness Report, designed from the ground up, to accurately assess the skills and potential of the individual Marine. In this new report, a picture of the *whole Marine* is created by assessing observed performance in four major areas: mission accomplishment, leadership, intellect and wisdom, and individual character. The new report will eventually be fully automated, featuring a reduction in the time to complete the report, a built-in test to look for administrative errors, and an electronic filing system.

(2) Future direction. From July to September 1998, DC/S M&RA will conduct a comprehensive training program, designed to educate the Corps on the new fitness report system. Reporting commands will stop submitting the old reports on 30 September 1998. From 30 September to 31 December 1998 a moratorium will be in effect, where no fitness reports will be submitted or written. DC/S M&RA shall implement the new Fitness Report throughout the Marine Corps on 1 January 1999.

m. Marine Mail. An innovative, forward-looking, learning organization must have a vehicle to solicit ideas from all of its members. Marine Mail was created for just that reason. Marine Mail was not designed to bypass the chain of command. The CPG directed the use of Marine Mail to answer three questions. First, what aren't we doing that we should be doing? Second, what are we doing that we should do differently? Third, what are we doing that we shouldn't be doing?

(1) Status. Many thousands of Marine Mail messages have been received and answered. The ideas generated through the Marine Mail system are making an impact on how the Marine Corps conducts business.

(2) Future direction. I intend to expand the scope of the Marine Mail system, adding a fourth question: What new concept, idea, tactic, or piece of equipment should the Marine Corps investigate to improve its warfighting capability? I want to encourage every Marine who has an idea that will improve our warfighting capability to submit his or her idea via Marine Mail.

4. LEANING INTO THE 21ST CENTURY. The Marine Corps revolutionized the art of warfare with the introduction and perfection of the air-ground, combined-arms team. The beauty of combined arms is that, if planned for and executed properly, it places our adversaries in a position from which they have few good choices. If they attempt to avoid the effects of one of our capabilities, they expose themselves to exploitation by another. The combined-arms team is, and

will remain, the foundation of the Corps' warfighting capability, but the changing nature of warfare requires us to extend that foundation to other areas of our national power projection spectrum.

a. The changing face of warfare. Factors such as shifting economic centers, increasing urbanization, resource shortages, environmental disasters, and cultural strife, when combined with a rapid infusion of accessible high-technology weapons and information systems, will change the way our nation projects military power -- and the way our adversaries counter us. In the 21st century, our adversaries will not make the same mistake the Iraqi's did in Desert Storm. They will attack us asymmetrically, pitting their strength against our weakness, whether that lies in the military, political, or domestic realm. For example, in future conflicts, data lines of communication may be just as important as sea lines of communication -- and our adversaries, whether they are third world nations, transnational actors, or crime syndicates, will attack them.

(1) In the next century, we will have Marines conducting humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and high-intensity combat all in the same day and in the same operating area. This mission depth will require Marines to work side by side with other government and non-government agencies. What is lacking at this point is an operational concept for comprehensive command and control that weaves the diverse capabilities of the different entities into a coherent campaign plan. This can result in a lack of coordination creating friction, reducing our tempo and allowing our adversaries opportunities to exploit our political, military, or domestic seams. This will not suffice in the 21st century. The Corps' future operating environment will require our forward-deployed, sea-based forces to quickly and efficiently integrate the intelligence, operations, and support assets of the entire spectrum of national power. This spectrum includes military, academic, industry, government, and non-government agencies and assets.

(2) This operational concept should define a new command and control capability that unifies the efforts of the intellectual, experiential, and operational capabilities of all the elements of our national power. The operational concept should address the following requirements:

(a) The ability to proactively study the structural underpinnings of emerging problems, crises and conflicts around the world, and offering workable interventions.

(b) The ability to identify the potential strategies, tactics, and asymmetric counters that our opponents will attempt to use against our nation and our allies both militarily and domestically -- and to develop pre-emptive options against them.

(c) A decision-making and solution-development partnership with business and industry that harnesses the power and potential of their management, research and development, production and distribution capabilities, and their entrepreneurial spirit.

(d) The ability to look for ways to ensure our humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or conflict termination efforts avoid costly duplication of effort between military, government, and non-government agencies -- and to ensure our efforts most effectively address the source of the problem.

(e) The ability to quickly and efficiently coordinate the generation of resources in the incipient phase of a crisis.

(f) The ability to study ongoing operations for new developments, threats, or opportunities.

b. Tasking. I desire that this operational concept combine and coordinate the intellects, assets, and capabilities of the military, academic, industry, government, and non-government agencies to achieve a combined-arms effect that can effectively address the warfighting challenges we will face in the 21st century. Including a virtual staff at its core, this new warfighting command and control concept must contain the ability to leverage technology to "reach back" to the various agencies, organizations, industries, and individuals' expertise -- wherever they may be located -- during war gaming, mission planning, and the execution phase of an operation to ensure our solutions and actions are sound, efficient, and effective. This operational concept may well define a new command and control organization, able to orchestrate the capabilities of all the elements of national power in a unified effort, to meet our national security objectives in the 21st century. By 1 April 1998, I want CG MCCDC and DC/S PP&O to produce this operational concept, with its associated C4I requirements, for my review.

5. SUMMARY GUIDANCE. Preparing our Corps for fighting and winning our nation's battles in the 21st Century will require the maximum effort of every Marine. The initiatives laid out in the CPG, tirelessly implemented by the Marines, sailors, and civilians on our team, have begun the process of building the Marine Corps our nation will need to prevail on the battlefields of the future. The focus of our efforts, and the enduring centerpiece of the Corps, is the individual Marine. Each and every initiative laid out in the CPG and this Frag Order serves to improve and empower the individual Marine, to build cohesive teams ready for the chaotic and lethal battlefields of the 21st Century. The power of the Corps resides, as it always has, in our warfighting competence, our innovative approach to problem solving, our infectious can-do attitude, and the honor, courage, and commitment of the individual Marine.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "E. C. Smith".

Distribution:
Special

EVENT CHRONOLOGY FOR THE 31ST COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

JULY 1995

- 1 Jul 95 CPG/First ALMARs
- CMC and staff moved into offices at Navy Annex 1 Jul 1995. CPG formally completed and signed out. First three ALMARs issued: 190/95 "Assumption of Command," 191/95 "Commandant's Intent," and 192/95 Standdown."*
- 6 Jul 95 Swearing-In Ceremony w/ SecDef.
- 7 Jul 95 Brief DC area Officers.
- CMC begins a series of CPG briefings (Action Officers at HQMC, Marines assigned to Pentagon, Students at MCCDC, AWS).*
- Marine Mail instituted.*
- 10 Jul 95 CMC travels to Minneapolis, MN to attend NAACP Center of Influence.
- 13-14 Jul 95 CMC travels to New Orleans, LA for MarForRes change of command ceremony.
- 14 Jul 95 Evening Parade IHO the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Ronald R. Fogelman.
- 20-22 Jul 95 SecNav Off-Site, Annapolis, MD.
- 28 Jul 95 CMC makes "maiden" public speech during the Mass Muster of Korean War Veterans' ceremony on the Mall in Washington, D.C.
- Evening Parade IHO Gen Davis and the Korean War Veterans.*
- 29 Jul 95 CMC addresses 1st Marine Division Association at Korean War Veterans' Memorial Banquet in Washington, D.C.

AUGUST 1995

- 1 Aug 95 CMC travels to CamLej, NC for MarForLant change of command ceremony.
- 1-3 Aug 95 Executive Off-Site.

Three-star Executive Off-Site held 1-3 August at Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA. First of a series of high-level planning sessions pivotal to changing the way the Corps is heading toward the future.

- 7-8 Aug 95 CMC visits Marines at Millington, TN and 6th Marine Corps District.
- 11 Aug 95 CMC addresses 1995-1996 classes of Marine Corps War College, School of Advanced Warfighting and Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA.
- Evening Parade IHO the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda.
- 15 Aug 95 CMC addresses the SgtMaj/MGySgt Symposium at Quantico, VA.
- 16 Aug 95 CMC addresses USNA Class of 1999, Annapolis, MD.
- 17 Aug 95 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Navy Annex.
- 19-20 Aug 95 CMC travels to Kingston, Ontario to review the Ft. Henry Guard and offer remarks at an evening dinner.
- 25 Aug 95 Evening Parade IHO the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable John H. Dalton.
- 27 Aug-6 Sep 95 CMC visits to West Coast/Mid-Pac/EastPac.
First major overseas trip coincides with V-J Day celebration.

SEPTEMBER 1995

- 8 Sep 95 CinCs Conference at the Pentagon.
- 11 Sep95 CMC addresses the Reserve Forces Policy Board in Arlington, VA.
- 14 Sep 95 CMC addresses Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, VA.
- 15 Sep 95 CMC addresses the Women Officers' Professional Association at the Pentagon.
- 21 Sep 95 CMC travels to New River, NC for the arrival of the 24th MEU.
- 22 Sep 95 CMC addresses Washington Area Retired Officers at Bolling AFB. CMC makes remarks at a Testimonial Dinner IHO General Gray in Tysons Corner, VA.

23 Sep 95 CMC addresses the Marine Corps Aviation Association in Arlington, VA.

25-29 Sep 95 General Officer Symposium at Henderson Hall.

27 Sep 95 CMC addresses the Modern Day Marine Grand Banquet in Alexandria, VA.

29-30 Sep 95 CMC travels to New Orleans, LA to serve as the principal speaker for the commissioning of the USS CARTER HALL.

OCTOBER 1995

3-6 Oct 95 CMC travels to Okinawa, Japan.
Late-scheduled CMC trip in response to the rape of an Okinawan girl by Marines on 4 Sep 95. CMC addresses Okinawa Marines, meets with Embassy and GOJ officials.

10 Oct 95 CMC travels to Newport, RI to address the Naval War College.

12 Oct 95 CMC addresses the Commanders' Course at Quantico, VA.

15-16 Oct 95 CMC travels to Los Angeles, CA to address the Los Angeles Chapter of the USNA Alumni Association.

17 Oct 95 CMC addresses the Surgeon General's Leaders Conference in Tysons Corner, VA.

18-21 Oct 95 CMC travels to the West Coast to visit I MEF units and address the Defense Orientation Conference Association.

24-25 Oct 95 CMC travels to New York, New York to attend the 1995 Salute to Freedom Benefit Dinner.

26 Oct 95 CMC travels to Newburgh, NY to attend FBI MCA Parade and to address the FBI Marine Corps Association at a luncheon.

30-31 Oct 95 CMC travels to Pascagoula, MS to visit Ingalls Shipyard, then to Biloxi, MS to serve as the keynote speaker for the 17th Annual Salute to the Military, then to Blount Island, FL for a command visit.

NOVEMBER 1995

1 Nov 95 CMC addresses National Defense University students and faculty at Ft.

McNair.

- 2 Nov 95 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Navy Annex.
- 3-4 Nov 95 CMC travels to Mobile, AL to address the Navy League Winter Board of Directors' Meeting.
- 5 Nov 95 CMC participates in the Annual Marine Corps Worship Service, Washington National Cathedral.
- 6-10 Nov 95 CMC participates in Marine Corps Birthday Week events in Washington, D.C. area.
- 10 Nov 95 HQMC Birthday Ball celebrating the 220th anniversary of the Marine Corps. *Guest of honor is the Honorable Dr. White, Deputy Secretary of Defense.*
- 11 Nov 95 CMC travels to New York, NY to attend the Nation's Day Parade.
- 29 Nov – 2 Dec 95 CMC travels to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for a command visit, to New Orleans, LA for an Executive Off-Site, and then to Columbia, SC to attend the M1A1 Inauguration Ceremony.

DECEMBER 1995

- 8 Dec 95 CMC travels to Ft. Leavenworth, KS to address the Army Command and General Staff College.
- 13 Dec 95 CMC addresses the Brookings Institution at an informal luncheon in Washington, D.C.
- 19 Dec 95 CMC presents opening remarks at the dedication of the Commandant's Warfighting Lab, Quantico, VA.

JANUARY 1996

- 5 Jan 96 CMC addresses the USNA Annual Leaders' Forum at Annapolis, MD.
- 8 Jan 96 Office of the Commandant moves to the Pentagon.
- 8-12 Jan 96 CMC visits II MEF units at MCAS New River, Camp Lejeune and MCAS Cherry Point, NC.
- 16-17 Jan 96 CMC travels to Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, AL to address the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College, then proceeds to MCLB

Albany, GA for a command visit and to present the Hammer Award.

- 17 Jan 96 "Welcome to the Pentagon" Ceremony to commemorate HQMC move from the Navy Annex to the Pentagon.
- 17-19 Jan 96 Three Star Meeting at MCCDC in conjunction with wargame testing USMC role in OPLANS per the JSCP.
- 22 Jan 96 CMC addresses the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security at the University Club, Washington, D.C.
- 23 Jan 96 CMC attends the State of the Union Address.
- 25-26 Jan 96 CMC travels to Camp Pendleton, CA to present the Hammer Award, then addresses the AFCEA/U.S. Naval Institute Annual Western Conference and Exposition in San Diego, CA, followed by a command visit at NAS Miramar, CA.
- 29 Jan 96 CMC travels to Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, AL to provide opening remarks at the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course.
- 31 Jan – 1 Feb 96 CinCs Conference at the Pentagon.

FEBRUARY 1996

- 2-17 Feb 96 CMC travels to Tokyo/Korea/Okinawa/Hawaii for a WestPac visit, then to Harlingen, TX for events at the Marine Military Academy.
- 21 Feb 96 CMC travels to Carlisle Barracks, PA to address the U.S. Army War College.
- 22 Feb 96 CMC is keynote speaker at the 10th Anniversary of T.I.Y.M. Publishing Company at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
- 28 Feb 96 CMC travels to New York, NY to attend and speak at the Council on Foreign Relations dinner and meeting with the Service Chiefs.

MARCH 1996

- 7 Mar 96 CMC addresses the Commanders' Course at Quantico, VA.
- 9 Mar 96 CMC addresses Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation at the 10th Annual Semper Fidelis Awards Dinner in Tysons Corner, VA.
- 17-27 Mar 96 Brigadier General Selectee Orientation Course held at Henderson Hall.

CMC offers welcome remarks to selectees and spouses on 18 Mar and addresses Roles and Missions with the selectees on 19 Mar.

- 21 Mar 96 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Navy Annex.
- 23 Mar 96 CMC is the guest of honor at the Marine Corps Mess Night, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD.
- 26 Mar 96 CMC addresses the Secretary's Committee on Retired Personnel at the Navy Annex.

APRIL 1996

- 2 Apr 96 CMC travels to Staunton, VA to be the guest speaker for the Shenandoah Valley Council of the Navy League.
- 4 Apr 96 CMC addresses the Advanced Logistics Officers' Course 96 at Quantico, VA.
- 9-10 Apr 96 CMC travels to Medford, MA to address the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, then visits the 1st Marine Corps District in Garden City, New York.
- 11 Apr 96 CMC addresses the American Enterprise Institute Commission on Future Defense in Washington, D.C.
- 12 Apr 96 CMC is a guest lecturer at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in Bethesda, MD.
- 13 Apr 96 CMC addresses the National Marine Corps Council Bi-Annual Meeting at the Sheraton National Hotel in Arlington, VA.
- 16 Apr 96 CMC addresses the Course and Speed Conference in Arlington, VA.

CMC makes an unannounced visit to MCAS Beaufort, SC and Parris Island, SC.
- 18 Apr 96 CMC addresses the DACOWITS Opening Ceremony at the Tysons Westpark Hotel in McLean, VA.
- 19-20 Apr 96 CMC travels to New York, NY to address the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball.
- 22-30 Apr 96 South America Counterpart Visit (USSOUTHCOM, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil).

MAY 1996

- 2-3 May 96 CinCs Conference at the Pentagon.
- 4 May 96 CMC is the guest of honor and addresses the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association at the Sheraton Premiere Hotel, Tysons Corner, VA.
- 5 May 96 CMC travels to Providence, RI for the Commemorative Naming of the Providence Post Office in honor of Harry Kizirian and to address the Pawtucket Veterans Advisory Committee.
- 7 May 96 CMC addresses the MEU(SOC) Review Conference at the Navy Annex.
- CMC is the keynote speaker at the Business Executives for National Security Annual Washington Forum in the Pentagon.
- 10-11 May 96 CMC travels to Chicago, IL to address the National Strategy Forum, then to Stillwater, OK for induction into the National Wrestling Hall of Fame.
- 14 May 96 CMC travels to Camp Lejeune, NC to visit Exercise Purple Star.
- 19-21 May 96 Executive Off-Site, Washington, D.C. (concluded with attendance at ADM Boorda's funeral at the Washington National Cathedral).
- 24 May 96 Evening Parade IHO the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable John Deutch.
- 28 May- 7 Jun 96 European Counterpart Visit (less Royal Marines).
Belleau Wood Ceremony/Address.

JUNE 1996

- 12 Jun 96 CMC addresses the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Newport, RI.
- CMC is the guest speaker at the Marine Corps Aviation Association's monthly dinner at the Ft. Myer Officers' Club, Arlington, VA.
- 14 Jun 96 CMC attends and makes remarks at the Bertaud Range Dedication at Range 14, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA.
- Evening Parade IHO House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on National Security -- Honorable Bill Young, Chairman, is the Reviewing Official.

4-16 Aug 96 USCINPAC , WestPac, and West Coast visit (visited operational and base/station units in III MEF, and MCAGCC.)

30 Aug 96 Evening Parade IHO the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable John H. Dalton.

SEPTEMBER 1996

6-8 Sep 96 CMC travels to San Antonio, TX to visit RS San Antonio and to speak at the Women Marines Association 19th Biennial National Convention.

13-15 Sep 96 CMC travels to Camp Pendleton, CA to attend the I MEF Change of Command ceremony and then to St Louis, MO to serve as the keynote speaker for the U.S. Marine Raider Association Convention.

20 Sep 96 CMC speaks at the National Press Club Morning Newsmaker Program in Washington D.C.

20-22 Sep 96 CMC travels to San Diego, CA to serve as the guest of honor for the MCAA Reunion/Awards Banquet.

23-27 Sep 96 General Officers Symposium at Henderson Hall

25 Sep 96 CMC addresses Marine corps League at an Awards Banquet.

29 Sep 96 CMC speaks at the Derwood Bible Church in Rockville, MC>.

OCTOBER 1996

2 Oct 96 CMC visits Parris Island, SC to observe the Crucible validation and to participate in the Scarlet Cord Ceremony..

4 Oct 96 CMC addresses Marine Corps Command and staff College and the School of Advanced Warfighting at Quantico, VA

9 Oct 96 CMC has first sitting for his official portrait at the Home of the Commandants.

11 Oct 96 CMC addresses Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, VA.

15 Oct 96 CMC travels to Las Vegas, NV to address the Retired Officers Association at its 33rd Biennial Convention.

17 Oct 96 CMC addresses the Commanders' Course at Quantico, VA.

17 Jun 96 CMC makes remarks at the AAAV Contract Signing Ceremony at the Clarendon Square Building in Arlington, VA.

19 Jun 96 CMC briefs the Secretary of Defense on Australia home basing initiative.

21 Jun 96 Evening Parade IHO Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense – the Honorable Bob Stevens, Chairman, is the Reviewing Official.

25 Jun 96 CMC is the guest speaker at the USAF Distinguished Speaker Series at the Pentagon.

27 Jun 96 CMC is the guest speaker at the Surface Navy Association's Luncheon, Arlington, VA.

28-30 Jun 96 CMC travels to El Toro, CA to attend the 3dMAW Change of Command, then to Sun Valley, ID where he is awarded the Banquet of the Golden Plate by the American Academy of Achievement.

JULY 1996

6-8 Jul 96 CMC travels to Chicago, IL to be inducted into the Minute Man Hall of Fame and then to Minneapolis, MN to address the North Heights Lutheran Church.

10 Jul 96 CMC addresses the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 2000 at Annapolis, MD.

12 Jul 96 Evening Parade IHO the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William J. Perry.

17 Jul 96 CMC travels to Richardson, TX to address to NNOA 24th Annual Training and Professional Development Conference.

24 Jul 96 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at Ft. McNair in Washington, D.C.

CMC addresses the Air War College at the Navy Annex.

27 Jul 96 CMC travels to Philadelphia, PA to address the Third Marine Division Association's 42nd Annual Family Reunion.

AUGUST 1996

2 Aug 96 Evening Parade IHO the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Honorable Anthony Lake.

20-25 Oct 96 Counterpart Visit to Royal Marine Commandos.

26 Oct 96 CMC travels to Manchester, NH for the Joint Reserve Center Dedication.

30 Oct 96 CMC travels to Carlisle, PA to address the U.S. Army War College.

NOVEMBER 1996

1-2 Nov 96 CMC travels to New Orleans, LA to participate in the MARFORRES Marine Corps Birthday Celebration.

3 Nov 96 CMC participates in Annual Marine Corps Worship Service at the Washington National Cathedral. *Guest of honor is Dr. James C. Dobson, Founder and President of Focus on the Family.*

4-9 Nov 96 CMC participates in Marine Corps Birthday Week events in Washington, D.C. area.

9 Nov 96 HQMC Birthday Ball celebrating the 221st anniversary of the Marine Corps. *Guest of honor is LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret).*

12-14 Nov 96 CMC travels to Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, NC to give the "Making Marines" and the "CPG Plus One" briefs.

20-23 Nov 96 CMC travels to New York, NY to attend the Navy League Dinner, the Sardi's Toys for Tots Dining-In, a Corporate Roundtable Luncheon hosted by Chase Manhattan Bank, and an editorial board with Newsweek.

25 Nov 96 CMC travels to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College to address the ILS and SAMS courses.

26 Nov 96 CMC addresses the Foreign Service Institute's (Dept of State) 39th Senior Seminar.

27 Nov- 7 Dec 96 CMC travels to Hawaii, and then visits Australia for bi-lateral discussions on US/Australia training opportunities

DECEMBER 1996

13 Dec 96 CMC addresses the Retired Navy Four Star Symposium at the Pentagon.

17 Dec 96 CMC addresses the CSIS Maritime Dinner in Washington, D.C.

19 Dec 96 CMC briefs Secretary (Designate) Cohen about the Marine Corps.

- 20 Dec 96 CMC travels to New Orleans, LA to retire MajGen Coyne at MARFORRES.
- 23 Dec 96 CMC travels to Camp Lejeune, NC accompanying President Clinton to welcome the returning 24th MEU and meet with members of the Airlift Contingency Force.

JANUARY 1997

- 4 Jan 97 CMC addresses the USNA Annual Leaders' Forum in Annapolis, MD.
- 7 Jan 97 CMC addresses the USNA Ethics Dinner for the Classes of 1964 and 1997.
- 9-11 Jan 97 CMC travels to Tampa, FL for the Executive Off-Site and visits with Marines from the 4th AAVBn, I-I Staff, and RS Tampa.
- 13 Jan 97 CMC addresses the USMC War College in the Private Dining Room at the Pentagon.
- 15 Jan 97 CMC travels to Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama to address the Air War College and the Air Command and Staff College.
- 17-18 Jan 97 CMC observes the Crucible at MCRD, Parris Island.
- 20 Jan 97 CMC and Mrs. Krulak attend the Swearing-In Ceremony for POTUS, as well as several other Inaugural Events.
- 21 Jan 97 CMC travels to Newport, RI to address the Naval War College.
- 29-30 Jan 97 CINCs Conference.

FEBRUARY 1997

- 4 Feb 97 CMC attends the State of the Union address.
- 5 Feb 97 CMC addresses the National Youth Leadership Forum at the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C.
- 7 -8 Feb 97 CMC travels to MCRD, San Diego and Camp Pendleton, CA to observe the West Coast Crucible and review a recruit graduation parade.
- 10 Feb 97 CMC addresses the VFW's Washington Conference Session at the Sheraton Washington Hotel.

14 Feb 97 CMC addresses the Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA

20-22 Feb 97 CMC travels to Anchorage, AK to attend the 20th Annual Salute to the Military.

28 Feb -3 Mar 97 CMC travels to Charleston, SC to address the Citadel Corps of Cadets, then to 29 Palms and Camp Pendleton, CA to observe the Hunter Warrior A WE.

MARCH 1997

8 Mar 97 CMC addresses the Annual Semper Fidelis Awards Dinner IHP Sen. McCain at the Sheraton Premiere Hotel in Tysons Corner, Va.

10 Mar 97 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Pentagon.

11-20 Mar 97 Commanders' Course. CMC participates in opening and closing sessions.

21-22 Mar 97 CMC travels to Parsippany, NJ to attend and make remarks at the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation Gala.

25 Mar 97 CMC addresses the Annual Sea-Air-Space Exposition at the Sheraton Washington Hotel.

26 Mar 97 CMC addresses the students and faculty of the National Defense University at Ft. McNair in Washington, D.C.

31 Mar 97 CMC addresses the SgtMaj/MGySgt Symposium at the Holiday Inn Express in Dumfries, VA.

APRIL 1997

5-8 Apr 97 CMC travels to Philadelphia, PA to attend the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball and then to Camp Pendleton, CA to participate in Exercise Emerald Express.

15 Apr 97 CMC addresses the First Annual USMC Symposium on Character, Values and Ethics at Quantico, VA.

VA. CMC addresses the National Defense Panel at the Crystal Mall in Crystal City,

16 Apr 97 CMC addresses the Congressional Airpower Caucus on Capitol Hill.

17 Apr 97 CMC addresses the Advanced Logistics Officers' Course at Quantico, VA.

18-20 Apr 97 CMC travels to Chicago, IL to attend local events for the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation (returns to Washington, D.C. for meeting on 19 Apr).

21-26 Apr 97 CMC hosts European Counterpart Visit for MajGen David Pennefather, Commandant General, Rayla Marines; MajGen Egbert Klop, Commandant, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps; and LtGen Abelardo Vazquez, Commandant General, Spanish Marine Corps. CMC travels to Camp Lejeune, NC to observe CAPEX with the counterparts.

24 Apr 97 CMC addresses the U.S. Naval Institute 1997 Annual Meeting at the USNA, Annapolis, MD.

26 Apr 97 SecNav Off-Site at the Navy Memorial.

27 Apr 97 CMC addresses the National Leadership Course at The Inn at the Collonnade, Baltimore, MD.

30 Apr 97 CMC travels to New York, NY to attend a reception for the Fisher Center for Alzheimer's Disease Research Foundation.

May 1997

2-3 May 97 CMC travels to MCAS Beaufort to meet with Marine Corps aviators and then to MCRD Parris Island to observe the Crucible.

5-9 May 97 Brigadier General Selectee Orientation Conference. CMC provides welcome remarks on 5 May, addresses Roles and Missions with selectees on 6 May and addresses spouses on 7 May.

5 May 97 CMC addresses the Joint Civilian Orientation Conference in the Pentagon.

CMC addresses the CSIS Forward Presence Conference at CSIS in Washington, D.C.

9 May 97 Evening Parade IHO Senate Committee on Armed Services -- Senators Strom Thurmond, Committee Chairman, and Carl Levin, Ranking Member, Reviewing Officials.

14 May 97 CMC travels to MCLB Barstow, CA for an unannounced visit.

15-16 May 97 Executive Off-Site, Xerox Training Center, Leesburg, Virginia.

17 May 97 CMC travels to Pascagoula, MI, with CNO to attend the christening of the USS BON HOMME RICHARD.

19 May 97 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Pentagon.

20 May 97 CMC addresses the Young Presidents Organization at the Pentagon.

20-22 May 97 CMC participates in American Academy of Achievement's 1997 Salute to Excellence in Baltimore and Annapolis, MD.

23 May 97 CMC travels to Detroit, MI to address the New Executive Class at Ford Motor Company.

23-27 May 97 CMC travels to France to attend Belleau Wood Ceremony, film the 1997 Marine Corps Birthday video and meet with General Mercier .

JUNE 1997

6 Jun 97 CMC travels to Camp Lejeune, NC to attend the 2/10 change of command and present the Leftwich Trophy.

7 Jun 97 CMC is the military guest of honor and speaks at the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball at the Sheraton Premiere Hotel in Tysons Comer, VA.

10 Jun 97 CMC addresses the 65th Military Operations Research Society Symposium at Quantico, VA.

11 Jun 97 CMC addresses the USMC Air Board at Henderson Hall.

CMC is the guest speaker at the MCAA Professional Dinner at Ft. Myer, VA.

13 Jun 97 Evening Parade IHO of House National Security Committee -- Congressman Spence is the Reviewing Official. Also reviewing are Congressmen Joe Scarborough, Bob Riley, Solomon Ortiz, Lane Evans and Robert Underwood.

16-21 Jun 97 CMC hosts a counterpart visit for the Commandant General of the Brazilian Marine Corps, ADM Valdir Bastos Ponte. CMC and Mrs. Krulak travel to Camp Lejeune and MCRD Parris Island with ADM and Mrs. Ponte.

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- 23-28 Jun 97 CMC hosts a counterpart visit for the Pacific Region Commandants: MajGen Suharto, Commandant of the Indonesian Marine Corps; MajGen Ponciano S. Millena, Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps; VADM Wasin Sarikabhuti, Commandant of the Royal Thai Marine Corps. CMC travels to MCRD Parris Island to link up with the counterparts.
- 24-25 Jun 97 CinCs Conference at the Pentagon.
- 26 Jun 97 CMC addresses the Presidential Classroom for Young Americans at the Sheraton Washington Hotel.
- 29 Jun 97 CMC travels to Goldsboro, NC to speak at the God and Country Day at the Eagle Heights Baptist Church.

JULY 1997

- 1 Jul 97 CMC travels to San Diego, CA to attend the MCRD change of command ceremony and present the Hammer Award.
- 2 Jul 97 CMC attends the Marine Barracks, Washington, DC change of command ceremony.
- 4 Jul 97 Evening Parade IHO the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William S. Cohen.
- 10 Jul 97 CMC makes an unannounced visit to Marine units in Kansas City, MO.
- 11 Jul 97 CMC travels to MCCDC to attend the OCS change of command ceremony.
- 12 Jul 97 CMC travels to Teaneck, NJ to serve as the honored guest at the Montford Point Marine Association's National Convention.
- 14 Jul 97 CMC is the guest speaker at the USAF Distinguished Speaker Series at the Pentagon.
- 16 Jul 97 CMC travels to Camp Lejeune, NC to attend the MCB change of command ceremony.
- 18 Jul 97 Evening Parade IHO the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili.
- 22 Jul 97 CMC addresses the National Naval Officers Association Conference at Annapolis, MD.

25 Jul 97 CMC travels to New York, NY to select a frame for his official portrait.

27 Jul 97 CMC is the keynote speaker at the Boy Scouts of America Council at Arlington National Cemetery Amphitheater .

30 Jul 97 CMC addresses the Army and Air Force War College TLS students at the Navy Annex.

CMC addresses the USNA Class of 2001 at Annapolis, MD.

31 Jul 97 CMC travels to Charlottesville, VA to speak at the Federal Executive Institute Primary Training Program.

AUGUST 1997

1 Aug 97 Evening Parade IHO the Asst to POTUS for National Security Affairs, the Honorable Samuel R. Berger .

2-6 Aug 97 CMC travels to Atlantic City, NJ to address the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation Dinner and then to Camp Lejeune, MCAS New River and MCAS Cherry Point for a II MEF command visit.

8 Aug 97 CMC travels to Burlington, VT for the LAV(AD) Roll-Out ceremony and then to Nashville, TN to be the guest of honor at the Marine Corps League's 74th National Convention Banquet.

11 Aug 97 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Pentagon.

CMC addresses National Defense University at Ft. McNair.

13 Aug 97 CMC travels to Tampa, FL for the CentCom change of command ceremony.

27 Aug 97 CMC addresses the ADP A/NSIA Professional Luncheon at the Army- Navy Country Club in Arlington, VA.

28 Aug 97 CMC addresses the Public Affairs Leadership Conference at the Sheraton National Hotel.

CMC addresses the Task Force on Defense Reform at the Pentagon.

CMC attends the MCCDC change of command ceremony.

29 Aug 97 Evening Parade IHO the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable John

H. Dalton.

31 Aug - 9 Sep 97 CMC travels to WestPac (Okinawa/Japan/Korea).

SEPTEMBER 1997

11 Sep 97 CMC addresses the students of Command and Staff College and Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, VA.

12-13 Sep 97 CMC travels to Parris Island, SC to attend the MCRD change of command ceremony.

17 Sep 97 CMC addresses the National Defense University at Ft. McNair.

18-20 Sep 97 CMC travels to Norfolk, VA to attend the departure/retirement ceremony for Gen Sheehan; then to Maxwell AFB, AL to participate in the 1997 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course and to address the Air War College; then to Pascagoula, MS as a Distinguished Guest at the Commissioning Ceremony of the USS BATAAN.

22-25 Sep 97 General Officer Symposium at Henderson Hall.

27 Sep 97 CMC travels to Cherry Point, NC to serve as guest of honor at the 1997 MCAA Silver Anniversary Reunion and Symposium.

30 Sep 97 Armed Forces Farewell Review in honor of General Shalikashvili, CJCS, Ft. Myer, VA.

OCTOBER 1997

1-2 Oct 97 CMC travels to San Diego, CA to attend to speak at Miramar Commissioning Ceremony; then to MCAS Yuma for a command visit.

3 Oct 97 CMC addresses The Basic School staff at Quantico, VA.

7 Oct 97 CMC addresses the USMC Command and Staff College students and faculty at Quantico, VA.

CMC addresses the Young Presidents Organization at the Pentagon.

10 Oct 97 CMC addresses the National Press Club at a luncheon in Washington, D.C.

13-14 Oct 97 CMC travels to Exeter, NH to receive the Phillips Exeter Award at Phillips Exeter Academy.

15-30 Oct 97 CMC takes an "around-the-world" trip (Hawaii; Jakarta, Indonesia; Utapao, Thailand; Muscat, Oman; Bahrain; Cairo, Egypt; Aviano, Italy).

31 Oct 97 CMC addresses the Marine Corps Historical Foundation at their annual awards banquet.

NOVEMBER 1997

2 Nov 97 CMC participates in the Annual Marine Corps Worship Service, Washington National Cathedral. *Guest of honor is The Most Reverend John McNamara, Bishop of the Merrimack Region of the Archdiocese of Boston.*

3-11 Nov 97 CMC participates in Marine Corps Birthday Week events in Washington, D.C. area.

7 Nov 97 CMC is the guest of honor at The Basic School Marine Corps Birthday Ball.

8 Nov 97 HQMC Birthday Ball celebrating the 222nd anniversary of the Marine Corps. *Guest of honor is the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable William S. Cohen.*

11 Nov 97 CMC attends the 44th Annual Veterans Day National Ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery.

13 Nov 97 CMC makes an unannounced visit to MCLB, Albany, GA.

17 Nov 97 CMC travels to New York, NY to address the Council on Foreign Relations.

19 Nov 97 CMC travels to Cambridge, MA to address the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Seminar.

21 Nov 97 CMC travels to Carlisle, PA to address the Army War College.

24 Nov 97 CMC travels to Newport, RI to address the Naval War College.

25 Nov 97 SecNav Off-Site, Arlington, VA.

DECEMBER 1997

2 Dec 97 CMC addresses the Harrier Review Panel at the Center for

Naval Analyses.

- 2-7 Dec 97 CMC travels to Birmingham, AL to address the Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs , makes a brief command visit in Yuma, AZ and then travels to CampPen, CA for a I MEF command visit.
- 12 Dec 97 CMC travels to Pascagoula, MS for the USS IWO JIMA Keel Laying.
- 13 Dec 97 CMC addresses the Army Times Editorial Board in Springfield, VA.
- 15 Dec 97 CMC addressess the Marine Corps War College at the Navy Annex.
- 17 Dec 97 CMC addresses the Center for Naval Analyses Board of Trustees' Dinner at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Pentagon City.
- 18 Dec 97 CMC addresses the Department of State's 40th Annual Senior Seminar in Arlington, VA.
- 19 Dec 97 CMC addresses the National Marine Corps League, Naval Enlisted Reserve Association, National Marine Corps Reserve Association and the Reserve Officers Association in Washington D.C.
- 23 Dec 97 CMC travels to New York, NY to visit Mr. Zach Fisher.

JANUARY 1998

- 5 Jan 98 CMC addresses the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, VA.
- 6 Jan 98 CMC addresses the USNA Leaders' Forum at Annapolis, MD.
- 14-17 Jan 98 CMC travels to Ft. Leavenworth, KS to address the Army Command and General Staff College, makes a brief stop at Focus on the Family in Colorado Springs, CO and then travels to San Diego, CA to visit Marines and address the AFCEA Conference.
- 18-23 Jan 98 CMC hosts a Venezuelan Counterpart visit for RADM and Mrs. Escalona.
- 20 Jan 98 CMC attends the White House Medal of Honor Ceremony in

honor of MajGen Day and then hosts a ceremony/reception for MajGen and Mrs. Day at Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C.

- 23 Jan 98 CMC addresses Focus on the Family CEOs at the USA Today Building in Washington, D.C.
- 27 Jan 98 CMC attends the State of the Union address.
- 29-30 Jan 98 CinCs Conference at National Defense University.

FEBRUARY 1998

- 10 Feb 98 CMC travels to Beaufort, SC to. LtCol Van Marines.
- 11 Feb 98 CMC addresses the Marine Air Board at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, VA.
- 26 Feb 98 CMC is the guest of honor and makes remarks at the Co F, Basic Officers' Course 6-97 Mess Night, Quantico, VA.
- 28 Feb 98 CMC makes remarks at the Semper Fidelis Award Dinner IHO Senator Chaffee in Tysons Corner, VA;

MARCH 1998

- 1-2 Mar 98 CMC travels to Phoenix, AZ to serve as the keynote speaker at Conoco' s Annual Senior Management Meeting.
- 10 Mar 98 CMC makes opening remarks at the Commanders' Course at the Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico, VA.
- 14 Mar 98 CMC makes remarks at Total Forces Day of the Commanders' Course at the Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico, VA.
- 18 Mar 98 CMC addresses the Brookings Institution Roundtable Discussion in Washington, D.C.
- 20 Mar 98 CMC addresses the spouses and makes closing remarks at the Commanders' Program, Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico, VA.
- 22-27 Mar 98 CMC hosts an Argentine Counterpart visit for RADM and Mrs. Jose Maurizio.

25 Mar 98	CMC addresses the Advanced Logistics Officers' Course at Quantico, VA.
26-29 Mar 98	CMC travels to San Antonio, TX to attend the Hispanic Yearbook Reception and then to Dallas, TX to attend the Dallas Military Ball.
31 Mar-18 Apr 98	CMC travels to Hawaii, Hong Kong, Thailand, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, San Diego and Camp Pendleton, CA.

APRIL 1998

20 Apr 98	CMC addresses the Sgt/MgySgt Symposium in Dumfries, VA
23 Apr 98	CMC addresses the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C.
24 Apr 98	CMC travels to New York, NY to attend the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball.
26-27 Apr 98	CMC travels to Vero Beach, FL to address the John's Island Forum.
29 Apr -2 May 98	CMC travels to Detroit, MI to address the 1998 New Executive Class at Ford Motor Company, then to Honolulu, HI for retirement and frocking ceremonies and the MARFORP AC change of command ceremony.

MAY 1998

4-11 May 98	Brigadier General Selectees Orientation Conference. CMC provides welcome remarks to selectees and spouses on 4 May and addresses Roles and Missions with selectees on 6 May.
4-10 May 98	CMC hosts a visit of the former Commandants of the Marine Corps attended by General Mundy (30th CMC), General Kelley (28th CMC), General Barrow (27th CMC), General Wilson (26th CMC) and General Chapman (24th CMC).
7 May 98	CMC is a keynote speaker at the National Day of Prayer at the Russell Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C.
8 May 98	Evening Parade IHO the former Commandants of the Marine Corps.

11 May 98	CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Pentagon.
16 May 98	CMC addresses the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences at their commencement exercises.
17 May 98	GWU commencement speaker.
19 May 98	CMC addresses the Military Order of the Carabao at a luncheon at the Army and Navy Club in Washington, D.C.
20 May 98	CMC makes closing remarks at the Course and Speed Conference, Key Bridge Marriott, Arlington, VA.
21 May 98	CMC travels to New York, NY to attend the Fleet Week Gala as an honoree.
22-24 May 98	CMC travels to Jackson Hole, Wyoming to participate in the American Academy of Achievement's 1998 Salute to Excellence.
26 May -3 Jun 98	CMC travels to France to make official calls; meet with General Mercier, visit MSG Det, and attend Belleau Wood Ceremony and then travels to the Netherlands for a counterpart visit.

June 1998

5 Jun 98	CMC addresses the Marine students at the National Defense University at Ft. McNair.
6 Jun 98	CMC addresses the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball in Washington, D.C.
12 Jun 98	Evening Parade IHO departing members of Congress.
25 Jun 98	CMC addresses the First Sergeants' Course at Quantico, VA.
26 Jun 98	Evening Parade IHO UN Ambassador, the Honorable Bill Richardson.
29 Jun 98	CMC travels to Watertown/Ft. Drum NY to visit Congressman McHugh's district and address a Marine Corps League dinner.
30 Jun -1 Jul 98	CinCs Conference at National Defense University.

JULY 1998

2 Jul 98 CMC addresses the Presidential Classroom for Young Americans at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

8-9 Jul 98 CMC travels to Ann Arbor, MI to attend and makes remarks at the Marine Military Academy "Texas Night Under the Stars," then to Chicago, IL to address the Chicago Chapter USNA Alumni Association and National Strategy Forum.

10 Jul 98 Evening Parade IHO the Secretary of State, The Honorable Madeleine Albright.

12-14 Jul 98 Executive Off-Site, Xerox Document University, Leesburg, VA.

16 Jul 98 CMC attended and makes remarks at the Marine Corps War memorial.

17-19 Jul 98 CMC travels to New Orleans, LA for the MarForRes change of command ceremony, then to Tampa, FL for the M Co, 3/7 Annual Reunion.

20-24 Jul 98 CMC hosts a counterpart visit for the Chilean Commandant, RADM Acevedo.

22 Jul 98 CMC addresses CAPSTRONE at the Pentagon.

24 Jul 98 Evening Parade IHO CJCS, General Henry H. Shelton.

25 Jul 98 CMC travels to Elmira, NY to visit Congressman Houghton's district.

29 Jul 98 CMC addresses the Air and Army War College TLS students at the Navy Annex.

31 Jul- 2 Aug 98 CMC travels to Kansas City , MO to make remarks at the Annual International Officers' Ball, then to Atlantic City, NJ to serve as the military guest of honor for the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation.

August 1998

3 Aug 98 CMC addresses the USNA Class of 2002 in Annapolis, MD.

4 Aug 98 CMC addresses the 1998 SgtMaj Symposium and the SgtMaj spouses at Henderson Hall.

6 Aug 98 CMC offers remarks at the James Wesley Marsh Center Dedication Ceremony at Quantico, VA.

7 Aug 98	CMC travels to Syracuse, NY to serve as the guest of honor at the Marine Corps League's 75th National Convention Banquet.
8 Aug 98	CMC addresses the 3/3 Reunion Banquet in Arlington, VA.
10 Aug 98	CMC addresses National Defense University and CMC Fellows at the Navy Annex.
21 Aug 98	Evening Parade IHO Secretary of Veterans Affairs, The Honorable Togo D. West Jr.
22 Aug 98	CMC travels to Rock Island, IL to visit Congressman Evans' district and address Rock Island Veterans Groups.
28 Aug 98	Evening Parade IHO SecNav, the Honorable John H. Dalton.
29 Aug-8 Sep 98	CMC travels to Israel where he makes official calls, visits Marines and Israeli Defense Forces, and then travels to the United Kingdom for a counterpart visit.

SEPTEMBER 1998

11 Sep 98	CMC addresses Command and Staff College/School of Advanced Warfighting at Quantico, VA.
14 Sep 98	CMC travels to Maxwell AFB, AL to address the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, then to New York, NY to attend the Medal of Freedom Award Ceremony.
15 Sep 98	CinCs Conference, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.
17 Sep 98	CMC addresses the American University community on campus in Washington, D.C.
18 Sep 98	CMC makes an unannounced visit to MCAS Beaufort, MCRD Parris Island and MCAS New River.
23 Sep 98	CMC makes remarks at the Modern Day Marine Grand Banquet in Pentagon City, VA.
25-27 Sep 98	CMC travels to Dallas/Fort Worth, TX to serve as the military guest of honor at the Texas State Fair and participate in the MCAA Convention Banquet.

28 Sep-2 Oct 98 General Officer Symposium at Henderson Hall.

OCTOBER 1998

7-18 Oct 98 West Coast command visit. While in Southern California, CMC addresses the Marine Corps University Foundation on 11 Oct, the students at Pepperdine University on 14 Oct, and the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball on 17 Oct.

21 Oct 98 CMC addresses the Commanders' Course and spouses at Quantico, VA.

CMC addresses the SJA Conference at the Pentagon.

22-23 Oct 98 CMC travels to Camp Lejeune, NC to participate in the Beirut Memorial Service, then to Carlisle, PA to address the Army War College

29 Oct 98 CMC travels to the Kennedy Space Center in FL to attend the launch of STS-95 Space Shuttle Discovery.

NOVEMBER 1998

1 Nov 98 CMC participates in the Annual Marine Corps Worship Service at the Washington National Cathedral. Guest of honor is The Reverend Doctor Charles R. Swindell, President of the Dallas Theological Seminary.

2 Nov 98 CMC addresses CAPSTONE at the Pentagon.

2-10 Nov 98 CMC participates in Marine Corps Birthday Week events in the Washington, D.C. area.

4 Nov 98 CMC travels to New York, NY to attend the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation "Thank You" dinner .

7 Nov 98 HQMC Birthday Ball celebrating 223rd anniversary of the Marine Corps.

10-11 Nov 98 CMC travels to New York, NY to attend the USMC birthday celebration aboard the Intrepid, attend a breakfast, make remarks and ring the Opening Bell at the New York Stock Exchange on Veterans Day.

12-13 Nov 98 CMC travels to Kerrville, TX to address the Kerrville Summit.

17-22 Nov 98 South America Visit (Argentina, Brazil).

24 Nov 98 CMC travels to Newport, RI to address the Naval War College.

25 Nov 98

CMC addresses the School of Advanced Warfighting at Quantico, VA.

DECEMBER 1998

1 Dec 98

CMC addresses Georgia Tech and Morehouse College via video teleconference from the Navy Annex.

3 Dec 98

CMC addresses the Department of State's 41st Senior Seminar in Arlington, VA.

CMC addresses Joint Staff Interns at the Pentagon.

4 Dec 98

CMC attends the Freedom Alliance Foundation Banquet where he is presented the Defender of Freedom Award and makes remarks.

7 Dec 98

CMC addresses the Retired Navy Four Star Symposium at the Pentagon.

10 Dec 98

CMC makes remarks at a ceremony honoring John Glenn at the Marine Corps War Memorial.

11-12 Dec 98

CMC travels to MCRD Parris Island, SC to observe and participate in Crucible events.

16 Dec 98

CMC addresses National Defense University at Ft. McNair in Washington, D.C.

17-18 Dec 98

CMC travels to Naples, FL to serve as the guest of honor at the Pelica Bay Women's League Annual Founders' Holiday Ball to benefit Toys for Tots.

21-23 Dec 98

CMC travels to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Soto Cano AB, Honduras to visit Marines.

JANUARY 1999

4 Jan 99

CMC addresses the USNA Annual Leaders' Forum at Annapolis, MD.

6 Jan 99

CMC travels to New York, NY to address the Council on Foreign Relations.

7 Jan 99

CMC addresses the USNA Ethics Dinner for the Classes of 1964 and 1999.

8-10 Jan 99 CMC travels to Sea Island, GA to serve as the keynote speaker for Awakening '99.

13 Jan 99 CMC addresses the Command and Control Systems Course at the Pentagon.

19 Jan 99 CMC travels to Ft. Leavenworth, KS to address the Army Command and General Staff College.

21-23 Jan 99 CMC travels to Tampa, FL for the Executive Off-Site.

26-27 Jan 99 CinCs Conference at NDU.

28 Jan – 4 Feb 99 Final East Coast command visit. During this trip, CMC addresses Lighthouse '99 in Greensboro, NC and addresses the 2dMarDiv Reunion. (CMC returns to Washington, D.C. on 30 Jan 99 to attend the Annual Dinner of the Alfalfa Club.)

FEBRUARY 1999

5 Feb 99 CMC addresses the Navy Flag Officer selectees and spouses at Pentagon City, VA.

9 Feb 99 CMC travels to New York, NY to attend the 7th Annual Salute to Freedom Dinner aboard the Intrepid.

10 Feb 99 CMC addresses the National Youth Leadership Forum in Tysons Corner, VA

16-26 Feb 99 West Coast/Hawaii command visit. CMC returned to Washington, D. C. on 24 Feb 99 for the HASC Posture Hearing.

MARCH 1999

2 Mar 99 CMC addresses the Commanders' Course at Quantico, VA.

6 Mar 99 CMC addresses the Commanders' Course Total Forces Day at Quantico, VA.

CMC addresses the Marine Corps University Foundation at the Annual Semper Fidelis Award Dinner in Tysons Corner, VA.

9 Mar 99 CMC addresses the Commanders' Course spouses at Quantico, VA.

18-24 Mar 99 CMC travels to WestPac (Okinawa).

26 Mar 99 CMC travels to Parsippany, NJ to serve as the guest of honor for the Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation Annual Gala.

APRIL 1999

6-14 Apr 99 CMC travels to Italy to make official calls and visit the MSG Det and MCSF Co., then proceeds to France for official calls and to visit the MSG Det.

15 Apr 99 CMC travels to Atlanta, GA to accept the National Citizenship Award presented by the Military Chaplains Association.

19 Apr 99 CMC addresses the SgtMaj/MGySgt Symposium in Dumfries, VA.

20 Apr 99 CMC addresses the Brookings Institution at a Roundtable Discussion in Washington, D.C.

21 Apr 99 CMC addresses the USNA Alumni Association at a luncheon at Ft. Myer, VA.

23 Apr 99 CMC provides closing remarks at the SgtMaj/MGySgt Symposium in Dumfries, VA.

CMC travels to New York, NY to address the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation at the Leatherneck Scholarship Ball.

27 Apr 99 CMC makes remarks at the groundbreaking of the Marine Corps Heritage Center at Quantico, VA.

28 Apr 99 CMC addresses the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Warfighting Transformation in Arlington, VA.

29 Apr 99 CMC addresses the DACOWITS Confernece in Herndon, VA

CMC makes remarks at the USMC Executive Conference in Quantico, VA.

30 Apr- 2 May 99 CMC travels to Pensacola, FL for a command visit at MATSG, then to Atlanta, GA to serve as the guest of honor at the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association Annual Military Conference.

MAY 1999

3-11 May 99 Brigadier General Selectee Orientation Course. CMC provides welcome remarks on 3 May and discusses current issues on 5 May.

6 May 99	CMC makes an unannounced visit to the 4th Marine Corps District in Harrisburg, PA.
7 May 99	Evening Parade IHO CNO, Admiral Jay Johnson.
10 May 99	CMC addresses the Carlton Club at the Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D.C.
12 May 99	CMC addresses the Greater Washington Area Retired Marine Corps Officers Luncheon in Arlington, VA.
13 May 99	CMC addresses the Institute for Defense Analyses at a luncheon in Alexandria, VA.
14 May 99	Evening Parade IHO the President/CEO of Perot Systems, Mr. Ross Perot.
22 May 99	CMC travels to Cleveland, OH to attend the Lerner Research Institute Dedication.
28 May 99	Evening Parade IHO the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Richard Danzig.
29 May -5 Jun 99	CMC travels to Hawaii and MCRD San Diego for final command visits and briefings.

JUNE 1999

5 Jun 99	CMC is the guest of honor and makes remarks at the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball in Washington, D.C.
7 Jun 99	CMC travels to New York, NY to attend services for Mr. Zach Fisher.
8 Jun 99	CMC attends a PME breakfast with Marine students at the National Defense University, Ft. McNair.
	CMC is the guest of honor at The Basic School Mess Night at Quantico, VA.
10-12 Jun 99	CMC travels to MCRD Parris Island and MCAS Beaufort for final command visits, briefings and Crucible.
14 Jun 99	CMC travels to West Palm Beach, FL to address senior and middle

management at Federal Express.

- 16 Jun 99 CMC addresses the Presidential Classroom for Young Americans in Washington, D.C.
- 23 Jun 99 CMC attends and makes remarks at the Marine Corps Amphibious Triad Ceremony at MCAF Quantico, VA.
- 25 Jun 99 CMC attends The Basic School Change of Command ceremony at Quantico, VA.
- 28 Jun 99 Relief of the 13th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps and posting of the 14th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps at a ceremony at Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C.
- 30 Jun 99 Change of Command ceremony at which General Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps relinquishes command to General James L. Jones
- 1 Jul 99 Transition Office of the 31st Commandant is established at the Washington Navy Yard.

CMC TRIP CHRONOLOGY

* Indicates trips on which Mrs. Krulak accompanied CMC

1995

10 Jul 95	Minneapolis, MN (NAACP Center of Influence)
*13-14 Jul 95	New Orleans, LA (MARFORRES Change of Command)
* 1 Aug 95	Camp Lejeune, NC (MARFORLANT Change of Command)
7-8 Aug 95	Millington, TN (MATSG-90) Montgomery, AL (6th MCD) Ft. Lauderdale, FL (6th MCD) Columbia, SC (6th MCD) MCRD Parris Island, SC
*19-20 Aug 95	Ontario, Canada (Fort Henry Guard)
22 Aug 95	MCAS Cherry Point, NC (unannounced visit)
*27 Aug - 6 Sep 95	MCRD San Diego, CA (WRR) Hawaii Midway Island Twentynine Palms (MCAGCC) MCAS El Toro, CA
21 Sep 95	MCAS New River, NC (arrival of 24th MEU)
*29-30 Sep 95	New Orleans, LA (commissioning of USS CARTER HALL)
3-6 Oct 95	Okinawa
10 Oct 95	Newport, RI (Naval War College)
15-16 Oct 95	Los Angeles, CA (USNA 150th Anniversary Ball)
*18-21 Oct 95	Sante Fe, NM (President's Own) Southern CA (I MEF, 1st FSSG, 1stMarDiv, MCB CamPen, DOCA Banquet)
*24-25 Oct 95	New York, NY (Salute to Freedom Benefit Dinner)
26 Oct 95	Newburgh, NY (FBI MCA Parade)

30-31 Oct 95	Pascagoula, MS (Ingalls Shipbuilding) Biloxi, MS (17th Annual Salute to the Military) Blount Island, FL
3-4 Nov 95	Mobile, AL (Navy League Winter Board of Directors Meeting)
*11 Nov 95	New York, NY (Nation's Day Parade)
29 Nov - 2 Dec 95	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba New Orleans, LA (Executive Off-Site) Columbia, SC (M1A1 Inauguration Ceremony)
8 Dec 95	Fort Leavenworth, KS (Army Command and General Staff College)
22-24 Dec 95	Aviano, Italy (USS AMERICA, 26th MEU)

1996

8-12 Jan 96	II MEF (MCAS New River, Camp Lejeune, MCAS Cherry Point)
16-17 Jan 96	Maxwell AFB, AL (Air War College, Air Command & Staff College) MCLB Albany, GA (Hammer Award presentation)
25-26 Jan 96	Southern California Camp Pendleton, CA (Hammer Award presentation) San Diego, CA (AFCEA/USNI Annual Western Conference and Expo) NAS Miramar, CA
29 Jan 96	Maxwell AFB, AL (Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course)
*2-17 Feb 96	WESTPAC Japan (USFJ/Camp Fuji/Iwakuni) Korea (USFK/MARFORK/31st MEU) Okinawa (III MEF/Camps Kinser, Schwab, Hansen; MCAS Futenma) Hawaii (Kaneohe Bay/CINCPAC COC/MARFORPAC) MCAS Yuma, AZ Harlingen, TX (Marine Military Academy)
28 Feb 96	New York, NY (Council on Foreign Relations)
2 Apr 96	Staunton, VA (Shenandoah Valley Council of the Navy League)

9-10 Apr 96	Medford, MA (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) Garden City, NY (1st MCD)
16 Apr 96	MCAS Beaufort, SC (unannounced) MCRD Parris Island, SC (unannounced)
*19-20 Apr 96	New York, NY (Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball, Wall Street Journal Editorial Board)
*22-30 Apr 96	South America Panama (SOUTHCOM, MARFORSOUTH) Lima, Peru (Counterpart Visit) Caracas, Venezuela (Counterpart Visit) Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Counterpart Visit)
5 May 96	Providence, RI (Post Office Dedication)
*10-12 May 96	Chicago, IL (National Strategy Forum) Stillwater, OK (National Wrestling Hall of Fame and Museum) Camp Lejeune, NC MCAS New River, NC
*14 May 96	Camp Lejeune, NC (Exercise Purple Star, Memorial Service)
23 May 96	New York, NY (Fleet Week Gala Dinner)
*28 May - 7 Jun 96	Europe Belgium (CinCEur) Portsmouth, England (CGRM) Oslo, Norway (Counterpart Visit) Paris, France (Belleau Wood, Counterpart Visit) Netherlands (Counterpart Visit) Madrid, Spain (Counterpart Visit)
12 Jun 96	Newport, RI (Naval War College)
26 Jun 96	Atlanta, GA (CNN)
28-30 Jun 96	El Toro, CA (3dMAW Change of Command) Sun Valley, Idaho (AAA Annual Salute to Excellence)
*6-8 July 96	Chicago, IL (Induction into Minute Man Hall of Fame) Minneapolis, MN (North Heights Lutheran Church)
17 July 96	Richardson, TX (National Naval Officers Association)

*27 July 96	Philadelphia, PA (3dMarDiv Association Annual Reunion)
4-16 Aug 96	WestPac/West Coast Hawaii (CINCPAC/MARFORPAC) Okinawa (III MEF/Camps Kinser, Butler, Hansen, Schwab and Foster/MCAS Futenma) San Diego, CA (MCRD/Miramar) I MEF (Camp Pendleton) 29 Palms, CA (MCAGCC)
*6 - 8 Sep 96	San Antonio, TX (RS San Antonio/Women Marines Assoc.)
13 - 15 Sep 96	Camp Pendleton, CA (I MEF Change of Command) MCAS Yuma, AZ (unannounced visit) St. Louis, MO (RS St. Louis/US Marine Raider Association)
20 - 22 Sep 96	San Diego, CA (MCAA Reunion/Convention)
2 Oct 96	MCRD Parris Island, SC (Crucible validation/Scarlet Cord Ceremony)
15 Oct 96	Las Vegas, NV (TROA Convention)
*20 - 25 Oct 96	United Kingdom (Royal Marines Counterpart Visit)
26 Oct 96	Manchester, NH (Dedication of Reserve Training Center with Senators Smith and Gregg)
30 Oct 96	Carlisle, PA (Army War College)
*1-2 Nov 96	New Orleans, LA (MARFORRES Marine Corps Birthday Celebration)
*12-14 Nov 96	II MEF/MARFORLANT (Camp Lejeune, New River and Cherry Point)
*20-23 Nov 96	New York, NY (Navy League Dinner, Sardi's Annual Toys for Tots Dinner, Corporate Roundtable at Chase Manhattan, Editorial Board with Newsweek)
25 Nov 96	Fort Leavenworth, KS (Army Command and General Staff College)
*27 Nov-7 Dec 96	Hawaii (calls/recovery) Australia (Counterpart Visit/discussions on USMC training opportunities in Australia)
*20 Dec 96	New Orleans, LA (retire MajGen Coyne at MARFORRES)

23 May 97	Detroit, MI (New Executive Class at Ford Motor Co.)
*23-27 May 97	Paris, France (Belleau Wood Ceremony, birthday video filming, met w/Gen Mercier)
6 Jun 97	Camp Lejeune, NC (2/10 change of command, Leftwich Trophy presentation)
*17-19 Jun 97	Camp Lejeune, NC and MCRD Parris Island, SC (CMC accompanied ADM and Mrs. Ponte, Brazilian Commandant General)
*25-26 Jun 97	MCRD Parris Island, SC (CMC accompanied the Pacific Region Commandants and their ladies. DI School graduation.)
29 Jun 97	Goldsboro, NC (God and Country Day at the Eagle Heights Baptist Church)
1 Jul 97	MCRD San Diego, CA (Change of Command/Hammer Award presentation)
10 Jul 97	Kansas City, MO (unannounced visit)
12 Jul 97	Teaneck, NJ (Montford Point Marine Association National Convention)
16 Jul 97	Camp Lejeune, NC (MCB Change of Command)
*25 Jul 97	New York, NY (CMC portrait frame selection)
31 Jul 97	Charlottesville, VA (Federal Executive Institute)
*2-6 Aug 97	Atlantic City, NJ (Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation) II MEF (Camp Lejeune, New River, Cherry Point)
*8-9 Aug 97	Burlington, VT (LAV (AD) Roll-Out Ceremony) Nashville, TN (MC League's 74th National Convention Banquet)
13 Aug 97	Tampa, FL (CentCom Change of Command)
31 Aug-9 Sep 97	WestPac Okinawa (III MEF – Camps Foster, Kinser, Hansen/MCAS Futenma) Japan (USFJ, Camp Fuji, MCAS Iwakuni) Korea (ROKMC, MARFORK, USFK)
12-13 Sep 97	MCRD Parris Island, SC (Change of Command)

18-20 Sep 97	Norfolk, VA (Departure Ceremony for Gen Sheehan) Maxwell AFB, AL (Air War College) Pascagoula, MS (Commissioning of USS BATAAN)
*27 Sep 97	MCAS Cherry Point, NC (1997 MCAA Reunion and Symposium)
1-2 Oct 97	San Diego, CA (Commissioning of MCAS Miramar) MCAS Yuma, AZ
*13-14 Oct 97	Exeter, NH. (Phillips Exeter Academy)
*14-30 Oct 97	"Around-the-World" Trip Hawaii (official calls, command visits) Jakarta, Indonesia (counterpart visit, official calls, MSG Det) Sattahip, Thailand (counterpart visit, official calls) Muscat, Oman (official calls, Omani Armed Forces, MSG Det) Bahrain (official calls, 13 th MEU(SOC)) Cairo, Egypt (24 th MEU(SOC), official calls) Aviano, Italy (VMAQ-2)
13 Nov 97	MCLB Albany, GA (unannounced visit)
17 Nov 97	New York, NY (Council on Foreign Relations)
19 Nov 97	Cambridge, MA (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy)
21 Nov 97	Carlisle, PA (Army War College)
24 Nov 97	Newport, RI (Naval War College)
2-7 Dec 97	Birmingham, AL (Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs of Birmingham) MCAS Yuma, AZ I MEF (Camp Pendleton)
*12 Dec 97	Pascagoula, MS (USS IWO JIMA Keel Laying)
23 Dec 97	New York, NY (visit Mr. Zach Fisher)

1998

8-10 Jan 98	Tampa, FL (Executive Off-Site)
*14-17 Jan 98	Ft. Leavenworth, KS (Army Command and General Staff College) Colorado Springs, CO (Focus on the Family)

San Diego, CA (AFCEA Conference)

- 10 Feb 98 Beaufort, SC (memorial service)
 MCRD Parris Island, SC
- *1-2 Mar 98 Phoenix, AZ (Conoco's Annual Senior Management Meeting)
- *26-29 Mar 98 San Antonio, TX (Hispanic Yearbook Reception)
 Dallas, TX (Dallas Military Ball)
- *31 Mar – 18 Apr 98 Camp Smith, HI (briefs/calls)
 Hong Kong (recovery)
 Thailand (official calls, visit MSG, Counterpart Visit)
 Okinawa (III MEF/Camps Schwab, Hansen, Foster, Kinser; MCAS
 Futenma)
 Iwo Jima (filming of 1998 MC Birthday video)
 San Diego, CA (recovery/frocking ceremony)
 Camp Pendleton, CA (I MEF Change of Command)
- *24 Apr 98 New York, NY (Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball)
- *26-27 Apr 98 Vero Beach, FL (John's Island Forum)
- *29 Apr – 2 May 98 Detroit, MI (New Executive Class at Ford Motor Company)
 Honolulu, HI (frocking/retirement ceremonies, MARFORPAC
 Change of Command)
- 21 May 98 New York, NY (Fleet Week Gala)
- *22-24 May 98 Jackson Hole, WY (AAA Annual Salute to Excellence)
- *26 May – 3 Jun 98 France (official calls, Counterpart Visit, MSG Det, Belleau Wood
 Ceremony)
 Netherlands (Counterpart Visit, official calls, MSG Det)
- *14-24 Jun 98 II MEF (Parris Island, Beaufort, Albany, Camp Lejeune,
 Cherry Point, New River, Norfolk)
- 29 Jun 98 Watertown/Ft. Drum, NY (visit Cong. McHugh's district)
- *8-9 Jul 98 Ann Arbor, MI (MMA Dinner)
 Chicago, IL (Chicago Chapter USNA Alumni Association/
 National Strategy Forum)
- *17-19 Jul 98 New Orleans, LA (MarForRes change of command)

	Tampa, FL (M Co, 3/7 Annual Reunion)
25 Jul 98	Elmira, NY (visit Congressman Houghton's district)
*31 Jul – 2 Aug 98	Kansas City, MO (Annual International Officers' Ball) Atlantic City, NY (Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation)
7 Aug 98	Syracuse, NY (Marine Corps League 75 th National Convention Banquet)
22 Aug 98	Rock Island, IL (visit Congressman Evans' district)
*30 Aug – 8 Sep 98	Israel (official calls, visit MSG Dets, visit Israeli Defense Forces) United Kingdom (Counterpart Visit, official calls, visit MSG Det and MCSF London)
14 Sep 98	Maxwell AFB, AL (Joint Flag Officers Warfighting Course) New York, NY (Medal of Freedom Award Ceremony)
18 Sep 98	MCAS Beaufort (unannounced visit) MCRD Parris Island (unannounced visit) MCAS New River (unannounced visit)
25-27 Sep 98	Dallas/Fort Worth, TX (Texas State Fair, MCAA Convention Banquet)
*7-18 Oct 98	I MEF (MCAS Yuma, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, MCRD San Diego, MCAS Miramar, CampPen) Malibu, CA (Pepperdine University) Newport Beach, CA (MCUF Mess Night) Los Angeles, CA (Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball)
22-23 Oct 98	Camp Lejeune, NC (Beirut Memorial Service) Carlisle, PA (Army War College)
*29 Oct 98	Cape Canaveral, FL (Space Shuttle Discovery Launch)
4 Nov 98	New York, NY (Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation "Thank You" dinner)
10-11 Nov 98	New York, NY (Intrepid MC Birthday Celebration, New York Stock Exchange)
*12-13 Nov 98	Kerrville, TX (Kerrville Summitt)

17-22 Nov 98 South America
Buenos Aires, Argentina (Counterpart Visit, MSG Det)
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Counterpart Visit, MSGDet)

24 Nov 98 Newport, RI (Naval War College)

11-12 Dec 98 MCRD Parris Island, SC (Crucible)

*17 Dec 98 Naples, FL (Pelican Bay Women's League First Annual Founders' Holiday Ball)

21-23 Dec 98 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (command visit)
Soto Cano AB, Honduras (visit Marines of Joint Task Force Bravo
And Marine Forces Honduras (Operation Fuerte Apoyo))

1999

6 Jan 99 New York, NY (Council on Foreign Relations)

*8-10 Jan 99 Sea Island, GA (Awakening '99)

19 Jan 99 Ft. Leavenworth, KS (Army Command and General Staff College)

21-23 Jan 99 Tampa, FL (Executive Off-Site)

*28 Jan – 4 Feb 99 East Coast (MARFORLANT, MCAS Cherry, MCB Camp Lejeune,
MCAS New River, MCLB Albany)
Greensboro, NC (Lighthouse Project)
(Mrs. Krulak accompanied CMC 31 Jan – 4 Feb)

9 Feb 99 New York, NY (7th Annual Salute to Freedom)

*16-26 Feb 99 West Coast Commands (MCAS Yuma, MCAGCC 29 Palms, MCB Camp
Pendleton, MCAS Miramar) *command visit*
Hawaii (CINCPAC Change of Command, ~~???~~what else)
(CMC returns to Washington, D.C. for the HASC Posture Hearing on
24 Feb 99)

18-24 Mar 99 WestPac
Okinawa (Camps Hansen, Butler, Kinser/MCAS Futemna)

*26 Mar 99 Parsippany, NJ (Marine Corps Law Enforcement Foundation)

*6-14 Apr 99 Europe
Italy (official calls, visit MSG Det and MCSF Co.)

France (official calls, visit MSG Det)

15 Apr 99	Atlanta, GA (National Citizenship Banquet/Award)
23 Apr 99	New York, NY (Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation Ball)
*30 Apr – 2 May 99	Pensacola, FL (MATSG) Atlanta, GA (MCROA Annual Military Conference)
6 May 99	Harrisburg, PA (4 th MCD unannounced visit)
*22 May 99	Cleveland, OH (Lerner Research Institute Dedication)
*29 May – 5 Jun 99	Hawaii (MarForPac, MCB Kaneohe) MCRD, San Diego, CA
7 Jun 99	New York, NY (services for Mr. Zach Fisher)
10-12 Jun 99	MCRD Parris Island, SC (final briefs, Crucible) MCAS Beaufort, SC
14 Jun 99	West Palm Beach, FL (Federal Express)

Final travel statistics for the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps:

Total flight hours – 1400

Total miles – 740,000 (equivalent to approximately 30 trips around the world)

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