Interviewee: General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

Date: 17 January 1979

Place: Marine Corps Historical Center, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Interviewer: This is side 1, tape 1, interview session I with Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., United States Marine Corps, retired. The date of this interview is 17 January 1979, it's being held in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Navy Yard, Washington.

I have an intro on here; the first question, General, is during your tour at Headquarters Marine Corps as G-4, what logistical actions and decisions were made that were to have a direct effect on the deployment of Marines to and Marine Corps operations in Vietnam? Do you recall any logistics preparations specifically designed to enhance the Marine Corps' ability to execute Vietnam contingency plans? It's a pretty broad one.

Chapman: That's a broad question. I'll do the best I can by it. I came to Headquarters Marine Corps as G-4 in the summer of ’61. I'd been CG of Force Troops at Camp Lejeune for the prior three years. During that time, I quickly became aware of the logistic unreadiness of force troops, and one of the projects I worked the hardest on during my time there was to bring force troops to a state of complete readiness. And as I observed other units there and elsewhere during that time, I formed the conviction that our logistic readiness was not generally good. So when I had the happy -- I use the word loosely -- assignment to Headquarters Marine Corps, again, as G-4, the one project that I had most in mind, and I think we worked the hardest on, was improving the logistic readiness of the Marine Corps as a whole, particularly the fleet Marine forces, of course. And to that end, we embarked on quite a number of separate actions.

I won't attempt to recall them all, but some, I guess, of the most notable were the first issuance in the form of Marine Corps order of a basic Marine Corps policy. That logistic readiness was as important as, and had to be put on the same level as personnel readiness and training. That order emphasized particularly the readiness of equipment, combat equipment. With the notion that the commander, in arriving at his training plans, in the execution of which the use of equipment was essential, had to consider the effectiveness and the remaining service life of his equipment as it would be affected by the use of that equipment in training.
And the requirement was laid on every commander to so organize his entire program so that the equipment would stay in a complete state of readiness and with adequate service life remaining as the training progressed. Now, needless to say, it wasn't easy to get that order concurred in by G-3 at Headquarters Marine Corps, because it was a basic departure. Marines historically have looked on equipment as just a device to enhance their training. If I'm making that clear. And all Marines will agree with that, I'm sure.

Well, this order was a basic departure, a basic new policy, that had a great deal to do with the readiness of the fleet Marine forces whenever the time came.

Interviewer: What about the existing cloud plans, these had to be revamped, or did you find when you took over G-4 that they were satisfactory with the material that was put aside --

Chapman: The plans were satisfactory, the execution was not. That was another subject that I wanted to mention. The cloud plans, of course, was a resupply plans for the combat resupply. Cloud and storm, cloud for the Atlantic, I believe, and storm for the Pacific. Or vice versa, I don't remember which.

Interviewer: They were mount out stores also, weren't they?

Chapman: Yes. Yes, they were, but the mount out stores were in the hands of the troops of the combat units and the resupply were in the hands of the supply agencies. So it's two, two separate, but closely related -- well, I was going to mention mount out. I had also learned that mount out was not -- it was not efficiently calculated. It was not stocked and it was not preserved. Its integrity was not maintained. It was common practice throughout the Marine Corps to use the mount out stocks (inaudible) for daily maintenance and use.

So we issued a second order, and then I went to some pains to check on it throughout the Marine Corps, that required that the mount out be calculated on the basis of peacetime usage and commander's judgment. And that it be stocked, packaged for mount out, and its integrity had to be maintained under all -- under no circumstances could it be used for daily routine maintenance and the like.
That was done. I guess the -- and that had a great deal to do with readiness, of course. Now, in that connection, one of the severe episodes that occurred shortly after I arrived, was that I went with Gen Shoup on an inspection on the -- through the Far East. And when we got to Okinawa, I had the unhappy task of checking up on the logistic readiness of the 3rd Marine Division Reinforcements. Well, I found, as I went around to the units, that not only did it not have the mount out, but they didn't know what mount out was in most cases. The for service regiment did know, but for a lack of funding they had been unable actually to execute good mount out stockage.

So when we came back, I had to write a report, which Shoup seized on with a certain amount of glee, I might say, as you probably remember --

Interviewer: I remember.

Chapman: -- and launched -- it required an investigation to be launched, and the investigation proved out what I had had to say in the report. So there was a great to-do, you know, and a lot of static arose from that, but it did have the effect not only of improving the mount out readiness through the 3d Marine Division, which, of course, is right out there on the front line, but also driving home throughout the rest of the Marine Corps the necessity of stocking and preserving the mount out.

Let's see, your first question, what else can I think of. The R&E program, the repair and evacuation program, or rebuild and evacuation, I guess it is. It was revised and revitalized, recalculated, on a different basis. It was made mandatory, rather than voluntary. We stocked, in the supply centers, sufficient major items of equipment in combat ready condition to deliver to the troops the replacement equipment before they had to evacuate the old equipment for rebuild.

And, thirdly, we required the commander to calculate the remaining service life in his items of equipment and propose it for replacement and evacuation at the point when there was insufficient service life predicted to remain in the coming year. I don't remember what that figure was, it was something like 30 or 35 percent. It was when two-thirds of the service life of a major item of equipment was used up in training, obviously, then it had to be evacuated and replaced by a fully serviceable item. That was the R&E program, and it had a major effect on equipment readiness.
Well, we were able to fund and deliver to the fleet Marine force units a large number of major items of new equipment. A whole family of communications, I particularly remember. The big radars for the air wings. Air control radars, search and, in both horizontal and -- yes, horizontal. Two dimensions of horizontal and one vertical.

Interviewer: Did (inaudible) come in a system -- did DASK equipment come in --

Chapman: Yes, the new equipment. It was new at that time, I don't remember the name of it. It had been the MPQ-10, but what was it, what was the new one called. Darned if I even remember now.

Interviewer: New DASK --

Chapman: Yes. Yes.

Interviewer: TPQ-10s?

Chapman: Yes, the TPQ-10, that's it. The MTDS.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Much other electronic and communication equipment.

Interviewer: How about ordinants?

Chapman: Let's see -- just running ordnance through in my mind. We rebuilt the tanks, of course. We kept the heavy tank, the M-103, though there were many efforts to have us dispose of it. We did dispose of the terrier during my time because it had been replaced by -- well, by the hulk. Now hulk is another example of new equipment. And then, later on, the improved hulk, the HIP, h-i-p. Hulk improve program, it's amazing how these things come back to me when I think about it. Hip.
Let's see, tanks, artillery, small arms; there was several pieces of small arms. A new bazooka and some new grenades. The M-14 rifle, of course, we reequipped all the combat troops with the M-14.

Interviewer: (Inaudible.)

Chapman: Yes, that's right. That machine gun, that new machine gun.

Interviewer: The M-60?

Chapman: The M-60, right. Well, in motor transport, a major step forward was the bringing under the Marine Corps auspices of aviation motor transport, as you all perhaps remember. Aviation had gone their own way with Navy funding for their motor transport, with the result that they had a whole families of peculiar items of motor transport. Any aviators here? This may be before your time.

But Marine Corps aviation had a half a dozen or more little families of peculiar equipment to which there was no counterpart in the Marine Corps ground or anywhere else for that matter. So that their resupply and maintenance, spare parts and so forth, problems were enormous. Well, we sold the idea of abandoning all that peculiar equipment and delivering to the Marine Corps Aviation the same motor transport that the ground had. And that had a great deal to do with improving the readiness of Marine Corps aviation.

Interviewer: Was that about the time that the procurement of aviation POL (inaudible) came under the Marine Corps? I remember -- or maybe that was a little later --

Chapman: Yes, I think that was later. I think I was chief of staff then. That didn't happen while I was G-4.

One other item I might mention, under the G-4 auspices, was the amphibious shipping program of which we, in a massive document to CNO, expressed the Marine Corps requirements for amphibious shipping in terms of square footage, cube, combat loading, tactical arrangements
and the like. And it was based on that document that the amphibious shipping program was
designed by the Navy. Originally, of course, the LPHs and LPDs and then, later, the LHA.

Interviewer: That must have been a historic document then --

Chapman: It was a -- I think it was a historic document, yes. Col Peter Hahn was our expert and
architect of that document. Which I think it took him about two years to assemble, prepare, get
in final form and we got, I remember, a trip I made up to persuade Gen Greene, who was the
chief of staff, to let me take it in and get Gen Shoup to sign it. Well, he finally agreed and so I
confronted Gen Shoup in his office in an effort to get him to sign this document. Well, he
protested and moaned and kicked and squirmed, but, finally, by gosh, he signed it. And I hand
carried it over to CNO, and delivered it to --

Interviewer: Did it cause any waves over at CNO for the Navy?

Chapman: Well, some, but not really, no. It was passed down through the -- of course, to the
amphibious warfare section in CNO, who then had the task of designing a fleet of amphibious
shipping that met the Marine Corps requirements. Which they did with great enthusiasm.

Interviewer: Of course, they didn't have the --

Chapman: But then came the problem, of course, of the funding -- the shipbuilding program to
carry out the designs. But it was done, and the Navy did do it. The objective was to create
amphibious shipping, combat shipping, sufficient to lift the assault echelons of two MEFs into
combat.

There are important points in those words. First, it was the assault echelons only. Not
the entire MEFs. Secondly, combat-loaded, you know, for debarkation in combat in the assault.

Interviewer: I want to get -- we'll get back to that because I remember there was a whole period
of time -- a full period during that time where the Marine Corps was very unhappy about the
inability of the Navy's amphibious lift capability. And I think that's when (inaudible) we'll talk about that later.

Interviewer: Yes, General, how much of this -- or how much of these developments in logistics were you looking directly at the Vietnam situation and the possible deployment of Marine forces at that time?

Chapman: Well, only as one of the possibilities. There were other -- you know, other possibilities on the horizon. You know, FMEF land had been alerted a number of time to go to, oh, Lebanon, Suez, elsewhere in Europe and the Atlantic, trouble spots in the Far East were, of course, Korea, Indochina. Not only in Vietnam, but you remember the SEATO, SEATO treaty, Laos.

Interviewer: Laos.

Chapman: Cambodia, Thailand.

Interviewer: And the task force --

Chapman: Singapore.

Interviewer: -- Simpson had. He took over that Laos, I think.

Chapman: Yes. Mm-hmm. You know, that was Thailand. That was Udorn, that was Udorn, yes.

Interviewer: That was Udorn, right.

Chapman: Yes. Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: (Inaudible) 16, I think it was.
Chapman: Mm-hmm. And then we put intelligence-gathering installations in various places. Of which that was one, by the way. That was an adjunct of that operation. Well, it wasn't until I was chief of staff, in '64 or so, that we began to focus directly on Vietnam.

Interviewer: Any other comments on that?

Chapman: If I can think of anything else in the G-4 line. Well, those are four or five of the principal things. There were many, many things. It was a very busy two years and I do think we -- I think we accomplished a great deal.

Interviewer: In the early spring of 1965 there was some question of whether the 9th MEF would receive its common item support from (inaudible) resources. What was involved in this issue and in your opinion, was it a significant one?

Chapman: Well, it wasn't particularly significant, no. The Army proposed that the command and support would come from them, but we rejected this report, the proposal. We thought it was our duty to support the Marines in combat, and that's what we did. But there wasn't any great hassle about it that I remember.

Interviewer: General, as I recall documents of that time, the contingency planning called for the Army to support the IX MEF at that time. The MEF, the Marines claimed -- or that the plans called for the Army -- for the Army to support the MEF. MacVie (phonetic) then found out that it didn't have the supplies to support the MEF and (inaudible) of a great deal of traffic going back between MacVie and his headquarters relating to who would actually be doing the support. Did any of this get back to headquarters? And it had a great deal to do with the -- with the release of bombing supplies and --

Chapman: Yes, mm-hmm.

Interviewer: -- which did not occur until June.
Chapman: Well, I'm sure we were aware of it. But, you know, the basic -- the basic mission of the Marine Corps as laid out in the law is to provide and support the fleet Marine forces. And our plans and arrangements had long since been completed to do just that. There didn't seem to be any good reason for suddenly, at the first entry into combat, to shift the system.

Interviewer: Well, as an add-on to that, there's some question, and I think this what you were getting at, of why it took from March to June, 1965 to get FMFPaC emergency mount out supplies released to support the Marines in Vietnam. Do you know of any reason for this three-month delay?

Chapman: Well, the reasons -- the basic reasons were that the initial landings of the Marines were administrative. Not into heavy combat. Combat developed, of course, later on. And, secondly, the Marines were -- had to be held in readiness to mount out from Vietnam and land in combat elsewhere. And, thirdly, there didn't seem to be any reason why the routine supply of Marine units that had been carried on for a long time couldn't just continue. That's all. They were essentially in the administrative semi -- semi-operational mostly training situation in Vietnam. After a couple of months, though, two or three months, then the fighting started. And it became obvious that the Marines weren't going to mount out and go elsewhere, like make a landing in North Vietnam. Not soon, anyway. So at that point, the mount out was released.

But that was the reason. I guess the principal reason was that the Marines had to be ready to mount out from Vietnam and make combat landings. And if the mount out had been used up in daily operations, in what was essentially a quiet Vietnam, they would have been logistically unready to do so. Does that answer the question?

Interviewer: Excuse me, General, I have one other. During this period, Marines talked of a pull system of supply for Vietnam as opposed to a push system. Could you explain the difference, and how well did it work?

Chapman: I don't recall a whole lot on that. Of course, a pull system is the one in which the troops predict need and requisition accordingly. The push system is one in which the
commander, outside the theater and the supply agencies, predicts demand and puts supplies in accordingly. I mean, those are the central differences between --

Interviewer: Supply.

Chapman: Yes. We ended up with, I thought, a very logical arrangement, which was a combination of the two. The -- you know, the (inaudible) that Gen Krulak set up were in the nature of the push system. But basic resupply was pull. And the troops made their needs known to the for service -- the logistic command and it, in turn, requisitioned on a predicted basis. Of course predictions were based on usage. And after we'd been there a while, the usage sort of settled down into a routine, you know. We were doing about the same things all the time, you know. And consequently our usage of consumable and wear-outables and so forth was at a pretty steady, uniform, predictable rate.

Interviewer: One more question in that respect, one commander made the observation that it was difficult to predict usage for Vietnam in that units were both in a garrison and a combat state so that usage didn't -- predicted usage didn't necessarily follow the combat predictions. Would you care to comment on that? In other words --

Chapman: Well, the combat predictions are on a combat usage rate and they're very heavy. You know, the garrison usage is a great deal less. Well, there wasn't anything easy about it, and many commanders didn't like to be troubled with the task of predicting what their future requirements would be. But by and large, they did it, and it worked.

Interviewer: When the Headquarters III MAF deployed to Vietnam, General, it was a skeleton organization and had to depend upon the wing and division headquarters for support and augmentation. Before too long, it was apparent that this concept would not work out and that this was no way to go to war. Can you comment on this matter and on the philosophy behind such headquarters structures?
Chapman: Well, the philosophy was based, pure and simple, on peacetime stringencies in personnel. And the Marine Corps didn't have the resources to maintain in being MAF-type headquarters, full scale MAF type headquarters. We just didn't have them. And, of course, furthermore, it would be a kind of a inefficient process to maintain a large complicated headquarters with many specialists in being in peacetime with nothing to do, really. Instead, the Marine Corps maintained what was just a small nucleus of planners and some of whom -- many of whom were on additional duty, or temporary duty, that is, with the MAF Headquarters. Of course, it was well-recognized that on deployment it would have to be made into a fulltime TO organization, and that was done as the Marine Corps got resources with the onset of the war and the first landings in Vietnam. See, we got major increases in strength and we were able to man not only III MAF Headquarters, but a lot of other outfits, too, that either didn't exist at all in peacetime or were on a skeleton basis.

Interviewer: Did you ever get the feeling that after this augmentation did take place, (inaudible) MAF Headquarters was too large and cumbersome?

Chapman: Well, it grew. It got to be big. I don't have the impression that it was over-large. It would have been too big to mount out on an amphibious operation, but I think each piece of it was necessary in the situation in which the Marines found themselves in Vietnam.

Interviewer: I know that Gen Tompkins made the comment that he was appalled by the fact that the tail behind each of the units, the regiment and so on, was just tremendous.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: And more than had ever been experienced by the Marine Corps previously and that this was a very cumbersome way of doing business.

Chapman: Well, it was cumbersome and heavy all right, yes. Not only III MAF, as you say, but others. Some of that was due to the fact that the Marine headquarters were in sort of permanent
position, you know, and having to carry on round the clock administrative, service, support, 
routine operations that they would not be expected to do in mobile combat.

Interviewer: Despite the fact that the 3d FSR was a growing concern on Okinawa, the decision 
was made, and I think this was by Gen Krulak with the approval of headquarters, to establish 
support and logistics command in Vietnam. Why was this action taken rather than just simply 
deploying the 3d FSR to Vietnam?

Chapman: Well, it became obvious that the Marines in Vietnam were going to be there, in 
combat, for a long, long time. You probably have among your memoirs here and papers Gen 
Greene's prediction that it would take --

Interviewer: I think he said something like 25 years.

Chapman: Well, no, he said five years, with a half a million Americans on the ground. Five 
years after, the half a million were there. Of course he didn't receive great plaudits from the 
President or Secretary of Defense, from McNamara, on that statement. As a matter of fact, that 
was some of the sleepless nights I put in was trying to extricate Gen Greene from that statement. 
Which we made in a deep background in Saigon.

Well, on an amphibious operation, of course, the Marines land in combat, seize the 
objective and then come out for a rebuild, retraining, restoration program before the next 
landing. And our logistics were keyed to that idea. They were not keyed to the idea of 
sustaining the Marines in combat for years on end.

Consequently, we had to have, on Okinawa or some convenient (inaudible) place, a 
resupply, rebuild capability for the Marine equipment and supplies. And the logical way to do 
that was just to maintain the 3/4 Service Regiment in position with what they already had, fourth 
and fifth echelon rebuild capability, heavy supply stockage and all the necessary computers and 
data banks and et cetera, et cetera, to do the job. And then to create, in Vietnam, on a provisional 
basis, something new called the force logistic command with the task of the immediate supply 
and support of the troops in combat, was the essential reason.
Interviewer: It wouldn't happen -- the FLC didn't have its fourth and fifth --

Chapman: Oh, no. No. No, they did not.

Interviewer: I didn't think so.

Chapman: They did not.

Interviewer: How was Marine Corps troop strength for Vietnam determined and where? And what role did Headquarters Marine Corps staff play in this determination?

Chapman: Well, the basic decision was made by McNamara. It started, of course, in Vietnam and came up through the MacVie chain of command. And then, of course, we had our own channels coming up through the Marine chain of command. And culminated in the joint chiefs and then the recommendations were made to the Secretary of Defense, who ran the war from his Pentagon office. And he then took, I suppose, many factors into consideration, and ceilings were issued for the units in Vietnam.

Interviewer: I understand at one time that (inaudible) and some of the other Pentagon high level people did not have any (inaudible) knowledge of Marine Corps strength and the organization. And that, I think, Gen Chaisson had to bring Entogue (phonetic) and some of his people over to headquarters and point out that this is a fire team, this is a PLC --

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: -- do you remember this --

Chapman: Vaguely. Yes, vaguely. Oh, Entogue knew how many Marines there were in Vietnam to the extent we knew it. I've often remarked that I spent four years as chief of staff and four years as Commandant trying to find out how many Marines there were in the Marine Corps and I never did find out. In eight years of -- I knew I could always find out how many there used
to be, six months ago, but to find out how many there are today was impossible. Never did find out.

Interviewer: Do you remember Jim March, who was the --

Chapman: Yes, he was in charge of finding out.

Interviewer: He was in charge of it.

Chapman: And he never found out.

Interviewer: He said yes. He said that at one particular point in time, there was no way of knowing how many Marines you had in the Marine Corps, pipeline and everything else.

Chapman: One time we stopped -- I'll never forget this. We put out an order, this is when I was chief of staff. We put out an order that on the 31st of December of that year -- it must have been about '66 maybe, and we put this order out about three months ahead of time -- that the whole Marine Corps was to gear up and on 31 December, meridian time, they were to count every Marine they had.

(Laughter.)

Interviewer: Well, didn't this happen in Vietnam, where they --

Chapman: It included in Vietnam and everywhere. In the transient centers, in the pipeline, in the training establishment, worldwide. At noon on 31 December, every Marine commander was to count how many Marines he had and make a report to Headquarters Marine Corps. By God, they did it, and it was useless.

(Laughter.)
Chapman: It was absolutely useless. We still didn't know how many. And the reason was that there were so many Marines in limbo. They were in transit, they'd been dropped on the rolls of one unit and not yet picked up by another unit to which they were destined and the like, and we came out -- we totaled it all up and it added up to some figure we knew was wrong. Had to be wrong.

So this has got nothing to do with the subject we're on, except I just want to point out that in eight years, I never could find out how many Marines there were in the Marines. I'll bet you Gen Wilson, today, don't know how many Marines there are in the Marine Corps.

Interviewer: I'm going to take that bet.

(Laughter.)

Interviewer: And, General, I would bet that the figures that we report, or that you receive, on how many there was six months ago weren't that exact, either.

Chapman: I think they were pretty good after six or nine months, you know, when all the auditing is done and all of that. They're pretty good then, and, of course, when the financial audit trails are run, then the fiscal director can tell you, you know, after about a year or two, he can tell you exactly how many of the Marines there were at the time the books were closed at the end of the fiscal year two years ago, you know.

Interviewer: What, if any, were the effects of the in country personnel ceilings on planned Marine Corps troop deployments?

Chapman: On troop deploy -- well, there wasn't any effect on troop deployments. Every time a Marine unit was ordered deployed to Vietnam, the ceiling was raised accordingly. Now that got to be a kind of tiresome process every now and then in dealing with Entogue and his analysts, but it was done.
Interviewer: I think perhaps the question might be what problem did the personnel ceilings cause in planning for these troop deployments or for planning and determining what forces that you could send to Vietnam.

Chapman: Those two things aren't related. The decision to deploy additional units to Vietnam was made at the highest level. In fact, the President himself approved it. And on such approval, the ceilings were raised. Whereas one was the chicken and the other was the egg. It wasn't vice versa. In other words, the ceiling wasn't set and then troops ordered to be deployed and come under the ceiling. It was the other way around.

No, the effect of the personnel ceilings was, however, significant on the units already in Vietnam. That's where the impact came because there were so many needs that came about from the unusual nature of the combat and that, that we were usually unable to meet because we -- because we were restricted by the personnel ceiling.

Interviewer: Prior to Vietnam, the Marine Corps was following a system of personnel stabilization, lock on training and unit rotation. As this system could not be sustained in combat, it was necessary to carry out a mix master program and shift to individual location. How much impact did this have on combat effectiveness and did you form any opinions about this problem and how it should be handled in the future?

Chapman: Well, let me read the second sentence again, in the question. As this system could not be sustained in combat, it was necessary, and so forth. That would more properly read as this system could not be sustained in the type of deployment that the Marines were required to handle in Vietnam, it had to be changed.

Remember, in World War II, we went overseas and we just stayed until the end of the war. And unit integrity was maintained. An officer or a Marine would join the 2d Battalion 4th Marines and he'd stay in the 2d Battalion 4th Marines until the end of the war, unless he got killed or wounded prior to that.

Vietnam was set up on an entirely different basis. That is, a one year tour of duty and constant, therefore, constant rotation of the personnel of a unit. In the course of a year, a unit would do 100 percent turnover. Now, had the initial Marine units landed in a situation like
World War II, it would have been no problem because they would have just stayed in that unit until the war ended. Like we did in World War II.

Interviewer: (Inaudible) sustained during the Vietnam period of time?

Chapman: Oh, I don't think so, no. But I'm just trying to make the point that it was the different nature of the engagement that caused the necessity of shifting to a personnel rotation system. And the same thing is true today, the Marines, again, have, today, as I understand it, locked on air and ground units. And there are many advantages to that. Many advantages.

There will be a great disadvantage, though, if we, again, have to land in a Vietnam-type situation, because what you find is that as soon as you land in combat, you've got to start rotating because you've got short-timers immediately and the entire unit will turn over in the course of a year. So those really are my opinions about the subject.

If we're going to operate in a World War II-type personnel situation, then the locked-in units are very advantageous. If we're going to land in a Vietnam-type situation where we stay four, five years and have a 100 percent rotation every year in every unit, why, then, obviously, it's a completely different situation.

Did that deal with that question?

Interviewer: Expanding on that point of view a little bit, Gen Chapman, who actually mandated this one year rotation policy, was this—

Chapman: Oh, McNamara. Yes, Secretary of Defense.

Interviewer: -- top level --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: In effect, the top level political decision then rather than any manpower requirement coming out of (inaudible) Marine Corps.
Chapman: Of course, we supported it. I mean it's obvious you couldn't keep Marines over there for years on end. It was just a practical matter, you know. And then not only that, but then we also had to set up, and there was set up, for all the troops, remember, the R&R program. Where midway through the one year tour, each Marine and each soldier, each airman, sailor, got to spend a week or 10 days in Australia or someplace. Remember that?

Well, and then, thirdly, there was this point -- I don't remember these figures exactly, but these figures are going to be in the ball park. And that is that the average Marine infantryman spent a tour in Vietnam of six months because within six months, in Vietnam, the average Marine infantryman was either wounded or dead or sick and had to be evacuated. The average tour of the infantryman was something like six or seven months.

Interviewer: The pipeline became a real problem --

Chapman: Yes. So far as the infantry was concerned, it was something like a six or nine month tour of duty no matter what policies McNamara enunciated. And, you know, I believe there was a similar figure for helicopters, if I remember correctly. Were you a helicopter pilot?

Interviewer: Yes, sir.

Chapman: You must have got through all right.

Interviewer: The first tour I did, the second tour I didn't.

Chapman: Well, then I'm not sure of the figure for helicopter pilots, but it, too, was -- it, too, was on -- was less. The average Marine helicopter pilot tour was less than 12 months. As was true of the infantry.

Interviewer: A lot of times that was because the squads themselves would rotate back to Okinawa for three months to refurbish (inaudible) rotate back (inaudible).
Interviewer:  With planes.  Well, I imagine the answer to what I would ask now is a matter of practicality.  But why a year instead of a year and a half or two years?  Public opinion wouldn't sustain it?  The high level politicians wouldn't go for it?

Chapman:  I don't think I remember what those factors were, if I ever knew.  I -- the best I can recollect, it was just a judgment, a quick judgment, based on the belief that a year was long enough, and that the Marines --

End Tape 1, Side A
Chapman: Yes, the Marine tour on Okinawa and in Japan, our aviators in Japan, was 13 months. The Army unaccompanied tour, in various places around the world, was 12 months, I think. Maybe it was 18, I don't remember that exactly. And so I think 12 months just looked like a good figure, that's all, and that's -- now, of course, as you knew, there was a lot of uninformed criticism during the war about the cost and turnover and the fact that experts in various slots in Vietnam were constantly turning over and why didn't we just put them there and keep them on the job and improve the effectiveness of the units. Well, every time I heard that I always pointed out to them that the average Marine infantryman lasted only six or seven months. That usually ended the argument, by the way.

Interviewer: I imagine that public opinion wouldn't have sustained a longer --

Chapman: No, I don't think so, either.

Interviewer: General, do you think it had a lot to do with the way we were fighting the war and the -- the no win type of situation where we weren't allowed to invade the north and (inaudible) holding our own a lot?

Chapman: Well, that and it went on so long, you know, that was probably the underlying reason. The Americans want to win wars and they want to win them quick. Every time we've gotten into a protracted war, like Korea and Vietnam, and our own Civil War, you know, there has been much, much dissention. World War I was a short war for us. World War II was a long war, but the individual battles, campaigns, were rather quick, you know. In the Pacific they only lasted a few days in most cases. Tarawa lasted three days, I think.

Interviewer: Seventy-six hours.

Chapman: Yes. Guadalcanal went on three or four months. In Africa and Europe they were a relatively short duration.
Interviewer: With respect to the (inaudible) of Reserves, General, do you recall that this matter was recommended to the Secretary of Defense, or to the President at any time during your tenure as chief of staff or as a member of the JCS? And the reasons why there was no mobilization of the Reserves?

Chapman: Yes, we recommended it at least one time. It must have been after the Tet offensive. You'll have to get back into the record and check me on that. I'll be danged if I remember. It was not approved, rather the decision was made to increase the regular forces through the draft. And that was a top level decision. Of course, the President made that decision and I presume for primarily political reasons.

I must say that I, for one, concurred, really, in the decision. We recommended the mobilization of the Reserves with a certain amount of reluctance. And the reason is very obvious, the Reserve, which was a first class combat-ready counterpart to a regular air ground team in almost every respect, is like a huge piece of artillery that only had one round it can fire. Because when you -- by law, when you activate the Reserve, and then at some point deactivate them, their military obligation is completed. And your Reserve is totally gone. And you have to start absolutely from zero to build another Reserve.

I don't know if you all knew that, but that's true by law. As I say, it's like a huge piece of artillery that only has one round. You can fire it once and then it'll be 20 years probably before you can fire it again, because that's how long it took us to build the 4th Air Ground team into its absolutely outstanding shape. It took us about 20 years.

Interviewer: After Korea?

Chapman: After Korea, yes. And if we had fired that one enormous round, it would have been another 20 years before we would have had a Reserve again. So, the Reserve ought to be preserved as a matter of policy for some time when it really counts. I don't know, am I making that clear?

Interviewer: Yes, that's clear.
Interviewer: General, perhaps going to question 25, (inaudible) if we're talking about the (inaudible) calling up of the Reserves in '68?

Interviewer: Page six, sir.

Chapman: Yes, I've got it. Hand me that ash tray, will you. Is anybody allergic to --

Interviewer: No, sir.

Interviewer: No, sir.

Chapman: I'll never forget one time I went to Albany, when I was commandant, and we got in that conference room down there and one of his -- Gen Fairbourn was the CG. And one of his civilians got up to give a briefing on some supply subject and I lit up my cigar and he said, good morning, Gen Chapman, Gen Fairbourn. I will now brief on this subject, and a slide came on the board. Then the slide went off and then he said, now to begin, and with that he turned as white as that piece of paper and fell down on the platform and totally unconscious. Well, it turned out he was allergic to cigar smoke. Totally allergic, it simply knocked him unconscious. Literally unconscious. So, we had to clear the room. I had to put out my cigar, which was a terrible ordeal for me. And after the room had been evacuated of cigar smoke and they'd thrown a bucket of cold water on him, we went back in and he picked up right where he left off.

(Laughter.)

Chapman: Of course, I haven't told that in years.

Interviewer: Well, the question is a number of individuals, including Gen Chaisson, had stated that in 1968, following Tet, the JCS and Gen Wheeler, quote, maneuvered Gen Westmoreland into asking for massive reinforcements in order to force the President to call up the Reserves. Do you recall this to be the case essentially? Do you recall discussions in the tank about this matter?
Chapman: Well, that was all carried on in the back channel, eyes only, personals between Westmoreland and Wheeler. Which we all -- chiefs all got copies, of course. It may be that there is no official record of that, those many exchanges. I don't know, is there?

Interviewer: Yes, I believe so, sir.

Chapman: Yes. Gen Greene may have (inaudible) one. He was Commandant then, he kept everything. It culminated in Westmoreland stating that the situation was -- I'm trying to think of the word he used. It was "catastrophic" or -- let's see, what was that --

Interviewer: Critical?

Chapman: No, it was stronger than critical. It was more like catastrophic. I never thought I'd forget that word. That shows you how bad my memory is getting because that was a critical word that he used. Based on which the chiefs did recommend major increases -- that must have been the occasion on which we recommended the mobilization of the Reserve. Not just the Marine Reserve, but the other Reserves, too.

Interviewer: Well, what part of this discussion of mobilizing the Reserves, wasn't there an equal status? In other words, the Marine Reserve could be called up much more quickly than the Army Reserve would be. The Army Reserves were in bad shape.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: It was so much overhaul or so much -- a long time involved in mobilizing may have been part of the problem.

Chapman: I think that's so. Whereas our Reserve was ready. First class, absolutely first class in every respect, personnel manning, training and logistic support. That's a subject I didn't touch on when we were talking about G-4 accomplishments.
During my time as G-4, the Reserve was reorganized under the auspices of Gen Fairbourn, who was Director of Reserves, into the 4th Div Wing team. And it was under my auspices as G-4, we equipped the 4th Div Wing with the same equipment and supplies that the regulars had. With some exceptions, mostly airplanes. Whereas the Reserve, instead of having F-4s, they had F-8s. And instead of having -- let's see. what the hell else did they have? Instead of having the A-4M, they had A4Gs, or something or other.

Interviewer: A-4Cs, I think.

Chapman: A-4Cs, and the like. We accomplished that when I was -- during the time I was G-4.

Interviewer: General, do you think if the political decision had been made to call up the Reserves that there would have been a corresponding change in the way that they were waging the war in Vietnam? Do you think we would have gone for the win? Do you think to call up the Reserves would have forced that win?

Chapman: Oh, I doubt it, you know. You know, we could have gone for a win without calling up the Reserves. I doubt if it would have forced it. What did we have to do to win? We had to - - I think we had to do what we proposed right along, was put a half a million men on the ground in Vietnam for security and to stamp out the Viet Cong. To land in North Vietnam, land the Marines in North Vietnam, up above the DMZ, and just cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and all their supply lines and conduct an all-out bombing campaign in Haiphong and Hanoi and their complete industrial and supply base. And, like Gen LeMay said, just bomb them back to the Stone Age. That would have won.

In fact, that's what the chiefs proposed in the summer of '65, exactly that. Not the half million men on the ground, but the landings in North Vietnam and the all-out bombing campaign was the chiefs' proposal in the spring of '65, right after the Marines first landed. Of course, it was disapproved.

So as a major element in executing such a plan, the Reserves would probably have been necessary, but I don't think it would have forced it.
Interviewer: Well, another aspect, this calling up the Reserves, do you think that calling up the Reserves would have mobilized American public opinion in support of the war to a greater extent, inasmuch as there were more people involved? More segments of society --

Chapman: I don't know, I somehow doubt it. I don't think that alone would have made any significant change in the attitude of the Congress and the American people. I believe a plan to win the war, such as I described, would have made a change.

But I think that's what the American people wanted. The way I once time once heard it expressed I thought was awfully good was that -- in a nutshell, the American people, at the beginning of the war, said win it. In the middle of the war they said win it or get out. And toward the end of the war, they said get out. And that, in a nutshell, was about the way public opinion evolved, I think. Win it, win it or get out, get out.

Interviewer: This is question 10. In the summer of 1966, several Marine units reported serious personnel shortages in foxhole strength. Do you recall what caused these shortages and how they were remedied? And this was a constant complaint, I think, on the part of commanders.

Chapman: Yes. Well, there were two basic causes. The first was that our predictions as to infantry strength, or infantry replacements, were not as accurate as they should have been, could have been. And, secondly, that the infantrymen in Vietnam were siphoned off for just a host of other things. Security around CPs, every unit in Vietnam had to have some kind of security platoon to guard the CP against Viet Cong raids. There was no provision in the TO for security around CPs.

You know, in our amphibious operations, the way we do that is that the cooks and the bakers and the clerks and the radio operators take turns standing watch at night around the CP. Well, you can't -- if the radio operator is manning his radio 24 hours a day, as he was in Vietnam, he can't stand guard at night. So infantrymen were siphoned off for that kind of purpose -- many other kinds of purposes, with the result that the -- that the 0-3s reaching the foxhole were less than they ought to have been under the TO.

Well, we went through a great flail and tried to ferret out all these places where Marines had been -- infantrymen had been stashed away. If some of you were in Vietnam at that time,
you remember that very well, I think. And we eventually did find them all and got most of them back in the foxhole and then we increased the flow of 0-3s to Vietnam.

We set up a reporting system that required each unit to report, every Monday at 8:00 or some such time, what his percentage of foxhole strength was against a scale of 100, and that meant Marines in the foxhole, not just on the rolls of the company, but how many were actually out there carrying a rifle. And the first reports we got on that were pretty alarming because it was only something like 40 or 50 percent in many outfits.

But after a month or two of heavy flailing around, why we got the foxhole strength up to something like -- damned if I remember. I think our objective was 90 percent. I think we got to about 90 percent eventually. You'll have to check these figures, I don't remember these figures all that well.

Interviewer: We probably have them. Again, in '66, when the supply of Marine helicopter pilots became critically short, what steps did Headquarters Marine Corps consider taking to fill the void and was mobilization of the Marine Air Reserve alone ever considered?

Chapman: Well, the mobilization of pilots was considered, yes. Now helicopter pilots, that was another one of those things that we got all tangled up with Entogue and systems analysis on. Pilot seat ratios is a term I'll never forget. I must have listened to discussion on pilot seat ratios for a zillion hours in headquarters and over at Navy and up at the SECDEF.

Interviewer: What did that mean, exactly?

Chapman: For each cockpit seat, combat cockpit seat, how many pilots do you need, Marinewide. And we started out with a figure of something like three and a half, I think it was. And Entogue drove us down to a final figure of something like two and a half. Two and a half pilots per combat seat. Now that -- say we had a -- let's see, we had about 400 A-4s, and there's only one pilot in an A-4, so that meant we could have a thousand A-4 pilots. And those A-4s had to be -- those A-4 pilots, those thousand A-4 pilots were the total that we could have and they manned the A-4s in Vietnam. They manned the training establishment at Pensacola and in the
wings back in the States. The instructors with the Reserve, going to school, on duty at Headquarters Marine Corps, and everywhere.

Interviewer: And go back to Vietnam every year.

Chapman: And going back to Vietnam every year, right. Right. Well, that figure of 1,400 is not accurate, but that will give you the idea. It was particularly crucial with helicopters because we had so many helicopter casualties, pilots and crews and birds.

Interviewer: A lot of times, too, most of the helicopters would require two pilots per plane.

Chapman: Yes, that's right. Well, that was -- well, it meant pilot seat. That included the co-pilot's seat. If it was a bona fide co-pilot seat. That, on the light helicopters, that's not a co-pilot's seat.

Interviewer: It's the Huey single --

Chapman: Yes. But on the medium and large birds, it is actually a co-pilot, and that was included in the calculations. Well, based on these calculations and resulting manning levels, the recruitment of would be pilots, the training at Pensacola, the -- let's see, what do we call that thing at Glencoe and --

Interviewer: Glencoe Marine Air Reserve Training Command?

Chapman: No, the -- after a pilot graduates from Pensacola, gets his wings, then he goes through --

Interviewer: RAG squad --

Chapman: That's it, RAG, readiness air group. Readiness air group, where the pilot, who's only a basic pilot at that point, learns to fly an A-4, an F-4, or whatever. We eventually got the
ceilings set at a point where we could live with them and keep the birds in Vietnam manned. But it was quite a flail.

Interviewer: Well, of course, I think at this time, perhaps shortly after, I recall seeing the figures that there was a large exodus of helicopter pilots resigning, getting out. They'd be brought back to the States after a tour in Vietnam and go down a new river, they next thing you know, they're out on a -- either on a Med cruise or down at -- (inaudible). And it seemed to me that the helicopters particularly were hit very hard by this --

Chapman: Yes. We had to change the personnel policy to advance a pilot's overseas deployment date by the amount of time he spent in the Mediterranean or (inaudible) or elsewhere. We eventually did that. That helped some in that problem.

Interviewer: In 1965 to '66, there was considerable debate about a Marine, and quote, strategy based on an expanding enclave concept versus an Army search and destroy strategy. Could you address this matter with respect to the then prevailing Headquarters Marine Corps view?

Chapman: You know, Ben, this is a big subject. And it's five minutes to 12:00, and I've got to go at 12:00. You got a five-minute question in here somewhere. And I'll come back another time and we'll resume. I find this very interesting. I'm sort of amazed at how much I remember once I put my mind to it.

Interviewer: We had no question -- number 15, okay. At the beginning of the Vietnam war, the Marine Corps (inaudible) separate helicopter gunship. And I recall Gen Greene then being against it at that time. Why, I guess it was because Gen Greene didn't want it. And what finally induced the Marine Corps to (inaudible).

Chapman: There is a very simple answer to that, Gen Greene. He made a -- it was either his first or second trip to Vietnam after becoming Commandant. I believe it was his first -- or maybe his second. Immediately he was sworn in as Commandant. Within a week, he abandoned me at Headquarters Marine Corps, because I was the new chief of staff, and I said, my God, you
aren't going to go off and leave me all by myself -- yes, he was. He went to Vietnam for two weeks, on a two-week trip. And it was either that trip or the next trip, which was in June, I think, that he observed, he visited the Army, he watched the gunships in action, he talked to the Marine pilots, aviators, and infantry in Vietnam.

He came back to headquarters and issued an order, we want gunships. We'll get gunships the soonest we can get them. So we all got hot and within a reasonable period of time we had gunships in Vietnam, too. And that in a nutshell is how it happened. It was Gen Greene. And it was a very fine decision on his part.

Interviewer: I recall a statement he made at his state of the Marine Corps message at the beginning of the year there, about rocketing Marines to the heart (inaudible) if necessary. I think he got off of that pretty quick.

Chapman: Well, that didn't turn out to be very practical.

Interviewer: No. Especially the idea of coming back with African war brides.

Chapman: Yes. Well, that's it in a nutshell. It was Gen Greene and his own decision, made on the spot in Vietnam. Very courageous and correct decision.

Interviewer: Well, fine, then we'll get you on your trip back --

Chapman: As you can see, I hold Gen Greene in very high regard.

Interviewer: I think we all do. Thank you very much, sir. Have a --

Chapman: Okay. I'll call you when I get back.

End Session I
Interviewer: This is tape 1, side 1, interview session with Gen Chapman, this is the second session. The date is 28 March.

And where we left off last time, General, if you recall, was a massive question which you said would take all day to answer. And that was in 1965, 1966 there was considerable debate about a Marine, quote, strategy, based on an expanding enclave concept versus an Army search and destroy strategy. And we asked if you could address this matter with respect to the then prevailing Headquarters Marine Corps view.

Chapman: Well, there were two kinds of strategy, all right, for use in Vietnam and you've named -- you've given the name to each one of them. I think they came about, though, mostly because of the logic of the terrain and the population arrangements in the different parts of the country.

You know, down in III Corps, there was heavy population, Saigon and intensive agriculture. It was even more true in IV Corps. Whereas in the Marine area, in I Corps, the population was relatively sparse and was scattered in villages mostly, except for the big city of Da Nang. Further, there was the DMZ, there were the mountains to the west, the jungles.

It just made sense in the I Corps, as it was laid out, as the Marines found it, to use the expanding enclaves system. On the other hand, I always thought it made sense, you know, in III Corps, to use the search and destroy. So I think the controversy has been overblown.

Interviewer: Do you ask this question?

Interviewer: Yes, I'd like to.

Interviewer: Okay.
Interviewer: I'd like to go a little bit further and that's really in connection with our next question. Going to Gen Westmoreland's book, in this connection Gen Westmoreland said in his book, A Soldier Reports: "During these early months, I was concerned with the tactical methods that Gen Walt and the Marines employed. They had established beachheads at Chu Lai and Da Nang and were reluctant to go outside them. Not through any lack of courage, but through a different conception of how to fight an anti-insurgency war. They were assiduously combing the countryside within the beachheads trying to establish firm control in hamlets and villages and planning to expand the beachhead gradually up and down the coast."

What is your reaction to Westmoreland's implied criticism of this (inaudible) strategy?

Chapman: Well, my reaction is that it's not a valid criticism. That the Marines were doing the logical thing for the terrain and the population arrangements as they existed in I Corps. It's hard for me to see how searching for fleeting enemy in the jungles and the mountains in the west part of I Corps would have accomplished anything. I don't think it would have done anything. Whereas protecting the villages and the hamlets, bringing security there to them, accomplished a lot.

Interviewer: It seems to me there was this undercurrent, though, this conflict between -- well, I think during the time that (inaudible) had FMFPac and Gen Walt was out there, and that I have a feeling -- well, I think some of the back channel messages and some of the things that have been said since then, there was this conflict in concepts. And it was almost three ways, between Westmoreland and Walt and Krulak.

But then I think what we're trying to get here is what was the Headquarters Marine Corps reaction, was there a hands off or was headquarters telling Gen Krulak, yes, we agree with you and keep reinforcing this.

Chapman: I think it was the latter. Yes, there was strong agreement within Headquarters Marine Corps certainly on the part of Gen Greene in the tactics --

Interviewer: Well, then were these --
Chapman: -- that the Marines were employing.

Interviewer: Okay. Then were the tactics discussed in a tank, did it get to the JCS level?

Chapman: No, not to my knowledge. No, I don't think it ever arose as an issue in the tank.

Interviewer: It was local matter then as far as --

Chapman: It was a local matter.

Interviewer: Actually -- and you're sort of hitting that by getting into that next question we're talking about.

Interviewer: Okay.

Interviewer: And why don't we give the official questions and see --

Interviewer: All right.

Interviewer: You know, because you're touching on --

Interviewer: Okay. I didn't even know that I did --

Interviewer: Yes.

Interviewer: All right. Well, then the next question is in referring to the Marine emphasis on pacification, rather than on a defensive operations, and this is as of October, 1965 the Pentagon papers state, and I quote, indications are strong that the decision was made almost entirely inside Marine Corps channels through a chain of command that by passed Corn U.S. MacVie (phonetic) and the civilian leaders of our government and ran from Gen Greene through Gen Krulak to Gen Walt. The files do not reveal discussions of the implications, feasibility, cost and
desirability of the Marine strategy among high-ranking officials in the embassy, MacVie, headquarters, the Defense and State Departments.

Yet, in retrospect, it seems clear that the strategy the Marines proposed to follow, a strategy about which they made no secret, was in sharp variance with the strategy of other U.S. units in the country.

I think -- does someone have an -- I think you probably better have a copy of --

Chapman: Yes, I've got it.

Interviewer: Oh, have you --

Chapman: Oh, I got it.

Interviewer: All right. Then would you comment on this statement and particularly on the command relations implications of it? To what extent was this discussed, was this discussed at Headquarters Marine Corps and at what level did Gen Greene seek the counsel of the staff regarding the counter-insurgent strategy?

Chapman: Yes, the subject was certainly discussed on many occasions in Headquarters Marine Corps by Gen Greene with his principal staff officers. And, as I said, there was a strong agreement with the concept that had been adopted by Gen Walt and I think I'm correct in saying that Gen Walt was the originator of it. He was on the scene and made the decision as to how to employ his forces. That concept was strongly approved by Gen Krulak and, as I said, by Gen Greene.

To say that it was not discussed or approved by MacVie or higher ups, I think that's incorrect. Gen Westmoreland approved it at least tacitly, if not overtly because, my god, it went on the whole time he was there in command. And if he didn't approve of it, he certainly didn't disapprove of it and direct that the -- you know, that the strategy that was being employed in II and III Corps and later on in IV Corps, should be adopted by the Marines in I Corps. And he clearly had the authority to do so if he had so elected. And to say that it was not discussed and approved in civilian channels is also incorrect.
Just to give one example, the OSD approved the Marine concept of putting a -- what did we call that, we put a squad and a -- you know, a combined action forces approved that concept and approved the Marine personnel increases that were necessary to effect the combined action Platoons, we called them, didn't we. What did we call them?

Interviewer: Combined action companies, what they became.

Chapman: There was a platoon in each village.

Interviewer: The company was more of an administrative unit --

Chapman: It was -- in each village or hamlet, there was a Marine squad --

Interviewer: Marine squad --

Chapman: -- reinforced with a corpsman and maybe a machine gun or two and the like. That concept was approved and implemented with OSD blessing. And, further, there were many people as the thing wore on that came to the conclusion that the Marine concept of providing security to the hamlets and villages was the right one and should be adopted, should have been adopted for the whole country. Many came to believe that, and I was among them.

Interviewer: Do you have a feeling -- just to continue on with this, whether there was any (inaudible) between say MacVie and I MAF or III MAF. Do you think that Gen. Westmoreland may have handled the Marine situation as a whole with velvet gloves for fear of any conflict or --

Chapman: No.

Interviewer: -- getting too political? Or was --

Chapman: No, I don't think so, no.
Interviewer: Let me interrupt then, Gen. Westmoreland, in his book, does state that he didn't want to make an open confrontation with the Marines and so what he tried to do was by implication to get what he calls get the Marines out of their enclaves by specific orders to go into certain areas.

Now Gen. Krulak, in his comments on the draft, in 1965 he more or less -- in a letter to Secretary McNamara, sort of gave the implication or justified the Marine concept because of terrain, difference of terrain in I Corps and the rest of the country and why the Marines were employing perhaps a different policy than Army units were in that if the Marines were in II Corps, that perhaps they would be employing another (inaudible).

But in his comments after that, on the draft chapters that we've (inaudible), he's come to the point where the Marines use what they call the balanced strategy, which emphasized security, also search and destroy and pacification. But he stated basically that this was really a compromise with Westmoreland and that it was no real strategy at all and it was due to this that perhaps we -- that the war took the course that it did. Would you have any comments on Gen. Krulak's --

Chapman: Comments on Gen. Westmoreland?

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Well, no, not really. I certainly, at the time, never understood it to be that much of a controversy. There were honest -- you know, men may honestly differ as to the proper tactics and strategy to follow. But it never reached the point of being any kind of open conflict or open confrontation. Nor should it, should it have. It seems to me obvious that the Marine strategy worked. It did bring security to the hamlets and villages.

Came the Tet offensive and large-scale warfare broke out in I Corps as well as the other corps, and even prior to that, however, the Marines had, as a matter of military necessity, had moved out of the enclaves and taken vigorous action up around the DMZ and over in the jungles and mountains.
And then after Tet, of course, there was heavy fighting along the DMZ and over in the
counties. And, you know, we moved as much as reinforced regiments, we were right next to
the Laos border. And, in fact, there were some accusations that we moved over the Laos border.

Interviewer: You may very well have.

Chapman: It might well have, although nobody knows exactly where in the hell the border is
(inaudible) jungles, but it's very possible.

No, I think it's a controversy that has developed after the war was over. I don't think it
existed at the time.

Interviewer: To change the thrust of these questions, with respect to the generator shortage in
Vietnam, do you recall the cost of what effect it had on Marine air and ground operations and
how it was solved?

Chapman: Oh, I don't remember a great deal about it. The cause of it was the simple fact that
the Marine expeditionary forces were equipped with generators on the basis of an amphibious
combat deployment for a limited period of time.

In Vietnam, we were there for years on end. The generators had to run around the clock
for extended periods of time. There were generators requirements that didn't exist in a combat
amphibious employment. So that there was both a shortage of generators to meet the needs and
the continuous employment for months and years on end that they were required to do that they
just weren't equipped to do. I mean the field generators just don't -- aren't built to last that long.
And the obvious consequence was that we had a shortage of generators.

Now how was it solved? Well, it was solved by getting a lot more generators and
heavier, more enduring kinds of generators and together with a whole flock of spare parts and
moving them to Vietnam and putting them in operation. So it was eventually solved that way.

Interviewer: You know --

Chapman: That's my general recollection of the subject and I think that's about the essence of it.
Interviewer: A tremendous requirement for generates for a sophisticated year, especially inaudible) in the avionics area. But I can see, also, what --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- the requirement for the (inaudible) and other areas.

Chapman: Oh, yes, and the MTDS --

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: See that MTDS that we put up on top of the mountain there, you know, right near Da Nang. What was the name of that mountain?

Interviewer: Monkey Mountain.

Chapman: Monkey Mountain, yes. Well, the MTDS, you know, was designed to move into combat and operate for 60 and 90 days. Well, my God, it operated for three or four years. And incidentally, the MTDS which was predicted by OSD R&D to not endure for more than two weeks went something like 10,000 hours without a loss of a major function.

Interviewer: That was Marine Corps-developed?

Chapman: It was, over the powerful objections and criticisms of the OSD R&D. It went something over 10,000 hours without a major function loss.

Interviewer: Very intense.

Chapman: Well, it was the duration, you know, the generator just had to run 24 hours a day literally for years. And those field generators just weren't designed to do that. Then, as I said,
there were the additional generator requirements, you know. Big, sprawling CPs that are (inaudible) in combat to use Coleman lanterns, you know. Everybody had to have electric lights and the ice machines and electric shavers and air conditioners. And, you know.

Interviewer: Well, just to follow that up, there's been a -- I know Gen. Tompkins, for one, made a criticism about the tremendous tail from the combat to the Marine Infantry Division, the infantry regiments. And several other people have been very critical of the way the --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- as far as the Marines were concerned. The Army expected, but the Marines it wasn't understood too well how this could happen.

Chapman: It's just like topsy, you know, it's just an inevitable sort of thing when you move into what amounted to almost a state of siege warfare. You know, for months and years on end, it's predictable, and that's exactly what happened.

Interviewer: I missed a question here, this is number 16. After the Navy was tasked with logistic support of the Marines in I Corps, it appeared that Adm McDonald was unhappy with his assignment. Do you -- relayed his reluctance with the delay in establishing the Navy support activity at Da Nang with this?

Chapman: Well, yes. Adm McDonald, the Navy, was very reluctant to, you know, take on any part of that burden. But it was his duty, you know. The Navy was charged with that mission and eventually he did approve it and the Navy Logistics Command was established and functioned most capably from then on.

He was against it, of course, because it was a drain on the Navy resources of all kinds -- personnel, material, money, a considerable drain. And that's why he was against it. I can't say I blame him very much, but it was eventually solved and he did approve it, it was established. And the Navy did a fine job.
Interviewer: And I think that Gen. Greene told me, of course, in one of our interviews, that he really had to push McDonald to get going on this. It was a real source of conflict earlier on.

Chapman: Yes, it was. He had to be pushed. He was pushed. And he did finally approve it.

Interviewer: Can you discuss the red ball and critic pack supply programs and their effectiveness and had -- when you were a G-4, did you work on this concept for these programs?

Chapman: No. No, we didn't have those concepts. Those two concepts were children of Gen. Krulak's ingenuity and capability. He originated them, he established them and they were excellent, first class.

Interviewer: Olson must have conceived this.

Chapman: Could have been, I don't know.

Interviewer: I think he was the 4 up there at the time.

Chapman: Yes, he could have been. But there were two excellent concepts that worked extremely well in practice. And they were supported by Headquarters Marine Corps, you know.

Interviewer: Of course the -- both the Barstow and the Albany supply centers, I guess --

Chapman: Were involved, yes. Yes, the critic pack and the items in a critic pack shipment, did come from Barstow, I think, in most cases. Some of them came from the FSR on Okinawa, mostly from Barstow. Of course, the red ball, I think, came from the service regiment on Okinawa, didn't it. I don't remember that.

Interviewer: Well, I think the red ball were items that were in short supply, while the critic pack was a shipment of what they thought battalions --
Chapman: Oh, I've got it backwards now. Yes. The red ball then came, I think, from Barstow and the critic pack came from Okinawa. But it doesn't matter, it could have come either way.

Interviewer: A critic pack was very much like what we had in World War II that was worked on, especially for the Okinawa operation. Prepackaged supplies delivered at certain --

Chapman: Prearranged intervals, yes.

Interviewer: And worked out very well there.

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: So I hope they don't think they were rediscovering the wheel over in Vietnam. In 1966, there were considerable informed military opinion, the Secretary of Defense, who was Ed McNamara, insisted upon construction of a barrier south of the DMZ.

In November of that year, Col Chaisson, III MAF, G-3, appeared to sum up the feeling of most of his fellow officers when he declared all of the barrier plans are fantastic, absolutely impractical. And III MAF, as opposed to all, because of engineer requirements and the installations must (inaudible) troops to protect the barrier.

What were your perceptions of the so-called McNamara Wall? What was the position of Headquarters Marine Corps on this issue?

Chapman: Precisely as stated by Gen. Chaisson. That it would require heavy resources to install, to build and install, and to man and defend and would be ineffective. And those are two of the best arguments I can think of, and in practice, that's exactly what happened.

It did take a lot of resources. It required the Marines to do sophisticated field engineering that we just didn't know how to do, almost World War I type of entrenchments and underground shelters and the like. It took the best part of a Marine division to man it and defend it and it didn't do a bit of good.

But they just, you know, if they couldn't (inaudible) through it, they just went around the end of it and came in through the mountains. The barrier there was supposed to be the electronic
sensing barrier. And the Air Force set up a most elaborate thing, as I'm sure you're all aware; that had some effectiveness, but it was by no means an iron curtain, you know, a total stoppage, far from it. So we really lost a lot of Marines and burned up a lot of equipment doing something that we didn't want to do and was ineffective.

Interviewer: Again, was this ever a top discussion in the tank?

Chapman: Oh, yes. Yes, it was.

Interviewer: And the rest of the joint chiefs felt the same way about it, against McNamara's obdurate attitude?

Chapman: I declare, I don't remember. I don't recall the chiefs ever took a position on it. It was discussed, but I don't think it ever came up as an agenda item and -- at least not to my memory. On which the chiefs took a position and made a recommendation. I don't think they ever did.

Interviewer: Actually, after the initial discussion, Gen. Westmoreland, even though it was mandatory for him to accept it, did -- and even in his book sort of supports the manned barrier that was built. He was opposed to the electronic concept, but once it became a sort of manned barrier, he more or less supported it and placed a lot of pressure on Gen. Cushman up to 1968 to complete the barrier.

Chapman: Well, it was eventually completed within the capabilities of the Marines to do that kind of thing. To do it properly, it would have required heavy engineering effort over a long period of time and using sophisticated procedures, you know, with their concrete blockhouses and -- like a Maginot Line.

Interviewer: Yes.
Chapman: You know, the hasty field engineering sort of thing, which is what all the Marines could do, was just not adequate up there in the mud and the rain and the monsoons and the enemy shelling and the enemy sniping and infiltrating; a very tough situation.

Interviewer: Of course Gen. Simpson later made use of a lot of that fortification material (inaudible) 1st Division -- in that area.

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: (Inaudible.) Apparently Generals Walt, Cushman and Westmoreland on one side, and Gen. Krulak on the other, perceived the SLF and its role in the Vietnam War from considerably different viewpoints. How did Headquarters view the SLF? What, if any, doctrinal problems did the SLF present? What doctrinal problems might have arisen if there had been no SLF? And, finally, why was the SLF used exclusively in I Corps after 1967?

Why don't we take the first one, how did Headquarters view the SLF?

Chapman: Well, there, again, it was a decision on the part of CinCPac, CinCPacFlt and FMFPac. Let's see, and I guess the Seventh Fleet was in on it, too. The SLF belonged to the Seventh Fleet. To employ the SLF in accordance with the standard doctrine for the employment of an afloat, mobile, deployable, small, but complete, landing force. It had a mission of being in a state of readiness for employment anywhere in the South China Sea and elsewhere under the domain of the Seventh Fleet. It went frequently to the Philippines for training exercises and it maneuvered around Korea on a couple of occasions. And then it made numerous landings in the I Corps area. I don't think it ever landed anywhere other than I Corps, did it?

Interviewer: Yes, it did.

Chapman: I've forgotten.

Interviewer: It landed in Jackstay, or in Jackstay it landed in --
Chapman: Oh, yes, in II Corps.

Interviewer: No, that was in III Corps.

Chapman: III Corps, what, one time?

Interviewer: There was one in III Corps (inaudible).

Interviewer: Yes, there were a couple that they had and then they --

Chapman: I forgot.

Interviewer: Well, a conflict came up about air space, for one. And Mo Meyer (phonetic) had the 7th Air Force and this was one of the reasons why we're asking why was it used in the I Corps area. It seemed to be that --

Chapman: Well, the decision was to retain it as an afloat, mobile, deployable, small, but effective landing force under the (inaudible) for the Seventh Fleet. The controversy arose, really, when it did make landings in Vietnam and carved out for itself a command area, you know, complete with table (phonetic) gunfire support and air support and all that, which was all controlled from afloat. And did not come under MacVie or Mo Meyer and company with respect to the air. That's why, because it was a roles and missions conflict.

Interviewer: Well, it seems to me, and I've spoken to Gen. Krulak about it, and I think that he was the one who really stringently was the proponent for the SLF. And it seems to me that it's because of his memory of the unification fight after World War II that he insisted the amphibious presence of the Marine Corps had to -- it was paramount in the Vietnam War because, again, after the war, the question of missions and a review of what each of the services did. And that if the amphibious capability as exhibited by the SLF was not there, then there was going to be a really rough time for the Marine Corps in getting its slice of defense by getting its missions squared away after the war.
Chapman: Well, for whatever reason, the Marine Corps missions were, roles and missions were, and still are, intact, you know. How much influence that was, I don't know, I doubt if it was very much really because the SLF is a pretty small outfit in the scale of things. But that is another way of putting it. The controversy arose over the fact that the SLF did land in accordance with amphibious doctrines and procedures and command and structure. And Thomas MacVie and Mo Meyer didn't like it.

Interviewer: Gen. Simmons made the comment in one of his Naval Review articles that a lot of people were considerably unhappy with the so-called ritual dance that the SLF went through (inaudible) amphibious preplanning and going through the whole system of doctrine that -- what is it, USF 60 -- let's see --

Chapman: Well, it's probably changed now. It used to be the USF 67.

Interviewer: 66, 63.

Chapman: Yes, right. I don't know what it is --

Interviewer: But I forget what it is, but in any case, that -- we got landings that were carried out in accordance with this procedure.

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: And --

Interviewer: Gen. Chaisson suffered (inaudible). Of course, that was after he was working for Gen. Westmoreland (inaudible) remark that it was almost constant looking for a home in the way it was employed during the Vietnam War.
Chapman: Yes. Well, I think that's all about there was to it. And the SLF was effective. It made landings from time to time with a good substantial reason and objective and accomplished it.

Interviewer: I think there was some jealousy also on the part of the ground commanders in Vietnam that the SLF would be pulled out and go in toto, both the squadron and the battalion, to Okinawa or to (inaudible) to refurbish, for R and R, what have you. And that this group, that this size force, was not immediately available or under the control of the (inaudible) commander or MacVie. Isn't that what --

Chapman: Well, it was pulled out to resume its force and readiness mobile and mobile afloat status.

Interviewer: And I think the Navy commanders, especially Adm. Johnson and Adm. Blackburn and others, make a point that it was not only for Vietnam.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: It was for any other --

Chapman: Oh, yes, it was a mobile amphibious reserve for the whole Far East out there.

Interviewer: The next question, General, is that there was a general feeling, primarily on the part of Marine ground commanders and Gen. Davis in particular, that III MAF was light in helicopters when compared to U.S. Army units and, therefore, less mobile. What was the Headquarters view of this matter and what steps, if any, were taken to change the situation?

Chapman: I can't say I remember the details of all that. The Marine helicopters were arranged on the basis of the amphibious operation. I mean the responsibility of the helicopters in the amphibious operation is to -- I can't say I remember that, either. It's to land the assault elements of two RLTs, isn't that correct? Where are our aviators?
Interviewer: I think that's --

Interviewer: RLT by air, land or by surface (inaudible) the way it is now.

Chapman: Is that per division, the wing teams? Or it's the two assault regiments, isn't it. Isn't it two-thirds of each of two assault regiments? Mm-hmm. I think it was then. I declare, I can't remember.

Interviewer: And then one-third of the division (inaudible).

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: (Inaudible.)

Chapman: Right.

Interviewer: It used to be exactly the opposite.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Yes, I think that's correct. And to resupply for a fixed period of time. It seems to me it was 72 hours or such a matter. And that adds up to a lot of helicopters.

   Mostly, however, medium and heavy ones. I think the difficulty arose over the light helicopters. The lift capability of the Marine helicopter fleet was exceeded the lift -- the total lift capability of the helicopters that were apportioned to one of the Army divisions. But there were many fewer of them because they were mostly medium and heavy. And for the Army, there was a great many light helicopters, the Hueys. I think that was the essence of the problem. It was light versus heavy or medium.

   Well, what the Marine Corps did was get a considerable number of Hueys and deploy them. You know, we went from zero at the beginning of the Vietnam War to the whatever it was. It was two or three reinforced light squadrons by the time we pulled out. And that added
up to a considerable number of Hueys, I don't remember what the number was. How many was it?

Interviewer: I think about 24 squadrons, I believe, sir.

Chapman: Then. Those were reinforced squadrons where they had gunships.

Interviewer: Gunships --

Chapman: And slicks and I think there was -- were there such squadrons, I've forgotten.

Interviewer: I think so.

Chapman: Well, that would be on the order of --

Interviewer: Six and -- six and three were (inaudible)'66 (inaudible).

Chapman: Well, that would be on the order then of a hundred assorted light helicopters by the time we began to pull out. Whereas when we landed we had none. That's about all I can say on that subject, it wasn't the lift capability.

Interviewer: Numbers more so?

Chapman: It was the number of lights.

Interviewer: I guess some of the battalion commanders got a little jealous of the Army, like Herbert Hoover's old promise of a chicken in every pot and two cars in every garage. They wanted a light helicopter for every battalion. And we've also heard, talking with some people, some criticism of the fact that the Army had stolen the Marines' thunder by adapting this aircab mobile division which was something they felt that the Marine Corps ought to have had. And I
don't know how valid an argument that was given the reality of the logistics and the cost, you know.

Chapman: Yes, I don't think that's a good argument. The Marines were and had been and still are structured to conduct the amphibious operation.

Interviewer: Also on this helicopter thing, wasn't there a question that (inaudible) at least some of the Marine ground commanders were very attracted to the Army idea where a unit actually had its own organic helicopters and could use whatever it wanted to. Whereas the control of the Marine helicopters was more centralized.

Chapman: Well, I think that was true in the mobile division. The air mobile, the Army air mobile division. But the rest of the Army divisions out there had the same complaint the Marines did. They didn't have organic readily available helicopters to battalions and -- let's see, what did the Army call their -- task groups or -- instead of a regiment, they called, you know -- we continued with the regimental nomenclature. The Army --

Interviewer: (Inaudible.)

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: But we have a task force (inaudible).

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: For Gen. Davis --

Chapman: Of course, the air mobile division went into operation on a number of occasions just south of the Marines there in II Corps. The Marines could look over there and see all those Hueys flying around. Every battalion commander had two or three of them and every company commander had one. And I expected --
Interviewer: Gen. (inaudible), you know, it was quite critical on this point and said many times he needed a helicopter and he couldn't get one. And he'd call over for the Army and he was always supplied.

Chapman: Sure. Well, the Army battalion company, regimental commanders, had them and they were organic and they were immediately available to them. The Marine helicopters had to be programmed. In other words, if an infantry battalion was charged with a mission that required, then the helicopters had to be laid on by the -- you know, by the wing commander and they would be supplied and in sufficient lift capability.

Interviewer: The priority was not established by the wing.

Chapman: No, I'm sure it wasn't. It was established by the division.

Interviewer: Of who got them.

Interviewer: I think one of the problems Gen. Davis had at the beginning of '68 or mid-'68, wasn't until he got what they call Prob MAG up into northern I Corps -- there were detachments up there, but they (inaudible) Prob MAG 39 up there. You didn't really have a helicopter group that was readily responsive to him right up in the northern sector where he was fighting the war.

Interviewer: I'm going to change the direction again, General. Do you recall the background of the Marine Corps search for a long range weapon which led to the acceptance of the 175mm gun; and do you recall any other major procurement issues that confronted Headquarters during this period?

Chapman: Well, no, I don't remember much about it. The need for something like a 175 arose primarily because of the lack of a long range Navy gunfire support. You know, if we'd had two or three battleships there all the time, that need would probably never have arisen. But there never was a battleship until right at the end when the New Jersey -- wasn't it? --
Interviewer: Yes, sir.

Chapman: The New Jersey was over the vehement protests of OSD. We finally got the New Jersey out of mothballs and deployed her out there and she was only there a very short time. And came back and went back into mothballs. The Marine 155, 155s, were outranged by the North Vietnamese -- whatever they were. Russian guns.

Interviewer: 130s.

Chapman: 130s, Russian, Russian artillery, Russian ordnance. Meanwhile, the Army had developed and deployed the 175. So it was out of that train of circumstances that the need for the 175 arose and we went in for it and got it, deployed it in Vietnam, and there they were.

Interviewer: How about other major items that were needed in the field that had to be procured specially by Headquarters, can you recall any in particular?

Chapman: Well, I'm trying to think. I guess the obvious example was an M-15. You know, the Marine Corps went for some time trying to make up its mind whether to give up the M-14 and replace it with the M-15 in Vietnam. And after numerous tests and much debate, the decision was made. The Marine Corps went in for the M-15 and got it without any trouble and deployed it to Vietnam and equipped the infantry with it. That's certainly an obvious example.

Let's see, that's in the smaller arms field. I don't think of anything in heavy ordnance, like tanks and (inaudible). There was a good deal of signal -- communication equipment that completed development during the period. After all, we were there for the best part of five years. And there were many R&D projects that were on going and many of them culminated and resulted in going in for funds and going into production and all of that. Quite a bit of electronic equipment.

One that comes to mind was the new generation of computers, you know. We landed our IBM, whatever it was, 301 or 1301. Well, we landed in the seventh wave in Da Nang, when we landed, when the Marines landed in Da Nang early in '65. In the seventh wave, here came our
computer on a two-and-a-half ton truck. And it was dug in and (inaudible) and big old strong overhead put over it and it went into operation immediately.

Interviewer: There's a story that the cards expanded due to the heat --

Chapman: It was a card operating machine, the humidity got to the cards and put it out of operation for a little while. But that was solved. But then in the middle of the war we came in with the next generation of computer, and I can't remember what the number was. We deployed it to Vietnam. It was a deployable, mobile computer, too.

Let's see, during the -- another piece of electronic gear that was deployed that we procured and deployed there part way through the war, I've already mentioned, it was the MTDS. Together with its associated radars and communication and digital links to the airplanes and all that. You know, very sophisticated. Very sophisticated system.

Interviewer: (Inaudible) equipment associated with the SATS, like the catapult, they were still working on the engines and all --

Chapman: Yes. Those culminated and came into use, service use, during that period and we deployed them there and put it in operation at July.

Interviewer: So there was a tremendous improvement in the ground communications to, you know, the PRT 10 and the PRT 25.

Chapman: Yes, the new generation of tactical radios culminated and went into production and were deployed.

Interviewer: I just don't see how we could have fought Vietnam without (inaudible) I think (inaudible).

Chapman: I think the --

Interviewer: (Inaudible.)
Chapman: Yes, humidity and temperature and power. The old PRT 10s were -- and tuning. You know, these new ones are all digital tuning, you pushed a button.

Interviewer: No long test counts.

Chapman: That's right. You know, this is (inaudible) test count (inaudible). None of that anymore, you just pushed the button and you had --

End Tape 1, Side A

Begin Tape 1, Side B

Interviewer: Okay.

Chapman: The point should be made, though, that most of those things were the outcome of R&D projects that were launched before the war and just happened to culminate, you know, successfully at various periods during the war. And were therefore approved and we went into production and deployed them.

Interviewer: The next war, which way is the computer going in with?

Chapman: I don't know. They keep miniaturizing them, why, every squad leader will probably have one in his pack, you know.

Interviewer: Didn't the Marine Corps, during the war, develop that speed program for developing special items and equipment quickly that were needed by the field, for example the integrated observation device that they had out there for the artillery?

Chapman: Yes, that was that laser beam affair.

Interviewer: Yes, range fighter plus binocular (inaudible) night vision device. It seemed very --
Chapman: There were two -- well, there were two or three of them that were produced and sent over there for combat field tests. They worked and they worked well as long as you could see the target, you know, because the laser beam is a line of sight.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: If the target was (inaudible), that wasn't any more use than good old eyeballs.

Interviewer: Was the new utility (inaudible) development before the war or was that one of those hurry-up jobs?

Chapman: I don't remember what the timing of the development. It seems to me it was started before the war and initially, just only certain units were equipped, you know, the troops in certain units were equipped with that new -- you're talking about the camouflage uniform, aren't you? Yes.

Interviewer: And the one that preceded it, which is the same style --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- just put the camouflage on the same --

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Yes, that's correct. And now, I think, today, that all the Marines have it, don't they. It's the standard field uniform now.

Interviewer: Probably go back to the old (inaudible).

Chapman: I wish I still had some of those, I'd give them to the museum.

Interviewer: Durability and wear and everything else, the buttons, I don't think anything ever (inaudible). With respect to the matter of a viable and responsive III MAF staff, several interviewees have indicated that beginning in late 1967 and continuing on to 1968, Westmoreland was not entirely satisfied with Marine leadership or III MAF staff functioning.
Which may have been the reason for establishing of MAGV IV following Tet. Can you comment on this, General?

Chapman: If he was critical I don't recall it or didn't know about it. I thought our command and staff work was good. At times it was exceptional, and certainly when Gen Abrams took over, he was in the highest degree complimentary about the command, the leadership, and the staff work of the Marines in I Corps.

He, for instance, just to give one example, he said that the best division commander, Army or Marine, in the history of the Vietnam War was Gen Davis. By far.

Interviewer: I think they were classmates at -- they had known each other -- of course, Gen Davis went out there and worked for Abrams for a while, didn't he?

Chapman: If so, I don't remember it. No.

Interviewer: I think the question might be referring to the fact that right before the Tet offensive Gen Westmoreland didn't believe that the Marines were that good on defensive maneuvers or something. That's when he was going to rearrange and put in a prov corp and initially he was going to send Gen Abrams to command it and take over like the III MAF and everything. And Gen Chaisson, I believe, got involved and told him if that would happen, he would never again have the support of the Marines in the field and kind of talked him out of it and they made it a MAGV forward instead of another command --

Interviewer: It was right after --

Interviewer: -- a command under the Army. And then eventually they made it -- then the press got hold of this somehow or other and I believe Gen Krulak, in a message to Gen Westmoreland, said, you know, I think you better state exactly what your reasons are and, you know, it would help out the situation. At which time Westmoreland said that he was making a new corps, the III MAF will be the boss, and it would be under the Marines.
Chapman:  I thought the arrangement that was eventually approved and put into effect was a good one. I supported it. There was a need for a coordinating headquarters in the northern part of I Corps there. There was heavy combat going on up there and there were many forces. There was Cai Son, there was the barrier along the DMZ. There was a need for a coordinating headquarters up there.

Interviewer:  Along with that, many Marines who fought in the north, or fought with the 3d Division, those that later fought with the 1st Division, make (inaudible) difference of a war. For the two divisions --

Chapman:  Yes.

Interviewer:  -- especially once the north -- 3d Division deployed to the DMZ region.

Chapman:  Mm-hmm. Yes, I thought it was necessary and was right. I supported it.

Interviewer:  Well, it was Gen Tompkins, when he talked to me, was critical of some of III MAF functions, especially the logistics area.

Chapman:  Mm-hmm.

Interviewer:  And lack of understanding. You know, they'd requisition certain things and they either wouldn't come through or something else would come through. And I don't know if it was a distance from where he -- his CP was to III MAF Headquarters or maybe just a clash of personalities, but he indicated there was some difficulty from his viewpoint.

Chapman:  Of course that's execution rather than plans, you know. I mean, you know, the staff makes the plans, but then it's up to the logistic commanders to execute them. If he was requisitioning a tank and got a two-and-a-half ton truck instead, why, that's not the fault of staff work. That's --
Chapman: When you became Commandant, were there any specific plans for reinforcing Marine forces in Vietnam in the event of a new and major NVA effort, and to what extent were these plans implemented?

Chapman: There were JCS plans for such contingencies. They involved emergency deployment of state side units, mobilizing the Reserves; that kind of thing. There were no unilateral Marine Corps plans except as they stemmed from the JCS emergency plans.

Interviewer: But the JCS plans did affect the Marine -- would have affected --

Chapman: Oh, yes, they did include the Marine units because the Marine units were the only ones that were deployable really at that point. Although to deploy even the Marine units would have required drastic, dramatic changes in personnel policies, you know. We had the equipment and supplies, but the state side units were manned mostly with Vietnam veterans because all the new Marines went immediately to Vietnam, you know.

You know, at the peak of the war, there was -- there were just three kinds of Marines. There were those in Vietnam, those that had just come back from Vietnam, and those that were getting ready to go to Vietnam. And that's the only kind of Marines there were. So it would have required -- but those policies could have been altered. They were administrative policies, they were not statute. The only applicable statute was that you couldn't send a man less than 18 years old, and with less than three months of training.

Interviewer: Do you recall how many Marine units (inaudible) would have been called for --

Chapman: Well, the 4th Div Wing Team, of course. You know the Reserve assets. The 2d Div Wing Team and the 5th Division, minus the first one and then two RLTs in Vietnam. You know, RLT 26 went first and then 27 went near the end. 25, was it, or 28. I don't remember which --

Interviewer: 28th Marines.

Chapman: Was it 28th?
Interviewer: Yes, sir.

Chapman: Never went.

Interviewer: I don't know if it was even established, but I guess all three regiments had been.

Chapman: Yes, the full division was eventually activated.

Interviewer: It was the 27th Marines, wasn't it, that went there right after Tet and stayed?

Chapman: Yes, I don't remember which one was first.

Interviewer: And stayed about --

Interviewer: They didn't stay long.

Interviewer: They stayed about six months, I believe, and came back just --

Chapman: Yes, came back. 26 went over and stayed.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: Well, it was the 26th at Cai Son. I know we established a record with the 1st Battalion of the 5th Division to deploy to Vietnam. From the day it was activated, until it was engaged in full scale combat in Vietnam, was I think 90 days. It was 90 days or a few days one way or the other from 90. We activated it, staffed it, equipped it, trained it into complete combat effectiveness. Deployed it Vietnam and it was engaged with the enemy within a period of 90 days.

Interviewer: Certainly more quickly than the Army could proceed.
Chapman: Oh, the Army couldn't do that in six months, if then. And even then, when they moved into Vietnam, the Army put their units through a training period in Vietnam. You know, before they permitted them to engage in combat.

Interviewer: One of the questions in looking at this, this problem with the three kinds of Marines, the ones who were getting ready to go and the ones that were out and the ones that came back, this, in the later period of the war, is often blamed, is it not, for a lot of the disciplinary problems that they started running into out there, the turbulence.

Do you think that was a correct accounting of a lot of the disciplinary problems, this business of having constantly shoving an awful lot of new men out there and --

Chapman: Yes, there was total turnover every 12 months, of course. Well, yes, that was a factor. It was also a factor back here, you know, because the state side units, combat and logistic and administrative, were all Vietnam veterans. Practically all, except the recruits and the recruit people and the Marine Band.

Interviewer: This (inaudible) quite a problem both for the ground people, but especially the aviators, I would think, because the aviators -- and correct me if I'm wrong, Gary, were once they came back from Vietnam they were generally assigned to the 2d Marine Division, which immediately was --

Chapman: 2d Wing.

Interviewer: 2d Wing, yes, I'm sorry. 2d Wing. Immediately became involved with the Med cruise.

Chapman: Yes. Well, of course, that happened to the ground Marines also on the Med cruise. It was more stringent with the aviators, however. We eventually alleviated that problem somewhat by extending and overseas control date by the amount of a med deployment. We did that for both ground and air Marines.
Interviewer: A number of individuals, General, including Gen Chaisson, have stated that 1968, following Tet, the JCS and Gen Wheeler maneuvered --

Interviewer: I think we --

Interviewer: Did we do that one?

Interviewer: Yes, we skipped ahead to --

Interviewer: Oh, I didn't think that we asked -- okay. All right. Well, with respect to single management, 1968 and '70, Gen Westmoreland commented in his book, and I'm quoting: "Also disturbing was a failure of the Marines to provide tactical air support for the 1st Calvary Division. Having already become concerned about efficient management of tactical air resources in the northern provinces, and having directed Gen Mo Meyer to study the matter, I was convinced by this failure that I had to move immediately.

"Someone had to be in charge to allocate available tactical air resources other than the helicopters. There had to be a single headquarters in charge of all tactical air in the north to provide the required flexibility. It made nothing but tactical and management sense that the single manager should be my Deputy for Air, Gen Mo Meyer. Yet when I directed Gen Mo Meyer to set up such a system, the chorus of objections and decision precipitated was (inaudible).

"Perhaps Gen Cushman would have accepted the decision graciously had it not been for the close supervision that Marine Corps headquarters in Washington exercised over anything involving the III Marine Amphibious Force." And this says, "in other matters Gen Cushman's reaction came couched in the Marine Commandant's doctrinal terms." Unquote.

What do you recall the Headquarters Marine Corps reaction and response to the establishment of a single management program? What are your impressions of the entire controversy over control of Marine Corps air in Vietnam, and how valid is Westmoreland's statement about the close supervision Headquarters Marine Corps exercised over III MAF? Take it in order?
Chapman: Well, it's a big subject. It was highly controversial at the time and was eventually resolved and ended up amicably, I think. And practically. Prior to single management, for each day, the Marines allocated whatever air support the Marine units, ground units -- and for other purposes, thought were necessary. And the surplus was allocated to Mo Meyer and company. And it was up to him to decide how they were to be employed. And if the 2d Army -- was it the 2d Army Division that you mentioned in the question?

Interviewer: 1st Air Cav, I believe.

Interviewer: 1st Air Cav.

Chapman: Oh, was it the first Air Cav. Wasn't getting what it thought it needed it was Mo Meyer didn't allocate it to it.

Interviewer: Yes.

Interviewer: We had a controversy over that and I said that the Marine Corps was never tasked in the beginning to provide air support for the Army.

Chapman: True.

Interviewer: We were to give them --

Chapman: But did do so with whatever resources were surplus for a given day's operation, or a given week's operation, you know. And there were many Marine airplanes that flew in support of the Army out of that surplus, you know, that wasn't needed by the Marine ground units on a - for a particular operation, a particular day.

The single management became a controversial, but not on roles and missions grounds. That's an incorrect statement on his part. The Marine Corps did not battle roles and missions. Did not use roles and missions as an argument in battling single management. But battled it, rather, on two other issues. First, that it was unnecessary. That there was already a good system in effect that supported the Marines and supported the Army in the way I've already described it.
And, secondly, that it destroyed the immediate responsiveness of Marine close air support to the Marine infantry. And that's a fact. Under the Marine techniques, the Marine infantry commander can state tonight what he wants for tomorrow morning and get it in the way of close air support. Under single management, he had to state 72 hours ahead of time what he wanted, 72 hours hence. Well, at that point he didn't know.

Well, now, of course, that's the Army/Air Force system, you know. The air is programmed three or four days in advance under their system. They don't have any concept of immediately responsive exigency-type air support for the infantry.

And it was on those two grounds that the Marine Corps battled single management, and it is quite true that III MAF position was supported in Washington. I mean, we took it into the tank and it resulted in a split JCS paper. Interestingly, the Army joined us. The Navy joined us. Of course, the Air Force and the Chairman supported Thomas MacVie. Well, you would expect the Air Force to. You really didn't expect the Army to support the Marine position, though, but they did.

Interviewer: Chairman Wheeler, right, sir?

Chapman: Right. It went from there to the Secretary of Defense, who turned it over to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for resolution, namely Paul Nitza (phonetic). Nitza conferred with Wheeler on it and told Wheeler that he thought the Marines were right. Wheeler said, in effect, we can't direct MacVie to cancel his single management order. Why don't you give me a chance to see if I can't work out a compromise? Well, Nitza said okay. And that is what happened.

Gen Wheeler made a special trip to Vietnam to talk it out with MacVie and with the end result that single management was rearranged in a fashion that permitted the Marines to get their immediate responsive close air support as they needed it and the surplus to go to the Army. Just the way it had been before, but with a different name.

Interviewer: What cause -- was it Admiral --

Chapman: Actually, I took it to the President, as a matter of fact.
Interviewer: Oh, really?

Chapman: Yes, Adm Moore and I both went to the President on it. He directed SECDEF to do something. It was right at that point that the Marines were getting shelled on the DMZ, you know, and there were many Marine casualties. And he said something has got to -- this is harming the Marines, something has got to be done about it. He in effect told SECDEF to do something about it. Well, that is what was done.

But I think it's important that -- to note that it was not battled on roles and missions grounds. Now, of course, there were many who wished to do so. But I overruled them. I didn't think that was the sensible course to take.

Interviewer: Why not?

Chapman: Because it's a doctrinal, vague, unpersuasive argument, you know. The arguments that were persuasive and did win were practical arguments. Immediate response, nonnecessity.

Interviewer: Well, eventually it came back down to the modifications that the Marine Corps gave the Air Force and kept whittling down their response time to eventually it worked out to where it was the Marine system to begin with in the first place.

Chapman: That's true, and -- that's true. And one of the very interesting things is that we received great acclamations from the Army division commanders. And the battalion, because as the thing eventually evolved, the Army began to get immediate responsive close air support like the Marines had always had. And they were very thankful. Very complimentary to the Marines.

Interviewer: When was the first time the Army was ever able to more or less control any of the Air Force air?

Chapman: It was the first time that the Marine commander was able to say on short notice what he needed and what he wanted and get it. Well, the Army division commanders were our strongest supporters as it turned out.
Interviewer: I have a question, how is it that Westmoreland, as MacVie, didn't know that the Air Force was to support the Army units in I Corps? The implication is, in Westmoreland's statement, that he didn't realize that it was the Air Force that was responsible for providing this support for the --

Chapman: For the Army units in I Corps.

Interviewer: For the Army units in I Corps.

Chapman: I can't answer that, I just don't know. One would think he ought to know.

Interviewer: Sir, why did this matter have to go to the Secretary of Defense for resolution then?

Chapman: Because it was a split JCS paper.

Interviewer: (Inaudible.) Why also could not this matter have been resolved at the CinCPac level?

Chapman: Well, it could have been. In fact, that was the origin of the controversy. The employment of Marine air in Vietnam was -- the methods of employment, techniques, the doctrines of employment, were directed by CinCPac in a order that he issued when the Marines were deployed to Vietnam.

Single management came about by MacVie recommending to CinCPac that he cancel that directive. I forget the name of the directive or its number, I once could have said it in my sleep.

Interviewer: 95-4.

Chapman: Is that it, 95-4?
Interviewer: Gen McCutcheon, in fact, had written --

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: When he was --

Chapman: That's right.

Interviewer: -- CinCPac staff.

Chapman: Now, Gen Krulak argued long and vociferously with Adm Sharp, who was then CinCPac, about the MacVie recommendation. But Adm Sharp said that I'm going to have to do what the commander on the scene says is necessary.

Interviewer: He fought it for a long time though.

Chapman: He fought it for a long time.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: It was delayed in implementation.

Interviewer: And then he modified it by letting III MAF go directly to CinCPac with any modifications or recommendations that he may have had.

Chapman: Yes. So then the Marine Corps, that is to say, I, but we tabled the paper in the JCS, you know, disputing the decision and recommending that it be overturned by the joint chiefs. And that was the paper that was split three to two and went to SECDEF for a decision. An interesting controversy.
Interviewer: Yes, it was. Gary.

Interviewer: I've got another question, sir, relating to -- in fact, I have two of them if we're talking single management.

Interviewer: Yes, why don't you go on to your question. Did you ever see -- did I provide you with a copy of these questions, sir?

Chapman: Yes --

Interviewer: It's already been answered, but I --

Chapman: Oh, are these new ones?

Interviewer: Yes, these are the ones that (inaudible) prepared. So he's interested primarily in the single management since he's writing about aviation. And so while we started, Gary, you might as well go ahead on it.

Interviewer: In the 70/30 split came up around 1968, just prior to Adm Sharp's retirement. He --

Chapman: 70/30 split?

Interviewer: Yes, sir.

Chapman: I don't -- what's that.

Interviewer: We got a frag back 70 percent give back on the Marines sorties 70 percent, give them back to the Marines so that they could frag themselves.

Chapman: Yes.
Interviewer: And retain 30 percent for the Air Force to frag for their missions and type thing. Adm Sharp was going to go ahead with this and said that he wanted it done before he retired. I think he had to retire in 1 July of ’68. Adm McCane took over and Sharp had said, you know, I want to see this done before I left, however, it never did get finished and Adm McCane would not honor his predecessor's request. I wonder why that is, or was?

Chapman: Well, I discussed it at some length with Adm McCane, who's a dear friend of mine. His reaction was that he was new on the scene. That such an order was vehemently opposed by his principal commander in the field, namely Thomas MacVie. And that he just didn't feel persuaded that it was a good idea and he ought to do it, and he never did. But, as we've already said, as a practical matter, it eventuated pretty much like that anyway.

Interviewer: There are some indications, later on, that the Air Force was sorry that they ever introduced single management to begin with because it gave the Army some control over their air support --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- by the Air Force. Did you ever hear anything --

Chapman: Oh, yes.

Interviewer: -- of that nature?

Chapman: Oh, yes. It -- as it eventuated, as we've already said, it was -- it ended up providing the Army division commanders and battalions and regimental commanders with the type of immediately responsive close air support they'd never had. They always wanted it but never had it, and --

Interviewer: And since World War II, when they gave it to the Army in the Philippines.
Chapman: I guess that's right. Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: Gen McCutcheon had one of the groups and I forget who else (inaudible).

Chapman: With the obvious commandant loss by the Air Force of the control of their airplanes. So it's kind of an interesting outcome.

Interviewer: Do you believe that single management could have been prevented somehow in Vietnam? I think General --

Chapman: I don't -- some of -- I believe, that some of the Marine wing commanders were not as forthcoming as they could and should have been in the way of making excess Marine air support immediately available everyday, you know. I think that's true. Other than that, I don't know of anything.

Interviewer: Gen McCutcheon seemed to believe that the revised MacVie directive, 95-4, in 1970, the one that they finally defined mission direction and operation direction; the Air Force seemed to skid around operational control very well. He seemed to think that this is something that the Marine Corps was well to adhere to and something that we should look for in the future. Do you think that this is our policy, more or less? If we go into joint operations again?

Chapman: You know, that precedent might come back to -- might be brought to the surface and used as an argument, yes, that's true. But I thought then, and still do, that single management, even as it turned out, was a one time thing for a special situation, the like of which we'll probably never get into again. At least I hope we don't.

Interviewer: Even under a unified command situation?

Chapman: Well, under unified command, the roles and missions, the doctrines, are all stated, you know. They're all stated in JCS and theater plans. Now, there's been -- you know, the
Marines have had some difficulty in getting those doctrines into many of the theater plans, but it's been accomplished. Or last I knew it had, anyway.

Interviewer: Gen Chaisson and Gen Bruce Palmer, of the Army, have both stated that Gen Westmoreland was fairly weak as far as his everyday tactical -- everyday air to air type of knowledge was concerned. He was fairly weak in that area.

Chapman: With respect to aviation?

Interviewer: Yes, sir, and close air support. And he relied heavily upon Gen Mo Meyer and a lot of them seemed to think that Gen Mo Meyer, because of his persuasiveness and great respect between Westmoreland and Mo Meyer, that Mo Meyer sold his single management to Westmoreland.

Chapman: I wouldn't doubt that's true. Mm-hmm. I know that Gen Westmoreland eventually did get a full comprehension of the lethargy, the turgidness, the complexity and the time-consuming aspects of the Air Force system. And was, I've been told, appalled by it when he finally found out the way it really worked. Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: There have been a few back channel messages at this time between Navy Commanders Moore -- I forget who the other one is -- stating that, you know, we have to watch what happened to the Marines and not let this happen to the Navy because Mo Meyer was thinking about incorporating the naval air that was on the aircraft carriers, into his -- he had gotten the B-52s, he'd gotten the airplanes in Thailand under his control and he looked like he was trying to expand his empire. And the Navy was concerned over this. Did you ever -- any of this ever come up in the tank or with the --

Chapman: No, it never came out in the tank, but I talked to Adm Moore about it. Of course, that was one of the factors that impelled Adm Moore to support us so strongly in our single management paper that we inserted into the JCS. And to join me in talking to the President
about it. But I think primarily Adm Moore was impelled by a strong feeling of support for the Marines, you know, as were many others.

One of the arguments we used with considerable effect was that those who support single management are going to have a lot of little white crosses hanging around their neck. And that's true. When the Marine infantry battalion commander loses his immediately responsive close air support, he's going to have more casualties.

Interviewer: I know the --

Chapman: And that, you know, that was at the time we were taking heavy casualties all over Vietnam and that was a pretty persuasive argument. I made that statement to quite a few and they always -- they all turned kind of white when they thought about it. "A lot of little white crosses hanging around your neck" I'd say to somebody like Nitza or Entoven.

Interviewer: How did they respond to that?

Chapman: They didn't. They didn't, they couldn't.

Interviewer: Gary.

Interviewer: I just have one other question and it's kind of -- after this, Gen McCutcheon took over the III MAF or even before that, had started to settle down a good working relationship between the 7th Air Force and the 1st Marine Air Wing or the III MAF and its wing component.

As a matter of fact, things got so good that in 1970 or '71, Gen Clay tried to get a 1st Marine Air Wing an outstanding unit award with combat V, but the Navy wouldn't approve it because of supposedly they were going to give the 1st Marine Air Wing a like award and he couldn't present two types of like awards, but the Navy never came through with that award. I was wondering why we couldn't go back and get that award from the Air Force.
Interviewer: I think (inaudible) Armstrong had the wing, though.

Interviewer: Yes, McCutcheon was III MAF.

Interviewer: Oh, III MAF, yes, that's right.

Chapman: Yes. Right, that's right. Mm-hmm. But Gen McCutcheon had III MAF and that -- those two personality changes did pretty near solve the problem all by themselves.

Interviewer: (Inaudible) Gen Clay still feels strongly, we had him in here for an interview and he shook his head. He just couldn't understand what the Marine Corps or the Navy rationale was for not accepting this award, which he gave in all good conscience because he felt the wing deserved it. That was a (inaudible) when Gen Brown and I guess Gen Clay came out and there seemed to develop a very smooth working relationship between the wing and 7th Air Force. Pretty much so, as you mentioned, on the basis almost to the old system where the Marines reserved certain of their sorties and then the 7th Air Force could frag the rest.

Chapman: Yes, reserve them to the extent that the ground -- the infantry commanders had stated a need, you know, for a particular days operations.

Interviewer: We have another question here about single management, but I think you've pretty much asked it, Gary, except for the follow on here. What steps did the Marine Corps take to ensure the Marine Corps controlled its own air in future operations? This is going to continue to be a doctrinal matter, wouldn't it?

Chapman: It is a doctrinal matter, yes. Yes.
Interviewer: And it'll just have to be fought over and over again, I guess.

Chapman: I presume so, that's historically been the case and we've won every time except in the initial stages of single management. It's the only time we've ever lost.

Interviewer: I noticed in Gen McCutcheon's article for the Naval Review that he seemed to feel that all the fears he had didn't come to pass. That, in fact, it worked out fairly well. Did you get that impression, Gary?

Interviewer: Yes, he said, as a matter of fact, (inaudible) he says that his initial fears were allayed when they -- when he found out that the Air Force really wasn't trying to get complete operational control. Which is not really (inaudible) Gen McCutcheon seemed to think that single management, as it was modified, in other words, it came back that the Marine Corps system worked out better for MacVie, but not so much for the Marine Corps because they lost sorties and there's no doubt about it.

You have to remember that the Army had more gunships and more artillery. And, therefore, you know, when you take air away from the Marine Corps, then you're taking away some of their fire power that they depend upon and you can't supplement it in other ways like the Army can.

Chapman: That was one of our arguments, you know, in connection with the non-necessity and the Marine casualties, mm-hmm.

Interviewer: The thing, too, I noticed that both Gen Clay, when we interviewed him, and Gen Armstrong, who had the wing, Alan Armstrong, seemed to emphasize that there was a lot of this single management thing was a matter almost for the spirit of cooperation would be. Clay said that he always felt that he could have as many Marine sorties as he wanted if he really needed them. And Armstrong said the same thing in reverse, the wing needed more sorties for the Marines. He always had the confidence that Clay and the 7th Air Force would let him have
them. It was kind of a you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours arrangement that really made it work.

Interviewer: I have one question, sir. Also, during the controversy of single management, Gen Farren stated that there was a -- not a controversy, but there was always push and pull type of affair of the Air Force always wanting to assign Marine sorties, more Marine sorties, up north and the -- and North Vietnam, into Laos and everything. And that would always allow less sorties for the Marines and the Army on the ground. Did you ever get involved in that dispute?

Chapman: It was sort of a spinoff of the basic dispute, yes. No, I don't recall anything specific on that. I'm sure it happened.

Interviewer: You touched on something before, and I don't want to let it go past without asking your comments on it. As an old cannon cocker, your view of the Naval gunfire support furnished by the Jersey and why our views couldn't carry the day. Why the Navy took -- put the ship back in mothballs without really giving it a chance out there. Were you involved with any of the discussions on this?

Chapman: Yes, I think she was -- if I remember correctly, she went back into mothballs after my time in the saddle.

Interviewer: I think it was a DOD decision --

Chapman: I don't remember that exactly.

Interviewer: -- rather than a -- forced upon the Navy. Am I right on this, anyone?

Chapman: Yes, I think that's correct. The OSD was strongly opposed to taking her out of mothballs to start with. And when they did finally approve it, they allocated sailors to the New Jersey. Has this point come up? No. They allocated a crew large enough only to man one-third
of the engineering spaces. That is to say, a third of the boilers. All the eight-inch guns, none of the five-inch guns, and a navigation and communication crew.

Interviewer: None of the 16 or eight -- did it carry 18 shells?

Chapman: Sixteens.

Interviewer: Sixteens.

Chapman: Yes, all the main battery.

Interviewer: All the main battery?

Chapman: Yes, all the main battery, but that's all. She was just a floating -- a bombardment ship and that's all. She couldn't defend herself against airplanes or destroyers or anything. Had no capability. Five-inch guns weren't even –


Chapman: Something like that, yes.

Interviewer: Very, very reduced.

Interviewer: Did they have that many battleship experienced sailors in the Navy at that time anyway?

Chapman: Well, they'd have had to train the crew. Had to train a crew, of course. And had to get the money to, you know, man the ship and pull her out of mothballs and scrape off all the (inaudible) and put some new communication and other equipment aboard her.
Interviewer: Of course there's a political squabble about a skipper, also. You got involved with the Onheider affair.

Chapman: That's true, I'd forgotten that.

Interviewer: -- supported him and --

Interviewer: Alexander.

Interviewer: Yes, Cpt Alexander and then his command was taken away, which would have assured him of a star.

Interviewer: (Inaudible.)

Interviewer: Oh, yes. Yes. Yes, he supported Onheider.

Chapman: Well, then there were political decisions concerning the war that had an effect, too, you see. We had thought that the New Jersey would go out there and go up above the DMZ and bombard the supply lines, you know. Which her 16-inch guns could reach, and we didn't have anything in the way of artillery that could get there. Of course the aviation could.

But it was about that time, you know, that we started sitting around the table over in Paris and there was a decision to knock off bombardment north of the DMZ. So that she really only fired effectively south of the DMZ, up in the mountains, you know, back in the mountains.

Interviewer: When you come right down to it, she never really had a target worthy of 16-inch guns.

Chapman: That's true.

Interviewer: (Inaudible) suspected enemy position for something that big —
Chapman: She never did. And, of course, you had flat trajectory, those big 16-inch rifles, you know, up in those mountains, they were minimum effective.

Interviewer: How did you view the increased drug problem and racial confrontations in the late 1960s, General? What steps did you take to combat those problems? That's what it takes--

Chapman: Well, it was viewed with, you know, with a great seriousness. In Vietnam, the Marine drug problem was minimal. That's because we were -- the Marines were up there in the sparsely populated I Corps area and the drugs just weren't available. Whereas, you know, down around Saigon, why, the soldiers could get everything they wanted any time they wanted it. And you remember that Da Nang was off limits during the whole war, you know. No Marine was allowed inside the city limits of Da Nang through the entire war.

Interviewer: (Inaudible.)

Chapman: Yes, it was off limits. So there was, you know, there was some drug problem in Vietnam, but it was minimal. And the Marines were largely -- what drug problem there was in Vietnam, the Marines were largely self-policing as the experience showed. Whereas the squad leader didn't want a stoned Marine out in front stumbling over booby traps and land mines, you know. And so the squad leaders pretty well policed the situation as did the crew chiefs and, you know, small unit leaders of all kinds throughout the III MAF.

The drug problem existed back in the States and it was a problem that was common to not only the Marines, but the Army and the Air Force and the Navy and the civilians, you know. It's a national problem.

Interviewer: Marines --

Chapman: Similarly the --

Interviewer: The Marine drug problem was much greater in the -- there was a great Marine drug problem in the States?
Chapman: Yes, it grew to be one.

Interviewer: It grew to be one.

Chapman: It started out small and got bigger and bigger. Of course, in common with the whole country.

Interviewer: Did Project 100,000 help increase this problem of both disciplinary and drugs when we were forced to take some of the --

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Metal group force.

Interviewer: Yes, sir.

Chapman: I'm sure that was a factor, although I don't know of any documentation or any statistics to prove it. I just had, as many did, I just had a gut feeling that had to be true.

Similarly there was minimal racial troubles in Vietnam. That, too, was self-policing. We did have big problems back here.

Interviewer: Wasn't there, though, particularly in late '70 and going on into early '71, considerable drug and racial problems, particularly in the rear areas in III MAF? Certainly a lot of the unit reporting at that time was talking a lot about this kind of thing.

Chapman: I don't remember it that way. You may well be right. I just don't remember it that way. I can remember thinking that, you know, the real problem was back here in the States.

Interviewer: Well, in your 35 years of Marine Corps experience at that time, had you seen anything like that before?
Chapman: No. No. No, we had never -- the Marine Corps had never had any drug problem before then. Had no experience --

End Tape 1, Side B
Begin Tape 2, Side A

Chapman: -- and combat it. And similarly with the racial problems. Of course, you know, until -- what was it --

Interviewer: About '49, I think --

Chapman: '49, there were only whites in the Marine Corps, except for some stewards. So obviously we didn't have any racial problem prior to that. Well, I should say we had some black units in World War II, but they were segregated. You know, they were defense battalions.

Interviewer: But even with the order for integration that President Truman issued, I don't think too much of a racial problem erupted. It arose, I think --

Chapman: No, there really wasn't any. I don't ever remember one.

Interviewer: I think blacks were pretty well integrated into the Corps --

Chapman: Yes, they were. Yes, they were. No, it wasn't until Vietnam that we began to have racial problems, and they were serious. And they were serious country-wide, and in the other services. But apparently it's largely been overcome.

Interviewer: I would hope so.

Interviewer: There wasn't much of the racial problem getting (inaudible) Vietnam period the result of this black militancy that emerged. These guys that wanted to wear the Afros and were forming their own little groups in the units and this kind of thing.

Chapman: Yes, that was an outcome of the -- you know, the black power syndrome.

Interviewer: What about that time you came out with your message about green power.
Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: And you came out with some guidelines about the Afro, the hair styling. Could you give a little background of that, General, please?

Chapman: Well, that was at the height of the racial controversies. It was an ALMAR. Let's see if I can remember the number of it. Sixty something. Sixty-seven or --

Interviewer: Sixty-five, wasn't it?

Chapman: Something like that, yes. Sixty-some-odd. It was a pretty simple ALMAR. It said one basic thing, that the commander was responsible for his troops. It quoted Gen Lejeune's words in the Marine Corps manual about the relationship of the officer to his men, and required every commander in the Marine Corps, big and little, to read that paragraph in the manual.

Those of you that were commanders at that time had to read it and you had to require all of your officers and staff and COs to read that paragraph. The responsibility of a commander for his troops. Then it went on to clarify various things, one of which was the hair cut regulation.

Interviewer: Grooming, yes.

Chapman: Yes. And it said that within the limits of the Marine Corps regulation haircut, a Marine can wear his hair any style he wants to. That's what it said. So that as long as it's not more than two inches long and neatly trimmed up the sides, you know, the Marine Corps haircut regulation, if he wants to wear that constricted result in an Afro style, he can. And that the commanders were not to direct non-regulation haircuts. You know the -- what do you call them.

Interviewer: Whitewall.
Interviewer: Whitewall that many commanders commanded are non-regulation. I mean they're stricter than the Marine Corps haircut regulation. Those are most of the important things that it said.

Interviewer: You, sir, in that message also, wasn't it, permitted the blacks to use those black power greetings and signs outside of ceremonies where they weren't expressions of insubordination.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Yes, and they did, but then they forgot it and it disappeared.

Interviewer: Well, what kind of response did you get to this? This was a very important ALMAR as far as moral and discipline of the Corps was concerned, not only for the time, but historically. And, of course, the commandant's word is final, but did you get kind of any feedback from your senior commanders on this?

Chapman: No, we drafted it and distributed it to all of the senior commanders for comment. And many of them made suggestions. We distributed it again for comment to all of the senior commanders and the final version that was published was adhere to, agreed to, by all the senior Marines.

Interviewer: I think W.K. Jones had FMFPac about this time and he also came out with some very stringent guidelines.

Chapman: Along the same tenor.

Interviewer: As directed by your ALMAR.

Chapman: Yes, and there was some controversy over in the Congress, too. In fact, I had to testify before a congressional hearing on the subject of that ALMAR.

Interviewer: Oh, really?
Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: What happened?

Chapman: It was a subcommittee of the House Armed Services, and it was staffed by that committee consisted -- with one exception, of a -- some deep Southerners, you know. Who were just totally opposed to any overtures to the -- to blacks, no matter what kind of uniform they had on. Or anything they had on. So I spent an interesting couple of hours over there. Boy, after all, I'm a deep Southerner myself and so I was able to battle them with good effect.

And we -- the ALMAAR stayed in existence. We renewed it, I remember. I think we renewed it three or four times, you know. ALMARs automatically -- or did then, automatically expire in six months and -- wasn't it six months. I think it was six months. And at the end of the first six months we renewed it and did it two or three more times. I think it was a good ALMAR. It was an important one.

Interviewer: Yes, it certainly was. It was a landmark.

Chapman: Well, it's -- as I say, it primarily said the commander has got to take care of his troops. He's got to view them as a father views his son, you know. Or a master views an apprentice. Of course, that's -- those are Gen Lejeune's words --

Interviewer: That's right.


Interviewer: I know Gen Worton was extorted by Gen Hoakam to remember that when he's not in combat, the officer is a teacher. Whether they're (inaudible) on a firing range or in a
classroom or what, your time in combat is really short compared to the rest of it -- the rest of the time.

Chapman: I think the ALMAR did speak of green power, too, didn't it?

Interviewer: Yes, it did. It was no black power, white power, I think it was in the last paragraph.

Chapman: Only green power.

Interviewer: It referred to green power. Do you recall how many trips you made to Vietnam and when they were?

Chapman: Yes, I went twice a year for four years. Usually in January and July. Sometimes in February and August.

Interviewer: But it was close to the first --

Chapman: Yes, and the middle of the year, mm-hmm.

Interviewer: How did your perceptions change after each visit? Or did they change?

Chapman: Well, I -- that's a hard one to answer. I generally thought that we were doing the right thing and the right things. And we were doing them well. Then, as the war wore on, however, it became apparent -- this is outside of the Marines and Vietnam news became apparent that we were going to abandon ship, you know, sooner or later. And that it was necessary to get ready to withdraw the Marines and resume our force in amphibious readiness posture. A much smaller, highly professional, only a few good men concept.

So we started laying the ground work for that after one of my trips out there and, oh, about midway through my tour. And I can remember making my first speech on the subject to the staff NCOs of the III MAF Headquarters at a breakfast. And I made the speech, which I
made hundreds of times thereafter, about a small, elite outfit, highly professional, highly select. Shape up or ship out, only the best may stay, you know.

Interviewer: Yes, I remember when the policy came out. Of course, I think we also have that speech on tape, too.

Interviewer: That was in about '69 or '70, do you think?

Chapman: I think it was probably the middle of '69 or early '70. Yes, probably early '70, sometime in '70. And then we began to make all preparations to achieve that objective for the Marines to pull out as we did. And come out complete, you know, bringing everything with us, leaving nothing behind.

And every unit -- I mean, every area that was abandoned by the Marines was to be spic and span. Spit and polish. You know, no trash, no garbage, no impedimenta of any kind.

The first order that went out authorized the Marines to abandon anything that was worth $50 or less. Well, I found out about that and I changed it to $5. And so I think we did, we came out professionally. We resumed our peacetime structure and status. We reduced in size, we shipped out many who didn't shape up in (inaudible) recruiting standards and returned to a highly professional elite force.

Interviewer: Along those lines, didn't you allow the recruit depots to raise the percentage of attrition?

Chapman: Yes, I believe we did about that time.

Interviewer: I think you allowed it to go up to 15 percent.

Chapman: 15 percent, yes. We had held it at something like 7 or 8 percent, just because of the sheer need for the manpower throughout the war. So raised the allowable attrition rate.
Interviewer: It seems the Marine Corps was in a better position after the war was over. They had fewer -- I can only remember one RIF compared to the Army, you know. I think the Marines seemed to have had better foresight in seeing what was coming.

Chapman: Yes, I don't remember that I can make any comparisons, but I will say that the Marines did make all the proper preparations and did execute in a highly professional manner I felt. And we did start planning for it and it must have been at least a year and a half ahead of time.

And one of our plans was the engineering of our new recruiting campaign. You know, the --

Interviewer: Rose Garden?

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Only a few can -- you know, looking for a few good men.

Interviewer: The response to that was generally positive, was it not?

Chapman: Very much so, yes. Marines loved it and the Reserve Marines and the retired Marines and the former Marines, they all loved it. Of course, it was pitched to the prospective recruit. You know, that's a whole subject in itself and an interesting one, I always thought. But, very briefly -- what was the name of our recruiting -- I mean our advertising?

Interviewer: J. Walter Thompson.

Chapman: J. Walter Thompson, we reengaged them and they're the only ones we had had. I suppose we still do. Do we still have J. Walter?

Interviewer: Yes, sir, I think they're the only ones we've ever had.

Chapman: Ever had. We had had them at that point for 20 or 25 years. And I went up to New York and had a session with their board of directors and their account executives for the Marine
account. By the way, they lose money on the Marine account. We paid them at that time something like $25,000 a year and they spent, I don't know, a hundred or $200,000, but they wanted it and kept the Marine account because of the prestige item with them. They just liked it.

So I had a session with them and it must have been at least a year and a half before the end of the war, which, you know, I foresaw coming and I told them that I did foresee it. That we'd be back in a peacetime system and we needed a new recruiting campaign that we could launch coincident with our withdrawal from Vietnam.

So they -- oh, they were delighted. So they went to work. The first thing they did was conduct public opinion polls throughout the country in various age groups and backgrounds and urban and, you know, farming, blacks, whites, yellow, brown, red, Americans of all kinds. They conducted an extensive public opinion poll in order to get the profile of the typical Marine volunteer. Who is he, what does he look like, you know, where does he come from, what are his interests and background.

And I forget all the details of this, but it boiled down to -- it boiled down to something like 7 percent of the newly eligible young males in this country were the typical Marine recruit profile. The kind of young fellow that would volunteer for the Marine Corps.

By and large, he was a high school graduate. He was any color, he was an outdoor type, although he might live in a big city, he read Outdoor Magazine and Field and Stream, you know. He was typically somewhat athletically inclined. They got a detailed profile on him. Let's see, what can I remember about that.

There were something like -- there was something like 60 or 70 percent that wouldn't volunteer for any service under consideration. That left about 30 percent, and of that 30 percent, there was something like -- what the hell was it. There was something like 5 percent were inclined toward the Army, you know, 15 percent toward the Air Force. I don't remember the details.

Anyway, it got down to that 7 percent that were inclined toward the Marine Corps, and the recruiting campaign then, the slogans and the literature and all the rest of it, were pitched directly at that 7 percent. And that's where that recruiting campaign came from.

So the Marines were delighted with it, you know, they loved it. Particularly the phrase, which the Secretary of Defense directed me to drop, which said "make no mistake about it, we're
not joining you, you're joining us." Remember that, that was the Army slogan then. The Army wants to join you.

Interviewer: That's right.

Chapman: So our initial slogans all came out and said "make no mistake about it, we're not joining you, you're joining us." Well, the Army complained to the Secretary of Defense and he called me over there one day and said "you've just got to stop that, that's just causing too much controversy." So we had to eliminate that.

Interviewer: It was a great, great phrase.

Chapman: That phrase out of our recruiting campaign.

Interviewer: You had it for about a year, I guess. Or some time.

Interviewer: Was that Secretary Laird?

Chapman: That was Laird, yes.

Interviewer: Another one that was really good was "if you want to be one of the boys, stick with the boys."

Chapman: Yes, well, the Army objected to that, too, but they -- you know, they couldn't make the point very well because we didn't say Army. Well, we didn't on the other one, either, but it was obvious that it was the Army we were talking about.

Interviewer: It was very -- that rose garden and that DI looking up at the recruit.
Chapman: Mm-hmm. Well, you see, that appeals to the 7 percent, you know. I mean that would off the other 93 percent, but it appealed to the 7 percent. Which was the kind of young fellow we wanted.

Interviewer: Did you get a good response from the campaigns? Were you able to --

Chapman: Yes. Was recruiting successful? Yes, we did meet our quotas. Mm-hmm. I think we still are, aren't we? Or we may have had a little trouble here lately, but --

Interviewer: Last year I think there was something, none of the services made their quotas last year. Am I right?

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: Did you see that?

Interviewer: But it doesn't hurt as much as it has in other years because we're having a higher reenlistment, too.

Interviewer: Yes, that's --

Interviewer: It's a better quality of Marine.

Chapman: Well, as part of that quality drive, you know, we did do some very hard things. I can remember approving many recommendations of the enlisted performance board that recommended that a staff sergeant with 18 years' service not be reenlisted. See, he only needed to go another year and a half and he'd get his 20 years' Fleet Marine Corps Reserve qualification.

But there was just many, many sergeants and staff sergeants and even a few gunnery sergeants that simply had not shaped up during the course of the war for various reasons and we just, in effect, we threw them out short of retirement eligibility. A lot of them. Hard thing to do, but it cleansed the Marine Corps --
Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: -- and raised the professional level.

Interviewer: You got the message out.

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: Well, you made extensive use, too, didn't you, of the administrative discharges, particularly around '70 and '71, there was a housecleaning effort to separate --

Chapman: Yes. That's right.

Interviewer: -- some of these people.

Chapman: You know, that was part of the shape up or ship out syndrome, yes. Oh, we discharged a lot of Marines that had not shaped up. And, of course, we could do so because we reduced from 317,000 to 200,000. And we had to get rid of 117,000 Marines. Well, I had said about a million times that we might as well get rid of the 117,000 that are the poorest performers and keep the good ones. It's just what we did.

Interviewer: Well, I was going to ask you, while we're on the subject, what did you conceive of as being the end strength of the Marine Corps, what did --

Chapman: Two hundred thousand.

Interviewer: Two hundred thousand.
Chapman: As a matter of fact, during that period I often said to Congress and SECDEF and many others and in speeches, that was I was the foremost proponent of reducing the size of the Marine Corps.

In the other services, they strove to maintain their Vietnam levels. Only the Marine Corps actively sought to reduce. And needless to say, we didn't run into any opposition from SECDEF or his minions. They were delighted. We were the only outfit that they didn't have any trouble with in that regard.

Interviewer: I want to get back, while we have a little time left, General, on your visits to Vietnam. What particular things were you looking for on each visit? What areas were you the most concerned about?

Chapman: Well, of course, I was concerned with everything. I went everywhere and talked to practically everybody. I was concerned with performance, you know, level of professional performance and capability. With ways, anything we could do to help from Headquarters Marine Corps. You know, what did they need that they weren't getting. What were they getting too much of that, that kind of thing, obviously.

Interviewer: At this time, though, hadn't FMFPac taken over some functions which normally would have been Headquarters Marine Corps functions? With respect to supply, personnel, assignments and so on?

Chapman: Well, they hadn't taken it over, I don't think. It was in the discharge of their historical functions. You know, during World War II, for instance, personnel allocation within the FMFPac units was done by FMFPac. Headquarters Marine Corps provided the troops, in bulk, in each months draft, officers and men. Some went individually. I think everybody from major on up went individually in World War II.

But the assignments to units were made by FMFPac throughout World War II and similarly in the Vietnam War. And with respect to logistics, there wasn't anything new. I don't recall anything anyhow. It was in the discharge of their normal and historical functions.
Interviewer: Nothing that you particularly emphasized, there was nothing that you were particularly looking for?

Chapman: When I went out there?

Interviewer: Yes, sir.

Chapman: Well, each time I went, there was always some problem that would come up, you know, that -- some specific problem. But nothing in general. I can't remember any of the -- well, I remember one of the specific problems was those damn generators we were talking about here, earlier this morning. One of the trips I made out, the hot topic on the griddle was generators.

Interviewer: Generators. Bulldozers, didn't Gen. Brown say he had trouble, needed a bulldozer, when we interviewed him, Jack? I don't recall.

Chapman: Which Brown?


Chapman: Les Brown, he wanted bulldozers.

Interviewer: Well, now; I'm trying -- I think it was probably tractors because they -- was it tractors, did you see that in here? Well, where I seen there were complaints, weren't there, about the type of tractor that was being used, particularly to (inaudible) to do the -- dig out the gun pits and things when you set up a fire base. Apparently there was a lot of --

Interviewer: No, that's not what he was talking about. It was -- he talked about tractors to pull the aircraft, there was a --

Interviewer: Oh, that's right. Yes --
Chapman: Oh, well, that's an aviation tractor, yes.

Interviewer: He had (inaudible) 12 at that time.

Chapman: Yes, that's an aviation tractor. Well, throughout the war, the Marine Wing had lots of trouble with that peripheral equipment. What do you call that?

Interviewer: Yellow gear.

Chapman: Yes, yellow gear. Is that -- but there's a proper name for it, it's not yellow gear, it's aircraft support equipment or some such terminology. There's always been a problem with that stuff, I suppose there still is. You know, it's constantly breaking down and can't get spare parts for it. Is that still true?

Interviewer: If it doesn't fly, the don't --

Interviewer: Well, a lot of the problem is because (inaudible) gear that comes from the Navy, so Navy blue dollars, and trying to work within the Navy supply system --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- totally impossible.

Chapman: Yes, there was trouble with this and I guess there still is, with the spare parts and with the mechanics and technicians to fix it, you know, etcetera. That's all that gear, you know, like the generator that you plug into the airplane when it's standing still.

Interviewer: The tug.

Chapman: The tug to tow it around with. The jet starting engines. You know, there's an engine that starts those jet motors on the tactical airplanes. All the whole -- or all array of -- I mean, you
put down an airplane in a parking place and then it's surrounded by this dam gear, you see. All of which is painted yellow, as you've said. And about half of it was customarily out of action. It was broken down. That's probably what he was talking about.

Interviewer: Going back, again, to the planning for the pull out when you began to see that we were going to get out of Vietnam. I was wondering if we could try to place that a little bit more precisely in chronology. Do you think it was the Tet offensive that might have changed your mind that way or --

Chapman: No, it wasn't that.

Interviewer: -- or the fact that we were -- the fact that we began negotiating with the --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- North Vietnamese or was it when the Nixon administration came in? I was just wondering if you'd comment.

Chapman: Let's see, when was Nixon inaugurated? It was in --

Interviewer: '69.

Interviewer: '69.

Chapman: '69

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: It was not long after that, yes. It was some time that -- probably toward the end of that year or early '70. You know, and as it turned out, my prediction was correct. That is what happened.
Interviewer: It probably determined the end of the war in Vietnam much like Eisenhower ended it in Korea. You had the same --

Chapman: Yes, that was -- of course, it was at that point it was our stated objective, was to Vietnamese -- equip the Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, to defend themselves and protect their own country and for us to get out. And that was the national policy objective.

Interviewer: In 1969 the Marine Corps could have assumed some of the Army role and remained in Vietnam in greater strength had it wished to do so. Traditionally, the Marine Corps sought, quote, a piece of the action, unquote. But in 1969, it sought to withdraw. Would you discuss this position and the rationale behind it?

Chapman: Well, I already have, really. I felt, and I think most Marines felt, that the time had come to get out of Vietnam and resume our status as a force in readiness. A professional force in readiness. And that's just what we did.

Interviewer: What was the role of Headquarters Marine Corps in planning the withdrawal, Marine withdrawals, of men and equipment from Vietnam in '69 and '71, the roles of FMFPac and III MAF?

Chapman: Yes, well, the withdrawal plans were proposed by MacVie and approved by CinCPac and then came in to the chiefs for, you know, for final approval. And, of course, the Marine Corps participated and then had the responsibility of executing. Of course the tactical matters on the scene actually ordered a unit our. The Navy provided the shipping and then we readied a homecoming for them wherever they were headed for.

Interviewer: You didn't have --
Chapman: In some cases there were -- in many cases, there were deactivations, of course, like the 5th Division, you know, we deactivated the 5th Division. Deactivated each of the regiments as they returned.

Interviewer: You didn't have any particular policy, any particular policy, with respect to withdrawal?

Chapman: No, not really. Well, we thought that the -- that in tact air ground units should come out together, you know; and we did that. We came out mostly by reinforced regiments and brigades, you know, air and ground units. And we left behind, as the last element, the -- was it the III MAG.

Interviewer: Yes.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: The III MAG as a -- and it was a complete air ground team.

Interviewer: That was Al Armstrong?

Chapman: Yes, a complete air ground team. In that respect, there were a number of numerous proposals to leave only the ground elements behind, plus helicopters. But we elected and that was a Marine Corps decision to destructure the III MAG as a complete air ground unit. And that was done.

Then, of course, the second policy was to return the units to their original home bases and deactivate the non permanent organizations, like the 5th Division. Logistically, the policy was to bring everything out.

Interviewer: Regardless of condition?
Chapman: Yes, not leave it behind as garbage or trash, but to bring it out. There were some things that were excess we could give it to the Vietnamese. We did do that, you know, things they could use in their hospitals and villages.

Interviewer: Expendibles?

Chapman: Expendibles of various kinds. Oh, there were probably other policies, but those are the principal ones.

Interviewer: Well, to what extent, if any, did budgetary considerations and plans for post Vietnam -- post Vietnam War forces influence Marine Corps views on the timing and hasty withdrawals from Vietnam?

Chapman: Was the effect of budgetary considerations?

Interviewer: Mm-hmm. And plans, the post war plans?

Chapman: Oh, I don't think there were any. Adequate funds were provided to fight the war, by and large. And to effect the withdrawals. And then, because the Marine Corps did advocate strenuously reducing in size, you know, back to our original peace time, so it wasn't any problem about getting money for the Marines, you know, to effect a withdrawal and to reduce in size and to our post war structure.

I don't think there were any budgetary restraints. As a matter of fact, if I recall correctly, we had extra money during those times. You know, some of our deactivations and discharges we executed ahead of time so that we had excess money.

Interviewer: Do you recall the role of Headquarters in planning for III MAG to replace III MAF as Marine forces in Vietnam were reduced? Or did that plan come from FMFPac?

Chapman: Yes, as I said, I think it came from MacVie.
Interviewer:  MacVie.

Chapman:  And was approved by CinCPac and then came to the chiefs, you know, as one of the proposals of withdrawal plans in which we participated, of course.

Interviewer:  So III MAB could make the recommendation --

Chapman:  Yes.

Interviewer:  -- in response to MacVie's request (inaudible) within --

Chapman:  On up to CinCPac and into the chiefs.  Yes, all the withdrawal plans were -- well, it had to be that way because the -- although the tactical commander would execute the withdrawal, it was the service chief that had arranged to receive the unit wherever it was going.

Interviewer:  Wasn't there, though, considerable consideration given within the Marine Corps to the exact composition of that final brigade that would be left, the so called --

Chapman:  Yes, mm-hmm.

Interviewer:  -- residual force?

Chapman:  Yes, I mentioned that.  There were various proposals and it may have been a III MAF proposal.

Interviewer:  (Inaudible.)

Chapman:  I don't remember for certain, it could well have been that it be only a ground unit.  A reinforced regiment and helicopters.

Interviewer:  Yes, with helicopters.
Chapman: With helicopters and I don't remember, but probably some gunships. Yes, that's true. And at Headquarters Marine Corps, in fact, I made the decision that it was in the Marine Corps interest to make it a complete air ground team.

Interviewer: What were your grounds specifically for that decision, to insist on holding to a complete air ground team right down to the end?

Chapman: Well, obviously, the doctrine, the Marine Corps principles on the one hand. And on the other hand, the -- or secondly, the possibility that the North Vietnamese might attack again. You know, maybe the peace negotiations would collapse and here they'd come again. We wanted a complete combat unit there.

And then, thirdly, there was the possibility that the MAB might embark and make a landing somewhere, like Korea, or anywhere. It just seemed to me to make sense to have a complete air ground unit kept together in tact, ready for anything.

Interviewer: Was there any effort by the Army, particularly during those last stages in the withdrawal planning, say in '70 and '71, to hold Marine forces in there longer than the Marine Corps wanted to keep them in?

Chapman: If so, I don't remember it. No, I think the -- as best I can remember, the Marine withdrawal plans were those proposed by MacVie and approved up the line.

Interviewer: What, in your opinion, General, was the most significant impact of the total Vietnam experience on the Marine Corps?

Chapman: Oh, God, that really is a big question.

Interviewer: Well, maybe you could enumerate different ways in which the Marine Corps has been affected. I'm sure there have been a number of things; what are those that (inaudible) your mind?
Chapman: Well, that would take a lot of thought, but some things that immediately come to mind are that we learned a lot of lessons, you know. Some bad and some good, we learned many good lessons. We developed a whole generation of combat experience to career Marines, which is very important.

I often sometimes whether that isn't the thing that worries the Russians more than anybody because they haven't got any combat experience at all in the Russian Army anymore, except for a little in fighting on the Chinese border.

We've got a whole generation of combat experienced Marines. And all the World War II veterans are now gone, except I think there are only four or five World War II vets, and they're all general officers. Gen. Wilson, of course, Gen. Barrow, two or three of the lieutenant generals are post-World War II now.

Interviewer: Makes you feel awfully old.

Chapman: Sure as hell does. Here we've been talking for four hours and we've never gotten to World War II yet.

Interviewer: Well, that's what we're going to do –

Chapman: Someday. You know, we tested a lot of concepts. We tested a lot of equipment. We perfected many, many procedures, you know, those things were all good and very worthwhile.

On the bad side, you'd have to list the -- what, after World War I, we called the World War I mentality, we've probably now got a Vietnam mentality in the Marine Corps, while I'm not certain just what that is.

We enjoyed total control of the sea and air throughout the entire duration of the Vietnam War and that probably will never happen again. And we enjoyed it without thinking about it, you know, without recognizing it and realizing what great benefits there are in total control of the sea and air, which we'll probably never have again.
Interviewer: How would you compare the post-Vietnam Marine Corps with the post-World War II and post-Korean War Marine Corps?

Chapman: I'd say similar in many respects and with the obvious exception that the post-Vietnam Marine Corps is twice as big as the post-World War I -- World War II Marine Corps. See, our size after World War II was 100,000. At the end of Vietnam, it was 200,000.

After World War II we had two divisions and two wings and none in the Reserve, which had independent battalions and squadrons in the Reserves. After Vietnam, we had three divisions, three wings, force troops and a complete div wing team in the Reserves. So there's a size difference (inaudible) in magnitude. But I think in, you know, in outlook and professional status and combat experience, all of those good things are very similar.

Interviewer: Each is the product with some experience.

Chapman: Oh, obviously. Obviously.

Interviewer: Gentlemen, that's the last of the questions that we gave to Gen. Chapman. Does anybody else have anything that we've not asked? Rich? Well, thank you very much, General. And now it's going to be just one on one, we'll go -- the next session will be in my office when we start talking about your career.

Chapman: Oh, that will be a tiresome damn subject.

End Session II
PDS
MARINE CORPS ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Interviewee: General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

Interviewers:

Date: 7 January 1981

Place:

TAPE TRANSCRIPTION
Chapman: -- like to start this afternoon. I listened to the radio forecast coming in, it's supposed to start snowing.

Interviewer: This is side 1, tape 1, Session III, with Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. The date of this interview is 7 January 1981. And if you recall that listing we sent some time ago, General, of your duty assignments, we indicated I'd like to talk about the early years.

Now you're a native of Florida.

Chapman: Yes, I was born in Key West.

Interviewer: In Key West.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Key West, Florida. My father was a Methodist minister, stationed there at the old stone church when I arrived in 1913.

Interviewer: Methodist ministers, once they get a parish, do they stay there for life or do they have to move around like some of the other denominations?

Chapman: In those days, the diocese of Florida was run by the bishop of Florida the same way the Commandant of the Marine Corps runs officers and enlisted. He detailed his ministers and his practice at that time was to -- was for a one-year tour of duty. So each year, all of the Methodist ministers in Florida shuffled around, musical chairs. We were in Key West a year at that time. And then, later on, for another year.
Interviewer: But you stayed in Florida, you wouldn't -- unless your father had a call to some other state or some other diocese.

Chapman: There was no, quote, call, unquote then in the Methodist Church. No, the ministers, as I said, were detailed by the bishop. And his authority covered the entire state of Florida.

Chapman: Was your father a native Floridian?

Chapman: No, he was born in Phoenix, Arizona when -- in an adobe shack. His father, my grandfather, was a Methodist missionary to the Indians.

Interviewer: I'll be darned.

Chapman: And it happened that he was stationed in the Phoenix area when father arrived.

Interviewer: You were talking about your house down in Tennessee. That was from your mother's side?

Chapman: That's on my mother's side, yes. And that house goes back, way back. The original part of the house was built some time before 1800 as a tavern. The front part was built by my great grandfather, who was a country doctor, who thought that the original house was not sufficiently prestigious. So he built another house in front of the old house and joined them by a porch. So it's a unique structure. It's way out in the country, it's 12 miles to the nearest town, which isn't all that much of a town. It's on the bank of a little river. We have our own mill pond and dam, mill dam.

Interviewer: I was just thinking how unique that your father would marry someone who descended from a tavern owner.

Chapman: Yes, well --
Interviewer: Being a Methodist.

Chapman: No, great grandfather -- or great, great grandfather did not build the tavern, he bought it.

Interviewer: He bought it.

Chapman: It operated as a tavern about 20, 25 years and then he bought it and the adjoining farm and established residence and practiced medicine, country medicine.

Interviewer: When we spoke about that you told me you had the providence of the property.

Chapman: Had the what then?

Interviewer: Providence, who had owned it and its history.

Chapman: Oh, yes, I have all the way back to the original deed. I have that in papers. I have a large truckfull of old letters written to and from my various ancestors on that side of the family, going back to the earliest is 1791. And there are hundreds of them.

Interviewer: Have you read them?

Chapman: Yes, I've read them. They're of no great historical importance. They talk of family matters, the crops, the slaves, the weather, the relatives, their health. But they're very interesting to read.

Interviewer: Have you ever thought of --

Chapman: I donated them all to the Tennessee --

Interviewer: Historical --
Chapman: -- Historical Society. I haven't actually transferred them to them yet, but I'm going to in the next two or three months.

Interviewer: Good place for them, they'll make good use of them.

Chapman: Yes. They'll keep them, they'll use them and they'll be available to researchers. And they'll preserve them.

Interviewer: Yes, that's important. Yes. How was it growing up as a son of a Methodist minister, you had to be goody-goody in your life, kind of restricted in a way?

Chapman: At an early age, my father left the ministry and went into the newspaper business when I was about six or seven years old. And I don't recall that it was very straitlaced prior to that age. It may well have been. No, I think we had a very happy family life in the parsonage, at the several churches at which he was stationed, until the time he left the ministry.

He went into the newspaper business. I can remember some of the places. We lived in St. Augustine, Ft. Pierce, Key West. Then he left the ministry and became the editor and owner of a newspaper in Ft. Pierce, Florida. From there, we moved when I was about seven or eight to De Land, where he purchased -- sold the Ft. Pierce paper and purchased the De Land Daily News in De Land. He operated that newspaper during some very interesting times, by the way, if I can remember quite well. Until after a few years he sold the newspaper and bought a citrus packing company, the Blue Goose Packing Company.

Interviewer: Oh, yes.

Chapman: And he operated that for a number of years and was elected in the early '30s to the Florida state legislature, where he served two or three terms and was elected speaker, his last term, of the house in the Florida legislature. And at the conclusion of that, he was appointed by the governor as the superintendent of the Florida prison system. And that appointment occurred the year I entered college, at the University of Florida in Gainesville.
The state prison farm is some 30 or 40 miles north of Gainesville, so that I went back to the state prison farm during the time I was in college on weekends and summers.

Interviewer: Oh, you lived on the prison --

Chapman: Yes, the superintendent's house, right on the prison farm.

Interviewer: Now was he superintendent of all the prisons in Florida or this particular one?

Chapman: This was the only --

Interviewer: Oh, --

Chapman: This was it in those days.

Interviewer: Oh, I see.

Chapman: Had about 2,000 inhabitants, forced inhabitants.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And, of course, numerous guards and administrators of various kinds.

Interviewer: You're talking about the interesting times that occurred when he was editor, what might they have been?

Chapman: Well, first and foremost was the stock market burst and the Depression in '29, '28 and '29. During, earlier in the '20s, there were Ku Klux Klan outbursts. Numerous sordid episodes perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan. He editorially, violently opposed the Ku Klux Klan and all they stood for and tried to do. With the result that he was persona non grata.
Interviewer: Threatened?

Chapman: Threatened by many of those you could only call the leading citizens of the little town of De Land, Florida.

Interviewer: It didn't faze him, though?

Chapman: It didn't faze him in the slightest. No, he was the son of the old West pioneer type. As I said, he was born in Phoenix, Arizona. Grew up in a family whose head -- his father was a missionary to the Indians. They were stationed in Phoenix, in Brownsville, Texas, Austin, Texas; he really grew up in Texas. And from there, he went to the -- he went to college at -- this is where my memory is beginning to fail. It was a college in Brownsville. It later became Southern Methodist University.

Interviewer: Oh, yes, SMU.

Chapman: Later became SMU. He graduated from there with an A.B. degree, and then went to divinity school at Vanderbilt.

Interviewer: Well, he went to good schools.

Chapman: Yes. From when he got his divinity degree, he was ordained a minister in the Methodist church and his first parish was Key West.

Interviewer: Tell me about your college days, you became involved with the ROTC very --

Chapman: Yes, I went to grammar school and high school in De Land, and from there to the University of Florida at Gainesville in 1931. As a land grant college, the University of Florida was a land grant college. It was boys only in those days. No women, except a few in the law school. The women were at Tallahassee at the Florida State College for Women.
Interviewer: And how far away was that?

Chapman: 167.2 miles.

Interviewer: I figured you might have had that down tight. Did Mrs. Chapman go there?

Chapman: No, she's from Tennessee.

Interviewer: Tennessee, yes.

Chapman: But it was a land -- it was, in those days, a land grant college, which meant that all the students had to participate in the ROTC. It happened, because I went to the liberal arts college, the liberal arts students were all in the artillery regiment of the ROTC. There were two regiments, an infantry regiment and an artillery regiment. And the arts students were in the artillery regiment, other colleges were in the infantry regiment. So that's how I got in the artillery.

Interviewer: Well, that's an interesting breakdown. You would think that they would tend to get more of the engineers or the people strong in mathematics.

Chapman: I don't remember, I think the engineers were in the artillery, too. Journalism, the sciences, and others were in the infantry regiment.

Interviewer: What did you major in?

Chapman: I majored in mathematics. Mathematics was my major with an alternate -- a secondary in philosophy.

Interviewer: Were you intending to become a teacher, a math teacher?
Chapman: No, I intended to become a lawyer. And as a matter of fact, I had a year of law school. In those days you could take three years of arts and then your fourth year of arts was your first year in law school.

Interviewer: I didn't know that, very good.

Chapman: So I was in the artillery part of the ROTC and I ended up, in my senior year, as the cadet colonel. I was the commanding officer of the artillery regiment.

Interviewer: You must have found it very amenable.

Chapman: Hell, yes, I liked it very much.

Interviewer: Did you go away to camp during the summers?

Chapman: Yes, we went -- I guess it was one summer, between junior and senior years. We went to Ft. Benning for a few weeks. I don't remember how many. Four weeks, I think.

Interviewer: Now when graduation time came, what were your plans, continuing on with law school?

Chapman: Yes, continue on in law school. But during my fourth year, when I was the artillery colonel --incidentally, it took me a great many more years in the Marine Corps to get back to colonel again and command an artillery regiment.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Of course I was a cadet colonel, I didn't really command anything, except the Friday afternoon parades.
Interviewer: Well, it was pretty prestigious I think in those days with the ROTCs to have any staff or command funds.

Chapman: Yes, I know when I was in my fourth year, when I was a senior, the Marine Corps offered the University of Florida one commission, one regular commission in the Marine Corps. And similarly to the other 52 land grant colleges, the other 51 land grant colleges that were -- I think 52 is the right number in those days. It was about that, anyway. Offered one commission, regular commission, to each. That was in the spring of ’35. And I luckily was able to get the one that was offered to the University of Florida. I must say I’d never seen a Marine in my life. The first Marine I ever saw was when I went to Pensacola to take the physical exam at the -- doctors, the medical establishment at the Naval air station in Pensacola.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: I saw my first Marine and, fortunately, I passed the physical and the Marine Corps did commission me that summer, the 1st of July, 1935 with a regular commission. There's an interesting point there, the Marine Corps, through all the previous years of the ’20s and the ’30s, had been commissioning about 20 or 25 a year from the Naval Academy, two or three from the ranks and one or two or three from civilian colleges for a total of about 30 per year. In the fiscal ’36 budget, which began on 1 July ’35, of course, the Marine Corps was able to sell the idea of commissioning an additional 100 lieutenants that year.

That's something I've always meant to research and I never got around to it. Is how did the Marine Corps sell that proposition? How did they persuade the Secretary of the Navy and the President and the Congress to grant the Marine Corps 100 additional second lieutenants in 1935?

Interviewer: That's an interesting point, because the basic class of ’35 was the largest to date.

Chapman: Yes, it consisted of the 25 from the Naval Academy, two or three from the ranks, that was Jeff Fields and Mickey Curran and -- I know, I just can't think.
Interviewer: I've got a picture right in Jeff Fields –

Chapman: Oh, who was it, Sugar Cane. Cane.

Interviewer: That's right. Right.

Chapman: Called Sugar. Those three from the ranks. Twenty-five, I think it was, from the Academy and 48 of us from the land grant colleges. Now that I'll have retract and say it must have been 48 land grant colleges, because that's how many of us there were.

Interviewer: Forty-eight states, right?

Chapman: For the 48 states.

Interviewer: And of course, then, for the military -- oh, what's the term they used. From VMI, from --

Chapman: Yes, and from -- that's correct. From VMI, from the Citadel.

Interviewer: The Citadel, and I was going to say Norfolk. It's not Norfolk, it's up in Connecticut, up in New England.

Chapman: Norwich?

Interviewer: Norwich, Norwich Academy, right.

Chapman: Norwich, right. I don't think we had anyone from Norwich my year. There may have been some later on. Well, in any event, that made -- oh, and then in September, of that year, '35, another 45 or 6.

Interviewer: Right.
Chapman: Making about 130 total in fiscal '36, commissioned in the early part of fiscal '36. Which is really a remarkable achievement when you remember that the whole Marine Corps that year was only 16,000, including about 1,000 officers. My class made the officer total about a thousand. How the Marine Corps did that, I've always intended to research and I never -- I never have done it.

Interviewer: That's an interesting point because, as I said, the class of '35 was unique; first of all, it was the largest basic school class to that date in the Marine Corps. Secondly, it provided more general officers. Provided two Commandants, which is more than any of the basic school class. And I think it probably provided more general officers than any other class. The timing was --

Chapman: Oh, I'm sure that's so.

Interviewer: The timing of the class and the war and everything was just --

Chapman: Yes, of course, that's the primary point that the class, that class, and the next class, rode the crest of the wave.

Interviewer: '36, too, yes.

Chapman: '36, '37. Then came World War II, the huge expansion in the Marine Corps and then, of course, everybody knows what's happened since. So the first point would be that my class and the next two or three rode the crest of the wave and benefited there from.

But secondly, it should be realized, and I hope I say this without too much immodesty, each of us was the honor graduate of his land grant college ROTC. I was the top ROTC in my regiment and so were the other 40-odd in my class. So that I'd have to say, I think anyone would agree, that there was a group of rather talented, intelligent people.

Interviewer: Yes, and absolutely --
Chapman: So for those two reasons, it's not surprising that there was a heavy -- a large number made --

Interviewer: What was interesting was the fact that the Marine Corps was able to steal these men right under from the nose of the Army.

Chapman: Yes, we were all obligated, of course, to be Reserve second lieutenants in the Army and we were all so commissioned, in fact, when we graduated from college. So I was actually in the Army for about three weeks as a second lieutenant. The Army had to discharge me so that I could take the Marine Corps commission.

Interviewer: Well, a lot of famous Marine Corps names in that class. Let's see, George Rowell (phonetic), of course, was one of them.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: He was an anti-aircraft artilleryman, I think.

Chapman: Yes, he was, and an intelligence specialist. Exceedingly fine man. There was -- well, you could go right down the list. At the end of two years in the Marine Corps, as I'm sure you remember, we took a competitive probationary examination. If that hasn't been described to you by other participants in your program, I'll do it for you in a moment.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: As a result of that exam, and of the fitness reports for the first two years, we were ranked. The lineal list, which up to that point was alphabetical.

Interviewer: Yes.
Chapman:  After the exams and the grading of the exams and the examination of the fitness reports for that two year period, we were -- we received our final standing on the lineal list. In three groups, the Academy group that was commissioned in early June, my group, commissioned 1 July and the September group, commissioned the 1st of September.  And I'll have to say that I came out number one in my group.  I had the highest grade on the exam together with good fitness reports for the two-year period.  So I ended up number one in my class.

Number two was Dixon Goen, --

Interviewer:  Yes.

Chapman:  -- who had -- who contracted tuberculosis at the end of World War II and had to retire.  Very intelligent guy. Number three was Herman Nickerson,

Interviewer:  Yes.

Chapman:  -- who made lieutenant general. Number four was --I'm damned if I can remember. But you can go down the list of those 48 names and you'll find 12, 15 or 20 general officers and many distinguished Marines.

Interviewer:  Yes. I was -- just to jump ahead a little bit, the -- I was told that after World War II, in Quantico, about '47 or so, a number of your classmates were sitting around Waller Hall one night, and that just by figuring out numbers and dates and so on, they figured that this class had to provide a Commandant of the Marine Corps. And so for kicks, they wrote down -- each person wrote down three names. Or wrote down the name of who they thought from the class would be most likely to be the Commandant at the time when they would be due. And the three names were you, Bob Cushman, and Toots Henderson.

Chapman:  Mm-hmm. That's interesting.

Interviewer:  Yes, and you hadn't heard that?
Chapman: No, I hadn't heard that story.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: That's a new story to me.

Interviewer: Tell me about some of your other classmates and tell me about basic school and the instructors.

Chapman: The commanding officer of the basic school then was Gen Turnage. He was then a lieutenant colonel.

Interviewer: Much beloved.

Chapman: Much beloved. He and Mrs. Turnage mothered and fathered their second lieutenants. They literally loved us dearly. They had no children of their own and to the day he died, and all to now, for her, they consider us their children. They always have. My boys, that's what she called us.

Interviewer: Very interesting, yes. How is she, by the way?

Chapman: Not well. She's in a nursing home, but she's still hanging on.

Interviewer: I spoke to the general before he died. We --as matter of fact, we were going to get an interview under way and then he took sick and died. We had one session with him.

Chapman: The executive officer of the basic was Maj Brown, Lee Brown, I believe. The instructors were some very able people, Gen Twining, then a captain, comes immediately to mind. (Inaudible) Leroy Simms, Ducky Harris, Cpt Purple; if I thought long enough, I could remember some of the others. I'm sure you have the roster of them.
Interviewer: Yes, we've got the master roll.

Chapman: They were very able instructors. We -- it was a seven-month course for us, for my July group. The Naval Academy group went only three months and left the 1st of September -- left the end of September. Then the September class came in about the 1st of October. So my July group overlapped both. Then we, July group, graduated in February and we went to our various assignments.

The instruction was excellent, it was in Philadelphia at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, in one of the old barracks there. We lived in the barracks and went to class in the barracks. We ate in the mess hall. I take that back, we ate at the officer's club. We ate at the officer's club, where there was catered service to the basic school students. And it was good. The instruction was good, it was well done. It covered all the subjects that you might easily guess. There was heavy emphasis on World War I tactics and techniques. We memorized the dimensions of a standing -- a standing firing trench, a World War I trench, France kind of trench. And we memorized a whole lot of other things that proved totally useless when World War II started. There was a lot of coverage of amphibious operations as they were then conceived.

Interviewer: Who was the specialist in that at that time, do you remember?

Chapman: The tactics was Gen Twining, Cpt Twining. The techniques was Gen Simms, then Cpt Simms. Amory Leroy Simms. He taught the ship to shore movement, for instance. I'll never forget a class in which we were to make a landing and to plan the loading of the ship's boats, which, in those days, were 30, 40, 50-foot motor launches. And this was prior to the landing, the advent of the landing craft. So Cpt Simms had assembled the United States Fleet, which was then in the Atlantic, might. know it in passing that in those days there was only one fleet, and it was in the Atlantic. Today, we've got two fleets, and, really, two and a half.

He somehow managed to get the entire fleet together and get from every ship in the fleet, including all the battleships, all their motor launches. And then he loaded out, boat by boat, on a blackboard, several blackboards, arranged across the front of the room, a Marine brigade boat by boat. And he got all the way down to the last boat on the last blackboard and he didn't have a boatload left. And he said, gentlemen, I've got one boat too many. He said I've made a mistake
somewhere, we'll have to go over it all again. So we went back to the beginning and we reloaded those boats -- there must have been two or 300 of them -- until we found the missing boatload.

Interviewer: Well, the brigade-sized unit was pretty large for the Marine Corps at that time.

Chapman: Yes, a war strength brigade, which is what we were dealing with at the basic school. Well, we maneuvered in Fairmont Park.

Interviewer: Yes, I was just about to ask you about that.


Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: I remember one problem in which we were being defeated and the school's solution was to blow up the Fairmont Park dam and flood the enemy with the cascading waters trapped behind the dam. Well, none of the students had hit on that solution. Then we went to Indian Town Gap for a month, fired all the weapons, conducted firing exercises of many kinds. It was all excellent training.

Interviewer: Well, it's hard -- well, it's not hard --

Chapman: For its day.

Interviewer: But you think back, and here you had a bunch of high-spirited college boys, there must have been a lot of high jinks going on, too.

Chapman: Yes, there was some of that all right. Yes, there was some of that. I don't know, though, it was a pretty serious, thoughtful class, I think, looking back on it. Very little in the way of extremes. For one thing, I'm sure we were all sincerely happy to have a job.

Interviewer: Yes.
Chapman: Remember, that was the bottom of the Depression. I'll never forget my class, graduating class, at the University of Florida, there were 250 of us. All boys, of course, because that's all there was at the university in those days. And of the 250, there were exactly 25 that had a job, something to do, and I was one of them. I had a commission in the Marine Corps. The other 225 just went back home and sat on the porch or pumped gas, because there were no jobs in Florida in the bottom of the Depression. And it was similarly true for my classmates. So that I don't think any of us were thinking of, in any way, risking our commissions.

Remember, also, we all had probationary commissions for the first two years, and that was the practice in those days. The first two years were probationary and it was a simple matter for the Commandant simply to revoke the commission. It could be done administratively.

Interviewer: For cause?

Chapman: For any cause. Or I presume for no cause. And, in fact, there was one such revoked when we were there. One of my classmates was caught cheating during an exam and Col Turnage, I think this is what happened, he simply made a telephone call to headquarters, got authority and, right on the spot, revoked his commission and he left the basic school that day.

At the end of the two-year period, as I've already said, we took the probationary exam and then, having passed that, we received permanent commissions.

Interviewer: I think you were at Ft. Sill about this time?

Chapman: Well, that was after I had completed a year of my first duty station at Quantico, in the 1st Marine Brigade. I was in the artillery battalion of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marine.

Interviewer: Battery A.

Chapman: Battery A, yes, I was a battery officer. There were four of us, it was a battery commander, who was Larry Limon. The battery exec, who was also Larry Limon at that time, because we didn't have an exec. And then there were two lieutenants, myself and Joe McHaney.
Interviewer: Who also was the rifle and artillery man?

Chapman: Yes, he was.

Interviewer: Who was -- I understood in basic school at that time, there was always one officer who was the role model, who was, with respect to uniforms, et cetera. I think Chester Puller, at his time in basic school, that was his job. Who was it --

Chapman: You mean among the staff?

Interviewer: Among the staff, yes.

Chapman: Among the instructors.

Interviewer: Who was the one that mothered you -- well, fathered, in a sense to make sure that you bought uniforms from the appropriate place --

Chapman: Oh, yes.

Interviewer: -- and wore them properly and they fitted well.

Chapman: That was Cpt Muncie, Cpt Muncie. He was a World War I combat commissioned type and a very strict, very proper, perfectly turned out Marine. Very good looking Marine. He didn't do too well, however, in World War II.

Interviewer: No.

Chapman: Later on.

Interviewer: Would you have had the option -- was the Army offering any commissions -- offering commissions to the senior--- say the cadet colonel?
Chapman: Not regular commissions.

Interviewer: Reserve commissions?

Chapman: Reserve commissions.

Interviewer: No guarantee of remaining on active duty?

Chapman: Right. In fact, there was -- each ROTC graduate was obligated to accept a Reserve Army second lieutenant commission. Then there was a plan called the Thomason plan, by which the Army offered active duty to a selected few of the many newly commissioned second lieutenants, Reserve second lieutenants. I don't remember the numbers, it was a few hundred every year. But that was only for a two-year tour of active duty.

In practice, however, at the end of those two years, you know, at '39 and '40, along in there, when the Army was expanding, practically all of them stayed on active duty. Many of them got regular commissions in the Army. But the Marine Corps was the only service that offered regular commissions.

Interviewer: To non-Academy graduates.

Chapman: To non-Academy graduates. That year, and the next year or two.

Interviewer: At the time that you were commissioned, when you were in basic school, had you pretty well made up your mind that this was going to be your lifelong career?

Chapman: Oh, yes, once I had the Marine Corps commission and started active duty, why, I was --

Interviewer: Ate it up.
Chapman: I was determined. That was to be my lifelong career.

Interviewer: I think your --

Chapman: I come from a military family, you know, and I --

Interviewer: No, I wasn't aware of that.

Chapman: On my -- not totally so, but to a considerable extent. My uncle, my mother's brother, was an Army lieutenant. Their father was a Civil War veteran, Confederate veteran.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Needless to say.

Interviewer: Needless to say.

Chapman: His grandfather was a Revolutionary War officer, a captain, in the Tennessee -- what later became Tennessee militia. And then there are other military ancestors going further back.

Interviewer: That wasn't strange to you, right?

Chapman: No, not at all.

Interviewer: Now, you went -- after basic school, you were assigned to Battery A, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. Now, something sticks in my memory that Cpt Griffin was the battery commander or the -- battery commander. Was he --

Chapman: No, it was captain -- it was then LT Limon for a spell, then it was Cpt -- I'll think of it. He's a well-known artilleryman.

Interviewer: You went down there, I understand, also that the old NCOs, the old artillery NCOs were the ones who really trained you?
Chapman: Yes, of course I had learned a lot artillery in the ROTC. You know, I knew all the fundamentals of gunnery and communication and, of course, that's what we did in the Army ROTC. That was good training, too, for college kids. The gunnery sergeants were the ones that knew how to lead the troops.

Interviewer: And set the sights and so on.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Who else was in your battery with you, in basic school?

Chapman: Well, it was Joe McHaney, just the two of us in A Battery.

Interviewer: Paul Henderson went down there, too.

Chapman: He was there. He was in another battery. Well, there were only two batteries, there was A and B. He was in B.

Interviewer: And Kenny --

Chapman: Let's see, Barney Oldfield.

Interviewer: Barney Oldfield.

Chapman: Ken Dahmke, that's all, I believe. All I can remember, anyway. We were all, of course, from Army artillery ROTCs.

Interviewer: Was there much --

Chapman: So we knew quite a lot of artillery.
Interviewer: Did you have to learn, relearn much to apply artillery -- to apply your Army artillery learning to the Marine Corps way of doing things?

Chapman: Well, the basic weapon was the PAC howitzer, which none of us had -- the 75mm PAC howitzer, which none of us had ever seen before.

Interviewer: No, that wasn't the --

Chapman: No, no. The secondary weapon was the old French 75. And it's the one we used for service practice and so forth. The PAC howitzer was for landing operations. Of course, there were no landing craft and we had to take the thing apart and lift it over the (inaudible) of a 40-foot motor launch and carry it ashore in pieces through the surf. That's what we did many times. The old French 75, which is the same weapon we'd had in the ROTC, of course, was very familiar to us.

The Army ROTC, of course, was horse-drawn in those days. There was no such thing as a motorized, mechanized artillery in the Army. We had small TD -- what the hell were they. TD-4 or 5 tractors. Small Caterpillar tractors that had to be gotten ashore somehow and then pulled the PAC howitzer three or four miles an hour cross country into position.

Interviewer: I've seen a picture taken of the artillery park about that time in Quantico about that time, where there were about six GPFs lined up.

Chapman: Yes, the old 155mm gun.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: With the name Popeye, Mae West; do you remember those?
Chapman: Yes, I do. They were in defense battalion. They and the anti-aircraft, .50 caliber machine guns were in the defense battalion, which was another battalion in each of the two brigades. Ours, at Quantico, of course, was the 1st Defense Battalion.

Interviewer: The 1st Battalion 10th Marines was the FMF artillery for the East coast?

Chapman: Yes, it was the field artillery. The infantry support artillery. And we had just two batteries.

Interviewer: What did you do there for -- let's see, before you went to Ft. Sill, you --

Chapman: Well, we, of course, trained every day. We trained on the guns, we trained communications. We shot bishop battery. Bishop battery was a little small thing that shot a .22 caliber blank shell, about a one-inch diameter steel ball onto a miniature firing range which was on a scale of 1 to 100, I think it was.

Interviewer: I never heard about that.

Chapman: Yes, a bishop battery. The regular PAC howitzer sight was used on the battery, four guns, each firing this little .22 caliber black and (inaudible) steel ball. The range was laid out as a sand platform. There was something like -- there must have been about 90 feet long, so that would imply the scale was something like one foot to a thousand yards. I think that's about what it was.

Interviewer: (Inaudible.)

Chapman: Yes, it actually -- it worked. Of course, the instructor, who was usually the battery commander, would -- and the sand area had little churches and buildings and crossroads and little hills and forests and enemy installations in it, and he would say "Now, you look from the church with the white steeple, look 20 miles to the left and about 2,000 yards beyond and you'll see a group of enemy; bring them under fire. So then you'd do your firing command and this battery
would load up with .22 blanks and put a steel ball down the barrel, muzzle load it, and they'd fire. And these steel balls would go marching through the air and land and you'd sense them and give your commands and go ahead and adjust the fire on the target. It's kind of interesting, it worked.

Interviewer: Something like the thousand inch ring for machine guns.

Chapman: Yes, the same idea. Then, of course, we'd be -- well, we participated in fleet exercise. There was a big fleet exercise at Viakas (phonetic). The year I was there part of the East coast Fleet Marine force embarked on Navy ships and went around to the West coast, where they had a -- where we had a landing exercise. I wasn't on that particular expedition.

Interviewer: Was Don Weller at that time? Don Weller wasn't down at Quantico at that time, was he? I think he was shipboard. I think he was --

Chapman: I think he was aboard ship. I'm pretty sure he was not in the 1st Marine Brigade. Let's see, we went to Indian Town Gap for firing exercises, service practices, field exercises for the artillery battalion. We went to Parris Island, believe it or not.

Interviewer: Oh, to fire down there?

Chapman: To fire, service practice.

Interviewer: Where, at Hilton Head?

Chapman: No, right at Parris Island. Right at Parris Island. We placed our guns not far from the recruit area and we shot into the other end of Parris Island. Of the island.

Interviewer: I didn't know that.

Chapman: Yes.
Interviewer: Of course, you had the reenactment of the Battle of Manassas.

Chapman: Yes, we reenacted Manassas and we reenacted Petersburg.

Interviewer: Petersburg --

Chapman: The battle of the crater, at Petersburg.

Interviewer: There's a new book out on that, by the way.

Chapman: Is there? I haven't read it.

Interviewer: It's reviewed in the Post, I believe, Sunday.

Chapman: We participated in the presidential inauguration parade that year, of '37. March of '37, I think it was the coldest day that I could ever remember.

Interviewer: The troops came up by train from Quantico?

Chapman: Yes, we came up by train. Debarked in good Marine Corps tradition. We arrived and fell in ready to march about 3:00 in the morning; the parade didn't start until 10:00 or 11:00.

Interviewer: Did you go to the barracks for chow or something?

Chapman: No, we brought our hot chow with us, field kitchens.

Interviewer: I remember hearing about some of the people that used to come up. They'd have sand boxes to be used as urinals on the train and this type --

Chapman: That may have been so, I don't remember.
Interviewer: All right. What was the social life for a young Marine second lieutenant at Quantico without a car, undoubtedly, true, stuck on the base?

Chapman: Yes, we lived in Harry Lee Hall, that was the BOQ in those days. It was new and very, very nice. Each of us had a nice, very nice, suite, really. There wasn't much social life. Go to the movies, an occasional party at Waller Hall, which was then the officer's club. We were big on physical things.

Interviewer: Really, was there --

Chapman: Yes, we played a lot of physical games, (inaudible) basketball games, tennis, hiking - -

Interviewer: Did you get involved with a social swing social life in Washington at all?

Chapman: Not at all, it was too far away in those days if you didn't have a car. Which most of us didn't. There were only 12 second lieutenants at Quantico in those days, which I was one, and my classmates were the remainder. We did things together some, but they were pretty simple, easy things. There wasn't really very much social life. I don't think any of us ever felt the lack of it.

Interviewer: No heavy drinking or anything like that being second lieutenants?

Chapman: Not at all. Many of the second lieutenants just didn't drink at all, or they'd drink a little, but very little. No, there wasn't any heavy drinking. Again, I remind you that we were probationary lieutenants. And none of us were going to take a chance of --

End Tape 1, Side A
Chapman: And the reasons for possible revocation of a probationary commission were numerous, and pretty basic. Things like not paying the club bill on time. Or not being ready for inspection, you know, unshined shoes or something of the sort. It was a pretty tough outfit.

Interviewer: Your seniors from first lieutenant on up kept a pretty watchful eye on you.

Chapman: Yes, they did.

Interviewer: It was a small enough society that they wanted to make certain whoever was going to enter into it measured up to what they thought were their --

Chapman: That's true. That's true.

Interviewer: I guess Gen Hoakum was down there when you first got there.

Chapman: No, he was at headquarters. No, Gen Breckenridge was the brigade commander. Gen Little was the marine barracks commander. The Quantico command in those days was named the Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia. That was the overall command.

Interviewer: And Marine Corps schools came under it?

Chapman: Came under the barracks.

Interviewer: I thought the headquarters at that time had a pretty well direct line on Marine Corps schools operations. That there was a schism at that point between the schools and the barracks in the sense that headquarters had almost a direct hand on the schools. You don't remember that?
Chapman: I don't know. I don't remember that. I was too low down to know about anything like that. My impression is that headquarters controlled the academic program of the schools. But I'm quite sure that the discipline, the leadership and all that came under the Marine Barracks.

Interviewer: Well, the FMF, that came -- that was on the base there came under the barracks also?

Chapman: No, the Fleet Marine Force, the brigade, reported to the fleet.

Interviewer: Through the fleet.

Chapman: Operationally.

Interviewer: But it had its headquarters at Quantico?

Chapman: The headquarters, right. The headquarters and the units were all at Quantico.

Interviewer: But now who had the FMF at that time? Who had the brigade at that time?

Chapman: That was Gen Breckenridge.

Interviewer: Oh, Breckenridge had it.

Chapman: He was the brigade commander.

Interviewer: That's right, and, of course, Gen Hoakum was Commandant by now?

Chapman: Yes, in '37 or 6.

Interviewer: '36.
Chapman: '36, right, Gen Hoakum became Commandant.

Interviewer: Do you remember Gen Little at all?


Interviewer: How about Breckenridge?

Chapman: I remember him slightly, yes. He was a smaller, less conspicuous sort of man, but a good Marine.

Interviewer: Now, you're assigned to artillery school at Ft. Sill, that was field artillery, of course?

Chapman: Yes, that was the Army's nine months basic officer's field artillery course. And it was an excellent course.

Interviewer: Did you put in for it or were you assigned to it?

Chapman: No, the -- there were six of us assigned to it. And I think there were only -- as I remember it, there were only eight of us all together. I'm talking about the new second lieutenants, the class of '35 second lieutenants. There were two, four -- four or five of us at Quantico and four or five at San Diego in the second battalion, 10th Marines. And there was six of us, there were six spots for Marines, at the Army artillery school that year. So there was some competition and I don't know who made the choices, to tell you the truth to, you know, to decide which six would go. As it turned out, Oldfield, Henderson, and Chapman were chosen from Quantico. And Jorgenson, Faber, and Fairbourn from San Diego. We were the six Marines at the Army school that year.

Interviewer: Is this picture familiar?
Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: This is, I guess, after you were married.

Chapman: Yes, the Army gave us a -- we were all married, all except Oldfield, Barney Oldfield. We all married during the Christmas holiday.

Interviewer: I see. Toots Henderson drove you to the station.

Chapman: Right. And then we came back and the Army -- the Army was very good to us during our time there. Gave us an artillery rifle, a caisson rifle, which is the Army custom for newly married officers.

Interviewer: Didn't one tip over going around a corner?

Chapman: Yes, the Jorgenson.

Interviewer: Jorgenson's.

Chapman: It went around the corner -- this is an old World War I caisson, you know, horse-drawn, with steel wheels. And they went around a corner a little too fast and the steel tires slipped on the pavement, skidded across the slippery pavement and hit the curb and toppled over. But there was nobody hurt.

Interviewer: The artillery still at Ft. Sill was horse-drawn, there was --

Chapman: Well, it was half horse-drawn. There were two regiments, the 1st Field and the 15th Field. The 1st Field was motorized.

Interviewer: Already?
Chapman: Already. The 15th Field was horse-drawn, and we divided our time. The school instruction was divided between about half and half motorized and horse-drawn. And we spent - it was a nine months course, and we spent at least three months, the equivalent of three months of the course, thinking about horses -- how to ride them, shoe them, look in their mouths. Of course, I was a cowboy when I was younger. I already knew a lot about housing horses and driving them in draft pulling the French 75s and the caisson, maneuvering with them. And, of course, it goes without saying that throughout World War II nobody ever saw a horse.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: So about a third of the course was useless. And that's about -- to go back to our basic school, about a third of our basic school instruction was useless when we went -- when World War II started. But, of course, the other two-thirds was invaluable in both cases.

Interviewer: It was during the time that you were at Quantico -- and I was going to -- I thought it might apply to you, but it applied more to those to who were going to the schools there. They had the historical rides and the equestrian training, the pack mule training.

Interviewer: Yes, they had -- those occasions were for the school students. We sometimes got involved with them with respect to the transportation. Not directly.

Interviewer: What was the -- yes, I'm sorry.

Chapman: Not directly, otherwise.

Interviewer: What was the importance of going to Ft. Sill for a young Marine officer?

Chapman: Well, it was probably the finest school in the world for field artillery. The Army had operated the field artillery school at Ft. Sill since, I think, prior to World War I. All of the Army artillery officers went there when they were 1st lieutenants. And until World War II started and
we established our own field artillery school at Quantico, of which I was the executive officer, by the way.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: All the Marine artillerymen went to Ft. Sill. It was, to repeat, the finest artillery school in the world. And it really was excellent.

Interviewer: Did they have foreign students come there, too?

Chapman: Yes, our year there were two Chinese and three Filipino. The Filipinos were second lieutenants, as we were. The Chinese, the two Chinese lieutenants, were third lieutenants. The Army students were all first lieutenants, artillerymen, and there was one infantry captain. I'll never forget him, he was the class leader and his name was Baldwin, Capt Baldwin. And he was a spit and polish soldier of the old school. A fine officer.

Interviewer: They sent an infantry officer there.

Chapman: One infantry officer, he was a captain. The three Philippine second lieutenants became high-ranking officers in World War II. The two Chinese, I never heard -- none of us ever heard what happened to them. No telling. They didn't understand English very well and could speak it hardly at all. And it was always interesting in our firing problems. One of the Chinese would be called on to fire a problem, conduct an artillery problem. The other one would be called on to critique it. And each one would get a U, or unsatisfactory. The one who fired it never bracketed the target. The one who critiqued it never was able to explain why, what was wrong. And so they both got Us in every firing problem. No telling what ever happened to them.

Interviewer: Yes. Did any of the associations you made with any of the Army fellows bear fruit later on? Did you --
Chapman: Yes, I kept track of many of them. Some of them became quite famous. One that immediately comes to mind is Darby, who was --

Interviewer: Darby's Rangers.

Chapman: Darby's Rangers. He was a member of the class. Anyone who's interested could look up Darby's history. He had quite a career in World War II and was eventually killed in Italy. The head of the gunnery department was then LtCol -- I'll think of his name in a minute, too. One of the gunnery instructors was a Capt Booth. When we went to Okinawa in the spring of '45, my battalion was -- I was CO of the artillery battalion in the 11th Marines. My battalion was attached, during the first two or three weeks, when the 1st Marine Division was not in action. I won't go into the history of the Battle of Okinawa, which I'm sure you remember. But we landed, there was no opposition, just sporadic. So we went into a holding area and the artillery was assigned to the two Army divisions. And my battalion was assigned to the 7th Division. The 7th Division was commanded by LtCol -- the head of my gunnery department at Ft. Sill.

Interviewer: 7th Division Artillery?

Chapman: No, 7th Division command general.

Interviewer: Oh, it was --

Chapman: And the chief of staff of the division was then Col Booth, who had been one of the gunnery instructors at Ft. Sill. I'm danged if I can think of that lieutenant colonel's name now. But I will in a minute.

In any event, he commanded the Army's 7th Division on Okinawa. So I was among old friends right away when I joined the 7th Division for two or three weeks when we participated in supporting their infantry.

Interviewer: All right.
Chapman: And there were many, I could name off many other examples. Some of them became pretty famous in the Army in World War II.

Interviewer: When we get to Okinawa we'll get to the point where you fired a three-round TOT.

Chapman: Yes, 23 Battalion TOT.

Interviewer: 23 --

Chapman: 23 Battalions, yes.

Interviewer: But didn't you fire from one gun a three round TOT? Big Foot Brown told me to ask you about it.

Chapman: You think he said 23.

Interviewer: 23?

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Well, I was thinking --

Chapman: Because that was the famous event all right.

Interviewer: Yes, right. But couldn't you fire a TOT from a single gun by using different charges?

Chapman: Oh, yes, maybe that's what he's talking about.

Interviewer: That's what he's talking about.
Chapman: Oh, yes, you can do that, yes.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: We did that with the whole battalion, my battalion. You fire -- the first round, you fire with a low powder charge so that there's a long time of flight. And then you fire one with a medium powder charge and then the final one with a high power powder charge. And they all land on the target at the same time.

Interviewer: Yes, three battalion volleys I was talking about. Anything specific --

Chapman: Well, if we go back to Quantico, my time at Quantico.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: The big event for us was the probationary exams which I --

Interviewer: Yes, we were going to talk about that.

Chapman: -- previously alluded to. I think that's -- I'm getting a little hoarse, so I think I'll have to describe those probationary exams and fold up for this session.

Interviewer: Okay, fine.

Chapman: We'll have another session in a day or two.

Interviewer: Oh, sure.

Chapman: Yes. The probationary exam lasted eight days with two subjects each day, a morning subject and an afternoon subject. It was a closed book examine, except for the administration, which I'll come back to in a minute. There were therefore 12, 13 -- administration was an all day
exam, so I think there were 13 subjects. And they covered such things as close order drill, musketry, entrenchments, amphibious operations, engineering, all of the things that a lieutenant was supposed to know. And it was quite an ordeal.

Interviewer: Eight days –

Chapman: Eight days, all day long.

Interviewer: Did you do a lot of boning up on it?

Chapman: Oh, yeah, I studied for it three months ahead of time.

Interviewer: Really?

Chapman: Most of us did, yes. And there was no social life during that period. After office hours each day, I'd go home and study. I studied every afternoon and every night for about three months. As did all of us. I think the average grade, on a scale of four, I think the average grade from my class was something like 3.8 or 3.7, you know. And the difference between me and Dixon Goen, who came out number two, I was number one, and the difference between us was one thousandth of a point, I think it was. I had something like 3. -- I don't really remember, but say I had 3.924, he had something like 3.918, you know. A grade on the exact and there were similar minute differences between the 48 of us all the way down to the last man. And I think the lowest grade by the last man was something like 3.8.

Interviewer: A tremendous competition then.

Chapman: Oh, yes, tremendous competition and very extensive exams. Oh, we wrote for hours, it was all longhand. By the time you'd finish -- I'd finish a day's exam, my hand was absolutely paralyzed from writing for something like seven or eight hours straight each day.
Interviewer: You were talking about the admin exam; at that time was there a publication which you used by a MAJ Hooper, do you recall?

Chapman: No, I don't. It rings a vague bell, but not in connection that I can remember with the administrative. The administrative exam was an exam on the Marine Corps manual, and on the Navy regulations. And it was an eight-hour exam and it was an open book exam. Now if anyone that remembers the old Marine Corps manual will also realize what a difficult exam that was because that thing -- that old Marine Corps manual was a disorganized hodgepodge full of something like 30 or 35 annual changes and very little in the way of a logical organization. You were just as liable to find the answer to a question on how to embark troops aboard a train under -- well, under what. You'd normally look for it on the chapter on transportation, but it wouldn't necessarily be on the transportation. It might be under something like mess halls. Totally out of place. We were required -- it was an open book exam. The question was asked, we were required to write down the reference, chapter and paragraph in the Marine Corps manual where we found the answer and then give the answer, quote it from the manual. Well, I remember this, I did two or three questions before I caught on to the fact that I had to put the reference down. It was referenced to paragraph in the manual. The first question, I don't remember what it was, but it was a real oddball question. I didn't have the slightest idea what the answer was. But by an unbelievable stroke of luck, I was leafing through the Marine Corps manual and I looked at this page and there was the answer, just sheer luck. Well, I wrote the answer down quickly and I went on to the next question and then the third question. And then I suddenly woke up to the fact that I was supposed to put the paragraph reference down. So I went back and looked for that paragraph by which I'd answered the first question. Would you believe that in eight hours, I never found it.

Interviewer: Oh, no.

Chapman: I never found it again. I know it was in there somewhere, but I couldn't find it. So I had to leave the reference off that particular answer. But I had the right answer.

Interviewer: Every officer in those days had his own professional bookshelf or book --
Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: And you were --

Chapman: It's kind of interesting, the bookshelf and the battalion reference library consisted of the Navy Regulations, the Marine Corps Manual, the Navy Courts and Boards, the Letters of Instruction, which today we would call Marine Corps General Orders. And the Landing Party Manual. That was it, five books, that's all. You go into a battalion headquarters now and the battalion books occupy a whole room, lined on three sides, and there are probably two PFCs in there whose sole duty is put the changes in all those books.

Interviewer: Yes, absolutely. Okay. So these books and manuals were issued to you when you were up at basic school?

Chapman: Yes, they were.

Interviewer: It was the beginning?

Chapman: And they were our possession along with our '03 rifle.

Interviewer: Oh, did you keep it -- did you get an '03 rifle to keep?

Chapman: Yes, every officer was issued an '03 rifle. And it was his, presumably, for life.

Interviewer: When did they stop that?

Chapman: Well, World War II.

Interviewer: World War II, but up until World War II, every officer, including field grade, had its own --
Chapman: Oh, I don't remember that. Certainly of the company grades.

Interviewer: Company grades.

Chapman: Yes. Whether it went on to major and lieutenant colonel, I just don't remember. I wouldn't be surprised, though, because every officer had to shoot the rifle for marksmanship, you know, every year, including the lieutenant colonels. I suppose the colonels, too, although I don't remember. So, naturally, you preferred to shoot your own rifle on which you had the basic dope, you know. Go out there and start shooting right away without having to zero in.

Interviewer: Well, now, in the case, for instance, of the Marine Corps Manual and some of the other manuals that were the working manuals, you then got on a mailing list so when the changes came out you got your own personal change.

Chapman: Oh, yes. Every officer got his set of changes.

Interviewer: Now were they --

Chapman: Had to put them in.

Interviewer: Would they inspect to see that -- make sure that your changes were --

Chapman: That was one of the things the inspector general -- inspect the Marine Corps Manual in the hands of the officers.

Interviewer: Of all officers?

Chapman: Of all officers, right. All officers. In addition, of course, the units had an official unit copy of the Marine Corps Manual.
Interviewer: Who taught you all of the basic school?

Chapman: Gen Twining.

Interviewer: Oh, that's right. That's right.

Chapman: Who was then Cpt Twining.

Interviewer: That's right. He was -- that's right.

Chapman: And he was an excellent law instructor, too. Of course, the Navy Courts and Boards was a lot simpler then than it is now.

Interviewer: Yes. What do you remember of him, was he --

Chapman: He was a first class instructor. Really a challenging instructor, you know. His mind worked like really an –

Interviewer: Oh, yes.

Chapman: He was brilliant. He was just full of challenging statements, you know. Statements that challenged your intellect.

Interviewer: I think I told you --

Chapman: His classes sparkled.

Interviewer: I can imagine, because I think I told you -- I guess you were commandant at the time that I went out to interview him and came back, and, of course, I had heard his reputation and we got on famously. I just thoroughly enjoyed him, but I can see he must have been a rough cob later on when he didn't suffer fools too gently.
Chapman: No, he did not suffer fools gladly.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Shakespeare.

Interviewer: Yes. Tell me, did you get involved with any court martial's when you were down in the battery?

Chapman: Yes, I was the prosecutor, or judge advocate, who was then called for the general court martial. I was not involved -- I shouldn't say that, because I wasn't involved in any general court martial. I was obviously involved in a number of then called special courts. Special courts and deck courts. Of course, the deck court was simply the commanding officer. The special court was what we today call -- what do we call it, summary court.

Interviewer: Summary, yes. Summary court, right.

Chapman: And I was the prosecutor for several of those. They were simple cases, though, you know, we didn't have complicated cases and all this. A Marine was over the hill for three days. Well, there wasn't much to proving that, he usually pled guilty. Or he was accused of whacking the mess sergeant in an irate moment. Well, I shouldn't use that as an example, because that would have been a general court martial offense.

Interviewer: But I imagine --

Chapman: But simple things.

Interviewer: Yes, by the time you went on board the Astoria, you were pretty well --

Chapman: Yes, I was.
Interviewer: -- ready to take up --

Chapman: As I said, I had had some law in college, you know. I was somewhat familiar with legal processes. Of course, the old courts and Boards was very simple. 99 percent of the cases were guilty cases.

Interviewer: But, nonetheless, you had to know them.

Chapman: You had to know.

Interviewer: You had to know your --

Chapman: Yes, you had to know and those cases --

Interviewer: -- precedents.

Chapman: -- where the accused pled not guilty, why the proof and the witnesses had to be brought forth. The witness had to be sworn in, had to be an interrogation and the case had to be made beyond a shadow of a reasonable doubt, as in any courtroom.

Interviewer: We're jumping around here, I want to get back --

Chapman: I'll never forget, incidentally -- just an anecdote in passing.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: I'll never forget my first deck court in which I brought one of my Marines in A Battery, of the old 1st Battalion 10, before then the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion 10th Marine, who was an old Col. Fawcett.
Interviewer: Pop Fawcett, right.

Chapman: Well, this Marine had done something to one of his buddies. The buddy was there as the witness. So Col. Fawcett called on the witness to tell his story and he told his story. It had to do with something like scratching his foot locker or some simple thing like that. The other, the accused, Col. Fawcett then called on the accused to tell his story. So the accused told the story, which was also extremely convincing. And so Col. Fawcett had to choose between these two stories to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. And he thought a long while, sitting behind his desk, and he shook his head and finally he said to the accused, he says, I can't tell whether you're telling the truth or whether your Pvt. Smith here is telling the truth. He says, I'll tell you what I'm going to do. He says, to the accused, he said, you go down to the brig and serve three days on bread and water and I'll be thinking about it.

Interviewer: Those were the good old days when you could do that.

Chapman: Those were the good old days. This poor Marine went trudging off to three days of bread and water and solitary confinement while Col. Fawcett tried to think which of the two was telling the truth.

Interviewer: When you joined the 10th Marines, you had, I guess, for the most part, you had a bunch of enlisted men and NCOs that had been in for a while. You were the new boy.

Chapman: Oh, yes.

Interviewer: How did they treat you, with respect or kind of waiting to see how this wonder, this --

Chapman: I'd say barely concealed tolerance was my -- of course, when we got out in the field and started running artillery problems and conducting, then it became obvious that we knew what we were doing, you know. I think the troops picked up some respect (inaudible).
Interviewer: They didn't treat you all like red bottom bootloops?

Chapman: Not after we showed them we really knew what we were doing in the artillery. I'll tell you another anecdote, I think you like anecdotes in these things.

Interviewer: Yes, I do, sir.

Chapman: My very first morning in the 1st Battalion, A Battery, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, we fell out for troop inspection and close order drill. I had one -- we formed in platoons when we fell out for troop and drill. And I was leader of one of the platoons. And my gunnery sergeant was an old Marine gunny named Burke. I'll never forget him, gunny Burke. He's always been my idea of the ideal Marine gunnery sergeant. Really a splendid Marine. World War I veteran, Haiti veteran, Nicaraguan veteran. And the epitome of a spit-and-polish Marine gunnery sergeant.

Well, it came time to inspect the troops. Well, there were about maybe 40 of them. So we went down the line, they all had their '03 rifles and they came up for inspection and I looked at each one and tried to figure out whether he was ready for inspection or not. Burke was helping me and we finally got down to about the third from the last in the rear rank. And even to my inexperienced eye, I could see that Marine was not ready for inspection. His shoes were scuffed and his pants were wrinkled and he was unshaved. So I said to Burke, I said, "Gunny, this Marine," whose name was, let's say, Smith, "is not ready for inspection." And Gunny said, "No, sir, he's not." And I said, "Gunny, why don't you give him some extra instruction." Burke said, "Yes, sir, I'll do that." So we completed the inspection and we went on through the day's activities and we fell out for troop and drill the next morning. And we went down the front rank inspecting them and then we went down to the rear and we got down to the third from the end and there was Smith. And he was totally perfect. Absolutely perfect from the tips of his toes to the peak of his overseas cap. Absolutely perfect. There was only one thing, both his eyes were black, one ear was cut and bleeding and he had bruises all over his face. I said, "Burke, this Marine is really ready for inspection this morning." I said, "But what happened to him?" "Well," Burke said, "didn't the lieutenant say to give him some extra instruction?" Well, obviously, Burke had taken him out behind the barracks and just beat the tar out of him.
Interviewer: That was extra instruction?

Chapman: That was extra instruction in the eyes of old GySgt. Burke.

Interviewer: I guess Smith never showed up unready for inspection after that?

Chapman: No, he never did.

Interviewer: You know, one thing we didn't discuss, we just mentioned in passing --

Chapman: One more thing, then I think I'm done.

Interviewer: The Battle of Manassas.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Just what was the involvement, what did you do? I know we ran a picture of you. I think Toots Henderson gave us some pictures. You're draped over a cannon there as a casualty.

Chapman: Right. Well, it was the first Battle of Manassas, Bull Run, the first Battle of Bull Run. Well, we represented the Confederate forces. There were some Army units that represented the Yankees. We deployed on the principal part of the battlefield, which was around the Henry House.

Interviewer: Henry House Hill.

Chapman: Henry House Hill, where Stonewall Jackson -- we didn't attempt to depict the entire battle, which, of course, was a front of some five or six miles, but only the principal event in the battle, which was the Union assault on the Confederates in and around Henry House Hill. Where
Beauregard was in charge. Stonewall Jackson made his name and his (inaudible) of Stonewall. I remember a BG Bee said "There stands Jackson like a stone wall."

Interviewer: Yes, yes.

Chapman: So we deployed our artillery. We shot blanks, we fired blanks in the rifles and, of course, not machine guns because there were no machine guns in the Civil War. The Yankees, represented by Army units, assaulted Henry Hill and we moved back and forth approximately as it had actually occurred in the battle. And the Yankees retired, leaving us in charge of the field, and that was the end. And, of course, spectators came out from Washington and stood around at various points of vantage and watched the battle being reenacted. And after it was all over, why, we all stacked our arms and had a big social party.

Interviewer: Had you had a scenario for this? Had you been —

Chapman: Let us say, perhaps, did we rehearse it?

Interviewer: Yes, sir?

Chapman: No. But the leaders did.

Interviewer: Pardon me for a minute, sir.

Interviewer: That's enough for today.

Chapman: Okay, fine, very good.

Interviewer: An hour and a half.

End Session III
PDS
Interviewer: Interview session II, with Gen. Chapman. I believe we ended off the other day with your assignment to artillery school, at Fort Sill. Gen. Weller was telling me when he went there, they had a competition for the students. And I think he took the prize. It's an exercise dealing with horse-drawn artillery. Do you remember something along —

Chapman: No, I don't recall that there was any such competition. We ended the school year with class standings, and I was sort of proud. I came out number seven in the class.

Interviewer: Oh, really? Very -- were you the highest Marine?

Chapman: I was the highest Marine and, of course, I beat most of the Army officers, too. There were 60-something -- I don't remember the exact number, 65 or 70 Army officers.

Interviewer: This was a very important school for field artillery officers to go to.

Chapman: Oh, very much so, and it still is. It still is. To repeat what I said previously, it is the finest artillery school in the world and continues so to this day. And it's essential and class to career Army artilleryman and it's his class standing is of the greatest importance because as the Army operates, those that stand at the top of the class are the ones that are marked to go on to higher-level schools. War colleges and so forth.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: Let me digress to name a couple of names I couldn't think of the last time.
Chapman: My first battery commander at Quantico, in the 1st Battalion 10th Marines, was Archie Gerard. And I don't have any recollection of what eventually happened to him. The commanding officer of the artillery school at Fort Sill that I spoke of, who later on, during World War II, on Okinawa, was the commanding general of the 7th Army Division, that was LtCol. Arnold.

Interviewer: Yes, yes.

Chapman: LtCol. Arnold.

Interviewer: He was most cooperative when we wrote our Okinawa monograph; he commented on it and it was very favorable. What was the attitude of the Marine Corps regarding schooling at this time? I know early on it wasn't as great. You went to school, but had schooling reached a role of importance as far as the --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- officer corps was concerned say in '37, '38?

Chapman: Well, to the best of my limited knowledge and low level viewpoint, it did, yes. I can remember one of my classmates telling me that he had been advised by a very senior Marine, a general officer at that time, that aspiring young officers should always be doing one of two things, either serving in the Fleet Marine Force or going to school.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And those were the two roads -- two necessary pillars of success in the Marine Corps. Of course, the Marine school at Quantico had just recently come into existence. Its teachings in
amphibious warfare were first in the field in the world. And, of course, were used throughout World War II and the many Marine Corps landing successes in the Pacific.

And the prevalent view was, I'm sure, that every Marine officer had to go to Quantico to go to school to learn about amphibious operations. Schools like Fort Sill were held in high regard as a means of grounding the various officers in specialized subjects, in this case, field artillery, close support of the infantry, primarily because the Marine Corps had little or no general support artillery. And, of course, Marine officers went to Fort Leavenworth, they went to Benning, they went to the Naval War College, they went to the Army War College, which was then at McNair.

Yes, I'd say schooling was considered of the highest importance throughout the officer corps. Remembering it wasn't a very big officer corps. There were only 1,000 officers total in the Marine Corps at that time.

Interviewer: How about the attitude of the Marine officer as a teacher, was that drilled into your heads –

Chapman: As desirable?

Interviewer: -- as important, yes?

Chapman: As important.

Interviewer: I remember old Gen. Worton telling me that one time Gen. Hokam had told him that when you're not leading in battle, which is only a small part of time, you were teaching. It's incumbent upon the Marine officer to be teaching his men, teaching his junior officers, constantly teaching.

Chapman: Yes, that harks to that great paragraph in the Marine Corps Manual written by Gen. Lejeune concerning the relation between officers and the men.

Interviewer: Yes.
Chapman: Which says that the relation is not that of master and servant, but, of course, superior and subordinate, but rather of teacher and pupil, master and apprentice. So that I am sure that the general attitude was that with respect to the Marines that the role of the officer was that of a teacher, a trainer.

Now, a somewhat different subject is that of a formal instructor in a formal school, such as the amphibious school at Quantico. I think my recollection is that the military instructors were held in quite high regard and it was thought to be a desirable, even necessary, post at some point in an officer's career. Those that were the best at it certainly stood out, I think particularly of Gen. Twining at basic school. He was an absolutely superlative instructor. He sparkled, he could -- he seized the class' attention from the moment he stepped on the podium until the bell rang for the end of the period.

Interviewer: What was the perception of the prewar officer, junior officer, as to his future in the Marine Corps?

Chapman: Pre-World War II?

Interviewer: Yes. I think, for example, Gen. Del Valle told me that the reason he came in the Marine Corps was that his fellow students in the class of '15 at the Naval Academy, G-2, the perspective before them, and they figured that if they stayed, if they went Navy, that after 30 years they'd only be two stripes. But there was a good chance of making two-and-a-half stripes, becoming a major in the Marine Corps in 30 years. Promotions were a lot better, say in the late '30s, after your commissioning, than they had been before the selection system.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: But, still in all, what was the perspective you had of a career in the Marine Corps at that time, can you recall?
Chapman: Yes, I can. Two things happened; you just touched on one of them, the selection system, which came into existence in the early '30s and had the immediate effect of retiring rather rapidly a large number of officers who been commissioned during World War I -- had reached the rank of first lieutenant in many cases and could never be expected to go any further. Then, secondly, there were the expansions, the increases in the size of the Corps and the officer corps that took place in the very late '30s and, of course, during World War II.

But the expectation of a new second lieutenant in the mid-'30s, was, I think, just what you got through saying -- that it was to make major prior to retirement. I don't think any of us in my class realized that when we joined the Marine Corps. We all, as I mentioned in my case, it was the only job opportunity open to me. And I was one of the very few of my classmates at the University of Florida that had any opportunity at all. But after basic school and a year or two of service, it soaked in that the probable outcome, if things continued as they were, would be to make major. Possibly lieutenant colonel, but more likely major.

Interviewer: You weren't too unhappy about it?

Chapman: No, I wasn't the least bit concerned. I don't think I even thought about it.

Interviewer: You certainly didn't have any thoughts of commandancy at that time?

Chapman: Oh, good gracious, no.

Interviewer: Was there a time in your later career when you did think, well, maybe I would like to become Commandant and that --

Chapman: No, not really. I never really aspired, and I certainly never worked toward it.

Interviewer: Well, not necessarily work on it, but you know the old aphorism that Napoleon said that every man has a marshal's baton in his haversack. It sounds good, I don't know that it's quite true, although perhaps in the Napoleonic army it was.
Chapman: Well, I suppose I thought I probably had as good a chance as anybody, but there were some very talented people in my time.

Interviewer: Oh, yes, indeed.

Chapman: And which I well recognized. And it was clear that there were many outstanding possibilities.

Interviewer: When does the perception of commandancy become clear? I guess when you become a general officer.

Interviewer: Yes.

Interviewer: Then the chances -- you've got to cross that threshold from colonel to brigadier general.

Chapman: Yes, I'd say you have to make major general.

Interviewer: Oh, you do?

Chapman: Yes, you have to be selected because, remember that only two-thirds -- I don't think this has changed. Two-thirds of the brigadiers make major general.

Interviewer: Yes, but it's a 30 and 5 rule, of course.

Chapman: Yes, and the brigadier who does not make it, then either usually reaches 30 and 5 and must retire. And I think he has to retire after two Passovers, in any event.

Interviewer: Well, that's where --
Chapman: So I think it was then, and I presume it still is, that an officer has to make major
general before he can so -- before you can start thinking that he might be a Commandant in the
future.

Interviewer: Well, just to continue on in this thought vein while we're working on it, do you
suppose there are a number of general officers who, having reached major general, or do you
know of -- I'm sure you must know of some, who have said that I have had it. I don't want the
commandancy. If it were offered to me I'd just --

Chapman: Yes, I've known some like that, very few, but some. And, of course, we all know of a
good number who voluntarily retired after making major general. Long before they would have
been forced to.

Interviewer: Well, general officer is not an easy rank.

Chapman: No, some of them had opportunities on the outside they wanted to take.

Interviewer: And the responsibilities, I think, of a general officer are not commonly known of.
The deep involvement. The deep responsibilities.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Well, from Fort Sill, which was about a 10-month course or nine-month course --

Chapman: Yes, nine months.

Interviewer: -- you went on back to the 2d Marines, but this time -- the 10th Marines, this time
to the 2nd Battalion in San Diego.

Chapman: Yes. I want to remark on a very important event that happened while I was at Fort
Sill.
Interviewer: Your marriage, of course.

Chapman: I went home to -- back to Birmingham, Alabama and was married during the Christmas holidays, on the 27th of December, to Ms. Emily Donaldson Walton Ford.

Interviewer: Where had you met Emily?

Chapman: In Quantico; she was invited to pay a visit to Capt. and Mrs. Clark, Seville Trice Clark, then stationed at Quantico, and in the artillery he was. They were -- Ms. Clark and Emily were cousins, and they invited her to come and visit them in Quantico for two or three weeks. That's where I met her. So then I pursued her back to Tennessee the next time I had leave -- she was from Nashville -- and succeeded. So we were married on 27 December '37.

Interviewer: '37, so 43 -- you just passed your 43rd anniversary.

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: Very interesting. And Emily, of course, has always been very close to you in your career.

Chapman: Oh, very much so. Yes, she's been a wonder.

Interviewer: Now the 10th Marines on the West coast, 2d Battalion, was part of the West coast expeditionary force.

Chapman: Yes, it was part of the 2d Marine Brigade. This is not of any importance, but I've always wondered how it happened. There were three of us, Oldfield, Henderson, and Chapman, that went to Sill that year from the 1st Battalion. And there were three from the 2d Battalion, Jorgenson, Fairbourn, and Taber. And at the end of the school year, we received our orders and four of the six went back where they came from, and two of us swapped places.
Interviewer: How so?

Chapman: Taber and I swapped places. I went to the West coast and he went to the East coast and I've often wondered why headquarters made that decision and speculated on what would have been the outcome if we hadn't swapped, you know. How would our careers have gone if I'd gone back to the East coast and he'd gone back to the West coast.

Interviewer: Well, I thought, you know, what headquarters might have done, and, of course, all of you all being young junior officers, to send the former West coast officers to the East coast and vice versa, but it didn't fit.

Chapman: No.

Interviewer: It didn't work out.

Chapman: They swapped two of us, but the other four went back where they came from.

Interviewer: Who was your battery commander out on the West coast?

Chapman: I was the battalion staff.

Interviewer: Oh, you were on staff then.

Chapman: I was not on the staff, I was the staff.

Interviewer: Right, motor transport officer, assistant AQM.

Chapman: Yes, that means S-4, of course. I was also the quartermaster.

Interviewer: B-1, B-2, B-3 and a com officer.
Chapman: I was it.

Interviewer: And it kept you quite busy?

Chapman: I was it, I was the whole battalion staff.

Interviewer: Did you live in quarters on the base?

Chapman: No, we rented a house in between town and the base, on -- wait a minute, let me think of the name of that street we were on. Albatross.

Interviewer: Oh, yes.

Chapman: Albatross, very nice place, upstairs apartment, very nice. Forty dollars a month.

Let me go back to Fort Sill a minute, and this is another anecdote without any historical significance whatever. I was the senior of the 6th Marines at Fort Sill, the six students. Consequently, every month, I had to make out the muster roll.

Interviewer: Oh, yes.

Chapman: And anybody that was in the Marine Corps prior to World War II will remember what an exercise that was. The muster roll was a document that had existed since the Marine Corps was activated prior to 1800. It had to be perfect. You made up your muster roll each month to the best of your ability. I got one of the school clerks to type it for me. The abbreviations, of which there were many, had to be exactly right. There were certain red underlining required, they had to be exactly right. Then you mailed it in to headquarters, and then without fail, in two or three, four weeks, back it would come with marks on it, errors, and I had to do it over again. Well, by the time I left there, in June of '38, I had yet to get one of my nine muster rolls accepted by headquarters. They kept coming back, one after the other, time after time. I carried them with me to San Diego and I finally got the services of a first class
Marine first sergeant to make it out and make all nine of them out for me. And I signed them and sent them in and they didn't come back that time.

Interviewer: So they all accumulated and they had over the nine-month period --

Chapman: They didn't accept one of them. Every one of them was rejected time after time.

Interviewer: Someone being picky on you back at headquarters.

Chapman: Of course, that underlines the importance and the expertise of the old Marine Corps first sergeant, you know. Who was a master at muster rolls and service record books. You know, we tend to think of him today as more in the troop leading department. And, of course, he was a troop leader in those days, too. But, above all, he was an expert administrative.

Interviewer: Did the -- out on the West coast, the battalion commander was whom?

Chapman: Harrison.

Interviewer: Willie Harrison?


Interviewer: William Henry, who later became -- was regimental commander on Peleliu, I think.

Chapman: He was. Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: And I think the brigade commander was Louie McCarthy Little, if I'm not mistaken?

Chapman: No. No, Little, I think, was the base commander, wasn't he.
Interviewer: I thought maybe he might have been the expeditionary force commander. Or the FMF commander.

Chapman: Yes, he was also the Marine Corps base commander. Or I guess it was called Marine barracks, and that included the recruit depot. I think he was the Fleet Marine Force commander under another hat. I ought to be able to remember who our brigade commander was, but I declare I can't at this moment.

Interviewer: Okay.

Chapman: I hope it'll come to me.

Interviewer: Well, we could always fill it in. You were there for nearly two years.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: You went on the famous exercise to San Clemente?

Chapman: Yes, two or three times.

Interviewer: Two or three times?

Chapman: Yes, we went over at least twice with the artillery battalion for service practice. And it was a miserable place for artillery service practice, but it was all we had, so we made the most out of it. We would go over with an advance detail, one of which I took over as the battalion quartermaster with all the encampment materials and built the camp, tent camp, complete. And then the battalion came over on Navy tugs for the most part.

Interviewer: No landing craft in those days?
Chapman: No, no landing craft. The tug would be towing a 500-ton lighter containing all of the artillery equipment, which --

Interviewer: Which had to be manhandled over the gunwales.

Chapman: Yes, on landing exercises. At the little port and dock at San Clemente, it was lifted out of the lighter with a permanent dock crane, and put up -- laid up on the dock and then driven on up to the camp, which was about a half mile away, up on the hill. So then, from there, soon as we settled down in camp, we went out for just standard service practice. At that point, I would turn my hat around as quartermaster and become the battalion three and I, of course, planned, subject to the Seals' approval, the various firing exercises, service practices and the like. But during that period, we formed an additional battery, F Battery, so that we had three batteries. The first command officer of F Battery was later LtGen Fields.

Interviewer: That's right, he was --

Chapman: (Inaudible.)

Interviewer: Actually, I thought he told me that he never had a middle name, that someone gave him the name Jefferson. I forget exactly what, but of course he's known as Jeff.

Chapman: It's L. J. Fields.

Interviewer: L. J. Fields.

Chapman: I'm sure of that.

Interviewer: Yes. Anything interesting or outstanding during this two-year period, or was it strictly a period of learning, becoming a Marine officer, becoming a Marine artilleryman?
Chapman: Yes, there was a lot of learning all right. You know, how to be a battalion staff officer. How to be several kinds of battalion staff officers, because I was it. But things were mighty simple in those days. It wasn't necessary to work very hard at it. We also went to San Clemente for a brigade exercise. The whole brigade went over there and I was charged, on that occasion, with taking the brigade camp over and building the brigade camp. I had a detail from every one of the brigade units and we put up a pretty good-sized tent city on San Clemente.

Interviewer: I'm trying to remember which of the flexes that the 1st Brigade came through the canal and joined the 2d Brigade in. Was that '39?

Chapman: That was in -- no, that was --

Interviewer: That was earlier.

Chapman: That was earlier, yes. That was while I was at Quantico -- which I did not go on.

Interviewer: '36 or '37?

Chapman: I think it was '36. I think it was just prior to my arrival there at Quantico. I think it was the winter of '35, '36.

Interviewer: I can't see how they all could have fit on San Clemente with everything so rudimentary as it was in those days.

Chapman: Rudimentary is the right word. For instance there is no water. No fresh water on San Clemente, all the water had to be hauled over on Navy barges. There was one interesting episode that occurred during that period. On one of the trips from San Diego to San Clemente, a 500-ton lighter, with brigade equipment aboard, was sunk in a Santa Ana storm. And went down with all the gear on board. Well, in those days, every piece of equipment, every item of supply, was sacrosanct and lasted forever. There was such a thing as a Board of Survey which could remove from the rolls a piece of equipment that was worn out in service, but it required a board
of officers to meet on it and pronounce it in fact worn out in service. So that over the years pieces of equipment had been lost or misplaced or what not. When that 500-ton lighter went down, it was the greatest thing since canned beer for the quartermaster sergeants in the entire bridge. You wouldn't believe what was on that 500-ton lighter. Things like -- like Gatling guns, equipment for servicing 1897 field howitzers, which the Marine Corps hadn't had for 40 years. Kegs of horseshoe nails.

Interviewer: Well, expeditionary things.

Chapman: The Boards of Survey that met and declared items that had gone down on that 500-ton -- I'm sure they're on file in the Marine Corps archives somewhere, but if anybody ever got them out and read them, they'd get quite a laugh out of them.

Interviewer: Did you sit on the board of survey?

Chapman: No, I couldn't, because I was the quartermaster. You know, I wasn't eligible.

Interviewer: Were you going to be a culpable person or are you going to be a party to the event as brigade quartermaster?

Chapman: It wasn't during that occasion that that this barge went down, it was sometime previous, I forget just when. One of the trips to San Clemente.

Interviewer: But I guess the --

Chapman: It must have been after the camp was built. No, I wasn't in any way directly involved. Except we alleged we had some gear on there, too, that went down and that we managed to get off our books.

Interviewer: Well, I guess the old quartermaster supply people were very happy that happened?
Chapman: Oh, they were delighted.

Interviewer: They were able to write a lot of things off?

Chapman: Well, that was the old corps.

Interviewer: It wasn't replaced by like kind, was it?

Chapman: Not the ones that were obsolete. The serviceable equipment was replaced. Of course, remember in those days there was no system like we have now. Each item of equipment was carried on the property rolls of the unit and issued and each in its own right, by the Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps. So that if you wore out an artillery piece or a tank or a truck, you had to put in a requisition to headquarters to get another one. And the quartermaster general was often very loath to issue a new piece because it cost money.

Interviewer: Was there much new equipment coming in to the Marine Corps at this time?

Chapman: I would say yes. I can remember, for instance, the new Marmon Harrington truck that we received in this 2d Battalion 10th Marines at that time. A vast improvement over the little tractors that we had been using. It was a good four-wheel drive truck built by Marmon Harrington. There was a Marmon Harrington tank that came in at that time. There was a lightweight tank that could be delivered ashore in an amphibious operation. New communications equipment called the SCR-167 and 8.

Interviewer: Which lasted a long time.

Chapman: Which lasted a long time. It was about the size of a pack and had a hand set and earphones and could be carried on the back of a Marine in motion. Those are some of the things. Yes, we got a good deal of good new equipment during that time, the late ’30s.

Interviewer: How about artillery pieces, anything new in there?
Chapman: No, the 105 howitzer came out in '39 or '40, but at that time we still had the PAC howitzer and the old French 75.

Interviewer: Where does this artillery come from, the Army, or directly from factories? And who makes it?

Chapman: The PAC howitzer was made in this country. Well, the French 75s were made in this country, too. I think they came -- I'm sure the French 75s came from surplus Army stocks. The PAC howitzer was a standard Army weapon for mountain units. I presume the Marine Corps had a few of them made by the Army arsenal.

Interviewer: And they -- that's what I meant to ask.

Chapman: Oh, yes, they were all made at the Army.

Interviewer: GM didn't make it or --

Chapman: No.

Interviewer: -- something like that.

Chapman: No, they were made at -- I don't remember exactly where. The Army ordnance arsenal at that time.

Interviewer: Well, now, you -- this was your '38 to '40 was your third -- were your third to fifth years in the Marine Corps.

Chapman: Mm-hmm.
Interviewer: And, of course, while you were not salty, you were not red bottom boot loot anymore. Did you feel more at home, more comfortable with it?

Chapman: Oh, yes, sure. At the end of that second year in the Marine Corps, that would have been ’37, at San Diego, we all had to take the probationary exam.

Interviewer: Yes, you were talking about it.

Chapman: Yes. Oh, wait a minute, I'm getting mixed up. I took the probationary exam at Quantico. It was the end of the third year we had to take the promotion exam for first lieutenant, as others have remarked, I'm sure. In those days, an officer had to take a full scale exam for each promotion and then he had to pass it if he wanted to get promoted. Well, promotion to first lieutenant from second lieutenant in those days was automatic at the end of three years, barring prohibiting circumstances.

Interviewer: Were there many who didn't make second and first lieutenant?

Chapman: There were some who didn't pass the exam --

Interviewer: Oh, really?

Chapman: -- and had to take it over again. Those of us that had taken the probationary exam the previous year were exempt from most of the promotion exam, but there was some additional subjects that we had to take an exam on at the end of that third year, and we did. We all of us in San Diego passed it and we were promoted to first lieutenant.

Interviewer: What were some of the highlights out at San Diego in this three-year period, two-year period? Anything specifically come to mind?

Chapman: It was a routine barracks, garrison existence, I would say. Punctuated by field exercises and occasional trips to San Clemente. The Marine Corps base contained the recruit
deposit, the 2nd Brigade and some other special units. Our routine was each weekday was from 8:00 to 3:30, which was sort of a short day. And on Wednesday, it was 8:00 to 12:00. On Saturday, it was 8:00 to about -- until the completion of inspection, and we had an inspection. The commanding officer conducted an inspection every Saturday morning, at the conclusion of which we all went to the mess hall and tested the standard Saturday lunch, which was hot rolls and ham. And we always declared it suitable. During those rather brief hours each day -- and, of course, that was only about a 30-hour week, if that -- we conducted gun drills, communication talking exercises; we practiced with the radios. Of course, we had troop and stomp every morning at 8:00. It was very routine and quite simple.

Interviewer: Were you able to live comfortably on what you were making, on the social side of it, was it always a struggle? I'm sure you had to be --

Chapman: No, I'd say we lived comfortably. Our tastes were simple. Our pay was small, but prices were very low in those days, you know. At the Navy commissary two big, thick lamb chops for 25 cents. A bunch of carrots from the Japanese farmers who grew -- who had truck gardens in Mission Valley, which is now totally covered with housing.

Interviewer: Yes, yes.

Chapman: Two bunches of carrots for five cents. A hamburger was 10 cents. No, we did very well. Our rent was $40 a month. We spent a maximum of about $25 a month on really good chow, had one automobile, gasoline at the post exchange filling station was eight cents a gallon. A new Chevrolet, which we didn't have, we had a secondhand Dodge, but a new Chevrolet was $600.

Interviewer: Which was a lordly sum in those days.

Chapman: Yes, it was. It was half -- about half a year's pay for a second lieutenant. And I think that's still true as a Chevrolet today is about half of your pay for a second lieutenant, but it's a lot more money.
Interviewer: Yes, it is.

Chapman: But relatively it's about the same. Our social life consisted mainly of bridge with our other -- our second lieutenant friends. An occasional event at the officer's club, which was very nice and quite inexpensive.

Interviewer: Did you --

Chapman: We did very little drinking.

Interviewer: Very little drinking?

Chapman: Very little drinking among my contemporaries.

Interviewer: Living out in a civilian area, did you associate much with civilians?

Chapman: Not much, I'd say very little. We associated a little with our landlady, who was a very nice widow. The widow of Mr. Mack of Mack Truck, by the way.

Interviewer: Oh, really?

Chapman: She was our lady, Mrs. Mack. That was about it. Our social regimen was with the other Marine junior officers and very rarely, with more senior officers.

Interviewer: Who were you particularly friendly with, the friendship that carried on for say until today?

Chapman: Oh, well, Fields, Jorgenson, Fairbourn, of course, Willie Harrison until the day he died.
Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: John Bush, Rod Wilson, who was the battalion executive officer, and then, later, the battalion commander, when Col. Harrison transferred elsewhere, until he died. Others I got to know quite well were, of course, Don Weller, Lew Walt, who was in the 6th Marines. Joe Stewart, who was in the 6th Marines.

Interviewer: Great guy.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Lew Walt, particularly.

Interviewer: What was he like in those years? He was class of ’36, I believe?

Chapman: Yes, well, just like he has been ever since.

Interviewer: Oh, really?

Chapman: Yes, very hard-charging, physical, clean cut, just a born troop leader.

Interviewer: I guess troop leaders are born and not made, then.

Chapman: Well, in his case I'm sure he was born a troop leader, he was just a natural troop leader. Oh, another particularly close friend, who was killed in World War II, was Ken Bailey.

Interviewer: Oh, yes.


Interviewer: Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal. From Guadalcanal. Were you contemporaries? Yes, he was in your class.
Chapman: Oh, yes.

Interviewer: That's right, he was in your class, certainly. From there in 1940, February, '40 you're assigned to the 1st Defense Battalion. Now you became -- you were CO of HNS Battery. And I've been told that assignment to the Defense Battalion was very desirable in those days, that it was a flush assignment. Is that quite correct?

Chapman: I don't remember it that way. Certainly it wasn't undesirable. The Defense Battalion was a new thing. The 1st Defense Battalion was formed there at San Diego and I was a member of the forming, the activating, crew. Correct, I was COH in S Battery, but, more importantly, I was the adjutant. Col. Bone was our commanding officer, Bert Bone.

Interviewer: Bert Bone.

Chapman: He was our commanding officer. It was a temporary assignment in that I had orders, permanent change of station orders, to the Marine detachment, USS Astoria. So I moved over to the Defense Battalion for a period of about three months during its activation and formation. We received our troops. We received our weapons and officers and formed the battalion. It had .50 caliber machine guns, three-inch anti-aircraft and the old GPFs with a land mount.

Interviewer: Oh, yes.

Chapman: Sort of a permanent and placement mount, type of mount, that could be riveted in an island defense role as seacoast artillery.

Interviewer: Platforms had to be built for them, I believe.

Chapman: I think, yes. As a matter of fact, we just barely got started on our activation when we were ordered to convert ourselves into an aggressor force. And we moved to San Clemente to act as the enemy against the brigade landing that year. Col. Bone was COO of the aggressors and I was an aggressor company commander and we fought the landing brigade tooth and nail,
but, needless to say, they won in the end. Then we returned to San Diego and resumed forming the Defense Battalion. But about that time I was detached and went on sea duty.

Interviewer: Who was your detachment commander on the Astoria?

Chapman: I was.

Interviewer: Oh, did you command at that time?

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Oh, okay.

Chapman: Yes, there were several of us, still first lieutenants, who were -- classmates of mine, who were ordered to sea that year as detachment commanders as first lieutenants. In my carrier division, the Astoria Carrier Division, there were three of us. It was Collins, was on the New Orleans. I was on the Astoria. My computer is giving out again. I can't even remember the name of the third ship.

Interviewer: That was part of the Pacific fleet, or part of the U.S. fleet then?

Chapman: Well, it was both. They were one and the same in those days. There was only one U.S. fleet and it was in the Pacific. It wasn't called the Pacific fleet, it was called the U.S. fleet.

Interviewer: The old U.S. fleet. You joined the Astoria where?

Chapman: At Pearl Harbor.

Interviewer: At Pearl Harbor, that was where you were home based?

Chapman: Yes, that was our home station.
Interviewer: Mrs. Chapman came out with you?

Chapman: Yes, we went to Hawaii on the Lurline.

Interviewer: Yes, indeed.

Chapman: That was quite a wonderful experience for a young married couple. There were several of us that did, the Jorgensons, the Fairbourns, and ourselves, went on the Lurline together.

Interviewer: Of course, sea duty was part of the career pattern at --

Chapman: Oh, very much so. It was considered essential in those days. I was the commanding officer of the Marine detachment on the Astoria, and I had one officer, one JO, his name was Olrich, Martin Olrich, who later became an aviator and went on to colonel in the Marine Corps and retirement. I had a first sergeant, a staff sergeant and 39 Marines, 41 total.

Interviewer: This is independent in a sense for you.

Chapman: Very much so, yes. My first sergeant's name was Hord, H o r d, Hord. Many of the Marines of that detachment were commissioned in World War II and went on to higher enlisted and warrant officer ranks as well as commissioned ranks. They were very special young men. Of course, the average Marine in those days was of a very high type, as I'm sure you remember.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: The enlistment requirements, the recruitment, were -- couldn't be less than 5'8, or taller than 6'1”, I believe it was. Could not wear glasses, had to have 20/20 vision without the aid of glasses, had to be a high school graduate, had to have a perfect record. You know, no arrests, no failures in school, and all white.
Interviewer: All white.

Chapman: All white.

Interviewer: Never conceived of blacks ever coming in the Marine Corps or women?

Chapman: Never even thought of it in those days. The entire Marine Corps was white. White males. Let's see, well, on the Astoria we manned the number one and number two five-inch 25-AA guns, and the forward director. And I was the sky control officer for the main AA Battery, operated from sky director forward. Which is up in the very top of the foremast, over the bridge.

Interviewer: That must have been an experience climbing up there.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Often at a dead run. Kept in pretty good shape in those days racing up to the sky forward. And then, of course, that was at general quarters. Then in routine the Marines were captains or brig guard, other guards, gangway guards.

Interviewer: Any concern for forming up an expeditionary force on the ships?

Chapman: Yes, we -- there was a well-thought-out plan for both the Navy and Marine landing forces. Fleet landing forces --

Interviewer: Fleet landing forces, right.

Chapman: -- from the ships, and we practiced it a number of times. I was the CO of the combined company that was provided by the New Orleans, the Astoria, and the other ship whose name I can't remember, but sister ship to the New Orleans and the Astoria.

End Tape 1, Side A
Chapman: And she was the flagship. She was the flagship of the cruiser division, the division composed of the three cruisers.

Interviewer: You were fairly lucky. It seems to me that many of the officers who went sea going at this time, just before the war, many were stuck on board ship until '44, they couldn't get off.

Chapman: Yes, I think that's true.

Interviewer: There were a large number who really didn't get into the war until they joined either the 5th or 6th Divisions in '44. I can think of any number of --

Chapman: That's true. Yes, that's true.

Interviewer: And you got --

Chapman: Well, I don't know exactly why that happened except that I was ordered back to the artillery school at Quantico. But, before we get into that, let me remark on a couple of other things concerning the Astoria.

Interviewer: Yes, please. Okay. We were going to talk about the Astoria. You had a couple of --

Chapman: Yes, well, I can't talk about the Astoria without remarking that my first commanding officer, the skipper of the ship, was Richmond Kelly Turner.

Interviewer: Oh, so really?

Chapman: Yes, he was the captain. And he liked Marines very much.
Interviewer: He did.

Chapman: Yes, and, as a matter of fact, I probably was the closest to him of anybody on board, including the executive officer, and all the Navy officers stood in total awe and fear of him. And he was a stern taskmaster, there's no doubt about that. And, of course, he was incredibly brilliant, intellectually brilliant.

Interviewer: He made his mark at the Naval War College, of course.

Chapman: Yes, he had. And, of course, he left the Astoria and went back to Navy headquarters as the war plans officer and he was the U.S. Navy's war plans officer when War World II started.

Interviewer: He carried out many of the campaigns that he had planned. Okinawa was the first one.

Chapman: Right. That was his plan. His plan for the general conduct of the war in the Pacific was the one that was used throughout. And then, as you said, he went out and conducted about half of the major landing operations during the war. He was the amphibious task force commander.

Interviewer: He did like his Marines, though.

Chapman: He loved his Marines. The Marines could do no wrong and I, many times, would stand around and watch him just castigating these poor Navy officers.

Interviewer: Was he a sundowner in the tradition, say, of -- would you say of Adm King, Ernie King?

Chapman: Yes. Yes, I'd say very much so.
Interviewer: Same mold, cast out of the same mold.

Chapman: Same mold. Very tough, very strict, very high standards of performance in every respect. And absolutely ruthless, you know, in carrying out his standards. As far as I know -- see, I came aboard in June, I think it was, of ’38.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And he was detached early the next year. So I saw him for about seven or eight months, was quite close to him on many occasions and in that entire time I never saw him smile once. He was tough. He was really tough.

Interviewer: Did you ever see him on liberty at all?

Chapman: No.

Interviewer: Did you socialize with him?

Chapman: Oh, no, no. There was too much space separating us, the captain of the ship and the captain of the Marine detachment, it was just too far apart for any social contact.

Interviewer: There were no such thing as ship's parties or --

Chapman: No, there was no such thing as ship's parties in those days.

Interviewer: How were the Marines accepted aboard ship by the Navy, by the officers aboard there?

Chapman: Oh, I think they were liked very much, yes. I know they were. Sure, the ship's officers -- there were only about 20-odd ship's officers. And they were all career, Naval
Academy graduates, every one of them. And, yes, they thought highly of the Marines. Of course, the Marines often worked for them when they stood officer of the deck watches.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: In various proper Marine capacities.

Interviewer: Well, that's an interesting point that you made there. It's a matter of fact that the -- all the Navy officers at that time were Naval Academy graduates, and only a small percentage of the Marine officers were Naval Academy graduates. And I suppose that --

Chapman: In my class.

Interviewer: In your class.

Chapman: Of course, prior to my class, they almost all were Navy Academy grads, but they were much smaller classes.

Interviewer: But not being a Naval Academy graduate didn't work against you at all?

Chapman: I couldn't see it had any effect whatever. Well, during those two years on the Astoria, we participated in many fleet exercises. Many gunnery exercises of our own. I was the sky control officer for the main sky control. I was sky control forward so we -- the fleet air would send out an airplane with a target, a sleeve towing behind it. Very brave people that would fly those airplanes, by the way.

Interviewer: Yes, I would think so.

Chapman: And we'd bang away with our five-inch 25s. We had some notable successes when I was CO -- when I was sky control director -- and got highly complimented by the captain. And, of course, we had our standard battle practices broadside, main battery practices.
Interviewer: Astoria was a heavy cruiser?

Chapman: Heavy cruiser, eight-inch. One of the treaty cruisers, so called.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Coming out of the treaty with Japan and others for the limitation --

Interviewer: Of 1925.

Chapman: 1925, yes. It was a beautiful ship. Of course, she's on the bottom of Iron Bottom Bay now.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: With the New Orleans and the -- number of others.

Interviewer: Was that the Battle of Savo?

Chapman: Savo Islands, yes. Of course, World War II started -- that is, the Pearl Harbor attack.

Interviewer: Where were you? Where was the Astoria when World War II started?

Chapman: We were off the entrance to the harbor, several miles en route in, on that morning.

Interviewer: You were with that destroyer --

Chapman: The Yorktown.

Interviewer: Oh, you were with the Yorktown?
Chapman: We were with the Yorktown task force and we were the flagship. And the admiral was Frank Jack Fletcher. He was also the admiral of the Cruiser Division, of which our ship was a part, the Astoria was the flagship then. Well, we were, oh, 50, 100 miles off the harbor. I remember I had had the midwatch the midnight before.

Interviewer: The night before, yes.

Chapman: And at about 6:00 or so, 6:30, general quarters went. I was sound asleep, having been up practically all night. And I remember I was pretty unhappy with being roused by general quarters on Sunday morning after I had stood the midwatch. But, of course, I got up and raced up to my battle station. The captain came on the horn and said that he had -- they had just received a message that the Japanese were attacking Pearl Harbor and it was no drill. Well, we had a hard time believing it, believe me.

There was a Navy captain wrote an article in the Naval Institute Proceedings a number of years ago that I thought was so appropriate. It was a description of the Pearl Harbor attack, a historical description. And the title of the article was How Innocent We Were. That's a very appropriate title. We were certainly -- now there may have been those up high in the fleet hierarchy that apprehended conflict, but I can tell you that none of us down at low levels had the slightest idea that World War II was that close to us, yes. To the U.S. fleet.

Anyhow, what convinced us on the Astoria -- of course, we turned away from Pearl Harbor then and steamed out and received orders to simply lurk in the vicinity until they could decide what to do with us. And about noon, we spotted a flight of three PBYs making a bombing run on us. So we loaded up and fired our anti-aircraft. The PBYs dropped some minuscule hundred pound bombs. The air was full of bursts. There were some bursts in the sea. The PBYs flew away unscathed and we steamed on unscathed, but that convinced us that it really was no drill.

Interviewer: Now did -- Mrs. Chapman was out in Honolulu with you?
Chapman: Yes. Yes, we had an apartment up in Ouana Valley; she was right there when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

Interviewer: She was evacuated back to the States?

Chapman: No, she stayed for about six months. She managed to stay for about six months. Her ship date kept getting postponed and she was able to stay, and did.

Interviewer: You were -- of course, you worked in and out of Pearl.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Let's see, you took part in the Battle of the Coral Sea, which was in the spring of --

Chapman: Yes, May of '42.

Interviewer: May of '42.

Chapman: Yes, well, at first, we went off on some island raids.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Well, first, we were ordered from our position just off the harbor to enter the harbor and fuel and provision, so we did. We came into Pearl Harbor I think it was the second day after the attack and tied up at our regular buoy, one of the fox buoys. And it was a horrible sight. The harbor was. And I won't attempt to describe it, it's been described many times by word and by picture.

Interviewer: How did you feel --
Chapman: Well, of course we were, you know, that convinced, if nothing else did, that there really was a war going on and we were in it. Well, I'd say basically we were mad. We were angry. Determined. I often thought of what Yamamoto said about the attack on Pearl Harbor. He said we've had a great success, but we have awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible rage.

Interviewer: Which was true.

Chapman: And that was true. And you could feel it on my ship, the Astoria, from the captain right on down to the lowest-ranking Marine and sailor. They were filled with a rage.

Interviewer: Now you were part of the relief force, too, were you not?

Chapman: Yes. Well, from Pearl Harbor then, that was our next assignment. We were the flagship. Frank Jack Fletcher, vice admiral, was the -- in command.

Interviewer: And I think Adm Pie was in command of the whole operation.

Chapman: Well, he was the acting fleet commander, yes.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: Adm Fletcher was the task force commander for the Wake Island relief force. And the Astoria, my ship, was his flagship. We steamed toward Wake, and this has been covered historically in detail, with the defense battalion and another squadron of Marine fighters. As everybody knows, we never got there. We stopped to refuel the destroyers and we got there -- by the time we got there, there had been scouting reports of Japanese navy forces in the vicinity and the admiral elected not to close the island and land the reinforcements.

I'll have to say that all my Marines and I went up to the captain and volunteered to land. But the captain said, "Don't be a fool. Go on back and man your guns." So, fortunately, I guess, for us, he didn't accede to that request.
Interviewer: Considerable unhappiness when they didn't continue on to --

Chapman: Yes, although there wasn't a good understanding of the overall situation. It was as we were orbiting in the vicinity that we heard the island, that the Japs had landed and then, of course, we just beat a retreat back to Pearl Harbor. And that made many of us very unhappy.

Interviewer: Frank Jack Fletcher, it's been said, he found the most unfortunate times to refuel.

Chapman: That was to some extent true at Midway, too.

Interviewer: Midway and also at Guadalcanal.

Chapman: Yes, at Coral Sea or Guadalcanal.

Interviewer: At Guadalcanal he pulled -- he was there at the landing of division and then gave them, oh, I think, 72 hours to load, then pulled out. And I guess he had a real fear and I guess it was pretty valid that they didn't want to lose another carrier and they didn't want to lose the capital of ships or anything else.

Chapman: Yes, at that point we had lost the Enterprise and the Yorktown.

Interviewer: That's right.

Chapman: The Saratoga had been torpedoed and it was in the yard --

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: -- getting restored. The only carriers left were the --

Interviewer: Enterprise --
Chapman: Wait a minute, I said the Enterprise was lost. It was the Lexington --

Interviewer: The Lex.

Chapman: -- was lost at Coral Sea. Yes, I guess the only carrier left was the Enterprise.

Interviewer: Halsey's -- Halsey's flag aboard.

Chapman: Well, we then, after the Wake Island expedition, I should go back and say, by the way, that right after Pearl Harbor, after we had entered the harbor, refueled and provisioned and taken on some more sailors and a few more officers, we steamed out and we went -- we were part of a task force that was ordered south to try to find the Japanese carrier task force that had bombed the island. Well, unfortunately we were ordered to go south, because the Japanese had gone north and, therefore, we never found them. And then we went on some island -- we went on the Wake Island expedition, which was aborted. We went on to some raids down the islands down in the south Pacific.

Interviewer: Marshalls, I think.

Chapman: Yes, Marshalls, Solomons, Lee.

Interviewer: You went as far down there as New Guinea.

Chapman: Right. Then, next, came the Coral Sea. Well, I was still the sky control officer. The anti-aircraft officer. We bagged several Japanese planes in that battle. In fact, we led the fleet in affirmed anti-aircraft kills until through Midway with our five-inch 25s.

Interviewer: I think Toots Henderson was on the Indianapolis at that time. Was that part of your force?
Chapman: At the Coral Sea, I don't remember, but I don't think so.

Interviewer: Because I know he said that he was at Pearl.

Chapman: Yes, he was at Pearl all right. I don't think he was at the Coral Sea, I'm not sure about that.

Interviewer: And they went far afield, they went all the way down to the South Pacific.

Chapman: Yes. In any event, the -- it was an event I'll never forget. We got to the Coral Sea and the admiral sent out scouting planes early one morning when we knew the Japanese were on their way down. And after about two hours, in came the signal from one of the scouting planes and it was relayed to the whole fleet by means of the flags. And translated, it said I have sighted, and then he went to list what he had sighted. He sighted something like four battleships, eight carriers, scores of destroyers and smaller ships. Well, of course, those were a gross exaggeration. But it got the attention of all the sailors and the Marines in the fleet. Well, then we went on to the battle, of course, and that's been well documented historically. We picked up several of our aviators who crash-landed in the sea right beside our ship. Of course, the Lexington went down.

Interviewer: Did you see it go?

Chapman: Oh, yes, we saw her burn and go down. It was incredible, the fire that something made out of solid steel would make out there in the ocean. Adm Fletcher, who had been on the Lexington, transferred, again, to the Astoria, who was the flagship. So we were the flagship again. And it was a pretty bedraggled command group that finally got aboard, of course. They had had to get out through the fire and flame and oil of the Lexington. But we got them aboard. We got many of the Marine detachment from the Lexington came on the Astoria, too. And we helped strip them down and clean them off real good and issue them new Marine uniforms. Which, of course, was illegal in those days. I mean we were still on a very strict clothing accounting, you know. Whereas each Marine had a clothing allowance, not by money, not by
dollar value as he does today, but by individual item of equipment. You know, he was authorized one pair of khaki trousers each year and three sets of skivvies and so forth. So you just didn't issue clothes.

Interviewer: Most quartermasters wanted the stuff left on the shelves, anyway.

Chapman: Right. But, anyhow, we did it, and nothing was ever said.

Interviewer: You said that word had come down before the scouting planes went out, the Japanese force was on the way. Do you know by what means the word came?

Chapman: I think it was -- I don't know for sure. I think it was coast watchers, though.

Interviewer: As opposed to --

Chapman: Up at (inaudible) you know.

Interviewer: (Inaudible), along the Solomons.

Chapman: Along the Solomons, yes.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And then, of course, in those days, you know, we were breaking the Japanese codes.

Interviewer: Right. That's what I was --

Chapman: That was probably -- that may have been the major source.

Interviewer: Then word came out from Pearl?
Chapman: Probably, yes.

Interviewer: And, of course, since that time, I've learned about magic and it might have been through that means, too. Which --

Chapman: Yes, could be.

Interviewer: You would never know it.

Chapman: No, we wouldn't know it. The admiral, doubtless, knew, but we didn't. Well, the Coral Sea ended. It was a -- I think it was a tactical standoff, but it was a strategic victory.

Interviewer: For the United States?

Chapman: For the United States. In other words, we turned them -- in other words we turned them back. Their overall objective was Australia and New Zealand, after the Solomons, and we turned them back at that time. And then, of course, they came back again later on.

Well, from the Coral Sea, we went to Tonga Islands.

Interviewer: Samoa?

Chapman: No, the Tonga is an independent group of islands.

Interviewer: British protectorate.

Chapman: British protectorate.

Interviewer: Queen of Tonga was --

Chapman: Queen -- I'll think of it in a minute. Yes, Queen Salote.
Interviewer: Yes, that's right.

Chapman: Salote, Queen Salote.

Interviewer: How you remembered that, I --

Chapman: I'll never forget that week we spent in the Tonga Islands.

Interviewer: You had been aboard ship for how long now?

Chapman: It must have been 90 days or so.

Interviewer: Ninety days.

Chapman: I know we were down to -- in the officers' mess, and I was the mess hall (inaudible) by the way. I was the officer's mess. We were down to something like soda crackers and canned salmon.

Interviewer: Oh, man.

Chapman: And my days as the mess officer were somewhat unpleasant. But that's the best -- that's all we had left and it's the best we could do. Let's see, well, we'd gone to sea right after the Wake Island expedition.

Interviewer: You went back to Pearl and then --

Chapman: We went back to Pearl. And so then that was January, February, March, April, May. Well, I think that's -- I don't think we'd been out that long. We'd been out about 90 days, though, 90 or a hundred days. And we were getting down to the bottom on all of the consumables except oil, fuel oil. Of course with tankers had fueled us regularly all that time.
Well, in the Tonga Islands, we anchored. It was thought to be quite safe and so there was a minimum watch standing. We just worked on repairing the ships and squaring things away and getting some rest. And we got some liberty ashore. We were still the flagship. I'll never forget when Queen Salote paid a state visit to Adm Frank Jack Fletcher, who was the overall commander. She came out in an outrigger canoe with escorts of canoes. She weighed 300 pounds if she weighed an ounce and she was about 6'4" or five. Biggest woman I think I've ever seen. Very regal, dark brown, in native dress. She stepped out on the gangway platform and I'll swear the ship heeled over two or three inches. Up she came, we rendered her full band and honors and gun salute. She took it just as a head of state should. She inspected the Marine detachment. Very intelligent woman. Then she paid a state visit on the admiral to the admiral's cabin and then she made a ceremonious departure in her outrigger canoe. It was quite an experience.

Interviewer: Yes, it must have been. It must have been.

Chapman: Well, we pulled into the Tonga harbor at night. At daybreak, the next morning, I had the sky control watch. I had the 4:00 to 8:00, 0400 to 0800, sky control watch. And with the first peep of daylight, I started looking around through my high-powered sky control glasses. In the harbor were a number of small islands. One was quite near to us and so I just naturally out of curiosity I focused this high-powered glass on that little island and would you believe, I saw it was covered with avocado trees. So I called away the motor whaler and our mess steward and sent him over to that little island and he came back with a boatload of ripe avocados. And we had them on the table for the officers' breakfast that morning. That was the only plaudit I got as mess officer in the course of about three or four months.

Interviewer: Yes. Were you able to replenish your food at Tonga?

Chapman: Yes, we -- there was a provision ship there.

Interviewer: I see.
Chapman: And we got dry stores. We didn't get anything fresh. But we got a complete supply of dry stores.

Interviewer: This was part of the fleet train?

Chapman: Right. We refueled and then we were ordered suddenly back to Pearl Harbor. Later on, of course, we've learned it was because the code breakers had learned that the Japanese were going to attack Midway. So we went back to Pearl Harbor under forced draft, as they used to say. We steamed into Pearl Harbor, stayed one night and part of the next day, during which time we did provision with fresh stores. And we loaded back up on ammunition and fuel and everything else, took on some more sailors and steamed off to the Battle of Midway.

Interviewer: That stuff was all waiting there for your arrival?

Chapman: Yes, it was.

Interviewer: What did you do, requisition it by wire, or they knew or it was a standard replenishment?

Chapman: I think it must have been a standard replenishment. Everything was available, all we had to do was go ashore and get it.

Interviewer: That's quite --

Chapman: And get it back aboard ship in the space of about 18 hours. That's about how long we were there.

Interviewer: Quick turnaround. Mrs. Chapman, did you get a chance to see her (inaudible)?

Chapman: No. I called her, but I didn't get to see her.
Interviewer: Now you went out, of course, to take up stations for the Battle of Midway.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Again, we were with the Yorktown. We were the alternate flagship. And I don't suppose I need to describe the Battle of Midway, that's been done in great detail. Well, the Astoria played a good role. We, again, we shot down a number of the planes that attacked the Yorktown. And, again, we picked up Adm Frank Jack Fletcher off the Yorktown this time. And the Astoria was, again, his flagship. Historical records show that it was about at that point he turned over the command to Adm Spruins. So he was no longer in overall command. Again, we took on board the Marine detachment from the Yorktown, covered with oil and dirt, issued them new Marine uniforms. That was still illegal, by the way.

Interviewer: I think it must have been illegal throughout the war.

Chapman: And, well, that was the Battle of Midway. I spent the whole battle up in the sky control, forward sky control.

Interviewer: (Inaudible) of everything that was going on.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Occasionally we would go from general quarters to condition two, but not very often. That condition two was pretty tough, by the way. After that four on and four off, with the two dogwatches. And you could stand that for a few days, but after about a week of getting what amounted to, oh, four, four-and-a-half hours' sleep each 24 hours, maximum sleep, because we went to general quarters at sundown for a half before until a half after. And then we went to general quarters a half-hour prior to dawn and a half, or maybe it was an hour, afterwards. And so both of those caught in -- came in the middle of what would be your sleeping time. So after, oh, a week or 10 days of condition two, you began to get pretty darned tired. And we had a lot of people going to sleep on watch. Our captain finally devised something called condition three, which had been unheard of, where we stood one and three instead of one and two. And then we started getting a little more sleep.

You know, the Japanese -- I think it was the Japanese, maybe it was the British, always used to say if you ever got into a war with the United States Navy, they would just hover out of
range for two or three weeks and then they'd just walk in and take over because everybody would be exhausted.

Interviewer: Yes. Tell me, what did it mean to the ship's crew when the ship was made a flagship? Was it --

Chapman: Oh, not much. The flag complement was small. There were spaces reserved for them on the ship, so they didn't displace anybody. Of course, the flag bridge just stood vacant when there was no admiral aboard. It doubled the work of the communication people. The main impact was on them, particularly since we were under radio silence practically all the time. All of us -- all of the communicating was done by flags, signal flags. And semaphores and blinker lights.

Interviewer: I mean did the ship have to be a little bit smarter, a little bit more attentive?

Chapman: That would certainly be true in peacetime.

Interviewer: Yes,

Chapman: But I don't think it made any difference in wartime. You know, we were all at general quarters or at condition two constantly.

Interviewer: Well, you served, of course, in combat both at sea, aboard ship, and on land at Okinawa. So on --

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: Which is the cleanest way?

Chapman: Oh, unquestionably, aboard ship.
Interviewer: Aboard ship.

Chapman: You know, a bunk to sleep in every night, three hot meals every day. Take a shower every day, clean clothes all the time. No doubt, no question about it.

Interviewer: Were you chafing at the bit to get ashore, to get back with the corps again?

Chapman: I can't say I was, because we were so damn busy. After all, you know, we -- look what we'd been through in those -- what would that be, about seven months. We were constantly at sea, in two major battles, some smaller things.

Interviewer: It wasn't as though you were in the backwash of the war?

Chapman: Oh, certainly not. So, in any event, after the Battle of Midway, we were the -- we were sent north with the Saratoga to check into Attu and Kodiak, where the Japanese had made a landing. But it was a very small landing and amounted to nothing really in the strategic sense. But, en route, the Saratoga got torpedoed. The torpedo came right across our bow and right into the side of the Saratoga. I saw it coming and I was up at sky control. And you could see it for, oh, two or three miles, you know. And the wake, the torpedo wake. So I shouted "Torpedo," there was a mad scramble and the captain turned to -- the officer on deck turned the ship as he should have.

Interviewer: Toward the torpedo.

Chapman: Toward the torpedo. She went by us harmlessly and right into the Saratoga. So that ended that. We then, again, went back to Pearl Harbor and I was detached and began a new tour at Quantico.

Interviewer: A new tour. Was the speed of a torpedo and the maneuverability of ships such that it was very difficult to get it out of the way of a torpedo coming at you?
Chapman: Well, of course, depending on how soon you saw the torpedo. In this case, we saw her a couple of miles away and it was no trick to take emergency measures and dodge her. For a cruiser. The Saratoga was a different matter. She was so huge and unwieldy, but she tried to turn; but it was too late.

Interviewer: How far abeam was she of you?

Chapman: The Saratoga? Well, we were standard cruising formation, probably about -- damned if I remember the exact figure, something like a thousand yards.

Interviewer: It wasn't too far away, then.

Chapman: No. No, we were in close formation. That was for anti-aircraft protection.

Interviewer: But you had a destroyer screen for other (inaudible).

Chapman: And a destroyer screen, yes. The Saratoga had a cruiser on each beam and one ahead, I think. And then destroyer screen around the whole -- the lot.

Interviewer: And if that were the case, then her -- if that were the formation with the AA screen of the cruisers, then her stern was pretty vulnerable to incoming aircraft.

Chapman: Well, of course, when aircraft was sighted coming in, we maneuvered to bring to bear the most firepower we had. A target astern or ahead was in the most disadvantageous position for us. We had to get broadside with the anti-aircraft to put up the most firepower.

Interviewer: You had how many -- on the cruiser, you had how many gun mounts, how many anti-aircraft?

Chapman: Well, four five-inch on each side.
Interviewer: Four five-inch mounts on each side?

Chapman: Right. Four five-inch mounts and two directors, one forward and one aft. Sky aft -- sky forward and sky aft. We had .50 calibers. And we had something new that we got -- let me think now, when did we get them.

Interviewer: The Autocon 40s?

Chapman: The 1.1s.

Interviewer: Oh, the 1.1s?

Chapman: The 1.1 automatic quad mount. Was it an Autocon, I don't remember.

Interviewer: I think it was.

Chapman: I think it was Swedish. It was either the boffers or the autocon, but I think it's the autocon. I think it's the autocon, I think so. It was a quad mount for 1.1 inch anti-aircraft guns. Each fired a high-powered projectile.

Interviewer: 40mm?

Chapman: No, it was 1.1 inch caliber with a super-sensitive content fuse that could be set off by fabric in the aircraft or thin aluminum skin. They were good. They were not very reliable -- you could start firing at anti-aircraft with four guns working and by the time he was gone, you would probably have only one still firing, maybe none, because they would have jams and breakdowns.

Interviewer: Any explosions with them?

Chapman: No. Premature, you mean?
Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: No, no prematures, not while I was there.

Interviewer: I think the defense battalions that were out there at the time had been issued them for ground mounts and the 14th District Marine commander, who was -- I forget his name right now -- put out an order taking them away. He was going to take them away and there was a big whoopedy-do about it; apparently he was enjoined to keep them in, but the --

Chapman: I wasn't aware of that.

Interviewer: -- defense battalions had them, too.

Chapman: Well, the carriers had been equipped with .20mm, and they proved highly effective against a dive bomber.

Interviewer: I don't know why the .40mm thing sticks in my mind, that must have been maybe the boffers.

Chapman: Could be, we didn't have them, though.

Interviewer: They were effective, though?

Chapman: They were effective, yes. They were effective. Well, I think I've about run out for today.

Interviewer: Okay. This is a good point. We get to your assignment at the artillery course at Quantico, and then we go on to Peleliu and Okinawa.

Chapman: Okay. I'll have to think of some more things concerning (inaudible).
Interviewer: Very good. We have one of our research historians who has some questions about the Astoria, as a matter of fact; I'll call him and tell him to have it ready for you next time.

Chapman: Great.

Interviewer: He wanted to ask you. Well, thank you, General.

Chapman: Okay. You're welcome.

End Session IV
PDS
TAPE TRANSCRIPTION
Interviewer: This is side 1, Tape 1, Session V, with Gen Chapman. The date of this interview is 8 December 1981.

And where we ended last time, sir, was when you were due to be detached from the Astoria, June of ’42, to go to Quantico. But I'd like to go and recap the two battles, major battles, that the Astoria was involved with. We talked about the sinking of the Saratoga. Let's take the Battle of the Coral Sea first, and that was in, oh, let's see, ’42, I believe. Early ’42.

Chapman: Yes, May of ’42.

Interviewer: May of ’42, okay. All right. And I want to get your perceptions of the Battle of the Coral Sea campaign. Now, there were a number of striking engagements that you had, but also there was a major naval engagement, was there not?

Chapman: No, there was no meeting of surface ships.

Interviewer: I see.

Chapman: With each other. It was entirely an air battle. The air being based on carriers, Japanese carriers and American carriers. So that those of us in the fleet, it was Task Force 17, saw Japanese airplanes, but we never saw any Japanese ships.

Interviewer: This is quite an extensive cruise that the -- foray that the fleet and task force was involved with. Probably the furtherest at this time of the war than any American task force had been involved with, I think.
Chapman: Yes, it was, and it was the farthest from home base which, of course, was Pearl Harbor. And it was the longest time at sea, I think. We were at sea for something over three months.

Interviewer: Three months. I think Toots Henderson was in a detachment on another ship in that task force.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Pennsylvania, was it, perhaps?

Chapman: No, the Pennsylvania was a battleship. It was one of the other cruisers.

Interviewer: Indianapolis.

Chapman: It could have been. I've forgotten.

Interviewer: You mentioned they were running out of food and all sorts of things like that.

Chapman: Yes, we were, and I had the unhappy experience of being the mess treasurer for the officer's mess. Did I discuss that last time?

Interviewer: No, sir.

Chapman: And we got down to where just about all we had left was canned salmon and soda crackers. And so I was in somewhat low repute among the officers of the Astoria because we didn't have much to eat toward the end.

Interviewer: Was the mess treasurer responsible for the supplies in the ward room?

Chapman: Yes, he, together with the chief steward, who, of course, was the direct petty officer in charge. But when we sailed from Pearl, shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, on this
expedition, we had no idea where we were going or how long we were going to be gone. We had good stocks, but they weren't sufficient for the time that we were actually gone.

Interviewer: That's three months.

Chapman: Yes, it was over three months. I forget the exact period. We got back to Pearl just before the Battle of Midway. And we spent one night there.

Interviewer: Replenishing?

Chapman: In Pearl. And the chief steward and the mess stewards made a big run ashore and came back with a couple of boatloads of supplies for the officer's mess so that when we sailed to the Battle of Midway, why, we were well stocked again.

Interviewer: How about the enlisted messes, did they have sufficient food as far as you know?

Chapman: Well, they were running low, too; this was before the days of at sea replenishment.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Other than POL.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Black oil, which we regularly refueled at sea from tankers and then we in turn refueled the destroyers throughout the period, but for food and other supplies we had not yet enjoyed the technique of the at sea replenishment.

Interviewer: Were the fuel tanks on the Astoria, on these cruisers, so vast that it could take aboard enough fuel for its own supplies and also supply the destroyers?

Chapman: Yes. Yes, we had huge fuel tanks. We could sail around the world two or three times at moderate speed.
Interviewer: With what you had on board?

Chapman: With what we had on board, yes. They were long distance cruisers. That's where the name cruiser comes from. I mean it's a -- it is a cruiser. They can cruise for a long, long time.

Interviewer: How about the battleships?

Chapman: Yes, they had enormous supplies of fuel too.

Interviewer: And carriers?

Chapman: However, we refueled regularly from the tankers and then we in turn refueled the destroyers. And the reason for that was that the cruiser was more -- much more compatible with a destroyer than a tanker.

Interviewer: Now was the Astoria attacked directly or were you able to stay -- well, it wasn't hit at all, was it?

Chapman: We were not hit, but we were attacked.

Interviewer: Okay.

Chapman: But we had no even close hits. No, of course, most of the Japanese aircraft efforts were at our carrier. Carriers. We had two.

Interviewer: Now what was the role of the Astoria in the Battle of Midway?

Chapman: Well, one point before we get to that, when the Coral Sea battle was imminent we were in the northern end of the sea, toward Rabaul. We sent our scout planes out before daylight the first morning of the battle. And they almost immediately contacted the Japanese fleet and
sent back messages as to what they had seen. The flagship then, which was the Yorktown, ran up the signal pennants on the yardarms that in the signal code said enemy sighted as follows. And then there were three or four halyards of flags that we all read with great interest and it said -- I don't remember exactly what it said, something like two battleships, six carriers, 24 DEs and numerous other ships. Well, of course, that was wildly exaggerated.

I think perhaps the aviators, who were from both of the carriers, sighted the same ships and both reported them independently and they were added together. But, in any event, it was an imposing array of enemy ships that were reported, which had us somewhat alarmed.

Interviewer: How many ships were in the task force?

Chapman: Well, there were two carriers, the Yorktown and the Saratoga, and then, let's see, there were three cruisers and about eight or nine destroyers and a tanker. The tanker, however, was detached from us and you probably remember it was attacked by the Japanese planes and sunk.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And then they, in turn, the Japanese, claimed they had sunk a carrier.

Interviewer: That's right.

Chapman: And it was actually our tanker.

Interviewer: The tanker. Were people rescued from the tanker or did they all go down?

Chapman: Some of them were rescued; most of them went down, although, you see, it was nowhere in our vicinity. We knew about it only from the reports.

Interviewer: That was the only (inaudible) you had was that one tanker.
Chapman: That tanker, mm-hmm. Well, there were some interesting episodes. One, I remember so well when the -- when our carrier was hit. I said Saratoga a minute ago, it was the Lexington.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: When she was hit, she started to burn and she in fact burned and sank. And she made the most enormous fire I've ever seen. It seemed incredible that a thing made of steel and iron could burn as it did. Just a huge bonfire. Fortunately, we were under cloud cover at the time so the Japanese did not get the intelligence of her burning and subsequent sinking.

But her planes, when they returned from their strike, of course, were unable to land. Some of them landed on the Yorktown. Some of them simply ditched, and two or three of them ditched right alongside the Astoria. It was very interesting. I was the sky control officer and I had -- I was high up and had a good view. You know, the SBDs would come in -- pilot would come in with his gear down and he'd do a belly landing right alongside the Astoria in the water.

Interviewer: Canopy was open, they got out?

Chapman: Canopy was open, he'd quickly unhitch his gear. We'd throw a line out and he and his bomber, bombardier, would hook onto it and we'd haul him aboard. We did that several times.

Interviewer: On a previous tape then, that was the torpedo that was meant for the Astoria, which you turned into. So it was the Lexington rather than the Saratoga?

Chapman: It was the Lexington, yes.

Interviewer: Okay. Well, we'll have to correct the --

Chapman: Let's see, were we talking about the -- we were talking about the Coral Sea on the other one?
Interviewer: I think so.

Chapman: It was the Lexington.

Interviewer: Okay.

Chapman: The Sara went down when?

Interviewer: Well, she didn't go down. She was hit by a torpedo.

Interviewer: All right. The one that was meant for --

Chapman: I think that's the one that we turned away from.

Interviewer: Okay.

Chapman: That was after Midway.

Interviewer: Right, okay.

Chapman: And when we were en route to the Aleutians, after the Battle of Midway. She was hit, she was torpedoed and then had to go back to the coast for repairs. So she didn't show up in the war again for several months.

Let's see, well, I remember we picked up from the Yorktown, among others, the Seals Marine detachment.

Interviewer: Who is?

Chapman: Cpt Boogie Bierman, a classmate of mine from the Naval Academy, and quite a few of his Marines. We also picked up the admiral, and the Astoria then became the flagship.
Interviewer: That's right, I think you said --

Chapman: I remember one of the minor sidelight episodes was the question of issuing from our Marine clothing stores some uniforms and clothing for the Marines that we rescued -- of course, who had nothing except their oil-soaked khakis, if that, they had come aboard in. Well, anyone who was a Marine in those days will remember the strict Marine Corps accountability for everything and particularly clothing.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And there was no provision in the regulations for the free issue of Marine clothing to Marines. So I had to make a very important decision and I did. And I said, give them the clothes. So we did and I thought, man, I'll never hear the end of this. But actually, as it transpired, nothing was ever said and it was then or very shortly thereafter, you know, that we abandoned all peacetime accountability.

Interviewer: I know, right.

Chapman: And so that it no longer was a problem.

Interviewer: Well, it was a mentality in -- let's talk about Midway. Now after Coral Sea, you went back to Pearl for --

Chapman: Well, en route we stopped in the Tonga Islands. Did I mention that last time?

Interviewer: No, sir.

Chapman: Yes, the fleet, what was left of it, we stopped in the Tonga Islands and we spent two or three days and nights there refurbishing -- replenishing. The Navy had sent store ships there, and so we spent two or three days doing some replenishing, refueling and resting.
I'll never forget my first morning there, I had the morning watch, is the 4:00 to 8:00, 0400 to 0800 watch, that's sky control. And as the dawn broke, I was looking around this beautiful harbor, which is dotted with numerous little islands, and I got my telescope out and was idly looking at some of the islands and I was looking right at the nearest one, which was a few hundred yards away. And it suddenly dawned on me that it was covered with avocado trees, with avocados. So I called away our chief steward and the whaleboat and sent him over there with a couple of stewards and they came back with a boatload of ripe avocado. And we had them on the officer's mess table when breakfast call went and they were very welcome.

Interviewer: Were you able to -- how long were you in Tonga for?

Chapman: Oh, as I remember it was two days and two nights or three days and three nights.

Interviewer: Did you make another trip to the avocado island?

Chapman: Yes, we did. We made two or three more. We ate avocados until they were literally, almost literally, coming out of our ears. We were able to go ashore, too, and have a look around. The crews were granted liberty. Tonga and the Tongan people are really very interesting. They still are ruled by a king now. It was a queen then, Queen Salote, S a l o t e.

Interviewer: Yes, I remember she made quite a stir at the coronation, this giant woman.

Chapman: Yes, she was huge, well over 300 pounds, and 6'4" or 5 tall. Not really fat, just big, real big. Our admiral paid a state call, protocol call, on her ashore and she returned it and we were the flagship. Of course I was a CO of the Marines, so we drew up the full guard and band and gave her full military honors as she came aboard. She made the trip from shore to -- in a dugout outrigger canoe beautifully decorated. It was quite an occasion.

Interviewer: Yes, it must have been, especially in wartime, to see this type of thing.

Chapman: Well, we had understood that we were to stay in Tonga for several days. But we were there just two or three and we got immediate orders to return to Pearl. So the fleet sailed
again on short notice. We got to Pearl one afternoon, we spent that night, we worked all night replenishing, and we sailed the next morning for the Battle of Midway.

Interviewer: Your family was back in the States at this time?

Chapman: No, just my wife; we had no children at that time. No, she was still in Pearl Harbor.

Interviewer: She was still in Pearl?

Chapman: Yes, mm-hmm. Not in Pearl, actually, in Honolulu.

Interviewer: Were you able to get ashore to see her?

Chapman: I did that night for just two or three hours and I saw her and we exchanged experiences and then I had to get back aboard and off we went to the Battle of Midway.

Interviewer: What had been her experiences?

Chapman: Well, we had a house up in Nuwanna Valley. She was -- with a view of Pearl Harbor. So she had a view of the Japanese attack on the harbor on December the 7th, 40 years ago yesterday.

Interviewer: Yes, indeed.

Chapman: She then did volunteer work and as a result was -- her forced departure for the States was postponed. And in fact until after we sailed for the Battle of Midway, and she sailed then for the States while we were going to Midway, so that the next time I saw her it was when I finally got back to Quantico.

Interviewer: Well, you knew that she was going to have to go --
Chapman: Yes, I thought she would have, already have gone when we got back from Coral Sea, but she was still there.

Interviewer: And had you made plans where she was going to go and so on?

Chapman: We had talked about it briefly, right after the -- after Pearl Harbor, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, in those two or three days we were there. Before we sailed for -- well, first for some raids on the islands and then, later, to the -- what turned out to be the Coral Sea. Yes, and it was agreed that she would go back to her home in Tennessee, and she did.

Interviewer: Tell me about the Battle of Midway, the role of the Astoria in that.

Chapman: Well, we were one of the three cruisers with the Yorktown. There were three cruisers also with the Enterprise, and eight or nine destroyers for each. Everyone knows, and there's no need of me trying to recount, the details --

Interviewer: No, no.

Chapman: -- of the Battle of Midway.

Interviewer: But your perceptions. Now the admiral, who was the task force commander?

Chapman: Fletcher, Frank Jack Fletcher.

Interviewer: Fletcher. Is he the one who came aboard the--

Chapman: Of our -- let's see, yes, he was the task force commander at Coral Sea, too. Of course, Adm Spruins was the overall commander at Midway.

Interviewer: Right.
Chapman: Adm Fletcher was our immediate commander, and he was on the Yorktown. When she was hit, again, the Astoria evacuated much of the crew, including the admiral and his staff, and then we became the flagship again. We also evacuated again, this time, the Yorktown Marine detachment. So, again, I had another Marine detachment --

Interviewer: Who was that who had --

Chapman: You know, I said a few moments ago that it was Boosie Bierman from the Lexington.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: That's incorrect. Boosie was on the Yorktown. Let me think now, who was on the Lexington. I believe it was Ralph Hauser. We could verify that.

Interviewer: Is that a classmate?

Chapman: Yes, they were both classmates.

Interviewer: That's right. That's right, but your classmates all about that time were sent to sea?

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Many were.

Interviewer: They were all at sea at that time.

Chapman: Well, we went to general quarters at dawn the first day of the battle and we stayed at general quarters, for with brief periods of relief, for the next two or three days. My first observation of the battle was, of course, the taking off of the Yorktown's aircraft. Next was the arrival of the Japanese aircraft, who bombed the Yorktown. The dive bombers came in first; the fleet, including all of our guns, opened up on them. We shot down a good many, but many -- some, of course, got through --
Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: -- and scored direct hits on the Yorktown. It was a -- it was quite a thrilling experience. It only lasted a matter of minutes.

Interviewer: Oh, really, that's all it lasted?

Chapman: That's all it seemed, all those times seemed to pass pretty fast under those circumstances. The Astoria was not directly hit, although we had several near misses. I don't think they were actually aiming at us. They were aiming at the Yorktown and their wild ones came close to the Astoria.

Later in the day we sent our torpedo bombers out and on their return, they were given a safe bearing to approach. Unfortunately, one of the ships failed to remember, so when our torpedo bombers were approaching on the safe bearing, this particular ship opened fire on them and the other ships then, we were all trigger happy at that point, many of them opened up, too. Fortunately the torpedo bombers saw all this hail of iron coming and were able to evade and went back and complained bitterly over the radio, for which no one blamed them. And then they tried again and this time they got in safely.

Interviewer: What would happen to the ship that opened fire initially?

Chapman: Well, nothing.

Interviewer: No?

Chapman: No, I don't think anything ever happened. It was, you know, just one of the hazards of armed conflict.

Interviewer: Right. Right. How long were you out from Pearl for the Battle of Midway?
Chapman: Well, we sailed one morning and we were in the battle -- I forget exactly, but it was just a matter of three or four days later. The battle lasted two, three days and ended, for us, with the final sinking of the Yorktown. We were able to -- she was able to get under way and travel some distance when she was torpedoed again by a Japanese submarine. And then she was dead in the water, and so that's when the evacuations took place. And then we left her behind and she was then sunk by one of our destroyers, torpedoed by one of our destroyers, and went down.

Meanwhile, we, with the -- then with the Saratoga, which, at that moment, showed up, went up to the Aleutians where we were to do something about the expected assault of Kodiak and Attu by the Japanese, which, in fact, took place. We didn't do -- weren't able to do anything to stop them and, of course, it was a non-runner in the war, anyway. It was an insignificant action. So it was during that time that the Saratoga was hit by a Japanese torpedo and the Astoria evaded torpedoes. We let the torpedo go by and it then went on to hit the Saratoga.

Interviewer: When you left the Coral Sea to go up to Pearl, when you had your orders, did you go at flank speed? I mean it was a really --

Chapman: Well, we went up at high speed, not flank speed.

Interviewer: High speed.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Flank speed is top speed?

Chapman: Flank speed is, you know, for our cruisers, in those days, the cruiser would do about 34 knots. But you see, at flank speed, which is 34 knots, we would use up our entire fuel supply in something like I think it was four hours.

Interviewer: Oh, really?
Chapman: Yes. Whereas at steaming speed, normal steaming speed, we could go around the world a time or two.

Interviewer: Well, to see one of those big cruisers, heavy cruisers, going at flank speed must have been something.

Chapman: Yes, that was only for rare, special occasions that flank speed was used.

Interviewer: But even so, there was the time factor here between the time you left the Coral Sea to get up to Pearl and then get out on station.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: The Battle of Midway was very close.

Chapman: What the admiral's orders were from Pearl, but we went at a speed that got us there in the time that we were supposed to be there and we moved rapidly. As I remember it, we did not zig-zag, we got up to about 23 or 4 knots, which is above the speed that a submarine in those days could attack. Safe speed. In other words, zig-zagging wasn't required en route back to Pearl.

Interviewer: That's a pretty good speed for --

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: In July of '42, you were detached and get back to Quantico.

Chapman: Well, after the Aleutians, yes, we came back to Pearl, and that's when I got the order. They were waiting for me.

Interviewer: Were you happy to get off and get back to the FMF?
Chapman: Well, I didn't go back to the FMF, I went to the Marine Corps Artillery School at Quantico.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: Which had just been formed. I should say that on our return from the Coral Sea, the few hours we spent at Pearl, before going to Midway, I also -- I found another set of orders that promoted me to major.

Interviewer: Really?

Chapman: I was promoted to major at that point.

Interviewer: That's right.

Chapman: In between the Coral Sea and Midway. And then when we got back from Midway, why, my orders to (inaudible) at Quantico.

Interviewer: So you had made captain in just the previous year, too, as a matter of fact?

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: So the incremental (inaudible) incremental promotions start coming along.

Chapman: Yes, they sure did.

Interviewer: Had this been something you talked about, had this been anticipated? I guess it was, that when war came that the regulars would really be --

Chapman: I guess we sort of vaguely apprehended it, you know, but not --
Interviewer: Not any anticipation --

Chapman: It wouldn't be right to say that we really anticipated a war. You know, I've read a number of books on Pearl Harbor. One I remember the title of, one of which I remember particularly, was How Innocent We Were. And that's very descriptive, accurately descriptive of the way we were. We didn't really think we were going to get into the war. People at my level didn't.

Interviewer: Really?

Chapman: Mm-hmm. And I guess those at a somewhat higher level didn't think so, either, as the Pearl Harbor experience is evidence.

Interviewer: Well, of course, there is all sorts of new evidence coming out about that, new books.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: John Toland's coming out with one in March that will be interesting.

Chapman: Yes, there's one that's just out, I haven't read it yet.

Interviewer: Gordon Kranq's book --

Chapman: Yes, the Maryland professor.

Interviewer: At Dawn We Slept.

Chapman: Yes, well, that's a good title, too.
Interviewer: Yes. Yes.

Chapman: Do you have that book yet?

Interviewer: No, I don't have it yet, General, I'm going to get it through the History Book Club. As a matter of fact, many Marine officers got their degrees in a bootstrap program, getting their degrees in military history, which he taught.

Chapman: I see.

Interviewer: As a matter of fact, I went out there and lectured a number of years ago on (inaudible). Now who had the Artillery Corps? This was a new artillery school?

Chapman: Yes, just activated some few weeks before.

Interviewer: The decision was to send as few Marines out to Fort Sill as possible?

Chapman: Yes, in fact, we sent no Marines to Fort Sill. No junior Marines from then on. I think we sent some senior officers through the higher level course at Fort Sill, but all the battery officers were trained by the Marine Artillery School at -- field artillery school at Quantico.

Interviewer: Who had the school?

Chapman: John Beamis, Col. John Beamis.

Interviewer: He'd just come back from Guadalcanal, right?

Chapman: Mm-hmm. He was just back from Guadalcanal. The school had two parts, a field artillery course and an anti-aircraft artillery course. I was involved in the field artillery and it -- the anti-aircraft course, it was later deactivated when the need for this type of battalion was ended.
Let's see, I was, at first, one of the chief instructors and gunnery officers and then I later became the executive officer of the course when the exec -- I'm trying to remember who that was. I can see his face but I can't see his name; departed.

The artillery school was a pretty excellent school, we did a lot of good. To begin with, in a three-month course, we trained new Marine artillery lieutenants. We were able to select from the graduating ROC classes those that we wished to become artillerymen. And so we got a pretty high cut, high quality officer. Then we put them through a 12-week course, which was both classroom and field work. We had our own school troop that was about the size of an artillery battalion, but it had several -- it had all the kinds of artillery weapons, light, medium, and heavy. We had all the transportation and communications and the troops, so -- and we had practically an unlimited ammunition supply. So we did a lot of firing, a lot of maneuvering -- a lot of RSOPing, as it's called in the artillery.

Interviewer: The Guadalcanal area had been obtained so there was greater shooting --

Chapman: Yes, it had just been obtained.

Interviewer: Okay.

Chapman: It was virgin territory. So we turned out for the remainder of the war every so often a new class of about 50 or 60 thoroughly trained artillerymen. We also ran enlisted schools for the higher technical artillery occupations. And we did something else that was very valuable for the Marine Corps and for Marine artillery. We wrote, published, and distributed manuals.

Interviewer: Oh, really?

Chapman: Technical manuals, gunnery manuals, communication manuals, all kinds of artillery manuals. We used them for instruction at the school and which we distributed to the artillery regiments.

Interviewer: Yes.
Chapman: And they were really rather excellent manuals. I'd say that somewhat conceitedly and inasmuch as I wrote several of them myself. And Col. Beamis wrote several. As I say, we'd get them printed in the Marine Corps schools' printing plant, but, as instructional material. But we'd order a large enough supply that we could distribute them to all the field units as well. And they were better in almost every respect I think than those turned out by the Army. And not only in quality, but in the fact that we put in those manuals the techniques that are peculiar to Marine artillery.

Interviewer: Yes, that's --

Chapman: On a landing operation.

Interviewer: Mm-hmm.

Chapman: On an amphibious operation.

Interviewer: Did you develop some new Marine tactics and techniques?

Chapman: Yes, employment of artillery in the amphibious operations.

Interviewer: Was an extension of the landing party manual, the FTP 167?

Chapman: It was, in effect, exactly that.

Interviewer: Who were some of the other instructors who were there at the time?

Chapman: Well, later on, Bob Bluckey came in, the director of the school, relieving Col. Beamis, who went on to other duty. Oh, there were many others. Barney Oldfield.

Interviewer: A classmate of yours?
Chapman: A classmate of mine. Let's see, numerous captains who were graduates of the school who had been away and overseas returned and then left the Marine Corps at the end of the war, whose names are all young Marines who did well, but did not stay on for a career.

Interviewer: Early on, before the war, when the defense battalion concept came about, I'm told that Dunk Waller, from headquarters, had carte blanche to pick the best young artillery officers to be assigned there. Now is this same sort of elitism in being able to pick top notch people for artillery, field artillery for the school, did that prevail at this time, too? Who did you go for, the mathematics people, the engineering type?

Chapman: Yes, we went for those with some kind of mathematical background mostly. And with moderate to high standings in the ROC. That doesn't always mean very much, because it --

Interviewer: But a math major or a science major --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- proved to be a better artillery officer than say a history major or someone in the arts --

Chapman: Yes. Right. Definitely. Because the artillerymen in those days, particularly the fire observer and the fire control officer, had to be able to think figures accurately, rapidly in their heads. This was before the days of computers. All the artillery computations were done in the head for large part. To be done rapidly, and they had to be done rapidly. The Marine artillery in those days were very, very fast. The techniques have changed now, so that the artillery, in my view, is quite slow.

Interviewer: Oh, really?
Chapman: Oh, I think they're molasses slow now. They certainly are compared to the way we fired in World War II.

Interviewer: Do you remember in '43, June or July, did you set up a fire control school at Quantico in the artillery?

Chapman: I don't remember that, I don't think so. Of course, we taught fire control extensively in our regular course.

Interviewer: For enlisted --

Chapman: Well -- enlisted, in those days, were the horizontal control operator, the vertical control operator, and three battery computers. The fire direction officer was the S-3 and he had two or three assistants, assistant S-3.

Interviewer: Yes, because that's where I was supposed to go on out of electrician (inaudible) school at Newport. They were taking the East coast's Marines that went to the Navy-run electrician maintenance school up at Newport and putting them into fire control and radar. And the West coast Marines were sent back out and they got a promotion to corporal out of that school. Which was a good school. As a matter of fact, I got six credits of electrical engineering for (inaudible). But the West coast Marines were sent back to aviation with corporals warrant and then the Marine Corps in its wisdom, profound wisdom, decided it needed carpenters, so they sent people who were originally scheduled to go to fire control school or radar school, they sent some down -- that was Lejeune for carpentry school.

Chapman: Well, I mentioned the artillery, the speed of the artillery, I'm referring of course to the fire control speed. And the basic difference between then and now is that now the spotting is done by the observer on the observer target line. And the fire direction center then replots or plots and gets the--and derives the corrections on the gun target line. Well, that's a slow, laborious process.
In World War II Marine artillery, the observer spotted on the gun target line. He had to imagine the gun target, visualize the gun target line and plot on the gun target level in regards to where he was. There was no plotting then required. The battery computer simply converted his spot into (inaudible) and gave immediate orders to the guns. Well, the difference is this, that it now takes oh, a minute or more to deliver, to fire, from the time the observer gives his command.

On Okinawa, in my battalion, this was typical of all battalions, we got the rounds off in six or seven seconds. Ten seconds was considered unsatisfactory; from the time the fire observer said, for example, up 200, right 100, we had the rounds on the way in six or seven seconds. Routinely.

**Interviewer:** I think Gen. Brown was talking about the quality of Marine artillery. Gen. Sheets had had 24-hour artillery --

**Chapman:** Yes.

**Interviewer:** -- 10th Army --

**Chapman:** It was. Yes, right.

**Interviewer:** On Okinawa they brought the Marine artillery in.

**Chapman:** Right. Yes, I was CO of one of the battalions and we joined the 7th Army Division.

**Interviewer:** 4/11, I believe.

**Chapman:** 4/11, yes, we were -- we had 105 out there, and we were a direct support battalion, although we were -- our name was the 4th Battalion.

**Interviewer:** Well, you spent two years practically at Quantico.

**Chapman:** Yes, I did, from the summer of '42 to the spring of '44.
Interviewer: I imagine you were getting champing at the bit about this.

Chapman: Well, I was. We were working very hard, however --

Interviewer: I imagine you were, yes.

Chapman: -- turning out Marine artillersmen, and I think we did a rather good job at it.

Interviewer: What were some of the lessons learned in the innovations that were coming in from the field at this time as far as the deployment of artillery and amphibious operations?

Chapman: Well, of course beginning with Guadalcanal, which was largely an unopposed landing, of unopposed, which was unopposed of course. And which the artillery had a lot of difficulty getting to shore and it wasn't too useful once it did. Then in some of the later landings, the artillery did get to shore, sometimes on another island, and supported the landing from a nearby island. The artillery was heavily used at Bougainville. And several of the others. So there were lessons that came out.

The techniques of getting the artillery ashore, setting up and establishing communications and fire control, didn't really change really that much but the equipment improved so much. Particularly the radios, by which the fire observer communicated with the fire direction center.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: That's where the real improvement took place. It was almost all done by radio, whereas our teaching and practice prior to the war, and at Guadalcanal even, was by telephone wire. But then the families of new generation of radios came to lightweight, backpack, reliable walkie talkies came on the scene and that made a major improvement in the speed and quality of the artillery control.
Interviewer: Now you had several courses there, you had the beginner's course and then the battery officer's course?

Chapman: Well, the battery officer's course was the basic course.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Although we taught up through the tactics and techniques of the battalion and to some degree the regiment, to a small degree, the artillery regiment. Yes, that was the only officer's course for a while. We had two or three special courses that we conducted for a few lieutenants after they graduated. We had a sound ranging course and a flash ranging course and a liaison officer's course, one or two of them, but they were short courses, just a week or two.

Interviewer: You didn't have air observer's course there yet or anything? That would have been in the naval gunfire class, I guess?

Chapman: Yes, we taught air observation as part of the regular course.

Interviewer: You did?

Chapman: Yes, there's nothing really different -- there wasn't anything really different about it, except that you just operated from an airplane instead of from the observer. You operated from an airplane instead of from the ground.

Interviewer: The courses, you said, were what, 12 weeks?

Chapman: Twelve weeks, and it was a tough course. We started each day, six days a week, we started at 8:00 in the morning and we stopped at 6:00, 1800, in the evening. That was on the days when we didn't go into the field. When we went in the field, we often didn't get back until late at night. We had several all night, probably. We gave the lieutenants a pretty hard time.
Interviewer: Well, it sounds like it was really intensive.

Chapman: It was very intensive, yes. As I said, I think it was an excellent course.

Interviewer: But it was one course after another rather than a sequence of every two weeks another course coming in, or was that the way it worked?

Chapman: Let me see, the classes were heel and toe. We only had one at a time.

Interviewer: One at a time, that must have been quite a heavy load for you then.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: At what period did you know -- at what time before your detachment did you know you were going to go?

Chapman: Oh, I don't remember. It was a month or so I had orders to report to the 1st Marine Division.

Interviewer: Is that where you wanted to go?

Chapman: I never put in for it, but I was delighted that, you know, that that's was where I was headed.

Interviewer: Let's see, who had -- I guess Willie Harrison had the 11th --

Chapman: Yes, Col. Willie Harrison was CO of the 11th Marines when I got there.

Interviewer: He was a Reserve, wasn't he?

Chapman: No, no.
Interviewer: He was a regular --

End Tape 1, Side A
Chapman: See, he was commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines, which I joined in the summer of '37 -- '38, at San Diego. So I had known him all that time. Yes, Larry Limon was the regimental exec.

Interviewer: Gen. Limon?

Chapman: No.

Interviewer: No, that's Andy Limon.

Chapman: That's Andy Limon; no, this was a different -- I believe no relation.

Interviewer: No relation.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. He was regimental exec. The other three battalion commanders, the four battalion commanders, because I was -- became the regimental operations officer when I arrived. The regiment, by the way, was on Pavuvu.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: You know, after the --

Interviewer: Yes, that's where I joined the division.

Chapman: Yes, after --

Interviewer: Cape Gloucester.
Chapman: Gloucester, after Gloucester, we went to the Russell Islands, Pavuvu in particular. The four battalions and the four battalion commanders were all combat veterans.

Interviewer: Who were some of the other battalion commanders with you at this time?

Chapman: Well, let's see --

Interviewer: Tom Rowe, I guess was one?

Interviewer: Tom Rowe had the 3d Battalion. I cannot remember. I could look it up.

Interviewer: Well, it's easy to do.

Interviewer: Let's see, Tom Rowe went on to be a -- for a Marine career after the war, but I believe the other three did not.

Interviewer: Col. Sam Wooster had left by then?

Chapman: He was still there.

Interviewer: He was?

Chapman: He was a battalion operations officer. See, I think the 1st Battalion.

Interviewer: All right.

Chapman: Well, Pavuvu may have been a good resting place and not a bad maneuver site for the infantry, but for the artillery, it was no --

Interviewer: No real --
Chapman: -- there was just no place to fire and no place to maneuver.

Interviewer: I think the artillery had to go over to Guadalcanal for firing operations before --

Chapman: We did.

Interviewer: Before --

Chapman: Before we went to Peleliu, we went over to Guadalcanal for a -- after Peleliu -- before -- let's see, no. We went to Peleliu direct from Pavuvu.

Interviewer: You didn't go --

Chapman: We did not go there, we went over to Guadalcanal before we went to Okinawa.

Interviewer: Okinawa, right. But actually Pavuvu didn't have that much maneuver room for the infantry, either?

Chapman: No, it was pretty good for jungle training, but there wasn't much jungle on Peleliu.

Interviewer: No, no.

Chapman: What there was, there was air and the gunfire had laid pretty low before we got there.

Interviewer: What were your anticipations at Peleliu, what were the briefing that you -- what kind of briefing did you get in preparation?

Chapman: Well, I think we were pretty well prepared for the--what happened the way it happened. We knew clearly that there were how many Japanese were there and that they were well dug in; that it was a heavily fortified coral island and we expected it would not be unlike Tarawa, and it wasn't.
Interviewer: Did you -- did the ordnance load that you take, the types of ammunition you took with you, was it specifically for the coral islands, for the cave fighting? Would it have been high explosive?

Chapman: Well, there weren't any special types available for the artillery. There was just the high explosive shell with either a delay or a time or a quick fuse. We did do -- we did invent one innovation there that we called charge zero. The ranges were so short that -- and the geography was pretty steep in spots, we could have -- we, of course, could have fired high angle fire, but high angle fire is kind of inaccurate. It's subject to a lot of vagaries of the winds and so forth. And our support was so close to the infantry, our infantry, that we were very hesitant about using high angle. So one way -- one day I decided we would try a charge zero, a charge zero meaning take out the base charge. If you're not acquainted with an artillery shell, it has a howitzer shell. It has a base charge and then six increments. I'm talking about the 105 now.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: So you have seven possible charges. We took out the base charge, which is about twice as large as any of the increments and just took it out and put back in one of the small charges. I think we used the 6th charge, which is a rather small one. And we aimed one of the howitzers out to sea and pulled the lanyard to see what would happen. Well, the round did clear the muzzle and it went about 15 or 1800 yards, and that's what we were looking for. So we fired with a very high angle. So we fired several dozen rounds to make up a temporary firing table. We printed them up and distributed them to the 105 Battalions and that's what we used. We called it charge zero.

Interviewer: Charge zero.

Chapman: And we used it extensively from then on, to the end of the battle.
Interviewer: Now, of course, for the person who is going to listen or read this transcript, the 105, the shell you -- the shell casing came separately?

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Or it came with --

Chapman: Mm-hmm.

Interviewer: And what you did was put powder bags in, they were attached by strings.

Chapman: Well, they came in -- they came in the brass shell.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: And what you did was take out the ones and break the string.

Interviewer: Break the string.

Chapman: They were tied together with a piece of string from bag to bag.

Interviewer: Where did you attach the increments? Now on the--for mortar shells, the increments, which were little pieces--was a powder in a leaf pellet.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: In a leaf -- well, it was like pieces of paper stapled together.

Chapman: Yes.
Interviewer: And were attached to the fins. Where would you attach the -- where did the increments go on an artillery shell?

Chapman: Oh, they were down inside the brass casings.

Interviewer: Oh, they are?

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: They come that way.

Interviewer: I see.

Chapman: They come that way, the base charge and the six increments are in the brass.

Interviewer: The increments --

Chapman: The casing, when you take it out of the -- container.

Interviewer: The increments is actually the powder in the bag?

Chapman: Yes, it's seven separate bags.

Interviewer: Right. Those were the increments for artillery shells?

Chapman: Right, mm-hmm.

Interviewer: Okay.
Chapman: Seven separate bags inside, which were -- the base bag, the base increment, is tied by string to the bottom of the brass casing and the six then are each attached one after the other by string. So if the command was charge five, the gunner would pull out the two tops bags, which are six and seven, and break the string and toss them aside, let the other five fall back in the brass casing. One of the cannoneers would put the shell into the casing and she'd be rammed home.

Interviewer: And, of course, then the shell also had a nose fuse in some cases?

Chapman: Yes, either quick or delay or time. Later on, at Okinawa, we got our first VT fuses and we used them quite a lot at Okinawa.

Interviewer: On the delay, was there sort of a thing you put the nose of the shell in for a fuse setting?

Chapman: That's for a time setting.

Interviewer: Time setting.

Chapman: For a time setting.

Interviewer: There was a gadget that would -- you twist the --

Chapman: Right. The type that we had then and later, however, you set them mainly with a hand wrench. And the time markings are right on the nose of the fuse and you just move one of the rings around to the setting you wanted was opposite the index mark. That's all there was to it. And the fuse would then burn that number of seconds, however many you'd set.

Interviewer: Now were there -- there wasn't -- well, I mean, I'm not going to make a statement, I'm going to ask you. Were there many innovation -- was there much innovative in the field artillery pieces themselves during the war? It seems to me that there wasn't, but I'm not certain.
Chapman: I would say there was not. We used standard Army developed and produced artillery weapons throughout the war. At the beginning, on Guadalcanal, the PAC howitzer, the 75mm PAC howitzer, was the direct support weapon and the 105 howitzer, in the 4th Battalion, was the general support. And then the 155 howitzers and the 155 guns were in corps artillery. By -- let's see, by -- let me think. By Peleliu, and maybe previous, I don't recall in the other units, but on Peleliu, we had -- we still had the 375 PAC Battalions and the one 105 Howitzer Battalion. Then, after Peleliu, and before we went to Okinawa --

Interviewer: The TO changed.

Chapman: -- the TO changed, the TE changed and we had three 105 battalions, which was a direct support battalion. And they were the second, third and fourth. And the 1st Battalion still had 75 PAC howitzers on Okinawa and it became general support, strangely enough.

Interviewer: Yes, it's interesting --

Chapman: And that's how it happened that my battalion, which was the 4th Battalion, 11th (inaudible), which is traditionally the general support battalion, was actually a direct support battalion for all of Okinawa.

Interviewer: And then early on in the war, you had five artillery battalions, you had a 5th Battalion?

Chapman: Yes, I think that was true on Guadalcanal. I was the 155 howitzer.

Interviewer: That's right, yes. Which went up to corps artillery.

Chapman: Mm-hmm.
Interviewer: So would it be fair to say then, anything that was innovative in the way of artillery during the war was not so much the cannons themselves, but the communications and the fire control --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- and fire direction techniques and equipment that was associated with that?

Chapman: That's correct.

Interviewer: I mean, how much more, you know -- or how about the ordnance, was there much improved -- well, with the exception of the VT fuse, the proximity fuse, which came -- the ordnance that you were firing, wasn't so much changed in that type of powder --

Chapman: Very little. I think we started and ended with the same ammunition and the same fuses, except for the addition of the VT fuse which we got for the first time on Okinawa. I don't remember -- I don't believe they had, or used, the VT fuse on Iwo.

Interviewer: Do you suppose that --

Chapman: We didn't use it very much on Okinawa because it produces and air burst at lethal distance above the ground and is effective only against troops in the open. Well, there weren't any troops in the open on --

Interviewer: No.

Chapman: -- either Okinawa or Iwo.

Interviewer: Except toward the end of the --

Chapman: Yes.
Interviewer: When they withdrew from --

Chapman: Rare occasions, yes.

Interviewer: Were there any problems with the weapons and the ordnance?

Chapman: I would say not. It was very reliable, very useful. We never had any problems at all. There was adequate supply of spare parts and we always had ample ammunition except on Okinawa.

Interviewer: Well, I heard about you in Okinawa. You managed to squirrel away quite of bit of ammunition. Bigfoot Brown was wondering where you were getting it all.

Chapman: I had a very capable ammunition officer. I don't know where he got it, I never asked, but he got it. Somehow, somewhere. We were rationed in our expenditure on Okinawa for quite a period of time.

Interviewer: There was a shortage of 105?

Chapman: It was because of the Battle of the Bulge.

Interviewer: Oh, really?

Chapman: The supplies that were destined for us, the ammunition supplies that were destined for the Pacific, were diverted to Europe because of the Battle of the Bulge. So that we were on short rations and we had to -- we had a restriction on the number of rounds we could fire per day on Okinawa for a matter of two or three weeks.

Interviewer: That was almost, then, in the overall picture of artillery ammunition production in this country, it was almost a hand to mouth operation.
Chapman: Yes, it wasn't that -- apparently there wasn't sufficient to accommodate a crisis, an all out crisis. But, my goodness, we were really turning ammunition out of this country you know. And we were firing it too, over seas. It was just a minor limitation for a short period of time and I don't think it made any difference because the Japs were totally dug in, you know, and the artillery wasn't doing that much good anyway.

Interviewer: Let's talk about the battalion, what did you find when you hit Pavuvu, a lot of veterans from two campaigns?

Chapman: Well, yes, the 11th Marines, the artillery regiment, was 75 percent veterans. Maybe 25 percent replacements, like me. And some enlisted.

Interviewer: A lot of old timers there that you knew from way back in artillery?

Chapman: Yes, sure. Many of them, gunnery sergeants, warrant officers.

Interviewer: So you had a real community of artillery --

Chapman: Well, yes.

Interviewer: -- they were professional --

Chapman: Very much so, artillerymen who knew what they were about. Oh, the 11th Marines was a highly professional outfit, no question. And continued so right to the end of the war and thereafter.

Interviewer: Well, would you say an artillery regiment and an artillery unit is in comparison to an infantry regiment is unique, is different, aside from the arm of war, the combat arm it is, in terms of personality, in terms of the requirement of the individuals going in -- I know artillerymen always think they're smarter than everyone else in the Marine Corps.
Chapman: Well, I never thought that.

Interviewer: And perhaps in a way --

Chapman: I don't think there's a great deal of difference. Of course, there's the obvious difference that the artillerymen are operating heavier weapons. And only the foreign observers and the liaison officers are in real contact with the enemy, you know. And other than raids on the artillery positions, which occurred a good many times during the war --

Interviewer: Sure.

Chapman: -- on various of the campaigns.

Interviewer: Of course the foreign observers was always the --

Chapman: Well, he's right up with the infantry platoons and companies, you see.

Interviewer: And so that's a harry assignment?

Chapman: Yes. Of course he's the eyes and ears of the artillery. He's the one that spots the target and brings the fire on it.

Interviewer: A high rate of casualties amongst FOs.

Chapman: Amongst the FOs, right, there was. So we used -- we habitually used a watch system, you know. We'd rotate fire observers from the other officers in the batteries and --

Interviewer: I see.
Chapman: And the battalion. Everybody took his turn at being a fire observer. And in the case of a long campaign like Okinawa, we took several turns.

Interviewer: Right. I don't think we need to go into the Peleliu operation per se because there is certainly written enough, but I'd like to get your perceptions of the operation, Peleliu, the nature of the island. The miserable hot.

Chapman: Well, it was miserable. It was very hot.

Interviewer: You went in when?

Chapman: Well, I was the regimental operations officer, which is to say gunnery officer, regimental gunnery officer.

Interviewer: So you went with a ford of echelons --

Chapman: I did. I was -- I don't remember exactly. I was in the sixth or seventh wave, something like that.

Interviewer: Things were very --

Chapman: Went ashore in a Duck.

Interviewer: In a Duck?

Chapman: In a Duck. Just went in in a matter of a few yards, 50 or 75 yards, dug a hole, put in our communications, got in contact with the battalions and set up a centralized fire control system. We ran a regimental centralized fire control system throughout the campaign. And of course the battalions were still in -- were in direct support of the regiment. But we did a lot of multiple battalion firing. All of which was ordered and controlled by the regimental fire
direction center, which I was running, of course, as the gunnery officer. Regimental operations officer.

Interviewer: It wasn't an FDC as such, though, was it?

Chapman: Well, it's more of a fire —

Interviewer: FSCC?

Chapman: No.

Interviewer: The FSCC didn't come until later?

Chapman: Yes, well, the FSCC, of course, includes air and they were gun fire.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: No, that was at division.

Interviewer: Mm-hmm.

Chapman: And our regimental exec was our representative there to the extent that it was used. It wasn't used very much. There just wasn't very much that air can do at Peleliu. Artillery couldn't do a whole lot.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Although we did a lot of firing hoping we were doing some good. But the Japs, as everyone knows, were deeply dug in. And the Japanese just had to be dug out cave by cave.
Interviewer: For the Okinawa operation, one piece of equipment which joined the division was the M-7 siege gun, the self-propelled 105.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Which was --

Chapman: It was in a special unit. I never had any contact with it, any experience with it.

Interviewer: It replaced the half track 75 in the weapons company of the infantry regiment.

Chapman: Right.

Interviewer: It was the infantry regimental commander's own personal artillery. And it was --

Chapman: It was a direct support weapon.

Interviewer: Direct support.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Fired right --

Chapman: Direct fire weapon.

Interviewer: That's right, direct fire weapon.

Chapman: Direct fire.

Interviewer: Which is something it seems to me we could have used on Peleliu.
Chapman: We could have used it on Peleliu, yes. On Peleliu we actually deployed our 155 guns on occasion within a hundred yards or so of the caves, the cliffs.

Interviewer: Right up there at Horseshoe Ridge.

Chapman: Yes, we did it there, we did around on the north end of the island.

Interviewer: Did you go around to the north?

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: You redeployed there?

Chapman: We redeployed some of the artillery pieces for the purpose I've just described.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: We employed the charge zero that I mentioned extensively. We deployed several 105s in a direct fire role around the horseshoe and in other places. I'll never forget, right up on top of a high hill on the west side of the horseshoe, was a Japanese observation post. And there was one Jap solider, and probably a non-commissioned or even a commissioned officer, who took station there every day at dawn and stayed there all day long in full view of -- we fired at him with everything we had. He would disappear now and then, I guess maybe to get a bite to eat or relieve himself, and then he'd come back. He had a little chair he sat in and he had a pair of field glasses and I presume he had new communications. And he observed our operations all day long every day.

We fired at him, I remember, Lou Walt and I took him on as a our personal -- and Lou used everything one by one that the infantry had to try to nail that guy, and he never did. So then I tried it with the artillery and we tried a PAC howitzer and we didn't do any good. We tried 105. The problem was that we were at a lower level and he was on a kind of a shelf so that we could get up high and see him, but we couldn't get artillery up to where -- so we were down low and
we were trying to just skim the end of the cliff and nail trying him. We never did succeed. As far as I know, that guy's still up there watching what's going on. Well, of course, I know he's not, but we never did. We were never able to nail him.

Interviewer: Air couldn't get him either?

Chapman: Well, they couldn't see him. You know, he was too tiny a target and, besides, we were all around, our troops were all around there.

Interviewer: Too far away for a rifle or a sniper?

Chapman: Yes, too far away. From the point you could see him, it was too far away.

Interviewer: That's interesting.

Chapman: Well, toward the end of the operation, of course, as I'm sure you know from your historical accounts, the artillery stood down as artillery whenever we formed a couple of infantry battalions and took over sections of the line and I was -- I was CO of one of the -- became the commanding officer of one of these provisional infantry battalions.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And we manned a section of the line there on the west side of the horseshoe. And we had some small amount of hand-to-hand fighting as infantrymen, plus the artillerymen, there for a period of a week or 10 days.

Interviewer: Yes, it was very active in that Horseshoe Ridge area there.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Did the heat affect the guns at all?
Chapman: It didn't affect the guns, it affected the cannoneers in periods of heavy firing.

Interviewer: How about affecting the ordnance, I know that there -- isn't there a climatological officer with the regiment?

Chapman: No. No, that's part of the gunnery officer's duty is to keep track of the temperature of the ammunition. It can get to where it's sensitive and dangerous. But if you keep it shaded, it never gets to that temperature.

Interviewer: Did you use Ducks to -- did you preload Ducks with ammunition and bring them in at your initial --

Chapman: On the landing, yes. Yes, all the artillery got ashore in Ducks. All the light artillery, the 105s and the packs. That was a very near thing with that Duck with the 105 howitzer aboard and 20 or 30 rounds of ammunition and two or three crewmen, the thing was just about six inches above -- the water was about six inches above the scuppers. And so they had to be very calm sea conditions for that thing to survive. And, in fact, we lost two or three of them on the way in, they swamped and sank. We later salvaged them. I think it was the 3d Battalion lost three or four pieces on the way in.

Interviewer: How major a job is it to break these guns down for cleaning or changing tubes?

Chapman: The 105?

Interviewer: Yes, sir.

Chapman: Oh, it's not much of a job. I mean the experienced ordnants, warrant officers do it in short order. But a 105 tube is good for hundreds of thousands of rounds, unless you shoot charge seven all the time. If you shoot charges three and four, which is mostly what we shot -- in fact,
we shot much smaller charges than that on Peleliu. But those guns will last for hundreds of thousands of --

Interviewer: Yes. How about the hydraulic, the recoil system on it?

Chapman: Recoil, oh, it's good long as you -- you know, keep the oil level, the pressure, up to the mark. It'll last a long, long time. A very reliable weapon.

Interviewer: What were some of the lessons the artillery learned on Peleliu, was there anything unique about the operation with respect to artillery?

Chapman: Well, you know, getting ashore in the Ducks is chancey business. We certainly learned that.

Interviewer: To off load the weapons from the Ducks, some of these Ducks had --

Chapman: Well, there was an A frame Duck.

Interviewer: A frame, right.

Chapman: There was an A frame Duck for each battery, I guess. Yes, that unloaded the piece once the Duck got ashore. The Duck then made repeated trips bringing in ammunition and the rest of the crew and the rest of the battalion and all of that.

The charge zero was certainly a lesson we learned and profited from. The necessity for the artillery to do pinpoint firing rather than area firing in that kind of operation where the enemy is thoroughly dug in in the coral cliffs. Area fire is not much use. The artillery has to get in a position where it can do direct plunging fire on the caves.

Interviewer: Well, that, of course, was a problem that arose on Okinawa with that folded terrain there.
Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: Now you went back to Pavuvu.

Chapman: Back to Pavuvu.

Interviewer: And this time you had people who had three operations were due to go home so you had to bring in a lot more --

Chapman: Yes, we had quite a few replacements. After the -- I was relieved as an infantry battalion commander on Peleliu, I then became -- moved from the regiment to the 4th Battalion, 11th, and became the CO there. We embarked for the trip from Peleliu to Pavuvu on a Dutch passenger and cargo ship. Let's see, what was the -- the Elmore, was that it? I don't remember. Was that how the 4/11 got back to Pavuvu?

Interviewer: No, no. It was Sloterdyk, s l o t e r d y k.

Chapman: That's it. The Sloterdyk, yes. she was a Dutch ship that was at sea when the Germans invaded Holland and so he and his crew and his ship reported to the American Navy and served with our Navy for the whole rest of the war. The Sloterdyk.

Interviewer: What did it do, just sail across to America?

Chapman: The sailed across to America, they operated in the Atlantic for a while and then they were moved around in the Pacific and they served as part of the U.S. Navy fleet all the rest of the war doing things like that. It was a freighter with some passenger accommodations. And so we loaded the 4th Battalion and the 11th aboard the Sloterdyk. We moved out to the ship in barges and hoisted everything aboard and down in the holds and we tied it down and tied everything down. The battalion personnel came aboard and off we went.

Interviewer: A seven-day trip.
Chapman: Is that what it was, I've forgotten.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: I know we ate a lot of Dutch cheese and other things that he had in his stores that were there when Holland fell. And he still had a lot of it.

Interviewer: Now there's a period of about five months reorganization and training and so on, getting ready for Okinawa.

Chapman: For Okinawa, yes. Right. A lot of the Marines got to go home at that point. They had started out on Guadalcanal and went all the way through Gloucester and Peleliu.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: And then they finally got relief and went home. So I think there was a 30 or 40 percent turnover.

Interviewer: There had to be something like that.

Chapman: Well, yes, and so we had a lot of new comers that we had to fit in, but they was all -- they were all graduates of the Marine artillery school, officer and enlisted. And they knew their business so we went right to work training on Pavuvu as best we could. Which included, among other things, putting a barrel or something out in the ocean and shooting at it with the artillery.

Interviewer: That's pretty primitive.

Chapman: That's pretty poor.

Interviewer: Right.
Chapman: But then we got to Guadalcanal for I forget how long, two or three weeks I think.

Interviewer: I think the whole regiment went over to Guadalcanal.

Chapman: Yes, the whole regiment went. Right.

Interviewer: Let's see, you left on December 18, it was a month, six weeks. The 18th of December at Guadalcanal and you remained in Guadalcanal throughout -- returned to Pavuvu on the 30th -- 31st of January.

Chapman: January.

Interviewer: Yes, so it was a month and a half.

Chapman: We were there and we -- yes, we -- of course, that included the travel time. Which was by --

Interviewer: -- west (inaudible). Yes, one day. One day, so that's 65 miles from northwest of Guadalcanal to Pavuvu. Did you do any joint training on Guadalcanal with the 15th Marines?

Chapman: If we did, I don't remember it. We did extensive regimental training of our own. Massing fires and that kind of thing, but the battalions operated individually, trained individually. We were each assigned an area, you know, and we went out and we fired and maneuvered and we burned up a lot of ammunition. When we finished that six week period down there, we had a highly professional artillery regiment.

Interviewer: Tell me about Willie Harrison, what was he like?
Chapman: Well, you see, he would -- he left the regiment after Peleliu. He was one of those that went home and Bigfoot Brown took over the 11th Marines for the beginning, with the training period prior to Okinawa.

Oh, Willie Harrison was a good artilleryman. He had a good mortar transport background. He knew a lot about communications and he knew a lot about gunnery. He was a good artilleryman. He was a good regimental commander.

Interviewer: What was his period when -- what year did he come in to -- how far back did he go, do you remember?

Chapman: I really don't remember. He was post-World War I.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Probably in the early '20s.

Interviewer: Had you known Bigfoot Brown before or --

Chapman: Yes, I had known him. I'd known him ever since I was a new lieutenant and he was a captain at Quantico. Wilbert Scott Brown. A very remarkable person.

Interviewer: Yes, he was.

Chapman: Remarkable. Do you have in your archives his whole story?

Interviewer: Oh, I interviewed him, sure. Well, what were your perceptions of Bigfoot when he came aboard and took over?

Chapman: Well, I'd known him for a long time. I got on with him famously. He was an excellent artillery command -- regimental commander. He knew his business, he knew the
artillery, and he knew how to handle Marines. He was a good planner. He was in close with the division commander, who was another artilleryman, Pedro Del Valle --

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: -- and a former CO of the 11th Marines. He was CO of the 11th Marines on Guadalcanal.

Interviewer: Right, yes. Of Bigfoot, it's been said that he was loved by his contemporaries and his subordinates. But his relations with his seniors were not always that good.

Chapman: Well, he was a critic of his seniors, an outspoken critic, which certainly didn't endear him. I remember one instance when we were over on Guadalcanal, for some reason we spent the night at the corps CP. And along about 10:00 or 11:00 at night, Bigfoot was in full voice and he proclaimed as loudly as he possibly could that whoever picked out Pavuvu as a training and maneuver area for the 1st Marine Division, and particularly the artillery, ought to be hanged as a war criminal. Well, he said this in a tent which was right next to the tent of Gen Geiger, who is the corps commander who had picked out Pavuvu as the site for the 1st Marine Division. So it was that kind of thing that less than endeared him to his superiors.

Interviewer: I understand that he had a regimental surgeon who was a Jewish fellow and he had to constantly protect him from old Pedro Del Valle, who was less than friendly toward Semites.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: An interesting --

Chapman: I'll never forget one evening spent at dinner with Pedro on Pavuvu. He had the practice of inviting three or four battalion commanders from the division at a time to his hootch--we didn't call them hootches in those days -- for dinner.
Interviewer: He was --

Chapman: He had a nice bungalow, up on that little hill.

Interviewer: It was the one that was built for Gen Purdess, up on the hill. I remember that.

Chapman: So there was two or three of us gathered on this particular evening and we had a couple of cocktails and then we went into his mess for dinner. Well, he said, "I've got the most wonderful thing for dinner." He said "We haven't had any fresh meat on this island for weeks" -- and we hadn't. And he says "I managed to get hold of a shipment of something that's fresh and I love it and I know you're going to enjoy it." Well, we all said "What is it, General?" He says "It's New Zealand sheep liver."

Well, if there's anything I can't abide, it's liver and especially sheep liver and, above all, New Zealand sheep liver. Well, they brought out the dinner plate and on it was a slab of liver that I give you my word was at least eight or ten inches in diameter. Well, I smothered it with catsup and was plowing through it as best I could and I got down toward the end. Well, in the meanwhile, Gen Del Valle had gotten off on the subject of the Jews and he had reached a fever pitch that those who know him will well remember. And he was saying things like Hitler's got the right idea, they all ought to be put in those concentration camps, you know. And so forth. And he was in a very loud voice and just as he reached the height of his diatribe against the Jews, he looked at my plate, which was almost clean of that liver and he said, "have another piece of liver." And I couldn't -- in the condition he was in, I couldn't very well say no. So they brought me out another slab about six or eight inches in diameter and I had to eat that, too.

Interviewer: Well, if you'll recall, at that particular time, we were being inundated in division with New Zealand mutton and they were cooking it and you could smell it and it smelled terrible.

Chapman: Oh, yes, greasy and strong.

Interviewer: That's right.
Chapman: It was awful.

Interviewer: Yes, yes it was terrible.

Chapman: But it was better than those dry A rations -- not A rations, B rations -- that were the alternative.

Interviewer: B rations. Well, when we went ashore there, I think we were having K rations still.

Chapman: Yes, those were combat rations.

Interviewer: The combat rations, that's right. The dried A rations were the old dehydrated --

Chapman: The dehydrated mess hall rations were called B rations.

Interviewer: B rations, rather, right.

Chapman: A ration is fresh rations, yes.

Interviewer: B were, I guess, the dehydrated potatoes. They never learned how to cook those, they were like buckshot.

Chapman: I guess all that nomenclature has changed now, but that's the way it was then.

Interviewer: Yes, that's right. Well, someone ought to do a study on that. Well, let's talk about Okinawa.

Chapman: Well, we embarked from Pavuvu, the infantry went on the assault ships, the artillery went on LSTs. We proceeded separately. The rendezvous --

Interviewer: You were on an APA?
Chapman: I was.

Interviewer: You were on the McCracken, right.

Chapman: Yes, I was, with a small command group, but the pieces, the howitzers, the gun crews, were all on LSTs.

Interviewer: Which left early?

Chapman: Yes, left early, they proceeded at six or seven knots without zig-zagging. We went at 10 or 12 knots and zig-zagged, so we all got to Ulithi. Wasn't it Ulithi where we --

Interviewer: That's right, went there, went ashore at Mug Mug.

Chapman: Yes, we rendezvoused there and then proceeded in company from there to Okinawa. We spent a few days at Ulithi replenishing and, of course, I made the rounds of all my -- of the two or three LSTs that were carrying my battalion.

Interviewer: Okay. Went up the 1st of April, '45 --

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: -- Okinawa.

Chapman: Yes, we got there Easter Sunday. Well, we landed the 4/10th and 11th, landed in direct support of the 7th Marines and we stayed -- we remained their direct support battalion right to the end of the operation. Except for the brief period when we went over and joined the Army's 7th Division Artillery, when the 1st Marine Division was just in rendezvous.
Interviewer: What are your memories and perceptions that stand out about the Okinawa operation?

Chapman: Well, the first thing was the surprise that there was no opposition to the landing. I was in the sixth or seventh wave and we were ashore, went directly ashore, had no trouble at all. Established our (inaudible) got the pieces in position, fired our first registration round within a few minutes and we were ready to fire in support of the 7th Marines within just a matter of an hour or less from H hour. In fact it was less than that, it was 30 or 40 minutes.

Well, there were no calls for fire. There just wasn't any opposition. That was the first thing, the surprise at the unopposed landing. The fact that the Japanese really confused us on D Day and for the first two or three days thereafter because we had -- we had arrived at the phase line that we were supposed to reach about the fifth or sixth day, we were up there on the first day.

Interviewer: Yes. yes.

Chapman: And then everybody stood around and said what do we do now, we didn't have any plans beyond about D plus five or six.

Interviewer: Of course the weather was cold. The change in temperature --

Chapman: Oh, yes. Yes, it was a drastic change, it was chilly. But we endured. But we moved forward, I think we displaced that very first day. The second day, we moved well forward.

Interviewer: Across the island.

Chapman: You had to stay up with the infantry, keep up with the infantry, went into another position. We did some firing, but not very much. Of course, then, as everyone knows, the 6th Division went north, the Army divisions turned south. The 1st Division went into rendezvous, (inaudible) essentially.
Shortly after that, the Army asked for some artillery help. So the battalions of the 11th Marines went over and joined the Army divisions. My battalion went to the 7th Division, the 7th Army Division, and we went into direct support of one of their regiments, as they were still called in those days, before they became battle groups and various other names.

Interviewer: Yes. I remember -- I've spoken to you about this before, Bigfoot Brown said, now, you've got to talk to Chappie and tell him about his one gun TOT.

Chapman: Oh, yes, his -- I think he's talking about the 24th Battalion TOT.

Interviewer: No, about being able to find a -- fire a TOT with one gun.

Chapman: Oh, with one gun. Oh, yes, that was another technique. It was just a play thing really, but it involves one gun firing seven rounds, each with a different time setting and charge, so that all seven arrive at the target at the same time. You have seven arriving at the target at the same instant all fired from one gun. One 105.

Interviewer: That's a highly professional -- calls for a high degree of professionalism on the --

Chapman: On the part of the gun crew.

Interviewer: -- gun crew to fire that, I would say.

Chapman: You have to set up the --

Chapman: -- seven rounds with seven different charges. And then you have to have a very skilled gunner because he's only got two or three seconds between rounds. You fire one, he's got to lay the gun with a new elevation for the next round, get it off and he has to fire all seven of
them in a matter of, oh, about 20 seconds. The time of flight on the first round is about 20 seconds, so the -- maybe 22 seconds. But the time of flight on the last round is only three or four seconds.

Interviewer: Well, that was just a gimmick, that's not something you would do normally?

Chapman: No, that was just a gimmick. The 24th Battalion TOT, however, did he discuss that?

Interviewer: I think he did, but go ahead, I want to get it from your --

Chapman: Well, my battalion was the controlling battalion. And a TOT is time on target, in which the control battalion prescribes the time when the rounds are to land and the location of the target and then does the count down. Each battalion -- each of the battalions in the TOT compute their time of flight to the target depending on their distance from it and what charged they used. And so the control battalion prescribes the target and time on target and then starts counting two minutes or so ahead of time, second by second. And each battalion, when its time comes, fires until the closest one to the target is the last to fire. And then all -- this 24 battalion volley lands on the target at the same instant. It's quite an impressive show.

Interviewer: I'm sure. I know it must be -- it shakes the recipients of this TOT.

Chapman: Well, we fired that particular one toward the end of the campaign when the Japs had all -- what were left of them had retreated into that enclave and valley south of Naha.

Interviewer: Yes, right.

Chapman: South of Naha. And it was a lucrative target. Twenty-four battalions might have been overdoing it a little, but it was a good gunnery exercise.
Interviewer: I think Toots Henderson said the concentration of artillery at Okinawa was probably greater than anything else in the war except perhaps the Russian concentration on the Eastern front.

Chapman: Well, that's probably true. We had all the division artillery, the Army and Marine divisions. The 2d Division artillery came ashore toward the end of the campaign; however, they were never employed.

Interviewer: I don't think they did. 8th Marines came down and that was, aside from the initial feint maneuver, feint landing, on L day, the only troops of the 2nd Division to be committed ashore on Okinawa was the 8th Marines.

Chapman: Well, they must -- it must be the artillery battalion that came with them that I'm thinking of.

Interviewer: Okay. Then they might have brought --

Chapman: It's one of the battalions of the 10th.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: So there was that battalion.

Interviewer: I hadn't remembered the --

Chapman: And the artillery of the two and a third Marine divisions and -- let's see, how many Army divisions were there. Three?

Interviewer: No, you had II Army Corps there -- I Army Corps.

Chapman: I Army Corps.
Interviewer: I Army Corps, you had --

Chapman: I think there were three, the 7th --

Interviewer: The 7th.

Chapman: -- the 77th --

Interviewer: The 77th, 96th and the 27th, four divisions.

Chapman: There was four Army divisions, yes.

Interviewer: Right.

Chapman: All their artillery and then there was a lot of corps artillery.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: Toots Henderson had one of the corps artillery groups. We had eight-inch, we had 155 guns, 155 howitzer. The eight-inch were particularly impressive.

Interviewer: He had one of those as a lieutenant colonel, I guess.

Chapman: He did.

Interviewer: Yes.

Chapman: He had an artillery group which he had several batteries. So it was a heavy concentration of artillery by the time we had driven the Japanese into the southern end of the island, it was -- it was a really heavy concentration of artillery shooting at them.
Interviewer: There have been a number of statistical studies in which they've broken down, based on how many rounds of each caliber of ammunition was expended, say during a campaign. So many thousand caliber .30, so many and using that -- and of course it's a highly felicitous statistic determining how many enemy casualties, figuring out how many rounds of say 105 or 75 or .50 caliber it took to kill an enemy.

Chapman: Oh, it's an incredible number of rounds.

Interviewer: It is. Right. Of course that doesn't count the number of clips that have been ground into the mud or what have you. But is the nature of artillery such as to support -- of course, it's a supporting arm to support the infantry. It's to kill the enemy, but is it as much to kill the enemy as to destroy its equipment and so on?

Chapman: Yes, and to pin him down, too.

Interviewer: Pin him down.

Chapman: Yes. Artillery is basically an area weapon as contrasted to a pinpoint direct fire weapon. Artillery covers an area with its exploding shells and is most useful against troops in the open.

Interviewer: What's that old aphorism, the role of artillery in combat is to bring order to -- I forget, I think. I'll have to write it in. It's a -- it's a funny quote. To bring a sense of order to an otherwise confusing situation.

Chapman: Yes, or something like that.

Interviewer: Something like that. Well, Okinawa is not much sense going into further because that's been written about, and get your perception of Okinawa.
Chapman: Well, we were -- my battalion, we were in 24 different position areas during the --

Interviewer: That's how many (inaudible) you had?

Chapman: Yes, and positions.

Interviewer: And positions.

Chapman: Twenty-four, and we fired about three-quarters of the way through the operation, we fired our 75,000th round, so we fired something like 100,000 from my battalion to the end of the operation. And we had four gun batteries in those days. Of course, nowadays, the batteries all have six guns, but those were four gun batteries then. So we fired a lot of ammunition.

I remember when we fired our 75,000th round, we took a picture of it and I've got that picture somewhere in the Marine Corps photographic archives. I think I've got a copy of it at home. I haven't looked in a long time.

In later years, in trips to Okinawa, I once -- once when I was there, when I was Commandant, I took the afternoon off and got a jeep and I drove around the island trying to locate the 24 position areas where we had been and I was able to find only one or two of them. The rest of them were either under super highways or airfields or housing developments or something.

Interviewer: Okinawa has changed, nobody can go back there and recognize where they were.

Chapman: I found one or two. I could identify one or two.

Interviewer: You could?

Chapman: Mm-hmm. That were unchanged.

Interviewer: Well, you remained on Okinawa until July?
Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: After which the campaign had been secured the 20th of June, I think, the 21st of June.

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Yes, we moved up north along with the rest of the artillery and the division and went into camp. Built camps and prepared for the OLYMPIC. We were slated to go on the OLYMPIC operation. It was the invasion of Japan.

Interviewer: Right. Had you received any warning or advance notice of that?

Chapman: Yes, we knew that was the next operation.

Interviewer: You did know that?

Chapman: And that all of the Marine divisions, all six of them, were scheduled to go. So as you can well imagine, it was a source of deep disappointment to me when I got orders to return to the fleet Marine force headquarters at Pearl Harbor.

Interviewer: Now who did you know back there? I ask you this because you were made secretary of the general staff and I assume that someone wanted you back there and --

Chapman: Well, Gen Silverthorn, who was the chief of staff.

Interviewer: You had known him from before?

Chapman: Yes, I'd known him and I regret to say he sent for me to be secretary of the general staff, which I was for a year.

Interviewer: Yes.
Chapman: Well, initially I was for just a few weeks. I was in the G-3 section. I was put in charge of the planning of the return of the divisions after the Japanese capitulation in August. I was there when the Japanese surrendered and I had just gotten there, so as the first assignment, I was put in charge of planning the movement of the divisions to their various destinations. The 1st and the 6th went to China. The 2d went to Japan. Let's see, I guess the 4th and 5th came back to the islands.

Interviewer: Right, and then were demobilized.

Chapman: And then demobilized. Later on, the 6th was demobilized. The 1st, 2d, and 3d stayed in (inaudible). Later on, the 3d was demobilized, leaving only the 1st and 2d, during the end of the 1940s, right up to Korea.

Interviewer: I know there was great unhappiness in the division when it learned that it was going to go to China instead of going back to the States.

Chapman: I wasn't there then, but I can believe it, yes.

Interviewer: The feeling was that the division had been out in the Pacific longest. The first out should be the first to go back and get all these glories and everything. Although after the first few days in China I don't think too many people minded.

Chapman: No, my understanding is that they thought it was a pretty good tour.

Interviewer: Yes, it was.

Chapman: Once they got there.

Interviewer: Yes, it was, but it was --
Chapman: I never got there personally, after doing the planning, which was a highly detailed business for the movement of the various divisions. In fact, I had a large office and I had it all four walls covered with flow charts and graphs and time schedules.

Interviewer: I think when I interviewed Gen. Silverthorn, if I recall, he spoke of that study that you did and he was highly complimentary of you. It was a major project.

Chapman: It was a major project, yes. A very detailed one. But it all worked out successfully. We took -- what we did was take photographs of all these charts I had made and included them in the operation orders that went out to the divisions for their -- to govern their movements.

Well, when that was complete then, whoever had been the secretary of the general staff -- I don't remember who that was -- was detached, so Gen. Silverthorn brought me up to be the secretary and that I was for pretty near a year.

Interviewer: Were you able to bring -- when were you able to bring your family up?

Chapman: Oh, well, dependents weren't permitted to come out until just, oh, two or three months before I was due to come back. So I never did. Those that were slated to stay on, in Pearl Harbor for duty, brought their -- some of them brought their families out at that time. But of those who were destined for return to the States, of which I was one, none did.

Interviewer: Of course you worked very closely and handled Gen. Geiger, what do you remember of him?

Chapman: Well, he was gruff, reserved, matter of fact, no nonsense, very determined, very firm and quick to make a decision and stick to it. Really an extremely able commander and leader.

Interviewer: Who was the chief of staff out there at the time?

Chapman: Well, Gen. Silverthorn. He was a brigadier.
Interviewer: Was there an assistant force commander, too?

Chapman: Yes, it was Gen. Pepper -- wait a minute, excuse me, that's not right. Gen. Pepper was the assistant chief, the deputy chief of staff. He was then a colonel. There was an assistant force commander --

Interviewer: An aviator?

Chapman: No, because Gen. Geiger was an aviator.

Interviewer: Okay.

Chapman: Danged if I can remember who it was. There was such a person, but he didn't do much. He didn't have much opportunity to do much.

Interviewer: No. Who was the G-3?

Chapman: Dixon Goen, one of my classmates.

Interviewer: I've heard a lot about him. I understand he was a very sharp, very talented, very good Marine who I think took ill, had a --

Chapman: TB.

Interviewer: TB, that's right.

Chapman: Tuberculosis.

Interviewer: And was physically retired?

Chapman: Mm-hmm. Right after the war.
Interviewer: Right after the war. Very hard working, very able.

Chapman: Very meticulous, yes.

Interviewer: Is he alive still?

Chapman: Yes, he went into various things, but of late years into commercial real estate in the San Diego area. He's been quite successful. He was -- his TB was completely cured, but it caused him to be forcibly retired.

Interviewer: The G-1, I guess, was Russ Jordahl, from what I understand?

Chapman: Yes, it was. I'm trying to think of the -- I can see him. But you can look it up in the archives who the G-4 was. Actually, Col Goen, Dixon Goen, didn't retire until -- in the late '40s, because we served together here in the G-3 section of the old plans and policies headquarters Marine Corps.

Interviewer: I see, yes. Did he retire as a full colonel?

Chapman: No, we hadn't made colonel at the time he had to retire, which was '48 or '49. And we made -- or I made colonel in 1950 and he would have, too. He was one number junior to me.

Interviewer: I see.

Chapman: Yes, which is a source of considerable disappointment to him because I beat him out by one one hundredth of one point in the competitive exams that we took. You know, I described them on a previous session.

Interviewer: Yes, right, right.
Chapman: So I came out number one in my class; he was number two.

Interviewer: What was going on FMF PAC at this time?

Chapman: Well, initially, the retirement of the -- and the mobilization of the divisions. The handling of all the unbelievable personnel problems. You remember all World War II veterans will remember the point system which governed when you went to the states and got discharged.

Interviewer: Oh, yes.

Chapman: It also arose at that time -- the service men's -- what do I call them, meetings? Assemblies?

Interviewer: Right. Right. Centers.

Chapman: The centers.

Interviewer: I know that there was an occasion out there when Gen. Geiger waded into it with both feet and arms flailing.

Chapman: Yes.

Interviewer: And he --

Chapman: And he issued an order. He couldn't -- today, he couldn't get away with it. But he issued an order prohibiting the assembly of more than three or four Marines together at any one time. And he made it stick so that there were a number of those meetings took place, but there weren't any Marines in them. It was all soldiers and airmen and sailors. Not many sailors, either, mostly soldiers.
Interviewer: Mostly soldiers, right. I remember hearing about that. Bob Heinl recalled the situation in his interview.

Chapman: I know actually Gen. Silverthorn still has, I presume, the pen with which he signed that order as chief of staff.

Interviewer: Oh, really?

Chapman: He signed it and then he put the pen up and put it in his pocket and said "This may be a historic pen, I'm going to keep it."

Interviewer: I just saw him yesterday here. Anything unique about this one year tour at FMF PAC, was it a good –

Chapman: Well, we worked awfully hard. You know, as secretary of the general staff, I was in charge of a million details and operated directly under the beck and call of the chief of staff, who would call on the squawk box two or three dozen times a day and he'd say "Remember that dispatch we got two or three weeks ago that was on subject so and so, bring it to me immediately." Well, my God, I'd have to race into our file room, where I had a very sharp sergeant, and we'd hurriedly go through the files and I must say we were pretty good at it, locating the particular dispatch and getting it in to him on the double.

Of course, all the paperwork flowed through me, going and coming. We were extremely busy for the first several months, but then it tapered off. The divisions were deployed, some of them were demobilized. Many of the Marines were discharged. We were then, of course, the divisions left Japan and China and came home. 3d Division was demobilized and we were back. By the time I left there in -- when was that, June?

Interviewer: June of '46?

Chapman: June of '46 --
Interviewer: July of '46.

Chapman: July, '46 were essentially on a peace time footing.

Interviewer: That was sort of a pressure cooker to be put right in after combat.

Chapman: Well, it was, yes. It was a completely different kind of duty than I had been doing. There's a whole lot of difference between being a battalion commander –

Interviewer: At least you had a hot shower and wore khaki, which --

Chapman: Right. And --

Interviewer: The food was a little bit better.

Chapman: -- a high-priced staff officer, there's a lot of difference.

Interviewer: Well, let's see, what time is it?

Chapman: Yes, I guess it's time for me -- I've got a 12:15 luncheon.

Interviewer: Okay. Well, this is a good place to --

Chapman: Yes. I'm en route back to headquarters.

Interviewer: Right, headquarters of the Marine Corps. Okay. Do you want to give me a call for --

Chapman: Yes, I will.
Frank: Alright, we're ready to begin the session. I don't know whether "Big Foot" Brown told me, but I understand that on Okinawa you wound up with a hell of a lot more ammo than was the unit of fire... that you had a lot more 105mm ammo available than... there was shortage at the time, if you recall.

Chapman: No, well, for my battalion, yes. We were able to get additional ammunition from the Army dumps. That's how we managed that.

Frank: Did you do some moonlight requisitioning?

Chapman: Well, yes. I had a real good ordnance officer. His name was O'Neill, a lieutenant. He was an expert at getting things and he managed to get us some extra ammunition. So I think we fired more during the course the battle than any other artillery battalion.

Frank: That's what I understand, that you were...

Chapman: Direct support battalion. We were the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines but we were a direct support battalion. We had an unusual organization at that time. The 1st Battalion, which normally would be direct support, had pack howitzers, 75mm pack howitzers, and was in general support with 75s. The 2d, 3d, and 4th Battalions were 105 battalions and we were the direct support battalions for the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines. The 4th Battalion, 11th--of which I was CO--we were in direct support of the 7th Marines throughout the entire Okinawa battle.

Frank: Of course, with the change in the T/Os... I think the 11th Marines had five battalions on Guadalcanal.

Chapman: Yes, I believe that's right.
Frank: That was the Dog T/O and then it went to the Easy T/O and then the T/O that we fought on Okinawa with was the Fox T/O which came out.

Chapman: I believe that's right.

Frank: about the middle of '44.

Chapman: It was really a temporary arrangement. Right after the battle was concluded on Okinawa, the 4th Battalion, my battalion, changed to 155 howitzers which we received from the Corps artillery group that had the 155 howitzers and guns during the battle.

Frank: An eight-inch . . .

Chapman: Yes. Marines didn't have eight-inch during the battle. There was an Army eight-inch.

Frank: An Army eight-inch. Yes, we talked about the organization of massed artillery.

Chapman: Then we changed over to 155 howitzers and from then on the 4th Battalion, 11th were general support with the 155 howitzers.

Frank: A couple of general questions. They also had the M-7 siege gun on Okinawa, which was a regimental commander's weapon. I don't recall . . . it was a self-propelled weapon. I think it was a 105, self-propelled howitzer on Okinawa.

Chapman: It was an infantry direct support weapon. I had no connection with it.

Frank: No, it was in the infantry regiment.

Chapman: It was a tank, anti-tank gun and a direct support--that is a direct fire--infantry support weapon.
Frank: They used it for cave-busting.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: I guess people with arty MOSs had to be the ones who ran those weapons.

Chapman: I think so. I really don't remember. I don't think it had any connection with the artillery. It was more like the old 37mm. It was a direct fire weapon.

Frank: And the half-track 75 which also was . . .

Chapman: Yes, correct. And then the LVT . . .

Frank: Had 75s too.

Chapman: Yes. There was a battalion of LVTAs, I believe they were called. Lou Metzger . . .

Frank: Lou Metzger, I was just about to say . . .

Chapman: . . . was the commanding officer of that battalion. After the assault, later on in the course of the battle, they moved into a general support artillery role.

Frank: They also were used for flank defense down on the beaches . . .

Chapman: I believe they were . . .

Frank: . . . when that counter-attack came.

Chapman: . . . part of the time.
Frank: What happens when an artillery battalion gets new weapons, when you go from 105s to 155s? There has to be some retraining does there not?

Chapman: There does on the part of the gunners, yes.

Frank: And also the armorers and so on, the people who handle the . . .

Chapman: Yes, the gunners and the ordnance experts, the artillery experts, and to some small extent in the fire direction center; you know, new firing tables, new capabilities.

Frank: Well, that you have to change over regardless, each time you get a new supply of ammunition you'd have to change your firing tables wouldn't you?

Chapman: No, not the firing table, no. We'd have to re-register to get new gunnery corrections for a new lot of ammunition.

Frank: Yes, that's what I was thinking.

Chapman: But the table doesn't change. Actually we used graphical firing tables in those days. Let's see, have I previously talked about the difference between the fire direction center systems we used . . .

Frank: No, sir. This would be a good time too.

Chapman: . . . on Okinawa and that are currently in effect?

Frank: No, sir.

Chapman: The gunnery that we taught and used in those days was one in which the observer, the forward observer, sensed and gave commands with respect to the gun target line. Nowadays he senses on his line of sight. The difference between the two systems is, of course, that the former
is much faster gunnery-wise. The latter is much simpler for the observer in that he doesn't have to visualize where the guns are with respect to the target and determine in his mind, visually, what the line of fire is, but it's much slower. Nowadays, the average time from the time the observer issues his command corrections to the round landing on wherever it's going to land as a result is a minute or more. Well, in those days, you see, with the observer sensing on the line of fire, well, we averaged seven to ten seconds! Dramatic difference in speed of fire.

Frank: That's surprising.

Chapman: I, for one, have always regretted that we changed to the new system. We followed the lead of the Army. The Army and Fort Sill changed to the new gunnery system. They did it based on their experience in Europe and in North Africa in particular. They concluded from a good many statistical studies that, on the whole, it was faster for the observer . . .

Frank: How could slower be faster?

Chapman: Well, it was faster and more accurate with their type of employment. I have always contended, and still do, that for Marine employment, the system that we previously used is better, for Marines. Perhaps some day we'll go back to it.

Frank: The experience . . . I know . . . again, Gen. Brown was talking about the difference between Army artillery personnel and Marine artillery personnel. As I recall, he seemed to feel that in some of the techniques and some of the methodology, the Army was better; better trained and so on. But by and large . . . for instance when you had all the Marine and the Army artillery together the . . . I guess Gen. Sheetz, who was the 24 Corps artillery commander, Joseph Sheetz, that Marine communicators were much better. Do you recall the comparison, for Okinawa in particular?

Chapman: I remember this, that shortly after the landing, when it developed that there was no Japanese resistance to speak of against the landing and in the center of the island, the Army, as we all recall, turned south. The 6th Division turned north and the 1st Division stayed in reserve
in the center. At that point the 11th Marines battalions' were farmed out to the Army divisions to support them. We went with the 7th Division, 7th Army Division. I remember that we received our orders in the morning. We did a route march to our new position, which the Army had picked out for us. We went into position in a very short period of time, dug in all the gun positions with our TD-7s--tractors, bulldozers which were organic to each battery--camouflaged, and began firing in record time. So we fired in support of that Army division and in general support of the 7th Division artillery for about two or three weeks. When we were detached and returned to the 1st Division, 1st Marine Division, when it went into operation on the right side of the line going south, I got a letter from the CG of the division artillery—which is in my record some place—saying that we had the best artillery battalion he had ever observed, and, he said in the letter, far superior to his own battalions. (Laughter)

Frank: That must have been gratifying.

Chapman: The Army artillery, however, was very, very good. They had much smaller organizations than we did. Our battalions, our 105 battalions and theirs differed in size by 150 or so men. Consequently we could do a lot of things that they couldn't do, like dig in rapidly, camouflage rapidly. In communications, I admired them greatly in their radio communications, it was superior to ours. They had the techniques of radio talk that were much superior to ours. It was very quick, very simple, and they relied almost completely on radio for their . . .

Frank: Rather than line.

Chapman: Rather than telephone line. We relied on the telephone line, which, of course, took us longer to put in. Once we got it in, however, then we had a lot of trouble keeping it in and we had line crews constantly. We doubled our lines and we kept communications practically all the time. But our telephone communications from the forward observers, the liaison officers to the fire direction center, when they were working, were superior to the radio.

Frank: Yes, I think that was the point that Gen. Brown . . .
Chapman: But their radio, when we had to use radio--and they used radio all the time--their radio communications were a good deal better than ours.

Frank: Tell me about . . .

Chapman: Gunnery-wise, I don't think there was much difference.

Frank: Most of the Marines were Sill trained anyway weren't they?

Chapman: Yes, they . . . well, no we had our own artillery school in those days, during World War II.

Frank: But the more senior battalion commanders . . . you were Sill trained . . .

Chapman: Yes, I was.

Frank: The regimental and battalion commanders were Sill . . . had to be Sill trained.

Chapman: Yes, prior to World War II.

Frank: Well, because you were . . .

Chapman: And senior officers went to the Army artillery school at Sill during the war too. But the lieutenants were all trained in the Marine artillery school at Quantico.

Frank: Can you talk about the TIC, the Target Information Center? Apparently, on Okinawa, as I recall, may have been the forerunner of the FSCC, Fire Support Coordination Center. That's where all the information was and I think on the division and the Corps level, the TICs also held the air and naval gunfire as well as the artillery officers. But as I recall . . .
Chapman: The TIC is just what the name would suggest. It was target information center. It had intelligence gathering capabilities, identified targets, and then parceled them out to air, naval gunfire, and artillery as they thought best. Now, of course, that's all general support stuff. The direct support was handled between the infantry regiment and the artillery battalion.

Frank: One of the problems, as I recall, with the TIC, especially on Okinawa, was the fact that the information, the intelligence it had was way out of date by the time it came around to be by the time it got into operation.

Chapman: That may be, I really don't know. I managed to avoid any direct contact with it because it dealt with general support whereas we were direct support. I also was able to avoid any contact with it in that I was able to avoid being designated the G-3 of the division during the course of the battle.

Frank: Was that . . .

Chapman: Gen. del Valle, who was our commanding general and an artilleryman himself, during the course of the battle told Col. Brown--"Big Foot" Brown, our regimental commander--that he thought he wanted me to come up and be the division G-3.

Frank: To relieve Russ Honsewitz?

Chapman: Yes, who would remain--I think, I'm not sure about this--I believe he . . . the intention was that he would remain as assistant G-3 or perhaps he was going to give him a battalion, infantry battalion. I don't remember that point. Col. Brown, I'm thankful to say, succeeded in dissuading Gen. del Valle and so we all continued in place.

Frank: Gen. del Valle, of course, was very fond of his artillery boys.

Chapman: Yes he was, extremely, very partial to the artillery.
Frank: I guess "Big Foot" Brown had a hard time in having Gen. del Valle keep his hands off the 11th Marines too.

Chapman: (Laughing) Yes. It was sort of like being commanding officer of 8th and I, which we'll come to later on, which I always said was such a wonderful assignment because you had so many people helping you. Col. Brown had Gen. del Valle helping him throughout the course of the battle.

Frank: Had you known del Valle before?

Chapman: Just slightly.

Frank: When you left FMFPac, of course, you knew where you were going.

Chapman: Yes, I was Secretary of the General Staff and I read all of the dispatches first thing every morning. I got to the office about 7:00 and from then until 8:00 I read all the dispatches and arranged them in order of priority to give to the Chief of Staff, Gen. Silverthorn, when he arrived. I thought, during the year I was there, that one morning I'd read a set of orders for me to go somewhere, and it eventually happened. They were to Headquarters Marine Corps. Gen. Snedeker, then a brigadier general, who had been commanding officer of the 7th Marines on the Okinawa battle and whom I was in direct support, went to Headquarters Marine Corps as Director of Plans and Policies. As soon as he got there, or shortly after he got there, he put in a bid to get me to come join him in the G-3 division of the Plans and Policies Division. He was successful, so that's how I got there. By the time I got there, he had been transferred to Quantico.

Frank: He hadn't gotten his star yet, had he? Pots and Pans, was that a one-star billet?

Chapman: It was a one-star billet, yes.

Frank: He must have gotten it then.
Chapman: I think he did. I don't know, he was gone when I got there.

Frank: And who had Pots and Pans?

Chapman: Gen. Thomas, Jerry Thomas, . . .

Frank: Jerry Thomas had it.

Chapman: . . . at that point during my first year or so there.

Frank: Well, he had been there so maybe Uncle Eddy Snedeker was the deputy.

Chapman: Could have been. Yes. Wait a minute. Let me go back a minute. I believe Gen. Snedeker was then a colonel and was the G-3 in Plans and Policies. I believe that's the way it was.

Frank: I see, okay. Well, that sounds more . . .

Chapman: I've sort of forgotten.

Frank: That's more logical, because you had a very funny set up there with Plans and Policies which practically ran the whole Headquarters.

Chapman: Well, it was a planning and policy agency. It had no executive authority whatever.

Frank: With Jerry Thomas at the head of it, it had a very important function.

Chapman: Yes, it didn't have any executional authority is the point though, as contrasted to a general staff, which we went to later on. That is to say, it could prepare plans and prepare policies for approval by the Commandant, but then it didn't have any supervisory or monitoring capability of the execution of those plans and orders. That was the weakness. It would, for
instance, Plans and Policies would prepare a logistic plan of some kind. It would go up, get approved, and then it was up to the Quartermaster General to execute it.

Frank: You had no supervisory authority to . . .

Chapman: I had no supervisory authority at all.

Frank: I'm sure he was going to do it the way he wanted it, and of course the Quartermaster General was . . . that would be who? It wasn't Pete Hill.

Chapman: Yes it was. It was W. P. T. Hill for the first year or two I was there.

Frank: He cut a pretty wide swath there too.

Chapman: Well, he controlled the money and, as everybody knows, the golden rule, "He who has the gold, rules." He was the, in effect, the fiscal director as well as the Quartermaster General. Of course all that changed when we went to the general staff system.

Frank: You were there for just about a three-year tour.

Chapman: Yes I was.

Frank: It must have been a period of great fermentation, great change, and great development. What are some of the things that stick out in your mind particularly from this period?

Chapman: I was executive officer of the G-3 division.

Frank: I see.

Chapman: We had Training, Plans, Operations, Photography, Communications, Schools; all those things and others came under our purview. I guess the thing that sticks out most in my
mind is that we were demobilizing and reducing to the approved 100,000 man, peacetime Marine Corps. I think we did that pretty successfully, retaining in the Corps the best of the Marines for career, peacetime Corps, with two divisions and two wings and one in reserve. We were able to keep the one division on Okinawa or most of it.

Frank: No, in China.

Chapman: Well, in China initially, yes.

Frank: China then Guam.

Chapman: Then Guam and then Okinawa.

Frank: I don't think we went to Okinawa right on, did we?

Chapman: I don't remember just when, but the division stayed overseas. It stayed in the Far East.

Frank: That's right, Guam, and then that 1st Division, which Gen. Craig had, Provisional Brigade, went down to brigade, if you recall and was a brigade and finally came back to the west coast which was built up for Korea. It's a cloudy period there.

Chapman: Yes, I believe that's right.

Frank: Of course, the division . . .

Chapman: It was after Korea wasn't it?

Frank: That's right. 3d . . .

Chapman: That we went to Okinawa.
Frank: That's right, 3d Division.

Chapman: Yes, I'd forgotten. Well, during the three-year period, we went from 100,000 down to . . . Our approved strength and budget for the year in which Korea started was . . . let's see. We went to Korea in June of '50 and our end strength for that fiscal year, 1950, was 68,000 and our approved budget for fiscal '51 was $58,000. So Korea saved us.

Frank: And we saved Korea.

Chapman: And of course we saved Korea too.

Frank: About this period of time the Unification fight was going on hot and heavy; the Chowder people down at Quantico. Did you get into any of this at all?

Chapman: No, not directly.

Frank: Were you aware that there was . . .

Chapman: It was all handled . . . yes, I was very much aware of it, but it was all handled by a special task group that was set up at Quantico and direct with Gen. Thomas and the Commandant. Gen. Thomas was Chief of Staff by then.

Frank: You had the Edson Board up at Headquarters and the Marine Corps Board down at Quantico, so-called Chowder Group; Edson and Thomas and Heinl and Schatzel . . .

Chapman: And Hittle.

Frank: And Hittle, yes, of course.

Chapman: Hittle was the real key.
Frank: You think so.

Chapman: Yes, he was in the final stages in that . . . well, there have been several articles and books written about this. When the crunch came and [Congressman Clare] Mr. Hoffman? . . .

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . who was chairman of the Government Operations subcommittee that handled this . . . When he held his final executive session at the Congress to write the final version of the bill, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, en masse, were outside the committee room and Don Hittle was inside.

Frank: There was an old Michigan connection there.

Chapman: Yes, and Don Hittle is really the savior of the modern Marine Corps.

Frank: This must have been busy times, then, this three-year period at Headquarters.

Chapman: Yes, we were trying to maintain our combat readiness with dwindling resources. I remember that . . . what the heck was his name? The Secretary of Defense that came in and . . .

Frank: Louie Johnson.

Chapman: Johnson, right.

Frank: Yes, he was going to sink the Marine Corps, sink Marine aviation and everything else.

Chapman: Yes, and in fact, pretty well sink the Department of Defense. He was the one that was responsible for the derogation, the diminution of all the armed services. He was the reason
that we were going from about 75,000 to 68,000 and projected for 58,000 in fiscal '51. Of course, everything he did was approved by the President, who was Truman.

Frank: And done at the behest of the President.

Chapman: Yes. To repeat, Korea saved us all.

Frank: Hunter Hurst, I think, was involved there too. He was on that Edson Board.

Chapman: Yes, I believe he was.

Frank: And Phil Berkeley got involved too. There were quite a few hands involved with this. Of course, this is a separate story.

Chapman: They were all--yes, this is a separate story--they were all separate and apart, however, from Headquarters Marine Corps, you know. They operated in camera and they did a wonderful job.

Frank: But everybody on the staff was aware of what was going on.

Chapman: Yes, we were all aware. We were kept informed but we had no direct hand in it. We were . . . we continued to be concerned with the day-to-day and long-range operation of the Marine Corps.

Frank: Which way was the Marine Corps going in those days? There were some plans for reorganization, going into quadrangular organization or something?

Chapman: Yes, we did . . . that was one of the things that we did was write new tables of organization for a new concept. They were the famous J tables, the J tables. The J tables were unique. They were an attempt to cope with the dwindling size of the Marine Corps, and consisted of infantry battalions designated as regiments. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines became
the 5th Marines, for example, and had an organic artillery battery, tank platoon, engineer platoon, etc; all the things that a BLT normally has, and was designated with a regimental designation; had the regimental colors and preserved the regimental history and traditions. It was a way of doing it, and an effective way. Of course, it meant the loss of the regiment, regimental headquarters and regimental expertise, but it preserved the Marine Corps and preserved the regimental traditions and history. It was effective for that period. Those were the famous J tables.

Then, during Korea, when Korea got started, we formed a board at Quantico, of which I was the Plans and Policies member. That board met for three months and its purpose was to design new tables to cope with the . . . organization and tables to go with it.

Frank: This wasn't the Hogaboom Board, was it?

Chapman: It was the Hogaboom Board. We came up with the--what was it--H or K tables . . . I can't remember exactly what . . .

Frank: K tables, the K tables.

Chapman: The K tables. Well, the K tables were war-strength tables with a peace-strength companion to which the Marine Corps expanded and used in Korea and then for a few years after Korea. They were heavy tables. They implemented the idea that an amphibious operation, as we knew it at that time, was basically a siege operation. In other words, we landed against, and conducted siege warfare against, heavily prepared defenses. That was the concept behind the K tables. They were fully capable of doing the job. They were very heavy; heavy infantry, all kinds of . . . the heaviest kind of support that we could muster.

Frank: Division must have gone up close to 25,000.

Chapman: Yes, a reinforced division was big, very big.

Frank: 30,000 perhaps.
Chapman: Yes, around 30,000, as I remember. Meanwhile, the Twining Board was formed to come up with future concepts, and did so, as you know.

Frank: Well, that was the one that was involved with the vertical envelopment.

Chapman: Yes, that's the board that came up with the helicopter and the seaplane as the way to go.

Frank: And I think submarines too, they were talking about.

Chapman: Yes, submarines for reconnaissance, principally, not for combat formations.

Frank: You went down to Quantico in May of '49 and for a brief period of time there, the 22d Marines was down there, as I recall.

Chapman: Yes, yes it was. It was one of the Fleet Marine Force alternate organizations. It was school troops but it had a Fleet Marine Force designation too so that in an emergency it could expand and become a regiment in the Fleet Marine Force.

Frank: Was that . . . Did O. P. Smith have the 22d Marines at this time?

Chapman: That I don't remember. I don't remember who had it.

Frank: As I recall the 22d Marines proved to be the nucleus for the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic which was formed about this time, or it may already have been there.

Chapman: The 2d Division was at Camp Lejeune, 2d Wing was at Cherry Point.

Frank: Both had come back from Japan in '47 or so.
Chapman: Right, and it was decided—proposed by Plans and Policies and decided by the Commandant—that we would form Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, designate a commanding general—the first of whom, if I remember, was Tommy Watson, wasn't it? I believe it was. He was directed to report, operationally, to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic.

Frank: He may have been because he'd had it . . . he went out to FMFPac shortly . . . he was there about the time . . . just before Korea broke out. Gregon Williams was his chief of staff.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: I recall both of them had pretty well . . .

Chapman: Yes, I think that's right.

Frank: . . . pretty well T'd off the CinCPac. The relationship at that time was none too good.

Chapman: The new Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, as I said, was designated, his headquarters were formed, and he was directed to report, for operational control, to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. During that period, or just before, Gen. Cates, who was Commandant, and who had been the commanding general of the 4th Division during the Iwo battle—from the formation of the division until its demobilization. For training, they had been established on Maui in the Hawaiian islands. During the time I was at Plans and Policies, he was anxious to get some kind of Marine unit, preferably a division, stationed back in the Hawaiian Islands on Maui. So he sent a delegation, of which I was the Plans and Policies member, and one other officer, a logistics officer, it was A. E. Dubber, Col.--LtCol. then--Dubber. He and I formed a reconnaissance expedition to proceed to Hawaii and . . . He was an SDO.

Frank: Yes, I beg your pardon, A. E. Dubber, Jr., LtCol.

Chapman: Yes, he's the one.
Frank: Okay. When you said Dubber, A. E. Dubber somehow Dolph Zuber . . .


(Pause for siren)

Frank: They're having fun and games outside there. Yes, he has a quartermaster designation, you're absolutely right, Quartermaster, Department Technical, absolutely correct.

Chapman: Anyhow, he and I proceeded to Pearl Harbor; reported to Gen. Watson, who was CG, FMFPac; delivered to him a private, sealed letter from the Commandant, which I never saw but I'm sure it told him why we were there and what we were to do. Then we moved on over to Maui and conducted a reconnaissance and concluded, and brought back a report to the effect that, it was impractical to put a Marine division back on Maui. It had, of course, been practical during the war but that was because the local ranch owners had allowed the use of all of their millions of acres for the Marines to use for training.

Frank: In war time.

Chapman: In war time, but after the war they withdrew that permission and the result was that the area available to the Marines was sufficient to establish a camp, which A. E. Dubber so reported, but not sufficient for training, as I reported. So the project was dropped. Instead, later on, the division ended up on Okinawa.

Frank: This was when that you went over? Do you recall?

Chapman: Well, let's see, it was '47 I think.

Frank: Of course, you later had the brigade, the air-ground team at Kaneohe, but that was '53- '54.
Chapman: That was after Korea too.

Frank: Right. I know I was out at FMFPac at that time. They were planning for it. Gen. Krulak was the 3 and Gen. Shepherd, so they were pushing for it in '50-'51.

Chapman: Right.

Frank: Doing the surveys. I see you were also the coordinator of Reserve artillery training initially and an instructor in the artillery section for a period of about one month . . . two months down at Quantico at the Schools.

Chapman: That was after I was detached from Headquarters and went to Quantico and reported in awaiting assignment as a student at the--what was then called--Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course. So during that summer period, Gen. Shepherd, who was then the Commandant of Marine Corps Schools, put me in charge of the Reserve artillery training that summer. I was administratively carried as a member of the artillery section.

Frank: You were assistant 3 and then you turned out to be the 3 of the Schools.

Chapman: Well, yes, that was for a short period.

Frank: Then Chief of the Supporting Arms section, Landing Force Development Board.

Chapman: That was after I was a student.

Frank: What was it, a short course there?

Chapman: No, it was a nine-month course.

Frank: Oh, you did go for the full year.
Chapman: Yes, it was a nine-month course. To go back to Plans and Policies, LtCol. Fred Beans was the G-3 during most of my time there. My last year there it was Col. Bill Coleman. Both of whom were very fine Marines, very fine Marines.

Frank: Both old-timers of course.

Chapman: Yes, pretty much. Well, Freddy Beans wasn't all that old, and neither was Bill Coleman for that matter.

Frank: Really I thought they went back in the . . .

Chapman: Freddy Beans was.

Frank: Naval Academy graduate.

Chapman: Yes, I think they both were. I know Bill was. They . . . I don't remember exactly how far back but Fred Beans was only three or four years senior to me; Bill Coleman was five or six, senior.

We tackled many, many problems. I've described some of them. The conversion of the Headquarters to a general staff system was one of the things that we struggled with. Plans and Policies designed the organization of the new general staff system, which didn't go into effect . . . and I was one of the key players on the team that did the designing. It didn't go into effect, however until Gen. Shepherd became Commandant and Gen. Thomas, Chief of Staff. That was one of the first things they did was reorganize Headquarters Marine Corps on the general staff system, but I was gone by then.

Frank: There was considerable reluctance at the time that it was first brought up. I think one of the . . . of course, one of the people who resisted most was W. P. T. Hill because . . .

Chapman: Yes, because it stripped him of most of his power. The general staff system . . . the organization that Headquarters adopted and was put into effect by Gen. Shepherd and Gen. Thomas was the one that we designed while I was there.
A second thing that we worked on extensively was war planning. Technically, the Marine Corps had no business in war planning. That was all supposed to be done by the Joint Chiefs. But we felt compelled to do some too. So we formed up a task force and I was the G-3 member and we sat in a room across the hall from the Commandant's office that is now the general officers' mess and all the doors were closed. We sat in there without benefit of any stenographers . . .

Frank: Or air conditioning.

Chapman: . . . or air conditioning, and produced war plans, which we typed ourselves. Fortunately I was, in those days, pretty skillful on the typewriter. So I typed up the G-3 plans personally. Now let's see. Some of the areas for which we wrote war plans were an assault to seize, occupy, defend, and use the island of Kuwait. In conjunction therewith, there was a separate plan for landing on and forming a defensive line across the east. . . .

End Tape 1, Side 1
Session VI
Begin Tape 1, Side 2
Session VI

Frank: You were saying the plan was to protect the oil fields from the Russians on east side of
the Arabian peninsula.

Chapman: The east side.

Frank: The east side, right.

Chapman: We wrote a plan for the seizure and defense of Iceland; the critical assumption being
that it had been seized by the Russians and we had to take it back. The Azores, we wrote a plan
for a landing in Scandinavia, in Norway; those are the ones I remember.

Frank: Were these sort of a interim, sort of a bridge between the pre-war studies that were being
done down at Quantico in conjunction with the Naval War College, to the Advanced Base
Studies program which Quantico picked up?

Chapman: Yes, there was a connection there. The plans that we wrote were submitted to the
Joint Chiefs.

Frank: Oh, they were?

Chapman: Yes, they were submitted to the Joint Chiefs as the Marine Corps suggestions on how
to do those particular jobs.

Frank: What kind of response did you get from the Joint Chiefs? Any indication that they were
welcomed with open arms?

Chapman: I don't know that we got any. Remember that in those days the Commandant was not
... 

Frank: Represented.
Chapman: . . . not represented on the Joint Chiefs. I said they were submitted to the Joint Chiefs. I think I'd better retract that. I think they were submitted to the Navy.

Frank: CNO.

Chapman: Yes, they were submitted to CNO, with the request that he do the Navy war planning in conjunction with the Marine proposed amphibious operations. He did, and they were--the Navy-Marine plans--were then submitted to the Joint Chiefs by him. None of them were ever put into effect, of course. But I spent many a hot hour in that room typing up war plans.

Frank: Who else was there? Do you recall?

Chapman: There was a representative from G-4, G-2, G-1. It was Bill Van Ryzin from G-1. It was Fred Wieseman from G-4. The G-2 was . . . oh, what was his name? He was very famous. He was the one that jumped in training and his parachute was caught in the tail . . .

Frank: Oh, Walter Osipoff.

Chapman: Osipoff, that's it. He was the G-2.

Frank: Quite a stellar . . .

Chapman: The four of us sat in there.

Frank: Just by yourselves.

Chapman: Just the four of us, and we wrote up war plan after war plan (laughter). I guess they were pretty good plans too.
Frank: Well, certainly some of them were prophetic as to . . . Well, they were obvious areas of employment for Marines I'm sure, much like the plans . . . the Operation Cormorant, I guess it was, which was one of the advanced base studies. I think that was in Saigon or Haiphong.

Chapman: Yes, it was. We didn't prepare that one.

Frank: That initially was prepared, I guess, when Sam Shaw had TTUPac out at Coronado. It was done out there.

Chapman: That was the one that called for the landing at Da Nang, wasn't it?

Frank: Yes, in that area, yes.

Chapman: That's interesting. To jump ahead a minute, that's why the Marines ended up in I Corps in Vietnam.

Frank: Because of that . . .

Chapman: Because of Cormorant. The sudden decision was made by President Johnson to insert troops into Vietnam in the spring, early spring, of '65. The only ones that were ready to move were the Marines, and the only plan that existed, for Marines to land in Vietnam, was the Cormorant plan; to land at and in the vicinity of Da Nang.

Frank: That's interesting.

Chapman: So that plan was pulled out of the file, dusted off, and executed. That's how the Marines got to Da Nang and why the Marines were in I Corps for the entire war.

Frank: I recall that this was discussed and I don't recall who . . . You're absolutely right, of course, that's the way it was.
Chapman: That's the way it happened, that's why it happened. That's, for instance, why the Marines were not in IV Corps in Vietnam which was more like an amphibious employment.

Well, we're still at Headquarters Marine Corps, however.

Frank: No, we're down to Quantico.

Chapman: Well, let's see if I think of anything else with regard to Plans and Policies.

Frank: Right, yes, I think so.

(Pause)

Chapman: Well, midway through my tour there, Gen. Thomas left to become the CG of the brigade . . .

Frank: Tsingtao.

Chapman: . . . at Tsingtao.

Frank: FMFWestPac.

Chapman: FMFWestPac, BGen . . . oh I know him as well but I can't think of his name . . . became the director of Plans and Policies. [Ed note: BGen. Ray A. "Torchy" Robinson] I'll think of it in a minute. (Pause) (Laughing)

Frank: Okay, well we can fill in.

Chapman: Something's happened to my memory in the last 20 years.

Frank: Well, you get one of these lapses every once in a while.
Chapman: Let's see. What else was notable during that tour? Well, I can't think of anything else right now. Maybe I will later on.

Frank: Maybe when you see the transcript because it certainly was a period of change and . . .

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: . . . dire peril for the Marine Corps, amongst other things. The sails had to be trimmed to the budget?

Chapman: To the budget, right.

Frank: Still, it wasn't any less in the Marine Corps commitments in the period either. We still had the division in China.

Chapman: Yes, during the first part of that period. We had the division and wing in North Carolina. Let's see. During that period we began the deployment of the BLTs to the Mediterranean too.

Frank: Oh, did you have . . . what did you have to do with that?

Chapman: They were planned by Plans and Policies.

Frank: What was the rationale?

Chapman: Implemented, of course . . .

Frank: Relieving the British in the Mediterranean?

Chapman: A state of readiness in the Mediterranean for the newly developed Russian threat. Remember, of course, we ended World War II pals with the Russians.
Frank: Not exactly kissing pals.

Chapman: No, but we were war-time pals.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: During the next couple of years after the war, the Russians began their great build up. They established the Iron Curtain. They seized Sakhalin, the northern Japanese island, still have it. They overran all opposition in the Iron Curtain countries and established them as communist states, subservient states, and began to threaten in many parts of the world. It was at that point that we began to perceive the Russians as our enemy, and to take steps accordingly with a massive strategic change. NATO was formed and the BLT was a contribution to NATO, really. It constituted a small, but highly effective and combat-ready battalion, on the scene in Navy ships in the Mediterranean, available for employment anywhere around the littoral of the Mediterranean; and of course it's still there.

Frank: Was there, at this time, a looking away from the Pacific toward Europe on the part of the Marine Corps?

Chapman: I would say no, not overall. The Marine Corps, throughout that period, continued to consider that the Pacific was our bailiwick.

Frank: Paramount area of operations.

Chapman: Paramount area of concern and operations, as it continues to be to this day.

Frank: Do you still think it is today?

Chapman: I do, I do. We're giving attention to the employment of Marines in Europe or the littorals of Europe, but I think our primary concern still continues to be the Pacific. It's similar to
the situation that I've just described where we were giving some attention to NATO and Europe but our primary concern continued to be in the Pacific. Well, let's see. (Pause)

Frank: Did the . . . how much did the lessons learned in World War II effect the planning that you were doing, or was there.

Chapman: I'd say a great deal.

Frank: A great deal.

Chapman: The K tables that I've described, for example . . .

Frank: Based on experience.

Chapman: . . . were based on the World War II experience, and based on the concept, as I've previously stated, that an amphibious operation was basically a siege operation. Of course that concept changed radically with the results of the Twining Board which proposed the helicopter and the seaplane and the submarine, and conceived of operations in which the Marines landed by helicopter and did not land over a defended beach. That's still the concept today. Whereas under the K tables and previously, we thought in terms of selecting the best beach and landing against whatever obstacles were there, whatever defenses were there. With the helicopter, of course, the objective is to land where they ain't and attack the beach, if there is one, from the rear. If there's not a beach then by landing heavy equipment, by water and by helicopter, create a beach for landing the heavy stuff and the logistic support. It was a totally different concept.

Frank: Now, when you . . . had any of this concept of seaplane and submarine . . . using seaplanes and submarines as carriers.

This came down . . . came from Quantico later, not while you were up in P&P.

Chapman: True.
Frank: It's while you were down at Quantico that these things were being kicked around, again, part of the Hogaboom Board.

Chapman: No, the Hogaboom Board was in '4 . . .

Frank: The organization . . . I'm sorry.

Chapman: . . . was K tables.

Frank: Okay, I'm getting . . .

Chapman: That was in '48 believe, 1948. The Twining Board was . . .

Frank: It was earlier.

Chapman: No

Frank: Twining Board wasn't earlier?

Chapman: Twining Board was in '49 or 50. It was prior to Korea.

Frank: Prior to Korea.

Chapman: It was prior to Korea, because, based on the Twining Board, we actually bought some helicopters; the old flying banana?

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: The Piasecki and the HR-1, yes, the first Sikorsky.

Frank: It was the first Sikorsky and there was another one also.
Chapman: A small one.

Frank: The Bell? No.

Chapman: No it was . . .

Frank: Stanley . . .

Chapman: . . . some little reconnaissance/observation type helicopter.

Frank: There was the Piasecki, there was the Sikorsky, and there was the . . . another one, which we can fill in on.

Chapman: It was the one with the twin inter-meshing rotors.

Frank: Right, right.

Chapman: HK-1 . . .

Frank: The Kayman.

Chapman: Yes, that's it. The HK-1, that was its designation. Then during Korea, having bought these helicopters and formed the first squadron in the U.S. armed forces, we deployed it, as you know, to Korea; tested in combat very successfully.

Frank: Yes, the Sikorsky was . . .

Chapman: Of course that's a completely different story. But that's how that happened.

Well, that was after I reported to Quantico. As I previously said, I was--during that first summer--I was put in charge of the artillery reserve training at Quantico. There were three or
four battalions that came there to train. We set up a training headquarters and made plans for them, provided services and support of all kinds including the ordnance. The weapons were furnished to them by us at Quantico . . .

Frank: They didn't bring their own with them.

Chapman: . . . with which they trained. No, they didn't bring their own. Well, they didn't have . . . in those days the Reserves not did have a full complement of weapons. An artillery battalion would only have three or four pieces to train on.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: That was before the days of the T/O and E combat equipped Reserve artillery, or Reserve anything!

Frank: I guess the Reserves really didn't come into their own, as far as equipment and so on, until after Korea, when they had to rebuild.

Chapman: Yes, it was . . .

Frank: It had a certain . . .

Chapman: If you're willing to jump ahead, the time frame . . . it occurred when I was G-4 at Headquarters.

Frank: Oh, really.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: That much later.

Chapman: It resulted from a plan proposed by the director of Reserve, who was then Willy Fairbourn, Bill Fairbourn.
Frank: Classmate of yours.

Chapman: Classmate of mine. He proposed the plan which converted the Reserve from, basically, filler units into a full-strength, war-strength,

Frank: Division and wing.

Chapman: . . . completely T/O and E equipped division, wing, and force troops.

Frank: That's when the 4th Division/4th Wing were . . .

Chapman: That's when the 4th Division, 4th Wing, and the 4th Force Troops were organized and formed and completely equipped.

Frank: That's ten years hence.

Chapman: Yes, more than that. That was in '61 . . .

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: . . . when that occurred.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: I was, as G-4 I was concerned with it because we were the ones that planned for and provided all the equipment of the Reserves. But that's jumping ahead.

Frank: Let me make a note about this . . . (Pause) . . . and we can talk about that because you had to go in and get that supply of those items someplace.

Chapman: We got them.
Frank: Let's talk a little bit about the Hogaboom Board. Of course, Gen. Hogaboom was a fine individual to work for, and really bright, and decisive, and incisive. That must have been an all-star group that you had down there.

Chapman: Well, Gen. Shoup, then Col. Shoup, was one of the members. Ray Murray and I were the, and he . . . Col. Shoup, LtCols. Murray and Chapman were the operational part of the Hogaboom Board. There was an aviation group, there was a logistic group.

Frank: Who was on the aviation group?

Chapman: I'll be darned if I can remember, Ben. It was Col. Dyer I believe.

Frank: Oh, Coulter Dyer.

Chapman: Coulter Dyer, I believe, a very fine Marine.

Frank: Yes, yes.

Chapman: Well, we had a big job. We were given the task of conceiving of, the projected operational employment of, methods of operation of, the future Marine Corps combat organizations and then writing the tables of organization and equipment for them.

Frank: Who were you . . .

Chapman: In general form, not the line by line T/Os, but the sections, principal pieces, with the number of Marines in each and the equipment to go in it.

Frank: Who did you report to? Directly to the Commandant?

Chapman: We did, yes. The board reported directly to the Commandant.
Frank: And what were your guidelines? What was your directive?

Chapman: To do what I've just said, without regard to the strength of the Marine Corps. Based on the tables that we came up with the Marine Corps would, then, expand and convert those into the strength of the total Marine Corps. That's just what we did. Remembering, however, that at that time, which was just prior to Korea we were at 68,000 and the tables we came up with required--let's see if I remember that figure--something like a 210,000-man Marine Corps. Of course, as you know, those are the tables we fought Korea with, and then at the conclusion of Korea that's that size the Marine Corps returned to.


Chapman: Well, about 200,000. Then, in the intervening years to Vietnam, we went down as low as 178,000, but in Vietnam we went up; got up to 317,000 peak. Then at the end of Vietnam we went back to 200,000. So really those K tables were the basis for justifying the 200,000-man Marine Corps; although they, the K tables themselves, were long gone by the time of Vietnam.

Frank: Had you thought of any different commitment for the Marine Corps? It was still going to be an amphibious type of organization, still . . . This was set out by the National Defense . . .

Chapman: Yes, of '47.

Frank: . . . of '47, which gave its tasks.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: So, we didn't lose our amphibious character.

Chapman: No, and we were charged, also, with forming the Joint Landing Force Board. The Marine Corps was charged.
Frank: Right, right.

Chapman: Well, we're jumping ahead a little.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: After the Reserve training was completed, I matriculated as a student in the Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course; a nine-month course, an excellent course. Bob Bare was the director of the Senior School and he had been Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Division in the battle of Okinawa where, of course, I got to know him quite well.

Frank: I remember him quite well.

Chapman: So I was one of his students in the Senior Course. Fred Wieseman was the logistics instructor. Bill Van Ryzin was a classmate--a Marine classmate--was one of my Senior School classmates as well. In those days we were required to do a thesis. Bill Van Ryzin and I undertook, and got approval for, a joint thesis. We wrote a combined thesis, which was twice as long as the individual theses, and our subject was logistic support, particularly of aviation, in an amphibious operation. We produced a tome about an inch thick, mostly during the Christmas holiday . . .

Frank: Oh, gracious.

Chapman: I know it's still on file down there at Quantico and has been referred to on many occasions.

Frank: Is that when you started getting interested in logistical matters?

Chapman: Well, yes, I'd say so.
Frank: Because you'd been artillery up to that point and then, based on that, you later became the G-4 and you also . . . well you had Force Troops, FMFLant.

Chapman: G-4 was my first direct connection with logistics but I was definitely interested in it. Well, it was a good year. Oh, another classmate at the Senior School was Lew Walt.

Frank: He's class of '36 I believe.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: Had you known him from before.

Chapman: Oh, yes, I knew him . . . well, particularly on Peleliu. He was exec of the 5th Marines . . .

Frank: Sure.

Chapman: . . . and I was the gunnery officer for the 11th Marines and we had many connections. I'd known him before the war too, at San Diego in the old 2d Brigade, when he was in the 6th Marines and I was in the 10th.

Frank: Right. 10th never went to China, as I recall, or did a section of it go when the 6th Marines went to China?

Chapman: I don't remember.

Frank: I guess just the 6th went. They didn't send any artillery.

Chapman: Could be, I don't know. Do you mean at the conclusion of World War II?

Frank: No, in '36.
Chapman: Oh, in '36. Well, I don't know, that was before my time and before Lew Walt's time in the . . .

Frank: He . . . no, he went out to China. He went out to China shortly after, he and Ray . . . I have a picture of him and Ray Murray as young lieutenants.

Chapman: In the 6th Marines.

Frank: In the 6th Marines. I think that may have been almost his first assignment after Basic School.

Chapman: After . . . Well, he wouldn't have graduated from Basic School until '37.

Frank: '37, so it was . . .

Chapman: So it was probably then that he went out there.

Frank: Right, unless they shorted the course based on requirements out there.

Chapman: Could be, could have been early '37.

Let's see. I'm thinking about the Senior School.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: It was really a good school; full of meat and well done. The instruction was excellent, the materials, the handouts, the documents, were all of good quality, excellent quality. It was a fine year. I think it continues to be so to this day. I'm sure it does. It's now called the Command and Staff College, of course.
Frank: Command and Staff College, right. Well, you had a course . . . practically the whole class of ’35 was in that . . .

Chapman: There were a lot of them there.

Frank: I was told an apocryphal story that about this time, over a few drinks at Waller Hall, some of the class of ’35 were sitting around, and had pretty well G-2-ed the situation that, based on present incumbency and so on and the tenure of office, that a Commandant would have to come from the class of ’35. They drew up a list of who were the most likely candidates. There were three names on that list: Robert Cushman, Leonard Chapman, and Frederick P. Henderson. Had you ever heard of this?

Chapman: No, I never had. Well, we were the three . . . we were the number ones in each of our three sections. Bob Cushman from the Naval Academy group, and I was from the July 1st commissionees, and Paul Henderson from the September group.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: You see there were three groups in our year at the Basic School, in ’35.

Frank: So each one of you was number one in your group.

Chapman: Yes, and those standings were based--I think we previously talked about this--on that probationary exam that we took at the end of our second year in the Corps.

Frank: It's interesting, that's very interesting. Well, that class . . . Now, we've already talked about (interruption in tape)

Frank: Okay, we're on now. That was "Torchy" Robinson . . .
Chapman: Yes, who became director of Plans and Policies when Gen Thomas left. That was in, I think, '48.

Frank: '48s when he went out to FMFWestPac. It may have been a little earlier. I'm trying to think when Marines left China; February '49 when the last Marines left China. '48 would have been when Cates took over as Commandant. I'm trying to think of the sequence of events as it effected Gen Thomas because at that time the Unification fight had gotten very hot and his welcome was worn . . . he had worn out his welcome as far as the administration was concerned. They were starting to chomp on the bit as to the activists. So I guess to protect Gen Thomas he went out, and that would have been about the time that he went out, for about a year, and "Torchy" Robinson came in.

The question I was about to ask was, going back to Senior School . . . The vertical envelopment concept had not really taken hold yet so what was the nature of the concepts being taught, lessons learned from World War II mainly?

Chapman: Yes, at the Senior School?

Frank: At the Senior School, yes sir.

Chapman: Yes, with the improvements that were possible with various new weapons and resources. The Senior School was taught, on the K tables, by and large.

Frank: Had the Packard exercises started yet?

Chapman: Yes, yes. We went on a Packard exercise. Let's see, I think ours was about the third or so in the series.

Frank: Packard Three.
Chapman: I was the Corps G-3 for our Packard exercise. Lew Walt was the Chief of Staff and Paul Wallace was the commanding general. Then, of course, we had divisions, and wings, and regiments, and groups, all of which were commanded by the Senior School students.

Frank: It must have been a very interesting exercise.

Chapman: Yes, extremely. We embarked on an AGC right there at Quantico, journeyed south to Camp Lejeune, and assaulted the enemy with our plan. Our plan was so enormous, I remember that. It was, of course, written by the students based on everything they'd learned during the school year. That thing was about five inches thick. It was a lot more plan that anybody could read (laughter), but it served the purpose.

Frank: A lot of fun.

Chapman: It was a lot of fun, and very useful.

Frank: The people that you had, of course, were now pretty well senior lieutenant colonels, senior majors, perhaps in the class. Were there any majors in the class?

Chapman: No, all lieutenant colonels I believe, and many of us made colonel... I made colonel right after graduating from the Senior School. So did Bill Van Ryzin and, not long thereafter, Lew Walt. The class of '35 made colonel that summer. That would be the summer of '50.

Frank: Summer of '50, which would have been 15 years, would have been...

Chapman: That would be the summer of '50. A few of us didn't--depending on where we stood in the lineal list in our class--some didn't make it until in the fall or winter of that year. Ray Murray, for instance, who commanded the 5th Marines...

Frank: As a lieutenant colonel.
Chapman: . . . as a lieutenant colonel in the initial landings and battles in Korea.

Frank: That's right, he was the class of '35.

Chapman: He was the class of '35, yes. So he hadn't yet made his number when he was in command of the 5th Marines. Let's see. That was in the summer, in June. We graduated in June and, of course, Korea started in June of 1950.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: We all had our orders to various places though, to which we proceeded.

Frank: You stayed on as the Chief . . .

Chapman: My orders were to the new Landing Force Development Center, which the Marine Corps had formed pursuant to the National Security Act. In the National Security Act, you know, the Marine Corps' charged with developing the tactics and techniques of the landing force in amphibious operations. So the Marine Corps formed the Landing Force Development Center which . . . in early '50 . . . yes, it must have been in early 1950, and it continues to this day. It incorporated the old Marine Corps Equipment Board as the equipment side of the development of tactics, techniques, and equipment of landing forces. Then we formed a new board called the Tactics and Techniques Board. The law says we're charged with the development of the tactics, techniques, and equipment of landing forces in amphibious operations. So we had the old Equipment Board for the "equipment" word in the law and then we formed the new Tactics and Techniques Board for the other two words in the law.

The Tactics and Techniques Board was divided into an aviation division; a combat support division, which I was head of--that meant artillery, naval gunfire, etc--and I don't remember the name of the other panel, but it had to do, of course, with the infantry and so forth.

Frank: I think they called it the supporting arms section rather than . . .
Chapman: Yes, supporting arms is what I had, right. Then, concurrently, we formed the Joint Landing Force Board. We were all dual-hatted as members of the Joint Landing Force Board. It contained, in addition, an Air Force representative, an Army representative, and a Navy representative. It was also headed by the director of the Tactics and Techniques Board. The first director of the development center was, again, Jerry Thomas.

Frank: Ah, so, that's right. He came back for that.

Chapman: He came back from China and became the director of the Marine Corps Development Center and the Head of the Joint Landing Force Board as well.

Frank: I understand that the other services got involved very reluctantly. They kind of dragged their feet on this whole thing, and they did not, necessarily, send their best people down.

Chapman: They certainly didn't send their best people. The people they sent were non-contributors to put it mildly. The Marines did all the work, and not very much happened in the Joint Board area. Not only just there, but the Navy formed something called the Joint Amphibious Warfare Board. The Air Force had one, the Army had one, and they never did anything. I don't think they even exist any more.

Frank: Was there any . . . you had a feeling that there was a dog in the manger attitude on the part of these other people from the other services?

Chapman: No, not exactly. No, I'd say they were . . . their position was one of arrogance rather than supine-ness. They just looked on the whole thing as being beneath the concern of their service.

Frank: But the Marines went ahead anyway.
Chapman: Yes, we plowed ahead regardless, in both capacities. The Marines were charged, as members of the board--of both boards--were charged with coming up with both Marine tactics, techniques, and equipment and joint tactics, techniques, and equipment.

Frank: You kept churning it out regardless.

Chapman: And we kept churning it out, as best we could. Really, the main thing we did was write the Landing Force Manuals, which contained the tactics, techniques, and equipment that . . . I personally was concerned, and produced, several of those Landing Force Manuals.

Frank: That's what I understand.

Chapman: One on supporting arms, one on naval gunfire support, one on the ship to shore movement. That was a special one, a special board was set up to do that. Joe Dickey was the head of it.

Frank: An aviator.

Chapman: No, communicator.

Frank: Oh, Ward Dickey was the aviator I believe.

Chapman: Yes. Joe Dickey was the . . .

Frank: Communicator.

Chapman: . . . communicator. It was a three-man panel. He was the head of it, he was a communicator; I was on it, and Rip Collins was on it. The three of us sat down and wrote the ship to shore movement Landing Force Manual to include movement by helicopters.

Frank: Oh, you did include helicopters?
Chapman: Yes, yes we sure did. That was in 1951, I think we wrote that manual.

Frank: But at that time you had the helicopters . . .

Chapman: We had the concept.

Frank: . . . concept.

Chapman: Yes. The Manual was written based on the concept. We didn't actually have the hardware, yet.

Frank: Is this the one that Loren Hafner drew sketches for?

Chapman: Yes, it is.

Frank: In other words, this whole helicopter concept . . . everything just coming out of the blue. It's your imagination. The concept came before the actual equipment.

Chapman: Also a member of our panel that wrote the ship to shore movement was Keith McCutcheon. He was the aviator and rapidly becoming the Marine Corps' helicopter expert. He, at that time, was dual-hatted as the commanding officer of HMX-1, the experimental, the first and only Marine Corps helicopter squadron. It had an "X" in the title because it was experimental. He was the CO of that and he was a member of our panel. The four of us wrote the ship to shore movement both by sea and air.

Frank: How was it received?

Chapman: Oh, very well. It was published as an official Marine Corps Landing Force Manual.

Frank: LFMF . . .
Chapman: LFM-4. It went immediately into use throughout the Marine Corps. Of course it's been superseded since. But it was a good document, and I'll tell you we put in many hundreds of hours of labor over it. Then, my supporting arms section, we wrote Naval Gunfire Support, we wrote Artillery Support, and three or four others I don't remember.

Frank: Was Gen Krulak down there at this time?

Chapman: No, not in the Development Center.

Frank: No, he was out at FMFPac.

Chapman: Yes, he was out there with . . .

Frank: Gen Shepherd.


Frank: G-3.

Chapman: . . . during the Korean War.

Frank: He was there earlier on the Twining Board, I believe.

Chapman: He was on the Twining Board, yes.

Frank: That's when this helicopter business all started, with Twining, Shepherd, Dyer. It was then called the Marine Corps Board, I believe.

Chapman: Yes, but it was a sort of . . . It was completely separate and distinct board formed on a temporary basis for a specific purpose.
Frank: And they were dealing with never-never because you didn't even have the helicopters at the time.

Chapman: No, hardly any of us had ever even seen one. But they came up with a concept which has stood up and it's in effect today.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: Except for the seaplanes. The seaplanes, just as an aside, the seaplane was to be used for such operations as landing on that big lake in Thailand. You know, that big lake that's formed by the Mekong, I think it is. I've forgotten my Thailand geography. You know, there's a huge lake right in the middle of Thailand?

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: Well, they conceived that Marines might have to land in Thailand someday.

Frank: So they thought of . . .

Chapman: They thought of the seaplane for getting there, in part.

Frank: Were they thinking in terms of the one that Howard Hughes had built?

Chapman: Well, that type, yes, or the Mars.

Frank: Or the Mars, which was then in use.

Chapman: It was then in use. That type of plane. The Mars carried--I don't remember exactly--but it would carry a reinforced platoon, I'm sure. A couple dozen Mars would carry, probably, a Marine BLT.
Frank: Mars would only carry a reinforced platoon?

Chapman: I don't remember exactly what it . . .

Frank: I think it would have carried more than that. If I recall . . .

Chapman: It might well. It would depend on the . . .

Frank: A reinforced company, right.

Chapman: . . . of the flight. If it was short and they only needed a little gasoline, it would carry a lot more people.

Frank: I recall flying from Pearl Harbor to San Francisco on the Mars, and it seems to me that was awfully big.

Chapman: I made that flight too but I can't remember how many people were aboard, quite a few. Of course, a combat Marine is supposed to weigh, with his gear, 220 pounds so that's heavier than the weight of the average passenger.

Let's see, the Joint Landing Force Board and the Tactics and Techniques Board. Well, after . . . not long after we'd formed, Korea started so we were concerned with a number of projects that dealt with the war in Korea. We produced the plan, for instance, for inserting first helicopter squadron and the tactics and techniques it was to use. Kieth McCutcheon was the ring-leader in everything to do with the helicopters.

There was a basic . . . a fundamental question as to whether it was better to put what we had in the way of helicopters into Korea--in effect, test them in combat--and to be able to say that the Marine helicopters were the first in the world to be employed in combat. That was one point of view. The opposing point of view was that it was better to keep the helicopters that we had here and proceed to develop the techniques, the tactics, the doctrine of using the helicopter in an amphibious operation. But by that time in Korea, we weren't engaged in an amphibious
operation any more, they were on the main line fighting the Chinese and the North Korean. So there was a basic difference of opinion.

Frank: Between air and ground or . . .

Chapman: No . . .

Frank: It wasn't split that way.

Chapman: It wasn't split between air and ground. The aviators were split and others were split. The final decision was made by the Commandant and I think he made the right decision; that it better to go ahead and put all the helicopters we had--we didn't anything back here except a few training vehicles--put them in combat so that we could say that we were the first--and we were--and also get some combat testing of their employment. I'll have to say that I held the opposing point of view.

Frank: You didn't think they should go right away.

Chapman: I thought they should stay here and we should develop the tactics and techniques of employing the helicopter in an amphibious operation. But the Commandant approved the other point of view. I now think he was right, because we went on from there--for example--to write LFM-4, the ship to shore movement, without the benefit of any helicopters to test our ideas on.

Frank: Of course the concept was pretty much the same as the old ship to shore, the basic parameters, were they not?

Chapman: Yes, well with some exceptions. One was that the . . .

Frank: Landing beaches . . .

Chapman: . . . that the capabilities of the helicopters that we could foresee were pretty small . . .
Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . compared with today's helicopters. The biggest thing we could foresee then would carry a squad.

Frank: At most.

Chapman: At most, and with not much accompanying impedimenta.

Frank: I think the HRS . . . HSRs or HRSs . . .

Chapman: HRS.

Frank: . . . carried, what, a fire team.

Chapman: Well, it would carry five or six, fully equipped Marines; 220 pound Marines, with their equipment. That's all, so that the . . .

End Tape 1, Side 2
Session VI
Begin Tape 2, Side 1
Session VI

Chapman: ... borne Marines ...

Frank: Here we go, based on the idea of laying in the heliborne Marines.

Chapman: On ... near, not on but near, some key terrain feature which they proceed overland to seize as an adjunct to the main landing which was ship to shore, by water.

Frank: In other words, you weren't thinking about the heliborne ...

Chapman: Being the main landing, as we do today. We think of making the main landing today by helicopter.

Frank: Of course, the atomic bomb and the Eniwietok tests just changed everything.

Chapman: Well, the Twining Board was charged with coming up with concepts that would cope with the atomic weapon ...

Frank: As a result of the ...

Chapman: ... both exploiting and defending against it. That was the basis of the helicopter assault concept that they came up with. It was very rapid and it could be very dispersed.

Frank: This was an outgrowth of that ... Gen Geiger was the Marine observer, I believe, at the atoll.

Chapman: Yes, I think he was.
Frank: Bikini testing and . . . He was so concerned he wrote to the Commandant, Gen Vandegrift at that time. That was the license by which the Twining Board, if you recall . . .

Chapman: Was formed.

Frank: Was formed.

Chapman: To repeat, though, the Landing Force Manual that we wrote could only accommodate what we could foresee we would have, and its capabilities were limited. Because we've gone on to develop much better, bigger, faster helicopters and a whole lot more of them . . .

Frank: Yes. Was there . . .

Chapman: . . . that we employ today.

Frank: . . . any concern expressed by the aviation members of the Hogaboom Board . . . or the Board that you were working with on the development of the LFM as to the mix of helicopters to conventional aircraft? Did that ever come up?

Chapman: Not really in our board proceedings, it didn't. It certainly came up . . .

Frank: Discussions.

Chapman: . . . at Headquarters when the funding was being decided on because, in those days, all the Marine air was bought with Navy funds, BuAir funds and there was only so much. It had to be divided between the fixed wing and the rotary wing. Every helicopter that was bought meant one less fighter or attack aircraft that was bought. So it certainly came up there.

Frank: In those days of stringency, I guess it was a very important consideration.

Chapman: Well, we were in the midst of the Korean War then.
Frank: Okay.

Chapman: So that there was no lack of funds to support the troops in combat. But there wasn't all that much for other things, for future things.

Frank: How about weapons? Any concern given to those?

Chapman: Well, we had . . . the Equipment Board, of course, was charged with the development of new hardware of all kinds. They tested various different artillery pieces and all other kinds of ordnance too. But, as you know, we stuck with the 105 howitzer as the best available for a number of years, for direct support; the 155 howitzer for general support. That continued up through the 60s.

Frank: Did the Equipment Board work closely with the Tactics and Techniques Board? Was there much interplay there?

Chapman: Oh, yes, quite a lot. They had a single commander, the director of the Development Center, who was first, as I previously said, Gen Thomas, and then later on Linscott . . .

Frank: Oh, yes.

Chapman: Gen Linscott, during my time there.

Frank: He came down during your time. That's right, he commanded the base later on at Lejeune when you had Force Troops.

Chapman: Yes, he did. He was a dear friend of mine, very much so.

Frank: Is he still alive?
Chapman: Oh, I don't think so.

Frank: I'm trying to recall . . .

Chapman: H. D. Linscott.

Frank: Henry D. Linscott.

Chapman: Henry D. Linscott, a good Marine. Well, let's see if I can think of anything pertinent about the Development . . .

Frank: It was an active three years down there.

Chapman: Well, it wasn't that long . . . well, yes, including one year at the school . . .

Frank: Including one year at the school.

Chapman: . . . and two years at the Development Center. Then I got orders to be Commanding Officer, 12th Marines at Camp Pendleton. 3d Marine Division was formed and that's another chapter.

Frank: Okay.

Chapman: Let's see if I can . . . I'd just as soon conclude today with the Development Center. Let's see if I can think of anything else.

Frank: Talking about the schools, Senior School, was that . . . There's been a considerable amount of thought, change in thought, as to the role of the school or the necessity of going to the school with respect to your career pattern. Assignment to Senior School was something particularly desirable to have at this time.
Chapman: Yes, not everyone could go because the . . .

Frank: Very selective.

Chapman: . . . student body . . . There was a maximum size student body. It was about 100 plus some . . . about 100 Marines, I think the number was, plus another 15 or 20 from the other services and from foreign students.

Frank: Foreign students had started to come in by then.

Chapman: Yes. We had two or three in our class. We had a Royal Marine and one or two others I don't remember, and we had three or four Navy officers, and an Army, and I think we had an Air Force too.

Well, that's been a problem throughout the history of the school, namely that every Marine can't go. Those that do go, then, and I think it's still true, are not so much the white-haired boys, but simply those that are available for a particular school year; completing a tour of duty at the right time in their careers to be eligible for school.

Frank: There's been a . . .

Chapman: We made several efforts to cope with that when I was Chief of Staff and later on when I was Commandant, by designing a correspondence school in a way that would permit an officer to get the equivalent of going to the resident school. I don't think that ever came to very much but that was an effort to accommodate to the fact that there wasn't room for all officers to go to all schools in the course of their career.

Frank: Over the years, the attitude about attending school, the necessity for attending the schools as far as career patterns changed, and also over the course of the years the quality of the school has changed from hot-shot, really top drawer type of school to one which was not quite so good as compared to the other comparable service . . . comparable level service schools.
Chapman: Well, I think that's changed. It did have a period of depression from the time I went to it for the next . . . for a few years thereafter. But that changed. I would say the change took place when, under Gen Greene's commandancy, we changed the name, made it the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. I was Chief of Staff then, and we made a special effort to upgrade it, the name change being an intangible but one that was very helpful. There was just a lot more prestige, sort of, attached to the name Command and Staff College as compared to Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course.

Frank: Yes, I would think so.

Chapman: We improved the funding, the quality of instruction, the selection of instructors, and the like; everything we could think of to improve the quality and status of the college. I think we were successful.

Frank: If Marines weren't going to learn their trade at this type of a senior level school, they certainly weren't going to learn it at any other.

Chapman: There's no other place to get it.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: The Amphibious Warfare School was somewhat of a misnomer anyway since that name is outside the purview of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is charged with landing forces as part of amphibious operations, but not with the entire operation.

Frank: Yes. And curriculum changed to reflect that.

Chapman: Exactly. Well, we were thinking of things that occurred of interest during my time with the Landing Force Development Center.

Frank: Yes.
Chapman: Another one was, in which I was intimately concerned, was the writing of the new series of Navy manuals, one of which was FTP-67, I think it's the right number, the name of which was Amphibious Operations.

Frank: Okay, had to be . . .

Chapman: I was the Marine member of the team that wrote that manual, the rest of the team being Navy.

Frank: That must have been the outgrowth of that old FTP-167 . . .

Chapman: Maybe I should have said 167, I'm not so sure of my numbers. The Navy set out to write a complete new set of Navy operational manuals; one for carrier warfare, one for surface warfare, one for amphibious warfare, and etc. They went about it in an interesting way. They let a contract with McGraw-Hill to write the manuals with technical advice from Navy and Marine Corps. It was a stupid undertaking, because McGraw-Hill assigned some very able writers, of course, that they have in their stable as the full-time writers for the various manuals, but they didn't know beans about combat, Navy and Marine combat. So, in the upshot, what actually happened was that the manuals were written by Navy and Marine officers and then the McGraw-Hill writers would juice them up with better English and flamboyant introductions, and all sorts of other trivia that was wholly unimportant. So, McGraw-Hill ended up collecting their money alright, but the manuals were actually written by the Navy and the Marine Corps.

I was concerned with the Navy manual on amphibious operations. I had a Navy counterpart. The two of us, he was a Navy captain and I was a Marine colonel at that point and our counterpart at McGraw-Hill was a young civilian who'd never heard a shot fired in anger but was an excellent writer. So we'd write and he'd polish, and then we'd write some more and he'd polish some more. We produced the Navy manual on amphibious operations.

Frank: I don't think it's FT . . . the one that came out . . . the Landing Party Manual, which you had in the 30s, Manual for Landing . . .
Chapman: That was LFM, Landing Force Manual.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: Now, that's the landing force.

Frank: But I'm talking about the early one that was written when the FMF came into being in '33. It was a manual that was written . . .

Chapman: Oh, yes.

Frank: And the Navy later adopted that, in '37, as FTP-167. That was the one that we went to war with.

Chapman: Right.

Frank: Okay, so the one that you wrote, unless they kept the designation, had to be changed, and I don't know . . .

Chapman: I'm sure you're right, I just don't remember what . . .

Frank: But you're talking the same yard, the same area . . .

Chapman: Um hm.

Frank: Okay, and we can fill that in when get the transcript as to what the correct . . .

Chapman: What the designation was.

Frank: . . . designation was, right.
Chapman: It slips my memory as to just what it was. It had two parts, really. It had the amphibious operation part, which was the whole smear from . . .

Frank: Yes, sure.

Chapman: . . . from advance force operations, carrier protection operations, establishing control of the air, sea support operations, establishing control of the sea and the objective area, and then landing the landing force. I was concerned with that later part.

Frank: And what happens at the beachhead and so on, and the chain of command.

Chapman: Those manuals were written by the Development Center. The one that we previously discussed, the ship to shore movement, was one of them.

Frank: Did . . .

Chapman: Well, that thing eventually got written along with the other Navy manuals and they were published, and some version thereof probably exists today.

Frank: Did you have any trouble getting the Navy to approve them?

Chapman: Command relation problems.

Frank: I would imagine so.

Chapman: Yes. The Navy was insistent that they commanded the landing force. This was the same old . . . We finally persuaded them that the command of the landing force . . . that they did in fact . . . that the amphibious task force commander does, in fact, have operational control of the landing force. But he exercises his authority, not directly to the RLTs and the air groups, but
through the landing force commander. After much blood, sweat, and tears, on which subject I put in dozens of hours, they agreed; they finally agreed.

Frank: Apparently the Navy learned nothing because this was the big argument that went on in World War II in the Pacific. Gen Vandegrift had his problems with Adm Turner on this.

Chapman: So did Gen Geiger.

Frank: Yes, yes.

Chapman: Of course, Adm Turner, who was a pretty tough nut himself, he had an even tougher nut to deal with in Gen Geiger.

Frank: Or Gen Smith.

Chapman: Or Gen Smith, yes.

Frank: It was solved . . .

Chapman: There are two problems, one is during the planning and the other is during the operation. We were able to resolve the first one by persuading the Navy that they didn't have any command whatever over anybody on the landing force side, during the planning. There was coordination of course, there had to be, but no command. Then when the planning was completed and the operation was ordered executed, the landing force commander, at that point, reported to the amphibious task force commander for operational control and for the execution of the plans that had been adopted, written and adopted. So that's the way we resolved the command relations problem.

Frank: Now, when this thing is carried over ahead to future years, when you're getting into the joint arena, it became even more sticky.
Chapman: It did but the same principles . . .

Frank: Prevailed.

Chapman: . . . prevailed. There was one argument that we didn't have with the Navy and that was the use of the close air support.

Frank: Well, that's what I was thinking of . . .

Chapman: The Navy fully agreed to . . . had been and to this day continues to require that the carrier air, which may be Marine air or may be Navy air, must give close air support to the Marines in accordance with the Marine close air support principles.

Frank: Of course, this is . . .

Chapman: There's a different argument, however, when you're in a joint, as contrasted to a naval, task force, with Air Force air involved.

Frank: That's right, that's what happened with the single management problem which stuck its head up during the Vietnam War. While it's been resolved, it's not been fully resolved I don't think.

Chapman: Well, it was resolved for the duration of the Vietnam War. We'll get to that later but the outcome of the single management argument was that the Army got vastly improved close air support in Vietnam. Marines stayed about the same and the Army got a substantial improvement. In effect, the Air Force was ordered to provide for the Army the same kind of air support that the Marine air gave the Marines. That was the eventual outcome of the thing. Very interesting I always thought.
Frank: Of course, there's a parallel there too with World War II again, because . . . in the Philippines, Marine air provided close air support to the Army, which had never known such luxury, and the Air Corps did not have quality tactical air or was not capable . . .

Chapman: Well, they didn't have the training. They didn't have either the equipment, or the training, or the techniques.

Frank: Or the theory, or the constant . . .

Chapman: They could provide medium and deep support very well, but right in front of the infantry, they didn't know how to do it and they didn't have the equipment to do it.

Frank: They may have been reluctant to do it.

Chapman: They didn't have the communications, they didn't have the ground control or wouldn't submit to the ground control . . .

Frank: Well, that may have been it.

Chapman: . . . to do it. Well, that . . .

Frank: Well, we pretty well covered . . .

Chapman: I can't think . . . let me see if I can think of anything else concerning the Joint Landing Force Board and the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center. (Pause) Reid Paige was the director of the Tactics and Techniques Board . . .

Frank: Ah, he was. He was an old . . .

Chapman: . . . under first Gen Thomas and later Gen Linscott.
Frank: Old Defense Battalion man.

Chapman: Fine Marine, really fine Marine and a wonderful gentleman.

Frank: I guess he's still alive.

Chapman: Yes, oh, he's going strong. He's out in Oceanside, California.

Frank: Oceanside, right.

Chapman: Just outside of Camp Pendleton.

Frank: Yes, I interviewed him out there. His heart seems to be working okay and everything else.

Chapman: Yes, so far. Well, let's see Ben. Those were the principal things I worked on. It was a very busy two years. We were writing manuals, producing papers, making countless trips to here, there, and everywhere.

Frank: Oh, did you do a lot of traveling?

Chapman: Yes. I made umpteen trips to New York to deal that McGraw-Hill writer. I made trips to Pendleton, Lejeune, Cherry Point, El Toro, all in connection with the many manuals and projects I was working on.

Frank: All by prop-driven aircraft too.

Chapman: Yes. It was a very busy, and, I think, very productive two years. We produced a number of manuals, a number of papers, a number of staff projects of all kinds. I was concerned with more than just supporting arms which was my ostensible bailiwick. I was in a lot of other things too.
Frank: You got involved . . .

Chapman: Things like helicopters, the Navy amphibious manual, the ship to shore movement, and many others.

Frank: How about helicopter lift . . . this, again, is on the material side, but the helicopter lift of artillery and so on?

Chapman: We experimented with that, and initially we lifted them by hanging them underneath the helicopter, the pack howitzer, which is all the helicopters in that day could carry; just one pack howitzer slung underneath. There are interesting techniques to that. The cable has to be precisely the correct length or else you get a lot of oscillation.

Frank: Oh, really, I wasn't aware of that.

Chapman: Of course, Keith McCutcheon and his HMX-1 worked all that out. But the helicopter had to make about three trips. It had to carry the crew one trip, the howitzer another trip, and the ammunition the third trip. That's the most we could do in those days. But we worked it out. Given enough time, it could be done.

Frank: Well, I think we've had a productive morning.

Chapman: Very good.

Frank: Alright sir.

Chapman: Let's see if I can't get down here one more time . . .

Frank: Before you go away.
Chapman: ... before I go to ...
Frank: Before we get into a discussion of your command of the... no, you didn't go down to Lejeune, you went out to the west coast.

Chapman: Yes, Camp Pendleton.

Frank: Camp Pendleton, because 3d Division was forming, discussion of taking over 4th Marines. I was told an apocryphal story and maybe you can corroborate it. It seems that after World War II quite a few of your classmates and you were at Quantico, went to Senior School and were sent to various things. There were quite a few people there. A number of, then, lieutenant colonels were sitting around the bar at Waller Hall and talking and they G-2-ed the situation and they figured, based on their age, based on the age of the then present Commandant, and so on, and figuring ahead, that someone from the class of ’35 was going to made Commandant. They just projected. They all compared lists--maybe it was a half a dozen sitting around. There were three names on that list, Gen Cushman’s, yours, and Toots Henderson’s. Had anything of this... do you recall any of this? Or had you ever thought about...

Chapman: I've heard that story in recent years but I certainly didn't hear it at the time. It was news to me.

Frank: Had you projected that far ahead? Had you thought in terms...

Chapman: No, I didn't have the slightest idea. I hadn't even thought that far ahead, not at all.

Frank: Because I remember talking to Gen del Valle when I interviewed him. The reason he selected the Marine Corps out of Naval Academy--that was the class of ’15--was they projected ahead and the most they could expect to get, based on promotion standards and the rate of promotions in those days, was maybe two and a half stripes. If he went in to the Marine Corps he might make major, perhaps lieutenant colonel. So that's the reason for opting for the Marine
Corps. I think promotion opportunities in this time, what with the advanced promotions during the war and everything else, I think things looked much better in '47, '48 than they did in 1915.

Chapman: Well, yes, but they didn't look any better in 1935 or '36 than they did in 1915, the year that the three of us that you're speaking of came in the Marine Corps. The ultimate expectation then was major.

Frank: Really

Chapman: Yes, possibly lieutenant colonel. You must remember, the Marine Corps was very small in 1935. There were about 16,000 Marines total including the officers, and there were about 1000 officers and that's all. So the probability for career was major, for an officer. Now then, things came along to change that. First there was the selection law, which resulted in many leaving the Corps by virtue of being selected out. Then, of course, obviously, there was World War II and Korea, Vietnam, and the resulting expansion to the Corps.

Frank: Of course . . . but you see by '35 the selection system had come in, which . . .

Chapman: Just the year before, but it hadn't taken much effect yet.

Frank: Hadn't . . . no one saw the . . . what the effects would be.

Chapman: They were beginning to be felt but it took a couple of years before . . .

Frank: Someone had told me . . . someone I interviewed was out in the 4th Marines, which was supposed to have been a prime assignment in those days, I think, of all the officers who were eligible for promotion in the 4th at that time only one made it which was quite a crushing blow to the others. Did you ever hear of this story?

Chapman: I've heard similar stories. That was the working of the new selection law.
Frank: Which, of course, didn't . . .

Chapman: Up to the institution of that law, promotion had been strictly by seniority.

Frank: You could remain a captain or even a first lieutenant . . .

Chapman: Most did, even a first lieutenant, for 10, 12, 15 years.

Frank: That's right. Those who made captain at the end of World War I, in effect . . .

Chapman: Stayed captains.

Frank: Stayed a captain.

Chapman: Stayed captain, if they made permanent captain. There were many that got spot promotions, temporary promotions, during World War I, and then reverted their permanent rank at the end of the war, and then waited for . . . Second lieutenants would wait eight or ten years, first lieutenants would wait ten years. A 17, or 18, or 20-year first lieutenant was quite common. The selection law changed all that.

Then, of course, in the late '40s, when the Marine Corps went back to a authorized strength of 100,000 with budgetary strengths much below that, there were actually demotions from lieutenant colonel to major and colonel back to lieutenant colonel. Just before the Korean War, and the commitment of the Marine Corps to that war, the budgetary strength--the appropriated strength--for the Marine Corps for that fiscal year, which would have been--what--'51, fiscal '51, was 68,000.

Frank: That was the projected budgetary strength?

Chapman: That was the appropriated strength, yes.

Frank: These were the days of the Johnson . . .
Chapman: Yes, right.

Frank: . . . restrictions.

Chapman: The Marine Corps had two skeleton divisions, two skeleton air wings and some Reserves that were organized into battalions with no regard to any kind of divisional or wing and squadron structure. The Korean War saved the Marine Corps from that fate.

Frank: And, of course, the Marine Corps saved things for the . . .

Chapman: For the country . . .

Frank: . . . country. Right.

Chapman: . . . for the Koreans, absolutely.

Frank: Now, I imagine that lot of you people that were down at Quantico were working your bolts to get out to Korea during this period.

Chapman: Well, yes, we were going to school when Korea started. Let me think now, the war started in June of ’50 . . .

Frank: ’50.

Chapman: . . . and I went to school in September of ’49. So it was just after we graduated and we all had permanent orders and in most cases I think they remained in force. I was assigned to the Marine Corps Schools . . .

Frank: And then you went over to Landing Force Development . . .
Chapman: . . . and then I went to the Development Center.

Frank: We spoke about that the last session.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: Now, considering the number, and I relate that period to today in my mind . . . Here we have three divisions with nine regiments, which means that only nine Marine infantry officers can become a regimental commander at any one time, and only three artillery colonels. The odds were even greater when you got the 12th Marines because you only had two artillery regiments.

Chapman: Yes, of course, the 3d Division made the third, but it was just formed, activated.

Frank: Who commanded the . . . Chesty Puller commanded the division initially did he not?

Chapman: No, well perhaps initially . . .

Frank: At the formation.

Chapman: . . . but it was Gen Pepper . . .

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . who shortly thereafter took it over and stayed in command through our time at Pendleton, and then we moved overseas to Japan and he continued in command for about two years.

Frank: Why was the division, 3d Division, formed?

Chapman: As a reserve for Korea. The original expectation was that it would remain in strategic reserve, train, become fully combat ready at Camp Pendleton. Later, when things were going
badly in Korea, we were moved to Japan to be closer at hand. Shortly after we arrived there, in Japan—and we were in various camps throughout central Japan—things were going very badly in Korea, at that point, and it was . . . we expected to be deployed. But it never happened.

Frank: Where was the 12 Marines set up at?

Chapman: We were in a place called Camp McNair on the slopes of Mount Fuji. It was an artillery range and camp. It was pretty primitive, but ideal artillery training conditions with a very large maneuver and impact area and practically no encumbrances at all. We had a lot of ammunition.

Frank: So you did a lot of firing.

Chapman: We did a tremendous amount of training. We did a lot of firing, a lot of maneuvering, a lot of what the artillerymen call "RSOP-ing."

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position, RSOP.

Frank: Did . . . what had it been before? had it been an Army . . .

Chapman: Yes, it was an Army camp, still was. The camps were in the custody of the Army. The Army had a detachment at each one of the camps. We were at McNair. A little further down the road was Camp Fuji. Bob Williams and, I think it was, the 3d Marines were at Fuji. Then the 4th and the 9th were in other camps. The division battalions were in various places. Shore Party Battalion was up at Yokosuka, near Yokosuka.

Frank: Were you ever able to get together for a division exercise?

Chapman: Yes, we went on an exercise to Iwo Jima.
Frank: Was that Blue Star?

Chapman: Was it? I don't remember the name.

Frank: I don't remember the . . .

Chapman: We had a division landing exercise on Iwo Jima, and we had some smaller scale things too. We had some CPXs. The infantry would move to McNair now and then and we'd have combined infantry/artillery exercises.

Frank: It must have been a fast area, then, that the artillery had.

Chapman: It as an absolutely outstanding artillery training area. As I say, it was very large and we had unlimited ammunition, the only time I've ever heard of any artillery regiment having all the ammunition they wanted to shoot in training, but we certainly had it and we took advantage of it. I think we probably, this sounds very, very subjective, but I think at the end of six or eight months there we must have had the best trained artillery regiment in history probably. We certainly had the advantages.

Frank: Were there any contingency plans, as far as you know, for moving the division to Korea?

Chapman: Oh, yes, definitely. We were all set to go at any time. We kept all out gear in mount-out condition. We kept our mount-out spare parts separate and protected and used only operating stocks. We had our plans, full-scale plans, to move to the port of embarkation, which for us would have been Yokosuka. We were all ready to go.

Frank: Did you and your staff get a chance to go over to Korea to see where it . . .

Chapman: Yes, we went several times, I did. The staff went a couple times. We went to places where we expected to go in case they were put into effect.
Frank: But there was no such threat, never had a . . .

Chapman: Didn't materialize.

Frank: Did you remain in Japan for the two years? When did the division move to Okinawa?

Chapman: It was after I left.

Frank: After you left.

Chapman: Yes. I was in the division and commanded the 12th Marines for a year at Camp Pendleton and then a year, almost a year, in Japan. Toward the end of that year I moved down to division headquarters as the G-3 for just a couple of months.

Frank: And Chief of Staff.

Chapman: No, I wasn't Chief of Staff.

Frank: You never were Chief of Staff.

Chapman: No, I was G-3. Then from there I went to Marine Barracks, Yokosuka.

Frank: Did this . . . was the division under Gen Pepper's command for this whole time?

Chapman: Yes, until right at the end. Gen Riseley took over and he was the reason I moved down to G-3.

Frank: You know . . .

Chapman: He ordered me down there.
Frank: Where did you know Gen Riseley from before?

Chapman: I'd known, him, principally, from the time I was commanding officer at. . . . I'm getting my dates backwards. I really had not known him very well at that point.

Frank: I couldn't recall that, in our discussions, his name had come up.

Chapman: No, I think the chief reason I moved was that I'd been in command of the 12th Regiment for about two years. I think he thought it was about time I was moved. I think that's probably some kind of record for commanding a regiment, duration-wise.

Frank: Were the other regimental commanders on the division able to hold on to their commands that long?

Chapman: No, usually just a year on the average. A year is the, probably the Marine Corps average over time.

Frank: Sometimes even less.

Chapman: Well, yes.

Frank: Certainly in Vietnam it was that experience.

Chapman: Well, in Vietnam it was about six months.

Frank: What, if anything, stands out your mind besides the tremendous amount of training you were able to do, and the tremendous amount of firing you were able to do during this period?

Chapman: Certainly the association with the officers throughout the division, some of the Marine Corps' very finest; regimental commanders, and division commander and staff. And the
association with the Japanese. It was important and very interesting and impressive. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces, as they were called at that time, were there and about and we made many contacts with them. They, of course, were just getting off their backs from their total defeat in World War II. They were greatly ham-strung by the self-defense restriction in the constitution.

Another thing that was really pretty impressive was the quality of the officers and enlisted that we got as replacements. Because there was some turnover, not much. That was another advantage that we had, was that the 3d Division was pretty well stabilized--there was very little turnover--so that the people that we departed Pendleton with in the 12th Marines were still with us, most of them, a year later. That, of course, contributed greatly to the excellence of our training.

Frank: This was the first time . . . you didn't make China with the division.

Chapman: No

Frank: And hadn't made China in the pre-war period, so this actually was your first introduction to life in the East.

Chapman: Yes, it was. I was there for a total of three years in Japan, a year with the division and two years at Marine Barracks, Yokosuka.

Frank: Was that an accompanied tour?

Chapman: Yes, at the barracks.

Frank: So Mrs. Chapman and the children . . .

Chapman: She came over on a ship with our children and I met her, of course. We resided at the Navy Yard, Naval Fleet Activity, Yokosuka, as it was called then.
Frank: Who did you relieve?

Chapman: Johnny Dunlap? I told you my memory is getting weak. Johnny Dunlap, I think it was.

Frank: Who relieved you, Red Laswell?

Chapman: No, Willy Fiske relieved me . . .

Frank: Oh, Willy Fiske relieved you.

Chapman: . . . and then died a month later.

Frank: He was a classmate of yours.

Chapman: Yes, he was classmate. Just to digress a moment and leap forward a moment, he relieved me and I wished him well and departed for the Marine Barracks at 8th and I to be CO there. I had a little leave and reported in and the battalion exec said, "Well, it's a good thing you got here now, because we've got a funeral this morning over at Arlington for a colonel." The escort commander for a funeral has to be the same rank as the decedent. So I said, "Fine," and I got out my blues and they gave me some instruction and after it was all over I said, "By the way, who is it?" They said, "It's a colonel named Willy Fiske." Wasn't that something? So that was my first official act . . .

Frank: Kind of a shock.

Chapman: . . . was to go to the cemetery and command the honor guard for Willy Fiske's interment.

Frank: Bury an old friend.
Chapman: That I'd just seen a month . . . who'd relieved me a month before at Yokosuka.

Frank: Did you bury many old friends when you had 8th and I?

Chapman: No, I really didn't. It's a pretty hardy lot, the majority of them are still going strong.

Frank: That's right, the class of '35 is.

Chapman: We went over the time at . . . the year at Pendleton pretty fast. In fact we went over it entirely other than to say that I arrived and Gen Pepper gave me command of the 12th Marines. Gen Pepper was an artillery man, and I'd known him over the years.

So, I took the 12th Marines. It was a skeleton outfit, had just activated and we began to receive replacements, or fillers as the Army calls them, most of whom were Korean veterans . . . many of whom were Korean veterans.

Frank: Reserves or regulars?

Chapman: Both, both. So we had a pretty capable outfit. We did a tremendous amount of training. Twenty-nine Palms had just opened up. We did a good deal of firing there at Camp Pendleton on the ranges and then we went to Twenty-nine Palms. In the year I was there, I think we went three times! Am I right about that? It was either two or three. We went once in hot weather for that experience, and then we went once in cold weather because it does get pretty darned cold in that desert in the winter. We all dang near froze to death in the winter one, but it was great training. There wasn't anybody there but us. There was no base as there is today. There was a camp detachment that looked after things, but we were entirely on our own. The four battalions just . . . and then the Force Troops Battalion joined us for part of the time, making five battalions, and we just, from the base camp each morning--and for night time exercises too--we just sent them out in five different directions and they could shoot all they wanted to without any safety restrictions other than the ones they imposed on themselves for the protection of their own observers.
Frank: They ran their own exercises, night fire . . .

Chapman: Yes, for the first week or two and then we collected everybody and had combined firing exercises for about a week. We were up there about four weeks the first time and about three weeks the second.

Frank: That was good training.

Chapman: Oh, it's tremendous training, tremendous.

Frank: Of course it was no where like what they have out there now, I understand.

Chapman: Well, I don't think there's much change as far as artillery, field artillery. It's still very good. There are more safety restrictions now, but not many.

Frank: Of course they have that joint training.

Chapman: Oh, yes. They have air-ground, they have ground-ground--infantry, tank, artillery, C3.

Frank: Did you pull an RSOP going up there each time?

Chapman: We pulled a controlled motor march, strictly according to the book; in serials, in echelons, each one timed at various checkpoints, complete discipline in driving, prescribed distances between vehicles, all that sort of thing.

Frank: How far away is Twenty-nine . . .

Chapman: Let me see. I forget exactly, but it's over 100 . . . it's 130 miles or something like that.
Frank: It's at least a three or four hour trip.

Chapman: Yes, something like that.

Frank: Most of the pre-World War II artillery men had been Fort Sill trained—or on-the-job trained for the enlisted—but most of the officers Fort Sill trained. So there was a strong Army influence amongst the artillery people of the Marine Corps. Did this prevail? Was this still in existence after . . . during the Korean period and after?

Chapman: Well, our own artillery school had been in existence until about '49.

Frank: That's right Gen Thomas was influential in getting that closed down.

Chapman: Yes. Well, I had a hand in it. I was at Headquarters and I was the resident artillery man in Plans and Policies. But we had to agree . . . I had to agree that the only sensible thing to do was close it down. For the simple reason that we didn't have any students to send to it who hadn't already been to school. Remembering that this was the point at which the Marine Corps was headed for a total strength of 68,000, I forget the exact number of officers but it was just a few thousand, and all the artillerymen had been to the artillery school or to Fort Sill. All of them were World War II artillery combat veterans and we just didn't have any students to send.

The other side of the coin is that the artillery school was the catalyst, the think tank, the theorizers for the artillery fraternity, and the makers and publishers and prescribers of Marine Corps artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques. Well all that disappeared when the school was deactivated. Perforce, the Marine Corps had to fall back on Fort Sill for those purposes. I think in a previous session I mentioned that, as a result, the Marine Corps had to adopt the Army . . . the fire direction techniques that the Army adopted about that time, which most Marines were very much opposed to. Certainly I was. But there was no help for it. It was impossible for the three Marine regiments to have a fire direction technique different from that of the Army. We didn't have a school to publish the publications. We didn't have a source of supply for the necessary equipment. So we just had to go with the Army.
Frank: Of course, you had a large Marine Corps liaison organization on the . . .

Chapman: Oh yes, and also students and instructors out there.

Frank: So the Marine Corps had to provide . . .

Chapman: The Marine Corps has still got quite a contingent out there. Of course all the artillery officers go to school there too.

Well, let's see. What is it we were talking about? How did we get off on this tangent? We were still at Camp Pendleton.

Frank: We were talking about the technique of fire direction and how much influence . . . But I would think that after the World War II experience and Korean experience that the Marine Corps developed its own artillery SOP, didn't count on . . . didn't do the Army way that much.

Chapman: Not until we . . . a while after we deactivated our school and started sending officers to Fort Sill. When you've got Fort Sill-trained officers coming into your battalion, you've pretty well got to . . .

Frank: Do it the Fort Sill way.

Chapman: You've got to do it the Fort Sill way. There's no alternative. Eventually all the officers were Fort Sill-trained, so there you are. At the times that we fired at Pendleton and up at Twenty-nine Palms, we were using the Army doctrine, the Army tactics and techniques.

The basic problem with it is it's so slow.

Frank: Is it?

Chapman: Yes. It's very, very slow compared to the system that we used in World War II, which at that time, of course, was Army doctrine too, Army technique.
Frank: I think I've been told that during World War II--I think maybe Gen Brown, Big Foot Brown told me this--that in firing techniques, tactics, the Marine Corps was much faster and better than the Army. The only thing the Army surpassed the Marine Corps artillery on was an ability . . . use of and ability with communications.

Chapman: Yes, they were really good at communicating, by radio. They didn't use wire at all, they used radio only, on Okinawa where I'm familiar with. We used wire. Wire was our primary and radio was our backup. They were extremely good on the radio. I think we were equally good on the wire. Of course, we had more trouble keeping the wire in than one does with the radio. Of course, the radio has problems too from time to time.

Frank: What do you attribute this disparity to? The training or the outlook . . .

Chapman: Mostly I think to use. We used the radio as a backup, they used it as primary. We probably were much better on the telephone, with the wire hookup than they were, except they never used wire, so there was no way to compare.

Frank: No way to compare, no. After a year then, at Camp Pendleton you took off for Japan.

Chapman: Yes, and before we departed the Korean veterans in the division were offered the opportunity to volunteer to go to Japan. They were not required to. They were home on a sabbatical from overseas deployment and they were not eligible to be ordered back. Some did volunteer, many of them in the 12th Marines did, but of course quite a few did not. So we received replacements there and then later on after we got to Japan.

Frank: How did you feel about that, the people who didn't want to go?

Chapman: Oh, I understood that.

Frank: You understood.
Chapman:  Sure.  I certainly didn't try to persuade any of them to go, although some that we lost were a bad loss, a heavy loss because of their expertise and experience.  But we got along alright.  We made out alright.

Frank: Didn't train the replacements well then.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: They did?

Chapman: I beg your pardon?

Frank: I said they didn't train the replacement well.

Chapman: They did train their replacements well.

Frank: They did.

Chapman: Yes.  There were many events that occurred while we were at Pendleton.  One of them that will always stick out in my mind was the full-scale combat parade, with equipment, that the 3d Marine Division, Reinforced, put on on the parade ground there at Camp Pendleton, in which the colors were . . . all the colors were marched forward and blessed by the Chaplain and designated; and following a full-scale combat pass in review.  That means with complete combat equipment.  It took a half a day for the whole division to get through; that means the engineers with all their bulldozers and their backhoes and their cranes.  It means all the tanks, all the LVTs, all the trucks--thousands of trucks.  It was quite a display.  It was an immense display.  Each regiment, after it had passed in review, the regimental commander was invited up to the reviewing stand to watch the remainder of the parade.  One of the things I'll never forget is observing an engineer battalion bulldozer operator coming by at parade pass in review posture and inadvertently dropping his blade just as he got to the reviewing stand.  So he went right across the front of the reviewing stand digging a trench about four feet deep the full length of the
reviewing stand. He was at eyes right (laughter) and his blade was digging a trench. It wasn't until he came back to eyes front at the end of the reviewing stand that he noted what had been going on. So then there was a flurry. Everybody had to get out and fill in the hole before the parade could go on.

Frank: Gen Pepper still had the division.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: Did he hold it for the whole time you were there?

Chapman: Yes, and all the way over to Japan too. He commanded the division a full two years.

Frank: Any problems in setting out for Japan, loading and that?

Chapman: No. We embarked at San Diego and over the beaches at Pendleton, in LSTs, LSDs, and APs; we did, the artillery, the others similarly. We went by task forces overseas to Japan, direct. Debarked near Yokosuka at that shore party base, I can't remember the name of it, and then went overland to Mount Fuji and Camp McNair.

Frank: How was your equipment, in pretty good shape?

Chapman: Oh, yes, excellent equipment, most of it brand new.

Frank: Yes, I was just about to ask you if it was brand new.

Chapman: In fact, I'll say all of it was brand new.

Frank: It wasn't refurbished up at . . .

Chapman: No, no, it was new and good.
Frank: . . . Barstow.

Chapman: Oh, there may have been some rebuilt stuff, but most of it was . . .

Frank: It all looked shiny to you.

Chapman: . . . right off the production lines, which only would figure. The Marine Corps only had two divisions and created a third so the only way to get equipment was new production.

Frank: Well, I thought that a lot of World War II stuff had been sent up to Barstow to be refurbished and repainted and put in usable condition.

Chapman: Yes, there was some in that category. I think some of the artillery pieces were, but they were as good as new. They were completely rebuilt.

Frank: Where is Marine Corps artillery built anyway?

Chapman: By the Army. You mean the production?

Frank: Yes, sir.

Chapman: It's built by the Army at various arsenals, and some of it commercially.

Frank: I was trying to figure out where . . . whether special factories made it or whether it was an armory that made it. I guess it's an armory that makes it.

Chapman: Well, it's both. Some of the components are government built, most of the gun barrels are, but then usually there's a commercial concern, like Chrysler or Food Machinery, that builds the vehicle. The engine is probably built by somebody else, like General Motors.
Frank: Allis-Chalmers, something like that.

Chapman: Then there'll be a master contractor that'll assemble the entire vehicle.

Frank: How long did it take you to get set up once you got to Japan?

Chapman: Well, not very long. It was a tent camp with strong-backs, however.

Frank: It was in there already when you there?

Chapman: Oh, yes, it had been in use for some time. The tents were in storage. We had to put the tents over the strong-backs and establish the water points, get the mess halls operating, but they were in good shape.

Frank: You were operating within a short time of arriving.

Chapman: Oh, yes, over night practically. Of course we sent an advance party ahead that did most of the readying. We marched . . . We made a motor march. It's quite a way from our debarkation to the tent camp, Camp McNair.

Frank: I think you said it was.

Chapman: And we also moved a good many troops by train too.

Frank: There was a train up . . . a rail head up there.

Chapman: Yes, near there, just below Fuji.

Frank: Didn't have any problems moving in then, with the populace or anything like that?

Chapman: Well, around McNair there is no populace.
Frank: There is no . . .

Chapman: No. There's one or two very small villages, but, as I mentioned earlier that was one of the great advantages of McNair, there weren't any distractions.

Frank: Yes. Were people allowed to go on liberty from McNair or from Fuji?

Chapman: Yes, but there wasn't anywhere to go. We granted weekend liberties and the troops would go to Tokyo, Fuji.

Frank: You had a rail service nearby that was . . .

Chapman: Yes. You had to go down the hill below Fuji and there was a main rail line that came right through there; the main rail line from Tokyo to Kyoto and so forth.

Frank: Did your troops get into the habit of starting to climb Mount Fuji at this point?

Chapman: Yes, there was quite a rage on climbing Mount Fuji, and it was a pretty tough thing to do by the way.

Frank: Was it?

Chapman: Yes. I remember going up there myself. I got about two-thirds of the way up and I thought I couldn't take another step, and here came two Japanese momma-sans, who must have been at least 80 years old, they probably weighed about 80 pounds and each one of them had a pack on that I'll bet weighed 30 pounds. They were just talking and laughing and trudging ahead and I thought, "If they can make it, I can." (Laughter) So I eventually did.

Frank: What was outstanding at this time? Of course, you've had your training, your tremendous training area. You worked out your contingency plans for deployment to Korea.
Chapman: I'd say we had a stabilized outfit.

Frank: Morale was good.

Chapman: Morale was high, nothing an artilleryman loves to do like shoot. If he can go out every day and shoot, he's happy. So we went out every day and shot, and we were happy.

Frank: A lot of intramural sports, division competition?

Chapman: Oh, a lot of that. Within the regiment we ran extensive intramural programs of all kinds between the battalions, worked up a whole lot of enthusiasm.

Frank: Then you worked up with the intra-regimental competition.

Chapman: Between the regiments, yes. There was some of that but not a great deal. The distance between were pretty big.

Frank: So you had strictly intramural in the units.

Chapman: By and large, yes.

Frank: This was about a year. Let's see, you went down to . . .

Chapman: Let's see. I think one little episode sticks in my mind there. It certainly isn't of any historic value but it was pretty interesting. I went one morning, one Sunday morning, to church. We had a chapel there and so I tried to set an example by going to the Protestant service which was at 9:00 I believe, and was to be conducted by one of our new, newly commissioned JG chaplains who was a Southern Baptist. Well, our regimental chaplain was a lieutenant commander. I forget his name, but he was a Catholic. This young Baptist had been going around to the tents and the mess halls at night and collecting some troops around and preaching to them,
conducting prayer sessions. Our Catholic, senior, chaplain got him by the stacking swivel and told him to stop it, that it was irregular and was not allowed. On this Sunday morning he was scheduled to conduct the 9:00 service. I was there sitting in the first row or second or third row. There was a short delay and the chaplain, the JG, came down the aisle, up in the pulpit, did not have his robes on but had on his uniform, and announced that his ministry had been interfered with by the regimental chaplain, he refused to conduct services that morning, and we were all free to leave, there would be no service. We were all stunned, of course, particularly me, and he marched out. I couldn't think what to do. Finally I stood up and I said, "Look, everybody just keep your seats and I'll see if we can't find some way to have a service." So I went back in the back where the chaplains' offices were and there was another young JG who had just arrived, just a few days before. I said, "You, what's your name?" and he told me. I said, "Put your robes on. You're going to conduct the service this morning." Well, he did and he marched up front, we sang a couple of hymns, and we did some praying, and he preached an extemporaneous sermon which was really outstanding, a superior sermon. All the time he was preaching about love and brotherhood and kindness and mercy, I was sitting there thinking, "What am I going to do with that chaplain that shirked his duty!" which is what he'd really done. He deliberately shirked his duty.

The service ended and I went back to my hooch and I sent for my operator and I said, "Get me the division on the telephone. I want to speak to the division chaplain." So I got the division chaplain, who was a captain, Navy captain, and I said, "Look get an airplane and get up here right away. I've really got a problem." Then I got the OD and I sent him to put the chaplain under arrest and receive him of his sword, which he did. We awaited the arrival of the division chaplain. I told him the circumstances and I said, "Look, this is a real problem. This is a mixture of religious beliefs and military orders. It looks to me like an insoluble problem." (Laughter) He said, "Let me work on it a while." So he did. He talked to the young fellow. Well, the outcome was that we let him off with a slap on the wrist and he promised never to do it again, and he was transferred to another outfit. But I've often thought I'm probably the only regimental commander in the history of the Marine Corps that's been stood up by a chaplain at a church service.

Frank: And had to relieve him.
Chapman: And had to relieve him, yes.

Frank: I don't recall ever hearing that . . .

Chapman: I'll bet that's never happened. I'm probably the only Marine that's ever relieved a chaplain in line of duty.

Frank: I get the impression there was a lot of politics amongst the chaplains based on different religious sects.

Chapman: Yes, well of course this Southern Baptist, if you were born and raised in the south you can understand his attitude toward Catholics. That was the nub of the problem. If the regimental chaplain had been a Protestant, there would have never been a problem.

Frank: I'm just trying to remember . . . when you were in the 11th Marines when Big Foot Brown had it, whether he had troubles with the chaplain. He had troubles with his doctor I think.

Chapman: I believe so. I wasn't close to it though. I was a battalion commander.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: No, another anecdote I don't think I've told concerns the battalion chaplain that I had when I was CO of 4/11 on Okinawa. We were in direct support of the 7th Marines and we've been over why that was previously in that the 1st Battalion was the general support battalion and the 2d, 3d, and 4th were direct support battalions. Have I told the story of my chaplain? He was a JG, and a Catholic, and a really superlative chaplain who spent all his time up in the front lines with the troops, with the wounded, day and night; really outstanding young chaplain. His name was Ryan, Patrick Joseph Ryan.

Frank: Catholic.
Chapman: Catholic. In the battalion fire direction center, the horizontal control operator was a sergeant named Slanina, Sgt Slanina, and I got to know him very well. He's the principal operator in the fire direction center, fire control operator, sergeant. The war ended and we demobilized and years went by and I became CO at 8th and I. One day I got an engraved invitation in the mail inviting me to attend the ordination of a Catholic Jesuit priest named Paul J. Slanina, right here at St. Peter's in Washington. Well, of course, I accepted. The chaplain and I went and it was a real beautiful, tremendous ceremony. I'd never been to one before. It lasted four or five hours, there were 20 or 25 priests to be ordained. Sgt Slanina was one of them. He'd gone to school for seven years, which is the Jesuit curriculum, without ceasing, day and night. He'd succeeded and he was ordained. There was a long, long ordination ceremony followed by a long, long ceremonial Mass, and the . . .

End Tape 1, Side 1
Session VII
Chapman: To carry on this long, laborious, and monotonous story; later on I then became Commandant. I made many trips to the Far East and on some of them we would stop at Anchorage, Alaska for refueling, most of them in fact. Well, one of those stops I was idly looking through the cast of people in Anchorage and who should I discover but the Archbishop of Alaska was Patrick Joseph Ryan, who'd been my battalion chaplain on Okinawa. So I called him and arranged that the next time I came through we'd have dinner together and we did. We went to dinner and I was certainly glad to see him. He was then the Archbishop of Alaska. We had many discussions but maybe the most interesting discussion we had was a comparison of who had gone the farthest. Was it further from JG to Archbishop, or was it further from lieutenant colonel to four-star general. So we discussed that point for quite some time and never did reach a conclusion because it's quite a ways from JG to Archbishop and it's also a pretty good ways from lieutenant colonel to Commandant of the Marine Corps. He's still there today.

Frank: Of course a lot of military chaplains did go on to successful careers in their orders I would think.

Chapman: Oh, yes, of course. I think most of them do. Well, that was a digression for sure.

Frank: Yes, we're still with the 12th Marines. Outside of the good training was there anything unique? Did anything unusual happen while you were out in Japan that sticks in your memory . . . while you had the 12th Marines or when you went down to division as G-3?

Chapman: No, I can't think of anything. We worked very hard. We made ourselves totally combat ready in every respect. One thing that happened right at the . . . And we had detail plans for moving out and going to Korea or anywhere. There were other contingencies that were possible. Some of them as far away as the Middle East, so we had . . .

Frank: Did 3d Division . . .
Chapman: . . . a variety of contingency plans. But all of them, of course, first, being completely combat ready and second, embarking and then going wherever we were told to go.

Frank: At this time did the 3d Division provide troops for a special landing force of the Seventh Fleet? Was there such a thing at this time?

Chapman: As far as I remember, no. I'm sure there wasn't. That came later when the division moved to Okinawa at the end of the Korean War. The war substantially ended right at the end of my year there with the division.

Frank: August '54.

Chapman: Well, let's see . . .

Frank: The truce went into effect the previous July, '53.

Chapman: Right. So it was . . . let's see the truce went into effect July '53 didn't it?

Frank: Um hmm.

Chapman: And the spring of '54 the demobilization started and a little before I left the regiment. That, of course, caused great difficulties and concern. I don't remember the figures but I do remember that for the Marine Corps as a whole, something like half of the Marine Corps was going to demobilize. To put it another way, those who had commitments beyond the demobilization period were only about enough to man the Marine Corps 50 percent. Those are the approximate figures, I don't remember exactly. So that it became a necessity to try to reenlist many of those who were due for discharge. The Commandant came out with an order, that he personally visited around the Marine Corps to be sure it was being implemented, requiring each battalion commander (or barracks commander or ship's detachment commander, all commanders) to personally interview each of the Marines due for discharge and try to persuade
him to stay on; those that were qualified that is. So he visited the 12th Marines, where we were--
Gen Shepherd--where we were hard at work carrying out his order. I'm sorry to say it was with
small success, too. Battalion commanders worked very, very hard at it but it was pretty difficult
to persuade any of them to reenlist or even to extend for a year. But the Marine Corps weathered
that storm, of course.

Frank: What did this do to your regiment? How much did it deplete it by?

Chapman: Well, it was after I left but there was substantial depletion, something like 50 percent.
The Marine Corps, meanwhile, had a good many recruits coming out and we were ready to start
again with replacement drafts. It wasn't too long before it was back up to strength, but with new
Marines, not old hands, not old, combat experienced, fully trained people. But that's the nature
of life in the Marine Corps. There wasn't anything we could do about that.

Frank: Any innovations, tactical innovations, that were employed by the 12th Marines in their
training in this period? Or was it the same, methodical, traditional way of conducting an artillery
regiment?

Chapman: Yes, it was pretty methodical, but that doesn't mean it was slow. We were still using
the World War II gunnery method and gunnery techniques and it was pretty fast. We were,
really, very, very good. We had numerous regimental exercises in which we'd move all four
battalions out and hold a regimental shoot and test the accuracy and speed of each battalion
vying against one another. I, as regimental commander, would say, "The target is," so and so,
have all four battalion commanders standing there and I'd say, "Okay, let's see who can get the
first shot on the target." Then, man, all hell would break loose. (Laughter) Each one would do
his best to get his battalion on the target the quickest. WE had many shoots like that.

Frank: There wasn't really . . .

Chapman: That's the best training there is.
Frank: Oh, yes, unrestrained in a way. There wasn't that much of a change in the nature of the artillery weapons in this period was there?

Chapman: No, no. We still had 105s and 155s, same weapons.

Frank: Was there a need for innovation? Was there a need for new types of weapons, artillery weapons?

Chapman: No, not with the tactics and techniques that we employed at that time. We were still in a World War II, heavy landings against dug-in enemy mode.

Frank: So you were glad to get whatever you could.

Chapman: It was during that period that we began to devise the flexible assault with helicopters, but, of course, we didn't have any helicopters then except the initial squadron, HMX. It wasn't until after Korea that we actually began to get helicopters and could start using the new techniques that had been devised. At that point there really wasn't anything new. We were still using World War II doctrine and tactics and techniques and we were doing them very well. Of course, that was good doctrine, good armament, good organizing and equipping for the war we fought in Korea too.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: Because it was a slugging match . . .

Frank: Yes it was.

Chapman: . . . just like World War II had been.

Frank: Had the Marines gotten the eight-inch howitzer yet or was that just too big a piece for . . .
Chapman: No, we had eight-inch then. Let me think now, did we . . . perhaps we didn't, I don't recall. It seems to me we got one battery at McNair, with us, toward the end of my stay there. I believe we did, one battery.

Frank: In Korea it was strictly the Army that had the eight-inch if I recall.

Chapman: Yes, and the Army supported the Marines too. And also the long-range artillery, the 155 guns, I think was all Army in Korea.

Frank: That had greater distance than the eight-inch howitzer.

Chapman: Oh, yes, double the distance. The eight-inch, I think, had a maximum effective range of about 16 or 18,000 meters and the gun is up somewhere above 30,000.

Frank: Had you gone into atomic weapons yet, atomic shells?

Chapman: Yes, we didn't have them.

Frank: Didn't have them but you knew of them?

Chapman: Yes, and we trained. I remember one exercise at Pendleton, a landing exercise, a reinforced division and wing landing exercise under the threat of enemy use of atomic weapons, with the result that we had to make a dispersed landing and had dispersed positions areas.

Frank: But you had SOPs about . . . as far as the use of atomic warhead by yourself.

Chapman: Sure, we had a nuclear . . .

Frank: Capability.
Chapman: Capability, both offensive and then we employed the defensive techniques as well. We practiced them.

Frank: How would you characterize your two years now with the 12th Marines?

Chapman: Highly satisfactory. I was very proud of my regiment which was truly professional and, I felt, a really good example.

Frank: You'd had a battery, you'd had a battalion, and now you had the regiment.

Chapman: That's about as far as an artillery man can go. And I had the regiment for two years, too, which is somewhat... pretty unusual in itself.

Frank: What were you doing down on the staff down at... when they sent you down to division... when they brought you down to division.

Chapman: Well, I was the G-3, but it was only for about two months. Duke Jorgenson got the 12th Marines, another classmate and a dear friend, also an artilleryman. He had had the shore party.

Frank: Oh, had he had the shore party?

Chapman: Yes, he'd had the shore party. He was, of course, like I was, due for detachment.

Frank: I think I have a picture of him and you here when you were reporting aboard still as young newlyweds.

Chapman: That's right, there were six of us that went to Fort Sill together. He and I were two of them. This is... of course that's me and Emily on the front caisson and that's Jack Taber behind and then that's Willy Fairbourn behind that on the third one. Then there was another three... you may not have the picture of the other three.
Frank: Duke Jor . . . well the story was . . .

Chapman: Duke, Toots Henderson, and Barney Oldfield were the other three.

Frank: You and Paul Henderson went home and got married at the same time, I think.

Chapman: Christmas holiday.

Frank: Christmas holiday, right.

Chapman: That's also Taber and Fairbourn . . .

Frank: Oh, they all . . . your two years were up.

Chapman: . . . and Jorgenson.

Frank: Your two years probation was up.

Chapman: A couple of them got married before Sill, yes it was just two of us that got married during the holidays, that's was Toots and I. Barney didn't get married at that time. It wasn't until after he was back at Quantico after the war.

Frank: Of course just talking about Fort Sill at that time, I think you told me, or maybe Toots told me, that they were going around a corner and the caisson that Duke Jorgenson and his wife were on tipped over.

Chapman: Yes, tipped over and she sprained her ankle pretty badly.

Frank: Well, it could have been worse.
Chapman: Yes, it could have been worse. The iron tires of the caisson skidded on the concrete pavement and it skidded across the pavement. Then when the tires hit the curb, it stopped and toppled over.

Frank: One other comment about the class of ’35, you remained very close I think as a class.

Chapman: Very much so.

Frank: I don't know of the same . . . I would almost say much more so than any of the other classes, pre-war classes, wouldn't you? Or was it just that you were . . .

Chapman: That's hard to judge, but it certainly was close, yes.

Frank: Maybe you were more prominent than some of the people from the other classes.

Chapman: Perhaps that's so and then there was, no doubt, the fact that all the members were successful with one or two exceptions, so that there was not that kind of competition that separates friends.

Frank: Where was division headquarters set up?

Chapman: 3d Division headquarters?

Frank: Yes, sir.

Chapman: It was at Gifu.

Frank: Ah, yes, Gifu.

Chapman: I have a hard time remembering these names but I remember that one. Gifu.
Frank: What kind of set up was there?

Chapman: It was an Army camp with semi-permanent buildings and had been an Army division headquarters. I forget which one.

Frank: That was still the hottest . . .

Chapman: . . . but it was well . . . and there was a camp detachment there, an Army camp command with a colonel in command, who were the landlords and, of course the division was a tenant, division headquarters.

Frank: Of course you remained over in Japan when you took over the Marine Barracks at Fleet Activity at Yokosuka. What type of a tour was that?

Chapman: Oh, it was great, really great. Marine Barracks, Yokosuka was just that. We had a 500 and some odd Marines.

Frank: That's a large command.

Chapman: It was a big barracks. Its size was attributable, in part, to the fact that we had an anti-aircraft mission. We had 40mms and machine guns that we were supposed to man if Koreans or the Chinese raided Yokosuka, air raided Yokosuka.

Frank: Shades of the old defense battalion.

Chapman: So we'd periodically break out all of this material and go out and have firing exercises, but most of the time we were just acting like a barracks. We had a military police company and an interior guard company . . . two interior guard companies and one military police company. The two guard companies were also anti-aircraft artillerymen. They all wore a second hat.
Frank: What were you all guarding here at Yokosuka?

Chapman: The MPs were doing their thing out in town and, within the base the guard company was guarding several things; obviously, the perimeter and the gates, and also the deep command post there. That was CinCFE's war room was dug into one of those mountains there, and then there was war storage of munitions in the magazines that the Japanese had dug into the mountains right in the middle of Yokosuka. They were labyrinths that burrowed all the way . . . threaded all the way through that mountain and were impervious to any outside attack, really.

Frank: That was to supply the Seventh Fleet.

Chapman: Seventh Fleet and . . .

Frank: Was the Seventh Fleet based at Yokosuka?

Chapman: Yes, it was at that time. There was Seventh Fleet ordnance, a lot of special communications, many vital things. So we guarded all that, and we guarded the waterfronts. We manned our anti-aircraft every now and then too.

In addition to those traditional duties of a barracks, we also had a kind of a show piece duty of representing the Marine Corps in the Far East. We put on parades, field days, formal guard mounts. After I'd been there a little while I got blues authorized and one of the happiest days in my life, the supply officer discovered in storage, in his warehouse somewhere, a lavish supply of white pants. So we started wearing blue "Charlie" it was called then, which means the blue coat . . .

Frank: Blue-whites.

Chapman: . . . white, blue, white, when the weather was seasonable. That made quite an impression. We created an extra duty drum and bugle corps. It was really very good. We got the FMFPac drum and bugle team leader to come out and give us some schooling, which he did. We created a pretty fancy, really excellent drum and bugle corps. I think we made quite a show.
We made a showplace out of our barracks. We had our own maintenance force, Japanese, Japanese maintenance force and facilities. We had complete shops; wood shops, metal shops, automobile maintenance, truck maintenance. We had a complete logistic establishment all belonging to the barracks, manned by Japanese, and paid for by the Navy. (Laughter) That gave us the opportunity to really create a special barracks, and I must say it was really beautiful. Everything in it and everything about it was absolutely first class. And we maintained it that way. There again, the house keepers were Japanese so the Marines didn't have to push brooms, or polish brass . . .

Frank: Shades of China.

Chapman: . . . or wax the decks. It was all done by Japanese labor, again, paid for by the good old Navy.

Frank: I guess you didn't have to threaten the Marines with court-martial, just tell them you would send them home!

Chapman: (Laughter) Well, that's true. I think we had . . . One by-product of that was that we probably had the highest reenlistment rate in the whole Marine Corps. We were close to 100 percent reenlistment the whole time I was there. The obvious reason was that each Marine wanted to stay there and live the good life!

Frank: They could opt for that?

Chapman: Oh, yes, they could volunteer to reenlist and stay on station.

Frank: How long a tour would it normally be for an enlisted man? Two years?

Chapman: Two years.

Frank: So what did he stay on for another year?
Chapman: Another year, a third year.

Frank: But not a fourth year.

Chapman: I don't think so although I really don't remember that detail. I don't know why not. I imagine many of them did.

Frank: As I say, shades of the old China days.

Chapman: Similar in many respects. I know . . . I remember one time, just to reinforce my point so it won't sound like a lot of idle bragging, Gen Shepherd, the Commandant, paid us one of his many overseas visits. We really turned out the full guard and band for him; had a full scale, complete inspection of all the troops; the drum and bugle corps performed, we took him all through our barracks and he saw this really beautiful barracks that we had created and he saw the organization into squads--every Marine under a squad leader who was held fully accountable for his men. When it was all over he left and he got back to Washington and he said--I later learned--that the highlight of his entire career was what he had seen at the Marine Barracks, Yokosuka. (Laughter)

Frank: Really?

Chapman: Yes, that's what he said.

Frank: Of course he had served . . .

Chapman: Of that kind of . . . part of his career, excluding Commandant of course.

Frank: Of course he had . . .

Chapman: He had been a barracks commander.
Frank: 8th and I.

Chapman: Um hmm, yes.

Frank: So he knew.

Chapman: So he had a basis for judging.

Frank: Do you suppose that your performance there led to your assignment to 8th and I?

Chapman: Undoubtedly, although I'd known Gen Pate for . . . he lived right across the street from us at Quantico when I was there with the development outfit. He was . . . let's see, he was commandant of the Ed Center I believe . . .

Frank: I think he probably was.

Chapman: . . . at that time.

Frank: Yes, sir.

Chapman: And I was in the Development Center.

Frank: Because I know he didn't have the Schools.

Chapman: So, I'd gotten to know him pretty well. Anyhow I got a letter from him one day while I was doing no harm to anybody sitting in my office in Yokosuka and it said that he was . . . I guess he'd just become Commandant, and that the then commanding officer at 8th and I, who was Bob Williams, was due to retire that summer. This was along about April or May. Would I consider coming to 8th and I as the CO? Well, I had orders to the Naval War College as a
student and we were preparing to go to Newport. I remember I went over and asked Gen Wornham's advise. He was then the commanding general of the 3d Division, Tom Wornham.

Frank: Yes, fine . . .

Chapman: He's also a friend, who I'd lived next door to at Quantico at the same time I was across the street from Gen Pate.

Frank: Fine man.

Chapman: Wonderful man, wonderful wife too, really a wonderful man. Well, there were many advantages to going to the War College of course.

Frank: You hadn't been but to . . .

Chapman: I'd been to what was then called the Senior School, now called the Command and Staff College.

Frank: That and Fort Sill were probably the only two schools you'd been into in your Marine Corps career.

Chapman: And, obviously, this was my last chance to get the War College education. But going to 8th and I was pretty attractive too, so I went over to see Gen Wornham. I showed him the letter and I said, "What do you think?" He said, "Take it!" (Laughter) He said, "Take it!." So I said, "Thank you very much," and I wrote Gen Pate back and said I'd be delighted if he would order me to 8th and I. So that's where we went.

Frank: Had . . .

Chapman: As a result I've never been to school. I've often said I'm probably the most ignorant, uneducated senior officer the Marine Corps' ever had.
Frank: Well, I think some of the others didn't have that much schooling either. I don't think Gen Shepherd did, except for Company Officers' School perhaps.

Chapman: Well, I guess so.

Frank: I don't think he went to any of the senior . . .

Chapman: Well, I certainly didn't.

Frank: Did command of 8th and I have the same sort of I want to say reputation but that's not the word. Was that . . . There are certain commands, certain billets for colonels which most people lead to general officer rank; 8th and I, Basic School, and maybe Aide to the Secretary of Navy, Secretary of the General Staff, something like this where few people . . .

Chapman: Military Secretary to the Commandant.

Frank: That's right. Where few people who have held those billets, very few, have not made general officer.

Chapman: Quite true, quite right.

Frank: Did 8th and I have that sort of reputation at this time?

Chapman: Well, yes and no, because there were a number who had not. My predecessor, Bob Williams, did not, for instance and there were others who had not. So it wasn't a sure fire ticket to stardom. I guess one would have to say it increased the chances. It improved on the chances. It certainly didn't do them any harm, didn't do the chances any harm, but it didn't make it a certainty by any means.
Frank: What did you find at 8th and I when you went there? What was the situation? What was the, I want to say life, but . . .

Chapman: 8th and I is special, and it demonstrated, when I got there, the good effects of that special situation.

Frank: Special in what way? How would you characterize it?

Chapman: Choice of troops. We sent a team every year to the 2d Division, 2d Wing, Quantico and interviewed candidates to come to 8th and I, and picked and chose who we wanted. They had to meet the various requirements; they had to be six feet tall, couldn't wear glasses. Prior to my time there they had to be white.

Frank: Yes, that's true, right.

Chapman: I'm the one that changed that. I'm the one that brought the first black Marines to 8th and I.

Frank: I'll be darned.

Chapman: All necessary logistic support, funding, all of that.

Frank: You had the Band, you had the Institute.

Chapman: Had the Band, had the Drum and Bugle Corps, had the Marine Corps Institute. The CO of the Barracks wore a second hat as director of the Institute, still does.

Frank: Yes, he does.

Chapman: It was just special in every way. It was, as a result, it's the one outfit in the Marine Corps that has the capability of being perfect, and that's the objective at 8th and I, is to be perfect
in every respect. That's the standard. It's the only outfit that's capable of being perfect because of its special characteristics, some of which I've touched on, and no distractions. Didn't have to stand guard, didn't have to do all the things that other barracks have to do. We only had to concentrate on doing the ceremonial and similar things perfectly.

Frank: Didn't they . . . weren't there some standing guards over at main Navy at that time?

Chapman: No, not from 8th and I.

Frank: Not from 8th and I. Didn't 8th and I provide the guards here at the entrance to the Navy Yard.

Chapman: No, 8th and I didn't. There was a Marine Barracks of the Navy Yard at that time.

Frank: Okay, that's right.

Chapman: The Navy Yard had its own barracks.

Frank: I think the guards now come from 8th and I.

Chapman: Oh, yes, they do, now. Well, when I got to 8th and I, I found, which I know many people have heard, that the Barracks had sort of become Anglicized, Englishized. The British influence was very heavy, double-soled shoes with iron cleats on them, all the caps were too small, the officers spent most of their time in the Center House and the sergeant major and the first sergeant ran the troop units, all that sort of stuff.

Frank: Bob Williams had started that.

Chapman: That was all Bob Williams, that was him and his influence. As someone remarked--I think it was Fred Wieseman--that the greatest all Americanization day in history, in the history of
the Barracks, occurred right after I got there. The troops, in their ceremonial duties, they were
doing a whole lot of English-type maneuvers with the weapons, with the troop and stomp.

Well, I changed all that. I adopted the . . . My policy was that we will be regulation. We
will be U.S. Marine Corps regulation. We'll do everything in accordance with the Marine Corps
regulations and we'll do it perfect. That was the policy I instituted, and I'm happy to say I think
that same policy is in effect today.

Frank: Did you have much trouble . . . Did you find that your selection of the enlisted men and
the officers . . . I take it you also selected the officers who were assigned.

Chapman: Oh, yes we had our . . .

Frank: You were pretty good, pretty much on target, you didn't make too many mistakes of
judgment in the people you got?

Chapman: I don't think so. We sent . . . I would send one of the company commanders with
some staff NCOs on these recruiting expeditions. We'd send one team to 2d Division, one to the
2d Wing, one to Quantico, one to three or four other places. They would interview volunteers
who had to meet certain requirements. The number one requirement was that their tour in that
unit was coming to an end. We weren't taking anybody that was in the middle of his tour with
the division or the wing, just people who were due for either discharge or another assignment.

Frank: I think Warren Baker said--he was there during the Korean War--they'd send teams over
to come back with the ships to.

Chapman: And of course there were all volunteers. We'd get the division or the wing to put out
an announcement unit by unit asking for volunteers for 8th and I. Quite a few would show up, it
would be quite a choice.

Frank: How did this effect your family life and social life living at the Barracks?
Chapman: It was a pretty heavy social life, a lot of activity there on the row with the general officers and the Commandant, and the White House, and then many commitments with all sorts of military and military-related organizations, particularly those where the Marine Barracks units would perform; where the Drum and Bugle Corps and the Color Guard and the Drill Team would perform. So it was a pretty heavy social life.

Frank: Did it dip into your pocket much?

Chapman: No, very little, mainly keeping all those darn uniforms up.

Frank: Oh, you had to order another set of blues . . .

Chapman: Oh, yes, you had to have . . .

Frank: Whites.

Chapman: . . . two or three sets of blues and whites and at least two mess jackets. You couldn't keep up with it if you didn't because you always have at least one in the cleaners.

Frank: Did you have a contingency fund, an entertainment fund that . . .

Chapman: No, no, funds at all.

Frank: The Commandant had it.

Chapman: No, it all came out of my pocket, but it was worth it.

Frank: How did the boys like it here?

Chapman: Fair, it was a little hard on them.
Frank: It was?

Chapman: They had to catch a Navy bus every morning and go to school out in northwest Washington. Alice Diehl Junior High and Woodrow Wilson High were the two schools they went to for two years. Then they had to get on the bus and come back right when school was out every afternoon. They couldn't participate in any of the extra-curricular activities out there. One of my boys was really a good athlete and he wanted to play football and basketball but he couldn't do it. Then when they got back to 8th and I, there was very limited for them to do. It was a little hard on them.

Frank: It wasn't like the old Rudyard Kipling . . . they couldn't play with any of the enlisted men or anything like that.

Chapman: Oh, that was not . . . there was no such policy. They both went over to the gym every afternoon when they got back and played basketball with the troops, and pick up games with the troops, and other games with the troops.

Frank: What . . . did you have any problems at all with the Band? What was the association, the Band officer reported to you?

Chapman: No, the Band belongs to the Commandant.

Frank: Belongs to the Commandant.

Chapman: Yes, we were landlords and they were tenants. But they, of course, were required to participate in the parades and the funerals and many other ceremonial activities.

Frank: As far as discipline and good conduct and uniforms and all that, that was all up to the Band officer to . . .

Chapman: Oh, yes. He was the commanding officer of the Band . . .
Frank: Director of the Band.

Chapman: ... and he worked directly for the Commandant. No, they were a tenant and a very happy tenant and, of course, we were very happy to have them. So, although the official relationship was as I described, actually we got along splendidly.

Frank: They have . . . there was a special . . . they had a special arrangement, the bandsmen. They had a contract did they not? They were enlisted . . . or they signed to a contract for the Band?

Chapman: Yes, and of course they came in as staff sergeants, I think it was, as bandsmen. Yes, it was a special provision in the Personnel Act provided for that for all the services.

Frank: Do they get extra money as bandsmen, or they only got the money?

Chapman: No, except that they enlisted as staff sergeants instead of privates. They could teach . . .

Frank: But they couldn't play.

Chapman: . . . but they could not play for pay. They could teach for pay though, and most of them did, but they couldn't play for pay.

Frank: Now, once they signed up, they stayed with the Band as long as they were musicians in good standing and so on, and could not be transferred out of the 8th and I?

Chapman: That's right. They enlisted for Marine Band duty only. They were not eligible to go anywhere else.

Frank: But the Drum and Bugle Corps was different.
Chapman: The Drum and Bugle Corps, they were regular Marines, yes. Now the Drum and Bugle Corps, however, belonged to the Barracks. It was under my command. The leader of the Drum and Bugle Corps was an experienced drum and bugle corps drum major named Sturgio.

Frank: Yes, Chris Sturgio.

Chapman: Chris Sturgio, first class Marine and a first class Drum and Bugle Corps leader. He wrote and arranged their music, he rehearsed them and drove them—both in music and in drill—and it was just about the sharpest unit at the Barracks. They usually won the prize on inspections and that kind of thing. He was really a splendid Marine, hard-line Marine as opposed to what you might think of as a sloppy musician. He was a hard-line, tough Marine staff NCO, really good one.

Frank: Of course he got warrant officer and I think he went up to captain finally.

Chapman: I think he did, after I left. Then he had a heart attack and he had to retire. He lives over here in Maryland right now. I run into him occasionally.

Some of the good things that happened to the Drum and Bugle Corps while I was there, I succeeded in getting its strength raised from 36 to 48. That was a major step forward. Secondly I got approval for those red coats they're wearing today, the red coats with the either white or blue trousers and the white caps.

Frank: Gold buttons and so on.

Chapman: Yes, with the brass buttons down the front. Those red coats are one of my creations. Thirdly, we succeeded in getting the money to equip them with the kinds of instruments they've got now; with the four voices, two tenors, a baritone, and a bass. Prior to that they had just had the standard Marine Corps bugles. Those are three of the things that come to mind of improvements in the Drum and Bugle Corps while I was there.
Frank: Of course they had those timpani and those marimba type things and all.

Chapman: They all came later too.

Frank: They all came later.

Chapman: They came after my day there. Some later CO is responsible for them.

Frank: Did . . . was DeMar the drum major of the Marine Band or had he retired?

Chapman: No, he was still there. I think he retired about the end of my first year there.

Frank: Slim DeMar, a big, tall . . .

Chapman: Slim DeMar, good drum major.

Frank: Oh, yes.

Chapman: The best.

Frank: Yes, I knew him from World War II.

Chapman: He was the best. Well, I've remarked on some notable events at 8th and I. I guess the most notable of all was the creation of the Evening Parade.

Frank: Did it come to . . . it was at 5:30 or something . . . afternoon.

Chapman: Yes, I'm, there again, I'm the creator of the evening parade. The parade had been at 5:00 Friday afternoon for 150 years. It had several disadvantages. The first, it was very hot in the summer. Second, there was no parking. Third, everybody, the potential spectators, were still
at work and on their way home. So the average crowd was 300 or 400 people, that's all, most of whom were Marines and Marine families and some people that lived around in the neighborhood. My first spring there--let's see exactly when was it? Danged if I can remember.

Frank: Well, you took over in June of '56 so it would have been in the spring of '57.

Chapman: Last year the Barracks, one of the Barracks' officers, a captain who was the operations officer, took some time off and wrote a history; researched and wrote a history of the evening parade. He had all the facts and, of course, he came out and interviewed me two or three times and I told him everything I could remember about it, and it's all in that history which you probably have here.

Frank: Yes, he wrote it for his Masters I believe.

Chapman: Perhaps he did. It was a good job.

Frank: And there was an article in the Gazette recently, too, about it.

Chapman: That was taken from that history. So the facts are all in that little book. I'll just remark that it all got started because we were invited . . . our Drum and Bugle Corps, Drill Team, and Color Guard were invited by the British to participate in the tattoo . . .

Frank: Edinburgh Tattoo.

Chapman: No, not at Edinburgh, in Bermuda, and of course we agreed. This was before the parade season started. We went there and it was really a beautiful spectacle.

Frank: Did you go down too
Chapman: Well, I didn't go for the whole time, which was two weeks. I went down in the middle of it a couple of times just to see how it was. It was a--what the British call a--searchlight tattoo.

Frank: Alisdair MacLean, Brigadier MacLean, was in charge of . . .

Chapman: He was indeed. He had gone all over the world arranging them. There had been one in Canada, this was in Bermuda. They were primarily tourist spectacles. It was really good. It was at night, there were floodlights, search-lights, and it was well done. Among other appearances was our Drill Team, Drum and Bugle Corps, and Color Guard with the full panoply of periods of darkness, then spotlights, then searchlights, then floodlights, and then back to darkness. I sat there thinking, while I was watching, "Why don't we do our parade that way?"

So we came back and I gathered the officers around and I said, "Look fellows, we're going to do evening parades from now on instead of afternoon parades." And we did. It took us a couple of months to put on the first one. A lot of rehearsing because everything's different at night. When the troops throw those rifles up and catch them, it's a lot harder to do when there's a floodlight shining in your eyes than it is in broad daylight, for example. So we put in all jury-rigged lights, put up tinkertoy-type towers at the corners of the parade ground, the cables all lay along the ground. We put in jury-rigged communications and control. We practiced and practiced. We practiced every night, or most nights, for three or four weeks.

Then the great time came when we put on our first one. I had gotten Gen Pate's permission to do it and I asked him to advertise it at Headquarters and to see if we couldn't get a few spectators out. Well, the very first one, we had 3000 spectators as compared to 300 for the afternoon parades. And it's been running a full house ever since.

Frank: Oh, yes.

Chapman: 3000 or more every parade. So time went on and we gradually converted all the paraphernalia into permanent establishments; permanent towers, permanent lights, the wiring was all under ground, put in a permanent loud speaker system. We installed a saluting battery. I
sent one of my officers to the arsenal that the Navy has up in Pennsylvania, I can't remember the name of it.

Frank: Germantown? No.

Chapman: Could be. He went rummaging around in this Navy ordnance warehouse and found the two saluting guns, actually they're three-inch Navy rifles that are on the parade ground right now. We brought them down and installed them, and there were many other things I won't bore you with . . .

Frank: It's not boring, it's interesting.

Chapman: That's how the evening parade got started.

Frank: Did you have to get Gen Pate's permission to do it or . . .

Chapman: Yes, oh yes.

Frank: In other words you couldn't do this arbitrarily on your own.

Chapman: Well, no, I had to inform him and ask him to consent, which he did. He came to the first one, he was the reviewing officer for the first evening parade. It was a thunderclap success, no doubt about that.

Frank: It's been a running, full time success ever since. Tell me about the . . . your role as the director--I've got twenty after 3:00, sir--Chapman: Yes, I'm going to have to leave about a quarter to 4:00.

Frank: Okay, let me just put a new tape in.

End Tape 1, Side 2
Frank: Let's discuss your role as director of the Institute now, exactly what that encompassed, problems, how it worked, its relationship to the Barracks, and so on.

Chapman: It was a second hat for me. The Institute was run, in effect, by the deputy director, who had a full time assignment as the deputy director of the Institute. The staff of the Institute, officers and men were all... each one was hand-selected for his particular expertise. They all formed the second company in the parade, but only in the parade and the Iwo Jima ceremony. They did not participate in funerals, honor guards, many other things that the Barracks did, only in the parades. They, too, were--that is these corporals and below and some of the staff NCOs--were hand-picked for their ceremonial capability as well as their expertise at the Institute. My involvement was to go over there every day for an hour and see what was going on and how it was going. We did... I was the architect of the major change in course of the Institute, too, while I was there. Up to that time, the Institute had been a general education correspondence institute. That is a Marine could take arithmetic, English...

Frank: It was duplicating what the Armed Forces... oh, what do they have... Armed Forces Schooling... they had a...

Chapman: AFEES? No, not AFEES, but...

Frank: Oh, I'll get it...Chapman: AFSC sticks in my mind, but you're quite right.

Frank: Yes, which was out in Wisconsin or someplace, I think the headquarters...

Chapman: It duplicated that.

Frank: It was duplicating those courses.
Chapman: Largely duplicating that. It taught grammar school and high school academic subjects. That's what it taught, by correspondence.

Frank: The other one taught college I think.

Chapman: Yes, as well I believe, although I don't know exactly. Well, what we did was convert it to an MOS training institute, Marine MOS training, to supplement the Marine schools and the on-the-job training that was done in the Marine units. So we completely . . . we threw out all the academic courses and created a whole new body of academic courses, one for each MOS essentially. In other words, we had a rifleman course, we had a cannoneer course, we had bulldozer operator course, and then higher level courses too. We got Headquarters to issue a Marine Corps order--actually it was the Marine Corps training order--incorporating the Marine Corps Institute as a principal teaching means, training means, for the commanders of the Corps. If the commander had a corporal who wasn't doing very well in his MOS, he could say, "Look, you enroll in Marine Corps Institute course so and so and you will take it, and you check each lesson out with me so I can be sure you're submitting lessons on time, then you'll take the exam at the end and you'll pass it." That's the kind of arrangement we converted it to. It's been highly successful.

Frank: There was an institutional memory there in the sense that there was a civilian who was the academic . . .

Chapman: Yes, Dean Jacobs. He was the academic dean of the Institute. In other words, he was the academic professional who guided and supervised all the academic side of the operation of Institute.

Frank: Is he still there?

Chapman: He was as of a couple of years ago. His name was Jacobs, Dean Jacobs. He may still be there. A fine man, he made a whole career out of being academic dean of the Marine Corps Institute. He's a PhD of course.
Frank: Yes.

Chapman: And did a fine job for us.

Frank: Where was the Institute located when you were . . .

Chapman: It was here in the Navy Yard. It's still here isn't it?

Frank: Yes, but at one time I know it was spread out around several of the buildings in the Barracks area.

Chapman: Well at the time that I was concerned it was in a single building, one of these large buildings down here in the Navy Yard, up on the third or fourth floor.

Frank: I think that's where the photo lab was at one time.

Chapman: Could be.

Frank: What was your relationship with the White House?

Chapman: Well, indirect. One of the immediate relationships was that the White House aides were members of the Barracks, the social aides.

Frank: These were the bachelor officers.

Chapman: These were the bachelor officers. The officer had to be a bachelor, he had to meet the 8th and I standards--that is at least six feet tall, couldn't wear glasses and all that sort of thing--and up to a point he had to be white. We can come back to that point again in a minute. They all lived in the Center House, the BOQ at 8th and I, and their duty was at the White House although they did a good many things at the Barracks too. They stood guard duty and various
other chores. I guess the highlight of that was the fact that one of the White House aides . . . oh, wait a minute, I'm getting ahead of myself. Let me think now, I am getting ahead of myself.

Frank: You're thinking of Chuck Robb and . . .

Chapman: Right.

Frank: Yes, that came when you were . . .

Chapman: When I was Commandant.

Frank: . . . Commandant, yes. When did Phil Berkeley have the Barracks? Did he have it before you?

Chapman: Yes, before, about three before.

Frank: I think that he had some black Marines in . . .

Chapman: I don't think so.

Frank: You don't think so?

Chapman: There were stewards, of course.

Frank: Stewards, yes.

Chapman: There were some . . . I think there were some career Marines, that is mess chiefs, supply sergeants . . .

Frank: But they weren't in the parades.
Chapman: No. The parading troops were all white. The Band was all white, Drum and Bugle Corps was all white. As I mentioned earlier, I'm the one that changed all that. I had really had some fine black Marines at Yokosuka and elsewhere. I just didn't see any reason why there shouldn't be black Marines at 8th and I. Up to that point it had been an unwritten law that a black face among those white faces on the parade ground would not be a good thing, would spoil the symmetry of the . . . (laughter) of the appearance of the parade.

Frank: Specious argument.

Chapman: I thought that was ridiculous. So I told Gen Pate one time that I proposed getting some black Marines and bringing them into the Barracks. He said, "Sure, go ahead." So we did. Our next recruiting drive to the 2d Division, 2d Wing, I told the officer in charge, "Bring us back 12 or 15 really good looking, high quality black Marines." They were delighted and they did. They brought them in and they were among the best Marines we had. Still are, still are.

Frank: Sharp, good-looking.

Chapman: Sharp, good-looking, intelligent, highly motivated, and just loved 8th and I duty. In fact all the Marines love 8th and I duty.

Frank: I think they do. Did . . . now the Marines who . . . the bandsmen who perform over at the White House, and the officers who as social aides, they have to have special clearance don't they?

Chapman: Oh, they do, yes.

Frank: And the Marines who go up to Camp David . . .

Chapman: Yes, that permanent Camp David detachment has occurred since my time. During my time we manned it on a temporary, occasional basis. Now there's a permanent detachment up there.
Frank: Okay, so those who were temporary, temporarily sent up there, did they require a special clearance?

Chapman: Oh, yes, sure, they all did. That was one of the difficulties, because those special clearances take a long time and we were often panting up to the finish line trying to get the clearances before it was time to go up there. With a permanent detachment it makes it easier of course.

Frank: What other things were levied on you as commanding officer of the Barracks? For instance, were you . . . Now, I know, that the CO of the Barracks is part of the MDW committee that, semiannually, reviews funeral arrangements for the President and so on. Were you involved with that too?

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: Contingency planning for VIP funerals?

Chapman: Yes, we were. It wasn't as big a thing then. The biggest thing along that line during my time there was the Presidential inauguration. Let's see, who was that? That was in . . . must have been '57. Who was that? That would be . . .

Frank: Alright, '52 was Eisenhower . . .

Chapman: Well, the election was '52, the inauguration was January '53.

Frank: So it had to be Eisenhower.

Chapman: So it was Eisenhower.

Frank: Eisenhower's second term.
Chapman: Yes, second term. That's right, it was Eisenhower, second term. We were heavily involved in that, in all of the arrangements, in providing the marching unit, the Marine battalion, Band, Drum and Bugle Corps, Color Guard, and all the administrative arrangements.

Frank: Street guards and so on.

Chapman: Sure.

Frank: Did the Barracks provide a battalion?

Chapman: Yes, we provided a full dress battalion and we--it was a mass formation--and we rehearsed it and rehearsed it. We hadn't had any experience marching in a mass battalion. All the 8th and I ceremonies are company fronts, a line of platoons.

Frank: The old hurry up and wait, get out there at 8:00 for a 1:30 . . .

Chapman: I forget all the details but we were there pretty early in the morning. The battalion was commanded by my exec, a lieutenant colonel. I was one of the spectators to the thing. That was quite a parade. I remember at the very first organizing committee meeting, the President had appointed a parade chairman. I forget what his name was. Anyhow he said the President had directed him rigidly to reduce the length and size of the parade to one half what it had been at his first inauguration. I'll tell you, they worked awfully hard at getting it down to one half, and the result was that it was only about 20 percent bigger than the first one.

Frank: Oh, 20 percent bigger.

Chapman: Bigger than the first one; enormous parade. You just can't keep them out. When the 7th Regiment of New York, which was formed in 1772 and has fought in every war since, demands to march in the parade, you can't tell them no.
Frank: No, not when they're as well connected as some of the people in the 7th.

Chapman: You can't tell them no. And he couldn't tell them no, although he tried. But it a tremendous parade. It lasted about four hours, if I remember, and Eisenhower was getting madder and madder!

Frank: Oh, was he?

Chapman: He thought he was only going to be out there about two hours and, gosh, he was there more than four.

Frank: We were talking about the social things, things that Mrs. Chapman got involved in. I imagine there were command performances over at the Commandant's House that you . . .

Chapman: Oh, yes, and all the houses; the Commandant, the Assistant Commandant--and Chief of Staff as he was then--the Director of Aviation, and then one other two-star who at that time was Gen Riseley, he was the senior two-star that wanted quarters. He was Director of Personnel.

Frank: Was there anything levied on you to hold any entertainment in your house, to siphon off . . .

Chapman: No, there were no directives. Anything of that kind we would do at the Center House. Center House Officers' Mess was a going concern, did very well financially. We had had a liquor store there . . .

Frank: Yes, I remember.

Chapman: . . . until just about the time I arrived when it was ordered out of business by Headquarters Marine Corps. But it had made an enormous profit and the profit had been preserved over the years and there was something like 30 or 40,000 dollars in the bank account! Actually it was in treasury notes drawing interest. That's actually another one of the things I did
was to modernize and beautify the Center House into the . . . similar to the condition that it is today. Prior to that it had looked just like the identical set of quarters next door.

Frank: It had it's own mess and everything.

Chapman: Own closed mess for the bachelors, and of course the married officers could participate according to the rules. We did very well financially. So any entertaining that I was required to do, we did it there, at the Center House. Like, for instance, having the reviewing officer in for a reception after the parade. After they became evening parades we had him in for a reception before the parade.

Frank: How about the grounds keeping and so on? How was that handled?

Chapman: It was all done by Marines. We had a grounds-keeper, a tech sergeant, who was an arborist.

Frank: Oh really?

Chapman: Yes, he'd gone to school. He was a qualified technician at groundskeeping. The trees, the bushes, the shrubs, the lawns, the parade ground were all his responsibility. He had five or six Marines under his command and he did a good job of it, very good job.

Well, let's see, one or two other things, minor things that occurred to me was I had the parade sidewalk put in. When I arrived there the troop walk, the location in which the troops formed for the parade with the two companies abreast in line of platoons, that was just grass, or dirt actually. Midway through the parade season it was just dirt, they'd worn all the grass off. So I had that sidewalk put in on which they now march and stand during the parade. Similarly, the troop commander's walk from the reviewing stand to the color guard was a standard width, just ordinary sidewalk. Well, we had it doubled in size, had a new one put down, so it was wide enough for the battalion staff and the Color Guard. We rebuilt and repaved the parking lot.

Well, I won't carry on any more about these details. These were all things done to beautify and improve the setting in which the parades were conducted.
Frank: What about the troops' quarters? It seems to me that the Barracks being as old as they were that they . . .

Chapman: Well, they were poor, in a poor state of maintenance because of their age, and insufficient in capacity. We had authority, however, to put the Marines out on BAQ, and we did. We retained, in the Barracks, only as many as it was adequate to accommodate, and only the privates, the most junior Marines, and a few NCOs to ride herd on them. All the other Marines and all the corporals and above--many of the lance corporals--we put on BAQ, and they just lived on around. Four or five of them would get together and rent an apartment and "bach" it; some nearby apartment.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: Of course they loved that too.

Frank: Had the nature of the area around the Barracks changed much during your time? Of course now it's . . .

Chapman: Not a great deal.

Frank: . . . prize property.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: The row houses in back there . . .

Chapman: It was pretty . . .

Frank: Pretty grim then.
Chapman: Pretty grim, all the way around.

Frank: Now it's choice . . .

Chapman: It's almost choice now.

Frank: Well, it is, the prices. Did you have a problem from the people in the neighborhood once you started the evening parades about parking around on 9th Street? That's the back part of the Barracks.

Chapman: No, we . . . of course, we got permission from the police department for those special parking arrangements on 8th and 9th and E Streets in parade times. It's basically the police that run the parking and run the traffic for us. No, there never were any complaints. Of course, the kind of people who lived there on that row of houses on 9th Street behind the Barracks at that time weren't . . . were not some of America's best citizens.

Frank: Oh really? Did you have much trouble . . .

Chapman: But during my time there it began to change because there was an Air Force colonel--I believe he was--who bought one of them and restored it and rented it. When he began getting income then he bought another one and restored it. He kept that up and I think he owns that whole block now, or did at one time.

Frank: Really?

Chapman: Maybe he sold some of them off in the interim.

Frank: It's a gold mine.

Chapman: But he's the one that--and I knew him at that time, he was a retired Air Force colonel. Well, he wasn't retired when he started, he was still on active duty. He did it by buying them one
by one for a dirt-cheap price, and then he'd put quite a lot of money into each one to restore it and modernize it, and then he'd rent it. So gradually, one by one, they were filled up with pretty high quality people.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: People that could afford the rents.

Frank: Those houses back in the row are close to $100,000.

Chapman: Each.

Frank: Each now.

Chapman: Yes, maybe more.

Frank: Yes, and of course the whole neighborhood . . .

Chapman: But he bought them for just a song.

Frank: Less than $20,000.

Chapman: Oh, much less than that I would think. I know I had an opportunity to buy the house, the row house, that's just two doors this side of the church, Christ Church, which is the birth place of John Philip Sousa!

Frank: Oh, it was?

Chapman: Yes indeed, and there's a brass plaque on it right now that says, "Birth place of John Philip Sousa." That's the second one this way on the same side of the street from the church, Christ Church. It was, of course, a shambles, absolute shambles, and the sale price was just a
few thousand dollars. I didn't have a few thousand dollars or I would have bought it. But then having bought it, you had to have a good many more thousand dollars . . .

Frank: To fix it up.

Chapman: . . . to fix it up. I just didn't have the money so I was unable to do it. I really wanted to but I couldn't. It was a financial impossibility for me.

Frank: It would have been a good investment.

Chapman: It would have been certainly . . .

Frank: Some of these places off on the side streets . . .

Chapman: . . . but if you invest you've got to have money . . .

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . and I didn't have any money, not that kind of money.

Frank: Well, how would you sum up the two years there at the Barracks? It was just about exactly two years. Were you selected for BG while you were at . . .

Chapman: Yes, I was. My last three or four weeks there . . .

Frank: That's right because . . .

Chapman: . . . and my promotion ceremony was my last ceremony at 8th and I. The Barracks put on a parade and my two execs--the one exec for MCI and the one for the Barracks--they pinned my stars on, saluting battery fired 11 guns and we had a full parade/promotion ceremony.
Frank: Had you expected, anticipated, or hoped?

Chapman: No. You see I was below the zone . . .

Frank: Oh, you were picked . . .

Chapman: . . . so I had no idea. I was thinking about the next year when I would have been in the zone, the following year.

Frank: It save you worrying about next time.

Chapman: Yes, I never had any time to worry about it.

Frank: Well, sir, it's quarter of four.

Chapman: Yes, I've got to go Ben. I'm getting hoarse anyway.

Frank: Okay, fine and we'll continue on at your convenience.

Chapman: Alright. I'll be calling you here in . . .

Frank: Okay, thank you.
Frank: I don't remember whether I asked you this question or not, but does the CO of the Barracks get extra entertainment funds? Does he get any extra monies?

Chapman: No, he didn't then anyway.

Frank: You were out of pocket then, I imagine.

Chapman: Yes. Yes, it was expensive alright, entertainment, many extra uniforms, many trips at personal expense--local trips, not long ones.

Frank: But I was thinking the overflow, for instance when the Commandant . . . pardon me for a minute. ( Interruption in tape) The thing I was thinking about was the overflow, for instance if the CMC and ACMC are tied up and there's an overflow from the guests and so on, did you have to join in the entertainment?

Chapman: Yes, there was no expense involved in that though, as far as I can remember. Also, there's the point that during the afternoon parade time--and after we started the evening parades--the guest of honor was invited by me, those first . . . that first year and a half of the evening parades. After I left and was relieved then the invitation to and hosting of the guest of honor for the evening parade was done by the Commandant. But while I was there, and after we started the evening parades, I invited the reviewing officer and guest of honor. Consequently, we entertained, but we did it at the Center House using mess funds . . .

Frank: And stewards there.

Chapman: . . . and stewards there, yes. On occasion, the Commandant would host a garden party, reception and garden party. Then, of course, he would stand the . . . or his entertainment
fund would stand the expense. But it didn't become practically a weekly affair until after my time there.

Frank: How did you make out your guest list?

Chapman: Well, I invited Marine Corps general officers.

Frank: Oh, I see. They were general officers. You didn't start going to the . . . Capitol Hill or . . .

Chapman: No, or the Secretaries. As far as I can remember we didn't. No, I invited general officers and we just started at the top of the pecking order and worked down.

Frank: On this uniform business, I imagine you had to get several more sets of whites and another set of blues.

Chapman: And blues.

Frank: Several sets of blues?

Chapman: Two. I had to buy two additional to the one I had.

Frank: Two additional sets, that's a lot of blues.

Chapman: Well, yes. Of course we wore blues throughout the summer, throughout the parade season and it got pretty hot. Consequently you had to have more than one set.

Frank: Now, I know that the band has a light weight uniform, a light weight fabric for their uniforms.
Chapman: Yes. We experimented with that but we didn't . . . it was not adopted while we were there, while I was there.

Frank: I don't think they have it now, do they, for the Barracks personnel and the officers?

Chapman: Yes, I think they do, the new material but it's not special to 8th and I, I believe. We had the old serge, the old heavy wool serge which had been the standard for many years.

Frank: Was the blouse serge or gabardine?

Chapman: It was serge.

Frank: And the doeskin trousers.

Chapman: The gabardine came in later. Yes, the old doeskin trousers. It was a beautiful uniform . . .

Frank: Oh, yes.

Chapman: . . . but it was hot!

Frank: Yes, it was.

Chapman: It was hot!

Frank: Okay, we had the. . . .

Chapman: The only real help in that regard was that the CO of the Barracks had a part-time steward.

Frank: That helped out.
Chapman: Just one. That's not true anymore.

Frank: No.

Chapman: But it was true then. There was a part-time steward who was technically on the Center House staff, but actually worked at the Commanding Officer's quarters for eight hours a day.

Frank: I don't know and I went back to the end of the last interview which was last October, and I didn't . . . I should have, perhaps, listened to it all. I'm trying to recall if we discussed anything about the administration of the Barracks; how 8th and I differed. Of course, it's obvious that, being the ceremonial post of the Marine Corps, it had to be spick and span.

Chapman: Yes. I think we did touch on this subject. 8th and I is unique in that it comes directly under the Commandant. All the other Marine Barracks come under the local Navy commander; the Navy Yard commander or whatever the installation is. The objective at 8th and I is perfection. I think we covered that the last time.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: 8th and I is also unique in that it's the one place in the Marine Corps where perfection is possible. It's rarely possible anywhere else, but it is possible at 8th and I; and with a diligent search and effort, perfection can and has been attained in all respects.

Frank: Did you have any special qualifications required for officers? They have to be a certain height and . . .

Chapman: Oh, yes, they were all hand selected. They had to meet the physical requirements as to height, appearance, soldierly bearing, and for those that would be involved in the parade, they had to have adequate vocal chords . . .
Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . which is pretty important too.

Frank: Be able to do that adjutant shuffle across the parade ground.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: Did the Commandant, Gen. Pate at this time, pay much personal attention to the administration of the Barracks? Or Mrs. Pate?

Chapman: Not an unusual amount I would say. I made the practice of calling on the Commandant once a month, and, in a 30-minute interview, inform him of what was going on at the Barracks, what we were doing, what we were accomplishing, and what our plans were for the future. He always appeared to appreciate that very much; but otherwise he didn't dabble or interfere in any way.

Frank: Did you call on him at his quarters or at . . .

Chapman: No, at his office.

Frank: . . . at his office; kept it strictly formal.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: When you got your star, you were given command of Force Troops, FMFLant down at Lejeune, with collateral commands of the 4th Marine Provisional Force and then you were CG, 16th MEB. Let's talk about FMFLant, what you had down there, what your mission was, what your tasks were.
Chapman: Force Troops, FMFLant?

Frank: Yes, sir.

Chapman: Force Troops then, it doesn't exist any more, but then, was composed of 20-odd--I believe it was 22 or 23--independent units ranging in size from company to the Force Service Regiment. I should say the Force Service Regiment was administratively under the base, but became part of . . . came under Force Troops operationally for Fleet Marine Force commitments. They were the various units, reinforcing and support, for the division/wing team. The tank battalion, the amtrac battalion, the Force Engineer battalion, the Force Motor Transport battalion, the Force Reconnaissance company--which during my time there, incidentally, was commanded by Capt P. X. Kelley, who has just been selected as the next Commandant of the Marine Corps. Force Recon Company is a parachute/scuba/submarine Force reconnaissance company. Let's see, there's a bridge company, a Force hospital company, a Force dental company, I can't even remember them all now, there were 22 or 23 of them.

Frank: Didn't you have a FAG?

Chapman: Yes, a field artillery group with the medium and heavy artillery.

Frank: Yes. In other words, you had a lot of odds and sods down there.

Chapman: Yes, but they were powerful combat-wise, very powerful; tanks, heavy artillery, medium artillery, and they were powerful in support . . . logistic support roles; the engineers, the amtracs, the Force Motor Transport battalion--which was a five-ton truck battalion.

Frank: Did you have them all at Lejeune?

Chapman: They were all at Lejeune. Some were mainside, some were over at. . . . What is that Ben, you know, where the air station is?
Frank: Oh, at New River.


Frank: I'm trying to think where the amtracs used to be on . . .

Chapman: They were down at Courthouse Bay.

Frank: Courthouse Bay, right. And you had some outfits over at Montford Point.

Chapman: One other outfit that comes to mind is the ANGLICO.

Frank: Oh, yes.

Chapman: The ANGLICO was one of the Force Troops . . .

Frank: Was that a Force Troop . . .

Chapman: That was a Force Troop unit, yes.

Frank: This is your . . . '71 that you're returning?

Chapman: That's the . . .

Frank: Chapter.

Chapman: That's the Vietnam War . . .

Frank: Right.

Chapman: . . . '68 to '70, I believe?
Frank: Yes, sir. No, I don't think it's '68 to '70.

Chapman: Well, '69 to '71 then.

Frank: Right, I think it may be that. We had Gen. Westmoreland in Monday. He came and spent a couple of hours with us.

Chapman: On this?

Frank: Interesting.

Chapman: What was his reaction to it, generally?

Frank: Favorable, he was favorable. There were some things he wanted to get cleared up, clarified. . . . You were saying that you think the writers ought to pay closer attention to what you said in your interview about your. . . .

Chapman: I think it was two years ago. Remember I came down and did a special interview on. . . .

Frank: Yes, sir. We did two sessions.

Chapman: Two sessions, yes, on close air support, on single management. . . .

Frank: Single management, right.

Chapman: It was on the . . . among the other subjects was ALMAR 65, which I thought was covered rather well in there.

Frank: Yes, on the. . . .
Chapman: The third subject was why we didn't use the mount-out when we first entered Vietnam, and there was another subject or two.

Frank: I'm looking over . . . I have the questions here. We talked about the Harrier, we talked about SLF, single management, and we quoted what Gen. Westmoreland said about, "Also disturbing is the failure of the Marines to provide tactical air support for the 1st Cavalry Division." He's wrong here, he corrected himself Monday, by saying that it was the 101st Airborne.

Chapman: Yes, it was the Airborne.

Frank: Right. Someone had to be in charge, and so on, and we asked you. . . . He made this gratuitous statement, "Perhaps Gen. Cushman would have accepted the decision graciously had it not been for the close supervision the Marine Corps Headquarters, in Washington," and I guess, by inference, FMFPac . . .


Frank: . . ." . . . exercised over . . ." and he commented on that too.

Chapman: Yes, Gen. Krulak went through the roof on the thing, which he had a right to do, should have done, and did.

Frank: We asked you, "Do you recall the Headquarters Marine Corps reaction in response to the establishment was to the single management program?" and you talked about that. We asked about your impressions of the entire controversy over control of Marine Corps air in Vietnam. You talked about that and how valid was Westmoreland's statement about close supervision. So we asked a number of questions here about it and you responded to that. But you suggest that they . . . that the writers look back to what you said at that time.
Chapman: Yes, that is my suggestion . . .

Frank: Okay, fine.

Chapman: . . . and similarly, that after they do whatever re-writing they're going to do as a result of that and of talking to Gen. Westmoreland, let me have another shot at it.

Frank: Okay, alright, very good.

Chapman: It was an important issue, and that's really why I'd like to have another crack at it, because of the precedent that it set.

Frank: Alright fine, and we can schedule a special session when we get the writers around and talk about it. We'll go back to this matter.

Chapman: But I think, on the whole, that that's really quite good. I really couldn't comment on the details of the many actions, you know. I just don't have that much remaining knowledge, but they certainly read well.

Frank: Did you . . . were you able to keep up--and we're jumping ahead to your tour as Commandant--but speaking about this period, since you are discussing it . . . The division commander in the morning gets a briefing of what goes on down to the closest . . . to the fire team level. Were you, as Commandant, keeping an eye on this to this fine a degree of what was going there?

Chapman: No, not at all. In a larger sense, yes.

Frank: The major battles.

Chapman: The major actions, the major operations and campaigns. Oh yes, every day I got a operational briefing in the Command Center covering the current situation.
Frank: I guess we talked about Khe Sanh at that time, too. We may have, I don't know.

Chapman: I don't think so. I don't remember it, anyhow.

Frank: Was it a concern at the time you were Commandant, Khe Sanh?

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: That's right!

Chapman: In fact, one of my boys was a platoon leader at Khe Sanh.

Frank: Well, we'll have to talk about Khe Sanh.

Chapman: When we get to it.

Frank: When we get to it, yes. I think that we'll have to schedule that session . . . another session on Vietnam. I'll make a note about Khe Sanh.

Now in October '58 to October '60 you commanded the . . . as a . . . You were second-hatted as CG of the 4th Marine Provisional Force. Now that was about the time of Lebanon, wasn't it? Did that have anything to do with Lebanon?

Chapman: No, Lebanon had occurred just before that.

Frank: Just before?

Chapman: Just before, and Sid Wade, who was my predecessor at Force Troops, was the Marine commander for the Lebanon operation. It was just completed and he had just returned shortly after I arrived.
Frank: That's right. He was a brigadier general and he did have Force Troops then.

Chapman: He was CG of Force Troops.

Frank: What was the purpose and the mission of the 4th Marine Provisional Force?

Chapman: It was an expeditionary force, a extemporaneous headquarters that was pulled together to take charge of various operations.

Frank: Task unit.

Chapman: Operationally--for operations--and for training. We conducted, actually, only one--I think it was only one--and that was a training maneuver exercise in the Mediterranean.

Frank: Oh, you did go over to the Med?

Chapman: Yes, one time. Then I made two or three other trips over there for planning. When I first arrived there was an expedition planned and the brigade headquarters was formed by people ordered to it temporarily, as those headquarters are formed. The objective of that one. . . . That's too big a strain on my memory. I can't even. . . .

Frank: You can't remember that.

Chapman: I can't remember just where it was. It might have been Cuba. But it disappeared, never materialized. The brigade headquarters was formed and we did do the planning and made all preparations, but it was never executed.

Frank: Now, the SLF, or the float force of the Sixth Fleet which came out of 2d Division, you would task certain of your units to join it.

Chapman: Oh, yes, tanks, amtracs . . .
Frank: They were sections or platoons.

Chapman: . . . section of the ANGLICO, sometimes a platoon of heavy motor transport, and a detachment from the Force Service . . .

Frank: Now was the 16th MEB actually a. . . . Looking at the dates I would assume that the renaming of the 4th Provisional. . . .

Chapman: Yes, yes it was.

Frank: In other words, when it went into MEB, MAB, MAF format, this is what it was renamed.

Chapman: Yes, correct. The 4th MAB disappeared and the 16th MEB was activated for training and for operations on occasion. But, as is true of all those brigades, it was a temporary, staffed by individuals ordered in from various units.

Frank: Were things quite busy at Lejeune in these days?

Chapman: Well, yes, quite busy; not only the deployments to the Med, various brigade, regimental, division, wing-sized exercises, the annual major division/wing landing exercise--usually held at Lejeune--and of course heavy training. Training was the big responsibility of Force Troops, to train the units and get them in a state of full combat readiness for operations. That's what we worked on and we worked very hard at it. I think we did well at it. With a heterogeneous, disparate collection of units, it was a very interesting assignment.

Frank: Who was your chief of staff?

Chapman: Parker Colmer . . .

Frank: Oh, yes.
Chapman: . . . during almost my whole time there and he was good. He was very good.

Frank: Yes, I remember him. He used . . . he had the ANGLICO in FMFPac during Korea up there.

Chapman: He was very, very good.

Frank: I think he was an artilleryman too.

Chapman: Yes, base defense, anti-aircraft, heavy artillery type. We worked on many things. I thought that the condition and the state of readiness of the units when I first arrived was not all that it could be; certainly the appearance was not, military deportment and the like. So we worked on that, we worked on combat readiness, we did a number of things. Those that immediately come to mind are such things as surprise mount-out exercises, various types of field exercises. We conducted night exercises in which we required the unit to operate totally without illumination at night. We just turned night into day for three or four days at a time, one unit at a time. We required them to operate all night without any illumination and then to hide and camouflage and sleep all day; turning night into day; very interesting exercise, very successful. We conducted cold weather exercises and we were usually lucky enough to have really cold weather, often times snow, during our scheduled cold weather exercises.

The surprise mount-out exercises consisted of just that; without any warning, ordering a unit--one of the units--to mount out. We marked out a couple of LST shapes on one of the landing pads up at . . . what's that airfield just . . . that temporary airfield just south of Cherry Point that the wing uses up there? I can't remember the name of it, but there's some hard stand. We gave the unit 8, 10, 12 hours to deploy there, load their LSTs that were marked out on the pavement, and stand by for inspection. We formed, then, inspection teams that inspected the totality of the mount out; the loading of the ships, the embarkation rosters, the supplies and equipment under the heading of administration if they had completed everything with regard to last wills and testaments, taken care of the dependents, what they'd done about the dependents, forwarding mail addresses. We prepared a lengthy inspection check off list in every department, and we inspected them in detail as to their total mount out, combat readiness. Very successful.
Frank: They're doing that today, as a matter of fact, with the dependents, with the MAUs. They have a briefing. Now, at this time, as I recall, I was down there at this time chasing reservists. The 8th Marines, or one of the infantry regiments at 2d Division, had to provide an alert unit--stand-by alert unit--to be ready to leave within a matter of time. They had the trucks out in front of the barracks and everything and the people all ready to go within a matter of minutes if not hours--or hours if not minutes--to go to Cherry Point. Did you provide units, reinforcing units, for that?

Chapman: Yes, the appropriate ones. In those days the division did not have any tanks or amtracs or medium and heavy artillery. That was all in Force Troops. The division didn't have an ANGLICO, organically.

Some of the other things we inspected on the mount out exercises--remember now this was a surprise, they only got eight or ten hours warning--was the condition they'd left the barracks in; whether the barracks were clean and neat and ready for inspection, whether all the gear that they'd left behind was properly secured, what they'd done about a rear guard, a rear echelon. We worked on that sort of thing. We conducted a good many Force Troops field exercises in which we postulated the division and wing units and a combat scenario that we were supporting. We took Force Troops into the field on many occasions.

Frank: Was there a NATO commitment on the part of FMFLant, 2d Division, Force Troops, at this time.

Chapman: Yes, a reinforcing commitment to Europe. It included the possibility of landings along the littorals of the Mediterranean and a landing in Norway.

Frank: So you had it this early? You didn't have, of course, at this period of time, you didn't have the commitments to Vietnam so it wasn't. . . .

Chapman: That's true.
Frank: It wasn't as bad as it was later, when Gen. Bowser had FMFLant and so on. You spent about three years--just about three years--down there and you got your second star I would take it. Or did you go up to . . .

Chapman: No, I was selected . . .

Frank: You were selected and you went . . .

Chapman: . . . in the summer of '61.

Frank: Okay, and I recall seeing you, as a matter of fact, on the . . . just after you came aboard Headquarters.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: Of course, I'd seen you down at Camp. . . . I recall, down at Lejeune, I recall that your reputation had preceded you as having these people sharp with starched dungarees. As a matter of fact, I think. . . . Did you sew the crease in your dungaree trousers or was it just starched?

Chapman: No, it was just starched. Yes, we put quite an effort into the appearance and military bearing and deportment of all the Marines in Force Troops. I think we had quite a lot of success at it. They really were a sharp outfit.

Frank: Yes, I'd heard that, and of course I saw it.

Chapman: They really were a sharp outfit, both in garrison and in the field. I remember one time we deployed on a Force Troops training exercise. All the units went into the field on a combat exercise, combat training exercise. We'd invited the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Gen . . . you know, that just died.

Frank: Oh, Joe Burger.
Chapman: No, he was then the commanding general of the 2d Division. Pollock, Al Pollock.

Frank: Oh, Al Pollock, that's right.

Chapman: . . . down to spend the day and inspect the units. We took him to every one of the units and he was. . . . We were in the field, looking sharp, fully camouflaged, completely dug in, and each unit doing its thing. At the end of the day, he turned to me and said, "This is the best day I've ever spent in the Marine Corps!" which I thought was really quite a compliment.

Frank: Yes, it certainly was.

Chapman: It was a very sharp outfit, in all respects.

Frank: Now, when you were assigned as the G-4 was this a bit of a surprise? You really hadn't had that much logistics in your background had you?

Chapman: That's true, I really hadn't had any! But I'd learned a lot. I'd learned a lot at Force Troops in the logistic side of the house. We put a lot of effort, in Force Troops, into things like mount-out supplies, keeping them separate from the daily operating supplies, holding them sacred, insuring they were. . . .

Frank: We had the STORM system then.

Chapman: Yes, but STORM covered the second and third months of the commitment. The unit was responsible for its first . . . whatever, I don't remember . . . two weeks or so of supplies after commitment to combat. Those supplies, which were organic to the unit, were called the mount-out supplies. It's worth noting that they were organic to the unit. They were not in the Force Service. . . .

Frank: I see.
Chapman: We put a lot of effort on that. I held each battalion and company commander personally responsible for the computation, and amassing, and protection of his mount-out supplies; both spare parts, ammunition, replacements, the whole ball of wax. We inspected them regularly.

Frank: Went into the cases and crates and everything?

Chapman: Yes, all packed and ready to mount out, and held completely separate from the daily operating supplies.

Frank: Well, the things that had to be rotated for fear of growing stale or out of date and so on.

Chapman: Yes, that had to be taken care of too.

Frank: That's quite an effort, and quite a responsibility too, I'm sure, to ensure that you have your full mount-out.

Chapman: Yes. Well, you're not combat ready if you don't. Of course the system has changed now, I understand. The units, the individual units are no longer responsible.

Frank: That CLOUD system, was that much of an effort to keep that up to snuff?

Chapman: That wasn't Force Troops' responsibility.

Frank: That wasn't?

Chapman: CLOUD was, and I presume still is, the responsibility of the Marine supply and Navy supply for certain things.

Frank: I thought the blocks were held down at Lejeune.
Chapman: No, I don't think so.

Frank: STORM and CLOUD or...

Chapman: Some elements may have been, but the basic responsibility was with Albany and, for aviation supply, with the Navy supply system.

Frank: What was the situation up at Headquarters when you arrived up there? What did you find facing you as the 4?

Chapman: Well, the Marine Corps G-4--Headquarters was then on a general staff organization--the G-4, as you would guess, was responsible for planning, programming, and the supervision of the execution of all the Marine Corps logistic and supply matters. It involved just what you'd expect. One of the most important things was the preparation, submission, and defense before the various Navy, and Defense, and OMB agencies, and the Congress of the O&M budget and the procurement budget. They were both sponsored by G-4. So when I first arrived that was the first thing, almost the first thing I had to do was understand the O&M and procurement budgets, which had already been submitted, so that I could testify before the Congressional Appropriation Committees in support of them; which I succeeded in doing, I'm happy to say and we did get the money we'd asked for.

Well, there are just really too many things to remember: the O&M and procurement budgets. The procurement program was a big operation in itself. Procurement means all the Marine Corps vehicles, ammunition, spare parts, military construction; big subject.

Frank: Were you able to get... Of course you testified on that and it was the function of the Fiscal Director I would assume, or the Commandant, to get the budget approved, but I imagine you had a lot of close questions whenever you went up on the Hill concerning about specific MilCon and...

Chapman: Well, the principal witness was the G-4.
Frank: Oh, for all of that?

Chapman: Yes, for O&M, procurement, and military construction. The Fiscal Director, of course, sat right at the left hand of the chief witness in all the appropriation hearings. He was the technical expert. It was Jim Wright, and he was extremely good, extremely good.

Well, one of the first things that comes to mind was the Marine Corps general order we prepared, shortly after my arrival, on the subject of mount-out . . .

Frank: Tell me about that please.

Chapman: . . . embodying the principles that I had instituted at Force Troops, and requiring those principles to be executed throughout the Fleet Marine Forces. We've already discussed what the principles were.

Frank: Sure. Did you do much. . . . Was it your function to go out and inspect the units to ensure that they were complying with the order? That was the IG's function?

Chapman: That was the IG's function. Of course the Commandant, then Gen. Shoup, also made many trips.

Frank: Of course, he was very conscious of this area.

Chapman: Yes. One of the things that occurred shortly after I arrived was that the Commandant, Gen. Shoup, made an inspection trip to WestPac; FMFPac and WestPac. I was a member of his party. We went to Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and while we were on Okinawa I did inspect the mount-out of the 3d Marine Division. The truth is that they didn't have any, or only very partially, in the units and in the Force Service Regiment. So I made a written report to that effect to the Commandant, which caused him to get pretty excited, and he formed an investigation led by. . . . As I remember it now he required FMFPac to. . . .
Frank: Gen. Shapley.

Chapman: Yes, perhaps it was . . . headed it up. The result of that investigation was it confirmed what I'd reported. It was fortunate in this respect, that just at that time the GAO conducted an investigation of the logistic readiness of the 3d Marine Division. Because of the report that I had made, we were two or three jumps ahead of the GAO . . .

Frank: I remember that, yes.

Chapman: . . . which was really quite fortunate. In short, the Marine Corps had discovered the difficulties and was in the process of correcting them, rather than the GAO discovering them and, in effect, putting the Marine Corps on report. So there was that fortunate aspect to it, although it was pretty unfortunate for those on the scene who were responsible.

Frank: That's the point. I think Gen. Weller may have had the division.

Chapman: He did, he was the CG, and Gen. Cushman was the assistant division commander.

Frank: And . . .

Chapman: But it's a long and complicated story. It wasn't their fault, directly.

Frank: No, they said it went back . . .

Chapman: The basic fault was the lack of funding, and the lack of funding occurred because in the previous two years Gen. Shoup had cut the O&M budget.

Frank: That was part of it and also it went back to the item when he had had the division. Apparently it dated from that era.
Chapman: Yes, and he had reduced the funding of the division, then and later when he was Commandant. That was the basic problem. Although you would have to say in all honesty, that the division was really not aware of their shortages.

Frank: He was . . . a lot of hurt feelings. I know Gen. Weller felt the wrath of God.

Chapman: Yes, I fear that that's true.

Frank: Gen. Cushman did too, I believe.

Chapman: Well, not so much because he was . . . he'd only been there a short while. Of course, he was the assistant division commander, he didn't have any direct responsibility.

Frank: Now you held . . . you were. . . . How did. . . . At this point we're in the pre-Vietnam period. Okay, the . . . bringing the 3d Division up to snuff with the mount-out supplies. . . . I think there was some on-the-job training of Marine officers in Vietnam at this time, and also . . .

Chapman: Yes, I believe that's true. I don't remember any of the details.

Frank: . . . and also in Malaysia with the counter-insurgency, British counter-insurgency there.

Chapman: Yes, that's also true.

Frank: The real build up didn't come until after you became Chief of Staff, I guess, when Gen. Greene . . .


Frank: . . . became Commandant, right.
Chapman: Yes, we sort of dipped our toe in the water up to that point. But, you see, the first Marines actually landed in Vietnam in the spring of ’65.

Frank: March of ’65.

Chapman: Yes, March of ’65. Let's see, Gen. Greene became Commandant in ’64.

Frank: January ’64.

Chapman: January ’64.

Frank: Which is when you became Chief of Staff. With respect to the period of time as G-4, what were some of the new things the Marine Corps was getting in the way of equipment, of ordinance, and other supplies? Communications gear, etc.

Chapman: There was a lot of new equipment. The Marine Corps, and all the services, had been on pretty short rations for a number of years. You'll remember that when Kennedy came in, President Kennedy came in, he did so on the wave of a lot of complaints during the campaign about the short shrift that the services--remember the missile gap for example, and that was just one aspect... . .

Frank: So-called missile gap.

Chapman: So-called missile gap, of the difficulties and the shortages. So that when President Kennedy came in, one of the first things he did was to greatly increase the military budgets. The Marine Corps went from 178 million dollars, I think the figure was, up to 190 or thereabouts. We filled in the various cadre units, we fleshed out all the units that were at 80 percent or so of T/O strength, and we got a good deal of money to buy a whole lot of new equipment, so much of it that I really can't remember particular pieces. There were tanks, artillery, lots of communications, radars, electronic equipment of all types, engineering equipment. You'd have to go back into the procurement budgets and make a list, if you wished, of the many, many items
of equipment. They were all contained in the procurement budgets that we compiled while I was there and defended before the Congress and was successful in getting.

By the time the Marines were committed to Vietnam, we had substantially re-equipped the Fleet Marine Forces with new and modern equipment. We had, as I previously stated, dramatically improved the mount out readiness, the logistic mount out readiness, of all the Fleet Marine Force units. I thought we were in about as high a state of readiness as you could get in peacetime at the time we entered the Vietnam War.

Frank: What about your relationships with the Kennedy Pentagon, the people over there? Were they difficult?

Chapman: Well, now you're talking about McNamara, Enthoven, the Whiz Kids, systems analysis . . .

Frank: Yes, exactly.

Chapman: . . . and all of that.

Frank: You had to be involved with that.

Chapman: Yes, I was deeply involved in it. When I became Chief of Staff, of course, I was in it up to my scuppers. I thought, on the whole, the Marine Corps did much better in that arena than anybody else. For one thing, under Gen Greene's aegis as Chief of Staff, the Marine Corps alone had prepared a plan, a long-range plan. The Marine Corps had a 20-year plan, the only one in existence. That was a great help. We had already begun something like systems analysis, and we had some people that were knowledgeable in it. So that when it came to meeting the requirements that were laid on us by the systems analysis system, we did rather well. We really did rather well. Enthoven often remarked on it and said many times, in effect, that he wished that he could get the others to operate like the Marine Corps did in meeting his requirements. That doesn't mean we didn't have a lot of trouble.
The basic trouble was that you don't always have all the facts. The systems analysis system, to work, has to analyze the facts... 

End Tape 1/VIII, Side A
Chapman: . . . and by facts I mean detailed, statistical type data, which the military services, up to that point in most cases, just didn't have.

Frank: The Marine Corps was pretty far behind the curve though, compared to the other services, with respect to computers; getting these facts. I recall we set up a computer division under . . . let's see, it was Henry Smart to begin with and then Sam Jaskilka took it over.

Chapman: Yes, I wouldn't agree we were behind though. I'd say we were leading the field.

Frank: Oh really, compared to the other services?

Chapman: Yes. Well, I'm not so sure about the actual installation and use of computers, but--now we're getting into the time when I was Chief of Staff--we designed and implemented the first totally integrated master computer system for the entire Corps. It was called IIS.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: IIS, meaning Integrated Information System. It was a master cap system with subordinate systems; a pay system, a personnel system, a logistic system, a combat related system for intelligence and the like, a Reserve system; all integrated, all using a common language and all using the same type of computer, the IBM 360. So that the Marine Corps alone, of all the services and in fact of the whole government, had a single computer, single type computer using the same language and operating in a master system with subordinate elements.

Frank: Marine Corps-wide.

Chapman: Marine Corps-wide, including the Reserve. That system was designed under my aegis as Chief of Staff. As a matter of fact we started on it when I was G-4, and then we proceeded over the next three or four years to actually implement it.

Frank: The MCPPRS system was part of this too, wasn't it?
Chapman: Not part of the computer base system.

Frank: But it provided input.

Chapman: MCPPRS was a management system for controlling and checking on the progress of many. . . . Again that was instituted when I was Chief of Staff.

Frank: Marine Corps. . . .

Chapman: MCPPRS meaning Marine Corps Program Progress Reporting System.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: It encompassed several important things the Marine Corps was doing, and included a monthly briefing on each subject for the Chief of Staff and the Commandant. The briefing required three things; history, including the proposed plan up to the present; the actual status of the implementation of the plan, where were they with respect to the goal; and then the proposal for the future, where they expected to get in the next period of time. It was an excellent system and it held the managers right to the mark.

Frank: Yes, I remember hearing that you were quite stringent on that.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: It was a sophisticated how-goes-it.

Chapman: Yes, it was. It was a sophisticated how-goes-it and how-will-go-it. Remember it had the three elements; the past, the present, and the future.
Frank: With charts and everything. We have. . . . As a matter, an aside for historians who'll be using this tape, you might make note that we have, in our collection, all the reports.

Chapman: The MCPPRS reports?

Frank: Yes, sir.

Chapman: I don't know whether it's still being used or to what extent it's still being used, but it was a very important and efficient system. It covered all the Marine Corps major programs.

Frank: Well, it's important. . . .

Chapman: Everything we were doing, and, in turn, the G-1, the G-2, the G-3, the G-4, the Quartermaster General, the Director of Personnel, had to get up on the podium and, using his charts, describe what he'd done, where he was in the present with respect to his plan, and where he intended to go during the next period of time; usually a month, but the projection would cover a year and would set forth the goals for the ensuing year.

Frank: Well, the thing that's important about it is that, in as much as this time we were involved in Vietnam, it's a good measure of how and in what manner Headquarters Marine Corps was supporting the Marine Corps effort in Vietnam.

Chapman: It's a management tool, that's what it was, a management tool. It enabled the manager, the big manager of course was the Commandant, to see how his subordinate managers (namely his principal staff officers) were doing and, through that process, how the Marine Corps was doing.

Frank: I was just thinking as I looked here, I was going to ask you a question, how this compared to previous Marine Corps operations of this nature. But this was your very first tour at Headquarters Marine Corps!
Chapman: No, I was there right after World War II.

Frank: I'm sorry, that's right. You were in Pots and Pans.

Chapman: I was exec of the G-3 division of Plans and Policies.

Frank: That's right. Well, how would you compare...

Chapman: So it was my second tour, that's true.

Frank: Second tour.

Chapman: However, it was a pretty long one. I was there from...

Frank: Twelve years.

Chapman: ... 1961 to 1972.

Frank: Right, to the end of '71. It was 12-year tour there.

Chapman: Approximately.

Frank: How did... Okay, you were at Headquarters right after the war and that was a three-year, nearly a four-year tour.

Chapman: It was three years, summer of '46 to summer of...

Frank: May of...

Chapman: ... '49.
Frank: . . . '49, '46, '47, '48, just about. . . .

Chapman: '47, '48, '49, it was three years approximately.

Frank: Approximately. Of course, operations were considerably different from the time that you went up as 4 than it was. . . . The whole staff system. . . .

Chapman: It was a far different Marine Corps.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: Much bigger, and certainly more capable. Much, much bigger, we were down to--I think we went over this previously when we were talking about that period of time.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: The Marine Corps, at that time, was projected in the fiscal '50 budget to go to 58,000.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: 58,000 total. Well, in the time I was G-4 and Chief of Staff, before the Vietnam War, we were 190,000 approximately. I don't remember the exact figure but it was somewhere around. . . .

Frank: I think that's close to it. Entirely different management principals, management.

Chapman: Much bigger, more complicated, a lot more money to manage; a whole lot more money.
Frank: What were the other changes would you say? How else did the Marine Corps differ between those two periods? Being up at Headquarters, you have a fuller view than you would have if you were down, for instance, at a command.

Chapman: Not only much bigger, more powerful, many more commitments. Fleet Marine Forces were integrated into the war plans of the CinCs, the first of which to be executed, of course, was Vietnam.

Frank: Personnel, how would you compare them?

Chapman: About the same, pretty high quality, rather high quality. Recruiting was good in both of those periods. The Marine Corps was very selective. The quality of the Marines was excellent. I'd have to say that combat readiness was ever so much better...

Frank: Pardon me.

[Interruption in recording]

Chapman: The lack of combat readiness back in 1950 was not the Marine Corps' fault. The Marine Corps was on a starvation diet and was very small.

Frank: 58,000 for fiscal '51.


Frank: Of course with the Korean War on, that all went out the window.

Chapman: It started that summer, the Korean War did.

Frank: In June, I believe.
Chapman: June of ’50.

Frank: 23d.

Chapman: Yes, June of ’50, and of course that changed all that.

Frank: Well now, were we involved. . . . I think at this time the Pentagon, the administration, was planning on a two and a half war strategy. Were we involved with that?

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: We had to be, of course.

Chapman: We participated in it, both in the administrative chain and in the, Joint Chiefs, the operational chain, yes, of course. That was the objective, was to be ready to fight two and a half wars; that is a major war in the Pacific and Asia, one in the Atlantic or Europe, and then a small war somewhere else like Latin America. Of course we never achieved that objective. . .

Frank: The country as a whole never achieved that.

Chapman: . . . but that was the planning guidance. I meant to remark (I didn't get to it) on Enthoven, that the Marine Corps really became, when I was Chief of Staff, the only friend Enthoven had. Everybody else hated him [laughter] with a passion! But the Marine Corps didn't. We really did fine with Enthoven, and we benefited from our good relations with him.

Frank: Gen Chaisson told me the time that indicated that these people, like Enthoven, were so ignorant of unit structure and the formations, that he brought them over one Saturday and just had flash cards like, "This is a battalion. A battalion is composed of," so many companies and each company is composed. . . . Do you recall that?
Chapman: Oh, yes, very well. We were the only one that did that. Yes, I was remarking on the necessity for the facts, the detail facts. An example of that would be in the personnel field. The systems analysts would do a study on, let's say, what the rank structure of the Marine Corps should be as a basis for the budget. Well, the Marine Corps simply couldn't provide--didn't have--current information on how many Marines there were in the Marine Corps . . .

Frank: Right.

Chapman: . . . and in what ranks. I can remember asking many times, when I was Chief of Staff, "How many Marines are there in the Marine Corps?" Nobody knew! We knew as of three or four months previous, but there was no way of knowing how many there were today. If you couldn't provide current facts, there wasn't anything for systems analysis to study. That's what systems analysis does, is analyze the facts and draw conclusions from them. That's just one example. There would be many, many more examples. That was the basic problem. Since systems analysis was new, there had never been any requirement in the past for up to date detailed information on all the many subjects and therefore, the facts just, in many cases, didn't exist.

We set about getting the facts and the MCPPRS system was a part of that effort. In time, we had the facts and, with those facts, we were really quite successful with systems analysis.

Frank: But it was a very. . . . The criticism, as I recall, was that systems analysis--and, in fact the Whiz Kids and the people that were in DOD at that time, the administration people--it was quite impersonal. They didn't have the.

Chapman: They were analysts. That's what I say.

Frank: . . . didn't have a feeling for the personal side of it, the people side.

Chapman: No, they didn't have much feeling for the organizational and the combat side of it, or the human side of it.
Frank: Yes, well that's it.

Chapman: Well, that's the point I've been trying to make, that they were a dispassionate, cold, calculating, analyzers of detail facts. That was their mission in life and that's what they did. When the facts were defective, they came out with defective conclusions. [Laughter] That, of course is what... It also ought to be pointed out that their analysis and their recommendations could concern only things that could be quantified.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: That was the big and fatal flaw in the whole system. There are so many things that are not quantifiable but are of more importance than those that are quantifiable. Things like morale and readiness you can not quantify. I could name a host of other things that are not quantifiable. So that systems analysis, in short, studied only parts of the problems, only pieces of the problems. The unfortunate thing was that many of McNamara's recommendations were based on the systems analyst's analysis of the things that could be quantified and therefore were only a part of the problem. That was the real trouble with systems analysis.

Frank: I think that the personal side and a lot of the criticism I heard was based on the fact that they didn't have any blood or warmth over there.

Chapman: Well, they could be talked into it though. I can remember--I said that our relations with Enthoven were really quite good--one episode immediately comes to mind. There was a--I don't know that I remember all the details--but the question was whether or not we should be authorized to extend, involuntarily, the enlistments of a certain number of sergeants due to some exigencies in the war. That was an example. We couldn't produce up-to-date, detailed, quantified information as to how many sergeants we had and why was it we wanted to extend, so that the problem went to one of the systems analysts and, based on the facts we presented, he could not conclude that there was a shortage and therefore a need to involuntarily extend various enlistments. So I had a session with Enthoven, and I said, in effect, "Look, Alain. We haven't got the facts to prove it but I know it's true. I know it's true. My knowledge is based on intimate
knowledge of all the Marine Corps units and everything the Marine Corps' doing, and my certain knowledge that the Marine Corps is not wasting a single sergeant anywhere! Therefore, although I can't quantify it, and I can't prove it factually, I know it's true." He said--I was Commandant then--and he said, "Well, alright, if you know it's true, I'll agree with it and I'll support your recommendation." And he did. This makes the point.

Frank: Sure.

Chapman: It's only the things that can be quantified that systems analysis can deal with.

Frank: This problem came up with the pilot/seat ratio type thing, I think.

Chapman: Yes. There again, it's a question of quantification.

Frank: Was that when you were Chief of Staff or when you were Commandant?

Chapman: I think I was Chief of Staff although the problem hung around for a good many years.

Frank: Came on early on in Vietnam.

Chapman: Yes. There again, the problem was how many pilots did we have? [Laughter] We pretty quickly got a count, a roster of how many pilots we had and we solved that problem pretty quick.

Frank: I'm just trying to recall whether or not this was true or not or whether it was apocryphal, that at one deployment in Vietnam, as soon as the unit landed on the beach they stood them instead in ranks and counted how many people there actually were by. . . .

Chapman: Oh, that was an episode that occurred when I was--let's see, what was I--I was Chief of Staff, I think. It was along about, let me think now, it must have been about '67. It might have been '66. We had so much trouble trying to find out how many Marines there were in the
Marine Corps. Finally, I decided we would pick a date in the future— I think we picked Christmas Day or somewhere around Christmas in '66 or '67—and we ordered the whole Marine Corps to come to a halt on that day and count! How many Marines have you got? There were special rules about how to count those that were in transit and in hospitals and the pipeline and in training and in all the rest of the places where Marines disappear into and you lose them temporarily. So we did. We laid detailed plans and on that day the whole Marine Corps, including the Marines in Vietnam, came to a stop and we counted! Everybody turned their results in and we added them up and they were wrong.

Frank: Oh really? [laughter]

Chapman: Oh, they had to be wrong. They just couldn't be right. They were too low. I don't remember the figures but you can go back in the records and find out. It was something like we knew that the Marine Corps had about 300,000 Marines. Well, the count came out something like 250 or 60 or 70 or some such figure, well below what we knew we had. This is similar to the case I spoke about previously where I told Enthoven that I couldn't prove it but I knew it was true. There were just so many Marines that were lost in the system. They were in transit, they were either going to the hospital or coming out of the hospital, or they were off in some Navy unit or somewhere. We didn't know where they were. So even that great all Marine Corps count day, that didn't work either and when it was all over we still didn't know how many Marines there were in the Marine Corps. [Laughter]

Frank: The... did you find....

Chapman: We knew how many Marines there had been in the Marine Corps. Of course after two or three months, you can add up how many Marines there were in the Marine Corps at that time by using the pay records.

Frank: Unit diaries.

Chapman: Yes, but pay records is a better count.
Frank: It is?

Chapman: Yes, better than unit diaries because unit diaries don't contain the Marines that are in transit.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: . . . and in other ways lost out of the unit diary system. The only really accurate count is the pay record, because every Marine gets paid no matter what. After the pay records are compiled, after a lapse of three or four months, why then that's when you can find out how many Marines there were at that time in the Marine Corps.

Frank: Tell me, did you feel that the McNamara and his people were favorably inclined toward the Marine Corps, antagonistic toward the Marine Corps, or were they just plain antagonistic to all the armed services and suspicious of all the senior officers.

Chapman: I never had the feeling that McNamara was antagonistic. He was in opposition to the operational beliefs and concepts of the military services with regard to the war in Vietnam. He had grave difficulty in justifying, in his own mind, the many requirements the services laid on him for dollars, and units, and airplanes, and ships, and all the rest of it.

Frank: He had a pretty cold-blooded attitude toward it.

Chapman: Very cold-blooded. Of course, his major distinction, or lack of it, was his concept for winning the war in Vietnam, the gradualistic approach.

Frank: The gradual response.

Chapman: The gradual response, the slow tightening of the screws over a long period of time, as a means of coming up with a successful outcome. Of course that was in direct opposition to the
proposals of the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs proposed, right off the bat, an all-out war in the spring of '65. It was disapproved by McNamara and he ordered, with the President's approval, the gradualistic approach. Well, we all know the results of that.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: What else was I going to remark on? I've spoken about the computer . . . IIS, the computer-based system.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . which was the first and only, to this day, the only totally integrated, complete system covering all management areas and on a single computer, single type computer talking a common language. I'll have to say, I was the architect of that system.

Frank: Many bugs in the system initially?

Chapman: Oh yes, many, many difficulties, very complicated, very big, running very smoothly today, however.

Frank: I recall that Parris Island would make a count at the end of one day of certain supplies or clothing, and it would go into the computer, Albany would receive it and would replenish Parris Island on the basis of that inventory. Is this pretty basic?

Chapman: Well, that's part of the MUMMS part of the . . . M-U-M-M-S, the Marine Unified Material Management System, I think that's what the letters stand for.

Frank: JUMPS was the pay. . . .

Chapman: Was the pay system.
Frank: Right.

Chapman: The personnel system was . . . I forget the acronym. The personnel system covered both active, retired and Reserve in subordinate sub-systems. So did the pay system, the computer-based pay system. Well, enough of that. I was going to remark on another Marine Corps accomplishment during that period that I took considerable pride in and that was the design, development, and production of the LVTP-7 . . .

Frank: Oh, let's talk about that.

Chapman: . . . which was probably the first and only major contract that has ever been completed on time and at the contract cost, producing a first-class, capable vehicle.

Frank: Was that with FMC?

Chapman: FMC, right, the production was with FMC. The preproduction test models were also FMC. Well, I might just run over the history of it . . .

Frank: Please.

Chapman: . . . briefly because I think it's interesting and it sets a pattern that ought to be followed by others.

Frank: I wish you'd go into it a little more deeply because I think that we're going to get Vic Croizat to write a history of the LVT. This would certainly be an important aspect of it when he's researching.

Chapman: Well, I'll just hit the highlights of it. The need for a new LVT came up during the time I was G-4. The first step was to invite a design competition. We invited. . . . We wrote up a list of criteria, operational requirements, and we passed them out to eight or ten different establishments and asked each to submit a design proposal. They all did. In the contract we let
with them, the designs that they presented became Marine Corps property. Then we formed a board of experienced LVT people, and I think Vic was probably on it.

Frank: He must have been.

Chapman: The board selected, from these several designs that had been submitted, the best features of each and compiled them into a single test design, which we then went out on competitive bidding to build two or three test vehicles based on the single unified design. FMC got the contract and produced the test vehicle which we tested exhaustively, made many changes, came up with a production design embodying all the best features of several designs and the results of the test. Then we went out on competitive bid proposal to produce. As you might expect because of their experience, FMC won the competitive contract. It was a fixed-price contract with fixed production schedule.

As soon as the contract was signed, (I was then Chief of Staff and later Commandant) I issued a direct order that there would be no design changes during production without my personal approval. So that . . . and in fact there were none. As you probably well know, one of the big problems in Defense procurement is that they're continually making changes while the production line is going on. That's what causes, in most cases, the cost overruns.

Frank: Increase in cost.

Chapman: The cost overruns and the delays in the completion of the production. We didn't make any changes in the P-7 during the time the production line was running.

Frank: The design was that good?

Chapman: The design was that good and the prohibition against making any changes [laughter] helped too. Of course, there were various improvements thought of during the time that . . . but we simply compiled them into a list and, after the production run was complete then we went out on a competitive bid contract for modification kits to install, produce the modification. Those were the principles involved. The result, as I've already said, was that the P-7 was produced on
time and at cost and produced a really excellent vehicle that met all the Marine Corps requirements.

Frank: Do you recall what some of the unique qualities of the P-7... 

Chapman: Well, as compared to its predecessor, it would carry a lot more Marines, it was a lot faster in the water and on land, had some armor, much easier to maintain. It was a product improvement, a dramatic product improvement over its predecessor.

Frank: That's what we went to Vietnam with.

Chapman: We went to Vietnam with the P-7, and we still have the... I think there are still some P-7s in operation although the new one is coming in now.

Frank: Could the modifications be done by the unit itself?

Chapman: Um hm.

Frank: Didn't have to go back... 

Chapman: There weren't very many.

Frank: There weren't very many.

Chapman: No, and not very important. First-class vehicle. Well, what else do I remember of significance. Well, one thing was the institution of the oral history program.

Frank: That's right, when you were Chief of Staff.

Chapman: I don't know if I... You know the story, I don't know if it's ever been recorded, of how it all started.
Frank: Well, we have... I've got the whole package, as a matter of fact, that we went up to you with a presentation which you approved with very few changes.

Chapman: Yes, to institute the program.

Frank: Institute the program, yes sir.

Chapman: Yes, but to go back before that, the idea, the germ of...

Frank: Tex Rogers.

Chapman: ... it was a conversation I had one evening with Tex Rogers.

Frank: Why don't we put that on tape?

Chapman: Would that be of interest?

Frank: Yes, sir! I recall now.

Chapman: Well, my wife's cousin is Mrs. Renee Clark, Col Bill Clark's wife. They're long-time friends as well as relatives. They invited us to supper at their house one night when I was Chief of Staff before the Vietnam War started, I believe it was. Another cousin and guest was retired MajGen Tex Rogers of Marine Corps aviation fame. During the evening, Tex, who was quite a raconteur, told many stories--anecdotes really--about himself and his fighter squadron in France in World War I. As I sat there listening to him I thought, "That ought not to be lost. There ought to be way of capturing those interesting bits of history, of Marine Corps history."

So the next day I called somebody in, I don't remember...
Chapman: Was that who it was?

Frank: Probably, yes.

Chapman: ... and suggested to him that we ought to devise some means of. ... Well, I guess it was he or you came up with the idea of the oral, taped interview. Tape recorders hadn't been in existence very long at that point, I mean portable tape recorders.

Frank: Quality, yes.

Chapman: Quality tape recorders. So that was a technical development that really made it possible. Anyhow, I don't remember all the details, but the up shot was that we arranged (and I arranged with Tex) for you to go down and interview him. I remember you went down there with a tape recorder and two or three spools of tape, and old Tex talked for something like, what, three days or five days?

Frank: No, it was just one day. I should have gotten more. It was about four hours.

Chapman: Was it?

Frank: Four or five hours, right.

Chapman: But you went back again didn't you, with Tex?

Frank: No, we pretty well did it in that one day.

Chapman: Did you?

Frank: Yes.
Chapman: Well, I've forgotten. Anyhow that's the way it started and then you and others came up with the formal plan . . .

Frank: The plan which we presented to you . . .

Chapman: . . . which was approved and that's the way Marine Corps oral history began. It's been rolling full bore ever since.

Frank: We have on the shelves. . . .

Chapman: I just wish we'd have started sooner. There are people like Tommy Holcomb who we could have gotten . . .

Frank: Who was still alive then.

Chapman: . . . if we had started sooner.

Frank: The first one I was going to get on my first west coast trip was Holland Smith. He. . . . In fact we'd gone out with letters which you had signed soliciting his participation, and he, in fact, sent back a letter which I've kept which he typed himself, that said yes. Of course it was important to get him because through all the writing of the World War II operational histories, all the draft manuscripts (such as this one on Vietnam that you returned) went out to these participants. He never responded to any of his. Of course, taping him about his career would have been important. Unfortunately he was down in Harlingen that December '66, caught pneumonia and died in January '67.

Chapman: Well, in the taped interview of a live voice, you get more than the words and facts, you get some insight into character.

Frank: Personality, oh sure.
Chapman: Personality, yes. Just think, if we somehow could have started sooner, we could have gotten John A. Lejeune and a host of other . . .

Frank: Oh, sure.

Chapman: . . . famous Marines, so that we'd now have a record not only of what they said . . .

Frank: But how they sounded.

Chapman: . . . but of their voices and how they sounded.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: We didn't . . .

Frank: The ones we have . . .

Chapman: . . . but we did start when we did and it's a very successful program.

Frank: For instance, Big Foot Brown, to hear the humor in the man's voice was . . . and others.

To get back to your period as G-4, wasn't this the period that the Marine Corps was going through the throes of deciding which weapon system . . .

Chapman: Small arms?

Frank: . . . small arms weapon system was to be adopted?

Chapman: Yes, it began then. We were just in the process, or just finishing the process, of equipping the Fleet Marine Force, and in fact the whole Marine Corps, with the M-14 and the NATO round.
Frank: Right, 7.6. . . .

Chapman: .62. The whole object of that drill was to have, not a common weapon, but a common ammunition with the NATO forces.

Frank: And what was the problem with the M-14?

Chapman: Nothing really, it was a good weapon and the M-60 machine gun. They were good weapons. We finished equipping the Marine Corps--fully equipping the Marine Corps, I think including the Reserve--during my time as G-4.

Now, the M-16 controversy arose after we entered Vietnam. The great merit to the M-16 was its ability to fire automatic. It also had greater hitting power, believe it or not, than the M-14.

Frank: It's a 7.62 also.

Chapman: No, it's a .22 caliber.

Frank: Is the M-16 a .22 caliber?

Chapman: Yes, a .22 caliber.

Frank: I never realized that.

Chapman: It has a high velocity and when the .22 caliber projectile hits a man, it tumbles so that it tears out of his backside a huge hunk, and is very lethal; whereas the M-14, the 7.62 round, doesn't tumble. It makes a neat hole all the way through. So the M-16 is lethal, very lethal.

Frank: Yes!
Chapman: But more important, it can be fired automatic and held on the target, sort of like a Tommy gun. In Vietnam, when the Marines were caught in an ambush in the jungle the valuable thing is to be able to just spray the jungle with a high volume of fire in all directions. You don't know where the little bastards are, but you know they're hidden in there somewhere. If you can. . . . There isn't anything you can take aim on, but if you can just spray the jungle with a high volume of automatic small arms fire you are likely to be in pretty good shape. That was the value to the M-16.

Frank: Wasn't the study and development of the Stoner system on-going at this same time?

Chapman: Yes, it was. The Stoner system. . . . Its unique value was in its inter-changeability.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: It can be converted into a shoulder weapon and into a light machine gun, and into a heavy machine gun, by simply the addition or subtraction of some increments. That was the Stoner system. It used. . . . I don't remember exactly, but I think it used the 7.62 round. Yes, I'm sure it did. It used the standard NATO ammunition. The Marine Corps got pretty deeply into the Stoner and came very close to adopting it.

Frank: I think Gen Walt was very much for it.

Chapman: Very much so. Well it had that really valuable characteristic. You could arm your Marines with the rifle and then when you dug into a defensive position, a certain number of them could convert themselves into machine gunners so that you didn't have to have separate riflemen and separate machine gun units.

Frank: The adaptation of the M-14, I take it, was Army tested and Army. . . .

Chapman: The M-14 rifle and the M-60 machine gun?
Frank: Yes, sir.

Chapman: The Marine Corps tested it too, extensively; and adopted it in unison with the Army.

Frank: But we weren't in the same position as we were, for instance, say, earlier in World War II, where we had to take what the Army. . . . We had tried the Johnson, for instance, and found that it had certain qualities and could have been used by certain units in the Marine Corps, but. . . .

Chapman: Well, it just wasn't enough better . . .

Frank: Than the M-1.

Chapman: . . . or as good as the M-1. It wouldn't have made any sense to go to the Johnson at that time. It made plenty of sense to go to the M-14 and the M-60 in unison with the Army, for one reason because of our NATO commitment. The Marine Corps was committed to NATO just like the Army.

Frank: Was there any other weapons testing and development during the time that you were G-4, that the Marine Corps was seriously considering?

Chapman: Well, some that we adopted or kept were the heavy tank; we had the only heavy tanks in the world at that time. That was the M-103 I believe the number was, the 120mm gun tank. Let's see. I don't remember the details, Ben. I just repeat the generality that we pretty uniformly re-equipped the Marine Corps with new and modern equipment in that period just prior to Vietnam.

Frank: I think probably a basic. . . .

Chapman: That includes airplanes by the way, as well.
Frank: Were you deeply involved with that?

Chapman: Well, as Chief of Staff I was; G-4, no. Let's see. Well, we went to the F-4, the A-4, the A-6, and of course the helicopters. They were a whole story in themselves. We went from the HRS to the 46 and the 53, the Hueys. Then, when Gen Greene was Commandant, we went to the gunship, the armed Huey, at his personal direction.

Frank: He changed. . . . Initially he was opposed to arming it.

Chapman: Yes, but he made a trip to Vietnam--of course you should really talk to him about this. He made a trip to Vietnam and observed the Army's use of the gunship. He came back from that trip and issued an order, "We will immediately, as soon as we can, adopt a gunship and deploy it to Vietnam," and we did.

Frank: Wasn't one of the primary considerations in all the development of weapons and equipment helicopter lift ability? Weren't we looking forward, at that time, to an all. . . .

Chapman: Yes, and of course that's why we had pack howitzers and a number of other things up to that point. Then there was a dramatic change when we went to the 53 and the 46 because of their greatly increased capability as compared to the HRS and the other . . . the first generation helicopters.

Frank: All grey trucks.
Chapman: Yes, and with little or no logistic support; spare parts, maintenance, training of mechanics, and so forth. We made a major change when I was G-4; we persuaded the aviators to agree to it, and we talked the Navy into agreeing to it, and we simply abandoned all the Navy-furnished motor transport and substituted Marine Corps common trucks, light, medium, and heavy. That was accomplished before Vietnam started. We'd have had a nightmare in Vietnam with the aviation motor transport if it had still been the Navy-furnished stuff.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: But, fortunately, we didn't. We succeeded in making that major change, which is sort of surprising as you look back on it now. It made a dramatic improvement in the combat readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps aviation. It's kind of a humdrum, tiresome subject, you know, it nevertheless had that effect.

Frank: Was there... At this time... Well I think there was always a fight over the green dollars versus blue dollars, but didn't it start...

Chapman: Well, the motor transport was a part of the blue dollar problem, because the Navy would not fund adequately the motor transport that the wings needed.

Frank: I think under Gen Greene's Commandancy, and that's when you were Chief of Staff, that this fight became more heated over the gas supply and some other aspects of this blue versus green dollar business.

Chapman: Yes, and the technique of showing the dollars in the budget. Up to that time, the Marine Corps part of the Navy budget was simply incorporated, without identification, in the whole of the blue dollars. We succeeded in pulling out, still in the Navy budget but shown as a separate line, the dollars that were for the support of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps aviation. By that I'm talking about procurement of aircraft; the maintenance, support and operation of aircraft; and the like. By isolating and identifying the Marine Corps blue dollars we were able to
put up a big fuss and get adequate funding for the Marine wings; and also to get a picture of what the total cost of the Marine Corps was.

Frank: This is something the Navy wouldn't do?

Chapman: Well, they were against it, but we succeeded in getting it done.

Frank: Now, when you're talking about procurement of aircraft for the wings, for a long period of time the Marine Corps was forced to take cast-off Navy planes.

Chapman: Airplanes?

Frank: Yes, sir. Planes that the Navy...

Chapman: I guess so, Ben. I don't know that to be a fact. In my experience the Marine wings had the latest and best. I'm going all the way back to... well, shucks, going back to World War II at least.

Frank: Well, earlier on, I don't know that the Marine Corps had that much of an input in the development of aircraft for peculiarly Marine Corps use. As a matter of fact, the Corsair was originally envisioned as a carrier type aircraft.

Chapman: Oh, it was a carrier aircraft.

Frank: When it didn't prove out then the Navy gave it to the Marine Corps, initially because it was having problems.

Chapman: Well, you know that. I don't know that to be a fact. I do know to be a fact that the Corsair was one of the best, if not the best, close air support airplanes the Marine Corps ever had because it would carry an enormous bomb load, it would fly low and slow, the pilot had good
visibility because of the gull-wing shape, and as a close air support airplane I don't know if we've ever seen its equal.

Frank: Well, they had problems on board carriers. For instance, there was a so-called oleo strut that constantly broke on landing. Also the . . .

Chapman: I'm not aware of that.

Frank: . . . power of the engine caused a torque and the height of the pilot's seat and the long nose on the fuselage did not give him good vision on a carrier. This was one of the problems.

Chapman: Well, the Marine Corps was delighted to get it, I'm sure of that.

Frank: That's right, and made good use of it.

Chapman: It ought to be noted that in those days, and it's still is true, that the Marine Corps airplanes have to be common to the Navy as well.

Frank: For use aboard carriers.

Chapman: For use aboard carriers and because of spare parts and logistic support, and because of training, training of pilots and that kind of thing.

Frank: Did you have. . . . In G-4 did you have an aviation section directly under you?

Chapman: No, no we didn't.

Frank: That was under. . . .

Chapman: That was under the Division of Aviation.
Frank: Was that a problem?

Chapman: Not really, we had good relations. We constantly kept each other informed of what was going on.

Frank: Because, for instance, under the old staff system, I think before Gen Shepherd changed it in '52 or '53, and perhaps for a time afterwards, Division of Aviation was an empire unto itself as far as slating personnel.

Chapman: Yes, that's true. That changed when the general staff system was. . . . That part of it changed, and the detailing of aviators and the like was moved into the Personnel Department. I think Division of Aviation still had a hand in it, had some kind of review authority. Really this is a subject that you ought to talk to the aviators about. All up through my time there, the chief of the Division of Aviation, who had various titles--he was Assistant Commandant for Air, and then he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Air--he wore a second hat. He wore a Navy Op-05 hat.

Frank: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: Or assistant Deputy.

Chapman: Assistant. He was Op-52, I believe.

Frank: Something like that.

Chapman: 50-something, in 05, in Op-05.

Frank: Well, this created a lot of problems earlier on especially during the unification fight as I recall, this dual allegiance.
Chapman: Yes and no. That's a separate subject in itself, but, at bottom, that problem arose from the fact that the Navy people offered to trade the Marine Corps for the retention of naval aviation. Both the Marine Corps and naval aviation were on the firing line.

Frank: Oh, yes.

Chapman: And that was the root of that problem. But that's a whole subject in itself.

Frank: Yes, it is.

Chapman: Incidentally, I just read a National Defense University thesis that they sent me.

Frank: Right, by. . . .

Chapman: Some Marine colonel did his War College research paper on this subject.

Frank: Right. Well, he had done it. . . . His name escapes me.

Chapman: I just read it.

Frank: Gordon Keiser, Gordy Keiser.

Chapman: Yes, I just read it here two or three months ago.

Frank: He was Gen Anderson's aide down at FMFLant, but before that he had been assistant professor of naval science up at Tufts. He did his Masters on that, on the unification.

Chapman: I thought it was good.
Frank: It was excellent. It's an excellent study. He did . . . get some real great insights in there and he expanded it for his War College paper. He is now in Belgium on the staff there, I guess SHAPE headquarters, Belgium. But very set. So did you . . . you got a chance to read it.

Chapman: I read it, yes.

Frank: It's an exciting . . .

Chapman: It's good, it's well written, and I think it's historically accurate.

Frank: Oh yes it is, because he went to the players. He sent out questionnaires, went to Gen Twining and Don Hittle and people like that.

May I make a suggestion here and I'll just turn this off.

End Tape 2/VIII, Side A

End Session VIII
Chapman: Where are we, I've forgotten.

Frank: Well, we had. . . . We were discussing your tour as G-4 at Headquarters and we're now ready, unless you have something that comes to mind that we probably didn't cover--may not have covered at G-4.

Chapman: Well, we accomplished quite a number of important improving logistic projects for the Marine Corps during the time I was G-4. I won't take the time to try to remember them and catalog them all. I think we've touched on some of them; new equipment, new maintenance policies, new mount out supply policies, a whole array of new equipment, numerous important research and development projects that fell in the G-4 arena--materiel projects.

Frank: The Marine Corps was kind of late coming into the R&D area wasn't it, as far as . . . with relation . . . when compared to some of the other services?

Chapman: Well, yes. The other services conduct, generally conduct, research and development projects. The Marine Corps is a participant, but conducts very few on its own and that's still true. There's a lot of merit to that. We express. . . . The Marine Corps expresses its research and development requirements to the other services who then take the lead, usually, in a joint project.

Frank: That means we piggy-back but on the other hand, because of what our roles and missions are. . . .

Chapman: Some things that are Marine Corps-peculiar, like the LVT for example, is a Marine Corps. . . .

Frank: We initiate.
Chapman: . . . research. . . . Not only initiate but conduct it. Let's see, what was I thinking of of importance there?

Frank: I think we mentioned the fact that the LVTP. . . .

Chapman: We covered the P-7 . . .

Frank: P-7, the fact that it came in . . .

Chapman: . . . in some detail.

Frank: . . . came in on time and under cost.

Chapman: Yes, certainly did.

Frank: I think we also discussed the problems of logistics of the 3d Division which you got caught up with.

Chapman: Yes, I did, much to my dislike, but that's the way it was.

Frank: Did the situation which prevailed out at the 3d Division. . . . Was it paralleled in either the 1st or the 2d?

Chapman: Not in the 2d, and I don't think in the 1st, although I'm not as well acquainted with it.

Another project that we initiated and conducted was the Statement of Requirements for Amphibious Shipping. That was done by G-4. It consisted of working out what the requirements were in square footage, cubed, and follow-on echelons of shipping, and the requirement for the assault echelon shipping. We developed quite a package on that. LtCol Soper . . .

Frank: Oh, Jim Soper.
Chapman: . . . Jim Soper was the . . .

Frank: Expert on that.

Chapman: . . . action officer and the expert on that. He did a marvelous job. We got Gen Shoup to sign it and sent it on over to the Navy. It formed the basis of the amphibious ship design and shipbuilding program in the Navy, and continues to be to this day. Of course it's been modified many times, but that was the original statement of requirements.

Frank: How did the Navy respond to it? As I recall, during this whole period there was always a reluctance. . . . Well, for a long period of time the Navy's amphibious office or division has always had a captain rather than an admiral and the Marine Corps always felt. . . .

Chapman: It did at that time, yes. But the Navy responded very well. It was the initiating influence in the building of the Navy's 20-knot amphibious fleet . . .

Frank: That started it.

Chapman: . . . beginning right then. That was the 20-knot amphibious fleet, with the LPDs, the 20-knot LSTs, and LPHs. Later came the LHA, a few years later, but the Navy did, in fact, build a 20-knot amphibious fleet that almost met the total requirements at that time.

Frank: They kept it up all during your incumbency?

Chapman: Yes, yes they did. It was a steady program and it was completed about the time I was Commandant.

Frank: When did this program begin? In what year, do you recall? The package that you prepared?
Chapman: Well, it must have been '61 or '62. Yes, '62 probably. Because I didn't get there until August of '61.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: Let's see, there was something else I was thinking of, and it slipped my mind, that was important, that G-4 did while I was there. I'm sure it will come to me in a minute, so we'll go on.

Frank: Alright. When did you first know that you would be Gen Greene's Chief of Staff?

Chapman: To tell you the truth I was hoping I would, after my G-4 tour was complete . . . I was hoping that I would be sent out and have command of a division, but it didn't happen. In fact, I spent all the rest of my career right there at Headquarters.

Frank: You spent about 10, 12 years there.

Chapman: Well, '61 to . . . the middle of '61 to the end of 71.

Frank: 71, sure, so it was ten years.

Chapman: December 31st, 71. There was considerable delay in the selection of the new Commandant after Gen Shoup. As we all know, it turned out to be Gen Greene, which was a source of great pride and happiness on my part. He was Chief of Staff. After he been nominated by the President to the Senate and was awaiting confirmation, his first assignment was to choose his Chief of Staff. Well, he called me into his office one day and wanted to know if I would like to be Chief of Staff. Well I said, "Of course, I'll certainly do my best." So we shook hands and that's the way it was.

Frank: Who were some of the other candidates for Commandant?
Chapman: Gen Krulak. . .

Frank: At the time Gen Greene . . . that early?

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: He was candidate then as well as when you came up for Commandant?

Chapman: Yes, he was. He was held in very high esteem by McNamara.

Frank: But not by Shoup.

Chapman: Correct. So, of course, in the end, it was Gen Shoup's wishes that prevailed.

Frank: I'd like to talk a little about this because I want to talk later on when you were selected for Commandant. . . . This is a . . . . Seems to me that the selection of a Commandant is a pretty parochial matter of interest to the Marine Corps only and only to, perhaps, a certain echelon, a certain area of the Marine Corps. It doesn't go below a lower level. Is there much politicking or intriguing that goes on in that? Was there any in the case of Gen Greene's selection?

Chapman: I'm sure there was not, except to the extent that Gen Shoup went out to seek approval for Gen Greene. Actually it's a mistake to politic.

Frank: It can ruin you.

Chapman: Yes, it does ever so much more harm than good. There have been a number of instances of that in which perhaps two or three, or three or four, of the candidates would politic . . . .

Frank: Or their wives.
Chapman: . . . all but one, and the one who did not politic was almost always the one that won the battle.

Frank: Then there's some interest on the part of Congress, some of the Congressmen. For instance, I'm sure, in your case, that the Florida members of the Senate Armed Services Committee or the House Armed Forces Committee were interested in. . . . First let me put it in a different context. Doesn't the Secretary of the Navy ask to see the file jackets of a number of general officers who are potential candidates?

Chapman: Well, I can only speak of the one instance I know about and in that case it was true. That's what happened, that's the way the Secretary of the Navy wanted to handle it. I don't know that that's true in every case, but it might well be.

Frank: Well, insofar as. . . .

Chapman: But I think more so it depends on personal knowledge on the part of the Secretary and those above too; personal acquaintance with the candidates, rather than the record. Records are pretty well known and in any event you don't get to be a major general or a lieutenant general in the Marine Corps without an outstanding record. That's sort of taken for granted.

Frank: Of course, if you've done any service at Headquarters in general officer rank, then you've. . . .

Chapman: Then you become well-known, sure.

Frank: . . . well-known and you've testified up on the Hill and so forth.

Chapman: Oh, yes, many times probably.

Frank: Now, for a long time. . . . It's my opinion that for a long time the incumbent Commandant had a very great say in who his successor was.
Chapman: I think that's always the case, or almost always.

Frank: Does the incumbent Commandant, as far as you know, always poll his general officers to get their opinion of whom they think. . . . It's like the College of Cardinals who. . . .

Chapman: Yes . . . that's. . . . I don't know in which regime that started. It may have been going on for a long time, but not to my knowledge.

Frank: I think Gen Greene did.

Chapman: Yes, I think Gen Shoup did although I'm not certain. Well, yes I am, I'm pretty sure that Gen Shoup did. I know Gen Greene did, and I did. I've heard that Gen Cushman did but I can't speak with any knowledge.

Frank: Of course that became quite a notorious thing as you recall.

Chapman: Well, I didn't really. . . . I didn't know anything about it, not really, and I still don't.

Frank: Until the newspapers published that.

Chapman: I read what the newspapers said, but I don't always believe what the newspapers say.

Frank: I think the newspapers were pretty accurate in that case.

Chapman: It could have been, I don't know. But, if so, that was a case of politicking, and the moral from that is that it does more harm than good.

Frank: Well, it backfired in that case certainly. What duties did. . . . When you discussed your taking over the Chief of Staff's billet, what duties . . . what did Gen. Greene. . . . what was his philosophy? What did he want you to do? Did he want you to act as a classic Chief of Staff?
Chapman: Yes. He wanted me to be Mister Inside, and to free him to--except for the very important things--to be Mister Outside. He was superb at that and he tried to leave me free to plan and manage and operate the Marine Corps.

Frank: Run the staff.

Chapman: Run the staff which, in turn, ran the Marine Corps.

Frank: His Assistant Commandant was whom?

Chapman: Gen. Mangrum.

Frank: Mangrum, that's what I thought.

Chapman: Initially it was Gen. Hayes for a few months, and then Dick Mangrum.

Frank: What is the function of the Assistant Commandant?

Chapman: Well, just what the title implies. He was to take the place of the Commandant whenever the Commandant wasn't available. That meant many appearances in the Joint Chiefs while the Commandant was off on trips, representing the Marine Corps at numerous boards and committees over in the Navy Department and Defense Department, trips to the field in his own right; he was busy.

Frank: I think, in your case, when you had Lew Walt as your Assistant Commandant, there were two things. Lew Walt, perhaps, was better--not better--was more well known copy-wise. It was almost like the tail wagging the dog in a sense, and I don't say this pejoratively or denigratingly, but Uncle Lew, the three-star grunt from the skies, was front page copy. Seems to me he did a lot more field work for you, he was out on the hustings perhaps more that you were. Is this your impression? He was doing a lot more...
Chapman: He was out a lot, yes.

Frank: Yes, he was.

Chapman: We made him available for a great many appearances and he was extremely good at it; really wonderful at getting out there and telling the Marine Corps story to the public, to influential gatherings, and to Marines. Although I would have to say I think I traveled about as much as anyone could. Every year I made at least two trips to Vietnam and the Far East, and each year I made every major Marine Corps command and I tried, in the space of four years, to get to every minor Marine Corps command at least once. I think I did. So I logged a lot of air miles.

Frank: I'm sure you did. I read your speech file, but we're getting . . . I'm getting ahead of myself here. Do you think that the staff as then organized, when you were Chief of Staff, was responsive to the demands of the times? Did you have to reorganize?

Chapman: I do. It was a classic general staff organization. The span of control for the Chief of Staff was fairly large, but I'd had a lot of experience in the staff and I think I was able to handle it. I relied extensively on the conference method. I believed very strongly that everyone concerned--every staff office concerned--had to be in on every project.

Frank: A lot of cross-fertilization?

Chapman: There was a tremendous amount of cross-fertilization, and it was accomplished through the conference method, usually in my office. When I received some document for approval or signature that contained things that I didn't, perhaps, quite agree with, I would call a conference of all those concerned and we would thrash it out. What we did not do was send it back out for more staffing. It's a pretty successful method I think.

Frank: How soon after you took over as Chief of Staff did you institute the MCPPRS program?
Chapman: I don't remember exactly, probably about a year.

Frank: Is that something you'd thought about for a long time.

Chapman: Yes, I'd thought about it, and I had minor MCPPRS program in the G-4 division when I was there.

Frank: I see.

Chapman: We expanded it to become a major Marine Corps effort, Headquarters effort. The thing was formalized and organized and culminated in monthly briefings in the conference room--in the major conference room--for the entire staff on each project. It certainly was a successful management tool. That's what it was. The essence of it was the requirement that the project sponsor had to display his charts and talk, describe what had happened (history), what the present situation was, and whether or not it met the goal that had been stated at the previous session, and then the prediction for the future, the goal for the future, and the plan to reach it. The projects covered all aspects of the operation of the Marine Corps.

Frank: As a matter of record, we'll put it on the record here, we here, in our archives, have all the papers, the back up reports and so on of the whole MCPPRS. . . .

Chapman: Well, they should be valuable research material then on any effort on the management of the Marine Corps during that period.

Frank: Response of Headquarters to the needs of the units in the field in Vietnam, especially.

Chapman: Yes, in all respects; personnel, training, equipment, resupply, the whole bag.

Frank: Did the. . . .
Chapman: It comes, to interrupt, it suddenly clicked with me what the G-4 project was that I wanted to mention, and it was the institution or the beginning of the Marine Corps' computer based systems, which culminated, when I was Chief of Staff, in the design and the beginning of the implementation of IIS. It started when I was in G-4. We began the design of a Marine Corps-wide, total, overall system with subordinate sub-systems. The Marine Corps was the first in the field. Have we discussed this before?

Frank: No, sir. We talked around it but I don't think we discussed it in depth and I think perhaps this would be a good place. You might give what the acronym ITS stands for.


Frank: Right.

Chapman: I-I-S. IIS was a capstone system over the subordinate sub-systems. The important thing was that we, as the first step, worked out and complied, in written form, the requirements of the system; what we wanted it to do. That's a mistake that industry and others have made, in that they first go out, many of them have gone out and bought a computer system and then tried to design what they wanted it to do for them. That's the wrong way to go about it and the Marine Corps didn't make that mistake and I can take a good deal of the credit for I think. We first designed the system, what we wanted it to do for us (and the sub-systems too), and then we went out and bought the hardware. We were very fortunate that we were able to sell the idea of a single computer for every system in the Marine Corps--air, ground, management, and tactical--the IBM 360, it was at that time. Of course since the systems were identical, why the language was identical, the procedures were identical, the training of the computer operators was identical. That, again, is in contrast to others, particularly the other services, which have a dozen different computers. They have great difficulty working out how they can talk to each other and that sort of thing.

We completely designed IIS and all of the subordinate systems before we went out and bought computers and before we started programming. IIS is the capstone system at
Headquarters. The subordinate systems are personnel, pay, Reserve, logistics/the supply system which was called MUMMS. . . .

Frank: JUMPS was the pay system.

Chapman: JUMPS was the pay system. The personnel system was particularly important. It, together with JUMPS, was an overall personnel system, management information system with subordinate systems for active duty, Reserve, retired so that a Marine could move from active duty to retired or Reserve or vice versa all in the same system.

Frank: Who was your computer expert at this time?

Chapman: Oh, gosh, I know but. . . . Was it Smart?

Frank: Hank Smart?

Chapman: Hank Smart, I believe.

Frank: He started out and then Sam Jaskilka took over.

Chapman: Yes, he did. Sam took over when it was well along. Hank, I believe, retired although I don't remember for certain.

Frank: I think so. I think he had a heart condition.

Chapman: But I'm glad I remembered that because the design and accomplishment of IIS put the Marine Corps far ahead of anyone else, including industry.

Frank: That was really the beginning of the Marine Corps' entry into the computer age, was it not?
Chapman: In a big way, yes. Yes it was.

Frank: We'd had data systems and so on, but . . .

Chapman: We'd had data systems. We'd had a supply system, but they were small, independent systems. They were all, of course, simply obliterated when we brought the big, new, very complicated system in. By the way, we designed an instruction team—an indoctrination team—which traveled around the Marine Corps . . .

Frank: Yes, I think I remember that.

Chapman: . . . orienting, we oriented the whole Marine Corps on IIS: what it would be, what it would do, and how every Marine had to learn how to operate computers or in the computer system in order to get along in the future.

Frank: That's right, I remember it being given over in the Henderson Hall theater.

Chapman: Yes, it was good. It was an excellent briefing. It lasted several hours.

Frank: That's right, it was the whole morning.

Chapman: What it did was bring the whole Marine Corps into the computer age, in a big way.

Frank: How was it received in the field, by and large?

Chapman: There was a majority approval; there was a minority that thought it was terrible [laughter].

Frank: Couldn't cope with it.

Chapman: Well, they just didn't like the idea.
Frank: Oh, really? What was the reluctance?

Chapman: Well, one source of the reluctance, which is significant, is that it, to a considerable extent, changed the personal relationship of the commanding officer with his Marines, in that the Marine, in effect, was dealing with a computer for his pay, his personnel records, his leave record and the like, rather than with his first sergeant or commanding officer.

Frank: But on the other hand, taking it down to that bottom line, that basic area there, the individual, for the first time with a leave and earnings statement he could see where he actually was.

Chapman: Yes, he could see in his own right, whereas previously he'd have to find out from the company office or the battalion office, squadron office.

Frank: Not always accurate.

Chapman: Of course his pay record, you see, instead of being kept in the company/battery/squadron, was kept on the master computer in Kansas City, which is a heck of a long way from Okinawa or . . .

Frank: Were there many glitches in the system initially?

Chapman: Initially there were some, oh yes. There always are. They were smoothed out and today the thing is running very smoothly. I think the Marine Corps can be proud of that accomplishment, the first, biggest, and best, I think in the whole country.

Frank: Oh, really.

Chapman: Far ahead, certainly far ahead of the other services and still is, and far ahead of most of industry.
Frank: Was the Marine Corps late coming into the computer age compared to the other services?

Chapman: Yes, but it was probably a good thing because we waited until others had gained experience and we had thought out just what it was we wanted to do before we got into it in a big way. When we did, we did with IIS as I've described.

Frank: Was there a problem interfacing with the other services? Having our computers talk to theirs? Was that done?

Chapman: Well, there's always the problem if the computers are different and particularly if they speak a different language, yes. You always have that problem. They can't talk to one another unless they use the same language and have common programs.

Frank: Did it ever come down to that though?

Chapman: No, I don't think so, not to my knowledge. Our system was integrated with those of the other services that mattered; for instance the Navy's aviation supply system.

Frank: Seems to me that once you get an interfacing of all the systems within the armed forces, you're accomplishing the unification in fact.

Chapman: Well, yes, you have to be able to do that. You have to, for instance the Marine supply people have to be able to talk to the DSA systems. That's called DLA now, I believe.

Frank: Defense Logistic Agency, right.

Chapman: Yes, it used to be Defense Supply Agency, DSA in my day.

I can remember a briefing that I devised and gave myself when we were first getting going on this. It was a briefing in the shape of a pyramid. The top block of the pyramid was the statement of the requirements that we wanted the system to produce. That, of course, was a huge
Chapman: It's vastly increased the accuracy and speed of the management of the Corps; personnel, supply, pay, etc.

Frank: Do you think it's taken away from the personal . . . to the degree that it has taken away from the personal aspect, the personal relationship, the company commander's relationship with his people.

Chapman: Yes, that's the penalty that such a system imposes. In the old days, the first sergeant and the commanding officer figured out how much pay a Marine was due at the end of the month. Of course, it was pretty simple in those days. The Marine only got $20.80 a month (a private), and the supply sergeant kept the in-kind issue record for each Marine. He rated so many drawers, and so many undershirts, and so many shirts per year. It wasn't on a dollar basis, it was on an in-kind basis. Each Marine was authorized a certain number, in kind, of each article of the uniform each year. That record was all kept right in the battalion or company office. That's all disappeared with the advent of the computer-based supply and pay systems, personnel systems.

Frank: In '49 I think we went to the unit diary system . . .

Chapman: Yes, I guess it was '49.
Frank: . . . from the old muster role system. Yes it was.

Chapman: But the unit diary was just what the name implied. It was a daily record of what happened to each Marine in the unit.

Frank: It's awfully difficult. . . .

Chapman: Now, you still do, what in effect is a unit diary, but instead of keeping the record in the company/battalion/squadron office, you make inputs into the computer. Of course, you can get it back out any time you want.

Frank: Yes, you can get a read-out. I imagine it was much easier to keep track of personnel, the pipeline system, through a computerized program as opposed to the muster roles.

Chapman: Yes, it was very difficult and it wasn't all that good but it would have been a nightmare without the computer-based systems. I've often said that in four years as Chief of Staff and four years as Commandant, I never was able to find out (although I asked the question a million times) how many Marines there were in the Marine Corps. I used to berate the personnel people regularly on that question, and they never could say, currently. Of course, they knew and could say, as of a couple or three months previous, exactly how many there were. You could always get it from the pay records. When the pay records reached their final audit about three months after the event. Then you knew exactly how many there were and you had to project then; you simply had to project what had happened in the intervening three months to get an estimate of how many there were today. But it was always an estimate. And it was important, it was a problem we never solved. I don't think it's solved to this day. There's too many Marines in transit, in the hospital, going to and from the jailhouse and otherwise unavailable and not on anyone's record at any one time. So that you never know exactly, on a current basis, how many Marines there are in the Marine Corps, and just where they are, and what they're doing.
I remember one time in frustration, when I was Chief of Staff, we ordered about three months ahead of time, that there would be a pause in the personnel activities of the Marine Corps on a certain day. I think it was Christmas Day, I think we selected Christmas Day along about '66 or '67; and issued a general order two or three months ahead of time so that everyone had plenty of notice that on that day, everybody was to stop and count: count everybody that was on the roles then, everybody that was in transit and due in, everybody that was in the hospital or going to or from the hospital and to report how many Marines we had on that day. Well, we did it but it still wasn't the answer. We still didn't know about numerous Marines who were just not on anybody's rolls. They were traveling from on point to another; they either hadn't gotten to the hospital or they were coming back from the hospital, that kind of thing. So I'll say, in summary, in eight years I never did find out how many Marines there were in the Marine Corps.

Frank: You just had an estimate.

Chapman: But we had an estimate that was pretty accurate.

Frank: Of course you planned that at certain point you would have so many and all the planning for logistics and everything else was based on that.

Chapman: Oh, yes, recruiting, drafting--which we, of course, were doing toward the end of the war--training. The whole personnel game starts from knowing how many you've got right now; what the projected vacancies are; and who you have to recruit, train, and supply to keep the Marine Corps up to strength in the future, with trained Marines ready to fight because we were at war.

Frank: Yes. I was going to ask you in what way did the Headquarters staff respond to the needs of Vietnam? Did you have to put an over-layer of people who were just responsive to the needs of III MAF and the divisions in the field and the wings in the field?

Chapman: Yes, essentially the whole Marine Corps supported Vietnam, in many respects. Although, by careful planning and careful execution, we were able to do that without greatly
damaging the combat readiness of the units that were not in Vietnam, that were state-side. Of course, the Med battalions continued throughout. Other commitments continued. The turnover rate was pretty high in the state-side units, all state-side units: barracks, bases, as well as the Fleet Marine Force. But we were able to keep them up to strength, by and large. Of course the training pipeline was very large. At the peak of the war, when we had something over 300,000 Marines, there were 100,000 in Vietnam. So that the Marine Corps consisted of Marines in Vietnam, those that had just returned, and those that were getting ready to go.

Frank: Shades of World War II.

Chapman: Yes, one-third of the whole Marine Corps was in Vietnam. It's easy to imagine what that required in the way of personnel movements, training and movements.

Frank: What problems did you face during this period as Chief of Staff?

Chapman: Well, we've already touched on a number of them. The support of the units in combat was the chief thing, in all respects; personnel, materiel, resupply, repair and rebuild (most of which we did on Okinawa in the 3d Service Regiment), then state-side the training, equipping, combat readiness, and upholding the time-honored tradition of excellence in all Marine units: barracks, bases, ship's detachments.

Frank: Was not the major problem of this period the problem of personnel, being able to get the . . .

Chapman: It was the most difficult I think, yes. It was the most difficult.

Frank: Because you had . . . we had a commitment on the east coast of FMFLant and the 2d Division to NATO and the Caribbean, and yet I know Gen. Bowser was unhappy (or whoever had FMFLant at that time). . . .

Chapman: He was one that did.
Frank: Came up a number of times that the 2d Division, the 2d Wing and so on, were constantly being drawn down upon which made it difficult to keep up his commitments in the other area I believe.

Chapman: Yes. Of course we had worked out, and continued to keep up to date, emergency reinforcing plans for the uncommitted Fleet Marine Force units. I say that's traditional and it is. At any one time, when a Fleet Marine Force unit is ordered to deploy, it will contain 15, 20, 25 and higher percentages of Marines that are ineligible to deploy. They've just come back from Vietnam, they're in the hospital, their enlistment is about to expire, they're less than 18 years old, he's got a brother that's in Vietnam so he's not eligible, and many other personnel rules that make a Marine ineligible to be deployed. There will be a considerable percentage of such types in any FMF unit at any time. The percentage was much higher during the war.

So that there has to be a very carefully worked out personnel reinforcement plan--by rank and MOS--kept up to date and ready to launch into operation. So we did compile such a plan and kept it up to date throughout the duration of the war. But there's nothing new about that, that's the technique that the Marine Corps has used many times. For example, when we deployed first the brigade and then the division to Korea in 1950, that's the way we did it. We raided the entire Marine Corps--what there was of it, it wasn't a very big Marine Corps then--we raided the entire Marine Corps to fill first the brigade and then the division up with qualified Marines that were eligible to deploy. That's still true today, and always will be true.

Frank: Didn't the personnel assignment situation become so difficult that finally the responsibility for assigning personnel was put in the hands of FMFPac? In other words. . . .

Chapman: Oh, that wasn't anything new. That was true from the beginning.

Frank: It was?

Chapman: Yes. That's always been the Marine Corps policy.
Frank: There were . . . block allocations were made to Pac and Pac from then on. . . .

Chapman: Made the assignments. Of course the assignments were pretty obvious while the war was going on. They were destined for III MAF. On arrival at III MAF, of course, the division and the wing picked the Marines up and assigned them to the subordinate units. But the replacements were all designed to maintain the strength of the units in combat by rank and MOS, remembering that it was a one-year tour of duty. So that every year there was a complete turnover in III MAF.

Frank: This must have created a problem with the rest of the Corps. For instance, especially in the case of pilots. I remember that became a very, very difficult situation, pilot retention, officer retention.

Chapman: Well, yes, it was difficult for many critical MOSs; certainly a pilot is one of them. The pilot pipeline is typical. It's very long, for one thing. From the time an aviator is recruited, gets through Basic School, and goes into pilot training, comes out the other end up to a year later, then has to have some operational time in a squadron. . . .

End Tape 1/XI, Side A

Begin Tape 1/XI, Side B

Frank: You were saying it's a long pipeline for aviators.

Chapman: It's a very long pipeline for aviators and for some other MOSs too. The result was, until we got ahead of the game so to speak, the pilots were making repeated tours to Vietnam much faster than other ranks and MOSs. That continued true to the end of the war in some MOSs, critical MOSs; that we were never able to quite up to the population necessary.

Frank: What were the major problems facing Gen. Greene during his Commandancy from your point of view?
Chapman: Oh, the war above all.

Frank: The war above all.

Chapman: Above all, unquestionably. Frank: All-consuming.

Chapman: Oh, yes, of course. The conduct of the war, the policies driving the war, the troop and personnel requirements to fight the war successfully, and of course it's just hashing over ancient history to just remark in general that the war was never fought in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. The philosophy of gradualism was advanced by McNamara and approved by the President over the objections of the Joint Chiefs, who recommended an all-out, immediate campaign. This was never approved and it was never done. As a consequence, we eventually, as everybody knows, lost the war.

Frank: Any of the problems facing the Commandant, of course, faced the Marine Corps as a whole.

Chapman: Oh, very much so. Of course he was member of the Joint Chiefs and many Marines engaged in fighting.

Frank: As I recall, as a member of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Greene interested himself in everything that came up on the agenda, which meant that the Marine Corps was interested in everything that came up on the agenda.

Chapman: Those were the days of "direct concern." The Commandant, technically, was not a member of the Joint Chiefs except when the item on the agenda was of direct concern to the Marine Corps. So for each item the Marine Corps had to state whether it was directly concerned or not. In practice, the Marine Corps declared direct concern in about 99.9 percent of the agenda items, so that, as a practical matter, the Commandant was full-fledged member of the Joint Chiefs. Of course the law has since been changed and he is now . . .
Frank: By law.

Chapman: . . . by law, a co-equal member of the Joint Chiefs for everything.

Frank: Long time in coming.

Chapman: Yes. There's some disadvantages.

Frank: Oh?

Chapman: Well, the Marine Corps can no longer opt out of some controversial argument that it doesn't want to get involved in. It can't do that anymore.

Frank: No, but at least it has the possibility of the Commandant, for instance, becoming . . . or a Marine general officer becoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Chapman: Well, that wasn't prohibited previously.

Frank: That wasn't prohibited before.

Chapman: No, any military individual, of the necessary rank, is eligible to be Chairman; always has been. It's a Presidential choice of course.

Frank: Does it ever look like it will ever be?

Chapman: I don't see why not. I think there's been a close call several occasions in the past. I believe there was in my case, and I know there was in Gen. Barrow's case, a close call. In that regard the current difference is that the Commandant can now become acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman. If the Chairman goes on a trip, then the senior service chief becomes the acting Chairman. In the past, prior to the passage of the current amendment to the law, the
senior service chief could not be the Marine Commandant because he was not a full-fledged member of the Joint Chiefs. Now he can be.

Frank: Doesn't that leave the way open to all sorts of games to make sure that your chief of service is appointed before the other chiefs of services to make sure that he's the senior chief? I think that happened in the case of Gen. Wilson, where the Army . . .

Chapman: Could be, I don't know about that. I don't know, I think it's a distinction without a difference really. I really don't think any of the chiefs hunger to be acting Chairman . . .

Frank: Oh, really?

Chapman: . . . in the absence of the . . . Well, it's a drain on the time and on the effort that the chief, I think in most cases, would rather be devoting to running his service.

Frank: How would you compare Gen. Greene's Commandancy to Gen. Shoup's Commandancy?

Chapman: I don't know if I could make such a comparison.

Frank: Personality . . .

Chapman: The circumstances were very different. Gen. Shoup, peace-time; Gen. Greene, war time. I thought they were both great Commandants. I was very proud of both of them. Gen. Shoup did many great things for the Marine Corps. He was a very strong leader, very determined, very able.

Frank: What were some of those things would you say?

Chapman: Leadership, representing the Corps, management, fiscal responsibility, combat readiness, all of those good things he was very good at. Ran a very taut ship, and ran it well.
Gen. Greene was a very able war time leader, very determined, decisive, all-out effort, very able Commandant.

Frank: Two different personalities though.

Chapman: Very different personalities, both wonderful people though.

Frank: I don't think Gen. Greene ruled . . . commanded with as much fear as . . . exuded as much . . . aroused as much fear and concern as Gen. Shoup did.

Chapman: Well, there was no reason to be afraid of Gen. Shoup, as long as you did a good job. I had numerous experiences with him when I was the Commanding General, Force Troops. I can recall several happy episodes in that regard, and I think--this sounds very immodest--but I think it was because we really did . . . we were really doing an excellent job and consequently all he did was smile and brag on us. There was no reason to be. . . . Unless you were making mistakes or doing a poor job; then you'd better run for cover because he was tough. He was extremely tough.

Frank: Had there been a feeling amongst the senior officers at the time of his accession to the Commandancy that the Marine Corps had become slack and was kind of loose?

Chapman: I would say yes. I think that's true, for reasons that escape me, but I think that's so. Gen. Shoup didn't lose any time getting things tightened up.

Frank: How would you compare Gen. Greene's Commandancy to your Commandancy?

Chapman: Well, I would just say what I said on my acceptance speech to the Marines, which was, "Continue to march." I, obviously, strongly approved of everything Gen. Greene had done and we just continued doing it.

Frank: There really wasn't too much difference I don't think.
Chapman: Well, I think there was very little difference.

Frank: Except the things which faced you which was the setting down, ending of the war and getting the Marines out of Vietnam.

Chapman: Well, first, of course, fighting the war, participating in the Joint Chiefs, keeping the Marine Corps combat ready, all of those things. Then toward the end the problem of getting out of Vietnam and returning to a small, professional, high quality Corps. That engaged me pretty heavily for the last year or so.

Frank: When did you first know you were . . . that you would become Commandant; lay the background. The balloon had gone up, I think the Copley papers had raised the prospect of Gen. Krulak being Commandant and it was pretty generally accepted that he was the chosen one. But the thing dragged on and dragged on and dragged on and there was much conjecture, as you recall, and I believe that Gen. Walt was a major contender for the Commandancy.

Chapman: Yes, and so was Gen. Buse.

Frank: Oh really?

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: I thought Gen. Buse's illness and back problems and so on. . . .

Chapman: No, well that may have had an effect but he was definitely one of the candidates. He was strongly supported by many Marines who held him in very high regard and with justice. So there were really four candidates. You have to ask Gen. Greene how that ball bounced because I'm really not acquainted. The only thing I will say for myself is that I didn't raise a finger.

Frank: You didn't?
Chapman: No, I did absolutely nothing to advance my prospects, and I don't think Gen. Buse did either.

Frank: I think Gen. Krulak was racing pretty hard for it and Gen. Walt was too.

Chapman: That was my impression, yes. As I've said on a previous occasion, that often does more harm than good.

Frank: This particular selection period for the Commandancy was unique in the fact that a senior officer of another service came out backing a candidate. That was when Westmoreland wrote his letter. . . .

Chapman: Backing. . . .

Frank: Gen. Walt, which raised a lot of eyebrows.

Chapman: Yes, it did. Of course, he was entitled to do that. He held Gen. Walt, as he well should have, in the very highest regard. Lew Walt did a superb job in leading the Marines in Vietnam. I've often thought, and said, that Gen. Walt was probably one of the two or three greatest combat leaders the Marine Corps has ever had. He commanded, in combat, everything from a platoon to a corps, the III MAF: platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division, and corps (III MAF). He was a superb combat leader.

Frank: Great charisma.

Chapman: Yes. I've got the very highest regard for Lew Walt. I think he's one of the greatest Marines ever.

Frank: That's interesting. So when the selection came I think it was in late November, was it not?
Chapman: No, it was mid-December. It was very late. Or early December, something like the 10th.

Frank: Had you had an alert, a warning ahead of time?

Chapman: No, I was Assistant Commandant at that point.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: I became Assistant Commandant on the 1st of July of... let's see what year was that, '66?

Frank: '67 I believe.

Chapman: '67, for a six-month period.

Frank: How did that come about, because Gen Mangrum retired?

Chapman: Gen Mangrum retired and so Gen Greene wanted me to be Assistant Commandant and turn Chief of Staff over to... .

Frank: John Chaisson?

Chapman: No, gosh I can't even remember. I'll think of it in a minute.

Frank: Buse?

Chapman: No, Buse was my... .

Frank: Was your Chief of Staff. Oh, Van Ryzin?
Chapman: No, I chose him.

Frank: Okay, still guessing. I don't recall.

Chapman: I ought to know and I'll think of it in a minute. My memory ain't what it used to be.

Frank: No, well, when it comes up like that you get a lapse.

Chapman: So, as it happened I was in Gen Greene's office, along with some others, on some matter we were discussing and the aide came in and said the President wanted to see me. That was my first knowledge.

Frank: Did you guess that . . . what the reason was?

Chapman: Well, of course I guessed but I had no certain knowledge. So I got a car and went over to the White House and went right in to see the President, and he said--this was President Johnson--he said, "I think I want you to be the next Commandant of the Marine Corps." I said, "Mr. President, I'm honored. You can be sure I'll do my best," and he said, "Alright, let's get some pictures taken and then I'll make the announcement to the press." So he did. The photographer came in and took some pictures and then we went into the press room at the White House and he made the necessary introduction, and I made a couple of comments and there were two or three questions, and then I said, "Mr. President, if you would excuse me, I'll go phone my wife and tell her." He said, "You better do that right away." So I did.

Frank: What was your relation. . . . Had you known Johnson before?

Chapman: No, I had not.

Frank: Not any contact with him at all.
Chapman: No, no I had not. I think my selection was primarily Gen Greene's doing, plus Gen Wheeler, who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who, in a private letter to the President, recommended me. We spoke a moment ago of an officer of another service having a candidate; Gen Walt. Apparently I must have been Gen Wheeler's candidate but for reasons that escape me. I just don't know.

Frank: Had you known Wheeler intimately before?

Chapman: Only to the extent that I represented the Marine Corps at Joint Chiefs meetings.

Frank: You were the OpDep.

Chapman: No, I wasn't the OpDep but I was acting Commandant when Gen Greene was away. During that six months I was Assistant Commandant I made many appearances in the Joint Chiefs in Gen Greene's stead.

Frank: When you went over to the White House, before you left, did Gen Greene allow as to how . . . what it might be for?

Chapman: No, he didn't know. I know, because I've heard later, that this was an agonizing decision by President Johnson. I think he personally inclined toward Gen Walt. I believe. . . . This is largely hearsay on my part, but I believe that the SecDef--and we know Westmoreland--advocated Lew Walt. There were a number of Marines that advocated Bill Buse, and with much reason. (There's another Marine I've got the highest regard for.) I gather that Gen Greene, and as I later learned, the Chairman, Gen Wheeler, were advocating me. The President, as evidenced by the lateness of the decision, mid-December for a 1st of January appointment, did some agonizing over the choice. I'll have to say, in all honesty, I don't think he ever regretted the decision he made. At least I hope not.

Frank: Well, there . . . of course the matter of a select . . . As I indicated before, the matter of the selection of a Commandant is of parochial interest perhaps only to the Marine Corps and only
to segment of the Marine Corps; the senior officers or officers who may have served with one of
the candidates. I heard, for instance, that there was considerable 1st Division old boy support for
Lew Walt. As a matter of fact I know that some of the old 1st Division Association crowd, who
were . . . like to think of themselves as power brokers, were supporting . . . including Senator
Douglas, former Senator Douglas. You may have heard about this.

Chapman: I don't think so, or else I've forgotten it. You just have to say that they had a very
high regard for Lew Walt, as did I. You will remember that my first act after being nominated
was to pick Lew Walt to be Assistant Commandant, and Gen Buse to be Chief of Staff.

Frank: So you had a strong team.

Chapman: Yes. So as far as I was concerned the competition didn't do anything to damage their
prospects, their future prospects in the Marine Corps.

Frank: Would you talk about the obtaining of a fourth star for the Assistant Commandant; for
Lew Walt, who was the first Assistant Commandant.

Chapman: Well, that was an interesting power play that I conducted successfully. The position
of commander of the . . . what was the name of it? The joint command throughout Central
America and South America, its headquarters were in Panama. I can't even remember the name
of it now. But it was one of the joint commands in those days (It has since disappeared.), and it
was a four-star billet. So I nominated Lew Walt for the position and advanced that argument that
there'd never been a Marine joint commander, that he had outstanding combat service, he was
held in the highest regard by many others, and that I thought that he would be a most able choice
to be the new commander of that . . . was it South Command? Something like that.

Frank: CinCSouth?

Chapman: CinCSouth, I believe that's what it was. This, basically, was a ploy and it turned out
to be highly successful. There was immense and immediate opposition on the part of Army and
the Air Force and the Chairman, who wanted that post for an Army or an Air Force officer. They knew the President's high regard for Lew Walt, and if he was given a choice between some Army or Air Force general and Lew Walt, he'd pick Lew Walt. They put up a great hue and cry about how it was the Army's turn and it was an Army-type command (or maybe it was Air Force, I've forgotten which).

Anyhow, finally when the crisis reached a peak, I proposed to the Chairman that, alright, I would fall off if he would support a four-star Assistant Commandant, increasing the Marine Assistant Commandant from three to four stars as long as the Marine Corps was above 200,000 strength. Well, he gleefully bought that proposition, so we sailed it through. It went through the Joint Chiefs, though the SecDef, through the White House and over to the Congress. Congress passed the necessary enabling legislation, and of course Lew Walt was the one we had nominated and it sailed right through. That's how the Marine Corps got a four-star Assistant Commandant.

Frank: Why should it have had to go through JCS?

Chapman: All the senior nominations do.

Frank: Even the chiefs of services?

Chapman: Oh, yes. Wait a minute now, no, I would say not the chiefs of services, not then anyway. No, that is direct dealing with the White House on that. But all others, from the CinCs on down.

Frank: But the CinCs are a unified command type of operation which come under JCS. The Assistant Commandant is strictly an in-house Marine Corps function. Wouldn't it have been up to Congress to approve . . . to be the sole. . . .

Chapman: The legislation, the proposed legislation, I don't think went through the Joint Chiefs. But the nomination of the individual, yes, it went through the Joint Chiefs; had to.
Frank: It had to.

Chapman: All four and three stars do.

Frank: Even the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps, FMFPac . . .

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: . . . or Lant or. . .

Chapman: Absolutely.

Frank: Even though they're strictly a Marine Corps. . .

Chapman: Doesn't matter, they all go through the Joint Chiefs. It's routine, I don't know that there's ever been a case where the Joint Chiefs . . .

Frank: Didn't approve.

Chapman: . . . didn't approve.

Frank: But I can't see why the Joint Chiefs would have any particular interest, or should have any particular interest, in a strictly organic command, except that it's a type command. I guess that has to be the philosophy.

Chapman: That's the way the system worked though.

Frank: That's the way it works.
Chapman: I think it still does. Even more so now, in that there's an office set up in SecDef to massage and approve all three and four stars. It's now another link in the chain.

Frank: Well, now, the assignment of division commanders, of general officer assignments in the Marine Corps, did that have to go through SecDef?

Chapman: No, just SecNav.

Frank: SecNav had to approve that.

Chapman: Right.

Frank: Was that pro forma approval.

Chapman: Yes, in the case of the Marine Corps, yes, while I was there certainly. I'd almost always discuss it with the Secretary of the Navy, what my intentions were with regard to general officer assignments, but he . . . we always had a friendly discussion on the subject but he always approved.

Frank: As Commandant did you have to constantly massage SecNav, keep him apprised of everything that was going on?

Chapman: Oh, yes we certainly did that. But I don't know. Both Secretary Chaffee. . . .

Frank: Who was a former Marine.

Chapman: Yes. Secretary Warner, a former Marine. It was Paul Ignatius when I first took office. As they themselves said, they spent 99 percent of their time on the Navy and one percent on the Marine Corps. As Secretary Chaffee told me a good many times, that the Marine Corps just seemed to run like a well-oiled clock and there wasn't any need for him to do anything much about it. I think that was true.
Frank: How were your... Now I know that Gen Greene had problems with Adm McDonald.

Chapman: Well, differences of concept and philosophy, yes, in the tank and on Navy aircraft and shipbuilding programs.

Frank: And also the role of the Navy in Vietnam.

Chapman: That was one of the Joint Chiefs' issues. Adm McDonald did not want to devote the resources that were necessary to establish the Navy support of the Marine Corps in Vietnam; and he had good reason too. It was serious drain on his capabilities.

Frank: But he had to get his feet wet.

Chapman: Well, he had to do it, so he did. The Navy supply echelon, for example, in III MAF, was a considerable undertaking and it detracted from other Navy missions and capabilities.

Frank: What did you face initially upon taking over as Commandant? What were some of your problems? What were some of the pressing things that... Your relationship with Congress... the Marine Corps' relationship with Congress was good.

Chapman: Oh, it was excellent, yes. The Marine Corps has always done well with Congress. The Marine Corps has a reputation for honesty, frugality, professionalism, capability with the Congress that always stood it in good stead. And Congress has always been the strength of the Marine Corps, not the administration. There have been many efforts on the part of the administration, at many levels in the administration, to reduce or even eliminate the Marine Corps. But they've always foundered on the rock of Congress.

Frank: Did that go on during your Commandancy? Was there always... was there continuous sniping at the Marine Corps? Did you always have to watch over your shoulder?
Chapman: Well a Marine always has to do that, yes.

Frank: Well, that's what I mean. What were some of the things that were hazarding the Marine Corps?

Chapman: Very little, during the war, very little. I think everybody recognized the Marine Corps was doing a superb job in combat and there was no one else that was capable of taking on the Marine Corps' effort. The Army and the Air Force were strained to the limit; the Navy, obviously, couldn't do ground combat. So there really wasn't any competition in that regard. There were differences of philosophy on how to fight the war, how best to fight the war, that surfaced from time to time. There were issues like single management of air . . .

Frank: I was just thinking of that.

Chapman: . . . the Combined Action Program.

Frank: It's been said that during the peace time the services fight for their share of the Defense dollar and in war time they fight for their share of a mission. Was that a constant during your incumbency?

Chapman: I would say not.

Frank: The Marine Corps had all it could handle.

Chapman: Yes, the Marine Corps was able to get all the funding it needed to do what we were charged with doing during the war. There was no shortage of dollars.

Frank: Were you pleased as you went out to Vietnam the several times that you did. . . .

Chapman: That was the first thing I did after being sworn in on New Years Day, '68, was I took right off for Vietnam. I spent a few days out there.
Frank: Was this your first trip out to Vietnam.

Chapman: No, I'd gone out once as Chief of Staff. I'd gone once as Chief of Staff. But then I went twice, sometimes three times a year for the next four years.

Frank: What did you find out? What did you find on your first trip?

Chapman: I don't remember anything in particular, just what I already knew, that the Marines were doing well. We knew, already, about the many problems that we were going to have to try to solve: personnel replacements, materiel resupply and the like, and could confirm many of them, listen to their plans for future campaigns. I spent several hours with Westmoreland in Saigon, and he came up to Da Nang while I was there. I went around and met the Vietnamese combat leaders which was an uplifting experience, starting with Gen Lam, who could hardly be called a combat soldier. He was more of a politician, but he was a pretty good one. Others, like Gen Lee of the 1st ARVN Division, was a first-rate combat leader, and there were others. It was helpful to get out of the helicopter and on the ground and see the dispositions, the combat arrangements. So I came back convinced that we were doing well and there were ways we could do better. We set about trying to improve things.

Frank: In one of your first appearances before Congress--before the committees of the House and the Senate, Armed Forces, Armed Services--in'68, you said that the major problems were total strength, retention in pilots versus pilot requirements. Why don't we take each one of them in turn. The total strength problem: the Marine Corps was trying to increase its strength?

Chapman: Yes, in order to meet the . . . basically to meet two things: the pipeline requirements for Vietnam and the combat readiness of the uncommitted units, and the building of additional units to move to Vietnam. Remember, we activated elements of the 4th Division during Vietnam; first the 26th Marines and then the 27th Marines, both reinforced with artillery, tanks, etc, full-scale regimental combat teams.
Frank: Well now, in your . . . one of your . . . with respect to personnel, in your initial press conference you said you wouldn't call up Reserves unless there was a real job for them. In hindsight, how do you feel now about them not being called up?

Chapman: I think that was a good decision. The Reserves are like a cannon that's got one round of ammunition. If you shoot it, if you shoot that one round, that's it. That's the way the Reserves are. Remember that the public law prescribes that if a Reserve is called to active duty he is forever thereafter immune from ever being involuntarily called again.

Frank: So we would have had to keep them on for the length of Vietnam.

Chapman: Yes. So you really don't want to call the Reserve until you have got a . . .

Frank: You need to use them.

Chapman: . . . a real need for them, because once you call them, then the Reserve is destroyed and you've got to start building the Reserve all over again from zero.

Frank: Which was our experience after Korea.

Chapman: Exactly. It was perfectly practical and possible to fight the war with active duty Marines and that's the way we elected to do it. Meanwhile, I might say though, that we went through quite an effort to get the Reserve totally ready. We started that when I was Chief of Staff.

Frank: Build up the 4th Division/4th Wing team?

Chapman: Well, first we reorganized the Reserve into a division and a wing and force troops. You remember that it had previously consisted mainly of filler units, filler-type units, not. . . .

Frank: Companies, battalions, and squadrons.
Chapman: Yes, but not within any overall . . .

Frank: Structure.

Chapman: . . . division/wing structure arrangement. Actually that reorganization of the Reserve into a division, wing, and force troops was done when I was G-4. Then when I was Chief of Staff, we set about a major improvement effort for the 4th Div/Wing team, providing them with all the latest equipment, a full array of equipment, mount out, and personnel.

[Interruption in interview]

Chapman: We were talking about the Reserve.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: Well, I was remarking on the major effort we successfully conducted during the time I was Chief of Staff for . . . to bring the 4th Division/Wing team to a state of complete combat readiness. We formed the IV MAF headquarters for example. It was commanded, at first, by an additional duty active general but later on we designated Reserve generals to be the IV MAF commander; similarly with the 4th Division and the 4th Wing. We obtained and outfitted the Reserve with all the equipment that the regulars had, in large part. Some of it was hand-me-downs, but most was first-line equipment. We stockpiled in our supply system all the necessary mount out and combat support; ammunition, spare parts, replacement equipment of all kinds. We gave the Reserve not always the first line aircraft, but the next best, like the F-8 fighter instead of the F-4, at that time. The A-4--let's see what was it--the A-4C, I think, whereas the regulars had A-4Ds and Es. It was the same aircraft but an earlier version.

Frank: Not that obsolete.
Chapman: Oh, not obsolete, they were first-line aircraft. We went through a really major effort to get each Reserve unit actually ready to mobilize and deploy in a matter of hours. Each unit was required to work out and implement in detail how the Marines would report to the training center, how each would draw all of his individual equipment, how the dependents would be called into a conference and indoctrinated into what was going on and how they could get their husband's pay, all that kind of thing.

Frank: Same thing that was done for the regulars.

Chapman: Yes. Each unit was required to prepare detailed plans on movement from the training center to the Marine base where they would mobilize. They had to have contracts all signed with the trains or the airplanes or the buses or the truck companies, just how they were going to move. The bases were required to designate the barracks, the parking lots and have training plans worked out in detail and ready to implement when the units arrived. So those, and a great many other things, were all done so that we were quite confident that if the call came our division/wing team could be ready to mount out for combat in a matter of 30 days or less from the day of the call. It was a real major effort and it was very successful. I think there have been, of course, some ups and downs, particularly when the draft ended (personnel-wise), but I believe the Marine 4th Division/Wing team is equally combat ready today.

Frank: The second problem that you noted facing the Corps, again was the personnel aspect, was retention of Marines on active duty, which I guess meant reenlistments and officer retention.

Chapman: Yes, NCOs and officers.

Frank: Primarily?

Chapman: Primarily. Of course, we really don't want to ship over any privates. We wanted to ship over the experienced combat sergeants and staff sergeants, and of course officers, the young officers who joined the Marine Corps for a stated tour of duty, three or four years (I guess five years in the case of the Academy graduates) became pilots and artillerymen and infantrymen and
so forth and all had combat experience. Some of them had two or more tours and, of course, we wanted to retain them. It was one of the problems that we worked hard on. By and large, we were successful.

Frank: How about the pilot situation? As I recall that was particularly acute because, in the case of the helicopter pilots especially, if they came back and they were assigned to the east coast then next thing they knew they were on the Carib ready force or out in the Med.

Chapman: Yes, very true.

Frank: So the family life was pretty well fouled up and... 

Chapman: Of course it was all rooted in the fact that we only had a certain number of pilots for each type of aircraft, and a substantial portion—about a third or more—of each type of aircraft was deployed in Vietnam. So that it was just as inevitable as night follows day that the pilots for that type aircraft were going to do tours in Vietnam, come back, do tours in state-side helicopter units, and then go back to Vietnam. While they were in the state-side unit they simply had to do whatever that unit did, among which was deployments to the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, etc. So it was hard, it was tough. I will say, on the other side, that the one thing that pilots love is to fly an airplane. Well, by God, they got plenty of airplane flying during that period. They really flew their airplanes.

Frank: Now, I noticed also, in some of the posture statements you made at this time, that the Army and Air Force had to train Marine pilots. I was wondering why they had to train them at this time. Was the Navy training. . . .

Chapman: That was not the Marine Corps choice, that was a DOD decision to centralize helicopter pilot training in the Army.

Frank: It wasn't because the Navy was over-crowded?
Chapman: No, it wasn't. It was done in the name of "efficiency and economy," by the Defense Department.

Frank: How long did that last for?

Chapman: I think it's still going on, isn't it?

Frank: I don't know.

Chapman: I think helicopter pilots are still all trained at Fort Rucker by the Army. I maybe wrong, I'm not right sure. It certainly endured during all the time I was in the saddle and beyond the end of the war.

Frank: Do you think it makes sense?

Chapman: Well, we bitterly opposed it at the time. We believed then, and I imagine that we still believe, that the only way to train a good Marine pilot is under Marine. . . .
Frank: I have a note here, the last one we had was December of '83, so you've been hitting those golf clubs pretty damn heavy there, General.

Chapman: We were in Florida and we were in Tennessee in the summer. We're about to leave for Tennessee in fact.

Frank: Well, good thing we've got you. LtCol Babb is going to sit in on this interview and the first part will be concerned with the Barracks and the parades. So, Wayne, why don't you just go ahead and take over.

Babb: Thank you and Gen Chapman I'm real glad to have the opportunity to talk to you a little bit about this. General, I've listened to you oral history tapes that dealt with the time that you were at Yokosuka, sir, and when you came to 8th and I, and I believe the CO was Col Williams at the time at the Barracks. I listened to your comments there and I just wanted to expand on those a bit. The rationale for that is that I'm writing an article for Fortitudine dealing with parades and what they mean to the Marine Corps and how they evolved into the tool, if you will, that they are today directed at the public and certainly to instill this ____.

So I guess my first question, General, to get into this and break the ice is, if I can ask you to comment on why, perhaps, Col Williams anglicized the parades and the General's feelings about why that wasn't appropriate and what you did to change it; and in a little bit more detail perhaps than on the oral history tapes, the earlier oral history tapes, I should say, sir.

Chapman: I can't really speak for Col Williams. It's sound to note that he did one or more tours of duty in England . . .

Frank: Yes, that's what influenced him.
Chapman: . . . and I think that was the influence on him. The influence on me was the belief that Marines should be regulation, and, of all places, the Marine Barracks at 8th and I should exemplify the ultimate in the regulation Marine, doing things exactly the way it's written down in the book, so that they can be a model for visiting Marines who come to see the parades and other ceremonies and what not, and what a perfect, regulation Marine looks like and acts like and performs like. That was the influence on me. I, as I'm sure you know, I immediately removed all those tiny caps and double-soled shoes and other non-regulation. . . .

Frank: The medals. . . . I have some literature that goes back to the time of Gen Shepherd's Commandancy, and I think the double-soled shoes and the anodized medals and the anodized buttons on the blues go back to a uniform regulation which he signed which pertained to the Barracks itself.

Chapman: Special.

Frank: Special regulations. In other words, nowhere else in the Corps or the FMF could you have your medals anodized or your blues buttons anodized or double-soled dress shoes. Of course since that time, you've had the black overcoats that the Marines at the Barracks wear, I guess based on a concept that the green overcoats don't look to great with blues. But then I remember, and I'm sure you do, the days of the beaver overcoats and the heavier overcoats that Marines . . . beaver . . . great . . . beautiful . . . beautifully tailored officers' overcoats that sweep . . . that look like guardsmen's overcoats and the heavier overcoats that the Marines wore with their blues and I think they did very well with that. So I . . . This is your interview and your comments but I think . . .

Chapman: Although I think those things are all true.

Babb: General, when you came aboard 8th and I, sir, and saw the Barracks and saw the way the uniforms were at that time and how the parades were conducted by your predecessor, how soon did it take you, sir, if I might ask, in your own mind, that you were going to change that and how
soon afterwards did you make the change, roughly? Was it an instantaneous thing or an evolutionary change from the anglicized.

Chapman: It had to be evolutionary. When I got there we were in the midst of the parade season. It was impractical to make wholesale changes in uniforms and techniques and ways of doing things. So it was gradual over a period of time. As you know we went out in October, I believe, to recruit a fresh set of privates and PFCs for the marching platoons. I presume that's still going on.

Babb: General, was there any resistance among, obviously there was no active resistance in the Marine Corps to your authority, but was there any resistance, psychological or otherwise or any comments generated from your own staff concerning the change over?

Chapman: I would say not. It's pretty hard to read men's minds . . .

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: . . . but I'm pretty sure that most of them were actually all for it and really didn't like the anglicized aspect.

Babb: When I was there, sir, I remember that one of the things that I was told as adjutant by both Col Gray and Col Twomey is that they did not make changes in the parade and they did not make changes in the kinds of things that occurred in the format without the approval of the Commandant, since the Barracks was really the Commandant's back yard for having a parade for friends and neighbors, if you will, when necessary and required. Did you have that kind of direction sir, or was that something that was just generally understood by the Barracks' COs, or could you pretty much do what you wished?

Chapman: Yes, in my time there I could do pretty much what I wished. I took pains to keep the Commandant informed of prospective changes: as for instance the idea of shifting the parades to night time. I got his approval.
Babb: Which I will ask more about in a second.

Chapman: Similarly I sought his blessing for the idea of bringing the first black Marines to 8th and I. Prior to my time, I think I went over this. . . .

Babb: Yes, sir, part of it.

Chapman: The feeling was that the faces along the parade deck should all be white. I didn't agree with that.

Frank: Did Phil Berkeley relieve you?

Chapman: No, he was . . .

Frank: Ahead of you?

Chapman: . . . two. . . .

Frank: Before you.

Chapman: He was two before me. He must have been, yes.

Frank: I think he--if I may I'd like to correct you on that--I think he had black Marines there, during Gen Shepherd's regime. It may have been the first black Marines because it was right. . . . Well, Gen Shepherd took over as Commandant in 1952, January of '52 from FMFPac, and the order for desegregation of the armed forces, I think, went into effect in '49. Phil Berkeley mentioned in his interview that he was sitting . . . Gen Shepherd was sitting out there with him. . . . Of course those were the days of the sunset parades, Friday afternoon parades and they didn't have the big benches and everything just a bunch of chairs along the outskirts of the field. The thing that strikes my mind on this is that Phil said when they did squads right, all of
the sudden here these black Marines, who had been in the back row, were now in the front row. Gen Shepherd was kind of taken aback on that and was not too well prepared to receive or project the black Marines and so on because it was strange. Gen Berkeley said, "Well, there's no way other that you can do it." So I'm just wondering if maybe after that black Marines were excluded from the Barracks and they came back during your time.

Babb: Maybe what were saying is when the General first had them actively accepted, I suspect.

Chapman: Yes, maybe that might be it. I know I was certain that when I got there, there weren't and hadn't been . . .

Frank: Okay, well that. . .

Chapman: . . . for at least three or four years.

Frank: Well, the initial experiment then under Phil Berkeley's time must have ended.

Chapman: That's marching Marines.

Frank: That's right.

Chapman: There were stewards, there were administrative personnel.

Frank: Drivers and so on.

Chapman: Drivers, supply clerks, Marines at the Institute, but they were senior Marines; they weren't marching Marines.

Babb: Some of these things I'll ask, I ask them and I think maybe I shouldn't but I will anyway, and one is: in the evolution of the parade, General, from the time that you saw fit to change it from an afternoon function, as you mentioned in your earlier tape, where you had only a few
hundred spectators and generally all Marines and Marine families, as opposed to the making 8th and I the J. Walter Thompson of the Marine Corps and making it not only a drill and function kind of thing but a public relations thing for the Marine Corps. Whether that was a conscious desire at that time I don't know, sir, but certainly it has become the Marine Corps for many spectators. When during that time frame, General, after it transitioned over to the evening and people began to think, "This really does make a lot of money for the Marine Corps," (by money I mean the image and the things it projects to many mid-westerners who may never see the Corps except for that Friday evening) when did that come to that point, sir?

Chapman: Well, I think gradually over a period of time, but not very much time. I think by the end of that first season we had achieved that end; certainly it had in the Commandant's mind. Gen Pate, he loved it and he started bringing his important VIPs to the parade, inviting them to the garden party and then to the parade.

Babb: That's my next question sir.

Chapman: Well, I didn't really think in terms that large when we decided to move it to night. I was simply thinking that it was going to be a much better spectacle, that's all. I based that conclusion on, as you know, by going to Bermuda and watching the searchlight tattoo in Bermuda, which I thought was a tremendous show with lots of drama! Periods of blackness then sudden spotlights, then floodlights, and then black again, just like the parades are. It just makes a wonderful nighttime show.

Babb: When, sir... . .

Chapman: It actually started out at the very first parade, we had something like 3000 people there, the very first night parade, and it's been like that from then on.

Babb: I can't even get in on the nights when I try. General, in terms of the Thursday evening functions, as I used to know them and they may have changed somewhat over the years, but the garden parties as we affectionately called them at the Barracks when I was adjutant. When did
the Commandant begin doing the garden parties for Thursday evening functions? Was that a part of it beforehand when it was a routine late afternoon parade or did you get something that was given later on?

Chapman: It was not part of the afternoon parades. At the afternoon parades, the garden party followed the parade. The spectators and the honored guests all came to the parade and then they all marched up to the Commandant's garden and had a garden party. The Thursday evening, the special parade on Thursday evening . . . let me think now. Did that start when I was there? I believe it did. Seems to me that we had two or three or four of them.

Babb: Gen Twomey said he thought they started under your. . . .

Chapman: Yes, I believe they did. That was one of the sticking points in taking the thing up with the Commandant, the idea of having the parade after the garden party, which of course is required for an evening parade. There was a lot of worry about, "How are people going to get something to eat?" "How about dinner?" Well, of course it's all worked out. They have heavy cocktails and the people clean up the roast beef and shrimp and they feel well-fed when they get to the parade. I think that must have started during my time. Anyhow, the idea there, of course, was to have a large garden party so that there were seats for a large number of people.

Babb: They wined and dined Washington's finest I guess. That was a very, very special parade as I remember because we would call out every Barracks officer up there to assist as escorts and so on as the General knows I'm sure.

Chapman: I think Ben wants to say something.

Babb: You were going to say something?

Frank: I was just thinking, and I was thinking about Dave Twomey and his family. This has nothing to do with parades. The boys were small then. Did you send them to school?
Chapman: My boys?

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: Yes! They were in. . . .

Frank: Not from the area, you had to send them . . . you sent them out. . . .

Chapman: No, in those days the Navy Yard here ran a bus. . . .

Frank: Oh, really?

Chapman: Yes, ran a bus--and that had been going on for years--to Woodrow Wilson High School out in northwest Washington (I guess it's still there) and Alice Diehl Junior High is off in that same vicinity. So one of ours was a freshman in high school and the other one was in about the eighth grade, seventh or eight grade, so they just. . . . The Navy bus came by every morning and picked them up right there at 8th and I and off they went along with a lot of children from the Navy Yard. Ours were the only ones from 8th and I.

Babb: At the time, Ben, just to add to the tape, at the time I was adjutant for Col Twomey and for Gen Graham, the children were taken in a staff car to school because there was no bus. They were taken and that was, apparently, approved at the Headquarters level for that to be done. It was really not ostentatiously but they were taken to school. I can't remember where they went to school.

Frank: Dave had a large brood anyway.

Babb: Yes, he did, he certainly did.

Frank: I'm sorry. I just wanted to get that in while I thought of it.
Chapman: I don't think they could get away with that now since the schools have been desegregated.

Frank: Well, I think they probably very carefully choose who the Barracks commander is going to be with respect to the family.

Babb: I would imagine so. General let me, if I could, just continue. If I seem to be shot-gunning, all these will be tied up, I hope, in a nice article that I'll try to get in touch with you, sir, and read to you before we publish it. In terms of the competition that we enjoyed in a good sort of way with the Army's Old Guard, how would you contrast the impact on the public (not necessarily the Army trying to project the Army and the Marine Corps trying to project the Corps to the public) but how would you contrast the effect on people, and patriotism, and so on of our function--being the Marine Corps--vice the Old Guard's function. As you know, sir, we used to ask their CO and staff officers over to one of our parades and treated them royally--the Barracks officers--and the same thing went on over there. How did that evolve over time? Which is the oldest in terms of ceremonial functions, General, as you might know.

Chapman: I can't say I know the answer to that last question. I think the Army's been doing parades at Fort Myer for a long, long time. The Marines have been doing them at 8th and I for how long? I guess some sort of function goes all the way back to the activation of the Barracks.

Babb: Fifty years of parades.

Chapman: The afternoon parade, I think, goes back about 50, 75 years, something like that.

Frank: When I was a young officer down at Quantico in '50--that's 35 years ago--I remember it was the Friday afternoon parades.

Chapman: I think there was . . .

Frank: Played merry hell to get up there. . . .
Chapman: . . . in World War II also.

Frank: I'm sure there must have been. Of course you had the band concerts at that time. The Marine Band had a broadcast.

Chapman: The parade was sort of standard practice throughout the Marine Corps prior to World War II. I know at San Diego, where I was in the late '30s, we had a parade every Friday afternoon.

Babb: When I was a Parris Island. . . . Of course Parris Island is very, very much like 8th and I--somewhat unique--but my tour at Parris Island as a series officer and company commander, every Friday afternoon was an RTR parade of some sort.

Chapman: As for the comparison between the Army and the Marine Corps, I'd have to say I think each was very effective in its own way. The one at 8th and I, of course as everybody knows, has a special setting. There's just no way you can duplicate or excel that close . . .

Babb: Quadrangle effect.

Chapman: . . . quadrangle with that old world atmosphere. That can't be touched anywhere else. On the other hand, the Army ceremonies at Fort Myer were . . . they were typical Army. They were big, it was over a large area, there was a large number of troops out there . . .

Frank: Fort Myer has its own historic aura too.

Chapman: . . . and it's got a historic setting as well, with the cemetery in the background.

Frank: Civil War period buildings, housing, quarters.
Chapman: The Army put on a typical Army parades out there and they were very effective, but quite different from the feeling that you get from the one at 8th and I; but I would say typical Army feeling. They were good! I liked them, I enjoyed going to them and watching them.

Babb: General, a question here. We always seem to get back to money in anything that we talk about, and during my own tour at the Barracks we spent a great deal of money doing things that ordinarily would not be done at a typical Marine installation, obviously, because of the effect of showing our very, very best side and obtaining the perfection the General mentioned. I think as Marines we all understand that. I had some friends tell me one time, "This is the greatest thing I've ever seen, but Bill Proxmire would lay the biggest Golden Fleece award on 8th and I in the history of the world if he knew everything about it." That may or may not be true, but would the General comment on how the budget got larger and larger and larger over the years and the kinds of things that made that occur, like the changing of the sod and things of that nature almost any time there was a flaw; and how that kind of thing's approved or if it's a problem approving it. Obviously the Commandant approved it but . . .

Chapman: Yes, we had, and still do I presume, a basic budget, a base budget. Then for all those extra things we put in special budget requests and named each one, and we practically always got them. When we put in the permanent lighting and the semi-permanent bleachers for the second evening parade series, those were specially funded items and the Commandant approved them. The red coats for the Drum and Bugle Corps, that was a special budget project. Those sidewalks . . . the center walk and the troop walk were just dirt parade ground when I got there. It's amazing how much those dang sidewalks cost, too. That was a special project. The reconstruction of the parking lot, that was done, that was a special project. I can't remember everything, but anyhow each one (there were many of them) . . .

Frank: On the uniforms, the . . .

Chapman: . . . special budget items that we put in for in advance of the budget year and they were approved. They gave us the money.
Babb: There are so many intangibles there because of the public relations benefit--and that's a terribly overused word--the kind of image that we projected to the public. Obviously, I think, for the Marine Corps we could probably never quantify that but I think the return on the investment has been incredible; probably one of the finest returns, if you could quantify it, in history for the amount of money spent. But I really think we ought to address that very briefly to see . . . That really is a huge budget with the special items included each year.

Chapman: Yes, they're all . . . they're practically all capital items though, so they're permanent improvement items. They're not one-year items, they're capital improvements that will be there for a long, long time. I hope they will be.

Frank: I was going to say . . . another . . . talking about uniforms the red coats of the Drum and Bugle Corps. There were special uniform requirements for the Band also and the Drum and Bugle Corps. It was a certain . . . a light-weight material, and for the Marines at the Barracks, especially in the summer time, they couldn't possibly wear the serge blue or the officers wear the gabardine fabric jackets, they'd suffocate. So I think the Band . . . There's a light, it's a light wool . . .

Chapman: The Band has a light red . . .

Frank: And blue.

Chapman: . . . blouse fabric, light fabric and we used that same fabric for the Drum and Bugle Corps. I can't remember that we had special blue fabric.

Frank: It was just the red?

Chapman: It was just the red, I think. The officers in the parades . . . I have no idea. I think I just wore my regular approved blouse.

Babb: Yes, so did I.
Frank: Well, then you didn't have...

Chapman: We didn't have them then. Do they now? I don't know.

Babb: I think the blouses are the same. There are extra blouses. In fact, my blouse had the Sam Browne on it so much we ended up... The first IG officers' uniform inspection I stood, I didn't realize this and I wore the blues, that was the only discrepancy I had, is he said, "It's a little too slick where the belt was." I had to go out and buy a new blouse, but it was the same one.

General, could I ask you, if I could sir, about something else? Where this came from, and I always found it terribly convenient and interesting and I think Marines have over the years and I don't think the public really knows, and is it down anywhere that actually the white trousers that are used up there--at least during my time and when the General was Commandant--were actually mess trousers that were easily laundered and pressed in the press shop.

Chapman: Yes, they were easily laundered and pressed, but that they were mess trousers, I'm not aware of it.

Babb: Yes, sir, they were sir.

Chapman: I know they were manufactured at the Marine Clothing Depot up in Philadelphia until it was put out of business, which was after my time at the Barracks. We got them from Philadelphia.

Babb: They were mess mens' trousers and they looked great and they were easily laundered and I wondered where that... if that had been a conscious decision somewhere or they just came out of that process. How the white trouser situation came about at the Barracks.

Chapman: I don't know but you know the dress blue--is it "C," it used to be--dress blue charlie .

Chapman: . . . was the blue blouse and the white pants. That's an old, old Marine Corps uniform.

Babb: Yes, sir, it is.

Chapman: Those white pants go back a long time. I don't know how far back.

Frank: But one of the problems you had under the Pate regime was Gen Pate's insistence on where the break in the trousers was going to be. There's that famous shot of the--up at Iwo Jima, at the memorial statue--of the formation of 8th and I which was made into a big colorama thing at Grand Central Station, blown up. Every Marine in there, officer, man, and bandsman looked as though his white trousers were too long for him, because the break was way down at the bottom. It covered the heel, covered almost the whole shoe.

Chapman: What year was that?

Frank: Well, it had to be during . . . As you recall, Gen Pate was quite a stickler for clothing, both civilian and uniform clothing. He seemed to take quite and interest. I've got it on record, the fact that he was particularly interested in the break of the trousers. As a result, your trousers hung considerably longer than you would have normally worn them. It almost looked that the Marines would trip over their trousers; they were that long.

Chapman: I don't remember that. The only thing I remember about it is--what I insisted on--that it be regulation. I don't think Gen Pate ever said . . . I know he never said anything to me about trousers. Whatever was regulation. . . . Seems to me the regulation was that the bottom of the back of the trousers would come right down to the heel box and it would be cut up something like half an inch so that there was a small break over the toe.

Babb: Yes, sir.
Chapman: Is that approximately what it was?

Babb: Yes, sir, it was.

Chapman: Well, that's the way it was when I got there.

Babb: Before there was no angle cut at all, as I understand it. Perhaps [cross talk] . . .

Chapman: Maybe that's it.

Babb: They hit the heel, but then they were cut level across. They looked like they were stacked up on the front, and you could, literally, trip over them if you had a short foot, and that did happen.

General, could I ask a . . .

Chapman: Let me go back to those white pants a minute and tell you a story that has some interest. When I got to Yokosuka in '54, to be CO, we had . . . the barracks there put on a parade every Friday afternoon, when I got there, in service uniform, uniform of the day. I found out that we rated blues and many of the Marines had blues that they'd bought there in Japan. So we started wearing blue uniforms for the parade, in the winter, and then, of course it gets pretty hot in Yokosuka in the summer. I was undecided about what to do about it and one day my supply officer came up and said, "Do you realize that down in our supply room we've got about 500 boxes of white trousers?" I said, "Good Lord, where did they come from?!" He said, "I have no idea. They've been there for years!" So we broke them out. They were in good shape. We issued two or three pair to every Marine and we went into white-blue charlie for our parades.

Babb: Best looking uniform going.

Chapman: But where those white pants at Yokosuka came from, nobody knows, but they'd been there for years and they were discovered during my term and used. So those white pants have been around for a long, long time.
Babb: I'm sure they really have. They were terribly convenient. I would take them home and my wife would launder them and I would bring them back to the Barracks' press shop and have them pressed and it was the most convenient thing in the world. They were just this cotton trouser.

General, if I could, let me just continue by asking something that refers back to one of your oral history tapes, and that is your relationship, when you were there as CO with Gen Pate. I deduce or gather from listening to your comments today and previously, that Gen Pate virtually gave you a credit card so you could do pretty much what you wanted at the Barracks as long as it was done with discretion and done with careful thought. Could you comment on your relationship with Gen Pate as it pertained to the parades only sir when you were CO of the Barracks?

Chapman: I think you've expressed it very well. He didn't ride the Barracks with a tight rein at all, as long as we did things that he liked. As I have said previously, I took care to keep him informed and I had a standing appointment with him, once a month. Once a month I would report to Headquarters, wait my turn and go in and spend about 15 minutes briefing the Commandant on what was going on and what we proposed to do. He always said, "That's just fine, go ahead," and we did.

Babb: General, in . . .

Chapman: For example, when I came up with the idea for the red coats for the Drum and Bugle Corps, I had a couple of coats made up special. I got two of my best looking buglers to put them on, one with white pants and one with blue pants, and at my meeting that particular month with the Commandant I marched these two Marines in so the Commandant could look at them. I said, "Now here's what we're proposing to do with red coats for the Drum and Bugle Corps." He thought they were wonderful, he loved those red coats.

Babb: The Band had red coats then, didn't they?
Chapman: Oh, yes, they'd always had them. I might remark here incidentally, I guess it's still true, the Band is a separate administrative organization with its own budget and its own personnel system.

Babb: If I could expand on that sir?

Chapman: Yes.

Babb: In terms of the Band relationship, there have been changes, as the General knows, over the years. When I was there, certainly, it was a virtually autonomous outfit to the Barracks. It really worked with the CO of the Barracks and did the things that were required, but really, as we used to call it, worked for the Band Aide in the Commandant's office. A lot of things have changed over the years due to some internal administrative foul-ups and a few things that the General knows, and they do have a line officer -- the executive officer of the Band now. In fact one of my closest friends just left a tour there, Joseph Hayes. He was XO of the Band. Could the General comment on how you viewed the Band in terms of the Barracks, and how it related to the Barracks, and any really positive or negative things that you saw in that relationship over the years, sir, during your tenures, perhaps, as CO of the Barracks and later as Commandant?

Chapman: Well, the Band then, and I think still is, as separate entity. It's at the Barracks as a tenant. The CO of the Barracks is the landlord. The Band, the operations of the Band, and all of the musical aspects of the band are entirely separate from the Barracks and the Barracks commander. There are just a few administrative things that -- discipline for instance, like court-martial, disciplinary action -- comes under the Barracks, under the CO of the Barracks.

Frank: Who provides the . . .

Chapman: But the Band, in almost every respect, is an independent entity. The Band has the responsibility, of course, of providing marching units for the parades and for other kinds of ceremonies, but they were laid on not by the Barracks but by the Band Aide in those days. Now
I believe the Band comes under Public Relations doesn't it?

Babb: I think it does. Yes, that's correct.

Frank: That's the unfortunate part about it. I'm just going over in my mind

cross talk

Chapman: . . . mistake.

Frank: In the hands of one individual over there who gets pretty uptight. She books and everything else and I don't think it's a wise system but apparently it's working. I think a lot of people would like to take advantage of the Band. I think there's legislation, or a DOD ruling, that the Band, like the other service bands, can only be used for patriotic displays and affairs. I guess it was the same way then.

Chapman: Oh, yes. I think that's been true . . . That's got something to do with the labor laws and competition with other musical . . .

Babb: Well, as the General knows, and of course the General . . . I have a plaque on my wall that says, "Honorary member of the Marine Band," presented by LtCol--at that time--Dale Harpham, which was given . . . Dale got into a tricky, little, sticky mess later on after my tour and spent a little time down at Quantico, I think, working through that before he retired. I think things tightened up considerably after that and the Band is in a very sensitive position. But I too, as you feel Ben, that the Band should be under someone or some administrative or other agency either at the Barracks or under the Commandant's office. I think sometimes the Band is not used as effectively as it could be, but that's all I'm going to say on that.

Frank: It used to be . . . Years ago one of the Commandant's aides had the responsibility for booking the Band and budgeting the Band and so on. At this present time, Missy Crayer, who is
over in DivInfo, or Public Affairs, or Public Relations, whatever they call it now, is the dictator of the Band for all practical purposes.

Chapman: Well, it's a prestige question too.

Frank: Oh sure, the . . .

Chapman: Aside from the administrative machinations, the difference in status when the Band's directly under the Commandant and whether it's under one of his staff officers.

Babb: General may I expand. . . .

Chapman: It hurt the Band. I know it hurt their feelings. They were in effect demoted.

Babb: Yes, sir. I think psychologically many of them felt that way for a while.

General, could I ask something? This may or may not be true at all, back to something I asked you earlier. That was Gen Twomey and Col Green, they did not make a point of this but it was always essentially said to me that, "We do not make changes without CMC's comment." I'm not trying to overdo what I'm asking here. Simply, I felt that during my tenure as the adjutant that you sir, as the Commandant or the Commandant's office at that time whether it was your personality sir, or whether it was the CMC's office, had a very much stronger rein on the managing or the micro-managing of the functions within the Barracks than perhaps you've stated occurred during your regime some 10 or 12 years earlier. Was that true sir, or is that just something that I perceived?

Chapman: I don't think that's true, no. I didn't. . . . [cross talk] The only thing I required was, as had been true with my relations with Gen Pate, I required the 8th and I commander to come up once a month and tell me what was going on.

Babb: Yes, sir, I certainly remember that.
Chapman: But I didn't... I never did anything other than approved what he proposed to do.

Babb: You pretty much felt that the Barracks CO should run the Barracks.

Chapman: Absolutely.

Babb: I've got to ask this, sir, for the record also. In the selection process of the Barracks CO, when the books come up and the Commandant personally makes that selection as I understand it, and I'm not privy to all the things that go on there. Would you care to comment, sir, on how that selection process is made and how it was felt and perhaps some of the things looked at for a colonel who almost assuredly, unless something really, really happened, was going to have an awfully good opportunity, as you've said earlier, to be selected for a general officer. Was there ever anything... that's a terrible choice of words. I'll back away from the comment I was going to ask. Would you comment on that sir, as to how you felt about that selection process. Was it good?

Chapman: Well, it was personal choice by the Commandant. The Personnel Department would come up with a half a dozen nominations and the Commandant would pick the one he liked best, that's all. There was a... the picking usually was based on military appearance.

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: I mean he's got to be at least six feet or more, and be built like a...


Chapman: ...a picture book Marine.

Frank: But I think what Wayne's trying to ask you, sir, is whether or not a poor choice was made.
Chapman: To my knowledge?

Frank: Yes, sir.

Babb: And I guess not only a poor choice, sir. Did you ever feel . . . that's a poor choice of words. But you received six or eight books, General, did you ever feel like, "Christ, there's someone else here that I know that I'd like to see that book." Did you ever ask for another book, for example?

Chapman: No, I don't think so. I'd have to say personal knowledge had a lot to do with it too.

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: Prior service together, personal understanding, for instance. . . .

Babb: I know Gen Twomey had served with you in Force Troops I think.

Chapman: Yes, he was one of my . . . he was the 2d Force Recon Company commander.

Babb: Yes, sir, exactly.

Chapman: So was Gen Kelley as a captain.

Babb: Yes, sir, that's right.

Frank: Well, they were . . . as a matter of fact they . . . I was going . . .


Babb: I remember that in . . .
Frank: In a mid-air parachute jump. I was down at Lejeune at that time, in 1960. They passed the colors to each other as they were floating by in a parachute.

Chapman: Yes. [Laughter] That's the truth. That was my time in Force Troops.

Frank: Yes, you were Force Troops down there, sure. I think I came up to Headquarters just a little bit before you did because you came up in '61 I believe it was.

Chapman: Yes, '61, summer of '61.

Frank: You took over G-4.

Chapman: I'd have to say, in all honesty, that personal knowledge had more to do with it than anything else.

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: Of course the basis of the personal knowledge was the appearance, military performance, high standing.

Babb: Was Col Graham your selection, sir, or was that...? I can't remember.

Chapman: I don't know if I can remember either.

Babb: I know he would have been there two years I believe... and the General's term was four years of course and Gen Twomey was there your final year.

Chapman: Yes, he must have been.

Babb: So he would have been.
Chapman: He must have been.

Babb: Yes, sir. Over the years, in that selection process sir, did you ever hear of your fellow CMCs or any other individuals, as Ben said, maybe someone who, as an after thought, was not the ideal choice for CO of the Barracks or perhaps did not fit the mold later on? Did it always seem to work out okay?

Chapman: I think so. There was one name, whose name I can't even remember, who was in a certain amount of disfavor. I can't think who it was but I thought he did a good job with the parades, to my understanding.

Frank: Of course the fact that not everyone who had the Barracks made general officer.

Chapman: That's true.

Frank: ... is an indication that ... although a lot of eyebrows were raised in the case of Bob Williams and some others who had it who were general officer material and probably should have made it . . .

Chapman: Who did not make it.

Frank: . . . and did not make it.

Babb: Well, sir, Gen Twomey is a lieutenant general and he was not selected for one-star his first time up. I remember that because I was in the area when that occurred. I was at graduate school.

General, let me change just a bit and go back to something that may have been unique to your tenure, sir, and we thought was terribly unique during my time there, and that is the Vietnam veterans. Could you comment on that sir? I think it was your dictate that, until you changed it, there would be nobody on the parade deck in the Drum and Bugle Corps, or the parade troops, that would be there unless they were Vietnam veterans.
Chapman: That's correct. That, of course, was part of my overall policy that all Marines would go to Vietnam.

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: So that it would be unthinkable for a non-Vietnam vet to be at 8th and I.

Frank: No bare chests.

Chapman: No bare chests. Of course that did a lot for the appearance, and then as part of the announcement at the beginning of the parade the announcer always said, "Every Marine on the parade ground is a Vietnam veteran."

Babb: Yes, sir, 430 Navy Crosses and 2... [cross talk]

Chapman: That's right and we'd tabulate the medals too...

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: ... which was really pretty impressive! It was really impressive. But, in the larger context, it would have been impossible for a non-Vietnam vet to be there because the rule was every Marine had to go to Vietnam without exception. That included not only the marching Marines but all the supply and paymasters and the whole show.

Frank: Drum and Bugle Corps.

Chapman: And the Drum and Bugle Corps, but not the Band.

Frank: No.
Babb: The public would not have noticed this, General, but certainly we did as the... and I agreed with that policy totally. It's not my point to agree or disagree with it but I certainly do, I thought it was very impressive. But one of the more interesting things that happened during that tour, as you may have seen in the troop formations... The troops at that time, instead of being called A and B Company, they were called Guard Company and MCI Company. You may have seen (as opposed to now and perhaps when the General had the Barracks when you had sergeants and corporals and PFCs and privates), because they were Vietnam veterans, you had sergeants and sergeants and sergeants and corporals and corporals. It was an NCO platoon and company.

Chapman: Yes, that's true and often the platoon leader would be a captain...

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: ... and the company commander would be a major. That's quite correct.

Babb: The Guard Company CO was a major, as a matter of fact, Maj James Coolican, Jim Coolican was the CO of Guard Company and Capt Bill Phyte, who I believe is a lieutenant colonel now, William C. Phyte, III was the CO of MCI Company.

Chapman: That's quite true. It was really an impressive sight too.

Babb: Yes, sir, it was. I believe that was your decision, was it not?

Chapman: Yes, it was.

Babb: Ben, I'm thinking. Go ahead if you have a question you want to ask.

Frank: No, I have no more.
Babb: I have, I think, about one more that I want to ask. General, if you could. . . . This is an overall impression . . . this is more for the magazine than perhaps just for the record because you may have said this, but could I ask the General to take a second and just give an overall summary of how you view Marine Barracks today? As sort of an advertising tool (I won't quote it as such in the article), but as an advertising tool in addition to the Barracks overall function and what it does for the Corps, Marine Barracks, 8th and I on a daily basis. What it does for the Marine Corps.

Frank: You want to say public relations rather than advertising tool.

Babb: A public relations function or what the Barracks means to the Marine Corps. When I hear it, or when most Marines hear it, they think of--to use the Toyota commercial--the epitome of excellence. How do you see it sir, from your perspective now, having retired as Commandant, as you look back on the Barracks? What function does it serve for the Corps in the big picture?

Chapman: It's the oldest post of the Corps. It's sort of the birthplace of the United States Marine Corps. Over the years, it's grown to be just what you said, the epitome of. . . .

Chapman: . . . it's the only place where perfection can be achieved. So it has a major impact, both in the public arena and within the Marine Corps.

Frank: And in the political arena because it certainly has to be. . . . It's the only place where the Commandant really, except for the small social parties that he has with the powerful and the mighty in the area, to really use as a entertainment vehicle for the politicians up on Capitol Hill etc. It's a very important tool in the . . . weapon!
Chapman: Well, it's part of what I've always believed is one of the major functions of the Marine Corps, which is to set the example; to set a standard.

Babb: But it's also part of the mystique isn't it, General?

Chapman: Yes, it is, it's part of the mystique. But the Marine Corps, as a whole I believe--always believed--has a national duty to set an example, to be a model for all Americans to admire and attempt to achieve; a model of not only military professionalism, but also honor, integrity, honesty, all those good things, patriotism. That's a national duty that the Marine Corps has. As a part of that, the Marine Barracks at 8th and I has a special duty of setting an example of excellence. They do it, and they do it danged well too!

Frank: On the obverse side, the Marine Corps has to be very careful that the 8th and I (the glamour, the glitter, show biz) does not give a false impression of what the Marine Corps is. If you listen to the words when the colors are presented and the announcer announces the streamers and the awards and the battles, I think that . . . and the . . .

Chapman: I wrote those words.

Frank: Did you? Well, I'm glad to get that on. . . . I've been using that at the Virginia Scottish Games. I have the color guard there each year there and I've got a copy of that speech. I say, "The colors you see before you are the colors of the Marine Corps presented here by the courtesy of the Commandant," and I go into the speech that you wrote.

Chapman: Well, yes, I did. One word was changed. The last line is . . . as I wrote it the last line is, "Marine Barracks 8th and I is charged with the custody of this color." About the third or fourth evening parade we had, I invited Gen Krulak to be the reviewing officer. He was then the Director of Education down in Quantico.

Frank: He wouldn't have picked the words.
Chapman: So he listened to that and when it was over he said, "That's good but there's one word I would change." I said, "What's that?" and he said, "I would take out 'charged' and insert 'entrusted.'" So the word "entrusted" is Gen Krulak's word.

Frank: Although "charged," I think, has the same meaning.

Chapman: But "entrusted" has a little more . . .

Frank: But I think that's impressive . . .

Chapman: . . . oomph to it; to be "entrusted with the custody of this color."

Babb: I'll make sure I work that into the article.

Chapman: That's Gen Krulak's word.

Babb: I think Gen Krulak would enjoy reading that, and give the general credit for that.

General, I was going to stop here but I'll go ahead and expand, Ben if I might, just on a couple of things here that I think are important too. We haven't touched on, and I haven't heard in the oral history, the impact or the effect of, or the creation of, the Center House to the Barracks. Would the General care to comment on Center House in any way that you would like, and then maybe I'll ask a couple of more questions about how Center House fits into the Barracks' mission.

Chapman: Yes. Of course Center House is not in the center, for starters; it was originally up to when the Barracks was rebuilt in 1905 I believe?

Frank: I don't know the. . . .

Chapman: Just right after 1900 anyhow. The old Center House, which was the BOQ, was in the center. It was the center building there just behind the troop commander's walk, where Quarters
2 is now. Then when the Barracks was rebuilt, right after 1900, those sets of quarters were constructed and the one on the end, nearest the main gate, was made the BOQ. It persists to this day. Incidentally, it was rebuilt when I was there too, as you perhaps already know.

Babb: Yes, sir, it was. It was also rebuilt during your tenure as Commandant. . . .

Chapman: Yes, it was.

Babb: . . . by Gen Graham.

Chapman: When I was there as commander we made major structural changes.

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: We moved the kitchen down into the basement, turned the kitchen into a bar room.

Babb: The Drum Room, yes, sir.

Chapman: The Drum Room, put in the dumb waiter for the kitchen to get the chow up and down, opened up that--between front room and the original dining room--opened that out so it's about 10 feet wider than it is in. . . .

Babb: So the General rebuilt it structurally and internally. Then, later on, it was paneled even more elaborately by Gen Graham.

Chapman: Quite right, paneling was put in and a number of other . . . beautiful place.

Babb: Mahoganies and . . .
Chapman: It continues to this day as the BOQ. It's principally occupied, I think (it was then, probably still is), by the White House aides who have to be bachelors and any other bachelors that there happen to be at 8th and I. I don't suppose there are very many anymore.

Babb: Not as many as there used to be, sir.

Chapman: One of the notable bachelors during my time there as Commandant was Capt Chuck Robb who was a White House aide and met Linda in the Center House.

Babb: Yes, sir. I relieved Chuck Robb as adjutant at the Barracks and kept in contact with him over the years even when he became governor. Every once in a while, through a Christmas card or some sort of semi-obscene note, I'd hear something from him. But that's a special situation that I would never exploit and neither would he. But I value that very much.

General, I'm going to ask the question because everybody in the world is asking it nowadays. Col John Miller, down the hall, who was at the Barracks, (he's our deputy director here), and I have talked about it. The general remembers the infamous four-second club where the mug of beer was placed on the bar and if you could put the glass of beer down in less than four seconds, your name was put on a plaque. That has been put up and taken down, and put up and taken down over the years. Gen Graham took it down as "absolutely not." Gen Twomey let it go back up for a while and it's been down and up. Now the plaques have disappeared. Could the General shed any light on this?

Chapman: No, that didn't start when I was there.

Babb: I know it didn't, sir.

Chapman: That was after my time.

Babb: That was an interesting. . . .
Chapman: It sounds kind of like the buglers on the ramparts. Gen Shoup took the buglers off the ramparts; that was his first act when he became Commandant. [Laughter]

Babb: Did he sir?

Chapman: He didn't like the. . . . Well, he followed Gen Pate and Gen Pate loved those buglers on the ramparts.

Babb: We all do.

Chapman: Gen Shoup thought they were terrible, so practically his first act when he became Commandant was to take the buglers off the ramparts. They weren't up there for four years. Then Gen Greene became Commandant and his first act was to put the buglers back on the ramparts and they've been up there ever since.

Babb: All of us look at our peers, and I'll have to say for the record here that the record for the four-second club when it was in existence was held by a now-active duty colonel, Mike McGowan, who was a captain at the time. Mike put the beer down, from the time he lifted it to his lips and slammed it down on the bar in one second.

Chapman: I would say that was impossible!

Babb: I witnessed that and he didn't spill a drop and it was to the top. He had rehearsed it and worked and I don't know how . . .

Frank: Opened throat.

Babb: . . . suction device, opened throat and he poured it down his throat and put it down. I saw that.

Chapman: That almost sounds impossible.
Babb: Yes, sir, it does.

Frank: Waste of good beer. [Laughter]

Babb: He let it go flat.

Chapman: Well, that all started after my time. I really don't know anything about that.

Babb: General, do you know anything on how the mugs began, for example the Commandant's mug that has many Commandant's names on it.

Chapman: I don't know. . . .

Babb: I found my mug recently in there with about 40 names which age me after it.

Chapman: Adjutant names?

Babb: Anybody's name who inherited the mug.

Chapman: I see.

Babb: Just whoever came in, they pulled the mug out of the storage cabinet--the nice, glass mahogany breakfront if you will--and handed it to the officer and it was chance. How that came about, sir, would you know?

Chapman: I don't know. The mugs existed when I got there. Everybody had a mug but it was his. When that started I don't know. It might have been in Col Williams' time.

Frank: Possibly, that's a tradition of British officers' mess.
Chapman: Yes. The idea of mugs that are, in effect, permanent property of the bar--the kind you're describing--that began after my time there. I don't know how that got started.

Babb: Yes, sir. General, the Drum Room, when you had the building remodeled to convert the kitchen to what was known during my tour there when you were Commandant, sir, as the Drum Room, how did the name "Drum Room" come about?

Chapman: That also occurred after my time there and I really don't know. We made a very nice looking bar there. I can't remember whether we had the paneling or not. Maybe the paneling came later, but it was very nice looking. The idea of making it a Drum Room was after my time. I don't know when that originally started but I like it; it's good. It's a beautiful place. . . .

Frank: During your time--I think it must have been later--that the drum major of the Band got the tall shako, the British shako, the bear skin with the plate.

Chapman: Let me think now.

Frank: I don't think he had it during your time.

Chapman: I don't think he did either. I think that was imported from England . . .

Frank: It was imported, it was . . . that's right. Also . . .

Chapman: . . . at some later time.

Frank: . . . the drum major's sash and the, not tradition, but the system is now the drum major, after a parade, puts his sash and mace in a cabinet in the Center . . .

Chapman: Yes, in the Drum Room.

Frank: In the Drum Room.
Chapman: Right, that's fine, that looks good . . .

Babb: Yes, sir.

Chapman: . . . really looks good.

Babb: General, I'll finish up here with one other question that refers back to (without belaboring the point) about the black Marines and the General having black Marines on the parade deck and changing that. During your tenure as Commandant, one of the members of your general staff, Lieutenant General Hugh Elwood (that name just pops in), used to kid us a great deal, when we might be sort of standing and waiting in the dark while something was going on, and he might just come out in his civilian clothes out of his quarters and walk up behind us and talk to us and no one would know who he was. He would always punch me in the back and say, "Where in the hell are the aviators? I don't see any aviators on the parade deck." At that time there were no officers at Marine Barracks, 8th and I who were aviators nor had there ever been. Shortly after I left, sir, a couple of years later . . . and we always gave Gen Elwood credit for initiating that because he said he was going to. I wondered if the General had any knowledge or any comments. . . . During your tenure, sir, is when the . . . it did come about two years later, but there are aviators (flight officers, naval flight officers) on the staff at 8th and I periodically as they just happen to fall. I approved of that and I think many of us do. Was there any reason why, other than the cost of training these officers and having them fly, why aviators were not there in the past? Was that a policy General?

Frank: Probably just didn't march well.

Chapman: I don't think that was it. In those days the aviators drew . . .

Frank: Flight pay.

Chapman: . . . flight pay but only when they were flying.
Babb: Yes, sir. Now, of course.

Chapman: Now, it's only when they're flying, but in those days they drew it year-round, whether they were flying or not. It was a permanent part of their pay, but they had to get . . ., they had to do what was called refresher or . . .

Frank: Get flight time in.

Chapman: They had to get their flight time.

Babb: A certain amount of flight time, yes sir.

Chapman: I think that was the problem. It was pretty difficult for an aviator doing parade and guard duty to get flight time.

Frank: Proficiency.

Chapman: That's it, that's the word, proficiency flying. I think that was thing.

Frank: That's all changed now.

Chapman: That's all changed now so that they get flight pay only when they're flying.

Frank: And when they come up to Washington they don't have a chance for that.

Chapman: No, they don't get it. I think that was the basic reason.

Babb: During my tenure there were no female members of the Drum and Bugle Corps or the parades or the staffs or anything else and now, of course, there are. Was that ever debated early, during your time as the Barracks CO?
Chapman: No, I don't think that subject even came up.

Frank: Wasn't even thought of, no.

Chapman: Wasn't even thought of back in my day.

Frank: It all came up during Gen. . . . President Carter's regime when Mrs. Carter noted that amongst the White House aides there were no women. By God, it wasn't too long afterwards that you had females as aides, females in the guard companies and females in the service bands.

Chapman: Yes.

Babb: As I've told my wife, I'm a flaming liberal in many cases but I told her, I said, "I do not, in any circumstance," and she really (I didn't say it too many times, General) but I told her that I do not approve of females on the parade deck as members of the Drum and Bugle Corps because they're in such a distinct minority and their uniform is so different and they look so different in the uniform, I think they take away from the excellence. I had trouble talking to my wife for 48 hours. [Laughter] But I did state that and I stand on that.

Frank: I don't. . . .

Chapman: Well, there weren't any women in the Marine Band either, then. There have been since.

Frank: Oh, yes.

Chapman: And there weren't any black people in the Marine Band either. The last time I saw the Band, the part of it I saw at a parade here two or three weeks ago, there weren't any black bandsmen.
Frank: I only think there are a couple of blacks in the Band today. There are in the Drum and Bugle.

Chapman: It wasn't because the Band Director, who was Al Shoepper in my day, had anything against blacks. He just couldn't find a black musician that could qualify.

Babb: Had the education.

Frank: Or desired... the conservatory... who desired...

Chapman: The classical...

Frank: ...join the Band.

Chapman: ...instrument ability.

Frank: Conservatory graduate.

Chapman: Yes, exactly. There weren't any black Julliard graduates.

Frank: Well, there were but none who wanted to make a career out of being...

Chapman: Not with band instruments.

Babb: General, thank you sir. I know that you and Ben have other things to talk about to complete the oral history, but thank you very much sir. My plans will be to write an article for the Fortitudine concerning the Barracks at 8th and I and...

[Interruption in recording]

Frank: Well, one of the things we're going to go into is the immigration.
Chapman: Yes, that's going to take a while.

Frank: Alright well. . .

Chapman: We can get started on it.

Frank: I don't recall that I asked you, as we ended the interview, the things that I'm going to ask you now, and if I have we can cut it out. You know, you must have as your. . .

[Interruption in recording]

Frank: As your days as Commandant were ending I'm sure there was a round of farewell trips and farewell parties, and there was a time for musing and reviewing your years. What did you think about? How did you feel? Was there a sense of nostalgia, a sense of. . .

Chapman: Upon leaving?

Frank: Yes. A sense of accomplishment. What were the things that you never did that you would have liked to have done?

Chapman: Well, win the war for starters.

Frank: Well, of course you were there during the time that the Marines pulled out; that Vietnamization was in full force, but other. . .

Chapman: Yes, and the U.S. Marines began redeploying. I didn't have any real regrets. I thought the Marine Corps did a good job. I thought the Marines were professional. I thought that due to the large numbers of Marines--317,000 at the peak--and the one-year tour in Vietnam so that the Marine Corps consisted of three parts. One third of the Marine Corps was in
Vietnam, one third had just come back and was about to get discharged, and one third had just been enlisted and was being trained to go to Vietnam. It was a real merry-go-round.

There had been a certain . . . some loss of professionalism. I'm sure you remember, one of my chief projects toward the end of my tour was to restore that professionalism by reducing the size of the Marine Corps and getting back to a lean, mean, highly trained, highly professional outfit once again. We had taken many steps in that regard by the time I retired, and as the Marines pulled out.

No, I didn't have any real regrets. I thought we did well . . .

Frank: You thought . . .

Chapman: . . . under the circumstances.

Frank: . . . that all the things you wanted to do, you had pretty well done.

Chapman: Pretty much, or started at least.

Frank: Okay. It was during Gen Greene's Commandancy that the . . . Well, let me preface this by saying the traditional area of Marine Corps involvement has been the Pacific. That changed during Gen Greene's time, because at that point there was a NATO commitment; northern tier which started. . . .

Chapman: Still is.

Frank: Well, it still is. Oh yes!

Chapman: Even greater now.

Frank: Even greater now. Gen Al Bowser was saying that he had a hell of a hard time fulfilling the commitments, the Vietnam commitments at the same time fulfilling the commitments to NATO.
Chapman: He was FMFLant then?

Frank: He was FMFLant then.

Chapman: Yes. Well, that's true. The Marine Corps had to rely, however, then as it always has, on the emergency staffing of any unit that was ordered to deploy. We've done that many times. I guess the most outstanding example was when we sent the 1st Marine Division to Korea in 1950; first the brigade and then the rest of the division. That was done by emergency deploying of Marines from everywhere . . .

Frank: And calling up the Reserves.

Chapman: . . . and calling up the Reserves; deploying from Headquarters Marine Corps, the posts and stations, the barracks. We just pulled Marines--experienced, ready Marines--from everywhere and manned the division. That's just what we would have had to have done for the 2d Division if the call had come. We were prepared to do it. We had a plan that was kept current at Headquarters for that purpose.

Frank: The strategy of that time that the United States was prepared . . . the Department of Defense had to be prepared to fight two and a half wars.

Chapman: Two and a half wars, that was the stated objective.

Frank: Nowhere did it meet it.

Chapman: Oh, no, impossible. It was impossible manpower-wise and . . .

Frank: Logistically?
Chapman: . . . logistically. I think we, the Marines at least, we had the necessary equipment, but the back up for supporting two and a half wars at the same time wasn't there. I don't see how it could have been there. It would have meant billions and billions of dollars.

Frank: The Navy, of course, didn't have the lift.

Chapman: And the Navy, of course, didn't have the lift, right.

Frank: Now, more and more from the time that the Commandant became an active member of the JCS--while not legally a full-time member, but an active member--Gen Shepherd's time, the Commandants had more and more say in the tank . . . had evinced greater interest in items that came up before the Chiefs.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: I'm sure that must have kept you very busy, that you had to keep your finger on everything that was going on. The Pacific wasn't parochial center of interest for the Marine Corps.

Chapman: Oh, quite true. When Gen Shepherd first became an active member for subjects . . .

Frank: Marine Corps subjects.

Chapman: . . . of direct concern to the Marine Corps, the percentage of involvement was very low. I don't know, you've probably got that in your history somewhere. It was just a few percent. But it gradually increased and by the time it got to me it was up above 98 percent somewhere. That other one or one and a half percent was really minor things, very minor. Yes, to be a full-time, active member involved a tremendous amount of time and staff work. We had to. . . .

Frank: Increased the staff.
Chapman: We had the OpDep--the Operational Deputy--who was LtGen Elwood at one time, and Gen Tharin, and others during my tenure.

Frank: Buse was in there and John Chaisson later.

Chapman: Right. They had a considerable staff; had to have just to keep up with, and make input to. . . . One of the things that distinguished the Marine Corps in that regard, I think, was our ability to put forward non-parochial, best interests of the country positions.

Frank: Difficult.

Chapman: We did that time after time. Gen Greene insisted on it and I insisted on it. I'm sure it's still true. We had the unique advantage of being able to do that. Since the Marine Corps involvement in many of those things was pretty small, we could take an honest broker attitude and position, and we often did; quite often. I always used to tell the action officers and the OpDep, "When you prepare this paper, don't think about the Marine Corps; think about the United States only." It was on that basis that we wrote all our position papers. It was time after time when the Marine Corps position would be the one that was approved by the Secretary of Defense because it was non-parochial, very balanced.

Frank: That's interesting. It seems to me that the greater involvement the Marine Corps became . . . the more the Marine Corps became involved with Joint Chiefs matters, it effected the staff of Headquarters Marine Corps. At one time G-3 was the queen of the staff and the Policy Analysis section was very, very important. The more Headquarters became involved with joint matters that it changed to the point where . . . and of course it effected a great change in the structure of the Headquarters staff, where Division of Plans . . . PP&O was the paramount staff agency at Headquarters.

Chapman: Yes, it originally was in G-3.
Frank: Right, G-3 Plans.

Chapman: G-3 Plans and they were. . . .

Frank: Just enlarged . . .

Chapman: They were the Marine Corps' JCS planners, is what they were. Later on, I can't remember whether it was during Gen Greene's time or mine, we moved that from G-3 and put the Plans Section directly under the OpDep.

Frank: It was either at the end of Gen Greene's term . . .

Chapman: Or early in mine.

Frank: . . . or early in yours.

Chapman: It was around that time. I can't remember which it was.

Frank: I'm trying to think back.

Chapman: It was about that time though, about in '67 or early '68, and I think it's still there.

Frank: When you were in the tank, in your relationships with the other Chiefs, did you find that the other services still had a dog-in-the-manger attitude about the Marine Corps? Or the Marine Corps was no longer the little follow-on, the little brother chasing around waiting for tidbits.

Chapman: It certainly wasn't like that when I was there.

Frank: Marine Corps had full stature . . .
Chapman: They accepted that we had 100,000 Marines in Vietnam. It would be impossible to . . . out of a total over there of . . .

Frank: Denigrate or to . . .

Chapman: To look on the Marine Corps in that light. That was definitely not true when I was there. I guess perhaps it had been in years gone by, but it wasn't then and I'm sure it isn't today.

Frank: What were your retirement plans as you and Mrs. Chapman got ready to leave the Commandant's House?

Chapman: Well, we planned to stay in the Washington area. I'd had a number of assurances, from people like Mel Laird, that he was going to find another position for me in the government, which he did.

Frank: Did you have a good relationship with Mr. Laird as SecDef.

Chapman: Oh, yes, very good, close.

Frank: How do you rate him as a SecDef?

Chapman: I thought he was superb in his time.

Frank: Why? He was the consummate politician and he had no particular defense background.

Chapman: Because of the great difficulties, the dissension, the uproar about the war, that were going on in the country and in the Congress; and his ability to represent the military in the Congress was superb. He didn't take much of a hand in managing the department. He left that to his deputy who, most of the time that I was there, was Dave Packard and he was superb. He was superb as the business manager of the Department.
Frank: Packard.

Chapman: Yes, Packard, Dave Packard. Of course, Mel left and Clifford came in. I thought he was pretty bad. He, too, was a consummate politician.

Frank: Oh yes, going way back.

Chapman: But his attitudes were opposition to the war. He was on the side of the protesters in other words, as it turned out. His sole objective was to get us out of there.

Frank: That's right, that was his injunction, that was his . . .

Chapman: Get us out.

Frank: But you . . .

Chapman: Fortunately we had an election. The Republicans took over and that changed.

Frank: But you were assured . . . Mel Laird assured you that he'd find something for you as opposed to, say, going into private industry or . . .

Chapman: Oh yes. I had some opportunities on that side but I didn't want to do that.

Frank: Did you feel that they were just exploiting you as a former Commandant rather than . . .

Chapman: Yes, probably. I just simply wasn't interested in getting into business or corporate life. I didn't want to do it.

Frank: And you'd had the house in Alexandria bought before you left the . . .
Chapman: Yes. I just was philosophically opposed to using military service as a springboard to corporate life. I was just against it.

Frank: It wasn't the attitude of certain other senior military people, revolving door so-called.

Chapman: I was philosophically against that and I never had any intentions of doing that.

Frank: When did the . . . when were you first offered the position of Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization?

Chapman: Well, let's see. It was about a year, a little over a year, after I retired from the Marine Corps. It was about, approximately, February of 73, February or March.

Frank: Yes, I remembered I met you up at the Commandant's office the day it was announced. We were up there for some sort of . . .

Chapman: Award.

Frank: . . . award. Someone was getting . . .

Chapman: My first contact came from Elliot Richardson, who was the Attorney General, and had become Secretary of Defense after--or just about the time--I retired from the Marine Corps. He, apparently, had heard, from a number of sources, some really complimentary things about my tour as Commandant, probably from Mel Laird among others, but also from some of the others that remained there. So he called me--I was in Tennessee--and asked me if I'd be interested in taking one of the positions in the Justice Department; Immigration or DEA, specifically. I said, "Yes, I'd be interested." He said, "Well, you'd better come to Washington and talk to me about here in the near future."

So I did; I went in to see him. He was very kind, very complimentary. I told him, "Yes, I'd be interested. I'd prefer Immigration to DEA." Well, I didn't know a whole lot about either
one of them. In fact, I knew very little. I just didn't like the idea of getting mixed up in the drug business. So I preferred Immigration.

I was turned over to the White House personnel people and had a number of interviews with them. I eventually had an interview with the President, Nixon.

Frank: Had you met him before?

Chapman: Yes, I'd met him when he was President and I was still Commandant of the Marine Corps. So, in short, he nominated me to the Senate. I had my hearings. The Senate confirmed me. I then reported over to get sworn in on a Monday morning. That was the 13th of May? No, it was November; it was the 29th of November, a Monday. The previous Saturday was the Saturday Night Massacre . . .

Frank: Oh yes.

Chapman: . . . when both Richardson and Ruckelshaus resigned! Of course everybody knows about the Saturday Night Massacre. It's part of the Watergate tragedy. So when I showed up Monday morning there wasn't either an Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General. [Laughter] The Solicitor General, Bob Bork was there. He's a former Marine.

Frank: I didn't know that.

Chapman: Yes, and a good one. He was a Korean War Marine. And Glen Pommeraning, who was the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, who was a career government official. There was a big discussion about which one was the acting Attorney General. Was it the Solicitor General or the Assistant Attorney General for Administration. So, we finally decided that they'd both swear me in since it was bound to be one of them! So they stood up there together, and they both held up their hands, and I held up my hand, and they said the words, and I said the words, and I was sworn in, and they both signed my commission. I've got it hanging on my wall now with both of their signatures on it.
Frank: That's unique. Tell me, when you went over to the White House for interviews, what do they demand of you, protestations of loyalty to the Republican party or . . .

Chapman: Oh, not at all. No, not at all.

Frank: No politics involved at all.

Chapman: There really wasn't, absolutely none. As a matter of fact, I'm a registered Democrat in Florida . . .

Frank: I'm glad to hear that. [Laughter]

Chapman: . . . although I've been voting Republican for I don't know many years in Florida, still do. No, there was no politics whatever involved. It was, in effect, a professional type of appointment. The only thing they talked about was the difficulties of the Immigration Service, the terrible problem of illegal aliens and what to do about them, how best to organize and staff and operate the Service to cope with its enormous problems, that's all we talked about.

Frank: You were on your own to act independently.

Chapman: I was on my own. It was good in that I didn't have any political obligations whatever, so I was able to operate as Commissioner of Immigration without any regard to paying political debts. It was a unique position actually. I think it may have been the only one in the whole government that didn't have political obligations. That was tremendous advantage.

Frank: What did you find out when you went into . . .

Chapman: It wasn't long after I got there that Nixon was gone too. [Laughter]

Frank: When you went to the Bureau, were you given any direction as to what had to be done?
Chapman: No, nothing, absolutely nothing. Of course there wasn't any Attorney General. Bork and Pommeraning didn't know anything much about the subject. The Service had operated off sort of by itself, in a vacuum, for many years. My predecessor as commissioner had been such for 12 years and I don't think he had hardly any relationship to speak of with the Justice Department or with the Attorney General. His relations were all with the Congress and with the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate. It might be interesting to note that, in the 12 years as Commissioner, he had never once left Washington. He'd never, in 12 years, visited any Immigrations installation.

Frank: You did a lot of traveling though.

Chapman: Well, when I learned that (of course, I would have done this anyway being a Marine), one of the things I determined I would do was visit each Immigrations installation at least once during my tenure. There's almost 400 of them. A hundred or more are little two- and three-man posts along the borders and inside the country. It took me three years to do it, but I did. I got to every single one of them at least once. So I spent a tremendous amount of time traveling, and talking to my troops, for whom I built up a very high regard.

Frank: Well, I think . . .

Chapman: Very high regard. Then the major installations, like the regional, I visited at least once a year, sometimes twice; the regional headquarters.

Frank: Did you change the thrust of the Commission's mission at all? Did you find things that had to be tightened up?

Chapman: Well, yes. I thought there was general laxity both in enforcing and administering the law. It must be remembered that at least half of the Service's responsibilities are administration; naturalization, legalizing immigrants, receiving and authenticating legal immigrants (permanent resident aliens they're called in the law), legalizing all sorts of things like bona fide marriages (to convert an alien to a permanent resident alien because she's married an American citizen), that
kind of thing. That's at least half, administering the law, service, servicing the applicants is at least half the. . . . The other half, of course, is enforcing the law which principally means illegal aliens.

So the service is divided into, on the one hand, the border patrol and the investigators and the detention officers who run the detention facilities; that's enforcement. On the other half are the naturalization officers, the inspection officers, and the adjudicators, and the immigration judges who are the administrators. I thought there was a general laxity in both fields, although in many cases—say the border patrol, for instance—they were sure doing their damndest. They were doing their best. They were just wholly inadequate to the magnitude of the task.

I guess the two main things that I was able to achieve were . . . well, maybe three main things. One was a general tightening up of the performance of duty. Second was to get some substantial increases in the size of the Service, both in administration and enforcement. The third thing I did, which I've always thought may have been the most important of all, was I acquainted the American people with a problem they didn't know they had.

Frank: Illegal aliens.

Chapman: The illegal aliens. We ran a Gallup poll right after I first got there that showed that only something like 15 percent of the American people had ever heard of the problem. When I left, three years later, we had another Gallup poll and over 85 percent had heard of it. The crucial difference was that in that three years, I made something like 250 speeches all over the country, I had hundreds and hundreds of press interviews and television interviews, wrote (well, I didn't write them, people wrote for me) magazine articles—we were in Reader's Digest, we were in the U. S. News and World Report, and so forth—hundreds of magazine articles and periodical articles. So that over a three-year period we were able to acquaint the American people, and in turn the Congress, with what was really (still is) a terrible national problem. I'd better . . . at that point I'd better stop because I've got some more commitments too.

Frank: I was just thinking of one thing, before, we added. Shut my eyes here for a minute. I think I provided input to the Commission in two ways. One was a young fellow, former Marine, who just got out, who had just been released from active duty, who lived across the street. I told
him, "You ought to go to work for border patrol. You've got a Marine Commandant heading it up." A young fellow by the name of Reardon, Mark Reardon.

Chapman: Reardon, yes, I remember that name.

Frank: Yes, he's become a good. . . . And then, of course, your executive, Neal Leary, was my old high school buddy . . .

Chapman: Sure.

Frank: . . . who became very . . . I think I recommended him that day up at Headquarters. I said, "I know a lawyer over there who's a real fine man."

Chapman: That's just what he was, a fine man, fine citizen, patriotic, hardworking, servant of our country, he really was, fine guy.

Frank: Well, I think this . . . unless you have some other items on the Commission you want to enter into the record. . . .

Chapman: Well, I could say an awful lot about it. I could talk about the magnitude and the details involved in it . . .

Frank: Well, why don't we. . . .

Chapman: . . . at some length.

Frank: Well, I think we ought to get it on the record since it's . . . while it doesn't apply to your Marine Corps thing, I'm sure that anyone doing any research in the future . . . and the . . . because I know that the . . . let me turn this off here.

End Tape 1/X, Side B
End Session X
Frank: We're going to talk about your post-retirement involvements. Now, at the time you retired had you any idea what you were going to do.

Chapman: Well, no, nothing specific, although I'd been assured by both Mel Laird, the Secretary of Defense, and the Vice President, who was Mr. Agnew, that they were going to find a position for me in the government. So we moved to a house we had in Alexandria and enjoyed ourselves, did some traveling, and waited for the call, and it did come.

Frank: As a service chief . . . does a service chief, at the end of his tour, get solicited by a lot of big corporations to join them just for the prestige of having someone who had been in this position?

Chapman: Well, yes, I wouldn't say a lot, but a number. I was resolved that I would not enter the corporate world under any circumstances.

Frank: Or the defense industry?

Chapman: Or the defense industry or think tanks.

Frank: Was there anything that you wanted to do?

Chapman: Yes, I was interested in being of some further service to the country in some federal capacity, and short of that, however . . . or maybe I should say beyond that, I wasn't interested.

Frank: Okay, so you got the call to become the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Chapman: Yes. Actually I got a call from Elliot Richardson, who was Attorney General and whom I'd known in the Pentagon, but not well. He apparently had a high regard for my reputation and asked me if I would come in and see him. It happened that at the time we were at our summer home in Tennessee, so I said that. He said, "Well, when you get back." It was another week or two.

I did go down to see him and he said that he had two possibilities that he wanted to know if I would be interested in. One was Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and the other was Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Well, I told him immediately I didn't want to have anything to do with the Drug Enforcement, with drugs, but I would be interested in Immigration. I thought that did offer some real interest. So he said, "In that case I'll see if I can get you a Presidential appointment.

He did, and I got a call from the White House and had a meeting with both the Vice President and the President, who was Nixon at that time, and with Al Haig, who was Chief of Staff at that time. The President, of course, was deeply enmeshed in Watergate at that point, but he was very nice. I was nominated and confirmed by the Senate, and went to the Justice Department for swearing in on Monday the 29th of November, 1973; 29 November 73. I arrived at the appointed hour for swearing in by the Attorney General, which was 9:00, and, unfortunately the previous Saturday night was the Saturday Night Massacre!

Frank: Oh yes, so there was no Attorney General.

Chapman: There was no Attorney General and there was no Deputy Attorney General. There were two gentlemen there who were prepared to act as Attorney General. One was Bob Bork, a former Marine by the way, who was the Solicitor General, and Glen Pommeranening, who was the Assistant Attorney General for Administration. There was considerable discussion as to which of them was the acting Attorney General. After a space of listening to the argument, I said, "Why don't both of you swear me in? It's bound to be one of you." So they did. Both of them stood up, held the Bible, and they both (in unison) swore me in. Then they both signed my certificate, my appointment as Commissioner. So I guess I've got something rather unusual, I had to have it signed by two people on the theory that one of them had to be the acting Attorney General.
Frank: I've never heard of that. How soon after . . . did you go right over to your office?

Chapman: I went over immediately, right after that. The office was in a building right near the Senate office building and right near the Senate itself, for that matter, and the capitol.

I'd had a previous meeting with the acting Commissioner, who was an exceedingly fine gentleman and career public servant named Jim Green, James F. Green; really an admirable person. I went around and met some of the people involved and got prepared for ______ to the various Congressmen and Senators who were influential. I'd had the hearings, of course, confirmation hearings, but since I knew so little about the subject, I wasn't able to answer many questions. As a matter of fact, to most questions from a Senator or a Congressman I would say, "I really don't know the answer to that. What's your opinion?" So my hearings, in both the House and the Senate, were a compilation of what the Senators and Congressmen had to say, not what I had to say.

Well, I prepared to learn, and it was a lengthy learning process. It's a very complicated business. The lawyers say that immigration law is the second most complicated of all the federal statutes; the most complicated being the tax laws, next comes immigration law.

Frank: That's the McCarran-Walters Act that you were. . . .

Chapman: Well, no, it was superceded by the law in '65.

Frank: Oh really?

Chapman: Yes. However, it was the same general content. It replaced the previous national origins system which had been in effect since 1924. It, in turn, was the first immigration statute that controlled entrance. Up to that time it had been a wide open door with some exclusions. For a time Chinese were excluded, and for a time idiots, those with diseases, criminals, half-wits, paupers (laughter), children alone under 16 were all excluded. There were a number of other exclusions. But the 1924 Act was the first one to set up quotas and it did so on a national origins basis.
I don't suppose there's any need to go into the history of immigration except to say that it is, indeed, a country of immigrants; starting in 1605 with the Jamestown settlers, the Plymouth Rock settlers, the French in Louisiana, Spaniards in Florida, Englishmen (mostly Englishmen) at Jamestown and Plymouth Rock. It's interesting that among the Jamestown settlers were 12 Poles from Poland.

Frank: I'll be darned! I didn't know that.

Chapman: I didn't know it either until I got to Immigration and learned about it from some of my reading. The Poles were the artisans. They were blacksmiths, cobblers, glass-blowers, agriculturalists. The Englishmen were mostly gentlemen, with servants, who didn't do anything. The Poles planted the crops, worked the animals and, for the first few years, generated what profits were made by the colonies. Then a few years later, when it was proposed, when the colony was prospering, it was proposed to set up a colonial government of the colony of Virginia, and to do so by simply appointing some of the gentlemen in the House of Lords tradition to govern. The Poles revolted and said, "If you do that, well strike." Since they were running all the business, all the artisan-ship, all the blacksmiths, all the . . . it would have been a calamity for them to have go on strike so it was agreed that there would be an election. The Poles elected their man to represent them in the legislature. So we can say . . . I don't think it was called that. It can be said that the Poles are responsible for instituting democracy in America. They were the first, those 12 Poles.

Frank: I didn't know that. Isn't that interesting.

Chapman: It is interesting isn't it? It's true. That's a true historical story.

Frank: I imagine you found quite a bit of interesting history at . . .

Chapman: Well, yes, I could tell you a million anecdotes about immigration; of course, immigration having started with just the handful of people in those four locations in 1605 in the Spanish. There were about a quarter of a million in this country by 1700 and about
four million, I think it was, at the time of the revolution. Seven or eight million by 1820. 1820 is when the first records began to be kept. Congress passed a law requiring that passenger manifests of all ships entering U.S. ports would be forwarded for files. Those files were started in 1820 and any American today, who has a reasonable idea of what year, and what port, and particularly the name of the ship his ancestors came over on, can go to the National Archives right here in Washington, right now, and get out the proper transcript and see the name of his or her forbear right there on the passenger manifest.

Frank: There's also a storage area up in Jersey for immigration records.

Chapman: Yes. Not the ship manifests.

Frank: No, not the ship manifests.

Chapman: These are the immigration and naturalization records . . .

Frank: Right.

Chapman: . . . and other immigration records are stored there. That's true.

Frank: There and . . . I'm trying to think of where it was because there was a Marine Corps Reserve unit there.

Chapman: I know where it is, I've been there to see it. Danged if I can remember exactly where it is, somewhere in New Jersey. [Ed. note: Dover.]

Frank: And, of course, each of the Federal courts has a records of the people who were naturalized.
Chapman: Yes. That's because only a federal judge can confer citizenship. There was a time when county judges could do it, state judges. But Congress passed a law about a century ago which said, in effect, that only federal judges can swear in new citizens and confer citizenship.

Well, we had a wide open door except for some of the exclusions I've mentioned until 1924. People came here, mostly from Europe but from many other places too. Huge numbers came between 1890 and 1920.

Frank: That was the great surge.

Chapman: Well, 1915 really. There weren't many during World War I because of the travel difficulties. But from 1890 to 1915 or '14 something like 20 million people entered this country by the Statue of Liberty and through Ellis Island. About a million a year, and they came for the first few years from northern Europe but then the industrial revolution burgeoned in northern Europe and there were plenty of jobs. So in the second half of the surge they were mostly from southern Europe and . . .

Frank: Eastern Europe and around the Mediterranean.

Chapman: . . . and around the Mediterranean. Adriatics were largely excluded, not just illegally but because of the difficulty of the travel. It's interesting that just about one half of all Americans today are descended from the 20 million that entered between 1890 and 1914. Half of our population today is descended from those 22 or 23 million.

Frank: Well, I know I am. My grandfather came over in 1901.

Chapman: From?

Frank: From Russian Poland.

Chapman: Russian Poland.
Frank: Russian Poland, and he went up to upstate New York. My mother came over the following year. As a matter of fact, she got her derivative citizenship in '54 or '55. She was going on a vacation to Europe and she needed the citizenship. It was based on my grandfather who came under the pre-1924 regulations. He got his citizenship in Glens Falls, up in New York.

Chapman: Well, you're in good company. About half of all Americans today are just like you; descended from the 22 or 23 million that entered between those 25 years.

Frank: Me and Lee Iococa. That's interesting.

Chapman: His ancestors came from Italy.

Frank: Italy. Also interesting. . .

Chapman: John F. Kennedy, President Kennedy, his parents came from . . .

Frank: Ireland.

Chapman: . . . Ireland and they were among them of that period.

Frank: It's very difficult . . . you know this "Roots" syndrome that arose and I guess it arose during the time you were Commissioner. Alex Haley's book . . .

Chapman: Yes that's true.

Frank: . . . came out . . . where people were going back and trying to find out. . . . Now, the early American families, they knew where they stood. As a matter of fact there's a person I know, whom you may know, who says he can trace his heritage back to Charlemagne. That's getting a little ridiculous I think, that ancestor worship.
Chapman: That's unnecessary, you don't have to go back that far.

Frank: Well, he glories in it. Families . . . people whose families came over during this great immigration were able to trace when they came over and know what village or section or province they came from. But I think beyond that, earlier than that it's a little dim. The records aren't there and they can't prove it.

Chapman: Well, the records have been destroyed in various wars or there weren't any records to start with. It's interesting to note that the total number of immigrants who have entered this country since 1605 is a sum of two numbers. The first number is the definite, known number of those who've entered since 1820 and then an estimate of the number prior to that time. Adding those two together you come up with about . . . somewhere between 68 and 70 million immigrants that have entered the United States since 1605, 68 to 70 million. All Americans today, except those who just arrived, are descended from those 68 or 70 million.

Frank: We're all hyphenated Americans.

Chapman: Except the American Indians of course . . .

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . who are the only really native Americans.

Frank: When you took over the job as Commissioner, what problems did you find? What was facing you? I imagine the wetback situation was pretty bad.

Chapman: Yes, well of course, as I already noted, I first, among other things, I learned about the history of immigration and naturalization which is fascinating for any American and then about the current situation. Then-current situation, I'll have to say it hasn't changed very much since then either. That's a combination of legal immigrants, illegal immigrants or illegal aliens as they're called, naturalization, tourists, students, businessmen, are all involved in the immigration
picture. The Immigration Service, of course, has inspectors at all the ports of entry, border
patrolmen on the borders, investigators in the cities, naturalization examiners (who are all
lawyers by the way), and a host of administrative people of all kinds; not only stenographers and
record keepers, but also administrators because immigration is both law enforcement and
administration of the law.

Frank: How many people did you have working for you, all together, in the INS.

Chapman: There were about 8000, about half as many as they really needed.

Frank: Border patrol came under your jurisdiction.

Chapman: Oh, yes, part of the immigration service.

Frank: We have a couple of good Marines over there.

Chapman: Yes, the border patrol, in large part, is composed of former service men including
quite a number of Marines. ______ out there, I was right proud of the border patrol. People
often asked me, however, what were the differences between the military and civilian
government. In the civilian government, when you issue an order it's just a basis for negotiation.
You start arguing about it. And the other difference is that the Marines are able to handle their
jobs. In Immigration everything is multiplied 10, 20, 30 . . . The service is just swamped.

Frank: There must have been frustrations then on your. . .

Chapman: Yes, on the administrative side, the line wrapped around the block two or three times
at Los Angeles ______ . On the law enforcement side, of course, is the fact . . . literally.

Frank: Was one of the frustrations perhaps the fact that the law was not . . . while you tried to
administer the law, it was not supported by the Department of Justice or by the other legal
agencies?
Chapman: That wasn't the real problem: the budget problems. I had a certain amount of luck with the budget using my Marine Corps experience. I did manage to get about a 3000- to 4000-person increase for the Service. But it was an awfully hard bureaucracy to plow through. The budget. . . . Once we got a request to Capitol Hill, why we almost always got what we asked--both from the Judiciary Committee _____ both houses of Congress.

Frank: What was the oversight committee that took care of INS?

Chapman: It's a sub-committee of the Judiciary Committee and each . . .

Frank: Iberd?


Frank: What was the attitude of the Administration and of the Congress regarding immigration? _____ it, to let them in, to _____ them?

Chapman: I don't know. On the one hand was our open door history; the fact that we're all immigrants or descended from immigrants. That's how _____ . . . the unemployed, the repressed of the world. On the other hand there's the understanding that it's necessary to have some kind of control. So you often have the contradiction between the general and the specific. "_____ send back Jose Gonzales who's pulling the tomatoes in your backyard," and he'll invariably reply, "Oh, no, not Jose. I need him. Let's don't touch him in any way." That's the difference right there. So whereas enforcement . . . the effectiveness of the controls are set up in the law, public support in specifics is not. Very difficult.

Frank: We had a pretty good example of that the time that Castro sent these people from Martel. Here was the emotional side of it, "Yes we should take these people. They are refugees from a dictatorial government," and yet Castro was shoving out murderers and felons and . . .
Chapman: Yes, they were all a very small part of the total, even of that particular boat lift. It's interesting to note that 10 percent of the population of Cuba had moved to Florida, 10 percent; 100 and some odd thousand, ten percent. Of course the overwhelming majority of them (really overwhelming, 98 or more percent) were a native-born Cuban ______ boat lift.

Frank: I think one of the benefits of naturalization for any country is getting this mix. Of course, I think of all the countries in the world, we are the melting pot.

Chapman: It's a rather interesting social experiment going on here as to whether . . . and we're the only ones in history to try it.

Frank: Yes, that's true.

Chapman: All the other countries in the world, or most of them, are homogeneous.

Frank: Absolutely!

Chapman: I mean in Spain there's just Spaniards, and in China there's just Chinamen, and in this country . . .

Frank: We've got everything.

Chapman: . . . we've got everybody from everywhere. It's interesting if it's going to work or not. Our history is that it does work.

Frank: Two hundred years. The thing that's interesting, again going back to this "Roots" syndrome . . . people are looking back at their derivation and tracing their ancestry. Initially, this group 1890 to what? 1915 you said.

Chapman: World War I sort of stopped it. It resumed after the end of the war but not in such large numbers.
Frank: But the first generation, especially the Eastern Europeans, tried to become . . . tried to assimilate as quickly as possible. They were ashamed of their parents speaking a foreign language; threw all of it out, got rid of it, changed their names and so on. With this "Roots" syndrome it turned the other way and there was a great striving for ethnicity, being proud that you were a Swede, or a Russian or a Pole or . . . and you recall all the folk festivals that were going on and so on. Someone has said that, "This is great because when the first generation changed, tried to assimilate, they threw the baby out with the bath water." They threw some of the good out, the culture and what have you, the music, the language . . .

Chapman: Yes, of course.

Frank: . . . cooking out with it and now they're striving back to it. But along that line, a lot of the old feuds and conflicts were liable to have been brought up again. Did you find that to be the case?

Chapman: Yes, I certainly was aware of it, we all were. But that falls outside the purview of the Immigration Service. But we were very much aware of it, most of them were. . . . A couple of time it was Naturalization involved. The present situation is, and it hasn't changed very much since I left the Service, is that, legally, somewhere around a half a million new immigrants; principally, now, from Latin America and from Asia, very few, relatively, from Europe; _____ a year, a quarter of a million students a year and all of them never leave. They would come legally _____ And then there are the floods of aliens that are moving over our southern border, mostly, (to a small extent over the northern border) or coming through ports of entry with fake documents.

Frank: Borders are hard to protect.

Chapman: Yes, they're perfectly feasible. We cooked up a plan, in manpower relatively small, but with big increases in technology; sensors, command posts, data banks, sensor headquarters, that sort of thing, helicopters. Ninety percent stoppage is possible, still is.
Frank: Okay now, what has been the effect . . . what are the arguments against illegal aliens aside from the fact of knowing who's in the country and what? But there are certainly some side effects which are . . .

Chapman: Well, economic principally, the fact that they take jobs. In fact that's why they come, is to get a job. That's why all our ancestors came, by the way, was to get a job, start a new life. That's why . . . On the other hand, they're often on welfare and other public entitlement programs. In New York City it's around a million and a half or two million. The total number in the country as unknown. It's somewhere between 15 and 25 million, probably.

Frank: Is that costing money as far as education . . .

Chapman: Yes, they want jobs costing money, their children are going to school, and there are a large group of residents who are taking their children and teaching them to hide and lie.

Frank: I know you spoke about that quite often when you were Commissioner with, perhaps, little or no effect on Congress.

Chapman: Well, my preaching . . . By the way I . . . is that when I arrived at the Immigration, probably 15 percent of Americans had heard of illegal aliens. For my four years take credit for informing the American people of the problem.

Frank: Waking America up.

Chapman: . . . for that; for telling Americans about a problem they didn't know they had. Also I spent a great deal of time visiting the immigration units. Some . . . there are around 400 different installations in the Immigration Service; dozens of little posts along the Canadian border, 25--I think it is--major border patrol . . . In four years I visited every one of the 400.

Frank: Who oversees them? What do they do?
Chapman: Well, there's an office in Hong Kong and there's one in Italy and in Frankfurt. They're there principally to handle refugees, refugees that come out of Russia and out of the other communist countries. Refugees don't count as immigrants.

Frank: I was just about to make that point that this country has benefited, as it has throughout the years, from the quality of some of these people, for instance the Asians.

Chapman: Many of them, the total number, yes.

Frank: Sinecure.

Chapman: It is hard to believe isn't it? Well, I used the Marine Corps methods. I went out to visit and shake every hand in the Immigration Service.

Frank: What were some of the innovations that you brought around or about in the program?

Chapman: I tried to install modem management techniques like we had in the Corps.

Frank: No time a career?

Chapman: Oh yes, he was a . . . he enlisted in the Navy before [words lost due to sound activation of tape recorder], dedicated, hard-working, knowledgeable. One thing they didn't have, and this is characteristic of the civil service. . . .

[Interruption in interview]

Frank: Why don't we go back to the central office that you were talking about and Mr. Green.

Chapman: The central office is the headquarters of the Immigration Service and I rearranged it on a general staff system, with Mr. Green, the deputy Commissioner, as the Chief of Staff and
the three staff elements of enforcement, inspection, and logistics with various sub-elements under them. That was one major change. Secondly I created a planning and programming office of which the Service had none and in fact hadn't been doing any planning or programming of any kind. An element of that office was a computer, data planning.

Frank: Which they hadn't had up to then.

Chapman: Hadn't had up to that point. So, among the other things that we did while I was there was to create a computer system--data system--for the Service and began to install it. I think today it's in full effect. But the Immigration Service was 25 or 30 years behind the--well, say the Marine Corps--in that respect, and was behind everybody in planning and programming. There just hadn't been any. So we created, out of whole cloth, a complete planning and programming and budgeting and data, computer-based data system; and had it in effect and operating by the time I left. It was a tremendous help to us in budget arguments and activities of all kinds.

Let's see. The third thing I did was to reorganize some of the regions, shift one of the regions from Richmond to Dallas. That caused quite a bit of controversy by the way, but we got it done. Numerous personnel changes, people that had been around too long and had begun to retire, and appointed some new blood to various important positions in the Service.

Frank: Did you bring any Marines in?

Chapman: No, no I didn't. There were a few already there, but I didn't bring them in. I created a public information office, which the Service hadn't had. It was responsible for helping me in those many speeches I've spoken of and press appearances and so forth, and getting the district and regional directors to get out and talk too, which they started doing for the first time. Oh, there were many other changes. In fact, I tried to bring the Immigration Service up to date; organization, planning, executing, exchanging data, etc. It was a pretty tremendous undertaking, large in scope and importance because the Immigration Service is a very important piece of our government.

Secondly, I did a lot of lobbying on Capitol Hill in support of the Service and particularly to try to get Congress to pass a law that would do something about the illegal aliens. Congress is
still agitating over that law. The law that I proposed, and which Congress has been considering all this time, has three essential elements: first to make it illegal to hire an illegal alien. It's a surprise to most people that it's illegal for the aliens to be here and it's illegal for them to work, but perfectly legal to hire them. Of course hundreds of thousands of American employers do.

Frank: That presents another interesting economic aspect, that, in effect, these employers that hired the illegal aliens kept them (many of them) under slave labor conditions.

Chapman: Oh, yes, at sub-standard wages, sub-standard health and welfare conditions, not paying Social Security on them, all those things and more.

That was the first leg of the three-legged stool that I continually told Congress they had to do something about. Make it illegal to hire. That would turn off the flood because that's why they come here is to get a job. If they couldn't get a job, they wouldn't come. The second leg is increases in the Service to enable it to cope with the administration and enforcement of the law. Then third, some form of amnesty for those that are already here and have been here for some length of time with good records. I just thought it was impractical, and I still think it's impractical, to deport (who knows how many) 15, 20, 25 million people. You just can't do it; it's impractical. So I thought there had to be some kind of amnesty for those who are already here.

Well, those three elements are in the law that Congress is still mulling over and has not, to this date, passed. The House has passed it several times, and the Senate has passed a version two or three times, but the twain never seem to meet.

Frank: _____ committee probably.

Chapman: So there's no law as yet come out of the Congress. I'm hopeful that maybe this next year we'll see it.

Frank: What's the sticking point, the amnesty problem?

Chapman: That's one of the sticking points. There are those who don't want to see any amnesty or those that don't want to see so extensive an amnesty. Then there are those who fear that
there'll be discrimination in the hiring process against anyone who looks Latin, Latino. There's quite an element that opposes the provision in the law that would make it illegal to hire an illegal alien because they say there's going to be discrimination; that the employer, if he looks up and sees somebody applying for a job that looks like he came from Latin America, is just going to turn him away, that's all, because he wouldn't want to get the $10,000 fine or the year in jail that's provided in the proposed law for knowingly hiring an illegal alien.

Frank: I remember there was a case toward the early part of Mr. Reagan's administration where one of his supporters out in Los Angeles, a Mexican-American, a woman, had an effect. . . . They were arrested and she was. . . . This created all sorts of problems. Was this during your watch?

Chapman: No. No you see I was there with first Nixon, then Ford, and then Carter for about eight or nine months of the Carter administration; not with President Reagan.

Well, Congress is going to have to pass a law. I don't know when they're going to get around to it, but it's going to have to be done because the situation is just totally out of control. If they don't do something about it, it's going to grow, and grow, and grow and one day it's going to become a catastrophe. I mean it's easy to envisage 25 million, 50 million, 75 million, 100 million illegal aliens. Yes, why not? There's no machinery to stop them effectively. The border patrol arrests about two out of three. But a fellow that tries it three times is going to make it; on the third time he'll make it. Those that are arrested are simply turned away--around or back--and that's what they're doing. A day or two later, here they come again. Since the border patrol batting average is .666, .667, why . . .

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: . . . in one try out of three, they're going to make it. So here they are, in the interior of the country, where we have no machinery at all except about 1000 investigators (Immigration investigators), who are, in all the great citizens of this country, looking for millions of illegal aliens. By the way, only the Immigration officer has authority to arrest on the basis of citizenship or lack of it.
Frank: I didn't know that.

Chapman: Yes, the federal statute prohibits any state or local police from arresting on that basis. They can arrest for breaking other laws, but not the immigration laws. Only an Immigration officer can do that, can arrest on the basis of the immigration law. So, with 1000 investigators looking for unknown millions, I always said (I still say) that the illegal alien that gets caught has got to be the world's most unlucky guy [laughter], because his chances of getting caught are remote, simply remote.

Frank: Well... 

Chapman: Anyhow, that's about the whole story. I could go on for hours, but that's the essence of the thing. I was there about four years. I did my best for them and I think I did accomplish some good things for them.

But it's a political appointment. I was appointed by a Republican, Nixon and when a Democrat (Carter) came in, like all the rest of the political appointees, I submitted my resignation. A number of months went by before it was accepted because they couldn't find anybody to take my place, anybody who was willing to take my place. But eventually they did, and so I... .

Frank: It was an Hispanic as I recall.

Chapman: Yes, he was a legal American, native-born American.

Frank: He had his problems too, getting confirmed I believe.

Chapman: Yes, on the grounds that he would bring a prejudiced viewpoint, and in fact he did. But that's beside the point.
Frank: It's to the benefit of the country that so many of the aliens or the new-comers, the refugees and so on that we got, have done so well. You take a look at, for instance, the Vietnamese boat people who came in.

Chapman: By and large they're the cream of the crop. They're the cream of Castro's Cuba--with the exceptions we've already talked about, but they're rare exceptions. They certainly are the cream that came out of Vietnam; they're the military, the school teachers, the village chiefs, you know . . .

Frank: Professionals.

Chapman: . . . professionals, doctors, lawyers, dentists. The 40,000 Hungarian freedom fighters, they were the best of Hungary.

Frank: All achievers.

Chapman: Achievers, intelligent, hard working. They, by and large, they're rising right to the top in this country, in business, education, professions. We're lucky and proud to have them.

Frank: Yes. Has the present INS structure remained pretty much the same as you developed it?

Chapman: Oh yes, it hasn't changed any. And the current Commissioner (his name is Nelson) is really doing a splendid job. He was appointed by President Reagan. He's a lawyer from California and he's invited me into see him numerous times. He's doing an excellent job, really excellent, excellent Commissioner.

Frank: How closely did the INS work with the Customs Service?

Chapman: Very closely. Of course, Customs is in the Treasury Department; Immigration's in Justice. So they're in two different departments. And also with the Coast Guard, which is in the Transportation Department, although don't ask me why.
Frank: Well, General, I think that about covers it. I'd like to thank you for your time in coming down here for these interviews.

Chapman: You're certainly welcome. I was glad to be able to do it.
Frank: Yes, it is an interesting thing. When I did the research for it, that POW part, I was amazed at how close the speech was to what the Japanese colonel actually said. "Be happy in your work. You have no place to go."

Anyway, this is the final interview session with Gen Chapman. The date of this interview is 1 November. You wanted, as we spoke before, to clear up certain items on your Commandancy which we had been interrupted with.

Chapman: Yes. We really never got to the last couple of years.

Frank: No, that's true. I'm glad you had an opportunity . . .

Chapman: It was an important and interesting time, and I thought I'd like to add my . . .

Frank: I think it ought to . . .

Chapman: . . . thoughts and remembrances to it.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: To the record.

Frank: Sure.

Chapman: We were interrupted by LtCol Babb who talked about 8th and I at some length, which was fine, too.

Frank: But this is . . .
Chapman: I've got a high regard for 8th and I.

Frank: Yes. I'm sure every time you pass that row of houses in back of 8th and I you regret you didn't have a few extra bucks in those days.

Chapman: [Laughs] Yes, and also that I didn't do what I had an opportunity to do and that was buy the birthplace of John Philip Sousa.

Frank: Oh, did you have that.

Chapman: Which is right next door to Christ Church, just a block away on G Street.

Frank: Oh!

Chapman: It came up for sale. It was run down, decrepit, in deplorable condition. All of the plumbing was gone; the electric circuits were shot. But it was on sale. I could have gotten it for like $7000.00 or $8000.00.

Frank: Oh, gosh!

Chapman: [Laughs] But it would have cost another 20,000-25,000 to restore it.

Frank: And now it's at six figures, I'm sure.

Chapman: Oh, I'm sure it is, yes. I'm sure it is. And it's the birthplace of John Philip Sousa. He was born right there.

Frank: Too bad we didn't have a Marine Band Foundation at that time.

Chapman: Yes, something of that sort could have bought it.
Frank: Or as a matter of fact, we had a Marine Corps Historical Foundation could have used that for a headquarters.

Chapman: Historical Foundation could have made a lot of money on it; used it for a headquarters or you could do what's just being done now, is rent it. It probably rents at four figures.

Well, anyhow, I had the opportunity and I thought hard about it. I just had one problem: I didn't have any money. [Laughs] You know, with two boys getting ready to go to college and . . .

Frank: Colonel's pay.

Chapman: . . . colonel's pay wasn't much, and so I just was unable. But I certainly wanted to. I wish I had. Just for having the pride of owning John Philip Sousa's birthplace.

Frank: Also as an investment.

Chapman: Well as an investment, of course.

Frank: You thought about, sure.

Chapman: Well we stopped talking along about 1969, I think, the beginning of 70. It was in that year, 1970, that I could see that the war was going to end and the Marines were going to come out, and it was time to get going on preparing for a return to peacetime and reductions in size and all of that.

Frank: Any reduction in tasks or missions?

Chapman: I couldn't see that, no. I couldn't see any reduction in our tasks or missions. I was sure we'd go back to our three divisions and wings and Force troops and a full-scale, mirror-
image division and wing in the Reserve (and Force troops, too), and that we would redeploy to
the original home bases: Japan, Okinawa, California, North Carolina.

Frank: Had the Marine Corps been given increased tasks in NATO and the northern tier? Were
there glimmerings when you were Commandant?

Chapman: Yes. Although it was pretty well on the back burner because the forces that were in
Europe or would be deployed to Europe were heavily hammered by the necessity of the one-year
tour in Vietnam, including equipment which was wearing out all the time in combat and had to
be replaced. So there were heavy draw-downs on the Army in Europe.

We managed to keep up the combat readiness of the 2d Division and Wing pretty well,
but they were hit too. It was constant turnover in order to feed the pipeline to Vietnam. So the
turnover in the 2d Division and Wing was just about what it was in Vietnam, that is a one-year
tour. And that hurt combat readiness, of course. But we coped with it; we coped with it. As you
know, as we often remarked, there were only three kinds of Marines in the Marine Corps: the
Marine was either going to Vietnam, or he was in Vietnam, or he just came back from Vietnam.
That's the only kind we had.

Well, looking ahead at that point, I decided that it was time to start planning, and we did.

Frank: Did you set up a separate, special body for that?

Chapman: No, but I charged the staff with it, in addition to their regular duties concerning the
war. We did a number of things. One that I thought was particularly notable was that I made a
trip to New York and had a conference with J. Walter Thompson . . .

Frank: Ahh!

Chapman: . . . our advertising agency. J. Walter has been the Marine advertising since . . .
maybe since the year one, and still is I think. We only pay them something like (or did then)
$20,000 to $25,000 a year, which is only a fraction of what it costs them. But they like the
prestige of being the designers of the Marine Corps' . . .
Frank: Pro bono.

Chapman: ... recruitment program. So I had a conference with the top executives at J. Walter Thompson, and I told them I thought it was going to end and we were going to have to go back to an all-volunteer force, as the Marines had always been. I'll come back to that point in a minute; we did have to draft during the last part of the Vietnam War. And that it was time to get busy and dream up a new recruiting program. So they were happy to take on that task.

It was interesting what they did. They ran a survey of all the eligible young men in the country, those that were in high school now and weren't yet in the services but would be ... I mean would be eligible when the war ended. They discovered that only about 25 percent of all the young men, eligible young men, would be interested in the military--any military. Of that 25 percent about six percent would be interested in the Marine Corps. So they did an analysis of the 6 percent: what kind of young men were they. Well, it was no surprise. They were the young guys who read Field and Stream, that were on the high school basketball team, that were outdoorsmen, and did well in their studies.

So they designed a recruiting program to appeal to that six percent, and that's the campaign that is still with us: "The Marine Corps is looking for a few good men," "We didn't promise you a rose garden."

Frank: That was based on that song.

Chapman: That's where it all came from, was from J. Walter's design which they prepared and submitted to us. I approved it, and it went into effect and it was ready to go when the war ended and we were back to an all-volunteer force, again.

There really wasn't anything new about it. It was the same theme as the Marine Corps had always employed. Previously there's been "If you want to fight, join the Marines," "Only a 100,000 can belong." Those are some of the previous slogans, and they're all on the same theme that it's an elite outfit and not very many can get into it.

Frank: What were the results? Were they plausible results?
Chapman: Yes. The results were excellent from that. When we did come out and stop drafting. That's what we went to bat with and it worked. It worked real well. Has ever since.

Frank: Yes it has. There have been some really inventive programs and commercials, like the knight riding into the castle, which you've probably seen.

Chapman: Yes. All extensions of that basic theme.

Frank: Did you get some flak from the other services because of this recruiting program? Something sticks in the back of my mind.

Chapman: Well, yes. We did. The Army, a little later, came out with their program which was "The Army wants to join you." Well, we came out with a counter which said, "Make no mistake about it, the Marine Corps is not joining you. You're joining the Marine Corps." Well that incensed the Army, as I guess I have to admit it should have [Laughs]. So after we came out with that for a little while, I listened to a good deal of static about it, including from the Secretary of Defense who called me on it because the Army had complained to him. So we cancelled that phrase of our program. We just took it out, eliminated it.

Frank: The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, maybe the Coast Guard too, have a very limited market in which to sell its wares. What percent? You said 25?

Chapman: Twenty-five; that's the way it was then. Of course this was at the peak of the Vietnam War, you know, which had a lot of influence on the attitudes of the young people.

Frank: Yes. In times of war you're going to get a... You really don't have to recruit; just put on added clerical help to write up the... 

Chapman: Well, yes. That's certainly true at the beginnings of a war, the first part. That wasn't true toward the end of all our wars, though. It certainly wasn't true toward the end of Vietnam.
Frank: No.

Chapman: We had to start drafting, not so much because we didn't have enough volunteers, but because we had to have an even flow. The volunteers are available when school graduates in the summer. Summer months are the recruiting months. When school resumes, in September, then the school years are lean recruiting months. We couldn't live with that. We had to have an even flow of recruits because we had to have an even flow of replacements to Vietnam. We didn't want to do it, but we had to start drafting about . . . must have been 1970; must have been around '70, for that reason.

Frank: Of course Project 100,000 was still on, was it not?

Chapman: Yes. We had to take our share of the 100,000 types, who were all mental group 4s. Of course, in drafting, also, you have to take an even spread of skills, of capabilities, of the recruits. You can't just draft mental group 1s into the Marine Corps. You've got to draft a share of all the mental groups. Of course, we got some pretty bad actors in that process, too.

Frank: We suffered for it.

Chapman: Yes. We suffered for it. But then that brings me to the next thing I wanted to remark on which was what we did when we started pulling out of Vietnam.

Frank: Alright. Let me ask you one question before you get into that, while we're still on this personnel matter. I recall hearing and knowing and talking to people in this period, that in the time of the Depression you just could not get into the Marine Corps if you had one flaw.

Chapman: Yes.
Frank: People would have dental work done or hernia operations done and even that did not guarantee them, and we had a lot of what we call "gentleman rankers," college graduates and so on, who just could not get jobs. Alright. Harken back. . . .

Chapman: LtGen Jeff Fields is an example of that.

Frank: Sure.

Chapman: He graduated from St. John's College, was an honor graduate, played guard on the football team, and he couldn't find anything. He enlisted in the Marine Corps.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: 1933.

Frank: Okay, right.

Chapman: He was commissioned in '35.

Frank: That's right, he was in your class in '35. What I was going to ask you, during your early years, in the pre-war years, what was the situation of personnel, recruiting? Was it still hard to get in the service?

Chapman: Oh, very much so. When I joined the Marine Corps in '35, just to take one example, my class were ROTC graduates . . .

Frank: Honor students.

Chapman: . . . honor students from each of the 52 land-grant colleges. We were all the top ROTC, each one of us, at our particular school. I was at the University of Florida. I was the top artillery ROTC graduate, and that was true of each of my classmates; each from his own school
around the country. To enlist in the Marine Corps, the criteria were pretty simple. You had to be white; you had to be a high school graduate with good grades; you had to be between . . . I think it was five foot eight and six foot one; you had to be free of any physical flaws. You couldn't wear glasses; you couldn't be colorblind; you couldn't have any physical impediments at all. You had to be an athlete, an athlete in good physical condition. That's what it took to get in the Marine Corps.

Of course there were only 16,000 Marines and there was a deep depression. So there wasn't any trouble getting qualified recruits.

Frank: Do you think that the same applied to the other services of that period?

Chapman: Oh, yes, sure it did. I know it did in the Navy. The Navy recruits were--the sailors--they were top-quality young people. I was closely associated with sailors on the Astoria.

Frank: Sure, yes.

Chapman: My period on the Astoria. Oh, they were fine young men. And they, as happened in the Marine Corps, the 16,000 Marines that were there at the start of the expansion, they all became the gunnery sergeants and the sergeants major and the . . .

Frank: Officers.

Chapman: . . . and officers in World War II and similarly for the sailors in the Navy. The ones on the Astoria, they became the chief petty officers and petty officers and officers of the Navy in World War II; very high quality young men.

Frank: So things really didn't change from, say, the early part of the '30s to the end of the '30s before the real . . .

Chapman: Until they . . . when the expansion started.
Frank: . . . expansion started.

Chapman: Of course, the expansion was not driven by the draft. It was driven by the challenge of the world situation. That, of course, when the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor, that really fired up the national will.

Well, to come back to Vietnam, toward the end of the war, when we were pulling out of Vietnam, I came to the decision that we were going to clean house, shape up or ship out. We were going to reduce from 317,000 to 198,000, I believe it was. We launched our new recruiting program, and we simply did that.

We curry-combed through the Marine Corps; we picked out all of the ones that hadn't measured up, and we discharged them for the good of the service, administrative discharge. That happened to a large number of staff NCOs who just didn't measure up. Some of them had as much as 17 or 18 years' service and were within a year of reaching the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve retirement status. But we discharged them anyway. So it was a brutal time, but we really raised the level of the Marine Corps.

Frank: How about the officer corps?

Chapman: Same thing, same thing. Of course, that has to be done by selection boards. You can't summarily administratively discharge an officer.

Frank: Selection board, upper route, and Reservists who could not be integrated.

Chapman: Exactly, same thing. So it was a very vigorous and I might say ruthless cleaning house.

Frank: Did a lot of decisions come up to you about individuals?

Chapman: Yes! All the results of the Enlisted Performance Board came to me for approval.

Frank: No, but when reclamas were put in.
Chapman: Yes, oh yes. I decided all of them. You mean on individuals . . .

Frank: Yes, sir.

Chapman: . . . being ousted? Yes, oh yes. Sure, the reclamas all came to me through my sergeant major, SgtMaj Dailey.

Frank: Joe Dailey.

Chapman: Yes, who was a top Marine of all time in my opinion, or one of the top.

Frank: Yes, fine man.

Chapman: You've recently done, or one of your writers . . .

Frank: John Chapin.

Chapman: . . . Chapin, has done . . .

Frank: Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps.

Chapman: . . . has done the story of the . . . I think he's done, so far, he's done Sweet and Dailey.

Frank: He's done them all.

Chapman: Has he done them all?

Frank: Yes, sir.
Chapman: Well he sent Sweet and Dailey to me for checking, and I thought they were excellent, excellent, particularly the one on Dailey. Dailey is a really remarkable Marine and I thought the world of him.

Frank: He wore the Navy Cross.

Chapman: Yes.

During that period, SgtMaj Dailey and I continued to travel extensively around the Corps, including into Vietnam twice a year. Every time we assembled the officers and staff NCOs, in separate gatherings, I'd make my speech about tightening up the Marine Corps and going back to our standards, and I got applauded every time. SgtMaj Dailey would lash into the staff NCOs on the same subject. So we preached the gospel, and all to good effect. Certainly the Marines supported the program.

It was in such sharp contrast to what was happening in the other services. The other services loosened their standards: you know, long hair, beer in the barracks.

Frank: The Navy especially.

Chapman: Navy especially, yes. That was under Adm Zumwalt.

Frank: Zumwalt, yes.

Chapman: We went exactly opposite directions. The Navy loosened their standards. So did the Army. The Air Force to a lesser extent; it's interesting that the Air Force hung in there on the standards, but the Army and the Navy did not. And the Marine Corps, you know, got really tough about it.

Frank: Of course, I remember hearing Gen Chaisson give a speech talking about this and the problems they were having with corpsmen who were assigned, of course, to the Fleet Marine Force. If they were to wear the Marine Corps uniform then no sideburns and hair cut and none of these other things going on.
Chapman: Yes, that's right.

Frank: They were a little unhappy about that.

Chapman: Yes, I'd forgotten that, but that's true. The sailors on duty with the Marine Corps had to abide by the Marine Corps' standards. Well [laughs] it was a pretty radical departure for them. But they had to do it, and they did. They did, by and large. Those corpsmen are proud to be serving the Marines.

Frank: I think so.

Chapman: Yes. One of those six figures on the Iwo Jima statue is a corpsman, Navy corpsman.

Well, yes, I wanted to remark on that because it was a radical decision and it had radical effects on the personnel of the Marine Corps, but the Marines supported it.

Frank: You might want to talk about the order you gave about the . . . the going out . . . leaving nothing over $50.00. . . .

Chapman: Oh, yes, our withdrawal from Vietnam.

Frank: Right.

Chapman: Yes. I think Marines can be proud of that. To begin with, we withdrew in complete air-ground teams. When we pulled out, we didn't pull out by regiments or battalions or groups. We pulled out in balanced air-ground teams, each one fully ready for combat. And we brought out with us all of our equipment and supplies. The original order required that we bring out everything worth $50.00 or more.

Frank: $50.00.
Chapman: Yes. I learned about that; I found out about that, and I issued a correction to that order that we bring out worth $5.00 or more! Well, we did. We came out with all of our equipment and supplies, all in combat-ready condition and in balanced air-ground teams, one by one. Furthermore, I issued an order that we'd leave our spaces in Vietnam ready for inspection: everything cleaned up, all the trash buried, all the temporary buildings knocked down and disposed of. And we did that too. We left every one of our areas in impeccable condition, ready for inspection. I think Marines can be proud of that, too. Of course that's also the way we came out of Korea and out of the various areas in World War II. It's a Marine tradition to do that.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: And we did it in Vietnam.

It's an interesting aside that several of these orders we issued, in particular the radical ones with regard to cleaning house and shaping up, were very much . . . very much disbelieved in by the Secretary of the Navy. So I had the practice of . . . I followed the practice issuing the orders, announcing them to the press, and then telling the Secretary of the Navy about them. [Laughs] Which, of course, left him. . . . He was a wonderful guy, by the way, and a former Marine. But he was unhappy about the effects on the. . . .

Frank: Who was that, John Chafee?

Chapman: It was Chafee, yes, and later on, Warner. But it left him in the unenviable position of being unable to do anything about it. [Laughs] But he was glad in the end.

Frank: Sure.

Chapman: Because he could see the good effects.

Well, let's see. What else can I remark on in this connection that was of interest? I did want to add a reference to an order we issued during that period. The title of it was "Return to Professionalism." It was a Marine Corps general order, and it urged on all the Marines the need to, when we came out of Vietnam, to get back to home base and to immediately train to restore
the high standards of professionalism that had been met and had been served and served the Corps for so many generations. I thought it was quite an important order. I'm sure it's in the Archives. It said.

Frank: Was this a Green Letter or an order?

Chapman: No, it was an order. It was a Marine Corps... maybe it was a bulletin or a memorandum, but it was a Marine Corps-wide order directing the return to the standards of military professionalism that we had enjoyed before, that we had achieved before Vietnam and which we had, to some extent, lost in the havoc of fighting the war in Vietnam, the one-year tour of duty, the damage to our equipment, and all that. So that order was taken in good spirit by all the Marines too, so that as each of the balanced air-ground teams I've described came out of Vietnam, went to home base, carrying all their equipment and supplies with them. They immediately set about refurbishing the gear, restoring the mount-out supplies, training, cleaning house, and getting each of the units immediately back into the high standard of combat readiness that is the characteristic of the Marine Corps. That's combat readiness not only with training, but also morale, personal standards, appearance, readiness of equipment, mount-out, the whole bag of things that go into the definition of the term "full combat readiness."

Frank: You really were hitting, during the period of your Commandancy, some of the worst racial problems that the Corps' ever experienced.

Chapman: Yes, that also occurred toward the end and it was a... a large part of it was due to Project 100,000 and drafting. That's true. We had some severe problems. I do think we took care of them, though. One of the ways we took care of them was through the "shape up or ship out" program that I described. We just summarily discharged them.

Frank: Right. Of course, you had the problem with haircuts, the matter of Afro cuts, and I think you came out with a comment about "all Marines are green" type of thing.

Chapman: Yes.
Frank: You were saying that it wouldn't change the . . .

Chapman: No, it did not change the historical Marine Corps standards of haircut, which is no longer than three inches and evenly trimmed around the sides and back and nothing peculiar or unique.

Frank: Afros and so on.

Chapman: Yes. Oh, no, but it did . . . it did permit the Afro.

Frank: Modified.

Chapman: What it said was that within those limits, the three inches, within those limits a Marine can style his hair any way he wants to. That's what it said. So that if a black Marine wanted to have an Afro that was no more than three inches long and was neat and trimmed around the sides, fine. Why not? And similarly for a Marine who wanted to have a skin-head. If he wanted to have a skin-head style, he was free to do so, but the COs couldn't compel him to have a skin-head.

Frank: White-wall.

Chapman: Or white-wall. Because the regulations didn't require white-walls and skin-heads.

Frank: We didn't have any "Haircut" Charlie Lymans around.

Chapman: No. [Laughs]
Frank: You remember that story.

Chapman: Yes, I do. It's a good story.

Frank: He used to go around with a three-inch match-stick.

Chapman: Yes, I was in his command at Quantico . . .

Frank: At Quantico, sure.

Chapman: . . . at that time.

Frank: Sure, yes.

Chapman: Well, so that we really solved our racial problems by the simple expedient of cleaning house, and that pretty well took care of it.

Frank: Of course, we had this big EEO program, seminars being held that all officers and supervisors had to go to.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: And we set up, . . . There was a program initially set up at Headquarters. I think Ray Henry was the head of it initially, and then Ken Berthoud . . .

Chapman: Yes, right.

Frank: . . . and Frank Petersen, I think, was involved with it.

Chapman: Yes, he was. You see, what I took care to do--and so did they--was to direct our instructions and orders at the good Marines, the good black Marines of whom we had quite a
percentage. And they were really good. I mean we really had some outstanding black Marines. You know, heroic, brave, dedicated. Our orders were directed at them, to give them the feeling that we were not discriminating in any way. The bad black Marines we just got rid of, that's all.

Frank: How about bad white Marines? They were within the . . .

Chapman: Oh, yes. Well, they too, yes. They too, of course. So I think it's worth emphasizing that all of our attention was focused, with respect to discrimination, all of our attention was focused on the good Marines, white and black.

Frank: You had to reinforce them.

Chapman: Yes, and as I said, give them the feeling that they were welcome in the Corps and there wasn't going to be any discrimination of any kind just because he happened to be black. And we did things like, you know, improve the stocking at the post exchange so we had items in the post exchange for the black folks in the Corps, for example.

Let's see. What else was I going to remark on? Well, one thing of some interest was that we directed . . . and I wrote a letter. I mean the staff had me write it, but I wrote a letter to the commanding officers of all Marine shipboard detachments and all Marine Barracks, who, of course, are under the control of the Navy, under the operational control of the Navy. This letter. . . . I thought it was a pretty good letter. It drew attention to the--during this period--to the standards of the Marine Corps and urged on the COs of all these little outfits that were out there working for the Navy the necessity of running tight ships, and presenting Marine detachments that were a credit to the Corps. I remember the last words were, in a little paragraph by itself, "See to it." "See to it." And then I signed them all personally to the numerous shipboard detachments (They were all commanded by captains, of course.) and to the COs of all the Barracks. Most of them were commanded by lieutenant colonels and colonels.

Although we made an effort during that period to bring to the fore the junior officers of the Corps, as you may remember. We did things like down-grade the COs of some of the small Barracks . . .
Frank: To majors.

Chapman: Yes, to majors and even to captains, and even to captains. We down-graded a good many staff officers from lieutenant colonel and major down to captain, or major and captain instead of colonel and lieutenant colonel. We did that throughout the Corps to enhance the prestige and the opportunity for company grade officers in the Corps. Similarly, in my many travels around the Corps during that time, I made a point of assembling the junior officers as a separate audience and delivering them a speech on standards of the Marine Corps and return to full combat readiness and all of that that we were seeking to do.

Also, as a very minor note, I brought in a new aide. I brought myself in a junior aide, a captain. His name was Blikfelt, Joe Blikfelt, outstanding young Marine captain.

Frank: What was the rationale for doing that?

Chapman: Just so I would have right there with me a representative of the junior officers of the Marine Corps. I must say I enjoyed it a whole lot. He was a fine young officer.

Frank: So you had two senior aides. . . .

Chapman: Yes, a colonel and a lieutenant colonel and a Navy commander and then a captain. The colonel, of course, was also the Military Secretary.

Frank: Yes, sure.

Chapman: The aides really were the lieutenant colonel, a Navy commander, and a captain, Marine captain.

Let's see. I wrote some other things. . . . Oh, I guess the. . . . The only other thing I'd thought to add was a remark on the principles that govern the Marine Corps that I lectured on without ceasing for those years. I put out a Green Letter on it towards the end, and I think to good effect. I said that there were a set of principles that had governed the Marine Corps from the beginning and that we had to remember them and adhere to them for the future Marine
Corps. And the principles were things like combat readiness, tough training, personal leadership as described by Gen Lejeune in the Marine Corps Manual. You know, where the relationship between the officer and enlisted is not master and servant; it's more like master and apprentice or teacher and scholar. Those are John A. Lejeune's words in the Marine Corps Manual. That kind of personal leadership. Honor, integrity, tell it like it is, marshall the facts and tell the truth. Well, professionalism.

Frank: I think they have to be repeated in each generation.

Chapman: Tough training, tough training with the objective of seeing who really wants to be a Marine at recruit depots at officer candidate training. Make it so tough that only those that really want to be a Marine can get through.

Those things, and maybe the most important principle of all the infantry. I'm a great believer that the heart of the Marine Corps is the infantry, and all the rest of the Marine Corps exists to support the infantry. We achieve that by training every Marine, officer and enlisted, initially, as an infantryman. That's what we teach at Basic School: how to lead an infantry platoon. That's what we teach at San Diego and Parris Island: how to be a Marine rifleman. And then the Marines go on to learn to fly airplanes and aim artillery pieces and all those other good things. But every one of them, then, for the rest of his career knows the infantry and he's dedicating to supporting that 18 year old kid with his rifle who's standing on the high ground.

Frank: I think every Commandant has to remind his Corps of that. Gen Gray has come out with the "Every Marine a warrior," type thing.

Chapman: Yes, that's another way of saying it.

Frank: Sure.

Chapman: And it's a good way of saying it.

Frank: I think it has to be reasserted.
Chapman: But that infantry. . . . The principle of the infantry is what binds the Marine Corps together so the Marine Corps never fragments. Other organizations, other services, have a tendency to fragment. We don't have a Navy; we've got three or four different navies. Similarly elsewhere. But there's only one Marine Corps and what keeps the Marine Corps a single corps is the infantry. That's the glue that binds the Marine Corps together.

Frank: Yes, I think most kids who enlist want to be a fighter, want to be a rifleman.

Chapman: Yes. And if he doesn't get to be a rifleman, he gets to be a cannoneer or F-18 pilot, and he still wants to be a rifleman by supporting the rifleman.

I guess the final principle I ought to . . . I might remark on is the requirement that the Marine Corps set the standard and be a model for the country.

Frank: I think. . . .

Chapman: Set the standard and be a model of professionalism, of loyalty, of patriotism, of honor, integrity--the highest ethical standards.

Frank: Dedication.

Chapman: Of dedication: a model that all Americans can look up to. That's a. . . . I think that's a national duty that the Marine Corps has. Anyhow, I won't bore you any more with this, but . . .

Frank: No, no. No, no.

Chapman: . . . I'm just remarking on the . . .

Frank: Your philosophy.

Chapman: . . . the philosophy that I preached far and wide during my term as Commandant.
Frank: On the man to succeed you, who were the candidates, the outstanding candidates?

Chapman: Well, of course, obviously, Bob Cushman. He was in CIA at that point. He had been President Nixon's aide, you know and was with him in the tumult in Latin America that . . . the Vice President, yes, Vice President . . .

Frank: He was Vice President at that time.

Chapman: . . . went through. Bob Cushman was right with him.

Frank: They were very close. You'd have to be a blind man not to say that. . . .

Chapman: But the other obvious candidates were very strong ones. The first was Ray Davis, who was the Assistant Commandant. I made him Assistant Commandant when Lew Walt retired. Ray, of course, is an absolutely outstanding combat Marine. You may not know that Gen Abrams told me that the best division commander ever to serve in Vietnam, Army and Marine, was Ray Davis.

Frank: I can believe it.

Chapman: That's what Gen Abrams said.

Frank: He energized the 3d Division when he took over.

Chapman: And he conducted some really unbelievable combat operations.

Frank: Oh, yes. Dewey Canyon. . . .

Chapman: For example, yes. Dewey Canyon is an excellent example. And he did it all without any fuss. He never held press conferences. [Laughs] He never made any waves. He just went
about fighting the war in an absolutely outstanding fashion. And that was Gen Abrams' opinion, and that's an opinion to be respected.

Frank: Oh, absolutely, absolutely. Was John Chaisson still around?

Chapman: Yes, he was my Chief of Staff.

Frank: That's what I thought.

Chapman: Yes, I'd made him Chief of Staff. He was the third obvious candidate. And I'll tell you, that's . . . that was a tough choice between those three. They were really remarkable, outstanding Marines.

Frank: Earl Anderson was down at Lant at this time, I believe, was he not? Or had he gone down to Lant?

Chapman: Let's see. Where was he at that time? I declare I can't recall. He was not at Headquarters.

Frank: No.

Chapman: He was not at Headquarters. I don't remember just where he was. Well, he wasn't a candidate at that point.

Frank: No, he wasn't, but he was close to Gen Cushman.

Chapman: Oh, very much so, yes. He was Gen Cushman's . . . he was Bob Cushman's chief of staff when Bob Cushman was the CG of the III MAF.

Frank: Well, even though you had retired, I'm sure you were aware of the furor that was going on on the so-called Cushman-Anderson affair.
Chapman: Well, yes. I heard about it, but I... I didn't want to get involved in it, so I just... I didn't have any right to get involved in it, so I just stayed out of it. I just heard about it, that's all.

Frank: But you didn't know when it was going on, any of the matters that were going on that you were not aware of?

Chapman: I think I heard about it all, but I didn't have any... didn't play any part in it. The only part I played was when Jim Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, called up to get my recommendations as to the next Commandant. But that's private, so I'd better not talk about that.

Frank: Was your recommendation any one of those three?

Chapman: No, this was with respect to Bob Cushman's successor.

Frank: Oh! He called you up for that.

Chapman: The only thing I'll say is that the recommendation I made to him is the way it turned out. [Laughs] So I guess maybe I had a hand in it.

Frank: You'd have to be a blind man not to know... Well, I think that was probably an obvious selection.

Chapman: Well, these taped records are held in confidence, aren't they?

Frank: Well, this part can be. We can excerpt it. As a matter of fact we can go off the record on that.

Well, we've come to the end of your career General. This material we spoke of will be excerpted.
Chapman: Just keep it under your hat. It's of no historical significance. Let's see, the only thing I can think to add is just a footnote, and that is Patrick Joseph Ryan, my Catholic lieutenant j.g. chaplain, when I was CO of an artillery battalion in the battle of Okinawa--I've spoken of him earlier.

Frank: Yes.

Chapman: At a later date, he became Archbishop of Alaska.

Frank: Oh, really.

Chapman: And then, at an even later date, while I was Commissioner of Immigration, he was selected as the Archbishop of the Military Diocese.

Frank: I'll be darned.

Chapman: And he served in that capacity until just a year ago. He had to retire for age. He started out as a lieutenant j.g. and he ended up as the Archbishop of the Military Diocese with . . .

Frank: They call it the Military Ordinary.

Chapman: Yes. He was the Archbishop and continued to be until just recently.

Frank: I guess he was relieved by the former Chief of Chaplains . . .

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: . . . who is now Cardinal . . . New York.
Chapman: Oh, I know as well as anything. Archbishop Ryan, I was invited to and went to his ordination. What a spectacular show!

Frank: I'm sure.

Chapman: I'll tell you those Catholic bishops and archbishops can put on a show that equals anything the Marine Corps can do.

Frank: Teach the Baptists and the Presbyterians something.

Chapman: [Laughs] I'll tell you. 8th and I can't do any better than those Catholic bishops and archbishops do at an ordination. It was a spectacular show. It must have been... must have been 75 bishops there, bishops and archbishops, each one in his distinctive regalia, a full choir, organ; beautiful affair. I was really impressed. I tried to discern some features of it that I could suggest for the Marine Corps to adopt, you know, to improve our ceremony.

Well, Ben, I don't think of anything else at this point. Maybe by the time you get it transcribed and sent to me, I'll think of something else in which case I can just write it down.

Frank: Okay. Mrs. Hartley will do it.

Chapman: But I've covered the subjects that I thought would be valuable to add to the record.

Frank: Well, I thank you. I've enjoyed it thoroughly. I guess we've been associated together for 29 years, because I think I came to Headquarters when you came up as G-4 from Force Troops.

Chapman: Yes.

Frank: I met you on the steps outside Headquarters. I recall seeing you. I'd been on active duty down at Lejeune chasing Reserves, so I remember seeing you down there.

Chapman: Yes. Oh, I remember those days, mighty well.
Frank: I want to thank you. Thank you for our friendship.

Chapman: Well, Ben, and I want to thank you for what you've contributed to the Marine Corps. You're the master-mind, the architect, and the creator of the Oral History Program, and it's a remarkable thing, and it's a most valuable addition to the activities of the Marine Corps. Most valuable. If we could only have started it back then when some of those great old-timers were still here. I'm thinking of Gen Lejeune, for instance.

Frank: Sure.

Chapman: Or even Tommy Holcomb.

Frank: Holcomb, I got a segment on tape with him.

Chapman: Did you?

Frank: Yes. I was . . .

Chapman: How about Holland Smith?

Frank: Holland Smith was going to be the first man I interviewed when I went out to California on my first trip in February '67. But he died in January. As a matter of fact, I have a letter that he obviously typed and said he'd be more than glad to talk to us.

Chapman: Isn't that interesting.

Frank: But the value of the Oral History program is shown by the fact that even though we didn't get Holland Smith, I interviewed all of the senior officers who'd been very, very close to him: Bobby Hogaboom, Graves Erskine, and so forth and so on.
Chapman: That would be the answer, and very valuable, with respect to all the decisions and the facts and what not. What you don't get is the personality of the man, as you learn it from listening to his voice.

Frank: No, no.

Chapman: That's what you don't get.

Frank: No, and as you know, this Norman Cooper, he did his PhD dissertation at Auburn on the biography of Holland Smith, and was able to use our interviews with people, because I would ask . . . I would want to know what was he like? What was his persona like? We were able to flesh out. . . . And of course, people like Bobby Erskine and Bobby Hogaboom worked very closely with him over the years. They were able to flesh out this.

Chapman: You can immediately get a picture of man's personality, of his character, by listening to him.

Frank: That's right. We've kept . . .

Chapman: The spoken word and how he says it.

Frank: We've kept the tapes. We've got all the interview tapes, voice on tape.

Chapman: That does bring up one other suggestion that might be some use. Have you ever thought of interviewing Secretaries of the Navy?

Frank: Well, that wouldn't be my area. We're leaving that to Navy.

Chapman: Are you?
Frank: Yes. They don't poach on my preserve on Marines, and I don't poach on their preserve on Secretaries of the Navy.

Chapman: Well, alright. I was just thinking of those that were also former Marines.


Chapman: Such as Chafee and Warner.

Frank: Of course, I've interviewed Don Hittle extensively.

Chapman: Oh, another example is Jim Webb.

Frank: Yes. Jim's young; he'll be around for a while. I'll let my successor get Jim, although I know Jim so no reason why we can't, but. . .

Chapman: Well, he's so prolific and so. . .

Frank: So disappointed that he didn't stay the course as Secretary of the Navy.

Chapman: Is he sorry he quit?

Frank: I don't know. I'm sorry.

Chapman: Oh, I'm sorry too. I often wondered if he has become sorry.

Frank: He got in a pissing contest with Weinberger which he could not win.

Chapman: Yes. He took a public stance that was incompatible with the Secretary of Defense, and that's a mistake.
Frank: Wasn't a team player.

Chapman: That's a mistake.

Frank: It was.

Chapman: Yes. If you've got a position that's contrary to the Secretary of Defense, keep it in house. Don't go public with it.

Frank: No, no. No, no.

Chapman: That leads to nothing but disaster.

Frank: Well, as we close, I wish you and Mrs. Chapman well, long life.

Chapman: Thanks Ben.

Frank: I thank you.

Chapman: Happy 215th.

Frank: Yes, sir. Happy Birthday, General.

Chapman: That's it this time, isn't it? 215?

Frank: Yes, sir, 215th.

Chapman: Okay, Ben. Well, I'll be seeing you.

End Tape 1/XII, Side B
End of Interview