Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization

Officer Block 4 & Enlisted Block 5:

USAFRICOM

Course Overview

The mission of the RCLF program is to ensure that Marine units are globally prepared and regionally focused so that they are effective in navigating and influencing the culturally complex 21st century operating environment in support of Marine Corps missions and requirements. The program is based on 17 regions of the world; however, Officer Block 4 and Enlisted Block 5 assigns and defines regions based on Combatant Command Area of responsibilities. The curriculum uses the regional construct to provide context for the cultural content of each RCLF block of instruction.

Learning Outcomes

A. Analyze the impact of cultural values on military operations (Regional and Cultural Studies)
B. Provide multiple explanations for the outcome of a successful or failed intercultural interaction (Communications and Cultural Studies)
C. Assess techniques for aligning culturally appropriate and mission effective behavior (Leadership and Warfighting)
D. Examine the effectiveness of communication strategies used to manage intercultural challenges (Communication and Cultural Studies).

Course Flow

This workbook serves as your instructional guide. It consists of six chapters. *Chapter 1* contains an overview of Geographic Combatant Commands, U.S. National Strategy, and the establishment and mission of your assigned Combatant Command (CCMD). *Chapter 2* includes an overview of the CCMD's Area of Responsibility (AOR) framed around key historical, government and politics, geographic, economic, people and society, and regional security issues. *Chapter 3* includes exposure to advanced operational culture general concepts, as well as considerations for culture general ethics. *Chapter 4* includes supplemental readings (available in the supplemental readings PDF) and applied scenarios, designed to illustrate specific cross-cultural concepts and skills. *Chapter 5* contains an overview of Marine Corps and Interagency Planning, with specific emphasis on culture as a variable in planning. Finally, *Chapter 6* contains a case study to illustrate the impact of cultural values and concepts on a specific military operations within the CCMDs AOR.

To successfully complete this block of instruction, Marines will need to download the materials zip file and read the workbook and supplemental readings. Marines must then complete an end-of-course evaluation and end-of-course survey.

Checklist:
☐ CCMD Workbook and Supplemental Readings (MarineNet)
     ○ CCMD Workbook PDF
     ○ Supplemental Readings PDF
☐ End-of-Course Evaluation (MarineNet)
☐ End-of-Course Survey (MarineNet)

Table of Contents

List of Figures

1 United States Africa Command Overview

"Since its inception in 2007, USAFRICOM continues to pursue the objectives of strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth, trade, and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development throughout Africa."

General David M. Rodriguez,
Commander, USAFRICOM 2016

1.1   Mission Statement

United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

Figure 1-1: Commanders' Area of Responsibility. *Source: Department of Defense.*[1]

1.2 Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S. National Strategy

National strategic direction is governed by the U.S. Constitution, U.S. law, U.S. policy regarding internationally recognized law, and the national interest as represented by national security policy. This direction leads to unified action. National policy and planning documents generally provide national strategic direction. National strategic direction provides strategic context for the employment of the instruments of national power. Executive Branch and Department of Defense (DOD) documents such as the *National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy,* and *National Military Strategy* define the strategic purpose guiding employment of the military instrument of national power as part of a global strategy. One important strategic directive for employment of U.S. military forces is the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP).

The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), signed by the President, and reviewed at a minimum every two years. The President, through the UCP, establishes *Combatant Commands* (CCMDs). The current UCP establishes nine (9) CCMDs: six (6) *Geographic Combatant Commands* with a regional focus *(Figure 1-2)* and three (3) *Functional Combatant Commands* with worldwide missions *(Figure 1-3).*

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is responsible for military relations with African nations, the African Union and African regional security organizations. It protects and defends the interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African nations and, in cooperation with African governments, conducts military missions that increase security while deterring and defeating a variety of transnational threats.

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is responsible for operations in twenty countries that fall in the "central" area of the globe: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen. United States Central Command utilizes national and international partnerships to build cooperation among nations, respond to crisis, deter and defeat threats and support development that ultimately increases stability in the region.

United States European Command (USEUCOM) works with NATO and other partner nations to address the security and defense needs of nations in Europe and parts of the Middle East and Eurasia. EUCOM coordinates with these nations to find cooperative solutions in peace and wartime alike, to plan training missions, provide humanitarian assistance and to develop strategies for promoting peace and stability in the region.

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) operates in the area of responsibility encompassing the continental United States, Alaska, Mexico, Canada, portions of the Caribbean and surrounding waters. NORTHCOM is primarily responsible for civil support and homeland security and also oversees the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). It has few permanent forces and is instead assigned forces by the Secretary of Defense or the President whenever required for the execution of its missions.

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) oversees an area of responsibility stretching from the waters of the United States west coast to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole, encompassing 36 diverse nations. USPACOM and its partners work to promote the development of the region while cooperating to enhance security, deter aggression, respond with force when necessary and to provide humanitarian assistance.

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) oversees an area of responsibility encompassing 31 nations in Latin America south of Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean Sea. USSOUTHCOM works to increase the security of the United States by engaging its partners to enhance the peacekeeping abilities of the region, to promote human rights, to deter illegal activities associated with illicit trafficking and to conduct multinational military exercises designed to strengthen partnerships while developing collective capabilities.

Figure 1-2: **Geographic Combatant Commands.** *Source: Department of Defense.*[2]

The *United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)* is responsible for planning for and conducting special operations. It offers direct action in the form of short duration strikes and small-scale offensives, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs operations, counterterrorism, psychological operations, information operations, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security force assistance, counterinsurgency operations and any specific activities directed by the President or the SecDef.

The *United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)* is headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska. It conducts global operations in partnership with other Combatant Commands, services and U.S. government agencies to deter and detect strategic attacks against the United States. USSTRATCOM is responsible for command of U.S. nuclear capabilities, space operations, global surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence, communications, computers, global missile defense and combatting weapons of mass destruction.

The *United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)* provides the Department of Defense with an aggregate of transportation capabilities and assets. Together with commercial partnerships, USTRANSCOM enables a diverse array of joint mobility missions.

Figure 1-3: Functional Combatant Commands. *Source: Department of Defense.*[3]

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for command preparedness and performance of assigned missions. GCCs have responsibility for a geographic *area of responsibility* (AOR) assigned through the UCP. The UCP establishes CCMD missions and responsibilities, delineates the general geographical AOR for GCCs, and provides the framework used to assign forces for missions to the GCCs.

Another important policy document directing GCC missions and responsibilities is the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF). The President approves the contingency planning guidance contained in the GEF, which is developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The GEF provides written policy guidance and priorities to the GCCs for reviewing and preparing operation plans (OPLANs) and theater campaign plans (TCPs).

GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy, and the military forces that conduct military operations within their AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area and for effective coordination of operations within that area. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. As military force may not achieve national objectives, military operations must be coordinated, synchronized, and -- if appropriate -- integrated with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational forces (MNFs), and the private sector. GCCs direct this coordination and integration of military power to achieve strategic ends.

Using their strategic estimates and strategic options, GCCs develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts or courses of action (COAs) to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. The plans developed by GCCs provide strategic direction, assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the use of force; establish constraints and restraints (military limitations); and define policies and concepts of operations (CONOPS) to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. GCCs also exercise directive authority for logistics over assigned forces, and

authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the GCC's AOR.

GCCs develop their theater strategies by analyzing events in the operational environment and developing options to set conditions for achieving strategic end states. They translate these options into an integrated set of steady-state engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities described in theater and subordinate campaign plans. In some cases, a GCC may be required to develop a global campaign plan. These plans operationalize the GCC's theater strategy. Contingency plans developed to respond to specific contingencies are treated as branch plans to the campaign plan.

Figure 1-4: National Strategic Direction. *Source: JP 5-0.*[4]

In joint operations, the supported GCC often will have a role in achieving more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the primary responsibility of the supported GCC, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies. Supporting CCDRs and their subordinates design their actions to be consistent with the supported commander's strategy. All CCDRs provide strategic direction, assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; establish operational limitations such as rules of engagement (ROE), constraints, and restraints; and define policies and CONOPS to be integrated into OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs). GCCs may also establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by SecDef.

1.3   Establishment of U.S. Africa Command

As one of six Geographic CCMDs, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is responsible for military relations with African nations, the African Union (AU), and African regional security organizations. It protects and defends the interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African nations and, in cooperation with African governments, conducts military missions that increase security while deterring and defeating a variety of transnational threats.[5]

No single event triggered the creation of USAFRICOM. Africa was generally a low U.S. military and strategic priority until the 1998 Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) embassy bombings. The attacks of September 11, 2001 also served, in part, as a decisive turning point in raising the tempo of U.S. interest in Africa. The formation of USAFRICOM was also a response to Africa's growing economic importance to the U.S and the necessity to combat the rise of non-state actors, including criminal networks, operating in Africa. Additionally, USAFRICOM became an operational necessity, as the European and Central Commands that formerly exercised command and control over the Africa AOR became overstretched in light of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

One of the first arguments for a formal USAFRICOM was published around November 2000. The earliest reference to the idea of creating USAFRICOM from the UCP is traceable to an article written by Richard G. Catoire, for the *U.S. Army War College Quarterly*. The article was entitled: *A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan*.[6] In his article, Catoire presented persuasive arguments as to why Africa should attract U.S. attention, and consequently, the need for a command specifically devoted to oversee U.S. security concerns on the continent. The actual policy actions to implement the idea came as the result of a planning team formed in mid-2006, under the leadership of the then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

The planning team was charged with coordinating the disparate bodies and commands already overseeing Africa, with the objective of extricating Africa from USEUCOM, USPACOM, and USCENTCOM. By December of 2006, the team's recommendation to create USAFRICOM was forwarded to the President for approval. The planning team built upon the Pentagon's tentative security arrangements already in place to oversee U.S. security interests in Africa. Many of these issues were articulated in the *2004 Pentagon Global Posture Review,* which established and placed African security issues under the purview of USEUCOM. Within USEUCOM specific responsibilities devolved to two military command and control structures in Africa, namely: *Cooperative Security Locations* (CSLs), and *Forward Operating Sites* (FOSs). These existing structures -- along with the establishment of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti -- formed the nucleus of USAFRICOM. In effect, USAFRICOM morphed from being appendages to three Unified Commands to a fully-fledged GCC.

On December 15, 2006, the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee, led by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, formally authorized the establishment of USAFRICOM. USAFRICOM was announced as a command on February 6, 2007 by the White House.

AFRICOM will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa[7]

USAFRICOM became fully operational on October 1, 2007 and was activated a year later. On September 28, 2007, the U.S. Senate confirmed General William 'Kip' Ward as the first USAFRICOM Commander. General Ward initially subsumed as a sub-unified command of USEUCOM, but with a separate headquarters located at Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Germany. This location remains the headquarters of USAFRICOM today even as talks, suggestions, and attempts have been made to relocate its headquarters to the African continent.

1.4   Area of Responsibility

Figure 1-5: USAFRICOM AOR.
Source: Department of Defense.[8]

GCCs are responsible for the development and production of joint plans and orders within their AOR. This AOR is assigned to USAFRICOM by the UCP issued by the President of the United States. During peacetime, GCCs act to deter war through military engagement and security cooperation activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required. During a conflict/combat, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions. These responsibilities include direction, collaboration, and cooperation with partner nations within their AOR. Since October 1, 2008, USAFRICOM maintains an AOR covering the 54 African countries, except for Egypt which is still part of USCENTCOM.

1.5   Structure

1.5.1   Headquarters

The USAFRICOM Joint Headquarters staff includes over 30 representatives from more than 10 U.S. federal agencies. Interagency representatives include staff members from:

- Department of State
- Agency for International Development
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Energy
- Department of Justice

Figure 1-6 below outlines the Joint Headquarters structure.

Figure 1-6: Headquarters, USAFRICOM. *Source: Department of Defense.*[9]

1.5.2 Subordinate Commands

USAFRICOM contains four (4) service components:

- U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), Vicenza, Italy
- U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF), Naples, Italy
- U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA), Ramstein Air Base, Germany
- U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF), Stuttgart, Germany

USAFRICOM also contains one sub-unified command:

- Special Operations Command – Africa (SOCAFRICA) in Stuttgart, Germany.
- USAFRICOM structure includes one standing task force as well:
- Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.
- In addition to this formal command structure, USAFRICOM maintains an enduring presence on the continent through cooperation with Embassy Country Teams via Defense Attachés, Offices of Security Cooperation, and Bilateral Assistance Officers.

1.5.3 U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa

Located in Stuttgart, Germany, U.S. Marine Forces Africa (MARFORAF) conducts operations, exercises, training, and security cooperation activities throughout the African continent. Its staff is shared with U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe. The primary focus of Marine Forces Africa is engagement, through theater-security cooperation activities, to bring Marine Corps competencies to the table in support of the AFRICOM mission of building enduring partnerships, bolstering military capacity, and promoting regional stability with our African partners throughout the continent.

MARFORAF also maintains a Special Purpose MAGTF: *SP-MAGTF Crisis Response (CR)*. SP-MAGTF Crisis Response is a rotational force of Marines and sailors temporarily positioned on Moron Air Base, Spain, capable of decisive action across a range of military operations. The SP-MAGTF CR gives U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa a broad range of military capabilities to respond to crises in its AOR, including conducting non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and support to U.S. embassies, and other operations, missions and activities as directed by national and command leadership.

1.6 Key Focus Areas

A full-spectrum combatant command, USAFRICOM is responsible for all U.S. Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security cooperation on the African continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters. Each GCC maintains a distinct mission and focus assigned by authoritative U.S. National Strategy documents and often updated and reflected in command Posture Statements and the Combatant Commander's Intent. The *2015 USAFRICOM Posture Statement* speaks of African states and regional organizations being important partners in addressing security challenges to include terrorist and criminal networks that link Africa with Europe. The posture statement articulates USAFRICOM's approach and primary tools for implementing these strategies, namely: *presence, programs, exercises, engagements*, and *operations.*

USAFRICOM identifies numerous challenges in recent and current areas of instability and conflict. These areas of instability and conflict are depicted in Figure 1-8.

Deter and Defeat Transnational Threats
… by engaging with partners to deter the threat posed by al-Queda and other extremist organizations, deny them safe haven, and disrupt their destabilization activities.

Protect and Secure U.S. Security Interests
… by ensuring the safety of Americans and the American interest from transnational threats, and by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and the regional organizations.

Prevent Future Conflicts
… by working with African militaries and regional partners to address security concerns and increase stability in the continent.

Support Humanitarian and Disaster Relief
… by providing military assistance, when directed, in response to human and natural crises.

Figure 1-7: USAFRICOM Key Focus Areas. *Source: USAFRICOM Posture Statement.*[10]

Figure 1-8: Africa: Conflict and Stability. *Source: USAFRICOM Website.*[11]

USAFRICOM maintains a Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan to confront the sources of instability and conflict. USAFRICOM's strategy articulates a long-term, regionally focused approach that seeks to establish, with partners, a strategic environment in which African nations are willing and capable of addressing security threats -- not solely from a military perspective, but from the foundations of governance, security, and development. The *2015 National Security Strategy* mandates that we train and equip local partners, and provide operational support to confront terrorist groups. It includes developing the ability to direct, manage, sustain, and operate a ready and able organization over time. These sustainable defense institutions promote governmental stability, respect for the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, and help to sustain broad-based development, all of which address the root causes of violent extremism and mitigate the need for costly international intervention.

1.7   Contemporary Operations

In achieving its mission, USAFRICOM deploys a range of strategies from operations, exercises, security cooperation programs, sustained engagement with nations and partners, military-to-military assistance, activities, and programs. The most recent *2016 Posture Statement* defines USAFRICOM's five (5) lines of effort (LOEs) within the Theater Campaign Plan over the next one-to-five years. *Figure 1-9* is testimony by the USAFRICOM CCDR before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2016.

The USAFRICOM operational approach seeks to disrupt and neutralize transnational threats by building African partner defense capability and capacity, as directed in the *2015 National Security Strategy*, in order to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity, while always protecting U.S. personnel, facilities, and the United States' access on the continent. This approach includes five lines of effort:

➢ neutralize Al-Shabaab, and transition the African Union Mission in Somalia to the Federal Government of Somalia
➢ degrade violent extremist organizations in the Sahel Maghreb and contain instability in Libya
➢ contain and degrade Boko Haram
➢ interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and through central Africa with willing and capable African partners
➢ build African peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response capacity

Sustainable security requires effective and enduring institutions, both civilian and military, that are guided by the rule of law and a merit-based promotion system. We provide direct support to strengthening defense institutions, and indirect support for governance reform and economic development, primarily led by the Department of State and USAID. Diplomatic, defense, and development efforts continue to reinforce each other to promote stability in both conflict-affected and steady-state environments to build resilient democratic societies.

General David M. Rodriguez, USA

Commander, USAFRICOM

8 March 2016

Figure 1-9: USAFRICOMs Theater Campaign Plan. *Source: USAFRICOM CCDRs Testimony.*[12]

In Fiscal Year 2015, USAFRICOM conducted 75 joint operations, 12 major joint exercises, and 400 security cooperation activities. In comparison, USAFRICOM conducted 68 operations, 11 major joint exercises, and 363 security cooperation activities in Fiscal Year 2014. This was slightly higher than the 2013 report where USAFRICOM conducted 55 operations, 10 major joint exercises and 481 security cooperation activities. This substantial support and interest in the AOR is indicative of the long-term objective to partner with African nations that have the greatest prospect of advancing good governance, security, and economic growth.[13]

[1] "Unified Combatant Commands," U.S. Department of Defense, accessed April 06, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Military-Services/Unified-Combatant-Commands.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning,* JP 5-0, (Washington D.C.: August 11, 2011), II-5, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf.

[5] "About the Command," U.S. Africa Command, accessed August 15, 2016, http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command.

[6] Richard G. Catoire, "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan," *Parameters* 4 (Winter 2000-01): 102 -117, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/00winter/catoire.htm.

[7] U.S. President, "Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command Africa," *White House Office of the Press Secretary*, modified February 6, 2007, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html.

[8] "Area of Responsibility," U.S. Africa Command, accessed July 14, 2016, http://www.africom.mil/area-of-responsiblity.

[9] Ibid.

[10] General David M. Rodriguez, "U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement 2015," (Washington, D.C., 2015), accessed July 14, 2016.

[11] Ibid.

[12] General David M. Rodriguez, "U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement 2016," (Washington, D.C., 2016), cleared March 2, 2016.

[13] General David M. Rodriguez, United States Marine Corps Commander, "U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement 2016, (hearing, Congress House Armed Services Subcommittee, Washington, D.C., 2016).

2 Regional Overview

In his statement before Congress, former Commander USAFRICOM, General Rodriguez, explained how he views the AOR and divided Africa into the following regions: East, North, West, Central, and Southern Africa.[14] This is consistent with the RCLF regional divisions from former blocks of instruction. With that in mind, what follows is a review of USAFRICOM's history, geography, politics, economy, people and societies, and regional security issues.

2.1 Historical Overview

African history is most notably marked by colonialism. Much of the history of the AOR can be defined by periods of pre-colonialism, colonialism, and post-colonialism. The 'Scramble for Africa' and Berlin Conference are important in understanding much of the history within the region. The demands of the Industrial Revolution in the West forced European countries to look at Africa's trade potential. Western powers looked at Africa as a source for raw materials like rubber, for use in the automobile industry, and ivory, which had varied uses.[15] The "interest" and competition among the European powers to occupy Africa to meet the demands of the Industrial Age is commonly referred to as the "Scramble for Africa". The "Scramble for Africa" paved the way for dialogue on various issues arising out of the exploration of Africa.

> **The Berlin Act of 1885:** The participating powers resolved to protect the freedom of religion in all colonial territories, to suppress slavery, and to preserve native tribes and "provide for their material well-being."

To facilitate an organized and conflict-free exploration of Africa, German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck convened a conference in Berlin in 1884. The two-year discussion, known as the Berlin Conference, was attended by 14 European powers. The Berlin Conference resolved to end the slave trade. Berlin conferees also agreed to partition Africa on behalf of the countries that they represented, drawing boundaries on a map and designating each new territory a colony.[16]

Throughout Africa, the divisions and outside influence have had significant implications on religion, language, and other aspects of the regions culture. For example, the partitioning of Africa did not take ethnic groups into consideration. As a result today, many members of the same ethnic group were -- and continue to be -- separated by national borders. Additionally, the newly formed states began to develop separately from each other in terms of governance. Generally, the colonial governance structures in Africa were based on two systems -- direct rule and indirect rule. The impact can also be seen in the infrastructure of the sub-regions. The need to transport rubber, minerals, and other goods to the West led to the development of roads, bridges and rail networks that connected the interior with the Atlantic coast.

As noted in *Figure 2-1*, colonialization and the resulting Berlin Conference have markedly impacted the history of the AOR. While each sub-region in the AOR has historical considerations, each can trace its history to implications from colonialism. The sections that follow contain a more in-depth review of the history of the East, North, West, Central and Southern African regions with attention to pre-colonialism, colonialism and post-colonialism timeframes.

Figure 2-1: The Colonies of Africa. *Source: Michigan State University[17]*

2.1.1   History of East Africa

The pre-colonial history of East Africa was impacted by ancient civilizations and the immigration of Arabs. The Kingdom of Kush (2686-1650 BC) was located in what is now northern Sudan and southern Egypt. The Kingdom of Kush interacted with the Egyptian civilization; the Egyptians traded grains and slaves in exchange for gold, salt, and cotton from the Kingdom of Kush.[18] In Ethiopia, Yikunno Amlak, an Ethiopian ruler in 1270 BC, established a formal government with a military. The Ethiopian Kingdom identified itself as an extension of Solomon's Kingdom, claiming that its rulers were direct descendants of King Solomon.[19] By the seventh century, Arabs reached the interior of sub-Saharan Africa, bringing

trade and the religion of Islam with them. Arab traders established trading posts along the east coast of Africa in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania.[20] They also established settlements along the Kenya and Tanzania coastline and intermarried with the local women. During this same period, Arabs invaded Egypt; they spread their culture throughout the region, including sections of northern Sudan. Arabization and Islamization continued to spread southward by land and along the coastline. Arab traders and travelers, along with African clerics, continued to spread Islam and eventually established the Darfur Sultanate in 1596 in western Sudan.

Colonialism significantly impacted the region, despite the regional resistance. The British, who colonized Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, administered these countries through so-called "indirect rule." In indirect rule, the colonial government took the role of advisor, and sometimes supervisor, of local indigenous authorities, such as the chieftaincy. Although the British government left intact indigenous forms of governance, including the method of appointing the local chief, they interfered in the affairs of the local communities where and when it was advantageous for Britain. Additionally, although the local authority collected taxes from its subjects, a percentage was retained by the British government. Germany also applied an "indirect rule" approach in Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania. Like Britain, the German colonial government left intact local forms of governance, though colonial administrators interfered when it suited them. France, which only colonized Djibouti, applied "direct rule," also known as "assimilation." This meant that the colonial government ruled through traditional African authorities who acted on the French government's behalf. This allowed the colonial government to create a society similar to that in France, including its language and culture.[21]

In the mid-1940s, soon after the end of World War II, resistance movements began to pressure colonial governments across the continent to grant self-rule.[22] In response, colonial authorities began to transition their colonies toward independence in the late 1950s. By 1960, the first of the territories had been granted self-rule – Sudan (1956), Somalia (1960), Rwanda (1961), Uganda (1962), Burundi (1962), Kenya (1963), and Djibouti (1977). Djibouti's independence marked the end of the era of European colonization. The remaining countries in this region gained independence much later: Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011). Both Eritrea and South Sudan were granted independence following years of violent struggle. Eritrea fought against Ethiopian domination, while South Sudan fought to separate from northern Sudan.

Throughout East Africa, outside influences have historically shaped religion, language, and other aspects of regional culture. These past experiences, coupled with ongoing social and political changes, continue to define regional history, politics, and economy.

2.1.2   History of North Africa

Due to its geographic location on the Mediterranean, which provides easy access from Europe and the Middle East, North Africa's historical development was shaped by many of the leading civilizations in world history, such as the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Romans, Byzantines, and a Germanic tribe called the Vandals just to name few. All these invaders left their imprint to some extent on the indigenous populations. Two pre-colonial examples of such an impact are the Arab Conquest and the Ottoman Conquest.

The Arab Conquest

In 639 AD, Arab forces invaded Egypt. By 642 AD, the Arabs had expelled the Byzantine rulers, taken control, and founded the city of Cairo.[23] They eventually migrated south and westward, spreading

Islamic and Arab culture throughout the region. The inhabitants of North Africa at the time of the Arab invasion were Berbers, Jews, and Christians. Some converted to Islam, while others continued to co-exist by paying a special tax. When the Arabs expanded westward from Egypt to North Africa, some Berbers became Muslim, others resisted, and some turned to Christianity. However, Berbers, as a group, have maintained a strong ethnic identity to this day.[24] Known for their riding and fighting skills, Berbers became the backbone of Arab armies.[25] They played a major role in spreading Islam throughout the North Africa region.[26]

The Ottoman Conquest

Following the Mamluks' rule of Egypt and Syria, which lasted from 1250 until 1517, the Ottomans conquered Egypt in 1517.[27] Shortly afterward, the Ottomans expanded to the Maghreb. Unlike Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya, Morocco remained largely independent of the Ottoman Turkish rule.[28] The roots of the Ottoman Empire could be traced back to the Turkish-speaking tribes who entered the Arab lands in the tenth century, establishing themselves in Baghdad and Anatolia.[29] About three hundred years after the Ottoman conquest, European colonialism replaced Turkish domination as European countries took over North Africa from the Ottoman Empire.[30] By 1830, Europe initiated its colonial expansion in the region, which started with the French occupation of Algiers. North Africa was then divided into four political entities. Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya were all semi-automatous states that fell under the Ottomans' religious authority. As mentioned earlier, the exception to this was Morocco, which was a sovereign country under the Alawi/Alaouite Dynasty.[31]

Much of North Africa was colonized by European powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Divisions are illustrated in Figure 2-1. The British took control of Egypt (for its strategic location) and Sudan in the 1880s, and retained control until the first half of the twentieth century. France moved into Algeria and Tunisia in the 1800s. Neither country received independence until the twentieth century. The Italians took over Libya in the early twentieth century;[32] and after World War II it came under Allied administration that lasted until 1954. Morocco evaded colonial rule until 1912, when Spain took control of the north and France claimed the eastern, western, and southern portions of the country. Eventually, Morocco gained independence in 1956. Spain and France also claimed ownership of the area now called Western Sahara. Once they relinquished their claim on Western Sahara, Morocco seized control and the area remains in conflict today.

Post-colonial North Africa is marked by a series of uprisings and attempts for stable governance. Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and the Sudan (as a few examples) have experienced modern uprisings against the autocratic governments established as colonial powers left.[33] Tunisia, often referred to as the Birthplace of the "Arab Springs," is one illustration of modern challenges. On 18 December 2010 high prices, unemployment, political oppression, and poor living conditions triggered a wave of demonstrations and unrest across Tunisia against Bin Ali's government.[34] The Tunisian revolution was sparked on 17 December 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26 year-old street vendor, decided to protest the unwarranted confiscation of his pushcart by the police by setting himself on fire.[35] Bouazizi's protest suicide precipitated a national revolt that ultimately ended President Bin Ali's 23-year rule, and sparked the beginning of what is now called the "Arab Spring"– a domino-like series of civil revolts occurring in Egypt, Libya, and other parts of the Middle East and North Africa.

The **"Arab Springs"** refers to the pro-democracy uprising that began in December 2010 and swept across the Middle East and North Africa

2.1.3   History of West Africa

Historically, West Africa served as a trade link between North Africa, the Mediterranean, and sub-Saharan Africa. Recorded history in West Africa documents the rise of three empires: the Ghana Empire, the Mali Empire, and the Songhai Empire, all centered in what is now Mali *(Figure 2-2)*.[36] The Ghana Empire began in the eighth century AD and lasted through the tenth century. Unlike the empires that followed, the Ghana Empire was not established by Muslims, but by Africans. Trade drove development of the Ghana Empire, helping it expand from modern southwest Mali into Mauritania and Senegal. The rulers of the Ghana Empire enjoyed good relations with Muslim traders from the north, but never fully adopted the Muslim faith. West African traders exchanged gold, cotton fabric, metal ornaments, and leather goods for copper, horses, salt, cloth, and beads.[37]

Figure 2-2: Kingdoms of West Sudan (inner to outer: Ghana, Mali, and Songhay). *Source: Smithsonian Institute.[38]*

The most significant event in the pre-colonial era was the emergence of the transatlantic slave trade in 1444. The sudden demand for slave labor largely came from colonial plantations operating in the "new world" of Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. Portuguese slave ships exchanged West African slaves for European goods, sugar, and cotton. The trade routes between Africa, Europe, and the Americas were lucrative and triangular: slaves from the Ghana coast were first sent to European slaving ports in London, Liverpool, and Bristol; and then moved on to labor-hungry plantations in the Americas.[39]

Throughout West Africa, outside influences—notably trade and interaction with Arabs—shaped religion, language, and other aspects of the region's culture. These experiences, coupled with ongoing social and political changes continue to define regional history and politics. While Islamic and Arab influences date

back to medieval times, West Africans have also adopted many customs from the European countries that colonized them from the late 1800s through the mid-1900s. The specific colonial powers present in West Africa are illustrated in Figure 2-1.

Most countries in this region gained independence in the 1960s after the formation of many indigenous political organizations that demanded self-rule and a change of governance at the local and national level. From these movements emerged West Africa's first generation of national leaders. For some West African countries, the years following independence were marked by intense internal upheaval: cross-border conflicts, insurgencies, and humanitarian crises were precipitated by political instability, poverty, extremism, and competition over resources. In other countries, however, independence led to significant and positive changes, including infrastructure development, development of governmental structures in education and health, and an expanded political field, which has allowed for voting systems and multi-party democracy. The most crucial challenges in the post-colonial era have been in the areas of security and healthcare: acts of terrorism and massive outbreaks of an Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) have necessitated the deployment of foreign militaries and aid organizations to the region. The United States is keen to build the capacity of nations in this region in order to stem the spread of extremist elements operating in the remote north – especially in Niger and Mali.

2.1.4   History of Central Africa

Prior to the arrival of European explorers in the sixteenth century, Central Africa remained relatively decentralized with no defined state boundaries. The social and traditional leadership structures were built around kinship. Notably, the traditional leadership structures across all societies in this region were similar prior to colonization: a society was headed by a chief who was perceived to be superior both socially and spiritually. The central figure in a given society was often assisted by a council of elders drawn from several villages spread across the kingdom. Typically, each village had a council of elders that would manage its affairs, including organizing communal ceremonies and rites of passage such as male circumcision. Among the Bakongo for example, the largest ethnic group in this region, several villages were organized into a district; several districts were organized into a province. The province was represented by a governor who was appointed by the King of Bakongo. At each level, a council of elders played an advisory role and was instrumental in conflict resolution. However, only the King had the authority to make trade agreements or declare war.

As with the other regions in Africa, the most significant event in the pre-colonial era was the emergence of the transatlantic slave trade in 1444. Throughout the region, traditional authorities allowed European traders to have access to trade routes; facilitated the activities of middlemen and traders who traveled throughout the region to sell goods in exchange for slaves. Slaves from Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Dominican Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sao Tome and Principe were transported to European ports in England and Spain, and then to the Americas.[40] The public's growing concern with the new form of trade, along with the decision by the European powers to ban slave trade in the late 1800s, led to the decline of the trade and the rise in demand for raw materials and other goods. These events precipitated the colonization of Africa by European powers.

Figure 2-1 illustrates the colonial divisions of power that resulted from the Berlin Conference. As with other regions, colonial powers applied either direct or indirect rule within the areas in the region. France, which colonized a vast portion of the region, applied direct rule while Germany applied an indirect rule in Rwanda, Burundi, and Cameroon. The largest territory in the region was the DRC. Despite competition from France and Britain, King Leopold of Belgium convinced all powers present at the Berlin

Conference that he was well-positioned to administer the Congo.[41] King Leopold had a personal interest in ensuring his control in Central Africa. He outlined a humanitarian plan to ensure that the slave trade was indeed stopped; he also promised to create a conducive environment for missionaries and explorers. King Leopold created a free trade zone in Central Africa where all parties could trade regardless of the local powers that governed the area. By 1905, reports of abuses in The Congo Free State prompted Britain and other powers to inquire about King Leopold's activities, including reports that he had revived the slave trade. In 1906, the U.S. and Britain called for changes; by 1908, King Leopold ceded control of the territory to the Belgian government.[42]

The era of European colonization ended in 1975 when the last territory in this region was granted independence. In the early '40s, soon after World War II, resistance movements began to pressure colonial governments across the continent to grant self-rule.[43] In Central Africa, colonial authorities had begun to transition their colonies toward independence in the late 1940s. By 1960, the first of the territories had been granted self-rule: Cameroon (1960), CAR (1960), DRC (1960), Gabon (1960) and Congo (Brazzaville) (1960). The remaining colonies in this region were granted independence soon after: Rwanda (1961), Burundi (1962), Equatorial Guinea (1968), and Sao Tome & Principe (1975). However, a lack of strong governing structures, ethnic disagreements, and competition over economic resources soon caused civil wars to break out within the newly independent countries. Many of these wars lasted for decades. Conflicts in the DRC, Rwanda, Congo (Brazzaville), and the CAR are responsible for millions of civilian deaths, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Throughout Central Africa, historical outside influences—notably trade and interaction with Europeans—have shaped religion, language, and other aspects of regional culture. These past experiences, coupled with ongoing social and political changes, continue to define regional history politics and economy.[44]

2.1.5   History of Southern Africa

Pre-colonial Southern Africa history is marked by two groups of people: the Khoisan and the Bantu. The Khoisan people consist of the San, a hunter gatherer group, and the Khoikhoi, a pastoralist group. The Khoisan are found in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Angola, and have a distinct identity. For example, their language has a distinctive click on every consonant.   This unique feature has been incorporated into the languages of several Bantu groups, including Xhosa and Zulu. These languages are also known as click languages, since they heavily rely on mouth clicks or "a sharp popping or smacking sound between the tongue and the roof of the mouth."[45] The Bantu descended from a common ancestor and -- through migration from central Africa to Eastern and Southern Africa -- their unique identifying features distinguish them from other people groups. There are over 500 Bantu languages and dialects encompassing East, Central, and Southern Africa. Tribe, clan, and family are important units in Bantu society.[46]

Figure 2-1 illustrates the colonial divisions of power which resulted from the Berlin Conference. As with other regions, colonial powers applied either direct or indirect rule within the areas in the region. The British, who colonized Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, administered these countries through so-called "indirect rule." France, which colonized Islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles applied "direct rule." Germany applied an "indirect rule" approach in Namibia.

After the Berlin Conference, Britain fought the Afrikaners (descendants of the Dutch)[47] in the South African War (1899-1902) in order to secure their domain on South Africa, while the Afrikaners fought for their autonomy.[48] By 1900, the British forces overwhelmed the formal opposition; however, a guerrilla

resistance war continued in the countryside. The British succeeded in breaking this resistance only after adopting a scorched-earth policy, torching more than 30,000 farms.[49] Afrikaner women and children were held in concentration camps where more than 25,000 died due to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions.[50] Britain defeated the Boers, annexed the Boer states, and consolidated the country into the Union of South Africa in 1910.[51]

After World War II the European colonizers were subjected to increasing international pressure to grant independence to their colonies.[52] British territories experienced the most peaceful transition to independence; by 1968, these British-held areas emerged as new countries: Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, and Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland (which later became Zambia and Malawi).[53] The most violent wars for independence took place in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, as well as Southern Rhodesia (which became independent Zimbabwe in 1980).[54] The reason for such violence in the Portuguese colonies was Portugal's defiance of the 1960 United Nations declaration that denounced colonialism and called for the European powers to relinquish controls of the colonies.[55]

The development of racially discriminatory practices in Southern Africa has occurred since the beginning of colonization. It was still present at the inception of South Africa's statehood, when black Africans were specifically excluded from having political rights in a reorganized South Africa, while the British and Boers shared a common goal of white minority rule.[56] Segregation was driven by the actions of the white minority to maintain and reinforce a racial and social class hierarchy, giving the whites economic advantage and higher social status.[57] Discriminatory practices evolved into segregation policies and finally apartheid. Apartheid was legislated and used to reorganize South African society after the Afrikaner Nationalists came into power in 1948.

> The term **"apartheid"** (from the Afrikaans word for "apartness") was coined during the 1948 general elections.[58]

2.2   Geographic Overview

Figure 2-3: USAFRICOM Global Location. *Source: Wikimedia.*

Figure 2-3 highlights the global position of USAFRICOM. As denoted in the image, the AOR consists of parts of the South Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the whole of the African Continent (less Egypt and inclusive of lands adjacent to the continent). The location of the AOR within the world has significant implications on the peoples in the regions of the AOR. This geographic location is further sub-divided into five regions: east, north, central, west and south.

2.2.1   Geography of East Africa

Figure 2-4 shows the global location and country composition of East Africa. The Horn of Africa (HOA), which consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, is a sub-region within East Africa. The remaining countries in the East Africa region include Burundi, Kenya Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. These areas are collectively referred to as East Africa. East Africa stretches about 1,800 mi (3,000 km) from north to south. Its land area is over 1.4 million sq mi (3.7 million sq km). Traveling from the capital city of Asmara, Eritrea, to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (equivalent to the distance between Washington, D.C. and Denver, Colorado).

Figure 2-4: Map of East Africa Region. *Source: CAOCL.*

Topography

The terrain in East Africa is unique and diverse. Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the landscape in East Africa is the Great Rift Valley, running from northern Ethiopia to southern Mozambique. The Great Rift Valley has active volcanic and seismic activity that produced Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, as well as Mounts Kilimanjaro and Kenya. The Ruwenzori Mountain in Uganda connects with the Virunga Ranges. The Virunga mountain ranges extend from Uganda through Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Virunga are volcanic ranges that spread 50 mi and have 8 volcanic peaks, with the highest at 14786 ft (4,507 m).[60] This region also has an abundance of rivers and lakes that are used for hydroelectric power, irrigation, fisheries, and tourism. In rural areas, people use rivers, lakes, and wells to obtain fresh water for drinking, crop irrigation, and watering livestock. In urban areas, water comes from municipal supplies.

Key Waterways
Lake Victoria *(26,828 sq mi)* is centrally located between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania and is the source of the River Nile. It is the second-largest freshwater lake in the world.
River Nile flows north from Uganda *(White Nile)* through Ethiopia *(Blue Nile), Sudan and on to Egypt. It is a major strategic feature in the region.*
Lake Tanganyika *(12,700 sq mi)* is bordered by Tanzania and Burundi. It is the second deepest lake in the world.[59]

Weather and Climate

East Africa straddles the equator. Much of the climate in the region is arid. The highlands of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya have relatively temperate climates. Tanzania's western plateau is hot and dry. Most of Uganda tends to have a comparatively moderate climate due to its high elevation. Desert areas in the region include northern Sudan and the coastal plain of the Horn of Africa. Temperatures vary according to altitude and distance from the sea. The region's weather is characterized by heavy rainfall during the rainy seasons, low rainfall in arid regions, and high humidity and heat inland.[61] Acclimatization to hot weather is very important while operating in this region. Of note, the temperature gets cold during the rainy seasons and at night during most of the year. This chilly temperature extreme occurs in the Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Kenyan highlands; and in the mountainous regions of South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania. The lowlands of the extreme east – Eritrea, Djibouti, and parts of Somalia – have near-desert conditions with very low rain fall. This often results in drought conditions. Temperatures on East Africa's mountaintops can drop below zero and are snow-capped throughout much of the year.

Environmental Hazards in the region include drought, cyclone-like winds, poaching and deforestation. Environmental hazards limit access to transportation, healthcare, and educational opportunities; and influence specific societies within many countries in this region.[62]

2.2.2   Geography of North Africa

North Africa is often divided into sub-regions: The Maghreb is the western sub-region that includes Morocco/Western Sahara, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya. Egypt and Sudan are referred to as the Nile Valley. *Figure 2-5* shows the global location and country composition of the North Africa Region.

Figure 2-5: Map of North Africa Region. *Source: CAOCL*

Topography

North Africa has three main geographic features: *the Sahara, the Atlas Mountains, and the Nile River.*

The Sahara, which means "The Great Desert" in Arabic, is the largest and hottest desert in the world.[63] It covers approximately 3.5 million square miles. The Sahara is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Red Sea on the east, the Atlas Mountains and the Mediterranean Sea on the north, and the Sahel region in the south.[64] This desert covers much of Western Sahara, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, the southern portions of Morocco and Tunisia, and the northern half of Sudan.[65]

The Atlas Mountains are a complex system of ridges, plateaus, and basins stretching for 1,200 miles across much of Morocco, northern Algeria, and Tunisia.[66] The Atlas range is an extension of the Alps mountain range of Southern Europe.[67] These mountains in North Africa peak at 14,000 feet. As the range recedes to the south and east, a steppe landscape is formed before ending at the Sahara Desert.

The Nile, known as the longest river in the world, and the most complex river system in the North Africa region. It flows northward from its major source, Lake Victoria in east central Africa, running about 4,160 miles before draining into the Mediterranean Sea. The Nile Valley and the Nile Delta are considered one of the most fertile areas in the world.[68] The Nile is the region's largest and most complex river system.

Weather and Climate

North Africa is one of the most arid regions in the world. Inland, North African countries have semiarid and arid desert climates, and experience extremely hot summers and cold winters and modest rainfall (3.9 to 15.7 inches per year).[69] The Sahara is the world's largest hot desert, with average temperature of 86°F. During the hottest months temperatures can exceed 122°F.[70] Temperatures can also fall below freezing in the winter. A single daily temperature variation of 32.9°F to 99.5°F has been recorded.[71] The heat and lack of water in North Africa are chief reasons why many people choose to live in the mountains along the coastline or become nomadic.[72] Bordered on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, coastal North Africa has a Mediterranean climate, with warm dry summers and mild wet winters, and sufficient rainfall.[73] Mild weather and consistently sunny days makes the coastal areas in North Africa a major tourism destination.[74] Temperatures in the Atlas Mountains can drop below freezing, and the peaks of the Atlas are covered in snow throughout most of the year.[75]

> ***Environmental Hazards*** in the region include earthquakes, drought, storms, and floods.[76] Among these hazards, drought and floods are the most extreme and threaten lives and economics.

2.2.3   Geography of West Africa

West Africa is bordered by the Sahara Desert to the north, dense tropical forests of Cameroon to the east, the Gulf of Guinea to the south, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. The Atlantic coastline curves around Benin, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia (officially referred to as "The Gambia"), Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The Sahara Desert encroaches into northern Mali and Mauritania. *Figure 2-6* shows the global location and country composition of the West Africa Region.

Figure 2-6: Map of West Africa Region. *Source: CAOCL.*

The terrain in West Africa is made up of flat, barren plains and a coastal belt. Additionally, this region also has some of Africa's longest rivers, including the rivers Gambia, Senegal, Niger, Volta, and Benue. In addition to the rivers and wetlands, this region is home to a vast forest canopy. The Guinean forests of West Africa extend from Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria.[77] Besides the forests and riverine networks, this region is defined by the Sahara Desert, which has gradually engulfed much of Mauritania and northern Mali. The encroachment of the desert – a phenomenon known a "desertification" -- impacts the climate, economy, and security of the region.

Weather and Climate

West Africa is characterized by relatively constant year-long temperatures, with an average of 64°F. In July, however, daytime temperatures can rise as high as 138°F, then drop to as low as 39°F at night. From May through June, colder water in the Atlantic Ocean generates monsoons that sometimes pummel the region with strong winds and heavy rainfall.[78] The average rainfall ranges between 7.2 to 13.5 inches across the region; but rainfall levels are much lower -- between 5 and 8 inches – in the coastal areas of Ghana and Senegal.[79] The rainy season is between March and November, with the highest rainfall between June and August.[80] Another important feature in this region's climate is the harmattan, a hot dry windstorm that blows southward from the Sahara. The winds reduce visibility and create overcast skies as they blow fine dust; the powdery air affects livestock and agriculture. The harmattan season is from November to March.[81]

Environmental Hazards in the region include drought, flooding and deforestation. The most significant of these events is drought. One relatively recent example of this is from 2010, when a drought in Mali created a humanitarian emergency that was made worse by the 2012 political crisis. Over 300,000 Malians displaced by this crisis sought refuge in Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria. The international response, led by the United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP), helped drought victims in Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Gambia, northern Nigeria, and Cameroon.[82]

2.2.4　Geography of Central Africa

Central Africa is part of Sub-Saharan Africa. It consists of three land-locked countries and five coastal countries. Burundi, Rwanda, and the Central African Republic are landlocked, and Cameroon, Republic of Congo Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe are coastal countries. This region stretches east from Africa's Atlantic coast into the Great Rift Valley, covering over 1.5 million square miles of land area. This is about two-fifths the size of the United States, with a travel distance comparable to that between Washington DC to Phoenix, Arizona, roughly 1,500 miles. *Figure 2-7* illustrates the country composition and geographic position of the Central Africa Region.

Figure 2-7: Map of Central Africa Region. *Source: CAOCL.*

Topography

The topography of this region is defined by the plateau that lies 2952.8 ft and falls 984.3 ft[83], with the edge of the Sahara bordering some areas of the Sahelian countries. Hilly plateaus stretch across central Cameroon and the CAR, and tropical rainforests blanket the northern Republic of the Congo and the DRC. Additionally, mountainous ranges like the Mount Cameroon in Cameroon, the Mitumba Mountains in the DRC, and the Ruwenzori predominantly stretch across Uganda, but connect with the Virunga Ranges. The Virunga Mountain ranges extend from Uganda through Rwanda and the DRC. The Virunga are volcanic ranges that spread 50 miles and have 8 volcanic peaks with the highest at 14,786.8 ft.[84] The dominant water feature of the area is the Congo River Basin, the second-largest watershed in the world. The Congo basin extends across six countries — Cameroon, CAR, DRC, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The adjacent land is fertile and swampy, and provides for both man and animals. This region is also known for its African Great Lakes; the four that lie within the Central Africa region are Lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu, and Tanganyika.

Weather and Climate

Central Africa straddles the Equator, causing climates across the region to be mainly hot, humid, and tropical. The highlands of Burundi, the eastern DRC, and Rwanda have relatively temperate climates

with average temperatures between 74 and 78°F. However, in Burundi, the eastern DRC, the Rwandan highlands, and mountainous regions of Cameroon it gets cooler during the rainy seasons and through the night throughout most of the year. The extreme northern areas of Cameroon and the CAR experience hot, dry, semi-arid, and desert conditions.[85]

The coastal areas of Central Africa and its rainforests are among the wettest places on earth. Seasonal weather can be grouped into a dry and wet season. The dry season, typically lasting from November to April, is characterized by little or no rainfall. Rainy seasons typically last from May to October. Spring rains are heavier and last longer, while autumn rains are brief and unpredictable.[86]

Environmental Hazards in the region include drought and famine, sandstorms, landslides, limnic eruptions, and deforestation. Mounts Nyiragongo and Nyamuragira are two hazardous volcanoes in the DRC. Each time there is seismic activity in this region, communities around the mountains are exposed to the dangers that come with living near volcanic activity. In addition to volcanic activity, Mount Nyamuragira is known for mudslides, which have in the past left communities devastated.[87]

2.2.5   Geography of Southern Africa

Figure 2-8: Map of Southern Africa Region. *Source: CAOCL.*

Southern Africa is a huge region occupying the entire southern cusp of the African continent, stretching west from the Indian Ocean to the Southern Atlantic Ocean. Its land area covers over 2.5 million sq mi,[88] nearly three-fourths the size of the United States. The region is bordered on the north by the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Tanzania. The Mozambique Channel, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean surround the area along the east, south, and west. *Figure 2-8* illustrates the geographic location and country composition of Southern Africa.

Topography

The most notable topographical features in Southern Africa include plateaus, forests and a river system. The Highveld Plateau is the dominant feature in Southern Africa, and it defines most of the landscape of the region.[89] This inland plateau stands at an altitude of more than 3,281 ft above sea level, separated from the narrow coastal plain in the south by a horseshoe-shaped ridge, the Great Escarpment.[90] These high grounds extend to east Africa and are comprised of three contiguous regions of anomalous topography: the East African Plateau, the Southern African Plateau, and the southeastern Atlantic Ocean basin.[91] Angola has the most significant forest cover in Southern Africa, followed by Zambia and Mozambique.[92] Rivers and lakes account for only a small portion of the area in Southern Africa, a factor that contributes to the aridity of the region. Water resources have major strategic significance in Southern Africa.[93] Some of the main rivers in the west are Cunene River (that forms the border between Angola and Namibia), and the Cubango and Orange Rivers. On the east coast, the major rivers are the Limpopo and the Zambezi. The main natural freshwater lakes are the Niassa, Funduzi, Oponono, and Liambezi. All other large static water bodies are either man-made dams or pans with closed drainage systems. The Zambezi River is the longest and most shared river system in the region. It is only navigable by shallow-water means, due to its innumerous natural barriers and rapids.[94] It stretches over 1,600 mi[95] and flows through Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.[96]

Weather and Climate

Southern Africa has a range of climates, from tropical in Angola and Zambia to subtropical in Mozambique and South Africa.[97] There are also wide seasonal contrasts in temperature and rainfall. Annual rainfall increases considerably in the north and east. Temperatures in the west coast are cooler than in east coast.[98] Southern African temperatures are affected by both latitude and high altitude. Summer temperatures are highest in the central Kalahari Desert. Winters are mild along the eastern coasts, with the coldest regions found in the Highveld and mountains of the Great Escarpment, which regularly have night frosts and heavy snowfall. The rest of the region is warm, with pleasant winter days and cool nights.

Environmental Hazards in the region include floods, soil erosion, drought, abandoned mining sites, poaching and burning. Floods and droughts are the main environmental hazards in Southern Africa.[99] Hurricanes and storms can cause flooding, which severely impact food and water security in the region.[100] Mozambique and the island nations of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles are predisposed to cyclones.

2.3   Economic Overview

The following sub-sections contain reviews of the major economic aspects of East, North, West, Central and Southern Africa. For brevity, the review is not exhaustive. A deeper review of the economic systems – such as a closer look at industry, infrastructure, and economic trends – can be found in prior RCLF courses.

2.3.1   Economy of East Africa

There are various economic systems in East Africa, including a traditional economic system based on pastoralism and agriculture. This is especially evident in rural communities, where subsistence production is localized, many times cashless, and often unregulated by the central government. There are numerous communities that co-exist alongside each other and trade milk for grain. Similarly, fishing communities such as the Luo of Kenya practice subsistence fishing, and trade fish for agricultural products or sell smoked fish to supplement their household income. Farmers also sell surplus food in local markets, enhancing the reach of a cash-based economy at the local level.

Additionally, traditional banking systems such as *hawala* are used extensively in this region.[101] Hawala is a parallel banking system that exists outside of formal structures.[102] Hawala banking is based on trust; families often use this informal financial system to remit money across great distances to family or friends.

> **Hawala** is popular because it is fast, cheap and reliable. Hawala functions outside regulations; it does not leave any record and is not subject to taxation.

The other type of economic system in this region is the market economy which is reliant on oil, tourism, and commercial agriculture. However, instability and the presence of aid organizations that provide direct and indirect assistance to refugees and displaced populations —sometimes in the absence of government—have created a hybrid economy. One instance of the hybrid economy can be seen in barter trade, whereby refugees exchange food aid with locals for firewood, soap, and other supplies.

Although the countries in this region rely on agriculture and oil, their economies vary widely in terms of GDP growth. Economic indicators suggest that this is a region with a lot of potential, but one whose growth is hindered by corruption and a harsh investment climate directly affected by conflict and the absence of structures that accurately measure growth.

2.3.2   Economy of North Africa

Due to its natural resources and its proximity to European markets, most North African economies rely on global trade and have major trading partners from other regions. Increases in the North African population have created a labor pool that exceeds the number of available jobs. This scarcity of work has triggered a migration from rural areas to cities, and the movement of North Africans to Europe. In addition, a large informal economy exists throughout the region.

The countries of North Africa have a variety of natural resources. Oil and, increasingly, natural gas have been the biggest booms to some North African economies, particularly Libya and Algeria. Egypt, a modest producer of oil, relies on oil output to generate export revenues. While Tunisia's small supply of oil helps offset portions of its petroleum imports. Libya's oil exports make it one of the strongest economies in Africa, contributing about 95 percent of export earnings, and 60 percent of public sector earnings.[103]

Although all North Africa countries import much of their food, *agriculture remains and important sector of their economies.* Famers constitute about 44 percent of the workforce in Morocco, 50 percent in Western Sahara, 32 percent in Egypt, 14 percent in Algeria, and 17 percent in Libya.[104] The regions principal crops are wheat, barley oats, citrus fruits, wine grapes, olives, tobacco, and dates.

All North African countries actively exploit agricultural and natural resources to support manufacturing industries. Egypt has developed a large textile industry to process cotton, while Morocco produces leather goods from its livestock. Algeria and Tunisia refine and bottle olive oil, and Western Sahara (an area occupied largely by Morocco) has developed a huge phosphate mining industry.[105] Despite this, much of the labor force throughout North Africa is underutilized and unemployed. Throughout most of the region, there still exists a large gap between rich and poor.

North African economies depend on the remittances of emigrated workers. When North Africans immigrate to Europe, they typically send a portion of their earnings back to their families at home. Many families subsist on this income. Remittances to Morocco are significant: in 2007, remittances reached over $5 billion, making Morocco the fourth most significant remittance receiver in the world. The same year, Algeria received $2.1 billion, and Tunisia received $1.7 billion.[106]

The black market is an economic driver in some areas of North Africa, principally Sudan and Algeria. Today, with chronic youth unemployment reaching 27 percent, many young men become involved in the illegal sale of goods.[107]   The black market enables many Algerians to buy goods that they could not otherwise afford, or even find, in the poorly stocked stores. Those who trade in illicit goods run the risk of encounters with street gangs or with police officers, who routinely confiscate goods or demand bribes.

2.3.3   Economy of West Africa

The economic systems in this region are built on formal and informal sectors. The informal economic sectors include fishing, pastoralism, and agriculture. Manufacturing, oil drilling, and mining are the main economic drivers of the formal sectors. Additionally, minerals such as diamonds, gold, bauxite, and iron ore play a crucial role in West Africa's economies. Ghana and Mali are the main distributers of gold in this region.[108]

While mining plays a key role in the regional economy, logging is a fast-growing industry, especially because of the expanse of forest covering the region and the number of unemployed who have turned to artisan logging. The Guinean forests extend from Guinea to Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria.[109] Additionally, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and more recently Mauritania extract and export oil.

The region's traditional economic system is evident today in rural and Saharan communities where subsistence production is localized. It is often cashless and goes unregulated by the central government. One such example is the traditional economy of the Tuareg, which functions across the boundaries of Libya, Mali, and Niger. Tuareg caravans were historically the backbone of the Sahara trade, transporting goods such as salt and gold across North Africa, West Africa, and the Sahel. Today, the Tuareg still buy grains such as sorghum from farmers along their nomadic routes. They also buy surplus crops from local farming communities in order to have an adequate supply of food during the dry season.[110]

As with other regions, *hawala* is a significant consideration for regional economics. Rural communities, especially in Nigeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, have relied on *hawala* for decades. Exploitation of the system by terrorist and trafficker groups, however, has ushered in attempts to thwart the informal system. Many West African governments are working to strengthen formal financial institutions by imposing a system of taxation -- principally to counter money laundering and the financing of regional terror groups.[111]

Although the countries in this region rely on agriculture, pasturage, fishing, manufacturing, drilling, and mining, their economies vary widely in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Economic indicators show West Africa as a region with a lot of potential, but one whose growth is hindered by corruption, a harsh investment climate, armed conflict, and an absence of the capacity for governments to accurately measure growth. For example, Niger needs viable structures to research, document, and monitor economic indicators for policymaking purposes. In a cash-driven economy, where alternative systems like *hawala* exist, it is difficult to accurately depict economic trends.

2.3.4   Economy of Central Africa

There are various economic systems in this region, including a traditional economic system based on agriculture. This is evident in rural and forest communities, where subsistence production is localized, many times cashless, and often unregulated by the central government.

One example of an unregulated economy can be seen in the pygmies of Central Africa, commonly referred to as "forest people," who rely on subsistence agriculture, hunting, and gathering. The region's forested areas cover Cameroon, the CAR, Rwanda, and the DRC[112] approximately 30 million people from 150 different ethnic groups live under the forest cover of Central Africa.[113] In recent times, forest-dwellers have been pushed deeper into their ecosystem as a result of rapid deforestation caused by unregulated activities: artisan mining (which is usually random and indiscriminate), commercial farming, and illegal logging.[114]

The other type of economic system in this region is the market economy which is reliant on mining, petroleum, commercial agriculture, and timber harvesting. However, instability and the presence of aid organizations that provide direct and indirect assistance to refugees and displaced populations — sometimes in the absence of government—have created a hybrid economy. One instance of the hybrid economy can be seen in barter trade, whereby refugees exchange food aid with locals for firewood, soap, and other supplies.

Central Africa lacks enough formal jobs to offer steady wages to employ people newly arriving to its cities. Many people work as unregistered street vendors, who form the backbone of Central Africa's marketplaces. A large number of these workers in the informal economy are self-employed laborers working in industries as diverse as textiles and construction. Some workers endure dangerous working conditions, and most lack the benefits and job security that come with jobs in the formal economy. Informal commerce is an economic engine in many countries recovering from conflict, especially in eastern Congo (Brazzaville) and Rwanda.

2.3.5   Economy of Southern Africa

As with other regions, traditional economic systems are present in Southern Africa. There are numerous communities that co-exist alongside each other and trade milk for grain. Similarly, fishing communities practice subsistence fishing and trade fish for agricultural products or sell smoked fish to supplement their household income. Farmers also sell excess foodstuffs in markets, enhancing the reach of a cash-based economy at the local level. The other type of economic system in this region is the market economy which relies on oil exports, tourism, and commercial agriculture. The leading activities in the formal economic sector in this region include industries like mineral extraction. Examples of this include gold mining in South Africa, diamond mining in Botswana, copper mining in Zambia, and the export of petroleum from Angola.

There are huge variations in the distribution of the labor force by sector. For instance, while 61.4 percent of the labor force of Angola is occupied in "industry," in Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zambia, and Zimbabwe this occupation involves less than 10 percent of the labor force. Similar wide variations are seen in the agriculture sector; while the labor force of Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia are more than 80 percent dedicated to "agriculture," the numbers are completely inverted for Angola, Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa -- all are below the 10 percent mark for labor forces in this sector. *Figure 2-9* compares the total labor force figure per sector of occupation. Agriculture includes farming, fishing, and forestry; Industry includes mining, manufacturing, energy production, and construction; and Services cover government activities, communications, transportation, finance, and all other economic activities that do not produce material goods.[115]

Figure 2-9: Southern Africa Labor Force by Country. *Source: CIA World Factbook.[116]*

All Southern Africa countries have significant minerals and natural resources, but despite rising global demand, these resources have not significantly contributed to sustainable social and economic development.[117] This has happened for a wide variety of reasons, but mostly because mining contracts are negotiated to benefit corporations or individuals; they lack effective measures to guard against environmental damage, corruption, bribery, unfair competition, or lack of transparency. This has resulted in poor working conditions, displacement of local communities, and harm to the environment.[118]

Among the natural resource-endowed countries of Southern Africa, Botswana is one country that has successfully transformed resource rents into sustainable growth.[119] The government of Botswana is now getting a reasonable return on these savings. They achieved this by insisting upon rigorous project appraisal – a political decision to treat such appraisals seriously, so that public savings were only used to finance public investment if the rate of return exceeded a critical point.[120]

Although the countries in this region rely on mining, agriculture, and other extractive industries, their economies vary widely in terms of gross GDP growth. Economic indicators point to a region with a lot of potential where growth is hindered by corruption, rent-seeking patronage networks, a lack of investment on key infrastructure, and by the inability of many governments to effectively implement long-term plans.

2.4   People and Societies Overview

2.4.1   East African People and Societies

In 2014, East Africa had an estimated population of approximately 322 million people across 11 countries.[121] Most people in this region live in rural areas; however, rapid population growth will likely increase urbanization. East Africa is a major contributor to the rapid population growth in Africa. The UN predicts that Africa's global population will increase to 2.2 billion (24 percent of the world's total population) by 2050. Uganda's population is growing at a rate of 3.2 percent, while the population of South Sudan is growing at 4 percent per year.[122] Currently, Ethiopia is the region's most populated country, with approximately 99 million people[123], as depicted in *Figure 2-10*.

Population by Country

Figure 2-10: East Africa Population by Country. *Source: CIA World Factbook.[124]*

Migration is a notable feature affecting the demographics of this region. Populations migrate to and from countries for seasonal work. Other migrants are people fleeing conflicts, drought, or other instability. In 2015, continued instability in Somalia and South Sudan -- coupled with depressed economic conditions in other East African countries -- caused the region's estimated number of migrants

to reach 92,466.[125] Additionally, heightened instability in Yemen resulted in a reverse shift in the migration patterns from this region: refugees and migrant workers in Yemen are now retracing their arduous route across the Gulf of Aden back into East Africa.

Religion

John Mbiti, famed African author and theologian, succinctly summed up spiritual life in Africa: "Africans are notoriously religious."[126] Religion plays a significant role in all aspects of life in East Africa. It shapes values and identity. The major religions practiced in the region are Islam, Christianity, and animism (nature worship), sometimes called "traditional beliefs." Islam has a majority following in Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and Tanzania. These countries have larger Muslim populations due to greater historical interaction with Arabs and closer geographic proximity to the Arab world. Other countries in the lower part of the region, particularly Kenya and Tanzania, have predominant Muslim populations along the coastline, as well along the border with predominant Muslim countries. Christianity is also practiced extensively in this region. Christians in East Africa are a majority. Except for Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti, all other countries in this region have a 50 percent or higher Christian population. While many Christians in the area practice a hybrid form of Christianity (merged with Animism, or traditional beliefs); the three most common Christian denominations in this region are Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism.

Animists believe that the universe contains three worlds: the past, present, and future; and that all three are interconnected. Animists or "traditional believers" tend to seek harmony between these worlds. There are no animist holy texts, nor official places of worship. Instead, the rituals are considered part of one's ethnic identity. Each ethnic group has its own creation story, creator-god, spirits, and rituals. Beliefs in witchcraft, sorcery, and magic are ubiquitous in this region.

> African traditional beliefs tend to share three common themes:
> - Universal forces created the earth and remain present
> - Spirits fill the natural world and mediate between the past and future
> - Spirits determine the course of present life, which often leads to a fatalistic view of events

Ethnic Groups

East Africa has hundreds of ethnic groups that live in the same geographical area and share similar cultures, language structures, and identities. The peoples of this region primarily belong to one of three main ethnic families: *the Bantu, the Cushite, or the Nilote.* The Bantu are descended from a common ancestor; their unique identifying physical features (facial structure, height, skin color, hair texture) distinguish them from other neighboring groups. There are over 500 Bantu languages and dialects encompassing East, Central, and Southern Africa. Tribe, clan, and family are important units in Bantu society.[127] The Cushite ethnic grouping is comprised of Somalis of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. They have similar physical features and language structure.[128] The Cushite were originally from the Middle East. From about 15,000 to 10,000 BC they migrated to Africa through the Sinai Peninsula to the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia), and eventually moved into Sudan and Kenya.[129] The largest Cushitic tribes are the Oromo of Ethiopia (35 million) and the Somali (18 million).[130] The final major ethnic group in this region is the Nilote. This group is found around the Nile River, in Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Kenya. The Nilote share similar physical features and economic lifestyles; they mostly practice agriculture and pastoralism.[131] The largest Nilotic groups are the Luo, in Kenya; the Acholi, in Uganda; the Nubians in Sudan; and the Dinka and Nuer, in South Sudan. Collectively, they

number approximately seven million people.[132] *Figure 2-11* highlights the distribution of major ethnic groups in Eastern Africa.

Figure 2-11: Major Ethnic Groups in Eastern Africa. *Source: CIA World Factbook.[133]*

The ethnic diversity of most East African nations has resulted in several languages being spoken within each country. These language groups, based on similarity of linguistic structure, consist of: Afro-Asiatic, Nilo-Saharan, Niger-Conga A, Niger-Congo B, Khoisan, and Austronesian.[134] As an example of the linguistic diversity, in Tanzania there are over 200 different dialects spoken; however, almost all Tanzanians speak Swahili. Despite the ethnic diversity in the region, people live in close proximity to other ethnic groups that belong to the same "people group" (Bantu, Nilote or Cushite). Almost all languages spoken in this region are classified under one of those three people groups.

Family and Social Structure

The concept of family across most of the African continent is different from that in the West. The extended family is an important unit in all countries in this region. Polygamy is widely practiced which expands the reach of the "immediate family." In a polygamous home, labor is split between the wives and children, especially in rural areas where the household economy is heavily reliant on agriculture. In urban areas, the extended family shares a home; the men are the main income earners while wives manage the home. In the social structure, authority is based on kinship, and the head of the family is usually the eldest male member. The tribe, clan, and family are taken into consideration in decision-making. There are advantages to the large familial homestead. For instance, in times of war, the larger homesteads can better protect themselves from their enemies. Larger homesteads also have a larger workforce, important because most of the countries rely on agriculture, fishing, and rearing livestock for their livelihoods. Nomadic tribes rely on their family members to graze and water their livestock.

Education and Healthcare

Traditionally, education in Africa has been an informal process lasting throughout a person's lifetime. Participation in work, community celebrations, religious traditions, and rites of passage guide a person's educational development. Formal education was introduced in the pre-colonial era by missionaries; by

the 1950s, most missions had established schools. However, only limited numbers of people in this region advance past primary school. In most East African countries, the quality of a person's education reflects their socioeconomic background. Wealthy parents send their children to private schools, while poor children must attend underfunded public schools, many of which have poorly-trained teachers. The student-instructor ratio is deficient which is problematic because it impacts enrollment rates for the youth. The shortfall is also a challenge to policy makers who have to address the youth bubble and employment options for a young workforce. Although there are various programs in place to enhance youth employability, many do not offer skills training that meets market-relevant needs.

Malaria is most common during the rainy season as the mosquitoes breed in damp and swampy environments. Malaria poses a risk to all, but especially to pregnant women and the elderly. To date, much of USAID's annual budget has been devoted to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS and malaria.[135]

East Africa is considered a high-risk area for vector-borne diseases such as malaria, and waterborne diseases like typhoid, cholera, and hepatitis A.[136] By global standards, medical capabilities in this region are below average. Some of the major challenges facing the health sector include inadequate access to healthcare and emergency facilities, lack of essential medicines, and a general inability of local governments to respond to outbreaks. The availability of trained professionals and medical supplies varies from country to country. Poverty, conflict, and an underdeveloped infrastructure are responsible for limiting the availability of medical care in the region. South Sudan and Somalia, for example, are worse off than other countries in this region.

2.4.2   North African People and Societies

The countries of North Africa have a combined population of about 217 million people (2012);[137] this is about a third less than the population of the United States.[138] Although the region is nearly as large as the U.S., much of it is harsh desert. As North Africa's population rapidly increases and its people flock from rural areas to cities, water and housing shortages are becoming acute.[139] North Africa is considered one of the most urbanized regions in Africa.[140]

While rapid increase is notable throughout North Africa, population growth varies between the countries. South Sudan has the highest rate of growth, and Libya and Tunisia the lowest. Evidence is inconclusive, but events surrounding the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 are generally blamed for population decreases in Libya and Tunisia.

The countries of the Arabian Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) have a higher percentage of urban population due to population density in the northern coastal cities rather than the southern arid areas. As for Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan, there is less urbanization, and more people reside in rural areas. Agriculture in the rural areas is one of the reasons for this. With the exceptions of Tunisia and Libya where the urbanization growth is dipping, the overall urban populations are increasing in all North African countries – especially South Sudan.

Religion

The major religion of North Africa is Islam.[141] The vast majority of North Africans are Sunni Muslim; the remaining people are either Jewish or Christian, but mostly Christian (especially in Egypt).[142] Egypt's Copts constitute 10 percent of the population.[143] These people endured increased animosity from militant Muslims during Hosni Mubarak's era, and continue to be targeted since the 2011 civil uprisings.[144] Jewish communities have existed for centuries in North Africa. However, in the last century

many Jews were forced to leave. Much of this diaspora settled in Israel or Europe.[145] North Africa also has a small minority of the Baha'i faith followers.[146]

"**Sunni Islam** accounts for over 75% of the world's Muslim population. The name comes from Ahl Al-Sunna wal Jamma'a which means "people of the Sunna and the community." It recognizes Abu Bakr as the first caliph after Mohammed. Sunni has four schools of Islamic doctrine and law - Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali - which uniquely interpret the Hadith, or recorded oral traditions of Mohammed. A Sunni Muslim may elect to follow any one of these schools, as all are considered equally valid."[147]

Ethnic Groups

In parts of North Africa, ethnicity and kinship influence politics, personal loyalties, population distribution of the region, and instigates conflicts. Throughout North Africa, people have strong loyalties to their extended family. Concentrations of members of an ethnic group often create a climate of ethnic favoritism. North Africans view ethnic favoritism and nepotism differently than Americans do. Government officials are often expected to take care of their kinsmen with jobs or special favors, often at the exclusion of other ethnic groups. This causes animosity and has frequently precipitated insurgencies led by groups excluded from receiving basic government services.

Except for South Sudan -- where the majority of the population is non-Arab, African Dinka, and Nuer -- North Africa's population is more uniform than the population of any other African region. Although minority populations exist in all eight North African nations, most people living in this region are comprised of Arabs, Berber, or a mixture of the two groups.

Despite North Africa's vastly homogeneous population, it has experienced a significant number of ethnic conflicts, many of which are ongoing. Recent or past impacts of these conflicts remain fresh in the minds of ethnic groups who have been most negatively affected. Darfur is one of the most commonly known examples of such disputes. Darfur, which means the land of the ethnic group Fur, is in western Sudan, and has been embroiled in armed conflict over land, water, and grazing rights.[148]

Today, Arabs are distinguished as a group that shares one language and close cultures. A majority of Arabs are Muslims, although there are non-Muslims who speak Arabic and share the similar culture.[149] Arabs can be Caucasians, like people from the Levant, or Black Africans, such as the Sudanese. The definition adopted by the Arab League for an Arab "is a person whose language is Arabic, who lives in an Arabic speaking country, who is in sympathy with the aspirations of the Arabic speaking peoples."[150]

The Berbers, a culturally distinct people indigenous to North Africa, have lived for thousands of years in communities from the Siwa Oasis in Egypt's western desert to the Atlantic Ocean.[151] Berbers live in Morocco, Algeria, and, to a lesser extent, Libya and Tunisia.[152] Many Berbers call themselves Amazigh, which means "free man or the free born,"[153] they speak a language called Tamazight. With the Arab Islamic conquest into North Africa, Berbers were introduced to Islam as well as to significant cultural change.[154] Centuries of exposure to the politically dominant Arab culture has lessened the Berber's own culture, language, and tribal laws.[155] Many urban Berbers have adopted Arab customs and speak Arabic; however, this is not so much the case for rural Berbers.[156]

Except for South Sudan, where the official language is English, Arabic is the official language of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. A variation of Arabic dialects is spoken in

each country. Egyptian Arabic is widely understood due to Egypt's strong media influence in the region through their popular films, music, TV programs, and other media. Inhabitants of the Maghreb speak Darja. This form of Arabic frequently uses French, Spanish, Italian, Berber's Tamazight words, and -- more recently English. Despite these diverse linguistic influences, Darja strictly applies Arabic grammatical rules.[157] The Sudanese speak Arabic, as well as several Nubian dialects; Ta Bedawie; Nilotic dialect; NiloHamitic;[158] and a multitude of minor Sudanese languages. It is estimated that there is about 100 distinct indigenous languages spoken in Sudan.

Family and Social Structure

Many marriages in North Africa are arranged by the bride and groom's parents. Families and matchmakers continue to bring together most North African couples. However, more urbanized, middle-class, young people are now meeting their own partners at work, at play, and at school; in these instances, couples simply ask their respective parents to bless the union. Nuclear families now outnumber extended families living in the same household. However, kinship ties remain strong. In Egypt, for example, extended families not only gather together frequently; if they live in the same city, they often live in the same apartment building. Multi-generational families in Libya and Sudan continue to live near the home of the family's patriarch.

> Divorce is quite common in the Muslim countries of North Africa, but Tunisia is the only country in the region where both sexes receive equal treatment under the law.[159]

In North Africa, it is not as important what you do for living, but who you are and who you know that gets results. North Africans take comfort in being part of large extended families; they turn to each other for help in finding a spouse and caring for needy or elderly relatives. Their social lives revolve around visits to other family members, who readily offer warm hospitality and food. With the exception of some young, university-educated urbanites, most North African men and women live parallel social lives. Even at wedding feasts, men and women almost always sit apart. The world of women is home-centered, while men congregate in public places. Women tend to socialize with other female relatives and friends in each other's houses or apartments, eating and chatting while they knit, embroider, or dance to traditional Arab music.

Education and Healthcare

The North African countries are doing a better job educating their children. Education is now largely free and compulsory through the 9th or 12th grades. High-scoring graduates are eligible to go on to college, at little or no personal expense. Education is available to most people in the region to varying degrees, and it has reached far more North Africans than 50 years ago.[160] However, because of cultural bias, girls may have less access to public education, particularly in rural areas. The quality of higher education in North Africa is improving, and literacy is also increasing. Among your counterparts, it is safe to assume they have at least some education and, possibly, a college or graduate degree.

Healthcare is available to most people in the region to varying degrees. Factors such as the nature of the illness, the availability of facilities, and confidence in the type of doctor, determines whether a family may choose medical professionals or a traditional healer. Healthcare services vary throughout North Africa, but most medical services and hospitals are adequate, especially in urban areas. However, the quality of healthcare often lags behind western standards, particularly in rural areas.[161] Additionally, systematic corruption, both small and large, in the healthcare system aggravates the situation. People

often opt to pay a bribe in order to receive health care. This is mainly due to the low wages of both doctors and nurses.[162]

2.4.3   West African People and Societies

In 2014, West Africa had an estimated population of approximately 312 million people across 17 countries.[163] Most people in this region live in rural areas; however, rapid population growth will likely increase urbanization. West Africa is a major contributor to the rapid population growth in Africa. West Africa's population grows at an annual rate of 2.6 percent, more than double the global rate. Additionally, the United Nations (UN) predicts that Africa's global population will increase to 2.2 billion (24 percent) of the world total population by 2050. Niger's population, for example, is predicted to increase from 18 million to 69 million people by 2050.[164] Currently, Nigeria is the region's most densely populated country, with approximately 177 million people.[165]

Migration is a notable feature affecting the demographics of this region *(Figure 2-12)*. Populations migrate to and from countries for seasonal work. Apart from internal conflict (which has displaced tens of thousands of people from Mali), this region has the highest number of intraregional migrants in this region. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the total migrant population in 2009 was 8.4 million people.[166] In addition to regional migration, there are approximately 65-120,000 sub-Saharan Africans who transit across the region to North Africa for employment opportunities.[167]

Figure 2-12: Migrants from Africa to Europe. *Source: IRIN.*

Religion

The major religions practiced in the region are Islam, Christianity, and animism (nature worship), sometimes called "traditional beliefs." Islam is practiced widely in this region and has a majority following in Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Gambia, Guinea and Mali. In each of these countries, there are

minority populations of Christians; however, Christianity is the predominant religion in southern Nigeria and in Ghana. A majority of Muslims in this region are Sunni whose practice is referred to as Sufism. Sufism promotes inclusiveness and is considered moderate, unlike Wahabism and Salafism, the other two major factions of Islam.

Muslims in West Africa adhere to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad and practice it within the *five Pillars of Islam:*
1. Profession of one's faith *(shahada)* [shah-hah-duh].
2. Prayer *(salat)* five times a day.
3. Giving alms *(zakat)*. Zakat requires giving 2.5% of a person's money each year, and a varying percentage for other assets held for the entire year.
4. A pilgrimage to Mecca *(Hajj)*.
5. Fasting during Ramadan *(sawm).*

Ethnic Groups

West Africa is home to numerous tribes. The major tribes in this region are: the Tuareg and the Mande (including the Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke) of Mali, the Hausa of Niger, the Wolof of Senegal, the Moors of Mauritania, and the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo of Nigeria. Each tribe has its own distinct language, which in part defines its identity. The two main ethnic groups in West Africa are the indigenous black Africans and Arabs. In many parts of this region, religious and commercial exchange with North Africa -- along with intermarriage, migration, and settlement – spread the Islamic religion and North African cuisine and modes of dress. For example, a majority of Mauritanian people are of Arab descent; in Algeria and northern Mali, many people are ethnically identifiable as Tuareg Arabs.

Figure 2-13 provides an illustration of the distribution of Major Ethnic Groups across West Africa.

Figure 2-13: Major Ethnic Groups in West Africa. *Source: CIA World Factbook.[168]*

Ethnicity is a divisive factor in this region today. Throughout this region, people have strong loyalties to their extended families. Concentrations of members of an ethnic group often create a climate of ethnic favoritism. Government officials are expected to take care of their kinsmen with jobs or special favors, often at the expense of other ethnic groups. This sometimes creates public discontent and has

frequently precipitated insurgencies led by groups excluded from receiving basic governmental services. Nigeria has over 250 tribes and over 500 languages and dialects; however, three of the tribes constitute approximately 70 percent of the population — Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo.[169] These tribes are differentiated by language, region, and culture— with the Hausa-Fulani inhabiting the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the South. The Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslim, the Yoruba consist of both Muslims and Christians, and the Igbo consist of a majority Christian population.

Family and Social Structure

The extended family is an important unit in all countries in this region. Polygamy is widely practiced which expands the reach of the "immediate family." In a polygamous home, labor is split between the wives and children, especially in rural areas where the household economy is heavily reliant on agriculture. In urban areas, the extended family shares a home, and the man becomes the main income earner while the wives manage the home together.

It is common for members of the extended family in rural areas to send their children to the city to reside with more affluent members of the extended family. Additionally, the modern family structure has been affected by war, the high rate of migration, and displacement. This is most evident in northern Nigeria, Chad, and Mali. Other factors have impacted the family unit structure including diseases: EVD, lassa fever, typhoid, and malaria. These effects, however, have not diminished the value of the family unit in society.

In the social structure, authority is based on kinship, and the head of the family is usually the eldest male member. The tribe, clan, and family are taken into consideration in decision-making. There are advantages to the large familial homestead. For instance, in times of war, the larger homesteads can better protect themselves from their enemies. Larger homesteads also have a larger workforce, important because most of the countries rely on agriculture, fishing, and rearing livestock for their livelihoods. Nomadic tribes rely on their family members to graze and water their livestock.

Education and Healthcare

As with other regions in Africa, education in the region is traditionally informal and lasts through a person's lifetime. In most West African countries, as with many other African countries, the quality of a person's education reflects their socioeconomic background. Technical and vocational schools offer a few specializations, but annual enrollment in these schools is low. Through USAID, the U.S. has boosted primary school education in the region, increasing both access to, and the quality of, education.[170] The literacy rate in West Africa varies — the literacy rate is lower in countries that have gone through periods of conflict. For example, in 2012, Sierra Leone reported 44 percent of people 15 and above were literate, an improvement considering the impact of the ten-year conflict there (1991-2000) on the education sector.[171] Even in the most stable economies, such as that of Nigeria, the quality of education has improved, yet is far from perfect, especially in the area of information technology.

By global standards, medical capabilities in this region are below average. This was evident during the onset and consequent management of the EVD outbreak in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Unlike East, Central, and Southern Africa, where millions of dollars in donor aid have been invested to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS, the HIV infection rates in this region have been relatively low, and thus, fewer resources have been invested to boost the healthcare infrastructure.[172] Experts point to this as part the reason why the health sector was ill-prepared for the EVD outbreak in 2014.

2.4.4   Central African People and Societies

In 2013, Central Africa had an estimated population of approximately 136 million people across seven countries.[173] The region's population is about a quarter of that of the United States. Most people live in rural villages near rivers. Rapid population growth will likely increase urbanization. The DRC is the region's most populated country, with a population of about 77 million.[174]

Conflict is a major driver of displacement in this region. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the highest number of refugees and internally displaced persons in this region is in the DRC.[175] The most stable country, according to World Bank data, is Gabon.[176] Facts like this are important because official population estimates many times do not take into consideration displaced populations. Additionally, census, birth and death registration in this region may not be accurate—especially in the DRC—where, as of 2007, only 30 percent of births and no deaths were registered by the government.[177] Regardless, the countries in this region are working towards a well-functioning civil registration system for administration and statistical purposes.[178]

Figure 2-14 depicts the population of concern, which includes, refugees, internally displaced persons and stateless persons.

Figure 2-14: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Central Africa. *Source: UNHCR.[179]*

Religion

The major religions practiced by Central Africans are Christianity and animism, sometimes called "traditional beliefs." Islam has a presence in the northern regions of Cameroon and the CAR. Most Central Africans are Christians belonging to two denominations: Roman Catholic and Protestant. Animism is the second-largest religion practiced in Central Africa. Though specific rituals and beliefs vary across tribes, the Mai-Mai movement depicts a society rooted in animism. Child soldiers recruited into the Mai-Mai militia believed that they could repel bullets after being anointed with protective water by a witch doctor. Mai-Mai fighters also believed that other projectiles fired at them will turn into water.

Animism is a communitarian concept, meaning that the community suffers or benefits from the consequences of one person's actions. The ancestors are also believed to be participants in the present world and can pass on good or evil to the community. Elements of the rituals practiced have influenced Islam and Christianity in this region.

Ethnic Groups

Central Africa has hundreds of ethnic groups. Most of the people in Central Africa belong to one of the many ethnic groups that collectively form the Bantu people. Hundreds of ethnic groups belong to the Bantu family. They all speak one of the Bantu languages,[180] and share common traditions and beliefs. The Bantu are descended from a common ancestor; their unique identifying features distinguish them from other neighboring groups. There are over 500 Bantu languages and dialects encompassing East, Central, and Southern Africa. Tribe, clan, and family are important units in Bantu society.[181] Although the groups are culturally aligned, ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi led to the 1994 genocide which took the lives of approximately 800,000 people.[182]

Figure 2-15: Ethnic Groups in Central Africa by Country. *Source: CIA World Factbook.[183]*

The ethnic diversity of most Central African nations has resulted in several languages being spoken within each country. For example, in the DRC there are over 700 different dialects spoken. The people of Central Africa are ethnically diverse, but because they have lived in close proximity for thousands of years their languages have many similarities. Almost all languages spoken in this region are classified as Bantu languages.[184] Most Central Africans speak two or more languages: an "official language" (French or English), a "national language" (Swahili, Kirundi, Kinyarwanda, Sango, Kikongo, or Lingala), and a language spoken within their ethnic group. In Equatorial Guinea, Spanish is the official language; Portuguese is the official language of Sao Tome and Principe. French is taught in almost all schools across the region. The majority of educated, urban people are fluent in French.

Family and Social Structure

The extended family is an important unit in the communitarian culture in all the Central African countries. Polygamy is widely practiced, which means that the face of the family is significantly different from the family structure in the West. Authority is structured around kinship, and the head of the family is usually the eldest male member.[185] The tribe, clan and family are taken into consideration in decision making. In urban areas, monogamous unions and the nuclear family are most common; although the extended family is consulted on important occasions such as births, marriage, and death. Members of the extended family residing in urban areas are relied upon for financial assistance by members residing in the rural areas.

In parts of Central Africa where there has been war, the modern family structure has been affected. Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, and the CAR have been impacted by migration and displacement created by regional conflicts.

Education and Healthcare

Formal education was introduced to the region in the pre-colonial era by missionaries. By the 1950s, many missions had established "brick-and-mortar" schools. However, only a few students completed their education past primary school.[186] In more recent history, the U.S. has, through USAID, boosted primary school education in the region, increasing overall the quality of education and people's access to it.[187]

The literacy rate in Central Africa varies, largely because of the impact of civil war in the DRC and the CAR. What is certain is that, even in the most stable economies (such as in Equatorial Guinea), the quality of education has generally improved yet is far from perfect — especially in the area of information technology. Equatorial Guinea has the highest literacy rate in this region at 87 percent, while CAR has the lowest score at 48.60 percent. (The literacy rate specifies the percentage of people, 15 years of age and above, who can read and write.)[188]

As with other regions in Africa, Central Africa's medical capabilities are below world-average standards; and Central Africa is considered high-risk area for vector-borne diseases such as malaria, and waterborne diseases like typhoid and hepatitis A.[189] Poverty, conflicts, and an underdeveloped infrastructure are responsible for limiting the availability of medical care in the region.[190] The most devastating effect on the population has been the rampant spread of HIV/AIDS and related diseases such as tuberculosis. Infant mortality is another significant health consideration in the region; although it has declined in recent years. The decline is attributed to the efforts by governments and international partners to increase access region-wide to healthcare and to counter common ailments – malaria, diarrhea, and respiratory tract infections.

2.4.5   Southern African People and Societies

The Southern Africa region has a population of approximately 179,668,782 people.[191] South Africa has the largest population, which stands at over 53.7 million. Swaziland is the least-populated nation on the mainland, with a population of about 1.4 million. Madagascar is the highest-populated island, while Seychelles is the least-populated, with only 92,430 people. Population growth in the region averages 1.71 percent, which falls below the 2.3 percent average for the rest of the African continent.[192] The

population growth rate compares the average annual percent change in populations, resulting from a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths and the balance of migrants entering and leaving a country. The rate may be positive or negative.[193]

The United Nations estimates that youth (people aged 15 to 24) constitute slightly more than 20 percent of Africa's population. Southern Africa is a youthful region, and there is a distinct youth bulge within the population. The youth

> Youth bulge is an increased population of youth in comparison to other ages in a population structure.

account for 37 percent of the total population of South Africa.[194] Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Lesotho have large populations of youth as they constitute between 23 and 24 percent of the population.[195] Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia have relatively smaller populations of youth.

Religion

Religion plays a significant role in all aspects of life in Southern Africa. It shapes cultural values and identity. The major religions practiced by Southern Africans are Christianity, Animism (indigenous beliefs or traditional beliefs), and Islam. Christianity is represented by 63 percent of the population. Most countries have a majority Christian population. Zambia and Zimbabwe's population is 90 percent Christian, followed closely by Seychelles and Malawi, with a more than 80 percent. Islam constitutes 12 percent of the region's population. Comoros stands out with 98 percent Sunni Muslims. Mauritius has the highest number of Hindu followers, at 48.5 percent.[196]

> Hinduism, the world's third largest religion after Christianity and Islam, is the largest religion in Mauritius. South Africa also has a significant Hindu population. Hinduism was introduced in both countries in the 1800s, when British colonialists transported Indians to work as indentured laborers on sugar plantations.

Languages

The dominant official languages in this region are rooted in its colonial history. They are used in business, government, and the public education system. In this region, English is prevalent followed by Portuguese and French.

Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are Anglophone (English-speaking) owing to the colonial history.[197] However, although English is the official language of Namibia, Afrikaans and German are more widely spoken, reflecting its history as a former German colony and an administrative district of South Africa. Creole, a hybrid of French and local dialects, is the primary spoken language in Mauritius and Seychelles. French is also widely spoken in Mauritius.

> The constitution of the South Africa recognizes 11 official languages most of which are similar and are considered either Bantu or Khoisan.[198] The choice to have 11 official languages is a reflection of the diversity of the post-apartheid "rainbow nation" and the ties that bind the diverse ethnic groups across the region. These 11 languages are IsiZulu 22.7 percent, IsiXhosa 16 percent, Afrikaans 13.5 percent, English 9.6 percent, Sepedi 9.1 percent, Setswana 8 percent, Sesotho 7.6 percent, Xitsonga 4.5 percent, siSwati 2.5 percent, Tshivenda 2.4 percent, isiNdebele 2.1 percent.[199] The most commonly spoken language in official and commercial settings is English, but it ranks fifth among languages spoken at home. The other languages are indigenous to the region and are widely spoken across Southern Africa.

Family and Social Structure

The extended family is an important unit in the communitarian cultures in the Southern Africa region. Polygamy is widely practiced, which means that the face of the family is significantly different from the family structure in the West. Authority is structured around kinship and the head of the family is usually the eldest male member.[200] The tribe, clan and family are taken into consideration in decision making. Division of labor is distinct and women (and co-wives) are responsible for domestic chores, including basic food supply for the family.[201] In urban areas, monogamous unions and the nuclear family are most common although the extended family is consulted on important occasions such as births, marriage and death. Members of the extended family residing in urban areas are relied upon for financial assistance by members residing in the rural areas.

The modern family structure has been affected by and the high rate of migration in search for opportunity. The economy and the scourge of HIV/AIDS have also negatively impacted the family unit: the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS is blamed, in part, for fueling the epidemic in many African countries.[202] This however, has not diminished the value of the family unit in society because the family is the primary a unit of production, consumption, reproduction, and wealth accumulation.

Education and Healthcare

Students from Southern Africa are the most mobile in the world.[203] Approximately 6 percent of students from the region enrolled in higher education studied abroad in 2009, compared to 2 percent globally. Almost half (48 percent) of the students who studied in a foreign country went to South Africa. Consequently, South Africa is emerging as a regional hub for scholarship and research.

This region has the highest literacy rates in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a reflection of high degree of education across the region. Adult literacy rates percentages in Southern Africa average at 79.6 percent, compared to the global average of 84.1 percent.[204] Seychelles and Lesotho have over 90 percent literacy rates, while Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana, and Zimbabwe are at par or above the global average. Angola, Madagascar, and Mozambique have the lowest literacy rates in the region. Madagascar is the only country in the region that was 20 percent below target of the United Nations Education for All (EFA) projections of halving adult illiteracy rates by 2015.[205] In Mozambique, at least two thirds of the illiterate populations were women.[206]

South Africa has many world-class healthcare facilities; since 1994 it has emerged as a "medical tourism" destination for people from neighboring countries with less-equipped health systems.[207] Although South Africa's public health system is under-resourced and overburdened, private practitioners deliver specialized treatment that is often unavailable elsewhere. Governments across Southern Africa have attempted to provide healthcare to their populations, and have focused on hospitals, dispensaries, and medical schools centered in urban areas.[208] These facilities are often beyond the reach of rural dwellers. Cutbacks in government healthcare budgets have compelled many healthcare workers to seek alternative means of generating income. Many have turned to moonlighting and other income-generating ventures; others have found it necessary to migrate abroad in order to increase their pay. Malawi has experienced a 12 percent reduction in available nurses due to migration.[209] More pharmacists emigrated from South Africa (600) and Zimbabwe (60) than graduated (500 and 40 people, respectively) in 2001.

2.5   Government and Politics Overview

Most countries in Africa have government and political structures heavily impacted by the end of colonialization, as national movements began to shape the political landscape. In the East, North, West, Central, and Southern regions ethnic groups, religions, and traditional leaders have all influenced the evolution of national political and legal systems.

Though most African countries have functional national and local governments, they rely on informal leadership structures to meet the needs of the population. Traditional elders and chiefs, as well as nongovernmental actors, are instrumental in delivering services.

Many African Countries contain three levels of government:
- Provinces (equivalent of state) at top.
- Districts (equivalent of county) in the middle.
- Town or village councils at the bottom.

The national (or central) governments have an executive branch, a legislature, and a judiciary. However, some of Africa's countries have decentralized the national government in order to reach the rural population, and they rely on informal leadership structures such as traditional elders or chiefs and nongovernmental actors in the delivery of services, especially in the health sector. Subordinate to the national (or central) government, there are government bodies that are typically structured in three tiers; these three levels of government are intended to give citizens a greater degree of self-rule. The top tier consists of the provincial governments (similar to state governments in the U.S.); the middle tier is made up of county-like district governments; and, at the bottom are town or village councils. Cities have a mayor and council representatives.   The provincial and district governments were meant to decentralize the government. Decentralization has worked in some countries to increase political participation at the grassroots level. However, informal governance structures are still much more effective in political mobilization than the formal structures.

Most people live in states governed by formal and informal institutions. What follows is a review of the formal and informal government and political structures in each sub-region.

2.5.1   Government and Politics of East Africa

Prior to the mid-twentieth century, a traditional chief exercised political leadership at the provincial, district, and village level. Today, central and local governments perform these functions, effectively removing the political and economic powers of most chiefs. However, in remote areas of many East African countries (particularly those neglected by central governments), chiefs wield significant power and work with the central government, elected leaders, and civil society in crisis management and conflict resolution.

East Africa's formal political systems (central government) remain fragile due primarily to their violent histories. Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan, and Somalia, for example have all experienced politically-instigated crises. At the same time, most countries in this region (Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi) have experienced successful coups d'état. There were 15 successful military coups d'état in this region between 1960 and 2014.[210]

President Yoweri Museveni took over Uganda's national government in a military coup in 1987. Although he was hailed as a reformer and a homegrown democrat in the first seven years of his presidency, President Museveni has remained at the helm of government for over twenty-five years.

The Ugandan President was the first in this region to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for another term in office. This has now become the new trend. Rwanda amended its constitution in 2015 to allow Paul Kagame to run for another term.[211] President Kagame has been in power since 2000, and the constitutional amendment will allow him to remain in power until 2034.[212]

Another major impediment to development in this region is corruption. Government services are not accessible to the people – especially those in the rural areas. It has become increasingly difficult to renew documents such as passports, car registrations, and land title deeds, among other documents, without a bribe. Bribes are labeled as "facilitation fees" and are openly requested by civil servants.

Nationalism

Nationalism in this context refers to the feeling of kinship and belonging based on shared values and beliefs. This usually translates to an identity.[213] Colonization fomented disaffection and resistance. Because people were prevented from organizing country-wide resistance, communities galvanized and mobilized ethnically. The result is that in this region, populations now identify first with their tribe and then with their nation.

Religious, ethnic, and other socio-economic issues have caused rifts that have led to conflict. In Rwanda and Burundi, for example, ethnicity became the source of conflict that eventually led to genocide in 1994.[214] Nationalism in East Africa can also be seen in language and language policy. Although local languages such as Amharic, Somali, and Swahili are widely spoken (as are other local dialects).

Language has been used to promote national cohesion in a region that is ethnically diverse with hundreds of linguistic groups. Language is the most unifying element, although it has also been a source of contention because, in many cases, some indigenous languages have been marginalized.

National pride is mostly observed in during national events such as independence recognition days. However, sports such as boxing and long-distance running are popular and often elicit a sense of unity and national pride. This region is home to world-record-holders in long-distance running: runners from Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda are known for their prowess at many international running events, including the New York, Boston, and London Marathons.

The national flag in each of these countries is a symbol of unity and shared nationhood. However, poverty and lack of transparency have eroded public trust in governance and institutions of government, making national pride an ideal that has yet to be fully achieved.

Figure 2-16: Ethiopia's Tirunela Dibaba at the Bislett Games in Solo (2008). *Source: Wikipedia.*

Rule of Law

Most countries in this region are currently undergoing institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the judiciary.

Rwanda is a good regional example of progress and adherence to the rule of law, especially because the 1994 genocide revealed an absolute collapse of rule of law. Like other countries in this region that have undergone conflict,[215] even before the 1994 genocide, Rwanda's judicial structures were dominated by unchecked executive power and a culture of impunity.

After the Rwandan genocide, the entire national judiciary was left in ruins, incapable of delivering justice for victims. In response, the International Criminal Court (ICC) set up a separate International Criminal Court for Rwanda to prosecute perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility for the genocide.[216] In an effort to promote reconciliation and strengthen local governments, the government of Rwanda released approximately two million offenders awaiting trial in jail back into their communities to be tried in the Gacaca, or community courts.[217] Gacaca courts were run by lay magistrates because of the lack of trained judicial personnel capable of addressing the scale of the offenses.

Other countries in this region emerging from conflict like Somalia, South Sudan, and northern Uganda, have faced the same challenges: an erosion of social capital and trust in the judicial system, and the lack of trained personnel to deliver justice. Because populations in conflict areas suffer injustices, it has become increasingly important to decentralize the judiciary in order to reach such populations. In Uganda for example, although mobile court systems have been set up as part of an access to justice program, there is still a vacuum when it comes to specific legal issues like gender violence. Rape and domestic violence are common, and in some places, gender violence units have been established within the auspices of the police force to investigate and prosecute such crimes.

In the Kenyan police and judiciary, reforms are underway to strengthen rule of law and the administration of justice. Because the judiciary and police have lost public trust due to corruption within the institutions, the government has put in place a vetting mechanism to weed out corrupt officers. Additionally, the police training curriculum has been enhanced to include courses on ethics and integrity.

Political Conflicts

This region has experienced several political conflicts. Somalia has had a long period of instability and the situation remains dire. Although Africa Union forces have been able to secure Mogadishu, much of Somalia is ungovernable due to the presence of Al-Shabaab, a terror group with links to al-Qaeda. Although neighboring countries have hosted refugees from Somalia and have also bolstered their own security infrastructure to counter threats posed by the terror group, Somalia's instability has greatly impacted the security of this region beyond its own borders.

Figure 2-17: Uganda Forces Train with U.S. Marines for Somalia Mission. *Source: USAFRICOM Website.[218]*

The most extreme violence in the region was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This infamous bloodbath was triggered by a political event, when the Presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi were killed when the Rwandan presidential jet was shot down on its way back from the Arusha Peace Summit in Tanzania.[219] Ethnic violence ensued in both Rwanda and Burundi. Although both countries have been able to rebuild to varying degrees since the genocide ended, Burundi has recently reverted into political crisis. Violence broke out all over the country after the President of Burundi announced his intention to run for a third term in 2015. The crisis in Burundi left several hundred people injured and thousands more displaced.

In 2007, Kenya's elections turned violent after the Electoral Commission announced the winner. The ensuing violence quickly escalated into conflict that left approximately 1,200 people dead and displaced another 600.[220] The Kenyan violence ended after a negotiated agreement was put in place. The opposing parties settled for a coalition government that had a president, vice president, and executive prime minister. Additionally, the ICC, investigating the post-election violence, eventually indicted six Kenyans for committing crimes against humanity. Although most of these charges were subsequently dropped, two of the ICC cases are still pending.[221]

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, yet many unresolved issues between the various pre-independence political factions still remain. South Sudan's president, Salva Kiir, and the former vice president, Riek Marchar, belong to two different political parties whose differences have persisted since South Sudan gained its independence.

2.5.2   Government and Politics of North Africa

Following independence, most North African states were ruled by autocratic regimes governed by one political party or ruling family. Examples of these autocratic regimes are Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. The region is also known for states dominated for decades by military rule; these include Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. Most of these military regimes seized power through coups. All of these repressive regimes imposed tight restrictions on freedom of speech, press freedoms, and political rights. Many of these governments harshly treated Islamic political movements[222] and Western-leaning progressives. A majority of the countries in North Africa gained independence in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, except for South Sudan, most current nation-states were created by colonial rulers in the nineteenth century.[223] The newest country in the region is South Sudan, which gained its independence in 2011.

With the exception of Morocco, which is a constitutional monarchy, all the other North African countries are republics. Defined simply, a republic is a "representative democracy in which the people's elected representatives vote on legislation."[224] However, the term "elected representative democracy" does not necessary mean that the political systems in these countries are democratic. For decades, until the 2011 uprisings, most of these countries were burdened with aging corrupt regimes.

A **constitutional monarchy** is system of government in which a monarch is guided by a constitution whereby his/her rights, duties, and responsibilities are spelled out in written law or by custom.

What followed after the "Arab Spring," unfortunately, was civil unrest, political upheaval, and economic chaos. Following the 2011 "Arab Spring," autocratic regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia were replaced with Islamic-leaning parties. In Egypt, however, the Muslims Brotherhood ruling party was overthrown in July of 2013 with the help of the Egyptian military.[225] The countries of North Africa have incrementally tiered government, starting at the top with the national leadership, and descending to the towns and

villages. Typically, there are three tiers, with states or provinces at the top, county-like districts in the middle, and town or village councils at the bottom.

Each tier of these sub-national governments usually has both appointed and elected officials, giving them at least a semblance of local democracy. However, each tier is usually presided over by an appointed governor or mayor who owes his job to higher-ups in the national government.

Nationalism

The main factor that binds North African countries and the Arab world in general is their perceived Arab identity, which is mainly built upon their shared Arabic language, and secondarily to the overwhelming preponderance of Islam as the primary religious force.

Islam as a bonding aspect in North African countries exists via two primary facets: Arabic is the language of the Qur'an (the holy book of Islam), and the Prophet Mohammed was an Arab. This makes the two identities (ethnicity and religion) intertwined. While there have always been non-Muslim minorities in the Arab world, their culture has often been determined by the tribal and Islamic way of life.

Figure 2-18: Flag of the Arab Revolt. *Source: Wikimedia.*

One of the earliest accepted rallying points of Arab nationalism was the Arab revolt encouraged by Britain and France against the Ottoman Empire instigated during World War I *(Figure 2-18)*.

Later, a general and stronger sense of identity and nationalism emerged under colonial rule following World War II. This eventually led to independence for most of the Arab countries during the 1950s and early 1960s, and extended beyond that period during Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arab popular nationalism wave.[226]

However it must be understood that prior to, and concurrent with, the rise of Arab nationalism, many sub-state, ethnic, sect, and tribal loyalties also competed with the wave of Arab nationalism and -- later -- with the Islamic identity wave.[227] An example of persistent tribal loyalty that overshadows national identity (despite decades of authoritarian rule) is Libya's tribal conflict following the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi.[228]

Another aspect of North Africa history that gives this region an identity distinct from the rest of the Arab world is the long and pervasive legacy of French colonialism.[229] This is particularly true of the Maghreb, a region that stretches from Morocco to Libya, and has always been perceived as different – not quite Arab, and not quite African.[230]

Overall, the region's Arab nationalism, or national identity, has been historically contested by other non-Arab ethnicities and cultures which pre-existed the Arab conquest. This is especially true of the Berber identity, which is defined by language and culture. Although many Berber chose to assimilate under the Arabization wave, the vast majority maintained their own cultures traditions, and language, such as the Amazigh and Tuareg, who will be discussed later.

Rule of Law

At one time, most North Africans saw the police and the legal system as no more than a tool of their autocratic overseers.[231] However, countries that experienced the so-called "Arab Spring" are currently undergoing institutional and constitutional reforms aimed at meeting popular demands for change, freedom, justice, and government accountability.

Although some of the 2011 uprisings created instability and disorder, these civil uprisings placed almost all of the countries in the region on a path to building efficient and accountable government systems. This is evident especially in Tunisia.[232]

In Egypt, following the uprisings, the state of the country's rule of law was questioned by international human rights organizations, due to the behavior of interim military rulers. Military courts were trying civilians, prisoners were reportedly tortured, and detained female protesters were subjected to "virginity tests" without legal grounds.[233] These incidents, incidentally, were no different from the way former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's regime had handled civilian protesters. Mubarak was subsequently put on trial for committing the same crimes as the interim military rulers.

Meanwhile, rule of law in post-revolutionary Libya is facing serious challenges from increased criminal activity, unsecured borders, drug and weapons smuggling, and illegal migration. The Libyan government has no control over many areas, which have fall into the hands of armed groups affiliated with various tribes.[234]

Political Conflicts

Corruption and injustice are entrenched in the political culture of the region's countries; they are among the major instigators of the 2011 civil uprisings. It will probably take some time to see the complete elimination of these two endemic issues, nor will North Africa enjoy true rule of law in the near future.[235]

Autocratic regimes in North Africa at one time used strict media control to hold on to power, restrict the flow of information, and to manipulate and influence public perception.[236] However, following the civil uprisings of 2011, a sizable amount of freedom was granted to journalists and the press.

What made press freedoms more attainable was the free flow of information through social media platforms, which in fact was one of the critical tools used by protesters across the Middle East to mobilize people in joining the wave of this civil uprising.

Although the 2011 civil uprisings brought about the long-awaited change in the region, it created instability and chaos. Journalists were among the groups that were targeted by the violence of armed militias and non-state actors in place such as in Libya.[237]

Following the overthrow of Morsi by the Egyptian army, led by General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, in July 2013, journalists, including Arabs and foreigners, perceived to be pro-Muslim Brotherhood or even sympathetic to them, were targeted, banned, harassed, and jailed.[238]

2.5.3   Government and Politics of West Africa

Similar to East Africa, traditional chiefs exercised political leadership at the provincial, district and village levels prior to the mid-twentieth century. Many chiefs and other traditional leaders inherit their titles. When national governments are unstable or ineffective, the rural populations turn to traditional leaders—a form of government that has worked for generations.

Today, central and local governments perform the functions previously performed by tribal chiefs, effectively removing the political and economic power of most chiefs. Additionally, national governments in this region use traditional authority as a form of indirect government. This system of indirect government is used in Niger's and Mali's rural communities to defuse the conflicts between the northern communities and the politically dominant southern communities.[239] In farming communities, a leader's power comes from his ability to manage and resolve conflict. In remote areas, particularly those neglected by central governments, chiefs continue to rule and provide governance.[240] Chiefs have a finger on the pulse of their community; they continually engage in conflict resolution and are consulted by elected leaders. Traditional structures aim to restore harmony within the community.

Negotiation and consensus are very important in the region; village chiefs and councils of elders specialize in peacemaking. A griot, a local historian and poet, is considered a "wise man" in the village community and often serves as a peacemaker in the Bambara and Mandinka cultures. Many governments in this region recognize that informal negotiation and problem-solving play a critical role. In Mali officials often include traditional peacemakers in their own problem-solving efforts.

One of the major shortfalls of government in this region is corruption, which can trigger unrest. Countries such as Sierra Leone and Nigeria have vast natural resources and earn large amounts of revenue, but the benefits do not translate to development at the local level.

> The term "corruption" does not have a direct translation in many African languages. This is because reciprocity and gift-giving are cultural concepts that are expected as forms of gratitude. In most African countries, it is difficult to conduct business without a "facilitation fee."

Nationalism

When West African colonies gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the national flags became symbols of national pride. However, national self-governance has had its share of challenges, and national pride soon began to erode in many of these emerging democracies. Nationalism in West Africa can also be viewed through the prism of language and linguistics. Although local languages such as Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Bambara, and Tamasheq are among the many indigenous languages spoken in this region, Arabic, French, and English have been used to promote national cohesion in a region that is ethnically diverse with hundreds of linguistic groups. However, language has also been a source of contention because in many cases, indigenous languages are marginalized.

National pride is unquantifiable in the region, especially due to poverty and other socioeconomic issues—even in nations that have enjoyed relative stability.[241] However, the region, in addition to each individual country, is united by soccer. In 2014, Nigeria played in the World Cup in Brazil. Although the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) suspended Nigeria after a dispute over bonuses, its national team still inspires youth in the region and remains a source of national pride.

Rule of Law

West Africa is plagued with a number of legal issues, including child labor and traditional practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM). Rates of FGM are high in many West African countries: Sierra Leone (94 percent), Gambia (79 percent), Burkina Faso (74 percent), and Mauritania (72 percent).[242] Although FGM has been outlawed in Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, enforcement to deter the practice is still lacking, especially in the rural areas.[243] There are efforts on several fronts to inform communities about the harmful effects of FGM; the goal of these efforts is to completely eradicate this barbaric practice.

In Nigeria, corruption and a culture of exemption by public servants been major hindrances to the rule of law. Although democratic structures exist and the judiciary has a wide reach, bribery and other corrupt practices have compromised access to justice and legal processes.[244]

Other hindrances to the rule of law in this region include armed conflict and political instability. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire have all experienced armed conflict in the recent past, and their judicial structures are in need of reform.

Political Conflicts

West Africa has had a violent political history. Challenges to governance have precipitated conflict in several countries in this region. In 2011, a Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, followed by a military coup that overthrew President Amadou Touré, opened up the Mali people to new threats. The prevailing instability facilitated the rise of extremist groups, such as the Islamist group Ansar al-Din (Arabic for "Defenders of the Faith," a splinter group of AQIM), which took control of northern Mali in March 2012.[245]

The issue of presidential term limits has been a friction point in countries like Togo and Burkina Faso. Though Togo is a small country in terms of size, the political situation there is a good example of the overall political climate in the region. President Gnassingbe Eyadema came to power through a coup d'état in 1967, and sustained one-party political rule for 24 years. At the time of Evadema's death, he had been in power for 38 years; soon after, his son, Faure Gnassingbe, took over the position as president.[246]

In 2015, for example, Nigeria's elections were postponed after the military establishment decided that an unstable security situation in the northern part of the country made it unsafe for many Nigerians to go to the polls. The public was generally accepting of the postponement of the election, but some political parties said that the measure was an attempt by Goodluck Jonathan, the incumbent president, to postpone his inevitable departure from office.

Successful and Attempted Coups d'etat in West Africa	
Côte d'Ivoire *(1999, 2002)*	Niger *(1999, 2010)*
Guinea Bissau *(2003)*	Mali *(2012)*
Mauritania *(2005, 2008)*	Guinea Bissau *(2012)*
Ginea *(2008)*	Gambia *(2014)*

In addition to the abovementioned friction points, there have been approximately 40 attempted or successful coups d'état in this region. Most of these overthrows have triggered civil war, as is the case in Sierra Leone; this war eventually spilled over Sierra Leone's borders into Liberia and Guinea.

West Africa has made tremendous progress in democratic governance, including the peaceful handover of power in Nigeria after the 2015 elections. However, the impact of political conflicts in this region can still be felt, as there are sectors of the regional economy that have not recovered from the mismanagement of rogue regimes. This was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both of which were hardest hit by the 2014 EVD outbreak. The rapid spread of this disease was largely due to a dilapidated health infrastructure and high levels of poverty, especially in rural areas.

2.5.4   Government and Politics of Central Africa

Figure 2-19: USAID Official Consults a Tribal Chief.
Source: USAID.

Most Central African countries gained independence in the 1960s. Since then, ethnic groups, religions, and traditional leaders have influenced the evolution of national political and legal systems.

Many Central African countries have functional national and local governments. However, as with other regions in USAFRICOM, they rely on informal leadership structures such as traditional elders or chiefs and non-governmental actors in the delivery of services, especially in the health sector. Governance which benefits the general population has been a challenged by leaders who have used the political infrastructure for personal gain. Corruption is rife, especially in the public sector.

Central Africa has had a treacherous political history. The DRC and the CAR have had politically instigated crises, and every country in this region has experienced a coup d'état. Between 1960 and 2014, there were 15 successful military coups in this region.[247]

Notwithstanding coups, authoritarian regimes have solidified their grip on power. One example is President Theodoro Obiang, who took over Equatorial Guinea's national government in a military coup in 1979, and has prevailed in every subsequent election -- partly because of the government's ever-increasing control of the voter registration process.[248]

In theory, governance structures in this region are decentralized. In reality, the central government holds the real power. In the DRC for example, demobilized rebel commanders have been reabsorbed into society, yet still yield significant power. The governor of North Kivu, the most volatile part of Eastern Congo, is a former rebel leader.[249]

Nationalism

Nationalism in Central Africa can also be seen in language and language policy. Although local languages such as Lingala and Swahili are widely spoken (as are other local dialects), French is predominantly used as an official language throughout the region. This is because France and Belgium were the main actors in Central Africa during the colonial period. However, Rwanda changed its language policy after the 1994 genocide, and made English the official language.

Language has been used to promote national cohesion in a region that is ethnically diverse with hundreds of linguistic groups. Language is the most unifying element, although it has also been a source of contention because in many cases some indigenous languages are marginalized.

Figure 2-20: Cameroon Flag. Source: Wikipedia.

National pride is not normally observed in Central Africa because of overwhelming instability, poverty, and other socio-economic issues— even in nations that have enjoyed relative stability.[250] However, soccer is one sport that has united both the country and the region. In 2014, Cameroon played in the World Cup in Brazil, fueling patriotism and African pride.

The national flag in each of these countries is a symbol of unity and shared nationhood. However, poverty and lack of transparency have eroded public trust in governance and institutions of government, making national pride an ideal that has yet to be achieved.

Rule of Law

Rwanda is a good regional example of progress and adherence to the rule of law, especially because the 1994 genocide revealed an absolute collapse of rule of law. Like other countries in this region that have undergone conflict,[251] even before the 1994 genocide, Rwanda's judicial structures were dominated by executive power and a culture of impunity.

After the Rwandan genocide, the entire national judiciary was left in ruins, incapable of delivering justice for victims. In response, the International Criminal Court set up the International Criminal Court for Rwanda to prosecute perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility for the genocide.[252] In an effort to promote reconciliation and strengthen local governments, the government of Rwanda released approximately two million offenders awaiting trial in jail back into their communities to be tried in the Gacaca, or community courts.[253] *Gacaca* courts were run by lay magistrates because of the lack of trained judicial personnel to cater to the scale of the offense.

Gacaca courts were traditional justice and reconciliation forums organized by the government of Rwanda to take on the backlog of cases in the formal justice system while fostering reconciliation at the grassroots level.

Other countries in this region emerging from conflict have faced the same challenges: an erosion of social capital and trust in the judicial system, and the lack of trained personnel to deliver justice. In the DRC, where human rights have been violated on a mass scale by rebels and security forces--especially in Eastern Congo--the government, with the assistance from the United Nations and other partners, has put in place a vetting mechanism that prevents offenders from joining the security forces.[254]

Political Conflicts

This region has experienced more conflicts than any other part of Africa; many of the crises that have rocked this region are interconnected. The ethnic violence that led to the Rwanda genocide of 1994 spilled over into the DRC, and also caused a significant backlash in Burundi.

Violence broke out in the CAR in March 2013 when the rebel group "Seleka Alliance," a predominantly Muslim group, mounted a coup ousting the president François Bozize.[255] The crisis soon turned sectarian with a counter-rebel movement – "Anti-Balaka," a predominantly Christian and Animist group -- mounting attacks against the Muslim community.[256] The root causes of conflict in the Central Africa Region include the unequal distribution and management of resources, governance issues, and ethnic and religious tensions.

The DRC fell gradually after the Rwanda genocide in 1994, when Rwanda pursued Hutu militia in Eastern Congo. Soon after, the government fell and the situation deteriorated further, leading to the plunder of mineral resources and escalated fighting for control of mineral-rich areas. Conflict minerals fueled the conflict, especially during the early 2000s.[257] The term "conflict minerals" refers to minerals mined originating from a conflict environment, such as the DRC, with significant human rights abuses that impact the mining and subsequent trading of the minerals.[258]

Governance issues, weak militaries, and collapsed security structures also contribute to ongoing conflicts. In the DRC and the CAR, the largest two countries in the region, instability is prevalent primarily due to war. War has created a breeding ground for militia groups that continue to destabilize the government. In the CAR, insurgents justify their challenge to the ruling government by citing inadequate national health and education systems, and their exclusion from the political process.[259]

2.5.5   Government and Politics of Southern Africa

The majority of countries in this region (Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, and South Africa) still honor the office of the chief, while in Zambia, the chiefly title is honorary. Mozambique resolved to scrap the position entirely though there are still informal elders at the village level. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, a traditional chief exercised political leadership at the provincial, district, and village level. Today, central and local governments perform these functions, effectively removing the political and economic powers of most chiefs. However, in rural areas of many Southern African countries, chiefs wield significant power and work with the central government, elected leaders and civil society in crises management, and conflict resolution. For example, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, the umbrella body that brings together all traditional leaders in South Africa, is actively engaged in governance at the village level. Chiefs are well respected because they are viewed as the custodians of a society's customs and traditions.

This region is unique because it also has two monarchies: the Kingdom of Swaziland and the Kingdom of Lesotho. Swaziland has the only absolute monarchy, while Lesotho has a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. In Swaziland, a kingdom of 1.2 million people, the king holds supreme executive, legislative, and judicial power. Parallel to the government structure is the traditional system, consisting of the king and his advisers, traditional courts, and chiefdoms. The king owns 60 percent of the land and 70 percent of the population leases land from the monarch,[260] which makes large-scale agriculture impossible for the ordinary person. UN data indicates that most households in Swaziland do not meet their food requirements.[261]

> Unlike Swaziland, Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy. The king serves a largely ceremonial function and does not possess executive powers. The Prime minister is the executive head of government and governs alongside a legislature.

Nationalism

In this region, as in other parts of Africa, colonization fomented disaffection and resistance. Because it was not possible to organize country-wide resistance, communities galvanized and politically mobilized along ethnicity; this meant that populations primarily identified with their tribe and secondarily saw themselves as citizens of their country. When nations gained independence in the 60s, the national flag became a symbol of national pride. However, self-governance had its share of challenges and the sense of national pride began to erode. Many newly formed African nations lacked a common cultural identity. The policies of divide-and-rule implemented by many colonial administrators further encouraged division, contributing to the absence of a national identity. Consequently, Africans developed and retained ideas of community at the local and ethnic level. This cemented tribalism as the main source of identity.

Race and socio-economic issues have been challenges to establishing cohesion and nationalism in this region. Politicians and other leaders have used their influence to drive ethnic agendas that propagate hate and division by extending favors (jobs, government contracts, and positions) to members of their own ethnic groups. Migrant workers are discriminated against and targeted for attacks as the black community struggles to find income opportunities. Although segregation is legally and officially a thing of the past, neighborhoods remain segregated as a result of income disparities. (For example, only a few affluent blacks have been able to live in rich neighborhoods such as Hyde Park in Johannesburg.) These divisions drive wedges within society (and serve as reminders of the apartheid past), and challenge the country's cohesion.

Historically, rugby and cricket were sports popular among the white populations in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The rugby jersey was only worn by whites. After the fall of apartheid in South Africa, Nelson Mandela attended the 1995 Rugby World Cup wearing his country's jersey and cap, a significant moment for race relations. This is seen as Mandela's first attempt to desegregate the game for both players and audiences, one of many gestures he made to unite South Africans.

Rule of Law

According to a study by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Rule of the Law and Access to Justice Report, respect for the rule of law and the ideals of fair and accessible justice systems are taking root in Southern Africa.[262] Transparency and accountability are vital to enhancing service delivery, promoting justice and economic development.[263] The UNDP has undertaken numerous interventions in the region; many indicators of progress are visible, such as constitutions and laws enacted in Mozambique, where reforms are under way to establish community policing, and human rights training in prisons, and for police.[264] Zambia has also demonstrated exceptional progress in the area of rule of law, with its recent peaceful and undisputed elections.[265] Nevertheless, in many other countries in Africa, despite UNDP's support for institution building, constitutionalism, and free and fair elections, the results were not always positive. In several places, elections continue to be a contentious subject, with several documented instances of vote rigging and electoral violence.[266]

The availability of legal aid is another important measure necessary to ensure individual rights are respected. Legal aid is central to guaranteeing human rights through effective access to justice. Within the Southern Africa Region, the countries that have made the most progress in this area are South Africa, which has guaranteed funding for legal aid; and Malawi, which has implemented legal aid

reforms for national legal aid policies and laws. Additionally, some countries have adopted affirmative action policies to expand opportunities for women and minority groups.[267] For example, employers in South Africa, Namibia, and Angola are required to have shareholders, board members, executives, and staff from specific demographics (usually black, female, and/or disabled). The policies also limit the number of expatriates who can be hired by a single employer.

Political Conflicts

The Cold War dominated global politics at a time when many Southern African nations were gaining independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Cuba and the Soviet Union extended military, financial, and technical assistance to the Marxist-Leninist governments of Angola and Mozambique in an attempt to advance socialism.[268] At the same time, the apartheid government of South Africa was involved in efforts that destabilized its neighbors as it defended its position and to provide a buffer zone holding back the spread of African nationalism.[269] South Africa directly participated in the early stages of the Angolan civil war when it launched "Operation Savannah" to protect its interests in Namibia, specifically, the hydroelectric installations on Cunene River.[270] South Africa continued to intervene in both the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars, and conducted raids on Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, and Zimbabwe targeting alleged Africa National Congress (ANC) networks in those countries.

The end of apartheid in South Africa and the cessation of civil wars in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique were negotiated outcomes. Major differences were ironed out in peace agreements and power-sharing structures; these efforts were seen as a sustainable path to stability.[271] South Africa used a transitional provision to bring different parties together at the end of the apartheid.[272] These agreements sought to enable opposing parties to share political power as well as economic and military resources.[273] Some important components of the agreements included protection of minorities and their interests; many of these components were included in a new constitution, along with the decentralization of power.[274]

Power-Sharing Agreements:

Namibia - After the end of apartheid in Namibia (and the declaration of an amnesty for the South Africa-based South West African People's Organization (SWAPO),the guerrilla group that led the liberation movement), national elections were held and more than 90 percent of the Namibian population took part, with SWAPO winning a clear majority.[275] Since Namibia's independence on 1990, there have been no conflicts as a sovereign state, and the South Africa/Namibia conflict is viewed as an intra-state conflict within South Africa.[276] The 1990 Namibian constitution was drafted as part of an internationally mediated transfer of power to an independent government, under continued threats of civil war.[277] It carried the challenge of ensuring checks and balances in a country where one dominant political party persistently holds 55 out of 72 parliamentary seats.[278]

Angola - The 2002 Angola Peace Agreements put an end to a 27-year-old civil war that claimed 500,000 lives and displaced millions.[279] The cosignatories were the army representatives of government and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) military leaders.[280] The agreement included the integration of a substantial number of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) officers and soldiers into the national army; the rest to be demobilized.[281]

One of the major impediments to development in this region is corruption. Corrupt practices in government often make many public services inaccessible to the people – especially for people living in rural areas. In some countries, it has become increasingly difficult to access services and business

opportunities without a bribe. Sometimes, employment or promotion in the civil service, military, or state-run companies is used by those in power as a way to reward family members and political cronies.

2.6   Regional Security Issues

USAFRICOM contains significant regional security challenges. Some of these challenges include terrorism, armed groups, ethnic conflicts, political conflicts, civil uprisings, territorial disputes, narcotrafficking, human trafficking, maritime security, and organized crime. Security challenges also stem from social issues such as youth bulge, youth unemployment, irregular migration, and healthcare concerns. An exhaustive review of all regional security issues within USAFRICOM is not possible in this limited review; therefore, what follows is a review based on current lines of effort:

- neutralize Al-Shabaab, and transition the African Union Mission in Somalia to the Federal Government of Somalia
- degrade violent extremist organizations in the Sahel Maghreb and contain instability in Libya
- contain and degrade Boko Haram
- interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and through central Africa with willing and capable African partners
- build African peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response capacity

2.6.1   Al-Shabaab

The origins of Al-Shabaab can be traced back to 2006, when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an umbrella organization of Islamist organizations that advocated for Sharia to be the rule of law throughout Somalia. The ICU clerics formed Sharia courts across the country. Judgments by these courts were enforced by clan militia.[282]

The last stronghold to be taken over by the ICU was in Mogadishu in 2004 with the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG was an internationally-backed governing authority that was meant to pave way for a stable elected government in Somalia following almost 20 years of instability. The TFG experienced resistance from the various informal governing structures across the country that were in place following the disintegration of the Somali national government in 1991. The entry of the TFG in the political arena sparked an ideological war between the various clans. Violence in Mogadishu escalated when clan militia, while trying to enforce Sharia law, began defending the courts against the TFG, which by that time was attempting to create new governing structures.[283] Politicians began using clan militia to settle political scores and target TFG supporters.[284] Ethiopia backed the newly formed TFG, owing to the fact that Somalia's ungoverned spaces posed a threat to Ethiopia. The ICU, in turn, responded by using clan militia to attack pro-TFG, Ethiopian troops.

The ICU militia, drawn from all clans, was the same militia used to enforce the rulings of the ICU courts. To more effectively counter the pro-TFG advance, the ICU militia organized into a military force known as Al-Shabaab (Arabic for, "the youth") in 2006. Al-Shabaab began actively recruiting, which was an easy task because many Somalis already considered Ethiopia to be an enemy. This is largely due to a history of violence between the two countries dating back to 1964. Additionally, a Soviet-backed war against Somalia in 1977 further aggravated the Somali-Ethiopian relationship.

Later, in 1991, after the ousting of President Said Barre, al-Itihaad al-Islaami a Somali Islamic nationalist group went to war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, an area inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The leader of al-Itihaad al-Islaami, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, later founded the ICU.[285] In 2008, the group pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda[286]; in 2009, the ICU lost Mogadishu to Ethiopian troops.[287]

By this time, the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was stood up to bolster the TFG and allow for humanitarian access. Ethiopian troops withdrew and AMISOM forces, comprised of Ugandan and Burundian troops, became Al-Shabaab's new target.[288] Al-Shabaab also began recruiting youth within Somalia, and even as far away as Minneapolis.[289] Subsequently, the group began targeting Uganda, Djibouti, and Kenya. Between 2010 and 2015, Al-Shabaab took responsibility for eight major attacks in the region that claimed approximately 350 lives.[290]

The first major Al-Shabaab attack that garnered international attention was the 2010 World Cup bombings in Uganda, which targeted Ugandan and Ethiopian nationals.[291] The history of Ethiopia in Somalia (and Ethiopian collaboration with Uganda in the Africa Union-led peace keeping mission under AMISOM) is believed to have been the motive behind the 2010 World Cup bombings.

The next major Al-Shabaab assault was the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya in 2013, which took 67 lives and left approximately 170 people wounded. The attack was significant because 19 of the 67 victims were non-Kenyan nationals.[292] The shopping mall attack was the first of its kind for the group. Westgate, owned by an Israeli company[293], was a meeting venue for expatriates and a symbol of a Western-leaning lifestyle. Most analysts agree that the attack was meant to send a message to the West.

In 2015, Al-Shabaab changed tactics and began targeting communities living close to the Kenya-Somali border. A porous border made for easy access. The group targeted Christians working at a quarry mine, travelling in buses, and at a university, all in Garissa County, which borders Somalia.[294]

Al-Shabaab's change of tactics was meant to create a religious wedge between communities. However, Kenya's wedge issues have historically centered on ethnicity and economic access, not religion. The group has also adopted guerilla tactics to attack AMISOM forces in Somalia, and used suicide bombers to launch targeted attacks against strategic installations like foreign embassies and Somali government buildings in Mogadishu.

The U.S. is working with governments in this region to counter Al-Shabaab's threat. This partnership has resulted in the elimination of high-value terrorists, including Al-Shabaab's leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, in September 2014.

2.6.2 Violent Extremist Organizations in the Sahel Maghred

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

The persistent threat of terrorism and radical Islamist movements represented by Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)[295] remains one of the top U.S. concerns in the region. For al-Qaeda, this rise in local militancy fulfills a vision of establishing a larger foothold in Africa. Al-Qaeda's expansion into North Africa, the Sahel, and West Africa was made easier by the collapse of security in the region, especially in Libya, as well as the availability of uncontrolled weaponry. In addition, Al Qaida has capitalized on the grievances of some marginalized groups.[296]

The AQIM began as an offshoot of the Armed Islamist Group, an insurgent group that fought against the Algerian government in the 1990s and later rebranded into the Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The group evolved into AQIM after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. AQIM uses common terrorist tactics, such as guerrilla-style ambushes, mortar, rocket, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, assassinations, and suicide bombings of military, government, and civilian targets.[297] The group raises money through kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and donations from its sympathizers. They also trade in arms, migrants, narcotics, and cigarettes.[298]

AQIM operatives are responsible for several kidnapping operations in the Sahara which targeted aid workers, diplomats, tourists, and expatriate employees of multinational corporations.[301] It was reported that AQIM has collected over the last decade an estimated $155 million from ransom money paid for the release of Western hostages.[302]

Consisting mainly of Algerian commanders and members within AQIM, in September 2014, an AQIM splinter group called "Jund Al Khalifa fi Ard Al Jazayer" (which means "Soldiers of the Caliph in the Algeria land"), under the leadership of a former AQIM central region commander, formally announced its formation and pledged allegiance to ISIS and its self-declared Caliph Abu Bakr AlBaghdadi.406 This leader's name is Khalid Abu Suleimane, an Algerian whose real name is Gouri Abdelmalek.[303]

In 2012, AQIM exploited the instability following the coup d'état in Mali and worked – at least initially -- with the MNLA and Ansar al Din to help ethnic Tuareg in northern Mali gain independence in Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu.[299] Subsequently, the Islamist militant group Ansar al-Din, backed by AQIM, turned against the MNLA and captured these three major cities. Occupation of these cities was important, not just because of their historic significance to Muslims, but because it fulfilled AQIM's vow to create of an Islamic state in Mali ruled by sharia law.[300]

"Jound Al Khalifa fi Ard Al Jazayer" is another group to splinter from AQIM, after Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian AQIM senior leader, announced his group "Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam,' meaning "Those who Sign in Blood," on December 2012.[304] AQIM is but one of the several militias and terrorist groups operating in North Africa; the region has been one of the main suppliers of young jihadists for ISIS.[305]

Though AQIM does not pose a direct threat to the U.S., its activities affect the U.S. strategic posture in the region. Additionally, AQIM's relations with other groups in the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in northern Mali, gives the group additional reach into West Africa.[306]

AQIM's partnership with MUJAO has emboldened this group, thus raising alarm in the rest of the region, especially because the group was supporting Ansar Al Dine, the radical Islamist Tuareg group that

advanced into Mali's capital, Bamako. The threat was worsened by the presence of weapons flowing into the region from Libya.

In order to combat and dismantle terrorist groups in North Africa, the nations of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have become partners with the U.S. as charter members of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).[307] Although the U.S.–backed TSCTP has been working with partner nations in the West Africa and the Sahel to counter violent extremism, AQIM is still active and is viewed as a significant threat.

Post-Qaddafi Challenges

Figure 2-21: Qaddafi at 2009 AU Summit.
Source: Wikipedia.

Since the 2011 fall of former Libyan President Muammar al-Qaddafi, hundreds of militias have assumed the role of Libya's de facto national police and army.[308] These groups fought in the eight-month revolution that toppled Colonel Qaddafi; now, they have become a government unto themselves.

Most of these militias are geographically-oriented and identify with specific neighborhoods rather than specific ethnicity. But one example is the Misrata Brigade or the Misrata Union of Revolutionaries, which is based in the central city of Misrata. The Misrata Brigade encompasses more than 200 registered militias or what is known as revolutionary brigades and other 'unregulated brigades' under its umbrella.[309]

However, there are other militias that are Islamist in nature and follow a radical ideology. A good example of this is "Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya," which emerged officially in 2012 and is based in Benghazi.[310] Thought to be a local front for al-Qaeda, the group calls for the implementation of strict sharia law and is believed to be behind the September 2012 attacks in Benghazi that led to the burning of the U.S. consulate and the killing of U.S. ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens.[311]

Though these militias were part of the efforts to oust Qaddafi, they have now become a "significant threat to the country's security."[312]

Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC) and post-Qaddafi governments have failed to bring these armed militias under state control. There are reports of rival militia clashes and revenge killings, as well as looting and robbery by gunmen against civilian residents.[313]

One of the most serious security threats in the region is the uncontrolled Libyan weapons that have been smuggled out of the country and sold on the black market and to militant groups in the Sahel region, south of the Sahara. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and other weaponry,[314] such as portable surface-to-air missiles and the shoulder-fired missiles known as MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems), has become an alarming problem.[315]

Internally, Libya's fighters refuse to put down their arms; instead, they use their arms as a negotiating tool in order to gain more influence and future benefits.[316]

As a broader and more regional dimension, Libya's unsecured borders have helped create smuggling routes for these arms where they have found their way into the hands of different terrorist groups in the region. There are also reports that these weapons have crossed the Egyptian border to 'Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya,' or the 'Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) fighters operating in the Palestinian Gaza Strip.[317]

Libyan weapons are said to have been acquired by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) through their links to drug dealers and gunrunners.[318] Furthermore, according to experts in the field, there is a high possibility that these uncontrolled weapons could be smuggled to as far as Eastern Africa and end up in the hands of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group in Somalia, where the situation in the Horn of Africa has already deteriorated.[319]

Rise of Marginalized Groups

Another pressing issue is the rise of historically marginalized groups in the rural areas, such as the ethnic Tuareg Berber in North Africa. Tuareg started migrating to Libya for economic reasons following Mali and Niger's independence in 1960. Libya attracted more Tuareg in the 1980s when the Libyan President Muammar al-Qaddafi started recruiting them to join his pan-African Islamic Legion, which was to serve as the military cornerstone for his vision of united Muslim states in North Africa.[320] Following several failed military campaigns, the Islamic Legion was disbanded and the Tuareg were eventually blended into the Libyan army under special brigades. When Qaddafi's rule was threatened by the 2011 Libyan uprising, he offered Tuareg rebels aid and shelter, and recruited them as mercenary fighters.[321] After the fall of the regime, the Tuareg rebels returned to Mali with weapons looted from Libya – along with significant combat experience.[322]

Figure 2-22: Armed Tuareg. *Source: Wikimedia.*

In October 2011, a coalition of political factions, including the Tuareg from Libya, merged to create the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA); the MNLA was to serve as a political military platform to continue their fight for independence from Mali.[323] Simultaneously, a group of officers in the Malian government led a military coup d'etat on March 21, 2012.[324] MNLA-led fighters took advantage of the ensuing chaos to seize control of all of the major northern towns, subsequently declaring the secession of the region as the independent country of Azawad.[325] In May of the same year, MNLA and the Ansar Al Din Islamic rebel group agreed to merge forces and establish an Islamic state. However, Ansar Al Din, backed by AQIM, soon after turned against MNLA and seized control of the territory.[326] This prompted French intervention to restore governance in Mali. USAFRICOM has also provided support to the French and African-led international support mission to Mali.

2.6.3   Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a jihadist group founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf. It has waged a terror campaign in northern Nigeria since 2009. The group's ideology is rooted in a Sunni Salafist branch of Islam as it fights to implement Sharia (Islamic law) in Nigeria.[327]

Boko Haram operates in the northern states of Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Borno, and Kaduno. The group has evolved into an armed insurgency characterized by suicide bombings, shootings, and bomb attacks.

Boko Haram became operationally active in December 2003, when approximately 200 militants attacked several police stations in Yobe, near Nigeria's border with Niger. By January 2004, Nigerian security forces had successfully put down this uprising. Between 2004 and 2009, Boko Haram repeatedly engaged in a low-intensity conflict with Nigerian security forces.

Sectarian violence in northern Nigeria has escalated since Boko Haram came onto the scene. In 2011 alone, over 600 people were killed in various attacks. Terrorism-related casualties in Nigeria were double the rate of the previous year during the first four months of 2012. One of the deadliest attacks killed more than 200 people in Kano, Nigeria.[328]   Boko Haram has reportedly expanded its operations into Cameroon and Chad, thereby posing a graver threat to Nigeria and to regional security. Further, the U.S. State Department designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2013, which is a significant step towards weakening the group in the context of the U.S. broader fight against terror.[329] This designation aims at isolating the group by raising public awareness, and enables a coordinated international response to the group and their activities.[330] The 2014 kidnapping of 250 school girls in northern Nigeria, and the subsequent public campaign to rescue the girls, drew the attention of international actors, including the U.S., which sent a team to assist the Nigeria military in tracking and rescuing the girls. Unfortunately, efforts to rescue the girls were hindered by various challenges common to this region, including the terrain. To date, the kidnapped girls have not been rescued.

Terror activities in the region are impacting the political landscape, as seen in the 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria: many candidates promised to finally deal with the security threat posed by Boko Haram. Eventually, the election was postponed so that the military could secure territories in northern Nigeria and make it safe for voters to go the polls.[331]

Chad and Niger have finally yielded to international pressure and are now helping Nigeria to defeat Boko Haram. The two countries have taken this step in order to prevent the terror group from crossing the Nigerian border into Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

The threat posed by Boko Haram in the region continues to be high, especially after the group renamed itself "Islamic State's West Africa Province" (ISWAP) in 2015, aligning itself with the Islamic State (IS).[332]

2.6.4   Illicit Activities in Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa

Narcotrafficking in this region is a major financier of terrorism. Illegal drugs from South America are transshipped though West Africa to Europe. This region became a popular transshipment zone after law enforcement officials cracked down on traditional trafficking routes.[333]

Smugglers coordinate logistics with regional networks and corrupt politicians in order to move illegal drugs and weapons. Most narcotrafficking activities in West Africa are connected to armed extremist militias, such as Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), an off-shoot of AQIM.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates the value of these criminal activities to be $3.8 billion annually.[334] Reports also point to the financial muscle of AQIM (derived from the illegal drug trade) and how it is used to influence groups such as Boko Haram.

Figure 2-23: Drug Flow through West Africa. *Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.[335]*

Figure 2-24: Nigeria Chief of Defense Staff visits AFRICOM. Source: USAFRICOM.

In addition to narcotrafficking, groups like AQIM have kidnapping foreign nationals to exert political leverage and to obtain ransom money. Kidnappings surged in Mali after the 2012 coup d'état, and dropped sharply after French forces drove AQIM out of the capital city of Timbuktu. The U.S. provides support to African militaries as part of a coordinated effort to counter kidnapping threats posed by AQIM and other extremist groups in this region.[336]

In addition to illegal trafficking, the Gulf of Guinea experiences piracy problems. Piracy negatively impacts the economy of the region because of the high insurance risk for oil tankers passing through the Gulf of Guinea; the cost for additional insurance is reflected in higher oil prices.

Fighting piracy is a priority in this region. In USAFRICOMs 2016 two-day meeting, U.S. and Nigerian officials discussed security cooperation relationships *(Figure 2-24),* to include security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Figure 2-25: Joseph Kony. *Source: US State Department.*

The LRA claims to be a Christian fundamentalist group; Al-Shabaab claims to follow Islamic precepts. Unlike other armed groups in East Africa, Al-Shabaab and the LRA have both been classified as terror groups by the U.S. Department of State. The U.S. is working with regional governments to counter the threats posed by these groups.

The LRA has been in existence since 1986; it is Africa's oldest, most persistent, and most violent insurgent group. The group was started by Alice Lakwena from remnants of the Uganda People's Democratic Army, which was comprised of the Acholi ethnic group in northern Uganda.The group purportedly fights for the interests of the Acholi people of Northern Uganda. In 1987, the current-day Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, led the National Resistance Army to overthrow the previous Ugandan President, Tito Okello, an Acholi. Okello's tribe, the Acholi, fled from northern Uganda into neighboring Sudan. Alice Lakwena, who claimed to have mystic powers, then led an insurgency against the new regime (Museveni's). Consequently, Joseph Kony, the current leader of the LRA, rose out of this movement.[337] The insurgency continues to this day.

The LRA has executed a brutal campaign against the civilian population by killing, maiming, and abducting children in Uganda. More widely, the LRA has committed mass atrocities, including forcibly recruiting and indoctrinating children and forcing them to fight as child soldiers. Reports show that between 1987 and 2006, over 20,000 children were abducted for use as child soldiers or sex slaves. Additionally, the LRA displaced over 2 million people in northern Uganda alone.[338]

After losing its home base in Uganda due to increasing pressure and loss of public support, the LRA now operates in the neighboring countries of South Sudan, Darfur in Sudan, northeast DRC, and the Central African Republic (CAR).[339] In 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act and deployed U.S. troops to support "Operation Lightning Thunder."[340] The ICC has issued indictments against Joseph Kony for crimes against humanity including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, and mutilation, among others, and war crimes committed against the civilian population.[341] Joseph Kony is yet to be captured.

[14] General David M. Rodriguez, United States Marine Corps Commander, "U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement 2016, (hearing, Congress House Armed Services Subcommittee, Washington, D.C., 2016).

[15] Adam Hochschild "Leopold II: King of Belgium" Encyclopedia Brittanica http://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-IIking-of-Belgium

[16] Ibid.

[17] Michigan State University, "Exploring Africa" accessed November 11, 2016, http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/colonial-exploration-and-conquest-in-africa-explore/

[18] "Nubia and the Powerful Kingdom of Kush" Ancient Origins (October 27, 2014) Accessed January 7, 2016, http://www.ancientorigins.net/news-ancient-places-africa/nubia-and-powerful-kingdom-kush-002257

[19] "People, Trades and Empires in East Africa," Macro History and World Timeline (2015). Accessed January 7, 2016,   http://www.fsmitha.com/h3/h15-af4.htm

[20] Ibid.

[21] Nana Arhin Tsiwah, "The French Policy of Assimilation and its Effects on French West Africa," Modern Ghana (March 25, 2014). Accessed January 9, 2015, http://www.modernghana.com/news/531830/50/the-french-policy-of-assimilation-and-its-effects.html

[22] "1960: the Year of Independence," France 24 (February 16, 2010). Accessed March 7, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20100214-1960-year-independence

[23] "The Story of Africa: Islam," BBC World Service, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/7chapter3.shtml

[24] BBC World Service, "The Story of Africa: Islam."

[25] Ibid.

[26] "The Spread of Islam in North Africa," Riad Reviews, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.riadreviews.com/resources/moroccan-history/the-coming-of-islam.html

[27] For more information see: Library of Congress, "Egypt Under the Ottoman Empire," Egypt, A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1990), accessed January 21, 2015, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+eg0026); "Egypt Profile," BBC News Africa (October 19, 2014), accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13315719; "History of Egypt: An Ottoman province: 1517-1798" History World, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=267&HistoryID=aa28&gtrack=pthc

[28] Paul M. Pitman III, "The Rise of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire," Turkey: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1987), accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Turkey2.html

[29] Library of Congress, "Egypt Under the Ottoman Empire."

[30] MMA, "Egypt, 1400-1600 A.D.," Metropolitan Museum of Art, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/ht/?period=08&region=afe

[31] Brian H. Warmington, "North Africa," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed December 5, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/418538/North-Africa/46494/Ottoman-rule-in-the-Maghrib

[32] "Egypt and North Africa, 1900 A.D. – Present," Metropolitan Museum of Art, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/ht/?period=11&region=afe

[33] For more information see, CAOCL, OB2/EB3 North Africa.

[34] Rima Maktabi, "Tunisia Fires Minister After Fatal Riots," CNN (January 12, 2011), accessed July 13, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/01/12/tunisia.protests/?hpt=T2; "Tunisian Court Jails Salafists for Burning Sufi Shrine," Reuters (June 18, 2013), accessed July 10, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/us-tunisia-islamistsidUSBRE95H0PH20130618

[35] "Slap to a Man's Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia," New York Times: Africa (January 21, 2011), accessed July 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html?_r=4&pagewanted=2&src=twrhp&

[36] Mary Ann Rogers and Melissa Tisnado, "Life in Ancient Ghana, Mali, and Songhai," Center for History and New Media, accessed April 20, 2015, http://www.learningace.com/doc/2454690/e7bbdcc29f13cfecb70eda662f8cbd4d/lesson69

[37] Ibid.

[38] Smithsonian Institute, "Kingdoms of the Western Sudan: Ghana, Mali, Songhay," accessed November 11, 2016, https://africa.si.edu/exhibits/resources/mali/

[39] Hampshire Record Office, "The Transatlantic Slave Trade and Abolition," (August, 2007), 6, accessed January 9, 2015, http://www.hants.gov.uk/rh/archives/slavery.pdf

[40] "Central African Missions: A History," Central African Missions (CAM), accessed November 12, 2014, http://hanswaldvogel.com/references/CAM%20History.pdf

[41] Colonialism in the Congo: Conquest, Conflict and Commerce Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, (2005) p 11-35

[42] Ibid.

[43] "1960: the Year of Independence" France 24 February 16, 2010 http://www.france24.com/en/20100214-1960-year-independence

[44] "Unit Four: Regional Perspectives, Module 18: Central Africa," Exploring Africa, accessed November 4, 2014, http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/teachers/curriculum/m18/activity2.php

[45] Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. "click languages", accessed October 27, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/topic/click-languages

[46] Tindall, P. E. N., *A History of Central Africa* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1968), 68-69.

[47] For more information please see, CAOCL, OB2/EB3 South Africa Region.

[48] Worger, "The South Africa War," South Africa.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Rita M. Byrnes, ed.,"Formation of the Union of South Africa," South Africa: A Country Study (Washington, DC:: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1996). Accessed November 30, 2015, http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/17.htm

[52] Britannica, "Freedom from Empire."

[53] Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. "South Africa," accessed June 10, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/555568/South-Africa/260109/The-National-Party-and-apartheid

[54] Ibid.

[55] Thomas Collelo, Angola Country Studies (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1991), 60. Accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.loc.gov/item/90003244/

[56] Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "South African War." Accessed December 9, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/event/SouthAfrican-War.

[57] J. D. Omer-Cooper A history of Southern Africa (London: J. Currey 1987)

[58] Britannica, South Africa.

[59] Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "East African Lakes." Accessed March 7, 2016, http://www.britannica.com/place/East-Africanlakes

[60] Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Virunga Mountains." Accessed March 7, 2016, http://www.britannica.com/place/VirungaMountains

[61] "Climate Changes in East Africa," weADAPT (March 30, 2011). Accessed January 20, 2016, https://www.weadapt.org/knowledgebase/national-adaptation-planning/climate-changes-in-east-africa

[62] For more information on environmental hazards in East Africa please see, CAOCL, OB2/EB3 East Africa Region.

[63] "Africa: Physical Geography," National Geographic – Education, accessed January 2, 2015, http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/encyclopedia/africa-physical-geography/?ar_a=1

[64] "Causes of Aridity, and Geography of the World's Deserts," UVLA, accessed July 19, 2014, http://faculty.unlv.edu/landau/desertgeography.htm

[65] "African Population 2013," World Population Statistics (May 20, 2013), accessed January 2, 2015 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:T20txB-uAmkJ:www.worldpopulationstatistics.com/africa-population2013/+&cd=16&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

[66] Marvin W. Mikesell and Hildebert Isnard, "Atlas Mountains," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/41302/Atlas-Mountains

[67] Thomas, M. Poulsen, "Alps" Encyclopedia Britannica (March 26, 2014), accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/17356/Alps

[68] "Nile River," USGS, accessed June 28, 2014, http://deltas.usgs.gov/rivers.aspx?river=nile

[69] Imed Drine, WP/32 Climate Change Compounding Risks in North Africa (Helsinki, Finland: UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2011/32, United Nations University, May 2011), 3, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/workingpapers/2011/en_GB/wp2011-032/

[70] Amanda Briney, "Sahara Desert - The Sahara Desert is The World's Largest Hot Desert," About Education (2013) , accessed July 1, 2014, http://geography.about.com/od/locateplacesworldwide/a/saharadesert.htm

[71] World Wildlife Fund, "Sahara Desert," The Encyclopedia of Earth (2013), accessed July 26, 2014, http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/155822/

[72] MSU, "Introduction to North African Geography."

[73] Leila Radhouane, "Climate Change Impacts on North Africa Countries and on some Tunisian Economic Sectors," Journal of Agriculture and Environment for International Development, Vol. 107, No. 1 (2013): 101 – 113, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.iao.florence.it/ojs/index.php/JAEID/article/view/123/106

[74] MSU, "Introduction to North African Geography."

[75] "Practical Travel Information: Introduction to Morocco." Dar Tassa (2013), accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.dartassa.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Morocco-Practical-Travel-Information-2013.pdf

[76] IBRD /The World Bank, Natural Disasters in the Middle East and North Africa: A Regional Overview (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /The World Bank, January 2014), accessed January 21, 2015, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/03/06/000442464_20140306122711/Rendered/PDF /816580WP0REPLA0140same0box00PUBLIC0.pdf

[77] Conservation International, "Guinean Forests of West Africa," http://www.microsfere.org/en/ghana/guinean-forests-of-westafrica-biodiversity-hotspot.html

[78] Leonard Druyan, "How Does the Atlantic Cold Tongue Affect West African Rains?" National Astronautics and Space Administration (April, 2014), accessed January, 6, 2015, http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/briefs/druyan_11/

[79] FAO, "Integrating Crops and Livestock in West Africa," Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, accessed January, 7, 2015, http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/x6543e/x6543e01.htm

[80] Ibid.

[81] J.M. Pritchard, Africa – A Study, Geography for Advanced Students (London, UK: Longman Group Limited, 1978), 29.

[82] "Sahel Crisis: 8 Questions Answered," World Food Program (June 29, 2012), accessed January, 8, 2015, http://www.wfp.org/stories/sahel-crisis-8-questions-answered

[83] J.M. Pritchard, Africa – A Study, Geography for Advanced Students (London, UK: Longman Group Limited, 1978), 4.

[84] "Virunga Mountains," Encyclopedia Britannica (May 20, 2013), accessed November 3, 2014, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/630217/Virunga-Mountains

[85] "Central Africa," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 3, 2014, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102127/Central-Africa

[86] "The World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal," The World Bank, accessed November 3, 2014, http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/index.cfm?page=country_historical_climate&ThisRegion=Africa&ThisCCode=CAF

[87] See more about Congo's (DRC) volcanoes at: BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1768321.stm

[88] United Nations Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs World Statistics Pocketbook, 2013 edition Series V, No. 37 (New York: United Nations, 2013)

[89] Andy Moore, Tom Blenkinsop & Fenton Cotterill "Southern African topography and erosion history: plumes or plate tectonics?" Terra Nova 21(2009) 310-315

[90] Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. "Great Escarpment", accessed May 28, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/243237/Great-Escarpment

[91] Nyblade, A.A., "The Origin of the African Superswell," SAO/NASA - AGU Fall Meeting Abstracts (December, 2003). Accessed November 19, 2015, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003AGUFM.S51F..01N

[92] Sasha Naidoo, Claire Davis and Emma A.V. Garderen, "Forests, Rangelands and Climate Change in Southern Africa," Forests and Climate Change Working Paper 12 (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations):4. Accessed in November 10, 2015, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i2970e.pdf

[93] "Rivers, Lakes and Dams," Global Water Partnership International (August 20, 2013). Accessed November 5, 2015,

[94] Ibid

[95] "Zambezi River," Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias (n.d.). Accessed October 30, 2015, http://www.gwp.org/en/GWPSouthernAfrica/The-Challenge/heading-1/Rivers-Lakes-and-Dams/http://universalium.academic.ru/247269/Zambezi_River

[96] "Zambezi River Basin – Atlas of the Changing Environment," GRID-Arendal (n.d.). Acessed November 2, 2015, http://www.grida.no/publications/zambezi/

[97] Compiled from various UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles, available at: http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/climate/projects/undp-cp/

[98] A. Karmalkar, C. McSweeney, M. New and G. Lizcano, "South Africa – General Climate," UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles (n.d.). Accessed October 30, 2015, http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/climate/projects/undpcp/UNDP_reports/South_Africa/South_Africa.hires.report.pdf

[99] World Health Organization Environmental Health Hazard Mapping for Africa by David Briggs, February 2000http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/tools/healthhazard.pdf

[100] "Vital Climate Graphics Africa," GRID-Arendal (n.d.). Accesses November 2, 2015, http://www.grida.no/publications/vg/africa/page/3109.aspx

[101] Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, "The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering," United States Department of the Treasury (1998), 4. Accessed March 7, 2016, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicitfinance/documents/fincen-hawala-rpt.pdf

[102] Ibid, 7.

[103] Exploring Africa, "Unit Four: Regional Perspectives."

[104] CIA, "The World Factbook: Labor Force by Occupation," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed July 10, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2048.html

[105] CIA, "Factbook: Western Sahara."

[106] "Migration and the Maghreb," Middle East Institute (May 2010), accessed July 10, 2014, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Migration%20Maghreb.pdf

[107] William Bauer, "Algeria's Necessary Black Market Economy," Your Middle East (March 29, 2012), November 11, 2014, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/columns/article/algerias-necessary-black-market-economy_5751; ILO, Global Employment Trends 2011 the Challenge of a Jobs Recovery (Washington, DC: International Labor Office, 2011), 81; Eleanor Beardsley, "In Rich Algeria, Youth Face Meager Future," NPR (June 1, 2011) November 11, 2014, http://www.npr.org/2011/06/01/136854232/in-richalgeria-youth-face-meager-future

[108] Bamako, "Mali Gold Revenues Rise in 2011 Alongside Price," Reuters (January 1, 2012), accessed December 10, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/01/mali-gold-revenue-idUSL6E8C105W20120101

[109] Conservation International, "Guinean Forests of West Africa," http://www.microsfere.org/en/ghana/guinean-forests-of-west-africa-biodiversityhotspot.html

[110] Stephanie E. Santos, "The Tuareg: Place and People in Self-Determination," Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference (2003), 7-9.

[111] ECOWAS Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering In West Africa (GIABA) Report " Threat Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (2010), 8, (Dakar Senegal) accessed December 16, 2015 http://www.giaba.org/media/f/116_threat-assessment-on-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-in-west-africa---englishrev051410-

[112] "Southeast Cameroon – Pygmies," Survival International, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/pygmies

[113] UNEP, "The Forests of Central Africa," Vital Forests Graphics (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, 2009): 40-41, accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.unep.org/vitalforest/Report/VFG_full_report.pdf

[114] Ibid., 48.

[115] CIA, World Factbook (2015). Accessed January 6, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wa.html

[116] Ibid, [Data in graph compiled from various countries and does not include Madagascar as data was not available].

[117] SARW, "Southern Africa Resource Barometer," Southern Africa Resource Watch, (2013), 6. Accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/southern_africa_resource_barometer_1.pdf

[118] Ibid.

[119] UNIDO, Industrialization, Environment and the Millennium Development Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa: the New Frontier in the Fight Against Poverty (Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2004), 9. Accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.unido.org//fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Research_and_statistics/Branch_publications/Research_and_Policy/Files/Reports/Flagship_Reports/IDR/Industrial%20Development%20Report%202004.pdf

[120] Ibid.

[121] CIA, [data for several countries], CIA World Factbook (2016). Accessed January 12, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[122] "The 20 Countries with the Highest Population Growth in 2014," Statista (2016). Accessed January 12, 2016, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264687/countries-with-the-highest-population-growth-rate/

[123] CIA, "Ethiopia."

[124] CIA, [data for several countries], CIA World Factbook (2016). Accessed January 12, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[125] Mridha Shihab Mahmud, "Irregular Migration for the Horn of Africa Increases in 2015," News Hour (January 26, 2016). Accessed January 27, 2016, http://www.newshour.com.bd/2016/01/26/irregular-migration-in-horn-of-africa-increases-in-2015/

[126] John S. Mbiti, African Religions & Philosophy (New York, NY: Praeger, 1969), 2.

[127] Tindall, Central Africa, 68-69.

[128] Maina Kiarie, "Cushitic People," enzi (n.d.). Accessed January 26, 2016, http://www.enzimuseum.org/peoples-cultures/cushiticpeoples

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Nilot." Accessed March 07, 2016,http://www.britannica.com/topic/Nilot

[132] Ibid.

[133] CIA, [data for several countries], CIA World Factbook (2016). Accessed January 12, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[134] For additional information see CAOCL, OB2/EB3 East Africa.

[135] USAID, "Health in Rwanda: Dollars to Results," USAID (2014). Accessed January 26, 2016, https://results.usaid.gov/rwanda/health#fy2014

[136] For details on major infectious diseases in this region see: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, [Website], https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2193.html

[137] Combined data from the World Bank (2014).

[138] "Population and Vital Statistics Report" United Nations (January 1, 2012), accessed July 9, 2014, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/vitstats/sets/Series_A_2012.pdf

[139] Maurice Mubila, "Briefing Note 4: Africa's Demographic Trends," African Development Bank Group (2012), accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/PolicyDocuments/FINAL%20Briefing%20Note%204%20Africas%20Demographic%20Trends.pdf

[140] Ibid.

[141] "Numbers and Percentage of Muslims in African Countries," Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa (2011), accessed July 9, 2014, http://muslimsinafrica.wordpress.com/numbers-and-percentage-of-muslims-in-african-countries/

[142] CIA, "Africa," The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency, accessed July 9, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_afr.html

[143] CIA, "Factbook: Egypt."

[144] David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, "Attack on Christians Comes After a Pledge," New York Times (April 7, 2013), accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/middleeast/in-egypt-attack-on-christians-comes-after-apledge.html?_r=2&&gwh=6DDEFF6D42CD5D5C3C14D13E1F0A6750

[145] Sara Sussman, "Jewish Population of French North Africa," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007310; "Jews From the Middle East and North Africa," Institute for Curriculum Services, accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.icsresources.org/content/factsheets/JewsFromTheMiddleEastAndNorthAfrica.pdf

[146] CIA, "The World Factbook: Religions," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed July 9, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html

[147] Ibid.

[148] Brendan Koerner, "Who Are the Janjaweed?" Slate (July 19, 2005), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2004/07/who_are_the_janjaweed.html

[149] "Rick Francona, "Who is an Arab?" Middle East Perspectives (April 4, 2007), accessed July 27, 2014, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:NlnJudsQSkwJ:francona.blogspot.com/2007/04/who-isarab.html+&cd=11&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

[150] Ibid.

[151] Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Berber Identity Movement and the Challenges to North African States (Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 2011), 305.

[152] Ibid.

[153] "Berbers," World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People (May 2008), accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.minorityrights.org/4083/algeria/berbers.html

[154] Ibid.

[155] Ibid.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Susan Rasmussen, "Tuareg," Encyclopedia of World Cultures (1996), accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Tuareg.aspx

[158] "Sudan" Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations (2007), accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Sudan.aspx

[159] Massan d'Almeida, "Marriage and Divorce in Tunisia: Women's Rights," Association for Women's Rights and Development (October 9, 2010), accessed July 9, 2014, http://www.awid.org/Library/Marriage-and-Divorce-in-Tunisia-Women-s-Rights

[160] "Unit Four: Regional Perspectives," Exploring Africa, accessed July 12, 2014, http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/students/curriculum/m16/activity3.php

[161] Aida Alami, "Morocco's Health Care System in Distress," The New York Times (March 27, 2013), accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/middleeast/fewer-than-30-percent-of-moroccans-have-healthinsurance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&

[162] Ibid.

[163] "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency [Website, data for several countries], accessed January 12, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[164] UNDESA, "World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision," United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (2012), accessed January 12, 2015, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm

[165] Ibid.

[166] "West and Central Africa," International Organization for Migration, accessed January 12, 2015, http://www.iom.int/cms/west-africa

[167] Hein De Haas, "Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends," International Organization for Migration (May, 2008), 9, accessed January 12, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/49e479ca0.pdf

[168] "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency [Website, data for several countries], accessed January 12, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[169] Emmy Irobi, "Ethnic Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa," Beyond Intractability (May, 2005), 5, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.beyondintractability.org/print/741

[170] See major infectious diseases in this region at: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, [website], https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2193.html

[171] "Data: Literacy Rate, Adult Total (% of people ages 15 and above): Sierra Leone," The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS

[172] IPI, Mali and the Sahel-Sahara: From Crisis Management to Sustainable Strategy (New York, NY: International Peace Institute, February, 2013), 234, accessed December 9, 2014, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/7764~v~Mali_and_the_SahelSahara__From_Crisis_Management_to_Sustainable_Strategy.pdf

[173] [Population, various countries], "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed May, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[174] Ibid.

[175] "2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Burundi," UNHCR News, accessed November 4, 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c056&submit=GO

[176] "Gabon: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate" Quandl (2012) https://www.quandl.com/data/WORLDBANK/GAB_PV_EST-Gabon-Political-Stability-and-Absence-of-Violence-TerrorismEstimate

[177] "Status of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in the SADC Region," United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Statistics Division, ESA/STAT/2010/10 (June 20, 2010), 7, accessed November 4, 2014, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/CRVS/Technical%20report%20SADC%20final%20v2.pdf

[178] Ibid.

[179] UNHCR News, Country Operations Profile – Burundi.

[180] Tindall, Central Africa, 68-69.

[181] Ibid.

[182] "Kigali Genocide Memorial," Genocide Archive Rwanda, accessed November 5, 2014, http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Kigali_Genocide_Memorial

[183] [Population, various countries], "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed May, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[184] Tindall, Central Africa, 66-68.

[185] Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 64-66.

[186] Tindall, Central Africa, 102; 305.

[187] See more on USAID programs in the region at http://www.usaid.gov/education

[188] "Ranking of African Countries by Literacy Rate: Zimbabwe No.1" The Africa Economist, July 6, 2013 http://theafricaneconomist.com/ranking-of-african-countries-by-literacy-rate-zimbabwe-no-1/#.Vg1FRMtdF6o

[189] See "Major Infectious Diseases" in this region at the CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2193.html

[190] WHO, Public Health Risk Assessment and Interventions: Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis in Central African Republic (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, December 20, 2013), accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.who.int/hac/crises/caf/car_crisis_ph_risk_assessment_23December2013.pdf

[191] CIA, "People and Society" [Data compiled from the specific country pages], The World Factbook(2016). Accessed on January 14, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html

[192] AfDB, OECD, UNDP, African Economic Outlook 2015(African Development Bank, Organisatoin for Economic Development, United Nations Development Programme, 2015). Accessed October 26, 2015, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2015/PDF_Chapters/Overview_AEO2015_EN-web.pdf

[193] CIA, "Country Comparison – Population Growth Rate,"World Factbook(2015). Accessed January 12, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2002rank.html

[194] NYDA,The Integrated Youth Development Strategy (IYDS) of South Africa2012- 2016 (Johannesburg, South Africa: Policy and Research Cluster, National Youth Development Agency, 2011), 15. Accessed January 16, 2016, http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/South_Africa_2012_Draft_Youth_Development_Strategy.pdf

[195] AEO, "Table 13 - Demographic Indicator"African Economic Outlook Statistical Annex(2015). Accessed January 12, 2016, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/data-statistics/table-13-demographic-indicators/

[196] CIA, "People and Society" The World Factbook[Data aggregated from the specific country pages]. Accessed January 20, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html

[197] CIA, "People and Society" The World Factbook[Data aggregated from the specific country pages]. Accessed January 20, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html

[198] Brand South Africa "The languages of South Africa" November 6, 2012 http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/language.htm

[199] CIA, The World Factbook.

[200] Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 64-66.

[201] Ibid., 24-77.

[202] "The Stigma of Being HIV Positive in Africa" PLoS Medicine, Vol. 2, Issue 8 (August, 2005).

[203] Chiao-Ling Chien and Felly Chiteng Kot, "New Patterns In Student Mobility In The Southern Africa Development Community," UIS Information Bulletin No 7 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012), 3. Accessed January 25, 2016, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002170/217095e.pdf

[204] UNDATA, "Adult Literacy Rate,"UNDATA (19 June 19, 2013). Accessed January 25, 2016, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SOWC&f=inID%3A74

[205] UIS/UNESCO, "Adult and Youth Literacy Projections," United Nations Institute of Statistics and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2015). Accessed January 25, 2016, http://www.uis.unesco.org/literacy/Pages/literacy-projections.aspx

[206] UIS/UNESCO, Adult and Youth Literacy, 1990-2015 – Analysis of Data for 41 Selected Countries (Montreal, Canada: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012), 6. Accessed January 25, 2016, http://www.uis.unesco.org/literacy/Documents/UIS-literacy-statistics-1990-2015-en.pdf

[207] IMTJ, "South Africa Medical Tourism is About… Africa," International Medical Travel Journal (September 20, 2012). Accessed February 2, 2016, http://www.imtj.com/news/south-african-medical-tourism-about-africa/

[208] Ezekiel Kalipeni, "Health and Disease in Southern Africa: AComparative and Vulnerability Perspective," Social Science & Medicine Vol 50, Issues 7–8 (2000): 965-983.

[209] Edward J. Mills, et al.,"Should Active Recruitment of Health Workers from Sub-Saharan Africa be Viewed as a Crime?" The Lancet Vol. 371, Issue 9613 (2008): 685-688.

[210] Habiba Ben Barka and Mthuli Ncube, "Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coup d'état a Never Ending Phenomenon?" Africa Development Bank (September, 2012). Accessed January 29, 2016, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic%20Brief%20%20Political%20Fragility%20in%20Africa%20Are%20Military%20Coups%20d%E2%80%99Etat%20a%20Never%20Ending%20 Phenomenon.pdf

[211] "Rwanda's Paul Kagame to Run for Third Presidential Term," BBC News Africa (January 1, 2016). Accessed January 27, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35209186

[212] Ibid.

[213] For additional information on Nationalism see: Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/

[214] FAO, "FAO in Emergencies," Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Accessed November 4, 2014, Accessed January 26, 2016, http://www.fao.org/emergencies/countries/en/

[215] "FAQ: War Between Somalia and Ethiopia," The Guardian (December 26, 2006). Accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/27/ethiopia

[216] For additional information on Rwanda's justice system see: "Keynote Address by the Ambassador of Rwanda: Rwanda and the Restoration of Rule of Law," The Hague Academic Coalition (November 2012). Accessed January 29, 2016, http://www.haguecoalition.org/storage/Lecture%20Rwanda%20by%20H.E.%20Ambassador%20Mrs%20Uwanyiligira.pdf

[217] Ibid. For additional information on Gacaca Courts see: BBC News Africa, http://www.bbc.co.uk/search?q=Gacaca%20courts

[218] USAFRICOM, "Ugandan Forces Train with the U.S. Marines for Somalia Mission," accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/10628/ugandan-forces-train-with-us-marines-for-somalia-mission

[219] Raymond Bonner "Unresolved Rwanda Mystery: The President's Plane Crash," New York Times (November 1994). Accessed January 29, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/12/world/unsolved-rwanda-mystery-the-president-s-plane-crash.html

[220] IRIN, "In-Depth: Kenya's Post – Election Crisis."

[221] Ibid.

[222] "Unit Four: Regional Perspectives," Exploring Africa, accessed July 12, 2014, http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/students/curriculum/m16/activity3.php

[223] Ibid.

[224] CIA, "The World Factbook: Government Type," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed November 11, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html#ar

[225] Ian Black, "Egypt's Overthrow of Morsi Creates Uncertainty for Islamists Everywhere," The Guardian, accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/egypt-morsi-islamists-uncertainty

[226] Brian. H. Warmington, "North Africa," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/418538/North-Africa/46497/Nationalist-movements

[227] Adeed Dawisha, "Requiem for Arab Nationalism" Middle East Forum (2003), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.meforum.org/518/requiem-for-arab-nationalism

[228] Ibid; Mohamed Hussein, "Lybya Crisis: What Role Do Tribal Loyalties Play?" BBC News Middle East (February 21, 2011), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12528996

[229] Michael Le Gall, "The Historical Context" in William Zartman and William Mark Habeeb eds., Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa (Boulder CO: Westview Press), 3-19.

[230] Patrick Peacock, "Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in Maghreb," Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 2002), accessed November 11, 2014, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history/summary/v003/3.2peacock.html

[231] Colette Rausch, "Justice and Security in the Middle East and North Africa," United States Institute of Peace (April 5, 2011), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications/justice-and-security-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa

[232] Colette Rausch et al., "Traveling Toward the Rule of Law in the Middle East and North Africa: Avenues and Obstacles," United States Institute of Peace (April 20, 2011), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB90Rule_of_Law_ME_and_North_Africa.pdf

[233] "Egypt: Rule of Law Under Siege," Irin News (November 22, 2011), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/94284/egypt-rule-of-law-under-siege

[234] Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, "Illicit Trafficking and Libya's Transition: Profits and Losses," United States Institute of Peace (February 24, 2014), accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications/illicit-trafficking-and-libya-s-transitionprofits-and-losses

[235] Rausch et al., "Toward the Rule of Law."

[236] "Middle East and North Africa," World Press Freedom Index 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, http://rsf.org/index2014/enmiddle-east.php

[237] Ibid.

[238] Ibid.

[239] For additional details on conflict resolution in the Sahel: Clionadh Raleigh and Caitriona Dowd, "Governance and Conflict in the Sahel's Ungoverned Space," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development (2013), accessed January 13, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bs

[240] Ajayi Aeyinka Theresa and Lateef Oluwafemi Buhari, "Methods of Conflict Resolution in African Traditional Society," African Research Review (April, 2014): 144, accessed March 23, 2015, http://www.afrrevjo.net/journals/multidiscipline/Vol_8_no_2_art_9_Ajayi&%20Buhari.pdf

[241] Vincent B. Khapoya, The African Experience (London, UK: Pearson, 2012), 150-179.

[242] WHO "Female Genital Cutting: Current Practices and Beliefs in Western Africa," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, accessed March 25, 2015, http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/2/11-090886/en/

[243] "Status of African legislations on FGM, No Peace Without Justice, Gender and Human Rights Program, accessed March 25, 2015 http://www.npwj.org/FGM/Status-african-legislations-FGM.html

[244] Esiemokhai Emmanuel Omoh, "The Rule of Law in Nigeria," GAMJI, accessed December 10, 2014, http://www.gamji.com/article8000/NEWS8046.htm.

[245] "Mali Profile," BBC News (October 1, 2013), accessed December 10, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881370

[246] "Togo Country Profile," BBC News (November 5. 2014), accessed April 5, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa14106781

[247] Habiba Ben Barka and Mthuli Ncube, "Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coup d'état a Never Ending Phenomenon.

[248] "Equatorial Guinea 2013 Human Rights Report Executive Summary" U.S. Department of State (February 27, 2014), accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220320.pdf

[249] Julien Palaku was elected governor of North Kivu in 2007. See Julien Palaku (January 29, 2015), https://www.julienpaluku.com/index.php/en/

[250] See more about Rwanda's justice system in the "Keynote Address by the Ambassador of Rwanda: Rwanda and the Restoration of Rule of Law," The Hague Academic Coalition (November 2012), accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.haguecoalition.org/storage/Lecture%20Rwanda%20by%20H.E.%20Ambassador%20Mrs%20Uwanyiligira.pdf

[251] See more about the root causes of the conflicts in Burundi, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo at: René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

[252] See more about Rwanda's justice system in the "Keynote Address by the Ambassador of Rwanda: Rwanda and the Restoration of Rule of Law," The Hague Academic Coalition (November 2012), accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.haguecoalition.org/storage/Lecture%20Rwanda%20by%20H.E.%20Ambassador%20Mrs%20Uwanyiligira.pdf

[253] See more about Gacaca courts at BBC News Africa, accessed January 29, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/search?q=Gacaca%20courts

[254] "Democratic Republic of Congo Background," American Bar Association, accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/africa/democratic_republic_congo/background.html

[255] "Central African Republic Profile," BBC News Africa (September 16, 2014), accessed November 10, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150040

[256] Ibid.

[257] Maria Otero and Robert Homats, "Joining Together to Combat Conflict Minerals," USAID (November 15, 2011), accessed November 10, 2014, http://blog.usaid.gov/2011/11/joining-together-to-combat-conflict-minerals/

[258] "What are Conflict Minerals" Source Intelligence http://www.sourceintelligence.com/what-are-conflict-minerals/

[259] Barbara F. Walter "Why Was CAR President Francois Bozize Recently Deposed, and Why Now?" Political Violence at a Glance (July 30, 2013), accessed November 10, 2014, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2013/07/30/why-was-car-president-francois-bozizerecently-deposed-and-why-now/

[260] Jonathan W. Rosen, "Last Dance for the Playboy King of Swaziland?" National Geographic (October 3, 2014). Accessed February 8, 2016, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/10/141003-swaziland-africa-king-mswati-reed-dance/

[261] Ibid.

[262] UNDP, Rule of Law and Access to Justice in Eastern and Southern Africa: Showcasing Innovations and Good Practices (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Development Programme, Regional Service Centre for Africa, 2013).

[263] Ibid.

[264] Ibid, 11.

[265] Ibid, 25.

[266] Ibid.

[267] Vandana Chatlani "Beating the drums" India Business Law Journal (May 2013) 31 – 37.

[268] Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics (London; New York: Routledge, 2010).

[269] J. D. Omer-Cooper A history of Southern Africa (London, England: J. Currey, 1987).

[270] Rodney Warwick, "Operation Savannah: A Measure of SADF Decline, Resourcefulness and Modernisation," Scientia Militaria Vol. 40, No. 3, (2012), 356. Accessed February 4, 2016, doi: 10.5787/40-3-1042

[271] Alexandra Remond, "Power-sharing in Africa: Does it Still Have a Role to Play?" E-International Relations (July 1, 2015). Accessed February 9, 2016, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/01/power-sharing-in-africa-does-it-still-have-a-role-to-play/

[272] Ibid.

[273] Ibid.

[274] Ibid.

[275] UCDP, "Namibia," Uppsala University Conflict Encyclopedia (n.d.). Accessed February 9, 2016, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=113

276 Ibid.

277 Sophia Moestrup, "Semi-presidentialism and Power Sharing – Does it Work? Examples from Anglophone Africa," IPSA Whatever Happened to the North-South (February 16-19, 2011). Accessed February 9, 2016, http://saopaulo2011.ipsa.org/paper/semipresidentialism-and-power-sharing-does-it-work-examples-anglophone-africa

278 Ibid.

279 AFrol News, "An End to Angola's 27 Years of War," Global Policy Forum GPF (March31, 2002). Accessed February 9, 2016, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/255-security-council-and-angola/41525-an-end-to-angolas-27-years-ofwar.html

280 Andreas Mehler, "Not Always in the People's Interest: Power-sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements," GIGA Research Programme, Working Papers No. 83 (July 2008), 18. Accessed February 9, 2016, https://giga.hamburg/en/system/files/publications/wp83_mehler.pdf

281 Ibid.

282 Cedric Barnes and Huran Hassan, "The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu Islamic Courts, Africa Program Briefing Paper 07/02 (London, UK: Chatham House, April 2007), 2. Accessed November 17, 2015, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf

283 Ibid, 3.

284 Ibid.

285 "FAQ: War Between Somalia and Ethiopia," The Guardian (December 26, 2006). Accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/27/ethiopia

286 "Mapping Militant Organizations: Al-Shabaab," Stanford.edu (2016). Accessed December 10, 2015, https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61

287 David H. Shinn, "Somalia: Origin, Development and Future of AMISOM," International Policy Digest (October 20, 2013). Accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/10/20/somalia-origin-development-future-amisom/

288 Ibid.

289 "Al Shabaab's American Recruits," Anti-Defamation League (February 2015). Accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-american-recruits.pdf

290 Stanford, "Mapping: Al-Shabaab."

291 Ibid.

292 "Nairobi Westgate Attack; The Victims," BBC News (September 26, 2013). Accessed December 11, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24195845

293 Yori Yanover, "3 Israelis Escape as Nairobi Shopping Center Attack Continues," The Jewish Press (September 22, 2013). Accessed December 11, 2015, http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/3-israelis-escape-as-nairobi-shopping-center-attackcontinues/2013/09/22/

294 Stanford, "Mapping: Al-Shabaab."

295 For more information on AQIM see Zachary Laud, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)," Council on Foreign Relations (January 8, 2014), accessed August 20, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-Qaeda-islamic-maghrebaqim/p12717

296 Jason Burke, "Al-Qaida Leadership Almost Wiped Out in Pakistan, British Officials Believe," The Guardian (December 25 , 2011), accessed August 20, 2014, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/25/al-qaida-leadership-pakistan-africa

297 NCC, "(AQIM).

298 Ibid.

299 NCC, "AQIM

300 BBC, "Mali Crises: Key Players."

301 BBC, "Al-Qaeda in North Africa."

302 Lamine Chikhi, "Algeria Kills Two Deputies to AQIM Leader: Source," Reuters (July 20, 2013), accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/20/us-algeria-violence-aqim-idUSBRE96J07M20130720

[303] "Splinter Group Breaks from al-Qaeda in North Africa," Reuters (September 14, 2014), accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/14/algeria-security-idUSL6N0RF0F020140914

[304] Reuters, "al-Qaeda's Splinter Group."

[305] Ibid.

[306] Christopher S. Chivvis and Andrew Liepman, North Africa's Menace: AQIM's Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response Rand Corporation (Washington, DC: RAND National Security Research Division, 2013), 1, accessed March 5, 2015, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf

[307] Reuters, "al-Qaeda's Splinter Group."

[308] "Guide to Key Libyan Militias," BBC News Africa (20 May 2014), accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-19744533

[309] Ibid.

[310] Faisal Irshaid, "Profile: Libya's Ansar al-Sharia," BBC News Africa (13 June 2014), accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27732589

[311] Ibid.

[312] Glen Johnson, "Libya Weapons Aid Tuareg Rebellion In Mali," Los Angeles Times (June 12, 2012), accessed August 20, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/12/world/la-fg-libya-arms-smuggle-20120612 ; Angelia Sanders, "Unsecured Libyan Weapons: Regional Impact and Possible Threats," ReliefWeb (January 5, 2012), accessed August 1, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unsecured-libyan-weaponsregional-impact-and-possible-threats

[313] Nick Meo, "Libya: Revolutionaries Turn on Each Other as Fears Grow for Law and Order," The Telehraph (October 31, 2011), accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8860684/Libya-revolutionariesturn-on-each-other-as-fears-grow-for-law-and-order.html ; "Militias Threatens Hope for Libya," Amnesty International (2012), accessed August 20, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/002/2012/en/dd7c1d69-e368-44de-8ee8cc9365bd5eb3/mde190022012en.pdf

[314] UN, "Resolution 2017(2011)," United Nations Security Council, accessed August 20, 2014, http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/SRES2017.pdf

[315] Kim Sengupta and Solomon Hughes, "Leaked UN Report Reveals Torture, Lynching and Abuse in Post-Gaddafi Libya," UNHCR (November 24, 2011), accessed August 20, 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4ecf40a95

[316] Ali Shuaib and Hisham El Dani, "Libya Militia Boss Says Not Ready to Lay Down Arms," Reuters (February 27, 2012), accessed August 24, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/uk-libya-militias-idUKTRE81Q1KD20120227

[317] Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, "Hamas Boosting Anti-Aircraft Arsenal with Looted Libyan Missiles," HAARETZ (October 27, 2011), accessed August 24, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/hamas-boosting-anti-aircraft-arsenal-with-lootedlibyan-missiles-1.392186

[318] Andrew Lebovich, "AQIM and Libya's Missing Weapons," al-Wasat (April 2, 2011), accessed August 20, 2014, http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2011/04/04/aqim-and-libyas-missing-weapons/

[319] Rachel Stohl, "Libya's Missing Weapons" STIMSON (February 2, 2012), accessed August 20, 2014, http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/libyas-missing-weapons/

[320] Peter Quin and Mali Timbuktu, "Former Qaddafi Mercenaries Describe Fighting in Libyan War," Pulitzer Center (August 31, 2011), accessed August 20, 2014, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/libya-qaddafi-tuareg-rebels-war-obama

[321] Ibid.

[322] Sanders, "Unsecured Libyan Weapons."

[323] For more information on the Mali crisis see Alexis Arieff, "Crises in Mali," A CRS Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2013), accessed August 20, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf

[324] Adam Taylor, "A Reminder of What Has Been Happening in Mali," The Washington Post (July 24, 2014), accessed August 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/24/a-reminder-of-what-has-been-happening-in-mali/

[325] Peter Schraeder, "Traditional Conflict Medicine? Lessons for Putting Mali and Other African Countries on the Road to Peace," Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011): 177–202; David J. Francis, "The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali," ReliefWeb (April 9, 2013), accessed January 26, 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/regionalimpact-armed-conflict-and-french-intervention-mali

[326] "Mali Profile," BBS News Africa (May 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13881978

[327] HIS, "Groups-Africa - Active, Nigeria," Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism (June, 2013): 1-27.

[328] Babjee Pothuraju, "Boko Haram's Persistent Threat in Nigeria," IDSA (March 19, 2012), accessed March 5, 2015, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/ThreatInNigeria_BabjePothuraju.pdf

[329] "Terrorist Designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru," US State Department (November 13, 2013), accessed December 17, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm

[330] Ibid.

[331] Monica Mark, "Nigeria Poll Postponed Over Battle with Boko Haram," The Guardian (February 7, 2015), accessed April 20, 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/07/threat-of-boko-aram-may-delay-nigeria-election

[332] Adam Withnall, "Boko Haram Renames Itself Islamic State's West Africa Province (Iswap) as Militants Launch New Offensive Against Government Forces," The Independent (April 25, 2015), accessed April 27, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-renames-itself-islamic-states-west-africa-province-iswap-asmilitants-launch-new-offensive-against-government-forces-10204918.html#

[333] SCR, "Special Research Report No.1: Emerging Security Threats in West Africa," Security Council Report (May 2, 2011), accessed December 17, 2014, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-6740225.php

[334] UNODC, "Sahel Region Countries Agree to Cooperate in Response to Illicit Trafficking, Organized Crime and Terrorism," United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (June 19, 2013), accessed December 17, 2014, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/June/sahel-region-countries-agree-to-cooperate-in-response-to-illicittrafficking-organized-crime-and-terrorism.html

[335] Ibid.

[336] Ibid.

[337] Emma Mutaizibwa, "The Roots of War: How Alice Lakwena Gave Way to Joseph Kony," The Observer (August 11, 2011). Accessed March 8, 2016, http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14678&catid=57

[338] Alexis Arieff, and Lauren Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army: The U.S. Response," CRS Report for Congress R42094 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 15, 2014). Accessed March 8, 2016, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42094.pdf

[339] Agence France-Presse, "Seleka, Central Africa's Motley Rebel Coalition," Globalpost (March 24, 2013). Accessed March 8, 2016, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130324/seleka-central-africas-motley-rebel-coalition

[340] AFRICOM, "Efforts to Counter LRA."

[341] ICC, "Situation in Uganda - Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony," International Criminal Court (September 27, 2005), 3. Accessed March 8, 2016, https://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%200204%200105/P ages/uganda.aspx

3 Operational Culture General

It has been said that the last one to notice the water is the fish who swims in it. How we use culture to shape our behavior and make sense of our observations often operates outside our awareness. By taking the time to read through RCLF culture general material, you are making a conscious effort to increase your understanding of variation in cultural values and the knowledge areas that will assist you in your attempts to make sense of culturally complex behavior. The necessity of this knowledge is captured by former US Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer's remarks as he reflected back on his career:

> *We had acquired the habit of looking at things two different ways – from the Japanese angle of vision as well as from our own national viewpoint. This proved to be the key to my career and, extended worldwide, it is the only hope I can see for world peace and human survival.[342]*

3.1   The Case For Culture General

Earlier in your career, you may have completed RCLF modules devoted to key culture general concepts and skills that were designed to help you think about and act in the culturally complex operating environments.[1] These concepts provide you tools for thinking about culture systematically (such as: change, variation, and holism) and understanding key cultural processes (such as: reciprocity, mobilization, conflict, and identity). You also may recall learning about the skills needed for cross-cultural operations that enable you to apply your knowledge during planning, analysis, and interaction (such as: observation, suspending judgment, maintaining tact and bearing, perspective taking, and reading the cultural landscape). You may want to refer back to the Operational Culture General Manual and the Reading the Cultural Landscape module from OB2/EB3 as you progress through this reading, since it is intended to build on that earlier learning. The intent of the culture general material in this block is to provide overviews of knowledge areas that will help you make connections among key cultural concepts and make sense of behavior in context.

The value of culture general knowledge lies in the fact that it is transferrable (in other words, applicable regardless of the specific culture) and can be elevated to higher levels of learning, as you will see in the pages to follow. Consider the potential consequences of *not* incorporating a culture general foundation into your mission preparation:

---

[1] CAVEAT: This document contains sections adapted from unclassified materials that also were used in the production of the Culture Generic Information Requirements Handbook (C-GIRH), DoD-GIRH-2634-001-08 and the Cultural Intelligence Indicators Guide (CIIG), DOD-GIRH-2634-001-10, which are available from Marine Corps Intelligence Activity's dissemination manager and in other products and publications.

You have been assigned to a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) as a part of the MEF G5 in order to advise on cultural issues that may impact the effectiveness of the mission. A cyclone devastated this small nation in which you are now deployed, causing flooding, wind damage and landslides in some areas. Prior to deployment you received a briefing on the local language, region, and culture. You know that the country was formed relatively recently as the result of a treaty between three nations in order to solve a long running border dispute.

Your arrival in country is a chaotic one. The foreign aid effort is being coordinated from the nation's only international airport on the outskirts of the capital. You step out of the C-130 and are immediately faced with various levels of disorganization and logistical distractions. The tarmac is littered with pallets of aid supplies from different nations, some broken open and scattered on the ground, others stacked on top one another. You count uniforms from at least seven militaries in the area, shouting in different languages. Looking over the area, you notice a small delegation headed in your direction.

The leader introduces himself as the local military liaison for your group. Accompanying him are representatives from the local police forces, health services and a few drivers/interpreters. Fortunately for you, they all seem to speak English fairly well. The Colonel in charge of your group asks about the logistical disarray around you. The liaison explains that they have been having issues with the Chinese assistance group that had arrived the week before. Other nations are pitching in with the relief effort, but the Chinese group has taken control of heavy moving equipment and refuses to let go of it until they are finished. Without the ability to move them, multiple refrigerated containers from other nations have sat out in the sun to spoil. They also have a tight grip on the transportation in the area, so securing transportation may prove to be difficult.

After a bit more discussion with the liaison, the Colonel calls you over and tasks you with the securing of the equipment from the Chinese. This places you in a difficult situation, because you were not briefed on the Chinese military element that is in country, and you know very little about Chinese people and their culture. You are going to have to rely on what culture general skills you have learned in the past to navigate this situation effectively…

When you think of the Marine Corps approach to understanding the impact of culture on military operations, you may recall the "Five Dimensions of Operational Culture" as a basis for organizing incoming information that could feed into planning frameworks such as ASCOPE or PMESII. The five dimensions framework (social, political, economic, physical, and belief systems) can help familiarize you with a new area on a basic level, but is unlikely to prepare you to navigate the more unpredictable events that may occur when boundaries are blurred and you are faced with unexpected intercultural interactions, such as the one you just read.

A culture-general foundation can help Marines identify and understand relevant information and, by employing these thinking concepts and skills, determine connections among different aspects of culture. For example, a general understanding of how people think about and use kinship relationships might help a Marine identify and understand the way kinship relationships are being used to move resources and information. Furthermore, it provides tools for taking full advantage of culture specific information using different lenses. For example, when you are provided a culture- specific pre-deployment briefing, you are not just receiving basic facts about that culture group. Culture specific information focuses on the patterns of behavior and meaning that are specific to a particular group or network at a particular time. This information is sometimes relevant to more than one knowledge area and, if you are tuned into potential connections, can help you understand better both the "what" and the "why" of what is going on around you. The fact that older men make most of the decisions in a group is a piece of information that can add to your knowledge about social roles (see "Organization and Interaction"

below), who has authority to influence decisions (see "Influence and Control" below), and the values of the group (see "Belief and Knowledge" below). Understanding the multiple layers of meaning beneath the surface of your observations can assist in mission planning and in your ability to anticipate second and third order effects of your decisions.

This section will review 10 knowledge areas. Why 10? There could just as easily be 25 or 8. Different aspects of culture are connected, and those connections are constantly being reworked through people's actions. Therefore, any set of knowledge areas, checklist, or taxonomy will be a limited tool. It will be apparent to Marines seasoned in learning about culture that the descriptions below are not comprehensive; however, they are a useful means for organizing facts and, *more importantly*, for understanding the connections among different parts of social life. The knowledge areas below help draw your attention to a greater level of detail so that you can identify additional considerations which may be relevant in different missions across the range of military operations. As you develop more knowledge about how people create and use culture to solve problems and make sense of behavior, it will become easier to select an approach that will be most useful for a particular interaction.

3.1.1   Belief and Knowledge

This knowledge area encompasses the beliefs, logics, values, learning, knowledge, and modes of questioning and investigation of a group (sometimes referred to as worldview). It includes, but is not limited to, topics such as religion and other beliefs, what people perceive to be logical and rational ways of thinking, what people believe is right and important, how the group thinks about and accomplishes learning and teaching, and the myths, history, and narratives that are important to the group. As with other aspects of culture, it is very common for multiple patterns of belief to co-exist, even when an outsider might see them as conflicting. People may be very devout in a monotheistic religion that instructs people to believe that a god controls all activities in the world. However, the same people may place great emphasis on scientific logic and also have shrines to ancestral spirits.

People use beliefs and knowledge to think about not only spiritual questions, but also more practical matters of how the world works, why things happen, and what is right or wrong. Beliefs need not be explicitly linked to religion to have significant impact. In the United States, many people place great value on individual rights and responsibilities. While this value is reinforced by some religious traditions in the country, it is shared by many non-religious people. Myths, historical stories, and other narratives also are important in how people interpret events and make decisions. For example, a group with many narratives or myths about past invasions may be more inclined to be wary of US military presence than a group without this sense of shared history.

Groups or sub-groups also form orientations toward developing knowledge through learning that are shaped by beliefs. Commonly, some kinds of learning are perceived to be the responsibility of the family or community, others expected to be covered in more formal educational systems, and others seen as things that will be handled during employment or apprenticeship. Access to learning is sometimes linked to social roles, status, or stratification, with some parts of the group encouraged or restricted in what kinds of learning opportunities they have. It is still common in many places for female children to be prevented from attending formal school. Instead, they are expected to learn from their family everything they need to know to fulfill the restricted set of social roles available to them. It is important to remember that people's beliefs are not always reflected in official policies. For example, even in places where people place a high social value on education, this value may not be reflected in

government distribution of funds, and access to all or higher levels of education may be restricted to those who can pay.

Example: Venezuelan Particularists

Assumptions about what is logical and rational can vary dramatically across cultures. The following scenario and responses are drawn from the book Riding the Waves of Culture and illustrate a distinction between American and Venezuelan perspectives:

"You are riding in a car driven by a close friend when he hits a pedestrian. There are no other witnesses and the pedestrian is bruised but not badly hurt. The speed limit in this part of town is 20 miles an hour, but you happen to notice that your friend was driving 35. His lawyer tells you that if you will testify under oath that your friend was driving 20, he will suffer no serious consequences."[343]

Would you testify that your friend was driving 20 miles an hour?

Percentage of Americans who said they would not: 96%

Percentage of Venezuelans who said they would not: 34%

Although there are a variety of factors that could contribute to this significant difference (e.g.; loyalty to friends vs. trust in the legal system) one way to make sense of the difference is to view it through the lens "universalism" and "particularism". A universalist perspective (which tends to be preferred more heavily by Americans than Venezuelans) takes the stance that right is right and wrong is wrong no matter what the circumstance. Whereas a particularist perspective (often preferred more heavily by Venezuelans than Americans) takes the stance that particular circumstances (especially those involving family and friends) are the most important part of the equation. An understanding of these concepts can help you more accurately assign meaning to seemingly confusing behavior.

People also use beliefs about knowledge to structure how questions get asked and by whom. For example, in a group where scientific ideas about causation are accepted, questions about the cause of a disease would be perceived as being best answered by medical or scientific professionals using a structured scientific method. Yet, in a group that sees cause and effect as driven by supernatural forces, people see it as more appropriate for a person connected to spiritual matters, such as a shaman or priest, to answer such questions.

The core considerations for this knowledge area are that ideas about what is logical and rational are not universally shared and that beliefs, values, and systems of logic are entangled in all aspects of life. It is important to learn as much as possible about these aspects of culture and to watch for their influence across all other aspects.

3.1.2 Narrative and Creative Expression

This knowledge area encompasses the different ways a group engages in expression of ideas and the use of different expressive forms to reinforce, challenge, or change aspects of culture. It includes history, myth, stories, oratory, the arts, and literature as well as their venues such as various kinds of media, public performance, museums, and archives.

The military relevance of this knowledge area may not be immediately apparent. However, the concepts and information included in this area can provide critical insights into every other aspect of culture –

values, beliefs, rules, identity, etc. – as well as into how people in the group may interpret current events and how they think about their own history. Just as importantly, creative expression often is a means of challenging old ideas or trying out new ones, providing an opportunity to identify emerging changes.

Example: Chinese Footbinding

Consider the creative way in which "perspective-taking" was used by Kang Youwei to challenge the practice of foot-binding[344]. The practice involved binding young girls' feet tightly, deforming them in an attempt to create the impression of "golden lilies" that were 4 inches in length. After enduring for close to one hundred years, it is said that a turning point in ending this cruelty forced upon Chinese women was in a letter by the Confucian scholar asking the Emperor to consider how other nations perceived the way China treated its women. It is said that his letter convinced the Emperor that nothing caused others to ridicule and look down upon the Chinese more than footbinding. This effective and creative use of perspective-taking was used in the right way at the right time to bring about change for millions of women.

Every group constructs stories about its past and present that contribute to people's sense of shared identity and help them interpret new events. When narratives, whether about history or current events, are constructed, certain aspects are included and emphasized; others are not included or are de-emphasized. In some cases, this is deliberate, such as when a political party wants to emphasize particular values or de-emphasize the contributions of a sub-group. In extreme cases, a government or powerful sub-group may seek to insert deliberate distortions into narratives to shape public perceptions. However, in many cases, the selection of information is less deliberate, following patterns in people's expectations about what stories and histories should include. For example, in the past US history textbooks rarely included information on the roles of minorities or women and focused on major political figures and events rather than the daily lives of people. This was not so much a deliberate choice on the part of historical scholars as it was a reflection of the assumptions and values of the time.

Myths, parables, and folktales are no less important than efforts to report factual accounts of past events. These kinds of stories often provide important insights into the beliefs (such as ethical constructs) and social relations of a group. In some groups, telling such stories can be an important social event, which can be important for building rapport. Additionally, the use of proverbs in initial interactions has been shown to help build rapport and can also provide insight into cultural values. For example, the common proverb in Swahili "The person you are with is more important than the person you are not with" reveals the prioritization of people over a schedule. Or consider how the following proverb in Dari reveals the cultural value of hospitality: "If a pot is cooking, the friendship will stay warm." In many places, using local proverbs or telling a story can be used as a way of conveying information about a current event, observation or expected behavior if the speaker feels it could be inappropriate to speak more directly.

Likewise, fiction, poetry, movies, television, and other means of telling stories can be important for understanding values, changing or controversial ideas, and deep patterns in how people expect events to unfold. It is common in the United States for stories to have a fairly straightforward progression of characters and events, heroes and villains, clear resolutions, and happy endings, a particular kind of narrative optimism. Therefore, people from the United States may sometimes have difficulty with stories constructed in different patterns in following the storyline or identifying the intended message.

As with many other aspects of culture, being able to understand these kinds of expressions can be difficult at first, but patterns will emerge over time.

Forms of creative expression such as art, music, literature, and performance are found in every group. These kinds of expressions can convey a great deal about both group identity and aspects of culture that are being contested, as can be seen when a painting or film creates controversy. Likewise, artistic forms sometimes enable people to convey feelings or ideas that have few other social outlets. For example, the fact that young Bedouin men in Egypt write poetry was surprising to many of the Americans who first encountered it, but really is no more unusual than the fact that American male country music performers can sing about feelings that many American men would feel uncomfortable bringing up in normal conversation. Creative expression can be an important part of individual or family life. That said, military personnel are most likely to encounter it first in more public forms. Many groups expect that almost every individual will be involved in some form of public creative expression, even if only through participation in group events involving dance and music or by incorporating creativity and beauty into daily work. In such places, efforts to dismiss creativity as unimportant or impractical may be met with confusion or be rejected.

It is fairly common for more powerful parts of a group to try to impose restrictions on creative expression intended for the public, to control what "counts" as artistic, whether through overt political pressure or more subtle social pressures. Restriction of public creative expression also can happen more subtly as a few individuals become professional artists, writers, or performers through finding a patron or being able to exchange their work for goods and currency. These restrictions can have the effect of reinforcing social stratification or other social distinctions. It also is a very common part of overt political strategy to promote a particular ideology through the restriction or use of the arts, literature, and music. Under these circumstances, creative expression by people or in forms that challenge these controls can be an important part of protest and mobilization.

As open access to the internet has become more common across the globe, more individuals have the ability to contribute publicly to stories, historical narratives, and forms of creative expression as well as to use creative expression for political purposes. Involvement of many individuals is not necessarily new, but the medium of the internet does introduce some differences in terms of access, processes, and scope. The long-term implications of how people choose to use and/or restrict the internet are not yet known. Thus, it will continue to be important to pay attention to how people use various internet venues, including but not limited to social media, to construct and contest identities and narratives, support and challenge values, norms, and ideologies, and engage in various forms of creative expression.

3.1.3   Communication

This knowledge area focuses on very basic aspects of individual and group communication including anticipating intercultural communication mishaps, communication patterns, and different modes of sharing information. For this knowledge area, the most important thing to remember is that almost all human behavior involves communication of some sort. All humans communicate, and symbolic communication is one of the few human universals. To do so, humans use verbal, non-verbal and paralinguistic cues as well as objects, space, and various forms of behavior. We communicate non-verbally (via cues like body stance, gestures, and pace of speech) about such things as: our perceptions of the social roles and status of the people in the conversation, power dynamics, or willingness to compromise. By accepting or rejecting hospitality or a gift, we communicate something about the kind

of relationship we have with the person making the offer. We build structures that communicate subtle cultural cues about the purpose of the structure and expected behavior, such as the use of high arches, pillars, and large open spaces associated with public and religious buildings in the United States. Even very large scale, complicated group behavior communicates a message, such as when the United States communicates the capacity for force by placing a carrier group off a coast.

The meanings associated with particular behaviors or symbolic objects and structures can vary a great deal, and misinterpretations of communication are some of the most common inter-cultural errors. Getting very close, making large gestures, and speaking loudly may be interpreted by an American as rudeness or aggressiveness when the speaker is intending to convey sincerity and engagement. Having foreign military partners show up late for an exercise may be seen by Marines as lazy or disrespectful when the partners did not intend to communicate anything of the sort. Likewise, actions by Marines can be misinterpreted in intercultural contexts. For example, establishing a dumping area in a field used for grazing might have been a simple mistake, but be interpreted as the Marines communicating contempt for local farmers. In any intercultural interaction, the more stakeholders can learn about each other, the easier it is to avoid and recover from potential problems.

Learning about communication also involves understanding different communication patterns. It is a mistake to think about communication as purely transactional, a simple exchange of information. Communication involves behaviors (such as tone, style, physical stance, presence or absence of honorifics, inclusion or exclusion of personal information) that people use to signal things about social relationships, relative status of people involved, the stakes involved in a discussion, and so forth. Social roles, status, and situation can have a great deal of influence on who can communicate with whom and the way such discussions play out. The following example relayed by a Major from the Canadian Infantry illustrates this point:

Example: Question-asking in Afghanistan[345]

"In 2008, while employed in the Canadian Task Force Afghanistan, I and a small number of Canadian and Afghan soldiers deployed to Maywand District, Kandahar Province, in what was to be the first permanent Coalition presence in the area to date. After a couple months of operations, we wished to implement some MoE to give us an azimuth check regarding our strategy. We canvassed the local population, asking such questions as: "Do you feel secure? Are you happy with the government? Do you trust the coalition and the Afghan security forces?" Inevitably, the responses were overwhelmingly positive; one would think that we were hugely successful—undoubtedly unrealistically so.

What we did not understand was that there were social norms, part of the cultural dimension of belief systems, at play when the local population was answering our questions. It was eventually explained to us by our Afghan security force partners that, when locals are engaged in conversation with people in positions of authority, the most likely responses are generally very positive in nature. Essentially, they were saying that most Afghans simply tell you what they think you want to hear. They do this primarily because they want to give the impression of being a "good" citizen and, secondly, because they do not want to cause trouble for themselves by appearing to be critical of the authorities.

From a Western perspective, our questions were designed to elicit direct and honest responses, regardless of whether these responses may have been an indictment of our efforts. Our failure to understand this social norm (also, perhaps, the Afghans' inability to understand our true motives in asking the questions) led to an inaccurate evaluation of the population's true perception of their environment, something that eventually

became clear to us through the actions of the population as well as the insurgents. Eventually, we learned that the problem was not the questions we were asking but rather the manner in which we asked them. By offering a list of issues and asking the local population to prioritize the most important concerns that the government should address, we were able to ascertain a more accurate picture of their perceptions. Instead of asking, "Do you feel secure?" or "Is the government doing a good job?" we said, "Please prioritize where the government should focus its efforts: security, building schools, the economy, or eliminating corruption." By changing the structure of the question, we were able to get the answers we were looking for, while still respecting the social norms of the population."

The more you learn about social organization and other aspects of culture, the easier it will be to anticipate common patterns of communication.

A final consideration about communication involves different modes of sharing information and how the legitimacy of information is determined. All groups have many different ways of sharing information. There are usually at least some structured channels such as official announcements, education, town halls, sermons, public lectures, organized protests, scholarly publication, and news media. There also are always less structured ways information is passed, such as gossip, individual media broadcasts or publications, street corner sermons and talks, and ad hoc gatherings. The availability of internet access has made some of these less structured venues available to far broader audiences than in the past. In the United States, it is still common for people to perceive information from structured venues as more legitimate and to place value on the perceived objectivity of a source. In many other places, especially populations with high inequality or segregation and in times of conflict or disaster, people may place more emphasis on the social position of the source. They may trust an account from a neighbor or local religious figure more than official pronouncements or news accounts from people whose motivations and allegiances are unclear. Little or no value may be placed on the idea of objectivity.

Also, keep in mind that people often place more legitimacy on information that fits with their existing ideas. For example, in places where Westerners are believed (sometimes with good reason) to have spread disease in the past, people may not immediately believe in the good intentions of personnel supporting response to a medical crisis. They may distrust official messages about the response and be more willing to believe a local leader or media personality spreading rumors about outsiders bringing disease to kill the people and take their land. It is rarely possible to shut down less structured information channels. People simply create new ones. It is more effective to pay attention to what those channels and the information being passed can tell you about the ideas and concerns of the population. It also may sometimes be possible to build relationships with influential voices, thereby making it possible to shift what is being communicated.

3.1.4   Interaction with the Environment

This knowledge area comprises the different ways in which people from different groups interact with and use their varying physical environments in order to live and the cultural landscapes that result. All groups have a unique and interdependent connection with their physical surroundings. The physical environment - to include resources such as land, water, food, and materials for shelter, terrain, climate, etc. - influences the people living in it by providing a range of possibilities within which they act. The physical environment may set certain limits on human actions. For example, in order to live, people need to build different types of shelter in hot versus cold climates. However, people have the ability to adjust to their physical environment and choose a course of action from many alternatives. These

alternatives are cultural and vary from place to place. They are not pre-determined by the environment. Consider the threat of river flooding. In one location a group may choose to respond by building houses on stilts. In another location a different group may develop a park on the flood plain and build their houses farther away from the river. And in a third, the people may decide to ignore the threat of flooding completely and, for aesthetic and economic reasons, build low lying houses on the flood plain overlooking the river. All three groups live in similar environments and face a similar threat, but they choose to interact with their environment in different ways.

Marines need to understand the close relationship between a local community and its environment. Most importantly, Marines need to determine what features of the local physical environment are used by people and the particular ways in which these features are used and understood. This is because a Marine presence in any area of operation will affect locals' interaction with their environment and, without careful planning, could jeopardize the locals' ability to live and survive. For example, if Marine operations divert or impede access to resources such as food or water, they may inadvertently cause real shortages or upset the local balance of power by allowing greater access to one group over another. This, in turn, may lead to unwanted conflict. Planners need to anticipate how their operations will impact local people's use of their environment and recognize that, since use of the environment is cultural, the impacts may significantly differ from what would be an expected outcome in the United States.

Hadrian's Wall

During the Roman invasion of what is now Scotland, a wall was constructed as a measure of defense against the northern clans. While a seemingly simple military solution, some of the long-term impacts to the physical and cultural environment were: isolating wildlife, leading to divergent evolutionary paths; deforestation leading to decreased animal populations and erosion issues; new population centers as towns appeared to support the various military garrisons; and finally, facilitating the growth of a distinct cultural group (the forebears of what are now Scottish) due to decreased interactions with people on either side of the wall.

People's interaction with the environment will also inform the range of options available to Marine forces entering an area. For example, understanding the culturally specific choices people have made around transportation within the constraints of available resources, climate, and terrain in a local area can help Marines make their own locally appropriate decisions with respect to the vehicles they use and the equipment they carry.

Through human environment interaction, the ways in which people change and shape their physical environment create cultural landscapes that reflect their social, economic, and political attitudes as well as their beliefs and values. As you learned in RCLF OB2/EB3, a careful reading, or interpretation, of a cultural landscape can provide useful information about the people who create it, use it, and live in it. Certain features of the cultural landscape may be imbued with a significance or symbolic value that goes far beyond their mere physicality or utility. These items of cultural property – to include archeological, historic, and sacred sites - are extremely important as they represent a group's identity and heritage. Damage or destruction by either US or enemy forces can create great distress among local populations and prompt mobilization in opposition to the mission. In contrast, protection by US forces can aid mission success. Unfortunately, items of cultural property are often not immediately obvious or easy to spot. However, careful reading of the cultural landscape using observation and interaction skills can help uncover what is important to which groups and why.

Finally, as Marines learn to read cultural landscapes, it is common for them to begin to notice material culture. At its most basic, the term material culture refers to things people make. It includes everything from symbolic objects, such as religious totems or ceremonial swords, to the more mundane items that surround us in everyday life, such as furniture, tools, computers, and clothes, to the things we throw away, such as plastic wrappers and broken dishes. The value of particular items depends heavily on cultural context and personal meaning. For example, what might appear to be a worn, dull knife to an outside observer may be a valued family heirloom to its owner and, because of the object's heirloom status and the importance placed on family history in his culture, he may be unwilling to sell it, even in dire financial straits. What a group takes time and resources to make, what they protect, and what they discard can provide insights that are useful in understanding interaction with the environment, but also other areas, such as exchange and beliefs. Also, as is the case with cultural property, the value of particular objects may not be obvious at first. The same observation and interaction skills can help Marines successfully interpret material culture.

3.1.5   Exchange and Subsistence

This knowledge area encompasses the concepts and information used to understand how people get, store, share, and exchange resources, commonly referred to as exchange systems (or economies) and subsistence patterns. Subsistence patterns refer to the primary ways a group gets the resources it needs and wants. A group rarely relies on only one mode of subsistence. For example, one group may engage in agriculture and herding to feed themselves, but also plant more of certain crops, mine gems, and fish specifically for the purposes of being able to trade with other groups. In the United States, most people engage in wage labor for subsistence, but it's also common for people to garden, hunt, and trade, sometimes as a means of supplementing monetary income and sometimes because they enjoy the other subsistence activities.

Exchange refers to all the ways a group stores, distributes, and exchanges resources. Exchange includes practices that are formally recognized as part of the economy as well as those that are not officially recognized, such as gift giving, charity, barter, reciprocity, and remittances. It also includes practices that are considered improper or illegal in the group, such as bribery or sale of prohibited items. With regard to this last category, it is important to remember that what is considered improper varies across and within culture groups. While some practices may be officially illegal, they still can considered normal and proper by most people, as is the case in areas where it is normal practice to tip or bribe government officials.

Money, taxes, and market exchange systems are common parts of exchange, but rarely the only means by which resources are stored, distributed, and moved. Resources are also moved through the means described above, as well as through sharing resources and labor among family, friends, and social networks. While these

---

On Gift Giving

It is important to note the dilemma this can place a Marine in as regulations forbid gift giving or receiving past certain monetary and annual amounts. Being handed a gift with nothing to give in return may place the individual in an awkward and embarrassing position or, because of honor and/or pride, place the Marine in a feeling of unspoken "debt" to the other individual. Always be aware of the policies in place (and varying interpretations) associated with the giving of gifts.

Example: Baksheesh

Baksheesh is a practice in parts of Asia and the Middle East that involves the gifting of sums of money for a range of reasons. Baksheesh can come in the form of alms given for charity or a tip given to a powerful or important individual as a form of respect. While some in the west interpret this as corruption, it can also be viewed as part of an elaborate system of interpersonal power relations.

other means of exchange may be less visible, they can still be critical parts of how resources are used and moved in a group or network.

Subsistence and exchange are tied to other aspects of culture. A group's laws, beliefs, and values may limit how certain goods, such as family heirlooms, or kinds of labor, such as work by children, can be exchanged. People with certain social roles may have limited access to some aspects of exchange. Certain types of exchange, such as reciprocity, may be important in maintaining social relationships, as the giving and receiving of resources reinforces the bonds among individuals. While not every aspect of exchange will be critical to military operations, it is important to be aware that there are different kinds of exchange taking place and that people may interpret assistance from or to military personnel in terms of a kind of exchange other than a simple transaction or gift.

Special note on corruption: Across many types of missions and in all areas of the world, Marines report seeing exchanges that, according to United States norms and Marine Corps rules, constitute corruption. However, in many places, exchanges that we categorize as corruption are perceived very differently. What we see as a bribe between villagers and the military may be perceived as a gift or normal payment by locals – the equivalent of bringing a bottle of wine to a dinner or tipping a waitress. Something that looks like nepotism to us may be seen by others as honorable attention to family needs. In short, some practices that seem illicit to us may be not only acceptable, but expected in other places. This does not mean Marines should ignore corruption. It means that, when time allows, it is best to apply cross-cultural skills, such as perspective taking, to determine how the action is understood by the people involved. That additional moment of data gathering and thought can help a Marine make a well-informed and effective decision about how to respond.

3.1.6   Organization and Interaction

This knowledge area encompasses the concepts and information needed to understand a group's patterns of roles, relationships, and social organization as well as how people use those patterns to shape interactions within the group and between the group and others. It includes topics such as social stratification, sub-groups or other divisions, kinship, status, and identity. This is a particularly complex knowledge area because many different patterns are likely to co-exist within one group, and there may be people both within and from outside the group trying to change the accepted patterns.

Every group has common social roles that involve expectations about behavior, status, and interaction, such as politician, brother, priest, wife, or community leader. Social roles often, but not exclusively, are linked to kinship or occupation. A person may take on a different social role depending on context or at different stages of life. There also is variation in the flexibility or inflexibility of social roles. For example, in some groups, there may be an absolute expectation that part of the social role of being an adult son or daughter is to provide for older relatives, but a different group may see that responsibility as being balanced against the individual desires and aspirations of the adult children.

There is a reciprocal relationship between identity patterns and social roles. Some social roles may be restricted based on identity factors, as was the case historically in the U.S. when married women were not allowed to be teachers and people identified as a race other than white were not allowed to serve in political roles. Likewise, when a person assumes a certain role, such as community leader, that role may become an important part of his personal identity. Some social roles and aspects of identity are ascribed, meaning they are determined by the group and cannot easily be changed by the individual. Other aspects are achieved or avowed, meaning the individual has some ability to choose them.

Social roles play an important part in the way people structure their relationships and interactions. For example, when interacting with an elected official, people often behave more formally and respectfully than they might if interacting with the same individual in a different role, such as a child's sporting event. In such cases, people are shaping their interaction around the social role, rather than the individual occupying it. Both social roles and identity are commonly linked to social status with some roles or identities being perceived as more or less valuable, important, or privileged. In turn, social status can affect how people interact. For example, a person who has a high social status may expect deferential behavior from people with lower status, and there may be serious consequences if this expectation is not met.

The concept of social organization refers to broad, enduring patterns of roles and relationships. One of the most basic forms of social organization is kinship, which takes many different forms and levels of importance across groups. It is common for groups to have sub-groups or sectors, based on things like ethnicity or race, occupation, religious beliefs, or socio-economic status. These sub-groups may not be tightly organized and formally recognized, but they still have great influence over people's perceptions of how they can interact with one another.

Family Ties

You can learn a lot about a group of people by the way that they organize themselves. In the U.S. there is the traditional idea of the nuclear family: father, mother and children. That basic unit may interact with other related family units, but it generally moves along its own course, making financial and lifestyle choices that will be of most positive impact for that unit. For most of human history, this has not been the case. Other cultures past and present put different levels of importance on the idea of family and who is considered to be family.

It is important to remember that there is no one single function for kinship. Through the act of marriage, kinship becomes a tool of diplomacy. A less powerful family could marry a daughter to the son of a wealthier family, bringing the less powerful family prestige. A dowry would be given in order to make the marriage 'worth the while' of the wealthier family. Kinship can also play a part in the distribution of resources as families share resources in times of difficulty. Family tends to be a very important theme throughout all cultures, but the exact meaning of the idea does vary from place to place and people to people.

Most groups also have some form of social stratification, such as socioeconomic classes or a caste system. As is the case with individual social status, these broader stratification patterns can be closed, meaning the individual has no ability to change their position within the hierarchy. Others may be more flexible, giving individuals at least some possibility of changing position, as is the case in some socio-economic class systems.

Social organization also includes the institutions people create and use to organize their lives. These institutions may be structured and look familiar to people from the U.S., such as churches, educational or legal systems, governance, and social services. Other institutions may be less easy to recognize, such as a system of apprenticeships that is managed separately from the educational system. While these other institutions may appear to be "informal," that does not mean they are any less important or powerful.

One final aspect of social organization is social networks. While it is easy to think of social organization in terms of sub-groups and stratification levels, there also are social networks that cross these kinds of lines and give people a wider range of possible interactions. For example, social networks based on

school ties, religion, or political affiliation may make it possible for somebody to have interactions that normally would be made difficult by the boundaries of social groups or stratification.

3.1.7 Power and Decision-Making

This knowledge area encompasses the officially recognized and unofficial ways that power and influence are gained, lost, and used by a group (sometimes referred to as formal and informal political systems). It also includes how different kinds of decisions are made and who gets to make them.

Broadly speaking, power and control are about getting people to do (or not do) something. Authority refers to the official or popular acknowledgement that a person has the right to exert power. These two things do not always come in the same package. It is possible for somebody to have power without authority, especially if he controls resources or has the means to use force, as is the case with drug cartels. It also is possible to have authority, but no real power, something that can be a significant challenge for officials in newly formed or unstable governments.

A further consideration is legitimacy, which is the degree to which authority and the use of power are perceived as being correct and are accepted. It is possible for an official, structured authority to be acknowledged as powerful, but perceived as illegitimate. This perception may undermine an individual or organization's ability to exercise power effectively and create problems for the people in the community, as they navigate different power processes. Legitimacy can be a particularly important concept for military personnel because there can be great differences in perception within a community or between a community and outsiders. What is seen as legitimate authority and use of power by US personnel may be understood very differently by people in the local area or region. When these kinds of differences arise, it is important to avoid focusing exclusively on trying to create the perception of legitimacy. It is just as important to understand why people are not accepting something and what alternatives they would propose.

In the United States it is common for people to think about power and control in terms of formal political processes, government institutions, and nation-states, all arrangements that have the sort of structured authority described above. These are important aspects of how people organize power in many places, but they are not the only aspects of this knowledge area that matter for military personnel. The ability to wield power may be very direct in cases where people have structured authority or control something, such as resources, the

> **Wasta**
>
> Wasta is an Arabic term best translated as 'clout, connections, influence, mediation, or pull.' It is a form of corruption especially if there is any form of payment involved. Wasta involves using one's connections and influence in places of power to get things done outside of the normal bureaucratic procedures.

use of force, or the ability to give definitive interpretations of important guidelines, such as laws, religious doctrine, regulations, or history. However, people also wield power – and are perceived as legitimate - in more indirect ways, through influencing the beliefs and positions of others or by more subtle control over any of the things listed above. In many places, it is very common for high status community members, such as elders, religious leaders and scholars, highly educated individuals, the wealthy, or people from families with a long history in the area to have great influence and legitimacy (*see wasta*[346] example). Individuals without high status may gain legitimacy through advocacy for a sector of the population that feels the formal political structures are not acting in its interests. Even individuals whose social role or status prohibits them from formal participation in politics or decision-making can have a great deal of indirect influence. This can be seen in any place where women are not

allowed a recognized political voice, but who – as individuals or collaboratively – wield power and affect decisions through male relatives. Keeping track of the social roles and individuals that have influence in particular aspects of culture can seem daunting, but over time, patterns will emerge that make this area easier to learn about and understand.

Power and authority intersect with decision-making for groups in complex ways. Official decision-making structures and processes are often layered on top of other expectations about how decisions should be made. For example, a government official may have the authority and power to make decisions about resource distribution for education. However, he may realize that his final decision will be seen as more legitimate, accepted, and acted on more readily if he consults with community leaders, important religious figures, and other influential organizations or individuals. In many cases, this kind of consultation is not officially required and may not be pointed out as a formal part of the decision-making process, but is still expected by all stakeholders. Also, sometimes the decision-making process can depend on context and topic. For one topic, one or a handful of individuals with authority may be expected to deliberate and make decisions for the group. For another topic, a process such as voting can enable the group to make decisions based on the will of the majority of those allowed a voice in the matter being debated. These kinds of practices should be familiar to Marines who have observed military and civilian authorities socializing ideas and building consensus prior to making and announcing a decision. It is as important to observe and understand the activities and narratives leading up to a decision and the processes expected for particular kinds of decisions, as it is to know who makes the final call.

One final note on the intersection between power and decision-making involves implementation. Many Marines will have encountered situations, at home or abroad, where a decision is made, but not acted on in the expected way. People may creatively reinterpret a decision to suit their own purposes or simply find ways to ignore it. In some cases, this kind of disconnect between decision and action results from lack of authority or legitimacy, as described above. It also can result from corruption, lack of trained personnel to do necessary work, or other problems. However, in places where part of the population does not have access to the formal political system and other decision-making processes, not acting on a decision or deliberately undermining the decision in small ways may be a form of resistance and protest. People may believe, quite correctly, that this type of resistance is the only political action available to them, a situation that can have a significant effect on mission accomplishment.

As is always the case, this knowledge area is connected with all the others. Social roles, organizations, and status have a major impact on who can wield power and how. Religious convictions are often deeply entangled with political decision-making. Ideas about how knowledge is gained or what counts as a valid argument are very important in decision-making. Symbols and the built environment are often used to create or reinforce the legitimacy. Understanding these connections will make it easier for military personnel to understand and anticipate the use of power and decision-making.

3.1.8   Social Control and Managing Conflict

This knowledge area encompasses ideas and practices people have developed to regulate social relations, individual behavior, and the rules of a group as well as establish patterns in how rules are used and what happens when people violate them. It also includes accepted processes for disputing and for managing or resolving disputes and conflicts. As such, it includes things familiar to Marines like legal systems, structured law enforcement, and official punishment and sanctions, but also different concepts of justice and different ideas about how disputes should be handled.

All groups develop rules to govern behavior and interactions. The term "norm" is generally used to refer to rules that are commonly understood (although sometimes contested) but not codified in a group. The term "law" refers to rules that have been codified into a formal system, which generally includes concepts and processes for enforcement, dispute resolution, punishment, restitution, and reconciliation. The degree of emphasis placed on aspects of a legal system can vary. For example, in the United States, our concept of justice emphasizes punishment and sometimes restitution. In places with different concepts of justice, restitution and reconciliation may be seen as the more important outcomes. For a Marine learning about social control in a group, it is critical to recognize that, while laws may be easier to learn about, norms may have as much or more power in governing behavior.

It is common to talk about rules as functioning to maintain social order, and this is true in the basic sense. However, it also is important to recognize that rules, such as norms and laws, also frequently serve to reinforce social stratification and inequalities, providing advantages to some parts of the group and disadvantages for others. This latter purpose is sometimes overt and acknowledged, sometimes more subtle. Likewise, rules do not always form a coherent system. It is fairly common for groups to have some rules that seem contradictory, especially during times of significant change. For example, long after women in the United States were legally allowed to vote, there was still a strong norm of women being expected to vote as directed by a husband, father, or brother.

When rules are broken, there are patterns in how the group responds. In the case of norms, all or part of the group is likely to respond to a rule breaker through social sanction. The social sanction can take many forms including but not limited to providing guidance, snubbing or shunning, gossip, shaming, or even violence. The reaction can depend on the individual as much as the offense. For example, if a child violates a norm of deference to a person of high social status, she might be gently corrected. An older person might be forgiven the offense without sanction, while a middle-aged offender might be shunned or beaten for the same behavior. As many Marines have experienced, most groups are willing to make allowances for outsiders not understanding norms. Offenses may be ignored or gently corrected. However, it is important to understand that in almost all situations the outsider is expected to learn "correct" behavior over time.

<u>**Saving Face**</u>

In many societies, personal status or prestige is a significant aspect of an individual's identity and classification within the social hierarchy. As such, public praise or condemnation can have significant consequences to an individual or even their entire family. Therefore, in these cultures it is imperative to avoid personal identification when assigning blame or poor decisions (especially for senior individuals) not only because of the insult to the individual, abut also the real possibility of loss of trust in you by the entire group over concern that they could also suffer loss of "face". For example, consider saying "Certain actions have led to unintended consequences that we need to work through" vice "Bill didn't listen to my advice and now we all have extra work to do to clean up his mess". Everyone will likely know that Bill is at fault, but more importantly, will recognize that you were honorable by avoiding shaming him and that you value the collective efforts over individual contributions.

When a law is broken, the situation is usually taken up by the formalized system of justice. This system may look like a familiar arrangement of police, courts, jails, and so forth, or the system may consist of a group of elders convening to hear about the situation and making a decision about what should be done. In many places, the system may be multi-faceted, with some matters being handled by local mediators or judges and others entering into a system of courts. No matter what the system looks like,

underpinning it will be a set of assumptions about what should be considered in decision-making and what constitutes a desirable, just outcome. In the United States, our ideal is that individuals should be equal before the law, that a person's social status, race, sex, and other such factors should not be considered in the judgment. Also, while our judicial system is expected to consider some aspects of context, such as killing in self-defense, others aspects are not allowed, or their consideration may be contested. The ideal of "equal before the law" is not a cultural universal, and many groups consider it very appropriate to judge a person differently based on personal characteristics or the particular situation. Likewise, the kinds of evidence that can be considered are influenced by other aspects of culture. So, in a place where many people believe sorcery can cause loss or death, evidence of a person practicing magic might be seen as a legitimate consideration.

Cultural Variation: The case of Sharia Law

It has become increasingly common to hear the term "Sharia Law" in American news outlets due to the multitude of extremist groups advocating for its adoption. Unfortunately, there is very little discussion pertaining to what Sharia actually is...often leading to misconceptions about what it is and is not along with a wide range of interpretations. In its most generic sense, Sharia is the concept of state and religion operating in conjunction for the moral and spiritual benefit of the population, with legal judgments delivered in accordance with religious texts. The problem is that, much like the Catholic version of this principle that flourished throughout Europe and eventually led to the schism and creation of the various Protestant faiths, there is a lack of uniform acceptance and "righteous" behavior and the punishments for disobedience. This is evident in countries that currently practice Sharia, with rules and authorities widely differing from country to country, or even region to region. Instead, much like the Catholic Church example, the intertwining of nebulous and fluid state and religious principles are used as a method to help solidify control over all (physical, legal, moral, and spiritual) aspects of a population by a select group of elite individuals.

Perhaps more importantly, there also is a great deal of variation in what people see as the desired outcome of a judicial process. In the United States, it is common for people to expect that a judgment will include the declaration of guilt/blame or innocence and a prescription for some type of punishment for the offender if found guilty. Again, this expectation is not universal. In some places, the outcome of a judicial process is expected to be the restoration of social harmony through restitution and acts of reconciliation rather than blame and punishment. In fact, placing blame and imposing punishment may be seen as making things worse, as exacerbating tensions rather than reducing them.

The preceding paragraphs focused mainly on violations of rules by individuals or small groups. All groups also have ways of handling broader disputes and conflicts that occur within the group or between groups. All groups have tensions of one sort or another, and these are generally managed rather than fully resolved. It is far more common for tensions, even very difficult ones, to be managed rather than erupting into violence. When a tension reaches a point where one or both parties feel some action is required, there are culturally accepted ways of disputing. For example, many forms of public protest, strikes, mediation, seeking greater political power, and legal action are all considered acceptable in the United States. In many places, these disputing practices are not allowed, but there may be others, such as gaining an audience with a ruler or religious leader and persuading him to intervene.

Even when a conflict results in collective violence, there generally are forms of violence that are accepted and forms that are not. Historically, some groups have accepted raiding and feuding as legitimate means of addressing grievances. The international community continues to try to impose

rules on large scale warfare, such as distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and treatment of prisoners of war.

Finally, all arrangements of social control, disputing, and conflict resolution rely on some mixture of perceived legitimacy and the threat of force (in the form of confinement, banishment, violence, or some other punishment). When some part of a population or an entire group does not have access to or does not accept the legitimacy of the social controls and patterns of dispute being imposed, the members of that group or population may try to pursue the conflict in ways that are perceived by other stakeholders as illegal or immoral. In the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014, each side accused the other of illegal and immoral acts in part because there were different concepts of what actions were acceptable within the conflict. Conflicts in which the rules of disputing are, themselves, part of what is being disputed can be particularly complex to resolve to the point where they can be managed through non-violent means.

3.1.9   Leisure

This knowledge area encompasses activities that people in the United States would typically consider as distinct from work, undertaken for enjoyment or as personal pursuits. It includes things like sports, social gatherings, hobbies, sport hunting and fishing, using media (films, television, websites, etc.) or reading for pleasure, relaxing at home, and outings or vacations. It also includes the special rules and expectations that apply to these activities.

Talking about and participating in leisure activities are well-established ways of building rapport. Many Marines have reported that discussions of sports, hunting, or movies are the initial ice-breakers in discussions with partner forces or local populations. In order to participate, it is important to identify shared interests and to be open to the fact that there are cultural differences in what counts as fun. For example, local people may enjoy a goat roast and spend as much time discussing all the details of killing and preparing the goat as Marines might spend discussing the nuances of a football game. The global entertainment industry and increasing internet access mean that it is now sometimes very easy for Marines to encounter people who have seen the same films, websites, and television shows. Understanding the "leisure" knowledge area can be helpful for rapport building but should not be limited to what is familiar and comfortable. When beginning to participate in a leisure activity, it is import to observe and ask about any special expectations for behavior. For example, when an individual is invited to dinner party at a family home, some groups expect the guest to bring a small gift. However, in other places, such a gift may be perceived as rude because it suggests the host cannot provide for the guest. There is no universal pattern. It is necessary to observe and ask questions.

Leisure activities can give important insights into other aspects of culture. At the most basic level, things people choose to do with free time can show what they think is important or provide windows into other values. Some groups spend a lot of leisure time in sports or other activities that provide opportunities for individual or team competition. However, competition is not universally valued, and people from other groups may choose to spend their leisure time on activities that focus on artistic expression or more directly building social bonds. Most frequently, Marines will encounter groups where there is a broad range of available leisure activities.

The Banker and the Fisherman

An American investment banker was vacationing in Africa. While visiting a coastal fishing village, a lone man in a small fishing boat pulled up to the pier. The American walked over to the boat to see three large tuna inside. The American complimented fisherman on the quality of his catch, and asked how long it took. "Only a couple hours," the fisherman replied. The American pointed out the nice weather and how early it still was in the day. "Why don't you stay out and catch some more?" he asks. The fisherman said that he had enough for his family's current needs. "But what will you do with all the rest of your time?" the American asked again.

"Well, this morning I slept in a bit then walked with my kids to school. I'm about to take a nap, then will go get my kids from school. I'll play with them and the dog on the way home, where I'll meet my wife. We'll go to the market and see some of our friends, try some new wine that somebody's selling down there. After that we'll have a nice big dinner and relax, maybe play some guitar."

The American's eyes light up enthusiastically, "Aha!" He exclaims "I can help you out! What you need to do is start working longer days. Catch two, three, even four times as many fish! Sell the fish you don't need at the market and keep the money. Save up and buy a bigger boat, and hire a crew too! That way you can catch even more fish. Eventually, you'll have enough money to buy more boats! From there you can move into a bigger city and look into ways to process and distribute the fish as well! You'll own your own company!"

The fisherman raised an eyebrow at the American, a quizzical look on his face. "How long will that take?"

"Probably fifteen or twenty years, but you'll be rich! And then you can retire!" The American exclaimed.

"But what would I do then?" asked the fisherman.

The American replied: "You could move to a small fishing village, sleep in, walk your kids to and from school, take naps, spend time with your wife, drink wine, spend time with friends and play guitar!"

As illustrated by this tale, different groups of people conceive of leisure time in different ways. The basic western idea surrounding work and leisure is that you do your job first, work hard and eventually be rewarded. Other groups do not always draw such hard boundaries around what is or is not considered work, nor is there a universal emphasis placed upon 'a hard day's work.

Social stratification, roles, and status may be reflected in who chooses (or is allowed) to participate in certain activities. In the United States, attending the opera tends to be associated with the upper socio-economic classes, although the only formal barrier to other people attending is cost. Participation in sports is still segregated by sex and/or race in many places, and the rules about segregation can be very strict. There also is cross-cultural variation in assumptions about who should have leisure time and why. Americans often assume that children and the elderly should have more leisure time than young and middle-aged adults, in particular that they should not have to be involved in wage labor. In other groups, this may not be perceived as desirable or may be impractical. This does not necessarily mean that children and the elderly are unhappy. They may value the chance to be perceived as making a contribution to the family or community.

As is the case with artistic expression, leisure activities are sometimes a context in which broader issues are challenged. For example, watching sports matches and sport hunting were traditionally male-only activities in the United States until recently. Over time, more women have chosen to challenge traditional gender stereotypes by openly displaying their interest in these activities or trying to participate. In cases where one part of a group is disadvantaged in ways that are not openly

acknowledged, it can sometimes be safer for people to highlight the issue in leisure activities rather than openly challenge the more powerful group. So, it might be easier for people to try out the idea of ethnic integration in a series of soccer games than in the political process. This is not to suggest that people perceive leisure activities as unimportant. After all, Jackie Robinson and Larry Doby received threats after breaking baseball's color barrier in 1945. However, as with the arts, sometimes people are more willing to allow challenges and exploration in these kinds of activities.

The idea of leisure and work as separate activities is not universally shared. Americans often compartmentalize the times and spaces where leisure activity is to take place. For example, for American adults, leisure activities are expected to take place at different times and in different places than work activities. These kinds of separations are not followed in many places Marines may operate. The concept of leisure itself, in the way it is commonly understood, seems to be a fairly recent development in human history. This is not because people in the past never had time to relax or pursue activities purely for enjoyment. It is just that the perception of a need to make a distinction between work and leisure does not seem to have been widespread. Blurred lines between work activities and non-work activities, still very common in many places, have sometimes created friction for military personnel. A common example is when a meeting includes time spent socializing, gossiping, making and eating food, and other activities military personnel think of as not work-related. US personnel may become frustrated, wanting to "get down to business" and stop "wasting time." The other people at the meeting may see no reason that a business meeting should not also be enjoyable. They may see the maintenance of relationships and exchange of information and hospitality as important as the specific topic of the meeting. In fact, the lines between leisure and work are also blurred in the United States. Most Marines have had to participate in "mandatory fun" where something cast as leisure was really just an extension of work. Most Americans also have had experiences where an activity that we might normally characterize as work, like helping somebody move, took on some characteristics of a social gathering.

For this knowledge area, it is not important to determine what "counts" as leisure in the group being studied. For interaction, what matters is being able to identify opportunities for participation and the different assumptions that may cause friction if not addressed. In particular, it is critical to keep in mind that the separation between work and leisure activities is not universal. For more in-depth knowledge, what matters is being able to understand what leisure activities mean to partners or local people and what clues they provide to other aspects of culture.

3.1.10 Health and Wellbeing

This knowledge area encompasses the beliefs, social relationships, institutions, and other aspects of culture that intersect with the overall health and wellbeing of a group. It includes topics such as beliefs about the causes and treatments of disease, power dynamics that affect access to sufficient water and food, how beliefs and social relations affect how care is provided, and how people are expected to behave when sick or injured. It involves not only what we would think of as physical health and nutrition, but also cultural orientations toward mental health and whether health is an individual or social matter. It also includes the health and treatment of wild and domestic animals that may be important for subsistence, labor, exchange, or symbolic reasons.

Cultural ideas about health matter not only for medical missions, but also more broadly for military operations. Because health and other aspects of culture (beliefs, social relations, exchange, etc.) are frequently tied together, a disease event or some US action related to health may have a ripple effect.

People may draw on unexpected aspects of culture to help them understand and deal with medical issues, such as the case of *empacho*.[347]

Empacho

Empacho is an illness within Latin American folk medicine that is associated with indigestion, diarrhea, loss of appetite and other minor symptoms. It is believed to be brought on by a mass of food becoming stuck within the digestive tract. During the 1980s there were recorded instances of young children being brought into emergency rooms exhibiting signs of heavy metal poisoning. Parents told medical care providers that their child was suffering from *empacho*. Upon investigation, doctors found orange or pink powder inside the stomachs of the children brought in for the condition. The powdery substance is known as *azarcon* or *greta,* and is prescribed by some Mexican folk healers as a treatment for *empacho*. Testing of the material revealed that *azarcon* and *greta* contain lead tetroxide and lead oxide respectively, and the materials were responsible for the deaths of many children throughout the region.

How could this have happened? Shouldn't it have been obvious to parents that you shouldn't feed your child lead? In this case, it is important to note that the families in these situations are dealing with two separate medical systems at once. On one hand, they are dealing with western biomedicine when they bring the child to the hospital. But going to a *curandero* or medicine man is a very different type of medical system, and sometimes medical systems don't interact in positive ways.

People rarely stick to one medical system, often seeking help from multiple sources. Even in America, a person who contracts a type of cancer will go to a special doctor and begin radiation treatments. That same person may also go into church and ask that their congregation pray for them to be healed. One course of action is physical and scientific, while the other is metaphysical and faith based.

As a Marine, it is important to understand the medical systems you may run into when deployed. The medical assistance offered by the United States is a very specific kind of medicine based on our understanding of science and the physical world. Locals may have other medical systems you have not heard of that play an important role in their lives. Taking time to understand how locals conceive of disease and illness as well as how they treat it will help reduce the possibility of unwanted surprises when it comes to treating the population in question.

Health issues may affect other aspects of culture in short term or long-term ways. For example, in many countries, epidemics of AIDS occurred at times when there were weak public health and medical infrastructures and aid from the international community was insufficient to provide the levels of care common in the West. The outbreaks killed many young and middle-aged adults, leaving large numbers of children and elderly people on their own. Over long periods of time, this has resulted in significant changes in economic patterns and family structure. It also altered social roles, with the elderly and children having to head households and support the family. As is often the case with lingering illnesses or debilitating injury, caring for the ill added an additional time and resource burden to families or communities already stretched. Disease burdens or health and nutrition insecurity can contribute to instability as well as affect the social, political, and economic contexts Marines will encounter when carrying out their missions.

When assessing the health situation of a group, the physical, psychological, environmental, veterinary, agricultural, and infrastructure aspects of health matter. It is important to remember to look at both individual medical issues and broader public health challenges, such as those arising from insufficient clean water or the presence of environmental toxins. It also is necessary to assess less visible aspects, such as beliefs about what causes disease and how it should be treated or how social divisions, roles,

and status may affect people's ways of seeking care. In many places, Marines need to be aware of the involvement of different kinds of practitioners, such as midwives, religious figures, herbalists, and community leaders in parts of care that may seem unusual to Americans. Overall, the goal is to balance learning about the community's health from the standpoint of US ideas about health with learning how the community thinks about health and what is necessary to maintain it or solve problems.

The quality of intercultural interactions will be improved when Marines learn about the cultural patterns of the people they encounter and consider how their own cultural patterns can affect the situation. In the case of health and wellbeing, this is particularly true, as many common assumptions from the United States are decidedly uncommon elsewhere. Consider what aspects of US beliefs and norms about health may be considered unusual by the local population. Many Marines are familiar enough with other cultures to recognize that certain normal US practices, such as a male physician treating a female patient, may be seen as unacceptable among certain groups. However, in some places, even more basic assumptions may not be shared. For example, most Americans believe that many diseases are caused by tiny organisms, invisible to the naked eye, that travel in people's blood and other bodily fluids. To some people, this may seem stranger than believing disease is caused by witchcraft. The idea that teeth and eyes are not part of routine medical care in the US system seems illogical to people in many other areas, as does the idea that mental illness is something separate from and more shameful than physical illness. Even the idea that a patient might be divided from his family or social network during his treatment, something we take for granted, could be perceived as strange or dangerous to other people. This last assumption caused problems in some past responses to Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) when locals became afraid, sometimes hostile, as relatives disappeared into isolation and treatment centers. In some areas, responders were able to use transparent sheeting in place of walls so that families could monitor how patients were treated and communicate with them, greatly reducing tension. Understanding such differences in fundamental beliefs and values can help Marines understand reactions and plan more effectively.

At the most basic level, having an understanding of the health situations and practices of a group will help Marines understand what the community is contending with that can affect the mission. For example, if Marines know their partners are coping with exhaustion from malarial parasites or worried about malnourished children, they can make more realistic plans for how much can be accomplished in a day. At a more complex level, understanding the cultural aspects of health can provide insights into many other aspects of culture as well as help anticipate the second and third order consequences of operations.

3.2   Culture General Ethics

As Marines, you have the opportunity to work with people from many different cultures. It goes without saying that you will be exposed to cultural situations and interactions that seem strange or seemingly make no sense at all. Often these events can be brushed off as simply the result of interacting with a culture that does things differently. These differences can be reconciled, and those involved can continue about their business. Things change, however, when the actions of another individual or group violate the ethical code of conduct under which you operate. It is at this point where the actions of another may move from being perceived as 'different' to being perceived as 'wrong,' for example, the sexual practices of Marines' Afghan partners with young boys. Witnessing the open violation of your own ethical code by others with whom you are working may incite frustration or anger within yourself and/or your Marines, potentially lead to friction or damaged relations with the other group in question, or worse, prompt an unethical response from your Marines. This section will offer an overview on the

concept of ethics and alternative ethical constructs to help you navigate these culturally complex situations.

3.2.1 Defining Ethics

What does the Marine Corps mean by the term 'ethics?' At the Basic School's course on ethics, Marines learn that ethics is "a set of standards or a value system by which free, human actions are ultimately determined as right or wrong, good or evil."[348]

From these definitions, we can tell: a) 'Ethics' is not a single thing, but rather the idea that right and wrong are made up of a number of standards/values that dictate what is appropriate (or ethical) and b) as they involve value systems, they are not universal. The standards and values that a group holds are the criteria by which thoughts and actions are judged as being ethical or not.

3.2.2 Marine Ethics Review

Honor, courage, and commitment are concepts that are familiar to all Marines. These core values are the bedrock upon which ethical Marine behavior is built. In general, most Marines view these concepts in a similar fashion. For example, there is no confusion among Marines as to what is meant by "patriotism." Devotion to country is a key value when it comes to serving the United States as a warfighter. How might other groups outside of the U.S. think about patriotism? What if the country in which an individual lives does not treat its citizens, or a select group within that citizenry, fairly? In order to be loyal to a cause, a person must generally agree with the standards and values of that cause. What happens when the goals of the organization to which a person is supposed to be loyal run counter to the needs of the individual or contradict other closely held values? Asking questions about how ethical ideas come to be perceived the way they are and how they interact with each other can help Marines to make sense of not only their own culture's ethics, but also those of others.

3.2.3 Exploring Alternate Ethical Constructs

Understanding how Marine Corps' values shape Marine behavior is very useful when it comes to exploring the ethical constructs of other cultures. While many groups have written down some aspects of their ethics in laws or other documents, such formal documents rarely capture the whole ethical system or the range of ways people are expected to follow it. In addition to observing behavior, there are a number of places where you can look for information about what others will consider right or wrong. As it is with Marines, you can observe any number of aspects within a culture group to find indicators of what is considered right and wrong. Art, history, religion, and general patterns of living all serve as good points of information. When you find familiar concepts such as honesty, courage, or honor, take time to consider how another culture might perceive them, keeping in mind that (as it is within your own culture group) you cannot make judgements based on any single observed aspect. If a certain film or story is popularly retold, for example, it is important to think deeply into why it is so popular. Is it because main characters display certain positive behaviors that are idealized? Is it perhaps a cautionary tale of how individuals should not behave? This can be seen throughout our own popular media, from the basic fairy tales and fables that Americans use to teach their children moral lessons to popular television series that tackle extremely complex moral situations. These stories often have multiple angles from which they can be interpreted. Not everyone within the culture group will necessarily have the same interpretation, so it is important to keep an open mind and constantly be on the lookout for opportunities to learn more and update your knowledge.

<div style="border:1px solid #000; background:#f5c6c6; padding:10px;">

Ethics in American Popular Culture: The Anti-Hero

While there are many heroes and characters in American pop culture that do display American cultural ideals (Captain America, Spider-Man, Jack Ryan, etc.), there is also a movement that focusses on a different type of character: the anti-hero. People find these characters interesting because they do not conform to our notions of the classic virtuous 'hero.' These anti-heroes have come to dominate many films and television series (Mad Men, Breaking Bad, House of Cards, Deadpool). Sometimes these characters are more relatable to audiences because they embrace the flaws of the character and explore ethical gray zones in which audiences might find themselves. The next time you find yourself watching a film or television program, think about the following questions. Why do people find these characters compelling? What does the popularity or unpopularity of the characters say about the way audiences feel about the ethical virtues (or lack thereof) that are on display? The answers to these questions can be indicative of a group's ethical constructs.

</div>

The culture general skills that you have learned in previous RCLF blocks – observing, perspective taking, suspending judgment, avoiding mirror-imaging, and maintaining tact and bearing – can and should be applied when learning about the ethical constructs of other culture groups. Also, the culture general concepts of change and variation should be taken into consideration both in the application and perception of ethical constructs.

Change: Much as everything else involving culture, a group's sense of what constitutes ethical behavior changes over time. This change may occur incrementally over many generations, or it could occur very quickly due to specific events or circumstances. It is also important to note that entire ethical constructs may not change evenly over time. Some aspects of what is considered right and wrong action may remain fairly static while other ideas evolve very quickly.

Variation: Not every member of a culture group interprets the groups' ethical standards in the same manner. Some may favor strict interpretations, while others favor more gray area in how right and wrong action is determined. This variation in 'gray area' also applies to individuals within a culture and can change depending on the situation in question.

3.2.4   Strategies for Ethical Sense Making

Because ethical constructs are not completely homogenous and are constantly in flux, it is sometimes difficult to immediately make sense of how right and wrong action is defined within a culture with which you are unfamiliar. In these times of uncertainty, you may find it useful to refer back to the culture general Rules of the Road.

Rule #1   The local people have not organized themselves, their beliefs, or their behavior patterns for your convenience. Figuring out what is going on can be complex. Accept it and move on.

Rule #2   Things you take for granted may not be true here. Basic concepts such as honesty, fairness, respect, winning, finished, ownership, and agreement may mean fundamentally different things to local people. Be prepared to cope with both your confusion and theirs.

Rule #3   You don't have to like it to understand it. Some things you learn about the local culture may anger or puzzle you. That's OK. View these differences as significant factors that shape the area of operations and affect a unit's ability to carry out missions. Figuring out

what is going on may require temporarily holding in check your own beliefs, assumptions, and expectations so you don't blind yourself with emotion or assumptions. This takes mental discipline.

Rule #4   Local people are not just reacting to you. They are reacting to their entire perception of U.S. influence. Before the first Marines hit the ground, local people have a perception of the United States based on U.S. products, media (such as films and television), and perhaps U.S. companies, NGOs, or charities. These previous experiences shape the way people react to the Marine unit.

When operating in and around other culture groups these rules can act as a first line of defense against misunderstanding.

3.2.5   Ethics in Action

Ethical standards and values are negotiated, not fixed. While these standards and values are the guiding points by which individuals and groups inform their actions, those individual actions are negotiated within their own unique sets of circumstances and pressures. These pressures come from both within and without the individual or group, and are constantly in flux. This negotiation between the internal and external ethical pressures is not always obvious or pronounced during periods of calm; however, during times of conflict, it can cause strain on the individual. Individuals face ethical dilemmas daily. These dilemmas range from, for example, having to make individual choices between family and work to prioritizing between the safety of the Marines under your command and mission accomplishment. While Marines have a solid ethical foundation upon which they base their own actions, interpreting the actions of others adds another layer of complexity.

When approaching ethically complex situations, it is helpful to ask the kinds of questions that explore the ways in which alternate ethical constructs may impact Marine operations. The following sections contain brief descriptions of current issues from across the globe along with some sample questions that can help explore the complexities of changing ethical constructs in times of crisis.

3.2.6   Marine Corps Concept: Honor

What constitutes Honor for the Marine Corps? For Marines, honor is "to live your life with integrity, responsibility, honesty, and respect."[349] This all makes perfect sense to Marines, but how does this concept change when considering other populations? The unique nature of the Marine Corps gives it a unique sense of honor, a fact that is important to keep in mind when considering other groups' ideas of the concept. During World War II, Japanese and American warfighters both fought hard for the defense of their respective countries, in order to protect their very way of living. Those ideal ways of living played out in the battlefield behaviors of the combatants. For example, even in the direst situations the very idea of surrender was offensive to the Japanese sense of honor. Their construction of honor was informed by propagandized versions of the Samurai bushido code, which idolized death in the purity of battle.[350] As a result, Japanese infantry would conduct banzai charges as a form of honorable suicide, preferring to die in battle than stain their honor in surrender. This behavior was puzzling to American infantry witnessing what they saw as senseless forward assaults by the Japanese forces. The American's idea of honor allowed for units to surrender and retain their honor.[351]

Differences in the interpretation of the cultural values that inform ethical behavior may have obvious consequences (as is the case with the Japanese infantry in WWII) or may be more subtle, depending on

the situation. Here we will look at migrant crises across the world and suggest questions to explore how ethical constructs may be impacted by these situations.

Europe's Refugee Crisis[352]

Conflict across the Middle East has driven crisis migration to a new all-time high in recent years. The Syrian civil war, the advent of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the civil war in Yemen have displaced hundreds of thousands. These join the already large numbers migrating to escape conflict and crises on the African continent. Many refugees flee via sea and land routes in hopes of finding sanctuary and opportunity in Europe. While some countries welcome refugees, there simply is not adequate infrastructure to deal with the population influx.

Rohingya Refugee Crisis[353]

The Rohingya people are a minority Muslim group in Burma's Rakhine State. Tensions with the local government, poor living conditions, and inter-communal violence have led many Rohingyans to flee the country, often by poorly maintained boats, to neighboring nations. This journey is perilous, as they have no guarantee of safety and no guarantee as to what type of response they will receive from destination countries. Strained relations between the Burmese government and the Rohingyans have made formulation of international policy toward this group difficult, at best.

Mexican Immigration to the U.S.[354]

Migration between Mexico and the United States has been going on far longer than either country has existed but has become an increasingly contentious topic within the past few decades. As a highly politicized topic within the U.S., it is easy to think of Mexican immigration as a single event; but in reality, there are three distinct types of immigration that occur: permanent legal admission, temporary legal admission, and unauthorized migration. How the migration occurs varies for each group, but the action is often driven by similar motivations, such as to seek economic or educational opportunities or to escape the violence of the Mexican drug wars.

Think About It:

Because concepts such as honor are informed by cultural values that are unique to an individual group as interpreted by the individual members, it is unlikely that each migrant population and the individuals in that group will conceive of the idea in the exact way. In the situations above:

> *What does honor look like when acted out by the individual, the various groups, or countries?*

> *How might contact with new host populations and the experience of migration impact a migrant population's sense of honor?*

> *In what ways might the local population react to exposure to this new idea of honor?*

> *Are migrant populations obliged to conform to their host country's ideas regarding honor and honorable behavior? How might the idea of tradition tie into that?*

> *For that matter, does it make sense to apply the sub-concepts that the Marine Corps uses (including integrity, responsibility, honesty, and tradition) to other groups? Might some of these be more important to some culture groups than others?*

How can one account for future fluctuations of ethical constructs within a region during the operational planning process?

3.2.7 Marine Corps Concept: Courage

What constitutes courage? Marines who are courageous have "The mental, moral and physical strength to do what is right in the face of fear, uncertainty, or intimidation."[355] "Courage is the commitment to uphold your honor at all times," provides a Marine respondent in a 2007 survey to the question, What is courage?[356] In these statements, it becomes clear that risk taking and boldness in face of danger, in and of themselves, do not equate with courage. There is another component, steeped in cultural values. It is when those acts are coupled the concept of "right" – a moral component – that we can label action as courageous. But what is "right?" In his work on courage in the Marine Corps, Dr. Frank Tortorello noted that courage is "the selfless pursuit of *prized cultural values* in situations of moral and physical risk"[357] (italics added for emphasis). How a culture group determines if an action is courageous is dependent on what cultural values are at play and how these values are defined. Obviously, these are going to vary in both definition and appearance across and through culture groups, and at times, there will be competing or conflicting values. It is important to remember that while the process of ethical construction takes place external to the individual, it is still up to the individual to decide upon *how* those ethics manifest in action. Take the Japanese businessman who commits suicide because of company failure. What are the cultural values at play? Is he acting courageously, or is he a coward seeking the easy way out? How we interpret another's actions largely is shaped by our own ethical framework, by what we consider to be "right." Let's look at the international security situation in Syria and Iraq involving ISIL and how the concept of courage and some of its associated concepts like loyalty and patriotism may manifest themselves and vary from the perspective of some of the players on the ground.

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[358]

ISIL is seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate, anchored in the territory of Iraq and Syria with global aspirations. ISIL bases its legitimacy in a particular branch of Sunni Islam, has established political and military structures and governance programs, and has gained physical territory. It employs the tools of terror and brutality to intimidate opposition and local communities, eliminate apostates, agitate disaffected Muslims globally, and influence Western countries' treatment of their internal Muslim populations. ISIL believes it gains increasing political and religious authority through military victories and justifies its military action and violence as sanctioned by God. ISIL's goal is to unite Muslims worldwide under the Caliphate and seek world domination.

The Refugees Feeling the Crisis[359]

The challenges facing refugees fleeing the security crisis in Syria and Iraq in transit to and upon arrival in Europe are daunting - human smuggling and trafficking, cramped, squalid conditions in the camps and holding areas, bureaucratic wrangling and processing, lack of economic opportunity, and death by drowning, to list a few. An individual, when deciding to stay or to depart, must weigh these against his or her current reality on the ground. Many in this position are parents, which factors into their decision calculus.

International Anti-ISIL Coalition[360]

As of March 2016, 66 countries represent the international anti-ISIL coalition. Contributing countries provide both military and non-military (such as humanitarian aid and weaponry) support. Operation

Inherent Resolve is the military component of the coalition's activities, in which 22 countries participate. The intent is for local forces to take the lead on the ground. U.S. and other coalition members work to support a three-pronged effort, involving training and equipping local forces, providing coordinated air strikes, and conducting limited targeted special operations. The level and type of support are adjusted as the situation on the ground evolves. With so many countries involved, there are inherent challenges with competing national priorities and strategic objectives and differences in levels of risk tolerance and rules of engagement and in the ways and means of carrying out missions.

Pro-ISIL Foreign Fighters[361]

Pro-ISIL foreign fighters come from around 85 countries in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia, and North America. They tend to be drawn from the youth of these countries. All figures relating to these fighters are estimates, and sources disagree sometimes on source countries and numbers; however, they agree on the large and increasing numbers of fighters joining ISIL. Despite the efforts of the international anti-ISIL coalition, their numbers nearly doubled in the latter half of 2015. Their motivations for joining are as diverse as they. Some come for the religious appeal; others for the sense of belonging missing from the current life experience; others for the adventure or the opportunity to be a part of something bigger; and others for their own personal reasons. Source countries are also experiencing returning fighters, whose motivations for leaving are just as diverse as for joining. For source countries, this, of course, elevates security concerns.

Think About It

> *What does courage look like for each of the above culture groups? Are they acting courageously? Says who?*

> *Break it down: First, note the various culture groups in the above descriptions.*

> *Think about what cultural values are at play. Remember there may be competing or conflicting values that the individual member of the culture group must consider before determining what is right and, thus, ethical.*

>> *For Marines, the cultural values of loyalty and patriotism are key components of courage. What does loyalty look like in each group? How about patriotism? Are they relevant?*

> *Consider the diversity of membership in each group. How may these concepts vary within the group? What becomes the prized cultural value? Are all members in agreement? How do you think those who have prioritized different values view each other?*

> *What happens when the prioritization of cultural values changes? Consider, for instance, the fighters leaving the pro-ISIL coalition. What is considered "right" then? By whom? What does "courage" look like? To whom? Would ISIL leadership think about the situation in the same way the individual does?*

> *Consider how the concept of courage is inherently both individual and collective and how perspective shapes your understanding. Why is this important for you as a Marine leader?*

3.2.8   Marine Corps Concept: Commitment

What constitutes commitment? For Marines, commitment is the "unwavering, selfless dedication to mission accomplishment and personal and professional responsibilities."[362] Marines are to have unwavering, selfless dedication to their work and family and, while in the field, to mission accomplishment. Well, we all know that sometimes – many times – you cannot do it all. You have to decide. Marines and individuals all over the world face such ethical dilemmas daily when values they hold dear are in conflict with each other. What is the right thing to do? Which cultural value should you uphold and how? As discussed above in Ethics in Action, how culture groups and the individuals within them determine what is the right is shaped by a unique set of circumstances and pressures, and this is constantly evolving.

Let's look at one value: commitment to one's children. For Marines with children, this is one manifestation of how they live out their commitment, a core value in the Corps and a key component of the Marine Corps ethical construct. Many culture groups and individuals within would agree with this cultural value, and they uphold this value through such actions as providing food, shelter, community, educational opportunities, healthcare, and safety to their children. It is important to remember that how such concepts display in and across culture groups varies and, thus, the accompanying actions do as well. Do all Marines with children agree on what commitment to one's children looks like? Of course not. Cultural values inform how parents and communities enact their commitment. The behavior associated with commitment to one's children does not look the same everywhere. Consider when it involves ensuring acceptance into the community through female genital mutilation or prohibiting a morbidly sick child access to medical care to ensure eternal salvation.

While culture groups may have a certain shared idea of what "right" commitment looks like, that cohesiveness can breakdown in times of crisis. Changing realities of life within a culture group have far reaching consequences on how the ideal ethical behaviors of that group are carried out and may, over time, change the underlying standards and values themselves. In the case of commitment to one's children, when faced with crisis, parents and communities are often confronted with ethical dilemmas to determine what is the "right" way to carry out their commitment to their children. How parents and communities prioritize the different values shaping that commitment informs their decisions on what to do with their children. The following examples explore situations involving children in crisis situations. Let's take a look at how the concept of commitment to children displays in each.

Unaccompanied Children from Central America[363]

In 2012, the United States started to see a dramatic increase in the number of unaccompanied minors entering the United States illegally from the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2014 (fiscal year), the numbers were near 52,000. This unprecedented volume shocked people in the United States and overwhelmed the U.S. immigration system. During this time, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were experiencing high levels of violence, instability, and poverty and lack of opportunity. To reach the United States, children had to travel via dangerous, life threatening routes to face uncertain futures upon arrival to their destination.

Educating children in war-torn Ukraine[364]

Education for children is a right, guaranteed under Ukrainian law. Both Ukrainian and Russian-backed rebel forces have commandeered school infrastructure for their use and destroyed it during the course of military action. Some of these schools were orphanages. School administrators, teachers, and parents alike have gone to great lengths to ensure continuity of learning, oftentimes at great risk and sacrifice.

Children as suicide bombers in Nigeria[365]

Jama'a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da'wa wa-al Jihad, commonly referred to as Boko Haram (Western education is forbidden), has been operating in and around Nigeria since the early 2000s. Around 2009, they instigated an insurgency, and their tactics shifted to escalated violence. Boko Haram's 2014 kidnapping of more than 270 Chibok school girls garnered the attention of the international community. Since 2014, there has been a troubling trend of using women and children as suicide bombers. The source of the children is varied. According to the Fund for Peace's research on the ground in Northern Nigeria, research and data do not support that all the children used as bombers are victims of kidnapping; rather it is more complex than that. Interviewers found that yes, some may have been abducted or coerced, forced to carry out this act. Some are old enough to join in the act willingly, as adherents to Boko Haram's message. Other older girls are "returned girls," those rescued from Boko Haram who have been raped and impregnated, deemed untouchable and socially marginalized by the recipient community. And then there are those children who are given to Boko Haram by their parents, either because of ideological affinity or out of desperation, an exchange of one life for the means to sustain others. The complex drivers of this phenomenon demand attention in order to design effective counter-measures to defeat it.

Think About It

> *In these examples, what does commitment to children look like? At the parent-level? At the community-level? At the national level? At the international level? When thinking about this, did you consider the community and parental response to the "returned girls" in Nigeria?*
>
> *What cultural values are at play? How do you see them changing? Consider how the crisis shapes parental decision-making and the actions of the various groups in the examples.*
>
> *What ethical dilemmas are facing parents and communities in these examples? Consider some of the internal dialogues these parents and communities may have had.*
>
> *What is considered "right" action? Consider your response to the parental action in the Boko Haram case. What are you thinking?*
>
> *How can an enemy exploit cultural values, say commitment to one's children, to further their cause? Think about two or three cultural values you hold dear. Consider how an enemy could use these cultural values and your commitment to them to his advantage.*
>
> *As a Marine, how does gaining a deeper understanding of the ethical constructs involved in a situation make you a more effective Marine? Consider problem framing and how that determines courses of action.*

3.3   Culture General Conclusion

The next section introduces a variety of applied scenarios that put several culture general concepts and intercultural communication skills into action. They allow you to explore the interconnectedness and variability of the knowledge areas you just read about in a specific intercultural interaction. The scenarios are designed to transition between culture general and culture specific content and illustrate how key concepts can be applied to Marine operations in your assigned GCC.

342 J. Bennett, "Cultivating Intercultural Competence: A Process Perspective," *The Sage Handbook of Intercultural Competence*, Ed. D. Deardorff, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), 135.

343 Adapted from F. Trompenaars & C. Hampden-Turner, *Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Diversity in Global Business,* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998).

344 K.A. Appiah, *The Honor Code*: *How Moral Revolutions Happen*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010).

345 C. Frederickson, "Culture & Evaluation of Methods and Assessment," *Case Studies in Operational Culture*, Eds. P. Holmes-Eber & M. Mainz, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2014), 51-52.

346 J. N. Hooker, "Corruption from a Cross-Cultural Perspective," *Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal*, 16, no. 3 (2008): 251-267.

347 Robert T. Trotter II, "A Case of Lead Poisoning from Folk Remedies in Mexican American Communities," in P. Brown, *Understanding and Applying Medical Anthropology,* (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Pub. Co., 1998), 279.

348 "ETHICS I, II, & III, B130736, B130756, B4W6829," (student handout, The Basic School, Quantico, VA, 2014), 2, accessed 20 May 2016, http://www.usmcofficer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Ethics-I-II-III.pdf.

349 "ETHICS I, II, & III," 3.

350 William R. Patterson, "Bushido's role in the growth of pre-World War Two Nationalism*," Journal of Asian Martial Arts*, 17, no. 3 (2008).

351 Frank J. Tortorello, *AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF 'COURAGE' AMONG U.S. MARINES*, PhD Dissertation, (Urbana, Illinois: Graduate College of the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2010), 19.

352 International Organization for Migration, "Europe/Mediterranean Migration Response, Situation Report," 18 January 2016, accessed 16 May 2016, http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/europe-mediterranean-migration-crisis-response-situation-report-28-january-2016.pdf.

353 European Commission Human Aid and Civil Protection, "The Rohingya Crisis," *ECHO Factsheet*, April 2015, accessed 16 May 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/rohingya_en.pdf.

354 Marc R. Kandel, William A. Seelke, Clare R. Wasem, and Ruth E. Rosenblum, *Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends*, CRS Report for Congress R42560, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2012), accessed 16 May 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42560.pdf.

355 "ETHICS I, II, & III," 3.

356 Quoted in Frank J. Tortorello, The Marine was participating in an anonymous survey, 2010*,* 280.

357 Ibid., iii.

358 Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, *Islamic State and U.S. Policy,* CRS Report for Congress R43612, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 2016), accessed May 16, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf ,

359 International Rescue Committee, *Policy Brief: Europe's Refugee Crisis*, September 2015, accessed May 12, 2016, http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/IRC%20-%20Europe's%20Refugee%20Crisis%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20September%202015.pdf.

360 Kathleen J. McInnis, *Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State*, CRS Report for Congress R44135, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 2016), accessed 12 May 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44135.pdf.

361 The Soufan Group, "Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of
Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq," December 2015, accessed May 12, 2016, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Where do they come from?," accessed May 12, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html.

362 ETHICS I, II, & III," 3.

363 Manuel Orozco and Julia Yansura, *Understanding Central American Migration: The crisis of Central American child migrants in context*, August 2014, accessed May 18, 2016, http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FinalDraft_ChildMigrants_81314.pdf.

364 Human Rights Watch, *Studying Under Fire: Attacks on Schools, Military Use of Schools During the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine*, February 2016, 1-24, 51-61, accessed May 18, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ukraine0216_web.pdf.

365 Patricia Taft and Kendall Lawrence, *Confronting the Unthinkable: Suicide Bombers in Nigeria*, February 2016, accessed 18 May 2016, http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/303011602-nigeriasuicidebombers.pdf.

4 Cross-Cultural Competencies Applied Scenarios

Before reading the following applied scenarios, please complete the following required readings:

- Mackenzie, Lauren (2014). Strategic enablers: How intercultural communication skills advance micro-level international security. The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security, 1 (1): 85-96.

- Rasmussen, Louise J. & Sieck, Winston, R. (2012). Strategies for developing and practicing cross-cultural expertise in the military. Military Review, Mar-Apr: 71-80.

These readings can be found in the supplemental reading PDF, which was downloaded with this workbook from MarineNet.

4.1   Language Competence and Communication Competence

Background:

You are designated the Officer in Charge (OIC) to lead a detachment of Marines in northeastern Mali, where one of your tasks is to improve relations with local residents. The general population in Northern Mali demonstrates bouts of anti-American sentiment and sympathy toward *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria* (ISIS) and *Al-Queda in the Lands of the Maghreb* (AQIM). Locals are largely resentful of U.S. involvement in northern Mali and the broader Sahel region. In order to achieve your assigned tasks, you and your Marines plan to employ a number of tactics that focus on showing the northern Malians respect. You have prioritized demonstrating a familiarity with the local Tuareg culture by learning basic *Tamasheq* and Arabic phrases, as well as local customs from experts on Tuareg culture. While you have the option to speak French with

Figure 4-1: North Mali Map Showing Rebel-Held Territory in January 2013. *Source: Wikipedia.*[366]

the Tuareg, you hope that an attempt to communicate with them in *Tamasheq* will convey a strong desire for friendship. The Tuaregs, Berbers who are traditionally nomadic, largely populate northern Mali. Your primary task will be to construct and repair facilities to support a large refugee population. You anticipate this will help improve relations with the Tuaregs, who consider the area to be theirs.

To begin construction, you must first win the support of the local Tuareg chief, whose family controls a significant portion of the vicinity where you plan to begin work. The chief's family has owned this

portion of land for centuries and he is highly revered by the locals. You have been invited to the chief's home to discuss the refugee housing project over tea, and are accompanied by a local interpreter, who is fluent in Tamasheq, Arabic, and French.

Critical Incident:

When you arrive at the chief's home, you begin the conversation by asking about his family, general well-being and the state of affairs in northern Mali; however, the chief is uninterested in engaging in lengthy small talk. The chief expresses his concerns about the quality of life for the large refugee population and the lack of housing facilities is an area of particular concern. He does not mention the role of the U.S. in the region and instead expresses his concerns about the activities of terrorists not only within northern Mali, but in the larger Sahel region. You express to the chief your desire to construct and repair the housing facilities for the refugees, but explain that you will need his support in order to begin working. When you directly request his permission for the Marines to have access to launch construction, he responds by saying, "Inshallah" and heaved a heavy sigh, which seems to be one of relief. You have heard the term before, but your interpreter confirms for you that "Inshallah" means "If God wills".

Keeping in mind the difference between communication and language competence, what is your understanding of the chief's use of "Inshallah"?

Context Considerations:

The Taureg are seminomadic, pastoralist people who are Berber in origin and who primarily follow the Maliki school of Sunni Islam. The Arabic phrase "Inshallah" holds a tremendous amount of religious significance among Muslims worldwide. The usage of the phrase is rooted in Chapter 18 -The Cave Verse 23 – 24 of the Qur'an, which when translated into English means, "And never say of anything, 'indeed, I will do that tomorrow'; except (when adding) if God wills." While Islamic tradition discourages the use of "Inshallah" unless someone sincerely intends to take a particular action, usage of the phrase has evolved and taken on a great deal of cultural significance throughout the Muslim world. In the context of a request being made, many individuals will use "Inshallah" to mean either yes or no. If the phrase is being used to mean "no," then the user is likely hoping to be respectful of the individual making the request by not directly rejecting the request. However, when the intended meaning is "yes" (and the individual fails to carry out the request), it is possible that extenuating circumstances prevented him or her from fulfilling the request.

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

Keeping in mind the religious, cultural, and political dynamics of northern Mali, what are some plausible interpretations of the chief's usage of "Inshallah"?

1. With the chief's expressed concern about the welfare of refugees and the activities of the terrorists, his use of "Inshallah" may mean that he is or is not be able to grant permission to commence construction within his territory. In this instance, the political dynamics could simply mean that he is concerned that if he is seen as cooperating with the U.S. Marines, he may be jeopardizing his own security or broader peace and stability within the area. It is likely that he is weighing this concern against the needs of his own people or the refugees.

2. Demonstrating hospitality and generosity are social customs that are highly regarded throughout African societies, and northern Mali is no exception. By responding with "Inshallah,"

the chief may be demonstrating his desire to please you, his guest, without directly rejecting your request. While the response may leave you hopeful, as well as confused, it is appropriate to respond with another question to gain clarity, such as "We would like to begin construction on the housing facilities. When would you like us to start?" Using such a tactic would open up the dialogue further with the chief in order to elaborate on his concerns and how they impact his decision.

For Further Consideration:

Despite not having any fluency in Arabic, you are able to attain linguistic competence through the use of your interpreter who is able to fluently translate the grammar, syntax, and vocabulary of both English and Arabic to ensure that you and the chief understand one another. Additionally, a well-trained local interpreter provides communication competence, meaning that he or she will know how to use and respond to language appropriately given the setting, the topic, and the relationships among the people communicating. In evaluating communication competence in an intercultural setting, it is important to gauge how effective you were in accomplishing your intended objective, and the degree to which your communication style was socially acceptable. Even with a high level of linguistic and sociolinguistic competence, you may still fail to achieve communication competence, especially in high-context societies such as in northern Mali, where indirect communication is common.

High-context cultures tend to use speaking styles that are indirect, leaving many things unsaid and passing on subliminal messages. This leads to an increased level of significance of the few words that are used, in which the few words are often intended to communicate complex messages. Relatively low-context cultures prefer that the communicator be more explicit and direct, using far less imagery and metaphor in their communication. Thus, communication competence is often more easily achieved in low-context cultures when linguistic competence is high. If the aforementioned scenario were to take place in Ghana rather than Northern Mali, for example, it is highly probable that the local chief may respond more directly by saying "Yes, you have permission to begin construction of the health center, Inshallah." While the northern Malian and Ghanaian chiefs are using the phrase differently, their usage reflects their respective cultural values. Ghanaian society has a much greater appreciation for directness, and is generally averse to speaking in ways that are indirect or vague.

4.2   Cultural Values Displayed in Communication Behavior

Background:

As the OIC assigned to lead Marines through the three-month bilateral training exercise with the Ethiopian National Defense Forces in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, you have developed a close relationship with members of the Ethiopian Army. The primary goal of the training is to strengthen partnerships with militaries in the HOA, and to provide the Ethiopian troops with the necessary skills to successfully carry out both anti-terrorism and counterterrorism missions. As this mission's lead, you recognize that sharing tactical knowledge and infantry skills with the Ethiopians will help strengthen their borders and their partnership with the United States. Over the course of the training, you and your detachment have worked side-by-side with members of the Ethiopian Army to build esprit de corps and increase proficiency on various small arms weapons through classroom training and exercises. At the training's conclusion, a formal graduation is staged to recognize outstanding

Figure 4-2: Map of Horn of Africa. *Source: U.S. Department of State.*[367]

performance, and award certificates and plaques in recognition of the skills of the trainees. After the ceremony, Ethiopian Lieutenant Colonel Dawit Tesfaye invites you and two of your senior NCOs to his home as a show of appreciation for all the hard work by you and your Marines. You gladly accept his invitation.

Critical Incident:

When you arrive at Lieutenant Dawit Tesfaye's home, you are invited into the living room and are seated beside the Lieutenant Colonel in the company of other Ethiopian soldiers. While you are being seated, a female Ethiopian soldier proceeds to conduct a traditional Ethiopian coffee ceremony. After roasting the coffee, she walks around the living room inviting everyone to smell the roasted coffee beans. You find the smell of the beans to be rather unpleasant; however, you do enjoy the cup of coffee that is offered to you at the end of the ceremony. When the Ethiopian soldier comes around again to offer everyone a chance to smell the roasted coffee beans you turn away and decline but inform her that you would like a cup of coffee. The Ethiopian soldier hesitates to respond. The Ethiopian soldier's facial expression appears to suggest your request was not well received.

Which cultural values are displayed during this communication ritual?

Context Considerations:

An invitation to an Ethiopian coffee ceremony is regarded as an indication of hospitality and friendship, as well as a mark of respect. Coffee is intricately woven throughout Ethiopian culture. While historians are unsure about the exact origin of coffee production and consumption, Ethiopians follow a legend that

an Ethiopian goat herder named Kaldi saw his goats become energetic after consuming coffee berries, which inspired him to make a drink out of the coffee berries. To the average Ethiopian, coffee is an integral part of Ethiopia's contribution to the world because coffee is one of the most widely consumed beverages worldwide. Today, Ethiopia's coffee bean production is done largely by hand - from the planting of new trees to final pickings - which are then sent to Addis Ababa (the capital) to be warehoused and processed.

It is estimated that one in four Ethiopian works in the coffee bean industry. Coffee accounts for nearly 65 percent of Ethiopia's export earnings. Coffee is therefore the "soul" of an average Ethiopian; it is served before, during, and after every meal. The importance of coffee is reflected in the Ethiopian idiom, "Buna dabo naw," which translated means: "Coffee is our bread." Given the importance of coffee in Ethiopian culture, it is natural that the Ethiopian coffee ceremony is an integral part of the social life of everyday Ethiopians.

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

1. Hospitality is a cultural value that is highly regarded not only by Ethiopians but across the HOA. Given the importance of coffee in Ethiopian culture, it is natural that the Ethiopian coffee ceremony is an integral part of the social life of everyday Ethiopians. An invitation to an Ethiopian coffee ceremony is regarded as an indication of hospitality and friendship, as well as a mark of respect. In addition to being a critical aspect of hosting revered guests, the coffee ceremony is a way for Ethiopians to pay homage to coffee.
2. Your rejection of the offer to smell the roasted coffee beans undermines the Ethiopian soldier's desire to have you participate in a ritual that, at its heart, is designed to seal a friendship with you and the other Marines. The soldier's hesitation to respond to the request also reflects her desire to not offend you, as well as her discomfort with engaging in direct confrontation. Among the HOA states, directness in speech or conduct is generally regarded as rude, particularly to a guest.

For Further Consideration:

Communication behavior and rituals often offer a great window of opportunity and insight into the values of a culture. The rejection of the offer to smell the roasted coffee beans may be interpreted by the host to mean he or she has not displayed sufficient hospitality to his guest. This tradition dates back centuries and is a cultural thread that runs throughout the states in the Horn of Africa. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, coffee is rooted in their folklore and history. In Djibouti and Somalia, a guests' satisfaction with coffee goes a long way in building rapport, which will enhance the professional relationship by allowing the parties to gain confidence and trust in one another. This contrasts with the tradition in countries of the Sahel region, where coffee drinking is not an entrenched culture for the most part. There are also places like Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, where coffee is revered, but the culture is nowhere as endemic as it is in the HOA. It is important to keep in mind that every society has a tradition that it values highly. An appreciation of this cultural value, and how to adapt in communication with the hosts and locals, becomes crucially important in successfully executing a mission.

4.3   Identity in Intercultural Interaction

Background:

Attacks by AQIM and Boko Haram in the Sahel have caused massive waves of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugee flows to northern Mali, northeastern Nigeria, and Mauritania. In response, the African Union Multinational Joint Task Force (AUMJTF) was set up to combat the threats and to engage in humanitarian assistance to the victims. The Mauritanian government has ceded considerable territory to the terrorists, and despite the arrival of the AUMJTF troops, the situation has not improved. In fact, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated considerably.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED BY REGION
Africa is still the continent with most internally displaced, despite the increase in the Middle East in 2012.

America **5,8**
Europe **2,4**
Asia and Oceania (incl. Middle East) **10,0**
Africa **10,6**
Figures in millions

Figure 4-3: Regional Distribution of IDPs. *Source: Norwegian Refugee Council.*[368]

Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (COMMARFORAF), in response to a request from AUMJTF, and at the direction of USAFRICOM, is leading the effort to distribute relief materials and support rebuilding projects. You have been designated as the OIC for your Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)'s Advanced Par ty (ADVON), to assess the needs of the affected population and coordinate the delivery of relief aid prior to the arrival of the main body for a Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) mission.

Critical Incident:

Major Traore was assigned by the Mauritanian Army as the liaison to you and your party for the mission. You arrive at a meeting scheduled with him at the relief supplies distribution hub for the affected areas. Major Traore is a Muslim and speaks English, as well as Arabic. Unfortunately, he does not speak Tamasheq, a language common among the Malian IDPs, so his party also includes a Tamasheq language interpreter named Oumar. Major Traore leads your party on a tour of the severely affected areas where hordes of refugees and IDPs can be seen living with no formal shelter, food, decent clothing, or medical assistance. You ask to be taken to one of the IDP camps in order to directly engage with the refugees to assess their priorities for relief materials. As you enter one of the camps and sit down and prepare to begin a discussion with the father of one of these makeshift households, you take note of five children, seemingly between the ages of about 10 and 16.

What is most striking to you about the children is that the youngest girl, age five, is visibly malnourished and appears to be substantially worse off than the other children. You are taken aback by not only the state of her health, but with the harsh tone that the other family members take with the young girl. She appears to have fewer provisions than the others in the house. She also appears to physically need more aid than the others, as she is dressed in clothing that seems to be almost in rags, and appears unkempt. You observe that the other members of the household seem to take a malicious or cruel tone when talking to the young girl. At one point, you notice Major Traore, whom you have gotten to know as a friendly and respectable man, also begins to scold the young child. You are surprised by his treatment of

the young girl, who appears in greatest need of aid. You discreetly ask Oumar to explain why Major Traore is treating her with such disdain. Oumar simply responds, "She is a slave."

Keeping in mind the ways in which identity can complicate intercultural interactions, what are some possible explanations for Major Traore's treatment of the little girl?

Context Considerations:

Mauritania's socio-cultural structure reflects the high value that Mauritanians place on tribe, clan, ethnicity, lineage, and wealth, as well as the widely held acceptance of slavery in Mauritanian society. In 1981, Mauritania became the last country on earth to abolish slavery; however, slavery remains widespread throughout the country. Despite abolishing slavery in 1981, slavery was not criminalized until 2007. The legacy of slavery in Mauritania is rooted in the arrival of Arab Berbers to Mauritania, who widely practiced slavery. More broadly, slavery and a system of forced labor in one form or another is widely practiced in the Sahel region. Despite legal efforts and government initiatives to make child trafficking and child labor an offense in these countries, it has not restricted the practice or the social acceptance. The stratification of people in Mauritania is still a fact of life. While change is occurring incrementally, these are still acceptable norms. This socio-cultural structure is a strong indicator that Major Traore's behavior is consistent with Mauritania's cultural norms.

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

1. Your confusion regarding Major Traore's behavior can be attributed to the difficulty associated with making sense of an individual's multiple layers of identity. A change in context can bring forth a different aspect of a person's identity – which is comprised of factors such as gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, socio-economic status; these are all heavily influenced by an individual's life experience. Many aspects of an individual's identity are socially constructed; thus, they influence and are influenced by our interactions with other people. From this, we can derive that Major Troare's interactions with you reflect his professional relationship with you. In dealing with another military officer, Major Troare behaves in a manner that is respectful and reflects his high regard for the military; however, his harsh behavior with the girl is indicative of him being accustomed to a society that has a history of institutionalized slavery. Although you may consider his treatment of the girl "uncharacteristic," it is important to note that this can change -- depending on where an individual is and with whom he is interacting.
2. Identity contributes to the many roles we play in our lives, and it is always evolving. Along with the various roles that stem from our identities, come role expectations. Role expectations are sets of behavior and characteristics associated with situations. Although Major Traore's behavior towards the little girl may seem abnormal to you, keep in mind that it is possible he was acting in a certain way because he believed that such behavior was expected of him. The behavior may seem harsh to you, but it may have reinforced his position with the head of household and his ability to gain important information from the IDPs. In such a situation, softness may have been perceived as weakness and a lack of authority.

For Further Consideration:

Identity is defined as a set of social expectations related to ourselves and others that is shaped by factors such as: profession, gender, race, social class, ethnicity, family, sexual orientation, caste system, religion, and language. There are aspects of identity that are products of choice and personality, and others that are shaped more by context and relationships (including ascribed – or imposed identity).

People have multiple dimensions to their identities; the dimensions they choose to emphasize at any particular time and place depends upon the situation in which they find themselves, or who they are dealing with. While various forms of identity may lead to specific role expectations and behavior in one society, they could manifest in a way that is drastically different in other cultures -- even within the same AO or GCC. There is a glaring cultural variation across Africa. The cultural landscape in Central and Eastern Africa is drastically different from West Africa. So too are the unique cultural values of North Africa as compared to the HOA.

By way of contrast, if the same situation above were to be replicated in the Island of Seychelles, the ways in which identity could complicate intercultural interactions would be quite different. The Island of Seychelles has cultural values that more closely resemble Western values, which frown upon any form of discrimination towards children, as well as the practice of slavery. In the Mauritania context, perceived "harsh" treatment may be viewed as acceptable since it reinforces the Major's identity aligned with his authority. However, the same type of behavior within the context of the Island of Seychelles may be perceived much differently, and damage how people perceive his authority.

4.4   Power and Authority in Intercultural Interactions

Background:

You, Major Johnson, are the OIC of a USMC Special Operations team tasked to provide HA/DR to the Jonglie region of South Sudan, alongside UN forces. The Jonglie region in particular is caught in the web of sectarian fighting between government and opposing militia forces; however, it remains as one of the militia's strongholds. Both groups have indiscriminately committed horrific massacres of civilians and

Figure 4-4: Civilians in South Sudan. *Source: UNMISS.*[369]

international organizations, including the UNMISS, have reported that hundreds of civilians were killed. The current humanitarian condition is such that children, women, and the aged are dying of malnutrition and waterborne diseases. You are at a crossroads as to how to navigate this difficult situation and get both government forces and the militia understand that they need to allow safe passage of relief materials to the affected people.

You have been briefed on the intense fighting that has taken place recently in the region, where it is estimated that over 500 of the militia and government forces were killed, along with hundreds of civilians. The UNMISS has successfully brokered a ceasefire agreement between militia and government forces. The deal obligated the two sides to allow the UN access to distribute essential humanitarian relief to the affected area. Rumors are circulating that the militias are impersonating government forces by wearing South Sudanese military uniforms in order to commit atrocities that could later be attributed to the government. You understand the broader fight is about who controls the central government between the president and the vice president, who respectively come from the Dinka and Nuer tribes. The tribal divisions have resulted in reprisal killings. It is generally understood that the militia forces are covertly backed – with the sale and supply of light and heavy weapons and training - by the vice president.

Critical Incident:

In order to facilitate access to the region, you arrange a discussion with representatives from the conflicting parties. Mr. Kuol is the representative for the militia, while Major Lasuba acts on behalf of government forces. Since the militia forces are covertly backed by the vice-president of South Sudan, you recognize that Mr. Kuol is limited in negotiating in an official capacity; however, you anticipate that he is in a position to take decisive action.

Major Johnson: *"I'd like to start by saying that this negotiation is to secure a cessation of hostilities across the Jonglei area to allow the UN access to distribute humanitarian assistance to civilians. We cannot, nor am I authorized, to engage in a political negotiation. No one can deny that the fighting currently taking place is endangering the lives of civilians and that the humanitarian relief provided by the UN has been unable to reach those that need it most. In order to get the civilians the humanitarian*

assistance that they need, I need reassurance from both parties that UN convoys carrying humanitarian aid will not be hindered from accessing the Jonglie region as needed. Are you able to suspend hostilities in order to grant the convoys access?"

Major Lasuba: *"As the government has not been carrying out any attacks in the Jonglei area, I can reassure you of the government's full commitment to a ceasefire."*

Mr. Kuol: *"I disagree with Major Lasuba's assertion that the government has not carried out any attacks but I do support a ceasefire in order to allow humanitarian assistance to be distributed to those in need."*

What should you take into consideration to display your understanding of the power and authority structure that exists within the respective groups? Where does authority of Major Lasuba and Mr. Kuol end, and where does effective exercise of power begin?

Context Considerations:

The government of South Sudan has been fighting militia forces since December 2013. As peace talks between the president and vice president collapsed, the militias have intensified their struggle to either overthrow the government or get the government to come to another round of negotiations. At the core of their grievance is lack of representation and an unanswered demand for distribution of power which would allow the Nuer, the rival tribe to the Dinka, to obtain control over the natural resources, such as petroleum, that are readily available in their region. In a traditional society such as the one that exists in South Sudan, ethnic and tribal configuration matters greatly; they can have a heavy impact on political and economic power structures.

Mr. Kuol and Major Lasuba's participation in the ceasefire negotiation gives a strong indicator of their authority to make decisions for their respective groups. Despite this perception, it is important to look beyond this and to seek to understand the nature of the command structure within the militia and government forces, which will ultimately determine who can make decisions and who can authorize decisive action. This is particularly important in the case of Mr. Kuol, who is acting on behalf of the militia, which is an unofficial group that is not officially recognized by either the U.S. or seen as a legitimate group by the South Sudanese government. The concept of authority and power is fluid, especially in a tribal conflict of this nature, where the protagonists and personalities involved may often include the most senior leadership. In this case, the power struggle between the president and the vice president is likely heavily impacted by local tribal leaders.

It is important to keep in mind that authority does not always equal power. One who holds authority does not always have the "means" to exercise power. Power is the ability to control or influence the behavior of individuals or groups of people. Authority is the legal or popularly granted permission to exercise power. It is legitimacy in the exercise of power. The current impasse created layers of authorities, as the militia and the government forces are pandering to ethnocentric demands; so while Mr. Kuol and Major Lasuba may seem to be acting in official positions of authority, they may not actually have the power to enforce any decision you reach with them. They may have to obtain approval for whatever decision they arrive at individually, or consensually with you.

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

Keeping in mind the ways in which authority and power plays out in South Sudan, particularly in the region where the militia controls a large swathe of the territory and enjoys ethnic support and loyalty

from the Nuer people, and government forces are seeking to reclaim and reassert government control: What could be possible explanations for the behavior of Major Lasuba and Mr. Kuol representing the government and militia?

1. The Republic of South Sudan was granted its independence in 2011; prior to this time, political institutions of South Sudan operated under the larger Sudanese government. Thus South Sudan's institutions are relatively weak and underdeveloped. The military broke into factions at the outset of civil war in December 2013, and their loyalties were placed with the vice president or the president. The government forces loyal to the president are from the majority Dinka tribe, and the Nuer tribes were either forcefully retired or they backed the Nuer tribe-inspired militia in support of the vice president. The contest for power between the president and vice president has split the country along ethnic and tribal lines and created a personality cult around each of them. The militia and government forces each separately maintain absolute loyalty to one of the political leaders, thus the real power goes through the chain of command in a complicated way without regard to formal structure. Power therefore depends on personalities and tribal affiliations. Thus, commitments or agreements reached with either representative in the scenario above may not be achievable unless a higher authority figure with actual power provides an endorsement.

2. In a situation like this, it is important to display courtesy, emphasize hospitality, and highlight the overarching need to deliver relief materials to the people who need them most. You must also display and demonstrate your neutrality to the conflict. You can do this by giving an opportunity for both sides to explain their position completely before expressing any stance that you may have. Remain cognizant that power and authority are displayed in intercultural interactions in a variety of ways across different cultures. Though the political situation remains fluid, your international counterparts are likely endowed with a certain level of authority within their pay grade to make decisions. It is within this window where you will have the greatest opportunity to leverage their assistance without getting embroiled in ongoing internal political power struggles.

For Further Consideration:

In contrast to South Sudan, countries with relatively stable political systems in Africa, like South Africa for instance, have a power and authority structure that is formal, professional, and institutionalized. It is the institutionalization of their systems that would allow their power and authority structures to be more clear to an external party. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that armed conflicts can create power and authority structures that are continually evolving, thus requiring a nuanced understanding of intercultural interactions. Marines will be more successful if they remain flexible and sensitive to the power dynamics of the area of operations.

4.5   Perspective Taking and Perception Checking

Background:

USAFRICOM is hosting a multinational seminar to discuss lessons learned from the AUMJTF. The objective is to bring together officers from troop-contributing nations like Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria. As the designated senior U.S. Marine Corps representative, you have been tasked with the responsibility of organizing the seminar. In preparation for the symposium, you have printed the officers' name/country cards and placed them in their respective positions.

Figure 4-5: USAFRICOM Hosting African Military Lawyers. *Source: USAFRICOM.*[370]

Critical Incident:

During the opening remarks, an officer from the Sudan Armed Forces stands from his chair and verbally issues a formal protest to you. The Sudanese officer protests the country tag that appears to have been neglectfully and/or inadvertently assigned to the South Sudanese officer. The tag reads: "Sudan" instead of "South Sudan" as the officer's country of nationality. He, like the Sudanese officer, has a tag displaying the rank of Major. Both officers trade verbal assaults, including snide remarks made by the Sudanese officer about the ranking that was inscribed on the South Sudanese officer's tag. You are aware that South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan in 2011.

How could you use perspective-taking in this context to guide your response?

Context Considerations:

South Sudan fought a protracted war of independence against Sudan. The animosity between Sudan and South Sudan dates back to the time of Sudan's independence from Britain in 1956. The second Sudanese civil war broke out in 1983 following breakdown of talks between the then South Sudanese insurgent group, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by the now deceased, John Garang. Since the granting of independence on July 9, 2011 to South Sudan - following a referendum on secession- relations between the two nations have remained unstable. In addition to its problematic relationship with its northern neighbor, South Sudan has also been fighting an internal civil war and many speculate that Sudanese officials have been supplying both sides of the conflict with resources. Consequently, the instability between both nations has been heightened by a combination of internal and external political conflicts.

Alternate Viewpoints / Elaboration of Concepts:

When individuals engage in interpersonal conflicts, practicing perspective-taking provides an opportunity to obtain an understanding of the other individual's mental state and provides insight into their behavior. It is important to take into consideration the following: How does the other individual perceive the situation? What are their priorities and constraints? What cultural factors are at play?

South Sudan's peaceful secession from Sudan was a tremendous achievement for the South Sudanese and failure to address the world's youngest country by its correct name undermines the decades of struggle to achieve independence. As an organizer of the seminar, your interjection into the argument may prevent it from degenerating further. However, publically rebuking the behavior of the Sudanese and South Sudanese officers may undermine their authority, and could possibly leave them in a humiliating position in front of their colleagues.

Alternatively, you may decide to let the two officers voice and vent their grievances. While doing this may give the officers an opportunity to verbalize a concern to a legitimate international audience, the situation may escalate and could ultimately undermine your credibility and position of authority. Another way the situation could have been handled professionally, is to engage in perspective-taking in order to understand where the officers are coming from, and to ask them politely to take their seats and focus on the seminar, with a promise to address the issue with them afterwards. As the session closes, you can then approach each officer individually and describe to them your understanding of their frustration, and ask them to clarify whether your impressions are accurate. Doing so will allow you to check your perception of the incident, revise your understanding if need be, and acknowledge the legitimacy of the officers' concerns, all while maintaining control of the situation.

For Further Consideration:

While perspective-taking is an "internal" process that you can engage anytime you encounter uncertainty or misunderstanding, perception-checking calls for a greater level of caution as it requires the solicitation of others' clarification of what you have observed and articulated. Conventionally, perception-checking would work best in "low context" cultures that rely heavily on verbal, direct, individual-oriented communication for meaning-making, with little concern for group harmony. In contrast, "high context" cultures that value and rely on nonverbal cues to create meaning, may find perception-checking rude because of the direct communication style that it involves, which could threaten group harmony. High-context cultures also tend to value established hierarchies and power relations to the point where a person in charge (like the designated seminar organizer in this scenario) will not necessarily seek clarification from the participating officers, as doing so may be perceived as a sign of weakness.

---

[366] "Map of the conflict in Northern Mali," *Wikipedia,* accessed November 1, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Mali_conflict#/media/File:Northern_Mali_conflict.svg.

[367] "Horn of Africa: Map," U.S. Department of State, accessed November 1, 2016, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/hornofafrica/169532.htm.

[368] "Regional Distribution of IDS," *NRC,* https://www.nrc.no/?did=9168321.

[369] "Civilians at the UN House compound on the southwestern outskirts of Juba, South Sudan," *United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan*, accessed November 1, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/.

[370] "United States Africa Command Image," USAFRICOM, March 18, 2015, accessed November 1, 2016, http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/25286/africom-hosting-african-military-law-forum.

5 Culture and Mission Planning

Good commanders know how to lead in combat. Great commanders possess the unique intuitive sense of how to transition very quickly from active, kinetic warfare distinguished by fire and maneuver to a more subtle kind of cultural warfare distinguished by the ability to win the war of will and perception. Rare are the leaders who can make the transition between these two disparate universes and lead and fight competently in both.[371]

Major General Robert H. Scales, USA (ret.))

Marines serve as America's forward-based and forward-deployed expeditionary force; we operate globally. Consequently, MAGTF planners consistently must plan operations, exercises, and engagements in countries across the world among myriad cultural groups. Through careful cultural analysis – *seeking cultural understanding prior to executing these global operations* – Marines can anticipate and plan for potential reactions of local populations and other cultural groups in foreign operating environments. The most important application of operational culture thus lies in its role in military planning.

Cultural factors should be assessed not only for the local population but also for all groups in the area of operations (AO) whose culture differs from our own. Insurgents, warring factions, and militias within an AO may have cultural beliefs and norms that differ from the local population. Host nation and multinational allied forces, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating within an AO will also undoubtedly hold their own varied cultural beliefs.   Even the different services within a U.S. joint force bring their own institutional culture to operations. Understanding that different cultures exist and greatly impact mission accomplishment is essential to deliberate military planning.

Consequently, this section provides an overview of culture as an integral variable of MAGTF planning for operations among foreign cultural groups, whether allies, adversaries, or the civil component within an operating environment. The learning outcome is for the MAGTF operator to be able to better assess techniques for aligning culturally appropriate and mission-effective behavior across the following activities:

- when conducting deliberate planning and employing the *Green Cell*
- when planning and conducting interorganizational operations
- when establishing a command communication strategy

The MAGTF operator should recognize and understand the necessity to utilize a systematic cultural analysis as a critical input when conducting these military planning activities.

5.1   Culture and the Marine Corps Planning Process

Sources and Supplemental Readings for Section 4.1.

- *MCDP 5 Planning*
- *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*
- *MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process*
- *MSTP Pamphlet 2-01.1 Red Cell / Green Cell*
- *Operational Culture for the Warfighter – Principles and Application*

Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about.[372]

5.1.1   Marine Corps Doctrinal Planning

The Marine Corps doctrinal approach to planning is described in *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning* and *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process*. This section will not cover service or joint planning activities, hierarchies, or processes in detail. Rather, the following outlines the importance of cultural understanding of the operational environment as a critical variable and essential input into successful planning by Marine Corps commanders and staffs. This section also contains a discussion of the *Green Cell* as a mechanism to ensure cultural understanding as a mission variable and civil considerations are integrated throughout the *Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)*.

5.1.2   The Nature of Planning

The key to the Marine Corps' shared doctrinal understanding of planning is to view planning as "a learning process – thinking before doing."

We should think of planning as a learning process—as mental preparation which improves our understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms, planning is thinking before doing. Even if the plan is not executed precisely as envisioned—and few ever are—the process should result in a deeper situational awareness which improves future decision-making. We should thus think of planning as a learning activity that facilitates the exercise of judgment and not as merely a mechanical procedure.[373]

Part of the fundamental value of planning is that it can serve, at least in part, as a substitute for experience. Certainly, Marines lack first-hand, specific cultural experience when operating in unfamiliar environments among, unfamiliar cultures. In situations in which Marines lack specific, first-hand experience, planning may be used to think through the problem systematically and devise a workable solution. Planning activities therefore:

- Result in deeper situational awareness which improves future decision-making
- Posture leaders to be ready to act when necessary or advantageous and not merely to react to developments
- Facilitate the exercise of judgment
- Generate tempo

Culture as a variable plays an important role in the Marine Corps planning approach for military operations in complex, foreign environments. A systematic examination of culture as an operational variable aids in developing this deeper situational awareness of an AO.

5.1.3   Marine Corps Planning Process

The *Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)* is designed to promote understanding among the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders regarding the nature of a given problem and to generate potential solutions to this problem. The plans which result may be considered hypotheses that will be tested and refined as a result of execution and assessment.[374] The six steps of the MCPP are —

- ***Problem Framing*** enhances understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem and also identifies the purpose of the operation.
- ***COA Development*** produces options for accomplishing the mission in accordance with commander's intent.
- ***COA War Game*** examines and refines options in light of adversary capabilities and potential actions/reactions as well as operating environment characteristics such as weather, terrain, and culture.
- ***COA Comparison and Decision*** requires the commander to review and decide how he will accomplish the mission.

- ***Orders Development*** translates the commander's decision into direction sufficient to guide implementation and initiative by subordinates.

Figure 5-1: MCPP Process. *Source: MCWP 5-1.*[375]*.*

- ***Transition*** may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution.

The tenets of the MCPP—top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning— derive from the doctrine of maneuver warfare. These tenets guide the commander's use of his staff to plan and execute military operations.

- ***Top-Down Planning.*** Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander must not merely participate in planning, he must drive the process. His personal

involvement and guidance are keys to planning. The commander uses planning to increase understanding of the environment and the problem to support his decision-making.

- **Single-Battle Concept.** Operations or events in one part of the battlespace often have profound and consequent effects on other areas and events; therefore, a commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. Commanders prepare for a single battle effort during planning primarily through their intent, which provides the larger context for subordinate units so they can exercise judgment and initiative when the unforeseen occurs while remaining consistent with larger aims.
- **Integrated Planning.** Integrated planning is conducted to coordinate action toward a common purpose by all elements of the force. Integrated planning is facilitated by the assignment of personnel with an appropriate level of knowledge of their respective organization or activity to the operational planning team (OPT). The key to integrated planning is to involve the right personnel from the right organizations in the planning process as early as possible to consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information as broadly as possible.

Important to the MCPP, MAGTF planners and operators must consider the beliefs, norms, and values of the people in their operating environment, while never assuming that these cultural characteristics mirror those of MAGTF forces. Therefore, the cultural understanding of the population within an AO is a critical input when planning for successful MAGTF operations among foreign populations.

5.1.4   Understanding Culture as an Input to Marine Corps Planning

Culture is of unique importance in understanding an operational environment.[376]

To understand culture as an input into the MCPP – and the effects upon the resulting operations – Marine planners may require a working definition of culture as an operational tool.   The U.S. military uses many definitions of culture. Two useful definitions for Marine Corps commanders and planners can be found in two relevant publications. *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* defines culture as a web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.[377] *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* defines culture as the shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influence a person's and a group's actions and choices.[378]

Regardless of the exact definition used, research and experience has resulted in some basic fundamental aspects of culture Marines should consider to successfully plan and execute military operations in complex, unfamiliar environments:

- Culture influences how people view their world.
- Culture is holistic.
- Culture is learned and shared.
- Culture is created by people and can and does change.[379]

A brief description of these fundamental aspects follows:

5.1.4.1   Worldview

The way that a culture influences how people view their world is referred to as their worldview. Many people believe they view their world accurately, in a logical, rational, and unbiased way. However, people filter what they see and experience according to their beliefs and worldview. Information and experiences that do not match what they believe to be true about the world are frequently reflected or

distorted to fit the way they believe the world should work. More than any other factor, culture informs and influences that worldview – perceptions, understandings, and interpretations of events. Marines should recognize that their interpretation of events may be quite different from others' interpretations within the operating area. If Marines assume that locals will perceive actions the same as they do, they are likely to misjudge their reactions. The pattern of assuming others see events in the same way the U.S. does is referred to as *mirror-imaging*. Mirror-imaging is dangerous as it leads Marines into thinking that their assumptions about a problem and its solution are shared by the population and multinational partners, rather than employing perspective taking and looking at the problem from the population's perspective.[380]

5.1.4.2   Holism

Holism is based on the principle that all socio-cultural aspects of human life are interconnected. While interacting with other cultures, Marines may be tempted to say their problems "are all about (fill in the blank: tribalism, corruption, lack of work ethic, et cetera)." In truth, every aspect of culture affects every other aspect in some way, even if indirectly. By acknowledging these interconnections, Marines can better assess how the local population might react to their presence and actions.[381]

5.1.4.3   Culture is Learned and Shared

The process of learning a culture is called socialization. Children learn culture as they grow within a society, but culture can be learned at any age. For example, Marines learn their own service culture later in life through basic or officer training courses which teach Marine culture on ethics and core values. Understanding that culture is learned and shared can offer an important operational and tactical opportunity. A Marine can learn about the local culture simply through interaction with and observation of the local populace within an operating area.[382]

5.1.4.4   Culture Changes

Large military presence and operations within a culture are often impetus for rapidly changing cultural norms in conflict areas. Since the arrival of a large military, often accompanied by the destruction of physical property and erosion of the local economy and security, is undoubtedly an enormous change for the local population, planners need to plan for the impact their operations will have upon the people and cultures in an area of operations.[383]

5.1.5   Assessing Cultural Situations

Culturally savvy Marines are a threat to our enemies.

General James N. Mattis, USMC

Military planners use various frameworks and tools to assess and analyze cultural variables during operational planning. There is no formal, doctrinal process to systematically capture all cultural data and to analyze the civil component of an operating area during the MCPP. While no single "checklist" exists to capture the myriad cultural data of an AO, Marine planners can leverage established methodologies to provide the commander with a systematic analysis of the cultural aspects and the civil component of the operational environment. Examples include:

- Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (CIPB)
- Five Operational Culture Dimensions

- District Stability Framework (DSF)
- ASCOPE Across PMESII

Supplemental readings on these frameworks are available for details and further study.

- Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (CIPB) – *CMO Planners Handbook*
- Five Operational Culture Dimensions - *Operational Culture for the Warfighter – Principles and Application*
- District Stability Framework (DSF) – *MSTP Pamphlet Red Cell/Green Cell, Appendix C*
- ASCOPE Across PMESII - *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*

Regardless of the frameworks and tools used to capture and synthesize data for the commander and fellow OPT planners, *MCWP 3.33.5* outlines some fundamental aspects of cultures that planners should understand while assessing any cultural situation.

5.1.5.1 Patterns

All human groups interact with their world and each other in some basic, predictable patterns. The particular details of these patterns may vary, but the underlying patterns will not. By identifying these patterns in an AO, Marine planners may better assess the cultural situation and the influence of their operations upon the local population.

5.1.5.2 Physical Environment

All cultures have a unique and interdependent connection with their physical surroundings. The physical environment (including climate, terrain, and resources) influences the people living in it by providing a range of possibilities within which they act. People shape their environment by the choices they make, creating a cultural landscape reflecting their social, cultural, economic and political attitudes. A careful reading of the cultural environment can provide useful information about the people who create it, use it, and live in it. A military presence in an AO will affect a local population and its use of the physical environment. Marine planners need to anticipate how their operations will impact local population use of their environment. Since use of the environment is cultural, these impacts may be significantly different than in another culture such as the U.S.

5.1.5.3 Economy

All cultures have specific systems for obtaining, producing, and distributing items people need to survive (food, water, shelter) or luxury or material items. This system, which does not necessary require money or banking, is called the economy of a culture. Formal and informal economies vary greatly among cultures. Also, different exchange methods and expectations from this exchange (money vs. relationship, for instance) of goods and services vary widely. Marine planners who do not assess the economic exchange expectations may find it difficult to anticipate people's behavior in an AO.

5.1.5.4 Social Structure

In all cultures, people hold differing positions of status and power often closely related to their roles in a group. The way that a group distinguishes among its members according to their roles, status, and power is reflected in its social structure. Positions within a social structure may depend on many factors such as age, gender, class, family name, tribal membership, ethnicity, religion, and rank. In conflict environments, different groups (tribal, ethnic, religious, et cetera) may each vie for power – often looking to outside militaries to support them.

5.1.5.5 Identity

A concept central to one's place in society is that of identity. Identity is a broad term used to describe how people conceive of themselves and are perceived by others. Identity shapes how people view themselves and the world. Understanding identity is complex because people have multiple identities. In times of conflict, people may choose to emphasize certain group identities, such as nationality or religion. At other times, different identities – such as one's profession or gender – may matter more. Both identity and social structure are extremely important concepts for Marine planners to understand in assessing a cultural environment. Both concepts affect people's allegiances and influence how groups will interpret and respond to U.S. actions.

5.1.5.6 System for Determining Leaders

In all cultures, people have a system that determines who leads the group and who makes decisions about its welfare. Marine planners should understand that both formal and informal leadership and governments can exist within any culture. Whether locals view leaders as legitimate or illegitimate, or effective or ineffective, should also be part of any cultural assessment of an AO. In most AOs, Marines will find that communities or groups are influenced by a variety of leaders, many of whom are not part of the government. Marine planners and operators need to accurately identify the various community leaders and develop strategies to engender the support of local power brokers who can influence the support of local populations.

5.1.5.7 Belief Systems

Cultures are characterized by a shared set of beliefs, values, norms, and symbols that unite a group. These beliefs come from many sources such as a person's background, family, education, religion, or history. Understanding the beliefs and values of a local population is critical for effective information operations. Failure to respect or understand beliefs of a local population can result in serious hostility towards foreign military operations.

5.1.5.8 Religion

Religion can be a powerful force in shaping beliefs. In many cultures, religion and religious leaders have significant influence over the local populations. Because religion is often an integral part of the values set of a local culture, Marine planners should conduct detailed analysis of religion and religious leaders within an AO.

5.1.6 Organizing to Integrate Cultural Considerations into the MCPP

As Marines prepare to integrate cultural considerations into the plan, it is important to recall the tenets of the MCPP: *top down planning, single battle concept*, and *integrated planning*.

Integrated planning is facilitated by organizing OPTs with the correct mix of knowledge and experience. Planning teams must develop an understanding of civilian aspects of the AO and the will of the population. There are many techniques to achieve this capability and each unit may approach this differently based on resources and available qualified personnel. The Green Cell is one technique to systematically analyze, synthesize, and present cultural information to the commander and fellow staff planners. (*The Green Cell will be discussed in detail in paragraph 4.2.7.*)

However, a dedicated Green Cell is not always an option for commanders with limited staff resources and expertise in analyzing cultural aspects of an operational environment. The Cultural Advisor (CULAD)

is a concept developed and employed in recent operations in Afghanistan. CULADs, the principle SMEs on culture and planning within their geographic region of expertise, serve as the cultural and language advisors to the commander. The CULAD is a special staff officer for the commander and a member of the planning staff. This advisor can often help explain to the commander what the advisor sees on the ground in the AO. A foreign area officer (FAO) or civil affairs (CA) Marine may be a good selection for a CULAD. These Marines can provide an understanding of the host nation and its specific regional, religious, and ethnic differences, and they may have foreign language skills. As a result, the commander can adjust operations in response to a culturally challenging environment.[384]

Overall, there are many options to task-organize staffs to incorporate culture into planning. While a Green Cell creates expertise in one part of the staff, those concerns are also important for other staff sections. Consequently, commanders must create staffs that are well-integrated across the warfighting functions. One danger in creating a "cultural cell" within the staff is that it will relegate cultural concerns to one staff element and inhibit integrating cultural concerns throughout the staff and the planning process. Regardless of the particular planning configuration, commanders and planners must find and use whatever cultural resources are available to the unit.

5.1.7   The Green Cell

The **Green Cell** is an ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of education and experience capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, the host nation government, and other stakeholders within the operating environment. The Green Cell helps to inform the commander, as well as his staff and the OPT, creating a better understanding of the operating environment throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).[385]

5.1.7.1   Purpose

The Green Cell is a working group which assists the commander, staff, and the OPT in understanding the effect of the civil environment on both friendly and threat forces. The cell articulates the actions and dynamics of selected individuals, groups, tangible assets, and cultural factors in the civil environment which may significantly impact friendly operations. Like the Red Cell, the Green Cell is used throughout the entire planning process. The Green Cell focuses on developing a "civil environment model" for testing, improving, and modifying friendly courses of action to enhance the desired friendly effects on the civil environment, and to mitigate potential negative effects.

While the purpose of a Green Cell is to consider the population in order to promote a better understanding of the civil environment through the entire MCPP process, at a minimum the Green Cell provides for the independent will of the population. The Green Cell may also provide consideration for non-DOD entities, such as IGOs or NGOs.

5.1.7.2   Staff Cognizance

Whenever practicable, the Green Cell should fall under staff cognizance of the senior CA staff member in the command. Usually, CA staff members are resident at the MARFOR/MEF/MEB G-9. Less common, CA staff expertise may be resident on the MAGTF MSC G-3/S-3, or the Battalion/Squadron S-3 staff at these command echelons. When this expertise is not resident on command staffs, staff cognizance of the Green Cell should fall to a staff member in the Intelligence section, or even under the OPT leader. In any case, the Green Cell should have a clearly designated staff cognizance relationship in order to ensure effective advocacy for resourcing, staffing, and other issues.

5.1.7.3   Staff Composition

The cognizant staff officer, in close coordination with the OPT leader, will direct standup of the Green Cell and designate the Green Cell officer-in-charge (OIC). The OIC will direct and oversee the detailed work of the Green Cell, coordinate Green Cell efforts with other command and external planning organizations (Intelligence section, Red Cell, higher and adjacent Green Cell equivalent organizations, et cetera), and serve as the primary "voice" and "face" of the Green Cell to the commander and the OPT. The OIC can be a Foreign Area Officer, Regional Affairs Officer, or expert in a civil-military operations (CMO) functional area relevant to the command's battlespace (such as public works or governance). Above all, the Green Cell OIC should be an experienced MAGTF professional who can effectively synthesize, apply, and articulate relevant Green Cell input to the command planning process.

Other factors influencing cell composition may include:

- the security classification level of the planning evolution
- "high-demand, low-density" SME availability (in some cases, the Green Cell may "share" a SME with another planning organization (intelligence section, red cell, combat engineer section, et cetera)
- in the case of non-DOD / U.S. interagency organizations – the willingness of those organizations to participate in a military planning evolution

By the very nature of the civil environment, the Green Cell will often require "non-traditional" cell membership – to include interorganizational, coalition / host nation civil officials, cultural / academic SMEs, and in some cases members of the civil population in the battlespace. This "non-traditional" membership requires creative ways to physically integrate members into the cell and to integrate their intellectual input and products into the process. Additionally, non-DOD personnel may only be available on a limited or part-time basis. Despite these challenges, the Green Cell OIC should make the necessary effort to integrate "non-traditional" member expertise and input. This input is often critical to understanding the civil environment and the character of the population with whom Marine forces must interact.

5.1.7.4   Contributions to the MCPP

During deliberate planning with the MCPP, the chief contribution of the Green Cell usually occurs during the COA Wargame step. However, Green Cell input plays a role in each step of the MCPP.

5.1.7.4.1 Receipt of Mission

The Commander forms the Green Cell upon receipt of mission and prior to the problem framing step of the MCPP. The Green Cell will add to the Commander's and OPT's cultural understanding of the operating environment. In order to support the OPT, the Green Cell understands the OPT mission and tasks and is constructed to translate cultural information that is relevant to the overall OPT mission.

5.1.7.4.2 Problem Framing

During problem framing, a critical function of the Green Cell will be the development and approval of the Civil Environment Model concept. As early as possible in this step, the Green Cell OIC should brief his staff cognizant officer and the OPT leader / selected OPT members on the key influences that the cell intends to portray in the planning process. The key influences the cell portrays will determine the direction and scope of Green Cell activities for the remainder of the process, and drive the commander, staff, and OPT to understand the civil environment and its effects on friendly plans and operations.

Other activities during this step include cell members gaining situational awareness, and providing civil environment input to the commander and OPT design dialogue. Green Cell members also assist in ensuring that aspects of the Civil Environment Model[386] are applied to the center of gravity analysis, suggested commander's intent, proposed commander's critical information requirements, assumptions, task analysis, and the other staff actions performed during the problem framing step. The Green Cell will also coordinate with the OPT to provide relevant input for the OPT *Problem Framing Brief.* This input should

Green Cell Actions – Problem Framing
• Gain and develop situational awareness
• Ensure OPT integrates civil and cultural considerations into its understanding of the operational environment
• Participate in design dialogue and contribute to IPB
• Complete sources of conflict/resiliency study

include a summary of significant aspects of the civil environment (individuals, groups, infrastructure, and belief sets / intangibles) as well as associated potential friendly planning considerations.

5.1.7.4.3 COA Development

During COA Development, the OPT develops one or more options for how the mission and commander's intent might be accomplished. As options are developed, the Green Cell ensures that the OPT considers the civil environment. The cell assesses how friendly actions might affect the civil environment, provides the OPT with feedback on these effects, and suggests possible enhancement or mitigation measures that can be built into COAs. In addition, the Green Cell begins COA wargame preparation, and continues to refine the Civil Environment Model.

The Civil Environment Model can be used to provide specific recommendations to COA development. Examples include:

- *Identification of key influences*. Key influences (individuals, groups, tangible assets, and societal-cultural factors) become potential engagement targets for friendly leadership, units, and organizations – in particular, the command effects and assessment cells may identify key influences for further information collection and nonlethal shaping. Key influence engagements will often translate into COA tasks for subordinate elements.
- *Identification of grievances*. By identifying grievances of specific groups or influential leaders, the OPT can generate tasks to subordinate elements, along with intermediate objectives, that address grievances that need to be mitigated for friendly success. Likewise, grievances associated with threat actions can be used to a friendly advantage in a COA.
- *Identification of "windows of opportunity" and "windows of vulnerability."* Key events (holidays, elections, et cetera) may create opportunity or vulnerability for friendly force COAs, and influence the timing, scope, and location of friendly actions. Likewise, civil events may be windows of opportunity or vulnerability for threat forces.

In addition to aiding friendly COA development, the Green Cell may support the CMO or CA OPT representative (if one assigned) in developing the CMO portion of the synchronization matrix and the CMO staff estimate / supporting concepts, while providing CMO input to the OPT course of action brief. Lastly, the Green Cell provides input from the civil environment perspective to assist the commander in the development of his COA wargame guidance and evaluation criteria, which may be given to the OPT at the conclusion of the COA development step.

5.1.7.4.4 COA War Game

The COA wargame is used to improve the plan by examining and refining options (COAs) in relation to adversary capabilities and actions, as well as in relation to the physical and civil environments. In this step, the Green Cell "brings the civil environment to life" in the form of key influence wargame actions that describe how friendly COAs, threat actions, and the civil environment will affect one another.

The importance of a well-developed Civil Environment Model and the proper selection of key influences will become readily apparent during the COA wargame. If the model does not have sufficient detail – and/or if too many, too few, or the "wrong" key influences have been selected – then the ability of the Green Cell to assist the OPT in assessing, refining, and modifying friendly COAs will be degraded.

COA wargame can take many forms, from a quick tabletop discussion at the small unit level to a complex multi-day event at higher echelons. In most cases, a normal wargame "turn" consists of a friendly action portion (friendly force representatives brief actions along warfighting function or lines of operation [LOO]) which are then followed by a threat reaction portion (Red Cell briefs reactions in response to friendly actions). Following the Red Cell reaction, the Green Cell should brief civil environment reactions by key influences - a significant point is that civil environment reactions are in response to both the friendly action AND the threat reaction within that turn.

The "reaction" portions of the turn are then followed by a "counteraction" portion - based on the outcome of "action / reaction," the friendly initial action may be "modified" based on the results of the turn. Note that this modification is an improvement / enhancement to the initial friendly COA action and not an additional friendly "turn" within the wargame turn. Note also that, while the Red Cell may have created its own undesired effects in the civil environment due to its "reaction" during that turn, the Red Cell will not normally modify (counteract) the threat COA - it is worth discussing in the OPT, but the purpose of the COA wargame is not to "improve" the threat COA.

From a civil environment perspective, the Green Cell helps improve the friendly COA by realistic and well-developed Green Cell reactions portraying key influences, as well as by providing feedback to the OPT on opportunities / risks in the friendly COA and identification of 2nd and 3rd order effects of friendly actions that may impact the mission.

The Green Cell continues to work with the CMO and/or CA OPT representative in developing the CMO staff estimate, supporting concept, et cetera. The cell also provides relevant input to the CMO OPT representative for the COA wargame brief, with emphasis on advantages / disadvantages of COAs from a civil environment perspective.

5.1.7.4.5 COA Comparison and Decision

The Green Cell should be prepared to provide input to this process by explaining how the wargamed COA(s) affected the civil environment and key influences. If COAs are compared, the Green Cell will offer input about which COA was most (and which was least effective) in achieving friendly objectives / end states in the civil environment.

5.1.7.4.6 Orders Development

During this step, the decision could be made to stand down the Green Cell. This should be a mutual decision involving the staff cognizant officer and OPT leader. However, the Green Cell OIC may still serve as a resource to other staff sections as they develop their portion of the orders.

5.1.7.4.7 Transition

This step is a wide range of activities conducted to ensure a successful shift by the force from planning to execution of the plan. Similar to the orders development step, having the Green Cell OIC available during transition can greatly facilitate translating the products and rationale of planning to the assets that will execute the plan.

5.1.8 Conclusion

An effective Green Cell integrates diverse perspectives and skill sets into the planning process and produces appropriate products or dialogue that strengthen the overall planning effort. Throughout the planning process, it is imperative the Green Cell be in close communication with the OPT and staff.[387]

5.2 Culture and Interorganizational Operations

Sources and Supplemental Readings for Section 4.2

- *MCRP 3-36B MAGTF Interorganizational Coordination*
- *JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*
- *Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Special Forces Advisor Reference Book, Research Planning Inc., October 2001.*

In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines.

General James Mattis, USMC (May 2010)

5.2.1 Interorganizational Operations Overview

The DOD conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of operations with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and structures. Each interorganizational partner brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the task of coordination. Additionally, each USG agency has different authorities which govern operations and determine the use of its resources. These factors can make planning and operating in an interorganizational environment very different for Marines practiced in only USMC or joint service operations. Key terms in discussing interorganizational operations, planning, and coordination include:

Interorganizational Coordination — *the interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector*

Interagency — *of or pertaining to USG agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense*

Intergovernmental Organization — *an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union*

Nongovernmental Organization — *a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society*

Private Sector — *an umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations[388]*

Interorganizational coordination aids in:

- *Facilitating Unity of Effort.* Achieving national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by interorganizational coordination.
- *Achieving Common Objectives.* Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives.
- *Providing Common Understanding.* Interorganizational coordination is critical to understanding the roles and relationships of participating military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced. Such common understandings will be essential to enable stakeholders to operate effectively in the same space, identifying opportunities for cooperation and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

The role of the Marine Corps is to be responsive and scalable, teaming with other services, interagency partners, and allies. Forecasts of the future security environment include threats and challenges; the solutions for which require a sustainable, integrated, whole-of-government application of national power and influence. Collaboration with the Marine Corps' interagency partners NGOs, IGOs, and multinational partners – all with their own distinct cultures – before and during a crisis is a critical component to reduce risk and help ensure the Nation's strategic success.[389]

5.2.1.1   *Interorganizational Coordination Challenges*

Why is it often so difficult for USG agencies and other organizations to work together? The U.S. Army Special Forces Command addresses these difficulties:

Part of the answer is found in the fact that organizations, like nations, can have cultures that are very different from one another. Even though all parties may agree to the ends, the ways and the means may differ from agency to agency. Distinct organizational cultures can inhibit cooperation among agencies. Commonly an agency employs resources in ways that run counter to other agencies' cultures. What one agency views as "by the book," another may see as "slow and bureaucratic;" "fast and loose" to one is "flexible and responsive" to another.

The UN, international organizations, and nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations often do not understand the military or military organization; likewise the military often does not understand them. They often have exaggerated impressions of military capabilities, and little or no understanding of limitations and restrictions. On the other hand, the U.S. military personnel do not realize that those organizations do not have a real chain of command as they are used to. In dealing with NGOs in particular it can be very hard to know who to listen to. They generally lack one voice that could speak for all subordinates, sometimes even within a single NGO.[390]

Some of the interorganizational planning and operations challenges for MAGTF planners include:

- interagency partners operate under disparate authorities and often have very different institutional cultures, norms, and agendas than the Marine Corps
- often interagency operational doctrine is very broad and lacks a concept of operations
- there is a limited comprehensive interagency planning frameworks and authorities
- demand for interagency expertise in operations, training, education, experimentation, and engagement generally outpaces supply
- interagency organizations have different planning and assessment practices than those recognized by the Marine Corps
- stability operations are core missions that have a high requirement for interagency integration. Currently, there is no Marine Corps doctrine for stability operations.
- currently, there are limited methods to identify and track interagency experience within the Marine Corps
- interagency partners manning and resourcing levels are significantly lower than those of the Department of Defense

5.2.1.2   Policy

United States law, policy, and the requirements of ongoing operations dictate that Marines integrate interorganizational capabilities into both service-led operations and operations in support of another service, partner, or ally. Effective integration requires an understanding of the authorities available to a MAGTF and its partners, as well as their application in a complex operational environment.   Marines must understand responsibilities beyond their traditional role, to include the capabilities and limitations of partnering organizations. MAGTF planners must coordinate with partners from the early planning phase through all phases of an operation.

In 2010, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed improvement in Marine Corps interagency interoperability. It was an effort that yielded the *United States Marine Corps Interagency Integration*

Strategy — which became *Annex V* to the *Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan* — and involved both policy and capability development products. It articulates the following mission:

The Marine Corps will strengthen integration with select interagency organizations in order to effectively plan and execute operations across the range of military operations, both for current operations and to posture Marine Corps forces to remain the Nation's premier expeditionary force in readiness.

DOD conducts interorganizational coordination across the range of military operations. Depending on the operation (e.g. domestic and/or foreign) coordination will occur within the federal USG; with state and/or local governments; with tribal authorities; with intergovernmental organizations; with nongovernmental organizations, and with the private sector. Interorganizational coordination enables unity of effort, allows for common objectives, and provides common understanding. Marines are increasingly deployed into complex and volatile situations where the separation between the warfighting and peace support is unclear. The requirement for pre-conflict and post-conflict stabilization has become central, such as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

5.2.1.3   Unified Action and Unity of Effort

The concepts of unified action and unity of effort are critical to interorganizational mission success. Marines conducting complex operations in the future security environment will continue to pursue unity of effort to achieve unified action objectives. Achieving effective interorganizational command and control in the military sense is extremely challenging because of the number of interorganizational entities participating as partners in the operating environment.   Command and control is further complicated because many of

> *Unified Action – the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort*
>
> *Unity of Effort – coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action*[391]

these partners are not under the military chain of command. Other constructs for managing and influencing military and interorganizational partnered operations are required to achieve unified action and unity of effort. Military forces organize to achieve unity of command, a central principal of joint operations. Achieving unity of command is possible as all military forces work in a hierarchy in which one person is in charge of the overall military operation. Unity of effort requires dedication to establish personal relationships among military commanders, subordinates, and interorganizational counterparts. Commanders must understand the differing perspectives of organizations outside the DOD.

Unified action begins with national strategic direction from the President, and includes a wide scope of actions such as interorganizational coordination techniques, information sharing, collaborative planning, and the synchronization of military operations with the activities of all the civilian stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination depends on a spirit of cooperation, while military efforts depend on command and control and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military command and control can facilitate unified action when adjusted to the dynamics of interorganizational coordination and different organizational cultures. Marine leaders should work with civilian stakeholders with skill, tact, and persistence.   Unified action is promoted through close,

continuous coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.

Achieving unity of effort requires the application of a comprehensive approach that includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and deconfliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. An inclusive approach of working closely with stakeholders is often more appropriate than a military command and control (C2) focused approach. Taking an authoritative, military approach may be counterproductive to effective interorganizational relationships, impede unified action, and compromise mission accomplishment. Gaining unity of effort is never settled and permanent; it takes constant effort to sustain interorganizational relationships. Important to achieving unified action and unity of effort is a *whole-of-government approach* by USG agencies:

Whole-of-Government Approach

Integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of the full range of available USG capabilities and resources that reinforce progress and create synergies. This approach facilitates all USG capabilities and resources being shared, leveraged, synchronized, and applied toward the strategic end state. In order to do this, interagency members must, to the greatest degree possible, resist seeing their resources (e.g., financial, diplomatic, military, development, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, consular, commerce) as belonging to a single agency, but rather as tools of USG power.[392]

5.2.1.4 Command and Control for Unified Action

Regardless of whether the operation is domestic or foreign, the U.S. military conducts joint operations commanded by a Joint Force Commander (JFC). A JFC may be a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or joint task force (JTF) commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. During Phase 0, which is to shape the environment, GCCs conduct operations through their Service components. In other situations, requiring the use of military force, GCCs create JTFs, which provide air, ground, and naval forces to the JTF commander. Most JTF commanders organize by function with air, ground, and naval components.

The MAGTF commander and his staff have expanded responsibilities when their operations occur alongside other organizational actors, especially in the area of problem understanding and operational deconfliction. These expanded responsibilities place increased demands on commanders and staffs at all levels that hold rigidly to military principles of chain of command and doctrine. Working with interorganizational partners requires negotiation skills, compromise, and patience. Commanders and staff officers interact with a larger number of personnel who are not under the formal military chain of command. Marines must understand the roles and responsibilities of these new partners, and work with them to ensure a common approach to problem framing and problem solving is developed.

5.2.2   Interorganizational Coordination

5.2.2.1   Domestic Interagency Operations

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the Nation. The Homeland Security Council is made up of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Homeland Security, Attorney General, SecDef, and other individuals designated by the President.   For the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the USG relating to homeland security, the Homeland Security Council:

- Assesses the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in the interest of homeland security and makes resulting recommendations to the President
- Oversees and reviews homeland security policies of the USG and makes resulting recommendations to the President
- Performs such other functions as the President may direct

Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in some respects, fall into two mission areas—homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).   The two GCCs with major homeland defense and DSCA missions are USNORTHCOM and USPACOM as their AORs include the U.S. and its territories. The CJCS ensures that homeland defense and DSCA plans and operations are compatible with other military plans.

Figure 5-2: Integrating the Interagency Community.
Source: JP 3-08.[393]

CJCS responsibilities relating to homeland defense and homeland security include:

- advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs
- assisting the SecDef with implementing operational responses to threats or acts of terrorism
- translating SecDef guidance into operation orders to provide assistance to the primary agency

5.2.2.2   Foreign Interagency Operations

SecDef is a regular member of the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Principals Committee. The NSC System is the channel for the CJCS to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC. The CJCS acts as spokesperson for the combatant commanders, especially on their operational requirements. The CJCS also represents combatant command interests in the NSC System through direct communication with the combatant commanders and their staffs. Combatant commanders and their staffs can coordinate most of their

standing requirements with the Chief of Mission (COM) and their joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization).

5.2.2.2.1 The Country Team

The senior, U.S. bilateral coordinating and supervising representative body in the foreign country is known as the country team. The DOS provides the core staff of a country team and coordinates the participation of representatives of other USG agencies in the country. A country team is led by the COM who is usually the ambassador or the *chargé d'affaires*. The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country except for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral mission, or an international governmental organization. The COM provides recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning directly to the GCC and JTF. While forces in the field under a GCC are exempt from the COM's statutory authority, the COM confers with the GCC regularly to coordinate U.S. military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the host nation. The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. programs and policies.

5.2.2.2.2 GCCs and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)

GCCs are augmented by representatives from other USG agencies to effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater, and to incorporate those instruments into regional strategies and into campaign and operation plans. GCCs use the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) staff structure to facilitate interorganizational coordination. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

Composed of USG civilian and military experts tailored to meet the requirements of a supported GCC, the JIACG (or equivalent organizations) provides the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the DOD and the NSC and HSC systems. Members participate in deliberate planning and CAP, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.

JIACG is a common DOD term across combatant commands. The operational environment and differing missions for each combatant


Figure 5-3: Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure. *Source: JP 3-08.*[394]

command has resulted in unique organizations (e.g., interagency partnering directorate, interagency group), but with similar functions. If augmented with other partners such as IGOs, NGOs, and/or multinational representatives, the JIACG enhances the capability to collaborate and coordinate with those organizations and the private sector.

5.2.3   Interorganizational Planning

In the interorganizational operating environment, differences in organizational culture and priorities result in critical differences in planning. These organizational differences pose challenges in ensuring the alignment of the various plans. One of the challenges associated with planning whole-of-government operations with other USG departments and agencies is ensuring consideration of a broader and somewhat unfamiliar set of planning approaches, organizational timelines, and different notions of mission success. For example, many nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations have limited budgets with long-term time horizons; they tend to see mission success in what is achievable and sustainable over the long term.

A lack of understanding by counterparts of how each of the participating organizations are structured – and how each organization approaches its responsibilities – can result in misunderstandings and communication failures. Organizations tend to have their own unique culture, which influences their decision-making processes and how they perceive and approach problems.

As discussed in Section 4.1, culture is a critical variable in planning operations among foreign populations in foreign operating environments. IGOs, NGOs, and multinational partners can bring important insight and expertise into the local culture not resident on MAGTF staffs. Critical to planning for and coordinating this insight is understanding information sharing challenges in interorganizational operations.

5.2.3.1   *Information Sharing*

All military operations are information intensive. Other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state. However, the cultures of non-USG organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military, and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military activities. By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, Marine planners can help encourage active IGO and NGO cooperation in resolving the crisis.

Locally stationed IGO and NGO personnel are usually well-qualified individuals who understand the local culture and practices, and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. Commanders at all levels should determine and provide guidance on what information needs to be shared with whom and when. DOD information should be appropriately secured, shared, and made available throughout the information life cycle to appropriate mission partners to the maximum extent allowed. Commanders and staffs need to recognize the criticality of the information-sharing function at the outset of complex operations, and not as an afterthought. The relief community is an important source of information regarding the following:

- historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand
- local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces with the populace
- local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders
- security situation
- role and capabilities of the host nation government.

This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. Therefore, it is important to not compromise the position of the IGOs and impartiality of the NGOs, and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are part of an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

Information sharing is critical to the efficient pursuit of unity of effort and a common purpose. A collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue—effective, low-cost network equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities.

The components of civil-military coordination consist of information and task sharing and collaborative planning — all of which depend on communications and management of data and information. The following issues, however, often complicate effective civilian-military coordination:

- a lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation
- suspicions regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence gathering
- tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data for operations security (OPSEC) and "need to know," versus the civilian need for transparence
- differences in the C2 style of military operations versus civilian activities
- the compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civil-military organization cultures

The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding source — whether it is an NGO, IGO, assisting country government, or host government — can be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration, and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to dismantle traditional institutional stovepipes and facilitate the sharing of information among civilian and military organizations.

C2 structures should be equipped with the capability to access the Internet to ensure effective collaboration with the external mission participants (e.g., IGOs, NGOs). The JFC establishes interoperable and compatible communications by using available commercial telecommunications networks, military satellite channels, C2 radio and radar coverage, and conventional military communications systems to support the exchange of orders, directions, and information among all participants. Establishment of direct communications between commanders, interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, indigenous

populations and institutions (IPI), and the private sector facilitates effective coordination and decision-making. Information protection for non-secure communications must be implemented. Additionally, communications systems planning must consider the termination or transition of U.S. involvement and the transfer of responsibility to the UN, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations.[395]

Terminology in information sharing during planning can also be a challenge in interorganizational operations. Among diplomacy, development, and defense communities, there are frequently important differences in the way that basic terms are used with regard to planning. For example, one agency's strategy is another agency's plan, or one agency's goal is another agency's intermediate objective. Marine planners should recognize and plan for misunderstandings in language and terminology during these operations.

5.2.4 Interorganizational Considerations for the MCPP

MAGTF commanders and staffs must continually consider how to involve relevant government agencies and other nonmilitary organizations in the planning process. They must also integrate and synchronize joint force actions with the operations of these agencies. In addition to real world planning events, interorganizational partners should be included in MAGTF planning through training and exercises.

The following subparagraphs provide important planning considerations for MAGTF commanders across the first three steps of the MCPP —*Problem Framing, COA Development*, and *COA War Game*. Failure to include partners early in planning prevents effective development of interorganizational teams and inhibits collaborative planning. Failures in collaboration often result in an "us-versus-them" mentality that could negatively impact interorganizational coordination

5.2.4.1 *Problem Framing*

During the Problem Framing step of the planning process, planners should consider the following:**Problem Framing – Interorganizational Considerations**

- establish contact with the JTF commander and other component commanders
- establish preliminary contact with the country team
- identify all agencies and organizational partners and invite them to MAGTF planning sessions
- understand the role each agency and organizational partner plays in the operation
- identify the resources of each participant to increase collective effort and reduce duplication of effort
- identify the legal and fiscal authorities for the operation
- determine whether there is a status of forces agreement in effect. If not, should a status of forces agreement or some other type of international agreement be negotiated or implemented
- determine whether interpreters are available
- identify constraints imposed by the host nation
- define the types of information that can and cannot be exchanged
- identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities
- begin to identify range of funding sources available
- examine applicable national and international maritime laws
- conduct initial assessment
- form an inclusive planning team with wide representation to ensure linkage among agencies and with the host nation

- establish transition criteria with measures of effectiveness and measures of performance
- support the development of the strategic narrative
- ensure the analysis carefully considers the complex set of actors (public, private, military, and civilian personnel and organizations) with a range of motivations
- ensure the analysis includes the identification of transnational entities, such as the European Union for example[396]

5.2.4.2   Course of Action Development

During the COA Development step of the planning process, planners should consider the following:

COA Development – Interorganizational Considerations

- include interorganizational partners
- compromise as necessary with key partners to achieve unity of effort
- identify short-term actions to help build momentum within the framework of strategic goals
- plan solutions that are implementable by host nation organizations and sustainable over the long term
- consider battlespace options that preserve maritime freedom of action
- provide for displaced civilian and detainee management
- provide a platform for special operations forces afloat forward staging base, as required[397]

5.2.4.3   Course of Action War Game

During the COA War Game step of the planning process, planners should consider the following:

COA War Game – Interorganizational Considerations

- include white, green, and red cells during the War Game
- use existing NGO/IGO assessments and open source analysis tools
- ensure lethal effects do not create unmanageable consequences in subsequent phases
- ensure COAs include consideration for human rights traditionally guaranteed by the state or by international organizations empowered to do so
- ensure communications plan supports unity of effort
- examine plan for intelligence and information sharing with all partners
- identify the logistical requirements (e.g., food and water, shelter, medical, transport, engineering) that must be provided to the host nation and to other partners
- assess COA against strategic narrative
- modify COA as needed in order to link to the strategic narrative[398]

During interorganizational planning, MAGTF partners may also be included in the *Orders Development* and *Transition* steps of the MCPP. If not however, these partner organizations should certainly be informed of MAGTF actions during these steps, as necessary, to facilitate *unified action* and *unity of effort* during interorganizational operations.

5.2.5   Interorganizational Coordination Resources and Enablers

5.2.5.1   Assessment Models

Various assessment frameworks/models have been developed by elements of the interorganizational community to assist in assessing status, evaluating progress, and measuring effectiveness of interorganizational activities in support of a range of domestic and international support activities. A few of these assessment frameworks / models have gained broad acceptance and are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

5.2.5.1.1 Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

The purpose of the ICAF is to develop a commonly held understanding across relevant USG departments and agencies of the dynamics that drive and mitigate conflict within a country that informs U.S. policy and planning decisions. The framework may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. The ICAF is a process and a tool available for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency planning.

The ICAF draws on existing methodologies for assessing conflict that are currently in use by various USG agencies as well as international organizations and NGOs. The ICAF is not intended to duplicate existing independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the intelligence community. Rather, it builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework through which USG agencies can leverage and share the knowledge from their own assessments to establish a common interagency perspective.

The ICAF is distinct from early warning and other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk of instability or collapse and describe conditions that lead to outbreaks of instability or violent conflict. The ICAF builds upon this forecasting by assisting an interagency team in understanding why such conditions may exist and how to best engage to transform them. To do so, the ICAF draws on social science expertise to lay out a process by which an interagency team will identify societal and situational dynamics that are shown to increase or decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, an ICAF analysis provides a shared, strategic snapshot of the conflict against which future progress can be measured.

The ICAF can be used by the full range of USG agencies at any planning level. Conducting an ICAF might be an iterative process with initial results built upon as the USG engagement expands. For example, an ICAF done in Washington at the start of a crisis might be enhanced later by a more in-depth examination in-country. The level of detail into which the ICAF goes will depend upon the conflict and type of USG engagement. The two major components of the ICAF are the *conflict diagnosis* and the *segue into planning.*

 1.   *Conflict Diagnosis* - Using the conceptual framework for diagnosing a conflict *(Figure 5-3)* the interagency team

Figure 5-4:Conceptual Framework for Diagnosing a Conflict.
Source: JP 3-08. [399]

will deliver a product that describes the context, core grievances and social/institutional resilience, conflict-drivers/mitigators, and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict. For detailed information on when and how to use the ICAF see *JP-3.08 Appendix H*.

2. *Segue into Planning* – An ICAF analysis should be part of the first step in the process of planning for conflict. It should inform the establishment of USG goals, design or reshaping of activities, implementation or revision of programs, or allocation of resources. The interagency planning process within which an ICAF analysis is performed determines who initiates and participates in an ICAF analysis, the time and place for conducting it, the type of product needed and how the product will be used, and the level of classification required.

When an ICAF is undertaken to support crisis response planning or contingency planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into situation analysis and policy formulation steps of the planning process. Specifically, the findings are inputs to the Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.

When an ICAF is undertaken to support interagency engagement or conflict prevention planning, after completing the diagnosis, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Team (ICAT) begins preplanning activities. During the segue into these types of planning, the ICAT maps existing diplomatic and programmatic activities against the prioritized lists of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors to identify gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics, it is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or value of any program or initiative. The ICAT uses these findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for USG activities.[400]

5.2.5.1.2 Stability Assessment Framework

The Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) methodology is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support the civil affairs methodology and nonlethal targeting approaches during MAGTF operations. The SAF methodology helps Marine and civilian practitioners identify sources of instability and stability, design programs or activities that address those sources, and measure the effect of those programs or activities in fostering stability.

The SAF methodology is a holistic analytical, programming, and assessment tool that reflects lessons learned and best practices by focusing on understanding and integrating multiple perspectives into planning and assessment. The SAF methodology has four basic components, nested within both the civil affairs methodology and the Marine Corps Planning Process. These components (civil preparation of the battlespace, analysis, design and monitoring, and evaluation) complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes used during civil affairs operations. To the maximum extent possible, all relevant actors and organizations in the battlespace should be encouraged to participate in the SAF process to create comprehensive efforts while conducting stability operations.[401]

5.2.5.1.3 Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework

Published by USAID but recognized as guidance for the USG, the Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework (ISSAF) provides a 10-step framework for security sector analysis. Because detailed assessments of a host nation's security, rule of law, and justice sectors are critical to understand and strengthen partner security sector capacity, the ISSAF is increasingly in use.[402]

5.2.5.1.4 Other Models

Other assessment models have been developed and used by various organizations: some based in systems design and others based in civil engineering or conflict simulation study. Additional assessment models include:

- ASCOPE: area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (characteristics of civil considerations during a military campaign)
- DIME: diplomatic, informational, military, and/or economic elements of national power
- PMESII: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information are elements in system of systems thinking. The PMESII model describes the foundation and features of an enemy (or ally) state, can help determine the state's strengths and weaknesses, and help estimate the effects various actions will have on states across these areas

5.2.6 Conclusion

MAGTF commanders and staffs have expanded responsibilities when their operations occur alongside other organizational actors with different organizational cultures, especially in problem framing and operational integration and deconfliction. These expanded responsibilities place increased demands on commanders and staffs at all levels that hold rigidly to military principles of chain of command and doctrine. Working with interorganizational partners requires negotiation skills, compromise, and patience. Some summary thoughts on operating in interagency and interorganizational environments are offered below:

Operating with other USG Agencies

Develop an Understanding of Other Agencies, Departments, and Organizations. Other Federal agencies and NGOs can see the ends, ways, and means differently than DOD. Interagency participants should understand that agencies are often guided by their unique cultures.

Establish Unifying Goals. Successful interagency operations require a consensus on a unifying goal. Reaching consensus on a unifying goal is the most important prerequisite for successful interagency operations. Consensus is frail and must be constantly nurtured; consensus is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. The objective is to ensure that everyone has a stake in the outcome.

Determine Mutual Needs. After developing an understanding of other agencies, determine the mutual needs between your unit and each of the other agencies. What things are important to both your unit and to other organizations?

Establish Functional Interdependence. Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to attain the objective. This interdependence is the strongest and the most lasting potential bond between agencies, departments, and organizations. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money and establishes a framework for cooperation.

Consider Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives. Long- and short-term objectives should be considered separately. Participants should not lose sight of establishing a continuing relationship in deference to the issue at hand.   Dominating on a short time issue can poison future relationships.

Operating with IGOs and NGOs

Remember that the members of IGOs and NGOs:

- are just as committed to their cause as you are to yours
- are extremely unlikely to accept subordinate or junior partner status with military
- have on-ground and in-country experience that may vastly exceed yours
- are essential in the transition to peace
- vary widely in willingness to work with the military
- usually stress impartiality, neutrality, and independence above all else.
- are sometimes suspicious of the purpose of your activities
- may choose to work near you but not with you
- have no central command. There is no "CINCNGO." They only work for their organization, but will work out cooperative efforts on ground
- may perceive info gathering as an interrogation[403]

Ultimately, successful integration during interorganizational operations comes down to the commander and the staff, and the personal relationships they form with their counterparts in the AO. As *MCWP 3.33.5* notes:

The importance of the commander's personal involvement in building interorganizational trust, understanding, mutual respect, and friendships cannot be overstated. If organizational leaders do not set the appropriate tone and establish the necessary climate, the best whole-of-government plan will fail.[404]

5.3   Culture and Command Communication Strategy

Sources and Supplemental Readings for Section 4.3

- *MCWP 3.33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*
- *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Joint Warfighting Center, June 2010*
- *Joint Doctrine Note 2-13: Commander's Communication Synchronization, 16 April 2013*
- *FM 3-14 Inform and Influence Activities*

It's impossible to not communicate. Everything one does – even an attempt to do nothing – communicates something to somebody somewhere.[405]

5.3.1   Introduction

Communication is not merely a matter of what is said, but is also, perhaps primarily, a matter of what is done. For this reason, communication cannot be treated as a discrete function within military planning and operations. Rather, communication strategies must be fully integrated into planning and operations to ensure consistent alignment between the military's words and deeds. Simply put, the U.S. military must prove both more trustworthy and more credible than its enemies.[406] Marines' actions in their AO are the most powerful influence on credibility of their commander's message. All audiences (including local, regional, and threat) compare the friendly force's message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the success of friendly operations by building trust and credibility. Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose credibility. Loss of credibility makes Marine forces vulnerable to threat counter propaganda, and places our forces at a disadvantage.

In this age of interconnected global communication networks and social media platforms, everything a military force does sends a message. Strategies, policies, plans, and actual military operations communicate intent in ways that confirm or conflict with what we want the audience to believe. MAGTF actions in foreign operating environments send clear messages to many different groups. In our messaging among varied cultural groups, what's meant isn't always what's perceived, adding further complexity to the communication process. Regardless of actions taken or not taken, words spoken/written or left unsaid, and images disseminated or withheld, Marine forces on the ground are always communicating something. Whether or not the consequences or effects communicate what the MAGTF or JFC intended. Not synchronizing communication activities and operations results in conflicting messages, reduces credibility, directly impacts communication effectiveness, and allows the adversary to undermine our credibility and narrative.

Cultural awareness and analysis are important tools to assist MAGTF planners in culturally vetting and synchronizing operational words and images with actions when developing communication strategies to support operations among unfamiliar cultures. Cultural analysis of all target audiences in an operating environment will increase the likelihood that "message sent is message received" in words and actions by these target audiences of different cultures.

5.3.2   Communication Strategy Terminology

Though the term "strategic" communication may connote developing communication strategies at the national strategic level, communication strategies apply at all levels of command across the range of military operations. A rifle platoon commander may have a communication strategy for engaging local audiences in his AO, just as the *National Security Strategy* may provide key strategic communications to global audiences at the national levels. Joint publications recognize the problem with the term "strategic" and explain thusly:

> *Using the term "strategic" communication naturally brings a mistaken intuition that it resides only at the strategic level. However, every level of command needs a strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions in support of SC-related objectives and ensuring the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level. This strategy must be coordinated with those above, below and adjacent in order to deliver a mutually supporting communication to the intended audiences. In order to eliminate the confusion caused by the currently broad SC definition, and intellectual baggage that comes with the term "strategic," we may want to consider using the term "Communication Strategy" for the overall construct, leaving specific terms intact that describe efforts at the different levels of war. For example, the U.S. Army uses the term "information engagement" at the tactical level, "commander's communication strategy" at the operational level, and "strategic communication" at the strategic level.*
>
> *Commander's Handbook for SC and Communication Strategy,*
> *Joint Warfighting Center 2010*

Some doctrinal terminology and the concept of "nesting" communication strategies for consistency, credibility, and unity of effort within any operating environment are important to the concept of strategic communication.

Some key terms relevant to developing a command communication strategy include:

- *Strategic communication* — Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power
- *Communication strategy* – A commander's strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support national level strategic communication-related objectives, and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level

- *Commander's communication synchronization* – A joint force commander's process for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives, and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communication activities
- *Narrative* - enduring strategic communication with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state
- *Theme* – an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application to achieve specific objectives
- *Message* – a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to create a specific effect while supporting a theme
- *Target audience*– an individual or group selected for influence (JP 3-13)
- *Information environment* – the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13)
- *Information operations* – the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13)

5.3.2.1   Nesting

Themes provided from the strategic level will necessarily be very broad and typically do not change for the duration of the operation. Commanders must create their own themes that are appropriate for their level of command, are slow to change, achieve specific objectives, and support higher-level themes. To provide a consistent effect, the themes at each level must be nested underneath the themes of the next higher level, and all levels support the strategic themes. Messages are subordinate to themes and deliver precise information to a specific audience to create desired effects while supporting one or a number of themes. Messages are necessarily more dynamic, but must always support the themes. This construct is widely accepted and used throughout the force.

In sum, messages should support the themes at that level, the themes should support (or be nested under) the next higher-level themes, and themes at all levels should support strategic themes and the enduring national narrative. This ensures consistent communications to global audiences over time.

5.3.2.2   Battle of the Narrative

Commanders, staffs, and unified action partners construct a narrative to help understand and explain an operational environment, its problem, and solutions. Narratives are tied to actions in an operational environment. A narrative is a brief description of a commander's story used to visualize the effects the commander wants to achieve in an information environment to support and shape an operational environment.[407]

For enduring conflicts, such as the previously named "Global War on Terrorism," there can be a continuing clash between the competing narratives of the protagonists – often referred to as the *Battle of the Narratives*. Succeeding in this battle is critical to both long-term strategy and operational success,

particularly in irregular warfare where gaining the support of the local populace is, by definition, a center of gravity.

The *Battle of the Narrative* is often thought of as a battle for the local audience to "buy" our "story" and push out the enemy's "story," such as "we are the good guys, we are here to help you and bring you a better quality of life." This perspective on the *Battle of the Narrative* is incorrect. The battle is not merely to push aside, defeat or gain superiority over the enemy's narrative; it is to completely supplant it. In fact, upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn't just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. The entire struggle is completely redefined in a different setting and purpose.

The *Battle of the Narrative* is a full-blown battle in the cognitive dimension of the information environment, just as traditional warfare is fought in the physical domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace). One of the foundational struggles, in warfare in the physical domains, is to shape the environment such that the contest of arms will be fought on terms that are to your advantage. Likewise, a key component of the *Battle of the Narrative* is to succeed in establishing the reasons for and potential outcomes of the conflict, on terms favorable to your efforts. Theses "reasons" and "outcomes" must be well-grounded in the realities of the situation, including cultural, political, and social perspectives of the intended audiences.[408] Consequently, cultural awareness and analysis of target audiences is critical to constructing effective narratives and success in the *Battle of the Narrative*.

5.3.2.3   Information Environment

The *Battle of the Narrative* is fought in the *information environment.*   This information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Understanding these communications systems is important because they influence international, national, regional, and local audiences. Adversaries within an operating environment often use information and disinformation to gain credibility and legitimacy with the population, while simultaneously undermining their opponents. Understanding how people communicate and who influences them on a daily basis is essential at all levels. For example, identifying local gathering places is important to understand or influence the spread of information, rumors, and gossip.

The information environment is made up of three dimensions: *physical, informational*, and *cognitive*. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision-maker or specific audience, and is the dimension where people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. The informational dimension is the place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected with key components of the content and flow of information. The physical dimension is composed of systems, human beings (including decision-makers, leaders, and military forces), and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects and conduct operations across multiple domains.[409]

The information environment is a very active and competitive venue, especially when trying to create effects in the cognitive dimension. Adversaries are normally very motivated and aggressive in selling their agenda. Likewise, local cultural and social communication has quite a powerful influence on local populations. Therefore, if the joint force is to compete favorably in this environment, there must be synchronization of all communication efforts with operations.[410]

Dimension	Description
Cognitive dimension	• exists in the minds of human beings • consists of individual and collective consciousness • where information is used to develop perceptions and make decisions • significant characteristics include values, beliefs, perceptions, awareness, and decision-making
Informational dimension	• created by the interaction of the physical and cognitive dimensions • where information is collected, processed, and disseminated • significant characteristics are information content and flow
Physical dimension	• the tangible, real-world • where the information environment overlaps with the physical world • consists of targetable individuals, organizations, information systems, and the physical networks that connect them • significant characteristics include terrain, weather, civilian information infrastructure, media, populace, and third party organizations

Cultural awareness, expertise, and analysis are critical to effectively operating in the modern information environment among foreign cultures.

5.3.3   Communication Strategy Principles

The following are some principles for developing communication strategies across the range of military operations.   The MAGTF planner should consider these principles when planning and supporting a command communication strategy.

5.3.3.1   Leadership-Driven

Leaders must decisively engage and drive the communication strategy process. To ensure integration of communication efforts, leaders should place communication at the core of everything they do. Successful Strategic Communication – integrating actions, words, and images – begins with clear leadership intent and guidance. Desired objectives and outcomes are then closely tied to major lines of operation outlined in the organization, command or joint campaign plan. The results are actions and words linked to the plan. Leaders also need to properly resource strategic communication at a priority comparable to other important areas such as logistics and intelligence.

5.3.3.2   Credible

Perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties. Credibility and consistency are the foundation of effective communication; they build and rely on perceptions of accuracy, truthfulness, and respect. Actions, images, and words must be integrated and coordinated internally and externally with no perceived inconsistencies between words and deeds or between policy and deeds. Strategic Communication also requires a professional force of properly trained, educated, and attentive communicators. Credibility also often entails communicating through others who may be viewed as more credible.

5.3.3.3   Understanding

Deep comprehension of attitudes, cultures, identities, behavior, history, perspectives and social systems. What we say, do, or show, may not be what others hear or see. An individual's experience, culture, and

knowledge provide the context shaping their perceptions and therefore their judgment of actions. We must understand that concepts of moral values are not absolute, but are relative to the individual's societal and cultural narrative. Audiences determine meaning by interpretation of our communication with them; thus, what we say, do, or show, may not be what they hear or see. Acting without understanding our audiences can lead to critical misunderstandings with serious consequences.

5.3.3.4   Dialogue

Multi-faceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships. Effective communication requires a multi-faceted dialogue among parties. It involves active listening, engagement, and the pursuit of mutual understanding, which leads to trust. Success depends upon building and leveraging relationships. Leaders should take advantage of these relationships to place U.S. policies and actions in context prior to operations or events. Successful development and implementation of communication strategy will seldom happen overnight; relationships take time to develop and require listening, respect for culture, and trust-building.

5.3.3.5   Pervasive

Every action, image, and word sends a message. Communication no longer has boundaries, in time or space. All players are communicators, wittingly or not. Everything the Joint Force says, does, or fails to do and say, has intended and unintended consequences. Every action, word, and image sends a message, and every team member is a messenger, from the 18-year-old rifleman to the commander. All communication can have strategic impact, and unintended audiences are unavoidable in the global information environment; therefore, leaders must think about possible "Nth" order communication results of their actions.

5.3.3.6   Unity of Effort

Integrated and coordinated, vertically and horizontally. Strategic Communication is a consistent, collaborative process that must be integrated vertically from strategic through tactical levels, and horizontally across stakeholders. Leaders coordinate and synchronize capabilities and instruments of power within their area of responsibility, areas of influence, and areas of interest to achieve desired outcomes. Recognizing that your agency/organization will not act alone, ideally, all those who may have an impact should be part of communication integration.

5.3.3.7   Results-Based

Actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated end state. Strategic communication should be focused on achieving specific desired results in pursuit of a clearly defined end state. Communication processes, themes, targets and engagement modes are derived from policy, strategic vision, campaign planning, and operational design. Strategic communication is not simply "another tool in the leader's toolbox," but must guide all an organization does and says; encompassing and harmonized with other functions for desired results.

5.3.3.8   Responsive

Right audience, right message, right time, and right place. Strategic Communication should focus on long-term end states or desired outcomes. Rapid and timely response to evolving conditions and crises is important as these may have strategic effects. Communication strategy must reach intended audiences through a customized message that is relevant to those audiences. Strategic Communication involves the broader discussion of aligning actions, images, and words to support policy, overarching

strategic objectives, and the longer term big picture. Acting within adversaries' decision cycles is also key because tempo and adaptability count. Frequently there will be a limited window of opportunity for specific messages to achieve a desired result.

5.3.3.9 Continuous

Diligent ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment that feeds planning and action. Strategic Communication is a continuous process of research and analysis, planning, execution, and assessment. Success in this process requires diligent and continual analysis and assessment feeding back into planning and action. Strategic Communication supports the organization's objectives by adapting as needed and as plans change. The Strategic Communication process should ideally operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries.[411]

5.3.4 Synchronizing Communications

An effective command communication strategy requires synchronization of crucial themes, messages, andimages with military operations to inform and influence selected audiences in support of operational goals. Conflict is a battle of wills, for those waging it, for those supporting the effort, and for even those who are undecided. The main effort for winning the battle of wills, particularly in operations characteristic of irregular warfare, will likely occur in and through the information environment. Because Strategic Communication may involve activities outside a MAGTF or JFCs control, coordination, and *synchronization* of a nested communication strategy can be inherently complex.

Synchronized communication focuses on the behavior of publics that can have an impact on mission success. The commander's approach to synchronizing communication emphasizes early planning, training, and guidance that enables decentralized, yet responsive action that reflect strategic guidance. In developing a communication strategy, planners must consider a public's awareness, motivation level, and ability and likeliness to act. The approach can create both positive and negative influences on publics' behavior. However, positive influence creates desired long-term effects, contributes to success across the lines of effort, and engenders lasting support. Therefore, research should be prioritized up front to support behavioral change in audiences intended for influence activities.

Research considerations should include, but are not limited to:

- local U.S. Embassy perspectives
- what information publics may have
- social norms
- how and when to intervene to effect genuine behavioral change
- how much change is actually possible
- how change will support force operations and\or activities

Likewise, communication activities should focus on important decision points of key publics to achieve the commander's objectives. The integration of operations, actions, words, and images is vital in this endeavor.   Cultural awareness, expertise, and analysis of the local AO are critical to this research.[412]

An important first step is conducting sufficient research to understand the culture, language, dialect, means of communication, historical, social, religious, economic storylines, group dynamics, issues, grievances, world view, and other factors that resonate and affect how various publics get information, influence others, and are influenced.

Some resources for planners and staffs include:

- intelligence products,
- special operations forces area studies
- Red Team products
- USG sources such as the DOS country books
- other open-source material
- anthropological and sociological studies
- U.S. academic blogs and local in-country academic blogs
- U.S. and international think tanks

These resources can provide profiles of the salient features of a country or its people; analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assessment of attitudes; identified vulnerabilities; and suggested ways and means to influence people. Careful consideration of what we say and do, and what that communicates to key publics, is fundamental. Academic sources of information such as existing field work from anthropology, linguistics, archeology, sociology, political science, history, and social psychology can help protect against bias, misperceptions, or misrepresentation.[413]

Adding to the staff or utilizing reachback to SMEs that understand these factors can significantly help planners in developing a synchronized communication strategy focused on the particular cultures within an AO.

Examples of such expertise include the following:

- anthropology or sociology (understanding the local culture)
- local marketing expertise (understanding points of individual influence/ interest in the local population and venues for communication)
- linguistics expertise (understanding linguistics nuances of local communication processes and products, translation of specific messages, and themes/messages to avoid)
- local and regional communication expertise (understanding the means, methods, relative impact of local and regional communication)
- diplomacy expertise (understanding intricacies of diplomatic efforts)
- U.S. embassy/DOS/USAID expertise (understanding local coordination requirements and methods between DOD and DOS ongoing foreign diplomacy)
- religious affairs expertise (may advise on various religious dynamics within the AO; or on occasion, may also be tasked with accomplishing certain liaison functions, particularly with indigenous religious leaders and faith-based NGOs operating in the AO)[414]

5.3.5 Information Operations and Information Related Capabilities

When conducting operations such as COIN, FHA, and HA/DR, the culture of the populations within an AO impact the mission more so than during "traditional" kinetic warfare between two adversaries. During such operations, information and expectations are related; skillful military forces in foreign AOs manage both. To limit discontent and build support, the affected government – and any U.S. forces assisting it – create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the population, friendly military forces, and

the international community. The key tools to accomplish this are information operations through the effective coordination and synchronization of information-related capabilities.

> ***Information Operations*** — the integration, coordination, and synchronization of all actions taken in the information environment to affect a target audience's behavior in order to create an operational advantage for the commander.[415]

Information operations seek to generate effects against the decision making of individuals, a group, or perhaps elements of a population. In general, the integration of information-related capabilities is most effective when employed against precisely selected targets to achieve clearly defined objectives. Information-related capabilities generate effects that support achievement of the commander's objectives. There are many military capabilities that contribute to operations, and commanders and staffs should consider them during the planning process.

Some of these capabilities are:

• Marine and key leader engagement	• Counterintelligence
• Civil-military operations	• Public affairs
• Cyberspace operations	• Combat camera
• Military deception	• Defense support to public diplomacy
• Electronic warfare	• Space operations
• Operations security	• Special technical operations
• Military information support operations	• Intelligence
• Physical attack	• Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations.
• Physical security	• Information assurance[416]

Marines execute information operations as an integral element of all MAGTF operations to enable and enhance the ability to conduct successful military actions. In their information operations, Marine forces must ensure that their deeds match their words and both are consistent with the broader narrative. They should also understand that any action has an information reaction. U.S. forces should carefully consider that information reaction's impact on the many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. They should work actively to shape responses that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global information environment, people in the AO can access the internet and satellite television to determine the messages U.S. forces are sending to the international community. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines operational efforts.[417]

The key to successful information operations is the commander's intent. The commander's intent provides a focus for the coordination and synchronization of information-related capabilities. Staffs and information operations planners must balance the use of different information-related capabilities, such as civil affairs operations, physical attack, and cyberspace operations; in order to communicate the intended message to the target audience with an understanding of possible 2nd and 3rd order effects on the rest of the global population.

When commanders and staffs use the various types of information capabilities, there is a tension between a broad message and engaging the population to achieve a two-way understanding. For

example, in COIN operations, the U.S. is generally involved to aid host nations. As such, commanders and staffs integrate information capabilities with the host nation's message to tell the population the reason for U.S. involvement. Commanders and staffs have to establish relationships, seek two-way understanding, and listen to what others think. Effective counterinsurgency normally requires an effective broad message and engaging the population in a dialogue. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance between using information capabilities to give a broad message versus creating a dialogue.

Commanders and staffs balance between controlling the message and allowing for complete freedom of messaging. Having a perfectly controlled message does not allow for real, timely communication with a population. Leaders must have some ability to actually engage a population and create a shared understanding. However, if representatives of a command have total freedom of message, the population is bombarded with contradictions and inconsistencies. Commanders and staffs must find the right balance to allow real communication, but also to ensure that the command has a coherent message.

5.3.5.1 Public Affairs

Public affairs and information operations are separate but related functions. Public affairs are *those public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (JP 3-61)*. External publics include allies, neutrals, and threats. When addressing external publics, opportunities for information overlap exist between public affairs and information operations. Information operations and public affairs personnel must maintain a common awareness of each other's support to operations to preclude the potential for information conflict. The information operations cell provides an excellent place to coordinate and deconflict information operations and public affairs activities that could result in information fratricide. Information fratricide is the result of employing information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces (FM 3-13). Final coordination of public affairs and information operations must occur within the operations process.[418]

5.3.6 Engagement of the Population and Key Leaders

Engagements – whether by the individual Marine or commander with the population or with key leaders – are critical to any command's communication strategy. While critical to a comprehensive communication strategy, these engagements are difficult to synchronize and control. U.S. Army *FM 3-13* gives planners an idea of both the risks and rewards of engagements of local populations within an AO.

Communicating is difficult to predict and control. Pragmatic Soldier (Marine) and leader engagement accepts the unpredictable, often opaque, nature of communications and operates with realistic expectations of message control. Leaders guide what their units say and do. However, they cannot control how others interpret friendly force messages and actions. Soldiers and leaders understand that the cultures, biases, religions, education, and experiences of the individuals and groups observing them shape perceptions or interpretations. Given the prevalence of technology, Soldiers (Marines) and leaders cannot control who eventually receives communications beyond the intended receiver.

FM 3-13 continues with the concept of *pragmatism* in applying engagements within a communication strategy: Pragmatism reflects an expectation and acceptance of prudent risk. Effective leaders expect small setbacks. Nurturing relationships and building trusted networks sometimes entails interacting with untrustworthy individuals. Leaders may even reveal those maligned actors who previously went undetected. Engagements with the local population and key leaders is a long-term, building effort assessed in terms of months or years, rather than in hours or days. Pragmatism acknowledges that the effects of Marine and leader engagement may not be immediately achievable or recognizable. Influencing audiences in an area of operations requires credibility. Building credibility, or trust, requires repeated and meaningful interaction. Recognizing any resulting change from these interactions requires familiarity or experience with the culture in which the engagement occurs.

As U.S. forces conduct engagements, they use discipline and professionalism in day-to-day interactions. Such interaction amplifies positive actions, counters enemy propaganda, and increases good will and support for the friendly mission. These engagements provide the most convincing venue for conveying positive information, assuaging fears, and refuting rumors, lies, and misinformation. Conducted with detailed preparation and planning, interactions often prove crucial in garnering local support for operations, providing an opportunity for persuasion, and reducing friction and mistrust.

5.3.6.1 Cultural Awareness in Engagements

Cultural awareness of engagement participants facilitates effective interactions that contribute to mission success. U.S. forces conduct engagements in the context of local customs, beliefs, and ways of communicating. Doing so builds understanding and cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and mistrust. Beyond familiarization with cultural practices, interacting with cultural awareness requires that Marines understand each population's communication style (direct versus indirect), their value of relationship over task, and their attitude toward time. A cultural support team facilitating an engagement illustrates how cultural awareness enhances engagements. Cultural support teams often consist of female Marines so teams can interact with indigenous women in regions where contact between an unrelated male and female is culturally unacceptable. Specially configured teams, such as cultural support teams, enable friendly forces to interact with a key demographic group while respecting cultural norms.

Indigenous communicators and leaders are sometimes the most effective at framing messages for populations in the AOs. In the past, commanders and staffs have developed messages unilaterally from their own cultural perspective and simply translated or interpreted them into the local languages or dialects. Invariably, the intended message got lost in translation or the message conflicted with local views or norms. Leveraging key leaders or actors from target audiences allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with those same selected audiences. It increases the likelihood that an interaction will inform or influence audiences as desired. Understandably, units balance the use of such individuals against security concerns. Units employ trained influence specialists (such as military information support and noncommissioned officers) and resident cultural experts (such as FAOs or political advisors at higher-level headquarters) to carefully craft messages for delivery through culturally and linguistically familiar means.[419]

5.3.6.2 Commander Involvement

Commanders are the key engagers because their position and authority often invest them with the greatest degree of credibility and access to undertake engagements. They do more than simply model

appropriate actions. During stability operations, in particular, commanders maximize interactions with the local populace through frequent Marine and leader engagement.

Doing so enables commanders to:

- assess attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors first-hand
- sense shifts in perceptions, both positive and negative, and take appropriate action
- engender the trust and confidence of the local populace
- sense and map the social networks active in the area of operations
- confirm who the key leaders are, as well as trusted, credible voices, both formal and informal
- bolster confidence in and consensus behind effective and mission-supportive local leaders
- deliver messages
- assess how effectively units synchronize words, images, and actions and make needed refinements
- quickly address adversary information
- ensure Marines and subordinate leaders effectively engage the populace in their areas

Commanders foster a culture to achieve both their vision and their unit's mission. As commanders seek to shape a culture that exhibits and upholds the values of the U.S. military (among many other shared beliefs and practices), they shape a culture of engagement. This culture buoys Marines' confidence to engage many audiences, especially the populace in which they operate.

Commanders may foster a culture of engagement in multiple ways:

- guidance in the development of a robust communication strategy
- reporting and critical information requirements
- organization of the staff
- employment of public affairs and MISO for advice and assistance
- leading by example (such as actively conducting engagements)
- training requirements (cultural, language, and negotiation training)
- ensuring resources are provided to staff (manning, funds, and time)
- building partner capacity with unified action partners

Critical to fostering a culture of engagement is the commander's supplying subordinates with proper training and guidance. The commander's themes and messages and unit cultural and language training requirements provide subordinates with critical tools for engagements. Still, Marines and leaders will likely make mistakes as they navigate the values and norms of an unfamiliar culture. Commanders balance their response to cultural and linguistic missteps with the task to actively seek engagement with target audiences.[420]

5.3.7   Conclusion

Developing a command communication strategy is a critical capability for winning the *War of Ideas* at all levels of war across the range of military operations. A command's communication strategy should be integrated into all operations processes at the outset and synchronized throughout planning, execution, and assessment to ensure the greatest effect in the information environment. Synchronizing words and

actions can help the JFC close the "say-do gap" and significantly increase the potential to influence intended audiences. Effectively employed communication strategies can potentially achieve national, theater-strategic, operational-level, and tactical objectives in a manner that lessens the requirement for

---

[371] U.S. Senate, *Army Transformation: Implications for the Future: Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee*, 8 (Washington D.C.: July 15, 2004) (Major General Robert H. Scales, USA (ret.)).

[372] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Planning*, MCDP 5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, July 21,1997), 3.

[373] Ibid., 4.

[374] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Planning Process,* MCWP 5-1 (Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2010),1-6.

[375] Ibid.

[376] Headquarters Department of the Army, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies,* FM 3-24/ MCWP 3.33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Dec 15, 2014), vii.

[377] Ibid., 3.1.

[378] Barak A. Salmoni, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter,* OCFW (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2008), 36.

[379] Ibid.

[380] Ibid., 13.

[381] Ibid.,42.

[382] Ibid.,104.

[383] Ibid., 213.

[384] Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3.33.5, 3.5.

[385] U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTAF Staff Training Program,* MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1 (Quantico, Virginia: October 2011), Green-1.

[386] U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTAF Civil-Military Operations,* MCTP 3-03A, (Quantico, VA: May 2, 2016), Appendix C.

[387] U.S. Marine Corps, MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1., Green-3.

[388] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations,* JP 3-08 (Washington D.C.: June 24, 2011), II-26.

[389] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTAF Interorganizational Coordination,* MCRP 3-36B (Washington D.C.: April 15, 2015), 1-1.

[390] U.S. Army Special Forces Command, *Special Forces Advisor Reference Book,* (October 2001), Ch. 3.

-See more at: https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2007/02/marine-advisors-can-marine-corps-better-prepare-them#sthash.1Xgdows7.dpuf.

[391] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* JP-1 (Washington D.C.: March 25, 2013),GL-12, GL-13.

[392] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-08, II-2**.**

[393] Ibid., D-2.

[394] Ibid., D-10.

[395] Ibid., II-26.

[396] U.S. Chiefs of Staff, MCRP 3-36B,2-10*.*

[397] Ibid*.,* 2-10.

[398] Ibid., 2-10, 2-11.

[399] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP3-08, H-4.

[400] Ibid., Appendix H.

[401] MCRP 3.36B, 3-2.

[402] Ibid.

403 U.S. Army Special, *Special Forces Advisor Reference,* Ch. 3.

404 Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3-33.5, 1-12.

405 U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, (Suffolk, VA: June 24, 2010), Appendix P.

406 Ibid.

407 Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3-33.5, 7.

408 U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook*, II-13.

409 Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3-33.5, 2-8.

410 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Commander's Communication Synchronization,* JDN2-13 (Washington D.C.: April 16, 2013), I-2.

411 U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook,* A-3.

412 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Commander's Communication*), I-8.

413 Ibid., III-14.

414 Ibid., III-15.

415 U.S. Marine Corps, *MAGTF Information Operations,* MCWP 3-40.4, (Washington D.C.: July 1, 2013), 1-1.

416 Headquarters Department of the Army, *Inform and Influence Activities,* FM 3-13 (Washington D.C.: January 25, 2013), 1-1.

417 Headquarters Department of the Army, MCWP 3.33.5, 1-21.

418 Ibid., Ch. 7.

419 Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-13, 8-2.

420 Ibid., 8-4.

6 Impact of Culture on Military Operations: Operation Restore Hope

6.1   Operation Restore Hope

Operation Restore Hope was a UN humanitarian assistance mission conducted by a U.S.-led combined/joint task force between December 1992 and May 1993 in southern Somalia on the HOA. Restore Hope was a mission to provide security and logistical support for the distribution of relief aid by UN/NGOs in reaction to severe famine in Somalia.   Operation Restore Hope was the successor to earlier U.S. and UN relief efforts named Provide Relief and UNOSOM I, and a precursor to subsequent operations in Somalia known as UNOSOM II which ended in 1995. This case study will focus only on Operation Restore Hope conducted by the operationally named Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia which was commanded by headquarters elements of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The case study will use the framework of the *Five Operational Culture Dimensions* to illustrate the impact of culture on military operations during Operations Restore Hope:

Five Operational Culture Dimensions of the Battlespace	
Environment	*All cultures have developed a unique interdependent relationship with their physical environment.*
Economy	*All cultures have a specific system for obtaining, producing and distributing the items that people need or want in a society. This system (which does not necessarily require money or banking) is called the economy of a culture.*
Social Structure	*All cultures assign people different roles, status and power within the group. The way people organize themselves and distribute power and status is called their social structure.*
Political Structure	*All cultures have a system that determines who leads the group, and how they make decision about its welfare. How a group is ruled (and it may not be by a specific person or set of people) is referred to as the political structure of a culture.*
Belief Systems	*All cultures have a shared set of beliefs and symbols that unite the group.*

6.1.1   Background

Following the overthrow of Somali leader Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia slid into a state of anarchy as various clans and warlords started a violent struggle for power. By 1992, the situation in southern Somalia was particularly bad. Widespread violence, lawlessness, and banditry -- together with a persistent drought in parts of the country -- hampered food production and distribution; this resulted in widespread starvation.

In April 1992, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 751* established United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Later resolutions increased the strength of military units sent to Somalia, and authorized emergency relief flights. Neither the additional security forces nor relief flights changed the situation substantially. The UNOSOM security forces were unable to provide security to prevent the food arriving in country from being looted when relief workers attempted to distribute it.

On December 3, 1992, *UN Security Council Resolution 794* called for peace-enforcement operations in Somalia. In response, the President of the United States directed the USCINCCENT to conduct Operation Restore Hope. USCINCCENT activated JTF Somalia (later renamed United Task Force--UNITAF) and named the Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force, LtGen Robert Johnston, as the JTF commander.

Over the next six months, Operation Restore Hope established eight humanitarian relief sectors (HRS) in southern Somalia, reopened key airports and ports, and provided security for relief operations. Actual aid distribution was the responsibility of the UN and a host of non-governmental relief organizations. More than 28,000 U.S. servicemen from all the services participated. In addition, over 10,000 servicemen from 24 coalition nations became part of the force. Operation Restore Hope ended with the transition to a UN force (UNOSOM II) on May 4, 1993.[421]

Events Chronology for Operation Restore Hope	
May 1992	Barre's forces are defeated and he flees Somalia. Fighting between the factions for control of the country begins.
18 August 1992	President George W. Bush orders airlift of 145,000 tons of food to Somalia in Operation Provide Relief.
20 November 1992	USCINCCENT notifies I MEF about a potential requirement to conduct U.S. military operations in Somalia. I MEF and USCINCCENT begin contingency planning.
25 November 1992	President Bush announces to the United Nations that the United States was prepared to provide military forces to assist in the delivery of food and relief supplies to Somalia.
3 December 1992	The UN Security Council unanimously passes *Resolution 794,* authorizing military intervention in Somalia. USCINCCENT issues deployment orders to I MEF. Tripoli ARG with 15th MEU (SOC) arrives off southern Somali coast.
9 December 1992	At 0330, landing craft carrying Marines and Navy SEALs are launched from the ARG for initial landings, and arrive at Mogadishu at 0540. By 1145, the Mogadishu airport is declared secure and the first military aircraft lands.
11-31 Dec 1992	JTF forces secure eight humanitarian relief sectors (HRS) throughout southern Somalia. Operations included convoys of relief supplies, engineering work to restore roads, ports and airfields; and the establishment of a Humanitarian Operations Center to coordinate operations with private relief organizations.
19 January 1993	3d Bn / 9th Marines redeploys to CONUS; the first major redeployment of U.S. ground forces. By the end of January, the security situation had stabilized and the CJTF assessed the situation as being ready for transition to the UN. The next few months are spent maintaining security, redeploying forces, and transitioning to UN control.

4 May 1993	Operation Restore Hope ends. About 5,000 U.S. service members remain in-theater and transition to either UNOSOM II (a UN command) under a modified OPCON arrangement or direct CINCCENT control in support of UNOSOM II.
5 May 1993	President William J. Clinton welcomes General Johnston and his staff back to the United States in a special ceremony on the White House lawn.

6.2   Operational Environment

As is so often the case with crises that seemingly flash across the nation's television screens and magazine covers, the situation that led to a united intervention in Somalia had a long and complex history that was not immediately apparent. Of all of the world's areas, the Horn of Africa always has been one of the most overlooked and least understood. Yet, an appreciation of the history and culture of this region is necessary to understand what the United States-led coalition did, and what its accomplishments were.[422]

The AO for Restore Hope consisted all of southern Somalia to the borders of Kenya and Ethiopia. This AO was divided into eight HRSs, so named in keeping with the nature of the mission. Each sector was centered on a major city that could serve as a distribution center; in fact, many of them had been such centers during Operation Provide Relief. The other qualification for choosing these cities was that each was located on a main road and had an airfield capable of handling military cargo aircraft. The original HRSs were Mogadishu, Bale Dogle, Baidoa, Bardera, Kismayo, Oddur, Gialalassi, and Belet Weyne (**Figure 6-1**). The boundaries for the sectors were not set with regard to clan or tribal affiliation, but by simple grid coordinates.[423]

The unique culture of the people of southern Somalia is critical to understanding the challenges U.S. and coalition forces of UNITAF faced in providing humanitarian assistance to a foreign population in dire need.


Figure 6-1: Restore Hope HRS. *Source: Baumann.[424]*

6.2.1   Physical Environment

Somalia would present a hot, dry, bleak desert environment that would test the strength and endurance of both men and equipment.[425]

Operation Restore Hope was conducted in the southern region of Somalia where coastal plains gradually rise to the Somali Plateau along the border with Ethiopia. The land was described as "undulating plains that are interrupted occasionally by areas of dissected terrain and isolated hills. The Webi Jubba and Webi Shebelle are the only streams that flow year-round along most of their lengths."[426] Somalia's coastline of 3,025 km has been of immense importance, primarily because it served as the gateway to trade with the Arabs in the Middle East and the rest of East Africa.

Somalia is hot year-round, but temperatures in the south are less extreme, ranging from 68° to 104° F. Most of the south of Somalia has a semi-arid to arid environment suitable for nomadic pastoralism practiced by 50 percent of Somalis. The rainy season varies by region and by year, with frequent droughts. The annual mean precipitation is almost 1,000 mm in Mogadishu, while it is much drier further inland.

The transportation and communication infrastructure across this physical terrain would also pose challenges to relief operations. Somalia's road system, which had only a few high-capacity modern routes, had lapsed into disrepair. About two-thirds of the national road system was dirt track. The AO also had (10) C-130-capable airfields. The major ports of Mogadishu, Berbera, and Kismayo could handle general bulk and small container vessels.

Another very important effect the environment had on the operation was in the area of health. Somalia presented medical planners with a wide variety of potential problems. These included a high potential for infectious disease, heat-related injuries, and bites from several types of venomous snakes and insects. Diseases were vector-borne, such as malaria, or could be contracted from the unsanitary conditions prevalent in the country. The major infectious disease risks were from food and water-borne diseases related to poor sanitation, indiscriminate disposal of waste, and decomposing corpses. This is how the CENTCOM order described this environment[427]:

Many of the deaths and much of the human suffering in Somalia is directly attributable to endemic disease, which is merely magnified and made more virulent by famine. Numerous diseases, some of which are carried by parasites (such as malaria), are present in Somalia. Among them are AIDS, tuberculosis, hepatitis, pneumonia, and measles. Dysentery and gangrene are common and frequently lethal complications. Virtually all water is unsafe for drinking even when boiled due to the possible presence of spores, which the boiling may not kill. The potential for cholera and related problems from decaying cadavers is also present.

6.2.2   Economy

At the time of Operation Restore Hope Somalia was one of the world's least-developed countries. In more peaceful times, agriculture was the most important sector of the economy. Livestock accounted

for almost 40 percent of the GNP and about 65 percent of export earnings. Almost 50 percent of the population were nomads who depend on livestock for their livelihood. Nomadic clan families viewed themselves as the true Somalis and hence believed they had a higher status in Somali society. Crop production generated only 10 percent of the GNP and employed about 20 percent of the work force. The main export crop was bananas. Sugar, sorghum, and corn were grown for the domestic market. The small industrial sector was based primarily on processing agricultural products. Since the start of the civil war in 1988, commercial agriculture and a viable economic system had been virtually nonexistent. The limited industrial base and food distribution system -- as well as much of the infrastructure -- had been destroyed prior to when U.S. forces were deployed in December 1992.[428]

The economy prior to Operation Restore Hope was built on self-sufficiency in grain, milk, and animal products. The government relied on taxing these products to support governance. Since the start of the civil war in 1988, commercial agriculture and a viable economic system had been virtually nonexistent. There was hyperinflation, the Somali currency lost its value, and goods were bartered instead -- in spite the government's desperate effort to address the inflation. The recession spiraled out of control. The economy nosedived and the government had no alternative in place to deal with the massive food shortage. Consequently, humanitarian assistance to the Somali people became a priority for the international community.

Figure 6-2: **A Somali herds his flock of goats near the village of Belet Weyne.** *Source: Restoring Hope.*[429]

6.2.3   Social Structure

The dimension of operational culture that is most critical to understanding how culture impacted Operation Restore Hope is the social structure – namely the clan system in Somalia. The Somalis have a very homogenous culture. They are bound by a common language, traditions, and the Islamic faith. Despite this apparent commonality, there is no real sense of nationalism. The clan system is the central tenet that binds Somali society together; Somalis rely on clans as the primary social and governmental organization. This aspect of the social structure is clearly illustrated by the following Somali proverb:

Me and Somalia against the world,
Me and my Clan against Somalia,
Me and my family against my Clan,
Me and my Brother against my Family,
Me against my Brother.[430]

The clan system has existed since the middle ages. There are six major clans in Somalia, with numerous sub-clans. The major clan families include: the *Hawiye, Ishaak, Darod, Raharwein, Dir,* and *Digil*. The clan structure emphasizes loyalty to, and from, its members. Constant fighting over political and ethnic differences has been the hallmark of Somali society. But, when threatened, Somalis will band together against the common enemy, much like the Somali Proverb says above. As a result, coalitions and alliances are very fragile and no one is ever politically neutral.[431]

Despite identifying with the same ancestral history and genealogy, Somalis are a fiercely independent and competitive people, who reject many forms of governmental authority. Among Somali nomads, wealthier men were traditionally those who owned more camels and livestock. Warriors and priests were considered to have the most prestigious vocations. In some *Rahanwayn* and *Digil* settlements, members are divided between dark skins and light skins, with those of darker skins having slightly more prestige in ceremonies (although the two are considered equal in other ways). A small percentage of the peoples of the riverine and Southern coastal area - where Operation Restore Hope was concentrated - are descendants of a pre-Somali people who lived in the HOA. Added to this group are descendants of Africans once enslaved by the Somalis. This cultural group is called the *habash.* While not overly poorly treated, the *habash* people are considered inferior by the Somalis. Decisions are made in traditional Somali society by a council of men, but decision-making may be influenced by a range of factors like age, wealth, lineage, and gender.

Somali social structure is complicated. Clan rivalry is a common feature of interpersonal relationships; these rivalries can extend to interfacing with governmental authority and institutions. Clan loyalty serves as a source of conflict or solidarity. Alliances are forged for protection, and to access social amenities like water and political power. The root cause of the Somali conflict therefore lies squarely with the clan structure, which has shaped the cultural values and views on respect, independence, gender roles, loyalty, individualism, egalitarianism, gratitude, and obedience. The troops of UNITAF had to operate within this alien social structure. UNITAF personnel were helping a people who -- while in desperate need of the international humanitarian assistance they were being offered -- did not always appreciate it. This dichotomy resulting from the unique history and culture of Somali social structures – the clans – could prove confusing to troops rapidly deploying to a crisis situation in this foreign land.

Somalia Clan Affiliations

The influence of clans and sub-clans was seen in the numerous factions and political organizations, which had been struggling for power since the overthrow of Muhammad Siad Barre. Virtually all derived their influence from their affiliation with one of the clans or clan-families. The important clans to the work of Operation Restore Hope were:

The United Somali Congress (USC). This was the largest of the factions operating in southern Somalia, and it was one of the first to fight against the Barre regime. Composed principally of the Hawiye clan-family, it was further subdivided into two factions, which were in violent competition with each other. The first of these was the faction led by General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed. Usually referred to as USC Aideed, it was drawn from the Habr Gedr clan. The force under Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the USC Ali Mahdi, drew its support from the Abgal clan and opposed the USC Aideed faction. Both were strong in the Mogadishu area, and each had supporters in other factions in the port city of Kismayo.

The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Active mainly in the south around Kismayo, this faction was drawn from the Ogadeni clan of the Darod clan-family. It also was divided into two rival groups. One, led by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, was allied with General Aideed. The other was led by Colonel Aden Gabiyu and was allied with the forces of Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as "General Morgan." Morgan's forces were an independent faction of the Ogadeni sub-clan and were active in the Kismayo area, extending to the towns of Bardera and Baidoa. Morgan was allied with Ali Mahdi and, therefore, was opposed to Colonel Jess.

Several other factions were operating in Somalia at this time. Each had an armed militia. While these had less impact on the coalition's work, they had to be considered.

In the north was the Somali National Movement (SNM), dominated by the Issaq clan-family. Under the leadership of Abdulrahman Ali Tur, this faction declared the independence of the northwestern portion of the country as the "Somaliland Republic."

Also in the north was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), composed of members of the Majertain clan of the Darod clan-family. The SSDF opposed the USC.

The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) was affiliated with the Rahanweyne clan-family and operated to the west of Mogadishu, centered on the town of Bardera and also strong in Baidoa.

The Somali National Front (SNF) was drawn from the Marehan clan of the Darod clan-family and was active along the border of Ethiopia near the town of Luuq.

The Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) had its center in the town of Kismayo, and was representative of the Biyemal clan of the Dir clan-family.

There also were several religious-based organizations, particularly in the north. These groups included al-Itihaad al- Islamiya (Islamic Unity), which had fought against the SSDF in the north, and Akhwaan al-Muslimiin (Muslim Brotherhood), which had adherents throughout the country.

Source: *Restoring Hope.*

6.2.4   Political Structure

The modern Somali political system is dominated by alliances and antagonisms among the clan and sub-clan groups. The clans provide structure to the daily lives of the Somali people. Consequently, the clan is the most important political unit in Somalia. Somalis pay allegiance to their "descent group unit" or clan.   Government entities and officials then derive their influence and power from their association with various clans. This clan structure is a primary factor in Somalia's continued fragmentation. Because the people do not perceive a function to a national or state allegiance, getting the various clans to cooperate has largely been a fruitless endeavor by a central government.[432]

Like most African countries of the modern era, the political state of Somalia was formed before there was a clear sense of nationhood.   In retrospect, even for Somalis, the decision of the country's founders to include the aspiration of gathering all Somali populations under one flag must appear to be a fundamental error. This

Figure 6-3: Clan Influence within the HRS. *Source: Restoring Hope.*[433]

goal inhibited the development of a national consensus because it maintained the focus of politicians on traditional clan politics, and kept alive dreams which were dysfunctional on the international level. Equally paradoxical, the decision to focus on an identity provided Somalia's neighbors and enemies virtually unlimited excuses to play one Somali group against another. In order to deflect attention from his narrow clan political base, an opportunistic dictator like Siad Barre found it easy to adopt a firm "anti-tribal" policy while doing everything possible to eliminate the internal coherence of enemy clans, sub-clans, religious structures, and leadership. Siad's excesses eventually caused the collapse of the dictatorship, and in 1992 very few building blocks were available to initiate peace between clans and -- eventually -- to support the creation of a national government. Somalia during Operation Restore Hope exhibited most of the frailties of a failed state, unable to maintain national security or provide basic social services to its people.[434]

Consequently, the highest level of politics in Somalia during Restore Hope was clan politics. With the overthrow of the Barre central government and the resulting power vacuum, Somalia as a nation had no civil authority or functional governmental partners at the national or local level when the Marines landed. The UNITAF forces would have to successfully navigate the political power structures of the

various clans in order to accomplish their mission without the help of host nation forces or government agencies. Various clans held the political power within the eight HRSs designated by UNITAF. These HRS boundaries were designated by map grid lines and not clan structures; therefore, the HRSs did not correspond to any established Somali political boundaries or organizations.

6.2.5   Belief Systems

Somalia is one of the rare countries in Africa in terms of cultural affinities. All of the peoples of Somalia share common cultural roots, and they speak a common language and religion. However, as one study notes: "Somalis are a people divided by their sameness. Unlike much of the rest of Africa, Somalia's postcolonial borders enclose only a single ethnic group, the Samaal. The Samaal have occupied this region since biblical times. Nearly all Somalis are Muslim. These people have been followers of Islam since as early as the 18th century, but their first contact with Islam is believed to have been in the eighth century. Somalis speak Somali as their official language. Somali, however, is a language that has only had a written component since the early 1970s. It has several dialects, of which three predominate, with common Somali being the most widely used. Some 10 percent of Somalis speak either English or Italian, and they use some Arabic, primarily in connection with religious observances. Until the Somali government's collapse in 1991, literacy was on the upswing, and in 1990, the UN estimated that Somali literacy was at 24 percent."[435]

English is spoken by many Somalis living in the north, but is spoken by very few people living in Mogadishu; the foreign language most commonly spoken in the southern part of the country is Italian.[436] Although the Somali people have a strong sense of history and their language has a rich and reportedly lyric poetic focus, the current writing style (Roman script) was only adopted as recently as 1972. Somali history remains primarily oral. A primarily nomadic people, the Somalis have many age-old rituals and an elaborate sense of protocol.[437]

Figure 6-4: Somali Women. *Source: Restoring Hope.*[438]

Somalis are mainly Muslim and belong to the Sunni sect of the Islamic religion. Somali Muslims subscribe to the Ash'ariyah theolog y, the Shafi'i jurisprudence, and orthodox Sufism. The role of religious teachers and teachings changed fundamentally with the introduction of scientific socialism by the Siad Barre administration. The government used Islam to justify scientific socialism, but this met with stiff resistance from some Muslim clerics and scholars. Weddings, births, circumcisions, and Islamic and secular holidays are all occasions for celebrations involving feasting, where families slaughter animals, make bread, and prepare food for guests and for the poor, who are invited to join the celebration.

Somali culture -- and the Islamic religion -- places emphasis on dress and personal attire, for both men and women. Women should wear *hijab,* a dress that covers all her body, exposing only the hands and face. Men wear clothes that cover between their waist and knees, according to similar Islamic traditions. This form of dressing is expected of youngsters, starting from the age of seven or nine years old. Food, as it is with attire, is important in Somali culture and religion. Because of Islamic tradition, it is prohibited to eat pork; the consumption of alcohol is also prohibited.

6.3   Required Readings

Please complete the following required reading. It is located in the supplemental reading PDF, which was downloaded with this workbook from MarineNet.

- Michael A. Marra and William G. Pierce. *Somalia 20 Years Later – Lesson Learned, Re-learned and Forgotten.* Small Wars Journal (September 2013).

6.4   The Case – Operation Restore Hope

6.4.1   Situation

6.4.1.1 Friendly

The UNITAF headquarters was built around the command element from I MEF, with some joint service and coalition augments. LtGen Johnston, I MEF CG, was commander of UNITAF. Marine Forces included elements from all I MEF major subordinate commands. Naval Forces included a carrier battle group, an amphibious task unit (including 15th MEU [SOC]) and three maritime prepositioning ships for sustainment). Army forces were built around the 10th Mountain Division.   USSOCOM provided special operations forces to include Army Rangers, civil affairs, and psychological operations (PSYOP) support. Twenty-four coalition partners provided over 10,000 troops. The largest forces came from France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, and Australia.

Figure 6-5: 15th MEU (SOC) AAV Landing in Mogadishu. *Source: Restoring Hope.*[439]

6.4.1.2 Adversary

Any of the clans, warlords, or faction leaders vying for power within the AO must be viewed as a potential adversaries and impediments to UNITAF mission accomplishment. In fact, the various factions throughout the battlespace had incentive to not assist the distribution of relief supplies, but rather

hoard these goods as a source of power for their own purposes. The below passage describes the threat environment UNITAF forces were operating in:

> *To add to the suffering of the Somali people, a severe drought had devastated the region for about three years. As farmers were unable to raise crops, food itself became a weapon. To have it made one's own group strong; to deprive one's rivals of it weakened them as it strengthened oneself. The threat of losing subsistence to armed bands of factional militias was now added to the threat of being robbed by the increasing gangs of bandits. With violence a reality of everyday life, everyone had to protect himself. Individuals armed themselves, formed local militias, or hired others for protection. Even private relief organizations became the targets of threats and extortion and had to resort to the hiring of armed bodyguards. It truly became a case of "every man against every man."[440]*

Compounding this plethora of armed factions with myriad goals was an abundance of heavy weapons throughout this AO. Some of the major militias were identified in the JTF Annex B to the OPORD:

Group	Leader	Fighters	Weapons
United Somali Congress (USC)	Aideed	≈20K	• Artillery • Tanks • APCs • Technicals
United Somali Congress (USC)	Ali Mahdi	≈15K - 20K	• Artillery • Tanks • APCs • Technicals
Somali National Front (SNF)	Mohamed Said Hirsi	≈9K	• 122mm Artillery • T-54/55 Tanks • Technicals
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)	Colonel Jess	≈15K	• Artillery • Tanks • APCs • Technicals

Somali "Technical": Machine gun mounted on pickup truck

Figure 6-6: Intelligence Estimate for Restore Hope. *Source: Restoring Hope.*[441]

The state of lawlessness in southern Somalia made for an AO where anyone could be a potential adversary at any time during Restore Hope.

6.4.1.3   Civil Component

The operational environment was characterized by a lack of any civil authority or central and local governance as we know it in the U.S. The local population within the various HRSs gave their allegiance to local clan and/or faction leaders, as they were the true power brokers within this civil structure. Consequently, UNITAF forces could not rely upon host nation government partners – whether national armed forces or municipal police – to assist in mission accomplishment.

6.4.2   Mission

Operation Restore Hope Mission Statement: When directed by the NCA, CINCCENT will conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia, to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.

6.4.2.1   Commander's Intent

LtGen Johnston made an important clarification of the UNITAF support to providing relief supplies to the Somali people: "JTF Somalia will focus on securing the lines of communication used for the ground movement of relief supplies by U.N. and NGO agencies to distribution sites. JTF Somalia will not be primarily involved in transporting supplies, but will assist relief organizations by securing their operating bases as well as the ground transportation routes to relief distribution sites."

This statement clearly kept the task force out of the business of actually feeding the hungry, and concentrated on the more appropriate military mission of providing the necessary secure environment for the relief operations.[442]


Figure 6-7: 15th MEU(SOC) Conducting Convoy Escort. *Source: Restoring Hope.*[443]

6.4.2.2   Concept of Operations

Operation Restore Hope was conducted in four phases:

- Phase I - coalition forces deploy to Mogadishu, create a security zone, secure the airport and port facilities, protect the humanitarian relief supplies in the capital as well as those organizations whose job it was to distribute them, and begin to establish a logistics base.; coalition forces also seize and secure an airfield in Baledogle.
- Phase II - coalition secures lines of communication (LOCs) leading to major relief centers in the remaining HRSs
- Phase III - expand operations within each HRS, and stabilize the situation for transition
- Phase IV - transition to a UN peacekeeping force (UNOSOM II) and redeploy[444]

6.4.3   Operational Culture Impacts on the Mission

The following section provides examples of how each of the five dimensions of operational culture impacted the Restore Hope mission. Certainly, these brief examples are not all-inclusive. Rather, one example is provided and questions for further consideration of operational culture impacts on Restore Hope are posed as fuel for thought in analyzing cultural impacts on future military operations.

6.4.3.1   Physical Environment

Question 1: How did the Somalis' traditional relationship with the environment impact the ability of UNITAF to exploit natural resources and infrastructure to facilitate relief operations and sustain the force?

Probably the environmental factor that most impacted military operations was the dependence by the population (and UNITAF) on scarce water resources in the arid plains of southern Somalia. A Restore Hope AAR discussed the impact of controlling scarce water resources on the operational environment: "The hostile climate and lack of adequate water sources made the wells critical from a political, economic and military perspective. The clans and political factions have routinely fought over these vital sources of water, and used them to gain and maintain control over the people of the region. UNITAF recognized the importance of the water sources, and took steps to ensure access to all people. However, in some areas of Somalia, warlords continued to control access to water sources, using it as a tool to gain political and economic power."[445] Clearly, the UNITAF security plan had to account for access to scarce water sources within the AO, and recognize the political power various factions derived from controlling this key terrain.

Question 2:   How did a maritime trading culture with modern port facilities and access to the sea impact the U.S. ability to rapidly respond to this particular humanitarian crisis in Somalia?

Somalia, located on the HOA with coastlines along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, has a long tradition as a maritime-trading culture. (Even today, ironically, the current issues with Somali high-seas piracy reflects this maritime culture.) Somalia exploited this geographical location as a gateway for trade with the Arabs in the Middle East and with other nations of East Africa. As part of this maritime trading heritage, Somalia had fairly modern port facilities in Mogadishu that could be exploited by the UNITAF to accomplish the Restore Hope mission.

Figure 6-8: Port of Mogadishu. *Source: Restoring Hope*.[446]

I MEF was designated as the command element with I MEF elements deployed as initial forces to flow into Somalia.   In order to rapidly gain a secure base to command, control, and flow forces into Somalia, the Marines would come by the sea. Not only did the 15th MEU (SOC) secure the initial airport and seaport facilities via amphibious landings, but -- perhaps more importantly -- the critical initial logistics sustainment for the force had to come from the sea via Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) offload. Due to these modern port facilities and the availability of MPF to support forces ashore, for the first few weeks of the operation, the 1st Force Service Support Group from I MEF provided outstanding support to UNITAF.[447]

However, by early January, the group's ability to continue its prodigious effort was under a severe strain due to U.S. forces and coalition partners approaching a total of 30,000. Since most of the supplies they needed were coming from MPF ships, of which four had been unloaded, that figure was about 10,000 men more than what would normally be supported from these sources. A related complicating factor was the distance that separated some parts of the coalition. Transportation assets, such as trucks, fuel tankers, and water trailers were critical for the continued success of the operation. Transportation that were available were being run hard on lengthy and rugged roundtrips to outlying sectors.[448]

> *The most critical commodity supplied to the troops was water. Drinking water alone was rated at four to five liters per man per day. Water also was necessary for basic hygiene and cleaning clothing. There were no sources of safe, potable water in Somalia when UNITAF arrived, so the coalition had to take extraordinary measures to provide the precious liquid. At first, ships in the port manufactured potable water and pumped it ashore for transportation to the soldiers and Marines in the field. The importance of this source can be gauged from the statistics in the situation reports of the maritime prepositioning force. On 15 January, for instance, the prepositioning ship MV 1stLt Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011) pumped 13.5 thousand gallons of water ashore. By that date the MPF had delivered a total of 845.5 thousand gallons of water to the collection points.*
>
> *Source: Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force 1992-1993*

The plan was to transfer logistics functions to the JTF Support Command run by the U.S. Army. When fully assembled in the theater, the Support Command could provide exceptional support and strength to UNITAF. The difficulty was in the amount of time it would take to bring all of these soldiers and their equipment to Somalia; plans called for the Support Command to become fully operational on 28 January 1993. Without the ports, access to the sea and the MPF, UNITAF would not have been able to rapidly build up the forces necessary to immediately support the relief efforts for the first 60 days.[449] Contrast this AO with a similar mission conducted in a landlocked country (Sudan, for example); would the U.S. be able to mount a similar rapid response to an international humanitarian crisis?

6.4.3.2   Economy

Any semblance of a national economy in Somalia had completely collapsed at the time of Restore Hope. Somalis are predominantly agriculturalists, producing millet, maize, wheat, beans, peas, and dairy food. Following a severe drought lasting for years, it was the shortage of food and resulting famine that heightened the economic collapse. The lack of basic food items made the population of southern Somalia almost completely reliant upon international relief efforts. Lacking throughout the AO were integrated commerce mechanisms such as markets, supply chains, and distribution networks for delivering goods to the at-risk population. Consequently, distribution centers had to be established by UN/NGOs/UNITAF within the HRSs to ensure food relief made it to the neediest within the population. This complete economic breakdown at the national and local levels contributed to the hoarding of relief supplies as not only political but economic power for the various groups vying for influence. Black market economic forces such as extortion and payoffs contributed to problems with effective and efficient delivery of life-saving relief to the starving. A U.S. Army history of operations during Restore Hope describes the impact of trying to distribute relief supplies in a nation devoid of political and economic institutions

> *Problems of distribution within the country continued to hamper the relief effort. In the countryside, lawless gangs seized relief supplies and used them to buy local loyalties while letting thousands starve. In the cities, the warring political factions, supported by their private armies, amassed food stockpiles as bargaining chips and signs of their power. These rival entities, often barely controlled by their clan leaders, terrorized the international organizations, stealing food and killing whoever did not pay protection money.[450]*

Question 1: Operational Culture for the Warfighter explains three models of economic systems that are significant for Marines operating in foreign AOs. Read the attached required readings and describe the model or models you believe are most appropriate in analyzing the economic systems in Somalia during Restore Hope.

Question 2: Was the military mission of setting security conditions for distribution of aid by NGOs to relieve the immediate famine the only realistic military mission in 1992? Would setting the conditions for re-establishment of national government (police, military) and economic institutions to sustain the UNITAF successes been achievable in this unique cultural environment?

While UNITAF during the time period of Operation Restore Hope was successful in its narrow mission tasks of setting security conditions to allow the UN/NGOs to feed the starving (and then transfer the mission to the UN), no sustained improvement to a recognized formal national economy resulted from the UN mission. In fact, the follow-on missions of UNOSOM II after transfer of authority from UNITAF to the UN in 1993 were wholly unsuccessful in the "mission creep" into nation-building. The implications of failures of UN missions subsequent to Restore Hope are illustrative for planners when devising appropriate, achievable end states for military missions. The following passages from National Defense University's *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* illustrate this point:

"During its existence from 9 December 1992 through 4 May 1993, UNITAF ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, including 28,000 Americans. It clearly succeeded in its missions of stabilizing the security situation—especially by confiscating 'technicals,' the crew- served weapons mounted on trucks and other wheeled vehicles. With better security, more relief supplies were distributed throughout the country, staving off the immediate threat of starvation in many areas. However, plans for the termination of UNITAF and an orderly handoff of its functions to the permanent peacekeeping force, christened UNOSOM II, were repeatedly put off. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali urged delay until U.S. forces could effectively disarm the bandits and rival clan factions that continued to operate throughout Somalia. In addition, he proposed to rebuild the country's fragmented institutions "from the top down"—an exercise akin to nation-building.

These disagreements delayed but did not ultimately prevent the formation of UNOSOM II, officially established by *Security Council Resolution 814* on 26 March 1993. The Resolution was significant in several ways:

- The Council mandated the first ever U.N.-directed peacekeeping operation under the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the Charter, including the requirement for UNOSOM II to disarm the Somali clans;
- It explicitly endorsed the objective of rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of a member state; and
- It called for building a secure environment throughout the country, including the northern region that had declared its independence.

These far-reaching objectives went well beyond the much more limited mandate of UNITAF as well as those of any previous U.N. operation."[451]

Another AAR from Somalia describes the effort of UNOSOM II to rebuild a functional economic system in Southern Somalia: "UNOSOM II undertook the arduous task of restoring Somalia's economic system. From its arrival, UNOSOM II had provided the security and assistance necessary for some economic life

to return to Somalia. Farming and livestock raising had begun by the summer of 1993. In August/September 1993, farmers from Afgoye brought their surplus to Mogadishu for sale in the markets, the first time in over two years. While great strides had been made, there continued to be much more to do. The single largest challenge seemed to be the need to provide jobs to displaced people and to an armed, idle society. There were never enough work alternatives for bandits and idle militiamen."[452]

However, the foray into disarmament of Somali clans ultimately evolved into open conflict between UN forces and various factions, causing a lack of political will from contributing nations to continue "nation-building" in the middle of a civil war. The "rebuilding" of sustainable economic institutions in this cultural environment ultimately proved to be a futile quest for a temporary military mission.

6.4.3.3   Social Structure

Question: How did the unique clan-based social structure of Somalia impact the mission of providing secure environment for food distribution by UN/NGOs, and hinder a unified effort in providing timely relief to a starving population?

By far the dimension of operational culture that most impacted the operation was the social structure – namely the clan-based society that has been a recurring theme across all five dimensions. The intense animosity between the clans made finding common ground among factions to aid the starving Somali people especially problematic. The clan social structure, even more so than the prolonged drought in southern Somalia, contributed to the conditions precipitating Operation Restore Hope:

Although drought conditions were partially responsible for this situation, civil war had devastated this already threatened country. Since 1988, this civil war had centered around more than 14 clans and factions that made up Somali society, all of which fought for control of their own territory. Their culture stressed the idea of "me and my clan against all outsiders," with alliances between clans being only temporary conveniences. Guns and aggressiveness, including the willingness to accept casualties, were intrinsic parts of this culture, with women and children considered part of the clan's order of battle. Because the area was for more than a decade a focal point for Cold War rivalries, large amounts of individual and heavy weapons found their way from government control to clan armories. After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the political situation deteriorated, with the clans in the north- ern part of the country trying to secede. With drought conditions worsening everywhere, clan warfare and banditry gradually spread throughout Somalia. By early l992, these conditions brought about a famine of Biblical proportions: more than one-half million Somalis had perished of starvation and at least a million more were threatened. Somalia had become a geographical expression rather than a country.[453]

These social divisions, of course, didn't disappear upon international intervention so operations would have to be conducted in this fractured, adversarial environment flush with heavy weapons (instead of a cooperative effort with national partners to alleviate the starvation and famine). Thus, the particular clan structure of Somalia made Restore Hope a uniquely problematic humanitarian assistance mission as compared to perhaps HA/DR relief operations in other disaster affected nations with a stronger national identity and cooperative spirit among social groupings. The primary tactic of all the clans was to deny

food to their opposition; this inevitably brought the fighters into conflict with the humanitarian relief organizations desperately trying to stem the tide of starvation.

A U.S. Army after action report for Restore Hope summarizes how the clan-based social structure made UNITAF mission tasks problematic in this unique environment: "As Somalia lapsed into sectarian and ethnic warfare, regional warlords drew upon clan loyalty to establish independent power bases. This situation led to a struggle over food supplies with each clan raiding the storehouses and depots of the others. Coupled with a drought, these actions brought famine to hundreds of thousands of the nation's poor. Although private and volunteer relief organizations established refugee camps to try to prevent widespread deaths from starvation, they could not handle the massive amounts of aid and the requisite security structure that were needed. International relief organizations paid protection money to the warlords as they tried to distribute what donated food supplies did arrive. More often than not, such supplies never reached the hands of those who needed them but instead were confiscated by the warlords who distributed or sold them to enhance their own power and prestige. The general misery was only compounded by the brutality of the Somali clans toward their rivals and the sporadic outbreaks of actual fighting."[454]

The specific clan structures and interplay between cultural groups varied widely across the AO, making for a complex operating environment where social structures were uniquely local. Consequently, the UNITAF planners and operators needed to conduct continuous analysis of the clan/factional structures within each HRS to effectively and efficiently provide security for UN/NGO food distribution.

6.4.3.4   Political Structure

> *The various armed Somali factions were regarded as a great threat to the task force and its mission, but their reactions could not be gauged in advance since internal Somali politics would undoubtedly be involved. It was possible that one faction could welcome the joint task force, while its rival would oppose the coalition. There was a possibility that the force might have to fight its way ashore.*[455]

Question 1: How did the fractious internal political situation impact the necessary planning to appear neutral during an international military intervention into a complex political environment characterized by multiple warring parties and no national government?

The *U.S. Army Restore Hope Soldier Handbook* cautioned soldiers participating in Restore Hope that "political neutrality was not part of the Somali world view."[456] This ingrained viewpoint of politics by the Somali people would make the mission difficult in terms of maintaining neutrality of the force with the mission of setting the conditions to deliver humanitarian relief. UNITAF had to conduct extensive planning in information operations to inform the population of this politically neutral humanitarian mission, and to influence factions to not engage in open conflict with UNITAF forces.

Consequently, what was formerly termed PSYOP was a critical line of operation for Restore Hope: LtGen Johnston knew the successful completion of his mission would be greatly helped by a well-run psychological operations effort. "Having understood the potential impact of PSYOP, I was extremely interested in having PSYOP up front for this operation because I knew ... that it would prevent armed conflict. ... You come in with tanks and people think you're there to hurt them. PSYOP worked well to

convince [Somalis] that we were there with the military capability to take care of the factions and their little armies—that we were going to provide support and safety."[457]

Due to the importance of information operations in this politically fractured operating environment, extensive planning and force allocation for delivery of themes and messages to the Somali people was key to mission effectiveness. UNITAF employed leaflets, a Somali-language newspaper and radio station, and PSYOP loudspeaker teams throughout RESTORE HOPE to reinforce themes and messages of political neutrality and the humanitarian nature of the mission to aid all the Somali people.

This internal political structure made political neutrality of the force – a critical requirement for mission success – difficult throughout all operations in Somalia. For the duration of Restore Hope, UNITAF was able to maintain political neutrality with the major factions (despite some conflicts with warlords such as Aideed) to successfully transition

Figure 6-9: Somali Youth Holding Restore Hope Leaflet, *Source: Restoring Hope.*[458]

the mission to UNOSOM II. However, follow-on operations in Somalia were completely compromised by the failure of UN forces to appear to remain neutral. In fact, open conflict with some of the major factions precipitated the eventual U.S. pullout from UNOSOM II in 1994 and the eventual end of the UN mission to Somalia in 1995. Since that time, Somalia would remain a "failed state" in terms of national governance.

 Question 2: How did the lack of national political institutions complicate the operational requirements to provide a secure environment for international relief operations to take place?

The complete collapse of civil authority meant that UNITAF found itself conducting many tasks that host nation agencies could have performed such as management of the port of Mogadishu, managing airspace over southern Somalia, and assisting in the reestablishment of police forces.[459] These mission enablers required extensive forces and detailed planning that may not have been necessary in an operational environment with functioning host nation civil agencies that are often present in contemporary HA/DR missions.

6.4.3.5   Belief Systems

Question: How did the Somali proverb and culturally ingrained belief of kinship and clan above all else ("my clan against the world") impact mission effectiveness?

Beliefs influence the way people perceive their world, resulting in a specific worldview that influences the way that people in the group interact with each other. While a group's beliefs influence behavior, the inverse is true as well: behavior causes group beliefs. People create relationships with each other, among groups, and with the environment. These relationships evolve into social and mental structures. Within a group, these relationships and structures need to be explained or justified as normal and proper. Cultural beliefs perform this function. These beliefs condition the way later generations of the

group understand the substance and meaning of phenomena and human activity as related to their particular relations and structures.[460]

The *U.S. Army Restore Hope Soldier Handbook* highlighted for soldiers going to Somalia that "Somalis did not need to take direct responsibility for their own actions, nor were they responsible in any moral sense for the well-being of those not bound to them by kinship ties." [461] Certainly this worldview among and within the various clans was a cultural belief learned through inherited group experiences and practices throughout the history of the Somali people. With no loyalty beyond family kinship and clan, Somalis did not necessarily view famine or starvation as a national problem requiring a comprehensive solution. Rather, clans took the viewpoint of protecting their own and the consequences on other clans or groups across Somalia had no moral resonance spurring cooperative efforts among the factions. Thus, food distribution by the UN/NGOs and the supporting security efforts by UNITAF were necessarily localized with the specific clans -- instead of across the battlespace HRSs, which were arbitrarily established and were not aligned along clan affiliations or territory.

The clans and factions throughout the UNITAF AO did not cooperate for the common good of all the Somali people affected by the severe famine that triggered the mission. One military scholar explained to troops deploying to Restore Hope this social phenomenon specific to Somalia: "There are two situations which traditionally unite the quarrelsome Somali clans: (1) religious revivals, normally under a charismatic leader, sometimes leading to a religious crusade, or jihad , against either less devout Somalis or non-Muslim peoples; and (2) resistance to foreign invasion of Somali ethnic territory and/or the reconquest of territories in which Somali culture predominates."[462] Since neither of these situations existed in the humanitarian mission of Restore Hope, the clans did not unite or even cooperate with each other for the common good of the nation of Somalia.

6.5   Conclusion: Enduring Lessons on Culture from Operation Restore Hope

---

When U.S. troops embarked on Operation Restore Hope, they set off on what many believed to be a relatively simple mission. Their task was to assist the UN in its efforts to deliver food to the Somali people. The U.S. role would be both logistic and tactical in that it would provide assistance through transport and, more important, by protecting the workers and means of distribution. The troops would find a country different from any they had seen, with rules and customs they did not understand, a climate that made even routine operations difficult, and a people who, while needing their assistance, did not necessarily appreciate the requirement.[463]

Operation Restore Hope demonstrated that a military response to a humanitarian crisis in a complex cultural environment can achieve success. Policymakers, planners, and operators should always analyze how specific cultural factors impact the purpose and end state of missions. In the case of Restore Hope – one successful military mission conducted between two other less effective military missions – the tasks and mission-success criteria were achievable within the context of the unique cultural features of the operating environment. One military study evaluated the success of Restore Hope in this way: "Judged by the criteria set forward in the CINCCENT and JTF OPORDs, Operation Restore Hope was a resounding success. The worst of the famine in southern Somalia was over, thanks to the acceleration of humanitarian relief operations following the arrival of coalition forces. As one indication of UNITAF's effectiveness on this front, U.S. authorities terminated Operation Provide Relief, the airlift of food out of

Kenya, in February 1993. By the time UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for the food program in early May, the relief community had declared the "emergency" in Somalia over."[464]

Despite some setbacks and incidents, Operation Restore Hope succeeded in its goal of bringing an end to mass starvation. The heavily armed UNITAF units quickly established security in their sectors, and an uneasy truce kept the peace between the factions. There were some warning signs on the horizon, however, as UN diplomats began to press for a more active role of the military in confiscating weapons and in forcing some kind of political settlement. "Mission creep" began to enter the vocabulary of those serving in Somalia, and soon after the United States turned over the mission completely to the United Nations in May, the situation began to unravel.[465]

An honest evaluation of the ability of a military force to create a lasting peace within the social, political, and economic structures may have resulted in termination of U.S. military involvement after success in alleviating the famine during Operation Restore Hope. Instead, the UN, supported by U.S. forces in Somalia, stepped off on goals by the subsequent force UNOSOM II that deeper scrutiny of these dimensions of operational culture would have proven difficult if not futile. Ultimately, the UN and U.S. forces withdrew from Somalia in 1995, with the UN goals of UNOSOM II unfulfilled.

Figure 6-10: Marines from Restore Hope Board Charter to Return Home. *Source: Restoring Hope.*[466]

One AAR summarizes a final analysis: "The United States entered Somalia in December 1992 to stop the imminent starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. Although it succeeded in this mission, the chaotic political situation of that unhappy land bogged down U.S. and allied forces in what became, in effect, a poorly organized United Nations nation-building operation. In a country where the United States, perhaps naively, expected some measure of gratitude for its help, its forces received increasing hostility as they became more deeply embroiled into trying to establish a stable government. The military and diplomatic effort to bring together all the clans and political entities was doomed to failure as each sub-element continued to attempt to out-jockey the others for supreme power. The Somali people were the main victims of their own leaders, but forty-two Americans died and dozens more were wounded before the United States and the United Nations capitulated to events and withdrew. American military power had established the conditions for peace in the midst of a famine and civil war, but, unlike later in Bosnia, the factions were not exhausted from the fighting and were not yet willing to stop killing each other and anyone caught in the middle. There was no peace to keep. The American soldier had, as always, done his best under difficult circumstances to perform a complex and often confusing mission. But the best soldiers in the world can only lay the foundation for peace; they cannot create peace itself."[467]

A more thorough analysis of how the operational culture factors in Somalia would impact mission end state could have been conducted by UN and U.S. policymakers. This study and viewing operations through the lens of operational culture principles may have prevented the "mission creep" that resulted in UN forces becoming entangled in a civil war within a complex foreign culture.

[421] George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel, *JTF Operations Since 1983*, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), 169.

[422] Dennis P. Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993,* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2005), 1.

[423] Ibid., 29.

[424] Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, *My Clan Against the World: U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 27.

[425] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope,* 24.

[426] Ibid., 24.

[427] Ibid., 25.

[428] *Somalia After Action Report (ARR) and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994*, Center of Military History United States Army, (United States Forces, Washington, D.C: United States Army Center of Military History, 2003), 55.

[429] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope*, 1.

[430] *Somalia AAR*, 55.

[431] Ibid.

[432] Baumann and Yates with Washington, *My Clan Against the World,* 10.

[433] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope,* 2.

[434] Walter S. Clarke, *Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-1993*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 9.

[435] Baumann et. al, *My Clan Against the World,* 9.

[436] Clarke, *Background Information,* 2.

[437] Ibid., 2-3.

[438] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope,* 64.

[439] Ibid., 10.

[440] Ibid., 8.

[441] Ibid., 23.

[442] Ibid., 27.

[443] Ibid., 43.

[444] Baumann et. al, *My Clan Against the World,* 28.

[445] *Somalia AAR,* 53.

[446] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope,* 37.

[447] Ibid., 119.

[448] Ibid.

[449] Ibid.

[450] Richard Stewart, *The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994*, (Washington D.C: United States Army Center of Military History, 2002), 8.

[451] Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 14.

[452] *Somalia AAR,* 54.

[453] Allard, *Somalia Operations*, 10, 11.

[454] *Somalia AAR*

[455] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope,* 24.

[456] *Somalia AAR*, 55.

[457] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope,* 137.

[458] Ibid., 139.

[459] Stewart et. al, *JTF Operations Since 1983,* 166.

[460] Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter, Principles and Applications*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2008), 155.

[461] *Somalia AAR*, 55.

[462] Clarke, *Background information,* 16.

[463] Baumann et. al, *My Clan Against the World*, 9.

[464] Ibid., 88.

[465] Stewart, *The United States Army,* 14.

[466] Mroczkowski, *Restoring Hope,* 146.

[467] *Somalia AAR*, 14.