SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2nd Bn, 7th Mar ltr 3/RAS/gwr over 1500 of May66

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AOJD)
Via: (1) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

2. It is believed that the Command Diary of the 2nd Battalion, Seventh Marines, hereby forwarded, contains significant material of historical value, not previously submitted.

LOUIS H. WILSON
By direction
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2ndBn, 7thMar ltr 3/RAS/gwr/1500 dtd 7 May 1966

From: Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
     (2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
     (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary: forwarding of

    1. Forwarded.

R. F. MAIDEN
R. F. MAIDEN
By direction
Unclassified Upon Removal of the Enclosure

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment
      (2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
      (3) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
      (4) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary; forwarding of

Encl: (1) 2/7 Command Diary for the period 18 May to 31 December 1965

1. The enclosed diary is a chronology of events with supporting documents covering this battalion's deployment and the first six months of operations in RVN. This document is forwarded in the belief that information contained therein has not previously been provided through normal channels and may be of historical value. This is particularly true of the period where this command was operating in Qui Nhon under operational control of the Commanding General, Field Force, Vietnam.

2. In the event via addresses do not deem the forwarding of this document appropriate, it is requested that it be returned to this battalion.

LEON N. UTTER

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES 661274
FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2d Bn, 7th Mar ltr 3/RAS/gwr Ser 005-66 over 1500 dtd 7May66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Diary; forwarding of (U)

1. Forwarded. The material enclosed is considered to be of historical value to the Marine Corps.

M. C. DALBY
By direction
THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CO, 2nd Bn, 7th Mar ltr 3/RAS/gwr over 1500 of May66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D).
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary; forwarding of

1. Forwarded.

2. This endorsement is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of the basic correspondence.

J. R. CHATSSON
By direction
Command Diary

1. Organization Data Sheet
   a. BLT 2/7
   b. 18 May 1965 to 31 Dec 1965
   c. Date of submission -
   d. Major R. W. WILSON USMC Commanding
   LtCol L. N. UTTER USMC Commanding
   e. Command Post - MCB, Camp Pendleton
   USS PICKAWAY
   CAMP SCHWAB, OKINAWA
   USS OKANOGAN
   QU BU Nhon, S Vietnam
   CR O73213
   PHU THANH Valley
   Qui Nhon, S Vietnam
   CR O18197
   USS PAUL REVERE
   APA 248
   CHU LAI ENCLOSED

   f. Company Commanders

(1) Company E
   18 May-14 Oct 65; 6-19 Nov 65
   15 Oct-5 Nov 65
   19 Nov-31 Dec 65
   Capt. F. L. TOLLESON
   Capt. A. LEE
   Capt. R. E. THEER

(2) Company F
   18 May-17 Nov 65
   18 Nov-31 Dec 65
   Capt. N. F. WELTY
   Capt. J. M. KOLAN

(3) Company G
   18 May-31 Dec 65
   Capt. W. D. SEYAUR

(4) Company H
   18 May-31 Dec 65
   Capt. M. E. O'CONNOR

(5) H&S Company
   18 May-31 Dec 65
   1st Lt N. H. GROSZ
HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Man #14)
FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

3/JMY/gwr
3120
7 January 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology Report

Ref: (a) Regt 3120.1A

From Log No. 66

Enc: (1) Organizational Data Sheet
(2) Sequential Listing of Events
(3) Task Force Delta OpOrder 1-65
(4) 2nd Bn, 7th Marines Frag Order 14-65
(5) Combat After Action Report (Operation Harvest Moon) of CO
(6) 2nd Bn, 7th Marines to Commanding General, Task Force Delta
(7) 2nd Bn, 7th Mar S-2 Journal for Dec 65

1. As directed by the reference (a), enclosures (1) through (7) are submitted herewith.

Leon N. Utter

7thMar 66 Log N.
0038-66 Copy # 1 of 7
part 3 of Copy 1.

DECLASSIFIED
ORGANIZATION DATA SHEET

1. Designation and Location: 2nd Bn, 7th Marines CP located at BT 513041, Chu Lai, Vietnam

2. Period Covered: 1-31 December 1965

3. Commanding Officer: LtCol Leon N. Utter, USMC

4. Executive Staff: Major G. H. GENTRY Jr, Executive Officer
   1stLt D. A. FLYNN S-1
   1stLt G. V. HARTMAN S-2
   Capt A. J. DOBLET S-3
   1stLt A. E. MCELWAIN S-4

5. Unit Commanders:
   Capt R. E. THEER Company "E"
   Capt J. M. NOLAN Company "F"
   Capt W. D. SEUMOUR Company "G"
   Capt M. E. O'CONNOR Company "H"
   1stLt N. H. GROSZ Jr H&S Company

6. Average monthly strength during period:
   Marine Officer - 38
   Marine Enlisted - 920
   Navy Officer - 3
   Navy Enlisted - 55

Enclosure (1)
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF EVENTS

1. Personnel

   a. Fifteen enlisted Marines were killed in action and five enlisted
      Marines died of wounds as a result of enemy action. Seven Marine
      Officers, Eighty-five Marine enlisted and six Navy enlisted were wounded in
      action during the period. One Navy enlisted died of illness.

   b. Five Marine Officers and forty enlisted Marines were transferred from this command by service record while hospitalized.

   c. Promotions affected during the period:

      GySgt - 1; Sgt - 28; Cpl - 7; LCpl - 14; PFC - 7.

   d. Thirty-two enlisted Marines and one enlisted Navy joined this
      command during the reporting period.

2. Training.

   During the period the Bn continued to train personnel in
   the operation and employment of the Seismic Intrusion Detector System.
   Replacements were received at the end of the month and training has
   commenced for the new personnel, emphasizing small unit tactics, par-
   ticularly as related to lessons learned in Vietnam. One man completed
   the Division Sniper School and the Bn now has a scout/sniper team con-
   sisting of four highly trained persons. The Bn continued to train PP
   units from Ly Tin District. This training was accomplished by integrat-
   ing PP units into Marine units so that the PP's could accompany the
   Marine units on patrols and ambush activity.

3. Special Operations. The Bn participated in Operation "Harvest
   Moon". A detailed account of the operation is included in enclosures
   (3) through (5).

4. Command and Control. The Bn continues under the Operational Control
   of the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines.

5. Close Combat. Close combat during the period was a result of
   Operation "Harvest Moon". Although enclosure (3) provides a detailed
   account of the operation, the battle of Ky Phu on 18 December rein-
   forces several points of standard Marine Corps training and is there-
   fore worthy of elucidation. The use of the helmet and body armor in
   the hot, humid climate has been discussed on many occasions and there
   are merits for and against the use of this equipment. At Ky Phu the
   body armor not only stopped shell fragments, as advertised, but also
   on numerous occasions completely stopped small caliber weapons fire.

Enclosure (2)
On one known occasion a man's life was saved when a small caliber round penetrated his helmet and liner, but did not injure the man. This is considered important because many of the weapons with which the VC are armed are small caliber and will not penetrate the armored vest or the helmet. Much can be said for fire superiority and aggressive action. At Ky Phu the VC were well protected by bunkers and trenches, but the Marines gained and maintained fire superiority and used aggressive fire and maneuver, thus routing the VC at a relatively small cost to the battalion. Flame throwers and demolitions were extremely useful against the VC bunkers. During this action the M-79 proved to be an invaluable weapon. The VC who were engaged at Ky Phu were apparently not accustomed to, nor expecting forceful, aggressive action. They would not have chosen to engage if they did not believe they had the advantage. The statistics contained in enclosure (5), and the fact that the VC fled without policing the battle area, are evidence of the heavy losses the VC sustained.

6. Fire Support. The fire power available to the command through the use of the 81mm Mortar was determined to be worth the difficulties of manpacking the heavy loads over rough terrain on an extended operation. During Operation Harvest Moon, the 81's fired over 1200 rounds of H.E. ammunition. On 14 December they were the only indirect fire support available to neutralize enemy fires in the objective area during a helicopter assault. By rapid employment the 81's were very effective. Also, at Ky Phu the 81's were able to quickly employ and deliver accurate fire on the VC, neutralizing and destroying several enemy positions.

7. Logistics. Operation "Harvest Moon" again proved the paramount importance of the helicopter for re-supply. Terrain, time and weather dictated the use of the helicopter for all resupply. Paragraphs 15.c and 16.b of enclosure (5) contain an analysis of helicopter support during the operation and recommendations for the use of helicopters on future operations.

8. Medical Support. The efficiency of a highly mobile BAS was proven on Operation "Harvest Moon". During a two hour period, over seventy battle casualties were treated on the spot in a makeshift BAS. Splints, battle dressings, medications and numerous bottles of plasma expander (that had been carried many miles over different terrain) proved to be of lifesaving importance. Despite extreme preventive measures, over 200 cases of immersion foot were treated as a result of the operation.

9. Chaplain. During the month there were 13 services held with a total attendance of 375. In addition there were 4 memorial services held with a total attendance of 549. A chapel was constructed in the battalion area using Vietnamese labor and materials at a cost of 48,000 piasters. Twenty benches were also constructed and a cross was erected at a cost of 6,300 piasters.
10. Civil Affairs

a. The MEDCAP team, consisting of 1 doctor, 3 corpsmen, and 1 interpreter from this battalion and 2 Vietnamese nurses from New Life Village, was active 6 days a week, excluding Sundays. Limited medical aid was given to 1530 Vietnamese for an average of 70 per day. The most prevalent treatment was for injuries. In addition, the battalion surgeon has commenced making house calls during MEDCAP and the diagnostic facilities of B-Med are being used when necessary.

b. Large quantities of soap, candy, and dolls were distributed to children of New Life Village, and the village was sprayed regularly for insects to improve the hygienic conditions.

c. ID cards are being prepared for a Popular Force company of Ly Tin District. The Ly Tin District Chief has approved of this project.

d. Technical assistance is being provided to 60 families of Chu Lai New Life Village to enable them to establish a pig farm. The project is 60% complete at the time of this report. Also during the month, assistance was provided to the people in establishing a commercial laundry. Both of these projects are designed to bolster the economy of the village.
Operation Order 1-65

Ref: (a) Map: AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I, IV, 6658 II, III
(b) Div OpnO 343-65
(c) DivO 02000.2c

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces, Annex B (Intelligence).

b. Friendly forces.

(1) 3d Marine Division continues operations against the Viet Cong.

(2) FMAW continues operations against the Viet Cong provides close air support and helicopter support as required.

(3) ARVN Forces.

(a) One ARVN regiment (-) on D-1 in coordination with Task Force Delta advances northwest between Highway 1 and railroad to THANH BINH. On D-Day advances southwest to Phase Lines A and B. It is anticipated that enemy contact will be made in the vicinity of PL B. Every effort will be made by ARVN Forces to maintain this contact.

(b) Provides security at selected bridge sites along route # 1.

(c) 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment (-) (Rein) RF on order feints attack west from HIEP DUC District Headquarters and blocks along line AT 970275 to AT 980260. Annex D (Concept of Operations).

(4) Special Landing Force, Seventh Fleet. Operational control upon arrival objective area.


(6) Naval Gunfire. One (1) DD and one (1) CL provides naval gunfire support.

2. MISSION. Commencing D-Day Task Force Delta in coordination with participating ARVN forces will fix and destroy organized VC elements in the QUE SON-VET AN - HIEP DUC valley complex. This operation is

DECLASSIFIED
essentially a spoiling attack to prevent the Viet Cong from their announced objective of capturing QUE SON. The operation will also eliminate VC forces that have isolated the ARVN out-post at Viet An, permitting ARVN to reestablish lines of communications.

3. EXECUTION.
   b. 2d Bn, 7th Marines,
      (1) On D-Day, M-Hour proceeds by motor march to TAM KY, defends and prepares for helicopter-borne assault.
      (2) On D+1 conducts helicopter-borne assault objective 1 on order.
      (3) On order conducts search and destroy operations as directed.
      (4) On order returns to TAM KY by helicopter and stages for motor march return.
      (5) Provides one platoon security "M" Btry, 4th Bn, 11th Marines motor march and subsequently provides security for LSU at HUONG XUAN.
   c. 3d Bn, 3d Marines,
      (1) On D+1, M-Hour proceeds by motor march to HUONG XUAN defends and prepares for helicopter-borne assault.
      (2) By 1500 on D+1 be prepared for helicopter-borne assault within TAOR.
      (3) On order conduct search and destroy operations as directed.
      (4) On order returns to HUONG XUAN by helicopter and stages for motor march return on order.
   d. Co C (-), 3d Recon Bn.
      (1) On D+1, on order proceeds by motor march to HUONG XUAN on order, helilifts to QUE SON.
      (2) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance of helicopter landing zones and/or conduct general reconnaissance of objective area on order.
II. COORDINATION

e. Co C (-), 3d Engr Bn.

(1) Provides combat engineer support as required.

f. Provisional Arty Bn.

(1) On D+1, K-Hour Bn (-) proceeds by motor march to HUONG XUAN, Helilifts to objective area and establishes firing positions in vicinity QUE SON.

(2) Provide artillery fire support Task Force Delta.

(3) On D-Day, G-Hour Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines proceeds by motor march from CHU LAI to HUONG XUAN, provides artillery fire support ARVN Regt (-) and Task Force Delta.

(4) On D+1 Btry F 2d Bn, 12th Marines proceeds by motor march from DA NANG to HUONG XUAN and prepares to helo lift to QUE SON on order. On D+2 Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Marines proceeds by motor march from DA NANG to HUONG XUAN and prepares for helo lift into the objective area on order.

(5) Be prepared to assume operational control ARVN artillery as directed.

g. Logistic Support Unit.

(1) Provides combat logistic support as required. (Admin Plan 1-65).

h. 3d Motor Transport Bn.

(1) Provides motor transportation for motor march to and from objective area.

(2) Provides motor transportation in objective area as required.

i. Reserve Special Landing Force, BLT 2/1.

(1) Operation control Task Force Delta on arrival objective area.

(2) Be prepared to land by helicopter to reinforce, block, counterattack or exploit gains by Task Force Delta.

j. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) D-Day 8 Dec

(2) K-Hour 0600H

(3) K-Hour 0600H.
(4) G-Hour, 1200H.

(5) This order effective for planning on receipt.

(6) EEI's.

(7) Use CN/CS on authority this Headquarters.

(8) Coordination with ARVN units in objective area through Headquarters Task Force Delta.

(9) Minimize noncombat casualties and damage to crops.

(10) Rules of engagement as detailed in reference (b) shall be strictly observed.

(11) The unclassified code name for this operation is HARVEST MOON.

(12) Each U.S. Unit will plan for psychological warfare and civic actions.

(13) Captured personnel and documents in accordance with Annex B (Intelligence).

(14) Fire Coordination Line. Appendix 1 (Operation Overlay) to Annex D (Concept of Operations). ARVN units will not fire to the west or north of the FCL without coordinating with Task Force Delta headquarters (FSCC). Task Force Delta fire support elements will not fire to the east or south of the FCL without coordinating with 5th ARVN Regt Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Administrative Plan 1-65.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. Communications-electronics.

(1) Annex E (Communication-electronics) and reference (c).

b. Command Posts.

(1) Task Force Delta

(2) All units report command post locations when established.
ANNEXES:

A - Task Organization
B - Intelligence (To be issued)
C - Air Support
D - Concept of Operation
E - Communications-Electronics
F - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 1-65

Ref: (a) CG, 3d Mar Div msg 061407Z Dec

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Commander Task Force Delta

Brig Gen HENDERSON

Hq

Composite Comm Plat
Det Hq Co, Hq Bn

2d Bn, 7th Marines (-) (Rein)

LtCol UTTER

2d Plat, Co C, 3d Engr Bn
HST, Co A, 3d SF Bn

3d Bn, 3d Marines (-) (Rein)

LtCol DORSEY III

4th Plat, Co C, 3d Engr Bn
HST, Co A, 3d SF Bn

Provisional Arty Bn

LtCol SNYDER

Det Hq Btry, 12th Marines
Btry C, 1st Bn, 12th Marines
Btry F, 2d Bn, 12th Marines
Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines

Co C (-), 3d Recon Bn

Capt REVELL

Co C (-), 3d Engr Bn

Capt O’LAUGHLIN

Logistic Support Unit

Maj BENSTEAD

A Co (-) (Rein), 3d Shore Party Bn

Det, Bulk Fuel Co, FLSG
Det, Ammo Co, FLSG
Det, Ration Co, FLSG
Det, ECD, FLSG
Det, MABS (TAFDS), MAG (HMM)
Clearing Plat (-) (Rein), 3d Med Bn
Plat, MF Co, Hq Bn
Det, 3d Engr Bn
Det, 1st Bridge Plot, 7th Engr Bn

2d HT Bn (Hein)

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL L. H. MANS

W.F. Dohler
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Annex C (Air Support) to Operation Order 1-65

Ref:  
(a) Maps: AMS Series, L-701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I, IV; 6658 II and III  
(b) FMFM 7-3 Air Support  
(c) FMFM 7-1 Fire Support Coordination  
(d) Third Marine Division OP Order 343-65

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.  
   a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).  
   b. Friendly forces.  
      (1) FMAW provides tactical air support to include offensive air support,  
          air assault support and an airborne command/control capability as  
          required.  
      (2) 7th Fleet provides naval gunfire and amphibious support to Task Force  
          Delta on request.  

2. PROCEDURES.  
   a. Commander Task Force Delta establishes bomblines and publishes changes  
      thereto as they occur.  
   b. Air support missions will be conducted in accordance with the schedule  
      contained in Appendix 3 to this Annex and as otherwise directed.  
   c. Air-to-Ground strikes within the bombline must be under positive control  
      of TACP, TAC (A) or ASRT. Objective area is within range of both ASRT's  
      (Da Nang and Chu Lai).  
   d. Coordination of supporting fires in accordance with references (b), (c)  
      and (d). When Marine Air Support is called into support the ARVN,  
      ARVN artillery will be called off.  
   e. Mark friendly front lines with front line marking panels and/or colored  
      smoke prior to executing air-to-ground strikes.  
   f. Use UTM grid contained in reference (a) for all air support missions.  
   g. Use normal mission request procedures as indicated in references (b) and  
      (c).  
   h. Control and Orbit Points for air support flights will be designated in  
      Tactical Air Requests.

C-1
i. Alert status of on-call support aircraft as follows:
   
   Condition I - Two minutes
   Condition II - Five minutes
   Condition III - Fifteen minutes
   Condition IV - Thirty minutes
   Condition V - As ordered

j. Medical evacuees will be brought to the clearing station at the LSA. They will be further evacuated to C Med or B Med at the discretion of the Medical Platoon. ARVN Med Evacs will be taken to the ARVN hospital at Da Nang unless otherwise directed.

k. Aerial Delivery. See Appendix 2 (Aerial Delivery)

l. Prisoners of War (POW) will be taken

m. Aircraft accidents or incidents should be reported in detail to DASC or FSCC by the most expeditious means giving complete details.


BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W. F. DOEBLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

1 Air Communications
2 Air Delivery
3 Air Support Schedule (To be issued separately)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operations Order 1-65

C-2
Appendix 1 (Air Communications) to Annex C (Air Support) to Operation Order 1-65

Time Zone: Hotel

1. General. Air communications in accordance with this Appendix and Annex E.

2. Call Signs
   a. Air communications call signs in accordance with TAB (A). Additional call signs are contained in Annex E (Communications Plan).
   b. Aircraft voice call signs will contain the respective air group call sign, event number and position of the aircraft in the flight.

3. Frequency Plan. All frequencies and net activation will be in accordance with TAB (B).


BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W. F. DOEHLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

TABS:
A - Call Signs
B - Frequency Plans
TAB A (Call Signs) to Appendix 1 (Air Communications) to Annex C (Air Support) to Operation Order 1-65.

Time Zone: Hotel

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BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W. F. DOEHNER
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
TAB B (Frequency Plan) to Appendix 1 (Air Communications) to Annex C (Air Support) to Operation Order 1-65

Time Zone: Hotel

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Landshark Monitors - A, C, D, (DEVASTATE BRAVO) TAC 2422, H, I, L, O, & P
Landshark Xray Monitors - B, F, I, P, K, or M
Landshark Bravo Monitors - B, F, I, O, P, K or M

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W. F. DOEHLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Appendix 2 (Air Delivery) to Annex C (Air Support) to Operations Order 1-65

Time Zone: Hotel

1. Organization

2. General. First Marine Aircraft Wing provides aerial delivery of supplies from airfields to be designated.

3. Operating Procedures
   a. Elements of Aerial Delivery Platoon, operating at such airfields as may be directed, establish packing and handling facilities for air delivery of supplies as directed.

   b. Submit requests for air delivered supplies via command channels to Task Force Delta Air Officer or his representative using the format contained in TAB A.

   c. Make maximum effort to salvage parachutes and air delivery containers. Turn in daily to Battalion S-4.

4. Communications-Electronics. See Appendix 1 (Air Communications) and Annex E (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-65.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W. F. DOEHLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

TABS:

☑ A - Aerial Delivery Request Form

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65

G-2-1
TAB A (Air Delivery Request) to Appendix 2 (Air Delivery) to Annex C (Air Support) to Operation Order 1-65

**Time Zone:** Hotel

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ALFA</th>
<th>BR AVO</th>
<th>CHARLIE</th>
<th>DELTA</th>
<th>ECHO</th>
<th>FOXTROT</th>
<th>GOLF</th>
<th>HOTEL</th>
<th>INDIA</th>
<th>JULIET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Air Delivery Request**

- Support unit
- Pickup point
- Pickup date
- Drop Time
- Drop zone chart numbers
- Drop zone coordinates
- Controller freq, PRI/Sec
- Call signs: ACFT/Control Agency
- Vehicles/Class Cargo/Cargo Weight
- Drop zone markings:
  1. Panel color/pattern
  2. Smoke color
  3. Pyrotechnics color
- Contact origin and phone number
- Contact pickup point and phone number
- Remarks

**BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON**

W. F. DOELIER

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

**DISTRIBUTION:** Annex F (Distribution) to Operations Order 1-65
Annex D (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 1-65

Time Zone: H

1. Concept of Operations.

a. General. Task Force Delta consisting of two Marine Battalions, the Special Landing Force, 7th Fleet (SLF), and other supporting 3d Mar Div elements in coordination with an ARVN Regiment, will conduct a three stage search and destroy operation in the QUE SON-VIET AN-HIEP DUC valley complex. Marine logistic support will be from an established base complex, in the vicinity of HUONG XUAN.

b. Definition of Stages.

(1) Stage I. Period D-1 and D-Day. D-1 ARVN forces search and destroy enemy forces in vicinity of THANG BINH. D-Day ARVN forces cross LD at 0500H proceed generally southwest along Route 35 to vicinity Phase Line B. Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines, with one rifle platoon from 2/7, moves by motor march from CHU LAI enclave to vicinity of HUONG XUAN to provide artillery fire support for ARVN forces in vicinity of Phase Line B. 2d Bn, 7th Marines motor marches from CHU LAI to vicinity TAM KY.

(2) Stage II. Period D+1 to D+10. ARVN forces maintain contact enemy force. 2d Bn, 7th Marines is helolifted on D+1 to vicinity Objective 1, seized Objective, and is then prepared to move out to seek out and destroy the enemy as ordered. On D+1 all other elements of task force except SLF moves from DA NANG enclave to either the THANG BINH or QUE SON complex. Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines continues to support from position at HUONG XUAN. 3d Bn, 3d Marines and SLF prepare for immediate commitment to objective area on order. Logistic Support Unit supports force from D+1 to D+10 from LSA vicinity HUONG XUAN. Force Command Group, Prov Arty Bn (-), Recon Co (-) bases at QUE SON on D+1. No major displacement of this element, with the exception of the Recon Co (-), is contemplated prior to D+10.

(3) Stage III. D+11 to D+12. All elements of Task Force Delta withdraw by helo/foot/motor march to their respective enclaves. LSA transfers surplus supplies to FLISG control in enclave. Operation HARVEST MOON terminates D+12.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W.F. DOELHER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution)
to Operation Order 1-65
APPENDIX

1 - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65

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<tr>
<td>4th MARINES</td>
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<td>12th MARINES</td>
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BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

[Signature]

W.F. DOehler
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to
Operation Order 1-65
Appendix 6 (Switchboard Code Names) to Annex E (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

3d Mar Div
TF Delta
3d Bn, 3d Mar
2d Bn, 7th Mar
2d Bn, 1st Mar
3d MT Bn
Logistic Spt Unit
DisC
Prov Arty Bn
C Btry 1/12
F Btry 2/12
W Btry 1/11
M Btry 4/11

SHOVE
FINCH HITTER
SWAIN
PATSTUFF
TBA
YAGHT
PANHANDLE ALFA
DEVESTATE BRAVO
FINCH HITTER 24
GOOSE CHARLIE
WAGON MASTER FOXTROT
TBA
FLAID MIKE

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

[Signature]

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Appendix 5 (Radio Frequency Assignment) to Annex B (Communications- Electronics) to Operation Order 1-65.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. **Radio Frequency Assignment.**

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2. **Naval Gunfire.**

| NGF Control       | (P) 4301  | D=30       | B        | 100   |
|                   | (S) 8630  | D=68       | B        | 100   |
| SFC Spot          | (1) 3224  | D=16       | B        | 100   |
|                   | (3) 5120  | D=39       | B        | 100   |
| SFCP Local        | 48.6      | D=243      | D        | 16    |
| NGF Air Spot      | (P) 262.2 | D=300      | E        | 10    |
|                   | (S) 318.6 | D=307      | E        | 10    |
3. **Tactical Air Nets**

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<td>TAD #1 (Red)</td>
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<td>#2 (Green)</td>
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4. **Helicopter Nets**

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<td># 2 (Black)</td>
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5. **2d Bn 1st Marines**

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6. **3d Bn 3d Marines**

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7. 23 Bn 17th Marines.

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8. Artillery.

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<td>D-148</td>
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<td>16</td>
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E -5-3
9. **3d Motor Transport Battalion.**

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**BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON**

W.F. DOEHLER

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

**DISTRIBUTION:** Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Appendix 4 (Radio Frequency Employment Chart) to Annex E (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-65.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

**LEGEND:**

- C - Net Control
- X - Guard
- C - When Directed
- Y - Copy
- R - As Required
- L - Listen

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**DECLASSIFIED**
BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W.F. DOEHLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Appendix 3 (Radio Call Signs) to Annex (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

3 Mar Div
TF Delta
3D Bn 3D Mar
2D Bn 7TH Mar
2D Bn 1ST Mar
3D MT Bn
Liaison O/ARVN Regt
TACP W/ARVN Regt
Logistic Spt Unit
DACO
DACO (Airborne)
Arty Bn GRP
"C" Btry 1/12
"F" Btry 2/12
"W" Btry 1/11
"W" Btry 4/11
"C" Co 3D Recon Bn
Air Observer

Monroe
Murphy
Warehouse
Dixie Diner
Glimmer
Slow Roll
Monroe Kilo
Monroe Kilo 14
Ripe Peach Alpha
Landskark Bravo
Landskrk X-Ray
Ring Broom
Permission Charlie
Sunrise Foxtrot
Henpecked
Ruggles Mike
Scat Charlie
Rosemont (Phonetic Suffix)

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W.P. DOHILER
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
Appendix 2 (Cryptographic) to Annex E (Communication - Electronics) to Operation Order 1-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC
   a. Authentication
      (1) KAA-60 has been designated as the in-country authentication system and will be used on all radio circuits external to Task force Delta and on all internal radio circuits guarded or controlled by Task force Delta. KAA-60 may be used on all other task force circuits.
   b. Numeral Codes
      (1) KAC-138 is effective for joint use in plain language messages.
   c. Crypto Channels
      (1) KAK-2641 is the common on-line crypto channel for Task Force Delta and 3rd Marine Division.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGDIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W.F. DOEHLE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corp.
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
APPENDIX 1 (Radio Relay Plan) to Annex E (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 1-65

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON

W. F. DOKLER
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65

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Copy of Copies
TASK FORCE DELTA
DA NANG, RVN
070800R DEC 1965

E-1-1
Annex E (Communication-Electronic) to Operation Order 1-65

Ref: (a) 3d Mar Div O 0200.2c (COI)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces.

(1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 1-65

(2) The enemy has the capability to:

(a) Employ imitative deception.

(b) Conduct extensive wire tapping.

(c) Jam any radio circuit.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) See Operation Order 1-65.

(2) Command Posts.

(a) D-Day

Task Force Delta 955750
Prov Arty Bn 955750
2d Bn, 1st Marines Afloat
3d Bn, 3d Marines 975708
2d Bn, 7th Marines 380225
3d Motor Transport Bn DA NANG TAOR
Logistic Support Unit DA NANG TAOR

(b) D+1

Task Force Delta Vicinity of C23349
Prov Arty Bn 023349
2d Bn; 1st Marines Afloat
3d Bn; 3d Marines 150450
2d Bn, 7th Marines 000315
3d Motor Transport Bn DA NANG TAOR
Logistic Support Unit 160420

(c) Report Command Post locations when established.
2. **MISSION.** Commencing 0200H communications electronic elements of Task Force Delta provide continuous support for operations in the objective area.

3. **EXECUTION.**
   
a. **Composite Communications Platoon.**
   
   (1) On D-Day establish communications center within 3d Mar Div CP.
   
   (2) Establish radio communications with subordinate elements and ARVN forces.
   
   (3) Be prepared to displace to objective area on D+1.
   
   (4) Establish radio-relay circuit from objective area to 3d Mar Div Headquarters employing a relay station at LSU Headquarters.
   
   (5) Attach three Radio Sets, AN/MRC-62 to the Logistic Support Unit for movement to the objective area. One (1) AN/MRC-62 to be equipped with slings and basket for helilift.

b. **2d Battalion, 1st Marines.**
   
   (1) Enter appropriate Task Force Delta radio nets when directed.

c. **2d Battalion, 3d Marines.**
   
   (1) Enter appropriate Task Force Delta radio nets on D-Day at 0001.

d. **2d Battalion, 7th Marines.**
   
   (1) Enter appropriate Task Force Delta radio nets upon departure from the CHU LAI TAOR.

e. **3d Motor Transport Battalion.**
   
   (1) Provide convoy control communications as required.

f. **Logistic Support Unit.**
   
   (1) Enter appropriate Task Force Delta radio nets prior to departure from the DA NANG TAOR.
   
   (2) Provide radio-relay equipment to be employed on Task Force Delta-3d Mar Div link with a suitable operating site within the logistic support area and necessary food and fuel for a period of about ten days.
   
   (3) Establish internal wire system as required.
   
   (4) One channel of multi-channel radio-relay equipment is designated for Logistic Support Unit use. See Appendix 1 (Radio-Relay Plan).
g. **Air Support Communications.** See Annex C (Air Support) to Operation Order 1-65.

h. **Coordinating Instructions.**

1. **Communications Center.**
   - (a) See Appendix 2 (Cryptographic).
   - (b) Use GMT (ZULU) in all date time groups.

2. **Messenger Service.**
   - (a) Helicopter messenger service as required.
   - (b) Foot and vehicle messengers must be provided with adequate security prior to departure from command posts.

3. **Radio.**
   - (a) Tactical radio call signs in accordance with reference (a) and Appendix 3 (Radio Call Signs).
   - (b) See Appendix 4 (Radio Frequency Employment Chart).
   - (c) See Appendix 5 (Radio Frequency assignment).

4. **Wire.**
   - (a) Internal CP wire systems only until the tactical situation permits the installation of trunks.
   - (b) See Appendix 6 (Switchboard Code Names).


4. **Administration and Logistics.**

a. See Administrative Order 1-65.

b. Resupply of wire and common use batteries available from LSU.

c. Emergency air evacuation of electronic equipment to Force Logistic Support Group (DA NANG TAOR) as required.

**BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENDERSON**

W.F. DOEHLER

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

E-3

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APPENDIXES:

1 - Radio Relay Plan
2 - Cryptographic
3 - Radio Call Signs
4 - Radio Frequency Employment Chart
5 - Radio Frequency Assignments
6 - Switchboard Code Names

DISTRIBUTION: Annex F (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-65
FRAG ORDER 14-65

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series L701 Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I, IV, 6658 II, III (b) Task Force Delta OpOrder 1-65 (c) 2nd Bn 7th Mar (Rein) OpOrder 206-65

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

   a. Enemy forces. Annex A (Intelligence) to reference (c) and current INTSUMS.

   b. Friendly forces.

      (1) 1st MAW - CAS

      (2) MAC-16 and MAC-36 helo support

      (3) Arty Group elements support from Quá Son

      (4) 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines (-)(Rein)

      (5) One ARVN Regt (-)

      (6) 3rd Bn, 5th Regt (-)(Rein) RF

      (7) Plat M50 Ontos DS for Motorized-Mechanized Movement

      (8) Shore Party HST in DS 2/7

   c. Attachments and detachments. Co F detaches one platoon to provide security of 155 How Battery at 080730H.

2. MISSION

   2nd Bn, 7th Mar (Rein) moves by motorized-mechanized column via National Highway No. 1 to vicinity of T.I.M KY on D-day; defends and prepares helicopter loading zone for helicopter-borne assault on objective 1 on D+1; and on order conducts search and clear operations as directed. Provide one platoon for security of Battery 4th Bn, 11th Marines and subsequent security of LSU, THANG BINH.

3. EXECUTION

   a. Concept of operation. 2nd Bn 7th Marines (Rein) conducts motorized-mechanized column to vicinity of T.I.M-KY, establish and defends helicopter loading zone for helicopter-borne assault. Co's G and H make
initial helo lift to secure designated LZ on D+1 to be followed by remainder of the battalion into LZ. On order battalion moves to seize objective 1 and subsequently conducts search and clear operations as directed.

b. Co E (Rein).

Attached: 1st Sect 81mm Mortars
1st Sqd, Eng Plat
Arty FO Tm
81mm Mortar FO Tm

(1) Move as part of motorized-mechanized column as directed to vicinity of T.H KY on D-day, and occupy assigned defensive position on perimeter helicopter loading zone. (Annex A Operation Overlay).

(2) Be prepared to conduct helicopter-borne assault on order to seize objective 1, and subsequently conduct search and clear operations as directed.

c. Co G (Rein).

Attached: 2nd Sect 81mm Mortars
2nd Sqd, Eng Plat
Arty FO Tm
81mm Mortar FO Tm
FC Tm

(1) Move as part of motorized-mechanized column as directed to vicinity of T.H KY on D-day, and occupy assigned defensive position on perimeter helicopter loading zone. (Annex A Operation Overlay).

(2) On order conduct helicopter-borne assault to secure assigned portion of designated LZ.

(3) Be prepared to seize objective 1 on order, and subsequently conduct search and clear operations as directed.

d. Co H (Rein).

Attached: 3rd Sect 81mm Mortars
3rd Sqd, Eng Plat
Arty FO Tm
81mm Mortar FO Tm
FC Tm

(1) Move as part of motorized-mechanized column as directed to vicinity of T.H KY on D-day, and occupy assigned defensive position on perimeter helicopter loading zone. (Annex A Operation Overlay).
(2) On order conduct helicopter-borne assault to secure assigned portion of designated LZ.

(3) Be prepared to seize objective 1 on order, and subsequently conduct search and clear operations as directed.

e. " Plat, Co C, 1st AT Bn. Provides DS for motor-mechanized column to and from TM KY.

f. 106th Plat (-)/Flame Sect. Be prepared to support operations as directed within assigned TM OR.

g. Bn Reserve Co F (-)/(Rein).

(1) Move as part of motorized-mechanized column as directed to vicinity of TM KY on D-day, and occupy assigned defensive position on perimeter helicopter loading zone. (Annex A Operation Overlay).

(2) Be prepared to move on order by helicopter to designated LZ.

(3) Be prepared to conduct search and clear operations as directed.

(4) Provide one platoon as security for M Battery, 4th Bn, 11th Marines and subsequently act as security for LSU, THIETING BINH.

h. Coordinating instructions.

(1) D-day 8 Dec 65

(2) The unclassified code name for this operation is "HARVEST MOON".

(3) L-hr 090730H Dec 1965

(4) Leading elements of motorized-mechanized column cross IP (BT 515049) at 080800 Dec 1965.

(5) Reference (c) para 3.1.

(6) Plan and conduct psychological and civic actions as directed in reference (c).

(7) Captured personnel and documents in accordance with reference (b).  All VC and VOS including weapons captured will be tagged.

(8) Use of CN/CS on authority CG Task Force Delta.

(9) Coordinate with ARVN units in objective area through Task Force Delta Headquarters.

(10) Maximum alert conditions for mines and booby traps.
4. ADMIN-LOGISTICS
   a. Admin Order 205-65
   c. All units will be supplied with three days of Class I, III and V.

5. COMM-ELECTRONICS
   a. Annex F to reference (c).
   b. Reference (b).
   c. Command Posts
      (1) CO 2/7 BT 304230 initially then objective 1 area.
      (2) Report CP locations when established.
   d. Reports.
      (1) Companies submit situation report by radio every two hours unless there is contact.
      (2) Progress report to Task Force Delta every two hours after execution.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL UTTER

G. H. GENTRY, Jr
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX:
A - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Special
DECLASSIFIED

**CIA**  
**Priority**

**From:** 

**DD**

**To:** 

**CREW CUT**

**Harvest Moon Frag Order # 11-45**

**Situation:** No change except FAC FM JAN.

**FG H to DOG S**

**BETO to DD F, ENG, PLAT AUG**

**DD, DD H remains on Moon, Murphy &**

**Mission - One CO searches to NE to Glimmer**

**Posit while BNC** continues east on**

**Original Route &**

**Execution**

2. **Concert -** DOG moves to NE at 11:30 h 00 to

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**Communications Center Use Only**

**Comm Center or Releaser Use (Instr - 11)**

**Time Filed**

**Comm Cen No.**

**How Sent**

**Date-Time Group**

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**Cont'd**

**Glimmer Posit then S to Juncture with 3/18 BNC) sweeps route to E to PL 14**

**at 140 22 0 &**

**D. O.F - Advance Guard BNC) Tactical Column on sweep to fast & secure high ground vicinity at 0940 and at 095209 prior to arrival main body that area & juncture with DOG at 1821 00 continue advance E. on order**

**BDCG - Proceed NE by trail from present**

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CONT'D

POSt TO BT 107233 & COORDINATE WITH GLIMMER
AND PASS TO E. BT 11531 THEN S. TO BT 110318
TO JUNCTURE WITH DDF & PREPARE TO CONTINUE
Sweep E. AS PART OF MAIN BODY &

1. RG H. AS PART OF MAIN BODY PROVIDE SECURITY
   FOR CP GROUP. ONE PLAT (REIN) ACT AS REAR
   GUARD &

2. SAME PLAT - ONE SECT TO DDS & REMAIN:
   SECT SUPPORT DDS AND TACTICAL COLUMN &

CONT'D

(1) 141H DDF AND DDSI - 170800 H &
    BN (-) 170830 H &

(2) BE PARTICULARLY ALERT FOR MINES AND
    BOoby TRAPS &

(3) ENSURE POSITIVE ID PRIOR TO FIRING
    & TO PRECLUDE FIRING ON FRIENDLY UNITS &

4. ADMIN - LOG. NO CHANGE

5. COMM-ELEC. CMD GROUP BEHIND DDS & REPORT
   PROGRESS HOURLY

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (INSTR - 11)
DECLASSIFIED

FROM: DD
TO: CCEW CO.
FRAG ORDER #10-65 (HARVEST MOON)
1. SITUATION- NO CHANGE EXCEPT PERMISSION FOR HUMIKEY UNIT ATTACHED

2. MISSION -
DD CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY SWEET OF VALLEY TO EAST TO AWSI #1, AND CONDUCTS HELO BORNE RECON OF SPECIAL BOMBING AREA 

3. EXECUTION

CLASSIFICATION: PERPETUE

CONT'D

2. CONCEPT - DDH CONDUCTS HELO BORNE RECON OF SPECIAL BOMBING AREA (

COMMISSION SEARCH AND DESTROY SWEET OF VALLEY TO EAST LATER REJOINED BY DD HX

B. CCEW - ASSUME POSITION IN TACTICAL COLUMN AS MAIN BODY PROVIDE CLOSE SECURITY FOR CP GROUP

C. DOG - ASSIGNED MISSION AS ADVANCE

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9. PERMISSION WHISKEY SUPPORT BY FIRE HELD. AQUAMCE OF DDA AND L3 PREP OF OTHER DESIGNATED L1238

7. ASSUME MISSION AS SECURITY FOR WHISKEY.

8. DDA WHISKEY - ATTACH ONE SECTION TO DG AND PROBE.

(3) PROVIDE ATTACHMENT AS SECURITY FOR WHISKEY.

(C)糧 THE MISSION AS SECURITY FOR WHISKEY.

7. BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE TEAM FOR BOMBING MISSION.

6. PRICE TO CONDUCT RECON OF SPECIAL MISSION:

5. COMM CENTER LOCAL RECON ELEMENT TO BOMBING MISSION:

4. COMM CENTER LOCAL RECON ELEMENT TO BOMBING MISSION:

3. COMM CENTER LOCAL RECON ELEMENT TO BOMBING MISSION:

2. COMM CENTER LOCAL RECON ELEMENT TO BOMBING MISSION:

1. COMM CENTER LOCAL RECON ELEMENT TO BOMBING MISSION:

DECLASSIFIED
CONT'D

1. COORDINATING INSTR.
   (3) H-HR (XX GYEZ) TABLE 15
      (MN MT FJ) TABLE 14
   (2) L-HR TO BE DESIGNATED DEPENDING ON WEATHER
   (3) I-P FOR TACTICAL COLUMN B (CS ON NO) TABLE 15
      BT (TFUOEL) TABLE 14
   (4) ENSURE ADEQUATE FLANK SECURITY & ESTABLISH
       MARCH COPS ON KEY TERRAIN ALONG ROUTE OF MARCH
   (5) CHECK ROADS AND TRAILS FOR MINES AND ROAD TRAP

   (6) PHASE LINES DESIGNATED - GRID LINES (MG) TABLE 14
       (JW) TABLE 15
   (7) ALL UNITS BE PREPARED TO SELECT AND MARK
       NEW LINES ON THE MOVE

4. ADMIN-LOG - NO CHANGE

5. COMM-ELEC - CMD GROUP REAR OF ADVANCE GUARD
   CP GROUP WITH MAIN BODY
   REPORT WHEN CROSSING PHASE LINES

   [Signature]

   [Date: 19__]
DECLASSIFIED

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1. SITUATION - NO CHANGE EXCEPT DD HUM TERROR ON DD G

2. MISSION - WITHIN ASSIGNED TALKS DD UNITS CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS, APPOINT VC'S AND EQUIPMENT, EVALUATE RESULTS IN VC ZONE AND INTERROGATE PEOPLE ON VC ACTIVITY.

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3. EXECUTION

2. COF - CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED TALK AS ASSIGNED BY DD 6

3. RGH - CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED TALK AS ASSIGNED BY DD 6

4. 7/1 - BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS OF COF AND RGH TO BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE ANY OTHER MISSION ASSIGNED

C. Coordinating Instructions-

1. TALK UNITS CLEAR ADEQUATE L2'S

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4. ADMIN - LOG - NO CHANGE

5. COMM - ELECT - (1) DD CP - NO CHANGE
   (2) REPORT NEW CP'S WHEN ESTABLISHED
   (3) REPORT SITUATION IN ZONE EVERY 24 HRS.

SITUATION - NO CHANGE EXCEPT AIR WILL PREP LZ.

MISSION - CONDUCT HELD BORNE ASSAULT TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN SECTOR.

EXECUTION

1. CONCEPT - COF AND G SEIZE LZ FOLLOWED BY WHISKEY PARK GREEN HOTEL.

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CONT'D

AND YANKEE ORDER SEIZE OBJECTIVE

ASSIGNED

b. CO F - LAND AT 1 HR SEIZE SOUTHERN
180° OF L2 IN B BE PREPARED TO ATTACK
SOUTH ON ORDER.

c. CO G - LAND AT 1 HR SEIZE NORTHERN
180° OF L2 IN BE PREPARED TO ATTACK
SOUTH ON ORDER.

4. WHISKEY - LAND AFTER DOG, AND BE
PREPARED TO SUPPORT ATTACK TO SOUTH.

5. PG INTEL - LAND BESIDE WHISKEY AND
ACT AS RESERVE IN BE PREPARED TO ASSUME
MISSION OF ANY OTHER UNIT.

6. DD HOTEL - CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION.

COORD INSTRUCTIONS

DECLASSIFIED
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(1) L-N-R (IM OJ?EJ) H

(2) ALL UNITS BE PREPARED TO EVALUATE
    RESULTS SPECIAL BOMBING

(3) BE ALERT FOR MINES AND BOoby TRAPS

4 - ADMIN LOG - NO CHANGE

5. COMM - NO CHANGE - COMMAND GROUP WITH

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TIME FILED

COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (NO. 1-11)

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COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY

COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (NO. 1-11)

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3. EXECUTION

3. CONCEPT - ATTACHED ORDER

b. C.G. CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY

AXIS OF ADVANCE &

C. C.G. CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY AXES OF ADVANCE & PROVIDE ONE MAIN ELEMENT SECURITY &

D. C.P. CONTINUESSEARCH MISSION

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY

COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (INSTR - 11)

TIME FILED COMM CEN NO. How SENT DATE-TIME GROUP

CLASSIFICATION PRECEDENCE SEND MOD CLEAR SEND CLEAR

TO

4. END PLANNED SUPPORT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERA-

TIONS & BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE AS SCHEDULED

9. ENDURANCE INSTR

1) DATED 15 MARCH 1965 INSTRUCTION

4) ALL UNITS SELECT WAVE NO. 125 ON MOVES

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY

COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (INSTR - 11)

TIME FILED COMM CEN NO. HOW SENT DATE-TIME GROUP

DECLASSIFIED
3. AREA OF OPERATION AROUND VIET NAM REPORTEDLY HEAVILY MINED.

4. REPORT ARRIVAL AT ALL PHASE LINES.

5. BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE FRAG ORDER 6-15 AT ANY TIME.

4. ADMIN-LOG - ONE DAY CLASS I AND II IN POSSESSION.

5. COMM-ELEC - NO CHANGE.
PATROL ACTION FOR 12 DEC 65

THE ATTACHED PATROL ROUTES ARE ASSIGNED DDF AND DDG.

DDG WILL ESTABLISH BUSES AT FOLLOWING COORD BT 647.302 AND AT 038003.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
1) ASSIGN CHECK POINTS AS DESIRED.
2) ALL PATROLS AND AMBUSHES WILL RETURN AT FIRST LIGHT UNLESS EMERGENCY CONTACT NEGATES, DEPART AT 12000 H.
3) ALL PATROLS/AMBUSHES WILL MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT.
4) PATROL SOP PREVAILS.

DECLASSIFIED
1. Situation

2. Enemy Sit - Current Intums
   a. Friendly Set (1) Glimmer atks. 5 from Present Position
   b. Warehouse Helo Lifts to LZ at BT KPDG Q

3. Mission - DD Conduct Helo Borne Assault to LZ Bowie (at NEDDEY) Then Conduct Search and Destroy

4. Execution
   a. Concept, DDF and DDG Execute Helo Borne Assault into LZ Bowie, Secure LZ and on Order Conduct Search and Destroy Operations to SE and E Q Whiskey CMD Group, CP Rear and DDE follow into LZ in that order (Q)

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CONT'D

A. GO E. FROM ORTIC OR DDG HELO LIFT INTO LZ BOWIE AT 1-HR WITH DDG 0 SECURE EASTERN PORTION OF LZ TAKING 180°& PREPARE TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY ON ORDER OR

B. DDG FROM DDG OR HELO LIFT INTO LZ BOWIE AT 1-HR WITH DDG 0 SECURE WESTERN PORTION OF LZ TAKING 180°& PREPARE TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY

DAY MONTH YEAR TIME SIGNED SIGNATURE AND RANK OF releaser

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY

COMM CENTER OR releaser USE (INSTR - 11)

TIME FILED COMM CEN NO. HOW SENT DATE-TIME GROUP

CONT'D

ON ORDER OR

A. GO H. MAINTAIN PRESENT POSITION & CONDUCT TARGET SURVEILLANCE AND FIRE MISSIONS AS OBSERVED & BE PREPARED TO ASSUME MISSION OF DD F OR DDG OR

GO WHISKEY. ON ORDER HELO LIFT TO LZ BOWIE OR SUPPORT BY FIRE OPERATIONS OF DD OF

DAY MONTH YEAR TIME SIGNED SIGNATURE AND RANK OF releaser

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY

COMM CENTER OR releaser USE (INSTR - 11)

TIME FILED COMM CEN NO. HOW SENT DATE-TIME GROUP

DECLASSIFIED
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

1. L-1A (MAXINO) H&H TENTATIVE
2. L2 BOWIE BT NEEDED
3. MAXIMUM DISPERAL IN L2 NEEDED
4. BE ALERT FOR MINES AND BODY TRANSPORT
5. MARK ALL L2'S CLEARLY AS

ADMIN - LOG - NO CHANGE

COMM - ELEC - STANDARDS SET TO BE USED

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY

COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (INSTR. - 11)

DAY MONTH YEAR TIME SIGNED SIGNATURE AND RANK OF RELEASER

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER USE ONLY

COMM CENTER OR RELEASER USE (INSTR - 11)

TIME FILED COMM CEN NO. HOW SENT DATE-TIME GROUP

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

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FROM: COY'TD

TO:

DD 'F' - ON ORDER CLOSE ON OBJ 'B' AND OCCUPY REVERSE SLOPE BEHIND DD 'H',QO BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATTACK TO OBJ 'C' ON ORDER.

DD 'G' - ON ORDER CLOSE ON OBJ 'B' AND OCCUPY REVERSE SLOPE BEHIND DD 'E' BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATTACK TO OBJ 'C' ON ORDER.

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<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Time Signed</th>
<th>Signature and Rank of Releaser</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Precedence</th>
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FROM: COY'TD

TO:

DD YANKEE - ON ORDER CLOSE ON OBJ 'B' TO POSITIONS TO BE DESIGNATED IN TAC ELEMENTS BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT ATTACK ON OBJ 'E'.

ALL UNITS BE PREPARED TO MOVE BY 1000 HRS.

RESUPPLY CON OBJ 'B' 8/18 1000.

NO. 3 OF 3

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<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Time Signed</th>
<th>Signature and Rank of Releaser</th>
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DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

**SITUATION**: NO CHANGE

**MISSION**: HELIBORN ASSAULT TO SECURES LZ SPRUCE AND ON ORDER SIEGES OBJ A. ON ORDER ATTACK AND SECURES OBJ 1 AND OBJ B.

**EXECUTION**

1. **C&amp;G** LAND AT L-HR IN LZ SPRUCE

2. **BE PREPARED TO ATTACK OBJ A AND/OR OBJ #1**

3. **C&amp;G E LAND IN TRAEE** CO H AND MOVE TO SOUTH BEHIND CO G. BE PREPARED
TO ATTACK OBS 'A' AND OBS 'B'  

1. COF - LAND IN TRUCK OBS 'B' AND MOVE TO NORTH BEHIND BN RESERVE  

2. COORD INST  
   (1) L-HK 0930H  
   (2) FLAG ORDER 1445  

3. NO CHANGE  

4. NO CHANGE  

5. NO CHANGE  

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, Mar. #14
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta

Subj: After Action Report, Operation Harvest Moon

Ref: (a) DivO 3208/LA

Encl: (1) Daily Operation Overlay 9 Dec 65
 (2) " " " 10 Dec 65
 (3) " " " 11 Dec 65
 (4) " " " 12 Dec 65
 (5) " " " 13 Dec 65
 (6) " " " 14 Dec 65
 (7) " " " 15 Dec 65
 (8) " " " 16 Dec 65
 (9) " " " 17 Dec 65
 (10) " " " 18 Dec 65
 (11) " " " 19 Dec 65

1. Name of Operation. "Operation Harvest Moon".

2. Dates of Operation. 060900H to 191830H.

3. Location. Tam Ky (BT 308227), Que Son (BT28343), Viet An (BT 019269) and Song Kheng Valley (BT 085210).


5. Reporting Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Leon H. UTTER, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein).

6. Task Organization.

2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein)  LtCol UTTER
H&S Co (-)  1stLt GROSZ
Co B (Rein)  Capt THEER
Sect 81mm Mortars
Tm, Engr Plat
Arty F.O Tm
81mm Mortar F.O Tm

Co G (Rein)  Capt SETTOW

DECLASSIFIED
The battalion was provided twelve close air support strikes. These included LZ preparation, pre-assault preparation and C.S with both fixed wind aircraft and armed helicopters firing a variety of weapons. M.G 36 and M.G 16 provided transport and resupply helicopter support throughout the operation.

(2) Communications. The PRC/47 is a two-man pack radio for the Tar net that cannot be operated while on the move. Difficulties were experienced communicating with Land Shark "P" due to atmospheric conditions and the unreliability of the BB-451, necessitating each F.C and AIO team to carry two extra BB-451's, further increasing the individual load. While
on the move another means of communications should be made available to
the AD to monitor the TAR net if he is to remain mobile with the CO's
Command Group. Communications with helicopters was difficult becausethe
HST radios were inoperative after the first day. It is imperative that
HST have adequate communications. It is recommended that each battalion
be assigned a landing zone frequency. If HST can monitor this frequency
resupply and med-evac support would be enhanced.

(5) Helicopter Support. When a unit is in a dynamic situation
deep in enemy territory its only means of support is by air. When a
battalion is separated from its company's helicopter support becomes
difficult if different pilots from different squadrons are used. It
is recommended that two to four crews be put in direct support of a
battalion for the duration of an operation. These crews should get a
thorough briefing from the battalion CO, S-3, and/or AD. If the pilot
is abreast of the battalion's, tactical situation he will be able to
provide much better resupply and med-evac support, thus saving aircraft
hours, lost motion and mix up of supplies.

(4) Ordnance. It was found that, with the exception of very thick
rain forest, napalm was far more effective than other ordnance against
weapons positions. In two different cases when air was utilized to
destroy weapons positions, bombs, rockets, and 20mm were expended against
the targets without lasting effect however in each case when napalm was
put on target all enemy fire was stopped permanently. It is recommended
that attack air aircraft include napalm in their mixed ordnance loads for
CAS missions.

6. Intelligence

a. Estimate of VC strength, location, and disposition in the Objective
area.

(1) Forces anticipated in immediate objective area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Main Force</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Tactical Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st VC Regt HQ</td>
<td>AT 9820</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Bn</td>
<td>AT 9829</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Bn</td>
<td>BT 1432</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th Bn</td>
<td>BT 2322</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Bn</td>
<td>BT 1217</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th/AKA/49th Bn</td>
<td>BT 0727</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrillas</td>
<td>General area Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The source of intelligence information was considered valid as of
3 December 1965 and was initially obtained on 8 December from the Quang
Tin Province VN intelligence advisor. Subsequent current information
was obtained from Task Force Delta Operation Order 1-65 on 10 December 1965.

c. It was initially anticipated that the VC units in the objective
area were concentrating their efforts on resting and refurbishing following

3 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED
the attack on Nip Duo on 18 November 1965. However, it was expected that
the VC could provide firm resistance instead of withdrawing if caught in an
inescapable situation.

d. VC Strength and Situation actually found as Operation was conducted.

(1) Initially, no actual organized resistance was encountered. Con-
tact with snipers was frequent and continuous for the duration of the
operation. Much of the terrain traversed was jungle in nature and pro-
vided excellent concealment for small arms sniping and grenade incidents.

(2) Company E of 2/7, while attached to 2/1 met organized, sturdy
resistance on 10 December at the base of Hill 407, coordinates BT 073288.
The VC in battalion strength, armed with 12.7mm MG's and mortars were well
entrenched and concealed in fortified positions along the base of Hill 407.

(3) On 14 December, "F" Company received a heavy volume of 12.7 mm
MG fire from the vicinity of AT 994222. "F" Company was helicopter to a
position at AT 994231 to act as a blocking force to prevent VC units from
escaping from the Song Chang Valley region. Close contact with the VC was
not made during this encounter. However, air strikes and mortar fire during
the afternoon of 14 December served to eliminate VC in the area.

(4) On 18 December, 2/7 made solid contact with an estimated batta-
illon size VC unit at Ky Phu Hamlet, BT 2122. It was readily apparent that
the VC had expected the arrival of a Marine unit at that location and had
planned for a combat engagement. The VC were heavily armed with .30 caliber
MG's, 60mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, rocket launchers,
small arms, and grenades. The VC were well camouflaged and concealed in for-
tified positions throughout the area. The VC attack was well prepared and
coordinated in all respects.

(5) On 19 December at approximately 1730 H, an estimated small band
of dispersed VC engaged the 2/7 convoy as it was loading on National Route
#1 at BT 279258. The action was considered to be a harassing tactic as con-
tact was limited. It is significant, however, that the VC did employ a 60mm
mortar in this engagement.

VC Units Identified

(1) At 1330 H on 14 December, one (1) VC dressed in a khaki uniform
rallied to H&S Company personnel in the vicinity of BT 066306. He carried
no weapons or documents. Although ascertained to be a private in rank, he
was classified as a VIP captive after initial interrogation, and immediately
forwarded to Task Force Delta Headquarters. The VC admitted to being a
loader for a 12.7mm AA gun in the 306th BN which had engaged 2/7's "E"
Company from the base of Hill 407 on the previous day. He stated that his
unit had entered South Vietnam approximately one month prior via Laos and
Cambodia. The captive also reported his unit had withdrawn to Cao Nguyen,
vicinity of BT 068268. Artillery fire missions were called on the area,
but the results could not be observed or investigated at the time.
(3) On 14 December, at 1830H, H Company of 2/9 attached to this unit captured one (1) VC in the vicinity of BT 994222. He stated he was a member of the 1st Company of the 519th AA Bn. This unit had taken F Company under fire on the morning of 14 December. He reported that many of their weapons had been damaged during the air strikes and were discarded in the Song Chang River.

(4) At 0700H on 16 December, one (1) wounded VC was captured in the vicinity of BT 997218. He stated he was from the 2nd Company, 193rd Bn, of the 303rd Division. He reported that his company was trained and equipped as an anti-aircraft unit. The man died before further information could be obtained.

(5) On 17 December at 0900, one (1) VC who reported he was a deserter from the 519th Bn rallied to G Company in the vicinity of BT 0721. He was evacuated before further information could be obtained at battalion level.

(6) Two (2) WIA VC captured in Ky Phu, BT 2122, at approximately 1630H on 15 December and 0900 on 19 Dec identified the unit engaged there as the 80th VC Bn. The number of VC killed and the weapons captured confirmed this information, although it may only have been the battalion (-) involved.

f. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) This unit was fortunate in every one of its major enemy contacts on Operation "Harvest Moon", in that it was able to capture VC on the spot who were willing to provide information. This information was immediately beneficial in assessing enemy strength, weapons, location, logistic support, and morale.

(2) Initial interrogations indicated that there were VC units in the area not previously identified, for example, the 308th Bn and the 519th Bn. It is possible, however, that units were not new but merely redesignated following the "Diep " attack.

(3) Operation "Harvest Moon" clearly indicated that the Song Chang Valley region is a logistical support and training area for VC units deployed there.

(4) The vast number of well constructed and concealed "quick-shelter" caves on the major trail traversed by 2/7 in the Song Chang Valley indicated that the area was heavily traveled by VC units. Moreover, the trail in question was and is most assuredly a major resupply route.

(5) Considering the overall time span of the operation, and the amount of ground covered through populated areas, relatively few civilians were encountered. Maximum effort was made by indigenous civilians to hide from Marine units. This would indicate not only a fear of American forces but also a strong sympathy for the VC.
(6) Each VC unit encountered seemed to have an abundance of weapons and ammunition, probably as a result of their success at Hiep Duc.

(7) The Song Chang Valley region is definitely a heavily traveled infiltration route and should probably be subjected to interdiction bombing if future evidence indicates it is still being used. The nature of the terrain and foliage in that area facilitates concealed movement even in daylight hours.

g. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hill 270 (BT 000315)</th>
<th>Hill 195 (BT 022289)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hill 106 (BT 044292)</td>
<td>Hill 407 (BT 076277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 378 (BT 058270)</td>
<td>Hill 403 (BT 044273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridge line from (MT 999237 to MT 009255)</td>
<td>Hill (BT 000230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass (BT 134217)</td>
<td>River crossings (MT 996218)(BT 010213)</td>
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</tbody>
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(2) Observation and Fields of Fire

(a) The flat terrain in the Que Son and Viet Minh valley complexes offered excellent observation and fields of fire.

(b) The dense jungle foliage encountered in the Song Chang Valley region hindered observation and fire. It did provide excellent concealment for VC snipers who were adept at using it to their advantage.

(3) Cover and Concealment

(a) This proved to be a major problem for "E" Company of 2/7 when they engaged the 308th VC Bn at the base of Hill 407 (BT 073298). No cover with the exception of rice paddy dikes was available to "E" Company, whereas the VC were well concealed in the tree line.

(b) Once 2/7 entered the Song Chang region, cover and concealment was more than adequate.

(c) The lack of cover for Marine personnel caught in rice paddies during the engagement with the 80th Bn at Ky Phu (BT 2122), again proved to be detrimental. However, VC were subjected to the same disadvantage once Marine elements gained fire superiority.

(4) Obstacles

(a) The major obstacle encountered proved to be the weather. Badly swollen streams caused a definite loss of valuable time because of the slow, careful crossing required of each Marine.
(b) The low ceiling which prevailed during most of the operation curtailed to a great extent the use of helicopters and aerial observers.

(c) Movement when the unit tactically deployed was extremely slow and difficult due to the muddy nature of the terrain. In addition, serious medical problems arose when immersion foot started to take its toll of personnel.

(5) Avenues of approach.

(a) While operating in the Que Son Valley area, the flat terrain permitted excellent approach routes to almost every objective from any side.

(b) Once the battalion had penetrated the Song Chang Valley region, avenues of approach were often limited to trails due to the extremely thick foliage and underbrush.

9. Mission. 2nd Bn, 7th Mar (Rein) moved by motorized convoy to vicinity of Tam Ky on D-day to establish a secure helicopter loading zone from which a helicopter-borne assault would originate on D+1 to seize an assigned objective and conduct search and clear operations as directed. In addition one platoon was provided as security for "M" Battery, 4th Bn, 11th Marines and subsequent security of LSA at Thang Binh.

10. Concept of Operation.

a. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was to conduct a motorized-mechanized tactical march on D-day to Tam Ky and secure a helicopter loading zone for a subsequent helicopter-borne assault on D+1. One rifle platoon was to provide security for "M" Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines as it moved from the Chu Lai Enclave to Thang Binh, and subsequently provide security for the LSA in that area.

b. On D+1 conduct helicopter-borne assault to LZ Spruce in the vicinity of TF objective 1, after which the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines would secure battalion objectives "A" and "B", and await orders to continue search and clear operations as directed.

c. Companies G and H were assigned responsibility to secure the North and South portion of the LZ, and, on order, prepare to attack objective 1. Company F and H&S elements would follow into the LZ. On order Company G would secure objective 1 and companies E and H secure battalion objective "A" and "B", Company F following in trace. At 091115H CG, TF Delta directed the seizure of battalion objective "C" after objective "A" and "B" had been secured.

d. Fixed wing aircraft, artillery firing from the vicinity of Que Son (BT 028343) and armed helicopters provided one half hour of LZ preparation and 40-H34 helicopters from MGC-35 and MGC-16 provided troop transport. Prepositioned artillery at Que Son was to support the continued operations of 40-H34 helicopters from MGC-35 and MGC-16 provided troop transport. Prepositioned artillery at Que Son was to support the continued operations of
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. (Encl 1 Daily Operation Overlay 9 Dec 65).

11. Execution

a. Planning

(1) On 5 Dec 1965 the Commanding Officer received a warning order from the CO, 7th Marines to be prepared to participate in Operation Harvest Moon commencing about 9 Dec 1965. Further, to report to Headquarters CG 3rd MarDiv (Rein) P&F at 0600H for a briefing. Action was initiated immediately to requisition a five day stock of both Class I and V, and all unit commanders were notified accordingly.

(2) At 061000H the Battalion Commander and S-3 were briefed by the Task Force Delta Staff at Division Headquarters and received advance copy of the Task Force Operation Order 1-65. Upon return to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines area the Commanding Officer issued his planning guidance to his staff and work began on the battalion order.

(3) Based on verbal orders, the advance copy of the Task Force Operation Order, and because D-day was scheduled within 36 hours, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein) Frag Order No 1-65 was issued at 072400H. The final draft of Task Force Delta Operation Order 1-65 was received on D-day at 081630H in the Tam Ky area.

b. D-day, 8 December 1965.

(1) At 081000H 2nd Battalion 7th Marines (Rein) in a motorized-mechanized tactical column departed the Chu Lai Enclave for the Province Headquarters of Tam Ky (BT 308227). This move was made in two separate tactical columns due to a shortage of M-35 vehicle assets. The first column consisted of Companies E and F plus a platoon of Ontos and the Battalion Command Group. This column closed on Tam Ky at 081115H. The second column consisting of Companies G and H, the CO rear group and the same platoon of Ontos closed on Tam Ky at 081530H. The battalion bivouacked for the night in a secure athletic field East of the Province Headquarters.

(2) During the course of the day staff visits were exchanged between the American Senior Advisor of the province and the Battalion Commander S-2 and S-3. Current information on the friendly and enemy situation in the area of operation was obtained. (Paragraph 8. Intelligence).

c. D+1, 9 December 1965. L-hour had been designated as 090930H after one half hour of preparation by fixed wing aircraft. Low clouds delayed L-hour till 091040H. The CO's Command Group landed in LZ Spruce (BT 016138) behind Company H and moved with security of Company E to objective "A" (BT 030315) where it remained for the night. The helicopter-born assault and activity for D+1 was as follows: (Encl 1 Daily Operation Overlay 9Dec65).

(1) Company G landed in LZ Spruce (BT 016313) at 091040H and secured the southern portion of the LZ. One female VC was KIA as she fled carrying medical supplies. Upon consolidation of the LZ Company G was directed to seize the Eastern portion of objective 1 (BT 008315) with artillery and mortar preparation. The objective was secured without contact at 091345H. Company
Company E landed in LZ Spruce (BT 016318) after the assault companies and moved to the southern portion of the LZ. At 091355H Company E along with Company H assaulted objective A (BT 030315). The objective was secured without contact at 091440H. Company E continued the attack to objective B (BT 050315) with Company H and secured the objective at 091645H. The company established a perimeter defense with Company H for the night. No contact throughout the night. The 00's Command Group accompanied Company E to objective "A".

Company F landed in LZ Spruce (BT 015318) after the assault companies and moved to the Northern portion of the LZ. When companies E and H departed to secure objective "A", Company F assumed responsibility for the perimeter of the LZ. One helicopter had damaged its tail rotor on landing and could not be flown out without extensive repairs. Company F was then assigned responsibility to keep the LZ secure till the helicopter could be evacuated. At 091640H a platoon from Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines relieved Company F. As company F moved from the LZ to objective "A" it received approximately 30 rounds of sniper fire from vicinity BT 008332. Fire was returned and the VC withdrew. Pursuit was denied the company commander because of the lateness of the hour and a desire to have Company F close on objective "A" (BT 030315) before dark. Company F then closed at 092130H with the CP Rear Group and established a perimeter defense in conjunction with Company G for the night.

Company H landed in LZ Spruce (BT 016318) at 091040H and secured the Northern portion of the LZ. Two VC were KIA as they fled when challenged. One had a camouflaged helmet and wooden training rifle. At 091355H Company H along with Company E assaulted and secured objective "A" (BT 030315) without contact at 091440H. Company H continued the attack to objective "B" (BT 050315) with Company E, securing the objective at 091645H. Established a perimeter defense with Company E for the night. No enemy contact was made during the night, but one short round of artillery H&I fires resulted in two WIA's.

H&I (-) tactical elements landed in the LZ behind Company F. The attached 81mm mortar sections were detached and the platoon provided preparation fires on objective 1 (BT 008315) for Company G. At approximately 091630H helicopters lifted the 81mm mortar and 106HR platoons from LZ Spruce (BT 016318) to Objective "A". They occupied positions within and on the perimeter defense around objective "A".

Artillery H&I fires were requested and fired commencing 092200H. Certain concentrations were later secured because of a confirmed short round.

d. 22 December 1965. The battalion planned to close companies F and G to objective "B" (BT 050315) along with the tactical elements of H&I Company and the Command and CP Rear Groups. Upon consolidation these companies would sweep abreast to battalion objective "C" (BT 033532). Air was requested on station commencing 093000H. The latter scheme of maneuver
had to be altered as C3; Task Force Delta ordered one company to be sent to assist 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines who had landed by helo and had one company pinned down by enemy fire in the vicinity of Cam Lai (1) (BT 078292). Later in the day another company was sent to assist while one company was sent to secure objective "B" (BT 083325). Due to the weight and bulk of the ground mounted 106's and 81's, and the dispatch with which the battalion had to move one company, H&S tactical units and CF Rear Group remained on objective "B". The Command Group joined the one company on objective "C" for the night. 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines also closed on objective "C" (BT 083325). Late the 10th of Dec 1965 and coordination was completed by both unit C3's before dark as to defensive responsibilities. (Encl 2 Daily Operation Overlay 10 Dec 1965).

(1) Company E in conjunction with Companies G and H moved to sweep the area between battalion objective "B" (BT 050315) and objective "C" (BT 083325), at 10130H. Company E dispatched to the South to report OCON CO, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines whose unit landed earlier in the vicinity of Cam Lai (1) (BT 078292) and was presently pinned down by enemy fire. Before departing they turned over six VCS apprehended on the sweep to Company G. The S-3, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines directed CO, Company E to join with Company G, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines to attack South toward woodland at the northern base of hill 407 (BT 077276) to relieve pressure on their Company F. Company E vigorously pushed the attack, but poor communications hampered its coordination with Company G of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines and the S-3. Company G fell back on Company E's right flank exposing it to enfilade fire. Company E continued and enabled Company F, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines to gain freedom of movement to withdraw. Company E, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines had seven friendly KIA's and 29 WIA's, two of whom later DOW. Company E claimed 5 V.C. KI and estimated 4 WIA's for this action. Company E pulled back into a perimeter for the night in vicinity BT 067302 with remainder of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines.

(2) Company F closed on battalion objective "B" (BT 050315) at 101030H with elements of H&S 106H Platoon. The company was to follow in traces of the other three assault companies, however the partial change to the battalion mission necessitated the company remaining on objective "B" for the night. A perimeter defense was established with the tactical elements of H&S Company and CF Rear Group deployed within. Local security was deployed for the night.

(3) Company G in conjunction with Companies E and H moved to sweep the area between battalion objectives "B" (BT 050315) and "C" (BT 083325) at 101300H. Company G in the center. One VC sniper inflicted one friendly WIA and escaped in heavy underbrush. The company apprehended 19 VCS and picked up six more from Company E. The company commenced movement along road to battalion objective "C" (BT 083325) at 101645H but at BT 080320 they were dispatched to reinforce 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines in vicinity of BT 067302 as a result of directive received from CO, TF Delta. The company moved Southwest to join 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines closing on their lines at BT 067302 approximately 102015H. They assumed defensive positions for the night upon reporting OCON CO, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines.

(4) Company H in conjunction with Companies E and G moved to sweep area between objective "B" (BT 050315) and objective "C" (BT 083325) at 101100H. Company H on the left. Company H was temporarily delayed when Company E was dispatched to 2nd Battalion 1st Marines zone, but at 101430H
was directed to continue to sweep to battalion objective "C" (BT 083325). The company secured objective "C" at 101640H. The company apprehended 3 VOs during the day in its sweep to objective "C". Elements of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines were moving up on objective "C" also, and coordination was immediately effected. Company H organized a perimeter defense in conjunction with elements of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines for the night on objective and established ambushes at BT 079324 and BT 090327. At 102115H one VC, assumed to be armed, crossed the front lines and ran when challenged. He ran into an ambush and was KIA. No other contact throughout the night.

e. D+3, 11 Dec 1965. CG, Task Force Delta directed CO, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines to consolidate with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines in vicinity BT 067302 to secure defensive positions and be prepared to attack and seize on order mutually supporting positions. One company and the Battalion Command Group closed on 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines positions at 111005H. Companies E and G returned to OCON of battalion and remained in vicinity of battalion CP. Orders were issued and helo's requested to move elements of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines from battalion objective "H" (BT 050315) to vicinity BT 067302 so as to consolidate. Helicopter lift erroneously lifted units from battalion objective "H" to objective "O" (BT 083325). After consultation with CG, 3rd MarDiv, CO made helo recon to determine likely LZ's for attack on TF Delta Objective 7. Plans then commenced to have one company conduct helicopter-borne assault to LZ vicinity TF Delta Objective 7 commencing 111530H after fixed wing and artillery preparation. One company to move as a feint across rice field located BT 077229 toward base of hill 406 (BT 077276) then return to positions vicinity BT 067302. Weather precluded helicopter-borne assault and "H" company moved across rice field at 111500H. As no fire was received permission was requested and granted for this company to assault hill 407 (BT 077276). Hill taken without opposition at 111530H. Battalion CP Rear Group closed on new CP at 067302 at 111530H by helo. Company F remained on objective "O" (BT 083325) as weather closed in before helo lift could be completed. Companies E and G with elements of H&S composed perimeter for the night of 11 Dec 1965 at BT 067302. (Encl 3 Daily Operation Overview 11 Dec 65)

(1) Company E returned OCON CO, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines at 111005H. Continued to clean up battle field salvage from previous day in vicinity of BT 067302. alerted to be prepared to support helicopter-borne assault unit attack on hill 407 (BT 077276). Occupied positions as part of battalion defensive perimeter night of 11 Dec 1965. Conducted local security patrols and ambushes. No contact.

(2) Company F moved by helo from battalion objective "H" (BT 050315) to objective "O" erroneously. Company alerted to conduct helicopter-borne assault to LZ vicinity hill 407 (BT 077276) commencing 111530H in conjunction with Company H feint toward hill 407. Helicopter move later cancelled due to poor weather. Directed to remain on objective "O" for the night and coordinate with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines on defensive perimeter for night of 11 Dec 1965. No contact throughout night.

(3) Company G returned OCON CO, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines at 111005H. Shifted positions closer to new battalion CP at BT 067302. Alerted
to be prepared to support helicopter-borne assault unit attack on hill 407 (BT 077276). Occupied positions as part of battalion defensive perimeter night of 11 Dec 1965. Conducted local security patrol and ambushes without contact.

(4) Company H moved South from objective "O" (BT 083325) to consolidate with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines forces vicinity BT 067302, providing security for CO's Command Group. At 11005 joined elements of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. At 111600 directed to conduct limited objective movement in a feint across rice field at BT 072290 toward hill 407 (BT 077276). As weather precluded helicopter-borne assault by Company F in conjunction with this move, and the fact that once started no fire received from suspected enemy position, Company H was authorized to assault hill 407 (BT 077276). In the process the company discovered old VC 50 caliber machine gun positions with a good deal of blood and bandages strewn about. Also found seven cases of 50 caliber ammunition, 7 Bangalore torpedoes, 40 lbs of TNT, grenades and items of uniform equipment. Some of the ordnance was initially buried but later dug up and destroyed by an engineer team. Company H consolidated their defenses on hill 407 (BT 077276) at 1130H. Firing an artillery fire mission on VC positions in vicinity of BT 067302. Target surveillance not possible due to fading daylight. Local security positioned during the night without contact.

f. 12 Dec 1965. CG, TF Delta issued verbal orders at 1200H to have battalion stand by to execute helicopter-borne assault into LZ at BT 067302 to conduct search and destroy operations to the East and Southeast in conjunction with operations of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines and 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. 1-hour tentatively set for 1130H. Two companies alerted to execute helicopter-borne assault to secure LZ with remaining company and H&S units following into LZ. Battalion occupied CR vicinity BT 067302 during day waiting for weather to break. Two VCS and two VCC captured in surrounding village during occupation of area. At 121330H mission changed due to cloud cover and battalion ordered to move, less one company on hill 407 (BT 077276), to the West vicinity of Hein Loo (1)(BT 045293) and establish blocking position also to possibly relieve VC pressure on AVN outpost at Viet "in" (BT 018268), or attack South from the former position to block possible VC escape route from East. All companies alerted and held request to move Company F from objective "O". (BT 093325) submitted. Company F returned by helicopter to battalion CP 121500H and units moved out on assigned axis of advance to West, Southwest commencing 121600H. Battalion closed on hill 106 (BT 045291) at 121830H where night defensive perimeter was established by three rifle companies and H&S elements with CR located BT 047294. Fog Order issued to conduct patrols and ambushes during night of 12 Dec 1965. No contact throughout night. (Encl 5 Daily Operation Overlay 12 Dec 1965).

(1) Company F designated as battalion reserve for helicopter-borne assault. With changes to the battalions mission the company directed to follow in trace of Companies F and G as they swept to the Southwest toward Hein Loo (BT 045293). Closed on battalion march objective hill 106 (BT 045291) at 121830H without incident. Assumed portion of night defensive perimeter and conducted two night ambushes without contact.

(2) Company F rejoined battalion by helicopter from objective "O" at 121500H. Previously had been alerted to conduct helicopter-borne assault from objective "O" to LZ at BT 053250, but low cloud cover precluded operation.
Upon arrival at OP directed to follow in trace of Company G in move to Southwest to Hein Loc (BT 045293). Closed on march objective hill 106 (BT 045291) at 121735H. Assumed portion of night defensive perimeter and conducted deep patrol to the West vicinity of BT 024227. No contact throughout the night.

(3) Company G was alerted to conduct helicopter-borne assault with Company F to LZ at BT 055250, but cancelled due to low cloud cover. Instead directed to lead tactical column to Southwest to vicinity of Hein Loc (BT 045293) and march objective hill 106 (BT 045291) were it closed at 121735H. Assumed portion of night defensive perimeter and conducted local security patrols without contact.

(4) Company H remained on hill 407 (BT 077276) throughout the day and night conducting local security patrols and destroying confiscated VC ordinance. No contact or significant observations.

Dec 5, 13 Dec 1965. CG, TF Delta ordered Company H to withdraw to East-West grid line 28 due to B52 bombing South of their position early 13 Dec 1965. Later told Company H to reoccupy old position after B52 raid. Previous day helicopter-borne assault remained pending during early AM but low cloud cover again caused cancellation. Battalion ordered to sweep to the Southwest to Viet An (BT 018266) to relieve VC pressure on RVN outpost this area. Company E relieved by Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines at 131210H when, Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines company commander reported to CO. Two company sweep with one following in trace to search and clear from present positions to Viet An area. CO's Command Group to move behind security platoon provided by Company G, along road running generally Southwest. Battalion (-) closed on Viet An (BT 018266) at 131940H without major contact while Company F occupied hill 185 (BT 022288) at 131610H. CO discussed at great length the current enemy situation in the Viet An area with the captain commanding the RVN outpost. Also determined resupply needs for RVN and evacuated dead and wounded. In addition the battalion S-2 extracted all known VC dispositions from the RVN commander. (Encl 5 Daily Operation Overlay - 13 Dec 1965).

(1) Company E was relieved by Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines at 131210H.

(2) Company F commenced movement from night time positions West to search and clear hill 185 (BT 022288) in conjunction with Company G sweep to the Southwest. Fixed wing aircraft and armed helicopters provided preparation fire on hill 185. Company F assaulted and swept hill and established night defensive positions at 131610H. Met only sporadic sniper fire during move and apprehended one VOS. No contact during the night.

(2) Company G commenced movement from night time position to the Southwest to occupy high ground vicinity BT 035275, after 81mm mortar platoon provided preparation fires. Move made in connection with Company G move to the West. Continued move to sweep hill 105 (BT 025265) on order. Report was received and relayed that hill 105 had VC mines located on it. Company skirted mined area without casualties. Received some sniper fire.
during move and fixed-wing aircraft supported. One VC KIA by small arms fire. On order Company G closed on AVN outpost at Viet an (BT 018266). Because of the congested area at the outpost, and Hill 103 (BT 025265) to the East being key terrain, Company G reoccupied Hill 103 for the night at 131345H. Established perimeter defense and had no contact throughout the night.

(4) Company H, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, continued to occupy Hill 407 (BT 077276) under direct OCON CO, TF Delta.

(5) After reporting at 131200H Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines directed to follow in trace of the two company sweep as rear guard along road running generally Southwest. Moved without contact and closed on AVN outpost at Viet an (BT 028266) at 131940H. Occupied night defensive positions outside the outpost facing North, East and West. No contact throughout the night.

(6) Security platoon for Command Group following in trace of Companies F and G came upon downed Marine helicopter at coordinates BT 021278. Seven badly mutilated skeletons found in wreck and report made to TF Delta.

Dec. 6, 14 Dec 1965. Battalion directed to send one platoon to vicinity of downed Marine helicopter (BT 021278) for security while graves registration personnel recovered bodies. Platoon later had to be secured due to pending helo lift. Artillery reconnaissance arrived at battalion CP (BT 019269) to reconnoiter firing positions. CO conducted helicopter reconnaissance of proposed LZ vicinity of BT 000232 for execution of helicopter-borne assault later in the morning. Orders issued to conduct a two company helicopter-borne assault to secure LZ at BT 000232 followed by reserve Company and elements of 9th. Helo lift commenced at 141125H after fixed wing preparation of zone and surrounding area. Co's Command Group landed behind second assault company. LZ secured with minor contact as VC fled along river bank (BT 994224) after first firing reported. 50 cal machine gun at helicopter and initial wave. No friendly casualties. Five VC KIA. and estimated 11 WIA from ground action. Close air very effective particular napalm run. VC strafed when swimming river. Position consolidated at 141300H. One company directed to move at 141400H to secure the ground (BT 994222) overlooking suspected VC Ferry Crossing Site. Additional company sent at 141545H to secure area along northern bank of river vicinity BT 003220. Remainder of battalion established perimeter defense in LZ (BT 000232) for night of 14 Dec 1965. The 81mm mortar platoon fired MLF fires during night. A 4.2 mortar section consisting of two tubes was helo lifted into battalion CP area for fire support. One additional tube to arrive on 15 Dec 1965 (End Daily Operation Overlay 14 Dec 1965).

(1) Company F moved from Hill 185 (BT 022288) to helo loading zone to accompany Company G in helicopter-borne assault in LZ at BT 000232. Secured southern portion of LZ with minor resistance reporting VC firing 50 cal machine gun from vicinity of river bank at 1749224. One VC KIA and estimated 5 more KIA or WIA. Upon consolidation of LZ and in conjunction with Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines moved South at 141545H to secure high ground (BT 003220) overlooking suspected VC Ferry Crossing Site (BT 993221). With
difficult terrain to traverse Company F consolidated on designated high
ground for night at L42114H with the help of USAF flare ship. Apprehended
four VC's in move to objective. No other contact during the night.

(2) Company G helo lifted from hill 105 (BT 025265) as second
helicopter-borne assault company to secure northern portion of LZ at BT
000232. Minimum opposition in LZ but reported 50 cal. machine gun fire
coming from river bank at AT 994224. Four VC KIA and estimated six KL or
WIA. After consolidation of LZ and deployment South of Company F and
Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, established a perimeter defense for
the battalion CP. Had no contact remainder the day.

(3) Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines was helo lifted from the
Viet An area into the LZ at BT 000232. At 141400H directed to move South
and secure the ground (AT 994222) overlooking the suspected VC Ferry Crossing
sites. Heavy underbrush slowed movement of the unit, but at 141830H they
secured the area vicinity of AT 994222. During the course of movement
apprehended one VC. Company received sniper fire from vicinity of AT
993229 and took one friendly WIA. Returned fire but VC broke contact.
Apprehended one VC during the course of flare ship activity when he
wandered into company position. Established perimeter security for night
without contact.

1. Dec 15, 1965. The battalion sent out patrols along the river
bank to confirm location of VC Ferry Crossing site. Position located at
151630H vicinity of AT 993221. Company F and Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th
Marines assigned TAOR'S along North side of river bank to conduct search
and destroy operations. Company H returned OPCON of CO, 2nd Battalion, 7th
Marines at 151400H and was alerted to conduct company sized recon mission by
helicopter on south side of river to determine results of B52 clerbing strike.
Battalion assigned a reinforced platoon from C Company reportably familiar
with the area of operation. Designated to go with Company H on 16 Dec 1965.
Remaining 4.2 tube arrived and H & I fires planned and fired from 60mm and
40.2mm mortars during night. At 151730H Co TF Delta approved proposal of
CO 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines to conduct battalion patrol to the East in
the Song Khang valley (BT 085210) commencing 16 Dec 1965. However, a time
requirement of three and one half days was imposed due to the need to have
the battalion close on Chu Lai the night of 19 Dec 1965. This was in addition
to company sized recon of B52 raid area. (Engl 6 Daily Operation Overlay -
15 Dec 1965).

(1) Company F sent a reinforced platoon sized patrol East along
the North bank of the river to the vicinity of BT 010214 in search for the
reported VC Ferry Crossing. The patrol returned with negative results.
Company was assigned a TAOR North of the river by CO to conduct search
and clear activity. Finally discovered VC Ferry Crossing AT 993221 at 151500H.
No boats or sampans in area. Remainder of day and night without enemy
contact.

(2) Company G remained in a perimeter defense around battalion CP
(BT 000232) and 4.2 section without contact.

(3) Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines conducted patrols along
North bank of the river to the West. Assigned TAOR North of the river

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by the CO in which to conduct search and clear operations. Remainder of
day and night without enemy contact.

(4) Company H coordinated with RF platoon in connection with con­
ducting company recon mission of B52 strike area by helicopter South of
the river.

contact during the night and at first light recovered one VC KIA and one
WIA. The WIA later died. Heavy rains and low ceiling cancelled Company H
planned helicopter-borne recon mission South of the river. Company H to
provide security for 4.2 section while it provides fire support for the
battalion move to the East. The battalion (-) in a tactical column commenced
movement East at 160730H. The CO's Command Group moved behind advance guard
and the CF Rear Group with the main body. Movement slowed by heavy rains
and swollen streams. Harassing sniper fire during the day but no casualties.
VC snipers would break contact when return fire was placed on them. Area
of Dain Trang (BT 03910) searched thoroughly as it contained major caves.
Area appears to be VC staging and training area. One building had been
used as an aid station with excessive amounts of blood and soiled bandages
prevalent. Battalion stopped at first days march objective (BT 068211) at
161630H and established a night defensive perimeter around the CP. 81mm
mortars fired M1 fire during the night as did the 4.2 mortar section from
its positions at BT 000232. Wet weather started to extract its toll of
immersion foot cases and resupply helo's evacuated them. (Daily Operation Overlay 16 Dec 1965).

(1) Company F moved from its night time position and joined the
tactical column as the main body element behind Company G. It moved in
this position throughout the day without major contact. Occupied a section
defensive perimeter during night without contact.

(2) Company G moved from its night time position as the advance guard
of the tactical column. Taken under long range sniper fire on two occasions.
Returned fire and VC broke contact. Occupied a section of defensive perimeter
during night without incident.

(3) Company H remained in old CP (BT 000232) providing security for
4.2 mortar section. Conducted patrols and local security around position
without incident.

(4) Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines had a two man probe during
the night. Had no friendly casualties and at first light found one VC KIA
and one VC WIA forward of their position. No weapons were recovered. The
WIA later died. The company joined the tactical as the rear guard and moved
without contact during the day. Occupied a section of the defensive perimeter
during the night without contact.

k. Dec. 17 1965. The battalion was directed to send from its present
position one company to the Northeast to link up with 2nd battalion, 1st
Marines at BT 107233, then pass through the latter positions and again go
South to join remainder of our battalion as it moved directly East. This
order later cancelled and the battalion told to rejoin its forces and continue.
East ASaP. G Company, designated to link-up with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, continued on its planned course as the fastest means to rejoin remainder of battalion. The battalion (-) moved by tactical column and remained approximately one and half hours at BT 110218 for the company sent to link up with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Meanwhile, H Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines moved forward at 171130H to secure the pass at BT 134217. The battalion moved out with G Company catching up and following in trace at 171300H. Sporadic long range sniper fire continued to dog the column. One friendly WIA was taken with a minor flesh wound at 171330H in vicinity of BT 131218. A heavy volume of fire forced the VC to break contact. Estimated one VC WIA at 171530H and again at 171700H VC stick grenades thrown from dense underbrush at two separate locales caused a total of 4 friendly WIA's - none serious. All were evacuated later when resupply helicopters arrived. In addition an additional number of immersion foot cases were evacuated as result of the medical officer's inspection. The battalion closed on its day's march objective (BT 165221) at 171810H and established a night perimeter defense around the CP. The 81mm mortar platoon fired H&I fires. No other available artillery supporting arms due to our location.

(1) Company F was the advance guard for the initial move of the tactical column. Long range sniper fire from the VC was returned with a heavy volume and one estimated VC WIA was reported. At BT 110218 the company halted at 171130H and put out security awaiting arrival of Company G. Later Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines passed through to secure a key terrain feature and the battalion subsequently followed at 171300H. At 171540H a VC stick grenade was thrown from the dense underbrush at BT 153219 inflicting two friendly WIA's - neither serious. The area was vigorously searched but without contact. The company closed on its night defensive position at 171630H and occupied its assigned position during the night without incident.

(2) Company G departed its previous night time position for the northeast to link-up with elements of 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines at BT 107233. Prior to reaching elements of the 1st Marines this requirement was cancelled and the company was to move with dispatch to rejoin the remainder of the battalion. While moving to rejoin the main tactical column a VC stick grenade was thrown from heavy underbrush along the side of the road at BT 125219 resulting in two friendly WIA's - not serious. The area surrounding the incident was covered by fire and swept but failed to produce any VC. Company G closed on its night defensive position at 171810H.

(3) Company H remained as the security company for the 4.2 mortar section at BT 000232.

(4) Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines moved from its night time position as the rear guard of the battalion tactical column. At 171130H in vicinity of BT 110218 it was given instructions to proceed to the pass at BT 134217 and secure this area pending the arrival of remainder of the battalion tactical column. Long range sniper fire resulted in one friendly WIA. The WIA was able to walk out under his own power. Fire was returned vigorously but the VC broke contact and withdrew. With the passage of Company F, and the remainder of ASaP Company, and since Company G was delayed coming on the battalion, Company H 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines moved out to its night defensive area in vicinity of BT 165221. It occupied its portion of the defensive perimeter for the night without contact.
In 1965, 18 Dec 1965. The battalion march objective for the day was to be the city of Thon Biai (BT 250255). The tactical column formed up as had been ordered with the CO's Command Group behind the advance guard. Before departing one company killed a VC with small arms fire who was armed with a stick grenade. At about 181000H the column held up to take care of 32 med-evac cases for immersion foot. These men could not keep up and it was doubtful if they could make it all the way. When helicopters came in to pick up the group near the head of the column VC small arms fire came from the vicinity of BT 199219. The lead company sent a squad to search the area without making contact. The area searched contained a network of empty trenches and tunnels. The column again moved out at about 181130H. At 181355H the lead element received a large volume of fire from the vicinity of BT 225224 and immediately engaged the enemy. In an effort to push by the resistance the main body company was dispatched to give fire support to push aside the VC forces. About this time the rear guard and elements of the main body made solid contact with a larger VC force to the south flank of the column. Artillery and mortar fire support were called for with devastating results and the weather cleared sufficiently to call in armed helicopters. The main VC effort was concentrated near the center of the column as this is where he had most of his fire power and where he tried to support by fire an attempt to sever the battalion tactical column. The company that had earlier been deployed forward was returned to the vital area of battle and successfully outflanked the main VC position at BT 214225. and broke the VC main effort. At the outset of this action communications were poor as both the advance guard and rear guard radio operators and radio's became casualties. In addition, artillery, mortars and air requests had to be relayed over the battalion tactical net further reducing the element of control by the battalion commander. Increased artillery, 81mm mortar fires and air support gained more freedom of action for unit commanders enabling the entire battalion to consolidate within Ky Phu (BT 216226) where a perimeter defense was established for the night. Artillery and mortar H/S fires were called and a USAF Flare ship was on station all night. This action lasted for a period of about five hours, with initial and subsequent contact occurring at a range span of 400 meters. (Inc 10 Daily Operation Overlay, 18 Dec 1965).

(1) Company F moved from its nighttime positions as the main body. It continued in this position after evacuating its immersion foot cases, at the time Company G, as the advance guard, made contact with the VC, Company F had just entered the Western side of the Ky Phu (BT 216226) Village. They were then directed forward to engage the VC forces firing on the flanks of Company G and push aside what initially appeared to be a larger scale version of the long range sniper fire the tactical column had been exposed to for some days. It was soon after they arrived at the Company G position along with the 81mm mortar platoon, that a heavy fire fight commenced in the area they had just vacated. The company was turned around and moved back to the East side of Ky Phu where it had to engage five VC who attempted to cut through the column with a 50 cal machine gun so as to enfilade the column. Company F knocked out this gun and once again organized proceeded to outflank the VC main position at BT 214225. This maneuver was successful and with the help of flamethrower and engineer teams the company knocked out two more machine gun positions reducing the VC firepower considerably and giving units the freedom of action they needed. After the hopping up,
and once the battalion was consolidated in Ky Phu, Company F was responsible for the western portion of the night defensive perimeter.

(2) Company G had moved from its night time location to occupy its position of advance guard in the battalion tactical column. At 180800H elements of the company shot and killed a VC with a stick grenade. At about 181000H while the helicopters were taking out med-evac cases from immersion foot, the VC fired on the helicopters from the vicinity of BT 199219. A squad was dispatched to check the area out with negative results as far as VC, but did discover a complex of empty trenches and tunnels. Further search of this area was not practical at the time due to the urgency of getting the column on the move again due to the time delay required for med-evacs. No other sniping occurred until 181350H when the VC opened up on the company from the vicinity of BT 225224 with a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. Company G immediately engaged the VC in a fire fight and succeeded in driving them off to the South and West after about twenty minutes. The fire fight waned in the forward part of the column as it increased in tempo to the rear. Company G later took some incoming mortar rounds as it redeployed its forces to cover the eastern edge of Ky Phu for the night time perimeter defense.

(3) Company H, early in the afternoon was helicopter lifted along with the 4.2 mortar section from the high ground at BT 000232 to Que Son (BT 028343). Subsequently the company was helicopter lifted to the Chu Lai Enclave via the ISa at Thang Binh (BT 175418) arriving back in position on the MLR at 191200H.

(4) Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines moved from its night time position into the battalion tactical column as the rear guard. Other than the stop for med-evacs it had no activity at the rear of the column until approximately 181350H when the VC opened up with a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless rifle and mortar fire from the vicinity of BT 207220. The company was initially pinned down and with the loss of the company commander, and radio operator, control was lost for a short time. The company built up a heavy volume of fire and with the help of the armed helicopters, and some fast action on the part of the newly designated company commander, freedom of action was regained. The new company commander immediately proceeded to recover his dead and wounded, getting an LZ clear for med-evac prior to moving his company into the perimeter being established in Ky Phu (BT 216226). Once consolidated, he moved his company into the night time defensive perimeter occupying positions facing both north and south, successfully tied in with Companies F and G on his left and right.

m. 11 Dec 1965. After mopping up enemy and salvaging equipment early on 19 Dec 1965 the battalion once again formed up in tactical column to move to National Highway No. 1 for transportation back to Chu Lai. The enemy had left many dead and weapons on the battlefield, an indication he had been hit so hard he was not able to clean up as usual after the battle. The column commenced movement at 191130H. Again some long range sniper fire was received. The advance guard immediately engaged with a heavy volume of fire and both VC snipers were seen to fall. Air on station in the form of armed helicopters saw the VC and executed a strike on their positions. The VC were conservatively considered W/L's. The column moved the remain of the way east to Thon Hai (BT 250255) without encountering any further resistance.
Two companies swept through Thon Hai without incident after artillery, mortar and air preparation were planned but not called. The battalion reformed East of the city for the tactical march to Highway No. 1. Earlier an engineer unit had emplaced a foot bridge across a 50 foot stream at DT 263252 to expedite the movement of the battalion to the waiting motor-mechanized convoy. The lead elements of the battalion arrived at the highway for transportation at 191700H. At 191830H, when the battalion was loaded aboard trucks and departure had commenced South, a VC automatic weapon and mortar fired on the convoy from the vicinity of DT 281257. A heavy volume of fire was returned and the firing ceased. Many civilians and an RF or FF platoon were milling around the area at the time. Reports indicated that a few were wounded by the VC/Marine firing. Four friendly WIA's resulted in H&S Company, none of which was serious. The convoy then returned back to Chu Lai without further incident (Enol 11 Daily Operation Overlay 19 Dec 1965).

(1) Company F moved from Ky Phu (BT 216226) as the rear guard of the tactical column. It moved without incident to National Highway No. 1 via Thon Hai (BT 250255). It boarded trucks at the highway and moved south with the remainder of the battalion.

(2) Company G moved from Ky Phu (BT 216226) as the advance guard of the tactical column. It received long range sniper fire from the vicinity of DT 235229, which was immediately returned with a heavy volume of fire. Two VC were seen to run and additional fire felled them both. Armed halos then hit the area where they VC were located. The company claimed two estimated VC WIA's. The 1000 meter distance to their location would have consumed still more valuable time and no attempt was made to check the area they were last seen in. Company G in conjunction with Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, swept the city of Thon Hai (BT 250255) commencing 191330H without contact. A number of VC were apprehended but later released. Company G arrived at National Highway No 1 at 181700H and immediately boarded trucks for return trip to Chu Lai.

(3) Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines moved from Ky Phu (BT 216226) as the principle element of the main body of the tactical column. It moved without incident to the city of Thon Hai (BT 250255) where it conducted a coordinated sweep of the city with Company G commencing 191330H without contact. A number of VC were apprehended but later released. Company H arrived at National Highway No 1 without a contact at 191720H and immediately boarded trucks for return to the LSA at Thang Binh (BT 175418).

(4) H&S Company elements moved as part of the tactical column from Ky Phu (BT 216226). The 81mm mortar platoon occupied positions West of the city of Thon Hai (BT 250255) and planned on call supporting fires but were not used. When elements arrived at Highway No 1 they boarded trucks immediately. At 191830H four H&S Company men received minor wounds from a VC automatic weapon firing from vicinity of DT 281257 as the motorized mechanized convoy moved South to Chu Lai.

12. Results. The following table is a summary of enemy casualties and equipment losses which were cited and confiscated by members of this command for the entire operation.
a. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC WIA</td>
<td>3 (50-75 estimated)</td>
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<td>VC/VCS</td>
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b. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bars</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifles</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines (US)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infield Rifle</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M37 30 Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 cal MG's w/1 set tripods</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Sub-MG</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Thompson Sub-MG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom MG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caliber Carbine</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicom rocket launchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm mortar with bipods</td>
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<tr>
<td>80mm mortar tube</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PRC-10A Radios</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Cal MG</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerous caches of medical supplies, ammunition and clothing were confiscated and/or destroyed during the course of the operation.

c. The following is a summary of friendly forces casualties and equipment losses.

(1) Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Equipment: Because equipment was salvaged from at least three different organizations, and the fact that none of these organization has been able to coordinate and reconcile salvaged equipment, an accurate account cannot be made at this time.

13. Administrative Matters

a. Supply

(1) Upon receipt of verbal orders alerting the battalion for this operation, necessary planning and requisitioning was inaugurated; All required classes of supplies were on hand at the time of execution.

(2) Combat load. Consideration must be again given to the combat load the individual Marine must carry. Task Force Delta admin Order 1-65 prescribed one days ration and a basic load of ammunition in the hands of each Marine plus two additional days in the hands of the unit on D-day. Because...

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the battalion had no base of operation after it once moved out the S-4 was left with the dilemma of either issuing out two more rations per man, or hoping the continuous movement of the battalion would soon halt, and he could hopefully call for a resupply from an area where he previously staged his other two days of Class I. In the former situation it was virtually impossible to saddle the individual Marine with three days rations in addition to a basic load, flak gear and normal arms and equipment, not to mention the terrain over which he had to traverse. In the latter case resupply was tied solely to the helicopter in which case it was at the mercy of the weather and the availability of the helicopter. Counterinsurgency operations invariably include an elongated supply line and one that is not always secure due to the ever present danger of infiltration and hit and run tactics employed by the VC. Notwithstanding the problems of weather, it is believed that two to four helicopters in direct support of the infantry battalion will partially alleviate the problem of the combat load and timeliness of delivery. Only in this way can the user be assured that he will be able to get his supplies when and where he can receive them, and not be at the mercy of a flight schedule with its built in delays. This direct support role need not be for a continuous period but be set up in block times with a guarantee that the helicopter will be available during the period required.

(3) Water Cans. The present model is still too fragile in the area of the lid. Once the lid is lost the can is unserviceable as lids cannot be requisitioned separately. A lightweight plastic model should be investigated or spare lids should be stocked to take the place of those separated from the can.

b. Treatment of casualties and evaluation of hospitalization.

(1) The entire casualty reporting system was a source of difficulty during and after Operation Harvest Moon. Due to wide geographic dispersion during a large portion of the operation, units of this battalion were required to send strength and casualty information over the battalion tactical net, while on the move as the command net was not in operation. Due to the heavy volume of traffic on this net, and security considerations, difficulty was experienced.

(2) Transmittal of information to Task Force Headquarters was attempted by both radio and non-scheduled helicopter runs. Neither means was entirely satisfactory.

(3) Both battle and non-battle casualties were evacuated to LST, then to either "C" Med, "B" Med or the USS Valley Forge. Due to the fact that liaison personnel were not prepositioned at these evacuation centers battalion (rear) received delayed and inaccurate information on individual casualties. This was in part due to poor telephone service between Da Nang and Chu Lai. There also was no communications available between battalion forward and battalion rear.

(4) At this time, the whereabouts of some of this battalion's casualties is still undetermined. Reports on evacuation from Viet. Nam have been received five (5) days or more after the evacuation has taken place.

(5) The present model is still too fragile in the area of the lid. Once the lid is lost the can is unserviceable as lids cannot be requisitioned separately. A lightweight plastic model should be investigated or spare lids should be stocked to take the place of those separated from the can.
c. Communications

(1) Constant rain during the operation made it virtually impossible to keep field message books dry while in use. There is a need for a field message book that can be used and preserved in the rain.

(2) Radio sets AN/PRC-25 were effectively used on the Battalion Tactical Net and the Task Force Tactical Net. The radios performed in an excellent manner under all conditions thereby providing the commander with positive communications to his companies, increased range, and flexibility to maneuver in heavily vegetated areas. Two hand sets H-136 became inoperative and were evacuated during the course of the operation.

(3) Battery Bu-396 averaged 50 hours satisfactory performance under heavy duty cycles.

(4) A hook attachment similar to that of the H-33 is recommended for the H-136. A junction box, speaker, and remote facilities are also desirable.

(5) Radio set AN/PRC-10 and AN/PRC-9 with handset H-33 proved unreliable when subjected to days of heavy rains despite intense care and standard waterproofing procedures.

(6) The enemy directed efforts toward personnel carrying communications equipment. Three radio operators were killed and six wounded. Heavy fire was evident after the original operator had fallen to prevent other Marines from employing the radios. Tape antennas and camouflage were employed where possible to conceal and disguise equipment.

(7) Two radio sets AN/PRC-10a complete with accessories were captured from the enemy at Ky Phu. Both had tape antennas attached and were heavily camouflaged with vegetation. The radios were in good condition and appear to have been well cared for. Both were tuned to 45.3 megacycles.

(8) Some BB-451 batteries received through resupply were unsuitable for use due to the following:

(a) Batteries not modified in accordance with TI-04072-35/1 thereby making them unsuitable for use with the AN/PRC-41.

(b) Loose or broken power terminals.

(c) Batteries received with water or dirt on the power terminals.

(d) Batteries with less than 2 hours satisfactory power using a normal duty cycle on low power. Batteries received in any of these conditions were detrimental to the battalion's communications in the fast moving situation encountered where resupply could usually be effected only once a day.

(e) It is recommended that the support area more closely scrutinize BB-451's. Waterproof tape can be applied over power terminals to keep them dry and clean.
(9) Cryptographic material KMC-60 and KMC-138 are unsatisfactory for use at battalion level and lower due to the bulk of material involved, inadequate number of copies available, difficulty of making extracts, minimum time requirements for possession of material, accountability procedures, and total replacement if compromised.

(10) The fast moving tactical situation does not permit a timely exchange of material. It is recommended that III M.F or 3rd M.F DIV publish a pocket-sized SOI combining coupling, authentication and an operational brevity code, similar to that in use by the 7th Marines, that can be distributed to the platoon level.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. See paragraph 13.c, Communications.

15. Commanders analysis

a. There can be no question that the area of operation is a primary source of supply for the VC, and from all indications he has been free to cultivate and operate this area at will. The fields are well cared for, livestock abounds and storage areas are too numerous to count. If the area is to remain under VC control steps should be taken through required channels to conduct defoliation and crop destruction throughout this area. Roads and trails which show signs of being major VC supply routes run the entire length of the Song Khang Valley (BT 065210). Hiding places for supply caches and the individual carrier saturate the banks and entire length of these trails and roads, providing hiding places from both observation and bombing/strafing. All such trails and roads need to be interdicted both day and night.

b. The engagement at Ky Linh (BT 216226), in which this unit defeated the 80th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment, clearly damaged that organization severely as evidenced by the failure to police up their dead and weapons upon conclusion of the battle. The only assumption that can be made, based on previous experience, is that the enemy ranks were so depleted by casualties he was totally ineffective in his attempt at hiding his dead and recovering their weapons.

c. The timely availability of helicopters must be resolved if the desired mobility and quick response is to be executed by the ground Marine. Too often the infantry reaches his resupply rendezvous, or is delayed due to enemy contact, and resupply is missed. Helicopters trying to support more than one unit on a tightly scheduled basis are ineffective as a combat support unit. Direct support by certain segments of the helicopter squadron must be practical, just as the infantry battalion commander and separate battalion commanders must be expected to detach elements of their battalions for a direct support mission.

16. Recommendations

a. Limitations on time and space factors imposed on the battalion to move from one area to another often negated the possibility of thorough searches being conducted in areas that showed evidence of extensive trench lines and
b. Future operations of this type must include the use of direct support helicopter to the infantry battalion.
DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 9 DEC 1965

2nd Bn, 7th Par (Rein)
Operation Harvest Moon

Maps: AFS Series 1701 Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I, IV, and 6658 II, III

QUE SON

LZ SECURE 081040H

CP ESTABLISHED 091650H

NIGHT POSITIONS

ENCL (1)
DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 10 DEC 65

01
35

Co's F & G MOVE TO OBJ B
AT 100700H

3 Co SWEEP COMMENCES 101100H

C O H SECURES 'C' 101540H

Co G SENT TO REIN 2/1
AT 101730H

AM

C

Co E SENT TO REIN 2/1
101340H

C O H SECURES 'C' 101540H

2nd Brn. 7thMax (Rein)
Operation Harvest Moon

Maps: APS Series L701 Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I, IV, and 6658 II, III

ENCL (2)
DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 12 DEC 65

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (Rein)
Operation Harvest Moon

Maps: ANG Series L701, Vietnam
1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I, IV,
and 6658 II, III

Time Zone: H

BN TAC COL CO'S 'G' 'F' 'E'

BN CLOSES 121930H

CO F JOINING HCLO 121550H

DECLASSIFIED
DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 13 DEC 1965

131215 H
Bn W/Co H 2/9 moves
to relieve Viet An Co's F & G move on
separate axis.

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (Rein)
Operation Harvest Moon

Maps: AMS Series L701 Vietnam 1:50,000
Sheets 6657 I, IV, and 6658 II,
III

Time Zone: H

ENCL (5)
DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 14 DEC 65

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (Rein) Operation Harvest Moon

141125 H Co's F & G HELO
ASSAULT CP &
Co H 2/9 FOLLOW.

141430 H Co H 2/9 SECURES
141430 H

Co F SECURES 141930 H

Time Zone: H


ENCL (6)
DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 15 DEC 65

Bn stays stationary and patrols river for VC ferry site.

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (left)
Operation Harvest Moon

Maps: AFS Series I701 Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I, IV, and 6658 II, III

Time Zone: H

ENCL (7)
DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 17 DEC 1965

Co G departs to NE to link up w/2/1 170800H.

Co G link up cancelled. Moves to rejoin BN ASAP.

Bn (-) waits 2 hrs for Co G then moves to next march objective.

BN departs TAC column 170830H for next march obj.

Co H 2/9 secures pass 171330H.

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (Rein)
Operation Harvest Moon

Maps: AMS Series L701 Vietnam IV, and 6658 II, III

Time Zone: H

ENCL 9
DECLASSIFIED

1908 45H
L6 NEXT MARK 08L
G6 LESS CO H MOVES

181935H CO G MOVES

SOLID CONTACT WITH VC

CONTACT WV VC

TO NIGHT AT 181935H

ARM CONSOLIDATES FOR

RELIEVE VC PRESSURE

THEN BUCK COLUMN 10 F

TO MOVES FORWARD AND

PM

DAILY OPERATION OVERLAY - 18 DEC 1965
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SERIAL NO.</th>
<th>DATE TIME GROUP</th>
<th>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS</th>
<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01015H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF REPORTED RECEIVING 3 RDS SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM BT 493040. ALL GS WERE TRACERS AND WERE NOT AUTOMATIC, SPOT RPT SUBMITTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02145H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF RELIEVED OF 16 HR STANDBY IN SUPPORT OF 4TH MARINES CONTINGENCY.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02210H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TRAP FLARE SET OFF BT 510044, SHADOW OBSERVED JUMPING BEHIND SAND DUNE. PATROL DIRECTED TO CHECK OUT AREA. SPOT RPT SUBMITTED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02250H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NEGATIVE CONTACT ON SEARCH OF AREA WHERE FLARE WAS SET OFF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03125H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1ST PLT CO H DEPARTED TO RELIEVE 1ST PLT CO B 1/7 OF SECURITY DUTY OF RMX CONTRACTOR AREA. RELIEF COMPLETED 1330.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05140H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RONNIE HELD 6 AND COL RICHARDSON (RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT) VISITED DDE FOR DEMONSTRATION OF SLD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06004H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TF SMITH REPORTS SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM INSIDE N END OF AIRFIELD SECURITY. MAG-12 S-3 CHECKING.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06012H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FIRING AT AIRFIELD DETERMINED TO BE MAG-12 PERSONNEL TEST FIRING WEAPONS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06120H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/7 ASSIGNED STANDBY FOR 6 HOURS FOR CONTINGENCY PLAN.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06164H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO AND S-3 RETURNED FROM 3RD MARDIV HQ AFTER BEING BRIEFED ON OPERATION HARVEST MOON. OPERATION COMMENCES 6 DEC. 2/7 OPCON CG, TASK FORCE DELTA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07160H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO A 2/7, COMPLETED RELIEF CO F ON OPLR, IN PREPARATION FOR HARVEST MOON.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07170H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO E 2/7 HAS BEEN RELIEVED OF THEIR POSIT IN PREPARATION FOR HARVEST MOON.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07193H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO G RELIEVED FROM POSITIONS ON AIRFIELD DEFENSE IN PREPARATION FOR HARVEST MOON.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>071950H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO H RELIEVED IN PLACE BY CO M, 3/7 IN PREPARATION FOR HARVEST MOON.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081000H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THE FIRST MOTORIZED-MECHANIZED TACTICAL COLUMN DEPARTED THE CHU LAY ENCLAVE FOR THE PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS AT TAM KY (BT 308227).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081115H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THE FIRST COLUMN ARRIVED AT TAM KY.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THE SECOND MOTORIZED-MECHANIZED TACTICAL COLUMN DEPARTED THE CHU LAY ENCLAVE FOR THE PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS AT TAM KY.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081530H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THE SECOND COLUMN ARRIVED AT TAM KY.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081600H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN HENDERSON VISITED BN CP AREA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BN BIVOUACING FOR THE NIGHT IN SECURE ATHLETIC FIELD EAST OF THE PROVINCE HDQ'S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>090914H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L-HR CHANGED TO 1000H DUE TO DELAY IN Prep OF LZ.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091040H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FIRST ECHELON HELCO'S WITH C &amp; H COMPANIES IN LZ SPRUCE. NO CONTACT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091115H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN HENDERSON AND STAFF VISITED CP, CHANGED TO PLAN, ADDED OTHER OBJ C TO DEVELOP OTHER TARGETS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091117H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDH HAS 1 VCS WITH TRAILING EQUIP (DUMMY RIFLE, CANTER, AND CARTRIDGE BELT IN VIC OF LZ.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091150H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSUED PARG ORDER 2-65. (1) REMAINS THE SAME EXCEPT 81's DETACHED FROM CO'S AND REPORT TO JT ARCHER. NO RESISTANCE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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**COMMAND DIARY**

**NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)**

SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

---

**UNIT OR SECTION**

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

---

**PLACE**

Chu Lai, Vietnam (Operation Harvest Moon)

---

**TIME IN OUT**

SERIAL NO.

DATE TIME GROUP

INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS

ACTION TAKEN

M—Maps

T—Troops

S—Staff

P—File

---

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>091230H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) CONTINUE ATTACK ON OBJ 1 AND WITH ARTY AND MORTAR PREP. CO G TAKE OBJ 1 AFTER 5 MIN MORTAR PREP. WHEN ON TOP ACT AS BASE OBJ A. CO G MOVE INTO F POSIT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091250H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PREPARED TO ATTACK OBJ A ON ORDER. CO G TO LEFT OF B. CO F FOLLOW IN TRACE OF CO G AS BN RESERVE WITH EMPHASIS ON RIGHT FLANK.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091300H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SEARCH AND CLEAR; DON'T BUNCH UP; AIR ON STATION; PREP OBJ LS A #1 OR ORDER: HANG ON TO POM'S AND GET TO S-2 ASAP TONIGHT;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091440H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5) LOGISTICS — NO CHANGE; (5) COMM &amp; COMMAND.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091550H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CMD GROUP FORWARD ESTABLISHED CP IN VIC OF OBJ A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091710H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF3 RECEIVED APPROX 30 RDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM VIC OF PT 008332. DDF3 IS LOCATED IN VIC BT 010322. DDF3 DIRECTED TO MOVE TO OBJ &quot;A&quot; ASAP.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091715H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO S E AND H SECURE OBJ B.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091715H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CMD GROUP CLOSED ON OBJ &quot;A&quot; AT 091630. PROVISIONAL PLAT LANDED IN LZ SPRUCE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HELIO; HELO'S REQUESTED TO MOVE WHISKEY &amp; TANGO UNITS TO OBJ A FROM LZ SPRUCE, ALSO TO CP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092115H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AIR REQUESTED ON STATION COMMENCING 100900H.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF HAD 2 WIA W/SHORT ARMY ROUND. FSSC ADVISED AND CHECKING.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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**PAGE NO.**

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<tr>
<td>092400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FRAG ORDER 3-65: DD UNITS ON OBJ A WILL CLOSE ON OBJ B COMMENCING 100700H. ASSAULT UNITS BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATTACK TO OBJ C ON ORDER AFTER RESUPPLY ON OBJ B. DDH AND H MAINTAIN POSITION OBJ B. BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATTACK TO OBJ C ON ORDER. DDF ON ORDER CLOSE ON OBJ B AND OCCUPY REVERSE SLOPE BEHIND DDH. BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATTACK TO OBJ C ON ORDER. DDP ON ORDER CLOSE ON OBJ B AND OCCUPY REVERSE SLOPE BEHIND DDH. BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATTACK TO OBJ C ON ORDER. DDJ YAMNEE ON ORDER CLOSE BN OBJ B TO POSIT TO BE DESIGNATED. TAC ELEMENTS BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATTACK ON OBJ C. MG UNITS BE PREPARED TO MOVE BY 100700H.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100050H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FRAG ORDER FROM MURPHY FOR 10 DEC 65: ARVN OPERATION IN GC 1435, 0932, 0834, 1338. MISSION REF A DD CONTINUES ATTACK TO OBJ C SUBSEQUENT TO 0700. WAREHOUSE CONTINUES MISSION. PROVISIONAL ARNY PLAT CONTINUES TO SUPPORT TASK FORCE AND ARVN PARTY. REQUEST FOR LOG. REPORT ACKNOWLEDGE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101000H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSUED FRAG ORDER FOR 3 CO SWEEP OF AREA BETWEEN OBJ B AND OBJ C. CO F ON RIGHT, CO A IN CENTER, CO H ON LEFT. CO F REMAIN ON OBJ &quot;B&quot; WITH CP REAR.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101100H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THREE CO SWEEP COMMENCES TO OBJ C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101300H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO G HAD ONE WIA FROM VC SNIPER VC ESCAPED IN BRUSH.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101330H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TFD DIRECTED DD6 SEND ONE CO TO AID 2/1 ON HILL 407 VIC BT 07922. DD HELD POSITION.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101430H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD DIRECTED CO H TO TAKE OBJ C: CTD VISITED DD6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101640H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDH SECURES OBJ C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101645H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CTD GROUP WITH DDG COMMENCES MOVE TO OBJ C. CO E HAS BEEN HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH 2/1 - 7 KIA'S 29 WIA'S (2 LATER DOW'S).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>101730H</td>
<td>TFD DIRECT DD TO SEND ONE OTHER CO TO ASSIST 2/1. DDG DISPATCHED. CLOSED WITH 2/1 ABOUT 102015H.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101800H</td>
<td>DD CHD GROUP CLOSES ON OBJ C WITH DDH. COORDINATES WITH 3/3 UNITS ASSEMBLED ON SAME HILL FOR NIGHT TIME DEFENSE.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102115H</td>
<td>DDH OBSERVED VCS WITH REPORTED RIFLE CROSS IN FRONT OF THEIR LINES. CHALLENGED AND KILLED. DDH AMBUSH FIRED AND HIT SAME. ONE VC KIA.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110050H</td>
<td>TFD DIRECTED DD TO CONSOLIDATE WITH 2/1 VICTORS 067302 TO ATTACK AND SIEGE ON ORDER TACTICALLY SUPPORTING POSITIONS. COMPLETING FIRST LIGHT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110730H</td>
<td>DDH CHD GROUP CONVINCED MOVEMENT TO CONSOLIDATE GROUND'S AREA.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110930H</td>
<td>DDH MADE PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH DDG THEN ATTACKED TO 2/1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111005H</td>
<td>DDG ARRIVED GROUND'S AREA AND CONSOLIDATED WITH GROUND'S 6, RESOLVED ORGAN DOG AND DDG.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111235H</td>
<td>MONROE 6 VISITED DD CP AND DISCUSSED DD ATTACK ON OBJ 7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111245H</td>
<td>DDG AND CP REAR HELO LIFTED TO OBJ C ERRONEOUSLY.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111300H</td>
<td>MURPHY 6 VISITED DD CP ISSUED FRAG ORDER FOR COORDINATING ATTACK BY 2/7 AND 2/1 ON OBJ 7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111405H</td>
<td>DDG ISSUED HARVEST MOON FRAG ORDER #5 FOR ATTACK ON OBJ 7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SIT - LAST VC ROOF ELEMENTS HILL 407. HAVE USED 50's, 60's AND MG's. FRIENDLY - OUR 60's WILL BE IN SOON. AIR AND ARMY TO PREP. MISSION 2/7 ATTACKS HILL 407 (AT 078296) W/ CO F (-) HELO LIFT TO 12 ON 407 ON ORDER AFTER AIR AND ARMY PREP. CO F HELO LIFT FROM OBJ C TO OBJ 7. CO H

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**SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED**

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**UNIT OR SECTION**  
2nd Bn, 7th Marines

**PLACE**  
Chu Lai, Vietnam (Operation Harvest Moon)

**DATE TIME GROUP**  
111630H Dec 65 TO 130630H Dec 65

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>OUT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>111630H</td>
<td>HELD LOW WEATHERED OUT. CO E CONTINUED TOWARD 407 WITHOUT OPPOSITION. MISSION MODIFIED CO H TO 407; CO REMAINS ON OBJ C FOR NIGHT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>111725H</td>
<td>DDH FOUND 10 CASES 50 CAL AMMO, ONE HANGLERcola TORPEDO, HELMET, PIECE OF FIELD PHONE, AND BLOODY CLOTHING.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>111830H</td>
<td>CO H ELEMENTS ON HILL 407.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121236H</td>
<td>1 HR BEING HELD OPEN FOR POSSIBLE ATTACK ON HILL 407; WEATHER WILL NOTIFY YOU AS SOON AS DECISIONS MADE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121330H</td>
<td>MURPHY 3 VISITED DD CP AND CHANGED MISSION DUE TO BAD WEATHER. DD(-) NOW TO MOVE TO HIDDEN LOC (2).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121400H</td>
<td>81MM PREP OF HI GROUND N OF HI EW LOC (2) AND (4); BT 045280.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121520H</td>
<td>DDH ARRIVED AT DD CP FROM OBJ C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121600H</td>
<td>LEADING ELEMENTS DEPARTED FOR HI EW LOC (1).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121735H</td>
<td>LEADING ELEMENTS DD ON ASSIGNED OBJ. REMAINING ELEMENTS CLOSING.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121815H</td>
<td>ISSUED HARVEST MOON FRAG ORDER 7-65.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>122238H</td>
<td>MURPHY 6 FRAG ORDER 4-65 RECEIVED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130450H</td>
<td>MURPHY 6 DIRECTED DDH TO HAVE DDH WITHDRAW TO GRID LINE 28, TO TAKE MURPHY RELAY TEAM WITH HIM. BELIEVED IN CONJUNCTION WITH B-52 MISSION.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130630H</td>
<td>DDH WITHDRAWN AND DEPLOYED ON GRID LINE 28 WITH RADIO RELAY TEAM OF MURPHY. MURPHY ADVISED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>130846H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RECEIVED FRAG ORDER 5-65 FROM MURPHY.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131125H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSUED HARVEST MOON FRAG ORDER 8-65.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131130H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDE AND PARK GREEN H LIFT WILL START ASAP. BEGIN MOVEMENT WITH LEADING ELEMENTS AT 1215 (CO H 2/9 RELIEVES CO E 2/7).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131210H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PARK GREEN HOTEL 6 REPORTED OPCON DD 6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131230H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEADING ELEMENT S 2/7 DEPARTED OP FOR VIET AN. CO H 2/9 LEADING ARRIVED BY HELI TO DDE. DDE LEADING ELEMENTS DEPARTED OP.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131330H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PARK GREEN H AND DDE SWITCH COMPLETE. PARK GREEN H BRINGS UP REAR OF TACTICAL COLUMN TO VIET AN.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131724H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HILL 105 ARVN REPORTS HEAVILY MINED COORD 025266. ARVN OUTPOST ON HILL.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131730H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TACTICAL COLUMN CAME ACROSS DOWNED MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER. 7 MUTILATED SKELETONS FOUND IN WRECKAGE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131948H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD UNITS CLOSED VIET AN WITHOUT MAJOR OPPOSITION.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131950H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RECEIVED FRAG ORDER 9-65 FROM MURPHY. DD TO CONDUCT HELO-BORNE ASSAULT SOUTH OF VIET AN. TO RECON SCHEDULED R-52 STRIKE AREA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140700H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD6 DIRECTED PARK GREEN H TO SEND ONE PLAT (REIN) TO PROVIDE SECURITY AROUND DOWNED HELI AT BT 02178 FOR GRAVES REGISTRATION UNIT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141300H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PARK GREEN H DIRECTED TO TAKE OBJ AT BT 99422.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SITREP #12: DD EXECUTED HELO-BORNE ASSIT AT 1125H. NO FIRE IN LZ BUT VC 50 CAL FIRED AT HELOS FROM (AT 99422). AIR COVERED AREA WELL ON TWO SEPARATE STRIKES. 81'S FIRED ON AREA WITH GOOD RESULTS. NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. 8 VC KIA (BODY COUNT) 15 VC WIA (ESTIMATED).</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FROM MURPHY: W BATTERY (4.2) TO BE LIFTED TO YOUR POSIT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141545H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF MOVED TO SECURE OBJ AT BT 003221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPOT REPORT #13 TO MURPHY: DDF UNITS MOVED TO HIGH GROUND OVER FERRY CROSSING BELIEVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USED BY VC. DDF AND PCH MOVING TO CONSOLIDATE AT BT 002331. PCH RECEIVED SNIPER FIRE FROM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ACROSS RIVER VPC AT 993219. RETURNED FIRE. VC BROKE CONTACT. ONE VCS APPREHENDED DISPOSITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF PERIMETER DEFENSE AT BT 002252 WITH DD CP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141830H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JOINED TWO 4.2 MORTARS FROM W BATTERY FOR DS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141900H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DUE TO DARKNESS AND DENSE INDEGROWTH PCH HELD UP 500 METERS WEST OF DDF POSIT. CON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SOLIDATED AND SET IN PERIMETER FOR THE NIGHT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142305H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF WILL REJOIN YOUR UNIT TOMORROW. SAME FOR DDP2. POSSIBILITY OF CO SIZE RAID REMOTE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CONDUCT OPERATIONS TOMORROW IN PRESENT POSIT TO BE ABLE TO RETURN TO PRESENT CP LOCATION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SITREP #14 - DURING CONSOLIDATION FOR NIGHT PCH APPREHENDED ONE VCS REPORTED FROM 49TH N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VIETNAM BN. DDF APPREHENDED 4 VCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151135H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FROM MURPHY: ARVN HAS 1 RF CO WHO KNOWS YOUR AREA. APPX 50 OF THESE CAN BE LIFTED TO YOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AREA. ADVISE WHERE YOUR LZ LOCATED FOR LIFT IN LATE THIS AFTERNOON.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151229H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TO MURPHY: IN REGARDS TO ELEMENTS RF CO FAMILIAR THIS AREA. CP REMAINS THE SAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WITH LZ AT BT 001232. CAN ACCEPT ANY TIME. REQUEST AMERICAN ADVISOR ACOMPANY OR ENGLISH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPEAKING ADVISER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151320H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN WALT VISITED CP, BRIEVED BY CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN PLATT VISITED CP, BRIEVED BY CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDH ARRIVED CP AREA FROM POSIT HILL 407.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>151630H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNCOVERED FERRY CROSSING. CAPTURED ONE VC (IN UNIFORM) WIA. EVAC TO TF DELTA.</td>
<td>M-Map, T-Troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151700H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN VAULT AGAIN VISITED DD POSITION.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151730H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MURPHY 6 VISITED CP. ISSUED ORDER FOR DD TO MOVE BY TACTICAL COLUMN TO EAST. CONDUCT RECON B-52 AREA ACROSS RIVER ON 1630H Dec 65.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PLANNING STARTED FOR MOVE TO EAST. DD WILL WALK TO ROUTE ONE. CONDUCT SWEET OF VALLEY. DDH WILL CONDUCT RECON OF B-52 AREA ACROSS RIVER.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152300H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD FRAG ORDER 10-65 ISSUED ON VALLEY SWEET AND CON RECON OF B-52 STRIKE AREA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160100H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PGH HAD VC CONTACT VIA PRIME, BELIEVED WIA ONE VC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160630H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PGH CHECKED AREA FORWARD HIS POSITION, COVERED ONE WIA AND ONE WIA. WIA LATER DIED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160730H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD UNITS COMMENCED MOVE TO IP. WEATHER VERY POOR WITH HEAVY RAIN.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161100H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDG RECEIVED LONG RANGE SNIPER FIRE. FIRE RETURNED CONTACT, BROKEN, NEGATIVE RESULTS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161345H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STOPPED AT DAI TRANG (BT 039210) TO INVESTIGATE EXTENSIVE VC CAI. ONE BUILDING HAD SIGNS OF USE AS AN AID STATION WITH TWO DOORS, BLOOD AND BANDAGES WERE QUITE EVIDENT. LEAD ELEMENTS CROSSED PL 05.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161550H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEAD ELEMENTS CROSSED PL 07. BB CLOSING FOR NIGHT. SNIPER FIRE RECEIVED TO THE FRONT, RETURNED FIRE, CONTACT BROKEN, NEGATIVE RESULTS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161645H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MURPHY (TF DELTA) STAGES GUNNER WELL ENGAGED. DD TO MOVE 5500 METERS E TO BT 1222 TO BLOCK AND MOVE FORCES S AND N TO SEARCH. PREPARATION MADE TO MOVE OUT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>161722H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MURPHY STATES GILLER CONTACT NOW BROKEN. DD TO REMAINS POSITION FOR NIGHT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161815H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EN CLOSING ON PERIMETER DEFENSE FOR NIGHT AT BT 071212.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262220H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MURPHY FRAG ORDER RECEIVED FOR 17 DEC. CONTINUE BN SWEEP TO EAST.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162330H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSUED FRAG ORDER 11-650N SWEEP EAST.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDG MOVED OUT TO NW TO CONTACT 2/1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170830H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD TAC COLUMN MOVED EAST TO CONTINUE SWEEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171130H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PGH MOVED FORWARD TO SECURE THE PASS AT BT 134217. DDG WAITING FOR DDG AT RJ BT 110216.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171300H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD MOVED OUT WITH CO G CATCHING UP AND FOLLOWING IN TRACE. SPORADIC LONG RANGE SNIPER FIRE CONTINUED TO DOG THE COLUMN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171330H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ONE FRIENDLY VIA HAS TAKEN WITH A MINOR FLESH WOUND IN VIC OF BT 311216. A HEAVY VOLUME OF FIRE FORCED VC TO BREAK CONTACT. ESTIMATED ONE VC VIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171540H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STICK GRENADES THROWN FROM DENSE UNDERBRUSH CAUSING TWO VIA'S FROM CO G NOT SERIOUS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171700H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STICK GRENADES THROWN FROM DENSE UNDERBRUSH CAUSING TWO VIA'S FROM CO G NOT SERIOUS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171810H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDG ARRIVED CP AND ASSUMED SEPARATE PERIMETER E OF DD PERIMETER. CP LOCATED AT BT 165221 WITH DDF AND PGH FORMING PERIMETER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172030H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FROM MURPHY: FRAG ORDER FOR 18 DEC RECEIVED. CONTINUED PRESENT MISSION CONDUCTING BN SIZE PATROL IN SWEEP EAST.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>THE BATTALION MARCH OBJ FOR THE DAY; THE CITY OF THON FALL (BT 250255). PRIOR TO DEPARTING THE TACTICAL COLUMN HAD ONE VC KIA WITH STICK GRENADES.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<td>181130H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SNIPPER AREA SEARCH, CONTAINED A NETWORK OF EMPTY TRENCHES AND TUNNELS, THE COLUMN AGAIN MOVED OUT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181335H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LEAD ELEMENTS RECEIVED A LARGE VOLUME OF FIRE FROM THE VIC BT 225224 AND IMMEDIATELY ENGAGED THE ENEMY. DDF DIRECTED TO PASS THROUGH DDO ACTION TO CLEAR ROUTE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181345H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>REAR GUARD AND ELEMENTS OF MAIN BODY HAVE MADE SOLID CONTACT WITH A LARGE FORCE TO THE SOUTH FLANK OF THE COLUMN. ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE SUPPORT REQUESTED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF DIRECTED BACK FROM FRONT OF COLUMN TO VITAL AREA OF BATTLE. OUTFLANKED THE MAIN VC POST AT BT 214225. PRESSURE RELIEVED ON MAIN BODY AND PCH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENTIRE BN CONSOLIDATING WITHIN KY PHI (BT 216226) WHERE A PERIMETER DEFENSE IS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THE NIGHT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARTILLERY AND MORTAR HAI FIRES REQUESTED. USAF FLARESHIP WILL BE ON STATION ALL NIGHT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDF AGAIN SWEPT VC POSITION AT BT 214225. FOUND NUMEROUS VC DEAD AND WEAPONS, DESTROYED CAVE NETWORK WITH FLAME AND DEFO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190900H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CLEANING UP ENEMY AND SALVAGING EQUIPMENT FROM BATTLE AREA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191130H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BN MOVING OUT IN TACTICAL COLUMN TOWARDS NATIONAL HIGHWAY #1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191140H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LONG RANGE SNIPPER FIRE RECEIVED. ADVANCE GUARD RETURNED WITH HEAVY VOLUME OF FIRE AND TWO VC SNIPERS WERE SEEN TO FALL. ARMED HELICOPTERS ON STATION STRAFED VC, REPORTED VC WERE CONSERVATIVELY CONSIDERED HAI'S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191330H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TWO COMPANIES SWEEPING THROUGH THON HAI. NO CONTACT MADE.</td>
</tr>
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<td>191500H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BATTALION REFORMED EAST OF THON HAI, MOVING IN TACTICAL COLUMN TOWARDS HIGHWAY #1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191720H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ELEMENTS OF DD ON HIGHWAY #1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191830H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A VC AUTOMATIC WEAPON AND MORTAR FIRED ON THE CONVOY FROM VIC AT 281257. A HEAVY VOLUME OF FIRE RETURNED, CONTACT BROKEN. PLUS FRIENDLY WIA'S, NOW OF WHICH WAS SERIOUS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192000H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DD UNITS INTO CHU LAI ENCLAVE WITHOUT FURTHER CONTACT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDG AND DDE OCCUPY POSITIONS ON THE RIGHT HALF OF THE MLR AND OPLR RESPECTIVELY. PROVISIONAL BN NOW RELIEVED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201500H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDE PLAT SIZE PATROL DEPARTED TO SEARCH AND CLEAR AROUND HILL 365. 3/7 PREVIOUSLY REPORTED VC ACTIVITY THIS AREA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOTIFIED ALL COMPANIES OF MESSAGE FROM SHOES REGARDING VMAS CEASE FIRE. NO OFFENSIVE ACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 1945H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BH CALLED AND STATED SUPPRESSION OF FIRES HAS BEEN EXTENDED FOR 24 HRS. ALL CO'S INFO'D.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252000H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BH CALLED AND STATED SUPPRESSION FIRES HAS BEEN EXTENDED INDEFINITELY. ALL CO'S INFO'D.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252006H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BH CALLED AND DIRECTED CANCELLATION OF ALL PATROL AND AMBUSH ACTIVITY BUT TO KEEP LOCAL SECURITY STRONG. ALL CO'S INFO'D.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260100H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VC ATTACKING AN TAM BRIDGE. ALL CO'S INFO'D. TP SMITH WENT TO 100% ALERT.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260800H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BH STATES DIV HAS DIRECTED ALL UNITS TO RESUME ALL OFFENSIVE ACTION.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272015H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDH REPORTS UNIT ON LEFT CENTER OF MLR FIRED THREE ROUNDS .45 CAL AT THEE VCS</td>
<td></td>
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   c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.
   d. To: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is closed.

2. Body:
   a. Time In:
      (1) Unit Journal. Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.
      (2) Section Journal. Enter time information is received within section.
   b. Time Out:
      (1) Unit Journal. Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.
      (2) Section Journal. Enter time outgoing message is delivered to originator's communication center for transmittal, or time information is transmitted by releasing section.
   c. Serial No.: Number each entry consecutively as information is received by keeper of journal.
   d. DTG: Enter date/time group of radio message.
   e. Incidents, Messages, Orders:
      (1) Important incidents, messages and orders are recorded as they are made known.
      (2) Although brief, entries must include all vital elements of information, such as what, where, when, how, and who.
      (3) Original entries should not be altered, but should be supplemented or corrected by later entries when necessary.
      (4) A synopsis of written or oral messages is entered in the journal, leaving the full account for the journal file and other supporting documents.
      (5) Oral messages are reduced to writing and processed like written messages.
   f. Action Taken: This column is used to indicate administrative action taken, such as, routing to cognizant unit staff officer(s), dissemination of pertinent information and/or filing of message. Some of the more common symbols used to indicate action taken are: "M", posted on situation map; "S", circulated to unit staff; "T", information disseminated to troops or subordinate units; "F", filed in journal file.

3. Ending:
   a. Summary: A brief summary of major activities, with reasons underlying decisions, is entered in the journal at the close of each day. This is written in narrative form under the column entitled "Incidents, Messages, Orders."
   b. Closing: Journals are closed daily or at the end of periods or phases prescribed by higher authority.

4. Journal File:
   Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SERIAL NO</th>
<th>DATE TIME GROUP</th>
<th>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS</th>
<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>272200H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDG REPORTS 3-4 KDS SA INCOMING. RETURNED FIRE WITH ILLUMINATION. RESULTS UNK.</td>
<td>M-Maps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293100H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PATSTUFF SMITH RECEIVED INCOMING AUTOMATIC WEPS FIRE VIC 3RD PLT &quot;T&quot;, NO CASUALTIES</td>
<td>T-Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301210H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDE2 SEARCH AND DESTROY PATROL DEPARTED FOR 3 DAY OPERATION.</td>
<td>S-Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301210H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/7 CALLED AND DIRECTED 2/7 TO SUPPLY ONE RIFLE CO FOR STANBY TO SECURE AREA WHERE DOWNED AIRCRAFT LOCATED AT BS 77085. CO H ALERTED W/PAC TM, INTERPRETER ATTACHED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301600H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDH ORDERED TO STAND DOWN FROM ALERT FOR DOWNED AIRCRAFT. POSSIBLY MAY GO TOMORROW.</td>
<td>F-File</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310915H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DDE2 HAS 3 WIA FROM BOOBY TRAPPED GRENADE. OCCURED AT BT 44101. HELO EVAC REQUESTED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310950H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HELO EVAC OF DDE2 WIA COMPLETED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>311130H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALERTED FOR ONE CO STANDBY ON DOWNED AIRCRAFT. DDE ALERTED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. Heading:
   a. Unit or Section:
      (1) Enter designation of unit if this is a unit journal for regiment, air group, or smaller unit.
      (2) Enter designation of section if this is a section journal maintained by a general staff section.
   b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.
   c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.
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<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>010010H</td>
<td>E Company squad working in conjunction with an ARVN intelligence squad who were dressed as VC apprehended 3 VC suspects. VCS were apprehended in the hamlet of Tich May (2), Ky Lien Village, Ky Tin District, Quang Tin Province. The VCS were apprehended as possible members of a VC demolition squad with intentions of sabotage at Chu Lai airfield. VCS turned over to ITT Chu Lai collection point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011345H</td>
<td>E Company 3rd platoon apprehended 3 VCS at BT 449018. Subjects had no identification and were turned over to ITT Chu Lai collection point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020115H</td>
<td>F Company received fire. Three tracer rounds observed coming from BT 493040. Investigation of area made with negative results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092400H</td>
<td>Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 090000H to 092400H. Landing of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines unopposed in landing zone Spruce (BT 016318) at 091000H. At 091700H, F Company received sniper fire at BT 006328. No significant activity since. Total VC killed and captured for the period as follows: VC KIA VC Captured VCS Captured 3 1 34 Captives were evacuated to Task Force Delta collection point via helicopter. Equipment captured included helmets, cartridge belts, ammunition for small arms, and documents, which were forwarded via helicopter to Task Force Delta G-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102400H</td>
<td>Summary of operation Harvest Moon for period 100000H to 102400H. Sporadic contact with small groups of VC gas maintained until 101330H when E Company dispatched to the south to report Opcon 50, 2nd Battalion,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE 19
S-2, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines
Chu Lai, South Vietnam

102400H Dec 65  112400H Dec 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>IN</th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DATE CODE</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>INCIDENT, NSC, ORDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1st Marines. E Company turned over to G
Company 2 VC and 4 VCS apprehended in that
moring's sweep. E Company upon reporting
Opcon 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines attacked
south toward a woodline at the northern
base of hill 407, BT 07/276. E Company
claimed 5 VC KIA and an estimated 4 VC WIA
for the action. G Company in the morning
sweep between battalion objectives "B", BT
050315, and "C", BT 083325, apprehended 1
VC and 18 VCS in addition to the VC/VCS
turned over to them by E Company. H Compa-
ny continued the sweep toward battalion ob-
jective "C", BT 083325, Objective "C" se-
cured at 101614H. The company apprehended
7 VCS during the day sweep to objective "C".
H Company established ambushes at BT 07/22
and BT 080327. At 102114H, one (1) VC
crossed the front lines, and ran when chal-
cenged. He ran into an ambush and was KIA.
F Company occupied battalion objective "B"
BT 050315, throughout the period in con-
junction with tactical elements of HSS Com-
pany and CP rear group. 20 VCS were held
at this position who had been apprehended
by battalion units the evening and morning
of 9 and 10 December. Total VC killed and
captured for the period as follows:
VC KIA VC Captured VCS Captured Est WIA
6 3 39 4
Captives were evacuated to Task Force Delta
collection point via helicopter.

112400H Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the
period 110000H to 112400H. Light contact
continued throughout period for entire bat-
talion consisting of sniper fire. H Compa-
ny moved south from objective "C" toward
BT 067302 with CP's command group. Enroute
apprehended 3 VCS. H Company attacked hill
407, BT 07/276 (Task Force Delta objective
J). At the base of hill 407 in the area
where E Company had engaged a VC unit on
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines

Hu Lai, South Vietnam

FROM (DATE AND HOUR) TO

112400H Dec 65  132400H Dec 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>IN</th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DATE TIMES GROUP</th>
<th>INCIDENTS, MG, ORDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 December</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H Company discovered VC .50 caliber machine gun positions with a good deal of blood and bandages strewn about. Also found were ten (10) cases of .50 caliber ammunition, 7 Bangalore torpedos, 40 lbs of TNT, grenades and items of uniform equipment. Ordinance was destroyed by attached engineer team. 111830H fired an artillery fire mission on VCS fusing in vicinity of BT 069275. Target surveillance not possible due to fading daylight. Total 7 suspects captured during the period--3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 12000H to 122400H. No significant activity for period. One PAVN prisoner apprehended without weapon claimed to be a member of the 308th PAVN Battalion. Prisoner claimed his unit armed with 12.7mm AA machine guns, and had come from North Vietnam through Laos, and Cambodia into South Vietnam with the 308th Battalion. Subject claimed his unit was in flight on 10 December when Marines attacked them at the base of hill 407. Subject claimed that his unit had moved to the west of hill 407 the evening of 10 December and he and several men had deserted. PAVN deserter indicated that all fit men under the age of 60 years in the area were VC, also stated that all VC in his unit were told that if they became separated to go to hill 403, BT 043272, a large hill mass west of hill 407 that at present one VC company with their casualties are located vicinity of BT 067-272. G Company apprehended 3 VCS in the vicinity of BT 044300 at 121930H. Total VCS captured for the period--2; VCS--3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132400H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 13000H to 132400H. At 131400H, G Company kills one (1) VC in an attempt to flee at BT 030248. During afternoon, both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>EVENT DESCRIPTION</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 142400H | Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 140000H to 142400H. At 141130H, F Company received automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of BT 994222. Believed to be a 50 caliber. Airstrike called with positive results. Groups of khaki clothed men seen crossing river at AT 99222. Airstrikes conducted in vicinity BT 99221, and 9921, results unknown. F Company reported 1 VC KIA vicinity AT 994222 at 141200H. G Company reported 2 VC KIA vicinity AT 990225. Sporadic small arms fire received all afternoon from vicinity AT 99222, BT 0022, AT 99221, BT 0021. H Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines attacked, captured 2 VC vicinity AT 990225. F Company reported fortified positions, barbed wire traps in the vicinity of BT 002220. Landing zone, BT 002220, secured after minor contact as VC fled along river bank, BT 994224. After first firing machine guns at helicopters in initial wave, VC were stranded when swimming river by aircraft, vicinity of BT 002225. F Company reported capture of 1 VC and 4 VCS at 141300H. H Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, reported capture of 2 VC vicinity AT 994225 at 142300H. Total VC KIA for period as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>VC WIA est.</th>
<th>VCC</th>
<th>VCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152400H</td>
<td>Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 150000H to 152400H. The battalion sent out patrols along the river bank to confirm location of VC ferry crossing site. Position located by F Company patrol at 151630H in the vicinity of AT 993221, and at 151700H in the vicinity of AT 99225, they apprehended 1 VCS. H Company, 2nd Bat-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>SERIAL NO.</td>
<td>INCIDENTS, FACTS, ORDERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battalion, 9th Marines, conducted patrol</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>along north bank of the river to the west</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No enemy contact was made.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

162400H  
Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 160000H to 162400H. A Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines picked up a VC WIA with a dead companion in the vicinity of AT 997218. VC stated he was from the 2nd Company, 193rd AA Bn of the 308th Division. The VC died from wounds before he could be evacuated. (Information received later reports this organization to be the 195th AA Bn of the 308th Division.) At 160830H, 2 VC were apprehended by F Company at BT 011213. G Company received small arms fire and 1 grenade in the vicinity of BT 009219 at 161145H. Fire was returned with negative results, 3 VC were picked up in the vicinity where sniper fire received. Sporadic sniper fire received remainder of afternoon. At BT 043207, a bloody khaki shirt and bandages were found, also very deep bunkers. Total VC KIA and captured for period as follows: VC KIA — 2; VC Captured — 5; 1 VC document taken from dead VC appears to be a diary. VC and document forwarded to Task Force Delta via helicopter.

172400H  
Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 170000H to 172400H. Movement of entire battalion subjected to sniper fire and hand thrown grenades for period covered. F Company was the advance guard for the initial move of the tactical column, and was taken under long range sniper fire. A heavy volume of fire was returned and one estimated VC WIA was reported. At 171540H a VC stick grenade was thrown from dense underbrush at BT 153219. Area searched, but no contact made. H Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines at...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME START</th>
<th>TIME END</th>
<th>INCIDENTS, MSG, ORDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>172400H</td>
<td>192400H</td>
<td>BT 134217 received long range sniper fire. Fire was returned, and the VC broke contact. A VC from the 519th Bn surrendered to C Company in the vicinity of BT 0721. VC had the following equipment: 1 knife, 2 grenades, and a pack. Total VC apprehended for the period: 1 PAVN raider.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 180000H to 192400H. At 180000H, a VC threw grenade at elements of C Company in the vicinity of BT 170221. VC was KIA. At 183000H, battalion forward and rear elements taken under heavy fire by mortar, recoilless rifle, and automatic weapons. Estimated size of VC unit a battalion minus. VC WIA confirmed enemy unit as the 8th Battalion of the 1st Regiment. Location of contact: Ky Phu Hamlet, grid square BT 2122. VC were well camouflaged and dug into concealed positions. Weapons known to have been employed by the VC force were 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, 81mm recoilless rifles, .50 caliber machine guns, and other small arms. All VC contacted were well armed and equipped. Total VC KIA, WIA, and equipment as follows: VC KIA—105; est VC KIA—75; VC WIA—2, both WIA; equipment: 6 BAR's, 6 M-1 rifles, 5 carbines (US), 1 Enfield rifle, 1 MAS-36 rifle, 2 .30 caliber MG's with 1 set of tripods, 4 French submachine guns, 1 US Thompson SMG, 1 Chicom MG, 1 Chicom carbine, 2 Chicom rocket launchers, 1 60mm mortar, 1 81mm mortar tube, 2 AH/PRC-10A radios set on frequency 45.3, and 1 .50 caliber MG. Documents captured include booklets with VC names, sketch maps of area along national route 1, and sketch map of Ky Phu Hamlet and contact area. |

Summary of operation Harvest Moon for the period 190000H to 192400H. At 1917:30H,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>REPORTED INCIDENTS, MSG, ORDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201000H</td>
<td>Received report from S-2, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, that their OP could observe a platoon of VC with small arms in the vicinity of BT 523038 after being challenged. Check of area proved negative.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272120H</td>
<td>H Company reported that at 272015H, the 3rd platoon in the vicinity of BT 523038 fired at a VC after being challenged. Check of area proved negative.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272200H</td>
<td>G Company at BT 511043 reported receiving 4-6 rounds of small arms fire. Fire returned and illumination fired. Nothing observed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280100H</td>
<td>Task Force Smith received incoming automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of 3rd platoon I/Company at BT 548056. No fire returned. Patrol investigated; negative results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291515H</td>
<td>E Company captured a VC who was observing Marine positions at BT 488038. Subject turned over to IFF for further interrogation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291945H</td>
<td>G Company stopped a civilian boy, age 12, who was traveling on foot.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>DATE/TIME GROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>291945H</td>
<td>Dec 65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>312400H</td>
<td>Dec 65</td>
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<tr>
<td>311230H</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

at check point at BT 506058. Boy had in his possession 5 syrettes of penicillin, claimed to have found them in a trash dump. Turned over to ITT for further questioning.