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PART 2 OF 2

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

OKINAWA OPERATION

PHASE III

VOLUME FOUR

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

- CONTENTS -

PAGES

ANNEXES:

Annex C - 29th Marines	444 - 496
ANNEX D - 15th Marines	497 - 570
ANNEX E - 6th Tank Battalion	571 - 654
ANNEX F - 6th Engineer Battalion	655 - 695
ANNEX G - 6th Pioneer Battalion	696 - 709
ANNEX H - 1st Armored Amphibian Bn	710 - 718
ANNEX I - 4th Amphibian Tractor Bn	719 - 733
ANNEX J - 9th Amphibian Tractor Bn	734 - 745
ANNEX K - 6th Medical Battalion	746 - 757

29TH MARINES

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ANNEX C

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SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III OKINAWA OPERATION

29TH MARINES

18789(1) MCS Quantico, Va. 1-24-46-1M

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TWENTY-NINTH MARINES REINFORCED,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

OKINAWA OPERATION - PHASE III
2 MAY, 1945 to 21 JUNE 1945

SECRET

TWENTY-NINTH MARINES,

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, OKINAWA OPERATION PHASE III

T A B L E
o f
C O N T E N T S

- (1) Chapter I: General.
- (2) Chapter II: Task Organization.
- (3) Chapter III: Progress of the Operation.
 - (1) The Battle for NAHA.
 - (2) The Battle for OROKU PENINSULA.
 - (3) The Battle for ARA SAKI PENINSULA.
 - (4) Appendices:
 - Medical.
 - Supply & Logistics
 - Public Relations
- (4) Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics.
- (5) Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operations.
 - (1) Area Secured.
 - (2) Enemy casualties.
 - (3) Operational material damage to enemy.
 - (4) Own Losses.
- (6) Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations.
 - (1) S-3 Section.
- (7) Annexes:
 - (1) ABLE - 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, Reinforced.
 - (2) BAKER - 2d Battalion, 29th Marines, Reinforced.
 - (3) CHARLIE - 3rd Battalion, 29th Marines, Reinforced.

TWENTY-NINTH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION
REPORT, OKINAWA OPERATION PHASE III

a. Chapter I: General

The purpose of this report is to provide a synopsis of the activities and results thereof of the 29th Marines, Reinforced, in the Battle for Southern OKINAWA from 9 May, 1945, when this regiment was alerted for action in DERAGAWA, until 21 June, 1945, when the island was declared secured.

The overall mission of the 29th Marines, Reinforced, throughout Phase II of the OKINAWA operation was to seek out and destroy the enemy in its zone of activity.

b. Chapter II: Task Organization.

1st Bn, 29th Marines

Lt Col Moreau

Attached

1st Plat, Wpns/29

Det AGE Team, 6th JASCO

Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO

Det 3d Sec, Band Det

2d Bn, 29th Marines

Lt Col Robb

Attached

2d Plat, Wpns/29

Det AGE TEAM, 6th JASCO

Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO

Det 3d Sec, Band Det

3rd Bn, 29th Marines

Lt Col Wright

Attached

3rd Plat, Wpns/29

Det AGE Team, 6th JASCO

Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO

Det 3rd Sec, Band Det

Regtl Troops, 29th Marines

H&S Co, 29th Marines

Wpns Co, 29th Marines (less 1st, 2d & 3rd Plats)

Co C, 6th Medical Bn

3rd Plat, Co C, 6th MT Bn.

91st Chemical Mortar Co (Sep) (USA)

5th Prov Rocket Detachment

3rd Plat, S&S Co

Det 6th JASCO (less detachments)

3rd Sec, Band Det (less detachments)

* NOTE: The 91st Chemical Mortar Company and 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment were withdrawn and reattached at various times throughout the operation.

c. Chapter III: Progress of the Operation.

This chapter includes a complete narrative of the regiment's operation divided into three phases:

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation (Cont'd.)

(1) The Battle for NAHA.

9 May 1945: Regiment departed from DERAGANA area to assigned beach defense sector in vicinity of MACHINATO AIRFIELD and town of MACHINATO. Movement was completed at 1700. Units set up local defense with emphasis on defense against counterlandings. No enemy activity.

10 May 1945: First Battalion moved into beach defense along MACHINATO AIRFIELD as 22d Marines advanced south toward NAHA. A two squad security detachment was detached from the Second Battalion to protect Corps Forward Switching Central. Fire from LVT(A)s in Second Battalion sector sank one known suicide boat during the night. Survivor from suicide boat was captured by First Battalion.

11 May 1945: Two Jap barges were sighted off MACHINATO AIRFIELD and sunk by Naval gunfire. No personnel seen. Third Battalion, on order from Sixth Marine Division, was moved to new assembly area south of MACHINATO AIRFIELD preparatory to supporting attack of 22d Marines. Artillery fire was received in vicinity of MACHINATO AIRFIELD in First and Second Battalion sectors. No casualties sustained. Second Battalion assumed responsibility for area previously assigned to Third Battalion north of town of MACHINATO. One squad was dispatched from First Battalion to guard the ASA KAWA BRIDGE.

12 May 1945: Third Battalion, attached to 22d Marines, moved out of bivouac area 1345 and into lines on left flank of that regiment. First Battalion patrolled inland as directed by Sixth Marine Division to locate enemy soldier reported to have stolen dispatch case containing communication shackles code. Results were negative. First Battalion received an estimated 100 rounds of artillery fire in defense area along MACHINATO AIRFIELD. No casualties sustained. The 29th Marines were ordered to move on 13 May to assembly area in 7675 KING, LOVE, MIKE and OSOE; 7674 CHARLIE, BOB, and EASY; 7675 XRAY and YOKE, prepared to resume the attack in the left of the Sixth Marine Division zone.

13 May 1945: The 1st Platoon, Weapons Company, attached to the First Battalion, had one prime-mover destroyed by artillery fire during the night. Two men were wounded by artillery fire received on ASA KAWA BRIDGE. The 29th Marines completed movement to new assembly area at 1200. Received occasional artillery fire in regimental area throughout day and night. No damage reported. Fire believed to be coming from SHURI area.

14 May 1945: Artillery fire fell in the regimental area throughout the night and casualties were light. Third Battalion reverted to regimental control as of 0600. Third Battalion jumped off in the attack in regimental zone of action supported by the 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate) (U. S. Army). They were held up by a strong pocket of resistance in 7673 MIKE, NAL, and SUGAR. George Company assaulted hill in 7672 CHARLIE with one company of the 6th Tank Battalion in support; made contact on the right with the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, in 7672 BAKER-4. The First Battalion moved into left of regimental zone of action pushing down left (East) side of enemy pocket effecting juncture with the Third Battalion. No contact was established on left with First Marine Division. The First and Third Battalions received heavy casualties from enemy artillery and mortar fire during the day. Lines for the

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

14 May 1945 (Cont'd.): night work as follows: Third Battalion on the right - 7672 CHARLIE-3-2, 7673 XRAY-4-1, ROGER-2, MIKE-4-5, HOW-4, ITEM-5; First Battalion on the left - 7673 ITEM-5-4, OBOE-1-4, 7773 KING-3, LOVE-1, FOX-3, GEORGE-2, BAKER-5, ABLE-2.

15 May 1945: First and Third Battalions attacked to seize OBOE-CHARLIE line in zone of action. The strong point in 7673 MIKE, NAN, and SUGAR was eliminated at 1630 by How Company. Quantities of enemy material were destroyed; approximately 260 enemy found killed. Attacking against heavy enemy resistance, the assault battalions secured the line - 7672 BAKER-3, CHARLIE-2, 7673 WILLIAM-4, 7672 DOG-5, EASY-5, 7772 ABLE-1-2. Contact was established with 22d Marines on the right and the First Marine Division on the left. Received heavy casualties during the day from small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. Direct artillery fire from the SHURI area in 7772 ROGER, SUGAR and TAKE greatly hindered the advance throughout the day. Dog Company was sent to the area of the 22d Marines to assist in mopping up enemy in the rear of 2d Battalion, 22d Marines. The enemy had penetrated their lines during the previous night. On arrival Dog Company was ordered to move into the lines to assist in repelling counterattack by enemy on SUGAR-LOAF HILL, 7672 GEORGE. They arrived in position during height of attack and suffered heavy casualties until ordered to withdraw by battalion commander, 2d Battalion, 22d Marines. The 29 Marines suffered heavy casualties during the day from all types of enemy fire.

16 May 1945: The 29th Marines attacked with First Battalion on the left and Third Battalion on the right to seize the remainder of the OBOE-CHARLIE Line. The attack progressed favorably initially with tanks moving through draw in 7672 DOG and EASY to clean out enemy pocket. The Third Battalion was ordered to move out after the First Battalion had progressed about 300 yards on their left flank along the Sixth Marine Division boundary; Third Battalion's objective being HALF-MOON RIDGE in 7672 ITEM and JIG. On reaching the HALF-MOON RIDGE, Third Battalion was hit hard by enemy fire from pocket in 7672 DOG-2 and EASY-4. Because of fire from front and left flanks, First Battalion could not at this time clear the draw; requiring them to withdraw to lines held the night before. The position of the Third Battalion became untenable with both flanks exposed and enemy firing into their rear. The 3rd Battalion, 22d Marines, did not seize SUGAR-LOAF HILL in 7672 GEORGE on the Third Battalion's right flank. Third Battalion was ordered to withdraw to jump-off position and to establish contact with 22d Marines on right. Our lines at this time ran from right flank in 7672 FOX-1, BAKER-4, CHARLIE-3-2, DOG-5; 7673 XRAY-4, YOKE-3-2; 7773 UNCLE-1, PETER-5 to KING 3-1 where contact was made with the First Marine Division on the left. Fires were coordinated for night defense with adjacent units. Heavy casualties were received throughout the day by both assault battalions. Artillery fire continued to drop throughout regimental zone during day and night of 16 May making evacuation and supply difficult. The enemy had excellent observation over our entire zone of action making any movement hazardous. Major R. P. Neuffer, USMC, assumed command of the First Battalion when Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Moreau, USMC, was hit and evacuated this date.

17 May 1945: Due to the difficulty in coordinating the attack on SUGAR LOAF and HALF-MOON hills, the regimental boundary was shifted to the right (West) so as to include SUGAR LOAF HILL in 7672 GEORGE in the 29th Marines zone of action. The attack jumped off with three battalions abreast at 0855 under heavy artillery and Naval gunfire preparations. The Second Battalion on the right was assigned the mission of seizing SUGAR LOAF HILL and had one company in the assault. The First

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

17 May 1945 (Cont'd.): Battalion on the left started working south along the ridge in 7672 EASY and DOG. Easy Company jumped off at the same time to seize SUGAR LOAF HILL. Easy Company on reaching the draw along the railroad track in 7672 HOW-2-4, came under heavy mortar and machine gun cross fire emanating from 7672 ITEM-3 and 7672 MIKE. How Company was ordered to push south through 7672 HOW to HALF-MOON RIDGE in 7672 JIG to release the pressure on Easy Company. At 1530 Able Company, the right flank company of the First Battalion, was nearing the OBOE-CHARLIE line in 7772 FOX-3 and 7676 JIG-4 with Charlie Company moving up on the left of Able Company. At the same time Third Battalion had reached HALF-MOON RIDGE in 7672 ITEM-3. At 1630 Easy Company was in position to assault SUGAR LOAF HILL from the southeast, but was held up by artillery fire coming from SHURI. Between 1700 and 1830 Easy Company assaulted SUGAR LOAF HILL four times, receiving heavy casualties at each attempt. At 1840 Easy Company was ordered to withdraw to hill in 7672 CHARLIE for the night. At 1635 two platoons of Fox Company were ordered into the lines in order to stiffen the center of the line between the Third Battalion and First Battalion. At 1840 the entire line of the Third Battalion and First Battalion was established on high ground in 7672 ITEM-3, JIG-4 and 7772 FOX-4. At 1930 the line became untenable in the center between First Battalion and Third Battalion and both battalions were forced to withdraw to more favorable positions under cover of darkness. The location of troops at this time was difficult to determine due to darkness. The remainder of Third Battalion was on the reverse slope of HALF-MOON HILL in 7672 HOW and ITEM and were tied in by fire with Easy Company in 7672 DOG and EASY and 7772 ABLE. Extremely heavy casualties were received by all assault units during the course of the action. However, heavy casualties were also inflicted on the enemy throughout the day. Supply and evacuation from SUGAR LOAF HILL and HALF-MOON RIDGE proved extremely difficult because of intense mortar and artillery fire.

18 May 1945: The attack jumped off with three battalions abreast at 0830 under excellent preparatory fires. Dog Company in the assault on the right flank reached the top of SUGAR LOAF HILL at 0946. The hill was held after a fierce grenade and mortar duel. At 1030 Dog Company moved over and began to mop up and destroy enemy emplacements on the forward (South) slope. Third Battalion consolidated its position on the high ground (HALF-MOON RIDGE) in 7672 ITEM and dug in. First Battalion consolidated positions held in 7672 DOG and EASY sending patrols to mop up draw to front. At 1630 Fox Company assaulted ridge in 7672 KING assisted by fire from SUGAR LOAF HILL. On reaching the summit of ridge, Fox Company came under intense grenade and mortar barrage, but succeeded in holding the reverse slope. Fox Company's right flank in 7672 KING-5 was exposed and not tied in by the 22d Marines on the right. Starting at 1900 intense artillery fire fell on all command posts during the night. Lines for the night were as follows: Second Battalion from right to left - 7672 KING-5-2, GEORGE-3-4; Third Battalion HOW-3-4, ITEM-3-4; First Battalion DOG-3, JIG-1, EASY-4, 7772 ABLE-5, 7773 UNCLE-3. During the night Fox Company received and repulsed several counterattacks made on their position in 7672 KING. All three front-line battalions received heavy casualties during the night and morning of 18-19 May.

19 May 1945: At 0300 enemy troops gathered in 7572 OBOE and TARE, launched a counterattack against the exposed right flank of Fox Company in KING-2 with such strength that it could not be repulsed. Fox Company was forced to withdraw to the reverse slope of GEORGE HILL with the remainder of its company. The nature of the

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

19 May 1945 (Cont'd.) counterattacks received by Fox Company on KING HILL were peculiar in that the enemy employed White Phosphorous Mortar Shells to great advantage. Fox Company also received fire from isolated enemy caves on the south slope of SUGAR LOAF HILL during its tenure of KING HILL. Apparently they had infiltrated through this draw on Fox Company's right flank and reoccupied positions on SUGAR LOAF HILL. Commencing shortly after day-break relief was effected from right to left in the 29th Marines zone by the 4th Marines. The relief was effected smoothly despite the fire fight in which we were engaged on the south slope of GEORGE HILL and the heavy artillery fires being laid in the center and left sectors of the regimental zone. Relief was completely effected by the 4th Marines at 1520. At 1530 the 29th Marines occupied the beach defenses in the following positions: Second Battalion on coast along MACHINATO AIRFIELD; First Battalion extended along coast north of MACHINATO AIRFIELD to seawall in 7878 KING, LOVE, MIKE and NAN; Third Battalion occupied coast from inlet in 7978 MIKE to 8179 HOW. The regimental command post was established at 7878 VICTOR.

During the period the regiment was in the lines excellent support was rendered by 2d Battalion, 15th Marines, 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment and 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate) (USA) and Tank Group from 6th Tank Battalion used under difficult conditions with excellent results. Naval gunfire and air support were used continually with good results particularly for counterbattery fires in the cases of Naval gunfire for night illumination. One of the few occasions when this regiment was able to use the M-7 Tank Destroyers was during this period of action. They were used to fire against anti-tank guns and artillery emplaced on the western slopes of the SHURI HILL MASS. Despite the fact that the M-7s were under heavy fires, by careful use and selection of cover and firing positions, their fire proved very effective. Landing Vehicles, Tracked rendered indispensable aid in supplying front line troops and in the evacuation of casualties.

20-27 May 1945: During this period the 29th Marines were engaged in reorganization and rehabilitation of troops with the assigned mission of beach defense in the positions occupied on 19 May. During this period the 29th Marines was to be prepared to resume the attack in either assault zone of action on order. Heavy rains fell throughout period making movement of troops and supply extremely difficult. Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Yeaton, USMC, assumed command of the First Battalion vice Major R. P. Neuffer, USMC, on 27 May, 1945.

28 May 1945: At 0630 Third Battalion moved by truck to relieve elements of the 4th Marines in the left of the regimental zone. Relief was completed at 1500. First Battalion passed through right elements of 4th Marines in regimental zone and attacked to seize the OBOE-GEORGE line. During the attack they received heavy fire from 7471 SUGAR and TARE and 7571 PETER and UNCLE. Passage of lines was slow and difficult due to fire being delivered on front lines. The regimental command post opened at 1030 at 7573 BAKER-2. Second Battalion in regimental reserve moved to assembly area in vicinity of regimental command post. Relief of the lines was effected without a casualty. Third Battalion was assigned the mission of guarding the bridge across the ASATO GAWA at 7572 YOKE. At 1830 heavy artillery concentrations fell on regimental command post; no casualties were inflicted. Lines held at the end of the day were as follows: First Battalion right flank at 7471 JIG-3-4, 7571 FOX-1-2, GEORGE-5, HOW-4; Third Battalion 7571 CHARLIE-4, HOW-2, NAN-2, OBOE-3, 7671 PETER 3-4, QUEEN-1, LOVE-3-1, GEORGE-4-5.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

29 May 1945: No enemy activity during the night other than sporadic high velocity artillery fire and some heavy mortar fire received in both battalion zones of action. First Battalion attacked to seize the OBOE-HOW line on the high ground just northwest of SHICHINA, direction of attack was southeast. 22d Marines were on the right with their right flank resting on KOKUBA ESTUARY. Third Battalion was ordered to hold on high ground and assist First Battalion by fire. First Battalion met moderate small arms and mortar fire throughout period and consolidated lines making contact with 22d Marines. Lines held at end of day were as follows: 7471 OBOE-4-5, 7571 KING-1, FOX-4, GEORGE-5-4, HOW-3. Third Battalion lines remained essentially the same.

30 May 1945: No activities during the night. The attack jumped off at 0900 after attempts to force surrender of troops in front of 22d Marines had failed. Loud speakers and cooperating Prisoners of War were used in this attempt. Progress of First Battalion was slow and tedious due to the quantity of tombs and snipers in 7571 HOW, NAN and TARE. The explosion of a tomb full of enemy explosives estimated at one ton, was detonated by a friendly grenade or stachel charge and caused several casualties to Charlie Company. At 1730 the attack ceased. The left flank of Third Battalion pushed forward to maintain contact with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, advancing on left. Contact was made with adjacent units on both flanks. Lines held at end of day were as follows: Right flank of First Battalion - 7570 DOG-5-2, 7571 YOKE-3-5, 7671 UNCLE-1-3; Third Battalion 7670 ABLE-1-2, 7671 VICTOR-3-4, WILLIAM-5 where contact was made with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, on the 6th Marine Division left flank. An advance of 600 yards was made during the day. First Battalion and Third Battalion suffered moderate casualties during the day.

31 May 1945: First and Third Battalions attacked at 0730 and advanced rapidly against very light resistance until reaching foothills of SHICHINA RIDGE. The 29th Marines jumped off at 1330 in coordinated attack with 22d Marines to seize the high ground north of KOKUBA RIVER. After topping ridge in 7670 NAN and SUGAR, First Battalion received heavy flanking fire from the hills in 7669 BAKER, CHARLIE, and DOG in 22d Marines zone of action. First Battalion was forced to withdraw to their lines held at 1300. Lines were consolidated and contact made with adjacent units for night defense. First Battalion right flank 7670 LOVE-1 MIKE-2, ITEM-1-2, BAY-5-2, 7770 ABLE-1-2 where contact was made with Third Battalion, 5th Marines.

1 June 1945: Second Battalion was ordered to pass through First Battalion. The attack was continued in coordination with 22d Marines to seize high ground overlooking KOKUBA RIVER. Second Battalion passed through First Battalion rapidly and seized high ground in 7670 NAN and the high ground in 7670 YOKE and 7770 UNCLE and QUEEN. Against light opposition Second Battalion pushed to high ground which overlooks north bank of KOKUBA RIVER. Third Battalion in left half of regimental zone moved out against light opposition in the vicinity of the high ground in general area 7770 GEORGE and LOVE. As evidenced by the abandoned enemy weapons and emplacements, this was determined to be an abandoned enemy strong point. This was the point from which the advance was held up on the preceding day. Third Battalion moved on against light opposition to the high ground overlooking the river in the general area 7770 XRAY, YOKE, AND WILLIAM; 7870 PETER. Both assault units sent patrols to the front in their zones as far as the river. Troops were in contact on the objective line with the 22d Marines, on the right and the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marines, on the left. Outposts were sent out to the front to cover all road junctions and local avenues of approach across north bank of KOKUBA RIVER.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

2 June 1945: During the night sporadic artillery fire was received throughout the regimental zone. Second Battalion sent patrols to the river in its zone of action. Patrols killed 12 of the enemy; noted enemy activity just south of river. The 29th Marines was relieved by the 7th Marines. The relief was uneventful and was completed by 1215. This regiment was ordered to withdraw to assembly area as division reserve. The 29th Marines command post remained in same position in 7573 BAKER-2. Second Battalion assembled in 7573 HOW, ITTM, MIKE and NAN; Third Battalion assembled in 7572 DOG, FASY, ITFM and JIG; First Battalion assembled in 7571 ABLE, BAKER, FOX and GEORGE.

Because of the inclement weather during the attack on SHICHINA, supply and evacuation was difficult. Firing positions for the 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment were unattainable due to the muddy roads. The 3rd Battalion, 15th Marines and the 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate) (USA) rendered effective fire support until safety factors limited their fires as the 6th Marine Division and 1st Marine Division neared the north fork of the KOKUBA RIVER.

(2) The Battle for OROKU PENINSULA.

3 June 1945: The 29th Marines remained in assembly area and made preparations for the landing and attack on OROKU PENINSULA.

4 June 1945: At 1030 Second Battalion was ordered to embark, cross and land at 7271 QUEEN and ROGER on OROKU PENINSULA. The landing was uneventful and Second Battalion immediately moved into the lines to clear the ridge just south of ONNA YAMA ISLAND parallel to the KOKUBA ESTUARY. At 1255 Third Battalion was ordered to move across into the lines on the right of the Second Battalion to fill in the gap between the Second Battalion and 4th Marines, who were at this time pushing south across NAHA AIRFIELD. By nightfall Second Battalion was on the high ground in 7370 KING and PETER and Third Battalion had moved into 7270 MIKE, LOVE and GEORGE. The 29th Marines command post landed on OROKU PENINSULA and established a new command post at 7271 PETER-1. First Battalion in regimental reserve was ordered across and into assembly area 7171 SUGAR and TARE. During the evening heavy rocket fire fell in the regimental rear area. However, they were largely a source of annoyance and produced but few casualties inasmuch as the areas which they could cover were very restricted. This was our first experience with Jap rockets.

5 June 1945: The attack was continued, but progress was slow against moderate to heavy resistance. How Company successfully broke up a counterattack launched against them immediately after they had seized the hill in 7269 ITTM. Second Battalion continued to push its left flank southeast along the KOKUBA GAWA and cleared the coastline containing the bridge site which enabled the engineers to construct a pontoon bridge across the KOKUBA ESTUARY. Security detachments were left at this bridge to prevent any enemy attempts at demolitions of same. Mine fields became more prevalent as the attack continued which necessitated clearance by mine personnel before vehicles and personnel could move through much of the area. Third Battalion seized the hill in 7269 FASY and extended its right flank to maintain contact with the 4th Marines. A strong pocket of enemy resistance was being developed in the general area 7369 ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, DOG, FOX, GEORGE, HOW, ITTM, LOVE, MIKE, NAN, YORK and 7368 FASY. Rockets and Soligot Mortars continued to fall throughout the regimental area.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for OROKU PENINSULA (Cont'd.)

6 June 1945: The attack was continued to seize the high ground in 7369. The terrain consisted of a series of small temple-like hills each of which had been converted into a fortress by construction of innumerable caves from which automatic weapons well emplaced, were able to mutually support adjacent positions and prevent troops from crossing the open ground between the hills. The enemy in this sector were for the most part largely naval personnel and were armed primarily with 20mm guns and machine guns. Second Battalion seized the ridge in 7369 BAKER, CHARLIE and DOG and were pinned down thereby fire from their right flank. Second Battalion's left flank was able to push down and seize the high ground in 7369 ITEM-2-4, but in attempting to continue the attack they were also brought under heavy fire and pinned down. Third Battalion was not able to make any appreciable progress in their zone. The narrow roads in this area had been rendered impassable by the successful laying of mines and cratering due to shell fire. Gun positions were very well dug in and artillery fire was not successful in knocking them out.

7 June, 1945: The attack was continued and with the aid of tanks Second Battalion pushed out on its left and seized the town of OROKU and captured the high ground in that sector. The 37mm guns were man-handled to the high ground in 7370 QUEEN. From this position the gun crews were able to destroy many of the Jap automatic weapons by bringing them under observation and direct fire. Third Battalion, in the absence of tank support, used a grenade and bayonet assault to capture the hill in 7369 ABLE. Contact was maintained with the 4th Marines on our right. The progress of the attack was very slow and supporting weapons were greatly handicapped by limited area which the enemy was defending and the proximity of adjacent troops.

8 June 1945: First Battalion was ordered to push two companies down the left of the regimental zone and continued the attack along the KOKUBA ESTUARY to seize the high ground (HILL 53) in 7568 ABLE and FOX. Only patrol activity was carried out on this front as once again tanks were unable to operate due to road conditions (mines and craters). Second Battalion seized the hill in 7369 HOW and the high ground in 7369 ILL and JIG. Third Battalion pushed out and captured the hill in 7269 OBOE and mopped up the reverse slope of the hills in 7269 EASY and 7369 ABLE. In the process of this mopping-up operation, which was essential before the attack could be continued, a great number of Nips committed suicide in the caves as our troops armed with flame-throwers and demolitions moved in. During this period two 40mm guns were captured along with four 20mm guns. This was the first time that a 40mm gun (AA) has been used as an anti-personnel weapon against our troops. During the night attempts at infiltration by the enemy were repulsed.

9 June 1945: Third Battalion captured the hill in 7369 KING and GEORGE and pushed its right flank elements to hill in 7369 PETER where contact was made once again with the 4th Marines. Tank patrols were conducted by Second Battalion through the town in 7369 OPOE-NAN, where Nip snipers with light machine guns were encountered and destroyed. During the day enemy fire reduced itself to machine gun and small arms. In the evening mortar fire again began to fall. A company of Nips was observed attempting to withdraw to the south in the general area of the town of TOMIGUSUKI. Artillery concentrations were called down on them which inflicted a great number of casualties and dispersed the troops. 37mm guns continued to prove their worth as a direct fire support weapon and succeeded in knocking out five additional 20mm guns. First Battalion was ordered to patrol inland from base of KOKUBA ESTUARY. Patrols made little progress, meeting heavy fires.

10 June 1945:

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for OROKU PENINSULA (Cont'd.)

10 June 1945: Regiment continued the attack with the main effort on the right and Third Battalion with Baker Company attached, seized HILL 53 in 7368 ABLE and BAKER. The enemy pocket of resistance was now very clearly defined as being in 7369 LOVE, MIKE, NAN, YOKE and 7368 EASY. As a result, the 29th Marines were ordered to swing their attack to the left and envelope those hills which had defied frontal attack. Second Battalion continued tank patrols in the town of OROKU where a Jap high-velocity gun (later found to be 8-inch gun) firing from general area 7368 EASY (known as EASY-YOKE HILL), hit and destroyed the leading tank. This successfully blocked the avenue of approach and our tanks were compelled to withdraw. First Battalion was ordered to withdraw their battalion, less Charlie Company, to vicinity of regimental command post in 7271 PETER, prepared to relieve the Third Battalion on order. CHARLIE Company remained in Second Battalion on the left flank in 7469 KING-4 and FOX-4. At 1250 Charlie Company was ordered to assemble in vicinity of regimental command post in 7271 PETER. At 1700 First Battalion was ordered to relieve the Third Battalion in the lines in the regimental sector. The relief was completed at 1815. During this period one Spigot Mortar was captured along with a number of Jap automatic weapons. Item Company was attached to First Battalion and Charlie Company was attached to Second Battalion.

11 June 1945: The attack was continued with the main effort still on the right to seize the hills in 7369 VICTOR, QUEEN and LOVE. The hill in 7369 LOVE was captured by First Battalion plus elements of Second Battalion's right flank company. The hill in 7369 QUEEN continued to resist capture, and it now appeared that the enemy had two points of resistance left in the 29th Marines sector -- these being the hill in 7369 QUEEN and the large hill in 7369 YOKE and 7368 EASY. The same Jap high velocity gun knocked out another of our tanks which was attempting to operate in the town of OROKU.

12 June 1945: At daybreak Easy Company moved out to complete mopping up the town of OROKU. First Battalion continued to mop up on reverse slopes and hills in 7369 LOVE preparatory to seizure of high ground in 7369 ROGER and QUEEN. In its initial attempt to capture QUEEN HILL, Able Company was caught by a heavy concentration of enemy grenades and demolition charges hurled down the hill at them and received heavy casualties. The attack was pressed and at 1140 First Battalion seized and overran the hill in 7369 QUEEN. By 1540 First Battalion had seized the high ground in 7369 ROGER and WILLIAM. In a late afternoon attack, Fox Company moved out from OROKU and captured hill in 7369 YOKE and 7368 EASY, which was the last enemy strongpoint in the 29th Marines sector. Mopping up on this hill continued until late in the night and Fox Company was compelled to establish its own perimeter of defense and held the high ground for the night. Just prior to the seizure of YOKE-EASY HILL, a Jap rocket fired its last round. The launching platform was found to be a large cavity in the top of this hill.

13 June 1945: Third Battalion relieved First Battalion in the lines beginning at daybreak and jumped off in conjunction with Second Battalion from that point to destroy the enemy remaining in our zone of action which now consisted of low ground from 7368 EASY to the KOKUBA ESTUARY. Second Battalion in conjunction with Third Battalion sent patrols to the south bank of the KOKUBA ESTUARY. The enemy had now been driven into the marshy ground along the waterfront. Our troops moving through in skirmish lines beating the brush killed approximately 300 of the enemy, captured an 8-inch high-velocity gun which had previously knocked out our tanks, and seized the rocket launcher platform. Approximately 60 prisoners of war were taken. It

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for OROKU PENINSULA (Cont'd.)

3 June 1945 (Cont'd.): was apparent that many Nips still remained in caves in the area through which we had moved. The battalions sent their reserve companies into these caves with demolitions and flame-throwers to continue mopping up and sealing caves which the assault troops had passed beyond. First Battalion was given the mission of attaching a company to the 6th Marine Division Reconnaissance Company for a pre-dawn attack on SENAGA SHIMA on the morning of 14 June. Lieutenant Colonel L. P. Hunt, Jr., USMC, assumed command of First Battalion this date vice Lieutenant Colonel S. S. Yeaton, USMC, relieved.

14 June 1945: The area now secured, all units conducted vigorous patrol activity to mop up enemy remaining on OROKU PENINSULA. Charlie Company accompanied the 6th Division Reconnaissance Company to SENAGA SHIMA, which island was captured without any casualties. All enemy found on the island were dead. Naval gunfire and air strikes previously put on this island were responsible for the killing of the enemy and the destruction of guns which were known to be there and which had fired on friendly troops operating on OROKU PENINSULA. Lieutenant Colonel A. M. Fraser, USMCR, assumed command of Third Battalion this date vice Lieutenant Colonel E. A. Wright, USMC, relieved.

15-16 June 1945: The 29th Marines continued patrolling and mopping up of this sector and all units reorganized and rehabilitated where possible.

The nature of the terrain on OROKU PENINSULA and the proximity of friendly troops placed great limitations on the utilization of supporting arms. Artillery fire was effective in harassing the enemy and preventing troops from concentrating in any one area, but was unsuccessful in destroying enemy materiel due to the nature of the emplacements which the enemy had constructed. Poor condition of roads, lack of by-passes and the enemy's well-placed mine fields greatly retarded the use of tanks.

17-18 June 1945: Reorganization and rehabilitation continued and mopping up of the OROKU PENINSULA was concluded.

(3) The Capture of ARA SAKI PENINSULA.

A preliminary reconnaissance of the southern front of OKINAWA was conducted preparatory to our movement south to go into the lines with the 4th Marines and continue the attack to seize ARA SAKI POINT and that portion of southern OKINAWA which remained in the 6th Marine Division sector.

19 June 1945: Beginning at 0800 the 29th Marines moved by marching from OROKU PENINSULA to new assembly area on southern front. Regimental command post displaced to 7462 QUEEN-2. The 6th Marine Division Reconnaissance Company took over sector on OROKU PENINSULA which had previously been our zone of action. At 1300 First Battalion and Second Battalion were ordered to move further south to assembly area in the general vicinity of 7359 MAN (KUWANGA RIDGE). The attack of the 6th Marine Division to capture ARA SAKI PENINSULA was progressing rapidly and at 1445 the 29th Marines were assigned a zone of action which was generally the right half of the 6th Marine Division zone of action on southern OKINAWA and were ordered to attack immediately in coordination with the 4th Marines on the left. With the First Battalion on the left and the Second Battalion on the right, the attack jumped off from KUWANGA RIDGE at 1705. Troops moved rapidly against light resistance and reached the KIYAMA-GUSUKU hill mass and tied in with the 4th Marines for the night. Enemy attempted to infiltrate our lines during the night, but all attempts were unsuccessful.

455

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for APA SAKI PENINSULA (Cont'd.)

20 June 1945: The attack jumped off with the southern coast of OKINAWA as the objective. Second Battalion on the right pushed forward against light resistance and at 1250 reported themselves on the coast. First Battalion on the left moved out, but their left flank came under heavy fire from HILL 80 in 7456 UNCLE. In this sector our advance was held up. The rest of our lines were able to continue the attack along the coastline. Four Landing Craft, Infantry with loud-speakers patrolled off the southern coast of OKINAWA and succeeded in coaxing great numbers of civilians out of caves; also a large number of enemy soldiers. In this push, 235 of the enemy were killed and 92 prisoners taken. Flame-thrower tanks were particularly useful in burning out the town of KIYAMU and the heavy growth along the southern coast. Due to the temporary stalemate around HILL 80, the 6th Marine Division decided to envelope that sector from the left and the 29th Marines were ordered to extend its zone to take in the APA SAKI PENINSULA and the point extending into 7454 ABL, BAKER, CHARLIE and DOG. During the night many Jap soldiers were captured attempting to infiltrate our lines to go north.

21 June 1945: The 29th Marines attacked with two battalions abreast and pushed on to capture APA SAKI PENINSULA. Our troops reached the coast by 1200 in 7555 KING and PETER, 7455 TARE, YOKE, and 7454 ABL, BAKER, CHARLIE and DOG. George Company, 22d Marines, attached to First Battalion, aided the attack and planted the Colors on the southernmost part of OKINAWA. Large numbers of enemy personnel, both civilian and soldiers, were known to be in the caves which looked seaward from the southern coast of OKINAWA. Our troops were able to clear the ridge above these caves, but the terrain below was inaccessible.

With the seizure of the southernmost portion, the island was declared secured at 1305. Landing Craft, Infantry continued to patrol off the coast and coaxed out great numbers of Nips and civilians. 338 prisoners were taken, 381 Nip killed as we pushed to the south. Landing Vehicles, Tracked proved to be of great value as they worked with the Landing Craft, Infantry in removal of civilians and Jap soldiers from the inaccessible caves on the southern coast. Landing Vehicles, Tracked (Amphibious) provided excellent fire support against these same caves throughout the period of moving up.

(4) Appendices:

MEDICAL:

(A) Ashore - Assault.

When in combat, battalion aid stations and regimental aid station were set up in the battalion and regimental command posts close to the natural lines of drift. Camouflage and cover were utilized on every occasion. Casualties were evacuated by litter and litter-bearers from the front lines to the battalion aid stations; from there the patients were carried out by jeep ambulances to the regimental aid station. Casualties were transferred from regimental to medical company supporting our regiment. For several days, due to impassable roads caused by heavy rains, casualties were evacuated by Landing Craft, Vehicle to a hospital ship.

(B) Protective Measures Taken.

Battalion aid stations and regimental aid station were located within the

MEDICAL (Cont'd.):

perimeter defense of the battalion and regimental command posts and the companies attached to the battalion and regimental aid stations were also used as perimeter defense immediately around the aid station. Whenever possible, concrete tombs, defiladed positions and natural foliage were utilized for concealment and cover. Blackout precautions were practiced.

(C) Hospitalization.

8 All casualties were removed to the rear as soon as they were in condition to be moved and admitted to medical companies supporting the regiment. This hospitalization was adequate. Evacuation was carried out as referred to above.

(D) Casualties Treated.

	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Killed</u>
First Battalion	447	96
Second Battalion	463	129
Third Battalion	546	148
Headquarters & Service Company	14	3
Weapons Company	8	12

(E) Sanitation.

Sanitation was adequate and for the most part under battle conditions, well executed. Food and water were adequate. The command post area was sprayed with DDT spray from the air and by hand sprayers. Prefabricated heads were set up and cared for daily. When the galley was set up for feeding the men, adequate facilities were at hand for washing the mess gear. All burnable waste was burned and the rest buried.

(F) Disposal of Our Dead.

Turned over to S-1 who turned them over to Division Graves Registration. Enemy dead were buried on the spot. As a sanitary precaution, bodies were removed as soon as possible.

(G) Epidemics or unusual diseases in troops.

A fair number of three or four-day fevers were noted accompanied by generalized aching, general malaise, and headache. This was adequately controlled by systematic therapy and bed rest. No complications nor subsequent ill effects noted. It was not possible to obtain specific diagnosis.

There was also noted a fair percentage of gastro-enteritis accompanied by mild abdominal cramps and loose watery diarrhea, some with and some without diarrhea. These were successfully treated without ill effects or complications. Usual duration of the disease extended from three to six days. Specific etiology was not determined.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

MEDICAL (Cont'd.)

(G) Epidemics or unusual disease in troops (Cont'd.)

Dental services performed by Regimental Dentist consisted of temporary fillings and extractions. Number of cases treated - 165. Type of cases - filling and extractions. Additional duties of the Regimental Dentist: Evacuation officer, Liaison and Assistant to Regimental Surgeon, Forward reconnaissance during movement of aid station.

(H) Care of Civilians.

Number of cases treated - 30. First aid was given to civilians that passed through the Regimental Aid Station and evacuated to the nearest Civil Government Hospital.

(I) Prisoners of War.

Care of: None.

(J) Medical Personnel.

They were considered adequate.

(K) Losses and Replacements.

Corpsmen losses in the regiment were 49. Replacement of corpsmen were slow. Specialties needed - none.

(L) Medical Supplies.

The battalion aid stations carried a five-day supply of medical supplies, they were resupplied by the Regimental Aid Station. The Regimental Aid Station requisitioned supplies for the regiment from the Division Medical Store Room and Medical Company.

(M) Field Medical Equipment.

Only that portion of field medical equipment was carried that could be easily carried. Pilferage and losses - none.

(N) Motor Vehicles and Polling Stock.

Each battalion was allowed one jeep ambulance and in the regiment, two jeep ambulances. During combat, "four ambulances were drawn from the Medical Battalion", pooled at Regimental Aid Station and sent to each battalion upon request to evacuate casualties.

Because of the fact that our ambulances were worn out and not in good running condition which resulted in frequent breakdowns, and because of the heavy

Chapter III: Progress of the Operations - Appendices (Cont'd.)

MEDICAL (Cont'd.)

(N) Motor Vehicles and Polling Stock (Cont'd.)

load of casualties during the OPOKU PTWINSULA phase of the operation, we called upon the Medical Battalion for additional transportation. This was supplied by the Medical Battalion who gave us four additional jeep ambulances. These were returned upon call from the Medical Battalion when our casualty load was lightened.

Whenever a battalion moved forward, the jeeps were combat-loaded which made them useless for evacuation during the move. It is impossible to carry all the battle supplies of a battalion and regimental aid station and it is recommended that trailers be furnished for each jeep ambulance.

One ambulance jeep per battalion is deemed inadequate when battalions are committed in assault. It is therefore deemed advisable to have two additional jeep ambulances provided for the Regimental Surgeon to dispatch additional ambulance facilities where and when needed.

(O) Malarial and Epidemic Control Equipment, and Supplies.

Malarial Control was inadequate because of an insufficient amount of DDT spray and mechanical sprayers

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS:

On 9 May 1945, the regiment was ordered to leave DFPAGAWA and move to an assembly area at MACHINATO and be prepared to continue the operation to the south. The movement was accomplished by motor transportation, but due to insufficient number of trucks, the movement took twelve hours. Inclement weather and muddy roads were partly responsible for the delay. All troops were furnished one days King rations for the movement. Efforts were made to resupply the regiment with 782 equipment and clothing before the regiment was committed to action. Sea bags belonging to each unit were hauled from the NAGO dump and were distributed. A percentage of clothing to include shoes was drawn from Division Quartermaster and was issued. When the regiment was finally committed on 13 May, all men had either clean clothes from sea bags, new clothes that were issued to them or clothes that were washed by the Division Laundry Platoon which was functioning at that time. There was no particular strain on equipment with the exception of certain items of 782 equipment namely, ponchos, shelter halves and Browning Automatic Rifle belts.

All types of ammunition were available with the exception of Napalm. It was necessary to obtain Napalm from MAG 31, U. S. Marine Corps Aviation. They contributed 800 gallons to this regiment. Fuels of all types were plentiful. Water was furnished in enough quantity to have showers in the battalion areas. On 13 May, the regiment was committed to action. One of the most ferocious battles that this regiment ever participated in then developed. The intensity of the battle can be measured particularly well from the supply angle. During the period 13 to 19 May, supply was extremely difficult. All supply lines forward were under small arms, mortar and artillery fire. All supply lines were congested and in bad state of repair. Casualties among quartermaster personnel were high. 455 tons and ammunition were expended at terrific rates.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operations - Appendices (Cont'd.)

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS (Cont'd.)

Weapons: The Third Ordnance Platoon, Ordnance Company, serviced and replaced approximately 1,000 weapons of all types. Mortar sections and platoons were using ammunition in such large quantities that in the first three days of action, all mortars were in bad shape. About five 81mm mortar tubes were burned out and the rest near burned out. All 60mm mortars had tubes near the survey point. Division Ordnance replaced three of the 60mm mortars. Enemy artillery and mortar fire destroyed one 81mm mortar and one 60mm mortar section. Seven M-4 sights were destroyed by enemy fire. Due to the large amount of casualties this regiment could not account for 400 carbines, 802 M-1 rifles, 133 Browning Automatic Rifles, 12 rocket launchers and some light machine guns and pistols. However, regimental salvage parties on maneuvering through the areas soon made up a great amount of the shortages. In general, the weapon situation cleared itself up in the following weeks when the Division Ordnance Company found itself over on weapons of all types.

Individual Equipment: 782 equipment showed large shortages. From the battlefield over 2,000 ponchos, 1,800 shelter halves were reported lost. However, salvage parties recovered eventually an excess of these figures making better than 100% recovery. Canteens, cartridge belts, helmets complete, mess gear, etc., covered the entire area. It required more than two weeks for salvage parties to comb the area. This was mainly due to the large number of casualties suffered in this area.

Ammunition: Ammunition was supplied freely by Division. It was used so fast that at times no records were available. Towards the 17th of May, 81mm mortar light was rationed as was 60mm mortar illuminating. It is safe to say that about 15,000 rounds of 81mm light was used during 13-19 May. 81mm heavy about 3,000 rounds and 60 mm mortar about 30,000 rounds. When ammunition was critical, neighboring units, 4th and 22d Marines, supplied limited amounts. Small arms ammunition was used freely. Hand grenades were used to the general amount of 75,000 rounds. All ammunition expenditures were heavy.

Rations: King and Charlie rations were in abundance. At no time did any man miss a meal or have insufficient water. Five gallon water cans filled from trailers were used to supply front line troops.

Vehicles: All vehicles held up well. Many 1/4-ton 4 x 4 trucks had rear ends and clutches replaced. This was not exceptional because of extremely muddy and deep-rutted roads. 1-ton 4 x 4 cargo trucks were in the same category. Land mine accounted for three of these vehicles. M29C weasels served well in the mud, but all eventually broke down due to continuous use in wallowing mud. 1/4-ton 2-wheel cargo trailers held up unusually well.

Evacuation: Evacuation was a salute to all hands. Jeeps, ambulances, trailers, 6 x 6 cargo trucks and amphibious tractors all played an important role. Amphibious tractors served exceptionally well from front line units to battalion sick bays. They were not vulnerable to sniper fire.

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS (Cont'd.)

When the regiment was relieved on the 19th of May, supplies were still available in quantity. Weapons were reaching the critical stage, but at no time were we short of them. In general, every item requested from Division was available to us, some in small amounts.

The regiment rested from 19 until 27 May. During this time, the regiment was again resupplied and equipped. New replacements brought their own equipment which helped us no end. Laundry facilities were again used and salvage was called upon to supply a few items of equipment. From the 28th of May to 3rd of June, the regiment was again committed to action.

On June 4th, the regiment participated in an amphibious landing on OROKU PTWINSULA. Amphibious tractors were used to ferry men and supplies. All troops were across by evening of 4 June and all supplies by 5 June. Only mortar fire was received during the landing. From 4 June to 14 June, all supplies were normal 81mm mortar light ammunition and 60mm mortar illuminating shells were critical. The regiment being rationed again on these items.

Engineering: Supplies were hauled on fairly good roads. However, the area was heavily mined and it required about four days to check the road nets completely. Bridges to the island were constructed and when finished were used for supplies in lieu of amphibious tractors which were used continuously.

Water: For the first 72 hours after landing on OROKU PTWINSULA, water was critical but by using tractors and five gallon water cans no man was without two canteens of water daily.

Evacuation: Until bridges were completed all evacuation was by amphibious tractors which were in sufficient number to fill our needs. The evening of 5 June saw evacuation by road and bridge although under artillery fire.

Weapons: Very few weapons were lost due to light casualties. The amounts were too small to consider.

Ammunition: All types were sufficient to fill our needs.

The regiment gained its objective on 14 June and resupply and equipping went on again as usual. Because of the battle not being too intense, very small amounts of 782 equipment were lost or destroyed. New clothing was requisitioned in small amounts and were issued on request.

On 17 June, the regiment was committed to the southern end of OKINAWA. There was no undue strain on supply. From 17 to 21 June the regiment fought in the south. It is interesting to note that by this time all quartermasters and battalion 4's were used to solving most of their own problems. Supplies were furnished when requested. In conclusion, as the various battles were fought, the battalions became battle-wise and by the time the regiment reached southern OKINAWA the Regimental 4 did not receive any numerous complaints from the lower units. On the 21st of June, the island was declared secured and all problems on supply and evacuation generally were at an end.

Chapter III. Progress of the Operations - Appendices (Cont'd.)

PUBLIC RELATIONS

A total of 85 stories concerning the 29th Marines, Reinforced, were written by Marine Corps correspondents during the southern OKINAWA campaign. The three Marine Corps correspondents in addition to writing stories, kept civilian correspondents and radiomen supplied with information concerning the 29th Marines. Civilian correspondents were conducted to 29th Regiment areas by the Marine Corps correspondents attached to the regiment. Third Amphibious Corps Public Relations which distributes battle information to civilian correspondents aboard the command ship, was given a daily report of the 29th Marines progress.

d. Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics

Battle for NAHA: The enemy's defense in the regimental zone of action during the period 14 to 19 May was characterized by the excellent tactical use made of the terrain, and the number of troops that the enemy saw fit to commit to deny his western flank. The enemy defense was centered in caves on SUGAR LOAF HILL in 7672 GORGE and on the neighboring ridges. Natural avenues of approach were covered by mines, anti-tank weapons, and prepared concentrations of supporting weapons. The enemy defended forward slopes until they were no longer tenable, and then retired to alternate positions on the reverse slopes from which he denied us possession of the high ground by constant mortar and grenade fire and by well-organized counterattacks. The enemy's choice and organization of the terrain which provided him with a series of mutually supporting hill masses that were virtually fortresses and his willingness to commit tactical reserves to bolster depleted units in the line rendered the terrain in question almost impregnable. The enemy's defense was not properly speaking a fluid defense in depth, but rather a rigid accurate defense anchored on commanding ground, which was constantly bolstered by the commitment of fresh troops. Not only was the local terrain admirably chosen and organized, but the enemy was afforded excellent fields of fire and observation over the entire regimental zone of action from the higher ground in the vicinity of SHURI CASTLE. With complete reduction of SUGAR LOAF HILL and the neighboring peaks in 7672 KING, ITM and JIG, the enemy defense on his western, left flank, crumbled, and only scattered opposition from small delaying actions was encountered in the occupation of NAHA proper. The enemy's use of direct fire artillery was singularly effective, particularly because of their positions in caves which rendered counterbattery fire only temporarily effective.

Battle for OROKU PENINSULA: OROKU PENINSULA was defended by from 2000 to 3500 naval troops who were under orders to delay as much as possible our advance down towards ITOMAN by detaining a majority of our forces in a stubborn defense of the high ground north and east of the NAHA AIRFIELD. The enemy defense was hinged upon the large number of supplementary positions available to him, and upon his possession of a large number of automatic weapons of all calibers which were either stripped from grounded aircraft or converted from anti-aircraft use. Some units were armed with these weapons to such an extent that a machine gun was available to every three men. As in the defense of SUGAR LOAF, the enemy held the commanding ground, and the terrain was so organized as to render individual hill masses mutually supporting. In order to advance it was necessary to move forward direct fire weapons over difficult terrain where all natural avenues of approach were mined

 Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics (Cont'd.)

extensively. Once the enemy's high proportion of automatic cannon and machine guns were sealed by our fire, the enemy's defense crumbled rapidly. The enemy made use of rockets which proved largely ineffective and also used white phosphorus which served to disorganize our attacks in several instances. The final mop-up occurred when the enemy was driven from his hill positions into the low ground next to the estuary where large numbers of his troops were destroyed, taken prisoner, or committed suicide.

Battle for ARA SAKI PENINSULA: The defense of the southern tip of OKINAWA and ARA SAKI PENINSULA was singular in its absence of artillery and heavy mortar fire. For the most part, enemy resistance consisted of scattered groups of riflemen and machine-gun emplacements on the successive ridge lines. As the attack progressed, resistance became increasingly sporadic and disorganized. On the unwillingness of the individual soldier to give up made the mopping up a slow and arduous task. The enemy lost an excellent opportunity, largely because of our rapid advance, to defend the ground near the southern tip of the island. The successive parallel ridge lines with the low flat intervening valleys offering little cover or concealment made this terrain easily defensible.

e. Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operations.

(1) Area Secured - Approximately 4.5 square miles.

(2) Enemy casualties:

(a) Killed 3966 counted (14 May 45
 2772 estimated (thru 26 Jun 45.

(b) Captured 1127

(c) Estimated sealed
 in caves 856

(3) Operational material damage to enemy:

76 Light Machine Guns	2 75mm Artillery pieces.
18 Heavy Machine Guns	3 40mm Guns.
24 20mm Guns	5 Lewis Machine Guns
38 Knee Mortars	1 50mm Mortar
4 81mm Mortars	2 Spigot Mortars
4 47mm Anti-Tank Guns	2 Rocket Launchers
2 37mm Anti-Tank Guns	1 8-inch Naval Gun
1 70mm Artillery Piece	4 .51 Caliber Machine Guns
4 90mm Mortars	1 5-inch Naval Gun.

(4) Own Losses:

(a) Killed in action & died of wounds..... 23 officers 435 enlisted
 TOTAL - 458.
 (b) Wounded in action 58 officers 1516 enlisted
 TOTAL - 1574.
 (c) Missing in action 0 officers 6 enlisted
 TOTAL - 6

Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations.

f. Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations.

S-3:

(1) Throughout the OFINAWA operation the efficiency of the section has been seriously impaired because of the lack of necessary equipment for reproduction, records, files, etc. This shortage of equipment results from insufficient organic transportation. It is recommended that the S-2/S-3 Sections have a 1-ton, 4x4 truck with 1-ton trailer for transporting necessary operating gear. In addition it is believed that both the S-2 and S-3 Sections should both have one 1/4-ton, 4x4, truck and one trailer, 1/4-ton, 4x4.

(2) It is suggested that the allowance for training ammunition for the training of rifle grenadiers be increased to at least 15 rounds per grenadier, and/or allowance of grenades, rifle, fragmentation, M-17, be increased to a proportion greater than any other type.

(3) It is also recommended that the training allowance for 2-36" Rockets be increased considerably in order to improve the accuracy of the users of the Launcher, rocket, 2-36". It is further recommended that the rocket, white phosphorous, 2-36" be issued for combat use.

ANNEX ABLE TO TWENTY-NINTH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OKINAWA OPERATION PHASE III

a. Chapter I: General

The purpose of this report is to present in brief, clear terms a narrative of the activities of the First Battalion during Phase III of the OKINAWA operation with particular reference to the battles for NAHA, OROKU PENINSULA and the capture of ARA SAKI PENINSULA.

Included also within this report are the comments and recommendations of the battalion's staff sections on this phase of the operation beginning with the displacement south from DERAGAWA and ending with the cessation of organized enemy resistance on ARA SAKI PENINSULA.

b. Chapter II: Task Organization.

The First Battalion on 2 May, 1945 consisted of 35 Marine officers, 1 Commissioned Warrant Officer, 888 Marine Enlisted, 2 Navy Officers, and 39 Navy Enlisted, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jean W. Moreau, U. S. Marine Corps.

During Phase III of the OKINAWA Operation the First Battalion had a normal number of attachments from elements of the 6th Marine Division including the following:

- 6th Tank Battalion
- 6th JASCO (Artillery and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers and Forward Observers)
- 6th Engineer Battalion
- Regimental Weapons Co, 29th Marines.
- 15th Marines
- 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Sep)(USA)

c. Chapter III: Progress of the Operation.

(1) The Battle for NAHA.

2 May 1945: The First Battalion was ordered to cease patrolling its assigned sector of MOTOBU PENINSULA and to proceed to DERAGAWA and occupy a bivouac area at 7289 ITEM and HOW. This position was occupied until 9 May, during which period detailed preparations were made for the operation to the South.

9 May 1945: The First Battalion was ordered to move to the vicinity of MACHINATO AIRFIELD. The battalion entrucked at 1430 and arrived at 1700. A coast defense was set up extending from 7777 KING-1 to 7676 BAKER-3, tying in with the 22d Marines on the left and the Second Battalion on the right. This position was extended left to 7576 YOKE-3 on 10 May. A bridge guard, consisting of the Third Platoon of Able Company, was maintained during this period at 7575 OBOE-1. No enemy activity occurred although the battalion was alerted several times. Some enemy artillery fire was received in this area.

13 May 1945: The First Battalion was ordered to proceed to an advance bivouac area behind the 22d Marines at 7674 BAKER, CHARLIE and DOG. Long-range artillery fire was received in this area.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

4 May 1945: The battalion entered the lines and Able Company was committed at 673 NAN and OBO with the Third Battalion on the right and the First Marine Division on the left. Considerable resistance was encountered on the left of the division zone.

5 May 1945: Charlie Company continued the attack, passing through Able Company, and with one platoon cleaned out the pocket in 7673 NAN which had been holding the advance of How Company, Third Battalion. Simultaneously the other platoon of Charlie Company advanced against very strong opposition and reached its objective ridge at 7673 YOK. This company received heavy mortar fire and hand grenades from the reverse slope of this ridge. This position was held for the night with Able Company tying in on the right with the Third Battalion and Baker Company protecting the battalion left flank extending back from the left flank of Charlie Company to the First Marine Division lines.

6 May 1945: One platoon of Baker Company supported by tanks passed through the right element of the battalion line to attack from the west, the forward slope of the ridge occupied by Charlie Company. The remaining two platoons of Baker Company were to rush across the relatively open valley to the front and seize the next high ground, later called CTSUANT HILL. The platoon supported by tanks received such devastating fire from small arms, artillery, mortars and anti-tank weapons when they moved out of defilade that they were forced to withdraw as did the tanks. This made it impossible for Charlie Company to advance over the crest of the ridge, and for the remainder of Baker Company to advance. The lines for the night remained virtually the same after some adjustment and reorganization. At 1400 this date, the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel MORSEAU was wounded and his place was filled by Major NUTTER of the Second Battalion.

7 May 1945: Able Company, again supported by tanks, attacked from the west, rushing laterally across the forward slope of the ridge occupied by Charlie Company. The enemy positions had been somewhat weakened, and by direct fire from the tanks 5mm guns and machine guns along with demolitions used on caves and trench positions, Charlie Company was able to go over the top of the ridge and to secure the ground to the immediate front. After this ground was secured, Able Company swept across the valley to the reverse slope of CTSUANT HILL. This ridge was organized practically the same as the other with trench and cave systems on the forward slope. Our troops on this reverse slope were exposed to direct fire from the vicinity of SUGAR LOAF HILL, the high ground around SHURI to the east and from their left rear. In attempting to build up a line in this position such heavy casualties resulted that the elements of Able Company who had fought their way up had to withdraw to a defiladed area. Baker Company was not able to fill into the left as planned. Under heavy mortar and intermittent artillery fire in addition to machine gun and rifle fire, it was barely possible to build up lines for the night some 150 yards forward of jump-off position.

18 May 1945: The day was spent in reorganizing the ground held and in shifting of personnel to reorganize the squads and platoons in the companies. Intermittent to heavy enemy artillery fire fell in the battalion sector all day.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

13 May 1945: A relief of the lines was effected with elements of the Second Battalion, 4th Marines taking over this battalion's sector. The plan was to relieve individual platoons alternately from left to right, this movement to be covered by smoke. Company executive officers were called to the battalion command post to guide appropriate elements into position. When the relief was completed, the battalion marched to a beach defense position, order of march; Headquarters Company, Charlie, Baker and Able Companies. Beach area extended from 7677 FASY north to 7878 LOVE.

20-21-22-23-24 May 1945: During this period the battalion was occupied with this beach defense mission and assignment of replacements to the companies.

25 May 1945: Orders were received for the battalion to move by marching to an assembly area in rear of elements of the 4th Marines to be attached as reserve battalion. Positions previously filled by elements of 4th Marines were occupied in 7572 ROGUE, LOVE, TART, and SUGAR with Charlie Company on right and Able Company on left. Baker Company in reserve was in 7572 NAN. Intermittent artillery fire was received during the day and night.

26-27 May 1945: These positions were held with no commitment of any troops other than 1 platoon of Baker Company sent to guard a Bailey bridge at 7572 YOK, and one platoon of Able Company reinforced Easy Company, Second Battalion, 4th Marines.

28 May 1945: Orders were received to pass through Second Battalion, 4th Marines, and to seize line 7471 (PETER-4 OBOE-4-3 ROGUE-3-5-2 SUGAR-1-2 TART-1-2) 7571 (KING-3 GYOPGE-4 HOW-1), by pivoting action from the west holding our left flank in position. Charlie Company on the right advanced 250 yards as Able Company pivoted on the left. Heavy small arms fire was encountered as well as some mortar and artillery fire. Baker Company moved up in reserve to positions held previously by Able and Charlie Companies. A patrol was sent out by Charlie Company to contact elements of 22d Marines who were across the canal in NAHA town. Only visible contact was made with 22d Marines on the right after dark, and before this with the Third Battalion on left. Lieutenant Colonel S. S. YWATON, USMC, took command on the battalion at 1600 this date.

29 May 1945: With Charlie Company on right and Able Company on left, attacked by a pivoting movement across front held to the east to seize OBOE-HOW line. The Second Battalion, 22d Marines crossed the canal before dawn and was to advance abreast on division right flank. A slow advance over difficult terrain against strong points of resistance from Nins in caves and tombs brought lines to 7571 (BAKER-4-3 FOX-2-1) 7471 TART-4 and 7571 KING-3-5.

30 May 1945: The attack was delayed while attempts were made by Division Intelligence personnel to get Nins in area to surrender. This being unsuccessful, the attack was continued on OBOE-HOW with Able Company on left and Charlie Company on right. The same stubborn resistance was met causing considerable casualties among assault companies. Baker Company relieved Charlie Company on the right and established contact with elements of 22d Marines. Charlie Company became reserve company. Front lines at close of day were 7571 YOK-5 to VICTOR-4.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

31 May 1945: The attack was resumed to seize OBOE-ITM in zone of action, Able Company on left, Baker Company on right, and against less stubborn resistance the lines were moved up to 7670 HOW-4 ITM-3 LOVE-5.

1 June 1945: The Second Battalion passed through us. This was completed by 1040 and the battalion was assembled in vicinity of 7670 WASY around battalion command post until the following day.

2-3 June 1945: The battalion moved to former position in 7571 ABLM, BAKTR on 2 June as regimental reserve, and remained through 3 June.

(2) The Battle for OROKU PTINSULA.

4 June 1945: At 1610, the battalion was ordered to leave the bivouac area at 7571 ABLM, BAKTR and CHARLM, and proceed to 7473 SUGAR and embark in Landing Vehicles, Tracked, for amphibious landing on OROKU PTINSULA. Embarkation was halted at 1915 and elements of Headquarters Company remained at 7473 SUGAR for the night and joined.

5-6-7 June 1945: Remaining elements of Headquarters Company joined the rest of the battalion at 0830 5 June. Upon reaching OROKU PTINSULA, the battalion went into reserve position at 7271 PTMTR and 7171 TAPM. From 5 June to 7 June, this reserve area was occupied and patrols were sent in all directions. Charlie Company was alerted on 7 June and prepared to be attached to the Second Battalion, but this order was rescinded.

8 June 1945: The battalion, less Able Company, regimental reserve, moved out at 0700 and proceeded to 7369 where Charlie Company entered the lines in the left flank of the Second Battalion at 7369 (JIG-5 OBOE-5 KING-3 LOVE-1). Able and Baker Companies remained in reserve behind Charlie Company.

9 June 1945: Charlie Company relieved Wasy Company, Second Battalion on the OBOE-JIG RIDGE and continued to tie in the left flank of the Second Battalion with the estuary. Patrols were sent out to the front toward HILL 53. Heavy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire was received by these patrols. At 1445, Baker Company was attached to the Third Battalion.

10 June 1945: Charlie Company and the 81mm Mortar Platoon were attached to the Second Battalion and the battalion, less Charlie Company, Baker Company and 81mm Mortar Platoon, was designated as regimental reserve and returned to 7271 PTMTR. Able Company reverted to battalion this date. At 1530, the battalion was ordered to relieve the Third Battalion on the lines. At 1830 the relief was completed. Baker Company reverted to parent control and Item Company and the 81mm Mortar Platoon of the Third Battalion were attached to the battalion. The front lines extended from 7368 BAKTR-5 through BAKTR-1, ABLM-2, 7369 UNOLM-4, VICTOR-1, 7369 PTMTR-4-2, GORGE-5 with Baker Company on the right, Able Company in the center and Item Company on the left tying in with the Second Battalion on left. Charlie Company reverted to battalion at 1600 this date.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for OROKU PENINSULA (Cont'd.)

11 June 1945: At 0730, the battalion continued the attack with Baker Company pushing the right flank forward to 7369 WILLIAM-1, VICTOR-2-1. Able Company advanced to 7369 OROKU-3-1 in the center. Item Company advanced and seized LOVE HILL in its zone of action. Charlie Company relieved elements of Item Company on the line for night defense.

12 June 1945: The attack was underway at 0500 with both Item and Charlie Companies making the initial effort on the left advancing over the reverse slope of LOVE HILL and continuing the attack to QUEEN and WILLIAM HILLS. At 0730 Able Company advanced and seized QUEEN HILL in conjunction with Charlie Company and at 1000 Baker Company jumped off for WILLIAM HILL. This coordinated attack succeeded in seizing the high ground in QUEEN, WILLIAM and POGUE and permitted the Second Battalion to move up on the left.

13 June 1945: At 0730, the Third Battalion relieved us and the battalion returned to 7271 PETER. At 1330 Charlie Company was detached from the battalion and attached to Division Reconnaissance Company for the seizure of the island of SENAGA SHIMA and joined this unit at 7068 ITEM.

14 June 1945: At dawn, Charlie Company attacked SENAGA SHIMA with the Division Reconnaissance Company, encountered no resistance and returned to the battalion bivouac area.

15-16-17-18 June 1945: During this period the battalion patrolled OROKU PENINSULA destroying any enemy remaining in assigned sector. Lieutenant Colonel L. P. HUNT, Jr., USMC, relieved Lieutenant Colonel YATON as Battalion Commanding Officer on 15 June.

(3) Capture of APA SAKI PENINSULA

19 June 1945: At 0730, the battalion was ordered to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of TERA. After arrival at the designated area, the battalion was ordered at 1230 to proceed to an advanced bivouac area at 7359 QUEEN, POGUE, SUGAR, VICTOR, WILLIAM, XRAY. At 1630 the battalion was ordered to attack to the southern tip of the island in its zone of action. The attack jumped off at 1700 with Baker Company on the left, Charlie Company on the right and Able Company in reserve. The attack progressed against slight resistance to 7356 with the lines tied in for the night with the First Battalion, 4th Marines on left and the Second Battalion on the right extending from 7357 PETER-5, UNCLE-2, VICTOR-5, WILLIAM-3 to 7356 CHARLIE-1-5 DOG-1-5, WASY-1.

20 June 1945: The attack to the south continued at 0700. George Company, 22d Marines was temporarily attached to the battalion and attacked to the south at the right of the battalion sector with Charlie Company in the center and Baker Company on the left flank at YOKEL WASY RIDGE. At the end of the day's advance the battalion was tied in with the Second Battalion on the right and the Second Battalion, 4th Marines on the left with lines extending along the ridge line in 7355 from WASY-5 through ITEM-5, MIKE-5 to LOVE-5, and KING-1.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Capture of APA SAKI PENINSULA (Cont'd.)

21 June 1945: The attack to secure APA SAKI PENINSULA was completed against slight resistance. The battalion set up for the night along the ridge occupied the previous night sealing off the tip of APA SAKI PENINSULA.

(4) Appendices.

(a) Infantry combat:

In this phase of the operation, infantry combat varied with the type of defensive tactics employed by the enemy. During the battle for NAHA and OPOKU PENINSULA, the enemy's organization of forward and reverse slopes and his systems of interlocking strong points were overcome by varying uses of the tank-infantry team and supporting weapons. Forward slopes of ridges were cleaned out by extensive use of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire coordinated with direct frontal or flanking assaults by infantry. Generally, reverse slopes were cleaned out by flanking action of infantry preceded by tanks resulting in sweeping the reverse slope from one end to the other and coordinating this movement with a direct assault over the ridge by troops occupying the forward slopes. Supporting enemy fire from adjacent strong points was neutralized by continuous artillery, mortar and machine gun fire during the attack. Enemy artillery and mortar fire were neutralized by counter battery barrages.

In the capture of APA SAKI PENINSULA where no coordinated enemy defensive plan was encountered, frontal and flanking assaults across cross-compartments to ridges running parallel to the front were employed. A minimum of supporting artillery and mortar fire was used.

Tanks, including flame-thrower tanks, were extensively used to clean out the area followed closely by infantry. Armored Amphibious Tanks were employed to clean out vertical over-hanging cliffs facing the sea.

(b) Communications:

The communication plan, standard operating procedure, was adequate for this period. About the middle of the period, the Battalion Command "B" frequency was assigned to the 4th Marines. This battalion was not assigned another definite frequency. By using various channels considerable interference was caused to other units using the same channel.

Five (5) copies of Registered Publications GCRP-0130-D3 was received by the battalion communication officer prior to the beginning of this period. Four (4) copies were returned to the S-1, Regiment, because battalion staff members would not receipt for them. It is believed that two (2) copies per battalion is sufficient.

The SCR-300 proved to be a valuable means of communications during this period, as compared to the earlier days of this campaign. This was due mainly to terrain features, and better repair facilities. The SCR-610 was used very little due to failures in the battery cable. The T.C.S. and T.B.X. were used continuously without mechanical failures. The T.C.S. vehicle was damaged on 3 June 1945. It was replaced the next day by the Division Signal Section.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

(b) Communications (Cont'd.):

The SCR-536 proved invaluable to assault platoon leaders when they were in operating condition. It is believed that facilities should be established at regiment to repair these sets.

The battery supply for all radios was adequate.

Wire communication was used to a great extent during this period. "Trouble-Shooters" experienced great difficulties in repairing broken lines which was caused by enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire. During the latter part of the campaign the enemy, nightly, cut all wire lines. The supply and repair of wire equipment was adequate.

Battle casualties were partially replaced on 17 June 1945. The replacements came from artillery units, but quickly adapted themselves to infantry communications.

The wire "jeep" was lost 3 June 1945. To date it has not been replaced. This caused considerable difficulty in the transportation of signal equipment.

An enemy radio transmitter and generator were captured and given to the Division Signal Officer.

(c) Medical:

During the three main actions of Phase III from 2 May 1945 to 24 June 1945, the battalion was a movable unit. Rest periods were too brief for permanent installations. The aid station functioned twenty-four (24) hours a day throughout this period. The medical facilities were primarily limited to first aid and treatment of minor ills. The local road network was reasonably adequate so the movement was prompt, from battalion area to higher echelon medical installations. The aid station was usually set up in the vicinity of the battalion command post in close proximity to the nearest road or bull-dozed trail. If the lines were extended an unusual distance from the command post a small forward aid station was placed behind the front lines.

LOCATION: The aid station was usually placed behind a ridge or other elevation in the terrain defiladed to the front lines. Rarely was the battalion stationary more than a few days so that no permanent dug-out or prepared installations could be used. The numerous tombs in the area when supplemented with a tarpaulin cover served admirably for our purpose. Night work could be performed inside the tombs with impunity. Blackout regulations were strictly enforced. The lack of a blackout tent made night work hazardous when a tomb was not available. The local security was obtained by setting up a perimeter defense of two (2) or three (3) man fox-holes about the aid station. A watch was constantly maintained. This was a secondary defense inside the outer battalion command post defense.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

(c) Medical (Cont'd.):

HOSPITALIZATION: General hospitalization was not done at the aid station. In a few instances hospitalization of early combat fatigue and physical exhaustion cases was attempted. Our resources were poor, so many of these cases were eventually transferred to higher echelon. All casualties with minor wounds who could not be returned to full duty at once, were hospitalized in rear areas. No operations were performed during this action.

EVACUATION: In general, evacuation facilities were good when the surrounding road network was passable. Our jeep ambulance did heroic work in bringing litter cases from the company aid to the battalion aid station. From this point additional jeep and field ambulances carried casualties to the rear. A single jeep attached to the aid station is inadequate for our phase of evacuation. Facilities were grossly inadequate when roads were impassable. This was manifested during the first phase of this operation which occurred during the period of the greatest rain fall. A tracked vehicle such as a weasel or permanently attached Landing Vehicle, Tracked would have speeded evacuation and saved lives. When the need arises it is precipitous. The time interval involved in going through channels in order to have a weasel or Landing Vehicle, Tracked attached, loses lives.

CASUALTIES:

Casualties	Battle for NAHA 2 May to 1 June	OROKU PTWINSULA 2 June to 16 June	ARA SAKI PTWINSULA 17 June to 24 June
Killed - - - - -	475	162	46
Retained - - - - -	64	6	9
Evacuated - - - - -	411	96	37
Sickness - - - - -	22	14	11
Battle casualties - -	393	82	26
Died at battalion aid station -	2	0	0

In addition to the above, numerous casualties from other units were handled through this station. These are not included in this report.

FIELD SANITATION: Field Sanitation was generally fair. DDT strikes by plane and supplementary hand spraying around camp sites was moderately effective in controlling flies and insects. Prefabricated heads were excellent, but their employment was far too infrequent. Food was limited to King, Charlie, and "10 in 1" rations, so no unit galley set up was established in any area. Field ranges were used for the preparation of coffee and foods not requiring mess gear in a few rest areas. Garbage disposal was again by the individual and in front areas this was poor. Water points were adequate and chlorination served for purification. No other water was used for drinking or cooking purposes. There was no outbreak of any water born diseases.

- Disposal of Dead:**
- (a) Own - Quartermaster function.
 - (b) Enemy - Facilities were inadequate on our part. Bodies were allowed unburied until they were a decided menace to the health of our troops.
 - (c) Sanitary precautions taken 72 none.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

(c) Medical (Cont'd.):

EPIDEMIC OR UNUSUAL DISEASES: No severe epidemics were encountered which impaired the numerical strength of our troops. The efficiency of our troops was lessened by the large number of them who developed mild to moderately severe cases of diarrhea. Skin conditions of the body and feet were mounting during this period of the operation. The lack of showers and washing facilities contributed largely to the prevalence of these conditions.

DENTAL SERVICE: No service was maintained at the battalion. All cases were referred to the regimental dentist. There were no cases which required hospitalization.

PRISONERS OF WAR: First aid was given only to those who had not been treated prior to capture.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: No planned facilities were established at this activity. Their care was delegated to Civil Authorities and Military Government Agencies. These units for the most part were too far rearward. Transportation of non-walking, wounded and diseased cases was an ever present burden on the battalion aid station and quartermaster units. This should not be our problem. Dead civilians lying about unburied presented an additional hazard to field sanitation.

The duration of the campaign endangered the future health of the surviving troops. No suitable program for rest and rehabilitation had been planned prior to the operation. So-called rest areas were merely bivouac areas several thousand yards behind the lines. The men continued to sleep on the ground and in fox-holes with shelter halves for cover, cooked their own chow of King, Charlie and "10 in 1" rations and maintained night watches. Barely were shower facilities available at any reasonable distance from the area. Laundry service was for the most part self-maintained. No entertainment, movies or other recreation facilities were available to all. As a result of this, those individuals fortunate enough to have survived the entire eighty-two (82) days were in poor state of mental and physical health at the close of the campaign. In future operations which may in excess of three or four weeks, a planned program for rest and rehabilitation should be arranged.

Transportation is inadequate for supplies and emergency equipment. A jeep ambulance was not designed for transportation of medical gear in addition to evacuation of wounded. Two (2) jeeps with trailers attached would be sufficient. One (1) of these may be a tracked vehicle. An amphibious jeep could be modified into a litter carrying vehicle.

A unit as mobile as a battalion would be benefitted by an aid station which could be transported intact from area to area without breaking down. An amphibious tractor could have its cargo compartment changed into a complete, mobile, continuously functioning sick bay. With this type of set-up more prompt and efficient aid to battle casualties and treatment of routine ills would be possible.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

(d) Supply and Logistics:

The resupply of Class I, III and IV equipment was adequate at all times. Resupply of Class II individual equipment such as shelter-halves, ponchos, and Browning Automatic Rifle Belts was inadequate. All such replacements were made from salvage within the battalion, which in itself was inadequate. Resupply of Class V was adequate except for shell 81mm mortar BM M4 #41, shell 60mm mortar M1 and M2 and illumination M83A1 and demolitions which was very poor.

Good road conditions permitted supplies to be close up to front lines, except during the rainy season from 25 May to 3 June 1945, when road conditions almost prohibited use of wheeled vehicles.

Water supply was excellent except from 19 June to 23 June 1945, when water had to be supplied over a seven mile haul.

Salvage and collection was very good due to good coordination between battalion and companies. Weapons and individual equipment from casualties were placed at a collection point.

Transportation and maintenance was adequate except during the rainy season from 25 May to 3 June 1945. During this period road conditions almost prohibited use of wheeled vehicles and proper maintenance was impossible. Spare parts and tire resupply was limited. Resupply of destroyed vehicles and trailers was poor.

Supply communications were adequate throughout entire operation. Wire vehicles and radio were all used effectively.

d. Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics

One of the most important factors in the discussion of enemy tactics in Phase III is his excellent organization of ground, especially in the area east of SHURI in the vicinity of CRUSCANT HILL. He deployed his troops and weapons in such a manner as to take maximum advantage of the terrain in his defensive positions.

In front of his main defensive line he had many organized strong points in cave, trench and tomb positions employing machine guns, riflemen and satchel-carrying squads for attacking our tanks. An excellent example of this was in the area just north of CRUSCANT HILL. It is noteworthy that all avenues of approach to these strong points and to his main defenses were well covered by artillery and mortar fire as well as by direct fire anti-tank guns, generally 47mm.

Upon attacking a ridge line or any commanding ground it was found that the enemy had fully organized his forward slope and when this was assaulted and overrun he would retire to the reverse slope where he would hurl hand grenades over the crest and use his knee-mortar accurately against the assaulting troops. Further, from the high ground to either flank he was able to lay down devastating machine gun fire. He counter-attacked from reverse slope positions consistently.

Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics. (Cont'd.)

His interlocking trench and cave systems were excellently laid out for mutually supporting fires, and to overcome them it was necessary to use tank-infantry teams followed up by demolition and flame-thrower teams. In connection with this type of defense he mined the approach lanes with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. From "snider" and slit trenches he would employ his suicide anti-tank teams armed with satchel charges and magnetic mines against our tanks.

When any of the enemy soldiers were by-passed or overlooked he would immediately become a sniper and considerable casualties resulted from these practices. Their fire was very accurate and deadly, most wounds being in the head, neck, and chest.

On several occasions the enemy made use of white phosphorous smoke to screen his movements or for hampering our observation.

When the MAHA-SHUPI line had been breached his tactics changed over to defending strong points with artillery, including rockets and snigot-mortars, in addition to his usual light and heavy machine guns in well-concealed and protected positions. In connection with these strong points direct fire, anti-aircraft and dual-purpose weapons, were employed against our troops. Before occupying these prepared positions he would place small groups of infantrymen in adjacent areas to carry out delaying actions. This delaying action and the organization of small pockets of resistance became the main theme of his defense as the attack progressed south into the APA SAKI area.

It is worthy of note that in addition to other tactics mentioned the enemy still believed in the use of individual or small groups to infiltrate our lines to harass our front line troops and attempt to disrupt our communications. These tactics were not greatly effective in this battalion area.

As was to be expected when first class troops of the Japanese infantry were encountered they proved to be a tougher foe than in previous engagements where mostly SNLE and mixed units were used. He is smarter and more tenacious, therefore, able to defend his ground and employ his weapons to a high degree of effectiveness.

e. Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operations

(1) Area secured; See 29th Marines Special Action Report.

(2) Enemy Casualties:

(a) Killed	869
(b) Captured	428
(c) Sealed in Caves	193

(3) Operational Material Damage to Enemy:
(Destroyed or Captured)

Light machine guns	19
Heavy machine guns	5

Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operations - (Cont'd.)

(3) Operational Material Damage to Enemy (Cont'd.):

20mm - - - - -	6
.50 caliber machine guns - -	4
Mortars - - - - -	8 (Not reported as to size)
Rocket Launchers - - - - -	1
37mm Anti-Tank Guns - - - -	2
47mm Anti-Tank Guns - - - -	1
Radios - - - - -	1

(4) Own Losses:

(a) Killed in action - - -	97
(b) Wounded in action - - -	487
(c) Missing in action - - -	2

f. Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations.

(a) S-1: No comments or recommendations not covered in previous Special Action Report.

(b) S-2: The maps furnished for the operation were quite satisfactory and the supply was adequate at all times. The 1/25,000 was generally used while the 1/10,000 was used to supplement it in a slow moving situation. The road-net on the maps was excellent, but the contours, particularly on OROQU PINSULA, were faulty.

Aerial photos were supplied when requested. The value of the photos is increased by having the pertinent results of an aerial photo interpretation study marked directly on the photo in grease pencil.

Throughout the period intelligence liaison with higher and adjacent units was adequate. Information from higher echelons was effective and accurate, but was not in all cases available in sufficient quantities.

Prisoners, natives, and civilians were handled as previously reported prior to 19 June, 1945. However, after this date the great increase in the number of prisoners and civilians made it impossible to interrogate each prisoner or civilian individually. Whenever possible prisoners were briefly interrogated. When it was found they possessed information that was of immediate value to this battalion, they were used to assist patrols in the battalion zone. The personnel available to escort prisoners of war and civilians to the rear was insufficient. It is recommended that personnel and transportation be available from higher echelon to evacuate prisoners of war to rear areas. Prisoners of war taken during the hours of darkness have presented a definite problem to this battalion. The majority of the prisoners of war and civilians taken by this battalion had seen and read our written propaganda. It is believed to have had a definite influence on their surrender. No effect of verbal propaganda was evident.

The enlisted Marine Corps interpreter attached to this battalion was found to be highly qualified, professionally and temperamentally for this type

Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations (Cont'd.)

(b) S-2 (Cont'd.): of work. He was most effective in assisting in the capture of the unusually large number of prisoners of war, which surrendered to the battalion. It is recommended that each battalion have at least two (2) interpreters. The Okinawan temporarily attached was of limited value due to his inability to speak English.

The procedure set up for the recovery of enemy documents and material was effective. This was the direct result of the thorough indoctrination of the men in the battalion, as well as the intelligence personnel, with the importance of this work.

(c) S-3: With respect to the training of infantry personnel, it is strongly recommended that a more thorough period of training be given to infantry replacement personnel. A large percentage of replacements received had no infantry training prior to going into combat.

It is further recommended that the 4.2 Chemical Mortar be adopted by the Marine Corps and become an organic part of the infantry battalion.

Air observation of the battleground was very valuable in this organization. It is suggested that a more extensive use be made of this facility and that such service be made available for regular use by regiment and battalion.

The 60mm Mortar Illuminating Shell invariably disclosed position of companies by the trail of sparks.

The Hand Grenade, Illuminating, was used extensively and proved to be excellent.

Jap mines were effective against our personnel and tanks. With destroying tanks could have been used to great advantage. More education for troops should be planned on Jap mines. It is suggested that samples of all types of these mines found on OKINAWA be brought back to the next staging area. An increase in the number of people trained in mine disposal is essential.

(d) S-4: It is recommended that more organic transportation be furnished an infantry battalion. It is believed that an addition of two 1-ton cargo trucks (4x4) would allow more expeditious handling of supplies to the front line units thereby increasing the combat efficiency of the battalion.

This battalion's experiences with the Weasel has proven it to be a necessary item of equipment. It is recommended that each infantry battalion be authorized two Weasels as part of its organic transportation.

It is recommended that each battalion landing team be authorized to allow designated personnel to remain on landing beaches to see that organic equipment and supplies reach the battalion dump. Due to the lack of such arrangements on this operation two-thirds of our organic and individual equipment failed to reach the proper unit.

ANNEX BAKER TO TWENTY-NINTH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT,
OKINAWA OPERATION, PHASE III

a. Chapter I: General.

This report covers the third and final phase of the OKINAWA operation -- the conquest of the southern end of the island.

b. Chapter II: Task Organization:

The task organization for the third phase of the operation varied with the tactical situation. Basically the task organization consisted of the following elements:

2d Bn, 29th Marines	Lt.Col. Robb
2d Plat, Wpns/29	Lt. Fleming.
Det SFC Team, 6th JASCO	Lt. (jg) Howard
Det AGL Team, 6th JASCO	Lt. Therolf

To this basic organization was added, at various times, tanks from the 6th Tank Battalion; engineers and mine disposal personnel from the 6th Engineer Battalion; amphibian tractors (cargo), armored amphibian tractors, and the 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate)(U.S. Army).

c. Chapter III: Progress of the Operation.

Upon the completion of the HOTOBU PENINSULA phase, this battalion went into bivouac prior to moving south. On 3 Mar., 1945, Second Battalion moved by motor to the vicinity of DERAGAWA and went into bivouac.

(1) The Battle for Naha:

9 May 1945: Second Battalion set up beach defenses in 7777-7778-7878-7978 to protect the division right (West) flank.

14 May 1945: The battalion moved into reserve in 7674. During these periods the battalion was subjected to from light to heavy enemy artillery fire, but suffered few casualties.

15 May 1945: Dog Company was ordered to mop up all by-passed elements of the enemy in 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, zone of action. Due to the tactical situation Dog Company was committed upon arrival in that zone of action. Late in the afternoon Dog Company reverted to parent control after having suffered heavy casualties.

17 May 1945: Easy Company was committed on Third Battalion's right flank in an effort to flank the enemy's defensive positions on SUGAR LOAF HILL. Fox Company followed in rear of Easy Company to fill any gap which might occur between Easy Company and Third Battalion.

18 May 1945: Dog Company passed through Easy Company and assaulted and captured SUGAR LOAF HILL. Late in the afternoon Fox Company occupied HALF-MOON RIDGE, but during the night was forced to withdraw to more favorable defensive positions.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - The Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

19 May 1945: Second Battalion was relieved by 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines and returned to the vicinity of MACHINATO AIRFIELD and set up beach defenses.

1 June 1945: Second Battalion moved up and passed through the assault elements of the First Battalion; continued the attack and secured the high ground overlooking the ASA-GAWA.

2 June 1945: The battalion was relieved by elements of the First Marine Division and withdrew to an assembly area in the vicinity of NAHA.

(2) The Battle for OROKU PENINSULA.

4 June 1945: The battalion moved from its assembly area to the mouth of the ASA KAWA where we were boated in Landing Vehicles, Tracked. At 1230 Second Battalion landed on the tip of OROKU PENINSULA; passed through the last elements of the 4th Marines and continued the attack.

5-13 June 1945: These were nine days of bitter fighting over hilly terrain on OROKU PENINSULA, which a desperate enemy was stubbornly defending with a large number of automatic weapons skillfully emplaced. Following the cessation of all organized resistance the Second Battalion patrolled its zone of action sealing up all caves in the area.

(3) The Battle for ARA SAKI PENINSULA.

19 June 1945: The battalion moved by marching to the vicinity of KUWANGA RIDGE and was committed on the right flank of the First Battalion on the high ground in the vicinity of KIYANU.

20 June 1945: Second Battalion jumped off and attacked to the southern end of the island in its zone of action.

21 June 1945: Second Battalion, in a coordinated attack with First Battalion, attacked to a south-easterly direction and secured the tip of ARA SAKI PENINSULA. The ensuing days were spent in mopping up the scattered remnants of the enemy and sealing all caves located in the battalion zone of action.

d. Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics

The enemy's tactics in the third phase of the operation differed from those employed in the first two phases in that he deployed his forces in previously prepared defensive positions on the YOMABARU - SHURI - NAHA HILL MASS. The enemy's employment of automatic weapons, mortars and artillery was, as in the past, most effective. His withdrawal from the SHURI HILL MASS was executed to take full advantage of the adverse weather conditions existing at that time. As in the past, the enemy pressed his service troops into the line when his first line units became decimated.

e. Chapter V: Estimated Results of the Operations.

(1) Area Secured: See 29th Marines Special Action Report.

Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operation (Cont'd.)

(2) Enemy Casualties:

- (a) Killed: 1,554 counted - 1045 estimated.
(b) Captured: 301.

(3) Operational material damage to enemy:
(Captured or Destroyed)

Light machine guns	31
Lewis Machine Guns	4
Heavy machine guns	8
81mm Mortars	2
Knee Mortars	27
20mm Cannons	10
50 caliber machine guns	4
Spigot Mortars	2
47mm Guns	2
77mm Guns	1
Searchlights	4
Grenades (Potato Mashers)	2
Frangible Glass Grenades	12
Arisaka Rifles	550 (approx.)
Rockets	2

1 Fuel and Supply Dump

1 Generator

1 Machine Shop

4 Motor Boats

Quantities of: Picric Acid

Small arms ammunition

20mm Shells

77mm Shells

Fragmentation grenades

Demolition packs

Optical gear.

(4) Own Losses:

(a) Killed in action:	11 officers	119 enlisted	130 Total
(b) Wounded in action:	19 officers	477 enlisted	496 Total
(c) Missing in action:	0 officers	5 enlisted	5 Total

f. Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations.

It is highly recommended that replacement not be assigned to assault units without previous training from combat experienced personnel. This recommendation is based on the fact that it is impossible for unit leaders to devote the time necessary to personally direct those inexperienced individuals while in actual combat.

ANNEX CHARLIE TO TWENTY-NINTH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT,
OKINAWA OPERATION, PHASE III

a. Chapter I: General

The purpose of this report is to furnish an account of the combat operations of this battalion during Phase III of the OKINAWA operation, to include reports and recommendations by all battalion staff sections.

The missions assigned this battalion were in general the seizure and occupation of key enemy-held positions in the NAHA sector and in the OROKU PENINSULA sector, and the destruction of enemy forces in those areas.

b. Chapter II: Task Organization

During Phase III of the OKINAWA operation the following units were attached tactically to the battalion for the entire period:

3rd Plat, Regtl Wpns Co, 29th Mar. Reinf.
NGF, 6th JASCO
AGL, 6th JASCO
Det 3rd Band Sec, Hq Bn, 6th Mar Div

When the tactical situation necessitated the attachment of artillery forward observers, tanks, engineers, amphibious tractors, motor transport, and other special units, those units were attached to the battalion tactically from the following:

15th Marines
6th Tank Bn
6th Engr Bn
4th Amph Trac Bn
6th MT Bn
Other special units.

c. Chapter III: Progress of the Operation

(1) The Battle for NAHA:

3 May 1945: The battalion moved south by truck convoy from KAMISHI to DERAGAWA (9289-GWORGW), where it remained in a perimeter defense until 9 May.

9 May 1945: The battalion moved south by motor convoy to a vicinity north of UCHITOMARI (8078-PWTR) and set up a 2,000 yard beach defense.

11 May 1945: The battalion marched to MACHINATO AIRFIELD. Companies were disposed generally west of the southern end of the airfield in a beach defense position. They received approximately 60 rounds of artillery fire during the night. No casualties.

12 May 1945: The battalion was attached to the 22d Marines, crossed the ASA KAWA and established a command post at 7674-QUET. How Company and one platoon of George Company were put in the line at 7673 JIG-5 ITM-2-1 HOW-5 GWORGW-5-1 with the First Marine Division on our left and Second Battalion, 22d Marines, on our right, while Item Company was ordered into regimental reserve at 7573 DOG. During this move enemy artillery killed 4 and wounded 17 of our men. The battalion received heavy mortar and artillery fire during the night.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battabefor NAFA (Cont'd.)

13 May 1945: The command post was moved to 7673-BAKTR-2. At 1400, Item Company was released to the battalion which was ordered to attack and seize a hill at 7673 QUINN. Heavy resistance was met while moving through the draw approaching the hill. An advance was made of approximately 300 yards. The battalion had 9 killed and 47 wounded, and killed about 150 of the enemy. Again, we received heavy enemy shell fire during the night.

14 May 1945: The battalion reverted to the 29th Marines, and the attack was continued. Action was particularly heavy at all points along the line. George Company pushed southeast toward the hill in 7672 CHARLIE and at 1800 gained position in 7673 QUINN, the high ground north of CHARLIE HILL. Between this position and CHARLIE HILL, 200 yards of open, flat ground remained, covered by enemy machine gun, sniper, mortar and artillery fire. A running assault was made and CHARLIE HILL was taken at 1915. At the north end of the line, How Company moved southeast and at nightfall was held up by an enemy strong point at 7673 SUGAR. Our casualties were 17 killed, 81 wounded; enemy 97 killed. Sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire was received during the night.

15 May 1945: The objective was to wipe out resistance at 7673 SUGAR in order to straighten out and consolidate our lines. Dog Company, Second Battalion, replaced elements of Second Battalion, 22d Marines on the right flank of George Company, and was met immediately by an enemy counterattack. George Company received intense enemy mortar and artillery fire all day, but held the position on CHARLIE HILL. How Company moved south around 7673 SUGAR-1, one platoon of Item Company covering this advance by fire. Able Company, supported by tanks, advanced on the objective from the northeast and took it at 1500. Our lines at 1800 ran from 7673 SUGAR-4-ROGNER-4 WILLIAM-2-4 to 7672 CHARLIE-2-5-3.

16 May 1945: The plan for today called for the Third Battalion to assault HALF-MOON RIDGE (7672 ITEM-JIG), while Third Battalion, 22d Marines attacked SUGAR LOAN HILL (7672 GEORGE) on our right, and the First Battalion advanced south on our left flank. George and Item Companies on CHARLIE HILL, were subjected to heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire all morning, and also received heavy machine gun and rifle fire from SUGAR LOAN HILL on our right flank and from enemy held high ground at 7672 FASY on our left flank. How Company was assigned the mission of destroying several by-passed enemy positions and blowing caves in the battalion zone of action. Heavy mortar and artillery preparations were laid on the objective, and, at 1400 George and Item Companies jumped off from CHARLIE HILL, and, receiving practically no enemy fire during the advance, quickly occupied the north slope of HALF-MOON RIDGE. However, at 1500 the enemy launched a terrific counter offensive against our advanced positions, pouring machine gun, rifle and mortar fire into our exposed flanks and rear and layed in heavy concentrations of knee mortars and hand grenades from caves and emplacements on the south slope of HALF-MOON RIDGE still held by the enemy. With casualties mounting under the heavy fire received from enemy positions on both flanks, George and Item Companies were forced to withdraw from the north slope of HALF-MOON RIDGE to former positions on CHARLIE HILL. Our casualties for the day were 16 killed and 60 wounded. No losses were about 100 killed. Enemy artillery shelled our positions during the night.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAPA (Cont'd)

17 May 1945: Another attempt to take HALF-MOON RIDGE resulted in partial success. Naval Gunfire, artillery and mortar preparations were called throughout the day. Two enemy 77mm guns were knocked out by Naval gunfire in 7872-ABLW. At 1600 our companies again had fought up the north slope of HALF-MOON RIDGE, under heavy enemy fire, and engaged in close hand-to-hand fighting and grenade exchanges. On our right the Second Battalion had been committed and had moved up on SUGAR LOAF HILL. On our left the First Battalion had advanced to high ground in 7672 WASY. At 1700 the Second Battalion was driven back from SUGAR LOAF HILL and since the battalion was receiving fire from enemy positions to the rear of the First Battalion, our position on HALF-MOON RIDGE became untenable and our companies moved back about 150 yards to positions of advantage for night defense. For this date the battalion killed about 90 Nips and suffered 3 killed and 38 wounded.

18 May 1945: How and Item companies supported by tanks, attacked south moving around the right base of HALF-MOON RIDGE, then turning east to assault the south slope of the ridge. In the meantime, Second Battalion took SUGAR LOAF HILL and First Battalion cleaned out the high ground in 7672 WASY. By nightfall the lines were consolidated. This battalion tied in with the First Battalion on the left and the Second Battalion on the right. Our casualties for the day were 8 killed and 28 wounded.

19 May 1945: The battalion was relieved by the 4th Marines and moved by foot to our former beach defense positions in 8079, north of UCHITOMARI, for rest and reorganization. The command post was established in 8079 VICTOR-5. The battalion remained in this area until 28 May.

28 May 1945: The battalion moved by truck across the ASA YAWA and marched from there to the southern outskirts of MACHISI, an eastern suburb of NAPA, establishing the battalion command post at 7571 JIG-5. At 1430 the battalion relieved the 4th Marines and our companies dug in for the night in positions from 7571 CHARLIE-WAN-2 TAP-2 to 7671 FOX-2. Sporadic enemy machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire received during the night caused a few casualties.

29 May 1945: The right flank of the battalion was ordered to remain stationary and deliver supporting fire while a force composed of the First Battalion and two battalions of the 22d Marines with its right flank extending to the FOKUBA GAWA, swept southeast across the Third Battalion front. The left flank elements were to pivot in 7571 TAP-2 maintaining contact with the 5th Marines as that unit advanced squeezing out Third Battalion, 22d Marines. This movement was executed by the left flank of the battalion which advanced about 600 yards while maintaining contact with the 5th Marines. Meantime during the afternoon the center of the battalion was ordered to advance and Item Company assaulted and took the hill in 7670 ABLW-BAKFR against moderate enemy resistance, killing about 35 Nips and suffering 2 killed and 10 wounded.

30 May 1945: Item Company continued to support by fire the movement of the First Battalion and the 22d Marines on our right flank. How Company advanced and seized hills in 7671 VICTOR-WILLIAM while maintaining contact with the 5th Marines on our left. George Company sealed approximately 20 caves in the battalion zone during

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for NAHA (Cont'd.)

30 May 1945 (Cont'd.) the day. The battalion accounted for more than 100 Nips several enemy mortars and machine guns and some ARASAKI Rifles. Our casualties for the day were 1 killed and 6 wounded.

31 May 1945: How and Item Companies advanced to the intermediate ridge in 7670 LOVE-HOW-DOG, and George Company set up a perimeter defense around hill in 7670 ABL-BAKTR. In taking the objectives, moderate to heavy enemy machine gun fire was encountered.

1 June 1945: The battalion moved out to attack through the town of SHICHINA and on to the high ground immediately north of the KOKUBA GAWA and its surrounding valley floor, with the 5th Marines on our left and the Second Battalion replacing the First Battalion on our right. Supported by tanks, the battalion advanced steadily, destroying all enemy positions and resistance, and sweeping by 1600 through SHICHINA to the steep cliff overlooking the KOKUBA GAWA. How and Item Companies dug in for the night on the heights above the valley and the battalion command post moved to 7670 DOG-2. In this attack we destroyed several enemy six-inch guns, three 20mm guns, several 81mm mortars, six machine guns and killed 150 Nips.

2 June 1945: The battalion was relieved this morning by the 7th Marines and moved by foot to a bivouac area in NAHA, setting up a perimeter defense with the battalion command post established at 7572 ITM-5. The Battalion remained in this area until 4 June.

(2) The Battle for OROKU PENINSULA.

4 June 1945: The battalion was alerted to be ready to move out by 0800 in support of the 4th Marines early morning amphibious landing on OROKU PENINSULA. At 1330 we embarked in LVTs from 7473 YOKU, crossed NAHA BAY and made an unopposed landing on RFD BEACH 2 in 7271 KING. The battalion command post was set up at 7271 VICTOR George, How and Item Companies were put on the line to the left of the 4th Marines from 7270 (HOW-2 GFORGE-1 LOVE-4 ROGER-1). The Second Battalion was tied in on our left flank. From early evening and on through the night, sporadic fire was received from enemy artillery and mortars along with a new "Screaming Mimi" rocket missile not previously encountered. Twelve Nips were killed attempting to infiltrate through our lines during the night.

5 June 1945: The battalion was ordered to attack and seize, in its zone of action the OROKU-KING line extending from 7269 TAFE-1 to 7369 BAKTR-4, approximately 1400 yards to the battalion front. George and How Companies moved out in the face of extremely heavy enemy machine gun, rifle and mortar fire and, after overcoming bitter enemy resistance across intermediate hills, advanced to a line running from 7269 (ITM-4-2 DOG-4-2) to 7270 YOKU-2-4, approximately 500 yards short of the assigned objective. Further advance could not be made because of the heavy volume of fire coming from enemy positions on commanding ground to the battalion right front at 7269 OROKU-3 in the 4th Marines sector, and from the high ground to our left front at 7369 BAKTR-5 in the Second Battalion zone of action. During the advance we killed about 58 enemy and lost 7 killed and 32 wounded in the attack and from enemy artillery, mortar and rocket fire the previous evening.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for OROKU PENINSULA (Cont'd).

6 June 1945: The battalion had as a zone of action a series of scattered hills and broken, interlocking ridges to the battalion's immediate front, each strongly defended and all mutually supporting. These hills and ridges were located at 7369 KING-PETER to our right front; 7269 FASY, 7369 LOVE-QUINN to our direct front; 7369 GEORGE-ROGER-SUGAR to our left front. After a day of bitter fighting the battalion clawed forward approximately 150 yards and succeeded in securing the hill in 7269 FASY.

7-8-9 June 1945: By the evening of 9 June, after three days of vicious fighting, the battalion finally secured hills in 7269 OROW and 7369 PETER-QUINN-GEORGE-BAKER. In these three days of extremely heavy fighting, little ground area was gained, but we killed approximately 500 enemy, destroyed a great many weapons of all kinds and sealed many caves containing enemy troops, supplies and equipment. Our casualties for this period were heavy and on 10 June Baker Company of the First Battalion was attached to this battalion and put into the lines on our right flank.

10 June 1945: George Company assaulted the enemy strong point on the hill at 7369 LOVE, but was forced to withdraw due to intense enemy fire from high ground to our right flank. At 1010 Baker Company of the First Battalion with the Third Battalion, 4th Marines, on the right, assaulted and took the hill at 7368 ARL-BAKER. At this time, Second Battalion on our left flank had elements on the high ground at 7369 OROW. The afternoon of 10 June, Able Company of our First Battalion relieved George and How Companies. Item Company remained on the line attached to the First Battalion and moved forward and to the left to close the gap between our position and Second Battalion.

11 June 1945: How Company was attached to the Second Battalion and replaced Charlie Company on the extreme left flank of Second Battalion.

12 June 1945: Item Company assaulted and took the hill in 7369 LOVE, and was then squeezed out and put in First Battalion reserve. The evening of 12 June How and Item Companies reverted to Third Battalion and on the morning of 13 June we relieved the First Battalion.

13 June 1945: We put two companies on the line from 7368 ITEM-1 CHARLIE-5 to 7369 WILLIAM-5 ROGER-2, with Item Company on the left, George Company on the right and How Company to the rear. The battalion was ordered to continue the attack over the remaining ground in our sector. By 1200 our assault companies had swept to the sea-wall, finding remaining enemy forces thoroughly disorganized. The afternoon was spent destroying small groups of the enemy hiding in the bushes and rice paddies of the flats, southwest of the sea-wall in 7469 ROGER-QUINN-PETER-UNCLE-VICTOR and WILLIAM, and in the numerous caves in the area. Some of the enemy launched desperate, but ineffective, hand-grenade attacks when cornered and many killed themselves with grenades when approached by our troops. Unprecedented numbers surrendered. The day's count for 13 June showed that we had taken 47 Prisoners of War and killed approximately 225 enemy. Following the mop-up, the companies moved back to their morning positions for night defense.

14-15-16-17 June 1945: During this period we were engaged in patrolling and mopping up enemy resistance in the battalion zone which covered the area bounded on

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Battle for OROKU PENINSULA (Cont'd.)

14-15-16-17 June 1945 (Cont'd.): the left by 7369 (GEORGE-5 XRAY-5), 7469 VICTOR-1 to the seawall at 7469 QUINN-2, and on the right by 7269 (DOG-3 UNCLE-5), 7268 (HOW-2 JIG-1), to the seawall at 7469 SUGAR-5.

18 June 1945: The battalion sector was enlarged to include part of the area vacated by the 4th Marines. During the five days ending 18 June, approximately 150 enemy were destroyed in mopping-up operations.

(3) Capture of APA SAKI PENINSULA.

19 June 1945: The battalion received an order to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of the village of TEPA. The battalion command post was established at 7463 WILLIAM-4. On this date, the 29th Marines were committed with the Third Battalion in reserve.

20 June 1945: The battalion was ordered to move in a new assembly area in the vicinity of KUWANGA RIDGE. The battalion command post was set up in 7259 YOKI-3. How Company was attached to the Second Battalion. The day was spent in seeking out remnants of enemy forces hiding out in caves on the KUWANGA RIDGE and the flat ground between KUWANGA and MEZADO RIDGES. Twenty-eight Prisoners of War were captured and 29 enemy killed.

21 June 1945: The battalion remained in the same area and sent a patrol to the small island lying about 300 yards off-shore west of NAGUSUKU. No active resistance was encountered. Six enemy were killed and 3 Prisoners of War captured on the island. Patrolling was continued in the area between KUWANGA and MEZADO RIDGES and for the day the battalion netted 25 enemy killed and 19 taken prisoner. The island of OKINAWA was declared secured as of 1300 this date.

(4) Appendices

(a) Naval Gunfire Support was instrumental in destroying numerous definitely located targets and in neutralizing suspected areas of enemy activity. Illumination by them was also available and proved extremely valuable.

(b) Artillery Support and liaison were excellent. However, sometimes ineffective against enemy reverse slopes and cave defenses.

(c) Tank-Infantry Teams operated effectively subject to the limitations of terrain and the enemy's tactical anti-tank mining.

(d) Armed Amphibians proved invaluable for supply and evacuation during the battle for NAHA because of the muddy condition of the roads.

(e) Communications:

I. Communication Plan (SOI).

(A) There was a duplication of SCR 300 frequency in that First Battalion, 4th Marines was assigned a frequency 1/2 channel from our battalion frequency. Fighter director net jammed our TCS frequency with its traffic.

Chapter III: Progress of Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

II. Personnel.

(A) Radio Personnel - Radio personnel was inadequate due to the change in the Table of Allowances which added two SCR 610s when no change was made in the Table of Organization. The TRX personnel allotment is too small. It is recommended that four SCR 610 operators be added to the radio section. It is also recommended that one man be added to each TRX team in the radio section. Four additional SCR 300 operators for radios recommended for the 81mm Mortar Platoon are suggested. Losses in radio personnel:

- 1 Radio Operator Killed in Action.
- 1 Radio Operator Sick and Evacuated.
- 3 Radio Operators Wounded and Evacuated.

(B) Wire Section - There was insufficient wire personnel to trouble-shoot all lines in the cases where long trunks were laid. It is recommended that a battalion be allotted five wire teams of three men each. Losses in wire team personnel:

- 1 Wire Man Killed in Action.
- 8 Wire Men Wounded and Evacuated.
- 4 Wire Men Sick and Evacuated.

(C) Replacement of Battalion Casualties - Until 17 June only two replacements were received to replace 13 men lost during the period 6 May - 17 June.

III. Equipment.

- (A) Losses:
- Radio - 4 SCR 300s destroyed in action.
 - 3 SCR 536s lost in action.
 - 6 Short Antennae (SCR-300) destroyed in action.
 - 2 SCR 300 Hand Sets destroyed in action.
 - Telephone - 12 TRSs destroyed in action.
 - 4 Sound Power Phones destroyed in action.
 - 12 RL39 Lost in Combat.

IV. Recommendations for Changes in Table of Allowance.

(A) Radio - Increase SCR 300 to 16 to give four to 81mm Mortar and allow sufficient spares. More operating spare parts are needed. Recommend a spare part chest containing 4 hand sets, 2 sets of Jacks, 12 carbons, 4 receivers, 4 short, 2 long antennae. In place of TRX Radio it is suggested that the SCR 694 be adopted because it is more portable, has a longer range, and a silent hand generator.

(B) Telephone - In place of 1/4-ton 4x4 truck, it is suggested that a 3/4-ton 4x4 weasel carrier be adopted to facilitate the carrying of the communications equipment and the laying of long trunk lines. A Weasel with wire-laying equipment would be of great value to the battalion.

V. Supplies.

(A) Supply was good at all times. More trouble shooters could be spared if W-130 wire was delivered on DR-8s.

VI. Security.

(A) Navajo code talkers and shackles were used successfully. Authenticators were satisfactory.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

(4) Appendices (Cont'd.).

(f) Medical.

A. See OKINAWA operation, Phases I and II, for information concerning personnel and material.

B. Assault phases.

(1) In both of these phases, tombs and caves on reverse slopes were used as aid stations. The battalion aid station was always set up as close to the battalion command post as the lines of drift would permit. In several instances it was found necessary to establish a forward aid station directly behind the assault troops. When this was done, one of the battalion surgeons and five battalion aid men went forward to set up a station. In this way, casualties were seen much sooner after being wounded and life-saving measures could be undertaken. On completion of this treatment, the casualty could be taken via vehicle to the rear aid station for the more definitive measures. Jeep ambulances and amphibian tractors proved to be of unlimited value in the evacuation of casualties from the lines to the aid station.

(2) Once again because of the nature of this organization, all casualties were transported to the rear as soon as they were in good enough condition to travel and no facilities for hospitalization were necessary.

(3) Operations - It was again our policy to perform no definitive surgery. Instead it was our aim to administer emergency life-saving treatment and evacuate casualties to the various field hospitals which were better equipped for such measures. However, we did suture all sucking wounds of the chest and ligate all bleeding vessels which could not be controlled by direct pressure.

C. Evacuation.

(1) Evacuation of casualties was carried out according to the battalion standard operating procedure, and once again the system proved itself under fire.

D. Casualties treated by this Aid Station.

(1) Number of battle casualties - 643.

- (a) Retained - 86.
- (b) Evacuated - 525.
- (c) Died in aid station - 2.

(2) Killed in action - 114.

(3) Non-battle casualties - 99.

(4) Total casualties for the period - 856.

E. Sanitation and Disposal of the Dead - (See previous report in OKINAWA Phases I and II).

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

(f) Medical (Cont'd.)

F. There were no epidemics or unusual diseases amongst the troops of this organization during the period in question except for two cases of hookworm disease. However, it was noted that the instances of ordinary diarrhea amongst the replacements assigned to this organization was unusually high. We believe this is due to faulty training in field sanitation prior to their joining this organization.

During these phases of the campaign we saw a great many cases of unexplained fever. Each of these cases was characterized by a sudden onset of chills followed by fever ranging between 101 and 103 degrees Fahrenheit. They all had headache, backache, malaise, anorexia prostration, retro-orbital pain and severe muscle aches and pains. Initially it was thought that this was Dengue Fever, but all cases without exception responded within 48 hours to systematic therapy and there was no recurrence of the fever.

G. Medical Organization:

(1) See previous report on Phases I and II of OKINAWAN campaign.

(2) Of the original 40 corpsmen assigned to this battalion, five were killed in action and 16 evacuated as battle casualties. We have received 21 replacements and of these 3 were killed in action and 6 were evacuated as battle casualties. In addition 5 more of our corpsmen received wounds extensive enough to take them off the battlefield, but they preferred to remain in the aid station and help out rather than be evacuated to the rear. Thus out of a total of 61 corpsmen operating with this battalion, 35 were battle casualties and of these 8 were killed in action and 27 wounded in action.

H. Field Medical Equipment.

(1) See previous report on Phases I and II of OKINAWAN campaign.

(2) Resupply:

(a) At no time during these phases of the operation was this battalion short of medical supplies. The Regimental Surgeon always had an abundance of supplies on hand and brought forward that which we called for when needed.

I. Motor vehicles and rolling stock - see previous report on Phases I and II.

J. Malaria and Epidemic Control Equipment - see previous report on Phases I and II.

K. Recommendations.

(1) None. (All recommendations submitted in previous report on Phases I and II were complied with immediately.)

(g) Supply and Logistics.

(1) Generally speaking the supply for this operation was excellent. In the later stages of the III Phase a shortage of certain types of ammunition existed but this did not seriously hamper the tactical situation. We recommended that a greater supply of the following ammunition be made available:

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation - Appendices (Cont'd.)

(g) Supply and Logistics (Cont'd.)

81mm Mortar Shell M43A1 W/Fuse M-52.
81mm Mortar Shell M-56 W/Fuse M52A1B1
60mm Mortar Illuminating Shell
Grenade, hand, illuminating

We also recommended that the new 81mm Mortar Illuminating Shell be made available to units in combat.

(2) It was found highly satisfactory to have the battalion maintain one unit of fire in the battalion dump at all times. However, certain types of ammunition such as demolition packs should not be limited.

(3) Supply of food and water was entirely satisfactory during this phase.

(4) Road nets were opened as soon as possible under existing conditions. However, in fast-moving situations it was found that due to the increased use of mines and the lack of engineer personnel, many times roads which could have been used earlier were not available for several hours. Therefore, it is recommended that engineer personnel be assigned to every battalion operating on the front lines. Also, since the battalion depends heavily on jeep trailers, it is felt that more trailers should be carried in replenishment supplies.

(5) Evacuation was quite successful during this phase. The only recommendation being that at least five amphibian tractors be available at all times for this purpose. Being immervious to small-arms fire amphibian tractors proved to be invaluable for evacuation.

d. Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics

The outstanding development in enemy defensive tactics was his extensive and effective practice of defending reverse slopes. The nature of the terrain was such that the many disconnected hills and ridges provided the enemy with mutually supporting defensive positions. As a result, many times the assault companies seized a hill quite easily, but immediately received heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the rear of each flank as well as knee-mortar and grenade discharger fire from the reverse slope of the hill occupied. Also, heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire was brought to bear on our troops from defiladed positions at a greater range.

The enemy made frequent and accurate use of his artillery, employing battery fire and white phosphorous smoke. In every situation he possessed excellent observation of Marine troop movements, and he made use of prominent landmarks such as radio towers, chimneys, etc., for registering in his long range weapons. Suggest that all convenient registration points for enemy artillery be leveled as soon as possible and that all possible enemy observation posts be kept under fire during a Marine attack.

Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics (Cont'd.)

The enemy's anti-tank measures were unusually effective. He used extensive and well concealed mine fields which were covered by anti-tank guns, usually 47mm. Enemy anti-tank personnel armed with satchel charges and working in teams of three or four men, threw themselves upon the tanks and then exploded their charges, often seriously damaging our tanks. It is suggested that engineer personnel be added to the tank-infantry teams to clear paths through mine fields.

The following additional enemy tactics were particularly notable:

(1) Enemy night infiltration followed the usual pattern - small groups on suicide missions sometimes armed with satchel charges.

(2) Clever use of natural and man-made caves dug deep into clay or coral rock for defensive positions usually on reverse slopes of hills and ridges.

(3) Some armed enemy troops found in civilian clothes attempting to infiltrate our lines.

(4) After blasting of caves by Marines enemy in rear areas concealed themselves cleverly in ditches, high grass and cane fields.

(5) Toward the end of the campaign, the enemy surrendered in unprecedented numbers, both junior officers and enlisted men.

e. Chapter V: Estimated results of Operations

(1) Area secured.

NAHA Sector	-	0.685 square miles
OPOKU Sector	-	0.346 square miles
Total for OKINAWA,		
Phase III		1.031 square miles

(2) Enemy casualties.

(a) Killed - Counted	1148
Estimated	984
Total	2132

(b) Captured -	171
----------------	-----

Grand Total	2303
-------------	------

(3) Operational material damage to enemy.

Weapons captured and/or destroyed:

43 light machine guns
3 heavy machine guns
1 caliber .51 machine gun
3 Lewis guns

Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operations (Cont'd.)

(3) Operational material damage to enemy (Cont'd.)

Weapons captured and/or destroyed (Cont'd.)

12 knee-mortars	15 guns, 20mm
1 mortar, 81mm	2 guns, 40mm
9 unknown caliber	1 guns, 50mm
3 guns, 5"	1 gun, 37mm
2 guns, 77mm	2 guns, 47mm
2 medium caliber field pieces	1 gun, 13.7mm
1 cannon, 1"	6 shotguns, double barrel, 12 gu

Numerous .25 caliber rifles

8 Ammunition dumps and caves (Estimated 10,000 rounds small-arms ammunition, 500 rounds 77mm artillery shells, 2,000 rounds 13mm high-explosive, 500 rounds 20mm and 40mm ammunition and 200 rounds 81mm and 90mm mortar ammunition).

1 dump anti-personnel mines (quantity not counted).

10 or 12 dumps demolition equipment (estimated 500 to 600 pieces demolition boxes and satchel charges).

Fortifications and installations captured and/or destroyed

- 2 fortified command posts with bunkers, weapon emplacements and miscellaneous stores and equipment.
- 1 fortified artillery observation post with bunkers, weapon emplacements and communication equipment.
- 2 artillery communication and command post caves with barracks and mess facilities for estimated battalion - stores, supplies and radio and telephone equipment.
- 3 fortified snigot-mortar emplacements.
- 2 fortified field gun emplacements.

Numerous bunkers, pillbox emplacements, automatic weapon emplacements (machine gun and dual-purpose automatic weapons) and bunkered cave positions.

(4) Own losses.

(a) Killed in action	-	165
(b) Wounded in action	-	579
(c) Missing in action	-	0
Total	-	744

Chapter VI: Comments and recommendations.

f. Chapter VI: Comments and recommendations

(a) S-1 Section: The division and regimental standard operating procedure was followed in the reporting of casualties with somewhat less success than during Phases I and II. The length of the campaign and the unprecedented number of casualties revealed certain weaknesses in schooling of l-section personnel, chiefly in connection with supplies and equipment to be used. The following recommendations are made:

(1) Supplies and equipment:

Sufficient casualty report cards should be carried by the battalion l-section to enable submission of an average of two (2) cards on each officer and man in the original assigned strength. At least one (1) typewriter should be carried by the section and should be always available in the battalion command post. A blackout tent, field desk with blank forms and stationery and lantern should be carried in the battalion quartermaster dump and brought forward immediately whenever the tactical situation permits. This desk should also contain a copy of Naval Courts and Boards, Marine Corps Manual, a complete file of Circular Letters and Letters of Instruction and a file of current regimental and division orders.

(2) Battalion records:

Administrative records in battalion and company should be kept on 3"x5" file cards in a waterproof box. Posters are entirely unsatisfactory when casualties return to duty and replacements become numerous. They do not provide space to keep a complete record of dates of evacuation and return, type and body location of wound, burial, etc. Prior to D-day, one (1) casualty report card should be prepared in battalion for each officer and enlisted man, showing organization, name, rank, serial number, specification serial number and type of duty being performed. The permanent file card, in addition to this information should show ages, personal description, general classification test scores, awards and decorations received and, in the case of officers, date of joining organization. Also, there should be a file of fitness reports with complete information, and extra sets of blank forms for both Naval and Marine Corps officers.

(3) Time and space factors:

It is recommended that more time be allowed battalion in the submission of daily reports and that the responsibility for completeness and accuracy of records be left with battalion, the regimental l-section acting only in the capacity of consolidating and forwarding agency. Under conditions encountered at times during Phase III, it was necessary to submit reports from battalion to regiment by runner over a distance which required an hour or more to traverse. When blackout facilities were not available (see paragraph one (1) above), and there was only thirty minutes of daylight to work in in the morning before the runner had to be dispatched. It was found impossible to do an accurate job of reporting casualties received during the previous evening. If more time could be allowed, battalion would have time to keep records as outlined in paragraphs four (4) and five (5) below.

Chapter VI: Comments and recommendations (Cont'd.)

(a) S-1 Section (Cont'd.)

(4) Casualty report cards:

All casualty report cards should be initiated in battalion 1-section from previously prepared cards referred to in paragraph two (2). It is recommended that reports from company and platoon be submitted at dawn by telephone substantiated later in the day by a written list of casualties, returned to duty, etc., which could be checked against the telephonic report. No advantage was found in attempting to have the fire-team leader initiate the casualty report card, but it was found that the time and space factor was considerably strained.

(5) Daily reports:

In addition to posting information daily on the battalion record file card, it is recommended that battalions make a recapitulation on the reverse side of each daily report showing all information submitted on the accompanying cards. This could be done if portable typewriters, blackout facilities and more additional time were available for the submission of the report. Sufficient copies should be made on tissue to allow the following distribution:

- a. one to regiment and division.
- b. one to each company.
- c. one to battalion mail section.
- d. one to battalion aid station.
- e. one to Commanding Officer and Staff.
- f. one each to other battalions of regiment and other battalions in contact.

(6) Other agencies:

It is further recommended that evacuation channels be requested to keep records of patients received and disposed of which will enable a complete follow-through until man is buried, returned to duty or evacuated from the island area. It is recommended that change sheets and graves registration reports include battalion designation of personnel as well as regimental and that the Division Rear Administrative Group be kept within range of communication with battalion in order to facilitate the classification of erroneous or incomplete reports.

(b) S-2 Section:

We believe that the intelligence section of this battalion functioned smoothly throughout the operation, but it became increasingly difficult to do so due to the number of casualties occurring in the section, resulting in a shortage of personnel. The replacements received by this battalion from time to time did not include intelligence trained personnel. It is recommended that such personnel be included in replacements for the battalion in the future.

Maps were timely and amply supplied during the operation, but were sadly lacking in contouring and detail in many areas. In view of the length of the operation, it seems that improvements could have been made and it is strongly

Chapter VI: Comments and recommendations (Cont'd.)

(b) S-2 Section (Cont'd.)

recommended that every effort be exerted for improvement of map accuracy in the future.

While the battalion was in the line, many requests for aerial photographs of the front lines were submitted with few results. On four occasions we did get photos of the lines, but only on two of these occasions did they include our battalion zone. Further, these photos were of insufficient quantity; at least four copies are required for the battalion. Also recommend that each photo have at least one annotation identifying a feature on the photo with the same feature on the map being used by the battalion.

Dissemination of intelligence information by higher echelons was at times delayed, resulting in our receiving information concerning the enemy in an area which we had already fought over and possibly secured. Recommend that intelligence information affecting the battalion be sent down immediately by phone, radio or messenger if necessary.

We wish to comment on the full cooperation received from the companies of this battalion with respect to intelligence work throughout the operation. Also, higher echelons were at all times wholly cooperative.

(c) S-3 Section:

The replacement system now in effect considerably decreases battlefield efficiency. Replacements with no infantry background and little or no recent infantry training were received. These men, when committed in battle were unable to care for themselves. Experienced officers and non-commissioned officers were forced to expose themselves for extended periods in order to control and guide new personnel. This served to increase casualties unduly. It is recommended that all combat replacements be given a thorough course in basic infantry before assignment.

In future training programs, it is felt that greater emphasis should be placed on the fire and maneuver potentialities of the infantry units. In many instances the power of organic infantry weapons, such as rocket launchers, grenade launchers, 37mm guns, massed mortar and machine gun fire, etc. were ignored.

Basic infantry training (fire and maneuver, scouting and patrolling, etc.) should be given great emphasis in future training. Many casualties resulted from lack of use of proper individual conduct, poor individual cover and concealment, and failure to search ground.

Units as large as battalions should be thoroughly trained in night operations of all types.

It is acknowledged that battalions should make every effort to jump off at the assigned HOW hour. When for legitimate reasons, a jump-off must be postponed, a new HOW hour for the entire attack should be set and fires coordinated for this new time.

Chapter VI: Comments and recommendations (Cont'd.)

(d) S-4 Section:

Each battalion should be equipped with two (2) cargo carriers M29C, one fitted with PL31. Adequate spare parts and maintenance facilities should be provided.

THE END

0566-1

Part V of 12 pts

RECORD SECTION, M.C.S.

ANNEX D

RECEIVED FROM:-----

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SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III OKINAWA OPERATION

15TH MARINES

NOT TO

(NAVMC-QUANTICO)

13789(1) MCS Quantico, Va. 1-24-46-1M

RBL-smg

HEADQUARTERS,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

30 June, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding General, Sixth Marine Division.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division SO-154.

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Special Action report for this Regiment with attached overlays is forwarded herewith.

R. B. Luckey
R. B. LUCKEY

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

ANNEX DOG TO
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT,
OKINAWA OPERATION, PHASE III

CONTENTS

Chapter I	-----	GENERAL
Chapter II	-----	ORGANIZATION
Chapter III	-----	PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION
Chapter IV	-----	ENEMY TACTICS
Chapter V	-----	ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION
Chapter VI	-----	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter I: General.

1. This Special Action Report is submitted by the Fifteenth Marines covering Phase III of the Okinawa Operation. The mission assigned the Fifteenth Marines was that of an Artillery Regiment in direct support of the Sixth Marine Division, being the same mission as assigned in Phase I and II.

2. The 27th Division Artillery, XXIV Army Corps, was assigned the mission of reinforcing fires of this Regiment. The 27th Division Artillery consisted of three battalions of 105mm Howitzers, (104FA, 105FA, and 249FA), and one battalion of 155mm Howitzers (106FA). During Part I of Phase III this reinforcing mission was carried out by two battalions of 105mm Howitzers and one battalion of 155mm Howitzers. During Part II of Phase III the reinforcing mission was carried out by three battalions of 105mm Howitzers and one battalion of 155mm Howitzers. During Part III of Phase III the reinforcing mission was carried out by two battalions of 105mm Howitzers.

3. VMO-6 was assigned the mission of furnishing spot planes for the Air Observers of the Fifteenth Marines.

Chapter II: Organization.

1. The Fifteenth Marines organization and command remained the same as submitted in the Sixth Marine Division Special Action Report, Okinawa Operation, Phase I and II.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation.

Part I: The Battle for NAHA.

1. On 7 May, 1945, Regimental Headquarters and Service Battery displaced from TS8990C and proceeded to new position at TS8178H3. The First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, displaced to TS7877D and prepared to go into direct support of the 22nd Marines.
2. On 8 May, 1945, the 27th Division Artillery, less the 249th FA, were relieved of mission of reinforcing 11th Marines and assigned the mission of reinforcing fires of the Fifteenth Marines.
3. Mutual support was coordinated between the 11th and 15th Marines so that either could reinforce the other in their Division zone of action.
4. The III Phib Corps Arty furnished deep support missions and night harassing fires. They were also called upon in the support plan for preparation fires.
5. The survey section established flash-ranging bases and operated a counter-battery section at night. During the day all counter-battery fire was conducted by the Air Observers and Forward Observers.
6. On 11 May, 1945, the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, went into position at TS7877T, the Third Battalion went into position at TS7777J, and the Fourth Battalion went into position at TS7677X.
7. The 249th FA was detached from ISCOM, and reassigned to the 27th Division Artillery on 24 May, 1945, and went into position at TS77-76G on 29 May, 1945, with the mission of general support.
8. At all times, each assault infantry Regiment had one Battalion of Artillery in direct support and one Battalion in general support forming a groupment. This enabled the direct support battalion to call upon the general support battalion for the use of their FO teams.
9. On several occasions during this part of the operation, a general support battalion furnished FOs to the Sixth Tank Battalion, thus enabling the battalion to fire direct support missions for them.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation. Part I (Cont'd).

10. During the latter part of this period of the operation, observed fire missions were greatly handicapped and limited by the heavy rains and poor visibility.

11. Numerous TOTs were fired, both observed and unobserved, sometimes employing as many as fifteen battalions of Artillery. The nature of these targets was mostly troop concentrations. The effects reported on these targets were excellent.

12. The Artillery of this Regiment was credited with breaking-up a counter-attack in TS7672 at 0940 on 14 May, and a counter-attack in TS7671 at 2025 on 24 May, 1945.

13. The Air Observers throughout this operation kept enemy troop movements to a minimum during daylight hours, and in every case where they were observed in the open, artillery fire was brought upon them immediately.

14. Enemy troops observed in caves on the forward slopes of hills were attacked by FOs adjusting with OP methods with one piece of the 155mm Howitzer Battalion with excellent results.

15. Numerous smoke missions were used during this part of the operation, mainly to eliminate the enemy observation from the high ground to the East overlooking and dominating the Sixth Marine Division zone of action. Smoke was also used to enable our troops to evacuate the wounded.

16. During the battle of NAHA the Regiment remained in the same firing positions which greatly eased the communication problems and made it possible to establish and maintain a complete wire net throughout the Regiment and to the attached and adjacent artillery units.

17. The situation was a complete reversal from Phase I and II, when rapid movement and long distances necessitated the dependence upon AM radio. Telephone communication was used almost to the exclusion of radio during the NAHA battle. However, the FM radio which was used gave excellent results over the distances and terrain involved.

18. During the Battle of NAHA, the First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, was the only battalion displaced due to a shortage of range.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation. Part I (Cont'd).

19. The Ammunition expended during the Battle for NAHA was as follows:

105mm Howitzer

52,336 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.
14,730 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.
6,816 Shell, semi-fixed, WP, M60.
1,106 Shell, H.C., B.E., M84.

75mm Howitzer

18,106 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.
17,642 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.
1,784 Shell, semi-fixed, WP, M64.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation. Part II.

Part II: The Battle for OROKU Peninsula.

1. After receiving the Division Operation Order 77-45, the First Battalion was assigned the mission of direct support of the 4th Marines. FO parties and LNOs accompanied the 4th Marines on the amphibious landing on the OROKU Peninsula on KING Day - 4 June at 0600.
2. All Battalions of this Regiment plus the 27th Division Artillery fired a preparation on the OROKU Peninsula for this landing, which began at 0515 and lifted at 0555, as the assault waves neared the shore.
3. The Second Battalion went into direct support of the 29th Marines who landed on KING Day at 1200. The Third and Fourth Battalions were in general support.
4. On 7 June, the Third Battalion took over the mission of direct support of the 29th Marines and the Second Battalion went into direct support of the 22nd Marines.
5. In the first part of the Battle for OROKU Peninsula, Artillery was massed with excellent effect in TS7368, 7468, and 7568 on numerous caves and enemy strong points. In the latter part only observed fires controlled by the FOs were shot due to the encircling maneuver carried out by the infantry.
6. An operational highlight of this phase was that the 104th FA and the 3rd Bn 155 Howitzer Battalion, III Phib Corps Arty, conducted direct fire missions on caves in TS7568F.
7. At the outset of the OROKU Battle, the establishment of wire communications was slowed by adverse weather and impassible roads which held up wire laying vehicles. During this period, FM radio carried the bulk of traffic efficiently, and as road conditions improved, a complete wire installation was gradually established.
8. The landing presented no problems of a Regimental nature, but the direct support battalions were required to depend upon FM radio for communication with FOs as in any amphibious operation. Prior to the landing, wire lines of direct support battalions were extended to

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation. Part II (Cont'd).

the north bank of NAHA harbor and wire teams with rubber boats stood by to take them across to the Peninsula at the earliest practicable time. As soon as the infantry had sufficiently advanced, this was accomplished and wire communications to FOs and Liaison teams were established before the day was over.

9. The First Battalion was the only Battalion that it was necessary to displace during the Battle for OROKU Peninsula.

10. Ammunition expended during Part II of Phase III was as follows:

<u>105mm Howitzer</u>	<u>75mm Howitzer</u>
13,712 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.	7,136 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.
6,870 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.	3,063 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.
2,651 Shell, semi-fixed, WP, M60.	1,181 Shell, semi-fixed, WP, M64.
541 Shell, H.C., B.E., M84.	

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation. Part III.

Part III: Capture of ARA SAKI Peninsula.

1. On 14 June, 1945, the First Battalion displaced to TS7463R and the Third Battalion displaced to TS7463C. On 15 June, the Second Battalion displaced to TS7364T, and the Fourth Battalion displaced to TS7364Q, and Regimental FDC displaced to TS7167X. These positions for the Regiment remained unchanged throughout the Capture of ARA SAKI Peninsula.

2. On 16 June, the Fourth Battalion was assigned the mission of direct support of the 22nd Marines. Part III of Phase III began on 17 June, 1945.

3. On 14 June, the 249th FA and 106th FA Bns reverted to the 27th Division Artillery's control. The 104th and 105th FA Bns remained in general support reinforcing the fires of the Fifteenth Marines.

4. During Part III, Artillery was closely coordinated between the 15th Marines (Reinf), 11th Marines (Reinf), and the III Phib Corps Arty. Artillery fire was massed continuously on the ridges running perpendicular to the line of attack. Preparation, TOTs, and harassing fires consisted of eleven to fifteen Battalions.

5. During the final phase of the campaign, no particular problems were encountered with the communication set-up, as the entire Regiment was in position before Part III commenced, and normal wire and radio nets were established in time.

6. The last target fired on by Artillery was at 0954 on 20 June, 1945. At 1027, 21 June, 1945, all organized enemy resistance in the Division zone of action had ceased.

7. The Ammunition expended by the Fifteenth Marines during the Capture of ARA SAKI Peninsula was as follows:

105mm Howitzer

9,146 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.
1,874 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.
368 Shell, semi-fixed, WP, M60.
119 Shell, H.C., B.E., M84.
12 Shell, semi-fixed, leaflet, BE, M84.

75mm Howitzer

1,305 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.
2,609 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.
61 Shell, semi-fixed WP, M64.

Chapter III: Progress of the Operation. (Cont'd).

1. During Phase III of the Okinawa Operation, the Regimental Headquarters and Service Battery was divided into two separate units. One, the Operational unit which displaced with the Battalions, and the other, a service unit, which functioned as a rear echelon. The reason for this split was the limited amount of transportation in Regimental Headquarters and Service Battery.

1. Supply and Logistics:

- a. Materials used were organic and in most cases these proved ample.
- b. There was little difficulty in resupply since this Regiment utilized Supply Point Distribution. The various Division dumps were displaced forward promptly thus lessening the supply problem. Water points were installed promptly and drinking water was at all times available. Rations were more than adequate, though fruit and fruit juices were seldom available.
- c. Roads of the Division and circulation were in general good, during fair weather, but were deeply rutted and difficult to negotiate during periods of intense rain. In the displacement in preparation for the attack on OROKU Peninsula, this Regiment used M-5 High Speed Tractors furnished by the Twenty-Seventh Division Artillery. This expedited greatly the displacement, for the roads, due to continuous rain, were too poor for use by 2½-Ton 6x6 trucks. The howitzers would have been immobilized during rainy periods had it not been for the M-5 Tractors borrowed from the Army Division Artillery.
- d. Ammunition presented no particular problem and was available at all times.
- e. The total amount of ammunition expended in Phase III is as follows:

105mm Howitzer.

75mm Howitzer.

75194 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.	26547 Shell, semi-fixed, M48.
23474 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.	23314 Shell, semi-fixed, M54.
9835 Shell, semi-fixed, WP M60	3026 Shell, semi-fixed, WP M64.
1766 Shell, H.C., B.E., M54.	
12 Shell, semi-fixed, leaflet, B.E., M54.	

Chapter IV: Enemy Tactics.

1. There has been no marked change in the enemy's employment of his artillery. Pieces were placed in caves and carefully sighted to cover all approaches to his positions. Such a use of Artillery, narrowly restricts the field of fire of each gun and makes the massing of a large number of weapons on one target an impossibility.

2. Artillery fire was very accurate but the enemy seemed very reluctant, once he had a profitable target, to expend sufficient ammunition to give the area adequate coverage and to have the maximum effect on our troops.

3. It is interesting to note that the enemy has a high regard for our observation planes and would not commit the bulk of his artillery so long as there was a plane in position to observe. Although the Jap is well aware of our methods of sound and flash ranging, he evidently preferred to risk discovery by those methods rather than expose his guns to the air observers.

4. There were no indications of the employment of enemy massed artillery fire throughout the operation.

Chapter V: Estimated Results of Operation.

1. Area secured was entirely an infantry mission.

2. It is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the casualties inflicted on the enemy by artillery. The heaviest casualties suffered by the enemy from our artillery fire undoubtedly occurred in the counter-attacks of 14 May and 24 May, when the enemy left his well prepared positions and attempted to advance through heavy concentrations of defensive fires. In the attack of 14 May, only 150 to 200 men out of an estimated reinforced battalion were able to reach the front line positions. Morning up operations within the areas occupied by this Regiment accounted for 41 enemy killed and 31 captured.

3. In view of the fact that the entire section held by the enemy was severely pounded by all supporting arms of the Division, it would be impossible to single out very many installations that were destroyed by artillery alone. Most of the weapons captured were found in caves and heavy revetments and showed little damage from bombardment. It should be kept in mind that light artillery should not be given any missions of destruction so long as the medium and heavy battalions of Corps Artillery are available for that purpose.

4. Own losses: Killed in action - 4 Officers - 11 Enlisted.
Wounded in action
and evacuated - 5 Officers - 54 Enlisted.
Missing in action - None.

Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations.

S-1: Administration.

1. This regiment entered phase III of the Okinawa campaign with an effective strength of one hundred and fifty nine (159) officers, including eight (8) U. S. Navy, and two thousand three hundred and fifty seven (2357) enlisted, including fifty five (55) U. S. Navy. During this stage three (3) officers and eighty eight enlisted were detached and transferred. During this stage this regiment joined 16 officers and two hundred and eighty eight (288) enlisted. At the end of phase III of the Okinawa campaign the effective strength of this regiment was one hundred and fifty eight (158) officers, including eight (8) U. S. Navy, and two thousand four hundred and twenty seven (2427) enlisted, including forty seven (47) U. S. Navy. Aggregate two thousand five hundred and eighty five (2585).

2. Casualties sustained during phase III of the operation were three (3) officers and nine (9) enlisted killed in action, one (1) officer and two (2) enlisted died of wounds, five (5) officers and fifty four (54) enlisted wounded in action and evacuated, two (2) officers and forty five (45) enlisted sick and evacuated. Seven (7) officers and seventy four (74) enlisted returned to duty during the period from sick or wounded.

3. Morale throughout the campaign continued excellent with no visible laxity in the regiment.

4. Mail, although continuing irregular in delivery, was delivered in quantity comparable to that received in a base status and is believed satisfactory. The effort expended to place mail in the hands of the troops gives excellent returns in morale, and the quantity of mail increased as the operation progressed, including a parcel post delivery.

5. The use of Field Administrative Forms and Casualty Cards continued an excellent method of personnel administration in the field, and Division Change Sheets and Graves Registration Reports increased efficiency in the checking of evacuations and returns to duty.

6. Some difficulty was encountered in replacement handling, due to the fact that the One Section Administrative Group (rear), ordinarily responsible for personnel assignment, was unable to so assign replacements received during most of this phase, these replacements being turned over to the One Section Forward directly from Division Forward Administrative Group. As the Rear Section had been geared primarily for this duty, some confusion resulted, due again to poor communication and distances.

Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd).

S-2: Intelligence.

1. Photo coverage was much better for this part of the Operation. We still did not receive enough photographs to give each battalion adequate photo coverage. The appearance of mosaics gridded to correspond to the map were a great help to aerial and forward observers.

2. Our flash base operated with mixed success. It is recommended that all flash base locations be established, coordinated, and controlled by Corps Artillery. In this operation, flash bases were run by both the Eleventh and Fifteenth Marines with little or no coordination between them. Counter-battery is definitely a Corps mission since they alone have the weapons and facilities for the job. It is hoped that in future operations counter-battery will be initiated and run by Corps, coordinating all means and sources of information available.

THREE SECTION

1. From the experience gained in Phase III of the Okinawa Operation, the following comments and recommendations are offered for future operations involving an Artillery Regiment:

- a. It is recommended that the M-5 tractor be used as the prime-mover for the 105mm howitzer. During the period when there was continuous rain, it would have been impossible to displace the battalions of this Regiment if the 27th Division Arty had not placed at our disposal their M-5 tractors. These tractors were also called upon to haul ammunition for us when the 2½-Ton 6x6's were unable to move on the muddy roads.
- b. It is recommended that two Motor Carriage M29-C (Weasels) be included in the TBA for each battalion and Regimental Headquarters and Service Battery. This vehicle would have proved its value during the heavy rains both for reconnaissance missions, wire laying, and carrying the FO teams.

FOUR SECTION

1. Class I.

- a. Rations, milk, coffee, etc. were ample but fruit and fruit juices were difficult to procure and seldom issued. Ration Accessory Packs were furnished at regular intervals by Division and these proved highly satisfactory.

Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd).

4. The 1-Ton 4x4 Cargo Truck has been found impracticable due to limited cargo capacity and limitations during inclement weather. It is recommended that its use be discontinued.
5. The following is a proposed change of vehicles and trailers for an Artillery Regiment to insure mobility during all types of weather and over all types of terrain:

	2 1/2-Ton 6x6 SWB.	Tractor, High Speed, 13T 11-5.	1 1/2-Ton 6x6	Trailer, 1-Ton M-10.	Trailer 4-Ton M-21.	Motor Carriage M29-C (Weasel).
Regt'l H&S Battery	11	0	2	4	0	2
105mm Howitzer (3 Bns)	11	18	2	12	12	2
(H&S Btry)	(5)	-	(2)	-	-	(2)
(Firing Btry)	(2)	(6)	-	(4)	(4)	-
155mm Howitzer (1 Bn.)	11	24	2	0	24	2
(H&S Btry)	(5)	-	(2)	-	-	(2)
(Firing Btry)	(2)	(8)	-	-	(8)	-
Total Regiment -	55	78	10	40	60	10

Note: It is recommended that the use of the trailer, 1T, 2-wheel cargo, be discontinued and replaced by the more rugged and durable 1T M-10 Trailer.

6. This change will greatly facilitate transportation within an Artillery Regiment and assure close support of the infantry without recourse of borrowing prime movers from other sources.
7. It is further recommended that one (1) TD-14 w/dozer be furnished each firing battery, plus one for Regimental Headquarters and Service Battery, making a total of thirteen (13). In order to facilitate rapid displacement, thirteen (13) of the TD-14 Trailers, machinery, 15 to 18 ton, should be furnished.
8. The present allowance of trucks 1/2-Ton 4x4, cargo and radio, is adequate.

- e. Camp Equipment - No comments.
- f. Mess Equipment - No comments.
- g. Chemical Supplies - No comments.

Chapter VI: Comments and Recommendations. (Cont'd).

3. Class III - No comments.
4. Class IV - No comments.
5. Class V - No comments.

R. B. Luckey
R. B. LUCKEY,
Colonel, USMC.,
Commanding.

FIRST BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

26 June 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division GO-36.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Special Action Report for this battalion is forwarded herewith.

H. T. Bol
R. H. ARLESTRONG

[REDACTED]
FIRST BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

OKINAWA OPERATION, Phase III

[REDACTED]
520

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FIRST BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I	GENERAL
CHAPTER II	THE TASK ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER III	PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION
CHAPTER IV	ENEMY TACTICS
CHAPTER V	ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION
CHAPTER VI	COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

The purpose of this Special Action Report is to relate the activities of the battalion during Phase III of the Okinawa operation and to make recommendations based on experience gained during this period.

The mission of the battalion was to support, directly or by fire alone, the advance of elements of the Sixth Marine Division from the Asa-Kawa to the southern end of Naha, in the drive for Oroku Peninsula, and in the capture of the Ara-Saki peninsula.

CHAPTER II

THE TASK ORGANIZATION

1. The First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, commanded by Robert W. Armstrong, Major, U. S. Marine Corps, consists of three firing batteries and Headquarters and Service Battery.

2. Batteries are commanded as follows:

"A" Battery.....John J. O'Connor, 1stLt., USMC.
"B" Battery.....James H. Foyd, 1stLt., USMC
"C" Battery.....Herbert T. Fitch, Captain, USMC
H&S Battery.....Paul M. Lynde, 1stLt., USMC

253

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

1. THE BATTLE FOR NAHA

On 7 May the battalion commander's reconnaissance party left the First Battalion bivouac area (TS 8990 K3) to find a position area from which it could fire in support of the division. Forward observers and Liaison officers left the same date to join the 22nd Marines in bivouac, the battalion being in direct support of that regiment.

The battalion occupied a position north of Iachinato airfield (TS 7877 D) on 8 May and registered at 1700. Meanwhile a forward switching central was established and before nightfall wire was in to all observers.

Beginning on 8 May and continuing through 23 May the battalion executed a wide variety of missions. It fired preparations for all major attacks by the 22nd Marines, fired harassing and interdiction missions each night, and brought artillery on targets of opportunity. Targets included enemy troops, trucks, OP's, automatic weapons, artillery of all calibers, and dumps.

During the period the first Battalion maintained OP's well forward on the highest available ground. The first OP was situated on a ridge on the north bank of the Sa-Kawa, (TS 7674 A), the second and the third on the tops of hills overlooking the Asato River and the City of Naha (TS 7473 J & 7573 R). The OP's, manned 24 hours a day by officers and men of the battalion aided by the officers of the artillery battalions of the 27th Division, handled much of the registration for the regiment, took under fire all targets in their zone of observation and did considerable flash and sound-and-flash ranging. A great deal of information concerning enemy troop movements was gained from the OP's. The information sent down on 22 May that all enemy troops observed during the day had been heading south was one of the early indications that the enemy was abandoning his Naha-Shuri-Nomabaru line.

At 1600 on 23 May the battalion went out of direct support and into general support, reinforcing the fires of the Second Battalion. On the 29th of May the battalion displaced to the vicinity of Iachinato airfield (TS 7876 F), registered at 1830 and resumed general support.

From 30 May through 31 June the battalion was in direct support of the 6th Tank Battalion, but did no firing for the tanks.

During this period (3 May - 1 June) the battalion expended 37,643 rounds of ammunition.

2. THE BATTLE FOR OKORO PENINSULA

The battalion went into direct support of the 4th Marines on 3 June. Forward observers were dispatched to the infantry battalions on this date and an OP was established in the city of Naha at (TS 7571 S).

On 4 June the battalion reinforced by 15th Marines, 11th Marines, III Amphibious Corps and 27th Division artillery fired a pre-landing preparation for the 4th Marines. After the landing the battalion fired on targets of opportunity in the path of the advance of the infantry.

On 7 June at 1045 the Fourth Battalion took over direct support of the 4th Marines to permit displacement of the First Battalion to the city of Maha (TS 7471 J). The battalion resumed its direct support mission at 2000, 7 June.

On 8 June an OP was set up in Maha (TS 7570 L) with observation over the base of the peninsula, whence counter-battery fire had been received. The following day, another OP was established on high ground on the peninsula, (T 7209 V).

On 13 June the battalion went out of direct support of the 4th Marines and all observers were withdrawn.

The battalion displaced to the vicinity of Itoman (TS 7463 K) on 14 June and remained under regimental control until the end of the Oroku Peninsula phase on 16 June.

During this phase, (3-16 June) the battalion expended 15,203 rounds of ammunition.

3. CAPTURE OF RE-SALT PENINSULA

On 17 June the battalion went into direct support of the 6th Tank Battalion, but did no firing for the tanks.

The battalion went out of direct support of the 6th Tank Battalion on 18 June, and into direct support of the 4th Marines. Forward observers and liaison officers joined the battalions of the Fourth.

During this period the battalion, in addition to firing on targets of opportunity, initiated seven T.O.T.'s on remaining enemy strong points and assembly areas.

The First Battalion went out of direct support of the 4th Marines on 20 June. The last round was fired at 0940, 20 June.

During this period (17-20 June) the battalion expended 6,134 rounds of ammunition.

4. Communications

A. Air Communications

(1) Maha Campaign

When the battalion moved into position at 7877 D on 8 May, a switching central was established in the 22nd Marines CP in 777M; there lines were laid to this central from the battalion. Forward observer lines were taken over from the 11th Marines and placed into the central. All FO's and LNOs had wire by night.

On the morning of the 9th, the central was moved to 7676S, and the three trunks extended to this point. FO's laid new lines back to the central and the 11th Marines lines were abandoned. During the night of the 9th, all trunks were shelled out in 7676S and O; on the morning of the 10th two additional trunks were laid from the battalion by an alternate route. At no time thereafter in this phase was communication lost with the forward central.

On 10 May an additional central was established in 7675M to serve the battalion OP and "B" forward lines. At the same time an additional central was set up at 7575M to serve all other forward lines.

On the morning of 12 May the central at 7575M was secured and moved across the Asa Pasa, to 7574C, (The location of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines CP). Six lines were laid across the river at different points, to

avoid loss of all lines from shelling. By night all FO's and LNOs were served from this new central, except the Regimental Liaison Officer. In the afternoon of the 12th, 3 lines were laid to the battalion CP established at 7473N. During the next several days shelling was very heavy in this area, and it proved necessary to lay additional alternate lines to all liaison officers. For example, initially two lines were laid to "B" Battery Liaison Officer (7573 I) via the road through 7574S and 7573D. These lines were shelled out the night of the 12th; on the 13th, two additional lines were laid via the road junction in 7573 I. By early morning of the 14th, all four of these lines were shelled out. An additional line was laid directly overland to the position. Thereafter communication was never lost to "B" Liaison in this position, but each night at least two lines were shelled out.

On 15 May, the central at 7676S, retained for trouble shooting purposes, was secured, and a new central was established at 7573G, to serve FO's more satisfactorily, and to prepare for the advance into Naha. Continued heavy shelling of lines continued, especially on the night of 19 May.

On 27 May, FOs moved into Naha; when they reached the Naha estuary, the lines were approximately 6 miles in length. On 29 May, the battalion was relieved from direct support, and forward lines turned over to the Second Battalion.

(2) Oroku Peninsula

On June 2, preparatory to direct support of the 4th Marines' landing on Oroku peninsula, a switching central was established on the estuary in Naha, at 7371S, and five lines laid from the battalion position, now 7676L, portions of the old forward lines being utilized. On the morning of 4 June, 5 lines were laid across the Naha estuary supported by masts of ships sunk in the harbor. These lines were extended to the 4th Marines CP established at 7171O following the landing early in the morning. A switching central was established at this point, and by mid-afternoon all FO and LNO lines were tied into the central. On 6 June, the central was moved to 7170R, site of the new 4th Marines CP, and new direct lines laid to this point from the estuary crossing in Naha.

On 6 June, the battalion displaced to Naha, and lines were laid between the new position (7571B) and the central in 7371S.

On 8 June, a new central was established at 7269K, to serve all units except regimental liaison. On 9 June, the central at 7170R was secured and reestablished at 7168J, the location of the new 4th Marines CP. On 13 June, the battalion went out of direct support; forward lines were secured; and on 14 June the battalion displaced to Itoman.

(3) Ira-Saki Peninsula

On 18 June, the battalion went into direct support of the 4th Marines as the latter moved south to resume the attack south of Itoman. A switching central was established in 7361J and four lines laid to this point from the battalion. In the afternoon lines were started forward in preparation for the jump-off of FOs and LNOs the next morning. On the morning of the 19th, a temporary central was established at 7460V, and FOs laid from this point as the companies to which they were attached went into the lines. Later in the day the central was moved forward to 7459V, and all forward lines tied in to it. The central remained at this point until the battalion was secured the afternoon of the 19th.

(4) Conclusions

(a) In general wire communication was very satisfactory during the

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period. Lines were kept in operation to FOs and LNOs a high percentage of the times. All communication to forward units was lost only three times, and then for short periods, during the 50 day period. No trouble was experienced with local battalion lines; on only two occasions did gun-computer lines go out, and at no time was wire communication lost with a battery.

(b) The basic battalion wire system, involving use of FDC switchboard, forward switching centrals, W110 wire by FOs, and a single line serving both FOs whenever possible, proved to be satisfactory. Only by employment of these features is it possible to maintain wire communication to forward elements.

- (c) The principal difficulties encountered were:
- a. Shelling out of lines.
 - b. Impassable roads, and closing of roads for repair.
 - c. The long distance between battalion and front lines during most of the period.
 - d. Heavy rains, which caused failure of telephones and switchboards from moisture.

B. Radio Communication.

1. Use . During this phase, radio was used as a secondary means of communication. All FO and LNO sets were operated on one channel; FOs and LNOs secured their sets when they had wire communication. A continuous watch was operated on the FDC set even when all forward stations were secured.

2. Both 608 and 610 radios gave excellent results. 610 failures were less frequent than during earlier phases; the chief cause was shorting of battery box cables. 608 failures were extremely few, although great difficulties were encountered in keeping the vehicles in operating condition. All liaison officers were supplied with 608s, as well as 610s, whenever road conditions permitted.

3. TCS operation was satisfactory. TBX's were not used.

CHAPTER IV

ENEMY TACTICS

I Enemy Artillery

Protracted observation, both ground and air, of enemy artillery fire by men and officers of the First Battalion, brought to light certain facts concerning the enemy's employment of artillery.

(a) Enemy observation, principally from the Shuri hill mass and the Oroku ridge line, was excellent. During the critical phase of the battle of Naha, the highest ground in the area was in enemy hands and the enemy had a great deal of artillery, ranging in size from 20 mm to 8-inch and in velocity from anti-tank guns to spigot mortars which could be brought to bear on our troops and installations.

(b) The enemy rarely massed his artillery, although on two occasions 2 to 4 guns were seen firing simultaneously on one target.

(c) The enemy's artillery activity, except during counter-attacks, was confined to early morning and early evening with only sporadic firing during the rest of the day.

(d) Enemy use of time fire was limited and usually ineffective in the zone of observation of the battalion.

(e) The use of direct fire by both DP guns and heavy artillery against troops in the division forward areas was noted, and seemed very effective while it lasted. However, this method of fire was hazardous to the enemy, due to the fact that muzzle flashes were picked up and guns silenced by counter battery.

(f) Several Japanese gun positions noted by the OP's were protected and concealed to such a extent that their fields of fire were very limited. Presumably these pieces, which were almost impossible to hit, were sited to fire on strategic points only, as for example, the bridge across the Asa-Kawa. In addition, many instances of camouflage nets and gun locations which actually hindered the efficiency of any firing were observed. It was noted that some guns emplaced only during firing, then immediately pulled back to the cover of nearby cave positions. Dummy emplacements were set up near many gun positions.

(g) The OP's reported that some terrain features were brought under fire time after time while others, equally lucrative targets, were seldom if ever touched.

(h) An abnormal percentage of duds, increasing as the operation progressed, was reported throughout the period.

(i) The enemy's OP discipline was excellent; very little movement on commanding ground was observed.

(j) Enemy anti-aircraft fire seemed well controlled. Fire was brought to bear on observation planes working for the battalion only when the observer's vision was obstructed by the tail of the plane. Small arms AA was employed only when enemy troops knew they had been observed.

(k) The quality of captured Japanese optical instruments, such as the B.C. scopes on which the battalion's OP's chiefly relied, illustrates the enemy's emphasis on ground observation.

(l) It was noted that the enemy's artillery did not open up when observation planes were in the vicinity.

(m) It was noted on many occasions the enemy did not destroy his artillery as he retreated. Guns, some still equipped with sights, and with ammunition at hand, were found by the infantry as they advanced.

(n) Rocket launchers were found on Orök Peninsula. The launcher consisted of two small-gauge rails, approximately 10 feet long and 10 inches apart, emplaced in a cave at about 60° angle from the horizontal. There was no means of traverse or elevation except shifting the track. The field of fire of the weapon was very limited.

Though the fragmentation of the rocket was relatively slight and caused few casualties, the concussion effect was very great. In addition, the rocket possesses a definite psychological value, as when it is discharged, it makes a screaming noise.

Rocket launchers are difficult targets for artillery since they are emplaced in small-mouth caves, and in defilade.

II Movement

A large part of personnel movement in the zone of observation of the battalion was done between dusk and dawn. Continuous activity, however, was observed in certain key locations in each sector throughout the day. Such activity seemed to continue despite U. S. artillery, mortar or small arms fire. During artillery and mortar barrages by the division enemy troops were seen to take advantage of the nearest cover, wait for the end of the barrage and finally withdraw into caves and dugouts. Enemy soldiers were often seen to use footpaths rather than main roads, thereby making themselves less conspicuous. On the whole enemy personnel confined the main part of their troop movements to the hours of darkness and placed great emphasis on cover and concealment at all times.

CHAPTER V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

(1) Area secured

(a) During the period of 8 May - 3 June the battalion supported the 22nd Marines in securing their zone of action along the west coast from the Asa-Kawa through Naha.

(b) The 4th Marines were supported by the battalion from 4 June through 12 June in the landing on and the securing of Oroku peninsula.

(c) From 18 June to 21 June the battalion directly supported the 4th Marines as they secured their sector from Suwanga ridge to the tip of the Ara-Saki peninsula.

(2) Enemy casualties

(a) Killed

(1) Small arms

14

(2) Artillery

No estimate made

(b) Captured

23

(3) Operational material damage to enemy.

The following are confirmed as having been destroyed or damaged by the fire of the battalion:

1 Fuel dump	destroyed
3 Machine guns	do
2 Mortars	do
1 47 mm gun	do
1 6" gun	damaged
1 rocket launcher	destroyed
1 75 mm gun	do
1 20 mm DP	do
3 trucks	do

(4) Own losses

(a) Killed in action	8
(b) Wounded in action and evacuated	25
(c) Missing in action	0

CHAPTER VI

Comments and recommendations

I S-1

It is recommended that prior to operations battalion S-1's be given schooling by Division in the proper method of preparing recommendations for citations and awards.

II S-2

A. Maintenance of OP's

It is recommended that regiment establish and maintain OP's in the division zone of action for flash, and sound-and-flash ranging work, using the regimental flash-ranging section supplemented by personnel from the battalions. All computing and (or) plotting should be done at the Regimental FBC by the counter-battery officer and his team; communications should be direct, by wire and radio, between stations and regimental FBC.

During the drive for Haha, the best OP's were established by the battalions and most of the counter-battery work was done by the direct support battalions, which were not prepared to perform this task efficiently due to lack of equipment and time. It is further recommended that one battery of 155mm howitzers be reserved at night for counter-battery fire.

B. Photo Coverage

(1) Photo coverage, and the distribution of photographs, was greatly improved over the first two phases. However, in some instances, photos were so outdated that the area covered was in friendly hands by the time they were distributed.

(2) The ratio of distribution of late photographs between infantry and artillery was not considered equitable. It is strongly recommended that direct support battalions be furnished as ample a supply as possible.

III S-3

A. Transfer Limits

It was found that when using a map restituted from a mosaic such as the Ryukyu-Rotto, 1:25,000, the transfer limits as laid down in M 30-40 are too broad, due to photo distortion.

B. Preparations

(1) Against the Japanese, the basis of whose defense is subterranean installations, it was found that 30-60 minute preparations were not efficient because the enemy simply holed up for the duration of the preparation.

Towards the end of the phase, the battalion favored the use of TOT's as preparations, in an attempt to catch the enemy out of his holes with a great mass of fire. As an elaboration two, or even three TOT's were fired at varying intervals prior to the attacks, the last one just as the infantry started to move.

(2) Seldom during the entire phase did the infantry jump off on the schedule which had been given the artillery. It is felt that it is

more efficient to have the preparation on call by the infantry battalion commander making the main effort. The direct support battalion, if given some idea well ahead of time of the area to be covered by fire, can normally arrange a TOT preparation in a very short time, and fire it at the infantry's command.

C. Counter-battery

It was noted in many instances that the enemy would use his artillery at night only so long as he was not fired on in return. It is recommended that when an enemy piece or battery opens up, even if it cannot be definitely located, our artillery immediately fire in return, in the general vicinity if no better information is available.

D. Equipment

The most valuable instrument used by the battalion on its OP's was a 20-power Japanese B.C. scope. Another instrument put to good use was the new Army B.C. scope. It is strongly recommended that instruments of this quality be made available to the battalions for OP work.

E. It is recommended that all hands in the Division be instructed in the precautions against enemy observation which should be adhered to at all times on the OP's in the Division zone.

F. Airspot

It is recommended that observation planes come on station promptly at dawn, and remain until dark because, as has been noted, the presence of our observation planes served to discourage enemy artillery. Also, it is urged that two planes be on station during the early morning, so that each battalion may register thoroughly and fire in its preparations.

G. Survey

(1) When the Regiment displaces, it would expedite the survey operation for the battalions if the regimental survey section would locate initial points in the vicinity of the various battalion position areas and notify the battalion Survey officers of their location prior to the displacement. Invariably regimental survey control reached the battalions after their respective position areas surveys had been completed. Thus, the regimental coordinates served as a check on the inspected coordinates used by the battalions rather than as the basis for the battalion surveys; and, unless a large error were noted, no change was made on the firing chart.

H. Communications

(1) Personnel

(a) Wire personnel is entirely inadequate when the Battalion is in direct support. It was necessary to obtain additional personnel from the general support battalions. Twenty-five additional wiremen for the Battalion over present T/O allowance is necessary for thorough maintenance of a direct support battalion wire system.

(b) Radio operators showed much improvement over previous phases, due to practice received therein. The need for careful training of operators prior to combat must be emphasized.

(c) Absence of CP promotions continued to manifest itself in difficulties of control, lowered morale, and lack of inducement for newly trained non-CP personnel to stay in communication work.

(2) Equipment

(a) Shortages were as indicated in the action report on the first phases. Also, for prolonged direct support, 20 phones in addition to T/O allowances are necessary.

(b) The method of employment of FO teams from other battalions; namely, attaching one such team to each Fo-Liaison group, and employing the battalion's own officers for all liaison duties, aided communication, in contrast to the procedure followed in earlier phases, in which officers from other battalions were used for liaison duties.

(c) Standardization of nomenclature of FO's and LNO's among the battalions is highly desirable.

(3) The following conclusions were reached in regard to operation of the forward wire system:

(a) Switching central must not be more than half a mile apart if trouble shooting is to be efficient.

(b) Five lines to the central from the battalion are necessary if communication is to be assured.

(c) Where shelling is heavy, alternate routes must be used for the various trunks, or one shell may destroy all communication.

(d) All lines must be overheaded, by poles if necessary.

(e) Fire vehicles should receive real priority on roads.

(f) When time is available and the direction of the following day's attack known, it is recommended that battalion wire teams lay lines forward of the switching central ahead of time, as an aid to the liaison officer.

IV S-4

(1) Class I

(a) Rations: Rations were adequate in quantity but not entirely suitable for galley use. The greater proportion of rations issued during third phase of the campaign consisted of "C" and "10-in-1". This battalion had its galleys built by the second day of the phase and was in a position to use rations from then until the end of the campaign. "10-in-1" rations and "C" rations were broken down and an endeavor was made to use these two rations as "B" rations. The "10-in-1" ration is not entirely satisfactory when used in this manner. The most important shortage was of fruit and fruit juices; neither was issued during the entire phase, despite the fact that at least 30 of the battalion personnel were forward throughout the phase. It is recommended that "B" rations be carried and issued when usable on future operations.

(b) Water: A critical water shortage existed during the middle of the phase, due to road conditions and immobility of transportation. A battalion-operated water purification unit would have alleviated this shortage and saved transportation for more vital purposes. This item should be added to the table of allowances.

(2) Class II

Transportation:

The vehicles used by the battalion held up exceptionally well. However there was a marked inadequacy of spare parts of all types of vehicles. It is recommended that more spare parts be brought and that higher echelons be better equipped to make fourth and fifth echelon repairs.

(3) Class V

(a) Basic transportation, supplemented by transportation from the battalions, was used exclusively in hauling ammunition. Since all A.S.P.'s were a great distance from the position, the battalion transportation facilities were strained, particularly during the heavy rains, before the roads were repaired. It is strongly recommended that A.S.P.'s be set up as far forward as is consistent with safety.

(b) It is also recommended that either regiment or division maintain control over five units of fire at all times, in order that the battalions may draw ammunition as it is needed, rather than on a schedule which can seldom be adhered to.

(B) Ordnance

(1) Some trouble was encountered with sights clouding up due to condensation. It is recommended that the T/O allow one Instrument Repairman per howitzer battalion, so that optical instruments may be cleaned and repaired during the course of the operation.

(2) Supply of spare parts was inadequate.

R. H. STRONG
Major, U.S.C.
Commanding

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NMP/rtd

Ser:

SECOND BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

27 June, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.

Subject: Special Action Report.

Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division GO-36.
(b) Sixth Marine Division SO-154.

1. In compliance with reference (b) the Special Action Report for this battalion is forwarded herewith.

Nat M. Pace
NAT M. PACE.


SECOND BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III
OKINAWA OPERATION



CONTENTS

GENERAL - - - - -	Chapter I
THE TASK ORGANIZATION - - - - -	Chapter II
PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION - - - - -	Chapter III
ENEMY TACTICS - - - - -	Chapter IV
ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION - - - - -	Chapter V
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - - - - -	Chapter VI

Chapter II
GENERAL

Chapter I

GENERAL

1. See Phases I and II.

Chapter II

THE TASK ORGANIZATION

- b. Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines,
Commanding Officer.
Nat M. PACE, Major, USMC.
- a. Dog Battery, Commanding Officer,
Henry C. SCHLOSSER, First Lieutenant, USMCR.
- b. Easy Battery, Commanding Officer,
Joseph A. EDWARDS, First Lieutenant, USMCR.
- c. Fox Battery, Commanding Officer,
John L. NOONAN, Captain, USMCR.
- d. Headquarters & Service Battery, Commanding Officer,
Henry KUDLEK, Commissioned Warrant Officer, USMCR.

888

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Chapter III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

L. The Battle for Naha.

On 11 May the Second Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, displaced from its bivouac area near Chibana to Target Square 7877 TMM. Registration was completed by 1615 and the battalion assumed general support of the First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, supporting the Twenty-Second Marines. On the morning of 14 May the battalion assumed direct support of the Twenty-Ninth Marines which status was maintained through 19 May. Heavy fire, averaging more than 1500 rounds daily, was delivered during this period.

From 21 through 27 May the battalion was in direct support of the Sixth Tank Battalion. A liaison officer and two forward observers in tanks were sent forward. Although rain and mud rendered tanks ineffective for several days this arrangement proved highly successful when the tanks were able to operate. The battalion completed its part in the Battle for Naha by supporting the Twenty-Second Marines as it swept through Naha and drove east along the north bank of the Kokuba estuary.

2. The Battle for Oruku Peninsula.

On 3 June the battalion displaced to T.S. 7472 LNO in Naha from which position it supported the landing on Oruku Peninsula. In direct support of the Twenty-Ninth Marines from 4 to 6 June the battalion fired on caves, strong points, and numerous weapons retarding the advance. On 6 June the battalion assumed direct support of the Twenty-Second Marines which status continued to 12 June. During this period as the division closed in on the last pocket of resistance on the peninsula many enemy troops were caught in the open and fired upon. Preparations for morning "jump offs" were delivered with good effect throughout this period. The position occupied in Naha was subjected to infrequent small arms and artillery fire from Oruku Peninsula resulting in one casualty and no damage to materiel.

3. The Capture of Ara Saki Peninsula.

The battalion displaced to T.S. 7364 STY on 15 June and fired numerous missions while in general support of III Corps Artillery, the Fourth Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, and the Sixth Marine Division respectively until the end of the campaign on 21 June. Time-on-target missions were frequent as the remnants of the enemy forces were compressed on the southern tip of the island.

Chapter III, PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION (Cont'd).

4. Recapitulation of status during Phase III.

- 11 - 13 May, general support First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines.
- 14 - 19 May, direct support Twenty-Ninth Marines.
- 20 May, general support First Battalion, Fifteenth Marines.
- 21 - 27 May, direct support Sixth Tank Battalion.
- 28 May -
 - 2 June, direct support Twenty-Second Marines.
 - 3 June, general support Sixth Marine Division.
 - 4 - 6 June, direct support, Twenty-Ninth Marines.
 - 7 - 12 June, direct support, Twenty-Second Marines.
 - 13 - 14 June, general support Sixth Marine Division.
 - 15 - 16 June, general support III Corps Artillery.
 - 17 - 19 June, general support Fourth Battalion, Fifteenth Marines.
 - 20 - 21 June, general support Sixth Marine Division.

Total days direct support -- 28

Total days general support - 14

5. Survey, Fire Adjustment, Fire Direction, and Organization for Combat and Tactical Employment.

- a. See Phases I and II.

6. Liaison.

- a. The importance of effective liaison between the direct support artillery battalion and the supported infantry regiment and battalions was continually evident during this phase. All the minor details of each preparation and harassing mission as desired by the infantry battalions were organized by the regimental liaison officer and relayed to the battalion fire direction center. It was found that preparations should commence on signal from the infantry battalions themselves. Otherwise the effectiveness was lost because of delayed "jump-offs."

7. Communications, Observation, and Personnel.

- a. See Phases I and II.

8. Ammunition Supply.

- a. Number of rounds expended or lost due to enemy action.

M48 - 27,952

M54 - 5,847

WP - 2,386

HEAT - 0

BE - 657

TOTAL 36,842

- b. Methods and Problems of Supply, Storage, and Packaging.

- 1. See Phases I and II.

- c. Recommended Changes in u/f, New Types Desired.

- 1. See Phases I and II.

Chapter III, PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION (Cont'd).

9. Motor Transportation.

a. Number and type of combat vehicles used.

3 Trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, cargo, S.W.B.
4 Trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, cargo.
8 Trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, dump.
9 Trucks, 1 ton, 4x4, cargo.
9 Trucks, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, 4x4, cargo.
8 Trucks, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, 4x4, radio-equipped, SCR-608.
2 Trucks, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, 4x4, radio-equipped, TCS.
2 Trailers, water, 2 wheel, 300 gal. cap.
3 Trailers, 1 ton, 2 wheel, cargo.
4 Trailers, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, 2 wheel, cargo.

b. Number of days battle employment. Forty-two (42).

c. Number and type damaged beyond repair or lost.

1 Truck, 1 ton, 4x4, cargo, (stolen).
1 Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, 4x4, radio equipped, SCR-608
(destroyed by enemy shell fire).

d. Malfunctions, explain in detail.

1. See Phases I and II.

e. Principle items of maintenance difficulty.

1. See Phases I and II.

f. Adequacy of Spare Parts and Accessories.

1. See Phases I and II.

g. Recommendations as to modifications of existing types and for new types.

1. It is recommended that the Army type M-5 Prime Mover be adopted to replace the $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, prime mover.

10. Materiel used.

a. Number, type, and caliber of weapons used.

1. See Phases I and II.

b. Number of days battle employment.

1. Forty-two (42).

~~SECRET~~
Chapter III, PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION (Cont'd).

- c. Number, type, and caliber of weapons lost.
 - 7 Carbines, cal. .30.
- d. Malfunctions, explain in detail.
 - 1. None.
- e. Adequacy of Spare Parts and Accessories.
 - 1. See Phases I and II.
- f. Recommendations as to modifications of existing types and for new types.
 - 1. See Phases I and II.
- 11. Training Deficiencies.
 - a. See Phases I and II.
- 12. Maps and Photos.
 - a. Supply of maps and photos was adequate.
- 13. Enemy Action against our Artillery.
 - a. Small arms and counter battery fire was received. Damage in both cases was negligible to personnel and equipment. Land mines were encountered in two of the three positions occupied. Infiltration was attempted without success.
- 14. Supply.
 - a. Adequacy of all types of mounting out supplies.
 - 1. See Phases I and II.
 - b. Adequacy of resupply.
 - 1. Resupply in Class II was inadequate. Critical items such as soap, clothing, towels, blankets, and spare parts for vehicles were not readily obtainable. The soap allowance was not sufficient for cleaning guns, washing clothes, and galley use. Toilet soap issued in the emergency ration component was inadequate.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Chapter III, PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION (Cont'd).

15. Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by item.

a.	M48 - 27,887	
	M54 - 5,824	
	WP - 2,374	
	BE - 657	
b.	Cal. .30 Carbine	367
	Cal. .30 AP and Tracer	1800
	Fragmentation Hand Grenades	26

16. Summary of Ammunition Expenditure by Type of Fire Mission.

a.	Registration.	
	M54 - 284	
	M48 - 831	
	WP - 83	
	BE - 2	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	1,200
b.	Call Fires.	
	M48 - 13,465	
	M54 - 3,030	
	WP - 1,654	
	BE - 452	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	18,601
c.	Harrassing Fires.	
	M48 - 5,853	
	M54 - 1,140	
	WP - 122	
	BE - 186	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	7,301
d.	Preparation Fires.	
	M48 - 7,738	
	M54 - 1,370	
	WP - 515	
	BE - 17	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	9,640

17. Effectiveness of Artillery.

a. The Japanese use of caves invulnerable to indirect fire weapons cut down the effectiveness of our artillery. Preparations in many cases, however, had devastating effect and permitted the infantry to capture their objective readily.

Chapter III, PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION (Cont'd).

18. Tactical Employment of Enemy Artillery.

a. Fire from weapons of various caliber was received and included time fire as well as point detonating. Many rounds were not fuze. Enemy fire was ineffective against this battalion because it was not massed.

19. Types of Materiel used by Enemy Artillery.

a. 12cm duds were found in one position. Fragments and crater size also indicated 75mm and 90mm shells were fired against this battalion.

20. Effectiveness of Enemy Artillery.

a. Enemy artillery was ineffective as employed against this battalion.

21. Methods used to locate Artillery Targets.

a. See Phases I and II.

22. Effectiveness of coordination of Target Information Center.

a. No comment.

Chapter IV .

ENEMY TACTICS.

1. No comment.

Chapter V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

1. Enemy Casualties.
 - a. Killed - 19
 - b. Captured 2
2. Own Losses.
 - a. Killed in Action 2
 - b. Wounded in Action and Evacuated 15
 - c. Missing in Action 0

Chapter VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. S-1.

a. No comment.

2. S-2.

a. No comment.

3. S-3

a. No comment.

4. S-4.

a. Ammunition used in this phase was divided into numerous lot numbers, a small amount in each one. This led to great dispersion since it was in many cases impossible to fire the same lot number throughout a mission. It is recommended that the higher echelon wherever possible discard odd lot numbers.

b. It was noted that ammunition packaged in wooden boxes instead of metal containers consistently caused excessive flash. It is believed that this wooden-packaged ammunition had deteriorated somewhat causing a slower rate of burning. Considerable dispersion resulted when this type ammunition was fired.

c. It is recommended that the Army type M-5 Prime Mover be substituted for the present $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, prime mover. One displacement was made during this phase using the M-5 Prime Mover over roads impassable to $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, trucks.

Nat M. Pace
NAT M. PACE,
Commanding.

THIRD BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

Serial: 37-45.

26 June 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division SO-154.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Special
Action Report for this battalion is forwarded herewith.

J. C. McHALEY
J. C. McHALEY

~~REDACTED~~
THIRD BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

THIRD BATTALION, FIFTEENTH MARINES,
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, OKINAWA OPERATION, PHASE III.

CONTENTS

GENERAL - - - - - Chapter I
TASK ORGANIZATION - - - - - Chapter II
PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION - - - - - Chapter III
ENEMY TACTICS - - - - - Chapter IV
ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION - - - - - Chapter V
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - - - - - Chapter VI

Chapter I

GENERAL

1. The purpose of this report is to relate the activities of the Third Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, during the planning and execution of the OKINAWA OPERATION, Phase III.
2. This battalion carried out both Direct Support and General Support missions in this phase.

Chapter II

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. The Third Battalion, Fifteenth Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Joe C. McHaney, consists of three (3) 105mm Howitzer firing batteries and one (1) Headquarters and Service Battery.

2. Subordinate Commanders were:

Headquarters and Service - - Capt. Edward C. O'Donnell
George - - Capt. Harris H. Barnes, Jr.
How- - - 1stLt. Charles F. Petet, Jr.
Item- - - Capt. Louis B. Abney, Jr.

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Chapter III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

1. The Battle for NAHA:

The Battle of NAHA began for this battalion upon its displacement to Target Square 7777J on 11 May, 1945. The battalion arrived in its new position area at 0830, and registered by airspot on the Regimental check point, Railroad Crossing, Target Square 7570E. Survey had been completed prior to occupation of position. The battalion was assigned the mission of General Support and continued in this role until 28 May, 1945, when it went into Direct Support of the 29th Marines. This assignment was carried out until the completion of the NAHA operation on 1 June, 1945. Ammunition expenditure for this phase, by mission:

Registration	385
Preparation	5,531
Harrassing	4,120
Fire Missions	<u>16,176</u>
TOTAL	26,212

2. The Battle for OROKU PENINSULA:

A thirty (30) minute preparation beginning at 0545, 4 June, 1945 was fired to support the landing of the Fourth Marines on OROKU PENINSULA. The following day the battalion displaced to a new position area at Target Square 7472V, in the city of NAHA. Reconnaissance and survey were completed prior to arrival of the battalion at 1230, 5 June 1945. The batteries were registered by airspot on road-junction, Target Square 7366H N. The mission of General Support was given to the battalion initially, but on 7 June 1945, the battalion was assigned the role of Direct Support of the Twenty-Ninth Marines. The official release of all Forward Observers and Liaison Teams on 12 June 1945, concluded this battalion's participation in the Battle for OROKU PENINSULA. Ammunition expenditure for this phase, by mission:

Registration	83
Preparation	1,965
Harrassing	683
Fire Missions	<u>2,255</u>
TOTAL	4,986

3. Capture of Ara Saki Peninsula:

Chapter III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

3. (Cont'd)

On 14 June 1945, the battalion displaced to position area in Target Square 7463C. Survey was initiated and the batteries were registered on road-junction, Target Square 7458Y2. The mission of General Support was carried out by the battalion through the conclusion of the operation. The last mission completed was fired at 0815, 20 June 1945. Ammunition expenditure for this phase, by mission:

Registration	257
Preparation	2,926
Harrassing	767
Propaganda	12
Fire Missions	<u>2,163</u>
TOTAL	6,125

Ammunition expenditure by type of ammunition for Okinawa operation, Phase III:

M48	24,439
M54	10,470
M57	2,270
M84	<u>144</u>
TOTAL	37,323

4. No trouble was encountered in resupply of Class I, II, III, IV or V materials. At all times during Phase III these commodities were adequate. During the battle for NAHA, heavy rains made the Main Supply Route next to impassable and the mud not only retarded the circulation of traffic but put a heavy strain on the motor transport section. Nearly one hundred percent replacement of brake lining was necessary within forty five (45) days after the rains. However, this short period of repairs and the period during the rains were the only flaws in an otherwise smooth and efficient system of supply.

Water was never a problem and the fifty five (55) gallon water drums again served efficiently as a substitute for a water trailer in the Headquarters and Service Battery.

This battalion used the following weapons during Phase III:

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Chapter III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

4. (Cont'd)

TYPE	NUMBER	DAYS OF		LOST	MALFUNCTIONS
		BATTLE	EMPLOYMENT		
105mm Howitzer	13		42	0	None
MG, Cal. .50, hb.	12		42	0	None
MG, Cal. .30, M1919	4		42	0	None
Launcher, rocket	7		42	0	None
BAR, Cal. .30	22		42	0	None
Rifle, Cal. .30M1	143		42	0	None
Carbine, Cal. .30M1	391		42	0	None
Pistol, Cal. .45	23		42	1	None

The supply of spare parts for ordnance was adequate and no serious malfunctions were recorded.

Small arms ammunition expenditure by type of ammunition:

.50Cal.	1000
.30Cal., belted	750
.30Cal., clips	2000
.45Cal., ball	300
.30Cal., Carbine	4000
2.36 Rocket	0
Grenades, Hand Frag.	510
Grenades, Hand W.P.	195

No serious problems arose in the procurement or stowage of ammunition.

The following vehicles were employed and performed satisfactorily:

TYPE	NUMBER OF DAYS LOST OR DAMAGE		
	NUMBER	BATTLE EMPLOYMENT	BEYOND REPAIR
Ambulance, 1/4 ton, 4x4	1	42	0
Tractor, w/angle dozer, med	1	42	1
Trailer, 1/4 ton, cargo	6	42	0
Trailer, 1 ton, cargo	4	42	0
Trailer, water	3	42	0
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, cargo	9	42	0
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, w/TCS	2	42	0
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4, SCR608	8	42	0
Truck, 1 ton, 4x4, cargo	9	42	0
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo	15	42	0

The tractor, after serving erratically during Phase I and part of Phase II, finally broke down completely and was declared irreparable by the Motor Transport Battalion. This break down was due to the service the tractor performed during the landing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chapter III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

4. (Cont'd)

at which time it was immersed in salt water for hours at a time towing the battalion vehicles ashore. The Division Quartermaster replaced this tractor shortly after the break down.

Spare parts were sometimes difficult to obtain and a greater supply of parts would facilitate more efficient motor maintenance. The regimental machine shop would be of greater value to the battalion if it were readily available at all times, and in operations where rain and mud are encountered the steam jenny is of prime importance in the removing of mud from the chassis of motor vehicles to save wear on parts.

Operat

Chapter IV

ENEMY TACTICS

No new enemy tactics were observed during the Okinawa
Operation, Phase III.

Chapter V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

1. Area secured:

Fires of this battalion materially assisted the infantry of the Sixth Marine Division in the capture of NAHA, OKOKU PENINSULA, and ARA SAKI PENINSULA.

2. Enemy casualties:

- (a) Killed - 8
- (b) Captured - 14

No estimate can be made of the casualties inflicted by the battalion's fire though it was reported as particularly effective in stopping a counter attack against the Fourth Marines in Target Square 7671 A,B,C,D. A total of one hundred forty four (144) missions were fired on enemy troop concentrations and enemy activity. Many of these fires were reported as very effective.

3. Operational material damage to enemy:

A total of one hundred fifty six (156) missions were fired against enemy material and emplacements. Much of this fire was unobserved, and results of these missions cannot be ascertained. Of the observed fires, the following results were reported:

Artillery pieces destroyed	4
Direct hits, artillery pieces	7
Ammunition dumps blown up	5
Barges destroyed	2
Warehouses destroyed	1
Fuel dumps destroyed	2
Mortars, direct hit	1
Emplacements destroyed	4

4. Own Losses:

- (a) Killed in action 2
- (b) Wounded in action and Evacuated 7
- (c) Missing in action 0

Chapter VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. One Section: None

2. Two Section:

It is recommended that in future operations Forward Observers be furnished vertical and oblique photos of the area in which they are working. Verticals in insufficient numbers were received, generally too late to be of use.

3. Three Section:

(a) Radio communication was impaired by the long rains. The cable and plugs between the battery box and the transmitter and receiver of the SCR-610 radio caused the most trouble. In addition, the hand sets failed many times. It is recommended that a microphone similar to the TOS microphone and headsets be supplied to Forward Observer teams for use with the SCR-610 radio.

(b) Airspot.

1. It is recommended that airspot be attached to regiment instead of Corps.

2. It is recommended that two (2) SCR-193 radios be obtained for airspot, one to remain at Regiment and one at the airfield.

3. It is recommended that one officer be appointed Officer in Charge of Aerial Observers.

4. It is recommended that more use be made of stereo pairs and aerial photos, and that definite Targets for destruction be assigned before a flight.

5. It is recommended that an officer watch be maintained on airspot frequency by regiment at all times.

6. It is recommended that targets for night harassing fires be submitted to regiment by airspot.

4. Four Section:

(a) Medical supplies, in adequate quantity, were easily obtained from either Regiment or Medical companies.

(b) Control of flies and mosquitos was difficult by hand spraying; however, DDT spraying by airplane proved very satisfactory.

(c) There were only scattered cases of diarrhea but numerous cases of an undiagnosed fever similar in symptomatology to mild Dengue. This, however, did not prove serious and responded readily to symptomatic treatment. Cases of common infectious diseases, such as, respiratory and skin infections,

Chapter VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Four Section: (Cont'd)

were lower than usually found with men in the field.

(d) It is recommended that each battery be equipped with a water trailer.

(e) It is recommended that the present Headquarters and Service Battery be divided into a Headquarters Battery and a Service Battery with all service personnel to be placed in the Service Battery as prescribed in the Army Tables of Organization, TO E6-339, 3 July 1943.

This change would greatly aid this battalion in displacements and in general supply problems on operations covering vast distances in comparatively short time such as were encountered in Phase I and II.

(f) It is recommended that each battalion be equipped with the Army M5 Prime Mover.

J. C. McHAN, Y.
LtCol., USMC,
Commanding.

CONFIDENTIAL

BTH/dwc

Serial: 67F


FOURTH BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

27 June, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding Officer, Fifteenth Marines.
Subject: Special Action Report.
Reference: (a) Sixth Marine Division SO - 154.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the Special Action Report for this Battalion is forwarded herewith.

Bruce T. Hemphill
BRUCE T. HEMPHILL


FOURTH BATTALION,
FIFTEENTH MARINES, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

CONTENTS

GENERAL - - - - -	Chapter I
THE TASK ORGANIZATION - - - - -	Chapter II
PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION - - - - -	Chapter III
ENEMY TACTICS - - - - -	Chapter IV
ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION - - - - -	Chapter V
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - - - - -	Chapter VI

Chapter I

GENERAL

This report is submitted to give a complete and accurate narrative of the Battalion's operation in: The Battle for NAHA, The Battle for OROKU Peninsula, and the Capture of ARA SAKI.

This Battalion was assigned both general and direct support missions during this phase of the OKINAWA Operation.

Chapter II

THE TASK ORGANIZATION

The Fourth Battalion, Fifteenth Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill, USMC, is composed of three (3) firing batteries of 105mm Howitzers and one Headquarters and Service battery.

Battery Commanders are as follows:

Headquarters and Service --- Capt. Robert D. Lackland,
USMCR.

King --- 1stLt. Robert T. Patterson, Jr.
USMCR.

Love --- Capt. John T. Haynes,
USMCR.

Mike --- Major Robert F. Irving,
USMCR.

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Chapter III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

The battalion displaced on 11 May, 1945 and went in position around the northwest end of the MACHINATO Airfield. The mission was general support of the Sixth Marine Division. This position provided almost no flash defilade and since the front lines were only 1700 yards away at some points, night firing was not allowed initially.

Enemy counter-battery was inaccurate and very light. A single gun would fire at dusk every night expending about eight to twelve rounds. No damage was done.

On 19 May the battalion took over direct support of the 4TH MARINES.

"Sugar Loaf Hill" was retaken 20 May and at 2149 of the same date the enemy counterattacked along the ASATO GAWA in the vicinity of TA7572, 1:25,000 Ryukyu Retto, 3rd Revision, Contoured Revised Map.

The battalion fired from 2149 to 2350, expending 1490 rounds. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, Fifteenth Marines, and two battalions of the 27th Division artillery were also firing on this same mission. The counterattack was repulsed, and about 950 dead Japs were counted in that area two days later.

The 29TH MARINES relieved the 4TH MARINES on 28 May and this battalion was assigned to general support of the Sixth Marine Division.

The battalion displaced on 7 June, 1945 to TS7474Y3, 1:25,000 Ryukyu Retto, 3rd Revision, Contoured Revised Map, with the mission of general support in the Battle for OROKU. Operations from this position were routine.

The battalion displaced to its final position at TS7464C1, 1:25,000 Ryukyu Retto, 3rd Revision, Contoured Revised Map, on 15 June, 1945 and went into direct support of the 22ND MARINES on 16 June, 1945.

The 29TH MARINES relieved the 22ND MARINES on 19 June and the battalion took over direct support of the 29TH MARINES. Very little firing was done after 19 June because the enemy was surrendering in large numbers, and civilians were continually coming through the lines. No counter-battery was experienced in the capture of ARA SAKI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chapter IV

ENEMY TACTICS

The enemy displayed a great deal of skill in the employment of his artillery in support of the NAHA-SHURI defense line. His artillery was well concealed, and skillfully sighted to cover the key terrain and the approaches thereto. In the Sixth Marine Division zone of action, this key terrain proved to be the area just north of the AS GAWA in the vicinity of "Sugar Loaf" hill. Much of the artillery which supported this position was emplaced around SHURI, from which direct flanking fire in support of the defensive installations was possible. This artillery was frequently emplaced in caves and on reverse slopes and was extremely difficult to neutralize with counter-battery.

Enemy attempts at counter-battery were spasmodic and ineffectual. Such counter-battery as was attempted was never sufficiently concentrated or employed in sufficient volume to seriously endanger a battalion installation.

Chapter V

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

1. Enemy casualties:

(a) 2 captured in battalion area.

(b) An accurate number could not be made since many other supporting arms were in on the same targets.

2. Own losses:

3 Killed in Action.

12 Wounded in Action and Evacuated.

Chapter VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. One Section: None.
2. Two Section: See Special Action Report
Phase I & II, OKINAWA Operation.
3. Three Section:

It is believed that a more effective counter-battery system in the III Corps zone of action would have saved casualties in the Sixth Marine Division, particularly in the operations incident to the break through to NAHA. Much of the enemy artillery fire received by the infantry which this battalion supported during the above operations, came from positions outside the Sixth Marine Division zone of action, and it was often delivered in such volume as to be demoralizing. It is believed that more emphasis should be placed on counter-battery in planning future operations.

These remarks are offered in an attempt to present the situation from the viewpoint of a direct support artillery battalion commander; one who was unfamiliar with the problems and operations which had to be solved by other echelons at the time. However, the unpleasant fact remains that the infantry which we supported did suffer heavily from enemy artillery fire, and therefore we should exert ourselves to the utmost to prevent a recurrence of this in the future.

4. Four Section:

More spare parts for motor vehicles should be furnished for future operations. In making plans for resupply of spare parts consideration should be given to the ratio of motor vehicles allowed on the operation to the number listed in the table of basic allowances for the organization. As an example, this organization was allowed to bring about 65% of its 2½ ton 6x6 trucks on this operation. Since this number had to move and supply the battalion, the rate of expenditure of spare parts would obviously be much higher than normal because of the necessity of long continuous operation and occasional overloading required by extended periods of combat.

BRUCE T. HEMPHILL,
LtCol., USMC.,
Commanding

0566-1

Part VI of 12 pts

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ANNEX E RECEIVED FROM:-----
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SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT


PHASE III OKINAWA OPERATION

6TH TANK BATTALION

(NAVMC-QUANTICO)

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MAY 1946
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MAY 1946
MAY 1946

13789(1) MCS Quantico, Va. 1-24-46-1M


HEADQUARTERS,
SIXTH TANK BATTALION, SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

1 July, 1945.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
OKINAWA OPERATION
PHASE III

SIXTH TANK BATTALION, SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
PHASE III, OKINAWA OPERATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I	General.
Chapter II	Task Organization.
Chapter III	Progress of the Operation.
Chapter IV	Enemy Tactics.
Chapter V	Estimated Results of Operations.
Chapter VI	Comments and Recommendations of the Commander.

HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH TANK BATTALION
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III

CHAPTER I

GENERAL

1. This report covers the operations of the Sixth Tank Battalion in the Third Phase of the OKINAWA campaign, during which the Sixth Marine Division shared in the capture of SOUTHERN OKINAWA. It includes the movement south, from the MOTOBU PENINSULA, the forcing of the river crossing at the ASA KAWA, the capture of NAHA, the landing on OROKU PENINSULA and seizure of NAHA AIRFIELD, and the drive from ITOMAN to the southern tip of OKINAWA SHIMA. Our mission was to support the attack of the Sixth Marine Division.

2. The purpose of this report is to point out the weaknesses and good points of the training and operation of this battalion which became apparent during the 45 days of combat in which we participated, and to recommend changes in tactics and equipment for future operations.

CHAPTER II

THE TASK ORGANIZATION - III PHASE

1. In the task organization, of the division's operation plan, the Sixth Tank Battalion was a part of the tank group. This group, under the command of the Commanding Officer, Sixth Tank Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Denig, Jr., USMC, was composed of the following units;

Company A	- - - - -	Captain Philip C. Morell, USMC
Company B	- - - - -	Captain Robert Hall, USMCR.*
		Captain James R. Williams, US
Company C	- - - - -	Captain Hugh Corrigan, USMC.*
		Captain John H. Clifford, USMC
H&S Company-	- - - - -	1stLt. James C. Vail, USMCR.
Tank Maintenance Platoon,		
Ordnance Company-	- - - - -	2dLt. Raymond E. Novotny, USMCR
First Platoon, Company B;		
713th Armored Flame		
Thrower Battalion, AUS		1stLt. Thomas E. Bennett, AUS.†

Note: * This officer was wounded in action and evacuated.
† With the exception of four (4) days the above mentioned Army Flame-Thrower Tanks were attached during the entire Third Phase of the operation.

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

I. THE BATTLE OF NAHA

1. Introduction.

a. In preparation for the Third Phase the battalion made a night march on 5-6 May from the MOTOBU PENINSULA to a rear assembly position at DERAGAWA. This march covered a distance of forty miles and was made without mishap over narrow treacherous mountain roads in a total elapsed time of six and one half hours. On 9 May the battalion again displaced forward to a service park and assembly area about one and one half miles north of the ASA KAWA, the location of the front lines at that time.

b. During the day-by-day account of the action which follows the tank attack is described from right to left across the Sixth Marine Division's zone of action. Unless otherwise noted the tanks always returned to the service park for the night.

2. 10 May.

a. Company B was assigned the mission of supporting the 22d Marines in their seizure of a bridge-head across the ASA KAWA. Two platoons and the company commander moved forward and attempted to find a ford. During this forward displacement the second tank in column was completely destroyed by an undetected mine. Because of the urgent need for tanks a thorough reconnaissance was made in an attempt to locate a ford across the river. During this detailed reconnaissance two officers and one enlisted man were seriously wounded. Several attempts to cross were made at low tide in the hope that a few tanks might get across but the tanks bogged down and had to be retrieved under accurate enemy rifle fire with a protective smoke screen from the 2 inch mortar. Despite need for tank support the incoming tide forced the company to abandon its attempts to ford the river. The tanks then withdrew to await the construction of a bailey bridge which was to be attempted during the night of 10-11 May. All attempts to ford the ASA KAWA failed due to a mud and silt bottom which caused the tanks to bog down.

b. The remaining companies spent the entire day servicing their tanks and reconnoitering routes of approach.

3. 11 May.

a. During the night of 10-11 May Companies B and C moved into a defiladed attack position about 500 yards north of the point where the bailey bridge was being constructed. The scheme of maneuver called for these tanks to cross the bridge at dawn. Heavy fire in the bridge-head area fell in the attack position during the night destroying two radio jeeps but the tanks and personnel suffered no casualties. The bridge was completed during the forenoon and these companies quickly crossed the river as the bridge was under artillery fire and subject to destruction. A mine removal squad of thirteen men and tank liaison personnel for each company crossed with the tanks. Although the entire bridge-head area was under heavy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire the liaison radio teams successfully contacted the infantry commanders. Mine removal teams, despite heavy losses, cleared paths through previously located fields, thus permitting the tanks to deploy for the attack.

b. Company B deploying to the right in support of 3/22 immediately encountered heavy and accurate 47mm AT fire from cave and tomb positions. The right flank platoon destroyed at least one 47mm AT gun and advanced in support of the infantry destroying numerous small weapons and many cave and pillbox positions in the steep and rocky hillside to the front. Two platoons moving South astride the NHAH-YAFUSU ROAD were engaged by two mutually supporting AT guns. The covering infantry was so pinned down by enemy fire that they were unable to assist in locating or destroying these guns. Three tanks were hit one of which was destroyed before these guns were located and knocked out by the tanks themselves. Before dusk the tanks assisted 3/22 in making an 800 yard up-hill advance to reach the high ground overlooking NHAH, thus firmly anchoring the right flank.

c. On the left Company C was faced with a similar situation in their support of 1/22, a long up-hill and partially channelized attack with heavy AT gun opposition. As a result two tanks were immediately hit one of which was temporarily abandoned before the AT gun was silenced. One platoon delivered long range direct fire support and the remainder of the tanks closely supported the infantry in an attack on a commanding ridge position that dominated the bridge-head left flank. Two attacks were made on this ridge before it was finally captured.

Apparent reasons for the failure of the first attack was the lack of supporting shell fire on the reverse slope and the failure of the tanks to completely destroy all possible positions on the forward slope. During the second attack these faults were remedied by the advance of Company B tanks, which covered and supported the left flank, and the infantry was able to seize the objective.

d. Company A supported 2/22 on the divisions left flank. The tanks were able to advance until they reached a branch of the ASA KAWA which they were unable to cross. Only light artillery and small arms fire was received during this attack.

e. Companies B and C were ordered to remain for the night on the South side of the ASA KAWA. This was done because of the fear that the bridge would be destroyed by artillery fire during the night. Supplies were forwarded to them prior to darkness.

4. 12 May.

a. Company B on the right flank in the zone of action of 3/22 was ordered to assist the infantry's advance by direct fire support. Enemy artillery fire forced the company to withdraw and as the regiment's immediate objective had been secured the previous day no further attempt was made to advance either the tanks or infantry.

b. Company C in the center supported 1/22 with two platoons giving direct fire support from hull defilade positions while one platoon moved out in an infantry-tank attack to seize a hill just north of AMIKA. Tanks moving to the left of this hill destroyed an AT gun covering a road block and one tank was damaged by a suicide satchel charge attack. This hill was seized and numerous machine guns and enemy positions were destroyed.

c. Company A supporting 2/22 was separated from the remainder of the tanks due to a salient between this battalion and the remainder of the regiment. With the aid of a drum culvert a bulldozer tank constructed a crossing of the upper branch of the ASA KAWA that held up the tanks on the previous day. By this expedient the tanks were able to cross the river and occupy hull defilade positions for direct fire support. In the late afternoon three platoons and two command tanks moved out in a tank-infantry attack that carried them within 200 yards of SUGAR LOAF HILL. During this attack

two tanks were knocked out by mines, and one was stuck in a shell crater. This attack was repulsed by the enemy and the infantry was forced to withdraw under a withering cross fire. The tanks covered this withdrawal and assisted in the evacuation of infantry and tank wounded. During this withdrawal two officers and nine enlisted were wounded and two enlisted killed from the dismounted tank crews.

d. The opening by Company A of a new route across the ASA KAWA permitted the withdrawal of all tanks to the battalion service park for the night.

5. 13 May.

a. Company B was ordered to support both 3/22 and 1/22 in a limited advance through the out-skirts of N.H.A. to the ASA TO river. Heavy artillery fire forced both the infantry and tanks to withdraw to their original lines after the tanks had destroyed a 3 inch gun and numerous other weapons.

b. Company C in support of 2/22 gave direct fire support by firing on the forward slopes of SUGAR LOAF HILL and the hills immediately adjacent thereto. The infantry advanced to the hill but were unable to hold the ground because of heavy fire received from the reverse slope and from some by-passed positions.

c. Just prior to darkness on the previous day 3/29 was ordered to extend the left flank within the division's zone of action. Company A supported the attack. From hull defilade positions by firing at caves, tombs and pillboxes and by fire and movement they assisted the infantry's advance. One tank was destroyed by a suicide satchel charge attack and abandoned ahead of friendly lines.

6. 14 May.

a. Two platoons of Company B were ordered to support 1/22 in a limited advance in their zone of action. Heavy artillery fire prevented the tanks and infantry from seizing the objective and forced their withdrawal.

b. Company C supported the attack of 2/22 on SUGAR LOAF HILL. Two platoons attempted to flank the hill from the southwest, but were fired upon by AT guns that destroyed two tanks. One platoon simultaneously fired on the reverse slopes of hills adjacent to SUGAR LOAF and

northwest of it. The remaining platoon advanced with the infantry and reached the front slopes of the hill but not without losing one tank to AT fire. The infantry was unable to organize the ground and were forced to withdraw by heavy enemy grenade fire.

c. Company A supported 3/29 in the reduction of a salient between this battalion and the 22d Marines. By firing from stationary positions and by close in support they assisted the infantry in the seizure of their objective. One tank was damaged by a land mine and abandoned and two others disabled by an AT grenade and an unidentified explosion.

d. During the previous evening the division's zone of action was divided into a two regiment front with the 22d on the right and the 29th on the left. 1/29 moved and occupied the division's left flank zone. Two platoons of Company B were ordered to assist this battalion. During the attack one AT gun was destroyed by the tanks in a draw. The left flank platoon lost two tanks to satchel charge attacks and one to artillery and had to be abandoned.

7. 15 May.

a. As the division's right flank was ordered to hold the high ground overlooking NAHA the main effort of the tank battalion shifted to the left. In the central sector, of the zone of action, Company C was ordered to support 1/22 in their attack on SUGAR LOAF HILL. While planning the attack artillery fire killed or wounded the battalion commander and all company commanders of 1/22 plus the tank company and executive officer. This unfortunate incident so disorganized the infantry that the assault was abandoned pending reorganization.

b. Company A supported 3/29, by both overhead fire and direct assault, in their attack to seize the objective.

c. Company B assisted 1/29 in the reduction of a pocket between them and 3/29. One 47mm AT gun was destroyed after it had several times fired and hit the front slope plate of a tank. Heavy artillery scored several direct hits on the tanks but only slight damage resulted.

8. 16 May.

a. 3/22 was withdrawn from their zone of action and placed on the regiments right flank. Company C was ordered to assist them in the reduction of SUGAR LOAF HILL. Tanks

attempted to flank the hill so as to fire on the reverse slope but they entered into a mine field and lost one tank. Other tanks advanced with the infantry up to the forward slope of the hill and then shifted their fire to the flanks to aid the infantry in the organizing of the seized ground. Heavy grenade and mortar fire from the reverse slope of the hill again caused the infantry to withdraw.

b. Tanks from both Companies A and B attacked together in the support of 1/29 and 3/29 in their drive on the left flank of SUGAR LOAF HILL and the approaches to CRESCENT HILL on the left. This attack was directed by S-3 from a command tank. Company B on the left debouched through a railway cut into a broad valley that constituted the approaches to CRESCENT HILL. The tanks turned left and moved up the valley towards SHURI and the left of the hill. Company A covered the movement of Company B by direct fire support from the slopes of hills to just north of SUGAR LOAF. One platoon of Company A frontally attacked CRESCENT HILL and protected Company B's right flank. Company B received four AT gun hits immediately after entering the valley but destroyed the gun with no losses. By firing on the reverse slope of the hill ridge to the north they destroyed enemy positions and flame thrower tanks completed the enemy's destruction. However heavy fire from CRESCENT HILL and SHURI prevented the infantry from occupying the neutralized ground.

9. 17 May.

a. Company C again attacked SUGAR LOAF HILL and in support of 2/29. It was apparent that in order to reduce the Japanese defenses on the reverse slope of the hill that the tanks would have to bring direct fire to bear there, so that the heavy enemy grenade fire could be neutralized. One platoon negotiated a mine field and advanced far enough on the flank so that a portion of this reverse slope could be fired upon. One tank was lost by mortar fire in this operation and one large caliber gun was destroyed. The remainder of the company furnished direct fire support.

b. Companies A and B were again committed to support 1/29 and 3/29. The attack followed the same pattern as on the previous day but this time the tanks advanced further down the valley and destroyed a town by burning with flame thrower tanks. They fired at the reverse slopes of the hills guarding CRESCENT HILL and neutralized the area. During this attack two tanks were lost to mines and one tank was damaged by a 47mm AT gun hit and abandoned. Another tank was hit seven times by a 47mm AT gun without penetration before the AT gun was destroyed. After this neutralization

580

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the infantry in the late afternoon attempted to occupy CRESCENT HILL but were forced to retire by heavy fire received from the reverse slope of CRESCENT and SUGAR LOAF HILLS.

10. 18 May.

a. The battalion attacked in support of the 29th Marines which were still trying to seize CRESCENT and SUGAR LOAF HILLS. Company C supporting 2/29 and despite heavy artillery fire managed to occupy positions to the west of SUGAR LOAF so that they could cover the reverse slope by fire. They also neutralized adjacent ridges between SUGAR LOAF and NAHA.

b. Company A, less one platoon, flanked SUGAR LOAF from the east and in addition of being able to fire on its reverse slope brought a portion of CRESCENT HILL's reverse slope under fire.

c. Company B was ordered to envelope CRESCENT HILL from both flanks. One platoon of Company A furnished overhead fire support. On the right this company was unable to advance due to a narrow draw and a mine field that caused the destruction of one tank. On the left impassable terrain prevented the tanks from reaching a position to bring direct fire to bear on the reverse slope. The infantry managed to seize the forward slope of CRESCENT HILL but heavy artillery and grenade fire forced their retirement.

d. By the double envelopment of SUGAR LOAF HILL the tanks were able to neutralize and destroy the enemy on the reverse slope thus allowing 2/29 to seize and secure it.

11. 19 May.

a. The 4th Marines relieved the 29th Marines during the day. Only one platoon of Company A was committed. It was used by 2/29 and later by 3/4 to destroy by-passed positions.

b. Battalion maintenance crews were directed to retrieve damaged tanks but were forced to abandon their attempts by heavy mortar fire.

12. 20 May.

a. Company A in support of 3/4 established a base of fire with one platoon from the slopes of SUGAR LOAF HILL.

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The remainder of the company closely supported the infantry in their advance into NAHA. The platoon delivering overhead fire support was under intermittent heavy shell fire and lost one tank to a direct hit.

b. Companies B and C supported the attack of 2/4 which was ordered to seize CRESCENT HILL. Company C less one platoon by direct overhead fire acted as a base of fire for Company B. A double envelopment of this hill was again attempted by Company B. One platoon of Company B with one platoon of Company C in support forced a passage of the mine fields that guarded the west flank of CRESCENT HILL. A 47mm AT gun that guarded this route fired upon and damaged one Company C tank but was destroyed before further tanks were hit. The Company B platoon managed to find firing positions that brought the west flank of the reverse slope of CRESCENT HILL under fire. Neutralization firing permitted the infantry to seize this end of the hill.

c. The remainder of Company B again attempted to flank the eastern side of CRESCENT HILL. A dozer tank was used in an attempt to make a route of approach to the east of the hill but before the task was completed an operational failure occurred to the bulldozer attachment. Consequently, the tanks were unable to reach a firing position that could cover the entire reverse slope. The infantry who had seized the forward slope of the hill in this zone were forced to withdraw by heavy grenade fire delivered from positions that the tanks were unable to fire upon.

13. 21 May.

a. Company A supported 2/4 in their advance towards the ASATO GAWA and destroyed one newly emplaced 47mm AT gun.

b. Companies B and C repeated the previous days attack but poor terrain continued to prevent the tanks from enveloping the hill and bringing fire to bear on the reverse slope. Only minor gains were registered by the infantry in this sector.

14. 22 May.

a. The direction of the divisions attack was shifted from the southwest to the south. The left flank of the 4th Marines was to hold on the seized portion of CRESCENT HILL whereas the right flank was to push to the southward. The 22d Marines continued to hold positions on the ASATO GAWA.

overlooking NAHA. Heavy rains during the preceeding night limited tank employment and caused boggy terrain.

b. Company A in support of 3/4 delivered overhead fire support and gains were registered by the infantry.

c. Company C in support of 1/4 being limited to narrow roads was unable to properly support the infantry in their advance.

d. Flame thrower tanks were used to clean out some small pockets of the enemy along the north bank of the ASATO GAWA which acted as a barrier for the northern approaches to NAHA.

e. Company B reorganized and serviced their tanks.

15. 23 May.

a. Heavy rains prohibited the use of tanks but a reconnaissance of selected river crossings was made of the ASATO GAWA with the idea of installing a bailey bridge.

16. 24 May.

a. Continued rains and the lack of a bridge across the ASATO GAWA prevented tank employment.

17. 25 May.

a. Division engineers bridged the ASATO GAWA and the tanks again were in a position to support the attack of the 4th Marines. Continued rain made the terrain unsuitable for tank employment except along roads.

b. Company A supported 2/4 but being limited to the roads were ineffectual.

c. Company C supported 1/4 and assisted somewhat in the seizure of the objective.

d. Company B covered the river crossing of Companies A and C from positions on the southern slopes of SUGAR LOAF HILL.

18. 26 May through 29 May.

a. Intensive rains prohibited the use of tanks and even the roads became impassable.

19. 30 May.

a. With improved weather conditions Company B attempted to support the attack of the 22d Marines in their drive to secure NAHA. Being still confined to roads the tanks were hampered in rendering close support. Furthermore, all roads were heavily mined and although attached engineer mine teams carefully cleared mine areas, one tank was damaged by an overlooked mine. The lack of engineer support to repair the roads prevented the tanks from advancing with the infantry. The company because of bad road conditions was ordered to an assembly point south of the ASA KAWA, instead of returning to the service park.

b. The remainder of the battalion stayed in the service park.

20. 31 May.

a. Company B supported the division's attack but extensive mine fields that destroyed one tank and the lack of road improvement by the engineers failed to open routes to the front lines. Terrain conditions continued to prohibit the use of tanks off roads. The company again bivouaced for the night south of the ASA KAWA.

b. The remainder of the battalion stayed in the service park.

21. 1 June.

a. Improved weather conditions and a broadening of the division's front permitted the employment of two companies. Company B supported the 22d, Company C supported the 29th. Wet terrain and poor roads continued to restrict tank movement.

b. During the afternoon the battalion was warned of an impending amphibious landing by the division on the OROKU PENINSULA and plans were made for preparing the tanks for deep fording.

II THE BATTLE FOR OROKU PENINSULA

1. 2 June.

a. Preparations and installation of deep fording equipment on the tanks was commenced.

2. 3 June.

a. Installation of deep fording equipment was continued.

b. Five LCT's were assigned the battalion for the landing and were loaded at noon with eleven tanks from each assault tank company, A and C; one retriever, one battalion command tank and one artillery forward observer tank. A conference was held with the 4th Marines, the assault regiment on tank employment after landing. Company C was to support 1/4 and Company A 3/4. After landing the assault wave the LCT's were to return to the loading point to ferry across the remainder of the battalion.

3. 4 June.

a. The tank group with attached engineer mine removal teams commenced landing at 0600 and were soon unloaded. The LST's returned to the staging area and commenced loading the remainder of the battalion. At about 1000 a storm arose and all tanks that were loaded were disembarked. The LST's then retired to shelter from the storm.

b. Company C after losing one tank in the ocean upon landing, supported 1/24, in the seizure of the high ground overlooking NAHA AIRFIELD, thus securing the right flank and the beachhead.

c. Company A in support of 2/4 reached the high ground on the left.

d. The mine removal teams removed great quantities of mines in the beachhead area. However, the fields were so dense that one tank was disabled by an undetected mine. Heavy rains during the preceding ten days had soaked the ground into a muddy swamp thus in part channelized the tanks to roads. The roads had been blown in numerous spots and as it was impossible to traverse the fields around them engineer assistance was requested for the work was beyond the capability of a tank dozer.

e. The tanks established a temporary service park in the center of the beachhead area.

4. 5 June.

a. Company C in order to support the 4th Marines on the right was forced to send one platoon down the reef on the seaward side of the airfield until a breach was found in the sea wall. At this point they moved onto the airfield.

and contacted 3/4. Direct fire support was furnished the infantry. Enemy artillery fire was received by the tanks and artillery support was requested from our direct support artillery battalion. The enemy gun flashes were fired upon by the 15th Marines and the fire adjusted by a tank officer. An inspection at a later date ascertained that four 120mm DP guns, one 6 inch gun and several small field pieces were silenced. The remainder of the Company was unable to advance with the infantry because of blown roads and bridges that had not been repaired by our engineers.

b. Company A in support of 2/29 was faced with a similar situation in that the roads and bridges were damaged beyond the repair capabilities of a tank dozer and the terrain was too wet for tank movement. However one 3 inch DP gun was destroyed along with automatic weapons by their direct fire.

c. As the LCT's had not returned to complete the ferrying of the tanks to the peninsula the remainder of the battalion awaited in the loading area.

5. 6 June.

a. Company C in support of the 4th Marines attacked south of NAHA AIRFIELD in support of 3/4. One platoon was forced to withdraw into defilade when it encountered heavy and accurate artillery fire. The remaining tanks reinforced by fire from our direct support artillery battalion controlled by the F. O. tank silenced these enemy guns.

b. Company A supported the 29th Marines by placing one platoon on a high ridge and firing direct overhead fire at ranges up to 1200 yards. The other platoon moving through the village bordering the estuary destroyed numerous guns and assisted the advance through the buildings until stopped by a destroyed bridge.

c. Company B with the remainder of the battalions tanks, some twenty two in all, landed from LCT's at noon and went into battalion reserve.

d. Engineer assistance was given by division and work commenced on the main north-south road which was impassable. Mine removal teams disarmed eighty-three mines of various types.

6. 7 June.

a. Boggy terrain, heavy mine fields and steep and difficient terrain channelized tank employment on the

OROKU PENINSULA. As a result the platoon was the unit employed in support. On some occasions two or more platoons mutually supported each other but this situation was rare.

b. Company B supported 3/4. One platoon bogged down in the swampy ground along the shore and was unable to assist the infantry. Another platoon proceeded along the reef at low tide in an attempt to enfilade the slope of a ridge through GUSHI where the enemy was holding up the infantry. Upon retirement from this mission one tank fell into a pot-hole and had to be abandoned due to the rising tide and heavy enemy fire.

c. Company C supported 2/4 in their attack. Stone roadblocks were encountered but were removed by tank gun fire and a tank dozer.

d. Company A supported the attack of the 29th Marines. One platoon in support of 2/29 crossed a small bridge that had been constructed by the engineers over the destroyed one that prevented the advance the previous day. This platoon continued along the southern shore of NAHA HARBOR until halted by accurate artillery fire and a large mine field. Another platoon in support of 3/29 fired from positions along a road in their zone of action.

7. 8 June.

a. Company B supported 1/4 but swampy ground between the hills and the ocean hampered the tanks. Two platoons from positions of the reef delivered fire on the reverse slope of the GUSHI RIDGE. Two other platoons supported the attack by overhead fire.

b. Company C supported 2/4 and 3/4 from positions on high ground by delivering overhead fire. Both tank dozers and armored engineer dozers repaired roads so this company could advance.

c. One platoon of Company A reinforced with two flame throwing tanks moving along an inland road parallel to the route of advance of 3/29 burned and destroyed a town killing many of the enemy. Another platoon in support of 2/29 and with the aid of flame throwing tanks cleaned out the town along the harbor road. As during the previous day they were stopped by a mine field. While firing on the hills to their front they were taken under fire by an 8 inch howitzer and one tank was destroyed. The tanks being confined to road movement and as the second tank in column was hit the lead tank was abandoned and blown up during the night by the enemy.

8. 9 June.

a. Company B supported 1/4 by flanking the GUSHI RIDGE by sending one platoon by the reef to enfilade the ridge and by sending another platoon over a poor road that ran through the swamp between the ridge and the airfield. To return along this route was impossible so the platoon on the reef breached the sea wall near the ridge by gun fire. Three tanks were lost when the surface of the reef gave away during their withdrawal in the evening. The remainder of the Company moved south along the NAHA-ITOMAN highway until they passed through a cut in the GUSHI RIDGE. There they turned east to envelope the ridge.

b. Company C supported 2/4 and 3/4. With the aid of tank dozers and armored bulldozers they managed to slowly make their way up draws to destroy pillboxes and cave positions that were holding up the attack.

c. Company A in support of 3/29 and 2/29 moved along trails and narrow roads and through mine fields in order to bring the enemy under fire. Numerous caves and guns were destroyed and the infantry was materially assisted in their advance.

9. 10 June.

a. Company B reinforced with one platoon of Company C supported the attack of 1/4 which at this time shifted its direction of attack from the southward to the eastward. When contact was made with 3/22 on the right this platoon of Company C assisted the advance of 3/22 by overhead direct fire support.

b. Company C less one platoon supported the 4th Marines in their attack on HILL 53. One platoon formed a base of fire for the company and fired on the forward slope of this hill while two platoons enveloped it from the left.

c. Company A reinforced with two flame throwing tanks supported the 29th Marines in their reduction of strong points. One platoon supported Company C's attack on HILL 53 by long range direct fire. Company A although operating in an area some 800 yards from the point where the tank was destroyed by an 8 inch shell hit, again came under the fire of similar or the same weapon. One tank was completely destroyed by a direct hit from this gun.

10. 11 June.

a. Company B with the aid of two armored bulldozers managed to clear a road between the zones of the 4th and 22nd Marines. Upon joining the 22nd Marines they supported the advance through the town of TOMIGUSUKI.

b. Company C, less one platoon, supported 2/4 and 3/4 in their attack to seize the high ground remaining in the peninsula. Terrain difficulties and large mine fields restricted their movement, however, caves and automatic weapons were destroyed by tank gunfire. Two tanks were damaged in a mine field.

c. Company A reinforced by two flame throwing tanks and one platoon Company C continued to support the attack of the 29th Marines by the reduction of strongpoints. One tank was damaged by a mine.

11. 12 June.

a. The Japanese were now confined to an extremely small pocket which made it difficult to fire weapons because it was easy to fire into friendly troops. Company C supported 3/4 and helped to secure the final high ground and the objective. Company A supported 1/29 and 2/29 but did very little firing due to the confined area. Company B remained in battalion reserve.

13. 14 June through 16 June.

a. On June 16 the Battalion displaced southward to the ITOMAN area to support the division attack in the seizure of the ARA SAKI PENINSULA. The battalion service park was established about one mile north of the front lines.

III CAPTURE OF ARA SAKI PENINSULA

1. Introduction.

a. The terrain from ITOMAN south, in the division's zone of action, consisted of a series of four parallel ridges, KUNISHI, MEZADO, KUWANGA and KIYAMU. All ridges ran at right angles to the sea coast and parallel to the division's front. These ridges were each extremely steep, rocky and rugged on the north while on the south they sloped to some degree.

Between each ridge was a fairly wide valley, the widest was between KUWANGA and KIYAMU RIDGES. All valleys were passable for tanks except for the seaward side of the KUNISHI-MEZADO valley which was a rice paddy. All ridges except the before mentioned ones could be enveloped on the seaward side by tanks. The left flank of the division was exposed to fire from the YUZA-DAKE hill mass and presented to the division a problem comparable to the SHURI HEIGHTS.

2. 17 June.

a. Company C was ordered to support the attack of 1/22 on the MEZADO RIDGE. The only route through the rice paddy field, to their front, was a narrow heavily mined road which had been cratered in four places. The only route available to move the tanks forward to enfilade the ridge was along the reef. One platoon was ordered to proceed along this route but the depth of the water was such that they couldn't work their way forward far enough to enfilade the ridge. However they delivered supporting fire from these furthestmost positions. Another platoon took up firing positions astride the road and just south of ITOMAN and supported the advance by direct overhead fire. Two platoons with bundles of large logs attached to the front slope plates by a quick release device moved out to fill craters in the road. This method of fill was necessary as there was no readily available fill and the road was of the built up type. Furthermore, the road was swept with small arms and mortar fire so dump trucks could not be employed. These logs were released in the craters and a dozer tank was used to smooth them out. After two fills were completed it was discovered that a small bridge to the front had its approaches mined. Sniper and machine gun fire drove the mine removal teams from the road and the project of making the road passable for tanks was temporarily abandoned. However this expedient did permit two tanks to advance up to the mines and from stationary firing positions they were able to fire on targets on the KUNISHI RIDGE. This aided the infantry in its occupation.

b. Company B in support of 3/22 crossed the valley between the KUNISHI and MEZADO RIDGES. By using demolitions and digging away the hillside the company was able to advance to the top of the ridge and support the attack through the town of MEZADO and up to the base of HILL 69.

c. Company A, in battalion reserve, used one platoon with only the driver and tank commander in each tank, to supply troops on the KUNISHI and MEZADO RIDGES.

On the return trip they evacuated wounded. This was necessary because the valleys between the ridges were swept by intense fire from the high ground inland.

3. 18 June.

a. Company C was ordered to continue its project to open the ITOMAN-NAGUSUKU ROAD. This time they were equipped with a tank dozer that had 1/2 inch armor plates three feet high welded along the arms of the blade. Two mine removal men working behind this shield were able to clear all mines along the road until two large craters were encountered across of MEZADO RIDGE. This expedient effectively shielded the men from sniper and machine gun fire and made the opening of the road possible. The craters were filled in the same manner as on the previous day. Company C was then able to advance beyond HILL 69 and the MEZADO RIDGE and to support 2/22 in their attack on the KUWANGA RIDGE. Reinforced by two flame throwing tanks they burned numerous caves and the sniper infested towns of NAGUSUKU and KUWANGA. The tank dozer cleared the roads so the tanks could reach the reverse slope of KUWANGA RIDGE.

b. Company A supported 2/22 by a double envelopment of HILL 69. Two reinforcing flame throwing tanks destroyed a large number of the enemy.

c. Company B was held in battalion reserve.

4. 19 June.

a. The tank battalion supported the attack of the 4th Marines on KIYAMU RIDGE. Company C supported the battalion by direct overhead fire from positions on KUWANGA RIDGE. Between KUWANGA and KIYAMU RIDGES was a low intermediate ridge. Company B in direct support of 1/4 enveloped this intermediate ridge by attacking through a village on the right, and firing on the reverse slope and on the forward slope of KIYAMU RIDGE. Company A in direct support of 3/4 assisted the attack by overhead fire and an infantry-tank assault on this intermediate ridge. As the troops seized the intermediate ridge a dozer tanks widened a harrow cut through the ridge. Upon passing through this cut they surprised the crew of a 6 inch gun and destroyed them. They then continued the advance with the infantry on KIYAMU RIDGE. Just prior to noon Company C was ordered to advance two platoons on CHIYAN, a town on the seaward slope of KIYAMU RIDGE. As no organized resistance

was encountered in this area infantry was requested to support the tanks so they could advance through the town. As this town was on the far right of the 4th Marines zone of action and as all three battalions were on the line the request was forwarded to division. About 1600, 2/29 was moved forward and they seized the seaward tip of KIYAMU ridge thus insuring its envelopment on the following day.

5. 20 June.

a. Company B on the right supported 1/29 and 2/29 as they advanced through CHIYAN to seize the last low ridge which separated the division from ARA SAKI.

b. Company A supported the attack of the 4th Marine. One platoon enveloped KIYAMU ridge from the east, fired into the reverse slope and then proceeded to the ocean. Two platoons moved up a narrow trail leading to the top of the ridge under the covering fire of another platoon and attacked CASTLE HILL.

c. The four attached flame throwing tanks were in constant use destroying cave positions.

d. Company C was in battalion reserve. Two platoons assisted the rear elements of 2/29 in mopping up small pockets of resistance near the coast.

6. 21 June.

a. The battalion, less one platoon Company A, supported the 29th Marines in the seizure of the final intermediate ridge running perpendicular to KIYAMU ridge. Upon the seizure of this ridge Companies A and B swung northward to assist 2/4 and 3/4 in the seizure of CASTLE HILL by firing into the reverse slope of the ridge. The platoon of Company A moving in from the east towards ARA SAKI with the 4th Marines assisted in the reduction of "holed up" Japanese soldiers. At 1305 the island was announced as being secured.

7. 22 June through 26 June.

a. Detachments of tanks with flame throwing tanks supported the infantry in mopping up small pockets of resistance that had been by-passed. Flame throwing tanks were used mainly for this purpose and at least 30 counted enemy dead per day were credited to the flame thrower tanks.

IV DISCUSSION OF SEPARATE MATTERS

(A) Artillery Support.

1. Direct artillery support was furnished this battalion in a varying degree. At one time we had a captain of artillery as a liaison officer and two forward observers. During the last of the operation we had no direct support artillery at all but had to request for artillery fire through the infantry. During the period we had a direct support artillery battalion the following procedure was used and with good results, to obtain artillery fire:

(a) Upon the designation of the direct support artillery battalion the artillery sent a liaison officer and two forward observer teams to the tank battalion command post. Each night the S-3 indicated to the liaison officer the probable points and areas where screening smoke or HE fire would be required in order to assist the tanks in their maneuver and the plan of action for the following day. The artillery liaison officer then contacted his battalion and obtained concentration numbers that were closest to the areas pointed out to him and planned any prearranged fires for the following day. He then went over the plan with the two forward observers.

(b) Prior to the morning's attack one observer would go by his SCR 608 radio jeep to a selected observation post where he could view the tank attack and the ground to the front. The radio jeep was placed in a defiladed position and a SCR 610 radio carried to the OP. The other forward observer was normally in a battalion headquarters tank provided for this purpose. This tank was a free tank with the mission of accompanying the battalion or group commander. Freedom of movement was granted to enable him to place his tank in the most advantageous position to fulfill his duties as a forward observer.

(c) Targets of opportunity visible to the two forward observers were taken under fire except that when a support mission took precedence. All firing was cleared through the tank group commander. Targets of opportunity selected or discovered by any tank were referred to the FO's for fire and adjustment. If the tank officer requesting the

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fire was in a position to properly observe and was not occupied in the employment of his unit he either adjusted the fire himself through the FO or assisted the FO in the adjustment. If the unit commander was too occupied at the time that fire was needed the FO in the tank would displace to a new position if necessary to fire and adjust the problem.

(d) The FO tank had one receiver of the SCR 508 radio on the tank-artillery frequency which was in a primary net with the SCR 608 of his direct support artillery battalion. This provided for a rapid means of communications between the FO tank and the artillery FDC. The other tank receiver was on the tank battalion primary frequency.

(e) The group command tank had one receiver on the tank artillery common frequency so that all calls for artillery and artillery adjustments could be monitored by this officer as a double check to insure the safety of the troops in our front lines. Any artillery fired that was relatively close to the infantry was reported to their battalion commander through the tank-infantry net.

2. Infantry close to the assaulting tanks frequently requested artillery fire over the tank telephones, particularly when their own communication system broke down and excellent results were achieved by artillery requested in this manner. Among targets of opportunity were enemy troops who were attacking our infantry from the reverse slope of a hill with mortars and other high trajectory weapons. Frequently tanks detected their location but could not engage them with their direct fire guns. Actually over 50 percent of all artillery fire requested was for the immediate benefit of the infantry rather than for the tanks.

(B) Communications.

1. During the third phase communications were maintained with the tank battalion liaison officer stationed at the division command post by means of a SCR-509 which was later replaced by a jeep mounted SCR-508.

2. Communications between the tank battalion command post, the tanks in the field and the division command post were maintained originally through a SCR-508 mounted in the

automotive machine shop truck used as a radio maintenance shop. When the second jeep-mounted SCR-508 became available it was placed adjacent to the S-3 tent. The following sets were netted on the battalion primary frequency:

- (a) Division Liaison Officer.
- (b) Tank Battalion Command Post.
- (c) Regimental Liaison Officers.
- (d) Battalion Command Tanks in the field.
- (e) Company Commander's Tanks.
- (f) The Command Tank of any small group of tanks on an independent mission.
- (g) Infantry Battalion Liaison Radios.

The following sets were on the frequency of each tank company.

- (a) All command tanks in the platoons and in the company headquarters.
- (b) Liaison sets at infantry company command posts.

3. Although the battalion primary frequency contained a great number of sets much of the traffic took place on the battalion alternate channel. Any lengthy report was made on the battalion alternate.

4. Telephonic communication was maintained with division, First Tank Battalion, and within the battalion command post area, including the tank companies.

5. It was customary to have radio liaison teams at the assault infantry battalion and company command posts. These were furnished by the tank company operating in their zone of action. The set used was the SCR-509. Tank battalion headquarters furnished the sets and personnel for division and infantry regiments although some calls were made on the tank companies for personnel and sets due to a shortage in battalion headquarters. In addition to furnishing sets to the infantry battalions with which tanks were operating adjacent battalions were supplied with radios whenever possible. Only the infantry companies with which tanks were actually operating were supplied with sets. Any infantry regiment committed in the assault was immediately supplied with a liaison officer and radio liaison teams.

6. Every set was accompanied by the two-man liaison

team assigned. Teams and officers at regimental and division command posts stayed with them throughout the action but all other men and equipment returned each night to the command post.

(C) Engineers.

1. During the third phase of the OKINAWA operation the Sixth Engineer Battalion completed the following projects for the Sixth Tank Battalion, over which tanks were the first traffic:

- (a) Bailey bridge over the ASA-KAWA.
- (b) Bailey bridge over the ASATO river.
- (c) Pier bridge over the ASATO river.
- (d) Bailey bridge over the ASATO river.
- (e) Bridge within the city of NAHA.
- (f) Bridge within the city of NAHA.
- (g) Bridge within the city of NAHA.
- (h) Pier bridge along the south bank of NAHA HAF
- (i) Pier bridge on OROKU PENINSULA.
- (j) Bailey bridge on OROKU PENINSULA.

2. Four of these bridges had spans smaller than fifteen (15) feet. All bridges held up the advance of the infantry inasmuch as tank support was denied them until these bridges were completed.

3. Innumerable craters in roads were filled by armored dozers or by-passes constructed.

4. Mine teams were constantly attached to the Sixth Tank Battalion. Although they were composed of men from the Sixth Engineer Battalion primarily, during the battle for NAHA twenty-six (26) men from the First Separate Engineers Battalion joined them and also assisted in mine removal. The number from the Sixth Engineer Battalion varied between thirty (30) to fifty (50). Over five hundred (500) mines were removed or disarmed by these men.

5. During the battle on OROKU PENINSULA the need for Engineer support grew so critical that the armored dozers of the Sixth Engineer Battalion and a liaison officer were attached to the Sixth Tank Battalion and in addition the tank battalion was given first priority on engineer work and equipment.

(D) Medical Section.

1. Medical personnel consisted of the following:

H&S Company.	Battalion Surgeon
	Four Corpsmen
Company A.	Three Corpsmen
Company B.	Two Corpsmen
Company C.	Two Corpsmen

2. The Battalion Aid Station consisted of a pyramid tent erected in the battalion CP in spots protected by natural defilade. Individual Company Aid Stations were set up in Company Areas by the Company Corpsmen for minor treatment and first aid.

3. Casualties.

Percentage of all types calculated on basis of average battalion strength of six-hundred-eighteen (618).

	Number.	Percent
Total Casualties.	145	23.1
Injuries.	123	19.9
Illness.	14	3.2
Combat Casualties.	121	19.5
Non-combat casualties.	24	3.6
Evacuated.	94	15.0
Retained.	51	8.1
Killed in Action.	8	1.3
Known to have DOW.	3	0.5

4. Percentage of combat injuries calculated on basis of total number of injuries sustained in combat.

Small Arms.	17	15.0
Fragmentation due to high explosives.	59	52.2
Burns.	6	5.4
Miscellaneous.	31	27.4

5. Percentage of types of non-combat casualties calculated on basis of total number of casualties not due to combat.

Illness.	10	41.7
Injuries.	10	41.7
Operational or combat fatigue.	4	16.6

6. Individual company galleys were set up in which good sanitation was maintained. Diet was satisfactory in quality and quantity, consisting almost exclusively of "C" and "Ten-in-One" rations. Prefabricated heads were used in this phase of operation and displaced forward with the service park. These were of excellent design, and made for much better sanitation than heads improvised from material at hand. These heads were screened and relatively free from flies, being treated on alternate days with chlorinated lime.

7. Water supply was adequate for drinking but was limited for bathing and laundry purposes because native sources were scarce and regarded generally as being unsafe for use.

8. Illness among troops included several cases of Acute Catarrhal Fever, headaches, fatigue and general malaise. There were several cases of non-specific diarrhea of short duration and mild course, but no true dysentery.

9. Evacuees went to the Sixth Medical Battalion which also handled emergency dental work.

10. There were no illness, losses or replacements of medical personnel. The number was adequate and they were always in a state of preparedness. Company aid corpsmen went into the field with the tank retrievers to render first aid and treated numerous wounded men of other organizations when these were encountered.

11. Seriously wounded men of this organization were generally treated in the field and evacuated through the nearest aid stations and medical companies rather than through this battalion aid station.

12. Field medical equipment was adequate, being transported on the 1/4 ton ambulance and whatever other transportation was available at the time when forward displacement was carried out. Resupplying was adequate and was accomplished through the agency of the Division Field Hospital.

13. The supply of DDT and other insect control equipment was inadequate, and insect control measures such as clearing up debris and spraying pools of water in and about the camp areas were accomplished.

(E) Supply and Logistics.

1. The Battle for NAHA.

(a) The plan of supply for the Battle of NAHA was carried out as set forth by the Division Quartermaster. Dump distribution was used entailing the normal hauling of fuel, ammunition and rations from the division dumps to tank battalion dumps. The Division Quartermaster assisted in the hauling of fuel whenever requested. Adequacy of fuel, ammunition and rations was sufficient.

(b) Tank parts were obtained from our own stock, III Phib. Corps Maintenance Center, 7th Field Depot, 183rd Army Ordnance Depot and cannibalization of our own tanks after destruction in action. Requisitions for the necessary parts were submitted to the 7th Field Depot via the Ordnance Officer, III Phib. Corps.

2. The Battle for CROKU PENINSULA.

(a) The supply plan for the Battle of CROKU PENINSULA was planned and carried out as follows: One officer and fourteen enlisted men were sent with the forward echelon for the purpose of handling ammunition, fuel, water and rations for the assault troops. One officer and nine enlisted composed the rear echelon and were charged with the responsibility of resupplying the forward echelon.

(b) Resupply of ammunition, tank spare parts and various other items of supplies pertinent to a tank organization was procured and delivered to the forward echelon on call by the rear echelon. To make this possible radio contact was maintained at all times. Resupply of fuel, water and rations was accomplished by the Division Quartermaster.

(c) Resupply of ammunition was handled jointly by the Division Ordnance Officer and the tank battalion rear echelon supply section. Upon exhaustion of the unit of fire carried in our dump, ammunition was drawn from army dumps and was delivered to the forward division dump, which was strategically located across the estuary from the CROKU PENINSULA. The ammunition was then ferried by LVT to the assault troops on CROKU PENINSULA by the Division Ordnance Officer. Due to the lack of transportation, the supply of ammunition from the rear areas to the forward area was extremely difficult. At this time seven of the fourteen tank

battalion trucks were deadlined due to lack of spare parts. Nevertheless, by calling on the Division Motor Transport Battalion, we were able to supply the necessary ammunition.

(d) All urgently needed tank spare parts and other essential items (if they were available) were ferried by LVT from the tank battalion rear CP to the forward CP on OROKU PENINSULA. In this manner urgently needed items could be delivered in about one and one half hours. By land the time varied from three to four hours. Again tank spare parts and accessories were inadequate to suit the demands. The tank parts expended were obtained in the manner directed in paragraph (1) above.

3. Capture of ARA-SAKI PENINSULA.

(a) Same as (1) above.

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35. F

4. Maintenance of Tanks during the Third Phase.

(a) Following are listed the major items which through enemy action were damaged to an extent where replacement of the unit, or item, was necessitated. Listed also are enemy anti-tank weapons responsible for the damage. This chart covers the period from 10 May 45 to 24 June 45 and excludes parts expended through operational failures.

	47mm AT Gun	All Type	Mortars	Hollow Charge Rifle Grenade	Sat- chel charge	Medi Art. lery
1. Engine, Ford	1	9	1	1	3	1
2. Mount, Engine		6	2		9	4
3. Pipe, Exhaust		2	5		8	3
4. Radiators		1	6	1		4
5. Generators			8		4	
6. Starters			8		3	
7. Magnetos			14		7	
8. Instrument Panel			2		1	
9. Auxiliary Generator		1	2		3	
10. Batteries			8			
11. Final Drives	3	6			5	4
12. Suspension Assembly	1	10	3		6	2
13. Differential		2			1	1
14. Bogie Wheels	10	48	20		18	32
15. Strips, Track (10 Block Links)	10	40	8		24	20
16. Wheel, Idler	2	19	4		4	3
17. Spring, Volute	4	20				
18. Roller, Track	1	9			2	
19. Cable, Tow	2		23			27
20. Hatch, Drivers	1		3			4
21. Hatch, Ass't Drivers			1			4
22. Hatch, Commanders	1		2			2
23. Hatch, Escape		11			2	
24. Pistol Port	1					
25. Ammunition Racks	6		1			
26. Elevating Mechanism	1			1		
27. Gun, 75mm	1					
28. Machine Gun			3			
29. Machine Gun	1		7			4
30. Shield, 75mm Gun	1					1
31. Telescopic Sight			11	3		
32. Periscope	2		62			
33. Head, Periscope	3		89			
34. Blade, Dozer		2				
35. Flame Thrower				1		

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SIXTH ENGINEER BATTALION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASE III, OKINAWAN OPERATION

CHAPTER III

PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION

A. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT.

1. THE BATTLE FOR NAHA.

The end of Phase I and II found the Sixth Engineer Battalion bivouaced near GABUSUKU on the MOTOBU Peninsula. The northern end of OKINAWA had been declared secured on 21 April, but the infantry battalions were widely scattered in strategically located bivouacs to mop up enemy remnants. During this period this battalion maintained 75 miles of MSR to supply the widely separated elements. This was quite a task, not only was this a tremendous amount of road for one engineer battalion, but much of the heavy road equipment was deadlined for repair after the strenuous action of the first two phases. During this period a Cub landing strip was built at NAGO; it was named "GREEN FIELD" in honor of a battalion commander killed on MOTOBU.

On 30 April this battalion was alerted to move south and this movement took place, one company at a time, between 2 and 6 May. The battalion was first bivouaced in the vicinity of NIPUNJA (east of KADENA) awaiting definite orders to go in the line. Thereafter the bivouacs were kept from 2 to 4 miles behind the front line.

The SIXTH DIVISION was ordered to take over the right (west) flank of the line next to the EAST CHINA SEA on the afternoon of 8 May. An engineer company, was placed in direct support of the regiments going into the assault. Each supporting engineer company kept a Liaison Officer at the Regimental C.P. Under him was an Engineer Reconnaissance Officer who kept both the regiment and the engineer battalion advised on operations and obstacles to be encountered and supervised the work of engineer equipment supporting the regiments. This proved to be a satisfactory system and allowed the engineers to anticipate the next move and to have the material assembled and the men prepared before hand.

When the division took over, the front line was on the high ground at the south end of MACHINATO Airfield, overlooking the ASA-KAWA estuary. On the opposite bank was a heavily defended coral escarpment, honey-combed with natural and artificial caves, the west anchor of the NAHA-SHURI-YONABARU line, Route 1, the MSR for the division, was under observed artillery

661

(b) The parts expended during this operation are listed below. It does not include parts made by machinists or parts issued by the Ordnance section of this battalion such as machine guns, parts 75mm tubes, etc.

Parts Used on Operation

Group 0100

17 Engine, Ford	G 104-15-70399	GAA-6005-A
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Group 0101 A

12 Gasket, Cyl. Hd. Right	G 104-26-88458	GAA-6062
10 Gasket, Cyl. Hd. Left	G 104-26-88459	GAA-6063
2 Head, Eng. Cyl. Hd.	G 104-5411706	GAA-6046 B

Group 0106

6 Gasket, Cam Housing, Right	G 104-15-93810	D 66210
8 Gasket, Cam Housing, left	G 104-15-93811	D 6631
5 Gasket, Cam Housing, Inner	G 104-15-93812	B 258196
4 Gasket, Cam Housing Cover	G 104-15-93813	B 258197

Group 0107

7 Gasket, Eng. Oil Pump, Upper	G 104-15-93818	A 296524
5 Gasket, Eng. Oil Pump, Lower	G 104-15-93817	A 296523
8 Pump Eng. Oil		B 295198

Group 0107 A

3 Kit, Oil Pan Gasket		A 414701
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Group 0107 E

10 Gage, Oil Level Sending Unit		GAA-6337
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Group 0108 B

80 Gasket, Ex. Manifold to Block	G 183-62-58270	B 258270
16 Gasket, Ex. Manifold Tube	G-170-01-94033	A 296623
24 Manifold, Exhaust	G 104-16-87370	E 7190
42 Nut, Manifold	G 104-17-14568	A 296607

Group 0113 B

5 Gear, Ace, Drive	G 104-15-96200	B 296716
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Group 0105

24 Bushing, Valve Guide		B 296700 A
24 Valve	G 104-18-27200	B 258308
24 Valve	G 104-18-27190	A 296499

Group 0201

30 Disc, Clutch	G 104-15-51820	D 66317
15 Plate, Intermed- iate	G 104-17-40284	D 66319

Group 0202

15 Plate, Pressure	G 104-17-40345	D 66318
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Group 0301

12 Carburetors		D 66321
16 Kit, Carb. Repair	G 104-16-61001	A 303343

Group 0301 C

8 Hose, Air cleaner	G 104-16-17546	B 197403
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Group 0302

10 Pump, Fuel	G 104-17-45835	C 124361
8 Kit, Repair, Fuel Pump	G 104-16-61002	

Group 0402

20 Gasket, Exhaust Pipe	G 170-01-94016	A 244721
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Group 0501

12 Gasket, Radiator		A 248489
12 Gasket, Radiator		A 246527
12 Radiator	G 104-17-64891	CAD-50211

Group 0503

8 Pump, Water	G 104-17-45830	D 66320
10 Gasket, Water Pump	G 170-01-94011	A 296663
12 Kit, Repair, Water Pump	G 170-03-45906	A 296748

Group 0503 B

20 Belt, Fan, Pairs	G 104-15-18406	B 197369
6 Quill, Fan Drive	G 104-17-61310	B 258210

Group 0505

20 Clamp, Hose		CMA XIF
20 Clamp, Hose		B 259545 J

Group 0601

15 Generators	G 104-15-96455	D 70514
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Group 0601 B

10 Regulator, Voltage	G 104-17-67311	D 70566
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Group 0602

11 Starter		C 124376
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Group 0603 B

20 Gasket, Mounting Mag.	G 104-15-93806	A 296667
18 Magneto		C 124412 A
13 Magneto		C 124412 B

Group 0604 B

400 Plug, Spark	G 104-17-40555	A 296664
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Group 0610 B

10 Cable, Battery		B 281925 A
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Group 0611 B

8 Carburetor, Auxillary Generator	G 104-05-00639	HL-19404
5 Cyl. Ass'y	G 104-15-45604	HL-AA349
12 Filter, Fuel		HL-19345
8 Piston		HL-11569-FV
18 Ring Piston		HL-19398
60 Plug, Spark		HL-19726
6 Auxillary Generator Complete		

Group 0700

3 Transmission		E 4176
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Group 0711

12 Shoe, Brake	G 104-04-01880	C 83718
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Group 0901

2 Shaft, Prop.		D 78283 B
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Group 1008

18 Final Drive		E 4191
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Group 1008 A

2 Brg. Final Drive		A 196386
2 Shaft, Final Drive		46206 J

Group 1008 B

23 Bolt, Final Drive to carrier		BANXZCE
24 Gasket, Final Drive to hull		C 77546
24 Gasket, Final Drive Cap	G 104-04-00795	B 181922

Group 1303

124 Gudgeon, Wheel		B 208360
8 Gudgeon, Susp. Arm		B 168448
16 Plate, Rubbing Arm	G 104-03-04990	A 164236
12 Spacer, Bogie, Outer	G 104-03-06410	A 164241
12 Spacer, Bogie, Center	G 104-03-06410	B 153965

Group 1303 (Cont'd)

36 Spring, Volute		C 95133 A
92 Tire, Bogie	G 104-03-07320	C 66470
366 Wheel, Bogie		C 55573
28 Axle's Suspension	C 104-03-07166	D 47527 B

Group 1304

30 Brg Idler		CABX3AT
30 Brg Idler		CABX3AX
32 Wheel, Idler		D 37916
8 S. Indls, Idler	C 104-03-06460	C 73936
32 Retainer, Idler	C 103-03-03245	A 164511

Group 1305

328 Track, Steel (10 Block)	G 104-17-83067	D 480673
86 Track, Rubber (10 Block)	G 104-03-07761	A 176090
489 Connector End	G 104-03-01487	C 55596
568 Connector, DuckBill		
2800 Nut, Track		BBSX4AG
2800 Wedge, Track	G 104-04-07761	A 176090

Group 1306

24 Brg. Roller	G 130-01-18002	A 244902
16 Brg. Roller		CAAXIAS
32 Retainer, Roller	G 103-04-02256	B 132704 AB
12 Roller, Track		B 168339

Group 1307

12 Hub	G 104-04-01010	C 77545
160 Nut		BBSY4AL
560 Stud	G 104-04-01970	A 196384
33 Sprocket	G 104-17-91800	D 47366 A

Group 1501

94 Pin, Shackle	G 104-23-38685	C 100779
66 Shackle		C 100779
98 Cable, Towing		B 155657

Group 1804

6
6 Cushion, Seat

C 91932

Group 1805

14 Door, Escape

E4162 A

Group 2301 A

34 Axe
22 Crowbar
17 Handle
49 Shovel, Short
21 Sledge
45 Wrench

M 003-01-00090
M 003-01-00420
41H-131
M 003-01-13440
41S-3726
41W-640-100

B 150925
TDAXIC
TFHXIA
B 150926
TADXIE
B 248179

Sighting

5 Periscope, Dozer
368 Heads
117 Periscope M6
23 Holder

F 235-01-37401

C 80815
22-331
D 82236

Bull Dozer

6 Pump, Oil
5 Reservoir, Oil
6 Guard, Belt
5 Jack and Bracket
5 Guard, Oil Line
6 Hose, Pressure
4 Blades, Complete

75mm Gun

1 Gun, 75mm, Complete

C-34-W

(c) Battery record.

12 VOLT

Recharged.50
Resealed30
Replaced Cells10
Treated for Salt Water15
New Posts.	4
New Cases.	2
New Batteries Placed into Service.	5

6 VOLT

Recharged.12
Resealed	9
Replaced Cells	6
Treated for Salt Water	6
New Posts.	3
New Cases.	1
New Batteries Placed into Service.	4

USED

15 Gallons Electrolyte
30 Gallons Distilled Water

(F) Flame Throwing Tanks.

1. Introduction.

(a) Throughout all but four days of the Third Phase of the operation the 1st Platoon, Company B, 13th Armored Flame Thrower Tank Battalion was attached to the Sixth Tank Battalion. The attachment consisted of four tanks, two of which were lost by operational failures in the vicinity of CRESCENT HILL. These two tanks were replaced by the flame-thrower company within a day so that the operating strength may be considered to have been four throughout the period.

(b) Because these flame-thrower tanks are needed in quantity wherever they can be used and are a weapon of opportunity, the whole platoon was kept with the battalion reserve and dispatched to companies whenever they notified

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the battalion of a possible use for them. Their vulnerability made it necessary to hold them in an assembly area in defilade although they were at all times close to the front lines.

(c) The officer in command of the flame-throwing tanks was at all times alert to suggest possible targets and uses for his equipment. Rapidly answering any call from the 75mm tank officers they were responsible for inflicting casualties on a great many of the enemy. At no time did they hesitate about exposing their tanks to Japanese gunfire if it was necessary to do so in order to complete their mission.

(2) Narrative of activity during the campaign:

11 May: The first platoon, Company B, 713th Armored Flame-Thrower Battalion was attached to the Sixth Tank Battalion.

12 May: A large sugar mill, a village and numerous caves were burned out just south of the ASA-KAWA, and thirty Japanese killed. Fifteen machine guns, an anti-tank gun and a small howitzer were destroyed along with an ammunition dump. Eighteen hundred gallons of Napalm were expended.

13 May: Not committed.

14 May: Burned caves and trenches on the high ground overlooking Naha, killing four enemy and expending twelve hundred gallons of Napalm.

15 May: Not committed.

16 May: Burned caves on division left flank, killing two Japanese and expending six hundred gallons of Napalm.

17 May: Burned trenches north of CRESCENT HILL, killing two Japanese and expending six hundred gallons of Napalm.

18 May: No flame-throwers committed.

19 May: No flame-throwers committed.

20 May: Burned caves in the vicinity of CRESCENT HILL, killing six enemy and expending six hundred gallons of Napalm.

21 May: Burned village and ridge north of CRESCENT HILL. No enemy observed killed. Expended six hundred gallons of Napalm.

22 May: Burned caves in the vicinity of CRESCENT HILL and observed no enemy killed. Expended three hundred gallons of Napalm.

23 May through 5 June: No flame-throwers committed.

6 June: Landed on OROKU PENINSULA. No flame-throwers committed.

7 June: No flame-throwers committed.

8 June: Burned the village of OROKU, killing ten enemy and expending twelve hundred gallons of Napalm.

9 June: No flame-throwers committed.

10 June: Burned village of CHIWA and OROKU. Twenty-six enemy were killed. Fifteen hundred gallons of Napalm expended.

11 June: Burned a section of OROKU VILLAGE and a hill west of TOMIGUSKI. Nine enemy were killed and nine hundred gallons of Napalm expended.

12 June through 13 June: No flame-throwers committed.

14 June through 16 June: Reverted to Company B, 713th Flame-Thrower Battalion.

17 June: Reattached to Sixth Tank Battalion. Burned caves on the western end of KUNISHI RIDGE. Killing three Japanese and expending six hundred gallons of Napalm.

18 June: Burned KUWANGA VILLAGE and numerous caves, killing twelve Japanese and expending twelve hundred gallons of Napalm.

19 June: Two flame-thrower tanks burned caves along the KIYAMU RIDGE. Killing sixty-two Japanese and expending six hundred gallons of Napalm. One flame-thrower tank reported to the 22nd Marines to assist them in mopping up and killed an unknown number of Japanese.

20 June: Burned caves along the KIYAMU RIDGE, killing two Japanese and expending six hundred gallons of Napalm.

21 June: Burned thick brush and caves on the reverse slope of KIYAMU RIDGE, killing forty-one Japanese and expending eighteen hundred gallons of Napalm.

22 June through 24 June: Assisted in mopping up, killing thirty Japanese and expending six thousand gallons of Napalm.